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gao_GAO-06-376 | gao_GAO-06-376_0 | Most States Collect Limited Information on Company Ownership and Management
Most states do not require ownership information at the time a company is formed, and while most states require corporations and LLCs to file annual or biennial reports, few states require ownership information on these reports. States may require other types of information on company formation documents, but typically they do not ask for more than the name of the company and the name and address of the agent for service of process (where legal notices for the company should be sent). Some states have additional information requirements for company formations. Also, managers may or may not be owners of the LLC. An Alaska state official said that this information was originally required to identify offshore fisheries and their owners. For example, two agents told us that their firms did not keep a database of company information, in part because company documents filed with the state are part of the public record. Law Enforcement Officials Can Obtain Some Company Information from States and Agents, but a Lack of Ownership Information Obstructs Some Investigations
Law enforcement officials are concerned about the use of U.S. shell companies to facilitate or hide criminal activity. Law enforcement officials we interviewed noted that they often used the information available from states in investigating shell companies that were suspected of criminal activities and said that, in some cases, the names of officers and directors on company filings had generated additional leads. However, officials also said that the information states collected was limited, noting that it could provide a place to start but that some cases had been closed because of insufficient information on beneficial owners. Law Enforcement Officials Are Concerned about the Use of U.S. The FBI has also expressed concern about the use of third-party agents to form thousands of shell companies in the United States for criminals operating in other countries; the criminals then use the shell companies to open U.S. bank accounts. But if states or agents collected additional information on companies, filing times could increase, and a few states worried that costs could increase and company start-ups could be deterred. Other agents said that collecting and verifying ownership information would be difficult because they may have contact only with law firms and not company officials when a company is formed. Therefore, minimal information is collected on the owners of these companies. Further, such a requirement would need to be uniformly applied in all U.S. jurisdictions. Specifically, this report discusses 1. the kinds of information—including ownership information—that the 50 states and the District of Columbia collect during company formation and the states’ efforts to review and verify it; 2. the roles of third-party agents, such as company formation agents, and the kinds of information they collect on company ownership; 3. the role of shell companies in facilitating criminal activity, the availability of company ownership information to law enforcement, and the usefulness of such information in investigating shell companies; and 4. the potential effects of requiring states, agents, or both to collect company ownership information. | Why GAO Did This Study
Companies form the basis of most commercial and entrepreneurial activities in market-based economies; however, "shell" companies, which have no operations, can be used for illicit purposes such as laundering money. Some states have been criticized for requiring minimal ownership information to form a U.S. company, raising concerns about the ease with which companies may be used for illicit purposes. In this report, GAO describes (1) the kinds of information each of the 50 states and the District of Columbia and third party agents collect on companies, (2) law enforcement concerns about the use of companies to hide illicit activity and how company information from states and agents helps or hinders investigations, and (3) implications of requiring states or agents to collect company ownership information.
What GAO Found
Most states do not require ownership information at the time a company is formed, and while most states require corporations and limited liability companies (LLC) to file annual or biennial reports, few states require ownership information on these reports. With respect to the formation of LLCs, four states require some information on members, who are owners of the LLC. Some states require companies to list the names and addresses of directors, officers or managers on filings, but these persons may not own the company. Nearly all states screen company filings for statutorily required information, but none verify the identities of company officials. Third-party agents may submit formation documents to the state on a company's behalf, usually collecting only billing and statutorily required information for formations. These agents generally do not collect any information on owners of the companies they represent, and instances where agents told us they verified some information were rare. Federal law enforcement officials are concerned that criminals are increasingly using U.S. shell companies to conceal their identity and illicit activities. Though the magnitude of the problem is difficult to measure, officials said U.S. shell companies are appearing in more investigations in the United States and other countries. Officials told us that the information states collect has been helpful in some cases because names on the documents, such as names of directors, generated additional leads. However, some officials said that the information was limited and that cases had been closed because the owners could not be identified. State officials and agents said that collecting company ownership information could be problematic. Some state officials and agents noted that collecting such information could increase the cost of company filings and the time needed to approve them. Some officials said that if they had additional requirements, companies would go to other states or jurisdictions. Finally, officials and agents expressed concerns about compromising individuals' privacy because owner information disclosed on company filings would be part of the public record, which has not historically been the case for private companies. |
gao_GAO-16-575 | gao_GAO-16-575_0 | FHWA Encourages States to Install Crash-Tested Roadside Safety Hardware, but the Movement to Adopt Improved Standards Has Been Slow
FHWA oversees and promotes the installation of crash-tested roadside safety hardware through guidance and policy directives to the states and by issuing letters to roadside safety hardware developers that submit crash-test results for review by FHWA. We found that states generally require crash testing; however, some inconsistencies across state policies and practices exist, and a movement to adopt the improved MASH standards has been slow. Most States Said They Require Crash Testing, though Some Inconsistencies Exist, and Transition to Improved Standards Has Been Slow
Most states that responded to our survey told us that roadside safety hardware installed on the NHS is required to be crash tested, and many of those states said they had processes in place to limit installation of roadside safety hardware to those that have obtained FHWA eligibility letters. Monitoring and reporting industry and state progress to the goal dates set in the 2016 Joint Implementation Plan would allow FHWA to keep decision makers in both DOT and Congress aware of progress. Crash Testing Is Well Documented and Thorough, but FHWA’s Oversight Process Does Not Address Potential Threats to Independence
At all nine U.S. labs accredited to conduct crash testing of roadside safety hardware for FHWA review, laboratory crash testing was well documented and thorough in terms of consistency in documentation and test procedures across labs. Specifically, six of the nine crash test labs we reviewed can test products that were developed by employees of the same parent organization. FHWA reviews crash test results as part of its eligibility letter process; however, FHWA does not have a process for formally verifying the testing outcomes and making or providing for an independent pass/fail determination. FHWA relies heavily on the labs to determine whether the crash test outcome results in a pass or fail determination for roadside safety hardware. In other test settings we found that federal agencies require third party verification of test results or independent entities to make pass/fail determinations. Establishing a process for third-party verification of crash test results could provide greater assurance that threats to independence are fully addressed. Few In-Service Performance Evaluations of Roadside Safety Hardware Have Been Conducted, in Part, Due to a Lack of Data
According to FHWA and AASHTO-sponsored research, in-service performance evaluations (ISPE) are recommended for effective roadside safety hardware oversight because real-world crash conditions, such as vehicle characteristics, as well as the terrain of the roadway, may vary widely from those experienced in crash testing. FHWA officials told us that in the summer of 2015, FHWA began a pilot study on the collection of data on guardrail end terminals’ performance. FHWA officials told us they currently have no plans to include additional ISPEs for other types of roadside safety hardware as part of their broader highway-safety research portfolio. However, continuing this study and reporting on the performance of guardrail end terminals, or planning to make ISPEs part of other future research, could add to the limited body of knowledge regarding the in- service performance of roadside safety hardware. Recommendations
To promote the transition to improved crash test standards, to strengthen FHWA’s oversight of the roadside safety hardware’s crash-testing process, and to make more information available to states and industry on how roadside safety hardware performs in actual conditions, we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation direct the Administrator of FHWA to take the following five actions: 1. Develop a process for third-party verification of results from crash-test labs. In written comments, reproduced in appendix III, DOT concurred with GAO’s recommendations. FHWA also provided technical comments which we incorporated, as appropriate. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report addresses: (1) how FHWA performs oversight of state policies and practices related to roadside safety hardware; (2) the thoroughness of the crash-testing process and FHWA’s oversight of this process; and (3) the extent to which information is available on roadside safety hardware performance once installed. We reviewed standards and relevant guidance from the American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO). | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2014, 54 percent of traffic fatalities in the United States occurred as a result of a vehicle's leaving the roadway, according to U.S. Department of Transportation's (DOT) data. Roadside safety hardware, such as guardrails, is meant to reduce the risk of a serious crash when leaving the roadway. But in the last several years, a number of serious injuries and deaths resulted from crashes into roadside safety hardware. GAO was asked to review FHWA's oversight framework for roadside safety hardware.
This report assesses: (1) how FHWA performs oversight of state policies and practices related to roadside safety hardware; (2) the laboratory crash-testing process and FHWA's oversight of this process; and (3) the extent to which information is available on roadside safety hardware's performance once installed. GAO reviewed federal and state policies, surveyed state DOTs and received 44 responses, and reviewed documentation from nine U.S. crash test labs.
What GAO Found
The Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) oversees and promotes states' installation of crash-tested roadside safety hardware through guidance and policy directives to states and by issuing letters to roadside safety hardware developers that provide states with information on roadside safety hardware that has been crash tested. States that responded to our survey generally stated they require crash testing. However, some inconsistencies across state practices exist, and states' movement to require installation of devices successfully tested to updated, improved crash test standards—in the Manual for Assessing Safety Hardware (MASH)— has been slow. FHWA, in partnership with the American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO), recently established transition dates to the MASH standards for states, but some challenges exist in developing and approving a sufficient quantity of roadside safety hardware tested to MASH standards. FHWA currently does not have a monitoring plan to report on progress to meeting the established dates; monitoring and reporting would allow FHWA to keep decision makers aware of progress and position FHWA to take corrective actions as needed.
In general, laboratory crash testing appears to be well documented and thorough; however, FHWA's oversight of the process does not address potential threats to independence. GAO found that six of the nine accredited U.S. crash test laboratories evaluate products that were developed by employees of the parent organization—a potential threat to lab independence. FHWA reviews crash tests' results and related documentation, if they are submitted for review, but FHWA relies heavily on the labs to make a pass/fail determination. We found that some other federal agencies in oversight of similar labs' testing settings require third party verification of test results or independent entities to make pass/fail determinations. FHWA does not have a process for formally verifying the testing outcomes and making its own or providing for an independent pass/fail determination. Developing a process for third party verification of roadside safety hardware's lab test results could provide greater assurance that potential threats to independence are fully addressed.
Little is known about the in-service performance of roadside safety hardware because few evaluations of this performance have been done. FHWA and AASHTO recommend that states and others perform in-service performance evaluations (ISPE) of installed roadside safety hardware because crash testing cannot fully capture real-world crash conditions. However, few ISPEs have been done, in part, because of a lack of inventory and crash data. In the summer of 2015 in four states, FHWA began a pilot study that could provide useful information, but according to FWHA officials, the purpose of this phase of the pilot is to determine best practices on data collection rather than assess performance of roadside safety hardware. FHWA officials told us they currently have no plans to include performance findings as part of future phases of this study or in their broader research portfolio. Continuing this study or planning to make ISPEs part of future research could add to the limited ISPE body of knowledge.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making recommendations, including that DOT monitor and periodically report on the transition to the MASH crash test standards; develop a process for third party verification of crash test results; and support additional research on roadside safety hardware's in-service performance. DOT concurred with the recommendations and provided technical comments, which were incorporated in the report, as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-15-537 | gao_GAO-15-537_0 | DOD’s 2015 Sustainable Ranges Report Met Statutory Reporting Requirements
DOD’s 2015 Sustainable Ranges Report met the statutory reporting requirements to describe DOD’s progress in implementing its training range sustainment plan and to describe any actions taken or to be taken in addressing training constraints caused by limitations on the use of military lands, marine areas, or airspace. DOD also provided updates to several elements of the plan required by the Act including: (1) proposals to enhance training range capabilities and to address any shortfalls in current DOD resources identified pursuant to DOD’s assessment and evaluation; (2) goals and milestones for tracking planned actions and measuring progress in the implementation of its training range sustainment plan; and (3) projected funding requirements for implementing planned actions. DOD Reported on Proposals to Enhance Range Capabilities and to Address Shortfalls
In our review of DOD’s 2015 Sustainable Ranges Report, we found that DOD reported on its proposals to enhance training range capabilities and to address any shortfalls in resources. DOD developed these proposals by evaluating current and future training range requirements and the ability of current DOD resources to meet these requirements. In conducting the training range assessment, the Marine Corps, for example, identified several training shortfalls that it is working to remedy, such as the capability to fully exercise a large Marine Air-Ground Task Force in a realistic training scenario. The area currently being used is not large enough to accommodate a full-scale, live-fire Marine Expeditionary Brigade exercise. To address this shortfall, DOD was authorized to expand this training area by approximately 103,000 acres exclusively for military use and an additional 50,000 acres for joint military and recreational use. Efforts are under way to acquire this additional land. According to DOD’s report, the military services assessed the ranges’ assigned training mission areasattributes and 12 encroachment factors to evaluate their ability to support assigned training missions. The services also described any planned or ongoing actions to remedy the shortfalls. DOD Used Goals and Milestones to Update Its Progress in Implementing Its Training Range Sustainment Plan
In its 2015 Sustainable Ranges Report, DOD identified goals and milestones to help address the statutory requirements to describe its progress in implementing its training range sustainment plan. DOD has seven shared goals in support of this plan. The goals are: (1) mitigate encroachment pressures on training activities from competing operating space; (2) mitigate frequency spectrum competition; (3) meet military airspace challenges; (4) manage increasing military demand for range space; (5) address effects from new energy infrastructure and renewable energy effects; (6) anticipate climate change effects;excellence in environmental stewardship. Each military service has developed its own milestones and needed actions for reaching those milestones, using these goals as a common framework. DOD has delineated four funding categories to be used by the services to project their range sustainment requirements: (1) modernization and investment, (2) operations and maintenance, (3) environmental, and (4) encroachment. Agency Comments
We are not making any recommendations in this report. In its written response, DOD agreed with our report. Appendix I: Section 366 of the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003
SEC. (a) PLAN REQUIRED———(1) The Secretary of Defense shall develop a comprehensive plan for using existing authorities available to the Secretary of Defense and the Secretaries of the military departments to address training constraints caused by limitations on the use of military lands, marine areas, and airspace that are available in the United States and overseas for training of the Armed Forces. (B) Goals and milestones for tracking planned actions and measuring progress. (C) Projected funding requirements for implementing planned actions. (5) At the same time as the President submits to Congress the budget for each of fiscal years 2005 through 2008, the Secretary shall submit to Congress a report describing the progress made in implementing the plan and any additional actions taken, or to be taken, to address training constraints caused by limitations on the use of military lands, marine areas, and airspace. Military Training: DOD Met Annual Reporting Requirements and Improved Its Sustainable Ranges Report. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD relies on its training ranges within the United States and overseas to help prepare its forces for combat or complex missions around the globe.
Section 366 of the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (as amended) (“the Act”) required DOD to submit a comprehensive plan on its efforts to address training constraints caused by limitations on the use of military lands, airspace, and marine areas available in the United States and overseas for training, and requires DOD to provide annual reports on its efforts to implement the plan and address training constraints. The Act also includes a provision for GAO to submit evaluations of DOD's reports to Congress within 90 days of receiving them from DOD.
This is GAO's12th report evaluating DOD's annual report. GAO assessed the extent to which DOD's 2015 Sustainable Ranges Report met the statutory reporting requirements in that it described its progress in implementing its sustainable ranges plan and described any actions taken or to be taken in addressing training constraints caused by limitations on the use of military lands, marine areas, or airspace. To conduct this work, GAO compared DOD's 2015 report to statutory reporting requirements and interviewed cognizant DOD officials.
GAO is not making recommendations in this report. DOD agreed with GAO's report.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense's (DOD) 2015 Sustainable Ranges Report met the statutory reporting requirements in that it described its progress in implementing its sustainable ranges plan and described any actions taken or to be taken in addressing training constraints caused by limitations on the use of military lands, marine areas, or airspace. DOD's 2015 report provides updates to several elements of the plan required by the Act, including: (1) proposals to enhance training range capabilities and address any shortfalls in current resources; (2) goals and milestones for tracking planned actions and measuring progress in the implementation of DOD's training range sustainment plan; and (3) projected funding requirements for implementing its planned actions.
First, DOD's report included proposals to enhance training range capabilities and to address shortfalls in current resources. DOD developed these proposals by evaluating current and future training range requirements and the ability of current DOD resources to meet these requirements. For example, in the report, the Marine Corps identified several training shortfalls that it is working to remedy, such as the capability to fully exercise a large Marine Air-Ground Task Force in a realistic training scenario. The area currently being used is not large enough to accommodate a full-scale, live-fire Marine Expeditionary Brigade exercise. To address this shortfall, DOD was authorized to expand this training area by approximately 103,000 acres exclusively for military use and an additional 50,000 acres for joint military and recreational use. Efforts are under way to acquire this land. DOD also included in its report the results of a capability and encroachment assessment of its training ranges that evaluated the services' ability to support assigned training missions. In that section, the services described any planned or ongoing actions to remedy shortfalls identified during the assessment.
Second, DOD's report identified goals and milestones for tracking planned actions and measuring progress in the implementation of DOD's training range sustainment plan. DOD's report identified seven shared goals in support of its plan: (1) mitigate encroachment pressures on training activities from competing operating space; (2) mitigate frequency spectrum competition; (3) meet military airspace challenges; (4) manage increasing military demand for range space; (5) address effects from new energy infrastructure and renewable energy effects; (6) anticipate climate change effects; and (7) sustain excellence in environmental stewardship. Also, the report included discussion of each military service's milestones and needed actions for reaching those milestones, using these goals as a common framework.
Third, DOD's report identified projected funding requirements for each of the military services to implement their planned actions. DOD's report delineated four funding categories to be used by the services to project their range sustainment requirements: (1) modernization and investment, (2) operations and maintenance, (3) environmental, and (4) encroachment. DOD identified a total of approximately $1.68 billion in funding requirements across the services for fiscal year 2015 for these categories. |
gao_GAO-08-457T | gao_GAO-08-457T_0 | The act defined the department’s missions to include preventing terrorist attacks within the United States; reducing U.S. vulnerability to terrorism; and minimizing the damages and assisting in the recovery from attacks that occur within the United States. DHS began operations in March 2003. We also reported on broad themes that have underpinned DHS’s implementation efforts, such as agency transformation, strategic planning, and risk management. DHS Has Made Progress in Implementing Its Management and Mission Functions but Has Faced Challenges in Its Implementation Efforts
DHS has made progress in implementing its management and mission functions in the areas of acquisition, financial, human capital, information technology, and real property management; border security; immigration enforcement; immigration services; aviation, surface transportation, and maritime security; emergency preparedness and response; critical infrastructure and key resources protection; and science and technology. Overall, DHS made more progress in implementing its mission functions than its management functions, reflecting an initial focus on implementing efforts to secure the homeland. Mission Areas
Border Security. Surface Transportation Security. Although DHS has made progress in these areas, it has faced challenges in sharing information and warnings on attacks, threats, and vulnerabilities and in providing and coordinating incident response and recovery planning efforts. DHS has taken steps to coordinate and share homeland security technologies with federal, state, local, and private sector entities. We have reported that while it is important that DHS continue to work to strengthen each of its core management and mission functions, it is equally important that these key issues be addressed from a comprehensive, departmentwide perspective to help ensure that the department has the structure and processes in place to effectively address the threats and vulnerabilities that face the nation. Agency Transformation
DHS has faced an enormous management challenge in its transformation efforts as it works to integrate 22 component agencies. Nevertheless, in 2007 we reported that DHS’s implementation and transformation remained high-risk because DHS had not yet developed a comprehensive management integration strategy and its management systems and functions⎯especially related to acquisition, financial, human capital, and information management⎯were not yet fully integrated and wholly operational. According to the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as amended, DHS is required to develop a transition and succession plan to guide the transition of management functions to a new Administration by December 2008. DHS is working to develop and implement plans and initiatives for managing the transition. Since the issuance of our August 2007 report, DHS has begun to develop performance goals and measures for some areas in an effort to strengthen its ability to measures its progress in key management and mission areas. We commend DHS’s efforts to measure its progress in these areas and have agreed to work with the department to provide input to help strengthen established measures. Such a transformation is a difficult undertaking for any organization and can take, at a minimum, 5 to 7 years to complete even under less daunting circumstances. Nevertheless, DHS’s 5-year anniversary provides an opportunity for the department to review how it has matured as an organization. As part of our broad range of work reviewing DHS management and mission programs, we will continue to assess in the coming months DHS’s progress in addressing high-risk issues. In particular, we will continue to assess the progress made by the department in its transformation and information sharing efforts. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) began operations in March 2003 with missions that include preventing terrorist attacks from occurring within the United States, reducing U.S. vulnerability to terrorism, minimizing damages from attacks that occur, and helping the nation recover from any attacks. GAO has reported that the implementation and transformation of DHS is an enormous management challenge and that the size, complexity, and importance of the effort make the challenge especially daunting and critical to the nation's security. GAO's prior work on mergers and acquisitions found that successful transformations of large organizations, even those faced with less strenuous reorganizations than DHS, can take at least 5 to 7 years to achieve. This testimony is based on GAO's August 2007 report evaluating DHS's progress between March 2003 and July 2007, selected reports issued since July 2007, and our institutional knowledge of homeland security issues.
What GAO Found
Since its establishment, DHS has made progress in implementing its management and mission functions in the areas of acquisition, financial, human capital, information technology, and real property management; border security; immigration enforcement and services; aviation, surface transportation, and maritime security; emergency preparedness and response; critical infrastructure protection; and science and technology. In general, DHS has made more progress in its mission areas than in its management areas, reflecting an initial focus on protecting the homeland. While DHS has made progress in implementing its functions in each management and mission area, we identified challenges remaining in each of these areas. These challenges include providing appropriate oversight for contractors; improving financial management and controls; implementing a performance-based human capital management system; implementing information technology management controls; balancing trade facilitation and border security; improving enforcement of immigration laws, enhancing transportation security; and effectively coordinating the mitigation and response to all hazards. Key issues that have affected DHS's implementation efforts are agency transformation, strategic planning and results management, risk management, information sharing, partnerships and coordination, and accountability and transparency. For example, GAO designated DHS's implementation and transformation as high-risk. While DHS has made progress in transforming its component agencies into a fully functioning department, it has not yet addressed key elements of the transformation process, such as developing a comprehensive transformation strategy. The Homeland Security Act of 2002, as amended, requires DHS to develop a transition and succession plan to guide the transition of management functions to a new Administration; DHS is working to develop and implement its approach for managing the transition. DHS has begun to develop performance goals and measures in some areas in an effort to strengthen its ability to measure its progress in key areas. We commend DHS's efforts and have agreed to work with the department to provide input to help strengthen established measures. DHS also has not yet fully adopted and applied a risk management approach in implementing its mission functions. Although some DHS components have taken steps to do so, this approach has not yet been implemented departmentwide. DHS's 5-year anniversary provides an opportunity for the department to review how it has matured as an organization. As part of our broad range of work reviewing DHS's management and mission programs, GAO will continue to assess DHS's progress in addressing high-risk issues. In particular, GAO will continue to assess the progress made by the department in its transformation and information sharing efforts. |
gao_GAO-08-587T | gao_GAO-08-587T_0 | Overview of EAC Creation and Purpose
The EAC was established by Comptroller General David Walker to provide a consolidated forum for him to meet with representatives from the various employee liaison groups (e.g. Advisory Council for Persons with Disabilities, Blacks In Government, Gay and Lesbian Employee Association, etc.) so that these groups could voice the concerns of their constituency groups. He also decided to include representatives from each of the staff positions (i.e. Administrative Professional Support Staff (APSS), attorneys, and each of the Band levels). Consequently, the EAC was chartered in January 2000 to serve as an advisory body to the Comptroller General and other senior executives by seeking and conveying the views and concerns of the individual employee groups they represent, proposing solutions to those concerns where appropriate, providing input by assessing and commenting on GAO policies, procedures, plans and practices, and communicating issues and concerns of the CG and senior managers to employees. Overall Survey Response Rate
The survey was sent to all GAO employees except Senior Executive Service/SL and interns (a total of 3,002 employees). Conclusion
In general, Band IIA staff reported more unfavorable responses to many of the topics covered in this survey (Band II restructuring, the Watson Wyatt studies –analyst and APSS, market-based pay, and overall GAO climate) than staff in other bands and positions. African American staff, older staff, and staff with more years at GAO, also had generally less favorable opinions of these topics. There were few differences of opinion between male and female staff, and headquarters and field staff about these topics. Respondents used the open-ended question that we included to further highlight their concerns regarding these topics as well as to express their continued belief in the work of the agency. While the narrative comments can not be generalized to the overall GAO population, they did provide insightful and thoughtful feedback for consideration. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses H.R. 3268, the "Government Accountability Office (GAO) Act of 2007" and other GAO reforms, to discuss the results of the survey that Congress previously requested that the Employee Advisory Council (EAC) conduct of all GAO employees (except Senior Executive Service/SL and interns) on GAO's Band II restructuring and the Watson Wyatt market-based compensation study used to set salary ranges. The EAC was established by Comptroller General David Walker to provide a consolidated forum for him to meet with representatives from the various employee liaison groups (e.g. Advisory Council for Persons with Disabilities, Blacks In Government, Gay and Lesbian Employee Association, etc.) so that these groups could voice the concerns of their constituency groups. He also decided to include representatives from each of the staff positions (i.e. Administrative Professional Support Staff (APSS), attorneys, and each of the Band levels). Consequently, the EAC was chartered in January 2000 to serve as an advisory body to the Comptroller General and other senior executives by seeking and conveying the views and concerns of the individual employee groups they represent, proposing solutions to those concerns where appropriate, providing input by assessing and commenting on GAO policies, procedures, plans and practices, and communicating issues and concerns of the CG and senior managers to employees.
What GAO Found
In general, Band IIA staff reported more unfavorable responses to many of the topics covered in this survey (Band II restructuring, the Watson Wyatt studies -analyst and APSS, market-based pay, and overall GAO climate) than staff in other bands and positions. African American staff, older staff, and staff with more years at GAO, also had generally less favorable opinions of these topics. There were few differences of opinion between male and female staff, and headquarters and field staff about these topics. Respondents used the open-ended question that we included to further highlight their concerns regarding these topics as well as to express their continued belief in the work of the agency. While the narrative comments can not be generalized to the overall GAO population, they did provide insightful and thoughtful feedback for consideration. |
gao_GAO-14-330 | gao_GAO-14-330_0 | The special issuance process may require additional medical information and evaluations from, for example, a primary care physician or medical specialist. However, FAA officials have said that they do not convene such roundtables frequently due to time and cost constraints. FAA developed the program by identifying medical conditions that, in most cases, did not pose a safety risk, based on FAA analysis of historic medical and accident data. Agency officials expect the program to allow more applicants to be certified at the time of their AME visit while freeing resources at FAA to focus on medically complex applicants with multiple conditions or medical conditions that may pose a greater risk to flight safety, such as applicants who have had coronary artery bypass surgery. FAA authorization for a special issuance that they believe should be considered under the CACI program. FAA Has Identified Technical Solutions to Improve Its Medical Certification Systems, but Has Not Set Time Frames for Implementation
Although most medical certification determinations are made by one of the approximately 3,300 FAA-designated AMEs at the time of an applicant’s medical exam, approximately 10 percent of applications—or nearly 40,000 annually—are deferred to FAA for further medical evaluation if the applicant does not meet FAA’s medical standards or has a disqualifying medical condition. According to FAA officials, the 10 percent of applicants who are deferred requires a significant amount of resources from FAA’s medical certification division, which in recent years, has experienced a backlog of special issuance applications in need of review. Accordingly, technical working groups at AMCD have identified more than 50 problems and potential technological solutions to enhance their systems, including the special issuance processes, of which about 20 have been identified as high-priority, including improvements to the online application system, AMCS, DIWS, and the ECG transmittal and review process. A timeline to guide the implementation of the highest-priority enhancements would help the agency take another step toward reducing the delays and bottlenecks in the special issuance process related to FAA’s technology issues. FAA Could Enhance its Online Application System and the Clarity of its Medical Application Form for Private Pilots
FAA Could Enhance Usability of its Online Medical Application System
One of FAA’s main tools to communicate its medical standards directly to applicants, and to solicit medical information from them, is its online medical application system. In addition, two pilot associations stated that a specific Web page or website for applicants with links to information on various medical conditions, their risks to flight safety, and additional medical evaluations that might be needed for applicants with those conditions would be helpful. 2). More specifically, FAA’s Writing Standards also recommend using active voice and active verbs to emphasize the doer of the action. Conclusions
Aerospace medical experts we interviewed generally agreed that FAA’s current medical standards are appropriate and supported FAA’s recent effort to authorize its AMEs to certify a greater number of applicants by using a data-driven approach to assessing risk through the CACI program. FAA has identified approximately 50 potential technological enhancements to its computer systems that support its certification process, including adding new functionality to facilitate the process and provide applicants with more information about medical requirements. Efforts to provide applicants with useful and relevant information and improve the clarity of the questions and instructions contained in the online application system and form could allow FAA to more clearly communicate medical requirements to applicants. These improvements could not only aid an applicant’s understanding of the medical standards and requirements, but also may result in more accurate and complete information provided by applicants to better inform FAA’s certification decisions. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve the applicants’ understanding of the medical standards and the information required to complete FAA’s medical certification process, the Secretary of Transportation should direct the Administrator of FAA to 1. develop a timeline for implementing the highest-priority technological improvements to the internal-computer systems that support the medical-certification process, and 2. enhance the online medical-application system by clarifying instructions and questions on the medical application form and providing useful information to applicants. Contact information and major contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report are to provide information on (1) FAA’s medical standards and policies and certification processes, along with medical experts’ views on them, and (2) steps that could be taken to promote private pilot applicants’ understanding of FAA’s medical requirements, including potential revisions to the medical application form. To obtain expert opinions on FAA’s medical standards, we collaborated with the National Academies’ Institute of Medicine to identify aviation medical experts. We reviewed the Pilots Bill of Rights Notification and Terms of Service Agreement, Form 8500-8 (medical application form) and instructions, and links within the online application system, evaluating that information against federal government website- usability guidelines and against FAA’s plain language guidelines. | Why GAO Did This Study
FAA developed its medical standards and pilot's medical-certification process to identify pilot applicants with medical conditions that may pose a risk to flight safety. The Pilot's Bill of Rights (P.L. 112-153) mandated GAO to assess FAA's medical certification standards, process, and forms.
This report addresses: (1) FAA's medical standards, policies, and certification processes, along with medical experts' views on them, and (2) steps that FAA could take to promote private pilots' understanding of its medical requirements. GAO reviewed statutes, regulations, FAA documents, and interviewed officials from FAA, NTSB, pilot associations, and 20 aviation medical experts primarily identified by the National Academies' Institute of Medicine. Experts were selected based on their type and depth of experience, including recognition in the aerospace-medicine professional community. GAO also interviewed FAA's medical certification division and evaluated the usability of FAA's online application system and the clarity of its application form against federal writing guidelines and best practices in website usability.
What GAO Found
Aerospace medical experts GAO interviewed generally agreed that the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) medical standards are appropriate and supported FAA's recent data-driven efforts to improve its pilot medical-certification process. Each year, about 400,000 candidates apply for a pilot's medical certificate and complete a medical exam to determine whether they meet FAA's medical standards. From 2008 through 2012, on average, about 90 percent of applicants have been medically certified by an FAA-designated aviation medical examiner (AME) at the time of their medical exam or by a Regional Flight Surgeon. Of the remaining applicants, about 8.5 percent have received a special issuance medical certificate (special issuance) after providing additional medical information to FAA. Approximately 1.2 percent were not medically certified to fly. According to an industry association, the special issuance process adds time and costs to the application process, in part, because applicants might not understand what additional medical information they need to provide to FAA. Officials from FAA's medical certification division have said that technological problems with the aging computer systems that support the medical certification process have contributed to delays in the special issuance process. FAA's medical certification division has identified about 50 potential technological enhancements to its internal computer systems that support the medical certification process, of which about 20 have been identified as high priority, but the division has not yet implemented them or developed a timeline to do so. By developing a timeline to implement the highest-priority enhancements, FAA would take another step toward expediting the certification process for many applicants hoping to obtain a special issuance. FAA recently established a datadriven process using historic medical and accident data that authorizes AMEs to certify a greater number of applicants with medical conditions who had previously required a special issuance. Officials expect this effort to allow more applicants to be certified at the time of their AME visit and to free resources at FAA to focus on applicants with higher-risk medical conditions.
GAO's analysis and medical experts' opinions indicate that FAA could improve its communication with applicants by making its online application system--part of FAA's internal computer systems discussed above--more user-friendly and improving the clarity of the medical application form. Specifically, GAO found that the online application system requires applicants to scroll through a lengthy terms-of-service agreement and does not provide clear instructions, and that the application form contained unclear questions and terms that could be misinterpreted by the applicant. FAA could enhance its online application system by using links to improve navigability of the system and providing information that is more useful to applicants--for example, links to information about the risk that specific medical conditions pose to flight safety and any additional medical information applicants with those conditions would need to provide to FAA. FAA could also improve the clarity of its medical application form by incorporating guidelines established in FAA's Writing Standards, including shorter sentences and paragraphs, active voice, and clear terms and questions. These clarifications could not only aid an applicant's understanding of the medical standards and requirements, but also may result in more accurate and complete information provided by applicants to better inform FAA's certification decisions.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that FAA (1) develop a timeline for implementing high-priority technological improvements to the internal computer systems that support the medical certification process, and (2) enhance the online medical-application system by clarifying instructions and questions on the form and providing useful information. The Department of Transportation agreed to consider the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-09-435T | gao_GAO-09-435T_0 | Our nation has built vast systems of roads, airways, railways, transit systems, pipelines, and waterways that facilitate commerce and improve our quality of life. However, these systems are under considerable strain due to increasing congestion and the costs of maintaining and improving the systems. DOT implements national transportation policy and administers most federal transportation programs. For fiscal year 2010, the President’s budget requested $72.5 billion to carry out these and other activities. Rather, the recipients of transportation funds, such as state departments of transportation, implement most transportation programs. Aiding Economic Recovery and Ensuring Accountability for Recovery Funds’ Use
Congress and the presidential administration have fashioned the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 to help our nation respond to what is generally reported to be the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression. DOT received about $48 billion of these funds for investments in transportation infrastructure—primarily for highways, passenger rail, and transit—mostly for use through fiscal year 2010. As with other executive agencies, DOT now faces the challenges of using these funds in ways that aid economic recovery, making wise funding choices while spending the money quickly, and ensuring accountability for results. This is a difficult challenge for transportation infrastructure projects. Among other things, the act gives our office the responsibility of reporting to Congress bimonthly on how selected states and localities are using the recovery funds. Addressing Funding, Safety, Mobility, and Modernization Challenges in Surface Transportation and Aviation Reauthorization Efforts
DOT and Congress will be faced with numerous challenges as they work to reauthorize the surface transportation and aviation programs. In particular, the department and Congress will need to address challenges in (1) ensuring that the nation’s surface transportation and aviation systems have adequate funding, (2) improving safety, (3) improving mobility, and (4) transforming the nation’s air traffic control system. Surface transportation program funding is one of the issues on our high-risk list. Funding the Nation’s Transportation System
Revenues from motor fuels taxes and truck-related taxes to support the Highway Trust Fund—the primary source of funds for highway and transit—are not keeping pace with spending levels. This fact was made dramatically apparent last summer when the Highway Account within the trust fund was nearly depleted. Supplement existing revenue sources. Turning to aviation funding, the excise taxes that fund Airport and Airway Trust Fund revenues have been lower than previously forecasted, and forecasts of future revenues have declined because of a decline in airline passenger travel, fares, and fuel consumption. We recently reported that although the number of traffic crashes and the associated fatality rates has decreased over the last 10 years, the number of fatalities has, unfortunately, remained at about 42,000 annually and some areas are of particular concern. While the U.S. commercial aviation industry is among the safest in the world, aviation safety is also a major concern because when accidents or serious incidents occur they can have catastrophic consequences. Improving Transportation Mobility
Congestion has worsened over the past 10 years, despite large increases in transportation spending at all levels of government and improvements to the physical condition of highways and transit facilities. Flight delays and cancellations at congested airports also continue to plague the U.S. aviation system. For example, almost one in four flights either arrived late or was canceled in 2008, and the average flight delay increased despite a 6 percent decline in the total number of operations through December 2008. Sustaining the current air traffic control system and maintaining facilities during the transition to NextGen. Federal Aviation Administration: Challenges Facing the Agency in Fiscal Year 2009 and Beyond. | Why GAO Did This Study
A safe, efficient, and convenient transportation system is integral to the health of our economy and quality of life. Our nation's vast transportation system of airways, railways, roads, transit systems, and waterways has served this need, yet is under considerable pressure due to increasing congestion and costs to maintain and improve the system. Calls for increased investment come at a time when traditional funding for transportation projects is increasingly strained. The authorizing legislation supporting transportation programs will soon expire. The Department of Transportation (DOT) implements national transportation policy and administers most federal transportation programs. DOT received funds for transportation infrastructure projects through the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 to aid in economic recovery. DOT also requested $72.5 billion to carry out its activities for fiscal year 2010. This statement presents GAO's views on major challenges facing DOT and Congress as they work to administer recovery funds and reauthorize surface transportation and aviation programs. It is based on work GAO has completed over the last several years. GAO has made recommendations to DOT to improve transportation programs; the agency has generally agreed with these recommendations. To supplement this existing work, GAO obtained information on the recovery funds provided to DOT.
What GAO Found
The Department of Transportation received about $48 billion of recovery funds for investments in transportation infrastructure from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. As with other executive agencies, DOT is faced with the challenges of using these funds in ways that will aid economic recovery, making wise funding choices while spending the money quickly, and ensuring accountability for results. GAO will report to Congress bimonthly on how states and localities use the recovery funds received from DOT. DOT and Congress will also be faced with numerous challenges as they work to reauthorize surface transportation and aviation programs. Funding the nation's transportation system. Revenues to support the Highway Trust Fund are not keeping pace with spending levels and the Highway Account was nearly depleted last summer. In addition, the excise taxes that fund Airport and Airway Trust Fund revenues have been lower than previously forecasted, and forecasts of future revenues have declined. Declining revenues in both trust funds may adversely affect DOT's ability to continue to fund surface transportation and aviation programs at levels previously assumed. Improving transportation safety. Although the number of traffic crashes and the associated fatality rate has decreased over the last 10 years, the number of fatalities has remained at about 42,000 annually. The continued high level of fatalities and difficulties experienced by states in implementing grant programs raise issues for Congress to consider in restructuring these programs during reauthorization. While the U.S. commercial aviation industry is among the safest in the world, accidents can have catastrophic consequences. The lack of performance measures and complete data limit DOT's ability to improve safety and manage safety risks. Improving transportation mobility. Despite large increases in transportation spending, congestion on our nation's highways has increased over the last 10 years and increased demand will further strain the system. Flight delays and cancellations at congested airports continue to plague the U.S. aviation system. For example, almost one in four flights either arrived late or was canceled in 2008, and the average flight delay increased despite a 6 percent annual decline in the total number of operations through December 2008. Congestion poses serious economic as well as environmental and health concerns for the nation. Transforming the nation's air traffic control system. The air traffic control modernization program is technically complex and costly. The Federal Aviation Administration will need to accelerate the implementation of new and existing technologies, consider incentives for aircraft operators to acquire those technologies, and sustain the current system while transitioning to the new one, among other things. |
gao_GAO-16-695 | gao_GAO-16-695_0 | Background
IRS Budget Structures
Funding requests for IRS are organized by appropriation account, which aligns broadly with its strategic goals to (1) deliver high-quality and timely service to reduce taxpayer burden, and encourage voluntary compliance; and (2) effectively enforce the law to ensure compliance with tax responsibilities and combat fraud. 3. IRS’s fiscal year 2016 appropriations increased by $290 million. In its fiscal year 2017 CJ, IRS explained how requests for increased funding were linked to appropriations accounts, but it did not provide this information for the amount requested to maintain current funding levels. IRS linked each requested program increase to a future state theme and included details on how much of the requested increase would be funded by each of the four appropriation accounts. However, IRS did not provide data on how much it is currently spending in support of each theme. According to officials, IRS is working to develop such data, but officials cited technical challenges with data availability and comparability as well as challenges identifying spending for specific themes, some of which are worded broadly. Such information is important to ensure transparency on the current funding levels to assist Congress in making informed budget decisions. IRS Used Its Flexibility to Spend User Fee Revenue to Fund Priorities
IRS Allocated User Fees as Part of Its Broader Budget Execution Process
IRS has permanent, indefinite authority to obligate user fee collections. Additionally, for fiscal year 2016, IRS was directed to wait 30 days following the submission of the user fee spend plan to Congress before obligating these funds. As shown in table 3 and the sidebar, both the amount and allocation of user fee funds shifted between fiscal years 2011 and 2016. As we reported in June 2015, IRS management decided to allocate more user fee funds to Operations Support in fiscal year 2015, in part because of changes in the amount appropriated to its accounts and the cost of implementing mandates, such as the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), which is largely funded by user fee revenue and Operations Support funds. For fiscal year 2016, planned user fee obligations ($509 million) account for about 4 percent of IRS’s total obligations ($12,374 million). IRS Changed Reporting of Major IT Investments, but Treasury Lacked Controls to Detect Errors in Reporting Certain IT Spending Data
IRS Reported the Fiscal Year 2017 President’s Budget Request of $2.8 Billion for IT Spending Differently Than in Prior Years
IT is a significant portion—about 21 percent—of the total IRS budget request for fiscal year 2017. The President requested $2.8 billion for IRS’s IT investments in fiscal year 2017, an increase of about 15 percent. IRS and Treasury review and monitor the information before the Capital Investment Plan and the Summary of Capital Investments reports are generated. According to federal internal control standards, ongoing monitoring should occur in the course of normal operations. As a result of our recommendation that IRS implement internal controls to ensure the accuracy of information on major IT investments reported in the annual CJ, IRS took additional steps when preparing the fiscal year 2017 CJ. Such errors could negatively affect Congress’s ability to obtain accurate information on IT investments needed to inform future budget decisions and oversight. For fiscal year 2017, IRS did not make clear how spending by themes relates to appropriation accounts and how this advances IRS’s priorities; this linkage is important to the clarity and transparency of IRS’s budget presentation. Appropriations staff told us this information would help them make informed budget and oversight decisions. Recommendations for Executive Action
To enhance the budget process and to improve transparency, we recommend that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, to the extent feasible, ensure that the CJ includes data by appropriation account on the amount of funding requested to maintain current services for each future state theme. In written comments reproduced in Appendix IV, IRS agreed with the recommendation related to the presentation of data in the Congressional Justification. IRS has adopted a new, more strategic, approach to identify and select budget program priorities based on future state themes for the fiscal year 2017 budget request. As part of its planning process, IRS prioritized a subset of 5 objectives for action as part of the 19 objectives identified in the IRS 2014-2017 Strategic Plan. | Why GAO Did This Study
Funding the federal government depends largely upon IRS's ability to collect taxes, including providing taxpayer services that make voluntary compliance easier and enforcing tax laws to ensure compliance with tax responsibilities. For fiscal year 2017, the President requested $12.3 billion in appropriations for IRS; the request is almost $1 billion (9 percent) more than IRS's fiscal year 2016 appropriation.
Because of the size of IRS's budget and the importance of its service and compliance programs for all taxpayers, GAO was asked to review the fiscal year 2017 budget request for IRS. In March 2016, GAO reported interim information on IRS's budget. This report assesses (1) the extent to which IRS's fiscal year 2017 CJ presents data on requested funding levels by appropriation accounts and in alignment with agency priorities, (2) IRS's management and allocation of user fees, and (3) the costs and reporting of IRS's IT investments. GAO reviewed the fiscal year 2017 CJ, documentation on IRS's vision for the future state, IRS budget plans, IT investment reports, and IRS budget data for fiscal years 2011 to 2017, interviewed IRS officials, and met with congressional appropriations staff to discuss the information they want included in the CJ.
What GAO Found
Congressional justification data . The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has taken steps to manage its budget more strategically but did not make linkages between priorities and appropriations accounts. IRS prioritized a subset of its 19 strategic objectives for action and established six themes that represent its “future state” vision for tax administration. In the fiscal year 2017 congressional justification (CJ), IRS linked requests for increased funding to themes and included details on how much would be funded by each appropriation account. However, IRS did not provide data on how much it spends in support of each theme or the amount of funding needed to maintain current levels by theme. IRS is working to develop such data, but officials cited challenges with data availability and tracking spending by themes. Such information would provide transparency on the current funding levels which assist Congress in making informed budget decisions.
User fee spending . IRS has permanent, indefinite authority to obligate and spend user fee collections, which it obligates as part of its budget execution process. IRS's user fee spend plan must be approved by both the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) and the Office of Management and Budget. IRS was directed to wait 30 days following the submission of the user fee spend plan to Congress before obligating funds. As seen in the table, planned user fee spending increased more than $220 million (79 percent) between fiscal years 2011 and 2016. Of the $509 million planned user fee obligations in fiscal year 2016, the largest amounts are for the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ($204 million) and the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act ($62 million).
