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gao_GAO-09-955 | gao_GAO-09-955_0 | State Continues to Face Shortfalls in Meeting Its Foreign Language Requirements, with Potentially Adverse Effects on Department Operations
State faces notable shortfalls in meeting its foreign language requirements for overseas language-designated positions. Some Foreign Service Officers Do Not Meet the Language Requirements for Their Positions
As of October 2008, 31 percent of Foreign Service generalists and specialists in language-designated positions worldwide did not meet both of the speaking and reading proficiency requirements of their positions, up from 29 percent in 2005. For example, about 40 percent of officers in language- designated positions in the Middle East and South and Central Asia did not meet the requirements for their positions. Language Shortfalls Negatively Affect Aspects of U.S. In Vladivostok, State’s Inspector General reported that lack of proficiency in Russian limited the political/economic officer’s reporting (2007). State Efforts to Meet Foreign Language Requirements, Which Include Training, Recruitment, and Incentives, Face Several Challenges
State’s efforts to meet its foreign language requirements include an annual review process to determine the number of language-designated positions, providing language training, recruiting staff with skills in certain languages, and offering pay incentives to officers to continue learning and maintaining language skills. FSI’s School of Language Studies offers training in about 70 languages. For 2008, State reported a language training success rate of 86 percent. Under the critical needs program, State offers bonus points for applicants who have passed the Foreign Service exam and demonstrate mastery in a foreign language. Staffing Shortages and Other Challenges Have Limited State’s Ability to Reduce Its Language Shortfalls
According to senior State officials, the primary challenge State faces in meeting its foreign language requirements is the department’s continued staffing shortages. During this review, State officials told us that a comprehensive strategic approach to reducing foreign language gaps would be useful. The officials mentioned a number of documents where the department has addressed State’s foreign language proficiency requirements in various forms, including the Foreign Language Continuum, the Strategic Plan, a 2007 training needs assessment, and the Five-Year Workforce Plan, but acknowledged that these documents are not linked to each other and no one document contains measurable goals, objectives, resource requirements, and milestones for reducing the foreign language gap. Such a plan will help State guide its efforts to monitor and assess its progress toward closing its persistent foreign language gaps. Such a plan should include, but not be limited to, the following elements: clearly defined and measurable performance goals and objectives of the department’s language proficiency program that reflect the priorities and strategic interests of U.S. foreign policy and diplomacy; a transparent, comprehensive process for identifying foreign language requirements, based on objective criteria, that goes beyond the current annual process, to determine which positions should be language designated and the proficiency level needed to enable officers to effectively perform their duties; and a more effective mechanism that allows State to gather feedback from FSOs on the relevance of the foreign language skills that they acquired at FSI to their jobs, and mechanisms for assessing the effectiveness of State’s recruitment of critical needs foreign language speakers, and language incentive payments, as well as future efforts toward closing the department’s language proficiency gaps. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
In this report, we (1) examine the extent to which State is meeting its foreign language requirements and the potential impact of any shortfalls on U.S. diplomacy, (2) assess State’s efforts to meet its foreign language requirements and describe the challenges it faces in doing so, and (3) assess the extent to which State has a comprehensive strategy to determine and meet these requirements. | Why GAO Did This Study
Proficiency in foreign languages is a key skill for U.S. diplomats to advance U.S. interests overseas. GAO has issued several reports highlighting the Department of State's (State) persistent foreign language shortages. In 2006, GAO recommended that State evaluate the effectiveness of its efforts to improve the language proficiency of its staff. State responded by providing examples of activities it believed addressed our recommendation. In this report, which updates the 2006 report, GAO (1) examined the extent to which State is meeting its foreign language requirements and the potential impact of any shortfall, (2) assessed State's efforts to meet its foreign language requirements and described the challenges it faces in doing so, and (3) assessed the extent to which State has a comprehensive strategy to determine and meet these requirements. GAO analyzed data on State's overseas language-designated positions; reviewed strategic planning and budgetary documents; interviewed State officials; and conducted fieldwork in China, Egypt, India, Tunisia, and Turkey.
What GAO Found
As of October 31, 2008, 31 percent of Foreign Service officers in overseas language-designated positions (LDP) did not meet both the foreign languages speaking and reading proficiency requirements for their positions. State continues to face foreign language shortfalls in regions of strategic interest--such as the Near East and South and Central Asia, where about 40 percent of officers in LDPs did not meet requirements. Despite efforts to recruit individuals with proficiency in critical languages, shortfalls in supercritical languages, such as Arabic and Chinese, remain at 39 percent. Past reports by GAO, State's Office of the Inspector General, and others have concluded that foreign language shortfalls could be negatively affecting U.S. activities overseas. Overseas fieldwork for this report reaffirmed this conclusion. State's approach to meeting its foreign language requirements includes an annual review of all LDPs, language training, recruitment of language-proficient staff, and pay incentives for language skills. For example, State trains staff in about 70 languages in Washington and overseas, and has reported a training success rate of 86 percent. Moreover, State offers bonus points for language-proficient applicants who have passed the Foreign Service exam and has hired 445 officers under this program since 2004. However, various challenges limit the effectiveness of these efforts. According to State, a primary challenge is overall staffing shortages, which limit the number of staff available for language training, as well as the recent increase in LDPs. State's efforts to meet its foreign language requirements have yielded some results but have not closed persistent gaps and reflect, in part, a lack of a comprehensive, strategic approach. State officials have said that the department's plan for meeting its foreign language requirements is spread throughout a number of documents that address these needs; however these documents are not linked to each other and do not contain measurable goals, objectives, or milestones for reducing the foreign language gaps. Because these gaps have persisted over several years despite staffing increases, we believe that a more comprehensive, strategic approach would help State to more effectively guide its efforts and assess its progress in meeting its foreign language requirements. |
gao_GAO-16-184T | gao_GAO-16-184T_0 | In March 2011, the secretaries of the two departments announced that they would develop a new, joint integrated electronic health record system (referred to as iEHR). However, as of October 2015, the departments have not provided us with a comparison of the estimated costs of their current and previous approaches. On the other hand, with respect to their assertions that separate systems could be achieved faster, both departments have developed schedules that indicate their separate modernizations are not expected to be completed until after the 2017 planned completion date for the previous single system approach. In light of the departments’ not having yet implemented a solution that allows for seamless electronic sharing of health care data, the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2014 included requirements pertaining to the implementation, design, and planning for interoperability between VA’s and DOD’s electronic health record systems. Interoperability Efforts Continue, but DOD and VA Need to Develop Goals and Metrics for Assessing Their Progress
Our August 2015 report noted that the departments have engaged in several near-term efforts focused on expanding interoperability between their existing electronic health record systems. In addition, VA and DOD have both moved forward with plans to modernize their respective electronic health record systems. The IPO has also taken actions to facilitate departmental interoperability efforts. While these are important steps toward greater interoperability, VA and DOD nonetheless did not, by the October 1, 2014, deadline established by the 2014 National Defense Authorization Act for compliance with national data standards, certify that all health care data in their systems complied with national standards and were computable in real time. Additionally, the departments acknowledged that they do not expect to complete a number of key activities related to their electronic health record system efforts until sometime after the December 31, 2016, statutory deadline for deploying modernized electronic health record software with interoperability. The IPO is responsible for monitoring and reporting on the departments’ progress in achieving interoperability and coordinating with VA and DOD to ensure that these efforts enhance health care services. Toward this end, the office issued guidance that identified a variety of process- oriented metrics to track, for example, the percentage of data domains that have been mapped to national standards. Nevertheless, as we reported in August 2015, the IPO had yet to specify outcome-oriented metrics and goals that would gauge the impact interoperable health record capabilities will have on the departments’ health care services. However, the IPO had not established a time-frame for completing such metrics and incorporating them into the office’s guidance. Accordingly, we recommended that the departments, working with the IPO, establish a time frame for identifying outcome- oriented metrics, define related goals as a basis for determining the extent to which the departments’ modernized electronic health records systems are achieving interoperability, and update IPO guidance accordingly. Both departments concurred with our recommendations. Yet while the departments’ various initiatives over the years have increased the amount of patient health data exchanged by the departments and made accessible to providers, these efforts have been beset by persistent management challenges and uncertainty about the extent to which fully interoperable capabilities will be achieved and when. As we stressed in our report, establishing measurable goals for improving the care that VA and DOD provide to the millions of service members, veterans, and their beneficiaries is essential to more effectively position the departments to do so. | Why GAO Did This Study
VA and DOD operate two of the nation's largest health care systems, serving millions of veterans and active duty members and their beneficiaries. For almost two decades the departments have undertaken various efforts to advance interoperability between their respective electronic health record systems. While the departments have made progress, these initiatives have also faced significant management challenges. Among their recent initiatives, the secretaries of the two departments committed to establishing interoperability between their separate electronic health record systems, which they are working to modernize.
This statement summarizes GAO's August 2015 report (GAO-15-530) on VA and DOD's efforts to achieve interoperability between their health records systems.
What GAO Found
As GAO reported in August 2015, the Departments of Veterans Affairs (VA) and Defense (DOD), with guidance from the Interagency Program Office (IPO) tasked with facilitating the departments' efforts to share health information, have taken actions to increase interoperability between their existing electronic health record systems. These actions have included work on near-term objectives such as standardizing certain health data and making them viewable by clinicians in both departments in an integrated format. The departments also developed plans for their longer-term initiatives to modernize their respective electronic health record systems. In accordance with its responsibilities, the IPO issued guidance outlining the technical approach for achieving interoperability between the departments' systems.
Having taken these actions, however, the departments did not, by the October 1, 2014, deadline established in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2014 for compliance with national standards, certify that all health care data in their systems complied with national data standards and were computable in real time. Moreover, the departments do not plan to complete the modernization of their electronic health record systems until well after the December 2016 statutory deadline by which they are to deploy modernized electronic health record software while ensuring full interoperability. Specifically, VA plans to modernize its existing system, while DOD plans to acquire a new system; but their plans indicate that deployment of the new systems with interoperable capabilities will not be complete until after 2018.
Consistent with its responsibilities, the IPO took steps to begin developing metrics to monitor progress related to the standardization of the departments' data and their exchange of health information. For example, it called for the development of tracking metrics to gauge the percentage of data domains within the departments' current systems that have been mapped to national standards. However, the office had not defined outcome-oriented metrics and related goals to measure the effectiveness of interoperability efforts in terms of improving health care services for patients served by both departments. IPO officials said that work was ongoing to develop more meaningful measures of progress, but the office had not established a time frame for completing this work or incorporating the outcome metrics and associated goals into its guidance. GAO concluded that without defining outcome-oriented metrics and related goals and incorporating them into their current approach, the departments and the IPO will not be in a position to effectively assess their progress toward further achieving interoperability and identifying the benefits that their efforts yield.
What GAO Recommends
In its August 2015 report, GAO recommended that VA and DOD, working with the IPO, establish a time frame for identifying outcome-oriented metrics, define goals to provide a basis for assessing and reporting on the status of interoperability, and update the IPO's guidance accordingly. The departments concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-13-634 | gao_GAO-13-634_0 | § 2330, enacted in 2001 and amended in 2006, Congress required USD(AT&L) and the military departments to establish a management structure for the acquisition of services. DOD Has Taken Actions to Address Legislative Requirements to Improve Service Acquisition
Over the last decade, DOD has taken actions to address legislative requirements to improve the acquisition and management of services. With this management structure and review process in place, USD(AT&L) is focusing on efforts to improve the process for how requirements for individual service acquisitions are developed and training to respond to legislative direction. USD(AT&L) Did Not Develop a Plan to Meet the Requirement of Section 807 but Has Taken Actions to Address Each Element in the Law
Section 807 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012 required USD(AT&L) to develop a plan by June 28, 2012, for implementing the recommendations of the DSB to include, to the extent USD(AT&L) deemed appropriate, the following eight elements: 1. incentives to services contractors for high performance at low cost, 2. communication between the government and the services contracting industry while developing requirements for services contracts, 3. guidance for defense acquisition personnel on the use of appropriate 4. formal certification and training requirements for services acquisition 5. recruiting and training of services acquisition personnel, 6. policies and guidance on career development for services acquisition 7. ensuring the military departments dedicate portfolio-specific 8. ensuring DOD conducts realistic exercises and training that account for services contracting during contingency operations. DOD Has Not Fully Addressed Key Factors to Determine Whether Actions Are Improving Service Acquisition
While DOD has taken a number of actions to address legislative requirements, DOD is not yet positioned to determine what effects its actions have had on improving service acquisition. Specifically, USD(AT&L) has not yet fully addressed two key factors—a desired end state for the future with specific goals and associated metrics that would enable it to assess progress toward achieving those goals and determine whether service acquisition is improving. USD(AT&L) is challenged in addressing these key factors, in part, because it has limited insight into the current status of service acquisition in terms of the volume, type, location, and trends. USD(AT&L) Has Not Established Metrics to Determine its Progress in Improving Service Acquisition
USD(AT&L) has not established departmentwide metrics to assess the effects of its actions to improve service acquisition. While developing goals and metrics is challenging, it is not impossible. To address this shortfall, DOD expects to obtain better service acquisition data by improving and linking data within its contract and financial systems, but this effort will not be complete until at least 2014. For example, DOD concurred with the need to set goals for the amount of spending managed through strategically sourced acquisitions, link strategic sourcing to its Better Buying Power Initiative, and establish metrics, such as utilization rates, to track progress toward these goals. However, DOD is currently missing opportunities to fully leverage its command-level assessments, feedback from the military departments, and other ongoing efforts it relies on to gauge the effects of its actions to improve service acquisition. Nevertheless, until DOD utilizes them to develop baseline data, goals, and associated metrics, similar to what it has committed to do for its strategic sourcing efforts, DOD will continue to be in a position where it does not know whether its actions are sufficient to achieve desired outcomes. Recommendations for Executive Action
To better position DOD to determine whether its actions have improved service acquisition, we recommend that the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, in consultation with the military departments’ senior services managers, take the following three actions: identify baseline data on the status of service acquisition, in part, by using budget and spending data and leveraging its ongoing efforts to gauge the effects of its actions to improve service acquisition, develop specific goals associated with their actions to improve establish metrics to assess progress in meeting these goals. DOD also stated that as it improves its management of service acquisition, it should be able to measure performance, track productivity trends, and establish consistent best practices across the department. USD(AT&L) also identified 23 different actions it has taken or plans to take that officials regard as addressing all of the elements the plan was to include, a number which pre-date the April 2013 Better Buying Power Initiative memorandum. | Why GAO Did This Study
In fiscal year 2012, DOD obligated more than $186 billion for contracted services, making it the federal governments largest buyer of services. GAOs prior work found that DODs use of contracted services has been the result of thousands of individual decisions, not strategic planning across the department.
Over the years, Congress has legislated a number of requirements to improve DODs service acquisitions. For example, Congress required DOD to implement a service acquisition management structure, approval process, and policies. Congress also directed DOD to develop a plan to implement the Defense Science Boards recommendations for improving service acquisition.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 mandated that GAO report on DODs actions to improve service acquisition and management. GAO examined (1) the actions DOD has taken to respond to legislative requirements and (2) how DOD determines the effects of its actions to improve service acquisition. GAO reviewed documentation and interviewed DOD officials on the actions taken in response to the legislative requirements. GAO also assessed whether DOD addressed key factors, including establishing goals and metrics, to help it determine if it has improved service acquisition.
What GAO Found
Over the last decade, the Department of Defense (DOD) has taken several actions to address legislative requirements to improve the acquisition and management of services. In 2001, as amended in 2006, Congress required DOD to implement a management structure for the acquisition of services. In response, DOD implemented such a structure and service acquisition review and approval process. Recently, DOD also established new positions within its management structure, including senior managers within the office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) and the military departments, to oversee and coordinate service acquisition. With a management structure and review process in place, USD(AT&L) is focusing on efforts to improve the process for how requirements for individual service acquisitions are developed and enhancing training to respond to several legislative directives. USD(AT&L) also created its Acquisition of Services Functional Integrated Product Team, in part, to determine how to address legislative requirements to provide training for personnel acquiring services. USD(AT&L) did not develop a plan to implement the Defense Science Board recommendations to improve service acquisition but identified 23 different actions, including its Better Buying Power Initiative, it has planned or taken that officials regard as addressing what the plan was to include. For example, USD(AT&L) is updating its guidance on using incentives to improve contractor performance, which addresses one of the elements that was to be in the plan.
While DOD has taken a number of actions that address legislative requirements, DOD is not yet positioned to determine what effects these actions have had on improving service acquisition. Specifically, USD(AT&L) has not identified specific goals and associated metrics that would enable it to assess progress toward achieving those goals. USD(AT&L) has identified improving service acquisition as a priority but has not defined a desired end state for its actions or the measurable characteristics that would embody achieving such a goal. It is challenged in defining a desired end state for its actions, in part, because it has not determined the current status of service acquisition in terms of the volume, type, location, and trends. DOD is taking steps to improve its contract and financial systems to obtain such data, but these efforts will not be complete until at least 2014. Further, DOD has not established departmentwide metrics to assess its progress in improving service acquisition but has acknowledged the need to do so, which officials described as challenging. Nevertheless, despite the challenges in doing so, it is not impossible. For example, DOD has agreed to set goals for the amount of spending managed through strategically sourced acquisitions, link strategic sourcing to its Better Buying Power Initiative, and establish metrics, such as utilization rates, to track progress toward these goals. However, DOD is not fully leveraging the command-level assessments, feedback from the military departments, and other ongoing efforts it relies on to gauge the effects of its actions to improve service acquisition. By using its budget and spending data and leveraging these efforts, DOD could develop baseline data and identify trends over time, enabling it to develop measurable goals and gain more insight into whether its actions are improving service acquisition. Until then, DOD will continue to be in a position where it does not know whether its actions are sufficient to achieve desired outcomes.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD establish baseline data, specific goals for improving service acquisition, and associated metrics to assess its progress. DOD concurred with the three recommendations. |
gao_GAO-13-782 | gao_GAO-13-782_0 | Demand response (also referred to as dial-a-ride): vehicles operate in response to calls or requests from passengers. Contracting Is a Prevalent Means of Providing Transit Services
Extent of Contracting
Contracting is a prevalent means of providing transit services, with about 61 percent of the 463 transit agencies that responded to our survey reporting they contract out some aspect of their operations. According to our survey, among the agencies providing such services, paratransit, demand response, and commuter rail are more likely to be contracted out, and fixed-route bus, heavy rail, and light rail are most often operated by the transit agency. As a result, transit agencies may place more importance on reducing costs or providing more efficient service when making the decision to contract out for service. Reducing costs. Starting new service. Also, contractors may be able to provide service at a lower cost because their workforce is more flexible, with a greater number of employees working in part-time positions, resulting in decreased wage and benefit costs. Other factors. At all nine of the transit agencies we interviewed that use contracting, transit agency officials said that provisions of Section 13(c) have not been a deterrent to contracting; however, some transit agencies that responded to our survey reported that challenges presented by Section 13(c) are a reason for not contracting out service. As shown in table 3, for all modes except commuter rail, the top three reasons to not contract are that the agency desired to maintain control over operations, found no reason to change from the transit agency providing service, or found contracting was not cost effective. Transit Agencies Use Many Methods to Select and Oversee Contractors
Contractor Selection
According to our survey responses, transit agencies use several methods to select contractors. Among our survey respondents that contract out services, the most commonly used methods are periodic reports or meetings, on-site inspections, the use of performance metrics, and real time monitoring. About 84 percent of the surveyed transit agencies that contract out services reported having a specific unit or department to conduct oversight. Seven of the nine agencies use in-house staff to monitor the contractor’s performance, while two use third-party contractors to perform this function. Seven of the nine agencies that contract out for some or all of their transit services use metrics to establish performance incentives and/or penalties in contracts. Transit Agencies and Contractors Cite a Mix of Benefits and Challenges of Contracting; Unions Primarily Note Disadvantages
Transit Agencies’ Views
Transit agency officials whom we interviewed and the literature we reviewed cite potential benefits to contracting for transit agencies, which may vary based on the needs and circumstances of individual transit agencies. Contracting can be used to start or expand service. Transit agencies contract out for new services in order to avoid the high start-up costs, including the cost of new services, procuring new vehicles, hiring staff, and obtaining facilities, according to transit agency officials that we interviewed. In addition to these reported benefits and their associated cost savings, transit agencies and literature cite the following challenges to contracting out transit services, which may, in some cases, outweigh the benefits or cost savings:
Diminishes an agency’s direct control over operations. Increases labor flexibility. Union Views
Officials at national and local unions we spoke with said that whereas contracting may provide some short-term cost savings to transit agencies, the savings are almost entirely from lower wages and benefits paid by the private companies to their employees. Agency Comments
We provided a copy of this report to the Department of Transportation and the Department of Labor for review. The agencies had no comment on the report. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To comply with the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act (MAP-21) mandate we addressed the following questions: (1) What is the extent that transit agencies contract public transit operations and services and identify reasons for doing so? (2) What methods do transit agencies use to select and oversee contracted services? (3) What are the potential benefits, challenges, and disadvantages of contracting out public transit operations and other services? The results of our survey can be found at GAO-13-824SP. Using these procedures, we received responses from 463 transit agencies for a response rate of 73 percent. The results of our survey are not generalizeable to all transit agencies. At each location, we attempted to interview private transit contractors, citizens’ advisory groups, and a local union. | Why GAO Did This Study
Some transit agencies have found that they can save money by contracting out some or all of their services with private providers, while others have found it more beneficial to use their own staff to provide services. The Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act mandated that GAO review issues related to transit contracting. In this report, GAO identified: (1) the extent that public transit agencies contract operations and reasons why agencies decide to do so, (2) methods used to select and oversee contracted services, and (3) potential benefits, challenges, and disadvantages of contracting out public transit operations and other services.
GAO conducted a web-based survey of 637 transit agencies that submit reports to the Department of Transportation (DOT) and obtained 463 responses for a 73 percent response rate. The survey and results can be found at GAO-13-824SP . In addition, GAO interviewed federal officials, representatives from industry organizations, and national union officials. GAO also interviewed officials from 10 transit agencies, chosen based on a variety of characteristics, including geographic diversity, population served, use of contracting, and modes operated. At each transit location, GAO interviewed private transit providers, citizens' advisory groups, and local unions. The results of the survey and interviews are not generalizeable to all transit agencies. GAO also reviewed relevant studies and literature on transit contracting.
GAO is not making recommendations in this report. DOT and Department of Labor reviewed a draft of this report and had no comments.
What GAO Found
Contracting is a prevalent means of providing transit services. About 61 percent of the 463 transit agencies responding to GAO's survey reported they contract out some or all operations and services, while the rest reported that they do not contract out at all. According to GAO's survey, paratransit (services for the disabled), demand response (also known as dial-a-ride), and commuter rail service are most often contracted out, and fixed-route bus, heavy rail, and light rail service are most often operated by the transit agency. Operations are most frequently contracted out, followed by maintenance services. Transit agencies most consistently cite reducing costs as a factor influencing their decision to contract. Contracting can reduce costs because contractors' workforces are more flexible, with more employees working in part-time positions, and lower insurance costs, among other things. Transit agencies also frequently cited starting new service, improving efficiency, and allowing for more flexible service as reasons for contracting. State laws are generally not a reason for contracting, according to GAO's survey. Transit agencies that do not contract most often cited one of these three reasons: desire to maintain control over operations, no reason to change from the transit agency's providing service, or contracting was determined not to be cost effective.
Transit agencies GAO surveyed use various methods to select contractors and oversee contractor performance. To select contractors, most agencies used competition with a request for proposals. For oversight, transit agencies most commonly used periodic reports or meetings, on-site inspections, performance metrics, and real time monitoring, according to GAO's survey and interviews. About 84 percent of surveyed transit agencies that contract out services reported having a specific oversight unit. Of the nine transit agencies GAO interviewed that use contracting, seven used transit agency staff for monitoring, while two used contractors to perform this function. Seven of these agencies used performance metrics to establish incentives and/or penalties in contracts.
Transit agencies and contractors cited benefits and challenges to contracting, while labor unions primarily noted disadvantages--most notably, reduced wages and benefits and a potential decline in safety and service, among other issues. Specifically, transit agencies GAO interviewed and the literature cited benefits to contracting, which vary based on the individual needs and circumstances of transit agencies. For example, transit agencies that use contractors view contracting as advantageous when starting or expanding services in order to avoid start-up costs--such as the large capital cost of acquiring new vehicles and hiring new staff. Contractors reported they could improve transit agencies' operational efficiency by providing the latest technologies, such as routing systems and lower costs by providing more affordable insurance on vehicles. Transit agencies also cited some challenges to contracting, such as the agency's loss of direct control over operations. Officials from national and local unions GAO spoke with said that while contracting may provide some short-term cost savings to transit agencies, in their view the savings are almost entirely from lower wages and benefits paid by the private companies to employees. |
gao_RCED-98-7 | gao_RCED-98-7_0 | Airline Pilots’ Performance Was a Contributing Factor in Many Accidents and Incidents
About 30 percent of the 169 accidents and 18 percent of the 3,901 incidents that occurred from 1983 through 1995 were caused at least in part by pilots’ performance, according to our analysis of the National Transportation Safety Board’s (NTSB) and FAA’s data. Figure 2 shows the types of accidents and incidents in the air that were reported. For example, in the Charlotte, North Carolina, crash in July 1994, communication among crew members did not occur, according to NTSB’s accident investigation report. The first officer did not question the order, as he should have, according to NTSB, because the windshear was creating an unstable situation; the plane could not recover from the sudden downward shift in direction caused by following the captain’s order. FAA’s Guidance and Oversight Do Not Ensure Effectiveness of CRM Training
For AQP training, FAA has specified the process airlines need to follow to develop and implement a curriculum that integrates CRM concepts with technical flying skills, but FAA’s guidance for CRM training under part 121 does not have the same degree of specificity. As a result, airlines continue to need specific guidance for CRM under part 121—both those airlines that have opted not to enter AQP as well those that will continue to train at least some of their crews under part 121 until they have fully implemented AQP, which could take up to 8 years. FAA’s Guidance for CRM Training Is Detailed Under AQP but Not Under Part 121
Once an airline elects to participate in AQP, it must follow SFAR 58 (the AQP regulation) for developing a formal curriculum—including assessing the skills pilots need to safely operate the aircraft they fly, developing curriculum objectives for teaching those skills, having measurable criteria for evaluating whether the pilots have achieved those objectives, and developing materials to teach those objectives. As a result, the pilots trained under AQP are assessed on CRM principles as well as on technical flying skills. In contrast, FAA’s requirements for CRM training under part 121 do not require airlines to develop a curriculum for CRM training with measurable criteria or to integrate that curriculum with other aspects of part 121 training. While all the airlines provide classroom training in CRM principles under part 121 training, they may not integrate this training with technical flying skills. (See table 1.) We identified pilots’ performance as the cause of about one-third of all the accidents and nearly one-fifth of the incidents for the 10 major airlines from 1983 through 1995. However, while FAA’s guidance for the implementation of the Advanced Qualification Program specifies a process for curriculum development that integrates this training with training in technical flying skills, FAA’s guidance for curriculum development under part 121 is ambiguous and does not provide standards that inspectors can use to evaluate and approve airlines’ training in crew resource management. To determine the adequacy of FAA’ s guidance for and oversight of pilots’ training, we reviewed FAA’s role in the airlines’ implementation of CRM. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO examined the role of airline pilots' performance in accidents and the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) efforts to address any inadequate performance, focusing on the: (1) types and frequency of accidents in which an airline pilot's performance was cited as a contributing factor, including those in which failure to use crew resource management (CRM) principles was identified; and (2) adequacy of FAA's guidance for and oversight of the airlines' implementation of pilots' training for CRM.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) of the 169 accidents that involved the major airlines and that were investigated and reported on in detail by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) from 1983 through 1995, about 30 percent were caused in part by the pilots' performance; (2) in at least one-third of these accidents, GAO determined that the pilots did not correctly use CRM principles; (3) for example, according to NTSB, just before the 1994 crash in Charlotte, North Carolina, which killed 37 people, the aircraft had encountered a sudden change in wind direction and the captain gave an incorrect order to the first officer, who did not question the order, as CRM principles would require; (4) during the same period, of the nearly 4,000 incidents, GAO found that about one-fifth were caused in part by the pilots' performance; (5) FAA's guidance for and oversight of training in CRM does not ensure the adequacy of this training under part 121 of the federal aviation regulations, while they do under the new Advanced Qualification Program (AQP); (6) FAA's guidance for the implementation of AQP specifies a process for curriculum development that the airlines must follow in order to integrate CRM training with technical flying skills; (7) FAA inspectors overseeing this training assess the curriculum to see if FAA's process has been followed, enabling them to determine whether the pilots' training under this curriculum is adequate; (8) although FAA requires airlines to teach CRM in their traditional part 121 training, the guidance it provides on how to develop the curriculum for this training is ambiguous and does not provide standards that inspectors can use to evaluate airlines' CRM training; (9) because AQP training generally differs from traditional part 121 training in how it develops a curriculum for training CRM, the guidance for this training in AQP may not be applicable to CRM training under part 121; (10) FAA needs to develop guidance for teaching CRM under traditional part 121 training; (11) and although 8 of the 10 major airlines plan to train all their pilots under AQP, the need for guidance on CRM training under part 121 remains--both for those airlines that have opted not to enter AQP as well as for those that participate in the program but will nonetheless continue to have some of their pilots trained under part 121 for up to 8 years as they make the transition to AQP. |
gao_GAO-15-747T | gao_GAO-15-747T_0 | Background
The assistance PIH provides to low-income families encompasses three broad program areas: public housing, which offers units for eligible tenants in properties generally owned and administered by state and local public housing agencies (PHA); tenant-based rental assistance, which provides vouchers that eligible households can use to rent houses or apartments in the private housing market; and
Native American programs, which provide block grants and loan guarantees to tribal entities for housing development and assistance and housing-related services. The program is intended to give participating PHAs the flexibility to design and test innovative strategies for providing and administering housing assistance. FSS was authorized in 1990 to help families receiving vouchers or living in public housing become self-sufficient through case management and referrals to education, training, and other supportive services. In recent years, the voucher program has helped provide affordable rental housing to about 2 million very low- or extremely low-income households annually. IHBG Program. HUD’s Office of Native American Programs within PIH administers NAHASDA. HUD Has Taken Initial Actions to Better Assess the Moving to Work and Family Self- Sufficiency Programs
In our prior work on the MTW and FSS programs, we concluded that HUD could take additional steps to understand program outcomes. We made eight recommendations in our April 2012 report on the MTW program, seven of which have been implemented. We made two recommendations to HUD concerning FSS in a July 2013 report on self- sufficiency programs.recommendations. I for a full list of the recommendations from these reports and their status.) HUD Has Taken Steps to Improve What is Known about the Moving to Work Program
In our April 2012 report on the MTW program, we identified a number of weaknesses that limited HUD’s ability to determine program outcomes as they related to statutory purposes. HUD subsequently implemented all three of these recommendations. We recommended that HUD create a process to systematically identify lessons learned. HUD agreed and in response stated that once its revised reporting requirements were implemented, the resulting data would inform an effort to establish lessons learned. To address limitations in HUD’s oversight of the FSS program, we recommended that HUD develop and implement a process to better ensure that data on FSS participant grants were complete. To improve what is known about and better inform Congress on residents’ progress towards self-sufficiency, we recommended that HUD develop and implement a strategy for regularly analyzing FSS participation and outcome data. However, HUD has not yet determined what level of subsidy reserves PHAs should retain or provided Congress with criteria for redistributing excess reserves. HUD neither agreed nor disagreed with our recommendation. However, consistent with our recommendation, in the President’s budgets for fiscal years 2013-2016, HUD proposed a number of statutory changes to streamline administrative requirements for the voucher program. In addition, in January 2015 HUD published a proposed rule that included a number of program and administrative simplification measures for the voucher program. Differing federal environmental review requirements. HUD agreed with the recommendation. In June 2015, HUD told us it would continue collaborating with the other agencies to develop a coordinated environmental review process that would simplify efforts to develop tribal housing.collaborating agencies hoped to have some recommendations on the process by September 2015. concluded that a more comprehensive approach would include input from tribes that had not yet used HUD’s new procedures so that their concerns could be addressed. HUD has also developed a location on its website that collects and disseminates best practices on housing development to tribes, TDHEs, and the general public. HUD has made progress in implementing some of our recommendations, but additional actions are needed to address others. Appendix I: Content and Status of Relevant GAO Recommendations
The following table summarizes the status of our prior recommendations to the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) from our April 2012, July 2013, March 2012, and March 2014 reports that discuss Office of Public and Indian Housing (PIH) programs. | Why GAO Did This Study
HUD's Office of Public and Indian Housing (PIH) administers programs that help some of the nation's most vulnerable households—including low-income families and members of Native Americans tribes—obtain safe, decent, and affordable housing. PIH also operates complementary programs, such as FSS, that are designed to help assisted households become more self-sufficient. PIH programs accounted for about 60 percent of HUD's budget authority for fiscal year 2015, or about $26 billion.
GAO has issued four reports since March 2012 on PIH programs, including the MTW, FSS, voucher, and IHBG programs, that contained recommendations to HUD (see GAO-12-300 , GAO-12-490 , GAO-13-581 , and GAO-14-255 ). This testimony is based on these four reports. It discusses, among other things, HUD's progress in addressing prior GAO recommendations on the MTW and FSS programs, the voucher program, and the IHBG program.
To update the status of prior recommendations, GAO reviewed new or revised HUD policies, procedures, and reports and interviewed officials.
What GAO Found
As of June 2015, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) had addressed some of GAO's 16 prior recommendations for four programs: Moving to Work (MTW), Family Self-Sufficiency (FSS), Housing Choice Voucher (voucher), and Indian Housing Block Grant (IHBG). But other recommendations require further attention. Specifically:
HUD has addressed seven of eight recommendations GAO made in April 2012 to improve assessment of MTW, capture lessons learned, and enhance program oversight. The MTW program is intended, among other things, to give state and local housing agencies flexibility to design and test innovative strategies for providing housing assistance. HUD agreed or partially agreed with most of GAO's recommendations. However, it has yet to fully implement a process for systematically identifying lessons learned.
HUD has taken initial steps to address GAO's two recommendations from a July 2013 report to develop and implement (1) a process to better ensure that data on FSS grants were complete and (2) a strategy for regularly analyzing FSS participation and outcome data. The FSS program is designed to help families receiving HUD housing assistance become self-sufficient through case management and referrals to supportive services such as education and training. HUD agreed with the recommendations and has revised its data collection and analysis procedures. But it has not yet provided full documentation of these efforts so that GAO can assess its actions.
HUD has implemented one of three recommendations GAO made in a 2012 report on the voucher program. The voucher program subsidizes private market rents for about 2 million low-income households. HUD neither agreed nor disagreed with these recommendations. But HUD has addressed one that is aimed at streamlining the program's administration by, among other things, publishing a proposed rule that includes measures to simplify administrative processes. HUD has not yet provided GAO evidence that it has implemented the two other recommendations, one on informing Congress about excess state and local housing agency reserves and one on informing Congress about HUD's criteria for redistributing these reserves.
HUD has implemented two of three GAO recommendations from a March 2014 report on the IHBG program. IHBG annually provides more than $600 million in housing assistance to about 570 federally and state-recognized Indian tribes. Consistent with GAO's recommendations, HUD has broadened its solicitation of input from block grant recipients and developed a location on its website to collect and disseminate best practices on housing development. HUD has also taken steps to address a third recommendation to collaborate with other agencies that work with Indian tribes to improve interagency coordination on environmental reviews for tribal housing development. The agencies' efforts to develop a coordinated environmental review process are ongoing. |
gao_GAO-11-88 | gao_GAO-11-88_0 | FEMA had obligated all $150 million of its Recovery Act PSGP funds as of September 29, 2009. In addition to requiring certain actions by specified agencies such as Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Customs and Border Protection, and the Coast Guard, the directive provides that other DHS component heads not specifically identified—where appropriate based on the extent of use of SSI—should appoint an official to serve as the component’s SSI Program Manager, who is to be responsible for, among other things, developing component-specific SSI identification and procedural guidance as necessary, and conducting self-inspections of the component for the effective management and practical application of SSI, and consistent and appropriate application and use of SSI at least once every 18 months. Recovery Act Recipient Reporting Process
To promote transparency and accountability, the Recovery Act requires recipients of Recovery Act funds, such as PSGP recipients, to report each calendar quarter on the use of funds, and further requires that this reporting continue for every quarter in which the recipient receives Recovery Act funds from the federal government. FEMA has appointed an SSI Program Manager. FEMA’s GPD has appointed an SSI Coordinator. Reviewing these justifications and marking them immediately as SSI could help the SSI Coordinator ensure that GPD personnel are better positioned to safeguard them from inadvertent unauthorized disclosure. The training did not provide this information. We have previously reported on a number of factors that managers should consider when assessing training. Given that Recovery Act PSGP staff were unclear about the application of SSI to their work and attendees at GPD’s initial SSI training requested examples to illustrate how SSI pertains to their work, providing grant-specific examples in its SSI training could help FEMA ensure that all GPD staff, including Recovery Act PSGP staff, are better positioned to identify, mark, and safeguard SSI within their programs. FEMA Has Taken Initial Steps to Develop and Document a Review Process, but Additional Controls Could Help Prevent the Unauthorized Disclosure of SSI
FEMA has implemented an agencywide standard operating procedure governing the safeguarding of SSI within FEMA; however, this is a broad policy that does not specifically address aspects related to the Recovery Act PSGP recipient report review process. Further, while FEMA GPD staff have taken steps to outline their recipient review process, GPD management has not approved the procedure and the draft does not include key controls for reducing the risk of error. FEMA Lacks a Procedure for Comparing Recipient Reports Against SSI Criteria
FEMA’s standard operating procedure does not include a method for its Recovery Act PSGP recipient report reviewers to safeguard SSI as required of covered persons in SSI regulations. A TSA security official who reviewed our sample of 61 PSGP recipient reports available on Recovery.gov for the reporting period with data available as of February 2010, informed us that none contained SSI; however, FEMA should consider a cautious approach when reviewing this material in advance and inform recipients if their draft submissions contain SSI. While our review showed that none of the Recovery Act PSGP recipient reports for the single reporting period in our review contained SSI, developing a management-approved policy for reviewing Recovery Act PSGP recipient reports that includes steps to compare submissions against SSI criteria and properly safeguard it could reduce the risk that SSI is made publicly available on Recovery.gov in subsequent reporting periods. Specifically, the director instructed him to use boilerplate language when commenting back to the recipients, with the following notification statement: “Due to the public nature of this report, please adjust the Award Description to: American Recovery and Reinvestment Act Port Security Grant Program (ARRA PSGP).” This official stated that he did not develop standard criteria to determine what “too much detail” meant, nor does he compare the information contained in these quarterly reports against SSI criteria while conducting his data quality review. FEMA Has Not Provided Instruction to Recipients on Safeguarding SSI While Reporting Project Details in a Transparent Manner for Posting on Recovery.gov
During the Recovery Act quarterly reporting process, under federal SSI regulations, both recipients—who submit the initial information—and FEMA personnel—who review the information—are considered to be covered persons with a duty to safeguard SSI. According to FEMA, the sensitive nature of port security information affects the transparency of PSGP recipient reporting. Namely, by describing the information to include in narrative fields that ultimately will be posted on Recovery.gov and informing recipients of their duty to protect SSI as covered persons, FEMA could help ensure that recipients consider both the need to report on funded activities and expected outcomes in a transparent manner while safeguarding SSI when reporting information on issues that ultimately will be posted on Recovery.gov. Further, FEMA intends to enhance its current SSI training to ensure that it is relevant to FEMA personnel. | Why GAO Did This Study
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act) requires recipients to report, among other things, project descriptions on Recovery.gov, the federal Recovery Act Web site. Within the Department of Homeland Security, the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) Grant Programs Directorate administers the Port Security Grant Program (PSGP) to strengthen ports against risks from terrorist attacks. FEMA received and obligated $150 million in Recovery Act PSGP funds in 2009, and, as of September 2010, recipients have drawn down over $10 million. To facilitate recipient reporting, FEMA must consider the need both for transparency and for protection of Sensitive Security Information (SSI), which could be detrimental to transportation security if disclosed. As requested, GAO assessed FEMA's: (1) controls to ensure Recovery Act PSGP staff consistently follow SSI policies, and (2) steps to ensure PSGP recipients have not disclosed SSI on Recovery.gov. GAO reviewed relevant laws, regulations, guidance, and a random sample of PSGP Recovery Act recipient reports available as of February 2010, and interviewed agency officials.
What GAO Found
FEMA has taken steps to ensure Recovery Act PSGP staff consistently follow the Department of Homeland Security's SSI policies and processes, but key actions have not been taken. For instance, FEMA has appointed an SSI Program Manager--responsible for FEMA-wide SSI oversight--and an SSI Coordinator to facilitate the Grant Programs Directorate's use of SSI. Also, the SSI Program Manager provided SSI training to FEMA's Grant Programs Directorate staff; however, the training did not include FEMA-specific examples to illustrate the application of SSI, which the staff requested. GAO has previously reported that, when assessing training, managers should consider whether the training includes both the theoretical basis of the material--such as context and principles--and the practical application of the issues. Including FEMA-specific examples could help FEMA ensure Recovery Act PSGP staff have the necessary knowledge to handle and safeguard SSI. In addition, the SSI Coordinator has not assessed whether SSI documents have been appropriately labeled, in accordance with SSI regulations. For example, FEMA has determined that certain materials grant recipients submit to FEMA during the application process to describe how their projects will address current gaps and deficiencies are SSI, but has not marked them as such. While these documents have not been posted to Recovery.gov, immediately reviewing and marking them as SSI could improve safeguards and help prevent the information contained therein from inadvertent disclosure. FEMA has taken steps to develop a quarterly review process for Recovery Act PSGP recipient reports--prior to their public release on Recovery.gov--but does not have key controls to help prevent public disclosure of SSI. For instance, FEMA staff drafted a procedure for reviewing recipient reports, but FEMA management has not approved it and the draft does not include a procedure to verify the reviews' accuracy. Further, while GAO found that SSI had not been disclosed in Recovery Act recipient reports posted on Recovery.gov for the single reporting period GAO reviewed--with data publicly available as of February 2010--FEMA lacks a process for comparing recipient reports to SSI criteria, and a protocol that informs recipients when FEMA determines that their reports contain SSI. Introducing these measures could help Grant Programs Directorate staff consistently review reports, identify when they contain SSI, reduce the risk of SSI disclosure on Recovery.gov, and reinforce recipients' obligations to safeguard SSI. In addition, GAO found wide variation in the level of detail about the awards' descriptions among the recipient reports sampled from Recovery.gov as of February 2010, although the majority provided minimal detail. According to FEMA, the sensitive nature of PSGP information affects the transparency of PSGP recipient reporting. By providing instruction to recipients on what should and should not be reported due to SSI requirements, FEMA could help recipients report project details in a transparent manner on the expenditure of Recovery Act funds while protecting information that could otherwise jeopardize transportation security if released.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that FEMA improve SSI training, ensure proper marking of SSI, enhance recipient report review controls, and instruct recipients on safeguarding SSI while reporting on funded activities and expected outcomes in a transparent manner. FEMA concurred. |
gao_GAO-02-859T | gao_GAO-02-859T_0 | While there are no federal requirements or standards specific to the operation of federal ombudsman offices, the Administrative Conference of the United States recommended in 1990 that the President and the Congress support federal agency initiatives to create and fund an external ombudsman in agencies with significant interaction with the public. In addition, several professional organizations have published relevant standards of practice for ombudsmen. The role of an ombudsman typically includes program operating responsibilities, such as helping to informally resolve program-related issues and mediating disagreements between the agency and the public. Assigning these responsibilities to an office within the OIG would conflict with statutory restrictions on the Inspector General’s activities. However, if EPA omits these responsibilities from the position within the OIG, then it will not have established an “ombudsman” as the function is defined within the ombudsman community. According to our discussions with officials from the Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response and the OIG, the investigative aspects of the ombudsman function will be assigned to the OIG, but it appears that the regional ombudsmen will respond to inquiries and have a role in informally resolving issues between the agency and the public before they escalate into complaints about how EPA operates. Finally, including the national ombudsman function within the Office of the Inspector General raises concerns about the effect on the OIG, even if EPA defines the ombudsman’s role in a way that avoids conflict with the Inspector General Act. | What GAO Found
The Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) hazardous waste ombudsman was established as a result of the 1984 amendments to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. Recognizing that the ombudsman provides a valuable service to the public, EPA retained the ombudsman function as a matter of policy after its legislative authorization expired in 1988. Over time, EPA expanded the national ombudsman's jurisdiction to include Superfund and other hazardous waste programs, and, by March 1996, EPA had designated ombudsmen in each of its ten regional offices. In November 2001, the agency announced that the national ombudsman would be relocated from the Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response to the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) and would address concerns across the spectrum of EPA programs, not just hazardous waste programs. Although there are no federal requirements or standards specific to the operation of ombudsman offices, several professional organizations have published standards of practice relevant to ombudsmen who deal with public inquiries. If EPA intends to have an ombudsman function consistent with the way the position is typically defined in the ombudsman community, placing the national ombudsman within the OIG does not achieve that objective. The role of the ombudsman typically includes program operating responsibilities, such as helping to informally resolve program-related issues and mediating disagreements between the agency and the public. Including these responsibilities within the OIG would likely conflict with the Inspector General Act, which prohibits the transfer of program operating responsibilities to the Inspector General; yet, omitting these responsibilities would result in establishing an ombudsman that is not fully consistent with the function as defined within the ombudsman community. |
gao_GGD-98-204 | gao_GGD-98-204_0 | Among other things, this program provides investors with information on the professional background, business practices, and conduct of NASD member firms and their brokers. The Actions Taken Respond to Many of Our Recommendations
SEC and the SROs have taken actions that respond to many of the recommendations in our reports that address issues related to microcap stock fraud. The Actions Reported Respond to Many SEC Recommendations
SEC and the SROs have reported taking actions that respond to many recommendations in two SEC reports that address issues related to microcap stock fraud. Actions have not been completed on our recommendations related to the migration of unscrupulous brokers from the securities industry; modernization of CRD to allow regulators to more easily monitor brokers with disciplinary histories; and ability of SEC to identify, across firms, trends in violations found during its broker-dealer examinations. Also, SEC’s recommendation that would require disclosures to customers on the availability of broker disciplinary information prior to account activity has not been implemented. Action on the Migration of Unscrupulous Brokers Is Not Complete
Our report on unscrupulous brokers discussed the potential for brokers barred from the securities industry to migrate to other financial services industries, such as banking and insurance. However, the NASD rule does not require that the information be provided before activity occurs in an account or at account opening. These actions have improved the availability of registration and disciplinary information on brokers and firms, branch office audit selection, and availability and analysis of customer complaints, which should enhance regulatory oversight and investor protection. Full implementation of these recommendations should further enhance regulatory oversight and investor protection. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the actions taken by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the self-regulatory organizations (SRO) in response to GAO's and SEC's recommendations to reduce microcap fraud.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) SEC and the SROs have taken, or reported taking, actions that respond to many of the recommendations in GAO's and SEC reports that address issues related to microcap stock fraud; (2) in responding to these recommendations, actions have been taken to: (a) expand the disclosure of and public access to broker disciplinary information; (b) improve National Association of Securities Dealers branch office examination selection; (c) provide more focused sales practices examinations; (d) improve compliance with industry reporting requirements; and (e) implement a continuing professional education requirement for broker-dealers; (3) these actions should enhance regulatory oversight of microcap stock firms and help provide investors with additional protections against abusive practices by such firms; (4) actions have not been completed that would respond to other recommendations related to the: (a) migration of unscrupulous brokers from the securities industry to other financial services industries; (b) modernization of the central registration database to improve oversight of problem brokers and public access to broker disciplinary histories; (c) ability of SEC to identify, across firms, trends in violations found during its broker-dealer examinations; and (d) provision of information on the availability of broker disciplinary histories before activity occurs in an account; and (5) completing actions on these recommendations would further enhance regulatory oversight and investor protection. |
gao_GAO-10-694 | gao_GAO-10-694_0 | CBP is the lead agency responsible for securing the nation’s borders while facilitating legitimate trade and travel. FAST participation has increased substantially since CBP launched the program. CBP Does Not Collect Data That Would Allow It to Assess the Effect of Staffing and Infrastructure Constraints on Wait Times, but CBP Officials and Stakeholders Stated That Wait Times Have Decreased
CBP Does Not Collect Data That Would Allow It to Determine the Effect of Staffing and Infrastructure Issues on Wait Times
CBP is limited in its ability to accurately quantify the impacts of staffing and infrastructure on wait times because its wait times data are collected using inconsistent methods and are unreliable. CBP calculates and reports wait times hourly at 28 major land POEs along the northern border. The guidance outlined various methods for calculating wait times, including (1) line of sight—CBP officials at the port estimate wait times based on volume, number of lanes open, and landmarks that identify the end of the line to the naked eye or camera; (2) benchmark— CBP officials at the port and stakeholders identify various benchmarks and measure wait times from the end of the traffic line to the primary inspection booth based on the number of lanes open and the benchmark points; (3) license plate reader—CBP officials at the port manually record the license plate of the last vehicle in line and then run the plate in TECS to identify when the plate was processed at primary inspection; and (4) driver surveys—when the end of the line is no longer visible, CBP officials at the port use driver surveys to estimate wait times. However, some CBP officials as well as 13 of the 15 importers, trade organizations, and border stakeholders we spoke with about the accuracy of CBP’s wait times raised questions about the accuracy and reliability of CBP’s wait times data. The initial technology deployment is scheduled to occur in the summer of 2010. CBP Has Taken Actions to Address Staffing and Infrastructure Constraints, but Training Challenges Remain
CBP Has Taken Actions to Address the Effect of Staffing Levels on Wait Times, but Training Challenges Remain
CBP has increased staffing levels at northern border POEs to reduce wait times and improve operations, but is challenged in balancing increased staffing with training needs. Staffing levels along the northern border have increased by 47 percent from fiscal years 2003 to 2010 and, as a result, CBP officials at the six ports we visited told us that they are better able to staff all available primary processing lanes when needed, which increases throughput and decreases wait times. Due to CBP’s hiring effort, CBP officials report that northern border field offices received additional staff allocations. However, at five of six POEs we visited, CBP officers were not receiving the required 12 to 14 weeks of OJT. CBP Has Prioritized Infrastructure Needs and Has Made Incremental Improvements to Reduce Wait Times, but Infrastructure Challenges Continue
CBP Has a Process for Prioritizing Infrastructure Needs at Land Ports, and CBP and GSA Have Developed a 5- Year Plan for Infrastructure Improvements
CBP’s process for identifying and prioritizing capital infrastructure needs at land POEs consists of several steps, including gathering data using the SRA process, ranking the facilities by identified needs, conducting an analysis on the initial ranking of needs, assessing project feasibility and risk; and establishing a capital investment plan. Over the next 5 years, CBP will have infrastructure projects related to 35 different northern border land POEs in various stages of development. For example, CBP officials said that they have been discussing plans to expand the Peace Bridge Facility for the past 10 years. The facility sits on 17 acres and is confined on three sides by the Niagara River, a historic park, and a residential neighborhood. CBP Lacks Data to Assess the FAST Program, but CBP, Selected Importers, and Trade Organizations Report Generally Favorable Reviews Where Infrastructure Is Available
CBP Lacks the Data to Assess Whether FAST Participants Are Experiencing Intended Benefits, but Is Taking Action to Collect the Data
Although CBP established the FAST program to expedite cargo processing for low-risk shippers and uses the program as a tool to help focus its inspections, targeting resources on areas of greatest risk, it lacks the data needed to determine whether the FAST program is effective because it collects incomplete data on FAST shipments. Additionally, although CBP stated that once ACE is modified to collect data on all FAST participants, the data may be useful for measuring program benefits, CBP has no plans to conduct a study on whether the benefits are being realized. Establishing milestones for completing the enhancement to ACE could help ensure that CBP’s actions are implemented as planned so that it is better positioned to begin collecting the data necessary to determine whether FAST shipments are receiving the intended benefits of the program—shorter primary processing times and fewer referrals to secondary inspections. Moreover, once CBP completes the enhancement to the ACE database, using this information to conduct a study would enable CBP to determine if the benefits are experienced by all FAST participants and what program adjustments, if any, are needed. | Why GAO Did This Study
The United States and Canada share a border of nearly 5,525 miles. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), is responsible for securing the borders while facilitating trade and travel. CBP launched the Free and Secure Trade (FAST) program in 2002 to expedite processing for pre-vetted, low-risk shipments. GAO was requested to assess U.S.-Canadian border delays. This report addresses the following for U.S. northern border land ports of entry: (1) the extent to which wait times data are reliable and reported trends in wait times, (2) any actions CBP has taken to reduce wait times and any challenges that remain, and (3) the extent to which CBP and FAST participants experience the benefits of the FAST program. GAO analyzed CBP information and data on staffing, infrastructure, wait times, training, and the FAST program from 2003 through 2009 to analyze operations. GAO visited six northern border land ports, which were primarily selected based on commercial traffic volume. GAO interviewed importers, trade organizations, and border stakeholders. The results are not generalizable, but provide insights.
What GAO Found
CBP does not collect data that would allow it to assess the effect of staffing and infrastructure constraints on wait times, but CBP officials and stakeholders report that wait times have decreased. CBP calculates and reports wait times hourly for 28 of 122 northern border land ports. However, CBP officials and the 13 border stakeholders, importers, and trade organizations GAO interviewed about wait times questioned the accuracy and reliability of CBP's wait times data. For example, CBP officers at three crossings questioned the methods used to estimate wait times, such as driver surveys, which are subjective. According to CBP and all stakeholders GAO interviewed, wait times for commercial vehicles have generally decreased due to lower traffic volumes as a result of the recession as well as staffing and infrastructure improvements, among other things. CBP initiated a pilot project in 2009 to automate wait times measurement and improve the accuracy of the data, and plans to deploy initial technology in the summer of 2010. To reduce wait times, CBP has taken actions to address staffing constraints and make infrastructure improvements, but challenges remain. CBP has increased northern border staffing levels by 47 percent from fiscal years 2003 through 2010, and thus is better able to staff all available lanes. GAO found that CBP officers receive 3 to 14 weeks of on-the-job training rather than the required 12 to 14 weeks. CBP launched an enhanced tracking system in April 2010 to monitor training, which officials said will enable them to work with field offices that are not providing required training. CBP has a process for identifying and prioritizing capital infrastructure needs at land ports and has infrastructure projects related to 35 of the 122 northern border ports under way or planned over the next 5 years, in part, to help reduce wait times. CBP has made infrastructure improvements at 5 of the 6 land ports GAO visited. CBP officials said they face challenges addressing infrastructure needs, such as expanding infrastructure at the Peace Bridge, which is confined on three sides by the Niagara River, a historic park, and a residential neighborhood. CBP lacks data needed to assess whether FAST program participants receive program benefits, but depending on the infrastructure available, CBP and 8 of 11 stakeholders GAO interviewed had generally favorable views of the program. CBP's Automated Commercial Environment (ACE) collects data on freight processing but does not differentiate between FAST and non-FAST shipments. Thus, it is difficult for CBP to determine the extent to which participants experience intended benefits. CBP officials stated that the ACE system needs to be modified to capture these data, but CBP has not yet set milestones to do so. Establishing milestones could help CBP ensure that modifications to ACE proceed as planned so that CBP is better positioned to begin collecting data. However, CBP does not have plans to conduct a study to determine if program benefits are being realized once these data have been captured. Conducting such a study would help CBP determine if the benefits are experienced by all FAST participants, and what program adjustments, if any, are needed.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that CBP (1) develop milestones for completing the enhancement of the database to capture data on FAST program benefits and (2) conduct a study to determine if program benefits are being realized. DHS concurred. |
gao_GAO-12-84 | gao_GAO-12-84_0 | For tribal 8(a) firms, SBA has specific oversight responsibility for accepting the firm into the program, which includes ensuring that the tribal entity owning the firm does not have more than one 8(a) firm in the same primary line of business, defined by a North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) code and annually reviewing 8(a) firms to track their progress in the 8(a) program, including their mix of 8(a) and non-8(a) revenue in the last 5 years in the program and any changes to the firms’ business targets, objectives, and goals. Obligations to Tribal 8(a) Firms Have Grown Steadily, with Most under Sole- Source Contracts
From fiscal year 2005 through 2010, federal dollars obligated to tribal 8(a) firms grew from $2.1 billion to $5.5 billion. Obligations to 8(a) firms owned by ANCs—which represented the majority of these tribal obligations during each fiscal year—rose steadily, from $1.9 billion to $4.7 billion. The percentage of obligations under competitively awarded tribal 8(a) contracts increased from fiscal year 2005 to 2010. They further stated these awards help procuring agencies to meet their small business goals, but added that the program offices’ preference for using the same firms for follow-on contracts also plays a role.the methods used by contracting officials to determine price reasonableness in a sole-source environment. savings. Agency Oversight of Subcontracting under Tribal 8(a) Contracts Continues to Be Lacking
To ensure that 8(a) firms do not pass along the benefits of their contracts to their subcontractors, regulations limit the amount of work that can be performed by subcontractors. Of the 87 contracts in our review, 71 had one or more subcontractors. Confusion Remains about Accountability for Monitoring Subcontracting Limitations
In response to our 2006 recommendations, SBA clarified in its partnership agreements with the procuring agencies that it is the contracting officer’s responsibility to monitor compliance with the limits on subcontracting under 8(a) contracts. Even with these actions, however, we still found that some contracting officers do not understand that ensuring compliance with the limitations on subcontracting is their responsibility. However, SBA will have difficulty enforcing some of these new regulations given the information currently available. Further, SBA, in its regulations or elsewhere, has still not addressed some issues we raised in our 2006 report. Finally, in this review we discuss practices that highlight how some tribal 8(a) firms operate, in effect, like large businesses due to their parent corporation’s backing and relationships with their sister subsidiaries. SBA has not reviewed these practices to determine whether they are acceptable given the business development purpose of the 8(a) program. This situation could allow for a tribal organization to have more than one 8(a) subsidiary perform most of its work under the same primary NAICS code, which SBA regulation does not allow. Not monitoring the limitations on subcontracting can pose a major risk that an improper amount of work is being done by large business subcontractors under large-dollar value, sole-source contracts to tribal 8(a) firms. As the new 8(a) tracking database is being developed, take steps to ensure that it has the capability to provide visibility to district offices into all tribal 8(a) firms’ activity by tribal entity to ensure compliance with new prohibition to award sole-source 8(a) follow-on contracts to sister subsidiaries; track revenue from tribal 8(a) firms’ primary and secondary industry codes to ensure that subsidiaries under the same parent company are not generating the majority of their revenue from the same primary industry; and track information on 8(a) contracts and task or delivery orders, including orders awarded under basic ordering agreements, to help ensure that district officials have information necessary to enforce the 8(a) program regulations. SBA did not address our recommendations. This requirement led to our recommendations that SBA determine whether certain practices we found that are currently allowed under the 8(a) regulations—such as firms subcontracting to a sister subsidiary—are consistent with the business development purpose of the 8(a) program. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
The objectives of this review were to (1) identify trends in government 8(a) contracting with firms owned by Alaska Native Corporations (ANC), Native Hawaiian Organizations (NHO), and Indian tribes; (2) determine the reasons federal agencies awarded sole-source contracts to tribal 8(a) firms and the methods used to make price determinations; (3) assess the procuring agencies’ oversight of tribal 8(a) contracts for compliance with subcontracting requirements; and (4) examine the Small Business Administration’s (SBA) new 8(a) regulation, effective March 14, 2011, to determine how the changes could affect oversight of tribal firms and the extent to which previously identified problems are addressed. 6. | What GAO Found
Federal dollars obligated to tribal 8(a) firms grew from $2.1 billion in fiscal year 2005 to $5.5 billion in 2010, a greater percentage increase than non-tribal 8(a) obligations (160 percent versus 45 percent). Obligations to 8(a) firms owned by Alaska Native Corporations (ANC) represented the majority of tribal obligationsevery year during the period, rising to $4.7 billion in 2010. While tribal 8(a) firms comprised 6.2 percent of total 8(a) firms, their obligations accounted for almost a third of total 8(a) obligations in fiscal year 2010. Over the 6 years, the percentage of competitively awarded obligations to tribal 8(a) firms rose; however, solesource contracts remained the primary source of growth, representing at least 75 percent of all tribal 8(a) obligations in a given year.
Consistent with GAOs 2006 review of ANC 8(a) contracting, contracting officials said that awarding contracts to tribal firms under the 8(a) program allows officials to award sole-source contracts for any value quickly, easily, and legally, and helps agencies meet their small business goals. However, the officials added that the program offices push for awarding follow-on contracts to the same firm also plays a role. GAOs review of noncompetitive tribal 8(a) contracts shows the methods used to determine price reasonableness in a sole-source environment. In some cases, when agencies moved away from sole-source tribal 8(a) contracts toward competition, agency officials estimated savings as a result.
To ensure that 8(a) firms do not pass along the benefits of their contracts to their subcontractors, regulations limit the amount of work that can be performed by the subcontractors. Of the 87 contracts in GAOs review, 71 had subcontractors. GAO found that required monitoring of limitations on subcontracting by procuring agencies was not routinely occurring. Similar to what GAO reported in 2006, some contracting officers do not understand that ensuring compliance is their responsibility under partnership agreements with SBA, and the regulations do not make this clear. Further, agency officials did not know how to monitor subcontracting limitations, particularly for indefinite-quantity contracts, as the data are not readily available. Not monitoring the limits on subcontracting can pose a major risk that an improper amount of work is being done by large firms.
In March 2011, SBA revised 8(a) regulations to clarify program rules, correct misinterpretations, and address program issues. Although a positive step, SBA will have difficulty enforcing new regulations pertaining to tribal 8(a) follow-on contracts and joint ventures given the information currently available. SBA told GAO it is currently in the process of developing the requirements for a new 8(a) tracking database. Further, the new regulations do not address some issues GAO has previously raised, such as ANC 8(a) firms under the same parent corporation generating a majority of revenue in the same line of business. SBA regulations do not allow a tribal organization to have more than one 8(a) subsidiary perform most of its work under the same primary business line. GAO also discusses practices that highlight how some tribal 8(a) firms operate, in effect, as large businesses because of their parent corporations backing and interconnectedness with sister subsidiaries. SBA has not reviewed these practices to determine whether they are congruent with the business development purpose of the 8(a) program.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) amend acquisition regulations and provide guidance (including data collection) on monitoring the limits on subcontracting. OFPP generally agreed with the recommendations. GAOs recommendations also include that SBA include specific capabilities in its 8(a) database to improve tribal 8(a) tracking and that it examine tribal participation to determine whether certain practices align with the 8(a) programs business development goal. SBA questioned GAOs methodology, which GAO continues to believe is appropriate, but did not address GAOs recommendations. |
gao_GAO-17-488 | gao_GAO-17-488_0 | Background
FMCSA was established within DOT in January 2000 and was tasked with promoting safe commercial motor vehicle operations and preventing large truck and bus crashes, injuries, and fatalities. FMCSA’s estimated budget for fiscal year 2017 is approximately $794.2 million. Overview of FMCSA’s IT Environment
FMCSA’s Chief Information Officer (CIO) oversees the development, implementation, and maintenance of the IT systems and infrastructure that serve as the key enabler in executing FMCSA’s mission. Such planning includes defining the scope of the modernization effort, an implementation strategy, and a schedule, as well as establishing results-oriented goals and measures. However, FMCSA lacks complete plans to guide its systems modernization efforts. While the agency has an IT strategic plan that describes the technical strategy, vision, mission, and direction for managing its IT modernization programs, and defines the strategic goals and objectives to support its mission, the plan lacks timelines to guide its goals and strategies related to integrated project planning and execution, IT security, and innovative IT business solutions, among others. The official further acknowledged that updating the current strategic plan has not been a priority. According to the framework, Stage 2 includes the following three processes: Instituting the investment board: As part of this process, an agency is to establish an investment review board comprised of senior executives, including the agency’s head or a designee, the CIO or other senior executive representing the CIO’s interests, and heads of business units that are responsible for defining and implementing the department’s IT investment governance process. Nevertheless, FMCSA has not yet clearly defined roles and responsibilities of all working groups and individuals involved in the agency’s IT governance process. With regard to selecting and reselecting IT investments, FMCSA’s January 2017 governance order requires participation and collaboration of the IT system owner, business owner, IT planning staff, and governance boards during the select phases for all investments. According to the Acting CIO, FMCSA is currently drafting procedures for selecting new investments and reselecting investments that are already operational and intends to finalize the procedures by the end of May 2017. With regard to IT investment oversight, the agency’s order established policies and procedures to ensure that governance bodies review investments and track corrective actions to closure. However, the policies and procedures for reviewing and tracking actions have not yet been fully implemented by the three governance bodies. The Acting CIO did not attend any of the four meetings. These weaknesses were due, in part, to the agency not adhering to its IT orders and governance board charters, which establish FMCSA’s governance structure, as described above. As a result, the agency lacks adequate visibility into and oversight of IT investment decisions and activities, and cannot ensure that its investments are meeting cost and schedule expectations and that appropriate actions are taken if these expectations are not being met. Specifically, none of the program offices conducted the required operational analyses for the four systems. The program offices stated that, in lieu of conducting these analyses, they assessed the key factors of costs, schedules, investment performance, and customer and business needs as part of the capital planning and investment control process. Aspen: The Aspen program office had partially implemented one of the required operational analysis factors and had not implemented the three other factors. Until FMCSA fully reviews its O&M investments as part of its annual operational analyses, the agency will lack assurance that these systems meet mission needs, and the associated spending could be wasteful. Conclusions
While FMCSA has recognized the need to develop an effective modernization plan and has awarded a contract to do so, it has not completed an IT strategic plan needed for modernizing its existing legacy systems. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act included a provision for us to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the information technology (IT) and data collection management systems of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) by June 4, 2017. Our objectives were to (1) assess the extent to which the agency has plans to modernize its existing systems, (2) assess the extent to which FMCSA has implemented an IT governance structure, and (3) determine the extent to which FMCSA has ensured selected IT systems are effective. FMCSA had only identified one major IT investment in fiscal year 2016. We then assessed the agency’s efforts to determine the effectiveness of these systems in meeting the needs of the agency by reviewing documentation from the four selected systems and compared it to key factors identified in OMB’s guidance on conducting annual operational analysis, which are a key method for examining the performance of investments with O&M funding. | Why GAO Did This Study
FMCSA, established within the Department of Transportation in January 2000, is charged with reducing crashes involving commercial motor carriers (i.e., large trucks and buses) and saving lives. IT systems and infrastructure serve as a key enabler for FMCSA to achieve its mission. The agency reported spending about $46 million for its IT investments in fiscal year 2016.