Information technology data . The President's budget requested $2.8 billion for IRS's information technology (IT) investments which accounted for 21 percent of IRS's budget request for fiscal year 2017. Instead of presenting its IT investment data in its CJ, IRS moved them to a Treasury website. This is consistent with other Treasury bureaus and was intended to provide time for an enhanced data review process. However, despite the review process, Treasury did not detect an error which resulted in IRS underreporting its total IT investments by about $4 million. According to federal internal control standards, ongoing monitoring should occur in the course of normal operations. Data errors could negatively affect Congress's ability to make budget decisions and provide oversight.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that IRS ensure the CJ includes data on the amount of funding requested to maintain current services for each future state theme, and that Treasury ensure the accuracy of Treasury-generated IRS IT investment reports. IRS and Treasury agreed with the recommendations. |
gao_HEHS-97-147 | gao_HEHS-97-147_0 | In addition, CPSC does not maintain systematic information on past and ongoing projects, which makes it difficult to assess and prioritize the need for new projects in different hazard areas. These criteria, which are incorporated in agency regulations, include the following: the frequency of injuries and deaths resulting from the hazard; the severity of the injuries resulting from the hazard; addressability—that is, the extent to which the hazard is likely to be reduced through CPSC action—agency regulations note that the cause of the hazard should be analyzed to help determine the extent to which injuries can reasonably be expected to be reduced or eliminated through CPSC action; the number of chronic illnesses and future injuries predicted to result from the hazard; preliminary estimates of the costs and benefits to society resulting from unforeseen nature of the risk—that is, the degree to which consumers are aware of the hazard and its consequences; vulnerability of the population at risk—whether some individuals (such as children) may be less able to recognize or escape from potential hazards and therefore may require a relatively higher degree of protection; probability of exposure to the product hazard—that is, how many consumers are exposed to the potential hazard, or how likely a typical consumer is to be exposed to the hazard; and other—additional criteria to be considered at the discretion of CPSC. CPSC collects information on product-related deaths and injuries to provide information for project selection as well as to perform risk assessments and cost-benefit analyses. CPSC Uses COST-BENEFIT Analysis and Risk Assessment, but Improvements Are Needed in Data and Methodology
CPSC uses two analytical tools—risk assessment and cost-benefit analysis—to assist in making decisions on regulatory and nonregulatory methods to address potential hazards. CPSC frequently conducts cost-benefit analysis with respect to regulatory procedures, whether or not it is required to do so. We found 24 risk assessments conducted by CPSC between January 1, 1990, and September 30, 1996; only 4 of these were associated with regulatory action. CPSC Cost-Benefit Analyses Are Often Not Comprehensive and Not Reported in Sufficient Detail
The methodology used to conduct a cost-benefit analysis will frequently depend on the circumstances and the context of the analysis. CPSC Has Established Procedures for Complying With Statutory Requirements for Releasing Manufacturer-Specific Information
To help minimize the possibility that a product might be unfairly disparaged, in section 6(b) of the Consumer Product Safety Act the Congress imposed restrictions on the disclosure of manufacturer-specific information by CPSC. CPSC staff and commissioners, industry representatives, and consumer advocates expressed a wide variety of opinions on the effectiveness of these requirements, and some individuals favored specific changes. CPSC’s procedures outline several steps to verify all information before it is released. Evidence Suggests That CPSC Complies With Legal Requirements Regarding the Release of Information
Information from three sources of evidence—industry, published legal cases, and data on retractions—suggest that CPSC complies with its statutory requirements concerning information release. Our review of published legal decisions found no rulings that CPSC violated its statutory requirements concerning the release of information. Conclusions
CPSC’s current data provide insufficient information to monitor ongoing projects and to determine whether potential projects adhere to the agency’s selection criteria. Recommendations
We recommend that the Chairman of CPSC take the following actions: Improve the quality of CPSC’s injury, death, and exposure data by consulting with experts both within and outside the agency to (1) prioritize CPSC’s needs for additional statistically valid surveillance data on injuries and deaths related to consumer products and on exposure to consumer products and product-related hazards, (2) investigate the feasibility and cost of alternative means of obtaining these data, and (3) design data systems to collect and analyze this information. The literature on cost-benefit analysis makes a key distinction in this area. CPSC does not conduct a formal, numerical risk assessment for each project it undertakes. GAO Comments
1. 2. 10. 3. 7-8. 14-15. U.S. Commission on Risk Assessment and Risk Management. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Consumer Product Safety Commission's (CPSC) project selection, use of cost-benefit analysis and risk assessment, and information release procedures, focusing on: (1) the criteria CPSC uses to select projects and the information it relies upon in making these choices; (2) the information CPSC draws on to perform risk assessment and cost-benefit analyses and CPSC's methodology for conducting cost-benefit analyses; and (3) CPSC's procedures for releasing manufacturer-specific information to the public and whether evidence exists that CPSC violated its statutory requirements concerning the release of such information.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) although CPSC has established criteria to help select new projects, with the agency's current data these criteria can be measured only imprecisely, if at all; (2) although CPSC has described itself as "data driven," its information on product-related injuries and deaths is often sketchy; (3) this makes it more difficult not only for agency management to monitor current projects but also for staff and commissioners to assess and prioritize the need for new projects in different hazard areas; (4) CPSC has insufficient data on both internal agency efforts and external product hazards to assess the impact and cost of each project; (5) to help evaluate alternative methods of addressing potential hazards, CPSC may perform a risk assessment to estimate the likelihood of injury associated with a hazard or conduct a cost-benefit analysis to assess the potential effects of a proposed regulation; (6) although CPSC does not complete either a risk assessment or cost-benefit analysis for every project, the agency conducts these analyses more often than it is required to by law; (7) nevertheless, CPSC's data are often insufficient to support a thorough application of these analytical techniques; (8) to evaluate relative risks, it is usually necessary to have information on how many consumers use the product--information that CPSC frequently does not have; (9) risk assessment of consumer products requires measurement of the number of harmful incidents; (10) CPSC's imprecise and incomplete death and injury data make risk assessment and cost-benefit analysis at best less reliable and at worst impossible to do; (11) the cost-benefit analyses conducted by CPSC between 1990 and 1996 were often not comprehensive; (12) CPSC has established procedures to implement statutory requirements concerning the release of manufacturer-specific information; (13) when releasing information to the public that identifies a specific manufacturer, CPSC is required to verify the information and allow the manufacturer an opportunity to comment; (14) evidence from the industry and from legal cases suggests that CPSC has met its statutory requirements in this area; (15) individuals within CPSC, as well as some industry representatives and consumer groups, expressed dissatisfaction with the requirements of this law; and (16) some of these individuals have proposed statutory changes that range from reducing to expanding the current requirements. |
gao_GAO-02-173T | gao_GAO-02-173T_0 | In addition to VA’s better known missions—to provide health care and benefits to veterans and medical research and education— VA has a fourth mission: to provide medical backup to DOD in times of war and civilian health care backup in the event of disasters producing mass casualties. Medical Recordkeeping and Surveillance During the Gulf War Was Lacking
Investigations into the unexplained illnesses of service members and veterans who had been deployed to the Gulf uncovered the need for DOD to implement an effective medical surveillance system to obtain comprehensive medical data on deployed service members, including Reservists and National Guardsmen. The council concluded that the Gulf War exposed many deficiencies in the ability to collect, maintain, and transfer accurate data describing the movement of troops, potential exposures to health risks, and medical incidents in theater. Despite the department’s progress, we and others have reported on DOD’s implementation difficulties during Operation Joint Endeavor and the shortcomings in DOD’s ability to maintain reliable health information on service members. Specifically, these officials informed us that DOD is in the process of developing a more accurate roster of deployed service members and enhancing its information technology capabilities. | What GAO Found
The Departments of Defense (DOD) and Veterans Affairs (VA) are establishing a medical surveillance system for the health care needs of military personnel and veterans. The system will collect and analyze information on deployments, environmental health threats, disease monitoring, medical assessments, and medical encounters. GAO has identified weaknesses in DOD's medical surveillance capability and performance during the Gulf War and Operation Joint Endeavor. Investigations into the unexplained illnesses of Gulf War veterans uncovered many deficiencies in DOD's ability to collect, maintain, and transfer accurate data on the movement of troops, potential exposures to health risks, and medical incidents during deployment. DOD has several initiatives under way to improve the reliability of deployment information and to enhance its information technology capabilities, though some initiatives are several years away from full implementation. The VA's ability to serve veterans and provide backup to DOD in times of war will be enhanced as DOD increases its medical surveillance capability. |
gao_GAO-02-817 | gao_GAO-02-817_0 | Medicaid was established in 1965 under title XIX of the Social Security Act to provide health care coverage to certain categories of low-income families and aged and disabled individuals. The Secretary introduced the Pharmacy Plus initiative in January 2002 to encourage states to provide pharmacy benefits to low- income elderly populations. Four Waivers Have Been Approved Quickly to Expand Coverage
HHS has approved four section 1115 demonstration waivers to expand coverage for the uninsured and pharmacy benefits since August 2001. HHS Has Not Always Ensured That Approved Waivers Are Consistent With the Goals and Fiscal Integrity of Medicaid and SCHIP
HHS has not, with its recent approvals of waivers under the new flexibility initiatives, consistently ensured that waivers are in line with program goals and are budget neutral. These waivers raise legal and policy concerns in light of SCHIP’s stated purpose of expanding health coverage to low-income children. In creating SCHIP, the Congress authorized states to cover the entire family—both the parents or custodians and their children—if it was cost effective to do so. Furthermore, allowing states to cover parents with SCHIP funds without demonstrating its cost effectiveness allows limited program funds to be spent on individuals not targeted in the statute. In our view, HHS’s use of section 1115 authority to allow states to use SCHIP funds to cover childless adults is not consistent with the program’s statutory objectives to expand health coverage to uninsured, low-income children. To improve the opportunity for public input into HHS consideration of state Medicaid and SCHIP program proposals that waive statutory requirements, we recommend that the Secretary of HHS provide for a federal public input process that includes, at a minimum, notice of pending section 1115 waiver proposals in the Federal Register and a 30-day comment period in line with HHS’s 1994 policy. SCHIP Funding for Adults
With regard to our recommendation that the Secretary amend the approval of Arizona’s HIFA waiver to prevent future use of SCHIP funds on childless adults, and deny any pending or future state proposals for this purpose, HHS commented that our analysis was extremely narrow and did not recognize that the approval of the Arizona HIFA waiver promotes the objectives of SCHIP by providing health insurance coverage to those who were previously uninsured. Children’s Health Insurance Program: State Implementation Approaches are Evolving. | Why GAO Did This Study
States provide health care coverage to about 40 million uninsured, low-income adults and children under two federal-state programs--Medicaid and the State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP). To receive federal funding, states must meet statutory requirements, including providing certain levels of benefits to specified populations. Under section 1115 of the Social Security Act, the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) can waive many of the statutory requirements in the case of experimental, pilot, or demonstration projects likely to promote program objectives. Since August 2001, HHS has approved four of 13 waiver proposals from states to either expand health insurance to uninsured populations or extend pharmacy coverage to low-income seniors, consistent with the new goals. Of the nine proposals still under review, five seek to expand coverage to uninsured populations, while four would provide pharmacy benefits for low-income seniors. GAO has both legal and policy concerns about the extent to which the approved waivers are consistent with the goals and fiscal integrity of Medicaid and SCHIP. The legal concern is that HHS has allowed Arizona to use unspent SCHIP funding to cover adults without children, despite SCHIP's objective of expanding health coverage to low-income children.
What GAO Found
GAO found that HHS' approval of the waiver to cover childless adults is not consistent with this objective, and it is not authorized. A related policy concern is that HHS used its waiver authority to allow Arizona and California to use SCHIP funds to cover parents of SCHIP and Medicare-eligible children with no regard to cost effectiveness when the statute provides that family coverage may be provided only if it is cost-effective to do so--that is, with no additional costs beyond covering the child. An opportunity for the public to learn about and comment on pending waivers has not been consistently provided in accordance with policy adopted by HHS in 1994. At the federal level, since 1988 HHS has not followed established procedures to publish notification of new and pending section 1115 waiver applications in the Federal Register with a 30-day comment period. |
gao_GAO-01-943 | gao_GAO-01-943_0 | Each component has established a ManTech office within its organization to set policies and procedures for operating its ManTech program and determining which projects to fund. The funding trends for the program since fiscal year 1991 are shown in figure 1. Needs Are Generally Being Met, According to Users and Based on Our Analysis of Project Selection Processes
Users in the military services and DLA look to the ManTech Program to help meet certain needs related to weapons systems they are responsible for, such as developing technologies, products and processes that will reduce the total cost and improve the manufacturing quality of their systems. In each case, there was a documented justification to award the work on a sole source basis. DOD Is Missing Opportunities to Conduct More Joint Projects and Cannot Effectively Measure Success
DOD is not managing the ManTech Program as efficiently and effectively as possible. The department would also know what technologies had been successfully transferred and the extent to which the ManTech Program improved the quality of weapons systems. We discussed various manufacturing technology-related issues including overseeing responsibilities with officials from the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Science & Technology), Office of Technology Transition; the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Science and Technology; the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research and Technology; the Office Naval Research; and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition), Science, Technology, and Engineering. To assess the degree to which projects are awarded competitively, we randomly selected a sample of ManTech projects from the above list of fiscal years 1999 and 2000 projects for the Army, Navy, Air Force and DLA based on levels of funding, length of the projects, and varying types of technologies and weapons systems. We then reviewed the contract files to determine whether competitive award procedures were used. | What GAO Found
The Department of Defense (DOD) established the Defense Manufacturing Technology Program to develop and apply advanced manufacturing technologies to reduce the total cost and improve the manufacturing quality of weapon systems. By maturing and validating emerging manufacturing technology and transferring it to the factory floor, the program bridges the gap between technology invention and industrial application. The program, which has existed in various forms since the 1950's, received about $200 million in funding fiscal year 2001. DOD's Office of the Under Secretary of Defense provides guidance and oversight to the Army, Navy, Air Force, and the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), but each establishes its own policies and procedures for running the program and determines which technologies to develop. Users told GAO that the program was responding to their needs by developing technologies, products, and processes that reduced the cost and improved the quality of weapons systems. To the extent practicable, DOD used competitive procedures to award the work done under the program. The Army, Air Force, and DLA competitively awarded most of the projects GAO reviewed for fiscal years 1999 and 2000, and the remaining non-competitive awards were based on documented sole source justifications. DOD is missing opportunities to conduct more joint programs and lacks effective measures of program success. Joint projects would enable the services to address the funding issue by leveraging limited funding and integrating common requirements and approaches for developing manufacturing technologies. |
gao_GAO-14-431 | gao_GAO-14-431_0 | Among the topics discussed, the policy directives include a listing of the data that agencies are to submit to SBA annually—such as their extramural R&D budget amounts and the amounts obligated for awards for the programs—and call for agencies to submit reports describing their methodologies for calculating their extramural R&D budgets within 4 months of the enactment of appropriations. Program Managers Identified Reasons Agencies Did Not Comply with Spending Requirements
Program managers at the agencies that did not comply with spending requirements for fiscal year 2012 identified reasons that the agencies did not comply: (1) some agencies reserved funds to spend in a subsequent fiscal year without spending the minimum required amount in fiscal year 2012; (2) the spending requirement increased part of the way through the year, after agencies made spending plans; (3) agencies did not submit data on all of their spending; and (4) the amount agencies spent on extramural R&D was higher than estimated at the beginning of the fiscal year. However, program officials at DOD and USDA told us that they believe their agencies comply with spending requirements if the agencies spend the total amount reserved or budgeted for the program, regardless of the year the funding is spent. Agencies Did Not Fully Comply with Certain Reporting Requirements and Submitted Incorrect Data
Participating agencies and SBA did not fully comply with certain reporting requirements for the SBIR and STTR programs. Agencies generally submitted their data to SBA from March to July 2013—more than a year after agency appropriations for fiscal year 2012 were enacted on November 18, 2011, and December 23, 2011—because SBA allowed them to submit the reports later. As we found in our first annual report on these issues, as a result of not having the methodology reports earlier in the year, SBA does not have an opportunity to promptly analyze these methodologies and provide the agencies with timely feedback to assist agencies in accurately calculating their spending requirements. The Small Business Act requires federal agencies to spend a certain amount of their extramural R&D budgets on the SBIR and STTR programs if the agency meets certain thresholds for participation. According to SBA officials, SBA’s report to Congress depends on the timeliness and quality of the participating agencies’ submissions to SBA, and they delayed the submission of the last report and the fiscal year 2012 report to provide Congress with more accurate information on the SBIR and STTR programs. Changing the Calculation Methodology Could Increase Spending Requirements and Participation, with Potential Benefits and Drawbacks
Potential effects of basing each participating agency’s spending requirement on its total R&D budget instead of its extramural R&D budget include an increase in the amount of the spending requirement—for some agencies more than others—and, if the thresholds for participation in the programs did not change, an increase in the number of agencies required to participate. Little Information Is Known About Total Administrative Costs
Little is known about the total amounts agencies spent administering the SBIR and STTR programs because agencies do not consistently collect such information. Agencies are not required to track or estimate all costs for administering the programs. Administrative cost estimates that the agencies provided for fiscal year 2012 ranged from about $200,000 to about $8 million. As with the data on fiscal year 2011 for our first annual report, these data were wide-ranging, incomplete, and unverifiable. The 2011 reauthorization of the programs created a pilot program beginning in fiscal year 2013 that allows agencies to spend up to 3 percent of SBIR funds for administrative costs of the programs beginning in fiscal year 2013. Consequently, even with the pilot program, agencies will likely not identify or track all administrative costs for SBIR. Conclusions
Federal agencies have awarded billions of dollars to small businesses under the SBIR and STTR programs to develop and commercialize innovative technologies. First, some agencies did not comply with the requirement to spend program funds annually because SBA’s policy directives inaccurately summarize the requirement. Appendix I: Agencies’ Compliance with Spending Requirements for the Small Business Innovation Research Program for Fiscal Year 2012
Our analysis of the data that the agencies submitted to the Small Business Administration (SBA) indicate that the amounts that 8 of the 11 participating agencies spent for the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program met or exceeded their fiscal year 2012 spending requirements, while spending for the remaining 3 agencies did not meet the requirements. | Why GAO Did This Study
Federal agencies have awarded more than 156,000 contracts and grants, totaling nearly $40 billion, through the SBIR and STTR programs to small businesses to develop and commercialize innovative technologies. The Small Business Act requires agencies with extramural R&D budgets that meet certain thresholds for participation—$100 million for SBIR and $1 billion for STTR—must spend a percentage of these annual budgets on the programs. The agencies are to report on their activities to SBA and, in turn, SBA is to report to Congress.
The 2011 reauthorization of the programs mandated GAO to review compliance with spending and reporting requirements, and other program aspects. This report addresses, for fiscal year 2012, (1) the extent to which agencies complied with spending requirements, (2) the extent to which agencies and SBA complied with certain reporting requirements, (3) the potential effects of basing spending requirements on agencies' total R&D budgets, and (4) what is known about the amounts spent administering the programs. GAO reviewed agency spending data and required reports for fiscal year 2012 and interviewed program officials from SBA and the participating agencies.
What GAO Found
Agency data indicate that 8 of the 11 agencies participating in the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program and 2 of the 5 agencies participating in the Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR) program complied with spending requirements in fiscal year 2012. Program managers for agencies that did not comply with the requirements identified reasons for noncompliance. For example, program managers at two of the agencies told GAO that they believe their agencies comply with spending requirements if the agencies spend the total amount reserved or budgeted for the program, regardless of the year the funding is spent. However, the authorizing legislation for the programs requires agencies to “expend” a certain amount of funding each year. This difference in the interpretation of spending requirements occurred, in part, because the Small Business Administration's (SBA) policy directives for the programs inaccurately state that the authorizing legislation requires agencies to “reserve” the minimum amount each year. Additionally, some officials told GAO their agencies did not comply with spending requirements because the recent reauthorization of the programs included an increased spending requirement in fiscal year 2012, but the reauthorization was enacted a full quarter into the fiscal year, after some agencies had planned their programs and made awards.
Participating agencies and SBA did not fully comply with certain reporting requirements for the SBIR and STTR programs. For example, participating agencies are required to submit reports to SBA describing their methodologies for calculating their budgets for extramural research or research and development (R&D)—which is generally conducted by nonfederal employees outside of federal facilities—within 4 months of the enactment of appropriations. However, all 11 participating agencies were late in submitting these reports because SBA allowed them to submit the reports later. As a result, SBA was unable to analyze the reports and provide timely feedback to assist agencies in accurately calculating these budgets.
Potential effects of basing each participating agency's spending requirement on its total R&D budget instead of its extramural R&D budget include an increase in the amount of the spending requirement—for some agencies more than others—and, if the thresholds for participation in the programs did not change, an increase in the number of agencies required to participate. Officials identified benefits of such a change, such as funding more projects, but they generally said the drawbacks could outweigh the benefits.
Little is known about the total amounts agencies spent administering the SBIR and STTR programs because agencies did not consistently collect such information for fiscal year 2012. Agencies are not required to track costs for administering the programs. Most agencies provided GAO with some data on such costs for fiscal year 2012, ranging from about $200,000 to about $8 million, but the data were wide-ranging, incomplete, and unverifiable. With the start of a pilot program in fiscal year 2013 that allows agencies to use up to 3 percent of SBIR program funds for administrative costs, agencies will be required to report to SBA on the amount spent for such activities. However, even with the pilot program, agencies will likely not identify or track all administrative costs.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends, among other things, that SBA revise program policy directives to accurately summarize spending requirements and request that agencies submit their methodology reports on time. SBA and participating agencies generally agreed with GAO's findings and recommendations. |
gao_GAO-12-427 | gao_GAO-12-427_0 | Reported EHS funding also rose as a percentage of total NNI funding during this period, ending up at about 5 percent in 2010. We also identified several reporting problems related to the continued absence of detailed guidance on how agencies should report funding for their nanotechnology research, raising concerns about the quality of EHS funding data reported. EHS Research Funding by NNI Member Agencies More Than Doubled From 2006 to 2010 and Amounted to About 5 Percent of Total NNI Funding in 2010
From fiscal years 2006 to 2010, NSTC reported more than a doubling of NNI member agencies’ funding for nanotechnology EHS research in the NNI Supplements to the President’s Budget––from approximately $38 million to $90 million.reported to be by NSF, NIH, and EPA, and the largest increases in reported EHS research funding over this period were at NIH and EPA. Effect of Recent NNI Criteria for Agencies’ Prioritization of Nanomaterials Is Not Yet Clear
NNI has not prioritized nanomaterials for EHS research, but the 2011 NNI EHS research strategy outlines criteria to assist its member agencies in doing so. However, because the criteria were published in October 2011, it is too soon to tell how they will influence NNI member agencies’ decisions about which nanomaterials to prioritize. Furthermore, it is unclear if the information needed to use the NNI criteria is available. NNI Member Agencies Have Collaborated Extensively on Nanotechnology EHS Research
The NNI member agencies have collaborated extensively with each other and nonfederal stakeholders on EHS research and strategies. NNI Member Agencies Have Collaborated to Develop Joint Strategies
NNI member agencies have collaborated through the NSTC to develop joint EHS research strategies. Nonfederal Stakeholders We Surveyed Benefited from NNI Collaboration but Identified Some Challenges
The 138 nonfederal stakeholders who responded to our questionnaire reported that they benefited from collaboration with NNI member agencies but faced some challenges. When asked to rate the 2011 NNI EHS research strategy, most of those responding rated this strategy as somewhat or very effective at addressing nanotechnology EHS research needs. As described in table 4, we found, when reviewed as a whole, that the strategy documents address or partially address all of the desirable characteristics of a national strategy. Elements of these characteristics that are included in the documents are providing a clear statement of purpose, defining key terms, delineating what major functions or mission areas are covered, discussing problems with the current understanding of EHS implications of nanotechnology, and the quality of currently available data, among others. The NNI strategy documents contain detailed research needs for nanotechnology EHS and report the annual funding of EHS research and the number of projects supported for selected years, but the documents do not prioritize among these needs or include outcome-related performance measures, targets, or time frames that allow for monitoring and reporting on progress toward meeting the research needs. However, the documents do not include some elements of the characteristics, which could make it more difficult for federal agencies and other stakeholders to implement the strategy and achieve the identified results. In addition, the NNI strategy documents do not include estimates of the costs and types of resources associated with these goals and research needs. Providing cost estimates related to the NNI EHS research needs would allow the NNI member agencies, policymakers, and stakeholders to assess if investments are commensurate with costs of the identified needs. Recommendations for Executive Action
To better offer policymakers and implementing agencies a management tool that can help ensure accountability and more effective results, we are making two recommendations to the Director of OSTP: We recommend that the Director of OSTP coordinate development by the NNI member agencies of performance measures, targets, and time frames for nanotechnology EHS research that align with the research needs of the NNI, consistent with the agencies’ respective statutory authorities, and include this information in publicly available reports. OSTP and the agencies neither agreed nor disagreed with the recommendations. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our review examines (1) changes in federal funding for nanotechnology environmental, health, and safety (EHS) research from fiscal years 2006 to 2010; (2) the nanomaterials that National Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI) member agencies focused on in their EHS research in fiscal year 2010; (3) the extent to which NNI member agencies collaborate with stakeholders on nanotechnology EHS research and related strategies; and (4) the extent to which NNI strategy documents address desirable characteristics of national strategies. In those instances, we assessed whether at least some of the project was primarily directed at EHS. We also reviewed our 2008 report in this area, which found that 22 of 119 fiscal year 2006 projects reported as EHS research were miscategorized, and recommended that the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), in consultation with the Directors of the National Nanotechnology Coordinating Office and OMB, provide better guidance to agencies on how to report nanotechnology EHS research. | Why GAO Did This Study
Nanotechnology involves the ability to control matter at approximately 1 to 100 nanometers. Worldwide trends suggest that products that rely on nanotechnology will be a $3 trillion market by 2020. However, some of the EHS impacts of nanotechnology are unknown. The NSTC coordinates and oversees the NNI, an interagency program that, among other things, develops national strategy documents for federal efforts in nanotechnology.
In this context, GAO examined: (1) changes in federal funding for nanotechnology EHS research from fiscal years 2006 to 2010; (2) the nanomaterials that NNI member agencies EHS research focused on in fiscal year 2010; (3) the extent to which NNI member agencies collaborate with stakeholders on this research and related strategies; and (4) the extent to which NNI strategy documents address desirable characteristics of national strategies. GAOs review included seven NNI agencies that funded 93 percent of the EHS research dollars in fiscal year 2010. This report is based on analysis of NNI and agency documents and responses to a questionnaire of nonfederal stakeholders.
What GAO Found
From fiscal years 2006 to 2010, the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) reported more than a doubling of National Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI) member agencies funding for nanotechnology environmental, health, and safety (EHS) researchfrom approximately $38 million to $90 million. Reported EHS research funding also rose as a percentage of total nanotechnology funding over the same period, ending at about 5 percent in 2010. However, GAO identified several reporting problems that raise concerns about the quality of EHS funding data reported. For example, for 18 percent of the 2010 projects GAO reviewed that were reported as EHS research, it was not clear that the projects were primarily directed at EHS risks. In addition, NNI member agencies did not always report funding using comparable data. The absence of detailed guidance on how agencies should report funding for their nanotechnology research has contributed to these problems, as GAO also reported in 2008 and made a related recommendation.
In 2010, EHS research at the NNI member agencies GAO reviewed most frequently focused on carbon nanotubes, nanosilver, and nanoscale titanium dioxide. NNI has not prioritized nanomaterials for EHS research, but NNIs 2011 EHS research strategy outlines criteria for NNI member agencies to use in doing so. It is too soon to tell how these criteria will influence NNI member agencies decisions about which nanomaterials to prioritize, and it is unclear if information needed to use the NNI criteria is available.
The NNI member agencies have collaborated extensively on EHS research and strategies. They have collaborated through the NSTC to develop joint EHS research strategies and have initiated numerous formal collaborative EHS research projects. Nonfederal stakeholders who responded to GAOs web-based questionnaire on nanotechnology EHS research told GAO that they benefited from collaboration with the NNI member agencies but identified some challenges, including a lack of funding and limited awareness of collaboration opportunities, among others. Most respondents rated the 2011 NNI EHS research strategy as somewhat or very effective at addressing nanotechnology EHS research needs.
NNI strategy documents for EHS research issued by the NSTC address two and partially address the other four of the six desirable characteristics of national strategies identified by GAO that offer a management tool to help ensure accountability and more effective results. For example, the NNI strategy documents provide a clear statement of purpose, define key terms, and discuss the quality of currently available data, among others. However, they do not include performance informationsuch as performance measures, targets, and time frames for meeting those measuresthat would allow stakeholders to evaluate progress towards the goals and research needs of the NNI. In addition, the documents do not include, or sufficiently describe, estimates of the costs and resources needed for the strategy. Without this information, it may be difficult for agencies and stakeholders to implement the strategy and report on progress toward achieving the research needs and assess if investments are commensurate with costs of the identified needs.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), which administers the NSTC, (1) coordinate development of performance information for NNI EHS research needs and publicly report this information; and (2) estimate the costs and resources necessary to meet the research needs. OSTP and the seven included agencies neither agreed nor disagreed with the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-04-766T | gao_GAO-04-766T_0 | Since the act’s passage, a number of voting jurisdictions have replaced their older voting equipment with direct recording electronic systems. These standards define minimum functional and performance requirements, as well as minimum life-cycle management processes for voting equipment developers to follow, such as quality assurance. The Help America Vote Act Was Enacted to Strengthen the Overall Election Process
Enacted by the Congress in October 2002, the Help America Vote Act of 2002 addressed a range of election issues, including the lack of explicit federal (statutory) responsibility for developing and maintaining standards for electronic voting systems and for testing voting systems against standards. In particular, the act established a program to provide funds to states to replace punch card and lever machine voting equipment, established the EAC to assist in the administration of federal elections and provide assistance with the administration of certain federal election laws and programs, and established minimum election administration standards for the states and units of local government that are responsible for the administration of federal elections. Other examples of EAC responsibilities include ● developing and adopting voluntary voting system guidelines, and maintaining information on the experiences of states in implementing the guidelines and operating voting systems; ● testing, certifying, decertifying, and recertifying voting system hardware and software through accredited laboratories; ● making payments to states to help them improve elections in the areas of voting systems standards, provisional voting and voting information requirements, and computerized statewide voter registration lists; and ● making grants for research on voting technology improvements. In the 2000 election, about 12 percent of voters used this type of technology. ● A “review” feature. ● Accommodations for voters with disabilities. Expanded Use of Electronic Voting Systems Has Raised Concerns
As older voting equipment has been replaced with newer electronic voting systems over the last 2 years, the debate has shifted from hanging chads and butterfly ballots to vulnerabilities associated with DREs. Electronic Voting Systems’ Performance Can Be Judged on Several Attributes
Although the current debate concerning electronic voting systems primarily relates to security, other factors affecting election administration are also relevant in evaluating these systems. Ensuring the security of elections is essential to public confidence and election integrity, but officials choosing a voting system must also consider other performance factors, such as accuracy, ease of use, and efficiency, as well as cost. ● Audit trails. Accessibility to diverse types of voters, including those with disabilities, is a further aspect of ease of use. Among other things, these differences can be attributed to differences in what is included in the unit cost as well as differences in the characteristics of the equipment. In fact, one large jurisdiction that used optical scan equipment reported that its operating costs were $545,000. Electronic Voting System Performance Depends on System Design and Implementation
The performance of any information technology system, including electronic voting systems, is heavily influenced by a number of factors, not the least of which is the quality of the system’s design and the effectiveness with which the system is implemented in an operational setting. As described already, DRE equipment is designed to minimize voter error (by preventing overvotes, for example), but problems can also occur with this voting method. Jurisdictions Face Immediate and Longer Term Challenges in Leveraging Voting Technologies
In 2001, we identified four key challenges confronting local jurisdictions in effectively using and replacing voting technologies. | Why GAO Did This Study
The technology used to cast and count votes is one aspect of the multifaceted U.S. election process. GAO examined voting technology, among other things, in a series of reports that it issued in 2001 following the problems encountered in the 2000 election. In October 2002, the Congress enacted the Help America Vote Act, which, among other things, established the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) to assist in the administration of federal elections. The act also established a program to provide funds to states to replace older punch card and lever machine voting equipment. As this older voting equipment has been replaced with newer electronic voting systems over the last 2 years, concerns have been raised about the vulnerabilities associated with certain electronic voting systems. Among other things, GAO's testimony focuses on attributes on which electronic voting systems can be assessed, as well as design and implementation factors affecting their performance. GAO also describes the immediate and longer term challenges confronting local jurisdictions in using any type of voting equipment, particularly electronic voting systems.
What GAO Found
An electronic voting system, like other automated information systems, can be judged on several bases, including how well its design provides for security, accuracy, ease of use, and efficiency, as well as its cost. For example, direct recording electronic systems offer advantages in ease of use because they can have features that accommodate voters with various disabilities, and they protect against common voter errors, such as overvoting (voting for more candidates than is permissible); a disadvantage of such systems is their capital cost and frequent lack of an independent paper audit trail. Advantages of optical scan voting equipment (another type of electronic voting system) include capital cost and the enhanced security associated with having a paper audit trail; disadvantages include lower ease of use, such as their limited ability to accommodate voters with disabilities. One important determinant of voting system performance is how it is designed and developed, including the testing that determines whether the developed system performs as designed. In the design and development process, a critical factor is the quality of the specified system requirements as embodied in applicable standards or guidance. For voting technology, these voluntary standards have historically been problematic; the EAC has now been given responsibility for voting system guidelines, and it intends to update them. The EAC also intends to strengthen the process for testing voting system hardware and software. A second determinant of performance is how the system is implemented. In implementing a system, it is critical to have people with the requisite knowledge and skills to operate it according to well-defined and understood processes. The EAC also intends to focus on these people and process factors in its role of assisting in the administration of elections. In the upcoming 2004 national election and beyond, the challenges confronting local jurisdictions in using electronic voting systems are similar to those facing any technology user. These challenges include both immediate and more long term challenges. |
gao_GAO-07-943T | gao_GAO-07-943T_0 | Cost Growth Remains a Problem in Navy Shipbuilding Programs—and May Threaten Future Success
Cost growth is a persistent problem for shipbuilding programs as it is for other weapon systems. Over 40 ships were under construction at the beginning of this fiscal year. Funding for the 41 ships under construction is over $56 billion, almost $4.6 billion above initial budget requests. On the other hand, cost growth is particularly high on lead ships of a new class (see fig. Although LPD 18 is the second ship of the class, construction costs grew by over $500 million—a more than 90 percent increase over its initial budget for construction. The Navy anticipates increasing the baseline for the LPD 17 ships—resulting in even higher completion costs. Elements of a Business Case
We have frequently reported on the wisdom of using a solid, executable business case before committing resources to a new product development effort. In its simplest form, a business case requires a balance between the concept selected to satisfy warfighter needs and the resources— technologies, design knowledge, funding, time, and management capacity—needed to transform the concept into a product, in this case a ship. The Navy moved forward with ambitious schedules for constructing LPD 17 and LCS despite significant challenges in stabilizing the designs for these ships. This approach enabled the Navy to achieve its planned launch date for the first Littoral Combat Ship, but required it to sacrifice its desired level of outfitting. DDG 1000 and CVN 78 Have More Thoughtful Business Cases, but Significant Technical Risks Remain
Elements of a successful business case are present in the Navy’s next- generation shipbuilding programs—CVN 78 and DDG 1000. While the Navy has recognized the need to mature each ship’s design before beginning construction, CVN 78 and DDG 1000 remain at risk of cost growth due to continuing efforts to mature technologies. Our work on best practices highlights the need for a disciplined, knowledge-based approach so that programs proceed with a high probability of success. This means technology maturity must be proven before a design can be considered stable, and production outcomes cannot be guaranteed until a stable design is demonstrated. These include: ensuring that initial shipbuilding budgets are realistically achievable by improving cost estimating, and improving cost management through increased use of fixed-price contracting and comprehensive cost surveillance. Each shipbuilding program seems to have a different measure as to how much of the design needs to be complete—and what constitutes design readiness—prior to beginning ship construction. Further, there appears to be few criteria across shipbuilding programs regarding how much knowledge—such as the percentage of ship units built—is needed at different decision points, including keel lay, fabrication start, and ship launch. A clearer understanding of the key knowledge junctures and corresponding criteria across shipbuilding programs would help establish a better basis for cost and schedule estimates. The foundation of an executable budget is a realistic cost estimate that takes into account the true risk and uncertainty in a program. Defense Acquisitions: Plans Need to Allow Enough Time to Demonstrate Capability of First Littoral Combat Ships. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Navy is beset with long-standing problems that affect its ability to accomplish ambitious goals for its shipbuilding portfolio. Significant cost growth and long schedule delays are persistent problems. Making headway on these problems is essential in light of the serious budget pressures facing the nation. This testimony focuses on (1) cost growth in shipbuilding, (2) acquisition approaches in the LPD 17, Littoral Combat Ship, DDG 1000 and CVN 78 programs and (3) steps the Navy can take to improve its acquisition decision-making, particularly the adoption of a knowledge-based framework.
What GAO Found
The Navy has exceeded its original budget by more than $4 billion for the 41 ships under construction at the beginning of this fiscal year. And more cost growth is coming. Cost growth is not just a problem for lead ships of a new class but also for follow-on ships. For example, costs for the first two Littoral Combat Ships have more than doubled. Similarly, costs for the first two San Antonio class (LPD 17 and LPD 18) amphibious ships have increased by over $1.3 billion--almost a 77 percent increase above the initial budgets. Cost growth of this magnitude leads to lost opportunities for tomorrow's needs. These types of problems point to the wisdom of using solid, executable business cases to design and build ships. A business case requires a balance between the concept selected to satisfy warfighter needs and the resources--technologies, design knowledge, funding, time, and management capacity--needed to transform the concept into a product, in this case a ship. Neither LPD 17 nor the Littoral Combat Ship programs was framed around an executable business case; rather, the programs pushed ahead without a stable design and without realistic cost estimates, resulting in higher costs, schedule delays, and quality problems. The Navy has a more thoughtful business case for its next generation aircraft carrier and destroyer programs (CVN 78 and DDG 1000, respectively) before construction, but the programs remain at risk for cost growth partly because of continuing efforts to mature technologies. GAO's work on best practices highlights the need for a disciplined, knowledge-based approach to help shipbuilding, and other defense acquisition programs achieve more successful outcomes. This approach is predicated on certain essentials, including: ensuring that technology maturity is proven before a design is considered stable and understanding that production outcomes cannot be guaranteed until a stable design is demonstrated; improving cost estimating to develop initial shipbuilding budgets that are realistically achievable; and improving cost management through increased use of fixed-price contracting and comprehensive cost surveillance. A significant challenge to adapting a knowledge-based approach is the lack of a common understanding across programs regarding the definition, timing, and criteria for key knowledge junctures. For example, each shipbuilding program seems to have a different measure as to how much of the design needs to be complete before beginning ship construction. Similarly, there appears to be little criteria across programs regarding how much knowledge--such as the percent of ship units built--is needed at different decision points, including keel lay, fabrication start, and ship launch. |
gao_HEHS-98-76 | gao_HEHS-98-76_0 | To implement the GPO and WEP provisions, SSA needs to know which social security applicants and beneficiaries are, or will be in the future, receiving pensions earned in noncovered employment. SSA does not, however, make the same postentitlement comparison with OPM data to ensure proper application of the WEP benefit reduction for federal retirees. On the basis of these studies, we estimate that GPO- and WEP-related overpayments range between $160 million and $355 million. SSA’s Studies of the GPO Provision for Retired State and Local Government Workers Indicate That Overpayments Are Being Made
For many years, SSA has been concerned with its uneven approach to administering the GPO provision between federal and state and local government retirees. We identified two sources of information that can be used to identify state and local government retirees who have pension income resulting from noncovered employment: the individual retirement systems making pension payments to their eligible members and IRS, which receives reports from the retirement systems identifying pensions paid to each beneficiary every year. The merits and drawbacks associated with obtaining pension data from each source are described below. SSA could examine cases for which it has not applied the GPO and WEP reductions. Certainly, SSA can use the OPM pension data that it already has to enhance its WEP enforcement controls for federal employees. Recommendations to the Commissioner of Social Security
To improve the administration of the GPO and WEP benefit reductions, the Commissioner of Social Security should begin using pension information obtained from OPM to establish a postentitlement matching program for WEP so that it can verify the accurate payment of social security benefits to retired federal government employees and work with IRS to revise the reporting of pension information on IRS form 1099R, so that SSA would be able to identify people receiving a pension from noncovered employment and to improve its internal controls by establishing a postentitlement matching program. Evaluation of GPO and WEP Administration
To determine how well SSA administers the Government Pension Offset (GPO) and Windfall Elimination Provision (WEP) benefit reduction provisions, we reviewed past reports by the Office of Inspector General, Congressional Research Service, and Congressional Budget Office and SSA’s Office of Program Integrity Reviews concerning the GPO and WEP benefit reduction provisions; met with SSA headquarters staff in components responsible for policy, operations, and systems for GPO and WEP; reviewed SSA operating procedures for processing benefit claims and verifying payments made to retired government employees who worked in positions not covered by social security; and examined the results of monthly computer matching to pension data provided under agreement with OPM to identify persons receiving spouse benefits and federal pensions. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed: (1) how well the Social Security Administration (SSA) administers the Government Pension Offset and the Windfall Elimination Provision (WEP) benefit payment provisions of the Social Security Act; and (2) the options to improve any administrative deficiencies.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) from several internal studies of SSA's administration of the Government Pension Offset and WEP provisions, GAO estimates that the agency made overpayments costing the social security trust funds between $160 million and $355 million from 1978 to about 1995; (2) weaknesses in its internal controls are a primary cause; (3) in implementing the benefit reduction provisions for retired federal employees, SSA could make better use of available information; (4) although SSA reviews information on pension payments to federal retirees to ensure that it has properly applied the Government Pension Offset provisions, it does not use that information to ensure the appropriate application of the WEP provision; (5) in implementing the benefit reduction provisions on retired state and local government workers, SSA relies on the accuracy of information provided by the retirees regarding whether they receive, or will in the future receive, a pension that results from noncovered employment; (6) SSA has not developed any independent source of this pension information; (7) thus, it cannot verify the accuracy of the self-reported information, a basic and effective internal control practice; (8) although SSA managers have long suspected that its controls needed strengthening, they have not yet decided on a way to improve them; (9) several courses of action could improve SSA's internal controls; (10) for retired federal employees, SSA could periodically use the pension data it already receives from the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) to check whether WEP has been properly applied; (11) for state and local government retirees, SSA needs to obtain independently reported pension data to adequately control its payments for the Government Pension Offset and WEP reductions; (12) both retirement systems that pay benefits for noncovered employment and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), which receives reports of each taxpayer's pension income from individual retirement systems, are potential sources of pension data; and (13) both sources have various merits and drawbacks. |
gao_GAO-08-253T | gao_GAO-08-253T_0 | In other cases, the FBI will rely on the screening agency and other law enforcement agencies—such as U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement—to respond and collect information. Figure 1 presents a general overview of the process used to resolve encounters with individuals on the terrorist watch list. In accordance with Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6, TSC’s watch list is to contain information about individuals “known or appropriately suspected to be or have been engaged in conduct constituting, in preparation for, in aid of, or related to terrorism.” In implementing this directive, the National Counterterrorism Center and the FBI strive to ensure that individuals who are reasonably suspected of having possible links to terrorism—in addition to individuals with known links—are nominated for inclusion on the watch list. Because individuals can be added to the list based on reasonable suspicion, inclusion on the list does not automatically prohibit an individual from, for example, obtaining a visa or entering the United States when the person is identified by a screening agency. Rather, when an individual on the list is encountered, agency officials are to assess the threat the person poses to determine what action to take, if any. Agencies Have Had Approximately 53,000 Encounters with Individuals on the Watch List, and Outcomes Indicate the List Has Helped to Combat Terrorism
From December 2003 (when TSC began operations) through May 2007, screening and law enforcement agencies encountered individuals who were positively matched to watch list records approximately 53,000 times, according TSC data. Our analysis of data on the outcomes of encounters revealed that agencies took a range of actions, such as arresting individuals, denying others entry into the United States, and most commonly, releasing the individuals following questioning and information gathering. Potential Vulnerabilities in Agency Screening Processes and Agency Efforts to Address Them
The principal screening agencies whose missions most frequently and directly involve interactions with travelers do not check against all records in TSC’s consolidated watch list because screening against certain records (1) may not be needed to support the respective agency’s mission, (2) may not be possible due to the requirements of computer programs used to check individuals against watch list records, or (3) may not be operationally feasible. Rather, each day, TSC exports applicable records from the consolidated watch list to federal government databases that agencies use to screen individuals for mission-related concerns. For example, U.S. Customs and Border Protection has encountered situations where it identified the subject of a watch list record after the individual had been processed at a port of entry and admitted into the United States. Also, TSC has ongoing initiatives to help reduce instances of individuals on the watch list passing undetected through agency screening, including efforts to improve computerized name-matching programs. However, many critical infrastructure components are not using watch list records. A primary reason why screening opportunities remain untapped is because the government lacks an up-to-date strategy and implementation plan— supported by a clearly defined leadership or governance structure—for enhancing the effectiveness of terrorist-related screening, consistent with presidential directives. These plan elements, which were prescribed by presidential directives, are crucial for coordinated and comprehensive use of terrorist-related screening data, as they provide a platform to establish governmentwide priorities for screening, assess progress toward policy goals and intended outcomes, ensure that any needed changes are implemented, and respond to issues that hinder effectiveness. Such optimization should include development of guidelines to support private sector screening processes that have a substantial bearing on homeland security, as well as development of an up-to-date strategy and implementation plan for using terrorist-related information. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) maintains a consolidated watch list of known or appropriately suspected terrorists and sends records from the list to agencies to support terrorism-related screening. This testimony discusses (1) standards for including individuals on the list, (2) the outcomes of encounters with individuals on the list, (3) potential vulnerabilities in screening processes and efforts to address them, and (4) actions taken to promote effective terrorism-related screening. This statement is based on GAO's report (GAO-08-110). To accomplish the objectives, GAO reviewed documentation obtained from and interviewed officials at TSC, the FBI, the National Counterterrorism Center, the Department of Homeland Security, and other agencies that perform terrorism-related screening.
What GAO Found
The FBI and the intelligence community use standards of reasonableness to evaluate individuals for nomination to the consolidated terrorist watch list. In general, individuals who are reasonably suspected of having possible links to terrorism--in addition to individuals with known links--are to be nominated. As such, being on the list does not automatically prohibit, for example, the issuance of a visa or entry into the United States. Rather, when an individual on the list is encountered, agency officials are to assess the threat the person poses to determine what action to take, if any. As of May 2007, the consolidated watch list contained approximately 755,000 records. From December 2003 through May 2007, screening and law enforcement agencies encountered individuals who were positively matched to watch list records approximately 53,000 times. Many individuals were matched multiple times. The outcomes of these encounters reflect an array of actions, such as arrests; denials of entry into the United States; and, most often, questioning and release. Within the federal community, there is general agreement that the watch list has helped to combat terrorism by (1) providing screening and law enforcement agencies with information to help them respond appropriately during encounters and (2) helping law enforcement and intelligence agencies track individuals on the watch list and collect information about them for use in conducting investigations and in assessing threats. Regarding potential vulnerabilities, TSC sends records daily from the watch list to screening agencies. However, some records are not sent, partly because screening against them may not be needed to support the respective agency's mission or may not be possible due to the requirements of computer programs used to check individuals against watch list records. Also, some subjects of watch list records have passed undetected through agency screening processes and were not identified, for example, until after they had boarded and flew on an aircraft or were processed at a port of entry and admitted into the United States. TSC and other federal agencies have ongoing initiatives to help reduce these potential vulnerabilities, including efforts to improve computerized name-matching programs and the quality of watch list data. Although the federal government has made progress in promoting effective terrorism-related screening, additional screening opportunities remain untapped--within the federal sector, as well as within critical infrastructure components of the private sector. This situation exists partly because the government lacks an up-to-date strategy and implementation plan for optimizing use of the terrorist watch list. Also lacking are clear lines of authority and responsibility. An up-to-date strategy and implementation plan, supported by a clearly defined leadership or governance structure, would provide a platform to establish governmentwide screening priorities, assess progress toward policy goals and intended outcomes, consider factors related to privacy and civil liberties, ensure that any needed changes are implemented, and respond to issues that hinder effectiveness. |
gao_GAO-06-221T | gao_GAO-06-221T_0 | On October 5, 2004, however, Chiron announced that it could not provide its expected production of 46–48 million doses—about half the expected U.S. influenza vaccine supply. HHS has primary responsibility for coordinating the nation’s response to public health emergencies. Within HHS, CDC is one of the agencies that protect the nation’s health and safety. Preparing for and responding to an influenza pandemic differ in several respects from preparing for and responding to an annual influenza season. Limited Contingency Planning Slows Response
One lesson learned from the 2004–05 season that is relevant to a future vaccine shortage in either an annual influenza season or a pandemic is the importance of planning before a shortage occurs. At the time the influenza vaccine shortage became apparent, the nation lacked a contingency plan specifically designed to respond to a severe vaccine shortage. The absence of such a plan led to delays and uncertainty on the part of many state and local entities on how best to ensure access to vaccine during the shortage by individuals at high risk of severe complications and others in priority groups. Over the past 5 years, we have reported on the importance of planning to address critical issues such as how vaccine will be purchased and distributed; how population groups will be given priority for vaccination; and how federal resources should be deployed before the nation faces a pandemic. We have also urged HHS to complete its pandemic preparedness and response plan, which the department released in draft form in August 2004. On November 2, 2005, HHS released its pandemic influenza plan. We did not, however, have an opportunity to review the plan before issuing this statement to determine whether the plan addresses these critical issues. Streamlined Mechanisms for Expediting Vaccine Availability Are Key to Effective Response
A second lesson from the experience of the 2004–05 vaccine shortage that is relevant to future vaccine shortages in either an annual influenza season or a pandemic is the importance of streamlined mechanisms to make vaccine available in an expedited manner. For example, HHS began efforts to purchase foreign vaccine that was licensed for use in other countries but not the United States shortly after learning in October 2004 that Chiron would not supply any vaccine. Some states’ experience during the 2004–05 vaccine shortage also highlighted the importance of mechanisms to transfer available vaccine quickly and easily from one state to another; the lack of mechanisms to do so delayed redistribution to some states. Effective Response Requires Clear and Consistent Communication
Experience during the 2004–05 shortage also illustrated the critical role communication plays when demand for vaccine exceeds supply and information about future vaccine availability is uncertain, as could happen in a future annual influenza season or a pandemic. State and local officials, however, identified several communication lessons for future seasons or if an influenza pandemic occurred: Consistency among federal, state, and local communications is critical for averting confusion. Disseminating clear, updated information is especially important when responding to changing circumstances. Using diverse media helps reach diverse audiences. Education can alert providers and the public to prevention alternatives. Concluding Observations
Experience during the 2004–05 influenza vaccine shortage highlights the need to prepare the nation for handling future shortages in either an annual influenza season or an influenza pandemic. Related GAO Products
Influenza Vaccine: Shortages in 2004–05 Season Underscore Need for Better Preparation. GAO-05-984. | Why GAO Did This Study
Concern has been rising about the nation's preparedness to respond to vaccine shortages that could occur in future annual influenza seasons or during an influenza pandemic--a global influenza outbreak. Although the timing or extent of a future influenza pandemic cannot be predicted, studies suggest that its effect in the United States could be severe, and shortages of vaccine could occur. For the 2004-05 annual influenza season, the nation lost about half its expected influenza vaccine supply when one of two major manufacturers announced in October 2004 that it would not release any vaccine. GAO examined federal, state, and local actions taken in response to the shortage, including lessons learned. The nation's experience during the unexpected 2004-05 vaccine shortfall offers insights into some of the challenges that government entities will face in a pandemic. GAO was asked to provide a statement on lessons learned from the 2004-05 vaccine shortage and their relevance to planning and preparing for similar situations in the future, including an influenza pandemic. This statement is based on a GAO report, Influenza Vaccine: Shortages in 2004-05 Season Underscore Need for Better Preparation (GAO-05-984), and on previous GAO reports and testimonies about influenza vaccine supply and pandemic preparedness.
What GAO Found
A number of lessons emerged from federal, state, and local responses to the 2004-05 influenza vaccine shortage that carry implications for handling future vaccine shortages in either an annual influenza season or an influenza pandemic. First, limited contingency planning slows response. At the start of the 2004-05 influenza season, when the supply shortfall became apparent, the nation lacked a contingency plan specifically to address severe shortages. The absence of such a plan led to delays and uncertainties on the part of state and local public health entities on how best to ensure access to vaccine by individuals at high risk of severe influenza-related complications. Second, streamlined mechanisms to expedite vaccine availability are key to an effective response. During the 2004-05 shortage, for example, federal purchases of vaccine licensed for use in other countries but not the United States were not completed in time to meet peak demand. Some states' experience also highlighted the importance of mechanisms to transfer available vaccine quickly and easily from one state to another. Third, effective response requires clear and consistent communication. Consistency among federal, state, and local communications is critical for averting confusion. State and local health officials also emphasized the value of updated information when responding to changing circumstances, using diverse media to reach diverse audiences, and educating providers and the public about prevention alternatives. Over the past 5 years, GAO has urged the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to complete its plan to prepare for and respond to an influenza pandemic. GAO has reported on the importance of planning to address critical issues such as how vaccine will be purchased and distributed; how population groups will be given priority for vaccination; and how federal resources should be deployed before the nation faces a pandemic. On November 2, 2005, HHS released its pandemic influenza plan. GAO did not have the opportunity to review the plan before issuing this statement to determine the extent to which the plan addresses these critical issues. |
gao_GAO-03-881T | gao_GAO-03-881T_0 | The state must also develop water quality criteria, which specify pollutant limits that determine whether a water body’s designated use is achieved. States’ Practices in Changing Designated Uses Vary Widely
We asked the states to report the total number of designated use changes they adopted from 1997 through 2001. While some states made no use changes, others made over 1,000 changes. EPA Assistance and Guidance Needed to Help States Make Defensible Designated Use Changes
According to responses to our survey, a key reason state officials have not made more of the needed designated use changes is the uncertainty many of them face over the circumstances in which use changes are acceptable to EPA and the evidence needed to support these changes. To do this, states are required to conduct a use attainability analysis (UAA). Forty-three percent of states reported that they need additional clarifying UAA guidance. EPA Has Not Developed and Updated Key Criteria Documents
While EPA has developed and published criteria documents for a wide range of pollutants, approximately 50 percent of water quality impairments nationwide concern pollutants for which there are no national numeric water quality criteria. 2.) States Need EPA Assistance to Establish Criteria That Can Be Compared to Reasonably Obtainable Monitoring Data
Even when EPA has developed criteria recommendations, states reported that the criteria cannot always be used because water quality officials sometimes cannot perform the kind of monitoring that the criteria documents specify, particularly in terms of frequency and duration. Our survey asked states about the extent to which they have been able to establish criteria that can be compared with reasonably obtainable monitoring data. We first asked the states whether an improvement in the process of changing designated uses would result in different water bodies being slated for cleanup within their states, and 22 states reported affirmatively. As figure 3 shows, when we superimposed the states’ responses to obtain the cumulative effect of improving either designated uses or the process of criteria modification, a total of 30 states indicated that an improvement in the process of modifying standards (whether a change in their designated uses, their criteria, or both) would result in different water bodies being slated for cleanup. | Why GAO Did This Study
Water quality standards comprise designated uses and water quality criteria. These standards are critical in making accurate, scientifically based determinations about which of the nation's waters are most in need of cleanup. GAO examined the extent to which (1) states are changing designated uses when necessary, (2) EPA is assisting states toward that end, (3) EPA is updating the "criteria documents" states use to develop the pollutant limits needed to measure whether designated uses are being attained, and (4) EPA is assisting states in establishing criteria that can be compared with reasonably obtainable monitoring data.
What GAO Found
The extent to which states are changing designated uses varies considerably. Individual states made anywhere from no use changes to over 1,000 use changes during the 5-year period, from 1997 through 2001. Regardless of the number of use changes states made, nearly all states report that some water bodies within their states currently need changes to their designated uses. To do so, many states said they need additional EPA assistance to clarify the circumstances in which use changes are acceptable to EPA and the evidence needed to support those changes. While EPA has developed and published criteria for a wide range of pollutants, the agency has not updated its criteria documents to include sedimentation and other key pollutants that are causing approximately 50 percent of water quality impairments nationwide. In addition to needing new criteria documents, states need assistance from EPA in establishing criteria so that they can be compared with reasonably obtainable monitoring data. Changing either designated uses or criteria is considered a standards modification. Twenty-two states reported that an improvement in the process for changing designated uses would result in different water bodies being slated for cleanup; 22 states also reported that an improvement in the process for modifying criteria would have that effect. Collectively, 30 states would have different water bodies slated for cleanup with an improvement in the process of modifying standards. |
gao_HEHS-96-103 | gao_HEHS-96-103_0 | Differences in Physical Conditions by Region and State
The physical conditions reported by schools varied widely by regional and state locations and by other characteristics such as community type, percentage of minority and poor students served, and size and level of school. The percentage of schools reporting inadequate buildings and inadequate building features varied by location and community type as well as by student and school characteristics. Figures 1 and 2 show the differences by state. Funding Needed for Repairs and Upgrades Varied Widely
Differences in Funding Needed for Repairs and Upgrades Nationwide
We estimated that schools nationwide needed to spend about $112 billion to repair or upgrade them into good overall condition. Regarding the amount needed per school, the average school in America reported needing about $1.7 million to repair and upgrade schools to good overall condition. Differences in Funding Needed by Other Characteristics
Schools in central cities estimated needing the most funding to restore schools to good condition. Regional Differences in Number of Students Affected by Inadequate Conditions
The greatest percentage of students attending schools with at least one inadequate building, building feature, or unsatisfactory environmental condition or with multiple unsatisfactory conditions were in the West,although the South had the greatest number of students attending these schools. The greatest number of students attending schools reporting at least one inadequate building were in elementary schools (8.3 million). We asked about (1) the physical condition of buildings and major building features, such as roofs, framing, floors, and foundations; (2) the status of environmental conditions, such as lighting, heating, and ventilation; (3) how well schools could meet selected functional requirements of education reforms, such as having space for small- and large-group instruction; (4) the sufficiency of data, voice, and video technologies and the infrastructure to support these technologies; (5) the amount schools had spent in the last 3 years or planned to spend in the next 3 years on selected federal mandates; and (6) an estimate of the total cost of needed repairs, renovations, and modernizations to put all buildings in good overall condition. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the condition of the nation's school buildings, focusing on differences in the: (1) condition of schools; (2) amount of funding needed to repair or upgrade facilities; and (3) number of students attending schools in inadequate condition.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the condition of schools, the funding needed to repair or upgrade facilities, and the number of students attending schools in inadequate condition all differed by location, community type, percentage of minority and disadvantaged students, and school level and size; (2) the amounts schools and states needed to bring schools into good condition varied widely; (3) schools' environmental and physical conditions varied widely by region and states and by community type, percentage of minority and poor students served, and school size and level; (4) the largest percentage of schools that had inadequate environmental and physical conditions were in the western United States and in central cities that served minority and poor students; (5) schools needed to spend about $112 billion, or an average of $1.7 million per school, to repair or upgrade them to good overall condition; (6) although the amount of funding needed by state, school, and region varied, central city schools serving minority and poor students required the most funding; (7) schools estimated that they will require $9.2 billion over three years to comply with federal mandates; and (8) about one quarter to one third of the nation's students attend schools with one inadequate building, at least one inadequate building feature, and at least one unsatisfactory environmental condition. |
gao_GAO-05-471 | gao_GAO-05-471_0 | IPv4 uses a 32-bit address format, which provides approximately 4.3 billion unique IP addresses. IPv6 Dramatically Increases Address Space
IPv6 dramatically increases the amount of IP address space available from the approximately 4.3 billion addresses in IPv4 to approximately 3.4 × 10IPv6 addresses are characterized by a network prefix that describes the location of an IPv6-capable device in a network and an interface ID that provides a unique identification number (ID) for the device. IPv6 Considerations Include Significant Planning Efforts and Immediate Actions to Ensure Security
Key planning considerations for federal agencies include recognizing that an IPv6 transition is already under way because IPv6-capable software and equipment exist in agency networks. Furthermore, specific security risks could result from not managing IPv6 software and equipment in federal agency networks. One key aspect to consider while drafting the business case for IPv6 is to understand how many devices an agency wants to connect to the Internet. Progress Has Been Made at Defense but Is Lacking at Other Federal Agencies
Recognizing the importance of planning, DOD has made progress in developing a business case, policies, a timeline, and methods for transitioning to IPv6, but similar efforts at the majority of the other CFO agencies are lacking. Majority of Federal Agencies Have Not Initiated Transition Planning Efforts
Unlike DOD, the majority of other federal agencies reporting have not yet initiated transition planning efforts for IPv6. Conclusions
The increase in IPv6 address space and the other new features of the protocol are designed to promote flexibility, functionality, and security in networks. Instruct federal agencies to begin addressing key IPv6 planning considerations, including developing inventories and assessing risks, creating business cases for the IPv6 transition, establishing policies and enforcement mechanisms, identifying timelines and methods for transition, as appropriate. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to describe the key characteristics of Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6); identify the key planning considerations for federal agencies in transitioning to IPv6; and determine the progress made by the Department of Defense (DOD) and other major federal agencies to transition to IPv6. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Internet protocol (IP) provides the addressing mechanism that defines how and where information such as text, voice, and video move across interconnected networks. Internet protocol version 4 (IPv4), which is widely used today, may not be able to accommodate the increasing number of global users and devices that are connecting to the Internet. As a result, IP version 6 (IPv6) was developed to increase the amount of available IP address space. It is gaining momentum globally from regions with limited address space. GAO was asked to (1) describe the key characteristics of IPv6; (2) identify the key planning considerations for federal agencies in transitioning to IPv6; and (3) determine the progress made by the Department of Defense (DOD) and other major agencies to transition to IPv6.
What GAO Found
The key characteristics of IPv6 are designed to increase address space, promote flexibility and functionality, and enhance security. For example, by using 128-bit addresses rather than 32-bit addresses, IPv6 dramatically increases the available Internet address space from approximately 4.3 billion addresses in IPv4 to approximately 3.4 x 10^38 in IPv6. Key planning considerations for federal agencies include recognizing that the transition is already under way, because IPv6-capable software and equipment already exists in agency networks. Other important agency planning considerations include developing inventories and assessing risks; creating business cases that identify organizational needs and goals; establishing policies and enforcement mechanisms; determining costs; and identifying timelines and methods for transition. In addition, managing the security aspects of an IPv6 transition is another consideration since IPv6 can introduce additional security risks to agency information. For example, attackers of federal networks could abuse IPv6 features to allow unauthorized traffic or make agency computers directly accessible from the Internet. DOD has made progress in developing a business case, policies, timelines, and processes for transitioning to IPv6. Despite these efforts, challenges remain, including finalizing plans, enforcing policy, and monitoring for unauthorized IPv6 traffic. Unlike DOD, the majority of other major federal agencies reported not yet having initiated key planning efforts for IPv6. For example, 22 agencies lack business cases; 21 lack transition plans; 19 have not inventoried IPv6 software and equipment; and none had developed cost estimates. |
gao_GAO-15-48 | gao_GAO-15-48_0 | About 15 Percent of DOJ’s Total Budgetary Resources Comes from Alternative Sources of Funding, and Laws Specific to Each Source Determine How Funds Should Be Obligated
Seven alternative sources of funding made up approximately 15 percent of DOJ’s total budgetary resources in fiscal year 2013, and different legislative requirements affect the agency’s flexibility in using these funds. Specifically, DOJ had about $4.3 billion in collections from seven major alternative sources of funding in 2013, and generally used this funding for related program costs. In addition, agency flexibility regarding using the seven funding sources varied with laws specifying funding purposes, amounts, and availability. In addition to collections that DOJ had the authority to use, in fiscal year 2013, DOJ received deposits of about $1.6 billion from two of the seven alternative sources of funding that were by law not available for the department to obligate, and therefore not counted as a budgetary resource. Crime Victims Fund: Criminal fines and penalties collected from offenders, among other sources, are deposited in the CVF. DOJ Can Improve the Management of Unobligated Balances of Selected Alternative Sources of Funding
Selected alternative sources of funding have growing unobligated balances, some of which could benefit from improved management. DOJ Could Improve Transparency in Fingerprint Checks Fees and Determine Appropriate Size of Unobligated Balances
According to DOJ-provided data, in fiscal years 2009 through 2013, the FBI’s CJIS Division collected on average about $385 million per year in fingerprint checks fees. The two portions of the fee have different statutory requirements. The automation portion of the fee is no-year money that can be carried over from year to year. When including balances from fiscal years prior to 2009, the CVF had a temporarily unavailable balance—composed of funds received in excess of obligations made—of nearly $9 billion at the end of fiscal year 2013. Specifically, during the annual appropriations process, the CVF balance unavailable for obligation by DOJ during the year counts as a “savings.” Consistent with scorekeeping guidelines used during the congressional budget process, this savings resulted in DOJ reporting a lower level of net budget authority because the unavailable CVF balance For example, is applied as a credit to DOJ’s total discretionary budget.in fiscal year 2013,
DOJ received about $25 billion in enacted total discretionary budget authority according to DOJ’s congressional budget justification. Conclusions
The seven major sources of DOJ’s alternative funding bring in more than $3 billion annually. By developing a policy to analyze unobligated balances from the Three Percent Fund, DOJ could better manage balances to ensure efficient and effective use of resources to support program activities. In addition, CJIS is missing opportunities for meaningful feedback that could affect the outcome of changes in fees and program implementation by not transparently communicating with stakeholders and customers the breakout of cost recovery and automation fees. DOJ also provided various reasons why it does not query or calculate revenue estimates. DOJ concurred with our third recommendation, which called for the FBI to develop a policy to analyze the unobligated balances coming from the automation portion of the CJIS fingerprint checks fees and establish a range of appropriate carryover amounts to support program needs. For six of the seven alternative sources of funding—the Assets Forfeiture Fund, the Crime Victims Fund, the Diversion Control Fee Account, the Federal Prison Industries, the Three Percent Fund, and the United States Trustee System Fund—we determined that the data on the amounts reported for the years under review DOJ-wide were sufficiently reliable for determining how much of DOJ’s budgetary resources come from these alternative sources of funding. We also determined that for fiscal year 2013, the fingerprint-based Criminal History Record Information checks provided by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) Division (CJIS fingerprint checks fees) were also reliable for our purposes. To report on DOJ’s flexibility in using alternative sources of funding for DOJ activities, we identified key statutory characteristics that increase or decrease agency flexibility with respect to these funds by reviewing principles of appropriations law and our prior work.statutory language and identified legal requirements applicable to the seven funds in the scope of this objective for each of these key areas: (1) purpose—for what purposes the funds may be obligated, (2) amount— how available amounts are determined and what action triggers the availability of funding, (3) time—what is the period of availability for the funding, and (4) review—what specific reporting requirements apply to the funding. 5. As noted above, annual appropriation acts have included obligations limitations for CVF funds. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOJ is composed of approximately 40 components that carry out its activities and functions. The majority of DOJ’s budget authority is provided through annual appropriations, but, in some cases, DOJ has the ability to fund its programs by using money it collects through alternative sources, such as fines, fees, and penalties. The authority to use these sources may come from either permanent statutory authority or may be contained within an annual appropriations act.
GAO was requested to examine DOJ’s alternative sources of funds. Specifically, this report addresses (1) how much of DOJ’s total budgetary resources come from major alternative sources of funding and the key statutory characteristics that provide agency flexibility regarding these sources, and (2) any opportunities that may exist for DOJ to better manage unobligated balances for selected major alternative sources of funding. GAO reviewed DOJ budget documents and relevant laws, and interviewed DOJ officials.
What GAO Found
Alternative sources of funding—collections by the Department of Justice (DOJ) from sources such as fines, fees, and penalties—made up about 15 percent of DOJ's total budgetary resources in fiscal year 2013. Specifically, DOJ collected about $4.3 billion from seven major alternative sources of funding—including the Assets Forfeiture Fund, the Crime Victims Fund (CVF), and noncriminal fingerprint checks fees, among others—which were available to DOJ. Agency flexibility regarding the use of the seven funding sources varied with laws specifying funding purposes, amounts, and availability by, for instance, limiting obligations from a source or limiting the period in which funds may be obligated.
DOJ can improve management of two alternative sources of funding. Specifically:
The Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) Division collected $396 million in fees for providing non-criminal justice fingerprint checks during fiscal year 2013. The fee is made up of a cost recovery and automation portion but the breakout between the two portions of the fee is not explicitly communicated to stakeholders. As a result, stakeholders do not have complete information for providing meaningful feedback. Additionally, CJIS sets fees, in part, based on projected volume of transactions. Actual volumes have exceeded projected volumes, resulting in CJIS bringing in more than anticipated in automation fees and contributing to an unobligated balance of $284 million at the end of fiscal year 2013. CJIS officials stated that they are aware of growing unobligated balances but have not evaluated what an appropriate amount should be. As a result, CJIS does not know if it is carrying over a suitable amount to meet future needs.
In addition, unobligated balances in the CVF grew to nearly $9 billion by the end of fiscal year 2013. Statutory provisions annually limit DOJ's ability to obligate collections in the fund. For example, during fiscal year 2013, DOJ received about $1.5 billion in deposits to the fund, from sources such as criminal fines, and had statutory authority to obligate $730 million from the fund for crime victim assistance programs. Consistent with scorekeeping guidelines used during the congressional budget process, DOJ reported funds not available for obligation as a credit or offset to its annual discretionary budget authority. From fiscal years 2009 through 2013, DOJ reported $32 billion in offsets provided primarily by the CVF. As a result, DOJ's reported net discretionary budgetary authority decreased about 36 percent from 2009 to 2013, while DOJ's actual total discretionary budget authority remained relatively constant during these years.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOJ develop a policy to analyze unobligated carryover balances of the Three Percent Fund. GAO also recommends that the FBI publish cost recovery and automation portions of fingerprint checks fees and develop a policy to analyze and determine an appropriate range for unobligated balances from automation fees. DOJ generally concurred with our recommendations, but noted concerns with developing revenue estimates for the Three Percent Fund and establishing a range of carryover balances for FBI fingerprint check fees. |
gao_GAO-02-300 | gao_GAO-02-300_0 | CMS Had Not Implemented a Risk- Based Approach and Effective Control Activities for Financial Oversight
Although CMS is responsible for ensuring the propriety of over $100 billion expended annually by the federal government for Medicaid, its financial oversight process did not incorporate key standards for internal control necessary to reduce the risk of inappropriate expenditures. The comptroller general’s Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government requires that agency managers perform risk assessments and then take actions to mitigate identified risks that could impede achievement of agency objectives. Therefore, CMS did not have the requisite assurance that its control activities were focused on areas of greatest risk. The initiative was started to aid states in their program integrity efforts. The control activities that CMS had in place to oversee state internal controls and help ensure the propriety of Medicaid expenditures were not effectively implemented. During our site visits we interviewed 11 regional financial analysts responsible for overseeing the five states that accounted for over $70 billion in Medicaid expenditures in fiscal year 2000. In addition, the CMS audit resolution process did not ensure that audit findings were resolved promptly and did not collect sufficient information on the status of audit findings. Establishing clear lines of authority and performance standards for CMS oversight would also provide for a more efficient, effective, and accountable Medicaid program. Monitoring Performance
We also recommend that the CMS administrator develop mechanisms to routinely monitor, measure, and evaluate the quality and effectiveness of financial oversight, including audit resolution, by collecting, analyzing, and comparing trend information on the results of oversight control activities particularly deferral and disallowance determinations, focused financial reviews, and technical assistance; using the information collected above to assess overall quality of financial management oversight; identifying standard reporting formats that can be used consistently across regions for tracking open audit findings and reporting on the status of corrective actions; and revising DAL audit tracking reports to ensure that all audits with Medicaid related findings are identified and promptly reported to the regions for timely resolution. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Medicaid program spent more than $200 billion in fiscal year 2000 to meet the health care needs of nearly 34 million poor, elderly, blind, and disabled persons. States are responsible for making proper payments to Medicaid providers, recovering misspent funds, and accurately reporting costs for federal reimbursement. At the federal level, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) oversee state financial activities and ensure the propriety of expenditures reported for federal reimbursement.
What GAO Found
GAO found that weak financial oversight by CMS leaves the program vulnerable to improper payments. The Comptroller General's Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government requires that agency managers perform risk assessment, take steps to mitigate identified risks, and monitor the effectiveness of those actions. The standards also require that authority and responsibility for internal controls be clearly defined. CMS oversight had weaknesses in each of these areas. As a result, CMS did not know if its control efforts were focused on areas of greatest risk. CMS also was not effectively implementing the controls it had in place. Furthermore, managers had not established performance standards for financial oversight activities, particularly their expenditure review activity. Limited data were collected to assess regional financial analyst performance in overseeing state internal controls and expenditures. In addition, the CMS audit resolution procedures did not collect enough information on the status of audit findings or ensure that audit findings were resolved promptly. CMS' current organizational structure lacks clear lines of authority and responsibility between the regions and headquarters. |
gao_OP-94-1 | gao_OP-94-1_0 | Preface
In fiscal year 1993, GAO made over 1,600 recommendations. Improving National Security and International Affairs Programs
Acquisition, Policy, Technology, and Competitiveness Issue Area (Budget Function 050)
Impact of GAO’s Work
Given the ongoing reductions in U.S. defense funding, a new relationship is evolving between the government and the defense industry. These programs are implemented by HUD, VA, FEMA, and other federal agencies. The Department’s major management systems for information, financial, and human resources management also need attention. For example, our report on FDIC’s Asset Management System is found in the section on “Financial Institutions and Markets.”
Department of Defense: Corporate Information Management (CIM)
The Department of Defense has made little progress in implementing the recommendations in our September 1992 report. | What GAO Found
GAO reported on the conclusions and recommendations resulting from its audits and other reviews of federal departments and agencies. Information is presented on recommendations in the areas of national security, international affairs, natural resources, economic development, human resource management, justice, general government, and financial and information management. They are submitted for use in congressional review of budget requests for fiscal year 1995. |
gao_GAO-06-1032T | gao_GAO-06-1032T_0 | EPA Has Limited Information on the Health and Environmental Risks of Existing Chemicals and Has Issued Few Regulations Controlling Such Chemicals
Because chemical companies are generally not required to develop and submit toxicity information to EPA, when the agency decides to review existing chemicals, it generally has only limited information on the risks that the chemicals pose to human health and the environment. EPA has used its authority to require testing for fewer than 200 of the 62,000 chemicals in commerce when EPA began reviewing chemicals under TSCA in 1979. This program is intended to provide basic data on the characteristics of about 2,800 chemicals produced in excess of 1 million pounds a year. For example, there are currently over 200 high-production- volume chemicals for which chemical companies have not agreed to provide the minimal test data that EPA believes are needed to initially assess their risks. However, EPA officials told us that it is time-consuming, costly, and inefficient for the agency to use a two-step process of (1) issuing rules under TSCA (which can take months or years to develop) to obtain exposure data or available test data that the chemical industry does not voluntarily provide to EPA and then (2) issuing additional rules requiring companies to perform specific tests necessary to ensure the safety of the chemicals tested. Since the Congress enacted TSCA in 1976, EPA has issued regulations under the act to ban or limit the production or restrict the use of only five existing chemicals or chemical classes. According to EPA, the lack of information on existing chemicals and the relative difficulty of requiring testing under TSCA on the scale that would be necessary for the thousands of chemicals produced at high volumes, has led EPA, in cooperation with chemical companies, environmental groups, and other interested parties, to implement a voluntary program to obtain test data on high-production- volume chemicals from chemical companies. In the absence of chemical test data, EPA largely relies on scientific models that do not always accurately determine chemicals’ properties or the full extent of their adverse effects. This method, also referred to as the nearest analogue approach, involves using models to compare new chemicals with chemicals with similar molecular structures for which test data on health and environmental effects are available. That is, according to EPA officials, the majority of new chemicals submitted for review can be screened out as not requiring further review because (1) EPA determines on the basis of its screening models that a chemical has low potential to harm human health or the environment or (2) on the basis of other information, such as the anticipated uses, exposures, and releases of the chemicals, only limited potential risks to people and the environment are expected. EPA Reviews of New Chemicals Have Resulted in Some Control Actions
When EPA’s assessment of a new chemical identifies health and safety problems, EPA can issue a proposed rule to prevent chemical companies from manufacturing or distributing the chemical in commerce, or to otherwise restrict the chemical’s production or use, if the agency believes the new chemical may present an unreasonable risk before EPA can regulate the chemical under the relevant provisions of TSCA. Despite limitations in the information available on new chemicals, EPA’s reviews have resulted in some action being taken to reduce the risks of over 3,600 new chemicals that chemical companies have submitted for review. EPA’s Ability to Share Data Collected Under TSCA Is Limited
EPA’s ability to make publicly available the information that it collects under TSCA is limited. We also recommended that the Congress consider amending TSCA to authorize EPA to share with the states and foreign governments the confidential business information that chemical companies provide to EPA, subject to regulations to be established by EPA in consultation with the chemical industry and other interested parties that would set forth the procedures to be followed by all recipients of the information in order to protect the information from unauthorized disclosures. EPA did not disagree with the report’s findings and is in the process of implementing several of our recommendations. However, the fundamental and historical problems the agency has experienced with utilizing its authorities under TSCA continue to limit EPA’s ability to manage its chemical review program and assess chemical risks. Moreover, EPA’s ability to provide the public with information on chemical production and risks is hampered by the strict confidential business information provisions of TSCA. | Why GAO Did This Study
Chemicals play an important role in everyday life, but some may be harmful to human health and the environment. Chemicals are used to produce items widely used throughout society, such as cleansers and plastics as well as industrial solvents and additives. However, some chemicals, such as lead and mercury, are highly toxic at certain doses and need to be regulated because of health and safety concerns. In 1976, the Congress passed the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) to authorize the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to control chemicals that pose an unreasonable risk to human health or the environment. This testimony is based on GAO's June 2005 report, Chemical Regulation: Options Exist to Improve EPA's Ability to Assess Health Risks and Manage Its Chemical Review Program (GAO-05-458). GAO's report describes EPA's efforts to (1) assess chemicals used in commerce, (2) control the use of chemicals not yet in commerce, and (3) publicly disclose information provided by chemical companies under TSCA. GAO recommended that the Congress consider providing EPA additional authorities under TSCA to improve EPA's ability to assess chemical risks, and that the EPA Administrator take several actions to improve EPA's management of its chemical review program. EPA did not disagree with our findings and is currently implementing some of our recommendations.
What GAO Found
EPA's authority under TSCA to obtain the data needed to assess existing chemicals does not facilitate its review process because the costly and time-consuming burden of obtaining the data is on EPA, rather than chemical companies. Consequently, EPA has used its authorities to require testing of fewer than 200 of the 62,000 chemicals in commerce when EPA began reviewing chemicals under TSCA in 1979. To obtain more data on existing chemicals, EPA implemented its High Production Volume Challenge Program, under which chemical companies voluntarily provide test data on about 2,800 chemicals produced or imported in amounts of 1 million pounds or more a year. While the purpose of the program is laudable, several problems remain, including that the chemical industry has not agreed to provide test data for over 200 chemicals with high production volumes. Moreover, after obtaining test data, EPA is required under TSCA's provisions to determine that a chemical poses an unreasonable risk before EPA can act to regulate its production or use. EPA officials say the act's legal standards for demonstrating unreasonable risk are so high that they have generally discouraged EPA from using its authorities to ban or restrict the manufacture or use of existing chemicals. Since Congress enacted TSCA in 1976, EPA has issued regulations to ban or limit the production of only five existing chemicals or groups of chemicals. EPA's reviews of new chemicals provide only limited assurance that health and environmental risks are identified because TSCA does not require companies to test chemicals before they notify EPA of their intent to manufacture the chemicals. Because of a general lack of data on new chemicals, EPA has developed methods to predict their potential exposure and toxicity levels by using scientific models to compare the new chemicals with chemicals that have similar molecular structures and for which toxicity information is available. However, the use of these models can be problematic because the models are not always accurate in predicting chemical properties and EPA's evaluation of general health effects of the chemicals is contingent upon the availability of information on chemicals with similar molecular structures. Additionally, the estimates of a chemical's production volume and anticipated uses, which EPA uses to assess exposure, can change substantially after EPA completes its review. Despite these limitations, EPA's reviews have resulted in some action being taken to reduce the risks of over 3,600 new chemicals. EPA's ability to provide the public with information on chemical production and risk is generally limited by the confidential business information provisions of TSCA. As a result, state agencies and foreign governments interested in obtaining this data for important purposes are denied access to the information. Recently, chemical companies have expressed interest in working with EPA to identify ways of enabling the agency to share confidential information with other organizations, provided that appropriate safeguards are adopted to prevent the unauthorized use of the information. |
gao_GAO-12-943T | gao_GAO-12-943T_0 | FPS Does Not Currently Assess Risks at Federal Facilities but Multiple Agencies Are Conducting Their Own Assessments
Our preliminary results indicate that, in the absence of RAMP, FPS currently is not assessing risk at the over 9,000 federal facilities under the custody and control of GSA in a manner consistent with federal standards such as NIPP’s risk management framework, as FPS originally planned. As a result, FPS has accumulated a backlog of federal facilities that have not been assessed for several years. According to FPS data, more than 5,000 facilities were to be assessed in fiscal years 2010 through 2012. However, we were not able to determine the extent of the FSA backlog because we found FPS’s FSA data to be unreliable. In addition, since September 2011, FPS’s inspectors have collected information—such as location, purpose, agency contacts, and current countermeasures (e.g., perimeter security, access controls, and closed-circuit television systems) at over 1,400 facilities—which will be used as a starting point to complete FPS’s fiscal year 2012 assessments. GSA is also expending additional resources to assess risk. According to FPS officials, on March 30, 2012, Argonne National Laboratory delivered this tool, called the Modified Infrastructure Survey Tool (MIST), to FPS on time and within budget. MIST is an interim vulnerability assessment tool that FPS plans to use until it can develop a permanent solution to replace RAMP. According to MIST project documents and FPS officials, among other things, MIST will: allow FPS’s inspectors to review and document a facility’s security posture, current level of protection, and recommend countermeasures; provide FPS’s inspectors with a standardized way for gathering and recording facility data; and allow FPS to compare a facility’s existing countermeasures against the Interagency Security Committee’s (ISC) countermeasure standards based on the ISC’s predefined threats to federal facilities (e.g., blast-resistant windows for a facility designed to counter the threat of an explosive device) to create the facility’s vulnerability report. FPS Increased Its Use of Project Management Best Practices in Developing MIST
Our preliminary analysis indicates that in developing MIST, FPS increased its use of GAO’s project management best practices, including alternatives analysis, managing requirements, and conducting user acceptance testing. Our preliminary work suggests that MIST has several limitations:
Assessing Consequence. Three of the four risk assessment experts we spoke with generally agreed that a tool that does not estimate consequences does not allow an agency to fully assess the risks to a federal facility. FPS officials stated that they did not include consequence assessment in MIST’s design because it would have required additional time to develop, validate, and test MIST. Comparing Risk across Federal Facilities. We reported in 2010 that FPS’s approach to risk management provides limited assurance that the most critical risks at federal facilities across the country are being prioritized and mitigated.such a comprehensive approach to its FSA program when it developed RAMP and FPS officials stated that they may develop this capability for the next version of MIST. FPS Faces Challenges in Overseeing Its Contract Guards
GAO, Homeland Security: The Federal Protective Service Faces Several Challenges That Hamper its Ability to Protect Federal Facilities, GAO-08-683 (Washington, D.C.: June 11, 2008). In the absence of RAMP, in June 2012, FPS decided to deploy an interim method to enable inspectors to record post inspections. FPS officials acknowledged that this method is not a comprehensive system for guard oversight. Consequently, it is now more difficult for FPS to verify that guards on post are trained and certified and that inspectors are conducting guard post inspections as required. Although FPS collects guard training and certification information from the companies that provide contract guards, it appears that FPS does not independently verify that information. To verify the guard companies’ reports, FPS conducts monthly audits. We plan to finalize our analysis and report to the Chairman in August 2012, including recommendations. We discussed the information in this statement with FPS and incorporated technical comments as appropriate. | Why GAO Did This Study
FPS provides security and law enforcement services to over 9,000 federal facilities managed by the General Services Administration (GSA). GAO has reported that FPS faces challenges providing security services, particularly completing FSAs and managing its contract guard program. To address these challenges, FPS spent about $35 million and 4 years developing RAMPessentially a risk assessment and guard oversight tool. However, RAMP ultimately could not be used to do either because of system problems.
This testimony is based on preliminary work for the Chairman and discusses the extent to which FPS is (1) completing risk assessments, (2) developing a tool to complete FSAs, and (3) managing its contract guard workforce. GAO reviewed FPS documents, conducted site visits at 3 of FPSs 11 regions and interviewed officials from FPS, Argonne National Laboratory, GSA, Department of Veterans Affairs, the Federal Highway Administration, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and guard companies; as well as 4 risk management experts.
What GAO Found
GAOs preliminary results indicate that the Department of Homeland Securitys (DHS) Federal Protective Service (FPS) is not assessing risks at federal facilities in a manner consistent with standards such as the National Infrastructure Protection Plans (NIPP) risk management framework, as FPS originally planned. Instead of conducting risk assessments, since September 2011, FPSs inspectors have collected information, such as the location, purpose, agency contacts, and current countermeasures (e.g., perimeter security, access controls, and closed-circuit television systems). This information notwithstanding, FPS has a backlog of federal facilities that have not been ssessed for several years. According to FPSs data, more than 5,000 facilities were to be assessed in fiscal years 2010 through 2012. However, GAO was not able to determine the extent of FPSs facility security assessment (FSA) backlog because the data were unreliable. Multiple agencies have expended resources to conduct risk assessments, even though they also already pay FPS for this service.
FPS has an interim vulnerability assessment tool, referred to as the Modified Infrastructure Survey Tool (MIST), which it plans to use to assess federal facilities until it develops a longer-term solution. In developing MIST, FPS generally followed GAOs project management best practices, such as conducting user acceptance testing. However, our preliminary analysis indicates that MIST has some limitations. Most notably, MIST does not estimate the consequences of an undesirable event occurring at a facility. Three of the four risk assessment experts GAO spoke with generally agreed that a tool that does not estimate consequences does not allow an agency to fully assess risks. FPS officials stated that they did not include consequence information in MIST because it was not part of the original design and thus requires more time to validate. MIST also was not designed to compare risks across federal facilities. Thus, FPS has limited assurance that critical risks at federal facilities are being prioritized and mitigated.
GAOs preliminary work indicates that FPS continues to face challenges in overseeing its approximately 12,500 contract guards. FPS developed the Risk Assessment and Management Program (RAMP) to help it oversee its contract guard workforce by verifying that guards are trained and certified and for conducting guard post inspections. However, FPS faced challenges using RAMP for guard oversight, such as verifying guard training and certification information, and has recently determined that it would no longer use RAMP. Without a comprehensive system, it is more difficult for FPS to oversee its contract guard workforce. FPS is verifying guard certification and training information by conducting monthly audits of guard information maintained by guard contractors. However, FPS does not independently verify the contractors information. Additionally, according to FPS officials, FPS recently decided to deploy a new interim method to record post inspections that replaces RAMP.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making any recommendations in this testimony. GAO plans to finalize its analysis and report to the Chairman in August 2012, including recommendations. GAO discussed the information in this statement with FPS and incorporated technical comments as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-13-297T | gao_GAO-13-297T_0 | As reported to OMB, federal agencies plan to spend more than $74 billion on IT investments in fiscal year 2013, which is the total expended for not only acquiring such investments, but also the funding to operate and maintain them. Many of these investments are critical to our nation. Specifically, as of August 2012, according to the IT Dashboard, 190 of the federal government’s approximately 700 major IT investments—totaling almost $12.5 billion— were in need of management attention (rated “yellow” to indicate the need for attention or “red” to indicate significant concerns). Currently, the Dashboard publicly displays information on the cost, schedule, and performance of over 700 major federal IT investments at 26 federal agencies. We previously reported and testified on the issue of duplicative IT investments at DOD and the Department of Energy. We made recommendations to those agencies to report on the progress of efforts to identify and eliminate duplication, where appropriate. IT Dashboard OMB has taken significant steps to enhance the oversight, transparency, and accountability of federal IT investments by creating its IT Dashboard, and by improving the accuracy of investment ratings. However, there were issues with the accuracy and reliability of cost and schedule data, and we recommended steps that OMB should take to improve these data. More recently, in October 2012 we found that opportunities existed to improve transparency and oversight of investment risk at our selected agencies. Specifically, CIOs at six federal agencies consistently rated the majority of their IT investments as low risk. In the past, OMB reported trends for risky IT investments needing management attention as part of its annual budget submission, but discontinued this reporting in fiscal year 2010. Accordingly, we recommended OMB analyze agencies’ investment risk over time as reflected in the Dashboard’s CIO ratings and present its analysis with the President’s annual budget submission, with which OMB concurred. DOD’s ratings were unique in reflecting additional considerations, such as the likelihood of OMB review, and consequently DOD did not rate any of its investments as high risk. Although three DOD investments experienced significant performance problems and were part of a GAO high-risk area (business systems modernization), they were all rated low risk or moderately low risk by the DOD CIO. The nine In addition to efficiently acquiring IT investments, it is also important for the federal government to efficiently manage operational investments, especially since agencies are planning to spend about $54 billion in fiscal year 2013 on operational systems. Oversight of Investments in O&M While agencies spend billions on operational investments, they have not always provided adequate oversight of these investments. all investments and that all factors are fully assessed; and OMB revise its guidance to include directing agencies to report on the IT Dashboard the results from the OAs. We issued two reports on the federal government’s effort to consolidate data centers and made several recommendations for improvements. In a subsequent report we noted that agencies updated their inventories and plans, but key elements were still missing. OMB noted that the savings would be even greater and estimated that FDCCI would realize $3 billion in savings by 2015.However, while OMB required agencies to complete missing elements in their data center inventories and plans by the end of September 2011, only 3 agencies submitted complete inventories, and only 1 agency submitted a complete plan. Our report noted that until these inventories and plans were complete, agencies would continue to be at risk of not realizing anticipated savings, improved infrastructure utilization, or energy efficiency. As a result, we recommended that the five selected agencies should implement recognized best practices when establishing schedules and cost estimates for their consolidation efforts and that OMB ensure agencies utilize its standardized cost model across the consolidation initiative. We reported on the federal government’s progress toward implementing these actions in April 2012.OMB and key federal agencies had made progress on action items in the IT Reform Plan, but there were several areas where more remained to be done. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government plans to spend more than $74 billion on IT investments in fiscal year 2013. Given the size of these investments and the criticality of many of them to the health, economy, and security of the nation, it is important that OMB and federal agencies provide appropriate oversight of and adequate transparency into these programs. Nevertheless, IT projects too frequently incur cost overruns and schedule slippages, and result in duplicate systems while contributing little to mission-related outcomes.
GAO was asked to testify on the results and recommendations from its selected reports that focused on key aspects of the federal government's acquisition and management of IT investments. To prepare this statement, GAO drew on previously published work.
What GAO Found
GAO has issued a number of key reports on the federal government's efforts to efficiently acquire and operate information technology (IT) investments and found that if major initiatives are fully implemented, billions of dollars in savings could be realized. In particular, GAO has made recommendations regarding the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) public website, known as the IT Dashboard, which provides detailed information on federal agencies' major IT investments; agencies' efforts to perform analyses on existing IT investments; and agencies' progress toward consolidating data centers.
OMB has taken significant steps to enhance the oversight, transparency, and accountability of federal IT investments by creating its IT Dashboard, and by improving the accuracy of investment ratings. However, there were issues with the accuracy and reliability of cost and schedule data in the Dashboard, and GAO has recommended steps that OMB and agencies should take to improve these data--this is important since the Dashboard reports 190 investments totaling almost $12.5 billion being at risk. GAO recently reported that six federal agencies consistently rated the majority of their IT investments as low risk. Further, the Department of Defense's (DOD) ratings reflected considerations in addition to those OMB recommends, and consequently it did not rate any of its investments as high risk. However, GAO has recently reported that several DOD investments experienced significant performance problems and were indeed high risk, and that DOD business systems modernization is a high-risk area. In the past, OMB reported trends for risky IT investments needing management attention as part of its annual budget submission, but discontinued this reporting in fiscal year 2010. GAO recommended OMB analyze agencies' investment risk over time as reflected in the Dashboard's ratings and present its analysis with the President's annual budget submission.
While agencies plan to spend billions on operational investments--more than $54 billion in fiscal year 2013-- they have not always provided adequate oversight of these investments. Specifically, GAO reported in October 2012 that five agencies had operational investments with a fiscal year 2011 budget of over $3 billion that had not undergone operational analyses as required by OMB. The report also noted that until operational investments are fully assessed, there was increased potential for these multibillion dollar investments to result in unnecessary waste and duplication. GAO recommended that the five agencies conduct required analyses.
GAO reported on the federal government's progress toward data center consolidation (which OMB expects will save $3 billion by 2015). In July 2012, GAO found that agencies updated their required inventories and plans, but only 3 of 24 agencies in the review submitted complete inventories and only 1 agency submitted a complete plan, as required by OMB. Until these inventories and plans were complete, agencies would continue to be at risk of not realizing anticipated savings, improved infrastructure utilization, or energy efficiency. Accordingly, GAO reiterated a prior recommendation to update inventories and plans, and also recommended that agencies use best practices when developing estimates.
What GAO Recommends
GAO has issued numerous recommendations to OMB and agencies on key aspects of IT management, including (1) OMB's public website, known as the IT Dashboard, which provides detailed information on federal agencies' major IT investments, and (2) efforts to oversee IT operations and consolidate data centers. |
gao_GAO-04-937 | gao_GAO-04-937_0 | As shown in figure 1, RHS’s national, state, and local offices share administrative duties for the rental assistance program. The national office also distributes administrative notices and unnumbered letters on an as-needed basis. State and local office staff also collect and maintain property and tenant data for their areas. RHS calculates the payments property owners receive using information supplied by tenants and verified by property owners, who then use the information to create a tenant certification form. Funds Are Distributed to Properties through Contracts and Transfers of Unused Rental Assistance
The rental assistance program provides four types of contracts: renewal, construction, servicing, and preservation. 3). RHS’s Plans to Streamline the Payment Process Have Raised Concerns about Eliminating a Layer of Review
RHS’s national office is upgrading two systems to streamline the payment process. RHS’s National and State Offices Monitor the Use Of Rental Assistance, with Local Offices Performing the Primary Review Every 3 Years
RD Instructions provide guidance for monitoring the use of rental assistance funds. National office staff are planning a number of initiatives to increase rental assistance monitoring, but a number of key management positions in the national office have been unfilled, potentially limiting the effectiveness of monitoring efforts. Another survey respondent stated that RHS guidance is sometimes unclear. RHS’s Internal Controls Do Not Provide Adequate Oversight of Rental Assistance Funds
RHS’s internal controls do not provide reasonable assurance that rental assistance funds are used efficiently or that tenants’ incomes and assets are adequately verified. Alternate methods of verification, such as internal MFIS database checks and wage matching, could help improve RHS’s existing internal controls if properly designed and implemented. Additionally, the infrequency of the triennial supervisory reviews using a sampling methodology that may be insufficient cannot reasonably ensure that tenants’ income and assets, and ultimately rental assistance payments, are adequately verified. Recommendations for Executive Action
To ensure that rental assistance funds are effectively distributed to properties that have tenants with the greatest need, GAO recommends that the Secretary of Agriculture require program officials to (1) establish centralized guidance on transferring unused rental assistance, (2) improve sampling methods to ensure that a sufficient number of tenant household files are selected for supervisory reviews and (3) improve verification of tenant information including more effective use of alternate methods of income verification. However, GAO did not take a position on this issue. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.
Scope and Methodology
To determine how RHS distributes rental assistance funds and monitors the rental assistance program, and to identify the internal controls RHS has established to ensure that rental assistance funds are administered and used effectively, we collected written and testimonial information from agency officials in the national office and in the Office of the Deputy Chief Financial Officer in St. Louis, Missouri on the rental assistance distribution process and the guidance governing the distribution process. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Rural Housing Service's (RHS) Section 521 rental assistance program provides rental subsidies for about 250,000 rural tenants. Because the program has a waiting list of 80,000 eligible tenants and there are over 1.3 million rural low-income renters eligible for housing subsidies, it is important to effectively distribute resources to extend assistance to as many needy tenants as possible. Therefore, GAO was asked to assess (1) how RHS distributes rental assistance funds to properties and tenants, (2) how RHS monitors the use of rental assistance funds, and (3) whether there are sufficient internal controls in place to ensure that these funds are being effectively administered and used.
What GAO Found
RHS's national office pays rental assistance funds to property owners through a variety of contracts and transfers of unused rental assistance from one property to another. RHS staff calculate the payment amounts using information provided by tenants and verified by property owners. The current system requires RHS staff to enter payment data into the agency's database manually. However, RHS's national office is upgrading two systems to streamline the payment process. But some local RHS staff are concerned that the new process may eliminate a layer of review. RHS's national, state, and local offices share responsibility for monitoring the rental assistance program, with the local offices performing the primary review every 3 years. The national office outlines the monitoring activities for the rental assistance program in its Rural Development Instructions and provides other guidance, such as administrative notices and unnumbered letters. We found that state and local offices follow this guidance inconsistently and sometimes consider it unclear. National office staff are planning a number of initiatives to increase monitoring of the rental assistance program, but a number of key management positions in the national office are unfilled, which could limit the effectiveness of program monitoring. RHS's internal controls do not provide adequate oversight of rental assistance funds because RHS guidance is inadequate and tenants' incomes are not adequately verified. First, insufficient guidance on the transfer process limits RHS's ability to move unused rental assistance to properties that have tenants with the greatest unmet need. Second, the triennial supervisory review does not provide reasonable assurance that tenants income and assets, and ultimately rental assistance payments, are adequately verified. Alternate methods of verifying tenant information also have limited effectiveness but could help improve internal control if properly designed and implemented. |
gao_GAO-12-141T | gao_GAO-12-141T_0 | FAA Has Implemented Aspects of NextGen That Have Produced Measurable Benefits, but Delays Threaten to Increase Costs and Impact Overall Implementation
FAA has made progress in several areas to improve its implementation of NextGen. For example, FAA has begun work to streamline its procedure approval processes—including its environmental reviews of new procedures—and has expanded its capacity to develop new performance- based navigation routes and procedures. However, aircraft operators have complained that FAA has not produced the most useful or beneficial routes and procedures to date. To address these concerns, FAA has undertaken thorough reviews in a number of areas. With respect to the continuing implementation of NextGen systems and capabilities, our ongoing work has preliminarily found that some key NextGen-related programs are generally proceeding on time and on budget (see table 1). ERAM is also pivotal to the on-time implementation of two other key NextGen acquisitions—Data Communications and SWIM. The long-term result of this decision is not yet known but it could delay certain SWIM capabilities and hinder the progress of other capabilities that depend, in turn, on the system integration that SWIM is intended to provide. Most of this proposed reduction is on NextGen and NextGen-related spending, as reflected in FAA’s revised 5-year Capital Investment Plan for fiscal years 2012 through 2016. FAA Faces Several Ongoing Issues That Will Affect NextGen Implementation
To maintain credibility with aircraft operators that NextGen will be implemented, FAA must deliver systems and capabilities on time so that operators have incentives to invest in the avionics that will enable NextGen to operate as planned. That industry skepticism, which we have found lingers today, could delay the time when significant NextGen benefits—such as increased capacity and more direct, fuel- saving routing—are realized. For this statement, we would like to highlight a few specific areas: the potential effect of program delays on international harmonization efforts, the need for FAA to ensure that it addresses human factors and workforce training issues to successfully transition to a new air transportation system, the need for FAA to continue to address potential environmental impacts, and the need for FAA to improve the management and governance of NextGen. Delays to NextGen programs, and potential reductions in the budget for NextGen activities, could delay the schedule for harmonization with Europe’s air traffic management modernization efforts and the realization of these benefits. In addition to integrating human factors research into NextGen systems, FAA and NASA will have to identify and develop the training necessary to address controllers’ and pilots’ changing roles, and have this training in place before NextGen is fully realized (when some aircraft will be equipped with NextGen systems and others will not). To its credit, FAA has been working to develop procedures for streamlining environmental review processes that affect NextGen activities. Need to improve management and governance. We have previously reported on problems with FAA’s management and oversight of NextGen acquisitions and implementation. Specifically, FAA plans to abolish and merge a number of committees to improve decision making and reduce time requirements of senior FAA executives. In addition, contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses the current progress toward implementing the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen). NextGen will impact nearly every aspect of air transportation and will transform the way in which the air transportation system operates today. It will do so, in part, by (1) using satellite-based surveillance as opposed to ground-based radars, (2) using performance-based navigation instead of cumbersome step-by-step procedures, (3) replacing routine voice communications with data transmissions, and (4) organizing and merging the disjointed data that pilots, controllers, airports, airlines, and others currently rely on to operate the system. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has been planning and developing NextGen since 2003, and is now implementing near-term (through 2012) and mid-term (through 2018) capabilities. Over the years, concerns have been raised by the Congress and other stakeholders that despite years of effort and billions of dollars spent, FAA has not made sufficient progress in deploying systems and producing benefits. In past reports, we have made a number of recommendations to FAA to address delays in development and acquisitions, improve its processes, and focus on accountability and performance. Others have also made recommendations to FAA to improve its implementation of NextGen. For example, the Department of Transportation's Office of the Inspector General recently made recommendations regarding specific NextGen programs, and the NextGen Midterm Implementation Task Force--whose creation was requested by FAA--resulted in consensus recommendations from industry on specific capabilities FAA should prioritize. Over the last 2 years, FAA has taken several steps and instituted many changes to address several of these issues. This statement today discusses (1) the results of NextGen programs and improvements to date and (2) ongoing issues that will affect NextGen implementation. This statement today is based on our NextGen-related reports and testimonies over the last 2 years; ongoing work for this subcommittee that includes our analysis of selected NextGen acquisitions and our analysis of FAA's efforts to harmonize NextGen with air traffic control modernization efforts in Europe; our review of FAA's 2025 Strategic Plan, 2011 NextGen Implementation Plan, 2012 Budget Submission, and other documents; and selected program updates from FAA officials.