In December 2015, the Fixing America's Surface Transportation Act was enacted and required GAO to review the agency's IT, data collection, and management systems. GAO's objectives were to (1) assess the extent to which the agency has plans to modernize its existing systems, (2) assess the extent to which FMCSA has implemented an IT governance structure, and (3) determine the extent to which FMCSA has ensured selected IT systems are effective. To do so, GAO analyzed FMCSA's strategic plan and modernization plans; compared governance documentation to best practices; selected four investments based on operations and maintenance spending for fiscal year 2016, among other factors, and compared assessments for the investments against OMB criteria; and interviewed officials.
What GAO Found
The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) initiated a modernization effort in 2011 and developed an information technology (IT) strategic plan that describes the technical strategy, vision, mission, direction, and goals and objectives to support the agency's mission; however, the plan lacks timelines to guide FMCSA's goals and strategies. In addition, the agency has not completed a modernization plan for its existing IT systems that includes scope, an implementation strategy, schedule, results-oriented goals, and measures, although it has recently awarded a contract to develop such a plan. The Acting Chief Information Officer (CIO) said that updating FMCSA's IT strategic plan had not been a priority for the agency. However, without a complete IT strategic plan, FMCSA will be less likely to move toward its ultimate goal of modernizing its aging legacy systems.
FMCSA has begun to address leading practices of IT governance, but its investment governance framework does not adequately establish an investment board, select and reselect investments, and provide investment oversight. Specifically, regarding the practice of establishing an IT investment review board, FMCSA has not yet clearly defined roles and responsibilities for key working groups and individuals, including the Office of the CIO. Regarding selecting and reselecting IT investments, FMCSA requires participation and collaboration during the select phases for all IT investments; however, it lacks procedures for selecting new investments and reselecting investments that are already operational for continued funding. According to the Acting CIO, the agency is currently drafting these procedures and intends to finalize them by the end of May 2017. Regarding the practice of IT investment oversight, the agency has policies and procedures to ensure that corrective actions and related efforts are executed and tracked, but they have not yet been fully implemented by the three boards. These weaknesses are due to the agency not adhering to its IT orders that establish its governance structure. As a result, FMCSA lacks adequate visibility into and oversight of IT investment decisions and activities, which could ultimately hinder its modernization efforts.
FMCSA had not fully ensured that the four systems GAO selected to review are effectively meeting the needs of the agency because none of the program offices completed operational analyses as required by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). However, as part of its capital planning and investment control process, FMCSA assessed the four key factors of an operational analysis—costs, schedules, investment performance, and customer and business needs. One of the selected programs had partially implemented all four of these factors; two programs had partially implemented one factor, and one program had not addressed any of these factors. This was due to FMCSA not having guidance for conducting operational analyses for investments in operations and maintenance. Until FMCSA fully reviews its operational investments, the agency will lack assurance that these systems meet mission needs.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making five recommendations to FMCSA to improve its IT strategic planning, oversight, and operational analyses. The Department of Transportation concurred with all of the recommendations. |
gao_NSIAD-95-49 | gao_NSIAD-95-49_0 | The objectives of this report are to (1) compare the characteristics of the honor and conduct systems at each academy and describe how the various systems provide common due process protections from the perspective of key participants in the process and (2) describe the attitudes and perceptions of the students toward the honor and conduct systems. While the honor systems at each academy share many similarities, there are also some key differences. . . did not want a system that would codify right and wrong, or a system that over the years would become so involved with loopholes and elastic clauses that soon its very principles would degenerate into a set of rights and wrongs that would enable and tempt midshipmen to do wrong yet still be within the codified system’s bounds of right.”
“The honor concept is not a code of specific requirements or prohibitions, but is violated by the commission or omission of any act contrary to those principles, provided the commission or omission was done with the intent to breach the fundamental concept.”
The 1994 Naval Academy honor concept states, “Midshipmen are persons of integrity: They stand for that which is right.”
Air Force Academy
Prior to acceptance into the Cadet Wing, all Air Force Academy cadets take the Honor Oath, which states, “We will not lie, steal, or cheat, nor tolerate among us anyone who does. That is, they both include language that makes it an honor offense to allow an honor violation to go unreported. At the Military and Naval academies, only students serve on honor hearing boards, while at the Air Force Academy the board consists of seven student members and one field grade officer. Honor System Due Process Provisions
Based on a review of the rules and procedures governing the honor system and the views of academy officials, we assessed whether and how the honor system at each academy provided the various due process elements. The Naval Academy does not grant the right to remain silent before an individual is officially accused of an honor violation. Cadet and Midshipman Perceptions and Attitudes Regarding the Honor System
Our 1994 survey of students at the three academies found that they generally saw their honor systems as fair. Many students at each academy are reluctant to report honor violations. Toleration was more likely to be seen as a less serious offense at the two academies with a non-toleration clause than it was at the Naval Academy where toleration is a conduct offense, not an honor offense. 3.8). 3.10). Comparison of Due Process Protections in Academy Conduct Adjudication Systems
The due process protections available to cadets and midshipmen who are charged with serious conduct offenses vary across the academies and are somewhat different from those provided in honor cases (see table 4.1). As of January 1, 1995, the Air Force Academy replaced that board with a two-step process. The inconsistencies, with academy students having less protection, involve the right to be represented by counsel; the right to remain silent; the right to an independent appeal; the maximum length of the punishment of “restriction;” and, in the case of the Military and Air Force academies, the standard of proof used to determine guilt. UCMJ imposes limitations on article 15 punishments. For Naval Academy midshipmen, the standard of proof for administrative conduct hearings is the same at the Academy as it is for nonjudicial punishment in the fleet, “preponderance of the evidence.” However, the standard of proof used in Military and Air Force Academy administrative conduct hearings (preponderance of the evidence) is lower than that used for nonjudicial punishment in the active Army and Air Force. A majority of students at the academies perceived that the handling of conduct offenses, the application of rules and regulations, and the disciplinary actions imposed were not consistent. Many Rules and Regulations Seen as Unreasonable
The students overwhelmingly indicated that the academies have overregulated them. 5.2.) | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the honor and conduct adjudicatory systems at the Department of Defense (DOD) service academies, focusing on: (1) how the systems at each academy compare; (2) the due process protections of these systems; and (3) the students' attitudes and perceptions toward these systems.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) although the honor systems at the academies have many similarities, there are some prominent differences among them; (2) the honor codes at the Military and Air Force academies include non-toleration clauses that make it an honor offense to know about an honor offense and not report it, while at the Naval Academy failure to act on a suspected honor violation is a conduct offense; (3) differences also exist in the standard of proof that is used in honor hearings, "beyond a reasonable doubt" used at the Air Force Academy versus "a preponderance of the evidence" used at the other academies; (4) academy honor hearings provide students with the majority of the protections typically associated with procedural due process, with some exceptions and limitations; (5) the most prominent limitations exist on the right to representation by counsel and the right to remain silent and avoid self-incrimination; (6) all three academies impose a limitation on the right to counsel by prohibiting military or civilian lawyers from representing cadets and midshipmen in the hearing itself; (7) the right to remain silent is not granted until the individual is actually charged with an offense; (8) responses to a GAO questionnaire indicated that academy students generally saw their honor systems as fair; (9) in some cases, whether an act constitutes an honor violation is not completely clear because the intent of the accused must be inferred from the investigative and hearing processes; (10) there was considerable reluctance among students to report their fellow students for honor violations; (11) in general, the administrative conduct systems at the Military and Naval academies provide several due process protections, with some exceptions and limitations on others; (12) the Cadet Disciplinary Board proceedings at the Air Force Academy, on the other hand, provided fewer due process protections than proceedings at the other two academies; (13) as of January 1, 1995, the Air Force Academy eliminated the Cadet Disciplinary Board and implemented a two-step process aimed at improving timeliness and fairness in dealing with major conduct offenses; (14) while the conduct systems are characterized by academy officials as administrative, rather than judicial, they offer less due process protection than is mandated across DOD for other nonjudicial disciplinary proceedings; (15) a large majority of the students questioned the reasonableness of many of the minor rules and regulations in the conduct codes; and (16) many students perceive academy handling of conduct offenses, the application of rules and regulations, and the imposition of disciplinary actions as inconsistent. |
gao_GAO-12-454T | gao_GAO-12-454T_0 | Reexamining Federal Government Structures and Operations
Reforming and Consolidating Government Act of 2012 (S. 2129) Would Renew and Expand President’s Authority to Propose Restructurings
On February 17th, Chairman Lieberman and Senator Warner introduced S. 2129, entitled “Reforming and Consolidating Government Act of 2012”, a bill renewing the Presidential authority to propose government organizational changes and obtain congressional approval through an expedited process. From 1932 to 1984, Congress provided the President with some form of reorganization authority. S. 2129 renews most of the statutory framework as it existed before the authority lapsed in 1984. However, S. 2129 proposes noteworthy changes, both in terms of eliminating restrictions on the scope of a President’s plan and placing additional requirements on such plans. Unlike the 1984 version of the law, under S. 2129, the President would be permitted to propose the creation of a new department (or renaming of an existing department), the abolishment or transfer of an executive department, or the consolidation of two or more departments. There are currently fifteen departments, including the Department of State and the Additionally, the President would be Department of Homeland Security.permitted to propose the creation of a new agency, a restriction which was included by the 1984 amendment of this authority. The reorganization authority proposed under this bill would permit the President, as in the 1984 version of the law, to prepare and submit to Congress reorganization plans that call for the (1) transfer of an agency or some of its functions to another agency, functions of an agency, (3) consolidation of an agency or its functions or parts of an agency or some of its functions with another agency or part of another agency, (4) consolidation of part of an agency or some of its functions with another part of the same agency, or (5) authorization of an officer to delegate his or her functions. This led to an expansion of the responsibilities of this committee in the Senate, and the formation of the Committee on Homeland Security in the House. Reducing Duplication, Overlap, and Fragmentation Can Improve Government Efficiency and Effectiveness
In our series of reports on the topic to date, we have identified a number of areas of potential duplication, overlap, or fragmentation, as well as opportunities for agencies or Congress to consider taking action that could either reduce the cost of government operations or enhance revenue collections for the Treasury. 2012 Annual Report Identified 51 Opportunity Areas
In our 2012 annual report, we identified a total of 51 areas, including 32 areas of potential duplication, overlap, or fragmentation, as well as 19 opportunities for agencies or Congress to consider taking action that could either reduce the cost of government operations or enhance revenue collections for the Treasury. These areas involve a wide range of government missions including agriculture, defense, economic development, education, energy, general government, health, homeland security, international affairs, science and the environment, and social services. Within and across these missions, the 2012 annual report touches on virtually all major federal departments and agencies. Status of Actions Taken to Address the Areas Identified in 2011 Annual Report
In our 2011 annual report, we suggested a wide range of actions for Congress and the executive branch to consider such as developing strategies to better coordinate fragmented efforts, implementing executive initiatives to improve oversight and evaluation of overlapping programs, considering enactment of legislation to facilitate revenue collection and examining opportunities to eliminate potential duplication through streamlining, collocating, or consolidating efforts or administrative services. For our 2011 follow-up report, we assessed the extent to which Congress and the executive branch addressed the 81 areas—including a total of 176 actions—to reduce or eliminate unnecessary duplication, overlap, or fragmentation or achieve other potential financial benefits. Our assessment of progress made as of February 10, 2012, found that 4 (or 5 percent) of the 81 areas GAO identified were addressed; 60 (or 74 percent) were partially addressed; and 17 (or 21 percent) were not addressed. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses the need to reexamine the structures and operations of the federal government. Congress also asked that we address the Reforming and Consolidating Government Act of 2012 (S. 2129), first proposed by the President and introduced in the Senate by Chairman Lieberman and Senator Warner. The federal government faces an array of challenges and opportunities to enhance performance, ensure accountability, and position the nation for the future. A number of overarching trends, such as fiscal sustainability and debt challenges, demographic and societal changes, developments in science and technology, diffuse security threats, global interdependence, and the rapid expansion of collaborative networks, underscore the need for a fundamental reconsideration of the role, operations, and structure of the federal government for the 21st century. This testimony is based on our work on government reorganization, transformation, and management issues as well as our recently issued reports that identify additional opportunities and progress made to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of government. Specifically, it addresses:
issues related to reexamining the structure of the federal government and its operations, including the Presidents request that Congress grant authority to reorganize the executive branch agencies;
federal programs or functional areas where unnecessary duplication, overlap, or fragmentation exists as well as opportunities for potential cost savings or enhanced revenues identified in our 2012 annual report; and
the status of actions taken by Congress and the executive branch to address the issues we identified in 2011.
What GAO Found
On February 17th, Chairman Lieberman and Senator Warner introduced S. 2129, entitled Reforming and Consolidating Government Act of 2012, a bill renewing the Presidential authority to propose government organizational changes and obtain congressional approval through an expedited process. From 1932 to 1984, Congress provided the President with some form of reorganization authority. S. 2129 renews most of the statutory framework as it existed before the authority lapsed in 1984. However, S. 2129 proposes noteworthy changes, both in terms of eliminating restrictions on the scope of a Presidents plan and placing additional requirements on such plans.
Unlike the 1984 version of the law, under S. 2129, the President would be permitted to propose the creation of a new department (or renaming of an existing department), the abolishment or transfer of an executive department, or the consolidation of two or more departments. There are currently fifteen departments, including the Department of State and the Department of Homeland Security. Additionally, the President would be permitted to propose the creation of a new agency, a restriction which was included by the 1984 amendment of this authority.
The reorganization authority proposed under this bill would permit the President, as in the 1984 version of the law, to prepare and submit to Congress reorganization plans that call for the (1) transfer of an agency or some of its functions to another agency, (2) abolishment of all or some functions of an agency, (3) consolidation of an agency or its functions or parts of an agency or some of its functions with another agency or part of another agency, (4) consolidation of part of an agency or some of its functions with another part of the same agency, or (5) authorization of an officer to delegate his or her functions.
In our 2012 annual report, we identified a total of 51 areas, including 32 areas of potential duplication, overlap, or fragmentation, as well as 19 opportunities for agencies or Congress to consider taking action that could either reduce the cost of government operations or enhance revenue collections for the Treasury. These areas involve a wide range of government missions including agriculture, defense, economic development, education, energy, general government, health, homeland security, international affairs, science and the environment, and social services. Within and across these missions, the 2012 annual report touches on virtually all major federal departments and agencies.
In our 2011 annual report, we suggested a wide range of actions for Congress and the executive branch to consider such as developing strategies to better coordinate fragmented efforts, implementing executive initiatives to improve oversight and evaluation of overlapping programs, considering enactment of legislation to facilitate revenue collection and examining opportunities to eliminate potential duplication through streamlining, collocating, or consolidating efforts or administrative services. For our 2011 follow-up report, we assessed the extent to which Congress and the executive branch addressed the 81 areasincluding a total of 176 actionsto reduce or eliminate unnecessary duplication, overlap, or fragmentation or achieve other potential financial benefits.
Our assessment of progress made as of February 10, 2012, found that 4 (or 5 percent) of the 81 areas GAO identified were addressed; 60 (or 74 percent) were partially addressed; and 17 (or 21 percent) were not addressed. |
gao_GAO-06-722 | gao_GAO-06-722_0 | DOE relies on contractors to operate its facilities and accomplish its missions. The Federal Acquisition Regulation provides the basic guidelines that all federal agencies must follow in planning for and carrying out the process for awarding contracts. Delays Occurred in Most of the Contract Awards We Reviewed
Most of DOE’s 31 contract awards that we reviewed experienced delays when comparing the planned and actual award dates for the contracts. The 24 contracts awarded with competition faced delays of months to years; of the 7 contracts awarded without competition, 6 were awarded on time or nearly so. The other contract was awarded 2 months late. 1.) Delays Occurred Because DOE Had to Modify Its Approach after Beginning the Contract Award Process
Delays in awarding contracts occurred when DOE modified its approach after the start of the contract award process. Delays in Awarding Contracts Could Increase Costs to the Government and Industry and Affect Future Competition
Delays in awarding contracts could increase costs both to DOE and the companies that are competing for the potential contracts and could also affect whether companies are willing to compete for DOE contracts in the future. However, these costs cannot be readily quantified since the department does not accumulate or track the costs associated with individual contract awards. For DOE’s contracts, once companies submit proposals, DOE generally requires the companies to ensure that key personnel identified in the proposals continue to be available until the award decision has been made. Efforts to Address the Causes of Delays Are in Early Stages, but Concerns Remain about the Potential Effectiveness of DOE’s Planned Actions
When we began our review in July 2005, DOE officials generally were not addressing delays in awarding contracts because DOE’s data was showing that its contracts were being awarded in a timely manner. It is unclear the extent to which these delays may have been avoidable with better oversight or management, but at least some of the delays were avoidable, such as when DOE had to rework parts of the contract award process to correct errors. As DOE goes forward with its efforts to improve its contract award process, it will be important to ensure that performance measures address the timeliness of all of the department’s contract awards that require written plans and schedules, and that lessons learned and best practices are consistently shared with DOE staff that will plan for and carry out future contract awards. Scope and Methodology
In response to a congressional request, we determined (1) the extent to which the Department of Energy (DOE) adhered to its planned dates for awarding contracts and the factors contributing to any delays, (2) the impacts of any delays in awarding contracts, and (3) the extent to which DOE has taken steps to address delays in its contract award process. To determine the extent to which DOE adhered to its planned dates for awarding contracts, we analyzed 31 contracts from seven DOE locations that (1) were affiliated with the department’s three largest component organizations—the Office of Environmental Management, Office of Science, and the National Nuclear Security Administration—and (2) had awarded a large share of the department’s contracts valued at $5 million or greater in fiscal years 2002 through 2005, including facility management contracts. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Energy (DOE), the largest civilian contracting agency in the federal government, spends over 90 percent of its annual budget on contracts to operate its facilities and carry out its diverse missions. Federal law and regulations outline the steps DOE must follow in planning and carrying out the contract award process and emphasize the importance of awarding contracts in a timely manner. Several of DOE's recent contracts have taken much longer than anticipated to award. GAO was asked to determine (1) the extent to which DOE has experienced delays in awarding contracts and factors contributing to delays, (2) the impacts of any such delays, and (3) the extent to which DOE has taken steps to address the delays.
What GAO Found
Delays in awarding DOE contracts occurred in most of the 31 contracts that GAO reviewed. In fiscal years 2002 through 2005, DOE awarded 131 contracts valued at $5 million or greater; the 31 of these contracts GAO reviewed were affiliated with DOE's three largest component organizations and represented about 73 percent of the dollars awarded. None of the 24 contracts awarded competitively was awarded by the date planned in DOE's schedule, with 23 of the contracts awarded between several weeks and 4-1/2 years later than the planned date. Of the 7 contracts awarded without competition, 6 were awarded on time or nearly so, with the remaining contract awarded 2 months late. Delays in awarding contracts occurred, in part, because DOE had to modify its approach after beginning the contract award process. At least some of the delays were avoidable, such as when DOE reworked contract awards to correct errors. Delays in awarding contracts could increase costs both to DOE and companies competing for DOE work. Because the department does not track its costs for awarding contracts, it was not feasible to quantify the impact of these delays. Companies competing for DOE's work may also face increased costs when contract awards are delayed, such as the costs associated with ensuring that key personnel identified in proposals continue to be available. Increased costs and delays may affect the willingness of companies to compete for future DOE work, although the actual impact is unknown. Until recently, DOE had not been addressing delays in awarding contracts because incomplete performance data indicated that most of the contracts were awarded in a timely manner. In late 2005, DOE began several efforts to improve its contract award process, including implementing improved measures of contract award timeliness and restructuring the Office of Environmental Management to strengthen management of the contracting process. However, two concerns could limit the effectiveness of these efforts: (1) the efforts do not encompass all of DOE's contract awards and (2) DOE does not have a systematic method of identifying and disseminating lessons learned and best practices from past or current contract awards. |
gao_GAO-08-889 | gao_GAO-08-889_0 | Courthouse Has Experienced Repeated Delays Due to Changes in Project Scope, Unforeseen Construction Cost Escalation, and Procurement Issues
Since 2000 when GSA originally proposed building a new courthouse in downtown Los Angeles, the project has experienced repeated delays in its schedule. GSA has spent $16.3 million designing a new courthouse and $16.9 million acquiring and preparing a new site for it in downtown Los Angeles. Since no construction has occurred, about $366.45 million remains in GSA’s Federal Building Fund for the construction of a 41-courtroom L.A. The delays were initially caused by GSA’s decision to design a courthouse much larger than what was authorized by Congress. Delays Contributed to L.A. Project Cost Estimates Nearly Tripling and Current Problems Persisting
Over 8 years of delay in GSA’s estimated occupancy of the new L.A. courthouse, estimates have nearly tripled, rendering GSA’s currently authorized 41-courtroom courthouse unachievable. GSA is currently at a standstill because current cost estimates for a 41- courtroom courthouse exceed authorized and appropriated amounts and the President’s fiscal year 2009 budget request did not include any funds for the L.A. courthouse project. Consequently, GSA will need to obtain congressional approval to move forward on any plan. The L.A. Court’s operational problems continue. Housing district and magistrate judges in both the Spring Street and the Roybal buildings causes operational inefficiencies, according to judiciary officials. In addition, a high-level L.A. Court official said that the judiciary has stopped investing in the parts of the Spring Street Courthouse for which it is responsible because it expects the judiciary to move into a new building. Options for the Future of the Project Require Balancing Court Needs with Additional Costs and Other Factors
Since 2000, GSA has developed eight different proposals for housing the L.A. court. Option 1: Build a 36- Courtroom, 45-Chamber Building and Add 4 Courtrooms to Roybal
GSA estimated that this proposed project would cost $1.1 billion—$733.6 million more than Congress has already appropriated—and be completed by 2014 if construction starts in 2009. All the district and senior judges would be housed in the new courthouse, while the magistrate and bankruptcy judges would be in the Roybal building. With congressional approval, GSA could use existing funds to begin planning and constructing the new building. Option 4: Restart Planning Process and Possibly Use Remaining Funds for Other Purposes
Because there is neither consensus nor adequate funding to complete any of the plans currently under consideration, another option is for GSA and the judiciary to restart the planning process and develop a new proposal to meet the long-term needs of the L.A. Court that all stakeholders can support. Since GSA has developed numerous proposals on housing the L.A. Court, it is difficult to know which one it believes is the best solution, and the district judges assigned to the L.A. Court unanimously opposed GSA’s most recent proposal to build a 20-courtroom building. The remaining $366.5 million appropriated for the project could remain in place for meeting the judiciary’s needs in Los Angeles once a project is agreed upon, or the funds could be used for other purposes, such as addressing GSA’s $6.6 billion repair and maintenance backlog by receiving congressional approval to transfer or rescind the funds. We are not advocating this or any of the other three options. Nonetheless, it is clear the current process is deadlocked. In written comments, the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts indicated that the report reflects the general sequence of events and circumstances that have led to the current situation. In written comments, GSA indicated that it partially agreed with the report’s findings related to the delays in the L.A. Our report indicates that GSA and the judiciary were slow to reduce scope to stay on budget. What is the status of the construction of a new federal
courthouse in Los Angeles? 2. What effects have any delays in the project had on project costs and court operations? 3. Toured L.A. federal court sites, including the Spring Street Courthouse, the Edward R. Roybal Federal Building and Courthouse, the federal building on Los Angeles Street, and the planned courthouse site. Interviewed L.A. district and magistrate judges and other court officials, the Administrative Office of the Federal Courts, the General Services Administration (GSA), and the U.S. Our report does not make any statements related to the number of bankruptcy courtrooms required by the federal judiciary in Los Angeles, but does list the number of those courtrooms that GSA projects for each of the current options thus shows that the 20- courtroom courthouse option would provide 8 fewer bankruptcy courtrooms in Los Angeles than the other options currently being considered. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since the early 1990s, the General Services Administration (GSA) and the federal judiciary (judiciary) have been carrying out a multibillion-dollar courthouse construction initiative. In downtown Los Angeles, California, one of the nation's busiest federal district courts (L.A. Court), the federal judiciary has split its district, magistrate, and bankruptcy judges between two buildings--the Spring Street Courthouse and the Edward R. Roybal Federal Building and Courthouse. In 2000 the judiciary requested and GSA proposed building a new courthouse in downtown Los Angeles in order to increase security, efficiency, and space. In response, Congress authorized and appropriated about $400 million for the project. GAO was asked to provide information on the construction of the L.A. courthouse. This report answers: (1) What is the status of the construction of a new federal courthouse in Los Angeles? (2) What effects have any delays in the project had on its costs and court operations? (3) What options are available for the future of the project? GAO reviewed project planning and budget documents, visited the key sites in Los Angeles, and interviewed GSA and judiciary officials. In its comments, the judiciary indicated that the report reflects the project's general sequence of events and circumstances, and GSA partially agreed with the report's findings related to the delays.
What GAO Found
GSA initially estimated in 2000 that the L.A. Court could take occupancy of a new courthouse in fiscal year 2006, but occupancy has been delayed by 8 years to fiscal year 2014 at the earliest. GSA has spent $16.3 million designing a new courthouse and $16.9 million acquiring and preparing a new site for it in downtown Los Angeles. Since no construction has occurred, about $366.45 million remains appropriated for the construction of a 41-courtroom L.A. Courthouse. Project delays were caused by GSA's decision to design a larger courthouse than what was authorized by Congress, slow decision making by GSA and the judiciary to reduce scope and stay on budget, unforeseen cost escalations, and low contractor interest that caused GSA to cancel the entire 41-courtroom courthouse project. Due to the delays, estimated costs for housing the L.A. Court have nearly tripled to over $1.1 billion, rendering GSA's currently authorized 41-courtroom courthouse unachievable and causing the L.A. Court's problems to persist. Because current cost estimates exceed authorized and appropriated amounts, GSA will need to obtain congressional approval to move forward on any plan. Meanwhile, almost half of the courtrooms in the L.A. Court's Spring Street building do not meet the judiciary's standards for size or security, and the U.S. Marshals have chosen not to use the prisoner passageways that exist in the building because they are too dangerous and inefficient. The L.A. Court also estimates that current courtroom and support space shortages will continue to worsen over time. GAO's analysis showed that four options exist for the L.A. Courthouse project, which require balancing needs for courtroom space, congressional approval, and additional estimated appropriations of up to $733 million. First, GSA has proposed building a 36-courtroom, 45-chamber courthouse to house all district and senior judges and adding 4 more courtrooms in the Roybal building to house all magistrate and bankruptcy judges. The L.A. Court supports this option, but it is the most expensive of the remaining options. Second, GSA has proposed constructing a new 20-courtroom, 20-chamber building and adding 12 more courtrooms to the Roybal building. GSA could begin construction with existing funds, but the L.A. Court opposes this option. Third, GSA has proposed housing the L.A. court in the existing buildings by adding 13 courtrooms to the Roybal building and upgrading security at the Spring Street building. GSA could begin work on the project with existing funds but the L.A. Court also opposes this option. Finally, another option, given the lack of consensus and adequate funding, is to restart the planning process. Under this option, the remaining $366.45 million appropriated for the courthouse could continue to be available for meeting the judiciary's needs in Los Angeles or be used for other purposes through a transfer or rescission. While GAO takes no position on this or the other three options, it is clear the current process is deadlocked. |
gao_GAO-03-979 | gao_GAO-03-979_0 | In fiscal year 2002, the Trust Fund received about $10 billion in revenue from these taxes and interest. Table 2 breaks down the distribution of the funding among FAA programs for each of the three expenditure scenarios through 2006. Projected Financial Outlook for the Trust Fund Is Positive but Depends on Realization of Forecasted Passenger Traffic Levels and Airfares
Over the next 3 years, the Trust Fund is projected to have sufficient revenue to fund authorized spending and end each year with an uncommitted balance under each of the three expenditure proposals. Suspending Some or All Taxes Accruing to the Trust Fund Would Reduce or Eliminate the Trust Fund’s Uncommitted Balance
Billions of Trust Fund revenue would be forgone if all taxes accruing to the Trust Fund were suspended for 1 year. For example, a passenger ticket tax holiday would decrease the Trust Fund’s uncommitted balance from $4.8 billion in 2002 to $2 billion in 2003 and to $2.1 billion in 2004, while a fuel tax holiday would reduce it to $4.1 billion in 2003 and to $4.2 billion in 2004. For example, a passenger ticket tax holiday would cause the uncommitted balance to reach zero by October 2003. A tax holiday under the President’s proposal would have a greater effect because that proposal would require the Trust Fund to support a larger percentage of FAA Operations compared with the Senate’s and House’s proposals. For example, as previously noted, a 1-year all tax holiday starting in April 2003 would cause the uncommitted balance of the Trust Fund to reach zero by October 2003 and might require FAA to make significant spending cuts to the aviation programs supported by the Trust Fund unless additional funding were authorized from the General Fund. Although FAA would not have to terminate contracts under the House’s and Senate’s proposals if there were a passenger ticket tax, flight segment tax, or fuel tax holiday, FAA’ s ability to continue to fund its programs with Trust Fund revenue would be affected under the President’s proposal if one of these holidays were granted. Agency Comments
We provided the Department of Transportation with a draft of this report for its review and comment. FAA officials agreed with information contained in this report and provided some clarifying and technical comments that we incorporated where appropriate. Scope and Methodology
To determine the projected financial status of the multibillion dollar Airport and Airway Trust Fund (hereafter called the Trust Fund), we obtained from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) the financial projections for the Trust Fund that it had developed under the expenditure proposals included in the President’s reauthorization proposal. We subsequently asked FAA to develop similar projections using the expenditure scenarios in the proposals from the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation and the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Aviation. To assess the effect of various tax holidays on the financial status of the Trust Fund, we asked FAA to develop additional financial projections under various tax holiday scenarios. A cargo tax holiday in which the cargo waybill taxes are suspended. The following assumptions were also included in the analyses: As requested in March 2003, we based our analysis on hypothetical tax holidays that would have begun on April 1, 2003, and ended on April 1, 2004. | Why GAO Did This Study
The multibillion dollar Airport and Airway Trust Fund (Trust Fund) provides most of the funding for the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). The Trust Fund relies on revenue from 10 taxes, including passenger ticket, fuel, and cargo taxes. Concerns about the financial outlook of the Trust Fund have emerged recently given the downturn in passenger air travel, requests from the airlines to suspend some of the Trust Fund taxes, and the need to reauthorize FAA's major programs in 2003. GAO was asked to determine (1) the projected financial outlook of the Trust Fund and (2) how a 1- year suspension of various taxes accruing to the Trust Fund (i.e., a tax holiday), would affect its financial status. We were asked to assess five potential tax holidays that would have begun on April 1, 2003, and ended on April 1, 2004. GAO used a model developed by FAA that made financial projections for the Trust Fund using expenditure assumptions that were based on (1) the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation's May 2, 2003, and the House Subcommittee on Aviation's May 15, 2003, reauthorization proposals authorizing over $34 billion and (2) the President's proposal authorizing almost $38 billion from the Trust Fund. For each of these proposals, GAO asked FAA to model the effects of five different tax holidays.
What GAO Found
Over the next 3 years, with no change in tax rates and assuming that FAA's passenger traffic and airfare projections are valid, the Trust Fund is expected to continue to have sufficient revenue to cover authorized spending and end each year with a surplus, or an "uncommitted balance" as it is usually called, under each of the three expenditure scenarios we analyzed. For fiscal years 2004 through 2006, the potential uncommitted balances would range from over $4.4 billion (if Congress adopted either the House or the Senate proposal) to $1 billion, if the President's proposal were adopted. Suspending some or all of the taxes that accrue to the Trust Fund for 1 year would reduce or eliminate the Trust Fund's uncommitted balance. As depicted below, if all taxes accruing to the Trust Fund were suspended, effective April 1, 2003, almost $10 billion in tax revenue would be forgone and the uncommitted balance would be eliminated by October 2003. The status of the Trust Fund would also differ according to the reauthorization proposal adopted and the taxes suspended. For example, suspending the passenger ticket tax and adopting either the House or Senate proposal would reduce the uncommitted balance to $1.8 billion and $2 billion, respectively, in 2006. However, suspending the same tax and adopting the President's proposal would eliminate the uncommitted balance by October 2003. The budgetary consequences of the remaining potential tax holidays would vary substantially. FAA officials stated that under the President's proposal, a passenger ticket tax holiday might require spending cuts to its capital programs, while a cargo tax holiday would require few if any spending cuts to its programs. In its comments on a draft of this report, FAA agreed with the report's findings and provided some clarifying comments that we incorporated where appropriate. |
gao_GAO-17-721 | gao_GAO-17-721_0 | These tools, as explained in further detail later in the report, are to be used in coordination with federal regulation and NSF guidance. This variation was based on various factors, such as by the types of activities supported by the awards and the types of organizations receiving the awards. Budgeted Indirect Costs on NSF Awards Varied from Year to Year
Budgeted indirect costs on NSF awards ranged from 16 to 24 percent of the total annual amounts the agency awarded for fiscal years 2000 through 2016. The percentage fluctuated during this period, though it has generally increased since reaching a low point in 2010. As shown in figure 3, our analysis of NSF data indicates that on average, NSF budgeted about 23 percent of award amounts for indirect costs on awards to organizations for which NSF did not have indirect cost cognizance and about 11 percent for indirect costs on awards to organizations for which NSF had cognizance. NSF Has Not Consistently Implemented Guidance for Setting Indirect Cost Rates and Has Not Included Certain Details and Procedures
NSF has developed internal guidance for setting ICRs, but NSF staff have not consistently followed it. In addition, the internal guidance on supervisory review does not include certain details and procedures. NSF has designed control activities for setting ICRs and has implemented them through internal guidance, such as Indirect Cost Rate Proposal Review Standing Operating Guidance. Our review of a nongeneralizable sample of seven NSF ICR agreement files showed that NSF staff followed many parts of the agency’s internal guidance. For example, NSF’s internal guidance includes procedures for NSF staff to use a standard document checklist to verify that the awardee’s ICR proposal package is complete and that all required documents have been submitted. For example, some checklists required certifications of lobbying costs and indirect costs, and others did not. In particular, NSF’s existing internal guidance on supervisory activities, which are a key part of the agency’s control activities for setting ICRs, did not include details on (1) the criteria to be used by the supervisor to assess the risk level of a proposal and determine the types of review steps to be performed by staff for each risk level and (2) the steps that the supervisor needs to take when reviewing and documenting the work performed by NSF staff to set ICRs. By adding procedures in its internal guidance for implementing the new provisions, NSF could better ensure that NSF staff will apply the provisions correctly in accordance with the Uniform Guidance. NSF officials described ways that staff implement these procedures even though the procedures are not fully detailed or included in guidance. However, including the missing details and procedures in NSF’s internal guidance, and requiring staff to follow the guidance, could help NSF ensure that staff properly and consistently negotiate ICRs and that the rates negotiated comply with applicable federal guidance, which in turn would help ensure that the funding provided for indirect costs does not unnecessarily limit the amount available for research. In its comments, reproduced in appendix I, NSF concurred with our recommendations and described actions it would take to address them. | Why GAO Did This Study
NSF awards billions of dollars to institutions of higher education (universities), K-12 school systems, industry, science associations, and other organizations to promote scientific progress by supporting research and education.
NSF reimburses awardees for direct and indirect costs incurred for most awards. Direct costs, such as salaries and equipment, can be attributed to a specific project that receives an NSF award. Indirect costs, such as the costs of operating and maintaining facilities, are not directly attributable to a specific project but are necessary for the general operation of an awardee's organization. For certain organizations, NSF also negotiates ICR agreements, which are then used for calculating reimbursements for indirect costs. ICR negotiations and reimbursements are to be done in accordance with federal guidance and regulation and NSF policy.
GAO was asked to review the amount of NSF funding for indirect costs and NSF's negotiation of ICRs. This report examines (1) what is known about indirect costs on NSF awards over time, and (2) the extent to which NSF has implemented guidance for setting ICRs for organizations over which it has cognizance. GAO reviewed relevant regulations, guidance, and agency documents; analyzed budget data and a nongeneralizable sample of nine ICR files from fiscal year 2016 selected based on award funding; and interviewed NSF officials.
What GAO Found
For National Science Foundation (NSF) awards during fiscal years 2000 through 2016, budgeted indirect costs varied from 16 to 24 percent of the total annual amounts the agency awarded. The percentage fluctuated during this period, though this percentage generally has increased since reaching a low point in 2010. The variation from year-to-year was based on various factors such as by the types of activities supported by the awards and the types of awardee organizations receiving the awards.
Note: Award funding has not been adjusted for inflation.
NSF has developed internal guidance for setting indirect cost rates (ICR) but has not consistently implemented this guidance and has not included certain details and procedures, in particular:
NSF has not consistently implemented its guidance because it has not yet required NSF staff to follow aspects of its guidance, such as using a documentation checklist that NSF developed to verify that an awardee's ICR proposal package is complete.
NSF did not include details on supervisory activities, such as the criteria to be used by the supervisor of the ICR process for assessing an ICR proposal's risk level and mitigating risks at each level.
NSF did not include certain procedures, such as for implementing new provisions of federal guidance on setting ICRs.
NSF officials described ways that staff implement procedures even though the procedures are not fully detailed or included in guidance. Nevertheless, with complete guidance that includes the missing details and procedures and that is consistently followed, NSF could better ensure that ICRs are set consistently and in accordance with federal guidance on indirect costs and with federal internal control standards.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that NSF take three actions to improve its guidance for setting ICRs, including adding certain details and procedures. NSF concurred with GAO's recommendations and described plans to address them. |
gao_GAO-11-752T | gao_GAO-11-752T_0 | These tails are also known as depleted uranium because the material is depleted in uranium-235 compared with natural uranium. Tails have historically been considered a waste product because considerable enrichment processing is required to further extract the remaining useful quantities of uranium-235. DOE Potentially Has Options for the Tails but Has Not Implemented Its December 2008 Plan for Selling or Re- Enriching Them
DOE’s potential options for its tails include selling the tails “as is,” re- enriching them, or storing them indefinitely. We found that DOE generally has authority to carry out the re-enrichment and storage options. As we said earlier, DOE issued a comprehensive uranium management plan in December 2008 in response to a recommendation in our March 2008 report. However, to date, DOE has not done so and, according to DOE officials, has no current plans to sell or re- enrich this material. DOE’s Legal Authority to Sell the Tails in Their Current Form Is Doubtful
While selling the tails in their current unprocessed form is a potential option, we believe that DOE’s authority to conduct such sales is doubtful because of specific statutory language in legislation governing DOE’s disposition of its uranium. Should Congress grant DOE the needed legal authority by amending the USEC Privatization Act or through other legislation, firms such as nuclear power utilities and enrichment companies would be interested in purchasing at least that portion of the tails with higher concentrations of extractable uranium-235 as a valuable source for nuclear fuel. DOE Could Re-enrich Its Tails
Although DOE’s legal authority to sell the tails in their current form is doubtful, DOE has the general legal option of re-enriching the tails and then selling the resulting natural or enriched uranium. Furthermore, DOE would have to find a company with excess enrichment capacity beyond its current operations, which may be particularly difficult if large amounts of enrichment processing were required. Although DOE would have to pay for re-enrichment, it might obtain more value from selling the re-enriched uranium instead of the tails if its re- enrichment costs were less than the discount it would have to offer to sell the tails as is. DOE Could Store the Tails DOE also has the general legal option to store the tails indefinitely. DOE has constructed new facilities at its Paducah plant and its closed Portsmouth uranium enrichment plant to chemically convert its tails into a more stable and safer uranium compound that is suitable for long-term storage. As our March 2008 report noted, storing the tails indefinitely could prevent DOE from taking advantage of the large increase in uranium prices to obtain potentially large amounts of revenue from material that was once viewed as waste. We stated that the assessment should contain detailed information on the types and quantities of depleted, natural, and enriched uranium the department currently manages and a comprehensive assessment of DOE’s options for this material, including the department’s authority to implement these options. In December 2008, DOE issued an “Excess Uranium Inventory Management Plan.” Among other things, the plan states that DOE would begin selling or re-enriching depleted uranium in 2009. However, the department has not, to date, sold or re-enriched any of its depleted uranium. DOE’s Depleted Uranium Inventory Is Potentially Worth Billions of Dollars, but Many Factors Could Greatly Change Its Value
At current uranium prices, we estimate DOE’s tails to have a net value of $4.2 billion; however, we would like to emphasize that this estimate is very sensitive to changing uranium prices, which recently have been extremely volatile, as well as to the availability of enrichment capacity. Uranium prices are very volatile, and a sharp rise or fall in prices could greatly affect the value of the tails. Our March 2008 report therefore suggested that Congress consider clarifying DOE’s statutory authority to manage depleted uranium, under the USEC Privatization Act or other legislation, including explicit direction about whether and how DOE may sell or transfer the tails. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since the 1940s, the Department of Energy (DOE) has been processing natural uranium into enriched uranium, which has a higher concentration of the isotope uranium-235 that can be used in nuclear weapons or reactors. This has resulted in over 700,000 metric tons of leftover depleted uranium, also known as "tails," that have varying residual concentrations of uranium-235. The tails are stored at DOE's uranium enrichment plants in Portsmouth, Ohio and Paducah, Kentucky. Although the tails have historically been considered a waste product, increases in uranium prices may give DOE options to use some of the tails in ways that could provide revenue to the government. GAO's testimony is based on its March 2008 report (GAO-08-606R). GAO updated the analysis in its 2008 report to reflect current uranium prices and actions taken by DOE. The testimony focuses on (1) DOE's options for its tails and (2) the potential value of DOE's tails and factors that affect the value.
What GAO Found
DOE's potential options for its tails include selling the tails "as is," re-enriching the tails, or storing them indefinitely. DOE's current legal authority to sell its depleted uranium inventory "as is" is doubtful, but DOE generally has authority to carry out the other options. (1) DOE's authority to sell the tails in their current unprocessed form is doubtful. Because of specific statutory language in 1996 legislation governing DOE's disposition of its uranium, DOE's authority to sell the tails in unprocessed form is doubtful, and under the rules of statutory construction, DOE likely lacks such authority. However, if Congress were to provide the department with the needed authority, firms such as nuclear power utilities and enrichment companies may be interested in purchasing these tails and re-enriching them as a source of nuclear fuel. (2) DOE could contract to re-enrich the tails. Although DOE would have to pay for re-enrichment, it might obtain more value from selling the re-enriched uranium instead of the tails if its re-enrichment costs were less than the discount it would have to offer to sell the tails as is. (3) DOE could store the tails indefinitely. This option conforms to an existing DOE plan to convert tails into a more stable form for long term storage, but storing the tails indefinitely could prevent DOE from obtaining the potentially large revenue resulting from sales at current high uranium prices. DOE issued a comprehensive uranium management plan in December 2008 that stated that the department would consider selling depleted uranium or re-enriching it to realize best value for the government and that it would begin selling or re-enriching depleted uranium in 2009. However, to date, DOE has not sold or re-enriched any of its depleted uranium and, according to DOE officials, has no current plans to do so. The potential value of DOE's depleted uranium tails is currently substantial, but changing market conditions could greatly affect the tails' value over time. Based on May 2011 uranium prices and enrichment costs and assuming sufficient re-enrichment capacity is available, GAO estimates the value of DOE's tails at $4.2 billion--about $3.4 billion less than GAO's March 2008 estimate. However, this estimate is very sensitive to changing uranium prices, which have dropped since GAO's March 2008 report was issued. GAO's estimate is also very sensitive to the availability of enrichment capacity. In particular, DOE would have to find a company with excess enrichment capacity beyond its current operations, which may be difficult if large amounts of enrichment processing were required. In its 2008 report, GAO suggested that Congress consider clarifying DOE's statutory authority to manage its tails. No action on this recommendation has been taken to date. Also, GAO recommended that DOE complete a comprehensive uranium management assessment. DOE issued a uranium management plan in December 2008 that addressed GAO's recommendation. |
gao_GAO-05-345 | gao_GAO-05-345_0 | Passive and active RFID tags physically differ from one another, as figure 1 shows. Although the military components have begun acquiring and funding the infrastructure needed for passive RFID implementation, existing infrastructure is minimal because implementation did not begin until January 1, 2005. DOD Has Developed Policy and Guidance and the Military Components Are Developing Plans to Implement Passive RFID Technology
Since 2003, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) has developed policy and guidance to implement a potentially promising technology, known as passive RFID into their supply chain operations. Although DOD plans to begin implementing the use of passive RFID to all classes of all commodities, excluding bulk commodities, shipped to all locations by January 1, 2007, it will be fiscal year 2016—and beyond for the Army—before passive RFID will be fully implemented into supply chain operations, according to Navy and Army funding projections. DOD Is Using Pilot Projects and Initial Implementations to Test the Application of Passive RFID Technology
DOD is using several pilot projects and has begun initial implementation at several receiving and distribution facilities to better understand passive RFID technology and test its application to their business processes. Additionally, the projected cost for passive RFID implementation—about $437 million from fiscal years 2006 through 2011—includes costs for purchasing passive RFID equipment such as tags, readers, and writers, and costs associated with installation and maintenance, but does not include the cost of system interoperability, which officials estimate to be the most expensive element of implementation. As of January 2005, DOD and its military components had spent about $7.4 million on passive RFID technology. DOD’s Implementation of Passive RFID Technology Lacks a Comprehensive Strategic Management Approach
While DOD has taken a number of actions to guide and direct the implementation of passive RFID into the supply chain process, passive RFID could be more efficiently and effectively implemented if DOD developed a comprehensive strategic management approach to ensure that implementation efforts are guided by sound management principles. Because the military components are developing implementation plans to support DOD’s RFID policy, the development of a comprehensive strategic management approach that fully incorporates these key management principles could provide decision makers in both DOD and the military components with a framework to guide RFID implementation efforts and the means to determine whether these efforts are achieving the desired results. DOD Has Identified Several Challenges for Passive RFID
DOD officials have identified a broad spectrum of challenges concerning passive RFID that remain to be resolved before passive RFID technology can be fully implemented into DOD operations, but their RFID implementation planning does not include any actions to mitigate these challenges. First, passive RFID technology is a new technology that is evolving. Until DOD and the military components identify actions to mitigate these implementation challenges, their progress in resolving these challenges will be impeded. Although DOD and its military components have incorporated some of these key management principles in their RFID policy and guidance, many of these principles are missing or are only partially present. However, we continue to believe that the challenges identified in the report remain, and that the department needs to develop a mitigation plan to address these challenges. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) has had problems with tracking and identifying inventory for many years, most recently in Operation Iraqi Freedom. One of several tools DOD is using to address these inventory problems is radio frequency identification (RFID). RFID technology consists of passive or active tags that are attached to equipment and supplies that are shipped from one location to another. Although DOD did not begin official implementation of passive RFID technology until January 1, 2005, DOD has been using active RFID technology since the early 1990s and began developing policy and pilot testing passive RFID in 2003. As of January 1, 2007, all commodities, excluding bulk commodities, are to have passive RFID tags. Full implementation of passive RFID is estimated to cost hundreds of millions of dollars. This report (1) provides information on the status of passive RFID implementation, (2) addresses the extent to which DOD has developed a strategic approach for implementing passive RFID, and (3) highlights challenges DOD recognizes it faces in implementing passive RFID and any plans developed by DOD to mitigate these challenges.
What GAO Found
Since 2003, DOD and the components have taken actions to begin using a potentially promising technology, known as passive RFID, throughout their supply chain operations. These actions include development of policy and guidance and the use of pilot projects and initial implementation to test the technology's application to their business processes. In addition, infrastructure and funding have been provided, but this has been minimal because implementation did not officially begin until January 2005. Future funding requirements are expected to increase sharply as full implementation proceeds--from $6.6 million as of January 2005 to about $472 million projected from fiscal years 2006 through 2011. This $472 million projection does not include the cost of system interoperability, which officials believe will be the most expensive element of implementation. Full implementation of passive RFID in supply operations is not anticipated until 2016 or beyond. While DOD has taken a number of actions to direct the implementation of passive RFID, it has not yet developed a comprehensive strategic management approach that incorporates sound management principles. The planning by DOD and its components lacks or only partially incorporates several key management principles needed to effectively guide, monitor, and assess implementation. The development of a comprehensive strategic management approach that fully incorporates these principles could provide decision makers with a framework to guide RFID implementation efforts and the means to determine whether these efforts are achieving the desired results. This affects both DOD and its components because the components are developing implementation plans to support DOD's RFID policy. DOD has identified several challenges that will need to be resolved before passive RFID can be fully implemented, but it has not yet developed a mitigation plan to address these challenges. Some challenges relate to the fact that passive RFID is a new and evolving technology, while other challenges derive from operational issues and obtaining adequate funding. Furthermore, certain regulatory and administrative obstacles remain. Until DOD and the components identify actions to mitigate these implementation challenges, their progress in resolving these challenges may be impeded. |
gao_GAO-10-123 | gao_GAO-10-123_0 | Background
DOD plays a support role in CBRNE consequence management, including providing those capabilities needed to save lives, alleviate hardship or suffering, and minimize property damage caused by the incident. DOD’s stated requirement is to have three of these forces. DOD Has Its Own CBRNE Consequence Management Plans in Place but is Unable to Fully Integrate Them with Other Federal Plans, Which Are Incomplete
DOD has operational plans for CBRNE consequence management. However, DOD has not integrated its plans with other federal government plans because the concept and strategic plans associated with the Integrated Planning System mandated by Presidential directive in December 2007 have not been completed. DOD’s plans and those of other federal and state entities cannot be fully integrated until the supporting strategic and concept plans are completed. However, its ability to respond effectively may be compromised because (1) its planned response times may not meet the requirements of a particular incident, (2) it may lack sufficient capacity in some key capabilities, and (3) it faces challenges in adhering to its strategy for sourcing CCMRFs with available units. That risk can be mitigated by plans that integrate the Active and Reserve Component portions of the CCMRFs and agreements between DOD and the states on the availability of National Guard units and the duty status under which they would respond to a major incident requiring federal forces. DOD Has Taken Actions to Improve CCMRF Readiness, but Training Gaps and Conflicting Priorities May Degrade Performance
DOD has taken a number of actions in the past year to improve the readiness of the first fielded CCMRF. We found that CCMRF may be limited in its ability to successfully conduct consequence management operations because (1) it does not conduct realistic full-force field training to confirm its readiness to assume the mission or to deploy rapidly and (2) conflicting priorities between the CBRNE mission and overseas deployments affect some units’ mission preparation and unit cohesion. Therefore, for the first time, identified units have been conducting both individual and collective training focused on the CBRNE mission. These training and force rotation issues have prevented DOD from providing the kind of stability to the force that would allow units to build cohesiveness. CCMRF Requirements Have Not Been Fully Developed, and Funding and Oversight Are Decentralized
DOD is making progress in identifying and providing funding and equipment to meet CCMRF mission requirements; however, its efforts to identify total program requirements have not been completed, and its approach to providing program funding has been fragmented because funding responsibilities for CCMRF-related costs are dispersed throughout DOD and are not subject to central oversight. Extent of Dedicated Funds for Some CCMRF Training Affects Mission
In the spring of 2008, sourcing priority for the CCMRF mission increased substantially within the department, and funding was provided for specific aspects of the mission. Until all CBRNE plans that are being developed under the Integrated Planning System are complete, it will be difficult for DOD to know whether its considerable body of operational plans will adequately address anticipated gaps in the capabilities needed to respond to multiple, near-simultaneous, CBRNE incidents. Without an overarching approach to develop full and complete mission requirements, an approach and mechanisms in place to fully support those requirements, and a centralized focal point to ensure that all requirements have been identified and fully funded, DOD’s ability to carry out this high-priority homeland security mission efficiently and effectively could be in jeopardy. In order to ensure that DOD’s plans are consistent with stated program goals, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Commander of NORTHCOM and the military services to align plans for all parts of CCMRF, including specialized and general- purpose units, with stated objectives for CCMRF, and include in their planning efforts the extent to which existing CCMRF capabilities contribute to identified response requirements and stated CCMRF mission goals; and work with the state governors through the states’ Adjutants General and the National Guard Bureau to create a long-term plan for sourcing CCMRF and ensure that the agreements being established between DOD and state governors include specific terms on National Guard force availability and duty and response status. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) has planned for and structured its force to provide chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive (CBRNE) consequence management assistance, we met with DOD officials and reviewed DOD’s plans to determine sourcing requirements for the CBRNE Consequence Management Response Force (CCMRF). | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD plays a support role in managing Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives (CBRNE) incidents, including providing capabilities to save lives, alleviate hardship or suffering, and minimize property damage. This report addresses the extent to which (1) DOD's CBRNE consequence management plans and capabilities are integrated with other federal plans; (2) DOD has planned for and structured its force to provide CBRNE consequence management assistance; (3) DOD's CBRNE Consequence Management Response Forces (CCMRF) are prepared for their mission; and (4) DOD has CCMRF funding plans that are linked to requirements for specialized CBRNE capabilities. GAO reviewed DOD's plans for CBRNE consequence management and documents from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and FEMA. GAO also met with officials from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, U.S Northern Command, the military services, the National Guard Bureau, and some CCMRF units.
What GAO Found
DOD has its own CBRNE consequence management plans but has not integrated them with other federal plans because those federal entities have not completed all elements of the Integrated Planning System mandated by Presidential directive in December 2007. The system is to develop and link planning documents at the federal, state, and local levels. While the system's framework is established, the CBRNE concept and strategic plans that provide further guidance are incomplete. DOD has had operational plans in place and revises these plans regularly. However, until the Integrated Planning System and its associated plans are complete, DOD's plans and those of other federal and state entities will not be integrated, and it will remain unclear whether DOD's CCMRF will address potential gaps in capabilities. We previously recommended and DHS agreed that FEMA should develop a program management plan and schedule to complete the planning system. With a goal to respond to multiple, near-simultaneous, catastrophic CBRNE incidents, DOD has plans to provide needed capabilities, but its response times may not meet incident requirements, it may lack sufficient capacity in some capabilities, and it faces challenges to its strategy for sourcing all three CCMRFs with available units. Without assigned units and plans that integrate the active and reserve portions of CCMRF, and agreements between DOD and the states on availability of National Guard units and the duty status in which they would respond to an incident requiring federal forces, DOD's ability to train and deploy forces in a timely manner is at risk. DOD has taken a number of actions in the past year to improve the readiness of units assigned to the first CCMRF, increasing both individual and collective training focused on the mission and identifying the mission as high priority. However, the CCMRF has not conducted realistic full force field training to confirm units' readiness to assume the mission or to deploy rapidly. Competing demands of overseas missions may distract from a unit's focus on the domestic mission, and some CCMRF units rotate more frequently than stated goals. These training and force rotation problems have prevented DOD from providing the kind of stability to the force that would allow units to build cohesiveness. DOD is making progress in identifying and providing funding and equipment to meet CCMRF mission requirements; however, its efforts to identify all requirements have not been completed, and funding responsibilities are spread across the department and are not subject to central oversight. When the CCMRF mission priority increased in the spring of 2008, more funding was provided. However, units did not have dedicated funding and thus purchased equipment with funding also used for other missions. DOD lacks visibility over total funding requirements. Without an overarching approach to requirements and funding and a centralized focal point to ensure that all requirements have been identified and funded, DOD's ability to ensure that its forces are prepared to carry out this high-priority mission remains challenged. |
gao_GAO-12-1011T | gao_GAO-12-1011T_0 | FAA Is Taking Steps to Address Challenges in Delivering and Demonstrating NextGen’s Benefits
Delivering NextGen Benefits
FAA must deliver systems, procedures, and capabilities that provide operators with a return on their investments in NextGen avionics in order to convince operators to continue making such equipment investments. However, aircraft operators have expressed concerns that FAA has not produced the most useful or beneficial PBN routes and procedures to date. In response, FAA has worked to include stakeholders, such as air traffic controllers and airlines, in the study and design of new PBN procedures. To address these challenges, FAA has undertaken a Navigation Lean (NAV Lean) project to streamline the implementation process for flight procedures. For example, public information about FAA’s near-term plans for implementing additional capabilities lacks specifics about the timing and locations of implementation. FAA Is Working to Identify and Develop a Cost-effective Mechanism to Encourage Operators to Equip with NextGen Technologies
While some operational improvements can be made with existing aircraft equipment, realizing more significant NextGen benefits requires a critical mass of properly equipped aircraft. Reaching that critical mass is a significant challenge because the first aircraft operators to purchase and install NextGen-capable technologies will not obtain a return on the investment until many other operators are similarly equipped. FAA is soliciting industry input about how to design and implement such a program but has yet to decide on how to incentivize this transition. Although authorized, no funding has been appropriated to establish a public-private financing program. FAA Faces Challenges in Maintaining Timely Delivery of Key Acquisitions
NextGen has significantly increased the number, cost, and complexity of FAA’s acquisition programs, and it is imperative that these programs remain on time and within budget, particularly given current budget constraints and the interdependencies of many NextGen-acquisitions. In February 2012, we reported that most of the key NextGen-related acquisition programs were generally proceeding on time and on budget.See appendix I for the current cost and schedule performance of select baselined NextGen and related acquisition programs. However, delays with the En Route Automation Modernization (ERAM) program—a critical program for NextGen—illustrate how delays can affect overall acquisition and maintenance costs as well as time frames for other programs. According to FAA, this change increased NextGen’s visibility within and outside the agency and created a direct line of authority and responsibility for NextGen. However, in February 2012, the FAA Modernization and Reform Act designated that the Director of the Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO)—who is responsible for NextGen planning and coordination—report directly to the FAA Administrator and created a new leadership position—the Chief NextGen Officer—who will also report directly to the Administrator. FAA has not yet made the organizational changes called for by the act or clearly defined the relationships among the Deputy Administrator, Chief NextGen Officer, and JPDO director. According to FAA, no organizational changes will be made until the agency has a permanent FAA Administrator in place. FAA Faces Challenges in Balancing the Needs of the Current and NextGen Systems and Addressing Infrastructure and Operational Issues That Transcend NextGen
Particularly in light of constrained budget resources, FAA will have to balance its priorities to help ensure that NextGen implementation stays on course. Sustaining the current legacy infrastructure remains critical, as it will continue to be the core of the national airspace system for a number of years, and some of its components will be part of NextGen. We have ongoing work for this committee that is further exploring how FAA is preparing for the transition to NextGen and balancing the demands of the legacy and NextGen systems, including potential implications for the legacy systems and FAA budgets if NextGen implementation is delayed. These decisions could affect future consolidation plans. FAA has acknowledged the need to keep long-term plans in mind so that it does not invest unnecessarily in facilities that will not be used for NextGen. | Why GAO Did This Study
To prepare for forecasted air traffic growth, FAA is planning for and implementing NextGen in partnership with other federal agencies and the aviation industry. NextGen is a complex undertaking that requires acquiring new integrated air traffic control systems; developing new flight procedures, standards, and regulations; and creating and maintaining supporting infrastructure to create a more automated aircraft-centered, satellite-based air transportation system. GAO has made recommendations to address delays in NextGen's acquisitions, improve FAA's processes, and focus on accountability and performance, which FAA is implementing.
This statement discusses five key challenges that GAO and others have previously identified that affect NextGen implementation, as well as steps FAA has taken to address these challenges. These challenges are (1) delivering and demonstrating NextGens near-term benefits; (2) developing a cost-effective mechanism to encourage operators to equip with NextGen technologies; (3) maintaining timely delivery of acquisitions; (4) clearly defining NextGen leadership roles and responsibilities; and (5) balancing the needs of the current radar-based systems and NextGen systems through the transition. This statement is based on GAOs previous reports and testimonies, ongoing work for the committee, and updates on FAAs responses to these challenges through a review of FAA documents and interviews with FAA officials.
What GAO Found
Delivering and demonstrating the Next Generation Air Transportation System's (NextGen) benefits : The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) must deliver capabilities that provide aircraft operators with a return on their investments in NextGen avionics to convince operators to continue making equipment investments. However, operators have expressed concerns that FAA has not produced the navigational procedures needed to achieve benefits from existing avionics, such as reduced fuel burn and flight time. To help produce more beneficial procedures, FAA is, among other things, involving air traffic controllers and other stakeholders in the design of new procedures.
Encouraging acquisition of NextGen equipage : For some technologies, realizing NextGen benefits requires a critical mass of properly equipped aircraft. Reaching that critical mass is a significant challenge because the first aircraft operators to purchase and install NextGen avionics will not obtain a return on their investment until many other operators are similarly equipped. FAA has begun to solicit industry input about how to design and implement a public-private financing program for equipment but has yet to make decisions about how to incentivize the airline operators' transition to NextGen.
Maintaining timely delivery of key systems : NextGen has significantly increased the number, cost, and complexity of FAA's acquisition programs, which must remain on time and within budget, particularly given current budget constraints and the interdependencies of many NextGen-related acquisitions. While these acquisitions are generally proceeding on time and within budget, previous challenges with the En Route Automation Modernization (ERAM) program--a critical program for NextGen--illustrate how delays can increase the costs and schedules of other acquisitions as well as the maintenance costs of the system that is meant to be replaced. Overall, NextGen implementation will be affected by how well FAA manages program interdependencies.
Clearly defining NextGen leadership roles and responsibilities : Although FAA has made organizational changes to increase visibility and accountability for NextGen, it has not made management changes called for by the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012. According to FAA, those changes will not occur until a permanent FAA Administrator is in place. Further, FAA has not clearly defined the relationships among the Deputy Administrator (responsible for NextGen implementation and also the current Acting Administrator); the new Chief NextGen Officer position; and the Director of the Joint Planning and Development Office (responsible for NextGen planning and coordination).
Managing the transition to the NextGen system : Particularly in light of constrained budget resources, FAA will have to balance its priorities to help ensure that NextGen implementation stays on course while sustaining the current legacy infrastructure that will continue to be the core of the national airspace system for a number of years. For example, while FAA has an initial plan to consolidate facilities, the agency will need to keep long-term plans in mind so that it does not invest unnecessarily in facilities that may not be needed for NextGen. |
gao_GAO-14-494 | gao_GAO-14-494_0 | DHS Uses Collaborative Mechanisms to Share Information, Target Resources, and Leverage Assets
DHS has taken a number of actions to coordinate border security efforts both within CBP and externally with interagency partners using collaborative mechanisms in Arizona and South Texas in three primary areas: (1) information sharing, (2) resource targeting and prioritization, and (3) leveraging of assets. Information sharing. For example, in Arizona the JFC maintains the Joint Intelligence and Operations Center, which is an operations coordination center and clearinghouse for intelligence information. The ACTT is to act as a “force multiplier,” as interagency partners can leverage one another’s resources and capabilities to target individuals and criminal organizations involved in illegal cross-border activity. DHS and CBP, through the JFC, ACTT, and STC, have leveraged assets of CBP components and interagency partners through resource sharing or joint operations. DHS Has Established Performance Measures and Reporting Processes for the JFC, ACTT, and STC, but Could Strengthen These Collaborative Mechanisms
DHS and CBP Have Performance Measures and Reporting Processes in Place for Collaborative Mechanisms in Arizona and South Texas
DHS and CBP have established processes, including objectives and performance measures, to report on the results of the JFC, ACTT, and STC, and these reporting processes vary across the mechanisms. Each collaborative mechanism reports on its results to its leaders, or DHS or CBP leadership, through a variety of means, such as accomplishment reports and after-action reports, as discussed below. Assessment of Collaborative Mechanisms, Written Agreements, and a Monitoring Mechanism Could Strengthen Integration and Coordination Efforts along the Southwest Border
Opportunities exist to strengthen collaborative mechanisms by conducting an assessment of results across the mechanisms and establishing written agreements and a strategic-level mechanism to monitor coordination efforts. DHS Could Benefit from an Assessment of the JFC and STC Mechanisms
CBP has not assessed the JFC and STC to evaluate results across the mechanisms to identify any possible areas for improvement. An assessment of the JFC and STC mechanisms could provide CBP with information to help better address these challenges. Resource management challenges. Opportunities also exist for CBP components to share best practices across Arizona and South Texas. Best practices for interagency collaboration call for federal agencies engaged in collaborative efforts to create the means to monitor and evaluate their efforts to enable them to identify areas for improvement. planning for joint operations. Limited resource commitments by participating agencies. For example, a partner with the ACTT noted that resources are limited for all partners, and that there have been operations in which partners did not follow through with the resources they had committed during the planning stages. Lack of common objectives. For example, as previously discussed, officials from ACTT and STC Unified Command partner agencies we interviewed identified challenges associated with limited partner resource commitments to the collaborative mechanisms. Conclusions
Security threats along the southwest border highlight the importance of integrated operations and interagency coordination with respect to DHS’s border security efforts. DHS has established collaborative mechanisms in Arizona and South Texas to help better integrate CBP components and facilitate coordination with federal, state, local, tribal, and military homeland security partners. To strengthen coordination among partner agencies participating in the ACTT and the STC Unified Command, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security take the following two actions: 1. establish written agreements with interagency partners participating in the ACTT and the STC Unified Command, and 2. establish a strategic-level mechanism to monitor the interagency coordination efforts of the ACTT and the STC Unified Command. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report (1) describes how the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) uses collaborative mechanisms in Arizona and South Texas to coordinate border security efforts, and (2) examines the extent to which DHS has established performance measures and reporting processes and how, if at all, DHS has assessed and monitored the effectiveness of the collaborative mechanisms in Arizona and South Texas. To address these objectives we visited the Joint Field Command (JFC) and the Alliance to Combat Transnational Threats (ACTT) in Arizona and the South Texas Campaign (STC) in South Texas and conducted interviews with officials in U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) headquarters. | Why GAO Did This Study
According to DHS's CBP, Arizona and South Texas represent some of the highest-threat areas along the southwest border for illegal entrants and smuggling. DHS and CBP coordinate border security with interagency partners, including other federal, state, local, and tribal entities. DHS established collaborative mechanisms in Arizona and South Texas to integrate CBP operations and improve interagency coordination.