What GAO Found
In summary, FAA has improved its efforts to implement NextGen and is continuing its work to address critical issues that we, stakeholders, and others have identified over the years. In some areas, FAA has implemented NextGen capabilities that have demonstrated measurable benefits for system users, such as fuel savings. FAA has also made progress in streamlining its processes, improving its capacity to develop new flight procedures, and focusing its efforts on specific procedures that are needed in key metropolitan areas. Furthermore, we found that several NextGen-related acquisitions are generally on time and on budget. However, some acquisitions have been delayed, which has impacted the timelines of other dependent systems, and the potential exists for other acquisitions to also encounter delays. These delays have resulted in increased costs and reduced benefits. Going forward, FAA must focus on delivering systems and capabilities in a timely fashion to maintain its credibility with industry stakeholders, whose adoption of key technologies is crucial to NextGen's success. FAA must also continue to monitor how delays will affect international harmonization issues, focus on human factors issues, streamline environmental approvals, mitigate environmental impacts, and focus on improving management and governance. |
gao_RCED-95-12 | gao_RCED-95-12_0 | Part of this process involves developing the ASQ, which is the Forest Service’s estimate of the maximum harvest consistent with sustaining many other uses of the forest. The Ouachita National Forest was the only forest whose timber sales were higher in 1993 than in 1991. Factors contributing to differences between ASQs and timber sales at the five forests we reviewed included limitations in data and estimating techniques, the emergence of new forest management issues and changing priorities, and rising or unanticipated costs associated with preparing and administering timber sales. More detailed, on-the-ground analysis may later reveal that actual timber volumes differ somewhat from the estimated quantities, as the following examples show:
After estimating ASQ volumes for planning purposes, officials at the Deschutes National Forest discovered that they had overestimated the size of the timber inventory in timber harvest areas. In mid-1990, when the forest plans containing the ASQs for the three Pacific Northwest forests were ready to be implemented, the Department of the Interior’s Fish and Wildlife Service announced its decision to list the northern spotted owl as a threatened species under the provisions of the Endangered Species Act. The budget request for each forest is subject to levels of internal Forest Service review. Timber sales were below average annual ASQs in all years since the ASQs were implemented. The first period, usually a decade, provides the allowable sale quantity. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on timber sales in five national forests between 1991 and 1993, focusing on: (1) whether the Forest Service met its allowable sale quantity (ASQ) for the five forests; and (2) why the quantity of timber sold from the national forests was sometimes substantially below ASQ.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) timber sales for each of the 5 forests reviewed were significantly below the average ASQ between 1991 and 1993; (2) factors contributing to the Forest Service's inability to meet ASQ included the lack of adequate data and estimating techniques to base ASQ, the emergence of new and changing forest management priorities, and rising or unanticipated costs associated with preparing and administering timber sales; (3) forest officials at one of the five forests overestimated the size of the timber inventory and improperly based the inventory on average volumes rather than on the specific parts of the forest where timber sales were being prepared; and (4) ASQ were reduced in Pacific northwest forests after the northern spotted owl was listed as an endangered species and much of the proposed harvest areas were set aside for its habitat. |
gao_GAO-17-45 | gao_GAO-17-45_0 | For example, borrowers of any age receiving Social Security disability benefits are eligible for a Total and Permanent Disability (TPD) discharge if SSA has determined that they have a disability for which medical improvement is not expected. Education’s Collection Efforts in Fiscal Year 2015
According to Education data for fiscal year 2015, about $4.5 billion was collected by Education, private collection agencies, and guaranty agencies on defaulted federal student loans, excluding loan rehabilitations and consolidations. Growth in Social Security Offsets and Prevalence of Disability Benefits
In addition, our analysis of data we linked from Education, Treasury, and SSA shows that the number of borrowers, especially older borrowers, who have experienced offsets of Social Security benefits to repay defaulted federal student loans has increased over time. Three-quarters of older borrowers owed loans only for their own education, and most owed less than $10,000 at the time of their initial offset. The typical monthly offset was slightly more than $140 for older Americans, and almost half of those had the maximum possible reduction, equivalent to 15 percent of their Social Security benefit payment. Many Older Americans Had Held their Student Loans for 20 Years or More at the Time of Initial Offset
About 43 percent of older student loan borrowers with a Social Security offset had held their student loans for 20 years or more, and about 80 percent had held their loans for 10 years or more. According to linked data from the Treasury Offset Program, Education’s National Student Loan Data System, and the Social Security Administration from fiscal years 2001 through 2015, the length of time borrowers had held student loans that were in default at the time of their first Social Security offset payment varied as shown in figure 3. Most Older Americans Subject to Social Security Benefit Offset Took Out Loans for Their Own Education and Owed Less than $10,000 at the Time of Initial Offset
Older borrowers who became subject to Social Security offsets predominately defaulted on loans for their own education. Many Older Americans Subject to Social Security Offset for Student Loan Debt Have the Maximum Amount Withheld
About 44 percent of borrowers 50 and older at the time of their initial offset saw the maximum possible amount of their Social Security benefit withheld, equal to 15 percent of their benefit payment. Over a 5 year time period after becoming subject to Social Security offset, nearly one-third of older borrowers were able to pay off their loans or obtain a disability discharge. However, other older borrowers remained in default on their student loans, and some had their loan balances increase over time despite the reductions to their Social Security benefits. Such is the case for a growing number of older borrowers whose Social Security benefits have fallen below the poverty guideline because the offset threshold is not adjusted for increases in costs of living. Consequently, an increasing number of older Americans subject to Social Security offsets received benefits below the federal poverty guideline. Many Older Borrowers Subject to Offset May Be Eligible for a Total and Permanent Disability Discharge under Education’s Process but Have Not Applied
Older Americans subject to Social Security offset may be eligible to have their student loan debt discharged because they are severely disabled. Specifically, documentation provided by Education to borrowers in the 3-year monitoring period does not clearly and prominently state all requirements to report income annually. This relief option is also available to borrowers under age 50. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives for this review were to examine: (1) characteristics of student loan debt held by older borrowers subject to offset and the effect on their Social Security benefit, (2) the amount of debt collected by the Department of Education (Education) through offsets and the typical outcomes for older borrowers; and (3) effects on older borrowers as a result of program design for offsets and related relief options. | Why GAO Did This Study
An increasing number of older Americans have defaulted on their federal student loans, which are administered by Education, and have a portion of their Social Security retirement or disability benefits withheld above a minimum benefit threshold to repay this debt. Given that Social Security is the primary source of income for many older Americans, GAO was asked to review these withholdings, known as offsets.
GAO examined: (1) characteristics of student loan debt held by older borrowers subject to offset and the effect on their Social Security benefit; (2) the amount of debt collected by Education through offsets and the typical outcomes for older borrowers; and (3) effects on older borrowers resulting from the program design of relief options. GAO examined data from fiscal years 2001 through 2015 from Education's National Student Loan Data System and other administrative data from Treasury and SSA. GAO also examined aggregated data provided by Education and Treasury, reviewed documentation, and interviewed agency officials about Education's processes for providing relief from offset.
What GAO Found
Older borrowers (age 50 and older) who default on federal student loans and must repay that debt with a portion of their Social Security benefits often have held their loans for decades and had about 15 percent of their benefit payment withheld. This withholding is called an offset. GAO's analysis of characteristics of student loan debt using data from the Departments of Education (Education), Treasury, and the Social Security Administration (SSA) from fiscal years 2001-2015 showed that for older borrowers subject to offset for the first time, about 43 percent had held their student loans for 20 years or more. In addition, three-quarters of these older borrowers had taken loans only for their own education, and most owed less than $10,000 at the time of their initial offset. Older borrowers had a typical monthly offset that was slightly more than $140, and almost half of them were subject to the maximum possible reduction, equivalent to 15 percent of their Social Security benefit. In fiscal year 2015, more than half of the almost 114,000 older borrowers who had such offsets were receiving Social Security disability benefits rather than Social Security retirement income.
In fiscal year 2015, Education collected about $4.5 billion on defaulted student loan debt, of which about $171 million—less than 10 percent—was collected through Social Security offsets. More than one-third of older borrowers remained in default 5 years after becoming subject to offset, and some saw their loan balances increase over time despite offsets. However, nearly one-third of older borrowers were able to pay off their loans or cancel their debt by obtaining relief through a process known as a total and permanent disability (TPD) discharge, which is available to borrowers with a disability that is not expected to improve.
GAO identified a number of effects on older borrowers resulting from the design of the offset program and associated options for relief from offset. First, older borrowers subject to offsets increasingly receive benefits below the federal poverty guideline. Specifically, many older borrowers subject to offset have their Social Security benefits reduced below the federal poverty guideline because the threshold to protect benefits—implemented by regulation in 1998—is not adjusted for costs of living (see figure below). In addition, borrowers who have a total and permanent disability may be eligible for a TPD discharge, but they must comply with annual documentation requirements that are not clearly and prominently stated. If annual documentation to verify income is not submitted, a loan initially approved for a TPD discharge can be reinstated and offsets resume.
What GAO Recommends
GAO suggests that Congress consider adjusting Social Security offset provisions to reflect the increased cost of living. GAO is also making five recommendations to Education, including that it clarify documentation requirements for permitted relief resulting from disability. Education generally agreed with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-07-26 | gao_GAO-07-26_0 | Coding Errors Excluded Tax Debt from the FPLP
To maximize the effectiveness of the FPLP as a tool to collect outstanding federal taxes, it is crucial that IRS record and maintain accurate status codes for all tax debt within its systems. As a result of these errors, we estimate that over a half-million tax records containing about $2.4 billion in uncollected tax debt were erroneously excluded from the FPLP. However, IRS tax collections personnel can exclude these cases from the FPLP on a case-by-case basis. More Effective Monitoring Could Prevent Errors and Help Ensure Ongoing Accuracy of Account Status
IRS’s current monitoring of the ongoing status of accounts did not identify and correct the errors in our sample. As a result, these cases remained excluded from the FPLP and other collection actions. In that review, IRS examines other available data on the taxpayer, assesses whether a tax return should have been filed, and estimates the amount of tax due. Policy Changes Could Allow Billions of Dollars in Tax Debt to Enter the FPLP
IRS has significantly improved the effectiveness of the FPLP by making an additional $28 billion in unpaid tax debt eligible for the program since 2004. Since 1992, IRS has almost tripled the income it allows tax debtors in financial hardship to earn without pursuing collection, but IRS does not have documentation of any data analysis that justified the large increases. The exclusion of tax debt from collection actions may be appropriate in many circumstances to provide relief for those experiencing financial difficulty. IRS had previously set rates in 1992. The lowest state median income in 2004 was $31,500. Allowing relatively high income tax debtors, such as those earning $84,000, to avoid tax collection action calls into question the fair application of the tax system and may contribute to noncompliance by other taxpayers. Additionally, the FPLP is a cost-effective means of collecting from tax debtors. IRS excludes tax debt from the FPLP during the entire notice phase. IRS faces tough challenges in balancing its tax collection activities against its available resources. Recommendations for Executive Action
To increase the amount of tax debt eligible for, and to expedite the entry of tax debt into, the FPLP, we recommend that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue take the following actions: monitor the timely termination of defaulted installment agreements to help ensure tax debt is made available to the FPLP as soon as possible; place tax debt in the notice phase into the FPLP as soon as legally consider adding language to IRS’s second communication in the notice process informing the tax debtor that IRS has the authority to collect the debt by levying the tax debtor’s income and assets if the tax debt is not paid voluntarily; and modify FPLP exclusion policy to allow tax debt in ACS subcategories R-5 and I-6 that is being considered for a levy on financial assets through paper levies to be concurrently included in the FPLP. To help ensure that IRS’s financial hardship FPLP exclusions are appropriate, we recommend that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue take the following actions: reevaluate whether the dollar ranges for existing financial hardship income thresholds, especially those that exceed the national median income, are appropriate and reasonable; consider changing the financial hardship closing codes for tax debtors designated as being in financial hardship prior to the 2004 income threshold increases to a closing code that most closely corresponds to the originally designated income threshold—for example, tax debtors who were in a threshold of $50,000 prior to the change would be given a different subcode (closing code) so that the tax debtor’s income ceiling stays as close to the original $50,000 ceiling as possible under the new income thresholds; establish a policy so that in implementing future financial hardship income threshold changes, tax debtors’ financial hardship subcodes (closing codes) are changed to ones that maintain the tax debtor’s income ceiling as close as possible to the ceiling prior to the change; establish a policy to review tax debtors’ financial condition periodically to verify the continued validity of the financial hardship designation; evaluate the ongoing validity of the financial hardship designations whenever tax debtors fail to file their annual tax returns by comparing third-party income information to the tax debtors’ designated financial hardship income threshold ceilings; and refer tax debtors with a financial hardship designation to IRS’s withholding compliance program for special attention if those tax debtors do not pay their current income tax obligations. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine whether and to what extent Internal Revenue Service (IRS) tax records contain inaccurate or out-of-date status or transaction codes that exclude them from the Federal Payment Levy Program (FPLP), we used IRS’s unpaid assessments database as of September 30, 2005, to select two statistical samples. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO previously testified that federal contractors abused the tax system with little consequence. While performing those audits, GAO noted that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) records sometimes contained inaccurate or outdated tax information that prevented IRS from taking appropriate collection actions against those contractors, including submitting their tax debt to the Federal Payment Levy Program (FPLP) for collection. As a result, GAO was asked to review IRS's coding of tax debt excluded from the FPLP to determine whether (1) IRS tax records contain inaccurate status or transaction codes that exclude tax debt from the FPLP, (2) IRS's monitoring could be strengthened to ensure the accuracy of its status and transaction codes, and (3) other opportunities exist to increase the amount of tax debt included in the FPLP.
What GAO Found
IRS tax records had inaccurate information that resulted in it erroneously excluding cases from the FPLP and other tax collection actions. The FPLP is a cost-effective automated system used to collect unpaid taxes from certain federal payments. GAO estimates that as of September 30, 2005, over 500,000 tax records' equating to about $2.4 billion in tax debt--contained inaccurate codes that IRS systems used to exclude tax debts from the FPLP. Inaccuracies included tax debts coded as having active installment agreements even though the tax debtor had stopped making payments. IRS's monitoring of cases was insufficient to identify and correct the coding errors GAO identified. Additionally, IRS's monitoring of financial hardship cases is not sufficient to ensure their ongoing accuracy. IRS grants tax debtors experiencing financial difficulty a hardship designation that excludes them from the FPLP and other tax collection activities until their income increases. To measure this, IRS solely uses the income reported on the tax debtor's annual tax returns. However, IRS does not monitor those tax debtors to ensure they are filing and paying current taxes. For 31 financial hardship cases GAO examined, 24 had ceased to file tax returns. Although IRS has increased the amount of tax debt it submits to the FPLP, additional policy changes could further improve the program's effectiveness. Since 1992, IRS has almost tripled the maximum income it allows tax debtors in financial hardship to earn; raising it to $84,000 in 2004--almost double the national median income. As a result, whereas in 1992 no one earning above the median income was considered to be in financial hardship (and therefore excluded from the FPLP), in 2005 almost two-thirds of the tax debt in financial hardship was owed by individuals earning over the median income. Although a financial hardship designation may be appropriate in many situations, allowing relatively high-income tax debtors to avoid tax collection action, including the FPLP, calls into question the fair application of the tax system and may contribute to noncompliance. IRS policy also limits the amount of tax debt in the FPLP by excluding $5 billion in tax debt from the program while IRS is pursuing levies from other assets or income sources. Additionally, during notification IRS excludes individuals' tax debt from the FPLP about twice as long as legally necessary. |
gao_GAO-16-790T | gao_GAO-16-790T_0 | To address the potential security risks posed by the millions of containers that arrive in the United States each year, CBP has implemented a layered security strategy of related initiatives and programs that focus CBP’s limited resources on potentially high-risk cargo bound for the United States while allowing other cargo to proceed without unduly disrupting commerce. Container Security Initiative. In response to a requirement in the SAFE Port Act to scan 100 percent of U.S.-bound cargo containers, CBP established SFI. Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism. Through C-TPAT, CBP officials work with member private companies to review the security of their supply chains to ensure their security practices meet CBP’s minimum security criteria. In return, C-TPAT members receive various benefits, such as reduced scrutiny of their shipments. CBP Has Made Substantial Progress in Enhancing Cargo Security, but Some Challenges Remain
Our prior work has shown that CBP has made substantial progress in implementing various initiatives and programs that, collectively, have enhanced cargo security, but some challenges remain. Examples of progress and challenges in the areas of (1) using information for improving targeting and risk assessment of cargo shipments, (2) partnerships with foreign governments, and (3) partnerships with the trade industry are discussed below. CBP’s Efforts to Improve Targeting and Risk Assessments of Cargo Shipments
In January 2015, we found, among other things, that CBP did not have accurate data on the number and disposition of each high-risk maritime cargo shipment scheduled to arrive in the United States. Further, our analyses found that CBP’s data overstated the number of high-risk shipments, including those that appeared not to be resolved (examined or waived) in accordance with CBP policy. We recommended, among other things, that CBP define waiver categories and disseminate policy on issuing waivers for high-risk shipments. DHS concurred with our recommendations and, in December 2015, CBP issued a new policy, National Security Cargo Targeting Procedures, that includes criteria for waiving mandatory examinations of high-risk shipments (referred to as exceptions). In addition, CBP developed a new process for recording waivers and issued a memorandum to targeting units on how to apply the new procedures. Specifically, we found that CBP had not regularly assessed foreign ports for risks to cargo under the CSI program since 2005. We recommended that DHS periodically assess the supply chain security risks from all foreign ports that ship cargo to the United States and use the results of these risk assessments to inform any future expansion of CSI to additional locations and determine whether changes need to be made to existing CSI ports and make adjustments as appropriate and feasible. DHS concurred with our recommendation and, in response, CBP developed a CSI Port Risk Matrix and Port Priority Map. According to CBP, these tools are to be updated yearly and, if necessary, can be updated more frequently based on significant changes, emerging threats, and intelligence. Senior DHS and CBP officials acknowledged that most, if not all foreign ports, would not be able to meet the July 2012 target date for scanning all U.S.-bound cargo, and DHS would need to issue extensions to such ports to allow the continued flow of commerce in order to remain in compliance with relevant statutory requirements. In May of 2012, 2014, and 2016, the Secretary of Homeland Security authorized a 2-year extension of the deadline for implementing the 100 percent scanning requirement for U.S. bound cargo before it is loaded onto vessels at foreign seaports. However, we found challenges with the technology CBP used to help ensure that validation information is consistently collected, documented, and uniformly applied to decisions regarding the awarding of benefits to C-TPAT members, and that CBP lacked a systematic process to ensure that members take appropriate actions in response to security validation findings. We made recommendations to CBP to strengthen C-TPAT program management and oversight. CBP has since implemented these recommendations by, for example, creating an automated platform to track and capture the content and communication between CBP and C- TPAT members to ensure that C-TPAT validation report recommendations are implemented and identifying analytical tools and data for trend analysis to better assess C-TPAT’s impact on the supply chain. Appendix I: Description of CBP’s Layered Security Strategy for Maritime Cargo Shipments
This appendix describes the key initiatives and programs related to U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) strategy for ensuring the security of maritime cargo. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. economy is dependent on the expeditious flow of millions of tons of cargo each day through the global supply chain—the flow of goods from manufacturers to retailers. Criminal or terrorist attacks using cargo shipments can cause disruptions to the supply chain and can limit global economic growth and productivity. Within DHS, CBP has responsibility for administering maritime cargo security measures and reducing the vulnerabilities associated with the supply chain. CBP has developed a layered security strategy that focuses its limited resources on targeting and examining high-risk cargo shipments that could pose a risk while allowing other cargo shipments to proceed without unduly disrupting commerce arriving in the United States.
This statement discusses the progress and challenges associated with CBP's implementation of initiatives and programs responsible for enhancing the security of the global supply chain. The statement is based on reports and testimonies GAO issued from April 2008 through January 2015 related to maritime cargo security—with selected updates on how DHS has responded to GAO's prior recommendations.
What GAO Found
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) have made substantial progress in implementing initiatives and programs that, collectively, have enhanced cargo security, but some challenges remain. Examples of progress and challenges are discussed below.
Risk Assessments of Cargo Shipments . In January 2015, GAO found that CBP did not have accurate data on the number and disposition of each high-risk shipment scheduled to arrive in the United States. Specifically, CBP's data overstated the number of high-risk shipments, including those that appeared not to be examined or waived in accordance with CBP policy. CBP officers inconsistently applied criteria to make some waiver decisions and incorrectly documented waiver reasons. GAO recommended that CBP define waiver categories and disseminate policy on issuing waivers. In response, CBP issued a new policy that includes criteria for waiving examinations of high-risk shipments and developed a new process for recording waivers and issued a memorandum.
Partnerships with Foreign Governments. In September 2013, GAO reported that CBP had not regularly assessed foreign ports for risks to cargo since 2005. GAO recommended that DHS periodically assess the security risks from ports that ship cargo to the United States and use the results to inform whether changes need to be made to Container Security Initiative (CSI) ports. DHS concurred with the recommendation and CBP has since developed a port risk matrix and priority map to be used to help assess whether changes need to be made to CSI ports. These tools are to be updated yearly and can be updated more frequently based on significant changes, emerging threats, and intelligence. These tools should assist CBP in ensuring it is allocating its resources to provide the greatest coverage of U.S.-bound high-risk cargo.
In October 2009, GAO reported challenges to scanning 100 percent of U.S.- bound cargo at foreign ports. DHS officials acknowledged that most, if not all foreign ports, would not be able to meet the July 2012 target date for scanning all U.S.-bound cargo, and DHS would need to issue extensions to allow the continued flow of commerce and remain in compliance with statutory requirements. Although the Secretary of Homeland Security has issued three 2-year extensions for implementing the 100 percent scanning mandate, which have extended the deadline to July 2018, DHS has not yet identified a viable solution to meet the requirement.
Partnerships with the Trade Industry. Through the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) program, CBP officials work with member companies to validate the security of their supply chains in exchange for benefits, such as reduced scrutiny of their shipments. In April 2008, GAO found, among other things, that CBP lacked a systematic process to ensure that members take appropriate actions in response to security validations. GAO recommended that CBP document key data elements needed to track compliance. CBP has since implemented a process to ensure that C-TPAT validation report recommendations are implemented. GAO is currently reviewing the C-TPAT program, to include an assessment of CBP's ability to meet its security validation responsibilities.
What GAO Recommends
In prior reports, GAO has made recommendations to DHS to strengthen various maritime cargo security programs. DHS generally concurred with the recommendations and has taken actions, or has actions under way, to address many of these recommendations. |
gao_GAO-12-86 | gao_GAO-12-86_0 | Although the Total Federal Financial Risk Has Not Been Determined, Actions Are Needed to Reduce Known Risks
Both the individual circumstances of the Deepwater Horizon incident, as well as the overall framework of how the federal government responds to oil spills, present a mix of financial risks to the Fund and the federal government. The extent of financial risks to the federal government from the Deepwater Horizon is closely tied to BP and the other responsible parties and guarantors. Federal agency cleanup and restoration activities are underway and agencies continue to incur costs and submit them for reimbursement. As a result, it is possible that expenditures from the Fund for Federal removal costs and claims will reach the $1 billion cap, as the cap balance was over $626 million on May 31, 2011. When the cap balance reaches the total expenditure cap of $1 billion, no further payments to reimburse agencies’ costs (or to pay individual or business claims if not paid by the responsible parties) can be made from the Fund, so federal agencies would no longer be able to obtain reimbursement for their costs. Finally, the federal government’s longer-term ability to provide financial support in response to future oil spills is also at risk because the Fund’s primary source of revenue, a tax on petroleum products, is scheduled to expire in 2017. In November 2010, we suggested that Congress may want to consider setting a Fund cap associated with an incident, based upon net expenditures (expenditures less reimbursements). As of May 31, 2011, government agencies continue to submit documentation of their Deepwater Horizon oil spill recovery costs for reimbursement from the Fund. The per barrel tax revenue. The Coast Guard Has Effective Claims Processing and Cost Reimbursement Controls, However Could Benefit by Documenting Changes Made in Claims Practices
Our testing of the Coast Guard’s controls over Deepwater Horizon claims processed as of April 30, 2011, and cost reimbursements processed as of April 20, 2011, showed that adjudicated claims processed and costs reimbursed were consistent with its procedures. It has updated its cost reimbursement procedures to incorporate lessons learned from the initial response to this spill and although it has not yet updated its procedures for processing claims from spills of national significance to reflect lessons learned from its experiences processing Deepwater Horizon claims, it has plans to do so. Federal Agencies’ Oversight Efforts Include Monitoring GCCF’s Claims Process and Participating in Natural Resource Assessments
The federal government has used a variety of approaches to oversee BP’s and GCCF’s cost reimbursement and claims processing including monitoring their activities. Soon after the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, the Deepwater Integrated Services Team (IST) was established at the direction of the National Incident Command, under the command of the U.S. Coast Guard, and initially was responsible for monitoring BP’s claims process. The oversight effort for cost reimbursement and claims activities transitioned to Justice, who continues to lead the efforts. In addition, DOI and NOAA are serving as the federal government representatives for the natural resource trustees in evaluating the environmental impact of the Deepwater Horizon incident. Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report is the third and final in a series of reports on the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in response to this request. Shortly after the explosion and subsequent sinking of BP’s leased Deepwater Horizon oil rig in the Gulf of Mexico in April 2010, we were requested to (1) identify the financial risks to the federal government and, more specifically, to the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (Fund) resulting from oil spills, particularly Deepwater Horizon, (2) assess NPFC’s internal controls for ensuring that processes and payments for cost reimbursements and processes for claims related to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill were appropriate, and (3) describe the extent to which the federal government oversees the BP and Gulf Coast Claims Facility (GCCF) Deepwater Horizon oil spill-related claims processes. To determine the obligations and costs incurred in relation to the Fund’s $1 billion per incident cap, we obtained and analyzed daily financial summary data NPFC used related to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. To assess NPFC’s internal controls for ensuring that agencies’ requests for cost reimbursements and claims from individuals and businesses are appropriate, we reviewed relevant sections of OPA and compared the sections to NPFC’s cost reimbursement and claims Standard Operating Procedures and to GAO’s Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government. For claims, we tested a statistical sample of finalized Deepwater Horizon claims presented to the Fund between September 2010 and April 2011. | Why GAO Did This Study
On April 20, 2010, an explosion of the Deepwater Horizon oil rig leased by BP America Production Company (BP) resulted in a significant oil spill. GAO was requested to (1) identify the financial risks to the federal government resulting from oil spills, particularly Deepwater Horizon, (2) assess the Coast Guard's internal controls for ensuring that processes and payments for spill-related cost reimbursements and claims related to the spill are appropriate, and (3) describe the extent to which the federal government oversees the BP and Gulf Coast Claims Facility cost reimbursement and claims processes. We issued status reports in November 2010 and April 2011. This is the third and final report related to these objectives. We obtained and analyzed data on costs incurred from April 2010 through May 2011 and claims submitted and processed from September 2010 through May 2011. We reviewed relevant policies and procedures, interviewed officials and staff at key federal departments and agencies, and tested a sample of claims processed and cost reimbursements paid for compliance with internal controls..
What GAO Found
Both the individual circumstances of the Deepwater Horizon incident, as well as the overall framework for how the federal government responds to oil spills, present a mix of evolving, but as yet uncertain, financial risks to the federal government and its Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (Fund). The extent of financial risks to the federal government from the Deepwater Horizon is closely tied to BP and the other responsible parties. BP established a $20 billion Trust to pay for individual and business claims and other expenses. As of May 31, 2011, BP has paid over $700 million of federal and state government costs for oil spill cleanup. Federal agency cleanup and restoration activities are under way and agencies continue to incur costs and submit them for reimbursement. However, the full extent of these costs, particularly those related to environmental cleanup, may not be fully realized for some time. As cleanup costs continue to mount, it is possible that expenditures from the Fund will reach the $1 billion total expenditure per incident cap. Expenditures were over $626 million on May 31, 2011. If these amounts reach the total expenditure cap of $1 billion, the Fund can no longer be used to make payments to reimburse agencies' costs (or to pay valid individual or business claims if not paid by the responsible parties). At that point, government agencies would no longer be able to obtain reimbursement for their costs. In November 2010, GAO suggested that Congress may want to consider setting a Fund per incident cap based on net expenditures (expenditures less reimbursement), rather than total expenditures. Finally, GAO found the federal government's longer-term ability to provide financial support in response to future oil spills is also at risk because the Fund's primary source of revenue, a tax on petroleum products, is scheduled to expire in 2017. GAO's testing of the Coast Guard's internal controls over Deepwater Horizon claims processed and cost reimbursements processed and paid showed that adjudicated claims processed and costs reimbursed were appropriate and properly documented. In November 2010, GAO made four recommendations regarding establishing and maintaining effective cost reimbursement policies and procedures for the Fund. The Coast Guard changed its operating practices to reflect lessons learned from the initial response to the Deepwater Horizon incident, and it has updated its cost reimbursement procedures accordingly. However, the Coast Guard has not yet updated its procedures for processing significant claims, so lessons learned from its experiences processing Deepwater Horizon claims could be lost. The federal government has used a variety of approaches to oversee BP's and GCCF's cost reimbursement and claims processing. Soon after the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, the federal government established a Deepwater Integrated Services Team (IST), which was initially responsible for monitoring BP's claims process, among other things. Subsequently, the oversight of cost reimbursement and claims activities transitioned to the Department of Justice, which continues to lead this and other efforts. In addition, the Department of the Interior and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration are serving as the federal government's representatives for the natural resource trustees in evaluating the environmental impact of the Deepwater Horizon spill and selecting and implementing restoration projects to be funded by BP. GAO is (1) reiterating that Congress may want to consider setting a Fund cap per incident based upon net expenditures, (2) presenting a new matter concerning extending the barrel tax used to finance federal oil spill responses to sustain program funding, and (3) making a recommendation to improve procedures for future significant spills. In responding, the Department of Homeland Security concurred with the recommendation. |
gao_GAO-16-310 | gao_GAO-16-310_0 | Table 1 presents the number and type of individuals and entities that are registered with DEA to manufacture, distribute, or dispense controlled substances. However, we found limitations in DEA’s processes to collect and validate registrants’ identifying information and verify continued registrants’ eligibility. Our examination of DEA’s CSA2 data revealed gaps and other issues pertaining to registrants’ SSNs, as described below. Instructions on DEA’s application form state that SSNs are required for individual registrations, and tax identification numbers (such as an EIN) are required for business registrations. Our analysis of DEA’s CSA2 data identified 41,909 of about 1.4 million individual registrations (about 3 percent) who were registered using an EIN instead of an SSN. As a result, DEA would have to obtain additional legal authority in order to require SSNs for all individuals. We identified 688 SSNs associated with multiple individuals, which is a risk indicator for potential fraud. Some Registrants Were Potentially Ineligible Because They Were Reported as Deceased, Did Not Have a Current State License, or Had Criminal Violations Related to Controlled Substances
Of the approximately 1.4 million individual registrations in DEA’s CSA2, we found 764 registrants that may have been ineligible to have controlled substance registrations because the registrants were reported deceased by SSA, did not possess state-level controlled substance authority, or were incarcerated for felony offenses related to controlled substances. In addition, we also found 100 registrants who presented issues that may increase the risk of illicit diversion of controlled substances, such as registrants with active or recent warrants for offenses related to controlled substances, registrants incarcerated or with active or recent warrants for offenses unrelated to controlled substances, and registrants listed in the NSOR. The physician was still actively registered with DEA as of March 2014. However, DEA does not verify practitioners’ state licenses after initial registration to ensure they are still actively licensed by the state. The Manual also emphasizes that applicants and registrants who hire employees to work in or around areas where controlled substances are handled must carefully screen these employees, identifying this process as “a critical first step in diversion prevention,” “vital to fairly assess the likelihood of an employee committing a drug security breach,” and “essential to overall controlled substances security.” According to DEA, as part of the screening process, criminal-background checks with local law- enforcement authorities should be performed by the employer, and each potential employee should be required to answer the question, “Within the past five years, have you been convicted of a felony, or within the past two years, of any misdemeanor, or are you presently charged (formally) with committing a criminal offence?” Given DEA’s guidance to registrants that their employees with criminal convictions, or pending charges, may pose an increased risk of illicit diversion of controlled substances, we assessed the extent to which DEA’s internal controls help ensure individual registrants do not present similar issues that may increase the risk of illicit diversion of controlled substances. Registered Sex Offenders. DEA has implemented controls to register individuals to handle or prescribe controlled substances. Given that unique identifying information, such as SSNs, is critical to validating the identities and implementing controls to identify deceased registrants, obtaining legal authority to require such information and developing policies and procedures to validate this information would help ensure that DEA’s registrants are and remain eligible to prescribe and handle controlled substances. Similarly, developing procedures to verify the continued eligibility of its registrants in other areas, such as verifying that registrants maintain appropriate state authority and have not been subject to disciplinary actions that may affect their eligibility, would help ensure that its registrants maintain eligibility to handle and prescribe controlled substances. In its written comments, DEA stated that it appreciates the intent of our recommendations, but raised concerns about its legal authority to take some of the actions we recommended. We believe that developing procedures to monitor registrants’ criminal backgrounds using these databases would be beneficial for DEA to help ensure that its registrants are and remain eligible and do not possess an increased risk of illicit diversion. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report (1) identifies and describes the internal controls that selected states and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) use to help ensure the eligibility of individuals to handle controlled substances, and (2) assesses the extent to which DEA’s internal controls help ensure that individuals listed in the controlled substances database are and remain eligible and do not present issues that may increase the risk of illicit diversion of controlled substances. We also interviewed relevant DEA officials to identify DEA’s processes for registrants’ initial registration, renewal, and monitoring. FSMB licensure and disciplinary action data. | Why GAO Did This Study
DEA registers individuals and entities authorized to manufacture, distribute, or dispense controlled substances in accordance with the Controlled Substances Act, which seeks to ensure that only authorized individuals handle controlled substances. States also have a role in the registration process as they determine general licensing requirements for health-care professionals who are permitted to handle or prescribe controlled substances. Controlled substances include prescription pain relievers, such as OxyContin, stimulants, and sedatives.
GAO was asked to review DEA's processes for registering applicants, monitoring the eligibility of registrants, and managing CSA2 data. This report assesses the extent to which DEA's internal controls help ensure that individual registrants are and remain eligible and do not present issues that may increase the risk of illicit diversion, among other objectives. GAO reviewed relevant documents and interviewed DEA and state officials. GAO matched CSA2 data to several databases to identify potentially ineligible registrants.
What GAO Found
The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) has established controls for determining registrant eligibility to handle and prescribe controlled substances. However, GAO found limitations in DEA's controls to help ensure that individual registrants are and remain eligible and do not present issues that may increase the risk of illicit diversion. GAO's examination of DEA's controlled substances database (CSA2) as of March 2014 (the most-current data available) revealed gaps and other issues pertaining to registrants' identifying information. For example, GAO's analysis identified 40,785 of about 1.4 million individual registrations that were registered using a business tax identification number instead of a Social Security number (SSN). According to DEA officials, DEA does not have legal authority to require SSNs for individuals applying as a business. For individuals registered with an SSN, GAO found 11,740 SSNs that could not be validated by the Social Security Administration (SSA) and 688 SSNs that were registered to multiple names or variations of names, which can be a risk indicator of potential fraud. SSNs are needed to identify and remove deceased registrants as well as identify any past adverse history that may affect registrant eligibility. Given that SSNs are critical to validating identities, implementing DEA's controls, and identifying registrants' past adverse history, obtaining legal authority to require SSNs for all individuals and developing policies and procedures to validate them would help ensure that registrants are and remain eligible.
GAO also found limitations in DEA's processes for verifying continued eligibility of its registrants. Of the approximately 1.4 million individual registrations in CSA2 as of March 2014, GAO found 764 registrants who were potentially ineligible because they were reported deceased by SSA, did not possess state-level controlled substance authority, or were incarcerated for felony offenses related to controlled substances. GAO also found 100 registrants who presented issues that may increase the risk of illicit diversion, such as registrants incarcerated for offenses unrelated to controlled substances, registrants with active or recent warrants, and registrants listed as sex offenders. DEA does not have processes in place to verify its registrants' state licenses or criminal background after initial registration, unless the registrant self-reports or the state notifies DEA of actions taken against its registrants. Developing processes to monitor registrant state licensure and disciplinary actions, such as verifying that registrants maintain appropriate state authority and assessing the cost and feasibility of monitoring registrants' criminal backgrounds, would help ensure that registrants maintain eligibility to handle and prescribe controlled substances and do not present issues that may increase the risk of illicit diversion.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making five recommendations to DEA to help ensure practitioners are and remain eligible and that those who pose an increased risk of illicit diversion are identified. DEA stated it appreciated the intent of GAO's recommendations, but raised concerns about its legal authority to take some of the actions. GAO's recommendations include having DEA seek legal authority as needed, and remain valid. |
gao_GAO-08-573T | gao_GAO-08-573T_0 | Importance of GAO Act Provisions
The GAO Act contains several distinct and critical components. A number of provisions are designed to benefit our employees and to provide a means to continue to attract, retain, and reward a top-flight workforce, while other provisions are aimed at helping us improve our operations and increase administrative efficiencies. We ask for your support of these measures and have outlined each of them below. Establishing and Maintaining Constructive Union Relationships
As you know, on September 19, 2007, our Band I and Band II Analysts, Auditors, Specialists, and Investigators voted to be represented by the International Federation of Professional and Technical Engineers (IFPTE) for the purpose of bargaining with GAO management on various terms and conditions of employment. GAO management is committed to working constructively with employee union representatives to forge a positive labor-management relationship. Since September, GAO management has taken a variety of steps to ensure it is following applicable labor relations laws and has the resources in place to work effectively and productively in this new union environment. Our efforts have involved: postponing work on several initiatives regarding our current performance delivering specialized labor-management relations training to our Band III, Band III-equivalent, SES, and Senior Level staff; establishing a new Workforce Relations Center within our Human Capital Office that is responsible for providing employee relations and labor relations advice and services to GAO management and leadership; hiring a Workforce Relations Center director, who also serves as our chief negotiator in collective bargaining deliberations. In addition, we routinely notify union representatives of meetings that may qualify as formal discussions, so that a representative of the GAO Employees Organization, IFPTE, can attend the meeting. We also regularly provide the GAO Employees Organization, IFPTE, with information about projects involving changes to terms and conditions of employment over which the union has the right to bargain. As mentioned earlier, we were pleased that GAO and the GAO Employees Organization, IFPTE, reached a prompt agreement on 2008 pay adjustments. The agreement was overwhelmingly ratified by bargaining unit members on February 14, 2008, and we have applied the agreed-upon approach to the 2008 adjustments to all GAO staff, with the exception of the SES and Senior-Level staff, regardless of whether they are represented by the union. Pursuing Our Commitment to Diversity and Fair Treatment for All Staff
Recruiting, rewarding, and retaining a high-performing diverse workforce is critical if GAO is to successfully carry out its mission in support of the Congress. As you know, an effective GAO requires a first-rate workforce that is representative of our society and steeped in a wide variety of disciplines that can gather the facts and develop innovative solutions to both old and new problems challenging the federal government. This overall positive work environment is one of many reasons GAO’s dedicated and talented workforce is able to effectively serve the Congress and produce solid results for the American people. Last fiscal year, our work contributed to hundreds of improvements in government operations and benefits, as well as $45.9 billion in financial benefits or a $94 return for every dollar the Congress invested in us. We also contributed to over 270 congressional hearings and provided hundreds of valuable products to assist the Congress on topics as wide ranging as food safety, border patrol, and tax compliance. | Why GAO Did This Study
Today's testimony discusses several important topics: (1) provisions of H.R. 3268, the GAO Act, that would bolster our ability to attract and retain a highly skilled and diverse workforce needed to serve the Congress and provide for operational improvements and administrative efficiencies; (2) steps we are taking to establish and maintain a constructive working relationship with the GAO Employees Organization, International Federation of Professional and Technical Engineers (IFPTE); and (3) my commitment to ensure fair and equitable treatment for all segments of our diverse workforce, as reinforced by our commissioning of a study of various performance assessment issues related to African-American Analysts at GAO.
What GAO Found
The GAO Act contains several distinct and critical components. A number of provisions are designed to benefit our employees and to provide a means to continue to attract, retain, and reward a top-flight workforce, while other provisions are aimed at helping us improve our operations and increase administrative efficiencies. We ask for Congressional support of these measures and have outlined each of them below. On September 19, 2007, our Band I and Band II Analysts, Auditors, Specialists, and Investigators voted to be represented by the International Federation of Professional and Technical Engineers (IFPTE) for the purpose of bargaining with GAO management on various terms and conditions of employment. GAO management is committed to working constructively with employee union representatives to forge a positive labor-management relationship. Since September, GAO management has taken a variety of steps to ensure it is following applicable labor relations laws and has the resources in place to work effectively and productively in this new union environment. Our efforts have involved: (1) postponing work on several initiatives regarding our current performance and pay programs; (2) delivering specialized labor-management relations training to our Band III, Band III-equivalent, SES, and Senior Level staff; (3) establishing a new Workforce Relations Center within our Human Capital Office that is responsible for providing employee relations and labor relations advice and services to GAO management and leadership; (4) hiring a Workforce Relations Center director, who also serves as our chief negotiator in collective bargaining deliberations. In addition, we routinely notify union representatives of meetings that may qualify as formal discussions, so that a representative of the GAO Employees Organization, IFPTE, can attend the meeting. We also regularly provide the GAO Employees Organization, IFPTE, with information about projects involving changes to terms and conditions of employment over which the union has the right to bargain. We are pleased that GAO and the GAO Employees Organization, IFPTE, reached a prompt agreement on 2008 pay adjustments. The agreement was overwhelmingly ratified by bargaining unit members on February 14, 2008, and we have applied the agreed-upon approach to the 2008 adjustments to all GAO staff, with the exception of the SES and Senior-Level staff, regardless of whether they are represented by the union. Recruiting, rewarding, and retaining a high-performing diverse workforce is critical if GAO is to successfully carry out its mission in support of the Congress. An effective GAO requires a first-rate workforce that is representative of our society and steeped in a wide variety of disciplines that can gather the facts and develop innovative solutions to both old and new problems challenging the federal government. This overall positive work environment is one of many reasons GAO's dedicated and talented workforce is able to effectively serve the Congress and produce solid results for the American people. Last fiscal year, our work contributed to hundreds of improvements in government operations and benefits, as well as $45.9 billion in financial benefits or a $94 return for every dollar the Congress invested in us. We also contributed to over 270 congressional hearings and provided hundreds of valuable products to assist the Congress on topics as wide ranging as food safety, border patrol, and tax compliance. |
gao_RCED-96-176 | gao_RCED-96-176_0 | 1). However, before signing the agreement, FTA must ensure that BART has met all environmental requirements and developed an adequate finance plan. This announcement was supported in the administration’s fiscal year 1997 budget request, which included $51 million for BART. Under its planned construction schedule, BART expects to have the finance plan approved and to receive a full funding grant agreement from FTA by October 1996. To answer the concerns cited in the Conference Committee report, FTA must certify that a final cost analysis and finance plan have been completed and reviewed and that the federal share for the project has been reduced,the final EIS has been completed and approved, a study to consider a direct commuter rail (Caltrain’s) link to the airport has been considered in conjunction with the BART project, and the share of cost to be borne by the airport and its users is consistent with federal transportation policy and regulations. BART’s Construction Schedule and Cost Estimates
In its April 1996 draft finance plan, BART estimated that the project would cost $1.167 billion, construction would begin by October 1996, and revenue operations would begin in October 2000. Three issues remain that may affect BART’s ability to begin the project as scheduled and complete construction within the estimated cost: (1) whether environmental reviews, including the final EIS and a wetlands permit, will be complete before October 1996; (2) whether the use of innovative contracting procedures will produce the expected savings; and (3) whether BART has adequately included contingencies and cost escalations in estimating the project’s total cost. The Project’s Financing
BART’s April 19, 1996, draft finance plan, specifies the level and timing of the contributions the transit agency expects to receive from FTA and state and local contributors. BART anticipates finalizing agreements with the state, the San Francisco airport, and other regional transit agencies to provide the $417 million local share. State Legislation Needed to Establish Borrowing Program for the Airport Extension
BART does not have the authority to pledge its own revenues as a secondary source of collateral for a borrowing program it must establish to meet the expected cash shortfalls. Limitations on the Use of Airport Funds
The San Francisco International Airport Commission has committed up to $200 million for the BART airport extension. 3. 4. 5. 6. Additional copies are $2 each. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Bay Area Rapid Transit District's (BART) plans to extend its transit system to the San Francisco International Airport, focusing on the: (1) actions the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) must take before agreeing to fund the project; (2) factors that could affect the project's current schedule and estimated cost; and (3) project's finance plan, particularly assumptions that could affect its viability.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) before signing the BART funding grant agreement, FTA must ensure that BART has met all environmental requirements and secured necessary project financing; (2) FTA must also certify that BART environmental and financing plans, and cost estimates are reasonable and determine whether other transportation alternatives have been considered; (3) FTA and BART may not be able to resolve congressional concerns 60 days prior to the signing of the funding agreement, which BART expects to occur in October 1996; (4) BART estimates that its airport extension project will cost $1.167 billion, with construction beginning by October 1996 and line opening in October 2000; (5) the BART construction schedule is ambitious, since environmental reviews may not be completed by October 1996, and expected savings from innovative technology and cost escalations are uncertain; (6) BART expects to obtain $750 million in federal funding, with the remaining $471 million coming from the San Francisco airport, the state, and local sources; (7) BART must develop a borrowing program, since its accelerated construction schedule will outpace its funding; and (8) factors that could affect the finance plan's viability include BART receiving sufficient federal funds each of the next 7 fiscal years, the state allowing BART to use its own revenues as secondary collateral for loans, the airport providing its $200 million contribution, and other state and local contributors capping their BART pledges due to budget constraints. |
gao_GAO-06-267 | gao_GAO-06-267_0 | HHS has 14 operating divisions (see app. Weak Controls and Incomplete Implementation Compromise Effectiveness of HHS’s Information Security Program
HHS and CMS in particular have significant weaknesses in electronic access controls and other information system controls designed to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information and information systems. A key reason for these weaknesses is that the department has not yet fully implemented a departmentwide information security program. Electronic access controls include those related to network management, user accounts and passwords, user rights and file permissions, and auditing and monitoring of security-related events. These controls include policies, procedures, and techniques to physically secure computer resources, conduct appropriate background investigations, provide sufficient segregation of duties, and prevent unauthorized changes to application software. These weaknesses increase the risk that unauthorized individuals can gain access to HHS information systems and inadvertently or deliberately disclose, modify, or destroy the sensitive medical and financial data that the department relies on to deliver its vital services. Information Security Program Is Not Yet Fully Implemented
A key reason for the information security weaknesses identified at HHS was that the department had not yet fully implemented its information security program. Without such a program, security controls may be inadequate; responsibilities may be unclear, misunderstood, and improperly implemented; and controls may be inconsistently applied. Such conditions may lead to insufficient protection of sensitive or critical resources and disproportionately high expenditures for controls over low-risk resources. FISMA requires each agency to develop, document, and implement an information security program that includes the following key elements: periodic assessments of the risk and the magnitude of harm that could result from the unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of information and information systems; policies and procedures that (1) are risk-based, (2) cost-effectively reduce risks, (3) ensure that information security is addressed throughout the life cycle of each system, and (4) ensure compliance with applicable requirements; plans for providing adequate information security for networks, facilities, and systems; security awareness training to inform personnel—including contractors and other users of information systems—of information security risks and of their responsibilities in complying with agency policies and procedures; at least annual testing and evaluation of the effectiveness of information security policies, procedures, and practices relating to management, operational, and technical controls of every information system identified in the agency’s inventory; a process for planning, implementing, evaluating, and documenting remedial action to address any deficiencies in its information security policies, procedures, or practices; procedures for detecting, reporting, and responding to security plans and procedures to ensure continuity of operations for information systems that support the operations and assets of the agency. These weaknesses limit HHS’s ability to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of its information and information systems. Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services—administers the Medicare and Medicaid programs, which provide health care to about one in every four Americans. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) is the nation's largest health insurer and the largest grant-making agency in the federal government. HHS programs impact all Americans, whether through direct services, scientific advances, or information that helps them choose medical care, medicine, or even food. For example, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), a major operating division within HHS, is responsible for the Medicare and Medicaid programs that provide care to about one in every four Americans. In carrying out their responsibilities, both HHS and CMS rely extensively on networked information systems containing sensitive medical and financial information. GAO was asked to assess the effectiveness of HHS's information security program, with emphasis on CMS, in protecting the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of its information and information systems.