GAO was asked to review DHS efforts to coordinate resources along the southwest border. This report (1) describes how DHS uses collaborative mechanisms in Arizona and South Texas to coordinate border security efforts, and (2) examines the extent to which DHS has established performance measures and reporting processes and how, if at all, DHS has assessed and monitored the effectiveness of the collaborative mechanisms in Arizona and South Texas. GAO analyzed documentation, such as campaign plans for the mechanisms; conducted visits to Arizona and South Texas; and interviewed CBP components and interagency partners selected on the basis of agency type and level of participation in the mechanism. Information from these interviews cannot be generalized to all components and partners, but provided insights into the mechanisms.
What GAO Found
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has coordinated border security efforts using collaborative mechanisms in Arizona and South Texas, specifically (1) the Joint Field Command (JFC), which has operational control over all U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) resources in Arizona; (2) the Alliance to Combat Transnational Threats (ACTT), which is a multiagency law enforcement partnership in Arizona; and (3) the South Texas Campaign (STC), which integrates CBP resources and facilitates coordination with other homeland security partner agencies. Through these collaborative mechanisms, DHS and CBP have coordinated border security efforts in (1) information sharing, (2) resource targeting and prioritization, and (3) leveraging of assets. For example, to coordinate information sharing, the JFC maintains an operations coordination center and clearinghouse for intelligence information. Through the ACTT, interagency partners work jointly to target individuals and criminal organizations involved in illegal cross-border activity. The STC leverages assets of CBP components and interagency partners by shifting resources to high-threat regions and conducting joint operations.
DHS and CBP have established performance measures and reporting processes for the JFC and ACTT in Arizona and the STC in South Texas; however, opportunities exist to strengthen these collaborative mechanisms by assessing results across the efforts and establishing written agreements. Each collaborative mechanism reports on its results to DHS or CBP leadership through a variety of means, such as accomplishment reports and after-action reports. However, CBP has not assessed the JFC and STC mechanisms to evaluate results across the mechanisms. JFC and STC components GAO interviewed identified challenges with managing resources and sharing best practices across the mechanisms. For example, officials from all five JFC components GAO interviewed highlighted resource management challenges, such as inefficiencies in staff conducting dual reporting on operations to CBP leadership. Best practices for interagency collaboration call for federal agencies engaged in collaborative efforts to create the means to monitor and evaluate their efforts to enable them to identify areas for improvement. An assessment of the JFC and STC could provide CBP with information to better address challenges the mechanisms have faced. In addition, DHS has not established written agreements with partners in the ACTT and STC Unified Command—the entity within STC used for coordinating activities among federal and state agencies—consistent with best practices for sustaining effective collaboration. Officials from 11 of 12 partner agencies GAO interviewed reported coordination challenges related to the ACTT and STC Unified Command, such as limited resource commitments by participating agencies and lack of common objectives. For example, a partner with the ACTT noted that that there have been operations in which partners did not follow through with the resources they had committed during the planning stages. Establishing written agreements could help DHS address coordination challenges, such as limited resource commitments and lack of common objectives.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that CBP assess the JFC and STC, and that DHS, among other things, establish written agreements with ACTT and the STC Unified Command partners. DHS concurred with the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-08-624 | gao_GAO-08-624_0 | PBGC Has Generally Been Able To Hire and Retain Key Staff, but May Face Workforce and Compensation Challenges in the Future
From fiscal years 2000 to 2007, PBGC was generally able to hire and retain staff in its key occupations, but the corporation has had some difficulty hiring and retaining financial analysts and certain other staff. However, our analysis suggests that PBGC may face several workforce and compensation challenges in the future—such as (1) a workforce with relatively fewer years of federal experience, (2) the possible retirement of up to a quarter of its workforce within the next 4 years, and (3) the potential difficulty of hiring and retaining staff due to the corporation’s existing compensation structure, which offers salaries lower than those of some other executive branch agencies that employ similar staff. PBGC’s Overall Attrition Rate Is Similar to Those of Other Federal Agencies, but Rates Differ for Certain Key Occupations
From fiscal year 2000 to 2007, PBGC retained staff at rates similar to the rest of the federal government for the corporation’s key occupations. Our analysis also found that PBGC’s overall attrition experience was comparable to those at the federal financial regulatory agencies— such as FDIC and SEC. Second, PBGC faces the prospect of losing a significant number of its key staff due to retirement eligibility. These steps have included drafting planning documents, such as components of a human capital plan like a succession management directive. In addition to limited planning and data, PBGC had not fully explored all available compensation options under its statutory authority even though corporation executives stated that PBGC’s compensation structure may hinder it from attracting and retaining key staff. While PBGC Is Making Progress toward Better Human Capital Management, No Formal, Comprehensive Human Capital Plan Exists to Prepare for Future Challenges
PBGC has taken steps to improve its human capital planning and practices. Limited Data Analysis on PBGC’s Overall Workforce May Hinder Its Ability to Address Current and Future Human Capital Needs
PBGC has not routinely and systematically targeted and analyzed all key workforce data—such as attrition rates, occupational skills mix, and trends—necessary to create an overall workforce profile that addresses current and future workforce needs. After identifying these key occupations, we assessed PBGC’s recent experience in hiring and retaining staff by using the Office of Personnel Management’s (OPM) Central Personnel Data File (CPDF) to identify different workforce data, such as hiring, attrition, separation types, retirement eligibility, federal tenure, and pay averages for these positions. To identify the steps that PBGC had taken to strategically hire and retain key staff, we reviewed previous GAO work on strategic human capital management, PBGC’s single-employer insurance programs, and the corporation’s management challenges. Private Pensions: The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation and Long- Term Budgetary Challenges. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) employs over 800 federal employees and uses some 1,500 private sector employees to insure the pensions of millions of private sector workers and retirees in certain employer-sponsored pension plans. In recent years, PBGC's projected financial liabilities and workloads have increased greatly due to a large number of pension plan terminations. Given this, it is important that PBGC remain well positioned to fulfill its promise to those retirees who depend on it. GAO was asked to report on (1) PBGC's recent experience in hiring and retaining key staff and how it compares to other federal agencies and (2) the actions PBGC has taken to strategically hire and retain key staff and what additional steps, if any, can be taken. To do this, we analyzed PBGC's workforce by using the Office of Personnel Management's (OPM) Central Personnel Data File to identify data and compared those data to data from other federal agencies. We also interviewed officials from selected agencies, including PBGC, OPM, and the Department of Labor.
What GAO Found
From fiscal years2000to 2007, PBGC was generally able to hire staff in its key occupations--such as accountants, actuaries, and attorneys--and retain them at rates similar to those of the rest of the federal government. However, PBGC has had some difficulty with hiring and retaining staff for specific occupations and positions, including executives and senior financial analysts. Despite the general ability to hire and retain key staff, data also suggest that PBGC may be faced with workforce challenges; these include managing a workforce with relatively few years of federal experience, the prospect of nearly one-quarter of its key staff retiring within the next 4 years, and difficulty hiring and retaining key staff in the future due to PBGC's existing compensation structure, which offers salaries lower than some federal agencies that employ similar staff, such as the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. While PBGC is making progress in its human capital management approachby taking steps to improve its human capital planning and practices--such as drafting a succession management plan--the corporation lacks a formal, comprehensive human capital plan that integrates several critical components such as workforce planning. Also, even though it collects workforce data, PBGC has not routinely and systematically targeted and analyzed all necessary workforce data--such as attrition rates, occupational skills mix, and trends--to understand its current and future workforce needs. Instead, officials stated that they generally reacted to management personnel requests, and developed human capital data as needed. In addition to limited planning and data analysis, PBGC has not fully explored all available compensation options under its existing statutory authority, even though officials say and data suggest that the corporation's current compensation structure may limit its ability to hire and retain certain key staff. |
gao_GAO-01-523 | gao_GAO-01-523_0 | Conclusion
The use of incorrect or unreliable data and inappropriate assumptions in RSPA’s calculation of the minimum PSF balance resulted in RSPA overstating the necessary minimum balance. Crucial to a reasonable calculation of the PSF minimum balance is an analysis of expected receipts as compared to expected obligations. Until RSPA performs this type of analysis, it will not be able to provide a reasonable estimate of the required minimum PSF balance. In addition, the timing of OPS’ cash receipts is affected by OPS’ untimely data collection and verification process. This process results in delayed billings and likely delays cash receipts, resulting in a larger required minimum PSF balance. OPS’ current efforts to implement a new Internet- based data collection and billing system have the potential to shorten what is currently an extended billing process. Finalizing the operator data on which the fee assessments are based at an earlier date would allow billing to take place shortly after the agency received its appropriation for the fiscal year. Accordingly, fee revenue would likely be available for obligation in a more timely manner and help reduce the required minimum PSF balance. | What GAO Found
The use of incorrect or unreliable data and inappropriate assumptions in the Research and Special Program Administration's (RSPA) calculation of the minimum Pipeline Safety Fund (PSF) balance caused RSPA to overstate the necessary minimum balance. Crucial to a reasonable calculation of the PSF minimum balance is an analysis of expected receipts as compared to expected obligations. Until RSPA does this type of analysis, it will be unable to reasonably estimate the required minimum PSF balance. In addition, the timing of the Office of Pipeline Safety's (OPS) cash receipts is affected by OPS' slow data collection and verification process. This process results in delayed billings and likely delays cash receipts, resulting in a larger required minimum PSF balance. OPS' current efforts to implement a new Internet-based data collection and billing system could shorten what is now an extended billing process. Finalizing the operator data on which the fee assessments are based at an earlier date would allow billing to take place shortly after the agency received its appropriation for the fiscal year. Accordingly, fee revenue would likely be available for obligation in a more timely manner and help reduce the required minimum PSF balance. |
gao_GAO-06-322T | gao_GAO-06-322T_0 | The greatest natural threat posed to the New Orleans area is from hurricane-induced storm surges, waves, and rainfalls. Although federally authorized, the project was a joint federal, state, and local effort. The Corps was responsible for project design and construction of the approximately 125 miles of levees, with the federal government paying 70 percent of the costs, and state and local interests paying 30 percent. Level of Protection Authorized by Congress
Congress authorized the Lake Pontchartrain project in 1965, substantially in accordance with a Chief of Engineers report, to protect the areas around the lake from flooding caused by storm surge or rainfall associated with a standard project hurricane. For the coastal region of Louisiana, a standard project hurricane was expected to have a frequency of occurrence of once in about 200 years, and represented the most severe combination of meteorological conditions considered reasonably characteristic for the region. According to the Corps, the standard project hurricane used for the Lake Pontchartrain project would roughly equal a fast-moving category 3 hurricane on the Saffir-Simpson Scale. Authorities, Roles, and Responsibilities for Operating and Maintaining the Levees
Consistent with federal law, agreements between the Corps and local sponsors of the Lake Pontchartrain project specify that local sponsors are responsible for operation, maintenance, repair, replacement, and rehabilitation of the levees when the construction of the project, or a project unit, is complete. However, the Corps has authority to (1) repair the project if deficiencies are the result of the original construction and (2) rehabilitate the project, if damage resulted from a flood and the project is active in the Corps’ Rehabilitation Inspection Program. Although the Corps has not yet provided us with dates on when the project units for the Lake Pontchartrain project were completed, after Hurricane Katrina, the Corps’ New Orleans District and the Department of Defense’s Task Force Guardian determined, based on three criteria, that almost the entire Lake Pontchartrain hurricane project had been turned over to local sponsors for ongoing OMRR&R responsibilities. According to internal Corps regulations, upon transfer of a completed project to the local sponsors, the Corps may no longer expend federal funds on construction or project improvements. Local sponsors’ responsibilities for OMRR&R of the completed portions of the Lake Pontchartrain project were established through local assurances signed by the levee districts and the Corps. Procedures to Ensure That Levees Are Properly Maintained
Both local sponsors and the Corps are required to conduct oversight activities to ensure that levees are properly maintained. If, in the course of these oversight activities, the Corps finds that the local sponsors are not properly maintaining the levees, internal Corps regulations outline a series of steps that the Corps can take until the local sponsor comes into compliance. Authorities, Roles, and Responsibilities When Levees Fail
The Corps has authority to provide a variety of emergency response actions when levees fail or are damaged. Section 5 of the Flood Control Act of 1941, as amended, commonly referred to as Public Law 84-99, authorizes the Corps to conduct emergency operations and rehabilitation activities when levees fail or are damaged. In addition, under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act), as amended, the Corps and other federal agencies may be tasked by FEMA to provide disaster response, recovery, and mitigation assistance to state and local governments. Furthermore, a Department of Defense Manual for Civil Emergencies assigns responsibilities, prescribes procedures, and provides guidance by which the Department of Defense responds to all hazards in accordance with the Stafford Act. State and local roles and responsibilities when levees fail are similar to the Corps’ responsibilities and are also described in federal regulations. The National Response Plan lists the following activities for the Corps: coordination and support of infrastructure risk and vulnerability participation in preincident activities, such as prepositioning assessment participation in postincident assessments of public works and infrastructure to help determine critical needs and potential work loads; implementation of structural and nonstructural mitigation measures to minimize adverse effects or fully protect resources prior to an incident; execution of emergency contracting support for life-saving and life- sustaining services, to include providing potable water, ice, emergency power, and other emergency commodities and services; providing assistance in monitoring and stabilizing damaged structures, and demolishing structures designated as immediate hazards to public health and safety, and providing structural specialist expertise to support inspection of mass care facilities and urban search and rescue operations; providing emergency repair of damaged infrastructure and critical public facilities, and supporting the restoration of critical navigation, flood control, and other water infrastructure systems; managing, monitoring, and providing technical advice in the clearance, removal, and disposal of debris from public property and the re- establishment of ground and water routes into impacted areas; and implementing and managing FEMA’s Public Assistance Program and other recovery programs involving federal, state, and tribal officials, including efforts to permanently repair, replace, or relocate damaged or destroyed public facilities and infrastructure. Planned Emergency Response Activities
The Corps is authorized by Public Law 84-99 to prepare for emergency response when levees fail by undertaking disaster preparedness, advance measures, and hazard mitigation activities. As part of this effort, according to Corps officials, the Corps’ New Orleans district used a draft hurricane preparedness plan for the New Orleans area. 3. 4. 2. To implement advanced measures, the governor should make a written request to the Corps. | Why GAO Did This Study
The greatest natural threat posed to the New Orleans area is from hurricane-induced storm surges, waves, and rainfalls. To protect the area from this threat, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) was authorized by Congress in 1965 to design and construct a system of levees as part of the Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity, Louisiana Hurricane Protection Project. Although federally authorized, the project was a joint federal, state, and local effort. For the levees in the project, the Corps was responsible for design and construction, with the federal government paying 70 percent of the costs and state and local interests paying 30 percent. As requested, GAO is providing information on the (1) level of protection authorized by Congress for the Lake Pontchartrain project; (2) authorities, roles, and responsibilities of the Corps and local sponsors with respect to the operation, maintenance, repair, replacement, and rehabilitation of the levees; (3) procedures in place to ensure that responsible parties maintain the levees in accordance with the authorized protection level; (4) authorities, roles, and responsibilities of the Corps and local parties when levees fail or are damaged; and (5) plans, capabilities, and activities that have been developed by the Corps to ensure an adequate emergency response when levees fail. GAO is not making any recommendations at this time. The Corps is authorized to prepare for emergency response when levees fail by undertaking disaster preparedness, advance measures, and hazard mitigation activities. The Corps' New Orleans district has developed an all hazards emergency response plan for the New Orleans area.
What GAO Found
Congress authorized the Lake Pontchartrain project to protect the New Orleans area from flooding caused by storm surge or rainfall associated with a hurricane that had the chance of occurring once in 200 years. This was termed as the "standard project hurricane" and represented the most severe combination of meteorological conditions considered reasonable for the region. As hurricanes are currently characterized, the Corps" standard project hurricane approximately equals a fast-moving category 3 hurricane, according to the Corps. Agreements between the Corps and four New Orleans levee districts--the local sponsors for the Lake Pontchartrain project--specify that the local sponsors are responsible for operation, maintenance, repair, replacement, and rehabilitation of the levees after construction of the project, or a project unit, is complete. Pre-Katrina, according to the Corps, most of the levees included in the Lake Pontchartrain project had been completed and turned over to the local sponsors for operations and maintenance. The Corps has authority to repair or rehabilitate completed flood control projects if (1) deficiencies are related to the original construction or (2) damage is caused by a flood and the project is active in the Corps' Rehabilitation Inspection Program. According to internal Corps regulations, federal funds cannot be used for regular operations and maintenance activities. Both local sponsors and the Corps are required to conduct regular inspections to ensure that levees are properly maintained. If the Corps finds that local sponsors are not properly maintaining the levees, internal Corps regulations outline a series of steps, such as notifying the governor or taking legal action, that the Corps can take to bring the local sponsor in to compliance. Corps inspection reports for 2001-2004 indicate that the completed portions of the Lake Pontchartrain project were maintained at an acceptable level. When levees fail or are damaged, the Corps has authority to provide a variety of emergency response actions. Specifically, the Corps is authorized to undertake emergency operations and rehabilitation activities and, if tasked by the Federal Emergency Management Agency, to provide disaster response, recovery, and mitigation assistance to state and local governments, as needed. In addition, a Department of Defense manual assigns responsibilities, prescribes procedures, and provides guidance for responding to hazards. State and local roles and responsibilities when levees fail are similar to the Corps' responsibilities and are described in federal regulations. The Corps is authorized to prepare for emergency response when levees fail by undertaking disaster preparedness, advance measures, and hazard mitigation activities. The Corps' New Orleans district has developed an all hazards emergency response plan for the New Orleans area. |
gao_GAO-05-276 | gao_GAO-05-276_0 | To examine OMB’s processes for developing the list, we requested a copy of the Management Watch List; we reviewed related OMB policy guidance, including its Circular A-11 and Capital Programming Guide, as well as the Analytical Perspectives for the President’s Budget submissions for fiscal years 2005 and 2006; and we interviewed OMB analysts and their managers, including the Deputy Administrator of OIRA and the Chief of the Information Technology and Policy Branch, to identify the processes and criteria they have in place to determine which IT projects to include on the Management Watch List. To derive the total number of projects on the list that were reported for fiscal year 2005, OMB polled the individual analysts and compiled the numbers. OMB officials said that they did not aggregate these projects into a single list describing projects and their weaknesses. According to these officials, they did not construct a single list of projects meeting their watch list criteria because they did not see such an activity as necessary in performing OMB’s predominant mission: to assist in overseeing the preparation of the federal budget and to supervise agency budget administration. Nevertheless, OMB has not fully exploited the opportunity to use its Management Watch List as a tool for analyzing IT investments on a governmentwide basis. OMB’s Follow-up on Projects Was Inconsistent, and Follow-up Activities Were Not Tracked Centrally
OMB did not develop a structured, consistent process or criteria for deciding how to follow up on corrective actions that it asked agencies to take to address weaknesses associated with projects on the Management Watch List. OMB officials also stated that those Management Watch List projects that did receive follow-up attention were not tracked centrally, but only by the individual OMB analysts with responsibility for the specific agencies. Accordingly, OMB could not readily tell us which of the 621 watch list projects for fiscal year 2005 were followed up on, nor could it use the list to describe the relationship between its follow-up activities and the changes in the numbers of projects on the watch list between fiscal year 2005 (621 projects) and fiscal year 2006 (342). In addition, major projects with significant management deficiencies may have continued to absorb critical agency resources. Without tracking specific follow-up activities, OMB could not know whether the risks that it identified through its Management Watch List were being managed effectively; if they were not, funds were potentially being spent on poorly planned and managed projects. Conclusions
By scoring agency IT budget submissions and identifying weaknesses that may indicate investments at risk, OMB is identifying opportunities to strengthen investments. However, OMB has not developed a single, aggregate list identifying the projects and their weaknesses, nor has it developed a structured, consistent process for deciding how to follow up on corrective actions. We agree that our review described and assessed OMB’s processes for (1) placing the 621 projects representing about $22 billion on its Management Watch List and (2) following up on corrective actions established for projects on the list. | Why GAO Did This Study
For the President's Budget for Fiscal Year 2005, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) stated that of the nearly 1,200 major information technology (IT) projects in the budget, it had placed approximately half--621 projects, representing about $22 billion--on a Management Watch List, composed of mission-critical projects with identified weaknesses. GAO was asked to describe and assess OMB's processes for (1) placing projects on its Management Watch List and (2) following up on corrective actions established for projects on the list.
What GAO Found
For the fiscal year 2005 budget, OMB developed processes and criteria for including IT investments on its Management Watch List. In doing so, it identified opportunities to strengthen investments and promote improvements in IT management. However, it did not develop a single, aggregate list identifying the projects and their weaknesses. Instead, OMB officials told GAO that to identify IT projects with weaknesses, individual OMB analysts used scoring criteria that the office established for evaluating the justifications for funding that federal agencies submit for major projects. These analysts, each of whom is typically responsible for several federal agencies, were then responsible for maintaining information on these projects. To derive the total number of projects on the list that OMB reported for fiscal year 2005, OMB polled its individual analysts and compiled the result. However, OMB officials told GAO that they did not compile a list that identified the specific projects and their identified weaknesses. The officials added that they did not construct a single list because they did not see such an activity as necessary. Thus, OMB has not fully exploited the opportunity to use the list as a tool for analyzing IT investments on a governmentwide basis. OMB had not developed a structured, consistent process for deciding how to follow up on corrective actions that its individual analysts asked agencies to take to address weaknesses associated with projects on its Management Watch List. According to OMB officials, decisions on follow-up and monitoring of progress were typically made by the staff with responsibility for reviewing individual agency budget submissions, depending on the staff's insights into agency operations and objectives. Because it did not consistently require or monitor follow-up activities, OMB did not know whether the project risks that it identified through its Management Watch List were being managed effectively, potentially leaving resources at risk of being committed to poorly planned and managed projects. In addition, because it did not consistently monitor the follow-up performed on projects on the Management Watch List, OMB could not readily tell GAO which of the 621 projects received follow-up attention. Thus, OMB was not using its Management Watch List as a tool in setting priorities for improving IT investments on a governmentwide basis and focusing attention where it was most needed. |
gao_GAO-01-838 | gao_GAO-01-838_0 | Economic adjustment assistance programs are also available for distressed communities, regardless of what has caused the adverse economic condition. The Community Adjustment and Investment Program was established as a result of the 1993 North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act. Trade-related Layoffs Hurt Case Study Communities
The six communities we selected for our case studies varied in size, demographics, and location, but they all had experienced major trade- related industry and job losses in the mid- to late-1990s. However, local program administrators told us that these programs have structural problems that hinder the effective delivery of services. One issue is related to the profile of the dislocated workers, a significant percentage of whom were in their 40’s, had not finished high school, and needed remedial courses before they could start a degree or certificate program. TAA and NAFTA-TAA Dislocated Workers Present Training Challenges
The profile of dislocated workers that emerged from our visits and discussions with program administrators, training providers, and small groups of dislocated workers is consistent with the Labor Department’s available national data on TAA and NAFTA-TAA dislocated workers. However, many did not have a high school diploma or a General Equivalency Degree (GED), and few businesses would hire them without one or the other. Local Views on Trade-Impacted Communities’ Access to Federal Funds
Officials in the communities believe that they are limited in their ability to obtain federal economic adjustment assistance and cite a number of reasons. Trade adjustment assistance program administrators and training providers in the communities said that program rules regarding income support benefits limit their flexibility in addressing dislocated workers’ training needs. Local officials learned that the necessary training infrastructure must be in place to meet dislocated workers’ needs. Eventually, grant managers began offering workers monetary incentives to leave training and take available low- skilled jobs. Assistance to Dislocated Workers
We found that many trade-impacted workers did not enroll in training. Specifically, we examined (1) the impact of trade-related layoffs on these communities, (2) the experiences of these communities with dislocated worker assistance, (3) their experiences with economic adjustment assistance, and (4) the lessons learned from these communities’ experiences. To address all of these objectives, we conducted case studies in six communities. | Why GAO Did This Study
This report reviews trade adjustment assistance and other assistance programs, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement Transitional Adjustment Assistance (NAFTA-TAA) program, to determine if they have helped distressed communities deal with the adverse impacts of trade. GAO conducted case studies in six such trade-impacted communities, all of which experienced major trade-related plant closures and layoffs in the mid- to late-1990s.
What GAO Found
Two communities lost a large percentage of local jobs in sudden plant closures and experienced economic crises. The other communities experienced rolling layoffs or a series of smaller plant closures that dislocated as many or more workers but did so gradually. Experiences in the communities GAO visited indicate that Temporary Adjustment Assistance (TAA) and NAFTA-TAA assistance to dislocated workers, although substantial, could be implemented more effectively. Program administrators and training providers in each community said that the programs have structural problems that impede effective service delivery. One factor that influenced the implementation of training benefits in many communities is that a significant percentage of dislocated workers needed to earn a high school equivalency degree or take remedial courses before they could even start a training program. Case study communities' experience with economic adjustment showed that the assistance available to them was limited and that there are no easy answers to community recovery, even when funds are available. These communities had relied on low-skilled manufacturing jobs, which are disappearing, and now face the difficult task of diversifying their economies while addressing fundamental human capital issues. These communities' experiences with efforts to assist dislocated workers and adjust to changing economic conditions offer several lessons. Program administrators and training providers said that bureaucratic rigidities in dislocated workers programs limited their flexibility in addressing dislocated workers' diverse training needs. Also, local officials believe that dislocated worker training programs are more effective and job placements much higher when strong links exist between training and local business needs. |
gao_GAO-06-63 | gao_GAO-06-63_0 | IBD patients who have had an ostomy operation need to use specific supplies for their ostomy care. However, in January 2006, Medicare will begin to cover medically necessary drugs when the program’s new prescription drug benefit becomes effective. Medicare and Medicaid Coverage Standards for Medically Necessary Food Products
Medicare does not cover medically necessary food products because such supplies are not included in any of the benefit categories contained in the Social Security Act. Variation in Medicare and Medicaid Programs’ Coverage of Specific Supplies Related to IBD Therapies
Once coverage standards are met, Medicare generally covers all medically necessary supplies for the administration of parenteral and enteral nutrition and ostomy care—the three therapies that this program covers. On the other hand, our survey of Medicaid programs showed that although most states provide eligible individuals at least some coverage of each of the five therapies addressed in this report, the specific supplies that states will pay for vary and may be subject to restrictions. We also found that, while all states provided some coverage of ostomy care, the specific supplies that states cover varied. Medicare will also cover infusion pumps—only one pump will be covered at any one time. Enteral Nutrition Supplies Covered by Medicare and Medicaid
Medicare will generally cover supplies associated with enteral nutrition therapy for beneficiaries who meet coverage standards. In its written comments, CMS said that it determined that we correctly described the Medicare coverage policies for parenteral and enteral nutrition and ostomy supplies. However, CMS suggested that we clarify our description of Medicare’s coverage policy for prescription drugs that are not self-administered. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
In this report, we (1) identify the Medicare and Medicaid coverage standards for five therapies—parenteral nutrition, enteral nutrition formula, ostomy care, medically necessary food products, and drugs approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for inflammatory bowel disease (IBD); and (2) determine what specific supplies used in these therapies Medicare and state Medicaid programs pay for in home health and outpatient delivery settings. Medicare and Medicaid’s Coverage Standards of IBD Therapies
To identify Medicare’s coverage standards for parenteral and enteral nutrition, ostomy care, medically necessary food products, and drugs approved by the FDA for the treatment of IBD in home health and outpatient delivery settings, we reviewed the standards established by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) in its national coverage policies. We pretested our survey with Medicaid officials in the District of Columbia, Georgia, and Virginia. The state does not require documentation for adults. | Why GAO Did This Study
Inflammatory bowel disease (IBD) affects an estimated one million Americans. IBD patients often have difficulty digesting food. As a result, they may require parenteral nutrition (intravenous feeding) or enteral nutrition (tube feeding), medically necessary food products to supplement their diets, and medications. In addition, some IBD patients must care for their ostomies--surgically created openings for the discharge of digested food. IBD advocates have recently expressed concerns regarding the ability of IBD patients to obtain the health care they need. The Research Review Act of 2004 directed GAO to study the Medicare and Medicaid coverage standards for individuals with IBD, in both home health and outpatient delivery settings. GAO (1) identified the Medicare and Medicaid coverage standards for five key therapies used for the treatment of IBD and (2) determined what specific supplies used in these therapies Medicare and Medicaid programs will pay for. In this work, GAO examined Medicare's national and local coverage policies and conducted a survey of Medicaid programs in the 50 states and the District of Columbia.
What GAO Found
Medicare generally provides coverage for parenteral and enteral nutrition and ostomy supplies in both home health and outpatient delivery settings. However, specific standards regarding medical conditions and appropriate documentation must be met for parenteral and enteral nutrition to be covered. Medicare has one coverage standard governing the provision of ostomy supplies--that beneficiaries receiving these items have had an ostomy. Medicare does not cover medically necessary food products and generally does not cover self-administered drugs, which include most drugs taken by IBD patients. However, medically necessary drugs, including those that are self-administered, will be covered by Medicare's voluntary prescription drug benefit, which becomes effective in January 2006. State Medicaid programs reported covering, at least partially, each of the five therapies. The survey indicated that most states' Medicaid coverage standards are generally comparable to Medicare's coverage for parenteral and enteral nutrition and ostomy care. Once Medicare coverage standards are met, the program will generally cover all medically necessary supplies associated with parenteral and enteral nutrition and ostomy care. The survey of state Medicaid programs showed variation in the specific supplies that states will provide. While many states pay for most supplies associated with parenteral and enteral nutrition, the specific ostomy supplies states cover vary. Most states--46--reported covering at least some medically necessary food products. GAO also found that states generally cover the drugs listed in the survey. CMS said that GAO correctly described its Medicare coverage policies and suggested that we clarify our description of Medicare's coverage policy for prescription drugs that are not self-administered. It also said that it will continue to consider access issues for Medicare and Medicaid IBD patients. |
gao_GGD-96-1 | gao_GGD-96-1_0 | Export financing includes export loans, loan guarantees, and export credit insurance. In 1993, the Eximbank financed about 3.2 percent of total U.S. exports, the low end of the range financed by ECAs in the five EU member states. The U.K. uses a single government agency to deliver an entire range of export-financing assistance. Table 4 summarizes the types of export-financing assistance that governments in the six countries provide and the organizations used to deliver this assistance. Exporters, banks, and governments face a number of trade-offs due to the differences in the Eximbank’s and EU ECAs’ programs. Second, the level of risk-sharing between ECAs and participating banks may influence bank behavior. The Eximbank assumes 100 percent of the risks on most of the medium- and long-term cover that it issues. 1 and 2.) The OECD Consensus does not currently apply either to the premiums charged for export cover or to agricultural products. Six Nations’ Government-Supported Export-Financing Programs
The United States and the five European Union (EU) member states we reviewed—France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom (U.K.) use different organizational approaches in providing export-financing assistance. The Eximbank offers a wide range of financing services: direct and intermediary loans to foreign buyers of U.S. exports, helping U.S. exporters match officially supported foreign competition; guarantees to commercial lenders, providing repayment protection for loans to foreign buyers of U.S. exports; working capital guarantees, encouraging commercial lenders to make loans to companies that have exporting potential but need funds to produce or market goods or services to export; and export credit insurance to exporters protecting them against the failure of foreign buyers to pay their credit obligations. Forfaiting transactions are eligible for Mediocredito Centrale subsidies as well. International Efforts to Address Government Support for Export Financing Continue
The United States, EU member states, and other countries have agreed or are attempting to limit government subsidies and create a level playing field among their ECAs through various international forums, including OECD and the Berne Union, and within the EU. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the types of export-financing assistance that the United States and five European Union (EU) countries provide to exporters, focusing on the: (1) types of export-financing delivery systems used in the countries; (2) differences in and types of trade-offs among U.S. and EU member state programs; and (3) status of international efforts to limit the use of government-supported export financing.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the Export-Import Bank (Eximbank) financed $15.1 billion of U.S. exports in 1993 and the five EU member states collectively financed $74.8 billion of their total exports in that same year; (2) Eximbank provides a wide range of export-financing assistance to the U.S. exporting community, including direct loans, loan guarantees, and export credit insurance; (3) the five EU member states use a single government agency, as well as private and public sector providers to deliver export-financing capital; (4) Eximbank medium- and long-term loan guarantees are unconditional, and Eximbank assumes most of the risk involved in export transactions; (5) there are trade-offs between the time export credit agencies (ECA) spend scrutinizing loan applications and the time that elapses before the claims are paid, the level of risk assumed by ECA and participating banks, and the premium levels charged for financing assistance; (6) the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has implemented an agreement that limits government subsidies and provides common guidelines for national export-financing assistance programs; and (7) this agreement does not currently apply to the premiums charged for export credits relating to defense goods or agricultural products. |
gao_GAO-14-300 | gao_GAO-14-300_0 | submit a prospectus to Congress for all major medical facility leases. Project Delays and Cost Increases for Outpatient Leases Mostly Occurred Prior to Entering into the Lease Agreement
Project Delays
VA has experienced substantial delays in executing new outpatient clinic lease projects, nearly all of them occurred prior to entering into a lease agreement with the developer. We found that 39 of the 41 congressionally authorized outpatient clinic projects we reviewed experienced schedule delays, ranging from 6 months to 13.3 years, with an average delay of 3.3 years, while 2 projects experienced schedule time decreases. Outdated Guidance. VA provided cost data for its outpatient clinic lease projects in January 2014. Although first year rents increased for the 31 projects—increasing overall total costs—VA’s total build-out costs were lower than reported in the projects’ prospectuses. Based on the findings of the council and our work, VA is planning the following improvements to the major medical facilities leasing program: requiring detailed design requirements earlier in the design process to help avoid the delays, scope changes, and cost increases, and providing Congress with more complete information on the cost of proposed future lease projects. However, we also found that while VA has updated and refined some guidance for specific aspects of lease projects—including design guidance for the construction of outpatient clinics—to better support VA’s leasing staff and prevent project delays; it has not updated its overall guidance for staff involved in leasing projects. Creating a Review Council
In April 2012, the Secretary of Veterans Affairs established a Construction Review Council (CRC) to serve as the single point of oversight and performance accountability for the planning, budgeting, execution, and delivery of the VA’s real property capital-asset program, including the leasing program. The CRC report, along with GAO’s past work on VA leasing,below. During our review in January 2014, VA issued a guidance memorandum directing that beginning with fiscal year 2016, VA would develop more detailed space requirements before a prospectus is submitted to Congress for major construction and major leased projects.to VA officials, the more detailed requirements should be prepared as part of a business case for each major construction and lease project during the SCIP planning process that occurs before a prospectus is prepared. Developing a Process for Handling Scope Changes
VA has also taken steps to better manage scope changes to project leases. According to VA officials, this process will help ensure review and approval of any proposed scope changes by the appropriate department officials and will require a systematic review of projects at pre-defined stage-gates, as well as reviews of the effects of any changes to scope, schedule, and cost. VA’s 2014 budget submission includes an estimate of total costs for proposed future lease projects for the next 10 years; however, this estimate only provides the first year’s annual rent and build-out costs, and not the complete lifecycle costs for these leases. We reviewed VHA’s 2004 Handbook on Planning and Activating Community Based Outpatient Clinics, which is VHA’s overall guidance for leasing outpatient clinics. The Handbook is intended to establish consistent planning criteria and standardized expectations. As of November 2013, VHA’s leasing program has a long-term liability of $5.5 billion and growing, but its guidance on outpatient clinics is a decade old and no longer relevant. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government calls for federal agencies to develop and maintain internal control activities, which include policies and procedures, to enforce management’s directives and help ensure that actions are taken to address risks. Thus, the success of those efforts will depend on how quickly and effectively VA implements them. In its written comments, VA concurred with our recommendation and discussed actions under way to implement it. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine the extent to which costs and schedules changed for selected Department of Veterans Affairs’ (VA) outpatient clinic lease projects, we obtained and analyzed data that VA provided on VA’s 41 authorized major outpatient-clinic projects as of January 2014.included a short project description, project location, the original and current total estimated cost of the project, and the original and current completion date. To identify any actions VA has taken to improve its leasing management, and any opportunities that exist for VA to further improve its management of leased projects, we reviewed VA’s management practices of leased projects at the 11 locations we selected. | Why GAO Did This Study
VA operates one of the nation's largest health-care delivery systems. To help meet the changing medical needs of the veteran population, VA has increasingly leased medical facilities to provide health care to veterans. As of November 2013, VHA's leasing program has long-term costs of $5.5 billion and growing. Given previous problems that GAO has identified with VA's hospital construction program, GAO was asked to review VA's leasing program.
This report examined (1) the extent to which schedule and costs changed for selected VA outpatient clinics' leased projects since they were first submitted to Congress and factors contributing to the changes and (2) actions, if any, VA has taken to improve its leasing practices for outpatient clinics and any opportunities for VA to improve its project management. GAO analyzed agency documents as well as VA data for 41 ongoing major outpatient-clinic lease projects, for which a prospectus was submitted to Congress with an average annual rent of more than $1 million as of January 2014. We also interviewed VA officials and representatives from private companies, involved in VA leasing projects.
What GAO Found
Schedules were delayed and costs increased for the majority of the Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) leased outpatient projects reviewed. As of January 2014, GAO found that 39 of the 41 projects reviewed—with a contract value of about $2.5 billion—experienced schedule delays, ranging from 6 months to 13.3 years, with an average delay of 3.3 years. The large majority of delays occurred prior to entering into a lease agreement, in part due to VA's Veterans Health Administration (VHA): 1) providing project requirements late or changing them or 2) using outdated guidance. Costs also increased for all 31 lease projects for which VA had complete cost data, primarily due to delays and changes to the scope of a project. First-year rents increased a total of $34.5 million—an annual cost which will extend for 20 years (the life of these leases).
VA has begun taking some actions to address problems managing clinic-leased projects. First, it established the Construction Review Council in April 2012 to oversee the department's real property programs, including the leasing program. Second, consistent with the council's findings and previous GAO work (December 2009, January 2011, and April 2013), VA is planning the following improvements:
Requiring detailed design requirements earlier in the facility-leasing process . VA issued a guidance memorandum in January 2014 directing that beginning with fiscal year 2016, VA should develop detailed space and design requirements before submitting the prospectus to Congress.
Developing a process for handling scope changes. In August 2013, VA approved a new concept to better address scope changes to both major construction and congressionally authorized lease projects. According to VA officials, among other improvements, this process ensures a systematic review of the impact of any ad-hoc changes to projects in scope, schedule, and cost.
VA's 2014 budget submission did not clarify that its estimates for future lease projects included only one year's rent, which does not reflect the total costs over the life of the leases, costs that VA states cannot be accurately determined in early estimates. VA officials clarified this estimate beginning with VA's 2015 budget submission.
However, these improvements are in the early stages, and their success will depend on how quickly and effectively VA implements them.
Finally, VA is also taking steps to refine and update guidance on some aspects of the leasing process, for example the VA's design guides, but VHA has not updated the overall guidance for clinic leasing (used by staff involved with projects) since 2004. Specifically, VHA's Handbook on Planning and Activating Community Based Outpatient Clinics , which established planning criteria and standardized expectations for outpatient clinics, was based on past planning methodologies that no longer exist. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government calls for federal agencies to develop and maintain internal control activities, which include policies and procedures, to enforce management's directives and help ensure that actions are taken to address risks.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that VA update VHA's guidance for the leasing of outpatient clinics. VA concurred with GAO's recommendation and discussed actions under way to implement the recommendation. VA also provided technical comments, which GAO incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-06-126 | gao_GAO-06-126_0 | A similar demographic trend is occurring or will occur in all OECD countries. The number of workers for every elderly person in the United States is projected to fall from 4.1 in 2005 to 2.9 in 2020 and to 2.2 in 2030. Adjustments to Existing PAYG Programs Show Importance of Sustainability, Safety Nets, and Incentives to Work and Save
The countries that have adjusted their existing PAYG national pension programs demonstrate a broad range of approaches for both reducing benefits and increasing contributions in order to improve the programs’ financial sustainability. Essential Reform Elements Include Maintenance of a Safety Net and Work and Saving Incentives
All of the countries we studied that reformed their PAYG pension programs by reducing projected benefits included provisions to help ensure adequate benefits for lower-income groups and put into place programs designed to ensure that all qualified retirees have a minimum level of income. Successful Reform Requires Careful Implementation, Administration, and Public Education
The extent to which new provisions are implemented, administered, and explained to the public may affect the outcome of the reform. To educate workers about how PAYG programs and PAYG reforms affect them, countries including Canada, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States, send workers periodic statements concerning the program, the record of their contributions to it, and the benefits they are projected to receive. Early Action and Effective Management Help Strengthen National Pension Reserve Funds
Another measure often found in reform packages is the accumulation of reserves in national pension funds with the aim of partially prefunding PAYG pension programs. Effective Management Can Contribute to Financial Sustainability
Examples from several countries reveal that prefunding with national pension reserve funds is less likely to be effective in helping assure that national pension programs are financially sustainable if these funds are also used for purposes other than supporting the PAYG program. Some countries have used funds to pursue industrial, economic, or social objectives. Individual Account Reforms Show the Importance of Funding Decisions and Benefit Adequacy
Countries that have adopted individual account reforms—which may also help prefund future retirement income—offer lessons about financing the existing PAYG pension program as the accounts are established. To manage this transition period these countries have expanded public debt, built up budget surpluses in advance of implementation, reduced or eliminated the PAYG program, or used some combination of these approaches. Approach to Funding Individual Accounts Affects Sustainability of National Pension System
The experiences of other countries demonstrate the importance of considering how individual accounts may affect the long-term and short- term financing of the national pension system and the economy as a whole. Some countries transferred funds from general budget revenues to help pay benefits to current and near retirees, expanding public borrowing. Some countries set a guaranteed rate of return to reduce certain investment risks and help ensure adequacy of benefits. Additionally, as investment options have expanded, some countries have incorporated other protections. In the United Kingdom, for example, regulations capping fees may have discouraged some providers from offering pension funds. Many countries restrict the number of times an individual can switch. That is why reforms in one country are not easily replicated in another, or if they are, may not lead to the same outcome. Although some pension reforms were undertaken too recently to provide clear evidence of results, the experiences of other developed countries do suggest some lessons for U.S. deliberations on Social Security’s future. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
We reviewed national pension reforms that occurred since 1970 in all 30 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries and Chile. On the basis of our preliminary research, we identified three types of reform—adjustments to the existing pay-as-you-go (PAYG) program, national pension reserve funds, and individual account programs—that illustrate a variety of circumstances and experiences with national pension reform across these countries. We did, however, draw some lessons based on our review, as well as including the lessons that others have drawn. Table 7 provides information on individual account programs that countries have adopted as part of their mandatory national pension systems. | Why GAO Did This Study
Many countries, including the United States, are grappling with demographic change and its effect on their national pension systems. With rising longevity and declining birthrates, the number of workers for each retiree is falling in most developed countries, straining the finances of national pension programs, particularly where contributions from current workers fund payments to current beneficiaries--known as a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system. Although demographic and economic challenges are less severe in the United States than in many other developed countries, projections show that the Social Security program faces a long-term financing problem. Because some countries have already undertaken national pension reform efforts to address demographic changes similar to those occurring in the United States, we may draw lessons from their experiences. The current and preceding Chairmen of the Subcommittee on Social Security of the House Committee on Ways and Means asked GAO to study lessons to be learned from other countries' experiences reforming national pension systems. GAO focused on (1) adjustments to existing PAYG national pension programs, (2) the creation or reform of national pension reserve funds to partially prefund PAYG pension programs, and (3) reforms involving the creation of individual accounts. We received technical comments from SSA, Treasury, the OECD, and other external reviewers.
What GAO Found
All countries in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), as well as Chile, have, to some extent, altered their national pension systems, consistent with their different economic and political conditions. While changes in one country may not be easily replicated in another, countries' experiences may nonetheless offer potentially valuable lessons for the United States. Countries' experiences adjusting PAYG national pension programs highlight the importance of considering how modifications will affect the program's financial sustainability, its distribution of benefits, and the incentives it creates. Also, how well new provisions are implemented, administered, and explained to the public may affect the outcome of the reform. Most of the countries GAO studied both increased contributions and reduced benefits, often by increasing retirement ages. Generally, countries included provisions to help ensure adequate benefits for lower-income groups, though these can lessen incentives to work and save for retirement. Countries with national pension reserve funds designed to partially pre-fund PAYG pension programs provide lessons about the importance of early action and sound governance. Some funds that have been in place for a long time provide significant reserves to strengthen the finances of national pension programs. Countries that insulate national reserve funds from being directed to meet nonretirement objectives are better equipped to fulfill future pension commitments. In addition, regular disclosure of fund performance supports sound management and administration and contributes to public education and oversight. Countries that have adopted individual account programs--which may also help prefund future retirement income--offer lessons about financing the existing PAYG pension program as the accounts are established. Countries that have funded individual accounts by directing revenue away from the PAYG program while continuing to pay benefits to PAYG program retirees have expanded public debt, built up budget surpluses in advance, cut back or eliminated the PAYG programs, or taken some combination of these approaches. Because no individual account program can entirely protect against investment risk, some countries have adopted individual accounts as a relatively small portion of their national pension system. Others set minimum rates of return or provide a minimum benefit, which may, however, limit investment diversification and individuals' returns. To mitigate high fees, which can erode small account balances, countries have for example capped fees or centralized the processing of transactions. Although countries have attempted to educate individuals about reforms and how their choices may affect them, studies in some countries indicate that many workers have limited knowledge about their retirement prospects. |
gao_GAO-05-412 | gao_GAO-05-412_0 | Following the September 11 terrorist attacks, Congress passed the USA PATRIOT Act, which was enacted on October 26, 2001. In addition to requiring regulations for information sharing and customer identification programs, Title III of the PATRIOT Act expands Treasury’s authority to regulate the activities of U.S. financial institutions and requires a wide variety of types of financial institutions to maintain anti-money laundering programs. Key challenges related to implementing section 326 included developing regulations that could be applied consistently across a financial industry that has diverse business models, customer relationships, and financial products. Figure 2 illustrates requirements for identification and verification procedures. Treasury and the Federal Financial Regulators Have Reached Out to the Financial Industry to Assist It in Implementing CIP and Section 314 Rules, but Industry Concerns Remain
Treasury and the federal financial regulators have taken several steps to help the financial industry understand and comply with the CIP and 314 information sharing regulations; however, the need for agency coordination has slowed the issuance of additional guidance. Industry Officials Expressed Some Confusion about Types of Suspicious Activity That Can Be Shared under Section 314(b)
Although industry officials said section 314(b) is a helpful tool and has enabled them to share information in a new way, some officials said it is not always easy to determine if the suspicious activity is money laundering or terrorist activity or other financial crimes. Examinations and Enforcement Actions Highlight Progress and Difficulties in Overseeing Compliance with the CIP Requirement and Section 314
The federal financial regulators and SROs responsible for examining financial institutions’ compliance with anti-money laundering laws and regulations have conducted examinations that cover compliance with, and have taken enforcement actions concerning, violations of both the CIP requirement and section 314 and its corresponding regulations, but coverage of these requirements varied in the examinations we reviewed. When we reviewed the examinations for coverage of the CIP requirement, we specifically looked for documentation that the examiner assessed whether (1) the financial institution had developed a CIP and written procedures for CIP; (2) the CIP procedures included collecting appropriate customer information including the minimum requirements, such as date of birth for individuals; (3) the CIP procedures included verifying customer information using documentary or nondocumentary methods; (4) the financial institution was using risk-based procedures for verification, such as determining how much information to verify depending on its assessment of the risk of the customer or type of account or collecting additional information; and (5) the CIP had been adequately implemented by testing a sample of accounts. The Results of Our Examination Review Highlighted Some Difficulties in Understanding CIP Requirements
Our review of some of the examinations in the sample revealed that examiners and financial institutions may not always understand the requirements for CIP or interpret them in the same way. NYSE examinations did not always cover section 314(a) procedures, in part, because NYSE examination procedures were not clear about how examiners should review section 314(a) procedures. The sharing of information with other financial institutions pursuant to section 314(b) is voluntary. Law Enforcement Officials Believe That the Section 314(a) Process Has Improved Coordination with Financial Institutions and Has Led to More Efficient Investigations
Officials from the Department of Justice and other law enforcement agencies told us that the 314(a) process has improved coordination between law enforcement agencies and financial institutions and has increased the speed and efficiency of investigations. FinCEN also reported that 314(a) feedback from law enforcement requesters has been overwhelmingly positive. One prosecutor told us that the 314(a) process had been used 3 or 4 times during investigations of terrorist financing or money laundering cases. To determine the extent to which the federal financial regulators and SROs have updated examination guidance and trained examiners on CIP and section 314, we reviewed copies of draft and final versions of guidance; collected information on examiner training courses related to anti-money laundering and the number of examiners trained in 2002, 2003, and 2004; and interviewed officials on their examination guidance and training programs. | Why GAO Did This Study
Title III of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, passed after the September 11 terrorist attacks, amended U.S. anti-money laundering laws and imposed new requirements on financial institutions. Section 326 of the act required the development of minimum standards for verifying the identity of financial institution customers. Section 314 required the development of regulations encouraging the further sharing of information between law enforcement agencies and the financial industry and between the institutions themselves. Because of concerns about the implementation of these new provisions, GAO determined how (1) the government developed the regulations, educated the financial industry on them, and challenges it encountered; (2) regulators have updated guidance, trained examiners, and examined firms for compliance; and (3) the new regulations have affected law enforcement investigations.
What GAO Found
Treasury (including its Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN)), the federal financial regulators, and self-regulatory organizations (SRO) overcame challenges to create regulations that apply consistently to a diverse financial sector and have used several outreach mechanisms to help the financial industry understand and comply with Customer Identification Program (CIP) requirements under section 326 and information sharing requirements under section 314. However, several implementation challenges remain. Industry officials told us some of their concerns have been addressed but they are still concerned about (1) how some CIP requirements will be interpreted during compliance examinations, (2) the lack of feedback from law enforcement on information provided by financial institutions through section 314(a), and (3) the extent to which they can share information with each other under section 314(b). The six federal financial regulators and five SROs in our review have issued examination guidance covering sections 326 and 314, subsequently trained examiners, and begun examining financial institutions for compliance with CIP and section 314. GAO's review of examinations showed progress, but coverage varied in part because the examinations were conducted during early implementation. One aspect of CIP that was not always covered in examinations was whether financial institutions had adequately developed a CIP appropriate for their business lines and types of customers. However, this aspect of CIP is critical for ensuring that the identification and verification procedures are appropriate for types of customers and accounts that are at higher risk of being linked to money laundering or terrorist activities. Some examinations also revealed implementation difficulties related to CIP that could lead to inconsistencies in the way examiners conduct examinations. For example, some examiners did not differentiate between the CIP requirement and other procedures that require customer identification information. Coverage in the examinations GAO reviewed of how institutions had implemented section 314 requirements was somewhat lower than for CIP, in part, because CIP received more attention from examiners and information sharing between financial institutions is voluntary. In the examinations GAO reviewed, apparent violations of the CIP requirement and section 314(a) regulations were mostly addressed through informal actions between the institution and the regulator. Officials from the Department of Justice and other law enforcement agencies told us that CIP and section 314 have assisted them in the investigation of money laundering and terrorist financing cases. Some officials said that CIP has been useful because financial institutions have more information on their customers so they obtain more useful information when issuing grand jury subpoenas and other requests for information. Many officials said the 314(a) process had improved coordination between the law enforcement community and the financial industry and increased the speed and efficiency of investigations. |
gao_GAO-07-793T | gao_GAO-07-793T_0 | The Department of Transportation’s reauthorization proposal suggests changing the source of program funding to a mandatory appropriation of $50 million per year from the Airport and Airway Trust Fund. The EAS Program Provides Service to Small Communities While Increasing EAS Subsidies Raise Concerns about the Cost and Efficiency of the EAS Program and Its Service Providers
Mr. Chairman, as you know EAS provides service to many communities that otherwise would not receive air service. Furthermore, the federal median subsidy for providing air service to EAS communities is about $98 per passenger; the subsidies varied among communities from about $13 to over $677 per passenger in 2006. Finally, the number of air carriers flying smaller aircraft suitable for EAS communities may decrease and some industry officials are beginning to voice concerns about the availability of appropriate planes to provide small community air service in the future. As we have noted in past reports, if EAS subsidies were removed, air service might end at many small communities. The funding for EAS has also grown from $25.9 million in 1997 to $109.4 million in 2007. The Small Community Grant Program Has Funded Some Successful Projects
Mr. Chairman, we found that SCASDP grantees pursued several goals and strategies to improve air service, and that air service was sustained after the grant expired in a little less than half of the 23 completed projects in 2005—the time of our initial review. Although the program has seen some success, the number of applications for SCASDP grants has declined for a variety of reasons. The outcomes of the grants may be affected by broader industry factors that are independent of the grant itself, such as a decision on the part of an airline to reduce the number of flights at a hub. Several of these options formed the basis for reforms passed as part of Vision-100. Regionalizing service to some communities could generate federal savings. Options to Enhance the Long-term Viability of the Essential Air Service Program. | Why GAO Did This Study
Congress established two key programs to help support air service to small communities--the Essential Air Service (EAS) providing about $100 million in subsidies per year and the Small Community Air Service Development Program (SCASDP) that provides about $20 million per year in grants. As part of its reauthorization of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the Congress is examining the status and outcomes of these programs. This testimony discusses (1) the history and challenges of the EAS program, (2) the implementation and outcomes of the SCASDP and (3) options for reforming EAS and SCASDP. The testimony is based on previous GAO reports, interviews with Department of Transportation officials and industry representatives as well as program updates.
What GAO Found
EAS subsidies support air service to many small communities that would likely not have service if EAS subsidies are discontinued. Since 1997, funding for EAS has increased from $25.9 million in 1997 to $109.4 million in 2007 and the number of communities has generally increased. The federal government is spending a median of about $98 per passenger, with subsidies ranging from about $13 to $677 per passenger. Concerns exist about the costs of the program, particularly given the federal government's long-term structural fiscal imbalance. In addition, according to industry representatives, the number of air carriers flying aircraft suitable for EAS communities may decrease, raising concerns about the availability of appropriate aircraft to provide small community air service in the future. SCASDP grantees have used their grants to pursue a variety of goals and have used a variety of strategies, including marketing and revenue guarantees, to improve air service. Our analysis of the 23 grants completed by October 1, 2005, found that air service was sustained after the grant expired in a little less than half of the projects. Finally, although the program has seen some success, the number of applications for SCASDP grants has declined--from 179 in 2002 to 75 in 2006. As we have reported, options for reforming EAS, such as consolidating service into regional airports might make the program more efficient, but also could reduce service to some communities. Further, Congress may be able to use some "lessons learned" from marketing and other successful SCASDP strategies that may help it make the current programs more effective. |
gao_GAO-03-1148 | gao_GAO-03-1148_0 | Higher Natural Gas Prices Have Contributed to Higher Nitrogen Fertilizer Prices and Reduced Domestic Production but Have Not Affected Availability of Fertilizer
Because the cost of natural gas accounts for such a large percentage—up to 90 percent—of the total costs of manufacturing nitrogen fertilizer, nitrogen fertilizer prices tend to increase when gas prices increase. The higher natural gas prices in 2001 also led to higher production costs for the U.S. nitrogen fertilizer manufacturing industry and resulted in a significant reduction in the amount of nitrogen produced in this country that year. The results of this survey show that the supply of nitrogen fertilizer was adequate to meet farmers’ 2001 demand. The results of USDA’s survey are consistent with our analysis, which found that although domestic production of nitrogen declined 25 percent in 2001, the overall demand was met primarily because imports increased by about 43 percent. However, two federal agencies are responsible for ensuring that natural gas prices are determined in a competitive marketplace. Federal Role in the Fertilizer Market Is Limited
The federal government does not control prices for nitrogen fertilizer, and nitrogen fertilizer products imported from other countries are generally not subject to U.S. trade restrictions, such as quotas and tariffs.However, as part of its overall mission, USDA does monitor and report on developments in the agricultural sector that could affect farmers and offers certain programs to help farmers manage the risks associated with crop yield and revenues. Observations
Natural gas is the most costly ingredient used in manufacturing nitrogen fertilizer products. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
In our study of the natural gas and nitrogen fertilizer markets, we determined (1) how the price of natural gas affects the price, production, and availability of nitrogen fertilizer and (2) the federal government’s role in managing the impact of natural gas prices on the U.S. fertilizer market. In addition, we compared the relationship between the prices paid by farmers for nitrogen fertilizer and natural gas prices. To determine what role the federal government plays in managing the impact of natural gas prices on the U.S. fertilizer market, we reviewed the responsibilities of federal agencies regarding the natural gas and fertilizer markets and their efforts to monitor and collect information on these markets. | Why GAO Did This Study
Natural gas is the most costly component used in manufacturing nitrogen fertilizer. Therefore, when natural gas prices increased in 2000-2001, U.S. companies that produce nitrogen fertilizer reported adverse financial consequences resulting from much higher production costs. Concerns also arose that the nation's farmers would face much higher nitrogen fertilizer prices and that there might not be an adequate supply of nitrogen fertilizer to satisfy farmers' demands at any price. Responding to congressional concerns, GAO undertook a study to determine (1) how the price of natural gas affects the price, production, and availability of nitrogen fertilizer and (2) what role the federal government plays in mitigating the impact of natural gas prices on the U.S. fertilizer market.
What GAO Found
Higher natural gas prices have contributed to higher nitrogen fertilizer prices and reduced domestic production. The following figure shows the relationship between natural gas prices and the farmer price for nitrogen fertilizer. Higher gas prices in 2000-2001 also led to a 25 percent reduction in domestic production of nitrogen but, despite this decline, the supply of nitrogen fertilizer was adequate to meet farmers' demand in 2001. Demand was met because U.S. nitrogen production was supplemented by a 43 percent increase in nitrogen imports and a 7 percent decrease in agricultural consumption of nitrogen fertilizer. The federal government does not set natural gas prices, and it has a limited role in managing the impact of natural gas prices on the U.S. fertilizer market. Three federal agencies--(1) the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, (2) the Commodities Futures Trading Commission, and (3) the Energy Information Administration--are responsible for ensuring that natural gas prices are determined in a competitive and informed marketplace. Moreover, the federal government has no role in controlling fertilizer prices, but the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) does monitor developments in the agricultural sector, including fertilizer markets, that could affect farmers. Also, in 2001, USDA collected additional survey information in response to concerns about the price and availability of nitrogen fertilizer. |
gao_GAO-16-750 | gao_GAO-16-750_0 | Field staff in OFCCP’s 6 regional offices and 48 district and area offices manage and carry out the agency’s activities. During its compliance evaluations, OFCCP reviews the selected contractor’s hiring, promotion, compensation, termination, and other employment practices. While OFCCP conducted compliance evaluations for about 2 percent of all contractors in its jurisdiction, it is not able to determine the extent contractors are complying with equal employment opportunity requirements because of weaknesses in the contractor selection process. Instead, OFCCP relies on federal contractors to voluntarily comply with equal employment opportunity requirements, and some contractors may not be completing certain required activities. For example, in fiscal year 2015 OFCCP did not find violations in 83 percent of its evaluations and found discrimination in about 1 percent of evaluations (see table 1). In 2015, OFCCP conducted 2,345 compliance evaluations, which represents about 2 percent of federal contractor establishments in its jurisdiction. OFCCP’s contractor selection process is nonrandom and does not produce a generalizable sample of contractors for evaluation. Given these limitations, OFCCP is unable to quantify the extent to which federal contractors in its jurisdiction are noncompliant, and does not have reasonable assurance that it is focusing its efforts on those contractors at greatest risk of not following equal employment opportunity or affirmative action requirements. However, according to OFCCP compliance evaluation data, in 2015, close to 85 percent of contractor establishments did not submit an AAP within 30 days of receiving a scheduling letter, as requested, and OFCCP officials said that it was not unusual for establishments to request an extension. Implementing a mechanism, such as by allowing contractors to submit their AAPs electronically or certify that they have completed annual updates, could provide OFCCP reasonable assurance that contractors are complying with this requirement, which is a central component of OFCCP’s efforts to prevent discrimination and ensure covered contractors take affirmative action to ensure equal employment opportunities for protected workers. OFCCP Outreach and Compliance Assistance Activities Have Decreased and Stakeholders Reported Need for Improvement
Outreach Activities and Compliance Assistance Have Decreased Since 2012 and Contractors Often Use Third Parties for Compliance Support
Outreach
Prior to 2014, OFCCP focused its outreach on conducting a wide range of outreach events that furthered its mission through informing protected workers and applicants of their rights. Of the 24 contractors we spoke with, 20 told us that they use third-party support, such as consultants and attorneys knowledgeable about the relevant federal laws, executive orders, regulations, and processes, to help them understand the applicable requirements, interpret guidance materials, and develop their AAP. Stakeholders and contractors also identified various reasons for not using OFCCP compliance assistance, including: fear that asking OFCCP for assistance would call attention to them and possibly make them a target for future OFCCP enforcement actions, such as compliance evaluations; and having their own resources, such as third party assistance, or not needing OFCCP assistance. However, without increased contractor utilization of OFCCP compliance assistance, federal contractors may face challenges in complying with federal equal employment and affirmative action requirements, all to the potential detriment of protected workers. More than half of the contractors we spoke with said the OFCCP guidance is generally helpful, with some citing the FAQs as particularly helpful. Seven contractors and one industry group official told us that OFCCP’s guidance may sometimes be conflicting and could be simplified. Our interviews with contractors and stakeholder groups show that many contractors do not clearly understand OFCCP compliance requirements and do not know what they are supposed to do to meet the requirements. The process OFCCP uses to select contractors for compliance evaluations, its primary tool for enforcement, is not designed to focus on contractors with the greatest risk of noncompliance. Develop a mechanism to monitor AAPs from covered federal contractors on a regular basis. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We provided a draft of the report to the Department of Labor’s Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs for review and comment. | Why GAO Did This Study
OFCCP is charged with ensuring that about 200,000 federal contractor establishments refrain from discrimination and take affirmative action to provide equal employment opportunities for certain protected classes of workers. GAO was asked to review OFCCP practices.
In this report, GAO (1) assessed how OFCCP conducts supply and service compliance evaluations, including the methodology, resources, and results, and (2) evaluated OFCCP outreach, assistance, and guidance efforts to assist contractors in complying with the requirements it enforces. GAO analyzed both OFCCP Information System data and a nongeneralizable sample of 43 case files and reviewed relevant federal laws, executive orders, regulations, guidance, and agency documents. GAO also interviewed a nongeneralizable sample of 24 contractors with and without experience with a compliance evaluation; managers and staff in OFCCP's headquarters and all six regional offices; and representatives of national organizations representing contractors and protected workers' interests.
What GAO Found
Since 2010, most compliance evaluations conducted by the Department of Labor's (DOL) Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP) of federal supply and service contractors identified no violations; however, the methods used may not focus evaluations on contractors posing the greatest risk. OFCCP relies on compliance evaluations to detect equal employment violations by federal contractors and conducts evaluations for about 2 percent of federal contractor establishments annually. Since 2010, about 78 percent of evaluations found no violations and about 2 percent had discrimination findings (see figure). However, when it selects contractors for evaluations, OFCCP does not use a generalizable sample that would allow for conclusions about the federal contractor population. Therefore, it does not have reasonable assurance that it is focusing its compliance efforts on those contractors with the greatest risk of noncompliance. During evaluations, OFCCP requested and reviewed documents related to contractors' equal employment efforts, including their Affirmative Action Program (AAP), which outlines contractors' compliance efforts. In 2015, close to 85 percent of evaluated contractor establishments did not submit their AAP within 30 days of OFCCP's request and were granted extensions in some cases. This suggests that OFCCP processes do not ensure that all contractors are complying with their obligation to complete and annually update an AAP.