What GAO Found
HHS and CMS have significant weaknesses in controls designed to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of their sensitive information and information systems. HHS computer networks and systems have numerous electronic access control vulnerabilities related to network management, user accounts and passwords, user rights and file permissions, and auditing and monitoring of security-related events. In addition, weaknesses exist in other types of controls designed to physically secure computer resources, conduct suitable background investigations, segregate duties appropriately, and prevent unauthorized changes to application software. All of these weaknesses increase the risk that unauthorized individuals can gain access to HHS information systems and inadvertently or deliberately disclose, modify, or destroy the sensitive data that the department relies on to deliver its vital services. A key reason for these control weaknesses is that the department has not yet fully implemented a departmentwide information security program. While HHS has laid the foundation for such a program by developing and documenting policies and procedures, the department has not yet fully implemented key elements of its information security program at all of its operating divisions. Specifically, HHS and its operating divisions have not fully implemented elements related to (1) risk assessments, (2) policies and procedures, (3) security plans, (4) security awareness and training, (5) tests and evaluations of control effectiveness, (6) remedial actions, (7) incident handling, and (8) continuity of operations plans. Until HHS fully implements a comprehensive information security program, security controls may remain inadequate; responsibilities may be unclear, misunderstood, and improperly implemented; and controls may be inconsistently applied. Such conditions may lead to insufficient protection of sensitive or critical resources and disproportionately high expenditures for controls over low-risk resources. |
gao_GAO-04-1098T | gao_GAO-04-1098T_0 | EPA and the drinking water industry launched efforts to share information on terrorist threats and response strategies. Experts Identified Key Vulnerabilities That Could Compromise Drinking Water Systems’ Security
Our panel of experts identified several key physical assets of drinking water systems as the most vulnerable to intentional attack. Chief among these issues are (1) a lack of redundancy in vital systems, which increases the likelihood that an attack could render a system inoperable; and (2) the difficulty many systems face in understanding the nature of the threats to which they are exposed. Nearly half the experts (20 of 43) identified source water as among drinking water systems’ top vulnerabilities. Also cited as vulnerabilities were the sophisticated computer systems that drinking water utilities have come to rely upon to manage key functions. Experts’ Views on the Allocation and Distribution of Federal Funds
Many drinking water utilities have been financing at least some of their security upgrades by passing along the costs to their customers through rate increases. and (3) What are the most effective mechanisms for directing these funds to recipients? Experts also assigned high priority to utilities serving critical assets, such as national icons representing the American image, military bases, and key government, academic, and cultural institutions. The Drinking Water State Revolving Fund (DWSRF) received somewhat less support as a mechanism for funding security enhancements. Activities Experts Identified as Most Deserving of Federal Support
When experts were asked to identify specific security-enhancing activities most deserving of federal support, their responses generally fell into three categories: (1) physical and technological upgrades to improve security and research to develop technologies to prevent, detect, or respond to an attack, (2) education and training to support, among other things, simulation exercises to provide responders with experience in carrying out emergency response plans, and specialized training of utility security staff; and (3) strengthening key relationships between water utilities and other agencies that may have key roles in an emergency response, such as public health agencies, law enforcement agencies, and neighboring drinking water systems. Regarding efforts to improve education and training, over 90 percent of the experts (39 of 43) indicated that improved technical training for security-related personnel warrants at least a high priority for federal funding. As illustrated in figure 8, experts also cited the need to improve cooperation and coordination between drinking water utilities and certain other organizations as key to improving utilities’ security. | Why GAO Did This Study
After the events of September 11, 2001, Congress appropriated over $140 million to help drinking water systems assess their vulnerabilities to terrorist threats and to develop response plans. Utilities are asking for additional funding, however, not only to plan security upgrades but also to support their implementation. This testimony is based on GAO's report, Drinking Water: Experts' Views on How Future Federal Funding Can Best Be Spent to Improve Security ( GAO-04-29 , October 31, 2003). Specifically, GAO sought experts' views on (1) the key security-related vulnerabilities affecting drinking water systems, (2) the criteria for determining how federal funds are allocated among drinking water systems to improve their security, and the methods by which those funds should be distributed, and (3) specific activities the federal government should support to improve drinking water security.
What GAO Found
GAO's expert panel cited distribution systems as among the most vulnerable physical components of a drinking water utility, a conclusion also reached by key research organizations. Also cited were the computer systems that manage critical utility functions; treatment chemicals stored on-site; and source water supplies. Experts further identified two key factors that constitute overarching vulnerabilities: (1) a lack of the information individual utilities need to identify their most serious threats and (2) a lack of redundancy in vital system components, which increases the likelihood an attack could render an entire utility inoperable. According to over 90 percent of the experts, utilities serving high-density areas deserve at least a high priority for federal funding. Also warranting priority are utilities serving critical assets, such as military bases, national icons, and key academic institutions. Direct federal grants were clearly the most preferred funding mechanism, with over half the experts indicating that such grants would be "very effective" in distributing funds to recipients. Substantially fewer recommended using the Drinking Water State Revolving Fund for security upgrades. When asked to identify specific security-enhancing activities most deserving of federal support, experts' responses generally fell into three categories: (1) physical and technological upgrades to improve security and research to develop technologies to prevent, detect, or respond to an attack (experts most strongly supported developing near real-time monitoring technologies to quickly detect contaminants in treated drinking water on its way to consumers); (2) education and training to support, among other things, simulation exercises to provide responders with experience in carrying out emergency response plans; specialized training of utility security staff; and multidisciplinary consulting teams to independently analyze systems' security preparedness and recommend improvements; and (3) strengthening key relationships between water utilities and other agencies that may have key roles in an emergency response, such as public health agencies, law enforcement agencies, and neighboring drinking water systems; this category also includes developing protocols to encourage consistent approaches to detecting and diagnosing threats. |
gao_GAO-08-940 | gao_GAO-08-940_0 | judge and (2) the length of experience as an immigration judge. 3). 4). Affirmative applicants who filed their asylum application within 1 year of entry to the United States had a grant rate of 42 percent, compared with 26 percent of those who did not file within 1 year. In a later section of this report, we discuss the unavailability of EOIR data to assess whether applicants’ failure to apply for asylum within 1 year of entry to the United States was a basis for their being denied asylum. 5). As can be determined from table 2, in 14 out of 19 immigration courts for affirmative cases, and in 13 out of 19 immigration courts for defensive cases, the likelihood of being granted asylum was at least 4 times as great for applicants whose cases were decided by the immigration judge with the highest versus lowest grant rate in the immigration court. EOIR said it was using information on which immigration judges had unusually high or low asylum grant rates, in conjunction with other indicators of performance, to identify immigration judges in need of greater supervision, and has taken steps to increase training and make mentoring available for all immigration judges. facility, because of a significant reduction in the number of detained aliens in EOIR removal proceedings at the facility. However, these studies did not statistically control for the effects of a number of factors that could affect the asylum outcome. While we recognize that EOIR does not currently have the expertise to conduct multivariate statistical analyses, without doing so, the completeness, accuracy, and usefulness of EOIR’s grant rate studies are limited, and EOIR is hindered in its efforts to have the information it seeks to help it identify immigration judges who require additional training and supervision. EOIR’s deployment of supervisors to field locations was a pilot program undertaken in response to the results of the Attorney General’s 2006 review of the performance of immigration courts. BIA decisions favorable to asylum applicants were more than 50 percent lower in the 4 years following the 2002 changes, a period during which BIA members made substantial use of the authority to affirm immigration judge decisions without writing an opinion (AWO). 6). 9). Overall, 78 percent of AWOs issued by the BIA after streamlining resulted in removal orders. In June 2008, EOIR published proposed regulations for comment in the Federal Register. It is too soon to tell how these regulatory changes might affect outcomes for asylum appellants. If the Congress believes it is important for EOIR to begin collecting data on the impact of the 1-year rule on asylum decisions, the applicants, and their dependents, it would need to direct EOIR to develop a cost effective method for carrying this effort out. However, EOIR has not determined how many ACIJs it needs to effectively supervise immigration judges, and it has not provided ACIJs with guidance on how to carry out their supervisory role. GAO staff members who were major contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our reporting objectives were to (1) identify what factors affected the variability in asylum outcomes in immigration courts; (2) identify what actions DOJ’s Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) has taken to assist applicants in obtaining legal representation and immigration judges in rendering asylum decisions, and how, if at all, these actions could be improved; (3) determine what changes in asylum backlogs and outcomes occurred following the streamlining of appeals procedures at the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA); and (4) identify what information existed on the effects of the 1-year rule on reducing fraudulent asylum applications and preventing applicants from being granted asylum and what resources have been expended in adjudicating it. Factors Affecting Variability in Asylum Outcomes in Immigration Court
Analysis of Data on Immigration Judge Decisions
We used logistic regression multivariate statistical models to examine all decisions rendered by immigration judges from October 1, 1994, through April 30, 2007, that involved asylum seekers from the 20 countries that produced the most asylum cases and the 19 immigration courts that handled the largest numbers of asylum cases. We examined BIA decisions for fiscal years 1998 through 2006. For defensive cases, we further considered whether the asylum seeker had ever been detained. Specifically, after simultaneously controlling for the effects of the other factors, we found that for the six specific immigration court/nationality combinations in our analysis, asylum outcomes were generally not significantly affected by whether or not an immigration judge had previous experience doing immigration work for a nonprofit organization; whether or not an immigration judge had previous immigration the immigration judge’s gender (except for Haitians in Miami, where both affirmative and defensive applicants were 30 percent as likely to be granted asylum if the immigration judge was male rather than female); The immigration judge’s race/ethnicity (except for Chinese in Los Angeles and Haitians in Miami, where affirmative applicants were more than twice as likely to be granted asylum if the immigration judge was white, nonHispanic rather than other race/ethnicity); the immigration judge’s veteran status (except for Haitians in Miami, where defensive applicants were 40 percent as likely to be granted asylum if the immigration judge was a veteran); whether the immigration judge was appointed during a Democratic or Republican presidential administration (except for Chinese in New York, where affirmative applicants were more than twice as likely to be granted asylum, and defensive applicants were almost 3 times as likely to be granted asylum by immigration judges who were appointed during a Republican presidential administration); or the age of the immigration judge (except for Haitians in Miami where affirmative applicants were nearly twice as likely to be granted asylum by older rather than younger immigration judges). | Why GAO Did This Study
Each year, tens of thousands of people who have been persecuted or fear persecution in their home countries apply for asylum in the United States. Immigration judges (IJ) from the Department of Justice's (DOJ) Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) decide whether to grant or deny asylum to aliens in removal proceedings. Those denied asylum may appeal their case to EOIR's Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). GAO was asked to assess the variability of IJ rulings, and the effects of policy changes related to appeals and claims. This report addresses: (1) factors affecting variability in asylum outcomes; (2) EOIR actions to assist applicants and IJs; (3) effects associated with procedural changes at the BIA; and (4) effects of the requirement that asylum seekers apply within 1 year of entering the country. GAO analyzed DOJ asylum data for fiscal years 1995 through mid-2007, visited 5 immigration courts in 3 cities, including those with 3 of the top 4 asylum caseloads; observed asylum hearings; and interviewed key officials. Results of the visits provided additional information but were not projectable.
What GAO Found
In the 19 immigration courts that handled almost 90 percent of asylum cases from October 1994 through April 2007, nine factors affected variability in asylum outcomes: (1) filed affirmatively (originally with DHS at his/her own initiative) or defensively (with DOJ, if in removal proceedings); (2) applicant's nationality; (3) time period of the asylum decision; (4) representation; (5) applied within 1 year of entry to the United States; (6) claimed dependents on the application; (7) had ever been detained (defensive cases only); (8) gender of the immigration judge and (9) length of experience as an immigration judge. After statistically controlling for these factors, disparities across immigration courts and judges existed. For example, affirmative applicants in San Francisco were still 12 times more likely than those in Atlanta to be granted asylum. Further, in 14 of 19 immigration courts for affirmative cases, and 13 of 19 for defensive cases, applicants were at least 4 times more likely to be granted asylum if their cases were decided by the judge with the highest versus the lowest likelihood of granting asylum in that court. EOIR expanded its programs designed to assist applicants with obtaining representation and has attempted to improve the capabilities of some IJs. EOIR has conducted two grant rate studies and was using information on IJs with unusually high or low grant rates, together with other indicators of IJ performance, to identify IJs who might benefit from additional training and supervision. However, EOIR lacked the expertise to statistically control for factors that could affect asylum outcomes, and this limited the completeness, accuracy, and usefulness of grant rate information. Without such information, to be used in conjunction with other performance indicators, EOIR's ability to identify IJs who may need additional training and supervision was hindered. EOIR assigned some IJ supervisors to field locations to improve oversight of immigration courts, but EOIR has not determined how many supervisors it needs to effectively supervise IJs and has not provided supervisors with guidance on how to carry out their supervisory role. Following streamlining (procedural changes) at the BIA in March 2002, BIA's appeals backlog decreased, as did the number of decisions favoring asylum seekers. Such decisions were more than 50 percent lower in the 4 years after streamlining compared to 4 years prior. The authority to affirm the IJ's' decisions without writing an opinion was used in 44 percent of BIA's asylum decisions. In June 2008, EOIR proposed regulatory changes to the streamlining rules, but it is too soon to tell how they will affect appeals outcomes. Data limitations prevented GAO from determining the (1) effect of the 1-year rule on fraudulent applications and denials and (2) resources adjudicators have spent addressing related issues. EOIR lacked measures of fraud, data on whether the 1-year rule was the basis for asylum denials, and records of time spent addressing such issues. Congress would need to direct EOIR to develop a cost-effective method of collecting data to determine the effect of the rule. |
gao_T-AIMD-98-128 | gao_T-AIMD-98-128_0 | Disclaimer of Opinion
Overall, because we were unable to determine the reliability of significant portions of the government’s fiscal year 1997 consolidated financial statements, we were unable to express an opinion on them. Because of the government’s serious systems, recordkeeping, documentation, and control deficiencies, amounts reported in the consolidated financial statements and related notes do not provide a reliable source of information for decision-making by the government or the public. These problems impair the government’s ability to (1) know the location and condition of all its assets, including those used for military deployment, (2) safeguard them from physical deterioration, theft, or loss, (3) prevent unnecessary storage and maintenance costs or purchase of assets already on hand, and (4) determine the full costs of government programs that use the assets. These problems significantly affect the determination of the full cost of the government’s current operations, as well as the extent of actual liabilities. Preparation of Consolidated Financial Statements
The federal government cannot ensure that the information in the consolidated financial statements is consistent with agency financial statements. As a result, the government is unable to ensure that all disbursements are properly recorded. These weaknesses, such as the lack of effective reconciliations and poorly designed systems, result in ineffective controls over (1) safeguarding the federal government’s assets from unauthorized acquisition, use, or disposition, (2) ensuring that transactions are executed in accordance with laws governing the use of budget authority and with other relevant laws and regulations, and (3) ensuring the reliability of financial statements. We also found that widespread and serious computer control weaknesses affect virtually all federal agencies and significantly contribute to many material deficiencies discussed above. This situation requires extensive reliance on ad hoc programming and analysis and material audit adjustments to prepare basic financial information. Serious weaknesses also affect the federal government’s ability to effectively manage its taxes receivable and other unpaid assessments. Financial Systems Requirements Generally Not Met
The Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996 requires auditors performing financial audits under the expanded CFO Act to report whether agencies’ financial management systems comply substantially with federal accounting standards, financial systems requirements, and the government’s standard general ledger at the transaction level. Financial Management Improvements Underway
Several individual agencies that have been audited for a number of years faced serious deficiencies in their initial audits and made good progress in resolving them. We will continue to focus on financial systems and internal control deficiencies at particular agencies. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO discussed the results of its audit of the United States government's consolidated financial statements.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) significant financial systems weaknesses, problems with fundamental recordkeeping, incomplete documentation, and weak internal controls, including computer controls, prevented the government from accurately reporting a large portion of assets, liabilities, and costs; (2) these deficiencies affect the reliability of the consolidated financial statements and much of the underlying financial information; (3) they also affect the government's ability to accurately measure the full cost and financial performance of programs and effectively and efficiently manage its operations; (4) such deficiencies prevented GAO from being able to form an opinion on the reliability of the consolidated financial statements; (5) they are the result of widespread material internal control and financial systems weaknesses that significantly impair the federal government's ability to adequately safeguard assets, ensure proper recording of transactions, and ensure compliance with laws and regulations; (6) GAO's audit of the federal government's consolidated financial statements and the Inspectors General audits of agencies' financial statements have resulted in an identification and analysis of deficiencies in the government's recordkeeping and control systems and recommendations to correct them; (7) fixing these problems represents a significant challenge because of the size and complexity of the federal government and the discipline needed to comply with new accounting and reporting requirements; (8) several individual agencies that have been audited for a number of years faced serious deficiencies in their initial audits and made good progress in resolving them; (9) with a concerted effort, the federal government, as a whole, can continue to make progress toward ensuring full accountability and generating reliable information on a regular basis; (10) annual financial statement audits are essential to ensuring the effectiveness of the improvements now under way, and ultimately, to producing the reliable and complete information needed by decisionmakers and the public to evaluate the government's financial performance; and (11) they are also central to helping the government implement broader management reforms called for by the Government Performance and Results Act. |
gao_GAO-09-490T | gao_GAO-09-490T_0 | Overview of Federal Assistance Provided
Ongoing instability in global credit markets and other issues have resulted in over $182 billion in federal assistance being made available to AIG. Second, in November 2008, the Federal Reserve and Treasury announced additional assistance to AIG and restructured its original assistance. To date, AIG has not drawn against this facility. Some of the assistance also places restrictions on actions that AIG can take while it has loans outstanding to the federal government or as long as the federal government has an ownership interest in AIG assets, as well as restrictions on executive compensation. Federal Efforts Have Focused on Maintaining and Monitoring AIG’s Solvency, but AIG Faces Challenges in Repaying Federal Assistance
Federal assistance to AIG has been focused on preventing systemic risk from a potential AIG failure and monitoring its progress, but AIG faces challenges in repaying the assistance. If the ultimate goal is avoiding the failure of AIG, the Federal Reserve and Treasury have achieved that goal in the short-term. Federal and State Monitoring Efforts Are Focused on AIG Solvency
We asked Treasury and the Federal Reserve how they were monitoring AIG’s progress toward reaching the goals of the federal financial assistance and AIG’s compliance with the restrictions placed upon it as a condition of receiving the assistance. According to Treasury and Federal Reserve officials, the agencies are working together to monitor AIG’s solvency by reviewing the reports required by the terms of the financial assistance, and the Federal Reserve is in contact daily with AIG officials regarding AIG’s liquidity needs and their efforts to sell the company’s assets. AIG Faces a Number of Challenges to Its Ability to Repay Its Federal Funds
AIG’s restructuring has hinged on efforts in three areas: (1) terminating its CDS portfolio, (2) terminating its securities lending program, and (3) selling assets. The federal assistance has allowed AIG to undertake restructuring efforts, which continue. As of September 2008, AIG was to wind down the operations of AIGFP and sell certain businesses. AIG’s ongoing financial problems have resulted in additional assistance and restructuring of the terms of the original assistance, and AIG faces numerous, significant challenges to its ability to repay federal assistance in the future. However, damage to AIG’s reputation has made it difficult for its insurance companies to maintain current business and write new business. Some of AIG’s Competitors Claim that AIG’s Commercial Insurance Pricing Is Out of Line With Its Risks but Other Insurance Industry Participants and Observers Disagree
We are examining the potential effect of federal assistance to AIG on the insurance market, particularly AIG’s pricing practices within the commercial property/casualty market. State insurance regulators, insurance brokers, and insurance buyers that we have spoken to said that they have seen no indications that AIG’s commercial property/casualty insurers are selling coverage at prices inadequate to cover the risk involved: State insurance regulators we spoke to said that they generally do not closely watch commercial insurance rates because they may have been largely deregulated by the states, as well as because of the highly negotiated nature and complexity of many commercial lines of insurance. They also cited instances where AIG Commercial Insurance has lost business because other insurers’ prices were lower than theirs. Without knowing all the terms of an individual policy, it could be difficult to determine the extent to which that policy was priced adequately for the risk involved. In closing, the extent to which the assistance provided by the government will achieve its goal of preventing systemic risk continues to unfold and will be largely influenced by AIG’s success in meeting its ongoing challenges in trying to restructure its operations. While we have found no evidence that federal assistance has been provided directly to AIG’s property/casualty insurers, as has been the case for AIG life insurers, AIG’s insurance companies have likely received some indirect benefit to the extent that the property/casualty insurers would have been adversely affected by a credit downgrade or failure of the AIG parent. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve) and the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) have made available over $182 billion in assistance to American International Group (AIG) to prevent its failure. However, questions have been raised about the goals of the assistance and how it is being monitored. Also, because AIG is generally known for its insurance operations, questions exist about the effect of the assistance on certain insurance markets. This statement provides preliminary findings on (1) the goals and monitoring of federal assistance to AIG and challenges to AIG's repayment of the assistance; and (2) the potential effects of the federal assistance on the U.S. commercial property/casualty insurance market. GAO's work on these issues is ongoing. To date, we have reviewed relevant documents on the assistance and ongoing operations of AIG, as well as documents issued by the Federal Reserve and Treasury. We also interviewed officials from these organizations as well as industry participants (competitors, brokers, and customers) and insurance regulators, among others.
What GAO Found
Federal financial assistance to AIG, both from the Federal Reserve and Federal Reserve Bank of New York through their authority to lend funds to critical nonbank institutions and from Treasury's Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), has focused on preventing systemic risk that could result from a rating downgrade or failure of AIG. The goal of the assistance and subsequent restructurings was to prevent systemic risk from the failure of AIG by allowing AIG to sell assets and restructure its operations in an orderly manner. The Federal Reserve has been monitoring AIG's operations since September, and Treasury has begun to more actively monitor AIG's operations as well. Although the ongoing federal assistance has prevented further downgrades in AIG's credit rating, AIG has had mixed success in fulfilling its other restructuring plans, such as terminating its securities lending program, selling assets, and unwinding its AIG Financial Products portfolio. For example, AIG has made efforts at selling certain business units and has begun an overall restructuring, but market and other conditions have prevented significant asset sales, and most restructuring efforts are still under way. AIG faces ongoing challenges from the continued overall economic deterioration and tight credit markets. AIG's ability to repay its obligations to the federal government has also been impaired by its deteriorating operations, inability to sell its assets and further declines in its assets. All of these issues will continue to adversely impact AIG's ability to repay its government assistance. As part of GAO's ongoing work related to the federal assistance provided to AIG, GAO is reviewing the potential impact of the assistance on the commercial property/casualty insurance market. Specifically, GAO is reviewing potential effects of the assistance on AIG's pricing practices. According to some of AIG's competitors, federal assistance to AIG has allowed AIG's commercial property/casualty insurance companies to offer coverage at prices that are inadequate for the risk involved. Conversely, state insurance regulators, insurance brokers, and insurance buyers said that while AIG may be pricing somewhat more aggressively than in the past in order to retain business in light of damage to the parent company's reputation, they did not see indications that this pricing was inadequate or out of line with previous AIG pricing practices. Moreover, some have noted that AIG has lost business because of the problems encountered by its parent company. As GAO evaluates these issues, it faces a number of challenges associated with determining the adequacy of commercial property/casualty premium rates, especially in the short term. These challenges include the unique, negotiated nature of many commercial insurance policies, the subjective assumptions involved in determining premiums, and the fact that for some lines of commercial insurance it can take several years to determine if premiums charged were adequate for the related losses. |
gao_GAO-05-652 | gao_GAO-05-652_0 | However, in response to the events of September 11, 2001, the federal government has provided billions of dollars to state and local governments for planning, equipment, and training to enhance the capabilities of first responders to respond to terrorist attacks and, to a lesser extent, natural and accidental disasters. First Responders are Responsible for Carrying out Emergency Management Efforts
The nation’s first responders have the lead responsibilities for carrying out emergency management efforts. These attacks have resulted in greater public and governmental focus on the role of first responders and their capabilities to respond to large-scale emergency events. DHS also plans to develop national strategies for assessing and reporting the status of first responders’ capabilities, prioritizing federal, state, and local resource investments to enhance these capabilities, and standardizing training and exercise programs for first responders to practice and improve emergency response capabilities. While NIMS defines “how” to manage a large-scale emergency event and NRP defines “what” needs to be done, the National Preparedness Goal is intended to generally define “how well” it needs to be done. These stakeholder groups, called Integrated Concept Teams, developed the three program implementation requirement plans. Our analysis of DHS’s Target Capabilities List and our discussions with first responders and other emergency management stakeholders revealed that the capabilities required to address terrorist attacks and to address natural and accidental disasters are most similar for protection, response, and recovery, and differ most for prevention. Terrorist Attacks Share Common Characteristics with Natural and Accidental Disasters, and Most Preparedness Capabilities are Similar for All Emergency Events
Because terrorist attacks share many common characteristics with natural and accidental disasters, many of the capabilities first responders need to support national preparedness efforts are similar. The remaining 30 capabilities address preparedness for all hazards. As a result, all five of the prevention capabilities on DHS’s target capabilities list focus exclusively on terrorist attacks. Legislative language has directed DHS to use these funds chiefly to prevent, protect, respond to and recover from acts of terrorism. Additionally, HSPD-8 directs DHS to take an all-hazards approach to national emergency preparedness with a special emphasis on terrorism. Appendix I: Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5
Appendix II: Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8
Appendix III: Objectives, Scope and Methodology
This report addresses the following questions: 1) What actions has DHS taken to provide policies and strategies that promote the development of the all-hazards emergency management capabilities of first responders? 2) How do first responders’ emergency management capabilities for terrorist attacks compare to capabilities needed for natural or accidental disasters? 3) What emphasis has DHS placed on funding awarded to state and local first responders to enhance all-hazards emergency management capabilities? Using a structured interview guide, we solicited local first responder officials’ insights and perspectives on a variety of topics, including: the extent to which DHS uses an all-hazards approach in assisting state and local first responders’ emergency management capabilities, how DHS coordinates its activities, how locations use federal homeland security grant funds, what mechanisms DHS has in place to ensure that grant funds are spent in accordance with grant guidelines, how local departments assess and report their preparedness status, what gaps, if any, they believe exist between current and needed capabilities in selected locations, and what challenges, if any, they face in their emergency management responsibilities. | Why GAO Did This Study
The events of September 11, 2001, have resulted in a greater focus on the role of first responders in carrying out the nation's emergency management efforts. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is the primary federal entity responsible for ensuring that first responders, such as police, fire, emergency medical, and public health personnel, have the capabilities needed to provide a coordinated, comprehensive response to any large-scale crisis. In the last 4 years DHS has awarded $11.3 billion to state and local governments to enhance capabilities, primarily to prevent, prepare for, respond to and recover from acts of terrorism. Presidential directives instruct DHS to develop a national all-hazards approach--preparing all sectors of society for any emergency event including terrorist attacks and natural or accidental disasters. This report addresses the following questions: (1) What actions has DHS taken to provide policies and strategies that promote the development of the all-hazards emergency management capabilities of first responders? (2) How do first responders' emergency management capabilities for terrorist attacks differ to capabilities needed for natural or accidental disasters? (3) What emphasis has DHS placed on funding awarded to state and local first responders to enhance all-hazards emergency management capabilities?
What GAO Found
DHS has undertaken three major policy initiatives aimed at creating a national, all-hazards coordinated and comprehensive response to large-scale incidents: (1) a national response plan (what needs to be done); (2) a command and management process (how it needs to be done); and (3) a national preparedness goal (how well it should be done). GAO reviewed these products and determined that each supports a national, all-hazards approach. DHS has developed plans to implement three related programs to enhance first responder capabilities: (1) to assess and report on the status of first responders' capabilities; (2) to prioritize national resource investments; and (3) to establish a national training and exercise program. Implementing these programs will likely pose a number of challenges for DHS including integrating internal and external assessment approaches, assessing state and local risks in a national context to effectively prioritize investments, and establishing common training requirements across responder disciplines. Because terrorist attacks share some common characteristics with natural and accidental disasters, 30 of DHS' 36 capabilities first responders need to support preparedness and response efforts are similar. GAO's analysis found that the baseline capabilities required for terrorist attacks and natural or accidental disasters are more similar for response and recovery and differ most for prevention. Because terrorist attacks are planned, intentional acts, all of DHS' prevention capabilities focus on terrorist attacks, while almost all other baseline capabilities focus on all hazards. Legislation and presidential directives call for DHS to place special emphasis on preparedness for terrorism and DHS has directed that the majority of first responder grant funding be used to enhance first responder capabilities to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks. Nonetheless, grants funds can have all-hazards applications. |
gao_GAO-01-366 | gao_GAO-01-366_0 | Conclusions
As currently implemented, EPA’s post-award grant management policy provides minimal assurance that unallowable costs for nonprofit grantees will be identified. Identification of such costs is important for effective oversight of EPA’s nonprofit grantees. EPA’s on-site grantee visits could provide agency officials with a valuable opportunity to test for unallowable costs while they are testing the adequacy of the grantees’ financial and administrative systems. While additional time may be required to perform tests for unallowable costs and additional training may be required for regional personnel, the tests would provide greater assurance that grant funds are spent in accordance with OMB requirements. The single audit is an important tool for ensuring that federal funds are properly spent. EPA has taken several steps to identify grantees that need a single audit, but it is difficult to identify them definitively because information on total federal expenditures by each grantee is not available. As a result, EPA is using other information sources to identify grantees that are required to have a single audit. One of these sources is the Federal Audit Clearinghouse Internet site. This source could be used more effectively if EPA officials were better trained in using the site. Recommendations
To provide greater assurance that EPA grant funds are spent in accordance with OMB requirements, we recommend that the Administrator of EPA direct the Assistant Administrator for Administration and Resources Management to revise the 1998 post-award management policy to provide that transaction testing focused on identification of unallowable costs be included as a suggested practice during on site reviews of grantees, and increase the amount of training provided to grants specialists and project officers on accessing and using the Federal Audit Clearinghouse database to enhance their capabilities for obtaining single audit information. Appendix VI: Comments From the Environmental Protection Agency | What GAO Found
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) provides millions of dollars to grantees to conduct research, demonstrate pollution control techniques, and perform other activities. Oversight of this large pool of grantees has proven to be difficult. EPA's post-award grant management policy provides few guarantees that unallowable costs for nonprofit grantees will be identified. Identifying such costs is important for effective oversight of EPA's nonprofit grantees. EPA's on-site grantee visits could provide agency officials with a valuable opportunity to test for unallowable costs while they are testing the adequacy of the grantees' financial and administrative systems. Although more time may be required to test for unallowable costs and additional training may be required for regional personnel, the tests would provide greater assurance that grant funds are spent in accordance with Office of Management and Budget (OMB) requirements. The single audit is an important tool for ensuring that federal funds are properly spent. EPA has taken several steps to identify grantees that need a single audit, but it is difficult to identify them definitively because information on total federal expenditures by each grantee is unavailable. As a result, EPA is using other information sources to identify grantees that are required to have a single audit. One of these sources is the Federal Audit Clearinghouse Internet site. This source could be used more effectively if EPA officials were better trained in using the site. |
gao_T-NSIAD-96-217 | gao_T-NSIAD-96-217_0 | Eighty-eight countries are currently classified as low-income and food-deficit states. According to FAO, close to 800 million people, or 20 percent of the developing world’s population, are chronically undernourished. FAO has projected that, unless the root causes underlying food security are addressed by 2010, 700 million to 800 million persons worldwide will still be chronically undernourished. Poverty is a primary obstacle to food security. Other important factors affecting food security include weather, civil strife and war, widespread unemployment or underemployment, inadequate returns to food producers, unsustainable use of natural resources, high debt service, overvalued exchange rates, and distorted international markets. As a result, even with modest income growth, world food supplies will have to at least double by that year according to the World Bank. According to FAO, Africa currently accounts for about 200 million, or about 25 percent, of the chronically malnourished people in developing countries. V.)
According to one recent study, Africa’s agricultural production and trade have been affected by a variety of factors from the period following independence to the present, including: (1) the effects of the Cold War on agricultural and rural development policies, (2) chronic civil and social strife and the displacement of populations, (3) the mismanagement of national resources, (4) the failure to build capacity in critical areas such as policy analysis and entrepreneurship, (5) developments in the agriculture sectors and policies of industrialized countries, (6) the reduction in demand for primary commodities, (7) shocks caused by the oil crisis, (8) periodic droughts, and (9) the entry of the former Soviet Union into world markets. Most U.S. sub-Saharan Africa food aid is in the form of emergency and humanitarian grants under title II of the Public Law 480 program. It reports that from 1989 through 1992, Africa received the largest share of U.S. food aid. World Food Summit
In November 1996 a World Food Summit will be held in Rome. Countries attending the summit are trying to reach agreement on a broad policy statement and plan of action for significantly advancing world progress toward achieving food security. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the food security in Africa.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) 88 countries are classified as low-income and food-deficit states and 20 percent of the developing world's population is chronically undernourished; (2) by the year 2010, 700 million to 800 million people worldwide could be chronically undernourished unless food security is improved; (3) poverty, weather, civil strife and war, population displacements, widespread unemployement, unsustainable use of natural resources, high debt services, economic mismanagement, and distorted international markets are obstacles to world food security; (4) world food supplies will have to at least double by 2025, mainly through increased yields; (5) market-oriented agricultural policies will probably limit food production surpluses in the future and budget constraints are limiting donors' ability to provide food aid; (6) Africa accounts for about 25 percent of the chronically malnourished population in developing countries; (7) food security is precarious for sub-Saharan African countries where the population growth rate remains at 3.2 percent; (8) most U.S. food aid is in the form of emergency and humanitarian grants, but Africa no longer receives the largest share of such aid; and (9) the November 1996 World Food Summit plans to seek agreement on a broad policy statement and action plan for achieving world food security. |
gao_GAO-16-402 | gao_GAO-16-402_0 | States’ program integrity activities include a screening process to help ensure that ineligible providers do not participate in the Medicaid program. Selected States and Medicaid Managed Care Plans Face Significant Challenges Screening Providers
According to two selected states and 16 selected MMC plans that screen MMC plan providers, their efforts are challenged by fragmented information and difficulty accessing and using particular databases. Efforts to Screen Providers Are Based on Information that Is Fragmented across Multiple and Disparate Federal Databases
According to the two selected state officials and 16 selected MMC plan representatives we contacted, the information they use to screen MMC plan providers is fragmented across multiple and disparate federal databases. Overall, these two selected states and 16 selected plans identified a total of 22 databases managed by 15 different federal agencies. Officials from some states noted that plans checking more databases than recommended by CMS provided better assurance they would not enroll ineligible providers and helped provide a more comprehensive background on a provider. Federal internal control standards stress the importance of collecting quality information to achieve objectives and assess risks. However, the variety of databases checked by states and MMC plans beyond those specified by CMS, the use of NCQA’s accreditation requirements in all 10 states, along with the current rate of improper payments to Medicaid providers, suggests that CMS might not have identified all reliable sources of information about ineligible providers. Federal internal control standards state that agencies should use quality data that are complete, current, accurate, and accessible, and have a logical connection to the program, such as the data regarding deceased individuals in the DMF, to achieve agency goals to reduce fraud. The use of a consistent identifier would also help states and plans ensure that they are accurately identifying ineligible providers. Collaborating with other agencies to use a unique identifier: CMS officials said that they have not considered collaborating with other agencies to explore using a unique identifier—such as the NPI—that would serve to improve the ability of states and plans to confirm the accuracy of matches across databases. Selected States and Medicaid Managed Care Plans Use Inconsistent Practices to Make Data on Ineligible Providers Publicly Available
States must ensure that none of their providers has been determined to be ineligible anywhere in the United States. CMS issued guidance in 2012 encouraging states to share data on ineligible providers through its Medicaid provider termination notification system; however, doing so is optional, not all states are using the list, and the list is not available to MMC plans. In addition, CMS officials said they have not provided states with guidance on other ways to share their data on ineligible providers or how to access other states’ data on ineligible providers. 1.) 2.) 3.) Unlike states, MMC plans are not required to make their data on ineligible providers publicly available. The 16 selected MMC plans reported sharing these data with their state Medicaid agencies at varying intervals and in rare cases, with other plans. The inconsistency with which this information on ineligible providers is shared across states and MMC plans creates the potential that providers could be determined to be ineligible in some states, while still receiving payments from Medicaid in other states. CMS has not coordinated with other agencies to explore what options may exist to address these challenges. CMS guidance on how states should share data on ineligible providers is also limited, resulting in significant inconsistency in how such information is shared across states. 2. 4. In response to our fourth recommendation to provide state Medicaid programs with guidance that establishes expectations and best practices on sharing provider screening data among states and Medicaid managed care plans, HHS commented that it developed the Medicaid provider termination notification database to assist states with the requirement to deny or terminate the enrollment of any provider that has been terminated for cause under Medicare or another state’s Medicaid program or CHIP. List of Excluded Individuals and Entities (LEIE)
The Department of Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General (HHS-OIG) maintains and updates monthly the LEIE, a database of providers it has excluded. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO has reported that Medicaid remains a high-risk program, partly due to concerns about improper payments. Screening of providers is important to help prevent improper payments. Under managed care, states contract with plans to provide services to beneficiaries.
GAO was asked to examine the screening of managed care providers. GAO examined (1) states' and plans' experiences using federal databases to screen providers; and (2) how states and plans share data about ineligible providers. GAO interviewed officials from 10 states, selected generally based on enrollment and geography, and representatives from 16 plans from among these states. GAO reviewed those states' Medicaid program websites and plan contracts, and relevant federal laws, regulations, and guidance; and interviewed officials from CMS and the Department of Health and Human Services' Office of Inspector General.
What GAO Found
GAO found that the selected states and Medicaid managed care plans face significant challenges in screening providers for eligibility to participate in the Medicaid program. Based on information we received from two selected states and 16 selected plans, GAO found that the states and plans used information that was fragmented across 22 databases managed by 15 different federal agencies to screen providers. These databases included databases that the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) had not identified for use in screening providers. Officials from some states noted that these additional databases provided better assurance they would not enroll ineligible providers—i.e., providers who have been barred from participating in federal health care programs. Federal internal control standards stress the importance of collecting quality information to achieve objectives and assess risks. However, the variety of databases used for screening purposes beyond those identified by CMS, along with the current rate of improper payments to Medicaid providers, suggests that CMS might not have identified all reliable sources of information about ineligible providers that could help states and plans achieve program objectives. State officials and plan representatives also said that accessing and using fragmented information from multiple and disparate federal databases challenged their screening efforts. For example, they reported difficulties accessing certain databases, such as the Social Security Administration's Death Master File, and conducting and confirming identified provider matches across databases, particularly those not based on a unique national provider identifier. CMS has not coordinated with other agencies to address these challenges. Federal internal control standards state that agencies should use quality data that are complete, current, accurate, and accessible—and have a logical connection to the program—to achieve agency goals to reduce fraud. However, the difficulties states and plans experienced accessing databases and confirming matches could result in provider screening efforts that do not ensure that ineligible providers are accurately and consistently identified.
GAO also found that the selected states reviewed used inconsistent practices to make data on ineligible providers publicly available. States must ensure that none of their providers has been determined to be ineligible anywhere in the United States. Although CMS has issued guidance encouraging states to share data on ineligible providers through its Medicaid provider termination notification system, doing so is optional, not all states are using the list, and it is not available to Medicaid managed care plans. Moreover, CMS has not provided states with guidance on other ways to share their data on ineligible providers or how to access other states' data on ineligible providers. The 10 states GAO selected varied in how they shared data on ineligible providers. Plans are not required to make their own data on ineligible providers publicly available, and the 16 selected plans shared their data with states at differing intervals and, in rare cases, with other plans. The inconsistency with which this information is shared across states and plans creates the potential that providers could be ineligible in some states while still receiving payments from Medicaid in other states.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that CMS (1) consider additional databases used in screening, (2) collaborate with the Social Security Administration to improve access to the Death Master File, (3) coordinate with other agencies to develop a common identifier across databases, and (4) provide state Medicaid programs with guidance that establishes expectations and best practices on sharing provider screening data among states and plans. HHS concurred with our recommendations. |
gao_T-AIMD-98-125 | gao_T-AIMD-98-125_0 | (2) Why is it important? and (3) What happens when it breaks down? What Is Internal Control? Although ultimate responsibility for good internal control rests with management, all employees have a role in the effective operation of internal control that has been set by management. All internal controls have objectives and techniques. Plans and budgets should be developed in accordance with the missions of the agency and its components. Why Is Internal Control Important? The cost of fraud, waste, and abuse cannot always be measured in dollars and cents. To help restore confidence in government and to improve operations, the Congress passed the Federal Managers’ Financial Integrity Act of 1982. The Integrity Act required, among other items, that we establish internal control standards that agencies are required to adhere to, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issue guidelines for agencies to follow in annually assessing their internal controls, agencies annually evaluate their internal controls and prepare a statement to the President and the Congress on whether their internal controls comply with the standards issued by GAO, and agency reports include material internal control weaknesses identified and plans for correcting the weaknesses. What Happens When Internal Controls Are Not Effective? Weak internal controls pose a significant risk to government agencies. History has shown that serious neglect will result in losses to the government that can total millions, and even billions, of dollars over time. Our most recent high-risk series issued focuses of six categories of high risk: (1) providing for accountability and cost-effective management of defense programs, (2) ensuring that all revenues are collected and accounted for, (3) obtaining an adequate return on multibillion dollar investments in information technology, (4) controlling fraud, waste, and abuse in benefit programs, (5) minimizing loan program losses, and (6) improving management of federal contracts at civilian agencies. Legislation has been enacted to provide a framework for performance-based management and accountability. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the subject of internal control, focusing on: (1) what internal control is; (2) its importance; and (3) what happens when it breaks down.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) internal control is concerned with stewardship and accountability of resources consumed while striving to accomplish an agency's mission with effective results; (2) although ultimate responsibility for internal controls rests with management, all employees have a role in the effective operation of internal controls established by management; (3) effective internal control provides reasonable, not absolute, assurance that an agency's activities are being accomplished in accordance with its control objectives; (4) internal control helps management achieve the mission of the agency and prevent or detect improper activities; (5) the cost of fraud cannot always be measured in dollars; (6) in 1982, Congress passed the Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act requiring: (a) agencies to annually evaluate their internal controls; (b) GAO to issue internal controls standards; and (c) the Office of Management and Budget to issue guidelines for agencies to follow in assessing their internal controls; (7) more recently, Congress has enacted a number of statutes to provide a framework for performance-based management and accountability; (8) weak internal controls pose a significant risk to the government--losses in the millions, or even billions, of dollars can and do occur; (9) GAO and others have reported that weak internal controls over safeguarding and accounting for government property are a serious continuing problem; and (10) GAO's 1997 high-risk series identifies major areas of government operations where the risks of losses to the government is high and where achieving program goals is jeopardized. |
gao_GAO-12-329 | gao_GAO-12-329_0 | In its field operations manual, OSHA provides guidance to inspectors, employers, and workers on compliance with safety and health standards, inspections, and penalty assessments. For example, OSHA’s Voluntary Protection Programs (VPP) recognize employers with exemplary safety and health systems and relatively low injury and illness rates, and exempts them from routine inspections. There are two types of safety incentive programs: rate-based programs, which reward workers for achieving low rates of reported injuries or illnesses, and behavior-based programs, which reward workers for certain behaviors such as recommending safety improvements (see fig. Safety Incentive Programs and Policies May Affect Injury and Illness Reporting
Research on the Effect of Safety Incentive Programs Is Inconclusive, but Several Experts Agree Certain Programs and Policies May Discourage Reporting
Little conclusive academic research exists on whether safety incentive programs and other workplace safety policies affect workers’ injury and illness reporting, but several experts stated that rate-based programs may discourage injury and illness reporting. Three-Quarters of U.S. Manufacturers Had Safety Incentive Programs or Other Workplace Safety Policies
According to our survey, in 2010, an estimated 116,000 of about 153,000 manufacturers in the United States (75 percent) had safety incentive programs or had other workplace safety policies that, according to several experts, may affect workers’ reporting of injuries and illnesses. However, we estimated that safety incentive programs were less prevalent than other workplace safety policies, such as demerit systems, that discipline workers for unsafe work practices.a quarter of manufacturers had some type of safety incentive program and most had a demerit system or post-incident drug and alcohol testing We also estimated that policy. Demerit systems were the most common policy reported, followed by post-incident drug and alcohol testing policies (see fig. Most manufacturers had more than one safety incentive program or other workplace safety policy, and more than 20 percent had several, according to our estimates. OSHA Has Taken Limited Actions to Address Safety Incentive Programs and Other Workplace Safety Policies
OSHA’s Enforcement Efforts Address Safety Incentive Programs and Other Workplace Safety Policies to a Limited Extent
OSHA can use its enforcement authority to address certain aspects of safety incentive programs and other workplace safety policies, but the effectiveness of these activities is limited. Similarly, OSHA’s field operations manual does not provide guidance to its inspectors for addressing safety incentive programs during inspections. In response to our recommendation that OSHA add language about key elements of a positive safety culture—and the potential effect of different types of safety incentive programs and other workplace safety policies— to its field operations manual, OSHA stated that it has issued guidance for its inspectors about safety incentive programs that underscores the agency’s position that programs that discourage workers from reporting injuries may violate whistleblower protection statutes and OSHA’s recordkeeping regulations. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Literature Review and Expert Input on Safety Incentive Programs and Other Workplace Safety Policies That May Affect Injury and Illness Reporting
To determine what is known about the effect of workplace safety incentive programs and other workplace safety policies on injury and illness reporting, we conducted a literature search for relevant studies. To supplement our understanding of what is known about the effect of safety incentive programs and other workplace safety policies on injury and illness reporting, we interviewed experts and industry officials from academia, employer associations, a law firm, a consulting firm, unions, and state and federal occupational safety and health agencies. Survey of Manufacturing Worksites
To study the prevalence of workplace safety incentive programs as well as other workplace safety policies that may affect injury and illness reporting, we surveyed a nationally representative sample of manufacturing worksites. We interviewed selected OSHA officials from the agency’s national office as well as several regional and area offices to learn about (1) their efforts to address the potential impact of safety incentive programs and workplace policies on injury and illness reporting, (2) the recordkeeping enforcement initiative, and (3) their views on safety incentive programs and the potential relationship between these programs and injury and illness reporting. | Why GAO Did This Study
OSHA relies on employer injury and illness records to target its enforcement efforts. Questions have been raised as to whether some safety incentive programs and other workplace safety policies may discourage workers' reporting of injuries and illnesses. GAO examined (1) what is known about the effect of workplace safety incentive programs and other workplace safety policies on injury and illness reporting, (2) the prevalence of safety incentive programs as well as other policies that may affect reporting, and (3) actions OSHA has taken to address how safety incentive programs and other policies may affect injury and illness reporting. GAO reviewed academic literature, federal laws, regulations, and OSHA guidance; surveyed a nationally representative sample of manufacturing worksites; and interviewed federal and state occupational safety and health officials, union and employer representatives, and researchers.
What GAO Found
Little research exists on the effect of workplace safety incentive programs and other workplace safety policies on workers' reporting of injuries and illnesses, but several experts identified a link between certain types of programs and policies and reporting. Researchers distinguish between rate-based safety incentive programs, which reward workers for achieving low rates of reported injuries or illnesses, and behavior-based programs, which reward workers for certain behaviors, such as recommending safety improvements. Of the six studies GAO identified that assessed the effect of safety incentive programs, two analyzed the potential effect on workers reporting of injuries or illnesses, but they concluded that there was no relationship between the programs and injury and illness reporting. Experts and industry officials, however, suggest that rate-based programs may discourage reporting of injuries and illnesses. Experts and industry officials also reported that certain workplace polices, such as post-incident drug and alcohol testing, may discourage workers from reporting injuries and illnesses. Researchers and workplace safety experts also noted that how safety is managed in the workplace, including employer practices such as fostering open communication about safety issues, may encourage reporting of injuries and illnesses.
In 2010, from its survey, GAO estimated that 25 percent of U.S. manufacturers had safety incentive programs, and most had other workplace safety policies that, according to experts and industry officials, may affect injury and illness reporting. GAO estimated that 22 percent of manufacturers had rate-based safety incentive programs, and 14 percent had behavior-based programs. Almost 70 percent of manufacturers also had demerit systems, which discipline workers for unsafe behaviors, and 56 percent had post-incident drug and alcohol testing policies according to GAOs estimates. Most manufacturers had more than one safety incentive program or other workplace safety policy and more than 20 percent had several. Such programs and policies were more common among larger manufacturers.