Figure: Findings of Federal Contractor Nondiscrimination Compliance Evaluations From Fiscal Years 2010-2015
Since 2012, OFCCP's outreach and compliance assistance activities to assist contractors and other stakeholders, such as protected workers and industry groups, have declined as the agency refocused its activities on enforcement, and some stakeholders said guidance could be clearer. Outreach activities, such as community group presentations and job fair participation, decreased more than 80 percent from 2012 to 2014. Some stakeholders told GAO that workers, applicants, and contractors may benefit from more outreach activities. OFCCP's compliance assistance activities, such as seminars, for contractors—are down 30 percent since 2012. Many contractors told GAO they do not feel comfortable contacting OFCCP for assistance and hire third party support to help comply with federal nondiscrimination and affirmative action requirements. While contractors generally found OFCCP guidance helpful, both stakeholders and contractors said the guidance could be clearer to help them understand the requirements. Without clear guidance, contractors may not be able to understand their equal employment obligations.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making six recommendations to DOL, including that OFCCP develop a contractor selection process that reflects contractor noncompliance risk, develop a mechanism to monitor contractors' compliance with AAP requirements, and review and assess the clarity of its contractor guidance. DOL agreed with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-02-212 | gao_GAO-02-212_0 | However, the level of service declined in 1999, and the quality of service was mixed in the 2000 tax filing season and below IRS’ long-term goal of providing world-class customer service. IRS Made Limited Progress Toward Providing World-Class Telephone Service
IRS made limited progress in the 2001 tax filing season toward its long- term goal of providing world-class telephone service. When compared with the 2000 tax filing season, access and accuracy performance improved by 2 percentage points or less in three of the six comparable measures. Although it met or exceeded the 2001 quality targets, IRS did not meet the current year’s higher targets for providing taxpayers with correct responses. The “assistor response level” is to measure the percentage of taxpayers that waited 30 seconds or less to speak with an assistor. IRS also measures its performance in answering calls through the use of automation. IRS Missed Some Opportunities to Better Understand Telephone Performance
IRS missed some opportunities to better understand the factors that affected performance and to plan evaluations of the actions it took to improve performance. Field directors sometimes reached conclusions about the factors affecting access and accuracy without conducting analyses to test their conclusions. IRS Missed Opportunities to Plan Evaluations of Actions to Improve Access and Accuracy
IRS missed opportunities to plan evaluations to determine the effectiveness of actions it took to improve the access and accuracy of its telephone assistance. | What GAO Found
Congress has long been concerned about the quality of service that taxpayers receive when calling the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) for help in understanding and meeting their tax obligations. IRS has taken steps to improve its responsiveness to the tens of millions of telephone calls it receives each year, from expanding the hours of service to increasing the use of automation. In the 2000 tax filing season, the quality of telephone assistance was mixed and below IRS' long-term goal of providing world-class service. Overall, IRS made limited progress toward its goal of providing world-class telephone service. When compared with the 2000 tax filing season, access and accuracy in 2001 improved in two of six comparable measures, declined in one, and changed two percentage points or less in the others. IRS fell considerably short of its target to reduce the time that taxpayers spend waiting to speak with an assistor. Although assistors exceeded quality-of-service targets when responding to taxpayer questions, they did not meet higher targets for providing correct answers and account adjustments. IRS officials missed opportunities to analyze data to better understand the factors affecting telephone performance, including the actions it took to improve performance. IRS managers sometimes reached conclusions about key factors without conducting analyses to test their conclusions. IRS officials also missed opportunities to plan evaluations to determine the effectiveness of the actions taken to improve access and accuracy. |
gao_GAO-05-170 | gao_GAO-05-170_0 | For each exercise the Coast Guard conducts, an after- action report detailing the objectives, participants, and lessons learned must be produced within 60 days. Results
Coordination Framework Is Still Evolving
The framework under which federal agencies would coordinate with state and local entities to manage a port-terrorism incident is still evolving. However, the finalized plan is designed to be the primary operational guidance for incident management and, when fully implemented, will incorporate or supersede existing federal interagency response plans. However, it is still too early to determine how well the complete framework will function in coordinating an effective response to a port-related threat or incident. Our review of fiscal year 2004 after-action reports and observation of specific exercises showed that exercise participants encountered seven legal issues, but exercise participants and agency officials we interviewed did not recommend statutory changes to address these issues. Ability of participants to coordinate effectively in a command and control environment—41 percent of the exercises raised concerns related to command and control, most notably a lack of knowledge or training in the incident command structure. Lack of knowledge about who has jurisdictional or decision-making authority—28 percent of the exercises raised concerns with participants’ knowledge about who has jurisdiction or decision-making authority. After-Action Reports Show Problems Related to Timeliness and Completeness
Our review of the Coast Guard’s fiscal year 2004 after-action reports from port terrorism exercises identified problems with timeliness in completing the reports and limitations in the information they contained. Not meeting the 60-day requirement can lessen the usefulness of these reports. The Coast Guard has cited several planned actions that may allow for improved content and quality in after-action reports. The Coast Guard has several other steps under development to address issues of report content and completeness, and it is too early to assess the effect these actions will have. Recommendation for Executive Action
To help ensure that reports on terrorism-related exercises are submitted in a timely manner that complies with all Coast Guard requirements, we are making one recommendation, that the Commandant of the Coast Guard review the Coast Guard’s actions for ensuring timeliness and determine if further actions are needed. However, CPS has been in place since August 2003, and timeliness remains a concern. Release of National Incident Management System and draft National Response Plan. Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to (1) describe the emerging framework under which the federal government coordinates with state and local entities to address a terrorist incident in a U.S. port; (2) identify the issues, if any, regarding federal agencies’ legal authority that have emerged from port security exercises and what statutory actions might address them; (3) describe the types of operational issues being identified through these exercises; and (4) identify any management issues related to Coast Guard- developed after-action reports. | Why GAO Did This Study
Seaports are a critical vulnerability in the nation's defense against terrorism. They are potential entry points for bombs or other devices smuggled into cargo ships and ports' often-sprawling nature presents many potential targets for attack. To assess the response procedures that would be implemented in an attack or security incident, officials conduct port-specific exercises. Many federal, state, and local agencies may potentially be involved. The Coast Guard has primary responsibility for coordinating these exercises and analyzing the results. GAO examined (1) the emerging framework for coordinating entities involved in security responses, (2) legal and operational issues emerging from exercises conducted to date, and (3) Coast Guard management of reports analyzing exercises. GAO reviewed reports on 82 exercises from fiscal year 2004 and observed 4 exercises as they were being conducted.
What GAO Found
The framework under which federal agencies would manage a port-terrorism incident is still evolving. The primary guidance for response, the National Response Plan, is in the final stages of approval, and the National Incident Management System, the structure for multiagency coordination, is still being put in place. As a result, it is too early to determine how well the complete framework will function in an actual incident. GAO's review of fiscal year 2004 terrorism-related reports and exercises identified relatively few legal issues, and none of these issues produced recommendations for statutory changes. Most issues have instead been operational in nature and have surfaced in nearly every exercise. They are of four main types: difficulties in sharing or accessing information, inadequate coordination of resources, difficulties in coordinating effectively in a command and control environment, and lack of knowledge about who has jurisdictional or decision-making authority. Reports on the exercises often do not meet the Coast Guard's standards for timeliness or completeness. Sixty-one percent of the reports were not submitted within 60 days of completing the exercise--the Coast Guard standard. The Coast Guard has implemented a new system for tracking the reports, but after a year of use, timeliness remains a concern. The Coast Guard has requirements for what the reports should contain, but 18 percent of the reports did not meet the requirement to assess each objective of the exercise. The Coast Guard has cited several planned actions that may allow for improving completeness. These actions are still in development, and it is too early to determine how much they will help. |
gao_GAO-10-19 | gao_GAO-10-19_0 | In 2005, Congress authorized FTA to establish the Public-Private Partnership Pilot Program to demonstrate (1) the advantages and disadvantages of transit projects that use alternative approaches for new fixed-guideway capital projects and (2) how FTA’s New Starts program can be modified or streamlined for these alternative approaches. The pilot program allows FTA to study projects that incorporate greater private sector involvement through alternative project delivery and financing approaches; integrate a sharing of project risk; and streamline design, construction, and operations and maintenance. FTA can designate up to three project sponsors for the pilot program. Private Sector Roles in the Delivery and Financing of U.S. Project sponsors we interviewed cited a range of potential benefits, such as achieving cost and time savings, as well as potential advantages to the public sector, such as increased financing flexibility (see table 3). By transferring these project risks, the project sponsor creates incentives for the private sector to keep the project on schedule and on budget as, for example, the private sector would be responsible for any excess costs incurred from design errors. FTA New Starts Project Approval Process Is a Barrier to a Greater Private Sector Role in Transit
While we have previously identified FTA’s New Starts grant program— which funds new, large-scale transit projects—as a model for other federal transportation programs because of its use of a rigorous and systematic evaluation process to distinguish among proposed investments, the New Starts project approval process is not entirely compatible with transit projects that use alternative approaches in that the process is sequential and phased with approvals granted separately and at certain decision points. While it may be too early for FTA to grant major streamlining modifications with the other two pilot projects, FTA still has the ability as part of its pilot program to further experiment with the use of existing tools that could encourage a greater private sector role while continuing to balance the need to protect the public interest. In addition to not yet granting project sponsors any major streamlining modifications to the New Starts process, FTA does not have an evaluation plan to accurately and reliably assess the pilot program’s results, including the effect of its efforts to streamline the New Starts projects for pilot project sponsors. Although Limited in the United States, Some Other Countries Further Protect the Public Interest by Providing Guidance and Technical Assistance
Some countries have further protected the public interest in transit projects that use alternative approaches by establishing quasi- governmental entities to assist project sponsors in implementing these arrangements. Project sponsors are looking to transit projects that use alternative approaches to deliver and finance new transit projects, along with federal funds. Quasi- governmental entities established by foreign governments have better equipped project sponsors to implement alternative approaches, including public-private partnerships, by creating a uniform method to considering the implications of alternative approaches, reducing transaction costs, ensuring consistency in contracts, and serving as a repository of institutional knowledge. In particular, we focused on (1) the role of the private sector in the delivering and financing of U.S. transit projects compared with other countries; (2) the benefits and limitations of and the barriers, if any, to greater private sector involvement in transit projects and how these barriers are addressed in the Department of Transportation’s (DOT) Public-Private Partnership Pilot Program; and (3) how project sponsors and DOT can protect the public interest in transit projects that use alternative approaches. | Why GAO Did This Study
As demand for transit and competition for available federal funding increases, transit project sponsors are increasingly looking to alternative approaches, such as public-private partnerships, to deliver and finance new, large-scale public transit projects more quickly and at reduced costs. GAO reviewed (1) the role of the private sector in U.S. public transit projects as compared to international projects; (2) the benefits and limitations of and barriers, if any, to greater private sector involvement in transit projects and how these barriers are addressed in the Department of Transportation's (DOT) pilot program; and (3) how project sponsors and DOT can protect the public interest when these approaches are used. GAO reviewed regulations, studies, and contracts and interviewed U.S., Canadian, and United Kingdom officials (identified by experts in the use of these approaches).
What GAO Found
In the United States, the private sector role in delivering and financing transit projects through alternative approaches, such as public-private partnerships, has been more limited than in international projects. The private sector role in U.S. projects has focused more on how they are delivered rather than how they are financed, while the private sector role in international projects has focused on both project delivery and financing. Since 2000, seven new large- scale construction projects funded through FTA's Fixed Guideway Capital Investment Program--New Starts program--have been completed using one of two alternative project delivery approaches, and none of these projects included private sector financing. In 2005, Congress authorized FTA to establish a pilot program to demonstrate the advantages and disadvantages of these alternative approaches and how the New Starts Program could better allow for them. Alternative approaches can offer potential benefits such as a greater likelihood of completing projects on time and on budget, but also involve limitations such as less project sponsor control over operations. The sequential and phased New Starts process is a barrier because it is incompatible with alternative approaches and thus does not allow for work to be completed concurrently, which can lead to delays and increased costs. Under its pilot program, FTA can grant major streamlining modifications to the New Starts process for up to three project sponsors, but has not yet granted any such modifications because FTA has found that none of the projects has transferred enough risk, in particular financial responsibilities, to the private sector. FTA has the ability within its pilot program to further experiment with the use of long-standing existing tools that could encourage a greater private sector role while continuing to balance the need to protect the public interest. This includes forms of conditional funding approvals used by other DOT agencies and international governments. FTA also lacks an evaluation plan to accurately and reliably assess the pilot program's results, including the effect of its efforts to streamline the New Starts process for pilot project sponsors. Without such a plan, agencies and Congress will be limited in their decision making regarding the pilot program. Transit project sponsors protect the public interest in alternative approaches through, for example, the use of performance standards and financial assessments to evaluate the costs and benefits of proposed approaches. Other governments have established entities to assist project sponsors in protecting the public interest. These entities have better equipped project sponsors to implement alternative approaches by creating a uniform approach to developing project agreements and serving as a repository of institutional knowledge. DOT can serve as a valuable resource for transit project sponsors by broadening its current efforts, including providing technical assistance and encouraging the use of additional financial assessments, among other measures. |
gao_GAO-11-84 | gao_GAO-11-84_0 | Acceptance of Project Proposal Submissions to the Corrosion Office Often Varies by the Nature of Corrosion Executives’ Oversight and Review and Type of Project Proposed
The acceptance of military departments’ CPC project proposals varied relative to the nature of review—if any—that the Corrosion Executives required before proposals were submitted to the Corrosion Office for funding consideration. The panel member also told us that the Army and Navy fiscal year 2011 proposals were more complete and more effectively addressed the selection criteria than those submitted by the Air Force. The panel’s feedback to the authors of the Air Force project proposals highlighted areas where the provided information was insufficient or incomplete, such as the project managers did not follow the project proposal template in the DOD Corrosion Prevention and Mitigation Strategic Plan, which includes topics to be addressed in project proposals; the contents of the project proposals did not explain the technology demonstration aspects of the project; or the project proposals did not include information on matching funds that would be provided by the Air Force. The Corrosion Office Has a Rigorous Process to Evaluate CPC Proposals for Funding, but Selection Criteria Are Not Clearly Communicated
For fiscal year 2011, the Corrosion Office used a rigorous multistep process to review and select CPC project proposals that were acceptable for funding; however, some military department personnel involved in the process did not clearly understand the criteria used to select projects for funding. Corrosion Office officials told us that because the CPC projects are generally funded for 2 years of implementation and ROI validations are required within 3 years of completing the project’s implementation, reviews for projects funded in fiscal year 2005 are due by the end of fiscal year 2010. The military departments have completed these reviews, including the ROI validations, for 10 (36 percent) of the 28 implemented projects funded in fiscal year 2005. Army and Navy corrosion officials told us that, because CPC funding is awarded for a 2-year project implementation period, they typically do not have sufficient funds remaining for validating the ROI after projects are implemented. One project selection panel member told us that the lack of completed ROI validations makes it more difficult for the panel to make decisions about how to change project selection criteria to invest limited funds in the types of projects with the greatest benefits. Product Teams Propose and Implement DOD-wide CPC Activities, and the Staffing Process for the Teams Is Evolving
The Corrosion Office has created seven Product Teams to propose and implement DOD-wide CPC activities in seven areas, as discussed earlier. Using volunteers from the military departments, the Product Teams propose activities, such as determining the costs of corrosion, which are then selected for funding. Develop and implement a plan to ensure that return on investment validations are completed as scheduled. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD agreed with one of our recommendations and did not agree with the other two recommendations. However, DOD also stated: (1) “While not always defined as ‘criteria,’ all factors considered in the evaluation are articulated in Appendix D” and (2) “While not expressly defined as ‘criteria,’ these indices are clearly criteria from which anyone submitting a project plan can determine what is likely to improve the chances of a higher DEA [the model used in the panel process] ranking.”
In developing our findings, we analyzed the Strategic Plan to understand the process and criteria used to evaluate CPC projects for funding; observed the panel proceedings for both the preliminary and final project reviews; discussed the panel process with panel members and military department Corrosion Executives; and discussed their understanding of the process and the criteria used for project evaluation with Corrosion Executives and project authors. To address our objectives, we met with the Director of the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s Corrosion Policy and Oversight Office (Corrosion Office), members of the Corrosion Prevention and Control (CPC) project selection panel assembled by the Director of the Corrosion Office, DOD contractors who assist the Director of the Corrosion Office in managing the CPC program, each military department’s Corrosion Executive and their staffs, representatives of three of the seven Working Integrated Product Teams (Product Teams) that coordinate CPC activities, and the six project managers who authored the proposals for 11 of the CPC projects included in our sample. To determine the extent the Corrosion Executives are involved in preparing CPC project proposals for submission to the Corrosion Office for funding consideration, we met with each of the Corrosion Executives and their staffs and reviewed the military departments’ corrosion reports, to identify whether there was a process at each department to review CPC projects. | Why GAO Did This Study
Corrosion costs DOD over $23 billion annually, affects both equipment and facilities, and threatens personnel safety. DOD has taken steps to improve its corrosion prevention and control (CPC) efforts. These efforts include reorganizing the DOD-wide Corrosion Office and instituting Corrosion Executive positions in each of the military departments. In response to the Senate Appropriations Committee Report accompanying the fiscal year 2010 DOD appropriations bill, GAO evaluated to what extent (1) the Corrosion Executives are involved in preparing CPC project proposals for submission, (2) the Corrosion Office has created a process to review and select projects for funding, and (3) the military departments have validated the return on investment (ROI) for funded projects. GAO also reviewed the process the Corrosion Office uses to determine the CPC activities that it will fund. To carry out this study, GAO observed project selection panel meetings, interviewed corrosion officials, and reviewed documents and project proposals.
What GAO Found
The acceptance of the military departments' CPC proposals varied relative to the types of projects and nature of review that the military Corrosion Executives required before the proposals were submitted to the Corrosion Office for funding consideration. DOD guidance provides that Corrosion Executives coordinate CPC actions, including submitting corrosion project opportunities. Prior to submitting the proposals for a preliminary evaluation by the Corrosion Office's project selection panel, Army and Navy Corrosion Executives and staffs reviewed proposal summaries and provided feedback to the authors. The Air Force did not perform a review that included pre-submission feedback. Later, during a preliminary evaluation, the Corrosion Office's project selection panel determined that a much higher percentage of Army and Navy proposals were acceptable than those submitted by the Air Force. A selection panel member told us that because the Air Force did not perform a pre-submission review of proposals, deficiencies in those proposals were not corrected prior to the panel's evaluation. DOD has criteria and a rigorous multistep procedure for evaluating proposals, but some military department stakeholders indicated that this information is not communicated clearly. Previously, GAO noted involving stakeholders helps agencies target resources to the highest priorities. Criteria used for the project selection panel to evaluate proposed projects are not clearly identified in DOD's Corrosion Prevention and Mitigation Strategic Plan, and some project managers said that they were unfamiliar with how projects were evaluated. While the Corrosion Office already takes actions, such as providing in-depth feedback to proposals' authors and assembling corrosion experts to participate on the selection panel, unclear communications on some issues could adversely affect authors' abilities to prepare effective project proposals. The military departments are late in validating ROIs for some completed projects. The Strategic Plan suggests that follow-on reviews with validated ROIs are required for completed projects within 3 years after full project implementation. Project managers have completed these reviews for 10 of the 28 implemented projects funded in fiscal year 2005, with 8 of the 10 completed reviews performed by one Army command. Corrosion Executives told GAO that because CPC funding is awarded only for the 2-year project implementation period, they typically do not have funds remaining for validating ROIs after projects are completed. If the ROI validations of completed projects are not performed, the Corrosion Office will not have needed data to adjust project selection criteria in order to invest limited CPC funds in the types of projects with the greatest potential benefits. The Corrosion Office created Product Teams to implement DOD-wide CPC activities in seven areas. Using volunteers and a budget averaging around $4.5 million per year, the Teams propose activities, such as determining the costs of corrosion and DOD-wide specifications for CPC products, which are then selected for funding by the Director of the Corrosion Office. The Corrosion Executives are becoming more involved in Team activities.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making recommendations to: 1) improve the oversight of proposals submitted for funding consideration, 2) communicate more clearly the criteria used to select which projects will be funded, and 3) fund and complete ROI validations. In written comments on this report, DOD disagreed with the first two recommendations and agreed with the third, citing alternatives or differing views. GAO believes the recommendations remain valid. |
gao_GAO-13-47 | gao_GAO-13-47_0 | Background
Medicaid is a health care program jointly funded by the federal government and states to provide care for certain low-income individuals. However, MSIS data are not used to determine the federal share of Medicaid expenditures, and are not used by the states to manage the daily operations of their Medicaid programs. CMS-64 data are the most-reliable and most-comprehensive information on Medicaid spending. MSIS Medicaid expenditures for individual states were generally less than CMS-64 amounts. In fiscal years 2007 through 2009, states’ MSIS Medicaid expenditures ranged from 59 percent to 120 percent compared with CMS-64. Specifically, MSIS Medicaid expenditures were less than CMS-64 amounts in 40 states. Differences Attributable to the Design of the Data Sets Could Be Quantified and Adjusted
MSIS is designed to report claims data, and CMS-64 is designed to reimburse states for their federal share of Medicaid expenditures. After adjusting the MSIS data to include expenditures for factors not related to individual enrollees’ claims, Medicaid expenditures for the nation based on MSIS data were 92, 93, and 94 percent of amounts shown in CMS-64 data, respectively, for fiscal years 2007, 2008, and 2009. Some Medicaid health insurance payments were included in CMS-64 that CMS did not require states to report in MSIS.2009, total expenditures for the managed care and Medicaid premium assistance expenditure category, as reported on CMS-64, were approximately $82 billion, of which $3 billion were for Medicaid health insurance payments not reported in MSIS. The remaining differences between the two data sets are potentially explained by inconsistencies in CMS guidance and states’ reporting practices, neither of which can be quantified. Taken together, these two data sets have the potential to offer a robust view of the Medicaid program, enhancing CMS oversight of aggregate spending trends, per beneficiary spending growth, and cross-state comparisons, all of which could be useful in improving the financial integrity of this high-risk program. However, the usefulness of these data sets as oversight tools is limited because of delays in reporting and unnecessary inconsistencies between the two data sets, both of which are inconsistent with federal internal control standards. CMS has recently completed a pilot study aimed in part on improving MSIS data. Agency Comments
HHS reviewed a draft of this report and provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. To determine the extent to which MSIS and CMS-64 data sets on Medicaid expenditures differ, nationally and by state, for fiscal years 2007 through 2009, we conducted a multistep analysis.expenditures from both data sets, we calculated the expenditures reported in MSIS as a percentage of those reported in CMS-64. We also determined the percentage difference in total expenditures between the two data sets, by expenditure category. Step 1: Obtain MSIS and CMS-64 Data In order to identify the baseline of total Medicaid expenditures for fiscal years 2007 through 2009, we obtained from the Center for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) MSIS and CMS-64 data for each of the 50 states and the District of Columbia. Appendix II: Total Baseline Medicaid Expenditures in MSIS and CMS-64, by State, Fiscal Year 2009
State Ohio
Appendix III: Total Adjusted Medicaid Expenditures in MSIS and CMS-64, by State, Fiscal Year 2009
State Ohio
Appendix IV: Adjusted MSIS Expenditures as a Percentage of CMS-64, by State, Fiscal Year 2009
Appendix V: Adjusted MSIS Expenditures as a Percentage of CMS-64, by State and Expenditure Category, Fiscal Year 2009
Appendix V: Adjusted MSIS Expenditures as a Percentage of CMS-64, by State and Expenditure Category, Fiscal Year 2009 Adjustments were made by adding expenditures reported in CMS-64 to those reported in the Medicaid Statistical Information System (MSIS). Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Health and Human Services. | Why GAO Did This Study
CMS, within the Department of Health and Human Services, and state Medicaid agencies jointly administer the multibillion-dollar Medicaid program, which finances health care for certain low-income individuals. Medicaid is on GAOs high-risk list because of vulnerabilities to waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement. CMS has two data sets that report state Medicaid expenditures. The MSIS data set is designed to report individual beneficiary claims data. The CMS-64 data set aggregates states expenditures, which are used to reimburse the states for their Medicaid expenditures. However, neither data set provides a complete picture of Medicaid expenditures.
GAO was asked to compare MSIS and CMS-64 data. This report (1) examines the extent to which MSIS and CMS-64 expenditure data differ and (2) where possible, quantifies the identified differences between the two data sets. GAO reviewed documents, compared Medicaid expenditure data, and interviewed CMS and state officials. GAO used fiscal years 2007 through 2009 datathe most-recent and most-complete data available.
What GAO Found
Medicaid expenditures in the Medicaid Statistical Information System (MSIS) were generally less than CMS-64 amounts. National expenditures in MSIS were 86, 87, and 88 percent of the amounts in CMS-64 in fiscal years 2007 through 2009, respectively. In fiscal year 2009, MSIS expenditures for states ranged from 59 to 119 percent of CMS-64. Specifically, 40 states reported lower expenditures in MSIS than CMS-64; 5 states and the District of Columbia reported higher expenditures; and 5 states reported similar levels of expenditures.
GAO was able to quantify some, but not all, of the identified differences in expenditures between MSIS and the CMS-64.
GAO adjusted MSIS for expenditures that were not attributed to individual beneficiaries--such as prescription drug rebates. These adjustments increased MSIS to 92, 93, and 94 percent of the amounts in CMS-64 in fiscal years 2007 through 2009, respectively.
GAO could not account for the remaining differences in part because of inconsistencies in the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid (CMS) guidance between the two data sets. For example, CMS officials explained that expenditures for inpatient services as reported by a state in MSIS and as reported in CMS-64 are not necessarily for the same services.
GAO also found that states do not submit timely MSIS information. CMS requires states to submit MSIS data within 45 days and CMS-64 data within 30 days of the end of the quarter. However, states' reporting of MSIS data can be up to 3 years late, whereas CMS-64 data are consistently reported on time. Also, MSIS expenditure data are considered less reliable when compared with CMS-64.
GAO has reported that CMS will need more reliable data for assessing expenditures and measuring performance in the Medicaid program. MSIS and CMS-64 have the potential to offer a robust view of the Medicaid program, enhancing CMS oversight of aggregate spending trends, per beneficiary spending growth, and cross-state comparisons, all of which could be useful in improving the financial integrity of this high-risk program. However, delays in reporting MSIS data and inconsistencies between the two data sets limit their usefulness as oversight tools. CMS has recently completed a pilot study aimed in part at improving the timeliness and consistency of both systems data.
HHS provided technical comments on a draft of this report, which were incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-16-249 | gao_GAO-16-249_0 | According to the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (HSA), the ONCRC, located within DHS’s Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), is required, among other things, to: coordinate the activities of DHS relating to the NCR; coordinate on terrorism preparedness with federal, state, local, and regional agencies, and private sector entities in the NCR to ensure adequate planning, information sharing, training, and execution of domestic preparedness activities among these agencies and entities; serve as a liaison between the federal government and state, local, and regional authorities, and private sector entities in the NCR to facilitate access to federal grants and other programs; and provide state, local, and regional authorities in the NCR with regular information, research, and technical support to assist the efforts of state, local, and regional authorities in securing the homeland. ONCRC Has Taken Various Actions to Help Improve Emergency Communications Interoperability in the NCR
The ONCRC has worked with both state and local entities and other DHS components on various efforts aimed at improving emergency preparedness in the NCR, including emergency communications interoperability. For example, ONCRC staff helped revise the NCR’s 2013 Homeland Security Strategic Plan (NCR Strategic Plan). One of the goals of the plan is to ensure interoperable communications capabilities. The plan identified a number of NCR’s initiatives to achieve this goal including: ensuring communications interoperability across agencies, managing and coordinating radio upgrades across jurisdictions, maintaining a cache of extra radios, conducting training to improve the ability of all NCR partners to access and use communications systems effectively, and encourage participation in biannual communication exercises that test all regional communication platforms. The ONCRC officials told us that the ONCRC (as a member of the Senior Policy Group) has collaborated with the NCR’s Emergency Preparedness Council to facilitate state and local agencies access to the DHS’s UASI grant program. The UASI grant program is the primary source of federal homeland security funding for the NCR. In fiscal year 2014, DHS allocated $53 million through the UASI grant program to the NCR to enhance the region’s homeland security and preparedness capabilities. Almost $7 million of the $53 million was to fund projects aimed at the NCR Strategic Plan’s goal to ensure interoperable communications capabilities, such as purchasing radios and other equipment as well as developing a strategic plan for radio encryption. The ONCRC’s Ability to Coordinate with Federal Agencies to Help Improve Emergency Preparedness, Including Communications Interoperability, in the NCR is Currently Limited
As discussed in the previous section, the ONCRC coordinates with state and local agencies in the NCR primarily through its participation on NCR committees including the Senior Policy Group and the Emergency Preparedness Council. However, the ONCRC currently does not have a formal mechanism in place to coordinate with federal agencies and is making some effort to improve how it coordinates with them. From the establishment of the ONCRC in 2002 through 2014, the Joint Federal Committee (JFC) was the ONCRC’s primary means of coordinating federal efforts with state and local agencies in the NCR. However, the ONCRC officials said that the JFC has not convened since 2014. However, according to ONCRC officials, written plans or documents for the specific elements of the restructuring were not available. When the JFC existed, it did not fully operate in a manner that was consistent with key considerations for implementing interagency collaboration mechanisms that we have previously identified. Addressing the above key considerations for implementing collaborative mechanisms in the planned restructuring of the JFC could provide greater clarity to its members on their roles and responsibilities, particularly when responding to incidents, as well as improve the ONCRC’s ability to carry out its statutory responsibilities for coordinating federal homeland security and emergency-management activities in the NCR. Recommendation for Executive Action
To further build on the efforts to improve emergency communications interoperability in the NCR, we recommend that the FEMA Administrator direct the Director of ONCRC to take the following action: as part of its efforts to restructure the JFC, clearly articulate in a written agreement the roles and responsibilities of the participating agencies and specify how these agencies are to work together across agency boundaries. | Why GAO Did This Study
The NCR is considered at high risk for various threats and hazards. Federal, state, and local agencies in the NCR continue to face challenges with emergency communications interoperability—that is, the ability to use radios to communicate across entities when needed. The federal government has taken actions to improve interoperability in the NCR including allocating almost $720 million through a DHS grant program to enhance regional preparedness since fiscal year 2002, and establishing the ONCRC to coordinate NCR entities on homeland security activities, including interoperability.
GAO was asked to review federal efforts to improve emergency communications interoperability in the NCR. This report examines (1) actions the ONCRC has taken to help improve emergency communications interoperability in the NCR and (2) status of the ONCRC's efforts to coordinate with federal agencies to help improve emergency preparedness in the NCR, including communications interoperability. GAO reviewed documentation from the ONCRC and interviewed DHS officials and emergency managers from the District of Columbia, Maryland, and Virginia.
What GAO Found
The Office of National Capital Region Coordination (ONCRC), within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), has taken various actions, mainly through coordination with state and local agencies, to help improve emergency communications interoperability in the National Capital Region (NCR), a legally-designated area including Washington, D.C. and nearby parts of Virginia and Maryland. For example:
The ONCRC participates in several committees that are involved in planning and carrying out efforts to build preparedness and response capabilities of the region. In particular, the Director of the ONCRC is a member of the NCR's Senior Policy Group, which coordinates these efforts. The ONCRC staff helped develop the NCR's 2013 Homeland Security Strategic Plan . One of the goals of the plan is to ensure interoperable communications capabilities. The Strategic Plan identified a number of NCR initiatives to achieve this goal, including supporting the establishment and maintenance of radio interoperability and managing and coordinating radio upgrades across jurisdictions.
As part of the responsibility to serve as a liaison with entities in the NCR, the ONCRC has collaborated with the NCR's Emergency Preparedness Council (an NCR advisory body) to facilitate state and local agencies access to the DHS's Urban Area Security Initiative grant program—the primary source of federal homeland security funding for the NCR. In fiscal year 2014, DHS allocated $53 million in grant funding to the NCR to enhance the region's homeland security and preparedness capabilities. Almost $7 million of this amount was to fund activities, such as purchasing radios and other equipment, aimed at achieving the NCR Strategic Plan's goal to ensure interoperable communications capabilities.
A key role of the ONCRC is to coordinate with federal, state, and local NCR entities on emergency preparedness and homeland security activities. However, the ONCRC currently does not have a formal mechanism in place to coordinate with federal agencies. From 2002 through 2014, the Joint Federal Committee (JFC) was the ONCRC's primary means of coordinating with federal agencies in the NCR. The ONCRC has not convened the JFC since 2014 and plans to restructure it. Officials explained that the JFC was not efficient and effective as a coordinating body and that they plan to strengthen its coordination capabilities. However, written plans were not available. When the JFC existed, its operation was not fully aligned with interagency collaboration mechanisms that GAO has identified. In particular, the JFC's charter did not specify the roles and responsibilities of participating agencies or how they were to work together across agency boundaries. Addressing these interagency collaborative mechanisms in the planned restructuring of the JFC could provide greater clarity on roles and responsibilities and enhance its ability to coordinate federal efforts in the region.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that ONCRC, as part of its efforts to restructure the JFC, clearly articulate in a written agreement the roles and responsibilities of participating agencies and specify how they are to work together across agency boundaries. ONCRC concurred with this recommendation. |
gao_GAO-10-355 | gao_GAO-10-355_0 | IRS Has Demanding Responsibilities as the United States’ Tax Collector
IRS has demanding responsibilities in collecting taxes, processing tax returns, and enforcing the federal tax laws, and relies extensively on computerized systems to support its financial and mission-related operations. IRS Has Made Progress in Correcting Previously Reported Weaknesses
During fiscal year 2009, IRS has made progress toward correcting previously reported information security control weaknesses and information security program deficiencies at its three computing centers, another facility, and enterprisewide. IRS had corrected or mitigated 28 of the 89 previously identified weaknesses and deficiencies that were unresolved at the end of our prior audit. This includes 21 of 74 control weaknesses and 7 of 15 program deficiencies. For example, it has changed vendor-supplied user accounts and passwords, avoided storing clear-text passwords in scripts, deactivated proximity cards for separated employees in a timely manner, ensured that security guards follow established procedures and screen packages and briefcases for prohibited items. For example, IRS has enhanced its policies and procedures for configuring mainframe operations and established an alternate processing site for its procurement system. Nonetheless, of the previously identified security weaknesses and program deficiencies reported as unresolved at the completion of our prior year’s audit, 61 of them—or about 69 percent—remain unresolved or unmitigated. As a result, IRS is at increased risk of unauthorized disclosure, modification, or destruction of financial and taxpayer information. These weaknesses—both old and new—continue to jeopardize the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of IRS’s systems and were the basis of our determination that IRS had a material weakness in internal controls over financial reporting related to information security in fiscal year 2009. Organizations accomplish this objective by designing and implementing controls that are intended to prevent, limit, and detect unauthorized access to computing resources, programs, information, and facilities. IRS did not always enforce strong identification and authentication controls. Further, IRS did not sufficiently protect passwords during transmission. To restrict legitimate users’ access to only those programs and files they need to do their work, organizations establish access rights and permissions. IRS did not always log and monitor important security events on its systems. Subsequent to our site visit, IRS informed us that it had corrected this weakness. IRS Has Not Fully Implemented All Elements of Its Information Security Program
A key reason for the information security weaknesses in IRS’s financial and tax processing systems is that it has not yet fully implemented its agencywide information security program to ensure that controls are effectively established and maintained. FISMA requires each agency to develop, document, and implement an information security program that, among other things, includes periodic assessments of the risk and magnitude of harm that could result from the unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of information and information systems; policies and procedures that (1) are based on risk assessments, (2) cost- effectively reduce information security risks to an acceptable level, (3) ensure that information security is addressed throughout the life cycle of each system, and (4) ensure compliance with applicable requirements; plans for providing adequate information security for networks, facilities, security awareness training to inform personnel of information security risks and of their responsibilities in complying with agency policies and procedures, as well as training personnel with significant security responsibilities for information security; periodic testing and evaluation of the effectiveness of information security policies, procedures, and practices, to be performed with a frequency depending on risk, but no less than annually, and that includes testing of management, operational, and technical controls for every system identified in the agency’s required inventory of major information systems; a process for planning, implementing, evaluating, and documenting remedial action to address any deficiencies in its information security policies, procedures, or practices; and plans and procedures to ensure continuity of operations for information systems that support the operations and assets of the agency. Identifying and assessing information security risks are essential to determining what controls are required. Although remedial action plans were in place, corrective actions were not always appropriately verified. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to determine (1) the status of the Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS) actions to correct or mitigate previously reported information security weaknesses and (2) whether controls over key financial and tax processing systems were effective in protecting the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of financial and sensitive taxpayer information. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) relies extensively on computerized systems to carry out its demanding responsibilities to collect taxes, process tax returns, and enforce the nation's tax laws. Effective information security controls are essential to protect financial and taxpayer information from inadvertent or deliberate misuse, improper disclosure, or destruction. As part of its audit of IRS's fiscal years 2009 and 2008 financial statements, GAO assessed (1) the status of IRS's actions to correct or mitigate previously reported information security weaknesses and (2) whether controls over key financial and tax processing systems are effective in ensuring the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of financial and sensitive taxpayer information. To do this, GAO examined IRS information security policies, plans, and procedures; tested controls over key financial applications; and interviewed key agency officials at six sites.
What GAO Found
IRS has continued to make progress during fiscal year 2009 in correcting previously reported information security weaknesses that GAO reported as unresolved at the conclusion of its fiscal year 2008 audit. Specifically, IRS has corrected or mitigated 28 of the 89 weaknesses and deficiencies--21 of 74 previously identified information security control weaknesses and 7 of 15 previously identified program deficiencies. For example, it has (1) changed vendor-supplied user accounts and passwords; (2) avoided storing clear-text passwords in scripts; (3) enhanced its policies and procedures for configuring mainframe operations; and (4) established an alternate processing site for its procurement system. While IRS has corrected 28 control weaknesses and program deficiencies, 61 of them--or about 69 percent--remain unresolved or unmitigated. For example, IRS continued to install patches in an untimely manner and used passwords that were not complex. In addition, IRS did not always verify that remedial actions were implemented or effectively mitigated the security weaknesses. According to IRS officials, they continued to address uncorrected weaknesses and, subsequent to GAO's site visits, had completed additional corrective actions on some of them. Despite these actions, newly identified and the unresolved information security control weaknesses in key financial and tax processing systems continue to jeopardize the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of financial and sensitive taxpayer information. IRS did not consistently implement controls that were intended to prevent, limit, and detect unauthorized access to its systems and information. For example, IRS did not always (1) enforce strong password management for properly identifying and authenticating users; (2) authorize user access to permit only the access needed to perform job functions; (3) log and monitor security events on a key system; and (4) physically protect its computer resources. A key reason for these weaknesses is that IRS has not yet fully implemented its agencywide information security program to ensure that controls are appropriately designed and operating effectively. Although IRS has made important progress in developing and documenting its information security program, it did not, among other things, review risk assessments at least annually for certain systems or ensure contractors receive awareness training. Until these control weaknesses and program deficiencies are corrected, the agency remains unnecessarily vulnerable to insider threats related to the unauthorized access to and disclosure, modification, or destruction of financial and taxpayer information, as well as the disruption of system operations and services. The new and unresolved weaknesses and deficiencies are the basis for GAO's determination that IRS had a material weakness in internal controls over financial reporting related to information security in fiscal year 2009. |
gao_GAO-09-291 | gao_GAO-09-291_0 | From January 1997 to the Time of the Survey Response, Large Sponsors of DB Plans Have Revised Their Benefit Offerings in Various Ways
Our survey of the largest sponsors of DB pension plans reveals that they have made a number of revisions to their benefit offerings over approximately the last 10 years or so. Generally, respondents reported that they revised benefit formulas, converted some plans to hybrid plans (such as cash balance plans), or froze some of their plans. For example, 81 percent of responding sponsors reported that they modified the formulas of one or more of their DB plans. Regarding plan freezes, 62 percent of the responding firms reported a freeze, or a plan amendment to limit some or all future pension accruals for some or all plan participants, for one or more of their plans (see app. The vast majority of respondents (90 percent) to our most recent survey also reported on their 401(k)-type DC plans. The vast majority reported either an increase or no change to the employer or employee contribution rates, with generally as many reporting increases to contributions as reporting no change (see app. Many (67 percent) of responding firms plan to implement or have already implemented an automatic enrollment feature to one or more of their DC plans. We asked respondents to report on how an employer’s share of providing retiree health benefits had changed over the last 10 years or so for current retirees. At the Time of the Survey, Large DB Sponsors Anticipated Making Few Additional Changes to DB Plans
Responding before October 2008—before the increasingly severe downturns in the national economy—most survey respondents reported they had no plan to revise benefit formulas or freeze or terminate plans, or had any intention to convert to hybrid plans before 2012. When asked about how much they had been or were likely to be influenced by recent legislation or account rule changes, such as PPA or the adoption of Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) requirements to fully recognize obligations for postretirement plans in financial statements, responding firms generally indicated these were not significant factors in their decisions on benefit offerings. Their relative stability has been important, as these plans represent retirement income for more than three-quarters of all participants in single-employer plans. Today, these large plans no longer appear immune to the broader trends that are eroding retirement security. This trend is most pronounced among nonbargained plans but is also apparent among bargained plans. 2) What changes might employers make with respect to their pensions in the future, and how might these changes be influenced by changes in pension law and other factors? Large DB Plan Sponsor Survey: Health Benefits for Active Employees and Retirees
Health care was the single largest benefit as a percentage of base pay
(Figure 10)
All responding DB plan sponsors offered health insurance to active employees and contributed to the cost All responding DB plan sponsors offered health insurance to at least some current retirees—nearly all to both pre-age 65 and age 65-plus employees 80 percent provided health insurance to at least some active employees who become eligible for the benefit upon retirement 20 percent provided health insurance that was fully paid by the retired employee (Figure 11)
Large DB Plan Sponsor Survey: Health Benefits for Current Retirees
Compared to respondents reporting on their benefits covering CB employees, respondents with NB employees reported decrease in the employer’s share of the cost of providing health benefits to current retirees (Figure 12)
Main reasons were increases in cost of health insurance for retirees and for active employees (Figure 13)
Large DB Plan Sponsor Survey: Health Benefits for Future Retirees
46 percent of plan sponsors no longer offered retiree health benefits to active employees hired after a certain date. 54 percent decreased or eliminated the firm's share cost of providing health benefits for future retirees who were non-bargaining employees; (Figure 14)
Primary reasons cited were large cost increases in health insurance for both retirees and active employees (Figure 15) 41 percent of sponsors with bargaining unit employees reported decrease in or elimination of firm's share of health care costs for future retirees (Figure 14) 26 percent reported no change Primary reason cited was match/maintain parity with competitor’s benefits package (Figure 16)
Retiree Health Care Represents a Significant Liability for DB Plan Sponsors
Large DB Plan Sponsor Survey: Conditions to Consider Forming New DB Plans
Most sponsors reported no possible conditions that could make
them definitely consider forming a new DB plan 26 percent of sponsors reported that there were conditions under which they would have considered offering a new DB plan; the most common conditions selected were: Provide sponsors with greater scope in accounting for DB plans on corporate balance sheets DB plans became more effective as an employee retention Reduced unpredictability or volatility in DB plan funding requirements (Figure 17)
Implications/Concluding Observations
Stability of large sponsor plans now increasingly vulnerable to
Appendix II: Scope and Methodology
To achieve our objectives, we conducted a survey of sponsors of large defined-benefit (DB) pension plans. | Why GAO Did This Study
The number of private defined benefit (DB) pension plans, an important source of retirement income for millions of Americans, has declined substantially over the past two decades. For example, about 92,000 single-employer DB plans existed in 1990, compared to just under 29,000 single-employer plans today. Although this decline has been concentrated among smaller plans, there is a widespread concern that large DB plans covering many participants have modified, reduced, or otherwise frozen plan benefits in recent years. GAO was asked to examine (1) what changes employers have made to their pension and benefit offerings, including to their defined contribution (DC) plans and health offerings over the last 10 years or so, and (2) what changes employers might make with respect to their pensions in the future, and how these changes might be influenced by changes in pension law and other factors. To gather information about overall changes in pension and health benefit offerings, GAO asked 94 of the nation's largest DB plan sponsors to participate in a survey; 44 of these sponsors responded. These respondents represent about one-quarter of the total liabilities in the nation's single-employer insured DB plan system as of 2004. The survey was largely completed prior to the current financial market difficulties of late 2008.
What GAO Found
GAO's survey of the largest sponsors of DB pension plans revealed that respondents have made a number of revisions to their retirement benefit offerings over the last 10 years or so. Generally speaking, they have changed benefit formulas; converted to hybrid plans (such plans are legally DB plans, but they contain certain features that resemble DC plans); or frozen some of their plans. Eighty-one percent of responding sponsors reported that they modified the formula for computing benefits for one or more of their DB plans. Among all plans reported by respondents, 28 percent of these (or 47 of 169) plans were under a plan freeze--an amendment to the plan to limit some or all future pension accruals for some or all plan participants. The vast majority of respondents (90 percent, or 38 of 42 respondents) reported on their 401(k)-type DC plans. Regarding these DC plans, a majority of respondents reported either an increase or no change to the employer or employee contribution rates, with roughly equal responses to both categories. About 67 percent of (or 28 of 42) responding firms plan to implement or have already implemented an automatic enrollment feature to one or more of their DC plans. With respect to health care offerings, all of the (42) responding firms offered health care to their current workers. Eighty percent (or 33 of 41 respondents) offered a retiree health care plan to at least some current workers, although 20 percent of (or 8 of 41) respondents reported that retiree health benefits were to be fully paid by retirees. Further, 46 percent of (or 19 of 41) responding firms reported that it is no longer offered to employees hired after a certain date. At the time of the survey, most sponsors reported no plans to revise plan formulas, freeze or terminate plans, or convert to hybrid plans before 2012. When asked about the influence of recent legislation or changes to the rules for pension accounting and reporting, responding firms generally indicated these were not significant factors in their benefit decisions. Finally, a minority of sponsors said they would consider forming a new DB plan. Those sponsors that would consider forming a new plan might do so if there were reduced unpredictability or volatility in DB plan funding requirements and greater scope in accounting for DB plans on corporate balance sheets. The survey results suggest that the long-time stability of larger DB plans is now vulnerable to the broader trends of eroding retirement security. The current market turmoil appears likely to exacerbate this trend. |
gao_RCED-95-245 | gao_RCED-95-245_0 | In addition, USEC’s plan assumes that $400 million to $600 million will be transferred out of the Treasury when USEC is sold. Expected Impact on the U.S. Treasury
The total impact on the U.S. Treasury of privatization will depend on the proceeds from the sale, projected by Morgan to be between $1.5 billion and $1.8 billion (less transaction fees), plus any additional tax revenues that a private USEC may pay in the future to the government, less the cash that USEC will take with it from its Treasury account when it is sold. While the corporation would play a key role in the privatization, the Treasury would take the lead. USEC’s privatization plan assumes that most of the government corporation’s liabilities will remain with the government. For example, the analysis needs to be updated to reflect current market conditions and recent administration decisions. According to our estimates, the government could eventually pay $17.8 billion or more in costs associated with the former DOE program whether or not USEC is privatized. As discussed in our report, we recognize that under the privatization plan and a subsequent letter, the Department of the Treasury will play an active role in the privatization and will concur in key decisions. Under the first tier, USEC would attempt to sell the uranium in foreign countries. Because the act does not define “undue cost or ongoing obligation” or “net present value of the corporation,” our report identifies the government’s major costs and ongoing obligations associated with the enrichment program and the net present value of USEC under two scenarios: (1) if it were to remain a government corporation and (2) if it were to be sold to the private sector. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO provided information on the proposed privatization of the U.S. Enrichment Corporation (USEC), focusing on: (1) the net present value of the corporation; and (2) whether the privatization plan would result in any ongoing obligation or undue cost to the government.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the USEC privatization plan predicts that USEC stock could sell for up to $1.8 billion and USEC would take up to $600 million out of its Treasury account after privatization; (2) after privatization, USEC could pay taxes valued up to $1.1 billion annually, although it could have options to minimize taxes; (3) the current net present value analysis needs revision, since it does not reflect the value of excess inventory and current market conditions; (4) although USEC will play the lead role in determining how and when key privatization decisions are made, the Department of the Treasury will also play an active role and concur in key decisions; (5) safeguards may need to be implemented to protect taxpayers if USEC is undervalued when sold; (6) whether or not USEC is privatized, the U.S. government has ongoing obligations related to the uranium enrichment program and could pay $17.8 billion or more to meet requirements; and (7) the privatization plan assumes that most of USEC liabilities would remain with the government. |
gao_GAO-03-331 | gao_GAO-03-331_0 | Therefore, all brands of standard formula are nutritionally identical. The approach used by 48 WIC agencies in February 2002 was to adopt the restrictions contained in federal regulation, which limit the use of noncontract standard formula to certain specific situations, such as if medically prescribed or if needed for religious reasons. By comparison, 90.3 percent of all infants received contract standard formula, while 6.4 percent received nonstandard formulas, which are special formulas for infants who cannot use standard formula. Agencies Showed Variation in Both Noncontract Standard and Nonstandard Formula Use
The percentage of WIC infants receiving noncontract standard formula in February 2002 ranged from a low of zero to a high of 10.5 percent, as reported by the 45 agencies that provided this information. Some state agencies may have medical or dietary religious reasons for not entirely prohibiting the use of noncontract standard formula. These rebates could have been used to provide additional program benefits to women, infants, and children. In fiscal year 2001, FNS received $1.4 billion in rebates from the use of contract standard formula by infants participating in the WIC program. FNS is not routinely collecting from WIC agencies the data that would allow it to monitor the effectiveness of WIC agencies in restricting the use of noncontract standard or nonstandard infant formula. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Agriculture. All 51 WIC agencies receiving our survey responded. To determine whether WIC agencies restricted the use of noncontract standard formula, we primarily relied on the answers to a survey question which asked what the WIC agency’s current policy was on the use of noncontract standard formula, and we also obtained copies of the WIC agencies’ policies pertaining to the use of noncontract standard formula. Computations made to estimate the rebate dollars foregone by each of 19 WIC agencies with noncontract standard use in excess of the 3.3 percent average for all agencies that reported data in February 2002, are as follows: (1) we multiplied the total infants receiving formula by 0.033 to obtain the number of infants required to attain a 3.3 percent noncontract standard formula usage rate, (2) we subtracted the number of infants required to attain a 3.3 percent noncontract standard formula usage rate from the total infants that received such formula to obtain the number of infants receiving noncontract standard formula in excess of the 3.3 percent rate, and (3) we multiplied the number of infants receiving noncontract standard formula in excess of 3.3 percent by the average monthly rebate received per infant using contract standard formula to obtain the number of rebate dollars foregone. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Agriculture's Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) provided about $3 billion to state agencies in fiscal year 2001 for food assistance, including infant formula, through its Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants and Children (WIC). Most infants receiving formula are given a milk- or soy-based standard formula. To stretch program dollars, each state WIC agency contracts with a single company for purchases of that company's standard formula for which they receive rebates. These rebates totaled $1.4 billion in fiscal year 2001. Rebates do not apply to other companies' brands of standard formula (noncontract standard formula) or to nonstandard formulas designed to meet special medical or dietary conditions. GAO was directed to examine the extent that WIC agencies have restricted the use of noncontract standard formula to lower cost of the WIC program.
What GAO Found
As of February 2002, all 51 of the state WIC agencies included in our survey had policies to restrict the use of noncontract standard formula. Three of the 51 agencies prohibited the use of this formula entirely. The other 48 agencies restricted its use to specific situations, such as if medically prescribed or if needed for religious reasons. Seven of these 48 agencies also set percentage limits, such as 4 percent of all standard formula issued, on the use of noncontract standard formula. In fiscal year 2002, 3.3 percent of the infants using formula in the WIC program received a noncontract standard formula, while 90.3 percent received the contract brand. The remaining 6.4 percent received a medically prescribed nonstandard formula for special medical or dietary needs. There were wide variations between WIC agencies in the percentage of infants who received noncontract standard formula, ranging from a low of zero, for the 3 agencies that prohibited its use, to 10.5 percent. Likewise, the percentage of infants receiving medically prescribed nonstandard formula ranged from 0.2 percent to 27.7 percent. FNS has not routinely collected from WIC agencies the data that would allow it to monitor the effectiveness of these agencies in restricting the use of either noncontract standard or nonstandard infant formula. Buying noncontract standard formula brands cost the WIC program an estimated $50.9 million in foregone rebates in fiscal year 2002. Although it may be neither feasible nor desirable to prohibit all purchases of noncontract standard formula, rebates would have increased by $13.8 million if every state had a noncontract standard formula usage rate no higher than the average of 3.3 percent reported across all agencies. |
gao_GAO-12-636T | gao_GAO-12-636T_0 | Federal, state, and local government agencies, nonprofits, the private sector, and academia all play important roles in providing financial education resources, which can include print and online materials, broadcast media, individual counseling, and classroom instruction. The Federal Government Plays a Wide-Ranging Role in Promoting Financial Literacy
Efforts to improve financial literacy in the United States involve a range of public, nonprofit, and private participants. Among those participants, the federal government is distinctive for its size and reach, and for the diversity of its components, which address a wide array of issues and populations. They noted that the federal government has a built-in “bully pulpit” that can be used to draw attention to this issue. At our first forum on financial literacy in 2004, participants noted that the federal government can serve as an objective and unbiased source of information, particularly in terms of helping consumers make wise decisions about the selection of financial products and services. In preliminary results from an ongoing review, we have identified that, in fiscal year 2010, there were 16 significant financial literacy programs or activities among 14 federal agencies, as well as 4 housing counseling programs among 2 federal agencies and a federally chartered nonprofit corporation. That report, conducted by the RAND Corporation, was based on a survey that had asked federal agencies to self-identify their financial literacy efforts. We believe that our count of 16 significant federal financial literacy programs or activities and 4 housing counseling programs is based on a more consistent set of criteria. During his confirmation hearing, Comptroller General Dodaro noted that financial literacy was an area of priority for him, and he has initiated a multi-pronged strategy for GAO to address financial literacy issues. First, we will continue to evaluate federal efforts that directly promote financial literacy. Second, we will encourage research of the various financial literacy initiatives to evaluate the relative effectiveness of different financial literacy approaches. Third, we will look for opportunities to enhance financial literacy as an integral component of certain regular federal interactions with the public. Finally, we have recently instituted a program to empower GAO’s own employees. This program includes a distinguished speaker series, as well as an internal website with information on personal financial matters and links to information on pay and benefits and referral services through GAO’s counseling services office. Having Multiple Federal Agencies Involved in Financial Literacy Offers Advantages as Well as Risks
Having multiple federal agencies involved in financial literacy efforts can have certain advantages. In particular, providing information from multiple sources can increase consumer access and the likelihood of educating more people. Moreover, certain agencies may have deep and long- standing expertise and experience addressing specific issue areas or serving specific populations. Further, the participation of multiple agencies highlights the need for strong coordination of their activities. In general, we have found that the coordination and collaboration among federal agencies with regard to financial literacy have improved in recent years, in large part due to the multiagency Financial Literacy and Education Commission. In our recent and ongoing work, we have found instances in which multiple agencies or programs share similar goals and activities, which raises questions about the efficiency of some federal financial literacy efforts. Program Evaluation and the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection May Offer Avenues to Enhance Effectiveness
In prior work we have noted the importance of program evaluation and the need to focus federal financial literacy efforts on initiatives that work. We believe these measures are positive steps because federal agencies could potentially make the most of scarce resources by consolidating financial literacy efforts into the activities and agencies that are most effective. As such, the bureau offers potential in enhancing the federal government’s role in financial literacy. At the same time, as we have seen, some of its responsibilities overlap with those of other agencies, which highlights the need for coordination and may offer opportunities for consolidation. This underscores the importance of steps the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection has been taking to delineate its roles and responsibilities related to financial literacy vis-à-vis those of other federal agencies, which we believe is critical in order to minimize overlap and the potential for duplication. | Why GAO Did This Study
Financial literacy plays an important role in helping to promote the financial health and stability of individuals and families. Economic changes in recent years have further highlighted the need to empower all Americans to make informed financial decisions. In addition to the important roles played by states, nonprofits, the private sector, and academia, federal agencies promote financial literacy through activities including print and online materials, broadcast media, individual counseling, and classroom instruction.
This testimony discusses (1) the federal governments role in promoting financial literacy, including GAOs role; (2) the advantages and risks of financial literacy efforts being spread across multiple federal agencies; and (3) opportunities to enhance the effectiveness of federal financial literacy education efforts going forward. This testimony is based on prior and ongoing work, for which GAO reviewed agency budget documents, strategic plans, performance reports, websites, and other materials; convened forums of financial literacy experts; and interviewed representatives of federal agencies and selected private and nonprofit organizations.
While this statement includes no new recommendations, in the past GAO has made a number of recommendations aimed at improving financial literacy efforts.
What GAO Found
The federal government plays a wide-ranging role in promoting financial literacy. Efforts to improve financial literacy in the United States involve an array of public, nonprofit, and private participants, but among those participants, the federal government is distinctive for its size and reach and for the diversity of its components, which address a wide range of issues and populations. At forums of financial literacy experts that GAO held in 2004 and 2011, participants noted that the federal government can use its bully pulpit, convening power, and other tools to draw attention to the issue, and serve as an objective and unbiased source of information about the selection of financial products and services. In prior work, GAO cited a 2009 report by the RAND Corporation in which 20 federal agencies self-identified as having 56 federal financial literacy programs, but GAOs subsequent analysis found substantial inconsistency in how different agencies defined and counted financial literacy programs. Based on a more consistent set of criteria, GAO identified 16 significant financial literacy programs or activities among 14 federal agencies, as well as 4 housing counseling programs among 3 federally supported entities, in fiscal year 2010. The Comptroller General has initiated a multi-pronged strategy to address financial literacy issues. First, GAO will continue to evaluate federal efforts that directly promote financial literacy. Second, it will encourage research of the various financial literacy initiatives to evaluate the relative effectiveness of different approaches. Third, GAO will look for opportunities to enhance financial literacy as an integral component of certain regular federal interactions with the public. Finally, GAO has recently instituted a program to empower its own employees, which includes an internal website with information on personal financial matters and links to information on pay and benefits and referral services through its counseling services office and a distinguished speaker series.
Having multiple federal agencies involved in financial literacy offers advantages as well as risks. Some agencies have long-standing expertise and experience addressing specific issue areas or populations, and providing information from multiple sources can increase consumer access and the likelihood of educating more people. However, the participation of multiple agencies also highlights the risk of inefficiency and the need for strong coordination of their activities. GAO has found that the coordination and collaboration among federal agencies with regard to financial literacy has improved in recent years, in large part as a result of the Financial Literacy and Education Commission. At the same time, GAO has found instances of overlap, in which multiple agencies or programs, including the new Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, share similar goals and activities, underscoring the need for careful monitoring of the bureaus efforts.
In prior work GAO has noted the importance of program evaluation and the need to focus federal financial literacy efforts on initiatives that work. Federal agencies could potentially make the most of scarce resources by consolidating financial literacy efforts into the activities and agencies that are most effective. In addition, the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection offers potential for enhancing the federal governments role in financial literacy, but avoiding duplication will require that it continue its efforts to delineate its financial literacy roles and responsibilities vis-à-vis those of other federal agencies with overlapping responsibilities. |
gao_GAO-02-865T | gao_GAO-02-865T_0 | Broader Transformation of Government Needed
As you know, our country’s transition into the 21st Century is characterized by a number of key trends including global interdependence; diverse, diffuse, and asymmetrical security threats; rapidly evolving science and technologies; dramatic shifts in the age and composition of our population; important quality of life issues; and evolving government structures and concepts. Indeed, the goals of this phase of the reorganization plan are not highly controversial. major communications and information technology improvements, development of an internal control system that will ensure protection of civil liberties as investigative constraints are loosened, and management of the ripple effect that changes at the FBI will have on other aspects of the law enforcement community. Basic Elements of a Successful Transformation
As the FBI moves forward in its efforts to transform its culture and reexamine its roles, responsibilities, and desired results to effectively meet the realities and challenges of the post-September 11 environment, it should consider employing the major elements of successful transformation efforts that have been utilized by leading organizations both here and abroad. Organizations that have successfully undertaken transformation efforts also typically use best practices for strategic planning; strategic human capital management; senior leadership and accountability; realignment of activities, processes, and resources; and internal and external collaboration among others. Continuous internal, and independent external, monitoring and oversight are essential to help ensure that the implementation of the transformation stays on track and achieves its purpose of making the FBI more proactive in the fight against terrorism without compromising civil rights. Controlling the FBI’s Domestic Intelligence Operations. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) proposed reorganization and realignment plans.
What GAO Found
The FBI's plans are part of a broader effort to fundamentally transform the federal government in light of recent trends and long-range fiscal challenges. As it moves into the 21st century, the country faces several key trends, including global interdependence; diverse, diffuse, and asymmetrical security threats; rapidly evolving science and technologies; dramatic shifts in the age and composition of the population; important quality of life issues; and evolving government structures and concepts. The second phase of the reorganization focuses on major aspects of FBI's realignment efforts, including realigning staff, building analytical capacity, the National Infrastructure Protection Center, and recruiting. Other issues include (1) major communications and information technology improvements, (2) development of an internal control system that will ensure protection of civil liberties as investigative constraints are loosened, and (3) management of the ripple effect that changes at the FBI will have on other aspects of the law enforcement community. As the FBI moves to effectively meet the realities and challenges since September 11, it should reconsider employing the major elements of successful transformation efforts used by leading organizations. These elements include strategic planning; strategic human capital management; senior leadership and accountability, realignment of activities, processes, and resources; and internal and external collaboration. Continuous internal, and independent external, monitoring and oversight are essential to ensure that the implementation of the transformation stays on track and achieves its purpose of making the FBI more proactive in the fight against terrorism without compromising civil rights. |
gao_GAO-03-1016T | gao_GAO-03-1016T_0 | A new federal oversight tool, state performance reviews, implemented in October 2000, measures state survey agency performance against seven standards, including statutory requirements regarding survey frequency, requirements for documenting deficiencies, and timeliness of complaint investigations. Magnitude of Problems Remains Cause for Concern, Even Though Fewer Serious Nursing Home Quality Problems Were Reported
State survey data indicate that the proportion of nursing homes with serious quality problems remains unacceptably high, despite a decline in such reported problems since mid-2000. Beyond the continuing high prevalence of actual harm or immediate jeopardy deficiencies, we found a disturbing understatement of actual harm or higher deficiencies in a sample of surveys that were conducted since July 2000 at homes with a history of harming residents but whose current surveys indicated no actual harm deficiencies. Overall, 39 percent of 76 surveys we reviewed had documented problems that should have been classified as actual harm: serious, avoidable pressure sores; severe weight loss; and multiple falls resulting in broken bones and other injuries. Weaknesses Persist in State Survey, Complaint, and Enforcement Activities
Despite increased attention in recent years, widespread weaknesses persist in state survey, complaint investigation, and enforcement activities. Moreover, many state complaint investigation systems still have timeliness problems and some states did not comply with HCFA’s policy to refer to the agency for immediate sanction those nursing homes that showed a pattern of harming residents, resulting in hundreds of nursing homes not appropriately referred for action. Confusion about Definition of Harm and Other Factors Contribute to Underreporting of Care Problems
We identified several factors at the state level that contributed to the understatement of serious quality-of-care problems. Some states attributed the timeliness problem to an increase in the number of complaints and to insufficient staff. Substantial Number of Nursing Homes Were Not Referred to CMS for Immediate Sanctions
State survey agencies did not refer a significant number of cases where nursing homes were found to have a pattern of harming residents to CMS for immediate sanction as required by CMS policy, significantly undermining the policy’s intended deterrent effect. CMS Oversight of State Survey Activities Requires Further Strengthening
While CMS has instituted a more systematic oversight process of state survey and complaint activities by initiating annual state performance reviews, CMS officials acknowledged that the effectiveness of the reviews could be improved. For subsequent reviews, CMS plans to more centrally manage the process to improve consistency and to help ensure that future reviews distinguish serious from minor problems. Implementation has been significantly delayed for three federal initiatives that are critical to reducing the subjectivity in the state survey process for identifying deficiencies and determining the seriousness of complaints. These delayed initiatives were intended to strengthen the methodology for conducting surveys, improve surveyor guidance for determining the scope and severity of deficiencies, and increase standardization in state complaint investigation processes. Conclusions
As we reported in September 2000, continued federal and state attention is required to ensure necessary improvements in the quality of care provided to the nation’s vulnerable nursing home residents. Despite these efforts, however, CMS needs to continue its efforts to better ensure consistent compliance with federal quality requirements. Several areas that require CMS’s ongoing attention include: (1) developing more structured guidance for surveyors to address inconsistencies in how the scope and severity of deficiencies are cited across states, (2) finalizing and implementing the survey methodology redesign intended to make the survey process more systematic, (3) implementing a nationwide complaint tracking system and providing states additional complaint investigation guidance, and (4) refining the newly established state agency performance standard reviews to ensure that states are held accountable for ensuring that nursing homes comply with federal nursing home quality standards. The report on which this testimony is based contained several new recommendations for needed CMS actions on these issues; CMS generally concurred with our recommendations. GAO-03-187. California Nursing Homes: Federal and State Oversight Inadequate to Protect Residents in Homes with Serious Care Problems. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 1998, the Congress and Administration have focused considerable attention on improving the quality of care in the nation's nursing homes, which provide care for about 1.7 million elderly and disabled residents in about 17,000 homes. GAO has earlier reported on serious weaknesses in processes for conducting routine state inspections (surveys) of nursing homes and complaint investigations, ensuring that homes with identified deficiencies correct the problems without recurrence, and providing consistent federal oversight of state survey activities to ensure that nursing homes comply with federal quality standards. GAO was asked to update its work on these issues and to testify on its findings, as reported in Nursing Home Quality: Prevalence of Serious Problems, While Declining, Reinforces Importance of Enhanced Oversight, GAO-03-561 (July 15, 2003). In commenting on this report, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) generally concurred with the recommendations to address survey and oversight weaknesses. In this testimony, GAO addresses (1) the prevalence of serious nursing home quality problems nationwide, (2) factors contributing to continuing weaknesses in states' survey, complaint, and enforcement activities, and (3) the status of key federal efforts to oversee state survey agency performance and improve quality.
What GAO Found
The magnitude of documented serious deficiencies that harmed nursing home residents remains unacceptably high, despite some decline. For the most recent period reviewed, one in five nursing homes nationwide (about 3,500 homes) had serious deficiencies that caused residents actual harm or placed them in immediate jeopardy. Moreover, GAO found significant understatement of care problems that should have been classified as actual harm or higher--serious avoidable pressure sores, severe weight loss, and multiple falls resulting in broken bones and other injuries--for a sample of homes with a history of harming residents. Several factors contributed to such understatement, including confusion about the definition of harm; inadequate state review of surveys to identify potential understatement; large numbers of inexperienced state surveyors; and a continuing problem with survey timing being predictable to nursing homes. States continue to have difficulty identifying and responding in a timely fashion to public complaints alleging actual harm--delays state officials attributed to an increase in the volume of complaints and to insufficient staff. Although federal enforcement policy was strengthened in January 2000 by requiring state survey agencies to refer for immediate sanction homes that had a pattern of harming residents, many states did not fully comply with this new requirement, significantly undermining the policy's intended deterrent effect. While CMS has increased its oversight of state survey and complaint investigation activities, continued attention is required to help ensure compliance with federal requirements. In October 2000, the agency implemented new annual performance reviews to measure state performance in seven areas, including the timeliness of survey and complaint investigations and the proper documentation of survey findings. The first round of results, however, did not produce information enabling the agency to identify and initiate needed improvements. For example, some regional office summary reports provided too little information to determine if a state did not meet a particular standard by a wide or a narrow margin--information that could help CMS to judge the seriousness of problems identified and target remedial interventions. Rather than relying on its regional offices, CMS plans to more centrally manage future state performance reviews to improve consistency and to help ensure that the results of those reviews could be used to more readily identify serious problems. Finally, implementation has been significantly delayed for three federal initiatives that are critical to reducing the variation evident in the state survey process in categorizing the seriousness of deficiencies and investigating complaints. These delayed initiatives were intended to strengthen the methodology for conducting surveys, improve surveyor guidance for determining the scope and severity of deficiencies, and increase standardization in state complaint investigation processes. |
gao_T-NSIAD-97-191 | gao_T-NSIAD-97-191_0 | DOD and VA Have No Systematic Approach to Monitoring Gulf War Veterans’ Health After Initial Examination
Over 100,000 of the approximately 700,000 Gulf War veterans have participated in DOD and VA health examination programs. Of those veterans examined by DOD and VA, nearly 90 percent have reported a wide array of health complaints and disabling conditions. Without follow-up of their treatment, DOD and VA cannot say whether these ill veterans are any better or worse today than when they were first examined. Federal Research Strategy Lacks a Coherent Approach
Federal research on Gulf War veterans’ illnesses and factors that might have caused their problems has not been pursued proactively. We found that the bulk of ongoing federal research on Gulf War veterans’ illnesses focuses on the epidemiological study of the prevalence and cause of the illnesses. We found that the ongoing epidemiological federal research suffered from two methodological problems: a lack of a case definition, and absence of accurate exposures data. Without valid and reliable data on exposures and the multiplicity of agents to which the veterans were exposed, researchers will likely continue to find it difficult to detect relatively subtle effects and to eliminate alternative explanations for Gulf War veterans’ illnesses. In summary, the ongoing epidemiological research will not be able to provide precise, accurate, and conclusive answers regarding the causes of veterans’ illnesses because of these formidable methodological problems. Support for Key Government Conclusions Is Weak or Subject to Alternative Interpretations
Six years after the war, little is conclusively known about the causes of Gulf War veterans’ illnesses. Recommendations to DOD and VA
Because of the numbers of Gulf War veterans who continue to experience illnesses that may be related to their service during the Gulf War, we recommended in our report that the Secretary of Defense, with the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, (1) set up a plan for monitoring the clinical progress of Gulf War veterans to help promote effective treatment and better direct the research agenda and (2) give greater priority to research on effective treatment for ill veterans and on low-level exposures to chemicals and their interactive effects and less priority to further epidemiological studies. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the results of its study on the government's clinical care and medical research programs relating to illnesses that members of the armed forces might have contracted as a result of their service in the Persian Gulf War, focusing on the: (1) efforts of the Departments of Defense (DOD) and Veterans Affairs' (VA) to assess the quality of treatment and diagnostic services provided to Gulf War veterans and their provisions for follow-up of initial examinations; (2) government's research strategy to study the veterans' illnesses and the methodological problems posed in its studies; and (3) consistency of key official conclusions with available data on the causes of the veterans' illnesses.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) over 100,000 Gulf War veterans have participated in DOD and VA health examination programs; (2) of those veterans examined by DOD and VA, nearly 90 percent reported a wide array of health complaints and disabling conditions; (3) although efforts have been made to diagnose veterans' problems and care has been provided to many eligible veterans, neither DOD or VA has systematically attempted to determine whether ill Gulf War veterans are any better or worse today than when they were first examined; (4) federal research on Gulf War veterans' illnesses and factors that might have caused their problems has not been pursued proactively; (5) the majority of the research has focused on the epidemiological study of the prevalence and cause of Gulf War illnesses rather than the diagnosis, treatment, and prevention of them; (6) while this epidemiological research will provide descriptive data on veterans' illnesses, methodological problems are likely to prevent researchers from providing precise, accurate, and conclusive answers regarding the causes of veterans' illnesses; (7) ongoing epidemiological federal research suffered from two methodological problems: a lack of case definition, and absence of accurate exposure data; (8) without valid and reliable data on exposures and the multiplicity of agents to which the veterans were exposed, researchers will likely continue to find it difficult to detect relatively subtle effects and to eliminate alternative explanations for Gulf War veterans' illnesses; and (9) support for some official conclusions regarding stress, leishmaniasis (a parasitic infection), and exposure to chemical agents was weak or subject to alternative interpretations. |
gao_GAO-11-756T | gao_GAO-11-756T_0 | Background
SSA conducts periodic reviews called work continuing disability reviews (work CDRs) to determine if beneficiaries are still eligible or are working above the SGA level. Most DI Overpayments Are Work Related, and Their Recovery Can Take Decades
Medical and work-related overpayments in the DI program detected by SSA grew from about $860 million in fiscal year 2001 to about $1.4 billion in fiscal year 2010. Though the true extent of overpayments due to earnings is currently unknown, our review suggests that most of them are related to beneficiaries who work above SGA while receiving benefits. SSA officials estimate that from fiscal years 2005 through 2009, about 72 percent of all projected DI overpayments were work-related, or to beneficiaries who returned to work and were no longer eligible. Because the results of our case review are not generalizable, the incidence of such occurrences is currently unknown and thus the potential impact on total DI overpayments owed by ineligible beneficiaries is not clear. DI beneficiaries may reenter and leave the workforce based on their ability to perform SGA. In 49 of the 60 cases we randomly selected for review, there was no indication in the file that the individual had reported his or her earnings to SSA, and in 15 of the 60, SSA had detected two or more separate periods of earnings which resulted in overpayments. Despite a substantial increase in DI debt collections—$340 million to $839 million from fiscal year 2001 through fiscal year 2010—outstanding DI debt grew from $2.5 billion to $5.4 billion during this time, including a $225 million increase in fiscal year 2010. SSA attributes 77 percent of the approximately $839 million of debt collected in fiscal year 2010 to withholding of DI benefits. SSA Policy Does Not Require Supervisory Review of Repayment Plans
SSA does not require supervisory review of repayment plans prior to approval, including those in which repayment periods exceed the recommended 36 months. While SSA’s POMS require that staff should seek full repayment within 36 months, SSA officials reported that no supervisory approval is needed to exceed the 36 months. SSA officials told us they are often unable to increase monthly payment amounts and thus shorten repayment time frames because of a debtor’s limited income. In the course of analyzing repayment plans, we found that the ROAR system cannot capture and track overpayment debt scheduled to be collected beyond the year 2049. Since bringing this issue to their attention, SSA officials told us that the agency has begun to study this ROAR system limitation and an agency working group will recommend a course of action to correct the problem. Lack of Timely Earnings Data and Inconsistent Processing of Work CDRs Allow Overpayments to Accrue
SSA conducts periodic computer matches with wage data from the Internal Revenue Service to independently verify beneficiaries’ earnings. However, earnings data provided through the IRS match are often more than a year old when SSA staff begin the work CDR prompted by the IRS data. Yet 6 of these cases resulted in about $78,000 in total overpayments, even though the beneficiary reported returning to work more than a year prior to initiation of the work CDR. Several federal programs and agencies currently use the NDNH to verify program eligibility, detect and prevent potential fraud or abuse, and collect overpayments. However, the agency’s experience with the NDNH in its SSI program suggests it may be more cost-effective than indicated by SSA’s analysis. SSA Lacks Agency-Wide Performance Goals and a Consistent Approach for Processing Work CDRs
SSA does not have agency-wide performance goals or a consistent approach for processing work CDRs across its processing centers. While SSA has established an agency-wide goal for processing a certain number of medical CDRs in a fiscal year, and includes this goal in the agency’s annual performance plan, SSA officials told us they have not established similar goals for work CDRs. For example, SSA has set targets for 95 percent of IRS alerts on earnings generated in 2008 or earlier to have a work CDR completed by September 24, 2010, and for processing centers to complete development of cases within 270 days. We also found that while SSA’s policies establish steps for work CDR processing to be followed across all processing centers, processing times across the four centers we visited varied widely once development was initiated. More specifically, we found that processing times for the 60 cases we reviewed ranged from 82 to 992 days (with a median of 396 days) and resulted in combined overpayments totaling more than $1 million. While these and other recent initiatives represent promising steps, it is too early to assess what impact they may have on the prevalence and size of DI overpayments. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Social Security Administration's (SSA) Disability Insurance (DI) program paid almost $123 billion in benefits in fiscal year 2010 to more than 10 million workers and dependents. The program has grown rapidly in recent years and is poised to grow further as the baby boom generation ages. GAO examined (1) what is known about the extent SSA makes work-related overpayments to, and recovers overpayments from, DI beneficiaries, and (2) SSA's policies and procedures for work continuing disability reviews (work CDRs) and potential DI program vulnerabilities that may contribute to overpayments to beneficiaries who have returned to work. To answer these questions, GAO reviewed work CDR policies and procedures, interviewed SSA headquarters and processing center officials, and visited 4 of 8 processing centers. We reviewed a random nongeneralizable sample of 60 CDR case files across those 4 centers to ensure we had a wide range of cases for our review (15 cases from each). These 4 centers received almost 80 percent of all work CDRs from SSA's Internal Revenue Service enforcement data match in fiscal year 2009.
What GAO Found
Disability Insurance overpayments detected by SSA increased from about $860 million in fiscal year 2001 to about $1.4 billion in fiscal year 2010, though the full extent of overpayments to beneficiaries who have returned to work and are no longer eligible is unknown. Overpayments may also go to beneficiaries who are no longer eligible due to medical improvement, but SSA estimates about 72 percent of all projected DI overpayments were work related during fiscal years 2005 through 2009. While the agency collected, or recovered, $839 million in overpayments in fiscal year 2010, monies still owed by beneficiaries grew by $225 million that same year, and total DI overpayment debt reached $5.4 billion. SSA does not have agency-wide performance goals for debt collection, for example, the percent of outstanding debt collected annually. And while SSA does have a policy for full repayment within three years, 19 of the 60 continuing disability review (work CDR) cases we reviewed had repayment plans exceeding three years. SSA officials told us lengthy repayment plans are often the result of an individual's limited income, but SSA does not review or approve repayment plans which exceed agency policy. During the course of our review, we also found a limitation in SSA's Recovery of Overpayments, Accounting and Reporting (ROAR) system. Used to track overpayments and collections, ROAR does not reflect debt due SSA past year 2049 so the total balance due the program is unknown, and likely larger than the agency is reporting. SSA officials acknowledged this issue, but are unable to determine the extent of the problem at this time. They told us they have a work group which will recommend action to correct the problem. But until this issue is addressed, SSA officials told us the agency can only track and report on overpayments scheduled to be repaid through 2049. The amount owed after that year is unreflected in current totals even as it annually increases. SSA has numerous policies and processes in place to perform work CDRs, though two key weaknesses have hindered SSA's ability to identify and review beneficiary earnings, which affect eligibility for DI benefits. First, SSA lacks timely earnings data on beneficiaries who return to work. In 49 of the 60 CDR cases we reviewed, there was no evidence in the file that the beneficiary reported returning to work, as required by the program. To identify these unreported earnings, SSA primarily relies on data matching with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), then sends these matches to staff for a work CDR. However, the IRS data may be more than a year old when received by SSA, and SSA says it is not cost effective to gain access to and use other sources of earnings information, such as the National Directory of New Hires database. In addition, we found cases may wait up to 15 additional months before SSA staff begin work on the CDR. Second, SSA lacks formal, agency-wide performance goals for work CDRs. While it targets 270 days to develop a case, actual processing time taken ranged from 82 to 992 days (with a median of 396 days) in the 60 cases we reviewed, and overpayments which accrued as a result topped $1 million total. SSA officials reported several initiatives to more effectively prioritize work CDR cases, for example, those with the largest potential overpayment amounts, but these efforts are in the early stages and we could not yet assess their effectiveness. GAO has ongoing work on this issue and has no recommendations at this time. |
gao_GGD-98-11 | gao_GGD-98-11_0 | To obtain information on the reasons for the cost overruns at the new Chicago Main Post Office, we interviewed USPS officials; submitted written questions to the Postal Service; reviewed documentation of the cost estimates for the facility, including justifications for cost increases, project planning documents, and Board of Governors meeting minutes; and reviewed Postal Inspection Service reports on the project. We obtained information on the policies and procedures that the Postal Service implemented to prevent a recurrence of cost overruns in similar, future capital investment projects. To determine why the USPS Board of Governors approved some of the budget increases for the new Chicago Main Post Office in closed, rather than open, meetings, we questioned Postal officials and submitted written questions to the Postal Service. Cost Overruns at the New Chicago Main Post Office
In March 1990, the USPS Board of Governors approved $199.7 million for the construction of a new Chicago Main Post Office. The Postal Service responded that at the time of those two meetings, USPS was negotiating with the architectural firm and general contractor on change orders, and it would not have been in the Postal Service’s best interest to disclose the amounts being requested for various changes. Your office indicated that service provided by the Graceland station, which is part of the Chicago Postal District, was particularly problematic and asked us to compare the performance of Graceland station to that of a similar station in another city with a higher EXFC score than Chicago’s to attempt to determine the causes of problems at Graceland. They said that the new Chicago Main Post Office, for example, would not be responsible for misdelivery of mail. The Postal Service has implemented several process changes that could reduce the likelihood of cost overruns in future capital investment projects, such as more Inspection Service involvement earlier in construction projects and the establishment of an early warning system to alert the Board of Governors to problems. Our comparison of data provided for the two stations confirmed that differences existed in terms of the performance indicator results but also showed that the data provided were not informative about the causes of problems with mail service at Graceland or in Chicago. This was partly due to the differences in the types of deliveries made by both stations and uncertainty about whether the total number of complaints was accurately reported. 1. 2. 4. 5. 6. 1. 2. 3. 4. Physical Condition of Postal Facilities in the Ninth Illinois Congressional District
In November 1996, Postal officials offered to review the physical condition of postal facilities in Congressman Yates’ district. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed: (1) the reasons for the $133 million in cost overruns incurred at the new Chicago Main Post Office; (2) the list of procedures the United States Postal Service (USPS) has established to prevent a recurrence of cost overruns experienced with the new Chicago Main Post Office in similar, future capital investment projects; (3) why the USPS Board of Governors approved some of the budget increases for the new Chicago Main Post Office in closed, rather than open, meetings; (4) the performance indicators for the Graceland postal station in Chicago, as compared to those at a similar station in another city with a higher first-class, overnight delivery (EXFC) score; and (5) the results of a 1997 USPS survey of the physical condition of postal facilities in the ninth congressional district of Illinois.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the cost overruns that were incurred in the construction of the new Chicago Main Post Office appeared to be due primarily to inadequate planning; (2) USPS has implemented procedures aimed at reducing the likelihood of cost overruns occurring in similar, future capital investment projects, including earlier notification of problems to the Board of Governors and more Inspection Service involvement with review of facilities construction; (3) USPS officials indicated that budget increases for the new Chicago Main Post Office were approved in closed meetings because it would not have been in USPS' best interest to disclose the amounts requested while negotiating change orders with contractors and because the Postal Inspection Service was investigating the project; (4) comparison of performance data between the Graceland station in Chicago and the Brookline station in Boston, Massachusetts, confirmed that differences existed in terms of performance indicator results, and also showed that the data provided were not informative about the causes of problems with mail service at Graceland or in Chicago; (5) analysis of this performance data did not suggest that Brookline's performance would be informative for Graceland; (6) this was compounded by the high number of variables affecting the performance indicators, such as the differences in the types of deliveries made by both stations and uncertainty about whether the total number of complaints was accurately reported; and (7) the 1997 USPS review of postal facilities in the ninth congressional district of Illinois indicated that the facilities were meeting operational needs. |
gao_GAO-01-742T | gao_GAO-01-742T_0 | Shortcomings With the Current Contracting Approach
DOD’s current contracting approach for TRICARE poses several administrative challenges, and has contributed to significant funding shortfalls. Offerors have stated that complicating the preparation of proposals was the need to address DOD’s overly prescriptive requirements, restricting its ability to use best practices to achieve the same results with greater cost efficiency. The effect and cost of these numerous adjustments created an unstable program and contributed to annual budget shortfalls. Large, Complex Proposals Costly To Bid
Under DOD’s contract approach, the TRICARE contracts were competitively bid. In its claims improvement initiative, DOD has been partnering with its contractors to review the need for these edits. Numerous Contract Adjustments Lead To An Unstable Program and Funding Shortfalls
Further complicating the design of the TRICARE contracts is the fact that DOD designed them to have periodic adjustments to the contract price, which are called bid price adjustments (BPA). The ASD/HA is currently reassessing future contract approaches for TMA to employ and is considering DMOC’s recommendations. However, to successfully accomplish this initiative, DOD needs to address pervasive problems with its financial management and workload data. TRICARE 3.0 Withdrawn
TMA officials spent 3 years developing a new TRICARE contract vehicle, commonly referred to as TRICARE 3.0, for the next round of contracts. They were also concerned about the fairness of the structure for financial penalties and incentives. In determining this, DOD and the contractors recognize that the contract needs to be flexible to maintain a balance between DOD’s goal of providing uniform benefits nationwide with the realization that the delivery of health care is local. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses lessons learned from the Department of Defense's (DOD) TRICARE contracts and their implications for the future.
What GAO Found
TRICARE's successes and maturity reflect the ability of the DOD and its contractors to work within the current contract structure. However, it has not been easy, and there are important lessons from current contract shortcomings that need to be addressed in designing future TRICARE contracts. Most, including DOD, believe that the current contracts are too large, complex, and prescriptive in nature, limiting innovation and competition. Also, numerous adjustments to these contracts have created an unstable program, and program costs have been difficult to predict, contributing to annual funding shortfalls. Additionally, financial incentives, accountability, and data quality need to be strengthened to achieve greater efficiencies. To address these weaknesses, DOD redesigned its solicitation for the next round of TRICARE contracts; however, the initial issuance was withdrawn because of internal concerns and reservations about its costs and specifications. DOD is now reassessing how to structure the TRICARE contracts and is considering the views and recommendations of the Defense Medical Oversight Committee, a group formed to oversee TRICARE. |
gao_GAO-14-520 | gao_GAO-14-520_0 | Background
The Packard Commission, tasked by President Reagan to review defense management and organization, made a number of recommendations to improve the way DOD acquires weapon systems, including the need to establish “unambiguous authority for overall acquisition policy, clear accountability for acquisition execution, and plain lines of command for those with program management responsibilities.” Following the commission’s recommendations, the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 was enacted.the Act created the position of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, now known as Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)); established the military departments as the force providers to the combatant commanders; and mandated responsibility for acquisition to each respective military department. Also, the President issued a directive that directed implementation of another Packard Commission recommendation, to establish a more streamlined acquisition chain of command in DOD. The reporting chain, which remains in place today, runs upward from a program manager, through a program executive officer (PEO), to the service acquisition executive (SAE), and to the defense acquisition executive (DAE), which is USD (AT&L). Studies Recommended Expanding Service Chiefs Role in Acquisition to Varying Degrees, but Potential Effect on Improving Acquisition Outcomes Is Unclear
Five of the six studies we reviewed recommended an expanded role for the service chiefs in acquisitions, often citing this as a means to improve the integration of the acquisition, requirements, and resourcing processes, as well as improve authority and accountability for DOD acquisition programs. Also, three of the studies expressed concerns that the service chiefs are not sufficiently involved because the services had gone too far in their implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols Act and removed the service chiefs from the acquisition decision process. When we talked to the authors of this study, they stated that the current framework for the acquisition chain of command does not need to be changed but that the service chief’s involvement and authority should be enhanced throughout. Similarly, another study recommended that service chiefs be more engaged and accountable within the current acquisition process through the strengthening of partnerships between requirements, acquisition, and resource leaders. The other three studies called for changing the current chain of command structure by making adjustments such as inserting the service chief over program managers and program executive officers. While studies have advocated for a stronger role for the service chiefs in the acquisition chain of command, they provide little evidence or support that this would in fact improve program outcomes. Study authors we interviewed were unsure of the effects on the acquisition process of more involvement from the service chiefs. GAO previously found that strong leadership is key to stable and successful acquisition programs. Other studies discussed the need to fix unrealistic and changing requirements, optimistic cost and schedule estimates, and issues with the current budgeting process. DOD and Military Department Policies Provide Service Chiefs Multiple Opportunities for Involvement in Oversight and Management of Acquisitions
DOD and military department requirements and acquisition policies define several decision points, reviews, and mechanisms in which the service chiefs or their supporting staff offices can participate in the management and oversight of acquisition programs. As major defense acquisitions programs progress through the requirements and acquisition processes, there are several key stages where DOD-level reviews and approvals are required. Each military department uses a tiered requirements development and approval process supported by acquisition and other functional offices. Acquisition Planning and Execution within the Military Departments
Although responsibility and authority for major defense acquisition programs generally resides with the service or defense acquisition executives, DOD and military department acquisition policies provide opportunities for continued service chief involvement beyond requirements definition, throughout the life cycle of a program. For example, each of the services has an acquisition review board comprised of senior leaders that assess programs and advise the service acquisition executive on milestone decisions. Once an acquisition program has been established and enters into systems development, the military services conduct regular reviews to monitor the program’s progress in achieving cost, schedule, and performance targets and to resolve any issues that may occur. Existing policies and processes for planning and executing acquisition programs provide multiple opportunities for the service chiefs to be involved in managing acquisition programs and to help ensure programs meet cost, schedule, and performance targets. Agency Comments
We are not making recommendations in this report. | Why GAO Did This Study
Nearly three decades ago, Congress enacted the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act. As GAO has found, the act sought to strengthen civilian control over the acquisition function in DOD and establish a more streamlined chain of command for developing and procuring weapon systems. The reporting chain, which remains in effect today, runs upward from a program manager, through a program executive officer, to a service acquisition executive, and to the defense acquisition executive.
Many acquisition reform studies have identified a need for increased accountability in DOD's acquisition management chain of command. The Senate Armed Services Committee Report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 mandated that GAO review DOD's acquisition chain of command. This report examines (1) findings and recommendations made by studies that assessed the role of the military service chiefs; and (2) how current DOD and military department policies define the roles and responsibilities of the service chiefs in acquisition management.
To do this work, GAO analyzed the findings and recommendations of six studies that discuss DOD acquisition chain of command issues and interviewed authors from the three most recently published studies. GAO also analyzed DOD and military department acquisition and requirements policies and guidance, and interviewed DOD officials.
What GAO Found
Five of the six studies GAO reviewed recommended an expanded role for the military service chiefs in acquisition management, often citing this as a means to improve the integration of the requirements and acquisition processes that support a weapon system's development. Three studies expressed concerns that the services have gone too far in their implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols Act and removed the service chiefs from the acquisition process. However, the studies provided little evidence or support that such a change would in fact improve program outcomes. Studies varied on the degree to which and ways in which service chiefs should be involved in the acquisition process. While two studies advocated strengthening service chief's roles and responsibilities within the current structure, three studies called for changing the current chain of command structure by making adjustments such as inserting the service chiefs above program executive officers. Authors GAO interviewed were uncertain what effect incorporating the chiefs of staff into the acquisition chain of command would have on individual programs. These authors noted that service chief involvement does not guarantee success for a weapon system program and, in fact, pointed to examples of past programs that had significant service chief involvement, but poor outcomes. Finally, the authors we interviewed agreed that strong leadership is essential to acquisition success, but all six studies identified other factors that need to be addressed in acquisition programs such as unrealistic and changing requirements, optimistic cost and schedule estimates, and issues with the current budgeting process.
DOD and military department policies provide the service chiefs multiple opportunities to be involved in the management and oversight of major defense acquisition programs. Although responsibility and authority differ for the two distinct processes of requirements and acquisitions, multiple reviews, milestone decision points, and mechanisms are in place for these two processes to work together in planning and executing programs. Within each military department, the service chiefs and their staffs lead the development of operational requirements and are supported by acquisition officials to help ensure that requirements are feasible and affordable. Similarly, as acquisition programs progress through key phases of planning, development, and production, opportunities exist for continued chief of staff involvement beyond requirements development. For example, the offices of the service chiefs participate in senior-level acquisition review boards that assess proposed programs and advise the service acquisition executive at key milestone decision points. Once a program has been established and development has begun, additional opportunities remain for service chiefs to monitor progress and help resolve any issues that may occur. For example, military departments are required to hold annual configuration steering board meetings to discuss tradeoffs between requirements and cost and schedule delays.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making recommendations. |
gao_HEHS-98-106 | gao_HEHS-98-106_0 | Commerce reported that between 1994 and 2005, an annual average of 95,000 new systems analysts, computer scientists and engineers, and computer programmers will be required to satisfy the increasing demand for IT workers and that only 24,553 students earned bachelor’s degrees in computer and information sciences in 1994. Because there is a disparity between these two numbers, Commerce concluded that it will be difficult to meet the demand for IT workers. We agree with Commerce’s conclusion that more information and data are needed about the current and future IT labor market. Commerce also took issue with our characterization of the report title (America’s New Deficit: The Shortage of Information Technology Workers) and statements in the introduction as reflecting Commerce’s conclusion that there is a shortage of IT workers. The Acting Under Secretary said that the report does not conclude that a shortage of IT workers exists. Regarding Commerce’s first point, our correspondence explains that the stated purpose of Commerce’s report was to explore the possibility of a shortage of IT workers in the United States; we did not characterize the report as a definitive analysis of the labor market for IT workers. Finally, we believe the report’s title and the statements about the magnitude of the IT worker supply and demand imbalance contained in the report’s introduction could reasonably be interpreted as reflecting a conclusion that there is an IT worker shortage. As this correspondence states, the Commerce report appears to appropriately establish that the demand for IT workers is expected to grow, but it did not adequately describe the likely supply of IT workers. For that reason, we agreed with the Department’s conclusion that more needs to be known about the demand and supply of IT workers. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the Department of Commerce's analysis of the information technology (IT) labor market, focusing on: (1) Commerce's analysis of IT worker supply and demand; and (2) the basis for its conclusion that a shortage of IT workers exists in the United States.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) Commerce's report has serious analytical and methodological weaknesses that undermine the credibility of its conclusion that a shortage of IT workers exists; (2) however, the lack of support presented in this one report should not necessarily lead to a conclusion that there is no shortage; (3) instead, as the Commerce report states, additional information and data are needed to more accurately characterize the IT labor market now and in the future; (4) the report appears to appropriately establish that the demand for IT workers is expected to grow, but it does not adequately describe the likely supply of IT workers; (5) although Commerce reported that only 24,553 U.S. students earned bachelor's degrees in computer and information sciences in 1994, Commerce also stated that the Bureau of Labor Statistics projects increasing job growth--an annual average of 95,000 new computer programmers, systems analysts and computer scientists and engineers will be required to satisfy the increasing demand for IT workers between 1994 and 2005; (6) pointing to the disparity between these two numbers and referring to evidence from other sources, Commerce concludes in the report's title and introduction that there is a shortage of IT workers; (7) Commerce did not, however, consider other likely sources of workers, such as college graduates with degrees in other areas; and (8) as a result, rather than supporting its conclusion that a shortage of IT workers exists, the data and analysis support the report's observation that more needs to be known about the supply and demand for IT workers. |
gao_GAO-14-402 | gao_GAO-14-402_0 | Background
The RAD program was authorized by Congress in November 2011 under the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act of 2012. The RAD program provides HUD the opportunity to test the conversion of units subsidized under HUD’s public housing and certain other programs to long-term (typically 15 to 20 years), project-based voucher or rental assistance contracts—two forms of rental assistance that tie the assistance to the unit in order to provide subsidized housing to low- income residents. However, project-based vouchers provide a mobility option for residents. Specifically, a large percentage of conversions have taken place in New York, Massachusetts, Michigan, and New Jersey (see fig. HUD also took steps to communicate program requirements to property owners, PHAs, and residents. HUD officials explained that these conference calls help to ensure that applications are being processed similarly nationwide. RAD Conversions Have Had a Small Effect on the Percentage of Project- Based Vouchers
RAD conversions have had a small effect on the number and percentage of total vouchers (project-based and tenant-based vouchers). The remaining active contracts for the Rent Supp, RAP, and Mod Rehab programs include about 38,000 units, which is relatively small compared to the over 2 million vouchers currently assisting low-income residents. Even if all of these units were converted as of March 1, 2014, the maximum change in the nationwide percentage of project-based vouchers would be an increase from 3.45 percent to 5.48 percent. Stakeholders Utilized RAD Conversions to Preserve and Improve Affordable Housing Units
Property owners, PHAs, residents, housing organizations, and a housing expert we spoke with generally viewed the RAD program as a useful tool for preserving affordable housing. For example, representatives of a property owner involved in a large number of conversions told us that without RAD, they would not have preserved as many of the affordable housing units as they have, and that those units would have most likely been lost as affordable housing. PHA officials and HUD field office staff who administer and oversee RAD conversions to project-based vouchers consistently told us that, in their experience, most property owners plan to recapitalize or have recapitalized their properties, in order to rehabilitate the property. This recapitalization included refinancing with a long-term mortgage. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report examines aspects of the second component of HUD’s Rental Assistance Demonstration (RAD) program, which allows the owners of properties receiving rental assistance under the Department of Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD) Rental Supplement (Rent Supp), Rental Assistance Payment (RAP), and Moderate Rehabilitation (Mod Rehab) programs—referred to as covered programs—to convert tenant-protection vouchers to project-based vouchers upon contract expiration or termination. Specifically, this report examines (1) how HUD has implemented RAD conversions of tenant-protection vouchers to project- based vouchers under the covered programs; (2) how these conversions are expected to affect the long-term percentage of project-based vouchers and costs to the voucher program; and (3) how these conversions have affected selected converted units and the housing choices available to residents. The voucher data included the total number of tenant-based and project-based vouchers and the number of project-based vouchers created as a result of RAD conversions as of March 1, 2014. We also obtained and analyzed documentation from HUD to determine the impact of these conversions on the budget. | Why GAO Did This Study
Over the next several years, rental assistance contracts will expire for about 38,000 affordable housing units currently subsidized through three HUD rental programs. Owners of these units would no longer be required to maintain affordable rents or make their units available to low-income residents. Residents in these units are eligible to receive special tenant-based vouchers called tenant-protection vouchers to shield them from resulting rent increases. HUD's RAD program was created in 2011 to preserve affordable housing by, among other things, allowing owners to convert these tenant-protection vouchers to project-based vouchers for units in three designated HUD programs. Project-based vouchers result in a long-term contract between the property owners and PHAs, which administer the vouchers.
The Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act of 2012 mandated that GAO review these conversions under RAD. This report describes the results of these conversions.
GAO reviewed HUD program documentation and procedures; analyzed data on conversions as of March 1, 2014; and conducted interviews with HUD officials as well as nongeneralizable interviews with four PHAs and five property owners selected based on geography and other factors.
GAO is not making recommendations in this report.
What GAO Found
Conversions to project-based vouchers under the Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) Rental Assistance Demonstration (RAD) program will have a small effect on the percentage of total vouchers (made up of project and tenant-based) that are project-based. Residents with tenant-based vouchers can receive their assistance in any eligible privately owned rental unit, which means if they leave the unit, their assistance goes with them. In contrast, residents with project-based vouchers can only benefit from the assistance if they remain in the specific unit. As of March 1, 2014, property owners had converted a total of 6,670 units to project-based vouchers in nine states. The percentage of vouchers that are project-based including RAD conversions was 3.81 percent, and without RAD, would have been 3.45 percent. Further, the impact of these conversions on the overall long-term percentage of project-based vouchers will be small because the conversions are limited to the remaining 38,000 units assisted through the three designated HUD programs, which is relatively small compared to the over 2 million total outstanding vouchers. As the figure shows, most conversions have taken place in New York, Massachusetts, Michigan, and New Jersey—four states with a large concentration of units that were originally subsidized under designated HUD programs.
Stakeholders GAO interviewed generally viewed the conversions to project-based vouchers as a useful tool in preserving affordable housing. Stakeholders explained that, absent RAD, property owners would have had few or no options for continuing some form of rental subsidy when their contracts expired. Further, RAD conversions provide a stable subsidy for their properties that allows them to better obtain financing. All five owners—representing nine properties GAO contacted—have recapitalized or plan to recapitalize their properties, including refinancing or restructuring their debt, in order to rehabilitate them. Housing organization officials and a housing expert also told GAO that RAD has helped to preserve the number of affordable housing units. PHA officials, property owners, and residents told GAO that these conversions have not adversely affected residents' housing choices. |
gao_GAO-12-1016 | gao_GAO-12-1016_0 | Background
Grants constitute one form of federal assistance consisting of payments in cash or in kind to a state or local government or a nongovernmental recipient for a specified purpose.programs are extremely diverse. They can vary greatly in numerous ways including size, the nature of their recipients, and the type of programs they fund. Grant programs can also vary in two important dimensions— the amount of discretion they give to the recipient in how the funds will be used, and the way they are allocated or awarded. Grants to State and Local Governments Have Consistently Been a Significant Component of Federal Spending but the Focus of Grant Spending Has Changed Over the Last Three Decades
Grants are an important tool used by the federal government to provide program funding to state and local governments. OMB has previously estimated that grants to state and local governments represent roughly 80 percent of all federal grant funding, with the remaining approximately 20 percent going to recipients such as nonprofit organizations, research institutions, or individuals. However, during this period the proportion of federal grant outlays to state and local governments dedicated to Medicaid more than tripled, rising from 2.4 percent of all federal outlays in 1980 to 7.6 percent in 2011. The increase in outlays for Medicaid and other health-related grant programs was offset by an approximately equivalent decrease in the share of outlays for other grants to state and local governments. While the Number of Federal Grant Programs Has Generally Increased over the Last Three Decades, a Definitive Figure Is Not Available
Our prior work and the work of others have shown that the number of federal grant programs to state and local governments has generally increased over the last three decades. However, determining a definitive number of federal grant programs presents certain difficulties. We and others have previously reported on many of these issues which can be grouped into the following broad themes: (1) challenges related to effectively measuring grant performance; (2) uncoordinated program creation; (3) need for better collaboration; (4) internal control weaknesses in grants management and oversight; and (5) lack of agency or recipient capacity. Lack of Appropriate Performance Measures and Accurate Data Limit Agencies’ Ability to Effectively Measure Grant Program Performance
In our past work, we have reported that effective performance accountability provisions are of fundamental importance in assuring the proper and effective use of federal funds and determining if grant program goals are met. Numerous Federal Grant Programs, Created over Time without Coordinated Purposes and Scopes, Can Result in Grants Management Challenges
In our 2012 Annual Report: Opportunities to Reduce Duplication, Overlap and Fragmentation, Achieve Savings, and Enhance Revenue, we reported on examples of how multiple federal grant programs, created without coordinated purposes and scopes, can result in structural grants management challenges. In previous work, we have identified lack of collaboration among and between federal agencies, state and local governments, and nongovernmental grant participants as a challenge to effective grant implementation. When such controls are weak, federal grant-making agencies face challenges in achieving grant program goals and assuring the proper and effective use of federal funds which can help avoid improper payments. Three relevant types of capacity are organizational, human capital, and financial. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to describe (1) the amount of grant funding to state and local governments for fiscal year 2011, how grant funding to state and local governments has changed over the last three decades, and difficulties related to identifying the number of such grant programs; and (2) selected grant challenges involving federal grants to state and local governments that have been identified in our previous work and that of federal inspectors general (IG) over the last several years. To determine key information regarding grant funding for fiscal year 2011, the growth in grant funding over the last three decades, and shifts in the focus of grant funding during that time, we used OMB data, specifically, OMB’s Historical Table 12.3, Total Outlays for Grants to State and Local Governments, by Function, Agency, and Program: 1940 – 2013 and Table 12.2, Total Outlays for Grants to State and Local Governments, by Function and Fund Group: 1940 – 2017. OMB Budget Data. | Why GAO Did This Study
Grants are a form of federal assistance consisting of payments in cash or in kind for a specified purpose and they represent an important tool for achieving national objectives. They vary greatly, including in the types of programs they fund, the methods they use to allocate funds to recipients, and the amount of discretion they give to the grant recipient on how the funds are spent. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has previously estimated that grants to state and local governments represent roughly 80 percent of all federal grant funding, with the balance going to recipients such as nonprofit organizations, research institutions, or individuals. In a time of fiscal constraint, continuing to support the current scope and breadth of federal grants to state and local governments will be a challenge.
In response to a request, this report (1) provides information regarding the amount of grant funding to state and local governments for fiscal year 2011, how such funding has changed over the last three decades, and difficulties related to identifying the exact number of such grant programs; and (2) identifies selected grants management challenges that have been identified in previous work by GAO and federal IGs over the last several years. Towards this end, GAO analyzed data from OMB and the Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance and conducted a review of previous reports from GAO and federal IGs.
What GAO Found
Federal outlays for grants to state and local governments totaled more than $606 billion in fiscal year 2011. Over the last three decades, these grants have consistently been a significant component of federal spending, but the focus of this spending has changed over time. For example, during this period the proportion of federal outlays to state and local governments dedicated to Medicaid grants more than tripled, rising from 2.4 percent of total federal government outlays in 1980 to 7.6 percent in 2011. The increase in federal outlays for Medicaid and other health-related grant programs was offset by an approximately equivalent decrease in grants to state and local governments targeted for other areas such as transportation, education, and regional development.
GAOs prior work and the work of others have also shown that the number of federal grant programs directed to state and local governments has generally increased over the last three decades. However, definitively determining the number of such grant programs presents difficulties. The lack of consensus on a methodology for how to define and count grant programs and data limitations in the Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance further complicates this effort.
GAO and federal inspectors general (IG) have previously reported on a variety of management challenges involving federal grants to state and local governments, many of which can be grouped into the following five topic areas:
Challenges related to effectively measuring grant performance: A lack of appropriate performance measures and accurate data can limit agencies ability to effectively measure grant program performance. This can affect the ability of federal agencies to ensure that grant funds are effectively spent.
Uncoordinated grant program creation: Numerous federal grant programs have been created over time without coordinated purposes or scope. This can result in grants management challenges such as unnecessary duplication across grant programs and unnecessary overlap in funding.
Need for better collaboration: A lack of collaboration among grant program participants can impede effective grant implementation in areas such as knowledge sharing and defining clear leadership roles.
Internal control weaknesses: When internal controls in grants management and oversight are weak, federal grant-making agencies face challenges in achieving program goals and assuring the proper and effective use of federal funds. Effective controls can help to avoid improper grant payments.
Lack of agency or recipient capacity: Capacity reflects the organizational, financial, and human capital resources available for the implementation of grant programs. A lack of capacity can adversely impact an agencys or recipients ability to manage and implement grant programs.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making any recommendations in this report. |
gao_GAO-05-935 | gao_GAO-05-935_0 | The FSD role was more comprehensive and had responsibilities that included overseeing passenger and baggage screening. Furthermore, some of the stakeholders at airports we visited said that the FSDs’ authority relative to others was not always clear during a security incident, and that the FSDs’ authority in such cases had not been communicated to them. TSA’s Guidance Regarding Aspects of FSDs’ Authority Is Outdated, Lacks Clarity, and Has Not Been Adequately Communicated to Stakeholders
FSDs’ roles and responsibilities have been fairly well documented, but their authority relative to other airport stakeholders during security incidents has not been clearly defined. The Delegation Order is outdated in that it gives FSDs the authority to train, supervise, equip, and deploy a TSA law enforcement force that was never established. Furthermore, the Delegation Order does not clearly address the extent of FSD authority relative to other parties with responsibilities related to airport security, including law enforcement agencies. For example, at two airports, confusion or conflicting opinions developed over whether the FSD had the authority to take certain actions during particular security incidents. The FSD Advisory Council provides a mechanism for selected FSDs to be involved in TSA’s efforts to develop aviation security policy, according to TSA officials. FSDs Formed Partnerships with Key Stakeholders and Participated in Communication and Coordination Efforts
FSDs reported they entered into these partnerships at the seven airports we visited, and FSDs and stakeholders stated that these partnerships were generally working well. First, according to FSDs, FSD staff, and law enforcement stakeholders at the airports we visited, FSDs lack law enforcement personnel to respond to a security incident and, therefore, must rely on federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies in these instances. For example, FSDs need air carrier data on the number of passengers transiting airport checkpoints to appropriately schedule screeners. At the same time, air carriers seek an efficient screening process to minimize wait times for their customers. TSA Made Changes to Better Support or Empower the FSD Position and Was Planning Additional Changes
TSA has made a number of changes intended to provide FSDs with more authority and flexibility in carrying out their responsibilities, and most FSDs we interviewed responded favorably to these changes. Most FSDs We Interviewed Viewed the Changes TSA Made Favorably
To further support or empower the FSD position, TSA increased FSDs’ authority to address performance and conduct problems, established a local hiring initiative, increased flexibility to provide screener training, relocated Area Director positions to the field, and established a report group and a mentoring program. In addition, 14 of the 25 FSDs stated that, overall, they were satisfied with the new program’s ability to meet their screener staffing needs, but 7 said they were not satisfied. Views on this topic were also mixed among the five FSDs we interviewed during our airport visits. Report Group. It was also intended to provide operational support and a communication link between TSA headquarters and field-based Area Directors, and in turn, FSDs and their staff. Recommendations for Executive Action
To clarify the authority of the Federal Security Director during various security incidents and help ensure a consistent understanding of the authority of FSDs among FSDs, their staff, and airport stakeholders, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security for the Transportation Security Administration to take the following two actions: update TSA’s Delegation of Authority to FSDs to clearly reflect the authority of FSDs relative to other airport stakeholders during security incidents and communicate the authority of the FSD position, as warranted, to FSDs and all airport stakeholders. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) assigned Federal Security Directors (FSD) to oversee security, including the screening of passengers and their baggage, at the nation's more than 440 commercial airports. FSDs must work closely with stakeholders to ensure that airports are adequately protected and prepared in the event of a terrorist attack. This report addresses (1) the roles and responsibilities of FSDs and the clarity of their authority relative to that of other airport stakeholders during security incidents, (2) the extent to which FSDs formed and facilitated partnerships with airport stakeholders, and (3) FSDs' views of key changes TSA made to better support or empower the FSD position.
What GAO Found
TSA has issued guidance that clearly defines FSDs' roles and responsibilities. However, TSA's guidance related to FSDs' authority is outdated and lacks clarity regarding FSD authority relative to other airport stakeholders. TSA's document that delegates authority to FSDs gives them authority to supervise and deploy a TSA law enforcement force that was never established. Also, it does not clearly address FSD authority during a security incident relative to other parties with airport security responsibilities. At airports GAO visited, stakeholders said that this information had never been communicated to them and they were not always clear on the FSDs' authority in such situations. For example, confusion arose at one airport over whether the FSD had the authority to take certain actions during a security incident. In August 2005, TSA officials stated that they were updating guidance on FSDs' authority but had not finalized their revisions prior to this report's issuance. All of the FSDs and most stakeholders at the airports GAO visited reported developing partnerships that were generally working well. Communication and coordination were taking place among stakeholders at these airports, including meetings, briefings, and training exercises. According to TSA, partnerships with airport stakeholders are essential to FSDs' success in addressing aviation security and customer service needs. For example, FSDs rely on law enforcement stakeholders during security incidents since they do not have their own law enforcement resources. FSDs also rely on air carriers for passenger volume information to schedule screeners, and air carriers rely on FSDs for efficient screening that minimizes passenger wait times. TSA made changes in 2004 to better support or empower the FSD position, and most of the 25 FSDs we interviewed generally viewed these changes favorably. For example, most of the FSDs we interviewed were satisfied with TSA's new local hiring process that provided more options for FSDs to be involved in hiring screeners, and most said that the new process was better than the more centralized hiring process it replaced. Most FSDs we interviewed also saw value in the headquarters group TSA established to provide operational support to the field and a communication link among headquarters, field-based Area Directors, and FSDs. |
gao_GAO-11-832 | gao_GAO-11-832_0 | Background
Since 2007, a series of overlapping food, fuel, and financial crises have negatively affected the world economy, prompting the IFIs to respond. Economic Growth Slowed and Inflation Increased
While the average annual growth rate in real gross domestic product (GDP), or national income, for the 38 LICs remained positive during the crisis period, it declined by an average of about 1 percentage point, dropping from an average of 7.1 percent during the pre-crises period to an average of 6.2 percent during the crises period. 3.) The slowdown in the growth rate of real GDP in LICs was milder than the downturn in real GDP growth experienced by advanced economies during the crises, which declined from 2.7 percent in 2007 to -3.4 percent in 2009. However, IFIs have reported that lower growth rates caused by the crises could lead to increases in poverty in LICs. IFIs Increased Funding and Met Many Disbursement Goals, but the Impact of Their Actions on LIC Government Spending Has Been Difficult to Establish
In response to the crises, we found that IDA met its goal to increase the amount of financial assistance and partly met its goal to increase the speed of disbursements to LICs, but the impact of IDA’s actions on LIC government spending has been difficult to establish. The five initiatives are: the Global Food Crisis Response Program (food program), established in May 2008 to help countries reduce the impact of high food prices on the poor by providing rapid financial assistance, policy advice, and social protection services such as food stamps and school feeding programs for the most vulnerable; the IDA Fast Track Facility, established in December 2008 to help countries offset the impacts of the financial crisis on governments’ budget expenditures, including social and infrastructure programs; the Rapid Social Response Program (social protection program), established in April 2009 to help countries mitigate the impacts of crises by promoting social protection programs through rapid financing of immediate interventions in safety nets and other areas, and by improving capacity needed to establish and implement effective safety net systems; the Infrastructure Recovery and Assets Platform (infrastructure program), established in March 2009 to help countries mitigate the impacts of the crises by supporting critical infrastructure investments and new project development and implementation, and; the Pilot Crisis Response Window, established in November 2009 to help reduce the need for countries to make tradeoffs between financing crises response efforts or long-term development programs by providing new financing that was additional to countries’ existing IDA funds. 9). Disbursement rates, which vary over time, depend on a number of factors, including recipient country capacity, need, and governance, and the type of lending. IFC Increased Assistance to LICs, but Its Response Was Limited by Capacity Constraints
The IFC responded to the food and fuel crises through lending in the agriculture and energy sectors and responded to the financial crisis through existing and new initiatives and by enhancing coordination with donors, but its response was limited by capacity constraints. Our review of these DSAs is nongeneralizable and meant to be illustrative, not representative. IMF and World Bank Did Not Lower Debt Distress Ratings Due to Crises
Although the crises adversely impacted LICs’ economies, the IMF and World Bank did not change any country’s debt distress rating as a result of the crises, indicating that they did not expect the crises to adversely impact LIC economies enough to significantly impair their ability to repay debt. Concluding Observations
The food, fuel, and financial crises resulted in slower economic growth, higher deficits, and increased inflation for LICs. For example, our previous work shows that many LICs were experiencing protracted food emergencies and had severe and widespread malnourishment even prior to the onset of the crises. The IMF increased lending to LICs more than sixfold to almost $5 billion. The World Bank committed $18.1 billion through regular lending and five new crises response initiatives that committed $12.2 billion in financial assistance to LICs, including $1.4 billion in new funding. The World Bank provided funding as a mix of loans and grants, depending on the performance and debt vulnerability of each country. According to the World Bank and IMF, the crises did not significantly impair the countries’ ability to repay their future debt, because they expected the world economy to reestablish its pre-crises growth levels and the LICs to implement reforms necessary to achieve projected future growth levels. We included this information in our report. At that time, we will send copies to Members of Congress; U.S. Treasury, the IMF, and the World Bank. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to examine (1) the economic impact of the crises on low-income countries (LIC), (2) international financial institutions’ (IFI) responses and reported results, and (3) IFIs’ assessment of the impact of the crises on LICs’ ability to repay their debt. To evaluate whether the World Bank’s crisis response was consistent with the institution’s stated goals of increasing the speed of disbursements, we analyzed World Bank data on financial commitments and disbursements made to LICs between 2005 and 2010. Appendix IV: Comments from the U.S. Department of the Treasury
GAO Comments
1. Appendix VI: Comments from the International Monetary Fund
GAO Comments
1. 3. In August 2011, the IMF reported renewed risks to the global recovery, which means that projections for future export growth could be too optimistic. | Why GAO Did This Study
The 40 poorest countries in the world, known as low-income countries (LICs), have been negatively impacted by successive food, fuel, and financial crises since 2007. In response, international financial institutions (IFI), including the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), have taken actions to increase financial assistance for affected countries. Between 2008 and 2010, Congress appropriated $3.3 billion to the World Bank's International Development Association, which funds development programs in LICs. Congress also authorized the U.S. representative at the IMF to vote to approve the sale of some of the IMF's gold to increase lending to LICs. LICs' ability to repay debt remains important as financing levels rise and decisions are made about the mix of loans and grants they receive. GAO was asked to examine (1) the economic impact of the crises on LICs, (2) IFIs' responses and reported results, and (3) IFIs' assessment of the impact of the crises on LICs' ability to repay their debt. GAO analyzed documents and information from the World Bank and the IMF, including data on macroeconomic indicators, financial commitments, and debt analyses. GAO interviewed staff from the World Bank, IMF, and U.S. Treasury. GAO selected three African countries for more thorough analysis, a sample that is meant to be illustrative, not representative..
What GAO Found
In LICs, the recent food, fuel, and financial crises resulted in slower economic growth, higher deficits, and higher inflation, but the macroeconomic impacts were less than experienced by the advanced economies. The crises also slowed foreign direct investment in LICs, which had been growing steadily since 2000. During the crises period, LICs' average economic growth slowed from 7.1 percent in 2007 to 5.3 percent in 2009. IFIs have reported that lower growth rates caused by the crises could lead to increases in poverty in LICs, and our previous work shows that many LICs were experiencing protracted food emergencies and had severe and widespread malnourishment even prior to the onset of the crises. During the crises, food and fuel prices rose significantly, then declined, and have risen again in 2011 to levels experienced during the crises. In response to the crises, IFIs increased funding and disbursed some funds more quickly to LICs, but the impact of these actions on LIC government spending has been difficult to establish. Between 2008 and 2010, the World Bank committed $18.1 billion through regular lending and five crisis response initiatives, an increase of 39 percent from the pre-crises period. Total first year disbursements also increased by 12.7 percent. Three of four of the initiatives designed to increase the speed of disbursements met their goal. However, the proportion of committed funds that have been disbursed in the first year following project approval declined, as compared to the pre-crises period. Disbursement rates depend on several factors, including recipient country capacity, need, and governance; and the type of lending. The World Bank's International Finance Corporation responded to the crises through investments, trade initiatives, and enhanced coordination with donors, but its response was limited by the availability of resources and recipient countries' limited ability to implement programs quickly. The IMF boosted lending to LICs more than sixfold to $4.9 billion, which governments could use to bolster their reserves or make international payments. While most LIC governments' spending increased during the crises, we found that the impact of World Bank and IMF actions on spending has been difficult to establish. According to IFIs' analysis, the crises did not significantly impair LICs' ability to repay their future debt, and thus did not necessitate an increase in their access to grants, which do not have to be repaid, relative to loans. The reliability of this analysis depends on the realism of IFIs' projections, which include quick economic recovery, implementation of policy reforms, and low inflation. According to IFIs' projections, the ability of six LICs to repay their debt improved during the crises, and thus they received more loans instead of grants. However, the IMF subsequently reported renewed risks to the global economic recovery, meaning that projections for future export growth, government revenue, and inflation might be too optimistic. This report contains no recommendations. The World Bank, IMF, and U.S Treasury generally agreed with our findings but identified areas to provide greater context. |
gao_GAO-15-86 | gao_GAO-15-86_0 | In addition, according to NIH officials, the clinical trials registry was initially closed because of the shutdown but was reopened during the shutdown. To lessen the impact of the closure, the academy revised its academic calendar to allow eligible students to graduate as previously scheduled. Ongoing Communication Internally and with OMB Staff and OPM Officials
Officials at the selected departments commented that communication within their departments and with OMB and OPM was very important to the preparation for and implementation of the shutdown. For example, the number of employees furloughed at HHS changed according to the circumstances for each day of the shutdown, according to HHS officials. Selected Components, Grant Recipients, and Contractors Faced Challenges Related to Grants and Contracts during the Shutdown
Planning Helped Selected Components Manage the Shutdown’s Effects on Grants and Contracts, but Grant Recipients and Contractors Faced Other Challenges
The effects of the shutdown on contracts and grants management were more pronounced at the component level than at the department level for the three selected departments we reviewed. NIH had to reschedule the review process for over 13,700 grant applications. According to FTA officials, this had a minimal effect because FTA’s grant processing system is typically offline and unavailable in early October for end-of-year closeout processing and no new grant awards are processed. FTA does, however, normally make payments on existing grants in early October, but no payments were made during the shutdown because employees were furloughed. For example, EM did not furlough any federal contracting employees during the shutdown because most of its programs were exempt at the beginning of the shutdown and the agency had multi-year appropriations available, but several EM contractors that operate and maintain EM facilities experienced reductions because EM issued stop work orders. NIH officials reported that contracting activity and programs returned to normal levels of activity within 1 month, and EM officials reported that some programs required 4 months to return to pre-shutdown levels of contract activity. In January 2014, the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), the agency whose national economic statistics provide a comprehensive view of the U.S. economy in the form of summary measures such as GDP, estimated the direct effect of the shutdown on the real GDP growth in the fourth quarter of 2013 to be a reduction of 0.3 percentage points, which is within the range of estimates provided by the economic forecasters that we identified. Other Economic Effects of the Shutdown
The economic forecasters we interviewed believed the other economic effects of the shutdown to be minimal and they generally limited their analyses to the effect of the shutdown on direct effects of government spending, specifically real federal compensation, as discussed earlier. Among other factors, the selected departments were aided in managing the uncertainties of the shutdown by their experience with preparing for prior potential shutdowns. A-11, we recommend that the Director of OMB instruct agencies to document lessons learned in planning for and implementing a shutdown, as well as resuming activities following a shutdown, should a funding gap longer than five days occur in the future. On September 19, 2014, OMB staff did not state whether they agreed or disagreed with the recommendation. This report describes (1) how the shutdown of the federal government affected selected agencies’ operations and services, including the immediate and potential longer-term effects; (2) what is known about how the shutdown affected federal contracting and grants, including the immediate and potential longer-term effects, as reported by the selected agencies and associations with expertise in grants and contracts; and (3) what economic studies or reports state about the effect of the government shutdown on national economic activity. For this review, we selected three departments and three departmental components to serve as nongeneralizable case studies: the Department of Energy (DOE) and its Office of Environmental Management (EM); the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and its National Institutes of Health (NIH); and the Department of Transportation (DOT) and its Federal Transit Administration (FTA). These departments and components were selected based on the following criteria: (1) having grants or contracts valued over $1 billion in fiscal year 2013, as reported on USASpending.gov; (2) the percentage of federal employees expected to be furloughed as reflected in the department contingency plans; and (3) the potential for longer-term effects from the shutdown on operations, grants, or contracts based on our determination using department contingency plans, the dollar value of grants and contracts programs in fiscal year 2013, and background research (including the Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB) report on the shutdown). | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government partially shut down for 16 days in October 2013 because of a lapse in appropriations. According to OMB, about 850,000 federal employees were furloughed for part of this time. GAO was asked to describe the effects of the shutdown. This report describes (1) how the shutdown affected selected agencies' operations and services, including immediate and potential longer-term effects; (2) what is known about how the shutdown affected federal contracting and grants, as reported by the selected agencies and associations with expertise in grants and contracts; and (3) what economic studies or reports state about the effect of the shutdown on national economic activity.
GAO selected three departments for review—DOE, HHS, and DOT—based on the value of grants and contracts, the percentage of employees expected to be furloughed, and the potential for longer-term effects. GAO reviewed department contingency plans and other documents; economic forecasters' analyses; and interviewed officials from the selected departments and components, BEA, OMB, OPM, associations, and economic forecasters.
What GAO Found
The 2013 shutdown impacted some operations and services at the three departments that GAO reviewed: Energy (DOE), Health and Human Services (HHS), and Transportation (DOT). For example, at HHS's National Institutes of Health (NIH), initial closure of the clinical trials registry prevented new trial registrations for patients, before NIH recalled a small number of employees to reopen the registry. Similarly, DOT's Merchant Marine Academy closed and required a change to the academic calendar to allow eligible students to graduate on time. However, officials at these departments said that longer-term effects are difficult to assess in isolation from other budgetary events, such as sequestration.
Because of employee furloughs and payment or work disruptions, the three departments, their components, grant recipients, and contractors faced delays and disruptions in grant and contract activities during the shutdown, including the following examples:
Within HHS, grants management activities at NIH effectively ceased with employee furloughs, although most current grant recipients were able to draw down funds. NIH had to reschedule the review process for over 13,700 grant applications because of the shutdown. After the shutdown, NIH completed the process to meet the next milestone in January 2014.
Grants activities at DOT's Federal Transit Administration (FTA) effectively ceased with grants management officials furloughed and no payments made on existing grants. FTA officials said that no new grant awards were processed because of the shutdown, but the effect was minimal because the grant processing system is typically unavailable in early October for fiscal year closeout activities.
At DOE's Office of Environmental Management (EM), contract activities generally continued because of the availability of multi-year funding, but more than 1,700 contractor employees who operate and maintain EM facilities were laid off or required to use leave because EM issued stop work orders. EM officials reported some programs required 4 months to return to pre-shutdown levels of contract activity.
Researchers' analyses of the economic effects of the shutdown have been limited to predicting its effect on real gross domestic product (GDP) in the fourth quarter of 2013. In January 2014, the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) estimated the direct effect of the shutdown on real GDP growth to be a reduction of 0.3 percentage points. Economic forecasters GAO interviewed believed the other economic effects to be minimal at the economy-wide level.
The selected departments were aided in managing the uncertainties of the shutdown by their experience with preparing for prior potential shutdowns, funding flexibilities (such as multi-year funding), and ongoing communications internally and with Office of Management and Budget (OMB) staff and Office of Personnel Management (OPM) officials. OMB staff addressed questions from agencies on how to communicate about the shutdown with their employees, but did not direct agencies to document lessons learned from how they planned, managed, and implemented the shutdown for future reference.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that OMB instruct agencies to document lessons learned in planning for and implementing a shutdown, as well as resuming activities following a shutdown should a funding gap longer than five days occur in the future. OMB staff did not state whether they agreed or disagreed with the recommendation. |
gao_GAO-09-187 | gao_GAO-09-187_0 | Supply equipment management officers are responsible for managing each centers’ equipment program, including implementing the necessary equipment control procedures to ensure proper accountability for center equipment; establishing a process to ensure that all personnel associated with the utilization of government equipment receive documented, up-to- date property end user training; ensuring that end users are aware of the requirement to identify inactive equipment and ensure its reuse or disposal; and designating property disposal officers and center equipment managers to perform screenings for equipment estimated to cost $25,000 or more. Figure 2 illustrates NASA’s equipment screening process. Unclear Guidance on Equipment Descriptions and Usability Prevent Matches That Could Identify Equipment for Reuse
Inconsistent descriptions, inaccurate information on physical condition, and limited information about the equipment’s availability hamper the PP&E Module’s ability to produce equipment matches. The descriptions of equipment items, therefore, are crucial to the success of the new module in identifying equipment for reutilization. NASA has not provided adequate oversight and detailed guidance on what type of information should be included in the description field. For example, items that should have been listed as video frequency equipment racks were described as “disciplined frequency standard” and a camera lens cover as a “rear cover multicontrol.” In addition, the same type of computer server equipment was described as a “disk array,” “disk drive unit,” and “storage array unit.” Similarly, a generator was variously described as a “signal plug in generator,” “modulator,” “plug in unit,” and “tuning unit.” These differences in descriptions may lead to reutilization opportunities being overlooked. At two centers, our physical inspection of 84 equipment items that were transferred to disposal determined that 83 of the items were incorrectly coded as new and unused in the PP&E Module. Limited Information on Equipment Availability Impedes Reutilization
Another potential barrier to equipment reutilization is the limited amount of information in the PP&E Module on the availability of equipment. An end user searching for an oscilloscope, for example, would currently have to choose which of 1,700 other end users to contact to determine the availability status of their “active” oscilloscopes. The majority of end users we interviewed—98 of 121—stated that they had never used N-PROP (or the prior systems) to screen equipment for reutilization. NASA Has Not Implemented Effective Policies and Detailed Procedures to Enhance Equipment Reutilization
NASA’s existing policies and procedures related to equipment reutilization were either not being carried out or were being carried out inconsistently at the five centers we visited. NASA-Wide Implementing Procedures for Walk- Through Inspections Are Not Sufficient to Ensure Consistent Performance
At the time of our visits the five NASA centers were not conducting required annual walk-through inspections consistently, and sometimes not at all. Our testing of equipment in NASA’s legacy NEMS (as of September 30, 2007) estimated that about 16 percent of NASA’s controlled equipment (with a value of at least $230 million) was improperly listed as being actively in use in an ongoing program, and had been overlooked during annual walk- through inspections. These shortcomings may prevent the PP&E Module from providing NASA employees and contractors with the tools needed to make informed decisions regarding the disposal or reutilization of equipment, including over 1.2 million types of equipment if the space shuttle is retired in 2010 and NASA transitions to its new space exploration policy as planned. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To address whether the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has effectively (1) designed controls over steps NASA identified as key to its controlled equipment reutilization process, including equipment sent to disposal, and (2) implemented policies, controls, and processes to enhance equipment reutilization, we reviewed prior NASA’s Office of Inspector General reports and independent public accountants’ reports as well as our own prior reports and related recommendations. To determine the extent to which NASA’s planning and initial implementation of the new PP&E Module addressed problems and control weaknesses we identified in NASA’s reutilization of equipment, we reviewed and analyzed NASA equipment management policy and procedural guidance for the PP&E Module and module implementation and planning documents, including briefings and overviews of PP&E Module requirements. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2010, the planned retirement of the space shuttle will require the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to make disposal and reutilization decisions regarding over 1.2 million types of equipment. To facilitate these and other equipment management decisions, NASA recently invested $29 million in a new program: the Plant, Property, and Equipment (PP&E) Module--a component of NASA's Integrated Enterprise Management Program. GAO was asked to assess the effectiveness of NASA's processes, systems, and controls for managing its PP&E. This report addresses whether NASA (1) effectively designed controls over steps NASA identified as key to its controlled equipment reutilization process, including sending equipment to disposal, and (2) implemented policies, controls, and processes to enhance equipment reutilization. To answer these questions, GAO reviewed NASA equipment reutilization policy and conducted on-site visits at five NASA centers.