Although the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) is not required to regulate safety incentive programs, it has taken limited action to address the potential effect of such programs and other workplace safety policies on injury and illness reporting. These programs and policies, however, are not addressed in key guidance such as OSHA's field operations manual for inspectors. OSHA has cooperative programs that exempt employers with exemplary safety and health management systems from routine inspections. One such program prohibits participants from having rate-based safety incentive programs, but guidance on OSHAs other cooperative programs does not address safety incentive programs. Similarly, OSHA inspectors and outreach specialists provide information to employers about the potential benefits and risks of safety incentive programs, but the guidance provided to inspectors in its field operations manual does not address these programs.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that OSHA provide guidance about safety incentive programs and other workplace safety policies consistently across the agency's cooperative programs, and add language about safety incentive programs and other workplace safety policies to the guidance provided to inspectors in its field operations manual. OSHA agreed with the recommendations, and noted its plans to address them. |
gao_RCED-98-86 | gao_RCED-98-86_0 | Prepared in the spring of 1997, these reports identify a number of potential efficiencies from consolidating and centralizing processes. Beyond allowing the agency to operate with a reduced workforce, other efficiencies include reducing the processing time for single-family housing insurance endorsements and multifamily housing development applications and reducing paperwork requirements for grant programs. The potential efficiencies are generally not based on detailed empirical analyses or studies, but rather on a variety of factors, including some workload data, limited results of a pilot project, identified best practices in HUD field offices, benchmarks from other organizations, and managers’ and staff’s experiences and judgment. HUD’s Ability to Operate With 7,500 Staff Is Not Based Upon Systematic Analyses of Needs
According to the Deputy Secretary, the process changes proposed by the 2020 plan, along with partnerships with states and local entities and the use of contractors, will allow the agency to operate with 7,500 staff—a staffing target level established prior to the plan. Proposed staffing levels for each program area, as outlined in the management reform team and change agent team reports, are generally not based upon systematic workload analyses to determine needs. While the teams were instructed by the Deputy Secretary to determine staffing requirements on the basis of workload, they were also instructed to work within targeted staffing levels and HUD’s staffing constraints. The teams relied on a variety of factors, including workload data, to show whether they could carry out their responsibilities within assigned targeted staffing levels. Union Agreement Established Framework for Managing Personnel Changes
On August 10, 1997, HUD and the American Federation of Government Employees National Council of HUD Locals 222 signed an implementation agreement to carry out the 2020 plan. The letter stated that HUD would not implement a reduction in force until 2002 if one was necessary. Because the reforms are not yet complete and some of the plan’s approaches are untested, the extent to which its proposed reforms will result in the plan’s intended benefits is unknown. In addition, because the downsizing target of 7,500 staff is not based upon a systematic workload analysis to determine needs, it is uncertain whether HUD will have the capacity to carry out its responsibilities once the reforms are in place. Concerning HUD’s comment that the draft report did not acknowledge potential benefits from the 2020 reform plan, the report noted that the plan is directed in part towards correcting management deficiencies that we and others have identified. Scope and Methodology
To identify HUD’s analyses supporting the (1) prospective efficiencies from centralizing and consolidating major programs and activities and (2) agency’s ability to carry out its responsibilities with 7,500 employees, we reviewed the management reform and change agent reports for each of HUD’s major program areas. To identify how HUD plans to manage the personnel changes that will result from the reforms and downsizing, we interviewed officials responsible for the changes and obtained copies of union agreements and other relevant documents. High-Risk Series: Department of Housing and Urban Development (GAO/HR-97-12, Feb. 1997). | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed aspects of the management reform proposals outlined in the Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) 2020 Management Reform Plan, focusing on: (1) studies and analyses that HUD performed to determine the efficiencies derived from the centralization and consolidation of the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) and other major programs and activities; (2) studies and workload analyses that were conducted to show that HUD would be able to carry out its responsibilities with 7,500 employees; and (3) HUD's plan to manage the personnel changes that will result from its reforms and downsizing.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) reports covering each of HUD's major program areas and functions, prepared by teams of HUD employees in the spring of 1997, are the principal documents supporting the 2020 plan; (2) the reports identify a number of prospective efficiencies from consolidating and centralizing certain processes; (3) in addition to allowing the agency to operate with a reduced workforce, HUD intends the changes to reduce the time or paperwork required for various processes; (4) the efficiencies cited are generally not based upon detailed empirical analyses or studies, but rather on a variety of information, including some workload data, limited results from a pilot project, identified best practices in HUD field offices, benchmarks from other organizations, and managers' and staff's experiences and judgment; (5) the plan is directed in part towards correcting the management deficiencies that have been identified; (6) because the reforms are not yet complete and some of the plan's approaches are untested, the extent to which they will result in the intended benefits is unknown; (7) according to HUD's Deputy Secretary, the process changes proposed by the 2020 plan, along with states and local entities and the use of contractors, will allow the agency to operate with 7,500 staff--a staffing target level established prior to the plan; (8) however, proposed staffing levels for each program area are generally not based upon systematic workload analyses to determine needs; (9) while the reform teams were instructed by the Deputy Secretary to determine staffing requirements based upon workload, they were also instructed to work within targeted staffing levels and the Department's staffing constraints; (10) the reform teams relied on a variety of factors, including some workload data, to show whether responsibilities could be carried out within targeted staffing levels; (11) because the downsizing target of 7,500 staff is not based upon a systematic assessment of needs and because proposed legislation could affect those needs, it is uncertain that HUD will have the capacity to carry out its responsibilities once the reforms are in place; (12) an August 1997 agreement between HUD and the American Federation of Government Employees National Council of HUD Locals 222 established the framework for managing personnel changes to implement the 2020 plan; (13) this agreement includes buyouts, reassignments, and an outplacement program for HUD employees and provides that a reduction in force may be used if necessary, but not before 2002; and (14) this agreement also provides for hiring new employees for some positions. |
gao_GAO-04-1017 | gao_GAO-04-1017_0 | The act appropriated the funds as follows $9 million for CFSA, of which $2 million would be to establish an early intervention program to provide intensive and immediate services to foster children; $1 million would be to establish an emergency support fund to purchase necessary items to allow children to remain in the care of a licensed, approved family member; $3 million would be to establish a student loan repayment program for caseworkers; and $3 million would be to upgrade CFSA’s automated case management system, known as FACES, to a Web-based system and to provide computer technology to caseworkers; $3.9 million for DMH to provide all court-ordered or agency-required mental health screenings, assessments, and treatment to children in the care of CFSA; and $1.1 million for COG to develop a program in conjunction with the Foster and Adoptive Parents Advocacy Center to provide respite care for and recruitment of foster parents. CFSA Has Actively Recruited Caseworkers and Implemented Retention Strategies; however, Caseworkers Cited Management Practices That Adversely Affected Their Performance and Morale
CFSA has implemented various caseworker recruitment and retention strategies; however, caseworkers told us about several management practices that adversely affected their ability to perform their duties and lowered their morale. CFSA successfully hired 147 new caseworkers, which enabled the agency to exceed most of its staffing goals and lower caseworkers’ caseloads. Experts in the child welfare community endorsed several of these strategies. Required supervisory training. The quality of supervision of caseworkers at CFSA is not a new issue. Agency officials said that they are planning to develop policies and procedures for a formal rewards and recognition program. CFSA Has Developed a Recruitment Plan and Established New Licensing Standards for Foster and Adoptive Homes, but More Foster Families than Expected Have Stopped Serving
CFSA has taken several steps to recruit and license an adequate supply of safe foster and adoptive homes. The recruitment plan identifies specific strategies for recruiting new families. Some Foster Children Remain in Unlicensed Homes
CFSA has taken a number of steps to ensure that children are placed in licensed foster care homes, yet as of May 2004, 495 children—about 22 percent of children in CFSA’s care—were in unlicensed homes. CFSA Has Begun Collaborating to Centralize and Track Mental Health Services for Foster Care Children, but Challenges Remain to Ensuring Timely Delivery
CFSA has begun implementing a centralized mental health referral process in collaboration with DMH and the Family Court and has developed a database to track service delivery; however, challenges remain in meeting the statutory timeframes for initiating services and for completing and reporting on assessments. To increase the continuity of care between the foster care and mental health systems, CFSA and DMH designed a standard process for referring foster care children to DMH for mental health assessment and treatment and for tracking service delivery. CFSA and DMH began using the referral process in March 2004, and CFSA began using its newly developed database for tracking service delivery in August 2004. While officials were able to report some of the data collected manually, CFSA had not analyzed the information to determine whether foster care children were receiving mental health services within the statutory timeframes. DMH has made some progress in expanding its capacity to meet the assessment and treatment needs of foster care children. For example, CFSA officials meet with their evaluators to encourage them to contract with DMH. Future Funding for Some of the Long-Term Projects in the Plan Is Uncertain
While the expenditures proposed in the District and COG spending plans appear to be in line with the intentions of the act, it is unclear how the District and COG plan to support all of the programs and initiatives outlined in the spending plan in the long-term. As of June 30, 2004, Only a Small Portion of the $14 Million Had Been Obligated or Spent
The District and COG did not receive authority over their funding until 6 months into fiscal year 2004. Despite CFSA’s new efforts and attention to recruiting foster and adoptive families, the agency does not have a process for assessing the effectiveness of its recruitment efforts. Additionally, CFSA does not have sufficient information about the reasons foster families stop serving and leave the foster care system because it does not have a process to solicit feedback from them. Specifically, we reviewed CFSA’s strategic and annual plans for fiscal years 2003 and 2004 and CFSA’s recruiting and retention plans for fiscal years 2003, 2004, and 2005. Additionally, we interviewed officials from the Adoption Resource Center in Washington, D.C. and the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments (COG). | Why GAO Did This Study
The District of Columbia's Child and Family Services Agency (CFSA) is responsible for ensuring the safety and well being of about 3,000 children in its care and ensuring that services are provided to them and their families. In fiscal year 2003, CFSA's total budget was about $200 million. Concerns have been raised about CFSA's supply of caseworkers, the foster care and adoptive homes, and the quality and timeliness of mental health services for foster care children. To help address these issues, the Congress appropriated $14 million in fiscal year 2004 to CFSA, the Department of Mental Health (DMH), and the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments (COG) specifically for foster care improvement. GAO examined CFSA's (1) strategies for recruiting, retaining, and managing its caseworkers; (2) efforts to license an adequate supply of safe foster and adoptive homes; and (3) efforts to collaborate with DMH and the Family Court to provide timely mental health services to foster care children. GAO also reviewed plans for and use of the federal foster care improvement funds.
What GAO Found
CFSA actively recruited caseworkers and implemented retention strategies; however, caseworkers cited several management practices they said lowered their morale and adversely affected their ability to perform their duties. CFSA employed several recruitment approaches recommended by a number of child welfare organizations and exceeded most of its staffing goals for fiscal year 2003. Caseworkers cited high salaries and the training for new caseworkers as factors that encouraged them to remain at CFSA. However, GAO found a general consensus among the caseworkers with which GAO met that some management practices--poor communication, a lack of resources, poor supervision, and no rewards and recognition program--adversely affected their performance and morale. Agency officials said they had made some changes and were planning to take other actions to address these issues. CFSA has developed goals and strategies for recruiting new foster and adoptive homes and improved licensing requirements. CFSA has made progress licensing new families, although more families have stopped serving than expected. Further, CFSA does not have processes for identifying the reasons foster parents stop serving or for determining the effectiveness of its recruitment strategies. CFSA has standardized and raised licensing requirements for all foster and adoptive homes, but as of May 2004, 308 foster homes were unlicensed, with about 22 percent of CFSA's foster children residing in them. CFSA has begun collaborating with DMH and the Family Court to centralize and track mental health services for foster care children, but challenges remain to ensuring timely delivery. CFSA and DMH designed a standard process for referring foster care children to DMH for assessment and treatment and for tracking service delivery. DMH has also started expanding its service capacity for foster care children. For example, it has begun recruiting additional evaluators to perform assessments. While CFSA began using a database to track service delivery in August 2004, it has not analyzed the service delivery data collected on paper prior to August 2004 to determine whether foster care children were receiving timely services. Additionally, CFSA and DMH still face certain challenges, such as integrating caseworkers and Family Court judges into the new referral process. CFSA, DMH, and COG have spending plans that are consistent with the statutory language providing the federal funds, but only a small portion of the foster care improvement funds had been obligated or spent as of June 2004, in part because funding was not received until March 2004. Further, it is unclear how the District and COG plan to support some of these programs in the long-term because future funding is uncertain. |
gao_GAO-06-845T | gao_GAO-06-845T_0 | DOD believes it can better address managing defense-wide business transformation— which includes planning, management, organizational structures and processes related to all key business areas—by first transforming business operations that support the warfighter while also enabling financial accountability across DOD. DOD Lacks a Comprehensive, Integrated, and Enterprisewide Approach to Decisionmaking and Sustained Leadership
While DOD has developed plans that address certain high-risk areas related to business transformation, and is taking other steps to guide and lead transformation efforts, I believe that the department still lacks several key elements that are needed to ensure a successful and sustainable business transformation effort. However, the enterprise transition plan does not go far enough to constitute a strategic plan for the overall business transformation efforts since it is more focused on business systems. During the past year, DOD has taken additional steps to address certain provisions and requirements of the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, including establishing the DBSMC as DOD’s primary transformation leadership and oversight mechanism, and creating the Business Transformation Agency (BTA) to support the DBSMC, a decision making body. However, these organizations do not provide the sustained leadership needed to successfully achieve business transformation. Moreover, BTA has yet to fill a number of key positions for overseeing the transformation process. DOD Has Made Important Progress Complying With Business Systems Modernization and Financial Management Accountability Legislation, But Much Work Remains
As we testified and reported earlier this year, we believe DOD has made important progress in complying with legislation pertaining to its business systems modernization and financial management improvement efforts. For example, we reported in May 2006 that DOD released a minor update to its business enterprise architecture on March 15, 2006, developed an updated enterprise transition plan, and issued its annual report to Congress describing steps taken and planned, among other things. These steps address several of the missing elements we previously identified relative to the legislative provisions concerning the architecture, transition plan, budgetary reporting of business system investments, and investment review. Key DOD Systems Still Face Challenges
We testified in November 2005 that DOD faced a number of challenges, including ensuring that the department’s many business system investments are managed in a way to deliver promised system capabilities and benefits on time and within budget. Since our report, DOD has made some progress in addressing concerns, however significant challenges remain. Specific High-risk Program Areas Highlight the Need for Continued Attention to Ensure Effective Transformation
I would like to discuss the five remaining high-risk areas within DOD. Management of DOD’s Weapon Systems Acquisitions and Contractor Oversight
Two interrelated high-risk areas are the management of DOD’s major weapon systems acquisitions and its contractors due to recurring problems with cost overruns and scheduling delays. The consequence of cost and schedule growth is manifested in a reduction of buying power of the defense dollar, at a time when the nation is struggling with a large and growing structural deficit. In fact, all of these areas—along with weapon systems acquisition—are on GAO’s high-risk list of major government programs and operations. Notwithstanding this positive first step, the department faces challenges and risks in successfully implementing its proposed changes across the department and measuring progress. In addition, we are continuing to review DOD’s progress in implementing its supply chain management plan, the extent the plan is strategically linked to other logistics strategies, and the performance measures DOD is using to track the plan’s progress in resolving supply chain problems. For over 2 decades, we have reported on problems with DOD’s personnel security clearance program as well as the financial costs and risks to national security resulting from these problems. DOD Support Infrastructure Management
Since 1997, GAO has identified DOD’s management of its support infrastructure as a high-risk area because infrastructure costs continue to consume a larger than necessary portion of its budget. | Why GAO Did This Study
Of the 25 areas on GAO's 2005 high-risk list of federal programs or activities that are at risk for waste, fraud, abuse, or mismanagement, 8 are Department of Defense (DOD) programs or operations and 6 are governmentwide high-risk areas for which DOD shares some responsibility. These high-risk areas relate to DOD's major business operations. DOD's failure to effectively resolve these high-risk areas results in billions of dollars of waste each year, ineffective performance, and inadequate accountability. At a time when DOD is competing for resources in an increasingly fiscally constrained environment, it is critically important that DOD get the most from every defense dollar. DOD has taken several positive steps and devoted substantial resources toward establishing key management structures and processes to successfully transform its business operations and address its high-risk areas, but overall progress by area varies widely and huge challenges remain. This testimony addresses (1) DOD's progress in developing a strategic, integrated, enterprise-wide business transformation plan and its related leadership approach, (2) the extent to which DOD has complied with legislation that addresses business systems modernization and improving financial management accountability, and (3) selected additional DOD high-risk areas that highlight the need for continued attention.
What GAO Found
DOD has made some progress in its overall approach to business transformation, which GAO has designated as high risk. Yet, GAO still believes DOD needs an integrated, enterprisewide strategic plan and chief management official (CMO) to guide and oversee these efforts. DOD has developed a revised business enterprise architecture and enterprise business transition plan. However, this plan does not go far enough to constitute a strategic plan for the overall business transformation effort. DOD also established the Defense Business Systems Management Committee (DBSMC), as DOD's primary transformation leadership and oversight mechanism, and the Business Transformation Agency (BTA) to support the DBSMC. However, these organizations do not provide the sustained leadership needed to successfully achieve business transformation. Also, the BTA still faces challenges to become operational, such as filling a number of key positions to oversee the transformation process. DOD continues to take steps to comply with legislative requirements to improve business systems modernization, designated as a high-risk area. It has updated its business enterprise architecture and enterprise transition plan and issued its annual report to Congress. This report describes steps taken and planned that address several of the missing elements GAO previously identified relative to legislative provisions concerning the architecture, transition plan, budgetary reporting of business system investments, and investment review. While these steps certainly reflect progress, DOD continues to face challenges relative to ensuring that the department's key business system investments are managed in a way to deliver promised system capabilities and benefits on time and within budget. Further, in late December 2005, DOD issued its Financial Improvement and Readiness Plan to guide its financial management improvement efforts. Ensuring effective transformation of other defense areas that GAO has identified as high risk will require continued attention over many years. These other high-risk areas include weapon systems acquisition, contract management, supply chain management, personnel security clearances, and support infrastructure management. In the area of weapons system acquisition, recurring problems with changing requirements, cost overruns, and schedule delays have resulted in a reduction of buying power of the defense dollar at a time when the nation is struggling with a large and growing structural deficit. While it has made some progress in addressing its supply chain management problems, DOD faces challenges in successfully implementing its planned changes and measuring progress. Problems with the personnel security clearance program continue, although DOD has taken steps to address the financial costs, delays, and other risks associated with the program. Finally, much work remains for DOD to transform its support infrastructure to improve operations and achieve efficiencies so that infrastructure costs adequately fund but no longer consume a larger than necessary portion of DOD's budget. |
gao_GAO-12-223 | gao_GAO-12-223_0 | 2). However, the 11 programs that exceeded their initial estimated costs account for over 60 percent of total program costs for the 30 baselined programs—$11 billion of $17.7 billion. Ten of the 15 programs with schedule delays also experienced cost increases. Several Factors Contributed to Cost Increases and Schedule Delays, and Some Could Hamper NextGen Implementation
A Number of Factors Have Contributed to Cost Increases and Delays
Cost increases and schedule delays occurred because of several factors, all of which have been long-standing challenges for FAA and some of which continue to affect programs despite FAA efforts to mitigate the factors. Specifically, these factors include (1) additional, unanticipated system requirements work; (2) insufficient stakeholder involvement throughout system development; (3) underestimates of the complexity of software development; and (4) unanticipated events, including funding decreases or work stoppages (see table 5). Interdependencies among NextGen ATC Programs Could Slow NextGen Implementation
The interdependencies of ATC acquisition programs have become more prominent as the NextGen program shifts from planning to implementation, so that cost increases and schedule delays in one program could have a cascading effect on other programs. FAA’s acquisition management system was not designed for managing NextGen programs in an integrated way. For Programs We Reviewed, FAA Did Not Consistently Meet All Characteristics of Quality Cost Estimates or Schedule Best Practices
Selected Cost Estimates Were Generally Comprehensive and Well- Documented, but Accuracy and Credibility Need to Be Improved
Our review of the ADS-B, CATMT, SWIM, and WAAS cost estimates showed that while each program followed at least some of the four characteristics of high-quality and reliable cost estimates—well- documented, comprehensive, accurate, and credible—none of the programs adhered closely enough to those characteristics to create a reliable cost estimate. The four estimates did not fully meet the comprehensive characteristic because they lacked evidence that all cost influencing ground rules and assumptions were considered. Had an independent cost estimate been completed, the estimating team and program team could have identified the major differences between their estimates, reconciled those differences where possible, and provided a synopsis of the two estimates and their differences to acquisition program management. Our analysis found that the contractor’s CATMT schedule substantially or fully met four of the nine best practices: capturing all activities, assigning resources, establishing the durations, and updating the schedule. For example, since FAA does not perform schedule risk analysis on individual programs, it cannot predict with certainty if any of the programs will be completed on time. It is also important that FAA develop master schedules at the individual acquisition program level. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve cost estimates and schedules for NextGen and other major air traffic control acquisition programs, GAO recommends that the Secretary of Transportation direct FAA to take the following three actions when appropriate for major acquisition programs based on a program’s cost, schedule, complexity, and risk:
Conduct independent cost estimates and schedule risk analysis for major acquisition programs. Require a fully integrated master schedule for each major acquisition program, including those that are components of NextGen. DOT and FAA responded by email and did not comment whether or not they agreed or disagreed with our recommendations. DOT provided comments on the results of our analysis of the cost estimates and schedules for the four programs we reviewed in depth. FAA’s ATC acquisitions are critical to maintaining the NAS and transitioning to the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) over the next 10 years. Given that some key legacy and NextGen acquisitions have experienced schedule delays and cost overruns, which may risk the timely implementation of NextGen, we (1) determined whether the planned costs and schedules of current FAA ATC acquisition programs have changed since they were first submitted to Congress; (2) examined the reasons for any changes in planned costs and schedules; and (3) assessed the extent to which select ATC programs adhered to best practices for determining acquisition costs and schedules. Schedule Risk Analysis
A best practice that the WAAS contractor schedule did not meet is conducting a schedule risk analysis, which is not required by FAA’s schedule specifications. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), partnering with other federal agencies and the aviation industry, is implementing the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen), a new satellite-based air traffic management system that will replace the current radar-based system and is expected to enhance the safety and capacity of the air transport system by 2025. Concurrently, FAA continues to maintain and upgrade existing air traffic control (ATC) systems that will also be needed for NextGen. This involves acquiring and implementing new software and hardware.
GAO was asked to determine (1) how, if at all, costs and schedules of FAA ATC acquisitions programs, including those related to NextGen, have changed since they were first submitted to Congress, (2) the reasons for any such changes, and (3) the extent that selected ATC programs adhere to cost and schedule best practices. To do its work, GAO reviewed 30 programs and conducted cost and schedule analysis on four programs that had an approved baseline and were NextGen related. GAO reviewed acquisition documents and interviewed FAA officials.
What GAO Found
In a review of 30 major ATC acquisition programs, all of which will contribute to the transition to NextGen, GAO found that costs for 11 of the 30 programs have increased from their initial estimates by a total of $4.2 billion and 15 programs experienced delays. The 11 acquisitions that experienced cost increases account for over 60 percent of FAAs total acquisition costs ($11 billion of $17.7 billion) for the 30 programs. The 15 acquisitions that experienced schedule delays, of which 10 also had cost increases, ranged from 2 months to more than 14 years and averaged 48 months.
Cost increases and schedule delays occurred due to several factors, many of which have been longstanding challenges for FAA. Specifically, these have involved (1) additional or unanticipated system requirements; (2) insufficient stakeholder involvement (such as controllers input) throughout system development; (3) underestimating the complexity of software development; and (4) unanticipated events including funding shortfalls or work toppages. These challenges, if they persist, will impede the implementation of NextGen, especially in light of the interdependencies among many acquisition programs, where cost increases or delays in one program can affect the costs and schedules of other programs.
For the four programs GAO selected to analyze in depth, FAA is not consistently following the characteristics of high-quality cost estimates and scheduling best practices that GAO previously identified. Regarding cost estimates, GAO found that although all four of the programs generally provided well documented and comprehensive estimates, which are two of the four characteristics, no program fully met the two other characteristics. Specifically, each program estimate was not credible because each lacked an independent cost estimate, which provides a check against FAAs estimate and three programs lacked risk or uncertainty analysis. The estimates also lacked accuracy because they were not updated regularly or based on comparable programs. Regarding scheduling practices, most programs did not substantially or fully meet the majority of the 9 best practices GAO previously identified including developing a fully integrated master schedule of all program activities and performing a schedule risk analysis. For example, without a schedule risk analysis, FAA is unable to predict, with any degree of confidence, if the estimated completion dates are realistic. FAA is implementing new processes and organizational changes to better manage acquisitions. However, by not consistently following the characteristics of highquality cost estimate and scheduling best practices, FAA cannot provide reasonable assurance to Congress and other stakeholders that NextGen and other ATC programs will avoid additional cost increases or schedule delays.
What GAO Recommends
To better estimate the cost and completion dates for major acquisitions, FAA should, among other things, require cost and schedule risk analysis, independent cost estimates and integrated master schedules. FAA did not comment on whether or not it agreed with the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-13-38 | gao_GAO-13-38_0 | Significant Technical Challenges Remain Unresolved
Since the start of the project, DOE and Bechtel have identified hundreds of technical challenges that vary in their significance and potential negative impact, and significant technical challenges remain. Among others, the significant technical challenges DOE and Bechtel are trying to resolve include the following:
Waste mixing—One function of the WTP will be to keep the waste uniformly mixed in tanks so it can be transported through the plant and to prevent the buildup of flammable hydrogen and fissile material that could inadvertently result in a nuclear criticality accident. Preventing erosion and corrosion of WTP components—Excessive erosion or corrosion of components such as mixing tanks and piping systems in the WTP is possible. Substantial Additional Cost Increases and Schedule Delays Are Likely
The estimated cost to construct the WTP has almost tripled since the project’s inception in 2000, its scheduled completion date has slipped by nearly a decade, and additional significant cost increases and schedule delays are likely to occur because DOE has not fully resolved the technical challenges faced by the project. DOE Has Not Yet Fully Estimated the Cost and Schedule Impact of Resolving Technical Challenges
DOE’s original contract price for constructing the WTP, approved in 2000, stated that the project would cost $4.3 billion and be completed in 2011. As of May 2012, according to our analysis, the project’s total estimated cost had increased to $13.4 billion, and additional cost increases and schedule delays are likely, although a new performance baseline has not yet been developed and approved. In February 2012, DOE directed Bechtel to develop a new, proposed cost and schedule baseline for the project and, at the same time, to begin a study of alternatives that includes potential changes to the WTP’s design and operational plans to resolve technical challenges faced by the project. DOE Is Taking Steps to Address Some Management and Oversight Problems but Continues to Face Challenges to Completing the WTP
DOE is taking steps to improve its management and oversight of Bechtel’s activities, including levying penalties on the contractor for quality and safety problems but continues to face challenges to completing the WTP project within budget and on schedule. For example, in 2008, DOE’s Office of Enforcement and Oversight investigated Bechtel for circumstances associated with procurement and design deficiencies of equipment for the WTP and identified multiple violations of DOE nuclear safety requirements. In addition, in January 2012, DOE’s Office of Health, Safety, and Security reported that some aspects of the WTP design may not comply with DOE safety requirements. In November 2011, according to DOE officials, DOE ordered Bechtel to suspend work on design, procurement, and installation activities for several major WTP systems including parts of the pretreatment facility and high-level waste facility until the contractor demonstrates that these activities are aligned with DOE nuclear safety requirements. For example, DOE’s ongoing use of a fast-track, design-build approach continues to result in cost and schedule problems. According to DOE officials, construction of the WTP is currently more than 55 percent complete, though the design is only about 80 percent complete. Nuclear industry guidelines suggest that design should be complete to at least 90 percent before starting construction of nuclear facilities. build approach can be used most successfully with projects that have well-defined requirements, are not complex, and have limited risks. DOE has also experienced continuing problems overseeing its contractor’s activities. For example, DOE’s incentives and management controls are inadequate for ensuring effective project management and oversight of the WTP project to ensure that the WTP project is completed within budget and on schedule. This additional facility could add billions to the cost of treating Hanford’s waste. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve DOE’s management and oversight of the WTP project, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy take the following three actions:
Do not resume construction on the WTP’s pretreatment and high-level waste facilities until critical technologies are tested and verified as effective, the facilities’ design has been completed to the level established by nuclear industry guidelines, and Bechtel’s preliminary documented safety analyses complies with DOE nuclear safety regulations. Ensure the department’s contractor performance evaluation process does not prematurely reward contractors for resolving technical issues later found to be unresolved. Take appropriate steps to determine whether any incentive payments made to the contractor for meeting project milestones were made erroneously and, if so, take appropriate actions to recover those payments. DOE generally agreed with the report and its recommendations. | Why GAO Did This Study
In December 2000, DOE awarded Bechtel a contract to design and construct the WTP project at DOE's Hanford Site in Washington State. This project--one of the largest nuclear waste cleanup facilities in the world-- was originally scheduled for completion in 2011 at an estimated cost of $4.3 billion. Technical challenges and other issues, however, have contributed to cost increases and schedule delays. GAO was asked to examine (1) remaining technical challenges, if any, the WTP faces; (2) the cost and schedule estimates for the WTP; and (3) steps DOE is taking, if any, to improve the management and oversight of the WTP project. GAO reviewed DOE and contractor data and documents, external review reports, and spoke with officials from DOE and the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board and with contractors at the WTP site and test facilities.
What GAO Found
The Department of Energy (DOE) faces significant technical challenges in successfully constructing and operating the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) project that is to treat millions of gallons of highly radioactive liquid waste resulting from the production of nuclear weapons. DOE and Bechtel National, Inc. identified hundreds of technical challenges that vary in significance and potential negative impact and have resolved many of them. Remaining challenges include (1) developing a viable technology to keep the waste mixed uniformly in WTP mix tanks to both avoid explosions and so that it can be properly prepared for further processing; (2) ensuring that the erosion and corrosion of components, such as tanks and piping systems, is effectively mitigated; (3) preventing the buildup of flammable hydrogen gas in tanks, vessels, and piping systems; and (4) understanding better the waste that will be processed at the WTP. Until these and other technical challenges are resolved, DOE will continue to be uncertain whether the WTP can be completed on schedule and whether it will operate safely and effectively.
Since its inception in 2000, DOE's estimated cost to construct the WTP has tripled and the scheduled completion date has slipped by nearly a decade to 2019. GAO's analysis shows that, as of May 2012, the project's total estimated cost had increased to $13.4 billion, and significant additional cost increases and schedule delays are likely to occur because DOE has not fully resolved the technical challenges faced by the project. DOE has directed Bechtel to develop a new cost and schedule baseline for the project and to begin a study of alternatives that include potential changes to the WTP's design and operational plans. These alternatives could add billions of dollars to the cost of treating the waste and prolong the overall waste treatment mission.
DOE is taking steps to improve its management and oversight of Bechtel's activities but continues to face challenges to completing the WTP project within budget and on schedule. DOE's Office of Health, Safety, and Security has conducted investigations of Bechtel's activities that have resulted in penalties for design deficiencies and for multiple violations of DOE safety requirements. In January 2012, the office reported that some aspects of the WTP design may not comply with DOE safety standards. As a result, DOE ordered Bechtel to suspend work on several major WTP systems, including the pretreatment facility and parts of the high-level waste facility, until Bechtel can demonstrate that activities align with DOE nuclear safety requirements. While DOE has taken actions to improve performance, the ongoing use of an accelerated approach to design and construction--an approach best suited for well-defined and less-complex projects--continues to result in cost and schedule problems, allowing construction and fabrication of components that may not work and may not meet nuclear safety standards. While guidelines used in the civilian nuclear industry call for designs to be at least 90 percent complete before construction of nuclear facilities, DOE estimates that WTP is more than 55 percent complete though the design is only 80 percent complete. In addition, DOE has experienced continuing problems overseeing its contractor's activities. For example, DOE's incentives and management controls are inadequate for ensuring effective project management, and GAO found instances where DOE prematurely rewarded the contractor for resolving technical issues and completing work.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOE (1) not resume construction on WTPs pretreatment and high-level waste facilities until, among other things, the facilities design has been completed to the level established by nuclear industry guidelines; (2) ensure the departments contractor performance evaluation process does not prematurely reward contractors for resolving technical issues later found to be unresolved; and (3) take appropriate steps to determine whether any incentive payments were made erroneously and, if so, take actions to recover them. DOE generally agreed with the report and its recommendations. |
gao_T-RCED-98-134 | gao_T-RCED-98-134_0 | These plans have attempted to increase revenues and control costs through such actions as expanding mail and express service and adjusting routes and service frequency. Amtrak’s Financial Condition Continues to Deteriorate
Amtrak’s financial condition has continued to deteriorate despite its efforts over the past 4 years to reduce losses. While Amtrak has reduced its net losses from about $892 million in fiscal year 1994 (in 1997 dollars)to $762 million in fiscal year 1997, it has not been able to close the gap between total revenues and expenses. 1.) Notably, the net loss for fiscal year 1997 would have been much greater if Amtrak had not earned about $63 million, primarily from the one-time sales of real estate and telecommunications rights-of-way in the Northeast Corridor. In March 1998, Amtrak projected that the net loss for this year will be about $845 million, or $56 million more than budgeted. Improving Amtrak’s Financial Health Presents Challenges
Amtrak will continue to face challenges to its financial health. Another Amtrak initiative—establishing high-speed rail service between New York City and Boston—also will not provide immediate financial benefits. Amtrak’s goals are for the high-speed rail program to begin providing positive net income in fiscal year 2000. Amtrak does not currently plan to reduce any more routes. Instead, it plans to fine-tune its route network. The decision to make route adjustments is a difficult one, even though Amtrak’s data show that only one of the railroad’s 40 routes (Metroliners between Washington, D.C., and New York City) covers all its operating costs. However, federal funding from the Taxpayer Relief Act, the fiscal year 1998 capital appropriation, and the President’s proposed fiscal year 1999 budget—along with about $800 million that Amtrak anticipates receiving from state, local, and private financing—would provide about $5.0 billion, or about $500 million short of the $5.5 billion that it states that it needs for capital funding. The use of these available federal funds for maintenance expenses could have long-term financial impacts on Amtrak. In particular, such use would reduce the amount of money available to Amtrak to acquire new equipment and/or acquire those capital improvements necessary to reduce costs and/or increase revenues. In total, Amtrak plans to use $1.8 billion (65 percent) of $2.8 billion in capital grants under the President’s budget proposal to pay maintenance expenses from fiscal years 1999 through 2003. Short-Term Financial Effects of Amtrak Reform Legislation May Be Limited
The Amtrak Reform and Accountability Act was also designed to address Amtrak’s poor financial condition by making certain reforms to Amtrak’s operations to help Amtrak better control and manage its costs. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed: (1) Amtrak's financial performance during fiscal year (FY) 1997 and during the first quarter of FY 1998; (2) challenges Amtrak will face in improving its financial health; and (3) the potential impact that recently enacted legislation may have on Amtrak's financial condition.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) Amtrak's financial condition continues to deteriorate; (2) although Amtrak has been able to reduce its net losses (total expenses less total revenues) from about $892 million in FY 1994 to about $762 million in FY 1997, the 1997 loss would have been $63 million higher were it not for one-time increases in revenue from the sales of real estate and access rights for telecommunications; (3) in March 1998, Amtrak projected that its net loss for FY 1998 could be about $845 million--about $56 million more than planned; (4) Amtrak will continue to face challenges in improving its financial health; (5) Amtrak hopes to improve its financial health by increasing revenues through such actions as expanding mail and express service (delivery of higher-value, time-sensitive goods) and instituting high-speed rail service between New York City and Boston; (6) however, Amtrak has had to substantially scale back its net revenue projections for express business, and positive net income from the high-speed rail program will not occur for another 2 years; (7) Amtrak does not currently plan to reduce routes, even though one of its routes--the Metroliner service between Washington, D.C., and New York City--makes money; (8) instead it plans to fine-tune its route network and conduct a comprehensive market analysis; (9) federal funding and recently enacted reforms will not solve Amtrak's financial problems; (10) although the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, FY 1998 capital appropriations, and the President's proposed FY 1999 budget, if enacted, will provide Amtrak with historic levels of capital support, this support will fall short of Amtrak's identified capital needs by about $500 million; (11) in addition, Amtrak plans to use $1.8 billion of the $2.8 billion in requested federal capital grant funds to pay maintenance expenses between FY 1999 and FY 2003; (12) the use of funds for this purpose would substantially reduce the remaining level of funds available to acquire new equipment or make the capital improvements necessary to reduce Amtrak's cost and/or increase revenues; (13) therefore, such use will have a negative impact over the long term; and (14) furthermore, the Amtrak Reform and Accountability Act of 1997 significantly changed Amtrak's operations, but these reforms will provide few, if any, immediate financial benefits. |
gao_GGD-96-22 | gao_GGD-96-22_0 | • What were the effects of the various legal challenges to Brady? 3.) To obtain information on how frequently the 5-day waiting period and background checks were resulting in denials, we contacted local law enforcement agencies in several Brady states. Regarding follow-up enforcement actions on convicted felons and others who falsely complete Brady handgun purchase forms, we interviewed DOJ officials and reviewed documents prepared by DOJ officials responsible for establishing law enforcement policy guidance. In following up on reasons for denials, we determined that (1) most of the jurisdictions in our survey relied only on criminal history records and (2) comprehensive data on background check results were not available. The primary objectives of this information system are to (1) identify, describe, and categorize the procedures used to implement Brady; (2) measure results of Brady in terms of the number of applications accepted and denied, the reasons for the denials, and the actions taken as a result of the denials; and (3) create a database to permit analyses of the use of firearms in the commission of crimes. As table 2.2 shows, for handgun purchase applications processed by the respective law enforcement officers within these 20 jurisdictions, we found that the overall denial rate was 4.3 percent. Next, we attempted to determine how many of the felony-related denials involved violent crimes—aggravated assault, murder, rape, and robbery—as defined by the FBI. Of the 7,216 administrative or other denials, 7,012 (97.2 percent) were the result of gun dealers sending handgun purchase applications to the wrong law enforcement agency. Federal Agency Authority to Penalize or Redesignate CLEOs
DOJ’s Office of Legal Counsel has interpreted Brady’s criminal penalty provisions to be inapplicable to state or local law enforcement officers in performance of their duties under the act and that the government, therefore, lacks the authority to prosecute such officers for violations of the act. On the other hand, since no background checks had been conducted in these two jurisdictions there is no assurance that ineligible persons did not purchase handguns from licensed dealers. Conclusions
The effects of the legal challenges to Brady are not entirely clear because the cases are being appealed. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the implementation of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, focusing on the: (1) extent to which the waiting period and background checks required for handgun purchases have prevented ineligible persons from legally purchasing handguns; (2) extent to which denials have resulted in follow-up enforcement actions against those submitting false purchase information; and (3) effects of various legal challenges to the Brady Act.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) of the law enforcement agencies surveyed, handguns were denied to about 4.3 percent of applicants; (2) application denials varied by jurisdiction because law enforcement officials did not use standardized criteria for their decisions; (3) most denials resulted from misdemeanor warrants or administrative reasons, such as gun dealers, sending applications to the wrong law enforcement agency; (4) in four jurisdictions, 4.9 percent of denials resulted from convictions or indictments for violent crimes, such as aggravated assault, murder, rape, or robbery; (5) most law enforcement officers relied solely on criminal history records in conducting their background checks because no other information sources were available, but some officers routinely checked for mental history disqualifications; (6) the number of Brady Act prosecutions was relatively small due to the low priority of follow-up enforcement actions at the Department of Justice (DOJ); (7) federal officials believe that the Brady Act is achieving its primary goal of preventing felons from legally purchasing handguns; (8) the effects of legal challenges to the Brady Act will not be known until all appeals are decided; and (9) DOJ believes that it lacks the authority to take action against law enforcement officers who do not conduct background checks. |
gao_GAO-04-615 | gao_GAO-04-615_0 | The long-standing problems continue despite the significant investments made in DOD business systems each year. The challenges continue, in part, because of DOD’s inability to effectively modernize its business systems. As a result, DOD does not have complete visibility over its business systems to permit analysis of gaps and redundancies in DOD’s business systems environment and to assist in preventing the continuing proliferation of redundant, stovepiped business systems. DOD Continues to Have Ineffective Control and Accountability over Business System Investments
DOD continues to lack effective management oversight and control over business systems modernization investments. Furthermore, the department does not have reasonable assurance that it is in compliance with the fiscal year 2003 defense authorization act, which provides that obligations in excess of $1 million for systems improvements may not be made unless the DOD Comptroller makes a determination that the improvements are in accordance with the criteria specified in the act. Based upon a comparison of the limited information available, we identified $479 million in reported obligations over $1 million by the military services for system improvements that were not submitted to the DOD Comptroller for review and determination as required by the act. BSM and LMP Are Not Corporate Solutions to Long-standing Operational Problems
Effectively managing and overseeing the department’s $19 billion investment in its business systems is key to the successful transformation of DOD’s business operations. These problems have resulted in schedule slippages and cost increases. Therefore, DLA does not have reasonable assurance that BSM can perform this required functionality. Our two cases studies—BSM and LMP—are prime examples of DOD business system modernization projects costing billions of dollars that are not directed toward a corporate solution for resolving some of DOD’s long- standing financial and inventory management problems. DOD components being responsible for these functions has resulted in the existing business system environment of at least 2,274 systems that are not capable of providing DOD management and Congress accurate, reliable, and timely information on the results of the department’s vast operations. We also reviewed and analyzed the DOD budget requests for fiscal years 2003 through 2005 to identify the business systems investments that could be subject to the requirements of the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, which requires the DOD Comptroller to review all system improvements with obligations exceeding $1 million and make a determination whether the improvement is in accordance with criteria specified in the act. To determine if selected DOD business system projects are being effectively managed and will help resolve some of DOD’s long-standing business operation problems, we selected the logistics domain from which we chose individual case studies for detailed review. To assess whether DLA and the Army had established and implemented disciplined processes related to requirements management and testing, we reviewed DLA’s and the Army’s procedures for defining requirements management frameworks and compared these procedures to their current practices; reviewed guidance published by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers and the Software Engineering Institute and publications by experts to determine the attributes that should be used for developing good requirements; reviewed BSM’s system requirement documents related to finance, order fulfillment, planning, and procurement and LMP’s system requirement documents related to planning and budget development, asset management, inventory management, and maintenance analysis and planning; and selected 13 of BSM’s 202 system requirements and 12 of LMP’s 293 system requirements and performed an in-depth review and analysis to determine whether they had the attributes normally associated with good requirements and whether these requirements traced between the various process documents. We requested comments on a draft of this report from the Secretary of Defense or his designee. GAO posts this list, known as “Today’s Reports,” on its Web site daily. | Why GAO Did This Study
Despite its significant investment in business systems, the Department of Defense (DOD) continues to have long-standing financial and inventory management problems that prevent it from producing reliable and timely information for making decisions and for accurately reporting on its billions of dollars of inventory. GAO was asked to (1) identify DOD's fiscal year 2004 estimated funding for its business systems, (2) determine if DOD has effective control and accountability over its business systems investments, and (3) determine whether selected business systems will help resolve some of DOD's long-standing problems and whether they are being effectively managed.
What GAO Found
DOD requested approximately $19 billion for fiscal year 2004 to operate, maintain, and modernize its reported 2,274 business systems. This stovepiped and duplicative systems environment evolved over time as DOD components--each with its own system funding--developed narrowly focused, parochial solutions to their business problems. As a result of this uncontrolled spending, DOD reported over 200 inventory systems and 450 personnel systems. DOD's fundamentally flawed business systems affect mission effectiveness and can contribute to the fraud, waste, and abuse that GAO continues to identify. Further, the number of business systems is likely understated in part because DOD does not have a central systems repository or a standard business system definition. DOD does not have an effective management structure for controlling business systems investments and the business domains' roles and responsibilities have not been defined. Further, DOD does not have reasonable assurance that it is in compliance with the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, which requires the DOD Comptroller to determine that system improvements exceeding $1 million meet the criteria specified in the act. Based on limited information provided by DOD, system improvements with at least $479 million of obligations over $1 million were not reviewed by the DOD Comptroller. GAO's two case studies are examples of DOD spending hundreds of millions on business systems that will not result in corporate solutions to its longstanding inventory and related financial management problems. While these efforts should provide some improvement to the Defense Logistics Agency's and the Army's business operations, implementation problems have resulted in schedule slippages, cost increases, and critical capabilities not being delivered. These issues can be attributed, in part, to the lack of disciplined processes in the areas of requirements management and testing. If not corrected, the problems will result in two more costly, nonintegrated systems that only marginally improve DOD business operations and further impede DOD's transformation as envisioned by the Secretary of Defense. |
gao_T-RCED-98-120 | gao_T-RCED-98-120_0 | It did not reduce subsidies for administrative costs. Reduced Rates Had Little Effect Nationwide in 1997, but Some Future Effects Are Expected
The reduced reimbursement rates had little effect on the number of sponsors or children participating in 1997. Both USDA and many state officials expect the lowered reimbursement rates to somewhat reduce the number of sponsors and children participating in the program over the next 3 years. Few Sponsors Left the Program Because of the Reduced Rates
According to our analysis of data from the 50 states and the District of Columbia, 346 of the 3,387 sponsors that participated in the program in 1996 did not do so in 1997. In addition, some state officials said that sponsors that stayed in the program reduced the number of locations where they served meals. Many States Expect Some Future Decreases in the Number of Sponsors and Children
According to USDA officials, the full effect of the reduced subsidies was not experienced in the summer of 1997. The officials said that they believed some sponsors chose to continue participating in the program in 1997 to test their ability to manage the program financially with the reduced rates. In responding to our question of whether they would see additional changes in the number of sponsors over the next 3 years because of the rate decrease, the states reported the following:
24 states and the District of Columbia said that the number of sponsors
16 states reported that the lower meal rates would not affect the number
10 states reported that they were uncertain of the effect. State officials explained that a number of factors may mitigate the effects of the rate decrease on the number of sponsors and children over the next 3 years. Some state officials also said that the number of children seeking participation in the program may increase as a result of (1) welfare-to-work initiatives that could cause parents to rely more on the care provided through the sponsors and (2) a reduction in benefits such as food stamps that would make the summer food program more important. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reported on the changes made to the Department of Agriculture's (USDA) Summer Food Service Program, focusing on the: (1) effects these changes had on the number of sponsors and children participating in the program in 1997; and (2) potential effect of the reduced subsidies for the future.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the reduction in federal subsidies for sponsors did not have a significant effect on the number of program sponsors or children participating in 1997; (2) state officials specifically identified only a handful of 1996 sponsors that stopped participating in the program in 1997 because of the reduced subsidies, and the number of children participating in the program was generally not affected; (3) however, almost half of the states reported that the program was affected in other ways, such as sponsors' reducing the number of food items in the meals provided or reducing the number of locations where meals were served; (4) while the number of sponsors and children participating changed only minimally in 1997, both the USDA and the majority of the states expect to see a decrease in the number of sponsors and in the number of children participating over the future because of the reduced subsidies; (5) USDA and several state officials said that some sponsors continued their participation in 1997 to test whether they could finally manage the program with the reduced rate; (6) USDA officials expect that sponsors that could not manage the program with the reduced rates will leave it in future years; and (7) on the other hand, USDA and some state officials said that other factors such as increased outreach efforts and state funding could mitigate the effects of the rate decrease on the number of sponsors and children participating in the future. |
gao_AIMD-95-10 | gao_AIMD-95-10_0 | The Coins Act specified that the first $3 million in surcharges received by the Treasury from the sale of coins be transferred to the Battle of Normandy Foundation and used by the Foundation to create, endow, and dedicate, on the 50th Anniversary of D-Day, a United States D-Day and Battle of Normandy Memorial in Normandy. In carrying out our work, we reviewed historical and current Foundation financial information, including audited financial statements, federal income tax returns, minutes of Board of Directors’ meetings, pertinent agreements, and other financial reports; interviewed current and former Foundation officials regarding financial matters, including management’s plans for current and future financial operations; obtained from the U.S. Mint, Department of the Treasury, documentation on the payment of surcharge coin proceeds to the Foundation; verified selected interest income payments to Foundation bank accounts and performed analytical reviews of selected interest payments through June 30, 1994; traced a sample representing over 95 percent of Memorial Garden design and construction costs through June 30, 1994, to payment vouchers, invoices, and construction manager approvals; traced selected accounting, legal, and consulting costs for the Memorial Garden through June 30, 1994, to payment vouchers and invoices; reviewed the computations and reasonableness of the Foundation’s general and administrative overhead allocation rates and selected salary allocations charged to the Memorial Garden project through June 30, 1994; examined progress and final construction photographs of the Memorial Garden and interviewed officials at the office of the construction manager in New York City who were responsible for the Memorial Garden construction; read the Independent Review Committee’s January 7, 1994, report on its investigation and reviewed the work performed by the public accounting firm which assisted the committee; interviewed a U.S. Department of Defense official who was referred to in a newspaper article as implying that the Foundation had acted improperly in promoting tours to Normandy; and read the travel brochure published by the tour company that contracted with the Foundation. Overall Financial Condition
The Foundation has experienced significant managerial, financial, and internal control problems, and its liabilities substantially exceed its assets. Also, the precarious financial condition casts doubt on whether other projects, such as the Wall of Liberty, will proceed. As of June 30, 1994, the Foundation’s recorded cost included about $400,000 still owed to Memorial Garden contractors. Because of the Foundation’s current financial condition, it is uncertain whether the Foundation will be able to fund future costs of operating and maintaining the Memorial Garden. Allegation one: The Foundation spent most of its revenues from 1986 to 1992 for purposes not related to its stated program activities. For 1993, the Foundation’s financial statements showed that the cost of program activities were about 83 percent of its revenues or 76 percent of its expenses. Through December 1993, Foundation records indicate that $90,000 of the $120,000 pledge had been paid. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the Battle of Normandy Foundation's use of coin surcharge proceeds for the creation of the United States Armed Forces Memorial Garden in Normandy, France.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the Foundation has experienced significant managerial, financial, and internal control problems; (2) it is uncertain whether the Foundation will be able to pay current and future operating costs for the Memorial Garden or fund other projects such as the Wall of Liberty, since its liabilities substantially exceed its assets and its management structure is unstable; (3) the Foundation spent $3 million in surcharge coin proceeds it received in 1993 for the design and construction of the United States Armed Forces Memorial Garden in accordance with the Commemorative Coins Act; (4) as of June 1994, the total recorded cost of the Memorial Garden was $3.6 million and the Foundation owed $400,000 to Memorial Garden contractors; (5) between 1986 and 1992, the Foundation spent 63 percent of its revenues on program activities; (6) in 1993, the Foundation spent 83 percent of its revenues on program activities; (7) the Foundation properly contracted with a private tour company to promote the Memorial's tour activities; (8) the Foundation recovered $90,000 of the $120,000 a private contractor owed the Foundation; and (9) Battle of Normandy Foundation officials concurred with the findings presented in the report. |
gao_GAO-07-290 | gao_GAO-07-290_0 | 1). While Most Owners Renewed Their Contracts, Patterns Were Identified Among Properties Leaving the Program
We found a number of patterns in the volume, characteristics, and locations of HUD’s project-based Section 8 housing contract renewals and terminations, from 2001 through 2005. Relatively few owners opted out of the Section 8 program, and of those we interviewed, most reported that they did so to seek higher rents in the private rental market or to convert their units into condominiums. Of these, 92 percent of the eligible contracts and 95 percent of the eligible units remained in the program (table 2). Specifically, owners with properties that were generally not fully subsidized by the program, were family occupied, were for profit, or were in poor physical condition had a higher percentage of opt-outs. As stated earlier, Section 202 owners find it is in their interests to continue to serve the very-low income elderly and persons with disabilities. Mark-to-Market and Other Programs Encourage Owners to Keep Their Properties in the Section 8 Program
HUD offers a number of tools and incentives to property owners seeking additional funding to support their Section 8 properties. HUD officials, owners, and industry representatives have told us that Section 8 owners often opt to use non-HUD programs such as LIHTC and tax-exempt bonds, which the IRS administers mostly through state housing finance agencies. Both LIHTC and tax exempt bonds may be combined with HUD incentives to maintain housing at rents affordable to low-income households, but limited data is available to show how often owners make this choice. Low-Income Housing Tax Credits, Tax-exempt Bonds, and Other Tools May Also Help Preserve Project-based Section 8 Housing
HUD officials, property managers, and industry groups told us that project- based Section 8 owners also combine HUD preservation tools and incentives with non-HUD preservation tools such as the LIHTC and tax- exempt bonds to provide additional funds for rehabilitation. Among the frustrations they discussed were HUD’s one-for-one replacement policy for Section 8 units; policies and procedures that could lead to economic distress, especially Operating Cost Adjustment Factors (OCAF) payments; and a lack of clarity and consistency on HUD’s part in applying policies. HUD’s One-for-One Replacement Policy Can Result in Fewer Units and More Opt-outs
Some owners, managers, and industry representatives told us that some HUD practices have not always kept pace with changes in market conditions. Therefore, owners with a few Section 8 units may find the administrative costs of participating in the program burdensome. Property owners and industry representatives cited gray areas in the guide, particularly concerning the Mark-to-Market option. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help ensure that project-based Section 8 preservation efforts meet the needs of a changing housing market, we recommend that the HUD Secretary direct the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Multi-family Housing to: modify the one-for-one replacement requirement to allow for a case-by- case assessment of the merits of permitting owners to reduce the number of project-based Section 8 units or reconfigure the units to better meet market demand and to expand its reconsideration of this policy beyond elderly properties, expeditiously reevaluate its OCAF adjustment process to make sure that the adjustments reflect local variations, are implemented in a more timely manner, and are responsive to emergency situations, and determine if any of the additional issues raised by owners such as policies and procedures that are unclear, inconsistently applied, or administratively burdensome could contribute to owners’ opting out of the Section 8 program and take steps to address these issues. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To assess the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD’s) efforts to maintain Section 8 project-based housing stock and identify any discernable patterns in its preservation efforts, we reviewed the department’s five-year analysis of units terminated and retained by year, state, and locality for the period 2001-2005. | Why GAO Did This Study
In light of the pressing need for rental housing affordable to low-income households and concerns that the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) may not be committed to maintaining its Section 8 project-based housing stock--a key source of such housing--Congress directed GAO to assess HUD's efforts to preserve its project-based housing and recommend ways to improve these efforts. This report discusses (1) patterns in the volume and characteristics of HUD's Section 8 project-based properties; (2) tools and incentives that are available to encourage property owners to stay in the program; and (3) the views of property owners, managers, and industry representatives on HUD's preservation efforts. To address these issues, GAO analyzed HUD data, reviewed pertinent legislation and regulations, and interviewed HUD officials and industry representatives.