What GAO Found
Inconsistent descriptions and inaccurate information on the condition of equipment hamper the PP&E Module's ability to produce equipment matches and enhance reutilization. Although descriptions of equipment items are crucial for the new module to succeed in identifying equipment for reutilization, NASA has not provided detailed guidance on what should be included in the description field, leading to widely varying descriptions. For example, the same type of computer server equipment was described as a "disk array," "disk drive unit," and "storage array unit." GAO's physical inspections at two centers found that 83 of the 84 equipment items inspected were incorrectly coded as new and unused in the PP&E Module. These problems may lead to reutilization opportunities being overlooked. Further hampering equipment reutilization is the PP&E Module's lack of detailed equipment availability information. The module does not identify the extent to which each piece of equipment is in use, necessitating a potentially lengthy search process. For example, an end user searching for an oscilloscope could currently have to contact up to 1,700 other end users to determine the availability status of these equipment items. These conditions contribute to inadequate end user utilization of the NASA Property Web interface (N-PROP), the PP&E Module's automated component. N-PROP allows end users to perform online equipment management functions, which NASA anticipated would generate cost savings by facilitating equipment reutilization and eliminating manual processes. However, 98 of the 121 end users who were responsible for equipment selected from a NASA-wide statistical sample stated that they had never used either N-PROP or the prior systems, limiting the potential savings from implementing the new PP&E Module. NASA's existing policies and procedures regarding equipment screenings and annual walk-through inspections--both key controls in the equipment reutilization process--were carried out inconsistently, if at all, at the five centers GAO visited. Without specific guidance on how to implement NASA's equipment screening policy, centers failed to ensure that screenings occurred prior to purchasing new equipment, undermining the purpose of the screenings. Further, NASA does not require users to justify the need to purchase new equipment when a screening has identified equipment available for reutilization. In addition, required walk-through inspections intended to identify idle equipment were not conducted at one center and were ineffective at the other four. Equipment managers did not always follow up to ensure that the PP&E Module was updated and GAO's testing estimated that about 16 percent of NASA's controlled equipment (with a value of at least $230 million) was improperly listed as being actively in use and had been overlooked during annual walk-through inspections. |
gao_GAO-13-620 | gao_GAO-13-620_0 | In the May 30, 2012 reauthorization, Congress increased Ex-Im’s exposure limit to $120 billion, with provisions for additional increases to $130 billion in 2013, and $140 billion in 2014. 1). 2). Forecasting Processes Ex-Im Used for Its Business Plan and Other Estimates Have Weaknesses
The Ex-Im Business Plan concluded that the exposure limits Congress placed on the bank in the Reauthorization Act were appropriate, but the exposure forecast model Ex-Im used to justify its conclusion relied on authorization forecasts and assumptions about repayments that have a degree of uncertainty that was not accounted for in Ex-Im’s forecast. Although this exposure is closer to its exposure limit than it has been at year-end in recent years, it supports Ex-Im’s conclusion that the congressional limits are appropriate. 3). For example, Ex-Im reviews aircraft production and delivery schedules to determine when financing for new aircraft is expected to be needed. Ex-Im’s data on previous authorizations show that Ex-Im’s recent budget forecasts underestimated Ex-Im’s authorizations. 4). Ex-Im’s Business Plan notes that few could have predicted the financial crisis of 2007-2009, which led to a significant contraction in commercial lending and a sharp increase in demand for Ex-Im financing. Although the authorization forecast is uncertain and key assumptions about repayments affect the results, Ex-Im did not conduct sensitivity analyses to assess and report the range of various outcomes. Additionally, Ex- Im does not routinely report the performance of its subportfolios relating to the small business, sub-Saharan Africa, and renewable energy mandates, although these mandates encourage Ex-Im to undertake transactions in these subportfolios and their performance differs from the overall Ex-Im portfolio. While the plan provided historical data on overall risk rating and portfolio concentration in 2008 and 2012, such data did not reflect the projected changes of composition or the risks of Ex-Im’s subportfolios. Ex-Im Has Not Routinely Reported Risk of Loss Related to Three Congressional Mandates
Business Plan Did Not Provide Risk Rating Data to Support Its Risk Conclusions on Congressional Mandates
While Ex-Im included an assessment of the risk of loss associated with implementing the three congressional mandates in its Business Plan as required by the Reauthorization Act, Ex-Im missed the opportunity to present any risk rating data to support its risk evaluations, though this was not required. Ex-Im’s Business Plan’s Resource Analysis Was Limited and Growing Congressional Mandated Targets Challenge Bank Resources
In the Business Plan, Ex-Im’s response to the reauthorization requirement to assess its resources was limited and further details were not included pending OMB review of Ex-Im’s 2014 budget request. From 2008 through 2012, Ex-Im experienced rapid growth in authorizations while its staff and administrative budget level remained relatively flat. Ex-Im concurred with our recommendation. Ex-Im projects in its Business Plan that it will be challenged to meet the 20 percent mandate in 2013 or 2014 because the dollar amount of its overall growth will continue outpacing its small business activity. Ex-Im officials stated that additional administrative resources would not enable it to meet its renewable energy target, as its inability to meet the target results from a lack of demand for renewable energy export financing. These assumptions and forecasts should be supported by historical data and experience. In addition, a sensitivity assessment of the effect of these assumptions should be presented to management. Reporting such information would be consistent with OMB and federal banking regulator guidance as well as federal internal control standards. It is important to communicate the effect of these mandated targets on Ex-Im operations to external stakeholders, such as Congress, and the potential impacts percentage-based targets may have on the agency’s resources and ability to achieve its goals. Recommendations for Executive Action
To provide Congress with the appropriate information necessary to make decisions on Ex-Im’s exposure limits and targets, we recommend that the Chairman of the Export-Import Bank of the United States take the following four actions: To improve the accuracy of its forecasts of exposure and authorizations, Ex-Im should compare previous forecasts and key assumptions to actual results and adjust its forecast models to incorporate previous experience; and assess the sensitivity of the exposure forecast model to key assumptions and authorization estimates and identify and report the range of forecasts based on this analysis. To help Congress and Ex-Im management understand the performance and risk associated with its subportfolios of transactions supporting the small business, sub-Saharan Africa, and renewable energy mandates, Ex-Im should routinely report financial performance information, including the default rate and risk rating, of these transactions at the subportfolio level. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to examine the extent to which the Business Plan and analyses of the Export-Import Bank (Ex-Im): (1) justify bank exposure limits; (2) evaluate Ex-Im’s risk of loss associated with the increased exposure limit, the changing composition of exposure, and compliance with congressional mandates; and (3) analyze the adequacy of Ex-Im resources to manage authorizations and comply with congressional mandates under the proposed exposure limits. To assess the extent to which Ex-Im’s Business Plan and analyses evaluate the risk of loss associated with Ex-Im’s increased exposure limit, the changing composition of exposure, and compliance with congressional mandates, we reviewed agency data and documentation— including Ex-Im’s financial performance data, annual reports, and quarterly default rate reports. | Why GAO Did This Study
Ex-Im helps U.S. firms export goods and services by providing a range of financial products. Following the 2007-2009 financial crisis, increased demand resulted in rapid increases in Ex-Im's portfolio and exposure. The Export-Import Bank Reauthorization Act of 2012 reauthorized Ex-Im through fiscal year 2014 and, as a condition of raising Ex-Im's exposure limit in 2013, required Ex-Im to prepare a report with a business plan and analyses of key operational elements. The act also directed GAO to analyze the Business Plan. This report discusses the extent to which Ex-Im's Business Plan and analyses (1) justify bank exposure limits; (2) evaluate the risk of loss associated with the increased exposure limit, changing composition of exposure, and compliance with congressional mandates; and (3) analyze the adequacy of Ex-Im resources to manage authorizations and comply with congressional mandates. GAO reviewed Ex-Im's Business Plan, analyses, and other reports, and interviewed Ex-Im officials.
What GAO Found
While the Export-Import Bank (Ex-Im) Business Plan reported that Ex-Im's exposure limits were appropriate, the forecasting process used to reach this conclusion has weaknesses. Congress increased the Ex-Im exposure limit--the limit on Ex-Im's total aggregate outstanding amount of financing--to $120 billion in 2012, with provisions for additional increases to $130 billion in 2013 and $140 billion in 2014. Although Ex-Im's forecast model is sensitive to key assumptions, GAO found that Ex-Im did not reassess these assumptions to reflect changing conditions or conduct sensitivity analyses to assess and report the range of potential outcomes. GAO used historical data in lieu of these assumptions and found that Ex-Im's forecast of exposure could be higher than the limit set by Congress for 2014. GAO's cost guidance calls for agencies' assumptions and forecasts to be supported by historical data and experience, and a sensitivity analysis, which can assess the effect of changes in assumptions. Because Ex-Im has not taken these steps, the reliability of its forecasts is diminished. This is of particular concern because Ex-Im projects that its outstanding financing in the future will be closer to its exposure limit than it has been historically. Consequently, any forecast errors could result in the bank having to take actions, such as delaying financing for creditworthy projects, to avoid exceeding its limit.
The Business Plan provided limited analysis of Ex-Im's risk of loss. First, Ex-Im did not provide some forecast data because of pending Office of Management and Budget (OMB) approval of key analyses. For example, Ex-Im did not include conclusions on Ex-Im's overall risk of loss and risk by industry. Second, Ex-Im included only limited analysis to support its conclusions that changes in its portfolio--including subportfolios of transactions supporting congressional mandates for small business, sub-Saharan Africa, and renewable energy--would not affect its risk of loss. In addition, Ex-Im has not routinely analyzed or reported the risk rating and default rate of subportfolios that respond to these mandates, although their performance may differ from the overall portfolio. OMB and banking regulator guidance call for entities, including federal agencies, to be able to provide comprehensive information by subportfolio, product, and other financial performance metrics. By not routinely analyzing and reporting financial performance for mandated transactions, Ex-Im decreases its ability to evaluate such performance at the subportfolio level and inform Congress of related risks.
The Business Plan provided limited analysis of the adequacy of Ex-Im's resources and ability to meet congressional mandates. From 2008 through 2012, Ex-Im's administrative resources remained relatively flat as its portfolio grew. Ex-Im does not expect to meet its small business or renewable energy mandate targets in 2013 or 2014. These mandate targets are fixed to a percentage of the dollar value of Ex-Im's total authorizations. Although Ex-Im has dedicated resources to support these mandates, as Ex-Im authorizations have grown, the growth in mandate targets has outpaced Ex-Im's increasing support. Ex-Im projects that the targets will continue to outpace its growth in support through 2014. Mandate transactions also are resource-intensive and Ex-Im's ability to expand its renewable energy portfolio may be constrained by the size of the overall market. Communicating the effect of percentage-based targets on Ex-Im's resources and ability to achieve its goals to external stakeholders, such as Congress, is consistent with federal internal control standards.
What GAO Recommends
Ex-Im should (1) adjust its forecasting model based on previous experience, (2) assess and report the sensitivity of the exposure forecast model to key assumptions and estimates, (3) routinely report the financial performance of subportfolios supporting congressional mandates, and (4) provide Congress with additional information on the resources associated with meeting mandated targets. Ex-Im concurred with our recommendations. |
gao_GAO-02-655 | gao_GAO-02-655_0 | In addition, we included in group 1 the 173 CFP claims, totaling approximately $28 million, that were written off during fiscal year 1998, since this was the largest amount written off from fiscal year 1997 through fiscal year 2000. As of September 30, 2000, Customs reported about 7,180 outstanding CFP debts that represented about $773.6 million in gross receivables. Cancellation of a CFP Debt. Broker’s Bankruptcy Is the Primary Reason for the Increase in Uncollected Customs CFP Debt
Customs’ gross CFP receivables increased by about $556 million from the beginning of fiscal year 1997 to the end of fiscal year 2000. During fiscal years 1999 and 2000, Customs assessed numerous importers a total of about $566 million of CFP relating to the bankruptcy of the broker and recorded CFP receivables totaling about $484 million for these 422 claims. Customs records indicated that the remaining $82 million of assessed amounts was mitigated and thus these amounts were not recorded as CFP receivables. Opportunities Exist for Strengthening Customs’ CFP Debt Collection Policies and Procedures
Customs can strengthen its CFP debt collection and might improve its collection efforts by enhancing and better adhering to existing policies and procedures. OMB further added that it is the role of each agency to specifically monitor and collect its civil penalty debt regardless of dollar magnitude and that it is the responsibility of each agency’s office of inspector general to provide oversight through audit of the agency’s debt collection activities. Treasury officials stated that they rely on agencies to determine what debt should be referred to the Financial Management Service for collection and offset as required by the Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the Customs Service's management of and practices for collecting civil fines and penalties (CFP) debt.
What GAO Found
GAO found that Customs' gross CFP debt more than tripled from the start of fiscal year 1997 to the end of fiscal year 2000, rising from $218.1 million as of October 1, 1996, to $773.6 million as of September 20, 2000. During the same period, Customs annually reserved from 75 to 87 percent of its reported CFP receivables in an allowance for uncollectible accounts. The primary reason for the growth in Customs' reported uncollected CFP debt from fiscal year 1997 through fiscal year 2000 was the bankruptcy of a Customs broker in fiscal year 2000. The broker's bankruptcy resulted in Customs assessing 422 claims for $566 million and recording CFP receivables totaling $484 million during fiscal years 1999 and 2000. The remaining $82 million of assessed amounts was eliminated through the CFP mitigation process, and accordingly these amounts were not recorded as receivables. Customs can strengthen some of its CFP debt collection policies and procedures both by enhancing them and better adhering to them. The Office of Management and Budget stated that it had broad oversight responsibility for monitoring and evaluating governmentwide debt collection activities, but that it is the specific responsibility of the agency's office of inspector general to provide oversight through audits of the agency's debt collection activities. In addition, the Financial Management Service (FMS) officials stated that they rely on agencies to determine what debt should be referred to FMS for collection and offset as required by the Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996, and Customs refers certain delinquent CFP debts to FMS for collection action. |
gao_GAO-06-807 | gao_GAO-06-807_0 | The Office of Head Start collected some data on the language spoken by Head Start participants, which showed that about 13 percent of parents of the approximately 900,000 children enrolled in Head Start in 2003 reported speaking English “not well” or “not at all.”
Children of Parents with Limited English Proficiency Were Less Likely to Receive Financial Assistance for Child Care or to Participate in Head Start
National survey data from ECLS-K showed that in 1998, kindergarten children of parents with limited English proficiency who were in nonparental child care in the previous year were less likely than other children in child care to receive financial assistance from a social service or welfare agency for that care, after controlling for selected individual and family characteristics. They also encountered difficulties communicating with English-speaking child care providers. Some of the challenges to program access that these parents faced were the same challenges that many low-income families face, including difficulty finding care at nontraditional hours, lack of transportation, and the limited availability of subsidized child care slots. Selected Agencies Took Some Steps to Assist Parents with Limited English Proficiency but Reported Challenges in Serving Them
The majority of state and local agencies and providers that we visited took some steps to assist parents with limited English proficiency in accessing child care and early education programs for their children. Some state and local officials indicated that additional information on cost-effective strategies used by others to serve this population would facilitate their efforts to provide access. The majority of agencies that we visited provided written language assistance, such as translated subsidy application forms. Officials told us they faced challenges providing oral language assistance because of the difficulties that agencies had hiring qualified bilingual staff. HHS Provided Assistance to Grantees on Serving Children of Parents with Limited English Proficiency, but Gaps Remain in Its Program Review Efforts
HHS issued general guidance, translated materials, and provided technical assistance to grantees on serving children of parents with limited English proficiency, but gaps remain in its program review efforts. The Office of Head Start monitors grantees’ efforts to provide access for individuals with limited English proficiency by reviewing their biennial community assessments and conducting formal on-site monitoring reviews. While it has made efforts to assist states with serving the needs of children whose parents have limited English proficiency, CCB has no mechanism for reviewing how agencies provide access to CCDF subsidies for eligible children of parents with limited English proficiency or ensuring that these children are not inadvertently excluded as a result of state CCDF eligibility criteria that are inconsistent with agency guidance. Analysis of National Program Participation Data and State Data Inquiries
To obtain information on the participation of children whose parents have limited English proficiency in child care and early education programs funded through the Child Care and Development Fund (CCDF) and Head Start, we obtained and reviewed the most recent program participation data from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), surveyed states about their data on CCDF subsidy recipients, and analyzed national survey data available through the Early Childhood Longitudinal Study, Kindergarten Class of 1998-99 (ECLS-K). Eight of the 12 focus groups were conducted in Spanish and 4 in Vietnamese. | Why GAO Did This Study
Questions have been raised about whether parents with limited English proficiency are having difficulty accessing child care and early education programs for their children. Research suggests that quality early care experiences can greatly improve the school readiness of young children. GAO was asked to provide information on (1) the participation of these children in programs funded through the Child Care and Development Fund (CCDF) and Head Start, (2) the challenges these families face in accessing programs, (3) assistance that selected state and local entities provide to them, and (4) actions taken by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to ensure program access. To obtain this information, GAO analyzed program and national survey data, interviewed officials in 5 states and 11 counties, held 12 focus groups with mothers with limited English proficiency, and interviewed experts and HHS officials.
What GAO Found
HHS's Child Care Bureau (CCB) did not have information on the total enrollment in CCDF programs of children whose parents had limited English proficiency, but data collected by its Office of Head Start in 2003 showed that about 13 percent of parents whose children were in Head Start reported having limited English proficiency. The most recent (1998) national survey data showed that children of parents with limited English proficiency were less likely than other children to receive financial assistance for child care from a social service or welfare agency or to be in Head Start, after controlling for selected characteristics. Eighty-eight percent of these children were Hispanic, and their results differed from Asian children. Analysis of data from focus groups and site visit interviews held by GAO revealed that mothers with limited English proficiency faced multiple challenges, including lack of awareness of available assistance, language barriers during the application process, and difficulty communicating with English-speaking providers. Some of the challenges that low-income parents with limited English proficiency experienced, such as lack of transportation and shortage of subsidized child care slots, were common to other low-income families. The majority of state and local agencies that we visited offered some oral and written language assistance, such as bilingual staff or translated applications. Agencies in the majority of locations visited also made efforts to increase the supply of providers who could communicate with parents. Officials reported challenges in serving parents with limited English proficiency, such as difficulty hiring qualified bilingual staff. Some officials indicated that additional information on cost-effective strategies to serve this population would facilitate their efforts. HHS issued guidance, translated materials, and provided technical assistance to grantees to help them serve children of parents with limited English proficiency. The Office of Head Start reviewed programs' assessments of their communities' needs and conducted formal monitoring reviews, but could not ensure that review teams consistently assessed grantees' performance on the standards related to language access. CCB reviewed states' plans on the use of CCDF funds generally and investigated specific complaints, but had no mechanism for reviewing how and whether states provide access to CCDF subsidies for eligible children of parents with limited English proficiency. |
gao_GAO-04-142 | gao_GAO-04-142_0 | Villages located on the coast or along rivers are subject to both annual and episodic flooding and erosion. Coastal or River Flooding and Erosion Affects 86 Percent of Alaska Native Villages
Flooding and erosion affects 184 out of 213, or 86.4 percent, of Alaska Native villages to some extent, according to studies and information provided to us by federal and Alaska state officials. While flooding and erosion is a long-standing problem that has been documented in Alaska for decades, various studies and reports indicate that coastal villages in Alaska are becoming more susceptible. Small and remote Alaska villages often fail to qualify for assistance under the Corps’ Continuing Authorities Program because they do not meet the program’s criteria. Even villages that do meet the Corps’ cost/benefit criteria may still fail to receive assistance if they cannot provide or find sufficient funding to meet the cost-share requirements for the project. 6.) Four Villages in Imminent Danger Are Planning to Relocate, and the Remaining Five Villages Are Taking Other Actions
Four of the nine villages we reviewed are in imminent danger from flooding and erosion and are making plans to relocate, while the remaining five are taking other actions. The cost of relocating these villages is expected to be high, although estimates currently exist only for Kivalina. Federal Agencies Are Investing in Infrastructure without Knowledge of Villages’ Relocation Plans
During our review of these villages, we found instances where federal agencies invested in infrastructure projects without knowledge of the villages’ plans to relocate. In addition, many of the federal programs to prevent and control flooding and erosion are not a good fit for the Alaska Native villages because of the requirement that economic costs of the project not exceed the economic benefits. These alternatives include (1) expanding the role of the Denali Commission to include responsibilities for managing a flooding and erosion assistance program, (2) directing the Corps and NRCS to include social and environmental factors in their cost/benefit analyses for projects requested by Alaska Native villages, and (3) waiving the federal cost-sharing requirement for flooding and erosion projects for Alaska Native villages. In addition, GAO identified a fourth alternative—authorizing the bundling of funds from various agencies to address flooding and erosion problems in these villages. In response to this direction and subsequent discussions with committee staff, we (1) determined the extent to which Alaska Native villages are affected by flooding and erosion; (2) identified federal and Alaska state programs available to respond to flooding and erosion and assessed the extent to which federal assistance has been provided to Alaska Native villages; (3) determined the status of efforts, including cost estimates, to respond to flooding and erosion in the villages of Barrow, Bethel, Kaktovik, Kivalina, Koyukuk, Newtok, Point Hope, Shishmaref, and Unalakleet; and (4) identified alternatives that Congress may wish to consider when providing assistance for flooding and erosion of Alaska Native villages. | Why GAO Did This Study
Approximately 6,600 miles of Alaska's coastline and many of the low-lying areas along the state's rivers are subject to severe flooding and erosion. Most of Alaska's Native villages are located on the coast or on riverbanks. In addition to the many federal and Alaska state agencies that respond to flooding and erosion, Congress established the Denali Commission in 1998 to, among other things, provide economic development services and to meet infrastructure needs in rural Alaska communities. Congress directed GAO to study Alaska Native villages affected by flooding and erosion and to 1) determine the extent to which these villages are affected, 2) identify federal and state flooding and erosion programs, 3) determine the current status of efforts to respond to flooding and erosion in nine villages, and 4) identify alternatives that Congress may wish to consider when providing assistance for flooding and erosion.
What GAO Found
Flooding and erosion affects 184 out of 213, or 86 percent, of Alaska Native villages to some extent. While many of the problems are long-standing, various studies indicate that coastal villages are becoming more susceptible to flooding and erosion due in part to rising temperatures. The Corps of Engineers and the Natural Resources Conservation Service administer key programs for constructing flooding and erosion control projects. However, small and remote Alaska Native villages often fail to qualify for assistance under these programs--largely because of agency requirements that the expected costs of the project not exceed its benefits. Even villages that do meet the cost/benefit criteria may still not receive assistance if they cannot meet the cost-share requirement for the project. Of the nine villages we were directed to review, four--Kivalina, Koyukuk, Newtok, and Shishmaref--are in imminent danger from flooding and erosion and are planning to relocate, while the remaining five are in various stages of responding to these problems. Costs for relocating are expected to be high. For example, the cost estimates for relocating Kivalina range from $100 million to over $400 million. Relocation is a daunting process that may take several years to accomplish. During that process, federal agencies must make wise investment decisions, yet GAO found instances where federal agencies invested in infrastructure at the villages' existing sites without knowledge of their plans to relocate. GAO, federal and state officials, and village representatives identified some alternatives that could increase service delivery for Alaska Native villages, although many important factors must first be considered: (1) expand the role of the Denali Commission; (2) direct federal agencies to consider social and environmental factors in their cost/benefit analyses; (3) waive the federal cost-sharing requirement for these projects, and (4) authorize the "bundling" of funds from various federal agencies. |
gao_GAO-10-932T | gao_GAO-10-932T_0 | The United States Faces Challenges in Managing and Overseeing Programs in Afghanistan
Various factors challenge U.S. efforts to ensure proper management and oversight of U.S. development efforts in Afghanistan. Among the most noteworthy has been the “high-threat” working environment U.S. personnel and others face in Afghanistan, the difficulties in preserving institutional knowledge due in part to a high rate of staff turnover, and the Afghan government’s lack of capacity and corruption challenges. 1). This problem is exacerbated by the lack of mechanisms for retaining and sharing institutional knowledge during transitions of USAID personnel and the rate at which USAID staff turn over, which USAID acknowledged as hampering program design and implementation. The USAID monitoring officials for the eight agricultural programs we focused on during our review of USAID’s agricultural development efforts in Afghanistan were in place, on average, 7.5 months (see table 1). While relying on contractors to perform such functions can provide benefits, we found that USAID did not always fully address related risks. Limited Ministerial Capacity and Corruption Challenge Development Efforts
USAID has increasingly included and emphasized capacity building among its programs to address the government of Afghanistan’s lack of capacity to sustain and maintain many of the programs and projects put in place by donors. USAID has undertaken some steps to address the Afghan ministries’ limited capacity and corruption in Afghanistan by including a capacity- building component in its more recent contracts. The assessment noted that “substantial USAID assistance already designed to strengthen transparency, accountability, and effectiveness—prime routes to combat corruption.”
Additionally, we reported in 2009 that USAID’s failure to adhere to its existing policies severely limited its ability to require expenditure documentation for Afghanistan-related grants that were associated with findings of alleged criminal actions and mismanaged funds. USAID Did Not Consistently Follow Established Performance Management and Evaluation Procedures
USAID’s Mission to Afghanistan manages and oversees most U.S. development assistance programs in Afghanistan and relies on implementing partners to carry out its programs. USAID’s Automated Directives System (ADS) establishes performance management and evaluation procedures for managing and overseeing its assistance programs. These procedures, among other things, require (1) the development of a Mission Performance Management Plan (PMP); (2) the establishment of performance indicators and targets; and (3) analyses and use of program performance data. USAID had generally required the same performance management and evaluation procedures in Afghanistan as it does in other countries in which it operates. However, in October 2008, USAID approved new guidance that proposed several alternative monitoring methods for USAID projects in high-threat environments. USAID Needs an Approved PMP to Guide Management and Oversight Efforts
The ADS requires USAID officials to complete a Mission PMP for each of its high-level objectives as a tool to manage its performance management and evaluation procedures. While the Afghanistan Mission had developed a PMP in 2006, covering the years 2006, 2007, and 2008, the Afghanistan Mission has operated without a PMP to guide development assistance efforts after 2008. USAID Needs to Consistently Approve and Establish Indicators and Targets
Under USAID’s current policies, implementing partners working on USAID development assistance projects in Afghanistan are required to develop and submit monitoring and evaluation plans that include performance indicators and targets to USAID for approval. However, during our most recent review of USAID’s agricultural development programs, we found that USAID did not always approve implementing partner performance indicators and targets. While the implementing partners for the eight agricultural programs we reviewed did submit monitoring and evaluation plans, which generally contained performance indicators and targets, we found that USAID had not always approved these plans and did not consistently require targets to be set for all of indicators as required. For example, only 2 of 7 active agricultural programs included in our review had set targets for all of their indicators for fiscal year 2009. USAID Could Improve Its Assessment and Use of Performance Data
In addition to collecting performance data and assessing the data’s quality, ADS also includes the monitoring activities of analyzing and interpreting performance data in order to make program adjustments, inform higher- level decision making, and resource allocation. However, we are uncertain of the extent to which USAID used the 2007 evaluation to adapt current programs and plan future programs. We reviewed U.S. government performance management and evaluation, funding; and reporting documents related to USAID programs in Afghanistan. Our reports and testimonies include analysis of documents and other information from USAID and other U.S. agencies, as well as private contractors and other implementing partners working on U.S.-funded programs in Washington, D.C., and Afghanistan. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses oversight of U.S. assistance programs in Afghanistan. Strengthening the Afghan economy through development assistance efforts is critical to the counterinsurgency strategy and a key part of the U.S Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign Plan for Afghanistan. Since fiscal year 2002, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has awarded over $11.5 billion in support of development assistance programs in Afghanistan. Since 2003, GAO has issued several reports and testimonies related to U.S. security, governance, and development efforts in Afghanistan. In addition to reviewing program planning and implementation, we have focused on efforts to ensure proper management and oversight of the U.S. investment, which are essential to reducing waste, fraud, and abuse. Over the course of this work, we have identified improvements that were needed, as well as many obstacles that have affected success and should be considered in program management and oversight. While drawing on past work relating to U.S. development efforts in Afghanistan, this testimony focuses on findings in our most recent report released yesterday on the USAID's management and oversight of its agricultural programs in Afghanistan. It will address (1) the challenges the United States faces in managing and overseeing development programs in Afghanistan; and (2) the extent to which USAID has followed its established performance management and evaluation procedures.
What GAO Found
Various factors challenge U.S. efforts to ensure proper management and oversight of U.S. development efforts in Afghanistan. Among the most significant has been the "high-threat" working environment, the difficulties in preserving institutional knowledge due to the lack of a formal mechanism for retaining and sharing information during staff turnover, and the Afghan government ministries' lack of capacity and corruption challenges. USAID has taken some steps to assess and begin addressing the limited capacity and corruption challenges associated with Afghan ministries. In addition, USAID has established performance management and evaluation procedures for managing and overseeing its assistance programs. These procedures, among other things, require (1) the development of a Mission Performance Management Plan (PMP); (2) the establishment and approval of implementing partner performance indicators and targets; and (3) analyses and use of performance data. Although USAID disseminated alternative monitoring methods for projects in high-threat environments such as Afghanistan, USAID has generally required the same performance management and evaluation procedures in Afghanistan as it does in other countries in which it operates. Summary USAID has not consistently followed its established performance management and evaluation procedures. There were various areas in which the USAID Mission to Afghanistan (Mission) needed to improve upon. In particular, we found that the Mission had been operating without an approved PMP to guide its management and oversight efforts after 2008. In addition, while implementing partners have routinely reported on the progress of USAID's programs, we found that USAID did not always approve the performance indicators these partners were using, and that USAID did not ensure, as its procedures require, that its implementing partners establish targets for each performance indicator. For example, only 2 of 7 USAID-funded agricultural programs active during fiscal year 2009, included in our review, had targets for all of their indicators. We also found that USAID could improve its assessment and use of performance data submitted by implementing partners or program evaluations to, among other things, help identify strengths or weaknesses of ongoing or completed programs. Moreover, USAID needs to improve documentation of its programmatic decisions and put mechanisms in place for program managers to transfer knowledge to their successors. Finally, USAID has not fully addressed the risks of relying on contractor staff to perform inherently governmental tasks, such as awarding and administering grants. In the absence of consistent application of its existing performance management and evaluation procedures, USAID programs are more vulnerable to corruption, waste, fraud, and abuse. We reported in 2009 that USAID's failure to adhere to its existing policies severely limited its ability to require expenditure documentation for Afghanistan-related grants that were associated with findings of alleged criminal actions and mismanaged funds. To enhance the performance management of USAID's development assistance programs in Afghanistan, we have recommended, among other things, that the Administrator of USAID take steps to: (1) ensure programs have performance indicators and targets; (2) fully assess and use program data and evaluations to shape current programs and inform future programs; (3) address preservation of institutional knowledge; and (4) improve guidance for the use and management of USAID contractors. USAID concurred with these recommendations, and identified steps the agency is taking to address them. We will continue to monitor and follow up on the implementation of our recommendations. |
gao_GAO-13-530 | gao_GAO-13-530_0 | Program officials and shipyard representatives for both seaframes said that they are actively managing the weight of the variants. INSURV identified 36 out of 52 major systems that should be made common between the two variants, and the Navy is currently evaluating the business case for each of these changes. Navy Acquisition of Mission Modules Is Risky Due to Inadequately Defined Early Increments and Continued Developmental Difficulties
The Navy’s acquisition approach for mission modules is risky for three reasons: (1) the Navy continues to buy early increments of mission packages that lack defined requirements and clear definition of incremental cost, schedule, and performance goals; (2) developmental testing to date continues to identify problems with system performance; and (3) concerns persist about the overall effectiveness of each mission package. Navy Has Not Yet Fully Defined Early Increments
The Navy is pursuing an evolutionary acquisition strategy for the mission packages. The current ASW mission package is early in development, and is not intended to be fielded until 2016. Significant Questions Remain Regarding the LCS Business Case As the Navy Commits to Producing More Ships and Modules
The Navy continues to buy LCS seaframes and modules even as significant questions remain about the program and its underlying business case. Elements of the LCS business case, including its cost, the time needed to develop and field the system, and its anticipated capabilities have degraded over time. There are also significant unknowns related to key LCS operations and support concepts that could affect the cost of the program and soundness of the business case. By the time key tests of integrated LCS capability and survivability are completed in several years, the Navy will have procured or have under contract more than half of the planned number of seaframes. GAO, Navy’s Ability to Overcome Challenges Facing the Littoral Combat Ship Will Determine Eventual Capabilities, GAO-10-523 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 31, 2010). Production of Seaframes and Modules Is Proceeding without Key Knowledge about LCS Capabilities
The Navy plans to make significant investments in seaframes and mission modules before completing testing designed to demonstrate whether the integrated ship can perform its intended missions. Further, the Navy expects to procure at least 31 of the 64 planned mission packages while concurrently conducting developmental and operational tests on LCS 2 and LCS 3. More recently, USD AT&L rescinded the requirement for the seaframe program to have a Milestone C review, and also delayed the full-rate production decision for seaframes from 2015 to 2019 because the Navy will not be able to meet statutory criteria dependent on the completion of operational testing until then. Even though the milestone decision has been delayed, the Navy plans to continue purchasing seaframes, and if current plans come to fruition the Navy will have over half the planned seaframes under contract in the program’s low-rate initial production phase. Further, the Navy will not be able to demonstrate that the LCS can meet the threshold capabilities defined in its requirements documentation with mission packages integrated with the seaframes until 2019. To ensure that the Navy has adequate knowledge to support moving forward with future seaframe construction, Congress should consider restricting future funding to the program for construction of additional seaframes until the Navy: completes the ongoing LCS technical and design studies, determines the impacts of making any changes resulting from these studies on the cost and designs of future LCS seaframes, and reports to Congress on cost-benefit analyses of changes to the seaframes to change requirements and/or capabilities and to improve commonality of systems, and the Navy’s plan moving forward to improve commonality. DOD also stated that no major design changes are planned to the seaframes. While this may provide useful information, it would not address the relative advantages of the variants in performing the three primary LCS missions as we recommended. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Navy's LCS consists of the ship-- called a seaframe--and mission packages, which provide combat capability. LCS is intended to be reconfigurable to perform three primary missions: surface warfare; mine countermeasures; and anti-submarine warfare. The Navy currently plans to buy 52 seaframes, including two variants being constructed at two U.S. shipyards, and 64 mission packages. The total estimated acquisition cost is about $40 billion in 2010 dollars.
GAO was asked to assess the status of the LCS program. This report examines (1) the progress and challenges associated with seaframe and mission module production, development, and testing; and (2) the soundness of the Navy's business case for the integrated LCS program. GAO analyzed Navy and contractor documents, toured shipyards and LCS ships, and interviewed DOD and Navy officials and contractor representatives.
What GAO Found
The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) seaframe program continues to face challenges stemming from concurrent design, production, and testing activities. The Navy has taken steps to resolve problems with the lead ships, and the shipyards are beginning to realize benefits from facility improvements and experience. However, testing remains to be completed and the Navy is currently studying potentially significant design changes, such as increasing the commonality of systems between the two ship variants and changing ship capabilities. Changes at this point can compromise the positive impacts of shipyard learning, increase costs, and prolong schedules. The mission module program also has concurrency issues, and testing to date has shown considerable limitations in capabilities. The Navy is pursuing an incremental approach to fielding mission packages, but it has yet to finalize the requirements for each increment and does not plan to achieve the minimum performance requirements for the mine countermeasures and surface warfare packages until the final increments are fielded in 2017 and 2019, respectively.
The Navy continues to buy LCS seaframes and modules even as significant questions remain about the program and its underlying business case. Elements of the LCS business case, including its cost, the time needed to develop and field the system, and its anticipated capabilities have degraded over time. There are also significant unknowns related to key LCS operations and support concepts and the relative advantages and disadvantages of the two seaframe variants. The potential effect of these unknowns on the program is compounded by the Navy's aggressive acquisition strategy. By the time key tests of integrated LCS capability are completed in several years, the Navy will have procured or have under contract more than half of the planned number of seaframes. Almost half of the planned seaframes are already under contract, and the Navy plans to award further contracts in 2016, before the Department of Defense (DOD) makes a decision about full rate production of the ships. The Navy will not be able to demonstrate that mission packages integrated with the seaframes can meet the minimum performance requirements until operational testing for both variants (Freedom and Independence) is completed, currently planned for 2019. The Navy has also essentially bypassed two major acquisition reviews for mission modules, purchasing 8 of the 64 planned mission packages before gaining approval to enter the system development and initial production phases.
What GAO Recommends
To ensure that LCS investments are informed by key information, Congress should consider restricting funding for further ships until the Navy completes several studies about future LCS designs and capabilities. GAO is also making several recommendations, including that DOD limit future seaframe and mission package purchases until it achieves key acquisition and testing milestones. DOD disagreed with these recommendations, stating that slowing seaframe purchases would cause prices to rise and mission package purchases are needed to equip operational ships. GAO believes the Navy does not have adequate knowledge about LCS capabilities to support the planned procurement rate. |
gao_GAO-14-663 | gao_GAO-14-663_0 | In early 2009, in part to improve consistency in agencies’ use of social cost of carbon estimates for regulatory impact analysis, OMB’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs and the Council of Economic Advisers convened the Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Carbon. In June 2013, after using the 2010 estimates in an earlier proposal of the rule, the Department of Energy’s final rule on energy standards for microwaves was the first regulatory action to incorporate the revised estimates developed by the working group in the 2013 update to the Technical Support Document. The working group’s processes and methods for developing the estimates reflected three key principles. Specifically, according to participants, the working group (1) used consensus-based decision making; (2) relied largely on existing academic literature and models, including technical assistance from outside resources; and (3) took steps to disclose limitations and incorporate new information by considering public comments and revising the estimates as updated research became available. Participating Entities
According to the Technical Support Document and participants we spoke with, OMB and the Council of Economic Advisers convened and led the working group, and four other EOP offices and six federal agencies actively participated in the group. According to several participants, the participating EOP offices included the relevant subject-matter experts to best contribute on behalf of the EOP, and the other participating agencies were those likely to conduct rulemakings affecting carbon emissions and, therefore, use the social cost of carbon estimates in the future. According to the Technical Support Document, the working group was convened under the broad direction of Executive Order 12866 for agencies to assess the costs and benefits of intended regulations. According to OMB staff, there was no requirement that the informal working group should document its activities or proceedings, including the meetings held or specific discussions that occurred at each. However, OMB staff and EPA officials stated that all major issues discussed during working group meetings are documented in the Technical Support Document and its 2013 update, which is consistent with the control activities standard in the federal standards for internal control. Processes and Methods
Participants told us that the working group’s processes and methods reflected three key principles. First, the group used consensus-based decision making. The participants generally stated that they were satisfied that the final Technical Support Document successfully addressed individual comments on the draft version and the overall consensus of the working group and its participating offices and agencies. Relied on Existing Academic Literature and Models
The Technical Support Document states that the main objective of the working group was to develop a range of estimates of the social cost of carbon using a defensible set of modeling inputs based on existing academic literature. According to the Technical Support Document and many participants we spoke with, the working group calculated its estimates using three models that integrate climate and economic data into a single modeling framework for estimating future economic effects resulting from climate change. All other model assumptions and features were unchanged by the working group, which weighted each model equally to calculate the final estimates. Many participants stated that the working group also consulted with the developers of the models used by the group to develop the estimates. Specifically, the developers updated the academic models to reflect new scientific information, such as in sea level rise and associated damages, resulting in higher estimates. The working group did not make changes in the modeling inputs that it used for the 2010 estimates. The Technical Support Document discusses several limitations of its estimates and areas that the working group identified as being in particular need of additional exploration and research. Since 2008, agencies have published over three dozen regulatory actions for public comment in the Federal Register that use various social cost of carbon estimates in regulatory impact analyses. Several participants told us that the working group decided to revise the estimates for the first time in 2013 after agencies received a number of public comments encouraging revisions because the models used to develop the 2010 estimates had been subsequently updated and used in peer-reviewed academic literature. The Technical Support Document set a goal of revisiting the estimates within 2 years, or when substantially updated models become available. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report for review and comment to the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Energy, Transportation, and the Treasury; EPA; and OMB. | Why GAO Did This Study
Executive Order 12866 directs federal agencies to assess the economic effects of their proposed significant regulatory actions, including a determination that a regulation's benefits justify the costs. In 2008, a federal appeals court directed DOT to update a regulatory impact analysis with an estimate of the social cost of carbon—the dollar value of the net effects (damages and benefits) of an increase in emissions of carbon dioxide, a greenhouse gas.
In 2009, the Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Carbon was convened to develop estimates for use governmentwide, and it issued final estimates in its 2010 Technical Support Document. In 2013, the group issued revised estimates that were about 50 percent higher than the 2010 estimates, which raised public interest.
GAO was asked to review the working group's development of social cost of carbon estimates. This report describes the participating entities and processes and methods they used to develop the 2010 and 2013 estimates. GAO reviewed executive orders, OMB guidance, the Technical Support Document, its 2013 update, and other key documents. GAO interviewed officials who participated in the working group on behalf of the EOP offices and agencies involved. GAO did not evaluate the quality of the working group's approach.
GAO is making no recommendations in this report. Of seven agencies, OMB and Treasury provided written or oral comments and generally agreed with the findings in this report. Other agencies provided technical comments only or had no comments.
What GAO Found
To develop the 2010 and 2013 social cost of carbon estimates, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and Council of Economic Advisers convened and led an informal interagency working group in which four other offices from the Executive Office of the President (EOP) and six federal agencies participated. Participating agencies were the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Energy, Transportation (DOT), and the Treasury. According to several working group participants, the working group included relevant subject-matter experts and the agencies likely to use the estimates in future rulemakings. According to OMB staff, there is no single approach for convening informal interagency working groups and no requirement that this type of working group should document its activities or proceedings. However, OMB and EPA participants stated that the working group documented all major issues discussed in the Technical Support Document, which is consistent with federal standards for internal control. According to the Technical Support Document and participants GAO interviewed, the working group's processes and methods reflected the following three principles:
Used consensus-based decision making. The working group used a consensus-based approach for making key decisions in developing the 2010 and 2013 estimates. Participants generally stated that they were satisfied that the Technical Support Document addressed individual comments on draft versions and reflected the overall consensus of the working group.
Relied on existing academic literature and models. The working group relied largely on existing academic literature and models to develop its estimates. Specifically, the working group used three prevalent academic models that integrate climate and economic data to estimate future economic effects from climate change. The group agreed on three modeling inputs reflecting the wide uncertainty in the academic literature, including discount rates. Once the group reached agreement, EPA officials—sometimes with the assistance of the model developers—calculated the estimates. All other model assumptions and features were unchanged by the working group, which weighted each model equally to calculate estimates. After the academic models were updated to reflect new scientific information, such as in sea level rise and associated damages, the working group used the updated models to revise its estimates in 2013, resulting in higher estimates.
Took steps to disclose limitations and incorporate new information. The Technical Support Document discloses several limitations of the estimates and areas that the working group identified as being in need of additional research. It also sets a goal of revisiting the estimates when substantially updated models become available. Since 2008, agencies have published dozens of regulatory actions for public comment that use various social cost of carbon estimates in regulatory analyses and, according to working group participants, agencies received many comments on the estimates throughout this process. Several participants told GAO that the working group decided to revise the estimates in 2013 after a number of public comments encouraged revisions because the models used to develop the 2010 estimates had been updated and used in peer-reviewed academic literature. |
gao_T-AIMD-96-96 | gao_T-AIMD-96-96_0 | As a result, IRS relied without much success on alternative sources, such as Treasury schedules, to obtain the summary total by type of tax needed for its financial statement presentation. These discrepancies also further reduce our confidence in the accuracy of the amount of total revenues collected. Beginning with our audit of IRS’ fiscal year 1992 financial statements, we have made recommendations to correct weaknesses involving IRS’ revenue accounting system and processes. Accounts Receivable Could Not Be Verified
We could not verify the validity of either the $113 billion of accounts receivable or the $46 billion of collectible accounts receivables that IRS reported on its fiscal year 1995 financial statements. This is not a new problem, as we first identified IRS’ accounts receivable accounting and reporting problems in fiscal year 1992 and again in each subsequent fiscal year’s financial audit. Figure 3 shows IRS’ reported inventory of uncollected assessments for June 30, 1991, and each fiscal year from 1992 through 1995. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed its financial audits of the Internal Revenue Service for fiscal years 1992 through 1995.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) IRS relied on alternative sources to obtain revenue totals by type of tax for its financial statements; (2) IRS financial statements include various discrepancies that cannot be explained because of weaknesses in IRS information and collection systems; (3) the validity of IRS accounts receivable and collectible accounts receivable can not be verified; (4) many uncollected compliance assessments and financial receivables are uncollectible; (5) IRS has been unable to accurately account and report its total inventory of accounts receivable; (6) while IRS has made some improvements in accounting and reporting on its operating costs, significant problems remain; (7) IRS can not confirm when and if goods and services were received; and (8) the accuracy of the IRS Fund Balance with Treasury accounts cannot be verified. |
gao_GAO-09-450 | gao_GAO-09-450_0 | These property losses are in addition to what we identified in our June 2008 report. These reports identified that about 1,400 items with an acquisition value of about $3.5 million were reported lost or stolen in little over a year. Items that IHS continued to search for include the following: A 2002 ultrasound unit valued at $170,000, a 2003 X-ray mammography machine valued at $100,795, and a 2004 medication dispensing system valued at $168,285. A new pharmacy tablet counter with an acquisition value of $4,000 from a Washington location. Our full inventory testing at IHS headquarters identified that out of the 1,518 items tested that were on IHS’s inventory records as of December 5, 2008, 126 items with an acquisition value of $216,000 (or about 8 percent of the items tested) were lost, stolen, or unaccounted for—including 13 computers purchased in the summer of 2008. Specifically, we estimate that for the six locations, about 800 equipment items with an acquisition value of $1.7 million were lost, stolen, or unaccounted for. Aside from issuing a memorandum from the IHS Director that restated and refined existing IHS policies, IHS has taken little action to provide assurance that employees are aware of and complying with property policies. One way to enforce policies involves holding individuals accountable. For example, in December 2008, the IHS executive in charge of the property group and other areas received a $13,000 performance award (8 percent of the executive’s salary) from IHS senior leadership. This award was granted 5 months after the July 2008 hearing exposed mismanagement of property under the executive’s purview. Out of 1,400 items with an acquisition value of $3.5 million reported as lost or stolen in IHS Reports of Survey for fiscal year 2008 through January 2009, IHS could only provide one example in which an employee was found to be financially liable for lost or stolen property. However, as of February 2009, the individual has still not reimbursed the government for the loss—4 months after he was found financially liable. HHS agreed with all six of our recommendations to strengthen property management at IHS. GAO Recommendation #2. GAO Recommendation #3. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine whether property loss, property theft, and wasteful spending continues at the Indian Health Service (IHS) and to what extent IHS made progress in implementing our prior recommendations, we analyzed IHS documents that identified lost or stolen property from fiscal year 2008 through January 2009, reviewed IHS and Department of Health & Human Services (HHS) responses to our recommendations and updated policies and procedures, conducted a full physical inventory of property at IHS headquarters, and statistically tested information technology (IT) equipment inventory at six selected IHS field locations. Although IHS property at the field locations includes inventory items such as medical equipment and heavy machinery, we performed a statistical test of only IT equipment inventory at six IHS field locations. Although we did not perform a systematic review of IHS internal controls, we identified key causes of lost and stolen property and wasteful spending at IHS by examining IHS and HHS policies and procedures, conducting interviews with IHS officials and our observations of property through our inventory testing. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2008, GAO issued a report and testimony revealing gross mismanagement of property at the Indian Health Service (IHS). GAO found that 5,000 items with an acquisition value of $15.8 million were reported lost or stolen for fiscal years 2004 through 2007. GAO attributed the property mismanagement and waste to weak internal controls. GAO made 10 recommendations to IHS. IHS ultimately agreed to implement all 10 recommendations. Given the extent and seriousness of the property management problems at IHS, GAO was asked to determine (1) whether property loss, property theft, and wasteful spending continue at IHS; and (2) to what extent IHS made progress in implementing GAO's prior recommendations. GAO analyzed IHS property records from fiscal year 2008 through January 2009, conducted a full physical inventory at IHS headquarters, and performed a probability sample of information technology equipment inventory at six IHS field locations. GAO also examined IHS policies, analyzed documents, and conducted interviews with IHS officials.
What GAO Found
IHS continues to lose property at an alarming rate, reporting lost or stolen property with an acquisition value of about $3.5 million dollars in little over a year, including new medical equipment. IHS management's failure to implement most of our June 2008 recommendations and hold staff accountable for losses contributes significantly to ongoing property problems. These property losses at IHS are in addition to what GAO identified in its June 2008 report. GAO completed a full audit of IHS headquarters and found that 126 items worth $216,000 (or 8 percent of the items tested) had been lost, stolen, or were otherwise unaccounted for. GAO also estimates that about 800 equipment items at six field locations with an acquisition value of about $1.7 million were lost, stolen, or unaccounted for. Furthermore, although IHS performed an annual inventory as GAO recommended, as of March 2009, it had not finished reconciling the inventory and cannot locate many items, including medical equipment. These items include a 2002 ultrasound unit valued at $170,000; a 2003 X-ray mammography machine valued at $100,795; dental chairs, cardiac and vital sign monitors; and a pharmacy tablet counter machine. Aside from issuing a memorandum from the IHS Director that restated and refined existing policies, IHS has taken little action to ensure that employees are aware of and complying with property policies. One way to enforce policies involves holding individuals accountable; however, GAO found that the Senior Service Executive in charge of the IHS property group and other areas was given a $13,000 bonus after GAO's report exposed mismanagement of property under the executive's purview. Furthermore, IHS could only provide one example of an individual held financially liable for lost or stolen property over a 1-year period; but at the time of our audit, the individual still had not reimbursed the government for the loss. GAO also identified the following examples where IHS investigated the loss of property but did not hold anyone accountable. |
gao_NSIAD-99-53 | gao_NSIAD-99-53_0 | However, because of limitations in records checks, the services are not always able to obtain or substantiate all available criminal history information. Also, service policies and federal, state, and local laws and policies sometimes limit or preclude access to criminal history information, and the criminal history databases relied on by the services for record checks are incomplete. Of further concern is the services’ practice of sending enlistees to training before the results of criminal record checks are received, which incurs unnecessary costs. Through interviews and briefings listed in figure 3, the services provide applicants with as many as 14 different opportunities to disclose any prior criminal offenses and convictions to as many as 7 different recruiting, military entrance processing station, and training officials. A full fingerprint search is required to positively identify the person and detect when they have used undisclosed aliases. Services Have Limited Access to Criminal History Information
The services do not obtain or substantiate all available criminal history information because federal, state, and local laws and policies limit or prohibit access. However, state and local policies sometimes prohibit the release of information, or require fees or fingerprints to obtain it. Furthermore, DOD has not formulated a coordinated approach for integrating these initiatives into the recruiting process to address some of the deficiencies in their record checks. Conclusions and Recommendations
The services have extensive policies and procedures for gathering self-reported criminal history information and granting moral waivers. Collectively, these initiatives give DOD the opportunity to more fully obtain and substantiate criminal history information in a timely manner, avoid enlisting individuals with undesirable backgrounds, and eliminate the need to send enlistees to training before all criminal history information is available. To identify federal government initiatives that could improve the process of obtaining criminal history information, we interviewed DOD and Department of Justice officials and discussed the new requirements for security clearances, the Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System, automation of security questionnaire information, and continuing efforts to improve the completeness of the criminal history database. We performed our work at the following DOD, service, and Department of Justice locations:
Directorate for Accession Policy, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Force Management Policy, Washington, D.C.;
Security Directorate, Security and Information Operations, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence), Washington, D.C.; and Defense Security Service, Baltimore, Maryland;
U.S. Army Recruiting Command, Ft. Knox, Kentucky; Navy Recruiting Command, Arlington, Virginia; Marine Corps Recruiting Command, Arlington, Virginia; and Air Force Recruiting Service, Randolph Air Force Base, San Antonio, Texas;
U.S. Military Entrance Processing Command, North Chicago, Illinois; Military Entrance Processing Station, San Antonio, Texas; Military Entrance Processing Station, Chicago, Illinois; and Military Entrance Processing Station, Richmond, Virginia; and
FBI, Washington, D.C.; FBI Criminal Justice Information Services Division, Clarksburg, West Virginia; Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics and Bureau of Justice Assistance, Washington, D.C.; and Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Washington, D.C.
We conducted our review from October 1997 to January 1999 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps. We will make copies available to others upon request. 12, 1998). 4, 1998). 13, 1997). 5, 1997). Additional copies are $2 each. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) processes for investigating military enlistees' criminal history, focusing on: (1) the extent to which relevant criminal history information on potential enlistees is available to the military services; and (2) federal government initiatives that could improve the process of obtaining criminal history information.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the military services have extensive policies and procedures for encouraging applicants to self-report criminal history information; (2) among other things, the services repeatedly query each applicant, providing as many as 14 opportunities to disclose any criminal offenses to as many as seven different service and military entrance processing station officials; (3) the services also conduct periodic inspections and investigations to ensure the integrity of the entire recruiting process, which includes the disclosure of disqualifying information; (4) the services, however, are not always able to obtain or substantiate all available criminal history information because of service policies and federal, state, and local laws and policies that sometimes preclude access; (5) the services do not use fingerprints to substantiate the majority of enlistees' criminal histories; (6) without full fingerprint searches, the services cannot detect undisclosed aliases and ensure that they are aware of all available criminal history information; (7) federal law and state and local laws and policies, which generally limit or prohibit disclosure of criminal history information, impede the recruiting community's access to certain criminal history information; (8) in addition, state and local governments sometimes charge fees or require fingerprints to release the information; (9) available criminal history databases (not controlled by DOD) are incomplete; (10) of further concern is the services' practice of sending enlistees to basic training before the results of criminal record checks are received; (11) this practice results in training costs that could be avoided; (12) several DOD and Department of Justice initiatives are underway that could improve the access of obtaining criminal history information; (13) these initiatives have the potential of making available to DOD and the services more complete information upon which to make moral waiver decisions and expedite the process for obtaining record checks; and (14) however, DOD and the services have not yet formulated a coordinated approach for using these initiatives to better ensure that the military does not enlist and train individuals with undesirable backgrounds. |
gao_GGD-99-2 | gao_GGD-99-2_0 | Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our report objectives were to provide information on (1) the occurrence of abortion clinic incidents before and after FACE, as reported to us by representatives of clinics that abortion rights groups identified as having experienced relatively high levels of incidents before the enactment of FACE; (2) views regarding FACE and its effectiveness from representatives of these clinics, selected police departments and U.S. Attorney offices, and other representatives from DOJ, ATF, three national abortion rights organizations, and two national anti-abortion organizations; (3) efforts by local and federal law enforcement agencies following the enactment of FACE and clinic, U.S. Attorney office, police department, abortions rights group, and anti-abortion rights group representatives’ satisfaction with these agencies; and (4) any court cases pertaining to FACE and the courts’ rulings in those cases. To obtain the views of representatives from abortion clinics, police departments, U.S. Attorney offices, and others regarding the effectiveness of FACE and the efforts of federal and local law enforcement following the enactment of FACE, we conducted structured telephone interviews with representatives of 42 abortion clinics and 15 police departments selected from a stratified sample of the 40 departments that serve the locations of the clinics we contacted. We took the following steps to identify cases in which FACE was litigated and the courts’ rulings in those cases:
We obtained from DOJ a summary of all the criminal prosecutions and civil lawsuits it had initiated or completed pertaining to FACE as of September 11, 1998. We also asked representatives of these clinics whether incidents were more or less severe in the 2 years preceding our survey compared to the 2 years preceding the passage of FACE. Only 5 of the 42 clinic respondents indicated that FACE did not affect clinic incidents and 3 expressed the belief that FACE actually led to more threatening and violent incidents. Police Report Doing Training, Outreach, and Prevention to Reduce Incidents
Representatives of most of the 15 police departments we surveyed reported their departments had been involved in a variety of efforts to respond to and reduce clinic incidents since FACE was passed. Representatives of 31 of the 36 U.S. Attorney offices we surveyed reported that their districts had an abortion violence task force. Ten respondents told us their districts had established task forces prior to 1995. For example, 8 of the 10 respondents who said local law enforcement had been contacted about invasions at their clinics in the past 2 years said they were generally satisfied with local law enforcement’s response; only 5 of the 10 who reported local law enforcement was contacted about stalking were generally satisfied. Thirty of the 42 clinic respondents said that they were generally satisfied with federal law enforcement regarding anti-abortion activities, and 30 said they had observed particularly positive aspects of federal law enforcement. Most often, respondents described good communication efforts, with 16 providing responses that fell into this category. Constitutional challenges have included charges that FACE violates the freedom of speech and religion protections in the First Amendment. We identified a total of 46 criminal and civil cases that were either completed or pending as of September 11, 1998. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on: (1) the occurrence of abortion clinic incidents before and after the enactment of the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1994 (FACE); (2) views regarding FACE and its effectiveness from representatives of these clinics, selected police departments and U.S. Attorney offices, and other representatives from the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, and national anti-abortion organizations; (3) efforts by local and federal law enforcement agencies following the enactment of FACE; and (4) any court cases pertaining to FACE and the courts' rulings in those cases.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) clinic survey responses indicated that most of the clinics experienced fewer types of incidents during the 2 years preceding GAO's survey than they had in the 2 years prior to the passage of FACE; (2) respondents from 35 of the 42 clinics GAO surveyed credited FACE with deterring or reducing abortion clinic incidents; (3) respondents from 21 of the 36 U.S. Attorney offices GAO surveyed thought that FACE had positively affected incidents, including deterring or reducing their occurrence; (4) most of the other officials whom GAO interviewed from DOJ and national abortion rights organizations also felt that FACE has been a deterrent to clinic violence; (5) representatives of the police departments and anti-abortion organizations that GAO contacted were less consistent in their views; (6) representatives of 9 of the 15 police departments GAO contacted said their officers had received training pertaining to abortion clinics, and 12 said their departments had conducted outreach and education with clinics since FACE became law; (7) about half reported engaging in prevention activities; (8) representatives of 31 of the 36 U.S. Attorney offices GAO surveyed reported that their districts had established abortion violence task forces, and 29 reported accomplishments that included improved coordination and communication; (9) nearly all the U.S. Attorney respondents whose districts had task forces reported that meetings were typically attended by representatives of federal and local law enforcement agencies; (10) most clinic respondents were satisfied with both local and federal law enforcement; (11) clinic respondents who observed negative aspects of local law enforcement most often cited poor response to incidents and poor enforcement of laws; (12) 30 of the 42 clinic respondents were generally satisfied with federal law enforcement, often citing good communication, proactive steps, and good response to and investigation of incidents; (13) GAO identified 46 criminal and civil cases pertaining to FACE that were either completed or pending as of September 11, 1998; (14) many of these cases raised constitutional challenges to FACE; (15) these challenges were all ultimately unsuccessful; and (16) convictions were obtained in most of the reported criminal FACE prosecutions, and civil remedies were obtained in most of the civil lawsuits in which a FACE violation was alleged. |
gao_GAO-05-466T | gao_GAO-05-466T_0 | In return for committing to making improvements to the security of their shipments by joining the program, C-TPAT members may receive benefits that result in reduced scrutiny of their shipments (e.g., reduced number of inspections or shorter border wait times for their shipments). Of these companies, CBP grants importers key program benefits. CBP officials told us that validations are not considered independent audits, and the objectives, scope, and methodology of validations are jointly agreed upon with the member representatives. Moreover, as we reported, CBP has no written guidelines for its supply chain specialist to indicate what scope of effort is adequate for the validation to ensure that the member’s security measures are reliable, accurate, and effective, in part because it seeks to emphasize the partnership nature of the program. In 3 years of C-TPAT operation, CBP has validated about 11 percent of its certified members. Third, we reported that CBP’s record keeping for the program is incomplete, as key decisions are not always documented and programmatic information is not updated regularly or accurately. GAO Recommendations and CBP Response
Our C-TPAT report recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection to take the following five actions: strengthen the validation process by providing appropriate guidance to specialists conducting validations, including what level of review is adequate to determine whether member security practices are reliable, accurate, and effective; determine the extent (in terms of numbers or percentage) to which members should be validated in lieu of the original goal to validate all members within 3 years of certification; complete the development of performance measures, to include outcome-based measures and performance targets, to track the program’s status in meeting its strategic goals; complete a human capital plan that clearly describes how the C-TPAT program will recruit, train, and retain sufficient staff to successfully conduct the work of the program, including reviewing security profiles, vetting, and conducting validations to mitigate program risk; and implement a records management system that accurately and timely documents key decisions and significant operational events, including a reliable system for (1) documenting and maintaining records of all decisions in the application through validation processes, including but not limited to documentation of the objectives, scope, methodologies, and limitations of validations, and (2) tracking member status. Limitations Exist in Ability to Target Containers Overseas
In our CSI report, we noted that CBP officials told us the CSI program has produced factors that contribute to CBP’s ability to target shipments at overseas seaports, including improved information sharing between the CSI teams and host government officials regarding U.S.-bound shipments and a heightened level of bilateral cooperation on and international awareness of the need for securing the global shipping system. As we reported, one factor negatively affecting CBP’s ability to target containers is staffing imbalances across ports. As a result of these imbalances, 35 percent of U.S.-bound shipments from CSI ports were not targeted and were therefore not subject to inspection overseas—the key goal of the CSI program. Some Containers Were Not Inspected for a Variety of Reasons
As we reported, since the implementation of CSI through September 11, 2004, 28 percent (4,013) of containers referred to host government officials for inspection were not inspected for a variety of reasons including operational limitations that prevented the containers from being inspected before they left the port. In 1 percent of these cases, host government officials denied inspections, generally because inspection requests were based on factors not related to security threats, such as drug smuggling. Further, we reported that for the 72 percent (10,343) of containers that were inspected overseas, CBP officials told us there were some anomalies that led to law enforcement actions but that no WMD were discovered. However, the inspection equipment used at CSI ports varies in detection capability, and there are no minimum requirements for the detection capability of equipment used for CSI. As a result, CBP has no absolute assurance that inspections conducted under CSI are effective at detecting and identifying WMD. CBP Has Made Progress Developing a Strategic Plan and Performance Measures for CSI, but Further Refinements Are Needed
As we reported, CBP has made some improvements in the management of CSI, but further refinements to the bureau’s management tools are needed to help achieve program goals. GAO Recommendations and CBP Response
Our CSI report recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection to take the following three actions: revise the CSI staffing model to consider (1) what functions need to be performed at CSI ports and what functions can be performed in the United States, (2) the optimum levels of staff needed at CSI ports to maximize the benefits of targeting and inspection activities in conjunction with host nation customs officials, and (3) the cost of locating targeters overseas at CSI ports instead of in the United States; establish minimum technical requirements for the capabilities of nonintrusive inspection equipment at CSI ports, to include imaging and radiation detection devices, that help ensure that all equipment used can detect WMD, while considering the need not to endorse certain companies and sovereignty issues with participating countries; and develop performance measures that include outcome-based measures and performance targets (or proxies as appropriate) to track the program’s progress in meeting all of its objectives. This concludes my statement. | Why GAO Did This Study
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has in place two programs to help address the threat posed by terrorists smuggling weapons of mass destruction (WMD) into the United States: the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) and the Container Security Initiative (CSI). In July 2003, GAO reported that these programs had management challenges that limited their effectiveness. Given plans to expand both programs, in two recently issued reports GAO examined selected aspects of both programs' operations. This statement is a summary of those publicly available reports.
What GAO Found
In return for committing to making improvements to the security of their shipments, C-TPAT members receive a range of benefits that may change the risk characterization of their shipments, thereby reducing the probability of extensive inspection. Before providing benefits, CBP reviews the self-reported information contained in applicants' membership agreements and security profiles. Also, CBP assesses the compliance history of importers before granting them benefits. However, CBP grants benefits before members undergo the validation process, which is CBP's method to verify that their security measures are reliable, accurate, and effective. Although CBP's goal was to validate members within 3 years, to date it has validated 11 percent of them. Further, the validation process is not rigorous, as the objectives, scope, and methodology of validations are jointly agreed upon with the member, and CBP has no written guidelines to indicate what scope of effort is adequate for the validation. Also, although CBP has recently moved to a risk-based approach to selecting members for validation, it has not determined the number and types of validations that are needed to manage security risks or the CBP staff required to complete them. Further, CBP has not developed a comprehensive set of performance measures for the program, and key program decisions are not always documented and programmatic information is not updated regularly or accurately. The CSI program is designed to target and inspect high-risk cargo containers at foreign ports before they leave for the United States. It has resulted in improved information sharing between U.S. and foreign customs operations and a heightened level of international awareness regarding securing the global shipping system. Yet, several factors limit CBP's ability to successfully target containers to determine if they are high-risk. One factor is staffing imbalances, caused by political and practical considerations, which impede CBP's targeting efforts at CSI ports. As a result, 35 percent of U.S.-bound shipments from CSI ports were not targeted and not subject to inspection overseas--the key goal of the CSI program. In addition, as of September 11, 2004, 28 percent of the containers referred to host governments for inspection were not inspected overseas for various reasons such as operational limitations. One percent of these referrals were denied by host government officials, generally because they believed the referrals were based on factors not related to security threats. For the 72 percent of referred containers that were inspected overseas, CBP officials told us that no WMD were discovered. However, the nonintrusive inspection equipment used at CSI ports varies in detection capability, and there are no minimum technical requirements for equipment used as part of CSI. As a result, CBP has limited assurance that inspections conducted under CSI are effective at detecting and identifying terrorist WMD in containers. Finally, CBP continues to make refinements to the strategic plan and performance measures needed to help manage the program and achieve program goals. Until these refinements are completed, it will be difficult to assess progress made in CSI operations. |
gao_GAO-01-488 | gao_GAO-01-488_0 | Conclusions
INS continues to experience significant problems managing its application workload despite years of increasing budgets and staff. Automation improvements, including improvements to the reliability of data in CLAIMS 3 and CLAIMS 4, would provide INS with the management information it needs to determine how long aliens have been waiting for their applications to be processed. Automation improvements would also help INS determine whether it is processing all the applications it receives, working on applications in the order in which they are received, and providing prompt and correct responses to applicants’ inquiries about the status of their cases. INS does not know how to maximize the deployment of staff to process applications in a timely fashion because it lacks a systematically developed staff resource allocation model. Such a model could help INS determine the right number and types of staff it needs, efficiently distribute staff to the right locations, and ensure that resources are deployed commensurate with the workload to minimize backlogs and processing times. INS could reduce the need to revoke employment authorization documents by providing guidance and training on application screening to its district staff and taking steps to ascertain whether improvements could be made to the application screening process. INS’ long-standing problems with its fingerprinting process, including poor-quality fingerprints and ensuring that all fingerprint check results are obtained, appear to have been largely corrected. With digital technology now being used by INS to fingerprint aliens and transmit the fingerprints electronically to the FBI, there may be opportunities to store the fingerprints electronically and save the time and expense associated with the refingerprinting process. | What GAO Found
Congress, the media, and immigrant advocacy groups have criticized the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) for its inability to provide immigrants with timely decisions on their applications for such benefits as naturalization and legal permanent residence. INS continues to experience significant problems managing its application workload despite years of increasing budgets and staff. Automation improvements would provide INS with the management information it needs to determine how long aliens have been waiting for their applications to be processed. Automation improvements would also help INS determine whether it is processing all the applications it receives, working on applications in the order in which they are received, and providing prompt and correct responses to applicants' inquiries about the status of their cases. INS does not know how to maximize the deployment of staff to process applications in a timely fashion because it lacks a systematically developed staff resource allocation model. Such a model could help INS determine the right number and types of staff it needs, efficiently distribute staff to the right locations, and ensure that resources are deployed commensurate with the workload to minimize backlogs and processing times. INS could reduce the need to revoke employment authorization documents by providing guidance and training on application screening to its district staff and taking steps to ascertain whether improvements could be made to the application screening process. INS' long-standing problems with its fingerprinting process appear to have been largely corrected. With digital technology now being used by INS to fingerprint aliens and transmit the fingerprints electronically to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, opportunities may exist to store the fingerprints electronically and save the time and expense associated with the refingerprinting process. |
gao_GAO-08-162 | gao_GAO-08-162_0 | As of the end of fiscal year 2007, State had obligated more than $5.9 billion for this program, awarded contracts for the construction of 78 new embassy and consulate compounds, and completed more than 50 new facilities. State has identified the following four goals for CSUP: to provide physical security protection to the extent practical for existing facilities; to provide physical security upgrades to meet current security standards for those facilities that will not be replaced by a NEC in the near-term; to initiate physical security upgrades at facilities that are not part of the chancery compound, including annexes, public diplomacy facilities, and warehouses; and to provide security upgrades to nongovernmental facilities (“soft targets”) frequented by U.S. citizens. 1). The DS analysis currently focuses on embassy and consulate compounds, though DS is developing a risk- based prioritization process that considers the number of personnel, threats, and vulnerabilities at each facility, including off-compound facilities. OBO has improved its process for developing projects by conducting more comprehensive needs assessments of posts, including off-compound facilities, early in the design phase. DS Priority Assessments Focus on Main Compounds, but Efforts Are Being Made to Address All Post Facilities
According to OBO and DS officials, the DS physical security assessment is currently based on the physical security needs of each post’s main compound but does not factor in the security of facilities located outside the main embassy or consulate compound, even though hundreds of such facilities exist. CSUP Projects Generally Completed within Contractual Time Frames and Costs, and OBO Has Project Management Procedures to Help Ensure Completion
While most CSUP projects we reviewed have been completed within their contractual time frames and costs, OBO found it necessary to modify all but one of the contracts to extend project time frames, adjust costs, or both. In reviewing schedule performance data, we found that 96 percent of projects were completed within 30 days of their contractual completion date (see fig. However, we found that OBO modified the contracts to extend their completion dates for 81 percent of the projects. Many of these extensions did not result in increased costs to the government. For each of the 47 projects, OBO paid the contractor the amount specified in the fixed-price contracts—an average project cost of $2.6 million. OBO cited factors outside the contractor’s control as the cause of most of the delays and cost increases, such as unusually lengthy local permitting processes, previously unidentified underground utilities that needed to be moved, design changes that OBO made during construction work, and project changes requested by the post. For each CSUP project, OBO assigns a project manager who is responsible for the effective completion of the project. At the 11 posts we visited with ongoing or completed CSUP projects, we found that the projects had enhanced posts’ compliance with State’s physical security standards as detailed in the “Foreign Affairs Handbook” and “Foreign Affairs Manual.” The projects we viewed added or enhanced pedestrian and vehicle access points, replaced perimeter fencing to meet anti-climb requirements, installed bollards and barriers at key points to meet anti-ram requirements, built safe areas for post officials in case of attack, enhanced the hard line separating post employees from visitors, and installed forced entry/ballistic-resistant windows and doors. For example, most of the posts we visited were located in dense urban areas that prevented them from achieving a 100- foot setback from the street, one of the key security standards (see fig. As a result, many buildings and their occupants may remain vulnerable to attack. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
The Department of State provided written comments on a draft of this report, which are reproduced in appendix II. State agreed with our findings, noting that the report accurately describes State’s CSUP efforts. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To discuss the factors that the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO) considers as it plans and prioritizes Compound Security Upgrades Program (CSUP) projects, we reviewed Department of State (State) prioritization and planning documents concerning the assignment of post threat levels, assessments of the security vulnerabilities of posts, and CSUP. To review the extent to which State’s CSUP efforts have enhanced posts’ ability to comply with State’s physical security standards, we reviewed the project authorization memoranda, contract modifications, and OBO summary document on each of the 47 CSUP projects. To confirm our initial findings, we traveled to 11 posts in Latin America, Europe, and the Middle East that had recently completed or ongoing CSUP projects. Washington, D.C.: September 28, 2004. | Why GAO Did This Study
Following the 1998 embassy bombings, the Department of State (State) determined that more than 85 percent of diplomatic facilities did not meet security standards and were vulnerable to terrorist attacks. State's Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO) has undertaken a program to replace or upgrade the security of these facilities. As of 2007, OBO had constructed more than 50 new embassies and moved nearly 15,000 staff to safer facilities. However, most remaining facilities will not be replaced in the near term. To address these facilities, OBO has obligated about $140 million per year for its Compound Security Upgrade Program (CSUP). GAO was asked to (1) describe the process that OBO follows to prioritize and plan CSUP projects, including stakeholder involvement; (2) determine the extent to which CSUP projects met contracted cost and time frames and whether OBO has procedures to ensure security upgrades are installed; and (3) assess whether State's CSUP efforts have enhanced posts' abilities to comply with State's physical security standards. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed pertinent State documents, met with State officials in Washington, D.C., and overseas, and traveled to 11 posts in Latin America, Europe, and the Middle East. State provided written comments on a draft of this report and agreed with our findings.
What GAO Found
OBO has a threat- and vulnerability-based process for prioritizing which posts receive CSUP projects and a planning process that utilizes input from State's Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) and post officials. DS assessments are currently based on physical security of each post's main compound, although many posts have facilities located outside the compound. DS is developing a prioritization process that will factor in the number of personnel, threat levels, and vulnerabilities at each facility, including those off compound. OBO has improved its planning processes by conducting a comprehensive survey of posts' physical security needs, including off-compound facilities. GAO found that 96 percent of 47 projects undertaken since fiscal year 2004 were completed within 30 days of their contractual completion date. However, OBO modified 81 percent of the contracts to extend their completion dates. GAO also found that while OBO paid the contractors the amount specified in the contracts, contract modifications resulted in cost adjustments to all but two contracts, which GAO found in prior work is not uncommon in government renovation projects. OBO cited factors outside the contractors' control as the cause of most delays and cost increases, such as lengthy local permitting issues. To help ensure security upgrades contracted for are completed, OBO assigns a project manager who is responsible for the project's completion and relies on regional and post officials to provide additional monitoring. CSUP projects have enhanced posts' compliance with physical security standards by constructing compound access control facilities, safe areas for post personnel, and compound walls and barriers. However, at the 11 posts GAO visited, site conditions prevented them from adhering fully with standards. For example, more than one post's urban location prevented it from achieving a 100-foot setback from the street, a key security standard. As a result, many buildings and their occupants may remain vulnerable to attack. |
gao_NSIAD-96-134 | gao_NSIAD-96-134_0 | In November 1993, we reported that the services’ processes for identifying, classifying, and funding environmental compliance projects varied. Service Initiatives Have Been Taken Without Additional DOD Guidance
The services have taken initiatives to improve their programming and oversight of environmental construction projects. Despite these actions, DOD still has not issued specific guidance on how the services should program and report costs related to environmental compliance construction projects and how they should determine which appropriations should be used to fund the projects. Consequently, the services continue to inconsistently program and report environmental compliance construction projects. DOD-wide estimates of fiscal year 1997 environmental compliance requirements to be funded under the military construction appropriation fell from $257 million in February 1995—when they were submitted to Congress as part of the fiscal year 1996/1997 biennial budget estimates—to $84 million in April 1996. Some reductions resulted from a lack of support for projects proposed in 1995 or decisions to fund at a later time. However, in reviewing cost data provided by the Navy, we noted that the Navy’s current estimate for the project is still $24 million. Matter for Congressional Consideration
DOD cannot adequately determine its environmental compliance construction needs and project priorities. The continuing lack of guidance and inconsistencies in the way DOD programs and funds projects inhibit DOD’s and Congress’ ability to provide overall management and effective program oversight. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) prioritization of environmental compliance construction projects, focusing on: (1) the DOD construction program process; and (2) DOD cost estimates for future projects.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) since GAO's November 1993 report, the services have initiated actions intended to improve their processes for programming and prioritizing environmental compliance construction projects; (2) however, neither the current nor proposed DOD policy specifies how the services should report costs related to environmental compliance construction projects and how they should determine which appropriation account should provide the funds; (3) consequently, the services and DLA continue to vary the manner in which they classify and prioritize the projects and determine the source of funds for them; (4) the continuing lack of such guidance and the inconsistencies inhibit congressional oversight and DOD's program management; (5) DOD-wide estimates for fiscal year 1997 environmental compliance construction requirements fell from $257 million in February 1995 to $84 million in April 1996; (6) due to the lack of a uniform approach to categorizing such projects, GAO cannot determine whether this drop in funding is a result of a reduction in the need for such projects or simply a reflection of differing procedures for categorization; (7) the reasons for reductions fell into several different categories, for example, lack of documentation, decisions to fund in later years, or decreased project costs. |
gao_GAO-09-616T | gao_GAO-09-616T_0 | Our prior work has shown that DOD has relied heavily on contractor personnel to augment its in-house workforce. In addition, each military service has its own corresponding acquisition offices that develop additional service- specific guidance, and provide management and oversight of its workforce. AT&L Lacks Comprehensive Information on the Use of Contractor Personnel in Its Acquisition Workforce
DOD lacks critical departmentwide information on the use and skill sets of contractor personnel performing acquisition-related functions. As such, contractor personnel comprise about 29 percent of DOD’s total acquisition workforce. DOD also lacks information on factors driving program offices’ decisions to use contractor personnel rather than hire in-house personnel. The 30 program offices, which provided reasons for using contractor personnel, cited the following key factors: 22 cited a shortage of civilian personnel with a particular expertise, 18 cited staffing limits on civilian personnel, 17 cited that the particular expertise sought is generally not hired by the government, 15 cited the ease or speed of bringing on contractor personnel, 9 cited having a short-term requirement, 8 cited funding not being available for civilian personnel, and 1 cited the cost of contractor personnel being less than civilian personnel (See appendix III for information on the number of program offices reporting the reasons for using contractor personnel by component.) In comparison with DOD’s practices, we found that leading organizations maintain and analyze data on their contractor personnel in order to mitigate risks, ensure compliance with in-house regulations and security requirements, and ensure that reliance on contractor personnel creates value for the company. We also found that leading organizations take a business-oriented approach to determining when to use contractor support. AT&L Lacks Key Pieces of Information Necessary to Conduct Workforce Gap Analyses
AT&L lacks key pieces of information that hinder its ability to determine gaps in the number and skill sets of acquisition personnel needed to meet DOD’s current and future missions. However, AT&L lacks information on both what it has and what it needs. Not having this information in its assessments not only skews analyses of workforce gaps, but also limits DOD’s ability to make informed workforce allocation decisions. With regard to information on the personnel it has, AT&L lacks complete information on the skill sets of the current acquisition workforce— including contractor personnel—and whether these skill sets are sufficient to accomplish its missions. AT&L also lacks complete information on the acquisition workforce needed to meet DOD’s mission. In comparison with DOD’s practices, we found that leading organizations identify gaps in the workforce by assessing the competencies of its workforce and comparing those with the overall competencies the organization needs to achieve its objectives. Recent Workforce Initiatives May Not Yield the Additional Information DOD Needs
AT&L has begun to respond to recent legislative requirements aimed at improving DOD’s management and oversight of its acquisition workforce, including developing data, tools, and processes to more fully assess and monitor its acquisition workforce. The Secretary of Defense recently announced that efforts will begin in fiscal year 2010 to increase the size of the acquisition workforce by converting 11,000 contractor personnel to government positions and hiring an additional 9,000 government personnel by 2015. Although these efforts are promising, it is too early to determine the extent to which these efforts will improve the department’s management and oversight. Related GAO Products
Department of Defense: Additional Actions and Data Are Needed to Effectively Manage and Oversee DOD’s Acquisition Workforce. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 2001, Department of Defense's (DOD) spending on goods and services has more than doubled to $388 billion in 2008, while the number of civilian and military acquisition personnel has remained relatively stable. To supplement its in-house workforce, DOD relies heavily on contractor personnel. If it does not maintain an adequate workforce, DOD places its billion-dollar acquisitions at an increased risk of poor outcomes and vulnerability to fraud, waste, and abuse. This testimony is based on GAO's March 2009 report and addresses DOD's efforts to assess the sufficiency of the total acquisition workforce and to improve its management and oversight of that workforce. It also discusses selected practices of leading organizations that may provide DOD with insights for its efforts.
What GAO Found
Although contractor personnel are a key segment of its total acquisition workforce, DOD lacks critical departmentwide information on the use and skill sets of these personnel. DOD also lacks information on why contractor personnel are used, which limits its ability to determine whether decisions to use contractors to supplement the in-house acquisition workforce are appropriate. GAO found that program office decisions to use contractor personnel are often driven by factors such as quicker hiring time frames and civilian staffing limits, rather than by the nature or criticality of the work. In comparison with DOD's practices, leading organizations maintain and analyze data on their contractor personnel and take a business-oriented approach to determining when to use contractor support. DOD also lacks key pieces of information that limit its ability to determine gaps in the acquisition workforce it needs to meet its missions. In addition to lacking information on contractor personnel, DOD lacks complete information on the skill sets of its in-house personnel. DOD also lacks information on the acquisition workforce it needs to meet its mission. Not having this information not only skews analyses of workforce gaps, but also limits DOD's ability to make informed workforce allocation decisions and determine whether the total acquisition workforce--in-house and contractor personnel--is sufficient to accomplish its mission. In comparison with DOD's practices, leading organizations identify gaps in the workforce by assessing the competencies of their workforces and comparing those with the overall competencies the organization needs to achieve its objectives. DOD recently initiated several efforts aimed at improving the management and oversight of its acquisition workforce, such as plans for overseeing additional hiring, recruiting, and retention activities. DOD is also planning to increase its in-house acquisition workforce by converting 11,000 contractor personnel to government positions and hiring an additional 9,000 government personnel by 2015. The success of DOD's efforts to improve the management and oversight of its acquisition workforce, however, may be limited without comprehensive information on the acquisition workforce it has and needs. |
gao_GAO-10-847T | gao_GAO-10-847T_0 | Test Results Are Misleading and of Little Use to Consumers
The test results we received are misleading and of little or no practical use to consumers. Comparing results for 15 diseases, we made the following observations: (1) each donor’s factual profile received disease risk predictions that varied across all four companies, indicating that identical DNA can yield contradictory results depending solely on the company it was sent to for analysis; (2) these risk predictions often conflicted with the donors’ factual illnesses and family medical histories; (3) none of the companies could provide the donors who submitted fictitious African American and Asian profiles with complete test results for their ethnicity but did not explicitly disclose this limitation prior to purchase; (4) one company provided donors with reports that showed conflicting predictions for the same DNA and profile, but did not explain how to interpret these different results; and (5) follow-up consultations offered by three of the companies provided only general information and not the expert advice the companies promised to provide. For hypertension, Company 3 found that he had an above-average risk of developing the condition, Company 2 found that he was at below- average risk, and Company 1 found he was at average risk. When we asked the representatives whether they thought that any DTC genetic test companies currently on the market were more accurate than others, all claimed that their own companies’ tests were better than those offered by their competitors. the science of risk prediction based on genetic markers is not fully worked out, and that the limitations inherent in this sort of risk prediction have not been adequately disclosed.” As one expert further noted, “the fact that different companies, using the same samples, predict different…directions of risk is telling and is important. It shows that we are nowhere near really being able to interpret .” We also asked our experts if any of our donors should be concerned if the companies all agreed on a risk prediction; for example, all four companies told Donor 1 she was at increased risk for Alzheimer’s disease. Risk predictions sometimes conflict with diagnosed medical conditions or family history: Four of our five donors received test results that conflicted with their factual medical conditions and family histories. Donor 4 had a pacemaker implanted 13 years ago to treat atrial fibrillation. The company did not disclose this limitation prior to purchase even though it requested that consumers specify their race or ethnicity during the purchase process. When Donor 4 expressed concern that his doctor may not know what to do with the test results, the expert told him “True, not all physicians are familiar with these tests, so if you were to take it into a physician’s office, they may not be familiar with it.” Furthermore, when discussing Donor 3’s increased risk for colon cancer, one of Company 2’s experts told our donor that while he should become familiar with the symptoms such as blood in the stool, there was not much else he could do because “colon cancer is quite silent.”
Company 3 states that “because of the complexity and inherent uncertainties in genetic information, we recommend that you discuss the results of your genetic test with a genetic professional….Our on- staff Genetic Counselors are available any time to review your…results with you.” In our post-test interviews, the company further claimed that its genetic counselors are certified by the American Board of Genetic Counseling and that the counselors review family history and provide consumers with additional information that is not in the test results. For example, at least four companies claimed that a consumer’s DNA could be used to create personalized supplements to cure diseases. One company’s representative fraudulently used endorsements from high-profile athletes to try to convince our undercover investigators to purchase its supplements. Another flagrant example of deceptive marketing involved several companies’ claims that they could predict which sports children would excel in based on DNA analysis. Selected audio clips from our undercover calls and meetings are available at http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-847T. Moreover, an expert we spoke with told us that there is no scientific basis for claiming that supplements can be customized to DNA. In addition, we have referred all the companies we investigated to FDA and FTC for appropriate action. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2006, GAO investigated companies selling direct-to-consumer (DTC) genetic tests and testified that these companies made medically unproven disease predictions. Although new companies have since been touted as being more reputable--Time named one company's test 2008's "invention of the year"--experts remain concerned that the test results mislead consumers. GAO was asked to investigate DTC genetic tests currently on the market and the advertising methods used to sell these tests. GAO purchased 10 tests each from four companies, for $299 to $999 per test. GAO then selected five donors and sent two DNA samples from each donor to each company: one using factual information about the donor and one using fictitious information, such as incorrect age and race or ethnicity. After comparing risk predictions that the donors received for 15 diseases, GAO made undercover calls to the companies seeking health advice. GAO did not conduct a scientific study but instead documented observations that could be made by any consumer. To assess whether the tests provided any medically useful information, GAO consulted with genetics experts. GAO also interviewed representatives from each company. To investigate advertising methods, GAO made undercover contact with 15 DTC companies, including the 4 tested, and asked about supplement sales, test reliability, and privacy policies. GAO again consulted with experts about the veracity of the claims.
What GAO Found
GAO's fictitious consumers received test results that are misleading and of little or no practical use. For example, GAO's donors often received disease risk predictions that varied across the four companies, indicating that identical DNA samples yield contradictory results. One donor was told that he was at below-average, average, and above-average risk for prostate cancer and hypertension. GAO's donors also received DNA-based disease predictions that conflicted with their actual medical conditions--one donor who had a pacemaker implanted 13 years ago to treat an irregular heartbeat was told that he was at decreased risk for developing such a condition. Also, none of the companies could provide GAO's fictitious African American and Asian donors with complete test results, but did not explicitly disclose this limitation prior to purchase. Further, follow-up consultations offered by three of the companies failed to provide the expert advice that the companies promised. In post-test interviews with GAO, each of the companies claimed that its results were more accurate than the others'. Although the experts GAO spoke with believe that these tests show promise for the future, they agreed that consumers should not rely on any of the results at this time. As one expert said, "the fact that different companies, using the same samples, predict different directions of risk is telling and is important. It shows that we are nowhere near really being able to interpret [such tests]." GAO also found 10 egregious examples of deceptive marketing, including claims made by four companies that a consumer's DNA could be used to create personalized supplement to cure diseases. Two of these companies further stated that their supplements could "repair damaged DNA" or cure disease, even though experts confirmed there is no scientific basis for such claims. One company representative even fraudulently used endorsements from high-profile athletes to convince GAO's fictitious consumer to purchase such supplements. Two other companies asserted that they could predict in which sports children would excel based on DNA analysis, claims that an expert characterized as "complete garbage." Further, two companies told GAO's fictitious consumer that she could secretly test her fiance's DNA to "surprise" him with test results--though this practice is restricted in 33 states. Perhaps most disturbing, one company told a donor that an above average risk prediction for breast cancer meant she was "in the high risk of pretty much getting" the disease, a statement that experts found to be "horrifying" because it implies the test is diagnostic. To hear clips of undercover contacts, see http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-847T . GAO has referred all the companies it investigated to the Food and Drug Administration and Federal Trade Commission for appropriate action. |
gao_RCED-96-84 | gao_RCED-96-84_0 | The Forest Service and BLM use the same fee schedule for rights-of-way. As table 1 shows, the Forest Service’s fees are frequently less than fees charged by nonfederal landowners for similar rights-of-way. Options Available to Revise the Fee System
The Forest Service has several options available to revise its fee system for rights-of-way to reflect fair market value. The first option involves developing a new fee schedule based on recent appraisals and local market data. Appraisals are a technique commonly used in the marketplace for determining fair market value. However, most of the industry representatives we spoke with told us that if the Forest Service improves its administration of the rights-of-way program by using more market-like administrative practices, they would be willing to pay fair market value for rights-of-way on Forest Service lands. Members of the Western Utility Group
Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
We were asked by the Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management and the District of Columbia, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, to determine (1) whether the fees currently charged to users of Forest Service rights-of-way that operate oil and gas pipelines, power lines, and communications lines reflect fair market value, (2) how the Forest Service’s fees compare with fees charged by nonfederal landowners, and (3) what, if any, changes are needed to the Forest Service’s fee system to ensure that fees reflect fair market value. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Forest Service's issuance of rights-of-way on national forest lands, focusing on: (1) whether the fees collected for rights-of-way reflect fair market value; (2) how Forest Service fees compare with fees charged by private landowners; and (3) the changes needed to ensure that Forest Service fees reflect fair market value.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) Forest Service fees for rights-of-way for oil and gas pipelines, power lines, and communications lines are typically below fair market value; (2) Forest Service fees for rights-of-way are generally less than those charged by nonfederal landowners; (3) options available to the Forest Service for revising its fee determination system include using a new fee schedule based on recent appraisals and local market data, using a new fee schedule with the flexibility to disregard it when its fees are below fair market value, and using site-specific appraisals only; and (4) many rights-of-way users would be willing to pay fair market value for Forest Service rights-of-ways if the Forest Service would improve the administration of its rights-of-way program. |
gao_GAO-15-238 | gao_GAO-15-238_0 | CMS operated a federally facilitated marketplace or partnership marketplace for 34 states for plan years2014 and 2015. The Office of Information Services, headed by the CMS Chief Information Officer (CIO), is responsible for oversight of the development and implementation of federal systems supporting the establishment and operation of the federally facilitated marketplace, including review, selection, implementation, and continual evaluation of these systems. Eligibility and enrollment module. CMS concurred with most of the recommendations. Initial Development and Deployment of Healthcare.gov and Its Supporting Systems Faced Problems with System Capacity, Software Code Issues, and Limited Functionality, but CMS Has Taken Steps to Address Them
Several problems occurred in the development and deployment of Healthcare.gov and its supporting systems, which affected their performance. Since the initial launch of Healthcare.gov and its supporting systems, CMS has taken a number of steps to address these problems, to include increasing system capacity, outlining a new approach for ensuring the quality of software code, and further developing required system functionality. As a result, CMS had not planned to provide a level of capacity that would ensure uninterrupted service to users in a cost-effective manner. As with the capacity problems, these software code errors also contributed to the problems applicants faced in attempting to enroll in health care plans. CMS Inadequately Applied Best Practices in Developing Systems Supporting Healthcare.gov, and Needs to Build on Recent Progress
In developing Healthcare.gov and its supporting systems, CMS did not adhere to best practices for managing IT development projects, which contributed to problems with the launch of Healthcare.gov and its supporting systems. Such best practices include managing requirements to ensure that delivered functionality meets the needs of users, conducting adequate system testing to validate that systems function as intended, and providing oversight to ensure that a project is progressing as planned and that corrective actions are taken as needed. In addition, CMS’s oversight of the initiative was limited by an unreliable schedule, lack of estimates of work needed to complete the project, unorganized and outdated project documentation, and inconsistent reviews of project progress. However, deficiencies in requirements management, systems testing, and oversight remain. In addition, HHS has not provided adequate oversight of the Healthcare.gov initiative through its office of the CIO, while OMB’s oversight role was limited to facilitating discussions with federal partners, providing federal policy guidance, and overseeing the project’s budget. In addition, it was not always clear what requirements were being approved. Systems Supporting Healthcare.gov Were Not Fully Tested, and Test Documentation Was Missing Key Elements
Testing an IT system is essential to validate that the system will satisfy the requirements for its intended use and user needs. However, CMS did not always (1) ensure project schedules for Healthcare.gov and its supporting systems were well-constructed; (2) estimate level of effort for DSH and FFM functional requirements; (3) implement data management and monitoring processes; and (4) conduct all recommended and required project progress and milestone reviews. However, CMS and its contractors did not effectively implement data management processes. These reviews are important to ensure that a project is progressing as planned and to identify corrective actions needed. Consequently, individuals faced significant challenges when attempting to enroll for health insurance coverage. Specifically, by not managing requirements to ensure that they addressed all needed functionality and not fully documenting and executing key testing activities, CMS did not have reasonable assurance that Healthcare.gov and its supporting systems would perform as intended. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this study were to (1) describe the problems encountered in developing and deploying Healthcare.gov and its supporting systems, and determine the status in addressing these deficiencies; and (2) determine the extent to which the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) oversaw the development effort and applied disciplined systems development practices to manage requirements and conduct systems testing, as well as the extent to which the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) provided oversight of the effort. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act required the establishment of health insurance marketplaces to assist individuals in obtaining health insurance coverage. CMS, a component of HHS, was responsible for establishing a federally facilitated marketplace for states that elected not to establish their own. This marketplace is supported by an array of IT systems, which are to facilitate enrollment in qualifying health plans. These include Healthcare.gov, the website that serves as the consumer portal to the marketplace, as well as systems for establishing user accounts, verifying eligibility, and facilitating enrollment.
GAO was asked to review CMS's management of the development of IT systems supporting the federal marketplace. Its objectives were to (1) describe problems encountered in developing and deploying systems supporting Healthcare.gov and determine the status of efforts to address deficiencies and (2) determine the extent to which CMS applied disciplined practices for managing and overseeing the development effort, and the extent to which HHS and OMB provided oversight. To do this, GAO reviewed program documentation and interviewed relevant CMS and other officials.
What GAO Found
Several problems with the initial development and deployment of Healthcare.gov and its supporting systems led to consumers encountering widespread performance issues when trying to create accounts and enroll in health plans:
Inadequate capacity planning: The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) did not plan for adequate capacity to support Healthcare.gov and its supporting systems.
Software coding errors: CMS and its contractors identified errors in the software code for Healthcare.gov and its supporting systems, but did not adequately correct them prior to launch.
Lack of functionality: CMS had not implemented all planned functionality prior to the initial launch of Healthcare.gov and its supporting systems.
Since the initial launch, CMS has taken steps to address these problems, including increasing capacity, requiring additional software quality reviews, and awarding a new contract to complete development and improve the functionality of key systems. After it took these actions, performance issues affecting Healthcare.gov and its supporting systems were significantly reduced.
In addition, CMS did not consistently apply recognized best practices for system development, which contributed to the problems with the initial launch of Healthcare.gov and its supporting systems.
Requirements were not effectively managed: Requirements management helps ensure that a project's plans and work products are aligned with the needs of users. However, CMS did not always ensure that requirements were approved and were linked to source and lower-level requirements. As a result, CMS was hindered in ensuring that expected functionality for the system was delivered.
System testing was inconsistent. Testing is essential for ensuring that a system operates as intended. However, Healthcare.gov and its supporting systems were not fully tested prior to launch, and test documentation was missing key elements such as criteria for determining whether a system passed a test. Thus, CMS's assurance that these systems would perform as intended was limited.
Project oversight was not effective. Oversight includes monitoring a project's progress and taking corrective actions when its performance deviates from what is planned. However, CMS's oversight was limited by an unreliable schedule, lack of estimates of work needed to complete the project, unorganized and outdated project documentation, and inconsistent reviews of project progress.
As it has undertaken further development, CMS has made improvements in some of these areas, by, for example, establishing new requirements management processes and improving test documentation. However, weaknesses remain in its application of requirements, testing, and oversight practices. In addition, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has not provided adequate oversight of the Healthcare.gov initiative through its Office of the Chief Information Officer. The Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) oversight role was limited, and GAO has previously recommended that it improve oversight of IT projects' performance.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is recommending that CMS take seven actions to implement improvements in its requirements management, system testing, and project oversight, and that HHS improve its oversight of the Healthcare.gov effort. HHS concurred with all of the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-03-874T | gao_GAO-03-874T_0 | The usefulness of GIS in disaster response was demonstrated recently in connection with the Space Shuttle Columbia recovery effort. The Texas state GIS program provided authorities with precise maps and search grids to guide field reconnaissance and collection crews. In developing this testimony, our objectives were to describe the many GIS activities under way throughout the federal government and the federal government’s efforts to coordinate these activities, the long-standing challenges of adopting and implementing federal GIS standards, and the role of Geospatial One-Stop. Many Attempts Have Been Made to Coordinate GIS Activities
The federal government has tried for years to reduce duplicative geospatial data collection by coordinating GIS activities both within and outside the federal government. Building on that effort, a program was established by Executive Order 12906 in 1994 to develop a National Spatial Data Infrastructure (NSDI) to address the problem of the redundancy and incompatibility of geospatial information collected by many different organizations and stored and maintained at many different physical locations. Although efforts to build the NSDI are progressing, achieving the vision of a nationwide GIS network remains a formidable challenge. Geospatial One-Stop’s Objectives Are Limited
Geospatial One-Stop is intended to accelerate the development and implementation of the NSDI by promoting coordination and alignment of geospatial data collection and maintenance across all levels of government. Specifically, its objectives include (1) deploying an Internet portal for one-stop access to geospatial data as an extension to the NSDI Clearinghouse network (see figure 3); (2) developing data standards for the seven NSDI framework data themes; (3) creating an inventory of federal data holdings related to the seven framework themes; and (4) encouraging greater coordination among federal, state, and local agencies about existing and planned geospatial data collection projects. In order to attain the broader vision of seamless integration of GIS data on a nationwide basis, a longer-term effort will be required. Geospatial One-Stop, in particular, while addressing useful near-term tasks, has not focused on the need for a longer-term strategy for facing the challenges of implementing the NSDI. Existing draft standards may need revision to accommodate the needs of major federal agency users, and more extensive coordination efforts may be required to ensure broad adoption at all levels of government. Further, the effort is likely to require a continuing effort over an extended period of time, due to the fact that significant investments have already been made in existing non-standard systems, and the task of replacing those systems and migrating their data to new standards cannot be accomplished overnight. | Why GAO Did This Study
Geographic information systems (GIS) manipulate, analyze, and graphically present an array of information associated with geographic locations, have been invaluable to all levels of government. Their usefulness in disaster response was recently demonstrated during the Space Shuttle Columbia recovery effort. GIS provided precise maps and search grids to guide crews to the debris that was strewn across 41 counties in Texas and Louisiana. The federal government has long been attempting to develop an integrated nationwide GIS network. The information available through such a network could significantly enhance decision--making in myriad public--service areas, including emergency response, national security, law enforcement, health care, and the environment. Among GAO's objectives were to describe the federal government's efforts to coordinate GIS activities, the long-standing challenges of adopting and implementing federal GIS standards, and the role of Geospatial One-Stop.
What GAO Found
For decades, the federal government has tried to reduce duplicative geospatial data collection by coordinating GIS activities within and outside the federal government. For example, in 1990, the Office of Management and Budget established the Federal Geographic Data Committee to promote the coordinated use, sharing, and dissemination of geospatial data nationwide. In 1994, the National Spatial Data Infrastructure (NSDI) program was established by executive order to address the problem of the redundancy and incompatibility of geospatial information on a national basis. More recently, Geospatial One-Stop, a component of NSDI, was initiated. Although efforts to build the NSDI are progressing, achieving the vision of a nationwide GIS network remains a formidable challenge. Developing standards that meet stakeholders' needs remains a challenging and time-consuming task, and achieving full participation across governments in their development has also been difficult. Geospatial One-Stop is aimed at promoting coordinated geospatial data collection and maintenance across all levels of government. Among its objectives are (1) deploying an Internet portal for one-stop access to geospatial data; (2) developing data standards; and (3) encouraging greater coordination among federal, state, and local agencies. While these objectives are important, Geospatial One-Stop has focused on limited, near-term tasks and was not intended to fully address the longer-term challenges of implementing the NSDI. A much more substantial effort will be required to attain the broader vision of seamless integration of GIS data nationwide. Existing draft standards may need further revision, and more extensive coordination efforts may be required to ensure broad adoption at all levels of government. Further, the effort is likely to require a continuing effort over an extended period of time, due to the fact that significant investments have already been made in existing non-standard systems. |
gao_GAO-15-556 | gao_GAO-15-556_0 | Among those not participating, the majority worked for an employer that did not offer a program or they were not eligible for the programs that were offered. In particular, lower income workers and those employed by smaller firms were much less likely to have access to programs, after controlling for other factors. However, the majority of these workers participated when they had workplace access. Lack of Coverage Is Driven by Gaps in Access
Roughly half of private sector workers participate in a workplace retirement savings program, according to 2012 data. Specifically, self- reported SIPP data indicate that 45 percent of all private sector workers were participating in a program. The vast majority of workers who do not participate–84 percent—reported they did not have access to a workplace retirement program. States and Other Countries Use Similar Key Strategies to Expand Retirement Coverage
States and Countries We Reviewed Often Combine Workplace Access, Automatic Enrollment, and Financial Incentives
In the six states we studied, proposals were made and, in some, laws enacted in an effort to expand coverage that would combine workplace access to a retirement savings program with automatic enrollment and financial incentives —an approach that has helped increase worker participation in countries we studied. For example, the United Kingdom (U.K.) implemented reforms that require private sector employers to automatically enroll eligible workers in a workplace retirement savings program, allowing workers to contribute to individual accounts and receive financial incentives in the form of employer contributions and tax preferences. In addition, New Zealand and Canada would encourage or require certain employers to offer workplace access. Specifically, in order to mitigate some of the challenges of setting up workplace retirement savings programs, state officials seek to (1) limit the responsibility and cost for employers, and (2) reduce complexity, cost, and investment risk for workers. However, state and national stakeholders said these efforts face potential challenges because of legal uncertainties created by existing federal law—ERISA—and various agency regulations, depending on the type of program state efforts intend to create (see fig. Specifically, ERISA preempts, or invalidates, any and all state laws that “relate to” any private-sector employee benefit plan. Based on our interviews with state and national stakeholders and government officials, none of the state efforts we reviewed are immune from legal uncertainty caused by ERISA preemption, but the type of uncertainty differs depending on the details of the state efforts. For states that are attempting to use an employee benefit plan, such as a 401(k) plan or SIMPLE IRA, DOL officials told us that it is unclear whether a state could create a program without being preempted by ERISA because it is unclear what level of state effort would “relate to” employee benefit plans. Given the need of many workers to increase their retirement savings, and limitations on DOL’s ability to provide flexibility regarding ERISA preemption, stakeholders have suggested a number of ways to address uncertainty and facilitate state efforts to expand coverage in workplace retirement savings programs:
Amend ERISA’s preemption provision. Conclusions
Millions of workers in the United States have little or no retirement savings, an issue exacerbated by the lack of access to workplace retirement savings programs for many of them. For example, the Secretary of Labor could direct the Employee Benefits Security Administration’s (EBSA) Assistant Secretary to revise Interpretive Bulletin 99-1 to clarify whether states can offer payroll deduction Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) and, if so, whether features in relevant enacted state legislation—such as automatic enrollment and/or a requirement that employers offer a payroll deduction—would cause these programs to be treated as employee benefit plans. Treasury generally agreed with the findings, conclusions, and recommendation of this report. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives for this study were to examine: (1) recent estimates of workplace retirement savings program coverage, including eligibility and participation, and characteristics of workers who lack coverage, (2) strategies used by states and other countries to expand coverage among private sector workers, and (3) potential challenges states could face given existing federal law and regulations. Based on these criteria, we selected California, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Washington, and West Virginia. Appendix IV: Description of State Efforts to Expand Workplace Retirement Savings Program Coverage Identified by GAO
We developed the following list of 29 states with recent efforts to expand retirement savings program coverage for private sector workers— including the introduction, action on or enactment of legislation, an executive action, or a study—by (1) reviewing information posted online by industry stakeholders, including the National Council of State Legislatures, the Pension Rights Center, and other industry publications; (2) conducting targeted searches of enacted and proposed state legislation using LexisNexis and WestLaw, in consultation with a law librarian; and (3) interviewing federal officials and knowledgeable industry representatives, including stakeholders at the Pension Rights Center, the American Society of Pension Professionals and Actuaries, and AARP. Once they have been automatically enrolled, workers have 1 month to opt out. For our analyses, we used publicly available data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) from 2012, as shown in tables 9 – 12 of this appendix. For example: 1. | Why GAO Did This Study
Millions of U.S. workers have little or no savings for retirement, potentially adding to future strains on state and national safety net programs. In addition to federal efforts, a growing number of states have proposed efforts to expand coverage in private sector workplace retirement savings programs. Other countries have also implemented similar efforts. GAO was asked to study these state and international efforts.
GAO examined: (1) recent estimates of coverage, including access and participation, as well as characteristics of workers who lack coverage; (2) strategies used by states and other countries to expand coverage; and (3) challenges states could face given existing federal law and regulations. GAO primarily used SIPP data from 2012 (the most recent available). GAO also interviewed federal officials, national industry stakeholders, and officials and stakeholders in six states (California, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Washington, and West Virginia) and three countries (Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom) selected based on the range of strategies used in efforts to increase coverage and recommendations from knowledgeable stakeholders.
What GAO Found
About half of private sector workers in the United States—especially those who are low-income or employed by small firms—lack coverage from a workplace retirement savings program primarily because they do not have access. According to GAO's analysis of 2012 Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) data, about 45 percent of private sector U.S. workers participated in a workplace retirement savings program—an estimate that is consistent with prior GAO work and other research. Using tax data to correct for under-reporting raised the share of workers participating to 54 percent, but still indicates many workers lack coverage. Among those not participating, the vast majority—84 percent—lacked access because they either worked for employers that did not offer programs or were not eligible for the programs that were offered, for example, because they were new employees or in specific jobs that were excluded from the program. In particular, lower-income workers and those employed by smaller firms were much less likely to have access to programs. However, among those who had access, the majority of these workers participated.
Key strategies to expand private sector coverage identified in the states and countries GAO reviewed include encouraging or requiring workplace access, automatic enrollment, financial incentives, and program simplification. For example, pending implementation, programs in two of the states GAO studied—California and Illinois—would require certain employers to automatically enroll workers in a state-run program, though workers could choose to opt-out. In the countries GAO studied, combining workplace access with automatic enrollment and financial incentives—tax preferences or employer contributions—has helped increase participation. Moreover, states and countries have tried to simplify program designs to (1) limit the responsibility and cost for employers and (2) reduce complexity, cost, and risk for workers. For example, some states intend to not only reduce burdens for employers by selecting and monitoring providers, but also reduce complexity for workers by limiting the number of investment options.
State and national stakeholders reported potential challenges with uncertainty created by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) and agency regulations that could delay or deter state efforts to expand coverage. Generally, ERISA preempts, or invalidates, any state law relating to “employee benefit plans” for private sector workers, but different areas of uncertainty arise based on the details of each state effort. For example, four of the six states GAO reviewed intend to create payroll deduction individual retirement account (IRA) programs that would not be considered employee benefit plans. However, due to uncertainty created by ERISA, it is unclear whether a state can offer such programs or whether some of the program features would lead a court to find that they are, or relate to, employee benefit plans. Stakeholders also noted uncertainty caused by regulations from the Departments of Labor (DOL) and the Treasury meant to assist workers and employers. For example, DOL's regulation on payroll deduction IRAs was written before these state efforts were proposed and omits detail that, if included, could help reduce uncertainty. Given these uncertainties, states may face litigation and stakeholders noted that state programs could lose tax preferences if they were ruled preempted by ERISA.
What GAO Recommends
GAO suggests that Congress consider providing states limited flexibility regarding ERISA preemption to expand private sector coverage. Agency actions should also be taken to address uncertainty created by existing regulations. Agencies generally agreed with GAO's recommendation. DOL plans to issue a proposed rule on state programs by the end of 2015. |
gao_GAO-10-780 | gao_GAO-10-780_0 | Background
Federal funding for highways is provided to the states mostly through a series of grant programs collectively known as the Federal-Aid Highway Program. In 2005, Congress enacted SAFETEA-LU, which authorized $197.5 billion for the Federal-Aid Highway Program from fiscal years 2005 through 2009. 1). Rate of Return Varies Depending on the Calculation Used, but States Received More Funding from the Highway Trust Fund Than Their Users Contributed
States Received as Much or More Funding Than Their Highway Users Contributed
For the time period for which final data are available, fiscal years 2005 through 2008, our analysis shows that every state but one received more funding for highway programs than users contributed to the Highway Account (see fig. This occurred because overall, more funding was authorized and apportioned than was collected from highway users. A state can appear to be donor using one type of calculation and a donee using a different type. The state’s share of contributions into the Highway Account of the Highway Trust Fund is then used to calculate a relative rate of return—how the proportion of each state’s contribution compares to the proportion of funds the state received. This analysis shows California as a donee state (see table 2). Half of all states received a significant increase in their overall Federal-Aid Highway Program–at least 25 percent over their core funding. Adding General Revenues into the Trust Fund and Other Challenges Raise Questions about Relying on States’ Rate-of-Return to Distribute Federal Highway Funds
Additional factors affect the relationship between contributions to the Highway Trust Fund and the funding states receive. The Federal-Aid Highway program, in particular, distributes funding through a complicated process in which the underlying data and factors are ultimately not meaningful because they are overridden by other provisions designed to yield a largely predetermined outcome—that of returning revenues to their state of origin. DOT provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To determine the amount of revenue states contributed to the Highway Trust Fund Highway Account compared with the funding they received during the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU) period, we completed four analyses using Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) data. We interviewed FHWA officials and obtained additional information from FHWA on the steps taken to ensure data reliability and determined the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report To determine the provisions in place during the SAFETEA-LU period to address rate-of-return issues across states and how they affected the highway funding states received, we reviewed SAFETEA-LU legislation, reports by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) and FHWA. Our analysis compared funding levels distributed to states via apportionment programs and High Priority Projects before and after Equity Bonus Program provisions were applied, and calculated the percentage increase each state received as a result of the Equity Bonus. To determine what additional factors affected the relationship between contributions to the Highway Trust Fund and the funding states receive, we reviewed GAO reports on federal surface transportation programs and the Highway Trust Fund, as well as CRS and FHWA reports, and the report of the National Surface Transportation Infrastructure Financing Commission. | Why GAO Did This Study
Federal funding for highways is provided to the states mostly through a series of grant programs known as the Federal-Aid Highway Program, administered by the Department of Transportation's (DOT) Federal Highway Administration (FHWA). In 2005, the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU) authorized $197.5 billion for the Federal-Aid Highway Program for fiscal years 2005 through 2009. The program operates on a "user pay" system, wherein users contribute to the Highway Trust Fund through fuel taxes and other fees. The distribution of funding among the states has been a contentious issue. States that receive less than their highway users contribute are known as "donor" states and states that receive more than their highway users contribute are known as "donee" states. GAO was asked to examine for the SAFETEA-LU period (1) how contributions to the Highway Trust Fund compared with the funding states received, (2) what provisions were used to address rate-of-return issues across states, and (3) what additional factors affect the relationship between contributions to the Highway Trust Fund and the funding states receive. To conduct this review, GAO obtained and analyzed data from FHWA, reviewed FHWA and other reports, and interviewed FHWA and DOT officials. DOT reviewed a draft of this report and provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
Since 2005, every state received as much or more funding for highway programs than they contributed to the Highway Account of the trust fund. This was possible because more funding was authorized and apportioned than was collected from the states and the fund needed to be augmented with general revenues. If the percentage of funds states contributed to the total is compared with the percentage of funds states received (i.e., relative share), then 28 states received a relatively lower share and 22 states received a relatively higher share than they contributed. Thus, depending on the method of calculation, the same state can appear to be either a donor or donee state. The Equity Bonus Program was used to address rate-of-return issues. It guaranteed a minimum return to states, providing them about $44 billion. Nearly all states received Equity Bonus funding and about half received a significant increase, at least 25 percent, over their core funding. The infusion of general revenues into the Highway Trust Fund affects the relationship between funding and contributions, as a significant amount of highway funding is no longer provided by highway users. Since fiscal year 2008, Congress has transferred nearly $30 billion of general revenues to address shortfalls in the highway program when more funding was authorized than collected. Using rate of return as a major factor in determining highway funding poses challenges to introducing a performance and accountability orientation into the highway program; rate-of-return calculations in effect override other considerations to yield a largely predetermined outcome--that of returning revenues to their state of origin. Because of these and other challenges, funding surface transportation programs remains on GAO's High-Risk list. |
gao_GAO-16-647 | gao_GAO-16-647_0 | These representatives are to be selected from small businesses, not-for-profit organizations, and government jurisdictions. In particular, CFPB must prepare an Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis with the following required elements: a description and estimate, where feasible, of the number of small entities to which the proposed rule will apply; a description of the projected reporting, recordkeeping, and other compliance requirements of the proposed rule; an identification, to the extent practicable, of all relevant federal rules which may duplicate, overlap, or conflict with the proposed rule; a description of any significant alternatives to the proposed rule which accomplish the stated objectives of applicable statutes and which minimize any significant economic impact of the proposed rule on small entities; a description of any projected increase in the cost of credit for small entities (and, if so, any significant alternatives to the proposed rule that accomplish the stated objectives of applicable statutes and minimize any increase in the cost of credit for small entities); and a description of the advice and recommendations of representatives of small entities relating to the issues described above. CFPB Met Requirements to Solicit, Consider, and Incorporate Small Business Inputs into Rulemakings
CFPB Met Requirements for Conducting SBREFA Panels
CFPB Selected and Informed Panel Participants and Solicited Their Input
CFPB, in collaboration with SBA’s Office of Advocacy and OMB’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, accomplished required steps for conducting the four panels that we reviewed—including soliciting the input of small entity representatives at panel meetings. CFPB Addressed Required Elements of Initial and Final Regulatory Flexibility Analyses
CFPB addressed required elements for Initial and Final Regulatory Flexibility Analyses under the Regulatory Flexibility Act, as amended by the Dodd-Frank Act, and also for more general rulemaking requirements. Information on Panels Focused on CFPB Proposals and Alternatives
Our review of the rulemaking documents indicates that the discussion of the rule proposals and alternatives in panel reports, and the Notices of Proposed Rulemaking, focused on reactions to the proposals and alternatives that CFPB presented. We found that some alternatives posed by representatives as part of the SBREFA panel process were discussed and assessed in the proposed rule and others were not. They only had to include those that they deemed significant and consistent with applicable statutes of the proposed rule. The officials also noted that data needed to make a fuller assessment of some alternatives from small entities were not always available. However, several mortgage brokers believed their industry was not well- represented. When asked how CFPB’s conduct of the panel meetings could be improved (question 17), 19 representatives suggested more time or additional meetings would improve the process. Although most small entity representatives felt their views were at least partially considered in the rulemakings and most felt the agency amended its final rule based on their comments, most representatives expressed disagreement with CFPB’s final rules for reasons such as increased cost of compliance. Specifically, 7 of the 57 stated they were satisfied with the final rules (question 27). CFPB officials noted that the rules for which GAO reviewed SBREFA panels were based on statutory requirements in the Dodd-Frank Act, all involving issues related to mortgage lending. In its rulemaking process, CFPB is to consider input from multiple sources and make judgments deemed necessary to accomplish the stated objectives of applicable statutes. III), CFPB generally agreed with our findings. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report addresses (1) the extent to which the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) solicited, considered, and incorporated small entity inputs into its rulemakings; and (2) the views of the small entity representatives on CFPB’s rulemaking process. As of April 2016, four CFPB rulemaking efforts involving SBREFA panels had resulted in final rules. Each interview was conducted by a team of at least two analysts. For rulemakings that require the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) to convene a Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA) panel, CFPB must assure that small entities have an opportunity to participate in the rulemaking through reasonable techniques. Did the materials provided by CFPB prepare you to provide constructive input during the panel? | Why GAO Did This Study
The Regulatory Flexibility Act, which was amended by the Dodd-Frank Act, requires CFPB to convene Small Business Review Panels (also known as SBREFA panels) for rulemaking efforts that are expected to have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. These panels are intended to seek direct input early in the rulemaking process from small entities (which can include small businesses, small not-for-profit organizations, and small governmental jurisdictions) that would be impacted by CFPB's rulemakings. This report addresses the extent to which CFPB solicited, considered, and incorporated such inputs into its rulemakings, and the views of small entity representatives on CFPB's rulemaking process.
GAO analyzed and reviewed CFPB's rulemaking processes and documents and conducted semi-structured interviews with 57 of the 69 participants on four panels who agreed to be interviewed. The scope was limited to the four SBREFA panels that had associated final rules as of April 2016.
GAO does not make any recommendations in this report. CFPB generally agreed with our findings.
What GAO Found
The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) has taken steps to solicit, consider, and incorporate inputs from small entities into its rulemaking process, as required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act, as amended by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act). GAO reviewed documents from the four Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA) panels that resulted in final rulemaking as of April 2016 and found CFPB completed required steps for conducting them (see fig.). CFPB addressed required elements for regulatory analyses that are components of the proposed and final rules. Based on a review of selected rules, GAO observed that the discussion of rule proposals and alternatives focused on reactions to proposals and alternatives CFPB presented. Some alternatives that small entity representatives raised at panels were discussed in a significant alternatives section of the proposed rules, while others were not. CFPB officials noted that data needed to make a fuller assessment of some alternatives from small entities were not always available. CFPB officials, consistent with statutory requirements for CFPB rulemakings, also said alternatives that CFPB presents for a panel discussion and in a proposed rule are those they deemed significant and consistent with applicable statutes.
GAO interviewed 57 of the 69 small entity representatives who participated in the four SBREFA panels GAO reviewed and found they generally believed the process was useful but also that it could be improved. More than three-quarters stated the materials CFPB provided helped prepare them to provide constructive input, and two-thirds stated their industry was represented on the panels. However, two-thirds stated not enough time was allotted to discuss at least one of the topics on the panel agenda and a third suggested more time or additional meetings would improve the process. While 36 of 57 stated CFPB at least partially considered their comments in its rulemakings, most representatives expressed disagreement with CFPB's final rules for reasons such as increased cost of compliance. Specifically, 7 of 57 were satisfied with CFPB's final rules. CFPB officials noted that the rules for which GAO reviewed SBREFA panels were based on statutory requirements in the Dodd-Frank Act. In its rulemaking process, CFPB is to consider input from multiple sources and makes judgments deemed necessary to accomplish the stated objectives of applicable statutes. |
gao_T-AIMD-96-134 | gao_T-AIMD-96-134_0 | The demand for health information has climbed steadily in the past 5 to 10 years. Several hundred informatics systems—using a range of technologies, from telephones to interactive on-line systems—have been developed in the past decade alone. Consumer Health Informatics: What Is It? Informatics supports consumers’ ability to obtain health-related information through three general types of systems—those that simply provide information (one-way communication), those that tailor specific information to a user’s unique situation (customized information), and those that allow users to communicate and interact either with health care providers or other users (two-way communication). More complex systems that permit user interaction are usually among the most expensive. Some studies have shown, however, that informatics offers the potential to reduce some unnecessary medical services, thereby lowering health care costs. Such systems can also prepare doctors to more effectively treat certain patients. The three issues identified as most significant were access, cost, and information quality. Further, no nationwide infrastructure exists to link information from hospitals, clinics, and physicians’ offices, making it difficult to share critical health-related and patient information. States and local communities are also supporting projects that use technology to disseminate health information to their residents. HHS and other consumer health experts have recognized that federal coordination of government activities in consumer health informatics needs to be improved; while no single, comprehensive inventory of all federal activity exists for this new field, many federal agencies have plans for greater coordination and evaluation of consumer health informatics. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the emergence of consumer health informatics.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the demand for health-related information has increased steadily in the past 5 to 10 years; (2) many consumers have reported problems in gaining access to appropriate health information, especially in self-care situations; (3) several hundred informatics systems have been developed in the past decade, but most systems are still in early stages of development; (4) consumers are able to obtain health-related information through one-way communications, tailor specific information to unique situations, or communicate with health care providers through two-way communications systems; (5) more complex systems that permit user interaction are usually the most expensive; (6) consumers are able to reduce unnecessary medical services and lower health care costs by accessing health informatics systems; (7) these systems also help health care providers to more effectively treat certain patients; (8) the most significant issues that need to be addressed include system access, system development cost, and information quality; (9) there is no nationwide infrastructure to link information from hospitals, clinics, and physicians' offices; (10) states and local communities are supporting projects to disseminate health information to their residents; and (11) many federal agencies are planning greater coordination and evaluation of consumer health informatics. |
gao_GAO-03-1017 | gao_GAO-03-1017_0 | They report directly to the superintendent of their respective service academies, in accordance with the chain of command for each service. Preparatory School Missions Are Not Clearly Defined
The three preparatory schools’ current mission statements do not clearly define the purpose for which the schools are being used by their respective service academies. Without a clear mission statement, the organization cannot establish goals that fully reflect the organization’s intended purpose. However, neither DOD nor the service academies have required the preparatory schools to align their mission statements to reflect DOD’s guidance and the service academies’ expectations. Even though the mission statements are not explicit about the schools’ intended purpose, data on the number of students belonging to target groups who enter the preparatory schools and then enter the service academies indicate that, in practice, the schools are giving primary consideration for enrollment to those target groups identified by the DOD directive and the service academies—namely, enlisted personnel, minorities, recruited athletes, and women—and are primarily preparing those student groups for admission to the service academies. Preparatory Schools Maintain Performance Data, but Mission Effectiveness Is Difficult to Evaluate
It is difficult to evaluate how effective the preparatory schools have been in accomplishing their missions because the service academies have not established performance goals for their preparatory schools. Without specific performance goals, there is no objective yardstick against which to gauge preparatory school effectiveness, as would be consistent with the principle of best practices for ensuring optimal return on investment. DOD Lacks a Complete Framework to Facilitate More Effective Oversight of the Preparatory Schools
The effectiveness of DOD, military service, and service academy oversight is limited because the existing oversight framework for assessing preparatory school performance does not include, among other things, performance goals and mission statements—as discussed in previous sections of this report—and objective measures against which to assess performance. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, in concert with the service headquarters and service academies, to clarify the preparatory schools’ mission statements by aligning these statements with the department’s guidance and the academies’ expectations, which target student groups for primary enrollment consideration; establish quantified performance goals and measures, linked with the schools’ mission statements; and enhance the existing oversight framework by using quantified performance goals and measures to objectively evaluate the performance of the preparatory schools. Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland; the U.S. Air Force Academy Preparatory School, Colorado Springs, Colorado; the U.S. Military Academy Preparatory School, Fort Monmouth, New Jersey; and the U.S. | Why GAO Did This Study
Each year, the U.S. Air Force Academy, the U.S. Military Academy, and the U.S. Naval Academy combined spend tens of millions of dollars to operate preparatory schools that provide an alternative avenue for about 700 students annually to gain admission to the service academies. Service academy officials screen all applicants to identify those who they believe could succeed at the academies but who would benefit from more preparation. The Department of Defense (DOD) pays the full cost of providing this preparation. GAO was asked to review the three service academy preparatory schools, and this report specifically assesses (1) the adequacy of their current mission statements, (2) the effectiveness of these schools in accomplishing their missions, and (3) the effectiveness of DOD oversight of these schools.
What GAO Found
The three service academy preparatory schools' current mission statements do not clearly articulate the purpose for which the schools are being used by their respective service academies. In accordance with DOD guidance and the service academies' expectations, the preparatory schools give primary consideration for enrollment to enlisted personnel, minorities, women, and recruited athletes. However, the preparatory school mission statements are not clearly aligned with DOD guidance and the academies' expectations. This is a continuing problem, which GAO first reported in 1992. Without clear mission statements, the service academies and their respective preparatory schools cannot establish goals that fully reflect the preparatory schools' intended purpose. It is difficult to evaluate how effective the preparatory schools have been in accomplishing their missions because the service academies have not established performance goals for the preparatory schools. Without specific performance goals, there is no objective yardstick against which to gauge preparatory school effectiveness, as would be consistent with the principle of best practices for ensuring optimal return on investment. The effectiveness of DOD, military service, and service academy oversight is limited because the existing oversight framework for assessing preparatory school performance does not include performance goals and measures against which to objectively assess performance. DOD and the services receive annual reports from the academies on preparatory school performance. Without stated performance goals and measures, however, the reports do not offer DOD, the services, or the service academies as good an insight into the preparatory schools' performance and their return on investment as they could. |
gao_GAO-15-13 | gao_GAO-15-13_0 | DOJ and FTC are responsible for enforcing federal antitrust laws, which GPOs are required to follow. GPOs Reported Generally Utilizing a Three-Phased Approach to Competitively Negotiate Contracts with Vendors
According to the GPOs in our review, GPO contracting generally involves three phases: (1) issue requests for proposals (RFP) or invitations for vendors to competitively bid for a contract, (2) review proposals, and (3) negotiate and award contracts. GPOs reported negotiating and awarding different types of contracts to vendors in different situations. All five of the GPOs in our review reported that the majority of the contracts they negotiate are either dual-source or multi-source, meaning that the majority of the products sold through their contracts have more than one vendor available on the GPOs’ contracts. In addition, all five GPOs reported that they did not bundle unrelated products, and awarded mostly contracts with 3-year terms in 2012. The views of experts and others we interviewed on the effects of GPO contracting practices varied. While officials from the FTC told us that they continue to receive complaints each year about the potential anticompetitive effects of GPO contracting practices—including complaints that GPOs have contributed to recent shortages of generic injectable drugs—in the last ten years, the FTC has not initiated any enforcement actions directed at GPO conduct. GPOs Reported Being Predominately Funded by Vendors
The five GPOs in our review reported being predominately funded by administrative fees collected from vendors, which were almost always based on a percentage of the purchase price for products obtained through GPO contracts. Experts’ Views on the Effects of the GPO Funding Structure Varied Widely, Though Empirical Data on the Effects Are Limited
The literature we reviewed and the views of experts we interviewed varied widely on the effects of the GPO funding structure, specifically the reliance on vendor fees. Some of the literature we reviewed and experts we interviewed asserted that the vendor fee-based funding structure of GPOs creates misaligned incentives for them to negotiate higher prices for medical products in order to increase the amount of vendor fees that that they receive. Other people we interviewed—including some experts and representatives of the GPOs—stated that competition between GPOs to retain their customers incentivizes them to negotiate the lowest possible prices, and mitigates any theoretical principal-agent problem. To the extent that the vendor-fee-based funding structure affects prices for medical products and services—either by reducing or inflating the costs of the products and services—Medicare payment rates may be affected over time through the annual update to the Prospective Payment System hospital payment rates. Moreover, Medicare payments could be affected if hospitals do not appropriately account for any revenues they receive from GPOs. These revenues are required to be reported as a reduction in costs on hospitals’ costs reports. This represents 70 percent of the $2.3 billion in administrative fees collected in 2012. The extent to which hospitals are reporting this additional revenue is not known because HHS-OIG has not reviewed cost reports for this information since 2005. In addition, CMS officials told us that the agency has not specifically identified this as information that should be routinely audited by Medicare Audit Contractors. Some experts that we interviewed stated that the potential effects of the GPO funding structure on Medicare payment rates could be eliminated if the GPO safe harbor were repealed and GPOs were no longer permitted to collect fees from vendors. While a repeal of the safe harbor provision would require a clearer understanding of the impact of the GPO funding structure, hospitals’ potential underreporting of administrative fee revenue presents an immediate risk that can be addressed within the current GPO funding structure. Recommendation for Executive Action
To help ensure the accuracy of Medicare’s payments to hospitals, we recommend that the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services determine whether hospitals are appropriately reporting administrative fee revenues on their Medicare cost reports and take steps to address any under-reporting that may be found. We received technical comments from HHS, FTC, and DOJ which we incorporated as appropriate. However, the scope of this report is focused on GPO contracting practices and funding structure. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Our objectives were to describe (1) Group Purchasing Organization (GPO) contracting practices and the reported effects of these practices; (2) how GPOs are funded and the reported effects of this funding structure. We asked about their contracting practices and sources of revenue, including administrative fees collected from vendors. Through our questionnaire, we asked about each GPO’s purchasing volume by fiscal year, from 2000-2012; purchasing volume by category of medical product for fiscal years 2000, 2004, 2008, and 2012; average, highest, lowest, and most frequent administrative fee percentages received in fiscal year 2012, by category of medical product; total dollar amount of administrative fees received in fiscal years 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012, by category of medical product; average, highest, lowest, and most frequent licensing fee percentages received in fiscal year 2012, by category of medical product; total dollar amount of licensing fees received in fiscal years 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012, by category of medical product; average, highest, lowest, and most frequent fee percentages for any fee that was based on a percentage of the purchasing price of a product in fiscal year 2012, by category of medical product; total dollar amount of total fees based on a percentage of the purchasing price of a product received in fiscal years 2000, 2004, 2008, and 2012, by category of medical product; total dollar amount of total fees based on the purchasing price of a product received in fiscal years 2000-2012; average, highest, lowest, and most frequent administrative fee percentages received in fiscal year 2012 for generic injectable drugs; average, highest, lowest, and most frequent licensing fee percentages received in fiscal year 2012 for generic injectable drugs; total dollar amount and percentage of administrative fees shared with customers and owners in fiscal year 2012; sources of revenue in fiscal year 2012; services provided to customers in fiscal year 2012 and how those services were funded; whether the GPO awarded, or had in effect, any sole-source, bundled, non-bid, or long-term contracts with vendors; and key ways that GPOs bring value to their customers. We also reviewed laws, legislative history, regulations and guidance related to the GPO safe harbor. | Why GAO Did This Study
GPOs are purchasing intermediaries that negotiate contracts for medical products and services. GPOs contract with vendors and receive a fee from them when providers purchase from the vendor. These fees are a source of operating revenue for GPOs, and they are allowed to collect them if they meet the requirements of a safe harbor to the “anti-kickback” provision of the Social Security Act—known as the Anti-Kickback statute—which would otherwise prohibit such fees.
You raised questions about GPOs' contracting practices and about the impact of the GPO funding structure. This report examines (1) GPO contracting practices and the reported effects of these practices; (2) how GPOs are funded and the reported effects of this funding structure. To do this work, GAO sent a questionnaire to representatives of the 5 largest national GPOs about their contracting practices and sources of revenue; reviewed the literature on the effects of the GPO funding structure; reviewed laws, regulations, and guidance on the GPO safe harbor; interviewed representatives from HHS, FTC, the Department of Justice (DOJ), vendors, hospitals, trade associations, and economic and health care experts.
What GAO Found
According to representatives from the 5 large group purchasing organizations (GPO) in GAO's review, GPO contracting generally involves three phases: (1) issue requests for proposals or invitations for vendors to competitively bid for a contract, (2) review proposals, and (3) negotiate and award contracts. GPOs reported negotiating and awarding different types of contracts to vendors in different situations. All 5 GPOs reported that the majority of the contracts they negotiate are either dual-source or multi-source, meaning that the majority of the products sold through their contracts have more than one vendor available on the GPOs' contracts. In addition, all GPOs reported that they did not bundle unrelated products and awarded mostly contracts with 3-year terms in 2012. The views of experts and others GAO interviewed on the effects of GPO contracting practices varied on issues such as whether the practices affect product innovation. In addition, while officials from the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) stated that they continue to receive and review complaints each year about GPO contracting practices, in the last 10 years, the FTC has not initiated any enforcement actions directed at GPO conduct.
The 5 GPOs in GAO's review reported being predominately funded by administrative fees collected from vendors, which were almost always based on a percentage of the purchase price of products obtained through GPO contracts. The 5 GPOs reported that these fees totaled about $2.3 billion in 2012, and nearly 70 percent of these fees were passed on to GPO customers or owners. The literature and the views of experts varied widely on the effects of this funding structure. Some suggested it creates misaligned incentives for GPOs to negotiate higher prices for medical products in order to increase the amount of vendor fees that they receive. Others suggested that competition between GPOs incentivizes them to negotiate the lowest possible prices, and mitigates these concerns. There is little empirical evidence available to either support or refute these concerns. However, to the extent that the vendor fee-based funding structure affects prices for medical products and services, Medicare payment rates may be affected over time through the annual update to hospital payment rates, which relies, in part, on information that hospitals report to the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS)—an agency in the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). Moreover, Medicare payments also could be affected if hospitals do not account for revenue they receive from GPOs, which they are required to report as a reduction in costs on their cost reports. However, the extent to which hospitals are reporting this revenue is not known because this has not been reviewed by HHS since 2005, and CMS officials stated that the agency has not specifically identified this as information that should be routinely audited. Repealing the safe harbor—which allows administrative fees—could eliminate the potential effects of the GPO funding structure on Medicare payment rates, but experts and others stated that this could be disruptive to the health care supply chain at least in the near term. Over the longer term, GPOs and hospital systems are likely to adapt to the new market environment. While a repeal of the safe harbor provision would require a clearer understanding of the impact of the GPO funding structure, hospitals' potential underreporting of administrative fee revenue presents an immediate risk that can be addressed within the current GPO funding structure.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Secretary of HHS determine whether hospitals are appropriately reporting administrative fee revenues on their Medicare cost reports and take steps to address any under-reporting that may be found. HHS agreed with the recommendation. GAO also incorporated technical comments from HHS, FTC, DOJ, and GPOs. |
gao_GAO-17-413 | gao_GAO-17-413_0 | Background
Ship Manpower Requirements and Manning
The Navy determines the number of sailors and the skills needed to operate its ships through a standardized manpower requirements process. A time line of reduced manning initiatives that were implemented from 2001 to 2016 is included in figure 2. Ship Operating and Support Costs and Maintenance Backlogs Have Continued to Increase for Most Legacy Ship Classes since Optimal Manning Ended
Ship operating and support costs—the total cost of operating, maintaining, and supporting a ship, including personnel, operations, maintenance, sustainment, and modernization—increased during the optimal manning period and have continued to increase for most ship classes, in part because increases in maintenance costs offset reductions in personnel costs. Navy officials attributed maintenance cost increases to reduced crews, longer deployments, and other factors. Maintenance backlogs also increased during the optimal manning period for the same reasons and have continued to grow for most ship classes. The Navy Has Partially Restored Crew Sizes since Optimal Manning Ended, and Personnel Costs Have Increased
During the optimal manning period—which varied among ship classes but generally was around fiscal years 2004 to 2010—the Navy reduced average crew sizes, as shown in figure 3, resulting in reductions in personnel costs. Other factors, such as the age of a ship, may also affect maintenance costs. Our analysis does not isolate the effects of these factors from the effect of the optimal manning initiative. The Navy Has Updated Some Manpower Factors but Continues to Use an Outdated Workweek Standard
Since it ended the optimal manning initiative, the Navy has updated or is in the process of updating several of the factors and allowances it uses to determine manpower requirements on all ships, but it has not updated the standard workweek. The Department of Defense (DOD) agreed with our recommendation. Without accurate manpower requirements, the Navy risks having ship crews that are not appropriately sized and composed to carry out missions, maintain ship readiness, and prevent overwork of sailors. The Navy May Be Challenged to Man Its Growing Fleet
Moving forward, the Navy will likely face manning challenges, especially given its current difficulty in filling authorized positions, as it seeks to increase the size of its fleet as much as 30 percent over its current size. Crew Sizes on Recently- Inducted Ship Classes Have Grown as the Navy Gains Experience Operating Them
In addition to using the outdated standard workweek and not accounting for in-port workload, the Navy developed estimates of manpower requirements and crew size targets for its new ships based on assumptions that technologies would enable smaller crews. Recommendations for Executive Action
To ensure that the Navy’s manpower requirements are current and analytically based and will meet the needs of the existing and future surface fleet, we recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness direct the Secretary of the Navy to have the Navy take the following four actions: conduct a comprehensive reassessment of the Navy standard workweek and make any necessary adjustments; update guidance to require examination of in-port workload and identify the manpower necessary to execute in-port workload for all surface ship classes; develop criteria and update guidance for reassessing the factors used to calculate manpower requirements periodically or when conditions change; and identify personnel needs and costs associated with the planned larger Navy fleet size, including consideration of the updated manpower factors and requirements. To assess the extent to which the Navy’s manpower requirements process fully accounts for ship workload, we examined the factors and assumptions used in determining crew sizes for surface and amphibious ships, and we analyzed various Navy documents and instructions related to determining crew sizes, including Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Instruction 1000.16L, Navy Total Force Manpower Policies and Procedures, in order to identify the steps required in the Navy’s process to determine crew sizes. We also interviewed Navy officials and ship crews to discuss fleet-wide manpower and manning challenges. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2001, the Navy began reducing crew sizes on surface ships through an initiative called optimal manning, which was intended to achieve workload efficiencies and reduce personnel costs. In 2010, the Navy concluded that this initiative had adversely affected ship readiness and began restoring crew sizes on its ships.