What GAO Found
GAO identified a number of patterns in the volume, characteristics, and location of HUD's project-based Section 8 housing between 2001 and 2005. During this period owners renewed 92 percent of Section 8 rental assistance contracts and 95 percent of the units covered by these contracts. While relatively few owners left the program voluntarily, most of those we interviewed did so to seek higher rents in the private market or to convert their units into condominiums. The properties most likely to leave the program were those with few Section 8 units, family-occupied units, those in poor physical condition, and those located in markets with rapidly escalating housing values. HUD offers several incentives to keep Section 8 property owners in the program. Owners that used these incentives between 2001 and 2005 most often chose the Mark-to-Market and Mark-up-to-Market programs, both of which adjust rents to conform to prevailing market conditions. Some owners used HUD programs that offered additional financing for property rehabilitation to participants in the Section 236 mortgage reduction program and the Section 202 mortgage program for housing for the low-income elderly and persons with disabilities. HUD officials, owners, and industry representatives told us that many Section 8 owners also opted to use the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit and tax-exempt bonds, both of which the IRS administers through state housing finance agencies. Some property owners, managers, and industry representatives cited concerns with certain HUD policies and practices, especially the one-for-one replacement policy for Section 8 units and the Operating Cost Adjustment Factors (OCAF) payment process. GAO found that the one-for-one replacement policy, which prohibits reductions in the total number of Section 8 units in a property when a contract is renewed, had led some owners to leave the program. Property owners noted that they could not reconfigure their properties to supply larger units that were in higher demand, especially by elderly tenants. Although not required by statute to adopt this policy, HUD did so in order to preserve as many units as possible but is reviewing it in light of the growing concerns. Owners also expressed frustration with the long delay in OCAF adjustments, the use of statewide averages, and the inability of the process to deal with emergency situations. Finally, owners offered several suggestions that may warrant HUD's attention, including improving the Section 8 contract renewal guidance and revisiting physical inspection guidelines. |
gao_GAO-06-1100T | gao_GAO-06-1100T_0 | Federal policy also recognizes the need to be prepared for the possibility of debilitating disruptions in cyberspace and, because the vast majority of the Internet infrastructure is owned and operated by the private sector, tasks DHS with developing an integrated public/private plan for Internet recovery. In the event of a major Internet disruption, multiple organizations could help recover Internet service. Although Cyber and Physical Incidents Have Caused Disruptions, the Internet Has Not Yet Suffered a Catastrophic Failure
The Internet’s infrastructure is vulnerable to disruptions in service due to terrorist and other malicious attacks, natural disasters, accidents, technological problems, or a combination of the above. Recent physical and cyber incidents have caused localized or regional disruptions, highlighting the importance of recovery planning. Existing Laws and Regulations Apply to the Internet, but Numerous Uncertainties Exist in Using Them for Internet Recovery
Several federal laws and regulations provide broad guidance that applies to the Internet infrastructure, but it is not clear how useful these authorities would be in helping to recover from a major Internet disruption because some do not specifically address Internet recovery and others have seldom been used. Pertinent laws and regulations address critical infrastructure protection, federal disaster response, and the telecommunications infrastructure. However, this law and regulation do not specifically address roles and responsibilities in the event of an Internet disruption. DHS Initiatives Supporting Internet Recovery Planning Are under Way, but Much Remains to Be Done and the Relationship Between Initiatives Is Not Evident
DHS has begun a variety of initiatives to fulfill its responsibility to develop an integrated public/private plan for Internet recovery, but these efforts are not complete or comprehensive. Specifically, DHS has developed high-level plans for infrastructure protection and national disaster response, but the components of these plans that address the Internet infrastructure are not complete. In addition, DHS has started a variety of initiatives to improve the nation’s ability to recover from Internet disruptions, including working groups to facilitate coordination and exercises in which government and private industry practice responding to cyber events. As a result, the nation is not prepared to effectively coordinate public/private plans for recovering from a major Internet disruption. Multiple Challenges Exist to Planning for Recovery from Internet Disruptions
Although DHS has various initiatives under way to improve Internet recovery planning, it faces key challenges in developing a public/private plan for Internet recovery, including (1) innate characteristics of the Internet that make planning for and responding to a disruption difficult, (2) lack of consensus on DHS’s role and on when the department should get involved in responding to a disruption, (3) legal issues affecting DHS’s ability to provide assistance to restore Internet service, (4) reluctance of the private sector to share information on Internet disruptions with DHS, and (5) leadership and organizational uncertainties within DHS. Until it addresses these challenges, DHS will have difficulty achieving results in its role as focal point for recovering the Internet from a major disruption. As a result, the exact role of the government in helping to recover the Internet infrastructure following a major disruption remains unclear. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since the early 1990s, growth in the use of the Internet has revolutionized the way that our nation communicates and conducts business. While the Internet originated as a U.S. government-sponsored research project, the vast majority of its infrastructure is currently owned and operated by the private sector. Federal policy recognizes the need to prepare for debilitating Internet disruptions and tasks the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) with developing an integrated public/private plan for Internet recovery. GAO was asked to summarize its report--Internet Infrastructure: DHS Faces Challenges in Developing a Joint Public/Private Recovery Plan, GAO-06-672 (Washington, D.C.: June 16, 2006). This report (1) identifies examples of major disruptions to the Internet, (2) identifies the primary laws and regulations governing recovery of the Internet in the event of a major disruption, (3) evaluates DHS plans for facilitating recovery from Internet disruptions, and (4) assesses challenges to such efforts.
What GAO Found
A major disruption to the Internet could be caused by a physical incident (such as a natural disaster or an attack that affects key facilities), a cyber incident (such as a software malfunction or a malicious virus), or a combination of both physical and cyber incidents. Recent physical and cyber incidents, such as Hurricane Katrina, have caused localized or regional disruptions but have not caused a catastrophic Internet failure. Federal laws and regulations that address critical infrastructure protection, disaster recovery, and the telecommunications infrastructure provide broad guidance that applies to the Internet, but it is not clear how useful these authorities would be in helping to recover from a major Internet disruption. Specifically, key legislation on critical infrastructure protection does not address roles and responsibilities in the event of an Internet disruption. Other laws and regulations governing disaster response and emergency communications have never been used for Internet recovery. DHS has begun a variety of initiatives to fulfill its responsibility for developing an integrated public/private plan for Internet recovery, but these efforts are not complete or comprehensive. Specifically, DHS has developed high-level plans for infrastructure protection and incident response, but the components of these plans that address the Internet infrastructure are not complete. In addition, the department has started a variety of initiatives to improve the nation's ability to recover from Internet disruptions, including working groups to facilitate coordination and exercises in which government and private industry practice responding to cyber events. However, progress to date on these initiatives has been limited, and other initiatives lack time frames for completion. Also, the relationships among these initiatives are not evident. As a result, the government is not yet adequately prepared to effectively coordinate public/private plans for recovering from a major Internet disruption. Key challenges to establishing a plan for recovering from Internet disruptions include (1) innate characteristics of the Internet that make planning for and responding to disruptions difficult, (2) lack of consensus on DHS's role and when the department should get involved in responding to a disruption, (3) legal issues affecting DHS's ability to provide assistance to restore Internet service, (4) reluctance of many in the private sector to share information on Internet disruptions with DHS, and (5) leadership and organizational uncertainties within DHS. Until these challenges are addressed, DHS will have difficulty achieving results in its role as a focal point for helping the Internet to recover from a major disruption. |
gao_GAO-07-996 | gao_GAO-07-996_0 | They must also consider whether the device is effective by evaluating data provided by the sponsor for “clinically significant results.” The review team examines clinical studies of the device involving human subjects, engineering testing performed on the device, and other aspects of the PMA application such as device labeling. Management can make a recommendation regarding approval even if some concerns regarding the PMA remain unaddressed; however, a device can only be approved for marketing if FDA concludes that its benefits outweigh its risks. FDA Raised Concerns on All Implants and Addressed Many by Obtaining Additional Information and Establishing Conditions of Approval
In their review of the four PMA applications, FDA officials raised concerns that were similar for all four devices. FDA addressed many concerns raised in the approval process by obtaining additional information from sponsors to clarify and supplement data contained in their PMA applications. It also approved all four devices but required sponsors to comply with conditions of approval. In addition, the FDA review team and two levels of FDA management did not agree on the assessment of the safety and effectiveness of the two TMJ Implants, Inc., devices. FDA Raised Concerns That Generally Applied to All Four TMJ Implants
We grouped the concerns FDA raised during the PMA process into four main categories: study protocol, patient follow-up, engineering testing, and other concerns. FDA Obtained Additional Information from Sponsors and Required Conditions of Approval to Address Most, but Not All, Concerns
FDA addressed the concerns it raised in its review of the PMA applications in two ways: (1) by communicating with sponsors and collecting additional information from them and (2) by approving the devices with conditions. The second manner in which FDA addressed concerns was by approving the four TMJ implants with certain conditions. The concerns highlighted in these memos were that (1) lack of patient follow-up in the clinical study potentially biased the results, and consequently, the sponsor’s claim that the implant resulted in decreased patient pain was unsupported, (2) the clinical study protocol lacked scientific rigor, and (3) outstanding questions remained related to the indications for using the device. FDA Monitored Compliance through Review of the Sponsors’ Annual Reports It Received and Required Some Sponsors to Take Additional Action
In order to evaluate how the sponsors complied with the conditions of approval, FDA received and reviewed the majority of the required annual reports from TMJ implant sponsors. In addition, the FDA review team had concerns about one sponsor’s—TMJ Implants, Inc.—annual reports. FDA found that these reports lacked sufficient information that prevented them from monitoring safety and effectiveness. In addition, FDA officials told us that they are developing an improved postmarket surveillance effort to assist sponsors with annual report submission. As part of this effort, FDA recently issued draft guidance on October 26, 2006, which outlines FDA’s recommendations for submitting annual reports. FDA Required Some Sponsors to Take Additional Actions to Comply with Their Conditions of Approval
FDA evaluated information contained in the 13 annual reports it received and found that 7 reports—6 from TMJ Implants, Inc., (3 for the total joint implant and 3 for the partial joint implant) and 1 from Walter Lorenz—did not provide sufficient information to assess their compliance with conditions of approval. The sponsor maintained that the events related to the removed devices were not caused by device failure or function and concluded that they did not require reporting to FDA. When the sponsor did not adequately respond to the warning letter, FDA filed an administrative complaint on July 14, 2005, for civil monetary penalties, which resulted in a decision from an administrative law judge in favor of FDA on July 6, 2007. Agency Comments
In commenting on a draft of this report, HHS provided clarification on the postmarket requirements that apply to approved devices and updated information concerning the administrative complaint for civil monetary penalties. Appendix I: Concerns Left Unaddressed upon FDA Approval of TMJ Implants
While the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) addressed most concerns for each of the four temporomandibular joint (TMJ) implants we reviewed, we identified a number of concerns that were left unaddressed—concerns that were not offset or countered by a condition of approval or by FDA correspondence with the sponsor—upon approval. | Why GAO Did This Study
It is estimated that over 10 million people in the United States suffer from jaw joint and muscle disorders. Artificial temporomandibular joint (TMJ) implants have been used to replace the jaw joint in some patients in an effort to decrease pain and increase jaw function. The safety and effectiveness of these implants, like other medical devices, is overseen by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), an agency within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). Two implants used in the 1970s and 1980s that were later removed from the market caused severe side effects for some patients. In 1998, FDA began to require certain TMJ implant manufacturers sponsoring these devices to demonstrate the implants' safety and effectiveness before receiving approval. Since 1998, four TMJ implants from three sponsors were approved. In response to your request, GAO described (1) the types of concerns raised by FDA and how it addressed these concerns for the implants approved since 1998 and (2) how FDA has monitored sponsors' compliance with conditions of approval. GAO examined documentation related to the four TMJ implants approved by FDA since 1998 and sponsors' annual reports, which FDA uses to monitor compliance with conditions of approval. GAO also interviewed FDA officials, TMJ implant sponsors, and patient advocacy groups.
What GAO Found
FDA officials raised concerns during the approval process that were similar for all four TMJ implants. These concerns generally involved the adequacy of the sponsors' clinical study protocols, patient follow-up, engineering testing, and other matters, such as device labeling. FDA addressed many, but not all, concerns upon approval. Some concerns were addressed by obtaining additional information from sponsors to clarify and supplement data contained in their device applications before approval. Other concerns were addressed when FDA approved the implants but required sponsors to comply with certain conditions of approval, such as continuing clinical studies postmarket and collecting patient data. Because FDA staff, who review the device applications, and FDA management, who approve the devices for marketing, held differing views as to whether the implants' health benefits outweighed its risks, they did not agree on the approval decisions of two of the four TMJ implants. FDA management acknowledged that the concerns raised about the implants were legitimate. However, they ultimately concluded that the benefits provided by these two devices outweighed the concerns and approved both devices to help patients obtain relief from chronic pain. FDA monitored sponsors' compliance with conditions of approval by evaluating information contained in their annual reports. FDA often required additional actions by the sponsors to resolve questions that were raised through its review of these reports. However, GAO found that not all annual reports were received by FDA. At the time GAO conducted its work, FDA had only received 13 of 18 required reports. One implant sponsor did not submit 5 of 7 required annual reports. FDA has requested these reports and has issued draft guidance on annual report submissions to all medical device sponsors. In addition, when reviewing the available annual reports to determine if sponsors were complying with conditions of approval, many of the submitted reports did not provide FDA with sufficient information to assess compliance. FDA required these TMJ implant sponsors to provide additional information to address this lack of sufficient information. In most instances, once FDA received additional information from the sponsors, the annual reports were considered adequate. However, one sponsor submitted several annual reports for both of its devices that FDA said lacked sufficient information regarding patient follow-up and also underreported problems experienced by patients associated with the devices. FDA notified the sponsor that it must address these concerns, but the sponsor repeatedly provided inadequate responses. This situation ultimately led FDA to inspect the sponsor's records and file an administrative complaint for civil monetary penalties against the sponsor for failure to file certain reports with FDA. On July 6, 2007, an administrative law judge ruled in favor of FDA. In commenting on a draft of this report, HHS provided clarification on postmarket requirements for approved devices and updated information on the administrative complaint for civil monetary penalties. |
gao_GAO-05-50 | gao_GAO-05-50_0 | This report examines (1) what portion of the retail price of fluid milk is received by dairy farmers, dairy cooperatives, wholesale milk processors, and retailers in selected markets throughout the United States, how this distribution has changed over the period of our review, and the relationships among price changes at these levels; (2) how various factors, such as costs, influence the price of milk as it moves from the farm to the consumer, as well as how these and other factors affect the extent to which changes in price are transmitted among levels as milk moves from the farm to the consumer; and (3) how changes in dairy policies and alternative policy options have affected or might affect farm income, federal costs, economic efficiency, and consumer prices, among other policy considerations. Specifically, we calculated coefficients describing the degree of correlation between changes in farm prices and price changes at the cooperative, wholesale, and retail levels; price changes at the cooperative level and price changes at the wholesale and retail levels; and price changes at the wholesale and retail levels. Portion Received by Farmers, Cooperatives, Wholesale Milk Processors and Retailers
Between October 2000 and May 2004, on average, our data suggest that farmers received 45.9 percent, cooperatives 6.1 percent, wholesale processors 35.6 percent, and retailers 12.5 percent of the retail price of a gallon of 2 percent milk in the 15 markets we reviewed. Changes in Farm and Retail Prices and the Price Spread
From October 2000 through May 2004, the spread between farm and retail milk prices increased in 12 of the 15 markets. However, in some of the 12 markets, the spread between farm and retail milk prices increased dramatically and then moderated. Factors That Influence the Price of Milk as It Moves from the Farm to the Consumer
The prices that farmers, cooperatives, wholesale processors, and retailers receive are determined by the interaction of many factors, such as forces affecting the supply of raw milk and manufactured and fluid milk products, consumer demand for manufactured and fluid milk products, federal and state dairy programs, the level of services provided by dairy cooperatives, market structure at various levels of the marketing chain, and other input costs of processing and retailing. Recent increases in input costs such as labor and energy have been substantial. As a result of depressed farm milk prices during 2002 and 2003, federal costs associated with MILC payments exceeded original estimates. In general, options that increase farm income over the short term also tend to increase milk production and thus the potential for oversupply and lower average farm prices over the long term. These options also tend to be costly for the federal government during periods of low prices. Restricting de-pooling would have mixed effects on farm income. Extend the Milk Income Loss Contract Program
The MILC program has benefited many smaller dairy farmers during the most recent period of low farm prices by providing them income support. If U.S. prices are at the support price, then imports of dairy proteins could indirectly affect U.S. market prices. 7. 19. Milk Marketing Orders: Options for Change. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2003, U.S. dairy farmers marketed nearly 19.7 billion gallons of raw milk, one-third of which were used in fluid milk products. Farmers, cooperatives, processors, and retailers receive a portion of the retail price of milk for their part in providing milk to consumers. During 2002 and 2003, farm prices fell while retail prices did not similarly decline. This pattern raised concerns about a growing spread between farm and retail prices. Farm prices have since increased, reaching record highs in April 2004. As requested, GAO examined (1) the portion of retail milk prices received by farmers, cooperatives, processors, and retailers, how this changed over time, and the relationship between price changes at these levels; (2) how various factors influence prices and affect the transmission of price changes among levels; and (3) how federal dairy program changes and alternative policy options have affected or might affect farm income and federal costs, among other considerations.
What GAO Found
Between October 2000 and May 2004, on average, farmers received about 46 percent, cooperatives 6 percent, wholesale processors 36 percent, and retailers over 12 percent of the retail price of a gallon of 2 percent milk (the most common type of milk purchased) in the 15 U.S. markets GAO reviewed. During this period, in 12 of the 15 markets, the spread between farm and retail prices increased. However in some markets, the price spread between these levels increased and then moderated. Price changes at one level were most closely reflected in changes at adjacent levels of the marketing chain. Farm, cooperative, wholesale, and retail milk prices are determined by the interaction of a number of factors. For example, farm prices are affected by the supply of raw milk and the demand for milk products such as fluid milk, cheese, and butter, as well as by federal and state dairy programs. At the cooperative level, prices are influenced by the cost of services that cooperatives provide, and the relative bargaining power of cooperatives and milk processors. At the wholesale and retail levels, input costs such as labor and energy, and the continued consolidation of firms influence milk prices. Recent changes in federal dairy programs have affected farm income, federal costs, and other considerations. For example, the Milk Income Loss Contract program has supported some farm incomes but has exceeded initial cost estimates because of low farm prices. A number of options have been suggested to change federal dairy policies such as amending federal milk marketing orders and raising or eliminating the support price. In general, these options would have mixed effects depending upon whether milk prices were high or low over the short or long term. For example, options that increase farm income over the short term tend to increase milk production and lower farm prices over the long term. These options also tend to be costly for the federal government during periods of low prices. |
gao_GAO-01-449 | gao_GAO-01-449_0 | Conclusions
The AIDS epidemic in sub-Saharan Africa has grown beyond a public health problem to become a humanitarian and developmental crisis. However, USAID’s ability to measure the impact of its activities on reducing transmission of HIV/AIDS is limited by (1) inconsistent use of performance indicators, (2) sporadic data collection, and (3) lack of routine reporting of results to headquarters. As part of its approach for allocating the 53-percent increase in funding ($114 million to $174 million) for HIV/AIDS prevention activities in sub-Saharan Africa for fiscal year 2001, USAID prepared a plan to expand monitoring and evaluation systems in “rapid scale-up” and “intensive focus countries”—countries designated as in need of significant increases in assistance. However, when implemented, the monitoring and evaluation requirements in the plan will not initially include all countries where USAID missions and regional offices in sub-Saharan Africa implement HIV/AIDS programs. Further, the plan does not specify to whom these data will be reported or how the information will be used. Failure to address these issues not only inhibits USAID’s ability to measure the performance of its HIV/AIDS activities but also hinders the agency’s decision-making regarding allocation of resources among missions and regional offices and limits efforts to identify best practices. Specifically, we (1) identified the development and impact of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in sub-Saharan Africa and the challenges to slowing its spread, (2) assessed the extent to which the U.S. Agency for International Development’s initiatives have contributed to the fight against AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa, and (3) identified the approach the agency used to allocate increased funding and the factors that may affect the agency’s ability to expand its HIV/AIDS program in sub-Saharan Africa in response to this funding. | What GAO Found
The AIDS epidemic in sub-Saharan Africa has grown beyond a public health problem to become a humanitarian and developmental crisis. The Agency for International Development (AID) has contributed to the fight against human immunodeficiency virus (HIV)/AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa by focusing on interventions proven to slow the spread of the disease. However, AID's ability to measure the impact of its activities on reducing transmission of HIV/AIDS is limited by (1) inconsistent use of performance indicators, (2) sporadic data collection, and (3) lack of routine reporting of results to headquarters. As part of its approach for allocating the 53 percent increase in funding for HIV/AIDS prevention activities in sub-Saharan Africa for fiscal year 2001, AID prepared a plan to expand monitoring and evaluation systems in countries designated as in need of significant increases in assistance. However, when implemented, the monitoring and evaluation requirements in the plan will not initially include all countries where AID missions and regional offices in sub-Saharan Africa implement HIV/AIDS programs. Further, the plan does not specify to whom these data will be reported or how the information will be used. Failure to address these issues not only inhibits AID's ability to measure the performance of its HIV/AIDS activities but also hinders the agency's decision-making regarding allocation of resources among missions and regional offices and limits efforts to identify best practices. |
gao_GAO-12-831 | gao_GAO-12-831_0 | 1.) Option 3: Developing a New Identifier for Beneficiary and Provider Use: Under this option, the SSN would be replaced by a new identifier not based on the SSN, which would be displayed on the card. Under this option, the SSN would no longer be used by beneficiaries or providers when interacting with CMS, which could eliminate the need for providers to collect or keep the SSN on file. DOD, VA, and Private Health Insurers Have Taken Steps to Remove SSNs from Cards’ Display
DOD has taken steps to remove the SSN from display on the approximately 9.6 million military identification cards that are used by active-duty and retired military personnel and their dependents to access health care services. Replacing SSN with a New Identifier for Beneficiary and Provider Use Offers Greatest Protection Against Identity Theft and Minimizes Burdens
CMS’s Option to Replace the SSN with a New Identifier for Use by Beneficiaries and Providers Offers the Greatest Protection Against Identity Theft
Replacing the SSN with a new identifier for use by beneficiaries and providers offers beneficiaries the greatest protection against identity theft relative to the other options CMS presented in its report. 2.) Under both of these remaining options, providers would need to perform additional tasks, such as querying a CMS database or calling CMS, to obtain the full SSN to verify eligibility and submit claims. CMS would also likely see increased call volume to its 1-800-Medicare line with questions about the changes. Because of this, both DOD and VA have plans to remove SSNs that are stored in these technologies on their cards. CMS Reported Significant Costs Associated with Removing SSNs from Medicare Cards, but These Estimates May Not Be Reliable
CMS Reported that Removing SSNs from Medicare Cards would Cost Over $800 Million
In its 2011 report to Congress, CMS, in conjunction with SSA and RRB, developed cost estimates for the three options to alter the display of the SSN on Medicare cards or replace the SSN with a different unique identifier. While modifications to existing state Medicaid IT systems and related costs are projected to cost the same across all three options, the estimated costs for CMS’s IT system conversions vary. However, CMS officials acknowledged that the agency did not rely on any specific cost-estimating guidance, such as GAO’s cost-estimating guidance, during the development of the cost estimates presented in the agency’s report to Congress. For example, CMS and SSA used different assumptions regarding the number of Medicare beneficiaries that would require new Medicare cards. While CMS reported that this option is somewhat more costly than the other options, the methods and assumptions CMS used to develop its estimates do not provide enough certainty that those estimates are credible. Recommendations for Executive Action
In order for CMS to implement an option for removing SSNs from Medicare cards, we recommend that the Administrator of CMS select an approach for removing the SSN from the Medicare card that best protects beneficiaries from identity theft and minimizes burdens for providers, beneficiaries, and CMS, and develop an accurate, well-documented cost estimate for such an option using standard cost-estimating procedures. SSA provided only one technical comment, which we incorporated as appropriate, but did not comment on the report’s recommendations. Appendix I: Burdens of CMS’s Proposed Options for Removal of SSN from Medicare Card (Accessible Text)
Appendix I: Burdens of CMS’s Proposed Options for Removal of SSN from Medicare Card (Accessible Text) provider use) (beneficiary use only)
Social Security number (SSN)
While any change to the beneficiary identifier could cause initial confusion for beneficiaries, this option creates no additional burden for the beneficiary because the number on the card would be used to receive services and interact with CMS. | Why GAO Did This Study
More than 48 million Medicare cards display the SSN, which increases Medicare beneficiaries vulnerability to identity theft. GAO was asked to review the options and associated costs for removing SSNs from the Medicare card. This report (1) describes the various options for removing the SSN from Medicare cards; (2) examines the potential benefits and burdens associated with different options; and (3) examines CMSs cost estimates for removing SSNs from Medicare cards.
To do this work, GAO reviewed CMSs report, cost estimates, and relevant supporting documentation. GAO also interviewed officials from CMS and other agencies that perform Medicare related activities (the Social Security Administration and Railroad Retirement Board), as well as officials from DOD and VA, which have undertaken SSN removal efforts. GAO also interviewed private health insurance companies and relevant stakeholder groups.
What GAO Found
The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) 2011 report to Congress proposed three options for removing Social Security numbers (SSN) from Medicare cards. One option would truncate the SSN displayed on the card, but beneficiaries and providers would continue to rely on the SSN. The other two options would replace the SSN with a new identifier that would be displayed on the card and either be used only by beneficiaries, or by both beneficiaries and those who provide Medicare services. CMS, however, has not selected or committed to implementing any of these options. The Departments of Defense (DOD) and Veterans Affairs (VA), and private insurers have already removed or taken steps to remove SSNs from display on their identification or health insurance cards.
CMSs option to replace the SSN with a new identifier for use by both beneficiaries and providers offers the greatest protection against identity theft. Beneficiaries vulnerability to identity theft would be reduced because the card would no longer display the SSN and providers would not need the SSN to provide services or submit claims (negating the need for providers to store the SSN). This option would also pose fewer burdens than the other two options because beneficiaries would not have to remember an SSN to receive services or to interact with CMS. Providers also would not need to conduct additional activities, such as querying a CMS database, to obtain the SSN. The burdens for CMS would generally be similar across all the options, but CMS reported that this option would require more information technology (IT) system modifications.
CMS reported that each of the three options would cost over $800 million to implement, and that the option to replace the SSN with a new identifier for use by both beneficiaries and providers would be somewhat more expensive, largely because of the IT modifications. However, the methodology and assumptions CMS used to develop its estimates raise questions about their reliability. For example, CMS did not use appropriate guidance, such as GAOs cost-estimating guidance, when preparing the estimates to ensure their reliability. Additionally, CMS could provide only limited documentation related to how it developed the estimates for the two largest cost areas, both of which involve modifications to IT systems.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that CMS (1) select an approach for removing SSNs from Medicare cards that best protects beneficiaries from identity theft and minimizes burdens for providers, beneficiaries, and CMS and (2) develop an accurate, well-documented cost estimate for such an option. CMS concurred with our recommendations. VA, DOD, and RRB had no substantive comments. SSA had a technical comment. |
gao_T-AIMD-98-308 | gao_T-AIMD-98-308_0 | The COTR was able to accomplish this scheme without detection by Air Force officials because he took advantage of his broad authority and the lack of adequate supervision. Continuing Internal Control Weaknesses in Air Force Vendor Payment Processes
Now, Mr. Chairman, I would like to turn our attention to the current control environment at the locations where these incidents occurred. Our work shows that similar internal control and system weaknesses continue to leave the Air Force vulnerable to fraudulent or improper vendor payments. For example, as of mid-June 1998, over 1,800 DFAS and Air Force employees had a level of access to the vendor payment system that allowed them to enter contract information, including the contract number, delivery orders, modifications, and obligations, as well as invoice and receiving report information and remittance addresses. In addition, the automated vendor payment system is vulnerable to penetration by unauthorized users due to weaknesses in computer security, including inadequate password controls. Finally, controls over remittance addresses remain a weakness. Specifically, DFAS lacks procedures to ensure that the date that invoices were received for payment and the date that goods and services were received were properly documented. These are critical dates for ensuring proper vendor payments and compliance with the Prompt Payment Act, which requires that payments made after the due date include interest. Until DFAS and the Air Force complete the actions to address control weaknesses in vendor payment systems and processes and maintain accountability over goods and services received, Air Force funds will continue to be vulnerable to fraudulent and improper payments. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the current status of internal controls over the process for Air Force vendor payments, focusing on two recent cases of payment fraud.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the two cases of Air Force vendor payment fraud resulted from a weak internal control environment; (2) the lack of segregation of duties and other control weaknesses created an environment where employees were given broad authority and the capability, without compensating controls, to perform functions that should have been performed by separate individuals under proper supervision; (3) similar internal control weaknesses continue to leave Air Force funds vulnerable to fraudulent and improper vendor payments; (4) for example, as of mid-June 1998, over 1,800 Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) and Air Force employees had a level of access to the vendor payment system that allowed them to enter contract information, including the contract number, delivery orders, modifications, and obligations, as well as invoice and receiving report information and remittance addresses; (5) no one individual should control all key aspects of a transaction or event without appropriate compensating controls; (6) this level of access allows these employees to submit all the information necessary to create fraudulent or improper payments; (7) in addition, the automated vendor payment system is vulnerable to penetration by unauthorized users due to weaknesses in computer security, including inadequate password controls; (8) further, DFAS lacked procedures to ensure that the date that invoices were received for payment and the date that goods and services were received were properly documented; (9) these are critical dates for ensuring proper vendor payments and compliance with the Prompt Payment Act, which requires that payments made after the due date include interest; and (10) until DFAS and the Air Force complete the actions to address control weaknesses in vendor payment systems and processes and maintain accountability over goods and services received, Air Force funds will continue to be vulnerable to fraudulent and improper vendor payments. |
gao_GAO-12-1024T | gao_GAO-12-1024T_0 | Additionally, TSA has responsibilities for general aviation security, and developed the Alien Flight Student Program (AFSP) to help determine whether foreign students enrolling at flight schools pose a security threat. TSA Has Taken Actions to Validate the Science Underlying Its Behavior Detection Program, but More Work Remains
We reported in May 2010 that TSA deployed SPOT nationwide before first determining whether there was a scientifically valid basis for using behavior and appearance indicators as a means for reliably identifying passengers who may pose a risk to the U.S. aviation system. As noted in our May 2010 report, SPOT officials told us that it is not known if the SPOT program has ever resulted in the arrest of anyone who is a terrorist, or who was planning to engage in terrorist-related activity. Thus, we recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security convene an independent panel of experts to review the methodology of DHS’s Science and Technology Directorate’s ongoing validation study on the SPOT program being conducted to determine whether the study’s methodology is sufficiently comprehensive to validate the SPOT program. stated that its validation study, completed in April 2011, included input from a broad range of federal agencies and relevant experts, including those from academia. DHS’s validation study found that SPOT was more effective than random screening to varying degrees. DHS’s study also noted that the assessment was an initial validation step, and was not designed to fully validate whether behavior detection can be used to reliably identify individuals in an airport environment who pose a security risk. DHS and TSA Have Taken Actions to Enhance the Security of Cargo on Inbound Aircraft, but Challenges Remain
DHS and TSA have taken four primary actions to enhance the security of inbound cargo on passenger and all-cargo aircraft following the October 2010 bomb attempt originating in Yemen. TSA issued new screening requirements aimed at enhancing the security of cargo on passenger and all-cargo aircraft. Despite these actions, air carriers and TSA face three key challenges that, among other things, could limit TSA’s ability to meet the 9/11 Commission Act mandate to screen 100 percent of cargo transported on passenger aircraft as it applies to inbound air cargo and to provide reasonable assurance that screening is being conducted at reported levels. In response to these concerns, TSA officials stated that they revised the proposed requirements and issued new passenger security requirements in June 2012. Agency officials said they plan to require air carriers to screen 100 percent of inbound air cargo transported on passenger aircraft by December 3, 2012. data reported by air carriers, the agency has not yet fully met the intent of the recommendation. TSA relies on data submitted by passenger carriers to determine the amount of air cargo screened on inbound passenger aircraft but there is no requirement for all-cargo carriers to report comparable screening data to TSA, even though most of the cargo shipped from abroad into the United States is shipped on all- cargo carriers. DHS and TSA Have Experienced Difficulties Establishing Acquisition Program Baselines, Schedules, and Cost Estimates for Checked Baggage Screening Systems
TSA’s Electronic Baggage Screening Program (EBSP) reports that 76 percent of the airports (337 of 446) the agency regulates for security have a mix of in-line and stand-alone baggage screening configurations that best meet airport needs (i.e., optimal systems). In July 2011, we reported that TSA had established a schedule for the acquisition of the explosives detection systems (EDS) TSA deploys to screen checked baggage, but it did not fully comply with leading practices, and TSA had not developed a plan to upgrade its EDS fleet to meet the 2010 explosives detection requirements. DHS concurred with the recommendation to develop and maintain a schedule for the entire EBSP in accordance with the leading practices we identified for preparing a schedule. TSA Established a Process for Vetting Foreign Flight Students but Weaknesses Remain
As we reported in July 2012, TSA has worked with industry and other stakeholders to enhance general aviation security, such as issuing regulations and enhancing outreach and awareness, but there are weaknesses in the agency’s process for vetting foreign flight student applicants and in DHS’s process for identifying flight students who may be in the country illegally. We recommended two actions that DHS and TSA could take to address these concerns, with which DHS concurred. Identifying flight students entering the country illegally. | Why GAO Did This Study
Securing commercial aviation operations remains a daunting task, with hundreds of airports, thousands of aircraft, and thousands of flights daily carrying millions of passengers and pieces of carry-on and checked baggage. The attempted terrorist bombing of Northwest flight 253 on December 25, 2009, and the October 2010 discovery of explosive devices in air cargo packages on an all-cargo aircraft bound for the United States from Yemen highlight the continuing need for effective passenger, cargo, and baggage screening. This statement discusses actions TSA has taken to (1) validate the scientific basis of its behavior-based passenger screening program (the Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques, or SPOT); (2) strengthen the security of inbound air cargo (3) acquire checked baggage screening technology in accordance with established guidance; and (4) vet foreign nationals training at U.S. flight schools. This statement is based on GAO's work issued from September 2009 through July 2012, and includes selected updates on air cargo screening conducted from July through September 2012. For the selected updates, GAO interviewed TSA officials.
What GAO Found
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has taken actions to validate the science underlying its behavior-based passenger screening program, the Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques, or SPOT, program, but more work remains. GAO reported in May 2010 that (1) TSA deployed SPOT before first determining whether there was a scientifically valid basis for using behavior and appearance indicators to reliably identify passengers who may pose a risk; and (2) it is unknown if the SPOT program has ever resulted in the arrest of anyone who is a terrorist, or who was planning to engage in terrorist related activity, although there is other evidence that terrorists have transited through SPOT airports. GAO recommended in May 2010 that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) convene an independent panel of experts to review the methodology of the ongoing validation study on the SPOT program to determine whether it is sufficiently comprehensive to validate the program. DHS concurred and subsequently revised its validation study to include an independent expert review. DHS's study, completed in April 2011, found that SPOT was more effective than random screening to varying degrees; however, DHS noted limitations to the study, such as that it was not designed to comprehensively validate whether SPOT can be used to reliably identify individuals who pose a security risk. GAO is currently reviewing the program and will issue our report next year. TSA has taken actions to enhance the security of cargo on inbound aircraft, but challenges remain. For example, TSA issued new screening requirements aimed at enhancing the security of cargo on aircraft, such as prohibiting the transport of air cargo on passenger aircraft from Yemen. In June 2010, GAO recommended that TSA develop a mechanism to verify the accuracy of all screening data. TSA concurred in part and required air carriers to report inbound cargo screening data, but has not yet fully addressed the recommendation. In June 2012, TSA required air carriers to screen 100 percent of inbound air cargo transported on passenger aircraft by December 3, 2012. However, air carriers and TSA face challenges in implementing this requirement and in providing reasonable assurance that screening is being conducted at reported levels. DHS and TSA have experienced difficulties establishing acquisition program baselines, schedules, and cost estimates for the Electronic Baggage Screening Program (EBSP). For example, GAO reported in July 2011 that TSA had established a schedule for the acquisition of the explosives detection systems (EDS) TSA deploys to screen checked baggage, but it did not fully comply with leading practices. GAO recommended that DHS develop and maintain a schedule for the EBSP in accordance with leading practices. DHS concurred. GAO reported in July 2012 that TSA has worked to enhance general aviation security, such as though issuing regulations, but there are weaknesses in its process for vetting foreign flight school student applicants, and in DHS's process for identifying flight school students who may be in the country illegally. For example, TSA's program to help determine whether flight school students pose a security threat does not determine whether they entered the country legally. GAO recommended actions that DHS and TSA could take to address these concerns, with which DHS and TSA have concurred, and are starting to take actions.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making any new recommendations. GAO has previously recommended that TSA take actions to improve aviation security. In general, TSA concurred with the recommendations, and is taking actions to address them. |
gao_GAO-06-581T | gao_GAO-06-581T_0 | For each program and activity agencies identify as susceptible, the act requires them to estimate the annual amount of improper payments and to submit those estimates to the Congress. A-136 includes requirements for agencies to report on their risk assessments; annual improper payment estimates; corrective action plans; and recovery auditing efforts, including the amounts recovered in the current year. Section 831 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 contains a provision that requires all executive branch agencies entering into contracts with a total value exceeding $500 million in a fiscal year to have cost-effective programs for identifying errors in paying contractors and for recovering amounts erroneously paid. Specifically, we reported that while progress had been made to reduce improper payments, significant challenges remain to effectively achieve the goals of IPIA. Some Agencies Still Have Not Assessed All Programs and Activities for Risk of Improper Payments
We reviewed the fiscal year 2005 PARs or annual reports for 33 of the 35 federal agencies that the Treasury determined to be significant to the U.S. government’s consolidated financial statements and that were available as of March 2006. For example, auditors for the Departments of Justice and Homeland Security cited agency noncompliance with IPIA in their fiscal year 2005 annual audit reports, primarily caused by inadequate risk assessments. This represents almost a $7 billion, or 16 percent, decrease in the amount of improper payments reported by 17 agencies in fiscal year 2004. However, the magnitude of the governmentwide improper payment problem remains unknown. This is because, in addition to not assessing all programs, some agencies had not yet prepared estimates of significant improper payments for all programs determined to be at risk. Specifically, of the 33 agency PARs included in our review, 18 agencies reported improper payment estimates totaling in excess of $38 billion for some or all of their high-risk programs. Of the remaining 15 agencies that did not report estimates, 8 said they did not have any programs susceptible to significant improper payments, 6 were silent about whether they had programs susceptible to significant improper payments, and the remaining 1 agency identified programs susceptible to significant improper payments and said it plans to report an estimate by fiscal year 2007. Therefore, the federal government’s progress in reducing improper payments may be exaggerated because the reported improper payments decrease in the Medicare program accounts for the bulk of the overall reduction in the governmentwide improper payments estimate. Agency auditors have reported major management challenges related to agencies’ improper payment estimating methodologies and highlighted internal control weaknesses that continue to plague programs susceptible to significant improper payments. After passage of IPIA, OMB’s implementing guidance required that these programs continue to report improper payment information under IPIA. From these reviews, agencies reported identifying about $557 million in improper payments for recovery and reported actually recovering about $467 million, as shown in table 2. Agency did not address improper payments or the Improper Payments Information Act (IPIA) requirements for this program in its fiscal year 2005 PAR or annual report. Financial Management: Status of the Governmentwide Efforts to Address Improper Payment Problems. | Why GAO Did This Study
Improper payments are a long-standing, widespread, and significant problem in the federal government. The Congress enacted the Improper Payments Information Act of 2002 (IPIA) to address this issue. Fiscal year 2005 marked the second year that agencies were required to report improper payment information under IPIA. One result of IPIA has been increased visibility over improper payments by requiring executive branch agencies to identify programs and activities susceptible to significant improper payments, estimate the amount of their improper payments, and report on the amounts of improper payments and their actions to reduce them in their annual performance and accountability reports (PAR). Because of continued interest in addressing the governmentwide improper payments issue, GAO was asked to report on the progress made by agencies in complying with requirements of IPIA and the status of efforts to identify, reduce, and eliminate improper payments. As part of the review, GAO looked at (1) the extent to which agencies have performed risk assessments, (2) the annual amount of improper payments estimated, and (3) the amount of improper payments recouped through recovery audits.
What GAO Found
The federal government continues to make progress in identifying programs susceptible to the risk of improper payments in addressing the new IPIA requirements. At the same time, significant challenges remain to effectively achieve the goals of IPIA. The 33 fiscal year 2005 PARs GAO reviewed show that some agencies still have not instituted systematic methods of reviewing all programs and activities, have not identified all programs susceptible to significant improper payments, or have not annually estimated improper payments for their susceptible programs as required by the act. The full magnitude of the problem remains unknown because some agencies have not yet prepared estimates of improper payments for all of their programs. Of the 33 agencies reviewed, 18 reported over $38 billion of improper payments in 57 programs. This represented almost a $7 billion, or 16 percent, decrease in the amount of improper payments reported by 17 agencies in fiscal year 2004. However, the total improper payments estimate does not include 7 major agency programs with outlays totaling about $228 billion. Further, agency auditors have identified major management challenges related to agencies' improper payment estimating methodologies and significant internal control weaknesses for programs susceptible to significant improper payments. In addition, two agency auditors cited noncompliance with IPIA in their annual audit reports. For fiscal year 2005 PARs, agencies that entered into contracts with a total value exceeding $500 million annually were required to report additional information on their recovery audit efforts. Nineteen agencies reported reviewing over $300 billion in vendor payments, identifying approximately $557 million to be recovered, and actually recovering about $467 million. |
gao_GAO-07-1039T | gao_GAO-07-1039T_0 | KMCC Currently Experiencing Substantial Cost, Schedule, and Performance Problems
The KMCC currently faces significant cost, schedule, and performance problems, and it is unclear as to when the project will be completed and at what cost. Despite being originally scheduled to open in early 2006, neither LBB-Kaiserslautern nor the Air Force can estimate a completion date for the project because of the widespread construction management problems. The cost to repair damage caused by the vandalism is estimated to be over $1 million. Reduction of construction workers: In the past several months, the KMCC has faced a drastic reduction of the number of workers on-site. Currently, the number of workers on the site is routinely less than 50. KMCC Problems Caused by Overseas Construction Risks, LBB-Kaiserslautern Management Deficiencies, and Lack of Air Force Controls
Current problems facing the KMCC have been caused by the additional risks associated with overseas construction, project management deficiencies by LBB-Kaiserslautern, and the Air Force’s lack of effective controls to mitigate project risks. Instead, the Air Force did not have basic oversight and in some cases has circumvented controls in order to expedite payments. LBB-Kaiserslautern’s deficiencies in these areas have contributed to additional costs, schedule delays, and increased financial risk to the U.S. government for the KMCC project. The following are some examples of design and construction flaws for the KMCC project: Exhaust ducts: During review of the initial KMCC design, Air Force identified and commented to LBB-Kaiserslautern and JSK that the exhaust ducts used in the restaurant kitchens did not meet U.S. fire safety standards. Ineffective Project Management
LBB-Kaiserslautern did not effectively manage the KMCC project. Because of this, the Air Force is facing potentially millions of dollars in additional costs to replace the poorly built roof. KMCC Problems May Adversely Affect Military Members and Future Construction Projects
The substantial schedule and cost overruns of the KMCC may affect military personnel and have major implications for future projects in Germany. Absent better Air Force controls, these projects may experience the same types of heightened risks associated with KMCC. In addition, we conducted interviews with officials from the Air Force, Landesbetrieb Liegenschafts- und Baubetreuung (LBB) the German government construction agency, and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. In order to determine the management weaknesses of LBB and the Air Force, we interviewed officials from both organizations, conducted interviews with other organizations affected by the KMCC project including the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI), Air Force Audit Agency, Air Force Services Agency, and the Army and Air Force Exchange Service. | Why GAO Did This Study
According to the Air Force, the Kaiserslautern Military Community Center (KMCC), an over 800,000 square-foot facility, is currently the Department of Defense's largest single-facility project under construction. It is intended to provide lodging, dining, shopping, and entertainment for thousands of U.S. military and civilian personnel and their families in the Kaiserslautern, Germany, area. Initial costs for the KMCC were estimated at about $150 million, with funding coming from a variety of appropriated and nonappropriated fund sources. The construction for the project, which began in late 2003, was originally scheduled to be completed in early 2006. This testimony discusses GAO findings to date related to the KMCC. The testimony describes (1) current problems facing the KMCC, (2) causes for identified problems, and (3) the effect of problems identified and their implications for future projects in Germany. To address our objectives, we interviewed officials from the U.S. Air Force, Army and Air Force Exchange Service, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and German government. We also conducted a site visit and reviewed relevant KMCC documents. We plan to continue our work and make recommendations to the Air Force as appropriate.