The conference report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 included a provision that GAO review the Navy's reduced manning initiatives in the surface fleet. This report examines (1) any trends in ship operating and support costs and maintenance backlogs, (2) the extent to which the Navy's manpower requirements process accounts for ship workload, and (3) any manning challenges and implications for the future.
GAO analyzed and reviewed data from fiscal years 2000 through 2015 (the most current available) on crew sizes, operating and support costs, material readiness, and the Navy's manpower requirements determination process. GAO also interviewed Department of Defense (DOD) officials and ship crews to discuss workload, manning levels, enablers of smaller crew size, and implications for the future.
What GAO Found
Total ship operating and support costs—which include personnel and maintenance costs—and maintenance backlogs increased during the optimal manning period (2003–2012) and have continued to increase for most ship classes since the initiative ended. Since the implementation of optimal manning, the Navy reduced crew sizes, which decreased the associated personnel costs for most ship classes, even as crews were partially restored. However, increased maintenance costs offset the reductions in personnel costs, as shown below. Navy officials attributed maintenance cost increases to reduced crews, longer deployments, and other factors. GAO's analysis did not isolate the relative effects of reduced crews from these other factors. Maintenance backlogs also increased during the optimal manning period and have continued to grow.
The Navy's process to determine manpower requirements—the number and skill mix of sailors needed for its ships—does not fully account for all ship workload. The Navy continues to use an outdated standard workweek that may overstate the amount of sailor time available for productive work. Although the Navy has updated some of its manpower factors, its instruction does not require reassessing factors to ensure they remain valid or require measuring workload while ships are in port. Current and analytically based manpower requirements are essential to ensuring that crews can maintain readiness and prevent overwork that can affect safety, morale, and retention. Until the Navy makes needed changes to its factors and instruction used in determining manpower requirements, its ships may not have the right number and skill mix of sailors to maintain readiness and prevent overworking its sailors.
Moving forward, the Navy will likely face manning challenges as it seeks to increase the size of its fleet. The fleet is projected to grow from its current 274 ships to as many as 355 ships, but the Navy has not determined how many personnel will need to be added to man those ships. In addition, as the Navy has gained experience operating its new ship classes, their crew sizes have grown and may continue to do so. Without updating its manpower factors and requirements and identifying the personnel cost implications of fleet size increases, the Navy cannot articulate its resource needs to decision makers.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making four recommendations that the Navy (1) reassess the standard workweek, (2) require examination of in-port workload, (3) require reassessment of the factors used to develop manpower requirements, and (4) identify the personnel costs needed to man a larger fleet. DOD concurred with each recommendation. |
gao_GAO-12-885 | gao_GAO-12-885_0 | Background
From 1913 until 2002, USDA was responsible for the inspection of plants and animals at U.S. ports of entry. DHS and USDA Have Taken Steps to Implement GAO’s Seven Recommendations, but Have Not Fully Implemented Four of Them
DHS and USDA took steps to implement all seven recommendations we made in our May 2006 report, but they faced challenges fully implementing four of them. DHS and USDA Faced Challenges Implementing Four of Seven Recommendations
DHS and USDA faced challenges in fully implementing our recommendations to (1) adopt meaningful performance measures, (2) establish a national risk-based staffing model, (3) improve the agriculture canine program, and (4) revise user fees to cover AQI program costs. In 2006, we recommended that DHS and USDA adopt meaningful performance measures for assessing the AQI program’s effectiveness at intercepting foreign pests and disease on agricultural materials entering the country by all pathways and posing a risk to U.S. agriculture. Even as APHIS and CBP expanded existing performance measures, they did not develop measures for all aspects of the AQI program that are important for its management. CBP officials also told us they currently do not have the resources to increase staff above replacement levels. However, the agency has not developed a plan or strategy that assesses the risk of potential fiscal constraints on their ability to implement the staffing model. Without a plan or strategy to optimize the allocation of staff to those ports of highest need that considers the fiscal resources that may realistically be available, CBP risks investing in a staffing model it cannot execute and increasing the vulnerability of the agriculture sector to foreign pests and disease. Limitations in the Arrival, Inspection, and Interception Data May Hinder Their Use in Managing the Program
The AQI program uses data on arrivals, inspections, and interceptions to determine how well agricultural inspections identify prohibited materials and to review ports’ performance, but data quality issues may prevent AQI program officials from making full use of the data. Specifically:
The data may not be reliable. In addition, from 2010 through 2011, the joint CBP-APHIS quality assurance reviews, which focused on 22 ports, found instances of discrepancies between data recorded in WADS and data recorded on daily logs at about half of the ports reviewed (10 out of the 22 ports). Some of these data limitations have the potential to affect other key efforts that are currently underway, such as the program’s staffing model and the effort to analyze the structure and amounts of AQI user fees–– both critical to the AQI program. Without reliable data on work activities, AQI program officials cannot be assured that they have the information they need to manage the program. Survey Responses Show Some Changes in Agriculture Specialists’ Views
According to our analysis of agriculture specialists’ and supervisors’ responses to our 2012 survey and the results from our 2006 survey, some aspects of agriculture specialists’ and supervisors’ views about their work environment have changed since 2006. Conclusions
The AQI program is a key component of U.S. efforts to protect agriculture from the unintentional or deliberate introduction of pests and disease, and effective management of the AQI program requires a coordinated effort by DHS and USDA. Specifically, in the absence of a strategic plan that lays out the program’s joint mission and goals, APHIS and CBP do not have a framework for defining the program’s mission, setting goals to achieve the desired results, and identifying performance measures for gauging progress towards those goals. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to examine the extent to which (1) U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) have implemented recommendations we made in 2006 to improve the Agricultural Quarantine Inspection (AQI) program; (2) data on arrivals, inspections, and interceptions are used for managing the program; and (3) the views of agriculture specialists at Customs and Border Protection (CBP) regarding their work environment have changed, if at all, since our 2006 reports. We selected these ports of entry based on size; the presence of agriculture specialists, supervisors, and canine handlers; and entry pathways, such as air, sea, and land. To examine the extent to which GAO’s May 2006 recommendations have been implemented, we interviewed DHS and USDA officials and reviewed documentation related to (1) improving information-sharing, (2) undertaking a full review of DHS’s financial management system for the AQI program, (3) removing barriers to timely and accurate AQI user fee transfers from USDA to DHS, (4) adopting meaningful performance measures, (5) establishing a national risk-based staffing model, (6) improving the agriculture canine program, and (7) revising user fees to cover AQI program costs. | Why GAO Did This Study
According to DHS, invasive species cause an estimated $136 billion in lost agricultural revenue annually, and since September 11, 2001, concerns have persisted about the vulnerability of agriculture to deliberate introduction of foreign pests and disease. DHS and USDA manage the AQI program, which places agriculture inspectors at U.S. ports of entry to inspect imported agriculture products and intercept foreign pests. GAO reported in 2006 on management challenges in the program and made seven recommendations to improve it. GAO was asked to examine the extent to which (1) DHS and USDA implemented GAO's recommendations; (2) data on arrivals, inspections, and interceptions are used for managing the program; and (3) the views of AQI agriculture specialists on their work environment have changed since 2006. GAO surveyed a representative sample of agriculture specialists and supervisors; reviewed key documents and inspection procedures; visited five selected ports of entry based on size and entry pathways, such as air or sea; interviewed DHS and USDA officials; and reviewed AQI data. The survey instrument and most results can be viewed at GAO-12-884SP .
What GAO Found
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) have taken steps to implement all seven of the recommendations GAO made in 2006 to improve the Agriculture Quarantine Inspection (AQI) program, but they face challenges in fully implementing four of them. Specifically, DHS and USDA have implemented GAO's recommendations to improve information sharing, review DHS's financial management system for the AQI program, and remove barriers to timely and accurate transfers of AQI user fees--collected for AQI services provided in connection with the arrival of international air passengers and conveyances at U.S. ports. However, DHS and USDA face challenges in fully implementing GAO's recommendations to adopt meaningful performance measures, establish a national risk-based staffing model, improve the agriculture canine program, and revise user fees to cover program costs. For example, in 2006, GAO recommended that DHS and USDA adopt meaningful performance measures for assessing the AQI program's effectiveness at intercepting foreign pests and disease. DHS and USDA have expanded the use of one type of performance measure but have not developed measures for all aspects of the AQI program that are important for its management. In addition, the AQI program does not have a strategic plan--a leading practice that would provide DHS and USDA with a framework for defining the mission of what the program seeks to accomplish, setting goals to achieve desired results, and identifying performance measures for gauging progress toward those goals. Furthermore, DHS has undertaken efforts to respond to GAO's recommendation to develop a national, risk-based staffing model but does not yet have one, and DHS anticipates that the model will recommend significant staffing increases. DHS officials told GAO they do not have the resources to increase staff, but the agency has not developed a plan that assesses the risk of potential fiscal constraints on its ability to implement the staffing model. Without a plan or strategy to address potential resource constraints on staffing by considering the fiscal resources that may realistically be available, DHS risks increasing the vulnerability of the agriculture sector to foreign pests and disease.
The AQI program uses data on arrivals, inspections, and interceptions at U.S. ports of entry to determine how well agriculture inspections identify prohibited materials and to review ports' performance, but data quality issues may prevent AQI program officials from making full use of the data. For example, the data may not be reliable. DHS and USDA recognize that data quality is an ongoing issue and in 2004 created an interagency group to address this issue. However, from 2010 to 2011, joint DHS-USDA reviews of 22 selected ports found discrepancies in the data at about half of the ports reviewed (10 out of 22). Data reliability has the potential to affect other key efforts that are currently under way, such as the program's staffing model. Without reliable data, AQI program officials do not have assurance that they have the information needed to manage the program.
GAO also presents analysis of survey data from 2006 and 2012 on agriculture specialists' and supervisors' views about their work environment.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends, among other things, that (1) DHS and USDA develop a joint strategic plan for the AQI program, (2) DHS develop a plan for implementing a staffing model, and (3) DHS and USDA take steps to improve the reliability of certain data. DHS and USDA agreed with the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-17-128 | gao_GAO-17-128_0 | § 129a, and ensure that the savings are not achieved through unjustified transfers of functions between or among the military, civilian, and service contractor personnel workforces of DOD, consistent with authorities available to the department under sections 129a, 2330a, 2461, and 2463 of Title 10 of the United States Code; provide status reports describing the implementation of the plan in the prior year as part of the budget submitted by the President to Congress for each of fiscal years 2015 through 2018; and in each status report, provide a summary of savings achieved through personnel reductions and the number of military, civilian, and contractor personnel reduced in the prior fiscal year; and in each status report include an explanation where any savings fall short of the annual target. See table 2 for a summary of DOD’s compliance with selected section 955 reporting requirements. Further, officials stated that DOD did not include full-time equivalents (FTEs) for contracted services in the section 955 report because they were unable to provide an accurate number. Without DOD’s fully implementing the recommendation to include cost savings information for the prior fiscal year, as required by section 955, Congress may not know whether DOD is on track to meet its reduction requirements. DOD Estimates That It Will Meet Civilian Personnel Savings Requirements in Fiscal Year 2017, but That It Will Not Achieve Contracted Services Cost Savings Requirements
DOD estimates that it will meet its statutory requirement to reduce civilian personnel costs in fiscal year 2017, but that it will not meet its requirement to reduce contracted services costs. DOD Has Not Developed an Efficiencies Plan as Required by Section 955 of the Fiscal Year 2013 NDAA
DOD’s Report Does Not Include an Efficiencies Plan for Achieving Reductions
DOD’s February 2016 status report does not include an efficiencies plan for reducing its civilian and contracted services workforces in fiscal year 2015. We previously recommended that DOD include a comprehensive description of an efficiencies plan to achieve savings for the civilian workforce and contracted services workforces for fiscal year 2012 through 2017. DOD concurred with our recommendation. DOD’s Status Report Did Not Demonstrate How Civilian and Contractor Reductions Are Consistent with Workforce Management Laws
DOD’s February 2016 status report refers to elements present in workforce management laws, but it does not explain how savings are being achieved in a manner consistent with workforce management laws. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We are not making any new recommendations in this report and believe that DOD’s fully implementing the previous recommendations is needed to better inform the Congress. Although DOD has taken some action in response to our December 2015 report, we disagree that the recommendations have been fully implemented, as summarized below. In response to the recommendation in our December 2015 report to include a comprehensive description of a plan to achieve savings for the civilian workforce and contracted services workforces for fiscal year (FY) 2012 through 2017, DOD stated in its written comments that it included a section that describes its plan, guidance, and implementation in its February 2016 status report. For example, section 955 requires DOD to submit status reports each fiscal year through 2018 that describe the implementation of the efficiencies plan to reduce costs for the civilian and contracted service workforces, and states that in the development and implementation of the efficiencies plan, DOD may exclude certain civilian and contractor workforces from reporting required reductions. DOD did not include such a description in its February 2016 report and therefore DOD has not yet fully implemented our recommendation. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to evaluate the extent to which DOD’s February 2016 status report demonstrates (1) DOD’s achievement of savings, as required by section 955 of the Fiscal Year 2013 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA); and (2) DOD’s development and implementation of its efficiencies plan that is consistent with workforce management laws in fiscal year 2015, as required by section 955 of the Fiscal Year 2013 NDAA. | Why GAO Did This Study
With long-term fiscal challenges likely to continue, DOD must operate strategically and efficiently, to include cost-effective management of its human capital. Section 955 of the NDAA for FY 2013 requires DOD to, among other things, develop and implement a plan to achieve savings in total funding for civilian and contracted services workforces from FYs 2012 through 2017. Section 955 also includes a provision that GAO review the section 955 status reports DOD submits to Congress to determine whether the required savings are being achieved and the plan is being implemented consistently with workforce-management laws.
This report addresses the extent to which DOD's February 2016 status report demonstrates DOD's (1) achievement of savings and (2) development and implementation of its efficiencies plan that is consistent with workforce management laws in FY 2015. GAO reviewed DOD's report and interviewed DOD officials.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense (DOD) did not report all required data on military, civilian, and contracted services workforces in its February 2016 report that would demonstrate savings, as required by section 955 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2013, and it estimates that by FY 2017 it will meet savings for the civilian workforce but not for contracted services. Section 955 requires DOD to submit annual reports in FYs 2015—2018 that include the costs of civilian and contracted services workforces from FYs 2012—2017, among other items. See the table for DOD's February 2016 compliance with selected reporting requirements.
Officials stated that DOD interpreted section 955 as requiring DOD to report civilian savings achieved when comparing costs from FY 2012 to FY 2017, and not each year in between. Further, officials stated that DOD did not include full-time equivalents (FTEs) for contracted services in the report as required because they were unable to provide an accurate number. In December 2015 GAO recommended that DOD include costs savings for civilian personnel in its reports, and DOD concurred. Without including these cost data, Congress may not know whether DOD is on track to meet the mandated savings.
DOD has not developed and implemented an efficiencies plan for reducing the civilian and contracted services workforces, and DOD did not demonstrate how its reductions are consistent with workforce management laws in its February 2016 status report. Section 955 requires DOD to develop an efficiencies plan to reduce civilian personnel and costs for FYs 2012—2017, and for each FY through 2018 to submit a report that describes the implementation of the efficiencies plan. Furthermore, section 955 allows for DOD to grant civilian and contractor workforce exclusions from section 955 required reductions for areas identified as critical. For example, DOD reported that it excluded about 538,000 of 776,000 civilian FTEs. However, its reports do not provide a description indicating why these exclusions were chosen. In December 2015 GAO recommended that DOD include a comprehensive description of the efficiencies plan to achieve savings, and DOD concurred. Without an efficiencies plan, including an explanation of its exclusions, DOD has not provided Congress with information on how the department will achieve required savings.
What GAO Recommends
GAO previously recommended that DOD fully address ongoing section 955 requirements, such as including an efficiencies plan, among other things, in its subsequent reports. DOD agreed but has not yet implemented them. GAO is not making any new recommendations, but believes fully implementing the previous ones would better inform Congress. In comments, DOD stated it had implemented GAO's previous recommendations. DOD has taken some action, but GAO disagrees the recommendations have been fully implemented, as discussed in this report. |
gao_GAO-08-472T | gao_GAO-08-472T_0 | Supply of Primary Care Professionals Increased; Little Data Available on Minority Representation
In recent years, the supply of primary care professionals increased, with the supply of nonphysicians increasing faster than physicians. The numbers of primary care professionals in training programs also increased. Little information was available on trends during this period regarding minorities in training or actively practicing in primary care specialties. Number of Primary Care Professionals in U.S. Training Programs Increased from 1995 to 2006
For two groups of primary care professionals—physicians and nurse practitioners—the number in primary care training has increased in recent years. Comparable information for physician assistants and dentists was not available. Other demographic characteristics of the primary care workforce have also changed in recent years. Few projections have focused on the likely supply of primary care physician or nonphysician primary care professionals. Few Projections Address Future Supply of Primary Care Professionals
Despite interest in the future of the health care workforce, few projections directly address the supply of primary care professionals. Recent physician workforce projections focus instead on the supply of physicians from all specialties combined. Using these factors, HRSA calculated two estimates of future workforce supply. Move Toward Primary Care Medicine, A Key to Better Quality and Lower Costs, Is Impeded by Health Care System’s Current Financing Mechanisms
Health professional workforce projections that are mostly silent on the future supply of and demand for primary care services are symptomatic of an ongoing decline in the nation’s financial support for primary care medicine. Ample research in recent years concludes that the nation’s over reliance on specialty care services at the expense of primary care leads to a health care system that is less efficient. At the same time, research shows that preventive care, care coordination for the chronically ill, and continuity of care—all hallmarks of primary care medicine—can achieve better health outcomes and cost savings. However, some physician organizations—seeking to reemphasize primary care services— are proposing a new model of delivery. Several findings on the benefits of primary care medicine raise concerns about the prudence of a health care payment system that undervalues primary care services. | Why GAO Did This Study
Most of the funding for programs under title VII of the Public Health Service Act goes toward primary care medicine and dentistry training and increasing medical student diversity. Despite a longstanding objective of title VII to increase the total supply of primary care professionals, health care marketplace signals suggest an undervaluing of primary care medicine, creating a concern about the future supply of primary care professionals--physicians, physician assistants, nurse practitioners, and dentists. This concern comes at a time when there is growing recognition that greater use of primary care services and less reliance on specialty services can lead to better health outcomes at lower cost. GAO was asked to focus on (1) recent supply trends for primary care professionals, including information on training and demographic characteristics; (2) projections of future supply for primary care professionals, including the factors underlying these projections; and (3) the influence of the health care system's financing mechanisms on the valuation of primary care services. GAO obtained data from the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) and organizations representing primary care professionals. GAO also reviewed relevant literature and position statements of these organizations.
What GAO Found
In recent years, the supply of primary care professionals increased, with the supply of nonphysicians increasing faster than physicians. The numbers of primary care professionals in training programs also increased. Little information was available on trends during this period regarding minorities in training or actively practicing in primary care specialties. For the future, health professions workforce projections made by government and industry groups have focused on the likely supply of the physician workforce overall, including all specialties. Few projections have focused on the likely supply of primary care physician or other primary care professionals. Health professional workforce projections that are mostly silent on the future supply of and demand for primary care services are symptomatic of an ongoing decline in the nation's financial support for primary care medicine. Ample research in recent years concludes that the nation's over reliance on specialty care services at the expense of primary care leads to a health care system that is less efficient. At the same time, research shows that preventive care, care coordination for the chronically ill, and continuity of care--all hallmarks of primary care medicine--can achieve improved outcomes and cost savings. Conventional payment systems tend to undervalue primary care services relative to specialty services. Some physician organizations are proposing payment system refinements that place a new emphasis on primary care services. |
gao_AIMD-00-317 | gao_AIMD-00-317_0 | Our review of presidential CMB disbursements over $200 did not identify any documented evidence that presidential CMB funds were used to pay for printing reports for the 1998 World Exposition in Lisbon, Portugal. 2. Did congressional CMB videotapes have a narrow political distribution and did internal controls exist over the use of copyrighted material? 3. 4. We found no evidence to indicate that four presidential CMB contracts to conduct studies on census undercounting were improperly procured. 5. Were protected census data accessed by two former congressional CMB employees? We found that 2 of 27 questions in a congressional CMB contractor focus group study mentioned political parties. 7. We found some evidence of a verbal confrontation between a congressional CMB contractor and Bureau of the Census employees in a local census office (LCO). CMB Disbursements
The vast majority of CMB disbursements were supported and related to official business.However, we could not evaluate about $119,000 of disbursements, all but about $1,000 of which were the presidential CMB’s. We found specific internal control weaknesses in three main areas: travel, personnel, and the procurement of services. Some of these weaknesses allowed a number of inappropriate and wasteful practices, and two policies were inconsistent with federal law. We found weak internal controls and poor accounting by CMB regarding annual leave. Although specific weaknesses relating to travel, personnel, and the procurement of services were noted for both components, the congressional CMB made a considerable effort to establish an internal control environment that provided a foundation and tone of discipline and structure. Lack of Administrative Leadership. This contributed to a weak administrative management environment and poor employee attendance. No Evidence of Authority to Travel. Poor Records Management. Our disclosure of related-party relationships and transactions does not imply any improprieties, but is in response to your request for this information. Finally, we identified transactions involving prior substantive relationships among CMB officials, including employer/employee or contractor affiliations. We identified 13 congressional and 11 presidential CMB related-party relationships involving about $1 million in salaries, benefits, and contracts for each side. Scope and Methodology
Our scope was to obtain and review information on seven specific matters requested, as follows: 1. 3. Were congressional and presidential CMB funds used in connection with political events? 4. 6. In addition, our scope was to audit all CMB out-of-town travel disbursements and all other disbursements over $200 from the first transactions in June 1998 through March 31, 2000, including any unusual transactions that came to our attention after this period. Further, our scope included evaluating the internal control environment that existed for both sides of CMB; identifying CMB financial policies, procedures, and internal controls and whether they were followed and effective; determining if CMB disbursements were incurred for official CMB government purposes; and identifying related-party relationships and transactions. evaluate the effectiveness of CMB program activities in monitoring the 2000 Census; conduct a search for CMB transactions incurred before March 31, 2000, but paid later; determine whether royalty payments should have been made by the congressional CMB on copyrighted material used in the production of videotapes; evaluate CMB official travel or other activity beyond the stated purpose of the trip; evaluate the congressional CMB contractor’s focus group methodology or questions that were asked; conduct physical inventories of property; determine the extent of personal telephone usage; determine the extent of long distance telephone usage on office telephones; quantify the aggregate impact of improper charges discussed in this report; audit transactions with inadequate support; or determine whether frequent flyer mileage earned was used for personal travel. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the financial management of the Census Monitoring Board (CMB), focusing on: (1) information on seven specific matters contained in congressional requests; (2) an audit relating to all CMB out-of-town travel disbursements and all other financial transactions over $200 from CMB's inception in June 1998 through March 31, 2000, which resulted in GAO auditing about 98 percent of the dollar value of total CMB disbursements; (3) CMB financial policies and practices, the internal control environments, and specific internal controls over disbursements, including those related to travel, personnel, and procurement of services; and (4) related-party transactions that met the criteria congressional members asked GAO to use.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) it found little documented evidence to substantiate possible improprieties in connection with seven specific matters identified in congressional request letters: (a) no presidential CMB funds were used to print reports for the 1998 World Exposition; (b) congressional CMB videotapes did not have a narrow political distribution; (c) no CMB funds were used for political travel; (d) presidential CMB contracts for studies on census undercounting were not improperly procured; (e) no evidence existed that former congressional CMB employees accessed protected census data; (f) two out of 27 questions in a congressional CMB contractor focus group study made some mention of political parties; and (g) some verbal confrontation occurred between a congressional CMB contractor and Bureau of the Census employees, and the contract was terminated shortly thereafter for a variety of reasons; (2) GAO's remaining efforts focused on CMB support for expenditures and an assessment of the internal control environment established to ensure disciplined financial operations; (3) the majority of CMB disbursements were generally supported and related to official business; (4) however, GAO found a pattern of significant CMB internal control weaknesses related to travel, personnel, and the procurement of services, some of which resulted in inappropriate and wasteful practices; (5) weak internal controls allowed unreconciled payroll, benefits, and annual leave accounts, weak contract accounting, and disbursements without required approvals to pay; (6) some CMB policies were inconsistent with federal law; (7) while weaknesses related to travel, personnel, and procurement existed for both sides, the congressional and presidential CMB operated in substantially different internal control environments; (8) the congressional CMB made a considerable effort to establish an internal control environment; (9) the presidential CMB operations were primarily characterized by weak or unenforced policies, oral authorizations, and poor records management, largely due to a lack of administrative leadership; (10) GAO identified transactions involving prior business relationships among CMB officials, including employer/employee or contractor affiliations; (11) GAO found 13 congressional and 11 presidential CMB related-party relationships involving about $1 million in salaries and contracts for each side; and (12) GAO's disclosure of related-party relationships and transactions does not imply any improprieties. |
gao_GAO-06-488 | gao_GAO-06-488_0 | U.S. Of this amount, USAID was budgeted $496 million for reconstruction, and other U.S. agencies were budgeted $85 million for various other activities. USAID Reconstruction Programs in Indonesia and Sri Lanka
USAID’s planned reconstruction efforts in Indonesia and Sri Lanka include its signature projects, such as road and bridge construction; small-scale infrastructure projects, such as rebuilding schools and clinics; technical assistance for good governance; and transition assistance to improve survivors’ livelihoods and, in Indonesia, to build houses. Initial USAID plans call for completing its nonsignature activities in both countries by September 2007 and its signature projects in Indonesia and Sri Lanka by September 2009 and March 2008, respectively. USAID Has Obligated about One-third and Expended a Small Percentage of Reconstruction Funds in Indonesia
As of January 31, 2006, USAID had obligated $111 million (32 percent) and expended $9 million (3 percent) of the $349 million budgeted for its reconstruction projects in Indonesia (see table 4). 2. Increasing costs for materials and labor will also likely affect the road construction project’s overall cost. Although USAID is slightly ahead of schedule, the length of time required to correctly plan and design the signature bridge project at Arugam Bay may challenge the agency’s efforts to complete the bridge by March 2008, the projected deadline. USAID Intends to Strengthen Indonesian and Sri Lankan Audit Capacities
USAID plans to strengthen the capacities of the BPK, the Indonesian government’s supreme audit institution. USAID Has Taken Steps to Establish Technical Oversight but Has Not Filled Some Needed Positions
To establish technical oversight for its reconstruction programs in Indonesia and Sri Lanka, USAID has relocated experienced staff, plans to hire other staff locally, and has acquired additional expertise through agreements with other U.S. agencies. USAID also plans to hire an additional engineer locally when construction in Sri Lanka commences. Although USAID hired an engineer to oversee the signature road construction project in Indonesia, the engineer was not expected to begin work until May 2006. In addition, USAID had added two of the three engineers needed to oversee infrastructure construction activities in Sri Lanka. These include working in regions with long-standing civil conflicts, coordinating with host governments and NGOs, and ensuring adequate management of regular programs. To address this challenge, USAID is implementing peace-building initiatives in Aceh Province. In addition, USAID has faced coordination problems with NGOs. Recommendation for Executive Action
On the basis of our initial review of USAID’s design and implementation of its tsunami reconstruction programs in Indonesia and Sri Lanka, especially regarding its signature road project in Indonesia and bridge project in Sri Lanka, we recommend that the Secretary of State, in the department’s required semiannual report to Congress due in June 2006, provide updated cost estimates and schedules obtained from USAID. In this report, we review (1) USAID’s progress in providing longer-term reconstruction assistance in Indonesia and Sri Lanka, (2) the extent to which the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has established financial and technical oversight for its tsunami reconstruction programs in those countries, and (3) any challenges that USAID faces in implementing the Indonesian and Sri Lankan programs and any steps the agency has taken to address these challenges. 2. | Why GAO Did This Study
In December 2004, an earthquake off the coast of Indonesia caused a tsunami that left more than 230,000 people killed or missing and presumed dead and an estimated $10 billion in damage in 12 countries. In May 2005, Congress appropriated $908 million for relief and reconstruction. U.S. emergency relief efforts budgeted at $327 million were nearly completed in December 2005. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) plans to spend $496 million on longer-term reconstruction, focusing on Indonesia and Sri Lanka, with the remaining $85 million allocated to other U.S. agencies. GAO has been mandated to monitor USAID's reconstruction efforts. In this report, GAO describes USAID's (1) progress in Indonesia and Sri Lanka, (2) financial and technical oversight measures, and (3) implementation challenges.
What GAO Found
USAID has begun a number of reconstruction activities in Indonesia and Sri Lanka. As of January 31, 2006, approximately 8 months after Congress appropriated funding, USAID had obligated $111 million (32 percent) and expended $9 million (3 percent) of the $349 million budgeted for reconstruction in Indonesia, and it had obligated all and expended $2 million (2 percent) of the $85 million budgeted for reconstruction in Sri Lanka. However, rising prices of materials and labor in both countries may increase costs for many construction efforts, including USAID's "signature" projects, which are intended to generate greater visibility for U.S. assistance. In addition, revisions to initial assessments of site conditions may challenge USAID's ability to finish its signature project in Indonesia--a 150-mile road in Aceh Province--by September 2009, the estimated completion date. In Sri Lanka, the time needed to complete designs and plans may make it difficult to finish one part of USAID's signature project--a bridge at Arugam Bay--by March 2008, although this project is currently slightly ahead of schedule. USAID plans to complete most of its other reconstruction projects, such as building schools and restoring livelihoods, by September 2007. USAID has established financial and technical oversight for its tsunami recovery programs in Indonesia and Sri Lanka. For financial oversight, USAID plans to arrange a concurrent audit of the signature road project in Indonesia and strengthen Indonesian and Sri Lankan audit capacities. For technical oversight, USAID has begun to add staff to oversee its signature construction projects and has acquired additional construction engineering expertise from another U.S. agency. An additional engineer will start work in Indonesia in May 2006. In Sri Lanka, USAID has added two engineers to its staff and plans to hire an additional construction oversight engineer in April 2006, prior to beginning construction. In implementing its Indonesian and Sri Lankan reconstruction programs, USAID faces several broad challenges. These include working in regions with long-standing conflicts, coordinating with host governments and nongovernmental organizations, and ensuring that non-tsunami-related development assistance activities are not neglected. To address these challenges, USAID has taken actions such as engaging in peace-building initiatives, participating in regularly scheduled coordination meetings, and hiring and reassigning staff to assist with increased workloads. |
gao_GAO-01-15 | gao_GAO-01-15_0 | FEMA Has Responded to Lessons Learned From Oklahoma City Bombing
When the President declared the Oklahoma City bombing a federal emergency, FEMA served effectively as the lead federal agency responsible for consequence management. After FEMA had completed its response activities, it assessed its and others’ actions to reflect lessons learned from the response to the bombing. To ensure that roles and responsibilities for managing the consequences of a terrorist incident are clear and to respond to PDD 39 requirements, FEMA—alone or in coordination with other federal agencies: updated the Federal Response Plan and added a Terrorism Incident Annex that includes better interagency guidance and describes federal, state, and local policies and the structure for coordinating management of the consequences of terrorist incidents; added to the Federal Response Plan four support annexes covering community relations, donations management, logistics management, and occupational health and safety and an appendix, Overview of a Disaster Operation; developed a Concept of Operations Plan to guide the overall federal response to domestic terrorist incidents and describe actions federal agencies should take nationally and locally; established a better liaison between FEMA and local FBI offices and trained staff for liaison positions; developed terrorism preparedness annexes to support FEMA regions’ response plans and provided updates of these plans to federal and state partners; and established a logistics and donations manager as part of the response structure. After the Oklahoma City bombing incident, FEMA developed its first course specifically related to terrorism preparedness in 1996 (see table 1). 3). To determine the extent to which FEMA has ensured the preparedness of states and federal agencies to respond to terrorist incidents, we reviewed our prior work on combating terrorism, FEMA’s strategic plan, annual performance plans and reports, and the Terrorism Preparedness Strategic Plan. Through 1999, 62 CSEPP exercises had been conducted. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) actions to improve its capabilities to respond to terrorist incidents based on its response to lessons learned from the Oklahoma City bombing, requirements in Presidential Decision Directives 39 and 62, and its own guidance. Specifically, GAO determined the extent to which FEMA has (1) incorporated the lessons learned from the aftermath of the Oklahoma City bombing, (2) ensured the preparedness of states and federal agencies to respond to terrorist incidents, and (3) ensured that states' plans are tested through exercises.
What GAO Found
GAO found that FEMA (1) has made across the board improvements in those areas identified as needing action after the Oklahoma City bombing, (2) updated the Federal Response Plan to address how federal agencies, states, and localities would work together to respond to an act of terrorism, and (3) assessed states' capabilities for consequence management in 1995 and set up a system to continue monitoring those capabilities. |
gao_GAO-05-224 | gao_GAO-05-224_0 | Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine (1) the sources and magnitude of improper rental assistance payments that HUD has identified, (2) the actions HUD is taking under RHIIP to reduce improper rental assistance payments in the voucher and public housing programs and the status of these initiatives, (3) the actions HUD is taking under RHIIP to reduce improper payments in the project-based Section 8 program and the status of these initiatives, and (4) the status and potential impact of HUD’s efforts to reduce the risk of improper payments by simplifying the subsidy determination process. HUD Has Identified Sources of Errors but Lacks Complete and Reliable Estimates of Improper Subsidies for Every Source
As part of the Rental Housing Integrity Improvement Project’s (RHIIP) error measurement effort, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) identified three sources of errors that resulted in improper rent subsidy payments: (1) incorrect rent subsidy determinations made by program administrators (program administrator errors), (2) unreported tenant income, and (3) incorrect billing or distribution of subsidy payments (billing errors). HUD conducted separate studies to look at the amount of improper rent subsidies attributable to each source of error for vouchers, public housing, and project-based Section 8 but was able to develop reliable estimates of dollar errors for only one of the three sources—errors made by program administrators in determining rent subsidies—for fiscal years 2000 and 2003. HUD paid an estimated $1.4 billion in gross improper rent subsidies (consisting of an estimated $896 million in overpayments and $519 million in underpayments) as a result of such errors in fiscal year 2003. Estimated Errors by Program Administrators Declined by 39 Percent between Fiscal Years 2000 and 2003
Our analysis of data that HUD gathered for its quality control study indicates that HUD made an estimated $1.4 billion in gross improper rent subsidies in fiscal year 2003 as a result of errors made by program administrators—about 39 percent less than the estimated $2.3 billion in fiscal year 2000. 5). For the public housing program, HUD did not attempt to estimate billing errors. First, HUD instituted on- site Rental Integrity Monitoring (RIM) reviews to assess public housing agencies’ (PHA) compliance with HUD’s policies for determining rent subsidies, but these reviews, which are not a regular part of HUD’s PHA oversight activities, were poorly implemented due to, among other things, a lack of clear policies and procedures. 6). Furthermore, although HUD conducted over 700 RIM reviews, it did not collect complete or consistent information from these reviews. First, HUD has improved its policies and guidance for its project-based Section 8 programs and trained property owners, contract administrators, and HUD field office staff on their administrative and oversight responsibilities. HUD Plans to Implement a New Income Verification System but Must First Address Data Security Concerns
HUD plans to implement a Web-based income verification system for project-based Section 8, a key effort under RHIIP, after it addresses data security concerns. Once the system is implemented, property owners will be able to access earned income data from a secure Web site. HUD Will Rely on PBCAs to Address Its Monitoring Effort under RHIIP
HUD plans to rely on PBCAs to monitor property owners’ compliance with HUD’s policies for determining rent subsidies. However, HUD has not conducted a formal study on the impact of these approaches on tenant rental payments and program costs. According to HUD, a major reason for subsidy calculation errors is the complexity of the existing policies. For example, program administrators must determine tenants’ eligibility for 44 different income exclusions and deductions to determine their rent payments and subsidies. The October 2004 meeting concluded with HUD considering performing more extensive analysis of the various approaches to simplifying its policies for determining rent subsidies. | Why GAO Did This Study
In fiscal year 2003, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) paid about $28 billion to help some 5 million low-income tenants afford decent rental housing. HUD has three major programs: the Housing Choice Voucher (voucher) and public housing programs, administered by public housing agencies; and project-based Section 8, administered by private property owners. As they are in every year, some payments were too high or too low, for several reasons. To assess the magnitude and reasons for these errors, HUD established the Rental Housing Integrity Improvement Project (RHIIP). In response to a congressional request, GAO examined the sources and magnitude of improper rent subsidy payments HUD has identified and the steps HUD is taking to address them, including efforts to simplify the process of determining rent subsidies.
What GAO Found
HUD has identified three sources of errors contributing to improper rent subsidy payments: (1) incorrect subsidy determinations by program administrators, (2) unreported tenant income, and (3) incorrect billing. HUD has attempted to estimate the amounts of improper subsidies attributable to each source but has developed reliable estimates for only the first--and likely largest--source. HUD paid an estimated $1.4 billion in gross improper subsidies (consisting of $896 million in overpayments and $519 million in underpayments) in fiscal year 2003 as a result of program administrator errors--a 39 percent decline from HUD's fiscal year 2000 (baseline) estimate. GAO estimates that the amount of net overpayments could have subsidized another 56,000 households with vouchers in 2003. HUD has made several efforts under RHIIP to address improper rent subsidies for its public housing and voucher programs. Rental Integrity Monitoring (RIM) reviews by HUD's field offices--on-site assessments of public housing agencies' compliance with policies for determining rent subsidies--are a key part of the initiative. However, GAO found that resource constraints and a lack of clear guidance from HUD headquarters hampered the reviews and that the field offices did not collect complete and consistent data, limiting HUD's ability to analyze and make use of the results. HUD has not incorporated RIM reviews into its routine oversight activities. HUD expects that a second effort, a Web-based tenant income verification system, will avoid an estimated $6 billion in improper subsidies over 10 years, but the system is not yet fully implemented. HUD has undertaken RHIIP efforts for its project-based Section 8 programs but faces several challenges. HUD has improved its policies and guidance for property owners. The agency also plans to give owners access to the Web-based income verification system by the end of 2006. HUD plans to rely more extensively on contractors to monitor property owners' compliance with its policies for determining subsidies. According to HUD, the complexity of the existing policies contributes to the difficulties program administrators have in determining rent subsidies correctly. For example, program administrators must assess tenants' eligibility for 44 different income exclusions and deductions. However, simplification will likely require statutory changes by Congress and affect the rental payments of many tenants. HUD is considering various approaches to simplifying policies for determining rent subsidies but has not conducted a formal study to inform policymakers on this issue. |
gao_GAO-06-11 | gao_GAO-06-11_0 | To accomplish its mission, HHS is comprised of 12 component agencies and several staff offices that cover a wide range of activities—including conducting and sponsoring medical and social science research, guarding against the outbreak of infectious diseases, assuring the safety of food and drugs, and providing health care services and insurance. According to the President’s most recent budget, HHS expects to spend about $5 billion in IT in fiscal year 2006, making the department’s IT investment budget the third largest in the federal government. Until HHS implements and oversees a stable investment management process throughout the department, it will lack essential management controls over all of its IT investments, and it will be unable to ensure that it is appropriately selecting, managing, and evaluating the mix of investments that will maximize returns to the organization, taking into account the appropriate level of risk. Because of the management attention that has been given to IT investment management, the department has put in place over half of the key practices needed to establish the investment foundation. Defining business needs for each IT project helps to ensure that projects and systems support an organization’s business needs and meet users’ needs. For example, HHS has not addressed any of the key practices related to evaluating the portfolio or conducting PIRs. Despite these important steps in defining portfolio selection criteria, weaknesses remain. Until the department develops a mechanism for ensuring that component agencies define and implement investment management processes that align with those of the department, it is running the risk that effective processes are being institutionalized at both the department and the component agency level. HHS Does Not Have a Plan to Coordinate and Guide Improvement Efforts
HHS has initiated several efforts to improve its investment management process. Critical to HHS’s success, going forward will be the development of an implementation plan that (1) is based on an assessment of strengths and weaknesses; (2) specifies measurable goals, objectives, and milestones; (3) specifies needed resources; (4) assigns clear responsibility and accountability for accomplishing tasks; and (5) is approved by senior management. Without such a plan and procedures for implementing it, it is unlikely that the department will effectively establish mature investment management capability. As a result, HHS will continue to be challenged in its ability to make informed and prudent investment decisions in managing its annual multibillion-dollar IT budget. Recommendations for Executive Action
To strengthen HHS’s investment management capability and address the weaknesses discussed in this report, we recommend that the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services direct the Chief Information Officer to develop and implement a plan for improving the department’s IT investment management processes. Establish a process for the investment board to regularly review and track the performance of a defined set of component agency IT systems against expectations, and take corrective actions when these expectations are not being met; and establish a mechanism for maintaining visibility into other investments. Finally, to improve the department oversight of its component agency investment management process, we are recommending that the HHS Secretary direct the HHS CIO to establish a mechanism for ensuring component agencies define and implement investment management processes that are aligned with those of the department. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to (1) assess the Department of Health and Human Services’s capabilities for managing its IT investments and (2) determine any plans HHS might have for improving those capabilities. To address our first objective, we reviewed the results of the department’s self-assessment of Stages 2 and 3 practices using our ITIM framework and validated and updated the results of the self-assessment through document reviews and interviews with officials. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) is one of the largest federal agencies, the nation's largest health insurer, and the largest grant- making agency in the federal government. The department manages over 300 programs that serve to improve the health and well-being of the American public and is comprised of several component agencies covering a wide range of activities including conducting and sponsoring medical and social science research, guarding against the outbreak of infectious diseases, assuring the safety of food and drugs, and providing health care services and insurance. It also manages and funds a variety of information technology (IT) initiatives ranging from those facilitating the payment of claims for Medicare and Medicaid services to those supporting health surveillance and communications. In fiscal year 2006, the department plans to spend over $5 billion on information technology--the third largest IT expenditure in the federal budget. As we agreed with Congress, our objectives were to (1) assess the department's capabilities for managing its IT investments and (2)determine any plans the department might have for improving those capabilities. To address these objectives, we analyzed documents and interviewed agency officials to (1)validate and update HHS's self-assessments of key practices in the framework and (2)evaluate HHS's plans for improving its capabilities.
What GAO Found
Because of the management attention that has been given to IT investment management, HHS has established over half of the foundational practices needed to manage its IT investments individually and about 30 percent of the key practices needed to effectively manage its portfolio of investments. For example, HHS has implemented many of the practices required to ensure that (1) projects support business needs and meet users' requirements, (2) a well-defined and disciplined process is used to select IT investments, (3) investment information is captured in a repository for decision makers, and (4) IT portfolio selection criteria are developed and maintained. However, critical weaknesses remain in several areas. Specifically, HHS lacks: (1) business representation on its senior IT investment review board of component agencies to carry out its full scope of responsibilities, (2) an established process for the IT investment board to regularly review a defined set of the component agencies' IT investments and maintain visibility of other investments, (3) criteria for assessing portfolio performance or regularly reviewing the performance of the organization's investment portfolio, and (4) processes for conducting post-implementation reviews (PIR) of its IT investments. The department also does not have a structured mechanism in place for ensuring that component agencies define and implement investment management processes that are aligned with those of the department. Until the department fully establishes all foundational and portfolio-level practices and establishes a mechanism to ensure that component agencies define and implement processes that are aligned with those of the department, executives cannot be assured that they are appropriately selecting, managing, and evaluating the mix of investments that will maximize returns to the organization, taking into account the appropriate level of risk. HHS has initiated steps to improve its investment management process; however, these steps do not fully address the weaknesses we identify in this report, nor are they coordinated along with other needed improvement efforts into a plan that (1) is based on an assessment of strengths and weaknesses; (2) specifies measurable goals, objectives, and milestones; (3) specifies needed resources; (4) assigns clear responsibility and accountability for accomplishing tasks; and (5) is approved by senior management. Without such a plan and procedures for implementing it, the department risks being unable to effectively establish mature investment management capabilities. As a result, executives may not be able to make informed and prudent investment decisions in managing the department's annual multibillion-dollar IT budget. |
gao_GAO-13-186T | gao_GAO-13-186T_0 | Lack of an Agencywide Policy, Consistent Processes, and Agency Focal Point Limits TSA’s Ability to Receive and Use Complaint Information
TSA receives thousands of air passenger screening complaints through five centralized mechanisms but does not have an agencywide policy, consistent processes, or an agency focal point to guide the receipt of these complaints, or “mine” these data to inform management about the nature and extent of the screening complaints to help improve screening operations and customer service. TSA also uses TCC data to inform the public about air passenger screening complaints, monitor operational effectiveness of airport security checkpoints, and make changes as needed. To address these weaknesses, we recommended that TSA establish a consistent policy to guide agencywide efforts for receiving, tracking, and reporting air passenger screening complaints; establish a process to systematically compile and analyze information on air passenger screening complaints from all complaint mechanisms; and designate a focal point to develop and coordinate agencywide policy on screening complaint processes, guide the analysis and use of the agency’s screening complaint data, and inform the public about the nature and extent of screening complaints. We believe that these are beneficial steps that would address the recommendation, provided that the resulting policy refinements improve the existing processes for receiving, tracking, and reporting all air passenger screening complaints, including the screening complaints that air passengers submit locally at airports through comment cards or in person at security checkpoints. In commenting on a draft of our November 2012 report, TSA also stated that the agency began channeling information from the Talk to TSA database to the TCC in October 2012. TSA Has Several Methods to Inform Air Passengers about Making Screening Complaints, but Does Not Consistently Implement Them
TSA has several methods to inform passengers about its complaint processes, but does not have an agencywide policy or mechanism to ensure consistent use of these methods among commercial airports. TSA’s Complaint Resolution Processes Do Not Fully Conform to Standards of Independence, but TSA Is Taking Steps to Increase Independence
TSA’s complaint resolution processes do not fully conform to standards of independence to ensure that these processes are fair, impartial, and credible, but the agency is taking steps to improve independence. It is too early to assess the extent to which these initiatives will help mitigate possible concerns about independence. TSA Is Expanding Its Risk-Based Programs, Including the Pre✓™ Program
TSA officials stated that the agency is undertaking efforts to focus its resources and improve the passenger experience at security checkpoints by applying new intelligence-driven, risk-based screening procedures and enhancing its use of technology. One component of TSA’s risk-based approach to passenger screening is the Pre✓™ program, which was introduced at 32 airports in 2012, and which the agency plans to expand to 3 additional airports by the end of the calendar year. According to TSA, more than 4 million passengers have been screened through this program to date. Agency officials have reported that with the deployment of this program and other risk-based security initiatives, such as modifying screening procedures for passengers 75 and over and active duty service members, TSA has achieved its stated goal of doubling the number of passengers going through expedited screening. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses the findings of our November 2012 report assessing the Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) efforts to improve the air passenger screening complaints processes. TSA screens or oversees the screening of more than 650 million air passengers per year at 752 security checkpoints in more than 440 commercial airports nationwide, and must attempt to balance its aviation security mission with competing goals of efficiency and respecting the privacy of the traveling public. The agency relies upon multiple layers of security to deter, detect, and disrupt persons posing a potential risk to aviation security. These layers focus on screening millions of passengers and pieces of carry-on and checked baggage, as well as tons of air cargo, on a daily basis.
Given TSA's daily interaction with members of the traveling public, air passenger screening complaints reflect a wide range of concerns about, for example, the systems, procedures, and staff that TSA has used for screening air passengers at security checkpoints. This includes concerns related to the use of Advanced Imaging Technology and enhanced pat-down procedures. TSA screens or oversees the screening of more than 650 million air passengers per year at 752 security checkpoints in more than 440 commercial airports nationwide, and must attempt to balance its aviation security mission with competing goals of efficiency and respecting the privacy of the traveling public. The agency relies upon multiple layers of security to deter, detect, and disrupt persons posing a potential risk to aviation security. These layers focus on screening millions of passengers and pieces of carry-on and checked baggage, as well as tons of air cargo, on a daily basis. TSA has processes for addressing complaints about air passengers' screening experience at security checkpoints, but concerns have been raised about these processes. Also, TSA is implementing a Pre✓ program to expedite screening at security checkpoints.
This statement primarily based on our November 2012 report and, like the report, discusses the extent to which TSA has (1) policies and processes to guide the receipt of air passenger screening complaints, and uses this information to monitor or enhance screening operations, (2) a consistent process for informing passengers about how to make complaints, and (3) complaint resolution processes that conform to independence standards to help ensure that these processes are fair and impartial. As requested, the statement also describes TSA's recent efforts to make the screening process more risk-based and selective through use of TSA's Pre✓ program.
What GAO Found
In summary, TSA receives thousands of air passenger screening complaints through five central mechanisms, but does not have an agencywide policy, consistent processes, or a focal point to guide receipt and use of such information. Also, while the agency has several methods to inform passengers about its complaint processes, it does not have an agencywide policy or mechanism to ensure consistent use of these methods among commercial airports. In addition, TSA's complaint resolution processes do not fully conform to standards of independence to ensure that these processes are fair, impartial, and credible, but the agency is taking steps to improve independence. To address these issues, we made four recommendations to TSA with which the agency concurred, and it indicated actions it is taking in response. Finally, TSA officials stated that the agency is undertaking efforts to focus its resources and improve the passenger experience at security checkpoints by applying new intelligence-driven, risk-based screening procedures, including expanding its Pre✓ program. TSA plans to have this program in place at 35 airports by the end of the calendar year and estimates that it has screened more than 4 million passengers to date through this program. |
gao_GAO-15-419 | gao_GAO-15-419_0 | About Half of Older Households Have No Retirement Savings, and Many Rely on Social Security
According to our analysis of data from the 2013 SCF, 52 percent of households age 55 and older have no retirement savings in a DC plan or IRA, and Social Security provides most of the retirement income for about half of households age 65 and older. 1). Most of the households in this age group have some other resources or benefits from a DB plan, but 27 percent of this age group have neither retirement savings nor a DB plan. Among households age 55-64, the 41 percent with no retirement savings have few other financial resources but they are less likely to have debt than those with retirement savings.have less than $25,000 in total financial assets, such as in savings accounts or non-retirement investments. Six In Ten Households Age 55- 64 Have Some Retirement Savings
For the 59 percent of households age 55-64 with some retirement savings, we estimate that the median amount saved is about $104,000, which is equivalent to an insured, inflation-protected annuity of $310 per month for a 60-year-old. Studies and Surveys Provide Mixed Evidence on the Adequacy of Retirement Savings among Workers and Retirees Studies of Retirement Savings and Income Adequacy Conclude Different Things about U.S. Retirement Security, Largely Because of Different Savings Targets
Economists broadly agree that a conceptual benchmark measure for adequate retirement saving is an amount that will, along with other sources of retirement income, allow a household to maintain its pre- retirement standard of living into retirement. However, there is no consensus about how much income this standard requires. Assumptions about income targets and methodology help drive the conclusions of these different studies. Surveys Show That Workers Age 55 and Older Approaching Retirement May Overestimate Their Ability to Earn Future Income
Surveys indicate that workers age 55 and older generally plan to retire at an older age and work more in retirement than current retirees actually did. The Federal Reserve survey also suggests that many workers may unrealistically expect to continue working as long as possible or transition to new work when they “retire”. People Age 55-64 Are Less Confident about Their Financial Well-Being in Retirement Than Those over 65
As compared to people age 55-64, many people over 65 report being able to manage financially. According to the 2013 Survey of Consumer Finances, two-thirds of households age 65-74 say their received or expected retirement income is at least enough to maintain living standards (66 percent). Moreover, poverty rates are higher for people approaching retirement and people who are 75 and older. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Labor, the Department of the Treasury, and the Social Security Administration for review and comment. The Department of Labor provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. 2. What evidence do studies and surveys provide about retirement security for workers and retirees? Retirement Financial Resources
To describe the financial resources of near and current retirees, we examined financial information from the 2013 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF). Income from DB plans includes traditional pensions with lifetime benefits and annuitized DC plans. We also interviewed authors of studies and other retirement experts about retirement readiness. We also reviewed survey questions of retirees and workers approaching retirement age to infer information about their experiences of saving for and living in retirement. Based on this, we found the data to be reliable for the purposes used in this report. | Why GAO Did This Study
As baby boomers move into retirement each year, the Census Bureau projects that the age 65-and-older population will grow over 50 percent between 2015 and 2030. Several issues call attention to the retirement security of this sizeable population, including a shift in private-sector pension coverage from defined benefit plans to defined contribution plans, longer life expectancies, and uncertainty about Social Security's long-term financial condition. In light of these developments, GAO was asked to review the financial status of workers approaching retirement and of current retirees.
GAO examined 1) the financial resources of workers approaching retirement and retirees and 2) the evidence that studies and surveys provide about retirement security for workers and retirees. To conduct this work, GAO analyzed household financial data, including retirement savings and income, from the Federal Reserve's 2013 Survey of Consumer Finances, reviewed academic studies of retirement savings adequacy, analyzed retirement-related questions from surveys, and interviewed retirement experts about retirement readiness. GAO found the data to be reliable for the purposes used in this report.
GAO received technical comments on a draft of this report from the Department of Labor and incorporated them as appropriate.
What GAO Found
Many retirees and workers approaching retirement have limited financial resources. About half of households age 55 and older have no retirement savings (such as in a 401(k) plan or an IRA). According to GAO's analysis of the 2013 Survey of Consumer Finances, many older households without retirement savings have few other resources, such as a defined benefit (DB) plan or nonretirement savings, to draw on in retirement (see figure below). For example, among households age 55 and older, about 29 percent have neither retirement savings nor a DB plan, which typically provides a monthly payment for life. Households that have retirement savings generally have other resources to draw on, such as non-retirement savings and DB plans. Among those with some retirement savings, the median amount of those savings is about $104,000 for households age 55-64 and $148,000 for households age 65-74, equivalent to an inflation-protected annuity of $310 and $649 per month, respectively. Social Security provides most of the income for about half of households age 65 and older.
Studies and surveys GAO reviewed provide mixed evidence about the adequacy of retirement savings. Studies range widely in their conclusions about the degree to which Americans are likely to maintain their pre-retirement standard of living in retirement, largely because of different assumptions about how much income this goal requires. The studies generally found about one-third to two-thirds of workers are at risk of falling short of this target. In surveys, compared to current retirees, workers age 55 and older expect to retire later and a higher percentage plan to work during retirement. However, one survey found that about half of retirees said they retired earlier than planned due to health problems, changes at their workplace, or other factors, suggesting that many workers may be overestimating their future retirement income and savings. Surveys have also found that people age 55-64 are less confident about their finances in retirement than those who are age 65 or older. |
gao_GAO-13-762T | gao_GAO-13-762T_0 | Economic Significance of Intellectual Property Protection and Theft
As we reported in April 2010, IP is an important component of the U.S. economy and IP-related industries pay higher wages and contribute a significant percentage to the U.S. economy. Ensuring the protection of IP rights encourages the introduction of innovative products and creative works to the public. As we reported in April 2010, intellectual property is an important component of the U.S. economy, and the United States is an acknowledged global leader in the creation of intellectual property. IP-related industries also pay significantly higher wages than other industries and contribute to a higher standard of living in the United States. To the extent that counterfeiting and piracy reduce investments in research and development, these companies may hire fewer workers and may contribute less to U.S. economic growth, overall. The U.S. economy, as a whole, also may experience effects of losses by consumers and government. In addition, private sector organizations have experienced a wide range of incidents involving data loss or theft, economic loss, computer intrusions, and privacy breaches, underscoring the need for improved security practices. In February 2011, media reports stated that computer hackers had broken into and stolen proprietary information worth millions of dollars from the networks of six U.S. and European energy companies. Quantifying Economic Impacts Is Difficult, However Industry Research Suggests the Impacts Are Sizable
Generally, as we reported in April 2010, the illicit nature of counterfeiting and piracy makes estimating the economic impact of IP infringements extremely difficult, so assumptions must be used to offset the lack of data. Efforts to estimate losses involve assumptions such as the rate at which consumers would substitute counterfeit for legitimate products, which can have enormous impacts on the resulting estimates. Because of the significant differences in types of counterfeited and pirated goods and industries involved, no single method can be used to develop estimates. Each method has limitations, and most experts observed that it is difficult, if not impossible, to quantify the economy-wide impacts. Nonetheless, research in specific industries suggests that the problem is sizeable. Economy-Wide Impact of Counterfeiting and Piracy Is Unknown
While experts and literature we reviewed in our April 2010 report provided different examples of effects on the U.S. economy, most observed that despite significant efforts, it is difficult, if not impossible, to quantify the net effect of counterfeiting and piracy on the economy as a whole. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
The United States is an acknowledged global leader in the creation of intellectual property. According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, IP theft is a growing threat which is heightened by the rise of the use of digital technologies. IP is any innovation, commercial or artistic, or any unique name, symbol, logo, or design used commercially. IP rights protect the economic interests of the creators of these works by giving them property rights over their creations. Cyber attacks are one way that threat actors--whether nations, companies, or criminals--can target IP and other sensitive information of federal agencies and American businesses. While bringing significant benefits, increasing computer interconnectivity can create vulnerabilities to cyber-based threats. GAO was asked to testify on efforts to estimate the economic impacts of theft of intellectual property. Accordingly, this statement discusses (1) the economic significance of intellectual property protection and theft on the U.S. economy and (2) insights from efforts to quantify the economic impacts of counterfeiting and piracy on the U.S. economy. This statement is based on products GAO issued from April 2010 through June 2012 on the economic impacts of theft of intellectual property and on cyber threats and economic espionage.
What GAO Found
In April 2010, GAO reported that intellectual property (IP) is an important component of the U.S. economy and IP-related industries contribute a significant percentage to the U.S. gross domestic product. IP-related industries also pay significantly higher wages than other industries and contribute to a higher standard of living in the United States. Ensuring the protection of IP rights encourages the introduction of innovative products and creative works to the public. According to experts and literature GAO reviewed, counterfeiting and piracy have produced a wide range of effects on consumers, industry, government, and the economy as a whole. The U.S. economy as a whole may grow more slowly because of reduced innovation and loss of trade revenue. To the extent that counterfeiting and piracy reduce investments in research and development, companies may hire fewer workers and may contribute less to U.S. economic growth, overall. Furthermore, as GAO reported in June 2012, private sector organizations have experienced data loss or theft, economic loss, computer intrusions, and privacy breaches. For example, in February 2011, media reports stated that computer hackers had broken into and stolen proprietary information worth millions of dollars from the networks of six U.S. and European energy companies.
Generally, as GAO reported in April 2010, the illicit nature of counterfeiting and piracy makes estimating the economic impact of IP infringements extremely difficult. Nonetheless, research in specific industries suggests that the problem is sizeable, which is of particular concern as many U.S. industries are leaders in the creation of intellectual property. Because of the difficulty in estimating the economic impact of IP infringements, assumptions must be used to offset the lack of data. Efforts to estimate losses involve assumptions such as the rate at which consumers would substitute counterfeit for legitimate products, which can have enormous impacts on the resulting estimates. Because of the significant differences in types of counterfeited and pirated goods and industries involved, no single method can be used to develop estimates. Each method has limitations, and most experts observed that it is difficult, if not impossible, to quantify the economy-wide impacts.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making any new recommendations in this statement. |
gao_GGD-99-104 | gao_GGD-99-104_0 | As of April 1999, however, according to an update to a 1998 National Women’s Law Center report:
In addition to the federal government, 41 states and the District of Columbia had laws specifically criminalizing certain types of sexual misconduct in prisons. The four correctional jurisdictions we studied have or were in the process of developing staff sexual misconduct policies. Staff Sexual Misconduct Occurs, Although the Full Extent Is Unknown
Available data provided to us by the four jurisdictions we studied indicate that staff sexual misconduct in women’s prisons is not a hypothetical issue, i.e., such misconduct does occur. That is, the allegations resulted in staff resignations, employment terminations, or other administrative sanctions. Each of the four jurisdictions was involved in at least two civil lawsuits related to staff sexual misconduct. These jurisdictions either did not have or could not readily compile data on allegations involving other types of sexual misconduct, such as verbal harassment and inappropriate visual surveillance. At Least 92 Allegations of Staff Sexual Misconduct Were Sustained in the Three Largest U.S. Correctional Systems During 1995 to 1998
According to data provided to us by BOP, California, and Texas officials, female inmates in these three jurisdictions collectively made a total of at least 506 allegations of staff-on-inmate sexual misconduct during calendar years 1995 to 1998. Rather, according to an official from the District’s Office of the Corporation Counsel, for the period December 1995 to June 1998, female inmates in the District made 111 allegations of staff sexual misconduct, of which 12 (or 11 percent) were sustained. The official could not readily provide information on the nature or outcome of the allegations but noted that sustained allegations resulted in either staff resignations or disciplinary actions ranging from suspensions to employment terminations. Officials in the four jurisdictions we studied cited lack of evidence as the primary reason why the number of sustained allegations was relatively small compared to the total number of reported allegations. However, only BOP reported having any criminal prosecutions with convictions under applicable laws during calendar years 1995 to 1998. None of the four jurisdictions we studied had readily available, comprehensive data or reports on the number, nature, and outcomes of staff-on-inmate sexual misconduct allegations. The systemic absence of such data or reports makes it difficult for lawmakers, correctional system managers, relevant federal and state officials, inmate advocacy groups, academicians, and others to effectively address staff sexual misconduct issues. Laws, Policies, and Procedures Related to Staff-on-Inmate Sexual Misconduct in Four U.S. Correctional Jurisdictions
This appendix presents information about staff-on-inmate sexual misconduct laws, policies, and procedures regarding women’s prisons in four correctional jurisdictions—the federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP), the California Department of Corrections, the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, and the District of Columbia Department of Corrections. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on staff-on-inmate sexual misconduct in women's prisons, focusing on the: (1) applicable laws, policies, and procedures for addressing such misconduct; and (2) number, nature, and outcome of allegations that have been made in recent years.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) during the 1990s, most U.S. correctional jurisdictions have recognized that staff-on-inmate sexual misconduct is a problem that should not be tolerated; (2) as of April 1999, the federal government, 41 states, and the District of Columbia had passed laws criminalizing certain types of staff sexual misconduct in prisons; (3) most U.S. correctional systems have participated in training to help them develop and implement applicable policies and procedures to address such misconduct; (4) the four correctional systems GAO studied have or were in the process of developing specific policies that prohibit staff sexual misconduct; (5) while laws and policies could help minimize staff sexual misconduct, GAO's work in four jurisdictions indicates that such misconduct still occurs; (6) according to data provided by the 3 largest jurisdictions, during calendar years 1995 to 1998, female inmates in these jurisdictions collectively made a total of 506 allegations of staff sexual misconduct, of which 92 were sustained; (7) most of the sustained allegations resulted in staff resignations or employment terminations; (8) the full extent of staff sexual misconduct is unknown since two of the three jurisdictions did not provide data on all types of allegations; (9) the District of Columbia provided data for December 1995 to June 1998, during which 12 of 111 female-inmate allegations were sustained and resulted in staff resignations or disciplinary actions ranging from suspensions to employment terminations; (10) of the four jurisdictions studied, only Bureau of Prisons (BOP) reported having any criminal prosecutions with convictions under sexual misconduct laws during 1995 to 1998; (11) all four jurisdictions were involved in at least two civil lawsuits related to staff sexual misconduct during this period; (12) officials in the four jurisdictions cited lack of evidence as the primary reason why more allegations were not sustained; (13) the officials told GAO that most allegations involved verbal harassment, improper visual surveillance, improper touching, or consensual sex; (14) the officials noted that allegations involving rape and other types of forced sexual assault were relatively rare; (15) however, none of the four jurisdictions GAO studied had readily available, comprehensive data or reports on the number, nature, and outcomes of staff-on-inmate sexual misconduct allegations; and (16) the absence of such systemic data or reports makes it difficult for lawmakers, corrections management, and others to effectively address staff sexual misconduct issues. |
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