What GAO Found
The KMCC project has encountered cost, schedule, and performance problems. Currently neither Landesbetrieb Liegenschafts- und baubetreuung's office in Kaiserslautern (LBB-Kaiserslautern), the German government construction agency in charge of the project, nor the Air Force have a reliable estimated completion date or final cost for the project. Problems facing KMCC include construction flaws, vandalism of property, repeated work stoppages and slowdowns by contractors, and ongoing criminal investigations. Because of financial problems facing the project, the number of workers on-site has dwindled from several hundred to less than 50, which will likely further delay completion of the project. In addition, the KMCC's multimillion dollar "green" roof is experiencing water leaks, and will likely require the Air Force to spend millions of dollars for its replacement. The KMCC faced a high level of risk from its inception, which was not effectively mitigated by the Air Force. Increased risks included an overseas project controlled by LBB-Kaiserslautern with financial risks borne by the Air Force and its funding partners. Unfortunately, LBB-Kaiserslautern did not effectively manage the design and construction of the project. Rather than increase controls to mitigate project risks, the Air Force provided minimal oversight and in some cases circumvented controls to expedite the invoice payment process in an attempt to complete the project. Because this project is funded primarily with nonappropriated funds, the likely substantial cost increases in the project will be borne by military servicemembers, civilians and their families. Further, absent better Air Force controls, future projects may experience the same types of heightened risks associated with KMCC. |
gao_RCED-98-245 | gao_RCED-98-245_0 | EPA’s Efforts to Provide Communities With Information on the Risks Posed by Toxic Chemical Releases
Although EPA does not have any plans to expand the TRI to include information on the human health and environmental risks posed by toxic chemical releases, the agency has three projects under way that will provide communities with substantially more data on nearby facilities, the relative toxicity of their chemical releases, and the potential exposure to the releases. EPA recognizes that these projects separately and collectively are not definitive assessments of risks to individual communities. Opportunities Exist to Increase Accessibility of Chemical Inventory Data
Although the data reported under section 312 of EPCRA can be valuable to local emergency planning committees in their efforts to develop emergency plans and to reduce emergency personnel’s exposure to harmful chemicals, the use of the data by the wider public has been limited. During the past few years, two EPA regions have initiated projects to integrate state databases. Although EPA considers a national computerized database potentially worthwhile, the agency has no specific plans to assess the feasibility for such a database. Fire departments and other emergency responders have access to the data to help develop response plans before they arrive at the scene of a chemical accident or at a fire at a facility using hazardous chemicals. Although chemical inventory data can be useful to local citizens, the information has not been used extensively. EPA has supported efforts to computerize the chemical inventory data. According to the official, his office is concerned that, although EPCRA does not provide for EPA to receive the chemical inventory data and does not make the agency responsible for ensuring that they are accurate, states and industry may hold EPA accountable for the data’s quality if the agency aggregates the data from state databases and makes the information available to the public in either regional or national databases. For example, an official of the Sector Facility Indexing Project said that EPA worked for 3 years to identify the facilities to be included in the project and to collect and verify the data. The Deputy Director told us that such guidance could include policies, procedures, and standards for (1) setting priorities and performing cost-benefit analyses to determine which information projects should receive agency resources, (2) developing standards for the accuracy of data and mechanisms to determine and correct errors, (3) obtaining stakeholders’ involvement and analyzing users’ needs and (4) establishing other protocols that program offices should follow in designing information dissemination projects. He told us, however, that the Center has no specific plans to develop such policies, procedures, and standards. Conclusions
EPA is making progress in its efforts to provide communities with more information on releases of toxic chemicals in their areas. Not all of these activities are specifically directed by legislative mandates. Scope and Methodology
To identify the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) initiatives to provide additional information on the risks posed by toxic chemical releases to local communities, we held discussions with EPA’s Chief Information Officer and officials of EPA’s Office of Pollution Prevention and Toxics, which has responsibility for the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) program; Office of Policy, Planning, and Evaluation; Center for Environmental Information and Statistics; and Reinvention Office. Additional copies are $2 each. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative mandate, GAO determined the status of the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) efforts to: (1) provide communities with risk information on toxic chemical releases in their areas; (2) make the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act's (EPCRA) chemical inventory information publicly accessible; and (3) develop policies, procedures, and standards for disseminating environmental information to the public.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) EPA has three projects under way that would provide additional data to communities on releases of toxic chemicals from nearby manufacturing facilities; (2) although these projects are not being designed to comprehensively define an individual community's risks, collectively, they would substantially expand the information available to communities; (3) in addition to the Toxic Release Inventory's (TRI) quantities of chemical releases, this information is to include data on individual facilities' history of compliance with environmental laws, the relative toxicity of chemical releases, the dispersion of the releases to surrounding areas, and the estimated concentrations of the chemicals in the outdoor air from sources not covered by the TRI; (4) however, each of these initiatives has a different scope and timeframe for completion, and it could be several years before the initiatives' full promise would be realized; (5) although the data from the chemical inventory that is reported under section 312 of the EPCRA are potentially useful for such purposes as a citizen's finding out what chemicals are used at a nearby facility, public use has been limited; (6) much of the information has not been computerized to provide easy access and when it has, it is not available in regional or national databases that permit comparisons among industries or geographical areas; (7) EPA estimates that 868,500 facilities provide local emergency planning committees, fire departments, and the states in which they are located with data on thousands of hazardous chemicals; (8) in recent years, EPA has taken some steps to assist local and state efforts to computerize the data, and two EPA regions have initiated efforts to consolidate computerized state databases; (9) while EPA believes that such efforts might prove to be worthwhile, it has not provided funding for nor assessed the potential benefits and costs of developing a national computerized database for this information; (10) EPA has not developed policies, procedures, and standards to govern key aspects of its projects to disseminate information, such as the Sector Facility Indexing Project; (11) EPA also has not developed standards to assess the data's accuracy and mechanisms to determine and correct errors; and (12) while EPA has several initiatives under way to improve its data management practices, it has no specific plans to provide its program offices with guidance for designing, developing, and implementing their information dissemination projects. |
gao_GAO-10-786 | gao_GAO-10-786_0 | Use of TRA Has Been Low and TRA Grantees Include Both Younger and Older Veterans
Only 18 TRA grants have been used since the inception of the program. The age of these grantees and the cause of their disabilities varied, and the majority of the grantees have used the maximum allowable TRA grant amount of $14,000, although some adaptations have cost more than this amount. As a result, only a very small proportion of those potentially eligible for adaptive housing assistance have used TRA. Half of these grantees were under the age of 40 and half were over the age of 40. The average age of those under 40 was 26 years. Among those over 40, seven were over the age of 60. Three of the grantees were injured abroad while serving in Operation Iraqi Freedom, four grantees were injured domestically in a vehicle or sporting accident, and four grantees suffered an illness, such as multiple sclerosis. Most Individuals We Spoke with Were Unaware of TRA, and Some Could Have Benefited from the Program
To explore the underlying reasons for low use of TRA, we interviewed 50 service members and veterans under the age of 35 who were eligible for adaptive housing but had not used TRA. Awareness of TRA May Be Low
Our interviews suggest that awareness of the TRA grant program may be low among service members and veterans eligible for adaptive housing benefits. Of the 50 service members and veterans we spoke with, most were familiar with adaptive housing benefits in general, but 38 of the 50 were not familiar with the TRA program in particular, and they did not know that adaptive housing grants can be used to modify a home owned by a family member. The Veterans Benefits Administration’s mission is to provide benefits to veterans and their families in a timely and responsive fashion and one of the agency’s stated core values is to communicate to veterans in a timely, thorough, and accurate manner. The extent to which TRA is addressed in VA’s information sources about adaptive housing benefits is limited. In all seven cases, including the following examples, the individual or caregiver told us that they think they would have used the TRA program had they previously been aware of it. In addition to those cases, another seven individuals, including the following examples, told us that had they been aware of TRA, they would have at least considered using the grant. Of the 50 individuals we interviewed, many told us that TRA was not applicable to their personal circumstances. As a result, the program may not be reaching all of the individuals who could benefit from it. Specifically, a better understanding is needed of potential information gaps that may be occurring when severely disabled service members transition to civilian life and when veterans are informed about adaptive housing benefits. Additional efforts to make eligible individuals better aware of the TRA grant program could help ensure that the program more fully serves its intended beneficiaries. Recommendations
To help ensure that the TRA program serves its intended beneficiaries to the greatest extent possible, we recommend that the Secretary of Veterans Affairs direct the Under Secretary for Benefits to evaluate the current methods of communicating information about the TRA grant to eligible individuals, and take appropriate measures to improve awareness of the program among such individuals. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To describe the characteristics of Temporary Residence Adaptation (TRA) grants and grantees and how the grants have been used, we analyzed Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) data on selected characteristics of TRA grants and grantees for the period between June 15, 2006 (the date TRA was created) and April 4, 2010. To determine what accounts for service members’ and veterans’ low utilization of the TRA grant program and what, if anything, could be done to ensure that the program serves its intended recipients, we conducted telephone interviews with 50 service members and veterans who had qualified for adaptive housing benefits but had not applied for TRA. | Why GAO Did This Study
Adaptive housing assistance grants help eligible service members or veterans adapt or modify a residence to accommodate disabilities sustained through military service. The Veterans' Housing Opportunity and Benefits Improvement Act of 2006 authorized the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) to expand its existing adaptive housing assistance grants to include eligible individuals temporarily living in a home owned by a family member, known as Temporary Residence Adaptation (TRA) grants. The act also mandated GAO to issue interim and final reports on VA's implementation of TRA. This final report examines (1) the characteristics of TRA grants and grantees and (2) what accounts for low utilization of the program and how to ensure that the program serves its intended recipients. To address these objectives, GAO analyzed VA data and documents and interviewed service members and veterans who both had and had not used the TRA grant.
What GAO Found
Use of the TRA grant program has been low--from the program's inception on June 15, 2006, through April 4, 2010, VA processed only 18 TRA grants. Therefore, only a very small proportion of the thousands of individuals potentially eligible for adaptive housing assistance have used TRA. Half of these grantees were under the age of 40 and half were over the age of 40. The average age of those under 40 was 26 years. Among those over 40, seven were over the age of 60. Of the 11 TRA grantees we interviewed, all had lost the use of both legs, and most also had other disabilities, such as brain trauma. Three of the grantees we interviewed were injured abroad while serving in Operation Iraqi Freedom, four grantees were injured domestically in a vehicle or sporting accident, and four grantees suffered an illness, such as multiple sclerosis. Of the 18 TRA grants that had been awarded, 11 were for the maximum allowable amount of $14,000, and 3 others were near that maximum. In some cases, the cost of adaptations exceeded the amount of the TRA grant and was supplemented by donations, other grants, or the grantee's own funds. Interviews we conducted with 50 service members and veterans eligible for adaptive housing benefits suggest that awareness of TRA may be low and that the program may not be reaching all of the individuals who could benefit from it. While most of the 50 interviewees were familiar with adaptive housing benefits in general, 38 were not familiar with the TRA program in particular and did not know that adaptive housing grants can be used to modify a home owned by a family member. In addition, while TRA was not applicable for the personal circumstances of many of the interviewees, in seven cases individuals described personal circumstances well suited for use of TRA and said they likely would have used the TRA program had they previously been aware of it. An additional seven said they would have at least considered using the program had they been aware of it. The extent to which TRA is addressed in VA's information sources about adaptive housing benefits is limited--for example, VA does not have a separate fact sheet for TRA, and it is unclear how consistently VA representatives publicize the opportunity to use TRA when conducting outreach to and interviews with service members and veterans. One of the stated core values of the VA office that administers TRA is to communicate to veterans in a timely, thorough, and accurate manner. A better understanding is needed of potential information gaps that may be occurring when severely disabled service members transition to civilian life and when veterans are informed about adaptive housing benefits. Additional efforts to make eligible individuals better aware of the TRA grant program could help ensure that the program more fully serves its intended beneficiaries.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that VA evaluate current methods of communicating information about TRA grants to eligible individuals and take appropriate measures to improve awareness of the program among such individuals. VA agreed with GAO's recommendations and described actions to address them. |
gao_GAO-01-846 | gao_GAO-01-846_0 | The Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 increases all three of these limits beginning in 2002; the scheduled increases are to be fully implemented by 2006. The Majority of Pension Participants Had Low or Moderate Earnings, but More Than Half of Low and Moderate Earners in the Workforce Did Not Participate in a Pension Plan
About 51 million workers, or 47 percent of all workers, participated in a pension plan in 1998. However, higher earners were more likely to participate in pension plans than low and moderate earners. Of workers with household incomes of less than $40,000 per year, 30 percent participated in a pension plan. In 1998, about 53 percent of all workers were men. When we examined the percentages of workers in various earnings categories that were likely to benefit directly from these limit increases, we found that higher earners were more likely than low and moderate earners to benefit directly. About 8 percent of all DC participants, or 3.1 million people, were likely to have benefited directly if all the contribution limits analyzed in this report had been increased. We found that higher earning DC participants were more likely than low- or moderate-earning DC participants to benefit directly from an increase in all three DC plan contribution limits. Survey data suggest that limits on tax-deferred pension contributions may not be among the most important reasons why some small employers do not offer pension plans. “Catch-Up” Provision Was Likely to Benefit Few Participants Directly
Allowing a “catch-up” provision—permitting persons aged 50 or older to make additional contributions to DC plans in excess of the statutory limits we analyzed—would likely have directly benefited 11 percent of all eligible DC participants, or 721,000 participants. Copies will also be made available to others on request. Appendix: Scope and Methodology
We used survey data from the 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), sponsored by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, to estimate the number and percentage of workers that participated in pension plans and the number and percentage of workers that participated in DC plans, by earnings and gender; the earnings and gender distributions of pension plan participants and DC participants; the number and percentage of DC participants who would and would not likely have benefited directly from increasing the three contribution limits, by earnings and gender; the number and percentage of likely direct beneficiaries of increasing each of the contribution limits sequentially, by earnings and gender; and the number and percentage of participants in certain DC plans aged 50 or older who would and would not likely have benefited directly from allowing "catch-up" contributions in excess of the three contribution limits, by earnings and gender. | What GAO Found
Proposals to expand pension coverage and promote pension savings have recently received much attention. In the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, for example, Congress raised statutory limits on tax-deferred pension contributions and benefits and made other changes to the law governing qualified pension plans. Some believe that increasing these limits will encourage employers to start new plans and improve existing plan coverage, especially for employees of small businesses. Others contend that these measures will primarily benefit higher-paid individuals and may not improve pension coverage for low-or moderate-income workers. Forty-seven percent of all workers participated in a pension plan, and 36 percent of all workers participated in a defined contribution (DC) plan. Most pension plan participants had low or moderate earnings (less than $40,000 per year) and were men. About eight percent of all DC participants, or 3.1 million people, were likely direct beneficiaries of a simultaneous increase in all the statutory contribution limits GAO analyzed. Higher earners were more likely than low and moderate earners, and men were more likely than women, to benefit directly from such an increase; this was also true of increases in each of the separate dollar limits on contributions. About 721,000 DC participants, or 11 percent of eligible DC participants, were likely to benefit from a so-called "catch-up" provision allowing persons aged 50 or older to make additional contributions to DC plans. Higher earners were more likely to benefit directly from this option than were low and moderate earners. However, neither male more female DC participants were significantly more likely to benefit directly from this option. |
gao_GAO-03-692 | gao_GAO-03-692_0 | FMIS’ Design Addresses Previous Information System’s Shortcomings and Appears to Have the Capability to Meet BIA’s Needs
Recognizing the FACCOM system’s shortcomings, BIA worked with its system developer to design a new management information system that would assist in resolving many of the weaknesses identified with the old system, including those related to difficulty of use and accuracy of data. To help facility managers develop accurate and consistent cost estimates to address backlog items, FMIS is designed to operate with a software program that helps facility managers accomplish industry standard cost estimates for replacement, renovation, or construction projects over $5,000. Our review of some updates conducted during fiscal year 2002 indicates that AME’s reviews will continue to result in substantial changes in backlog data. However, officials said that in fiscal year 2002, the untimely transfer of data from the field assessments to the contractor’s information system and software compatibility problems between the contractor’s information system and FMIS delayed the update of backlog data for 33 schools for over a year. A BIA official told us that delays in introducing these updates into the FMIS backlog could have some impact on their ability to prioritize or fund repair and capital improvement projects, but not a significant impact for two reasons. Our site visits to 8 BIA-funded schools did not disclose any instances where serious problems were not being addressed. While facilities management staff and school principals pointed out problems with their facilities, we did not observe that the children were in an unsafe learning environment with obvious safety or repair issues. Control Measures in Place for Ensuring Data Quality Are Largely Ineffective
The ability of FMIS to provide accurate and complete data depends on BIA employees entering correct and timely information, but review processes and training programs BIA has established for ensuring data quality have been largely ineffective. Although BIA established this multilevel review process to improve the quality of the data entered into FMIS, AME continues to reject half of the proposed entries because they are inaccurate and incomplete. Such actions are needed if BIA is to rely on its employees, rather than the contractor, to ensure that it provides a safe and quality learning environment for Indian children. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this study were to determine (1) whether the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) new facilities management information system (FMIS) addresses the former system’s shortcomings and meets BIA’s needs for managing school facilities; (2) the status of BIA’s effort to validate the accuracy and completeness of the data being transferred from the old system into FMIS; and (3) how well BIA’s quality control measures are working to ensure that new data entered into FMIS are accurate and complete. To determine the extent to which FMIS was designed to address weaknesses of the previous data processing system and how the new system meets BIA’s facility management needs we reviewed contractor reports, BIA documentation on the FMIS, and interviewed contractors and BIA headquarters, regional, agency, and school facility management staff. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) is responsible for providing over 48,000 children with a safe place to learn. In response to concerns that data in its old information system did not accurately reflect the condition of facilities, BIA acquired a new system, called the Facilities Management Information System (FMIS). GAO was asked to determine whether FMIS addresses the old system's weaknesses and meets BIA's management needs, whether BIA has finished validating the accuracy of data entered into FMIS from the old system, and how well the quality control measures are working for ensuring the accuracy of new data being entered into the system from individual schools.
What GAO Found
FMIS is designed to address the previous data system's shortcomings and appears to have the capability to meet BIA's management needs if the data that are entered into FMIS are correct and timely. The old system was hard to use and did not readily provide data for maintenance and repair efforts. FMIS's design appears to overcome these weaknesses. For example, FMIS has features that help facility managers make data more consistent, as well as tools for helping managers develop cost estimates for maintenance and construction projects. BIA's contractor has been correcting the data that were transferred to FMIS from the previous system, but issues such as software compatibility problems between the contractor's system and FMIS have delayed entry of some of the data for more than 1 year. BIA officials say that these problems are being addressed. They said the delay has not affected their ability to prioritize or fund repair and construction projects, and our review of the data indicated that most newly identified deficiencies will not need to be addressed for 2 to 5 years. Our review of data from 14 BIA schools and observations during site visits disclosed no instances in which these data problems resulted in an unsafe learning environment for children. Most measures for controlling the quality of new data BIA employees are entering into the system for individual schools are not working well. BIA has established a multilevel review process and training programs to help ensure that such data entries are complete and accurate, but BIA's contractor, in reviewing data at the end of this process, continues to find that nearly half of the proposed data entries coming through the system are inaccurate and incomplete. Data entries from one-third of 102 schools that entered data show a 100-percent error rate. As a result, BIA officials continue to rely on their contractor to ensure that FMIS reflects accurate and complete data on the condition of BIA's facilities. |
gao_GAO-07-656T | gao_GAO-07-656T_0 | Additional investment of between $3.6 billion and $4.5 billion may be required should the Department decide to continue competition in the JSF engine program. While Pratt & Whitney design responsibilities and associated costs may be reduced under a sole-source contract, our analysis shows that competitive pressures may yield enough financial savings to offset the costs of competition over the life of the program. Given certain assumptions with regard to these factors, the additional costs of having the alternate engine could be recouped if competition were to generate approximately 10.3 to 12.3 percent savings. According to actual Air Force data from past engine programs, including for the F-16 aircraft, it is reasonable to expect savings of at least that much. This includes cost estimates for the completion of system development, procurement of engines, production support, and sustainment. JSF Engine Competition Could Result in Future Savings
In testimony last year, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics reported that DOD preferred a sole-source engine strategy for the JSF program. DOD implemented the JSF alternate engine development program to provide competition between two engine manufacturers in an effort to achieve cost savings, improve performance, and gain other benefits. In fact, in 1998 and 2002, DOD program management advisory groups assessed the JSF alternate engine program and found the potential for significant benefits in these and other areas. It is reasonable to assume that competition under these criteria may drive better engine performance and reliability over the life of the program. Because the JSF is expected to be the primary fighter aircraft in the U.S. inventory, and Pratt & Whitney will also be the sole-source provider of F119 engines for the F-22A aircraft, DOD is faced with the potential scenario where almost the entire fleet could be dependent on similar engine cores, produced by the same contractor in a sole-source environment. JSF Program Could Have Long-term Impact on Industrial Base
The economic stakes in the JSF engine program are likely to be high given the size of the program, international participation, and the expected supplier base. Prior engine programs and more recent DOD studies and analyses also suggest these outcomes to be reasonable. Tactical Aircraft: DOD’s Cancellation of the Joint Strike Fighter Alternate Engine Program Was Not Based on a Comprehensive Analysis, GAO-06-717R. Joint Strike Fighter Acquisition: Observations on the Supplier Base, GAO-04-554. We considered all costs for development through fiscal year 2007 to be sunk costs and did not factor them into analysis. We assumed costs to the government could decrease in any or all of these areas as a result of competitive pressures. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) is the linchpin of future Department of Defense (DOD) tactical aircraft modernization efforts because of the sheer size of the program and its envisioned role as the replacement for hundreds of aircraft that perform a wide variety of missions in the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. DOD implemented the JSF alternate engine development program in 1996 to provide competition between two engine manufacturers in an effort to achieve cost savings, improve performance, and gain other benefits. This testimony focuses on GAO's cost analysis performed in response to Section 211 of the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007. We examined the following areas: (1) sole-source and competitive scenarios for development, production, and sustainment of the JSF engine, (2) results of past engine programs and their related strategies, and (3) impact on the industrial base in the event of the complete cancellation of the JSF alternate engine program. DOD did not provide comments on our findings.
What GAO Found
Continuing the alternate engine program for the Joint Strike Fighter would cost significantly more than a sole-source program but could, in the long run, reduce costs and bring other benefits. The current estimated life cycle cost for the JSF engine program under a sole-source scenario is $53.4 billion. To ensure competition by continuing to implement the JSF alternate engine program, an additional investment of $3.6 billion to $4.5 billion may be required. However, the associated competitive pressures from this strategy could result in savings equal to or exceeding that amount. The cost analysis we performed suggests that a savings of 10.3 to 12.3 percent would recoup that investment, and actual experience from past engine competitions suggests that it is reasonable to assume that competition on the JSF engine program could yield savings of at least that much. In addition, DOD-commissioned reports and other officials have said that nonfinancial benefits in terms of better engine performance and reliability, improved industrial base stability, and more responsive contractors are more likely outcomes under a competitive environment than under a sole-source strategy. DOD experience with other aircraft engine programs, including the F-16 fighter in the 1980s, has shown competitive pressures can generate financial benefits of up to 20 percent during the life cycle of an engine program and/or improved quality and other benefits. The potential for cost savings and performance improvements, along with the impact the engine program could have on the industrial base, underscores the importance and long-term implications of DOD decision making with regard to the final acquisition strategy solution. |
gao_NSIAD-98-96 | gao_NSIAD-98-96_0 | Weaknesses in the Site Selection Process
The process used by DLA to support the site selection decision for its consolidated distribution headquarters contained several weaknesses, including insufficient data on personnel and facilities requirements, a questionable methodology for evaluating and comparing costs, and subjective responses used by steering group members for two criteria. Subsequent changes to the process, made at the request of the selecting official, did not correct these weaknesses and created concerns about the perception of bias. This produced the requirement for a third data request. No Evidence to Validate Claims of Predetermination
Allegations had been made that DLA officials had selected the eastern site for the Defense Distribution Center before the site selection study took place. 1.) Conclusions
DLA’s efforts to establish a steering group and formulate decision-making criteria indicate that DLA recognized the need for a credible process to guide its decision-making. However, the process used by DLA to support the site selection for its consolidated distribution headquarters contained a number of weaknesses, and raised questions about the soundness of the decision-making process. Although various officials from the western location raised concerns about whether the decision had been predetermined, we found no evidence to validate that the information they provided to us reflected official DLA positions. Also, we found no evidence that prior studies examining the consolidation issue influenced the current site selection process or outcome. The cumulative effect of these weaknesses raised questions about the soundness of the site selection process and the ultimate decision. GAO Comments
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the process used by the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) to select the site for its new defense distribution center, focusing on whether: (1) the process was sound; and (2) there was any evidence that the site selection had been predetermined.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) DLA officials believed that the consolidation of its eastern and western regional distribution headquarters would produce savings; (2) DLA's establishment of a steering group and decisionmaking criteria indicate that DLA recognized the need for a credible process to guide its decisionmaking in selecting a site for its consolidated distribution headquarters; (3) however, the process used by DLA to support the site selection decision contained a number of weaknesses; (4) among the weaknesses in the process were the absence of sufficient information concerning personnel facilities requirements for the new center, unrealistic cost comparisons between the competing sites, and the use of subjective data for two noncost criteria; (5) subsequent changes to the process, made at the request of the selecting official, did not correct these weaknesses and created concerns about the perception of bias; (6) the cumulative effect of these weaknesses raised questions about the soundness of the site selection process and the ultimate decision; (7) although various persons from the western location raised concerns about whether the decision had been predetermined, GAO found no evidence to validate these concerns; and (8) likewise, GAO found no evidence that prior studies examining the consolidation issue influenced the current site selection process or outcome. |
gao_GGD-98-175 | gao_GGD-98-175_0 | The Commissioner of Customs has designated drug enforcement to be Customs’ highest priority. Internal Control Weaknesses and Other Issues Raise Concerns About the Line Release Program
Line Release is one of two programs the Customs Service is using at its land-border cargo ports to segregate low-risk shipments from other shipments. In 1987, Customs began implementing the Line Release Program at cargo ports along the Southwest border; by the end of 1989, most of the major Southwest border cargo ports had fully implemented the program. In August 1997, Customs developed national Draft Line Release Quality Standards that, among other things, established volume and compliance eligibility criteria for program applicants and recertification standards for program participants. These weaknesses included (1) the lack of specific criteria for determining applicant eligibility at two of the three ports, (2) incomplete documentation of the screening and review of applicants at two of the three ports, and (3) lack of documentation of supervisory review and approval of decisions. Customs Officials at Three Ports Have Little Confidence in the Three Tier Targeting Program
Customs developed the Three Tier Targeting Program to help identify low- and high-risk shipments so that inspectors along the Southwest border could focus their attention on shipments determined to be high-risk for narcotics smuggling. Description of the Three Tier Targeting Program
In 1992, Customs implemented the Three Tier concept—a method of targeting shipments for narcotics examinations—at Southwest border ports. . . .” Port officials told us their inspectors now rely on other cargo entry programs—such as Line Release—to identify shipments that are low risk for drug smuggling. Prefile Process and Automated Targeting System Provide More Current Information to Assist in Identifying High-Risk Shipments
“Prefile” is a cargo entry process used at the Port of Laredo to expedite low-risk shipments. Recommendations
We recommend that the Commissioner of Customs strengthen internal control procedures for the Line Release application and review process to ensure fully researched and documented risk-assessment decisions on applicants; suspend the Three Tier Targeting Program until it can be determined if more complete and comprehensive data are available on which to base “low risk for narcotics smuggling” risk assessments; and evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of the Automated Targeting System, as designed and implemented at Laredo, and use the evaluation results to determine whether other land-border cargo ports should implement the system or whether additional testing is needed. Customs management, in their written comments, acknowledged that the Prefile Process, used in conjunction with the Automated Targeting System, does not require the use of preapproved carriers and drivers cleared under the Carrier Initiative Program and that this could be seen as a disadvantage. Yet, in July 1996, Customs strengthened the Line Release Program by requiring all participants on the Southwest border to use carriers approved under the Carrier Initiatives Program. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Custom Service's drug-enforcement operations along the Southwest border of the United States, focusing on: (1) Customs' low-risk, cargo entry programs in use at three ports on the Southwest border--Otay Mesa, California; Laredo, Texas; and Nogales, Arizona; (2) the results of GAO's evaluation of internal controls over the Line Release Program; and (3) the processes used to assess the risk of narcotics smuggling in other cargo entry programs.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) to balance the objectives of facilitating trade through ports and interdicting illegal drugs being smuggled into the United States, Customs has initiated and encouraged its ports to use several programs to identify and separate low-risk shipments from those with apparently higher smuggling risk; (2) the Line Release Program was designed to expedite cargo shipments that Customs determined to be repetitive, high volume, and low risk for narcotics smuggling; (3) in 1996, Customs implemented the Carrier Initiative Program, which required that the Line Release shipments across the Southwest border be transported by Customs-approved carriers and driven by Customs-approved drivers; (4) after the Carrier Initiative Program was implemented, the number of Southwest border Line Release shipments dropped significantly; (5) GAO identified internal control weaknesses in one or more of the processes used at each of the three ports it visited to screen Line Release applicants for entry into the program; (6) these weaknesses included: (a) lack of specific criteria for determining applicant eligibility at two of the three ports; (b) incomplete documentation of the screening and review of applicants at two of the three ports; and (c) lack of documentation of supervisory review and approval of decisions; (7) in May 1998, Customs representatives from northern and southern land-border cargo ports approved draft Line Release volume and compliance eligibility criteria for program applicants and draft recertification standards for program participants; (8) the Three Tier Targeting Program--a method of targeting high-risk shipments for narcotics inspection--was being used at the three Southwest border ports that GAO visited; (9) according to officials at the three ports GAO reviewed, the Three Tier program had two operational problems that contributed to their loss of confidence in the program's ability to distinguish high- from low-risk shipments; (10) one new targeting method--the Automated Targeting System--is being pilot tested at Laredo; (11) used in conjunction with the Prefile Program, this system is designed to enable port officials to identify and direct inspectional attention to high-risk shipments; (12) the Automated Targeting System, which automatically assesses shipment entry information for known smuggling indicators, is designed to enable inspectors to target high-risk shipments more efficiently; and (13) Customs is evaluating the Automated Targeting System for expansion to other land-border cargo ports. |
gao_GAO-17-573 | gao_GAO-17-573_0 | The Office of HUBZone Program administers the HUBZone program. Reporting Lines for Field Staff Who Implement Government Contracting and Business Development Programs Vary
OGCBD headquarters sets policies for SBA’s business development and government contracting programs, and SBA staff in field offices and other locations help to implement these programs at the local level. The reporting relationships between field staff and SBA headquarters also vary depending on the program. For example, field staff who implement government contracting programs report to OGCBD, while staff who manage the local portfolio-driven 8(a) business development program report to OFO, which oversees the field offices. In addition, OFO officials said the reporting structure, in which Business Opportunity Specialists who implement the 8(a) program report to OFO rather than to OGCBD, allows for staff to also support the goals of their district office, which may require them to support local market duties and other SBA programs, in addition to supporting the firms in their 8(a) portfolio. However, OGCBD officials told us that the current reporting structure can result in inconsistent program delivery for business development programs. Because the communications changes were implemented recently, it may be too soon to tell if they are having the intended effect. SBA Has Made Improvements to Its Certification Processes, but Some Weaknesses Remain
Over the past decade, we and SBA’s OIG have identified a number of weaknesses in the processes SBA uses to certify and recertify businesses as being eligible to participate in its HUBZone, 8(a), and WOSB programs and have made recommendations to SBA to address them. For example, in February 2015 we reported that SBA relied on firms’ attestations of continued eligibility and generally did not request supporting documentation as part of the recertification process. As of May 2017, this recommendation remains open. SBA’s OIG recommended that SBA (1) clearly document its justification for approving or denying applicants into the 8(a) program, particularly when those decisions differed from lower-level recommendations, and (2) provide documentation showing how eligibility concerns raised by lower-level reviewers were resolved for the 30 firms not documented. We made two recommendations in this report:
SBA should establish and implement comprehensive procedures to monitor and assess performance of certifiers in accord with the requirements of the third-party certifier agreement and program regulations; and
SBA should enhance examination of businesses that register to participate in the WOSB program, including actions such as developing and implementing procedures to conduct annual eligibility examinations, analyzing examination results and individual businesses found to be ineligible to better understand the cause of the high rate of ineligibility in annual reviews, and implementing ongoing reviews of a sample of all businesses that have represented their eligibility to participate in the program. In response to our recommendations, SBA has taken some actions. Legal Requirements and Volume, among Other Factors, Affect the Timeliness of SBA’s Rule-Making Actions
The timeliness of SBA’s rule-making process can vary due to the legal requirements that govern this process, among other factors. For SBA and the federal government more broadly, certain stages of the rule-making process have mandated time periods, as shown in figure 2. Interagency Review. SBA officials noted some factors that may have contributed to certain rules taking longer than anticipated in recent years. OMB officials stated that the timeliness of SBA’s rule makings is not unusual and has not raised any concerns. Various approaches exist for measuring the length of time required to develop and issue final rules, but they have limitations. Initiation to final publication. The most complete measure of the length of time for a rule making is to measure the period from initiation of the rule to final publication, but this approach is limited by disagreement as to when a rule-making process begins. For our current review of four selected SBA rules, the time between the publication of proposed and final rules ranged from 7.5 months to 17.5 months. The agency provided technical comments that we incorporated as appropriate. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report examined (1) the field-office and reporting structure the Small Business Administration (SBA) uses to implement government contracting and business development and the benefits and challenges posed by these structures; (2) progress SBA has made to strengthen its certification processes; and (3) the timeliness of SBA’s rule-making process. Further, we reviewed prior GAO and SBA Office of Inspector General (OIG) reports from 2008 through 2016 for findings related to SBA’s organizational structure and the benefits and challenges posed by its current structure. To examine the progress SBA has made to strengthen its processes for certifying small businesses as eligible to participate in its programs, we reviewed relevant laws, regulations, and agency guidance. We also reviewed four statutorily mandated SBA rules, selected from a possible 47 provisions in the National Defense Authorization Acts of fiscal years 2013, 2014, 2015, and 2016 that potentially required SBA to draft and implement rules. We selected these rules as examples of mandatory rule making. | Why GAO Did This Study
SBA's OGCBD administers a business development program and further promotes small business participation in federal contracting through a variety of other programs.
A House Committee Report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 included a provision for GAO to examine the operations of SBA's OGCBD. GAO examined (1) the field-office and reporting structure OGCBD uses to implement its government contracting and business development programs, (2) progress OGCBD has made to strengthen its processes for certifying small businesses as eligible to participate in its programs, and (3) the timeliness of SBA's rule-making process.
GAO reviewed documentation related to SBA's organizational structure and certification processes; relevant laws and regulations; SBA program guidance; and previous GAO reports. GAO interviewed SBA and OMB officials. GAO reviewed four statutorily mandated SBA rules, which were selected from 47 provisions in the National Defense Authorization Acts for fiscal years 2013, 2014, 2015, and 2016 as examples of mandatory rule making.
GAO makes no new recommendations in this report, and maintains that SBA should implement prior recommendations. SBA's technical comments on GAO's draft report are incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
The Office of Government Contracting and Business Development (OGCBD) at Small Business Administration (SBA) headquarters sets policies for SBA's business development and government contracting programs, and SBA field office staff help to implement these programs at the local level. The reporting relationships between field staff and SBA headquarters vary depending on the program. For example, field staff who implement government contracting programs report to OGCBD, while most staff who implement the 8(a) business development program report to the Office of Field Operations (OFO), which oversees SBA's field offices. SBA officials told GAO that this reporting structure, in which some field staff implement OGCBD programs but report to OFO, offers some benefits—for example, it allows these staff to support the goals of OGCBD programs as well as those of the individual field offices. However, officials also said the reporting structure can result in inconsistent program delivery. They described recent steps to improve communication between OGCBD and field staff, but it is too soon to tell if these steps will be effective.
SBA has taken some steps to address weaknesses GAO and the SBA Office of Inspector General (OIG) have identified in its processes for certifying small businesses as eligible to participate in SBA programs, but some recommendations remain open. For example, GAO found in 2015 that SBA had not required firms seeking recertification for the Historically Underutilized Business Zone (HUBZone) program to submit any information to verify continued eligibility and instead relied on firms' attestations of continued eligibility. GAO recommended that SBA assess the HUBZone recertification process and add additional controls; SBA had not yet implemented this recommendation as of May 2017. SBA's OIG also found in 2016 that SBA managers overturned lower-level reviewers' decisions to deny firms admission to the 8(a) program without documenting in the information system how eligibility concerns were resolved. SBA's OIG recommended that SBA clearly document the justification for approving or denying firms. In response, SBA stated that managers are now required to document decisions in the system that differ from those of lower-level reviewers.
A number of legal requirements and the volume of required rule makings, among other factors, affect the timeliness of SBA's rule-making process. Certain stages of the rule-making process have mandated time periods, such as the required 90-day interagency review process for certain rules. Various approaches exist for measuring the length of time required to develop and issue final rules, but they have limitations. For example, in measuring the period from rule initiation to final publication, agencies may differ on when they mark initiation. For four finalized SBA rules GAO reviewed, the time from publication of the proposed rule to publication of the final rule varied from 7.5 months to 17.5 months. SBA officials noted that an increase in the number of statutorily mandated rules in recent years has contributed to delays in the agency's ability to promulgate rules in a more timely fashion. Office of Management and Budget (OMB) officials GAO spoke with stated that the length of time for SBA's rule makings is not unusual and has not raised any concerns. |
gao_GAO-01-195 | gao_GAO-01-195_0 | Conclusions
Voluntary compliance with tax laws is the foundation of the U.S. tax system. This foundation can be eroded if the general public perceives that federal workers and former federal workers successfully evade their tax obligations. IRS records indicate that federal workers and annuitants, and IRS workers in particular, appear to be more compliant in meeting their tax responsibilities than the general population. Nonetheless, there are some federal workers and annuitants whom IRS records indicate are not fulfilling their tax responsibilities and owe the federal government about $2.5 billion in outstanding taxes. In its attempt to improve management and collection of federal taxes owed by federal workers and annuitants, IRS faces the same issues hindering its ability to manage and collect unpaid taxes of the general population. With respect to IRS’ efforts to improve compliance among federal workers and annuitants, IRS must first be able to determine how effective its program for this purpose has been and what, if any, modifications are needed to ensure that the program meets its objectives. | What GAO Found
Voluntary compliance with tax laws, the foundation of the U.S. tax system, could be undermined if the public perceives that federal workers and former federal workers successfully evade their tax obligations. Internal Revenue Service (IRS) records indicate that federal workers and annuitants, and IRS workers in particular, appear to be more compliant in meeting their tax responsibilities than the general population. Nonetheless, IRS records indicate that some federal workers and annuitants are not fulfilling their tax responsibilities and owe the federal government about $2.5 billion in outstanding taxes. In its attempt to improve management and collection of federal taxes owed by federal workers and annuitants, IRS faces the same issues hindering its ability to manage and collect unpaid taxes of the general population. With respect to IRS' efforts to improve compliance among federal workers and annuitants, IRS must first be able to determine how effective its program for this purpose has been and what, if any, modifications are needed to ensure that the program meets its objectives. |
gao_GAO-15-41 | gao_GAO-15-41_0 | GSA has key leadership responsibilities related to real property management for the federal government. Warehouse Inventory Is Vast and Diverse, but Data in the Federal Real Property Database Are Not Consistent or Transparent
GSA, Interior, and DOE Hold or Lease Over Half of Civilian Warehouse Space Owned or Leased by the Federal Government
According to FRPP data, in fiscal year 2013, three agencies held or leased most of the civilian warehouse space either owned or leased by the federal government: GSA, Interior, and DOE. In addition, civilian agencies leased about 1,000 warehouses covering about 24-million square feet of warehouse space. These warehouses were occupied by GSA or other federal agencies, as GSA provides other agencies with warehouse space from its government- owned inventory as well as through leases with private lessors. 2.) 3.) We found that among the warehouses listed in the FRPP as utilized, some were vacant for long periods of time. As such, while GSA’s interpretation of utilization in the FRPP may be explained given its government landlord role, its warehouse data in the FRPP—for warehouses GSA uses and those that it provides to tenant agencies— could be misinterpreted by decision makers, including Congress, OMB, and agencies, to mean that nearly all GSA warehouse space is being used for storage. Selected Agencies Report a Wide Range of Challenges in Acquiring, Managing, and Disposing of Warehouse Space
Challenges Acquiring Warehouse Space: Storage Specifications and Funding Constraints Increase Reliance on Leased Space
GSA, in its landlord role, is responsible for acquiring warehouses on behalf of federal agencies and works with those agencies to identify their storage needs. According to fiscal year 2013 FRPP data, the federal government leased about 24million square feet of warehouse space for civilian use, a substantial increase from the approximately 19-million square feet of leased warehouse space for both civilian and defense agencies reported in a 1999 GSA report on government warehouse, storage, and distribution functions. Aging buildings can also mean warehouses no longer meet agencies’ storage requirements, which can result in agencies vacating for newer space. However, required environmental assessments and remediation of excess or surplus property can be expensive and time consuming. GSA’s Office of Government-wide Policy (OGP) is the primary unit that performs such a role. Conclusions
The federal government’s vast and diverse civilian warehouse portfolio presents challenges to agencies—including reliance on costly, long-term leasing and aging and obsolete warehouses—when acquiring, managing, and disposing of warehouse space. Recommendations for Executive Action
To enhance the transparency of the FRPP data and help GSA make more informed decisions regarding the planning, effective and efficient management, and disposal of civilian warehouse assets, we recommend that the Administrator of GSA take the following three actions: In GSA’s FRPP documents, GSA should make transparent how its mission, which is to provide space to federal agencies, affects the reporting of its real property portfolio as it relates to utilization and status data elements. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to examine (1) available information on federal warehouses held or leased by civilian agencies in terms of size, location, utilization, and purpose; (2) challenges selected civilian agencies report in acquiring, managing, and disposing of warehouse space; and (3) the extent to which GSA has fulfilled its federal real property leadership role with respect to warehouses. We identified three real property-holding agencies for our review: the General Services Administration (GSA), the Department of the Interior (Interior), and the Department of Energy (DOE). | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO has identified managing the federal government's real property portfolio—which includes warehouses— as a high-risk area, due to long-standing problems such as reliance on long-term leasing. In 2013, federal civilian agencies reported that they occupied approximately 19,000 warehouses consisting of approximately 90-million square feet of space. GAO was asked to examine the management of federal civilian warehouses.
This report examines (1) available information on the characteristics of federal warehouses held or leased by civilian agencies; (2) the challenges selected civilian agencies report in acquiring, managing, and disposing of warehouse space; and (3) the extent to which GSA has fulfilled its federal real property leadership role with respect to warehouses. GAO analyzed fiscal year 2013 FRPP data on warehouses held or leased by federal civilian agencies; visited 30 GSA, Interior, and DOE warehouses—selected to reflect a variety of uses and sizes—and interviewed officials from the three agencies about real property data, the characteristics of warehouses, challenges to warehouse management, and GSA's real-property leadership role.
What GAO Found
The federal government's vast civilian warehouse inventory supports a wide range of agencies' storage needs; however, some data in the Federal Real Property Portfolio (FRPP) are not transparent for decision makers. According to the fiscal year 2013 FRPP data, three civilian agencies—the General Services Administration (GSA), the Department of the Interior (Interior), and the Department of Energy (DOE)—held or leased the most civilian warehouse space. GSA's warehouse portfolio— the largest covering about 29-million square feet—was divided across multiple agencies. This is because of GSA's landlord role to provide federal agencies with space from its government-owned inventory, as well as through leases with private companies. In the FRPP, GSA classified nearly all of this warehouse space as utilized and active. However, GAO found that among these warehouses were buildings that were vacant for extended periods of time. This discrepancy raises questions about the transparency and usefulness of FRPP warehouse data, which could be misinterpreted by decision makers, including Congress and the Office of Management and Budget.
GSA, Interior, and DOE officials reported a wide range of challenges in acquiring , managing , and disposing of warehouse space, for example:
Storage specifications related to the materials being stored, such as humidity controls for paper documents, can pose challenges acquiring space.
Aging and historical facilities can be difficult to manage because they require costly maintenance or may no longer meet agencies' storage requirements.
Agencies are required to address contamination or environmental concerns when disposing of warehouses—for example through sale or demolition—which can be expensive and time consuming. Disposing of warehouses in remote or secured areas can be particularly challenging.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that GSA take actions to (1) enhance transparency of the FRPP data, (2) develop and implement a strategy to prioritize and plan for warehouse space, and (3) develop a strategy for its government-wide policy role in relation to warehouses. GSA generally agreed with the recommendations. |
gao_HEHS-98-75 | gao_HEHS-98-75_0 | SSA conducts this match annually. For example, SSA’s fiscal year 1996 payment accuracy study shows that out of a total of $1.6 billion in overpayments, approximately 40 percent (nearly $647.6 million) was the result of nondisclosed earnings and financial accounts. About $379.5 million of these overpayments occurred because SSI clients did not disclose their earnings and $268.1 million occurred because SSI clients did not disclose their financial accounts. SSA conducts a second annual payment accuracy study, which contains more detailed information on the amount of overpayments in the SSI program. SSA could obtain such information by using new data sources on earnings and by enhancing its current computer-matching procedures. Because of the age of the data used in the match, these matches can detect only undisclosed earnings that were received 6 to 21 months in the past. OCSE uses this information to identify those parents who could make child support payments. SSA could also reduce the number and duration of earnings overpayments to ongoing recipients by using the new earnings data in a more fully automated computer matching process. More Current and Comprehensive Information on Financial Accounts May Be Available
As is the case with earnings, SSA’s present data sources and procedures for detecting undisclosed financial accounts do not provide up-to-date and comprehensive information on the accounts of applicants and recipients. Detection of such accounts, both at the application stage and once recipients are on SSI’s rolls, would prevent many of these overpayments and reduce the number and duration of others. SSA’s Present Approach to Detecting Undisclosed Financial Accounts Relies on Old Data
SSA’s current approach to identifying financial accounts can result in ineligible individuals getting on SSI’s rolls and remaining there for long periods of time. In addition to preventing significant overpayments, the agency would save the costs associated with processing invalid claims and determining medical and vocational disability for ineligible applicants. Conclusions
The two OCSE earnings databases, as well as data from the financial institution industry, would provide SSA with information needed to prevent or reduce overpayments resulting from undisclosed earnings and financial accounts. Study the feasibility of obtaining computerized information from financial institutions to detect financial accounts that SSI clients do not report during the application process and during subsequent determinations of eligibility. Field staff could use these databases to prevent overpayments by checking for undisclosed earnings at the time of application. He responded in the affirmative, stating that he would like us to examine (1) the extent to which overpayments occur because SSI applicants and recipients fail to disclose their earnings and financial accounts, (2) whether SSA could obtain more current and comprehensive information than it does now to detect the nondisclosure of earnings, and (3) whether the agency could also obtain more current and comprehensive information on financial accounts. We also interviewed government officials to determine to what extent the earnings information from the OCSE databases would be more current and comprehensive than the data presently used by SSA to verify earnings information reported by SSI clients. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO conducted a follow-up review on the feasibility of the Social Security Administration (SSA) using new data sources on earnings and financial account information to determine applicants' eligibility for the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program, focusing on: (1) the extent to which overpayments occur because SSI clients fail to disclose their earnings and financial accounts; (2) whether SSA could obtain more current and comprehensive information to detect undisclosed earnings; and (3) whether the agency could obtain more current and comprehensive information on undisclosed financial accounts.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) unreported or underreported earnings and financial accounts continue to result in significant overpayments in the SSI program; (2) according to SSA's overpayment data, the failure of SSI clients to disclose earnings and financial accounts was responsible for approximately 40 percent of the $1.6 billion in overpayments identified for fiscal year 1996; (3) specifically, about $379.5 million in overpayments was the result of SSI clients not fully disclosing their earnings, and $268.1 million was the result of clients not disclosing financial account information; (4) more current and comprehensive information is now available to detect undisclosed earnings; (5) SSA detects overpayments resulting from undisclosed earnings primarily by matching information provided by SSI clients with earnings data used in the administration of other government programs; (6) however, computerized matches, which are not done until individuals are on SSI's rolls, have built-in delays in detecting overpayments that range from 6 to 21 months; (7) two databases developed for use by the Office of Child Support Enforcement (OCSE) could provide SSA with more current and comprehensive earnings information; (8) SSA could check these databases prior to placing applicants on the rolls and thereby prevent overpayments caused by applicants failing to disclose earnings at the time of application; (9) these databases would also allow SSA to detect occurrences of undisclosed earnings to ongoing recipients within 4 to 6 months and thereby reduce the number and duration of the corresponding overpayments; (10) opportunities for improved financial account information also exist; (11) SSA detects undisclosed financial accounts by conducting computer matches once a client's eligibility has been established; (12) this match, however, can only detect undisclosed accounts that existed 9 to 21 months before; (13) SSA could obtain up-to-date information on the financial accounts of SSI clients from financial institutions by accessing the nationwide telecommunication network, which links all financial institutions; (14) such information would help ensure that applicants whose bank accounts would make them ineligible for the program do not gain eligibility; and (15) by eliminating ineligible individuals at the point of application, SSA could avoid the expense of determining medical and vocation disability and could also reduce the number and duration of overpayments to ongoing recipients who are overpaid because of newly acquired financial accounts or increases in existing ones. |
gao_GAO-05-182 | gao_GAO-05-182_0 | However, Congress did not require DOD to report when a program has been rebaselined. In addition to the comprehensive annual report to Congress for the period ending December 31, DOD also prepares a quarterly report for the second, third, and fourth quarters of the fiscal year when there has been an increase of 15 percent or greater in the current estimate of the program acquisition unit cost or average procurement unit cost in base- year dollars; a 6-month or greater delay in the current estimate of any schedule milestone since the current estimate of the previous report; or a milestone B or C and associated acquisition program baseline approval within 90 days prior to the quarterly report as of that date. Information for Congress on Unit Cost Performance Could Be More Complete
DOD could be reporting more complete information on unit cost performance to Congress for its authorization and appropriations deliberations. However, by comparing the latest unit cost estimate with the most recent approved baseline, DOD provides an incomplete perspective on a program’s performance because a rebaseline shortens the period of performance reported and resets the measurement of cost growth to zero. In providing information to Congress, DOD does not measure and report two meaningful perspectives—cumulative unit cost growth in constant dollars and the change in unit cost between one budget request and the next. For example, DOD reported in the December 2003 SAR that the Marine Corps’ H-1 helicopter upgrade program’s unit cost has shrunk by 1 percent in the last 20 months; however, DOD did not report that the program’s unit cost had, in constant dollars, doubled in the last 87 months. DOD did not report that the costs increased by more than one-third, once the effects of inflation are removed. Reporting of Rebaselinings Could Be More Timely and Unclassified Data Is Unnecessarily Restricted
DOD could be more timely in reporting to Congress that it has rebaselined individual programs. A key factor here is DOD is not required by statute or its own policies to report a program’s rebaseline to Congress. A new baseline approved after early April may not be reported to Congress before the enactment of authorization and appropriations legislation. For example, the DD(X) Destroyer program established a new baseline on April 23, 2002, but did not report this new baseline to Congress in a SAR until April 2003. As result, between the April 2002 and the passage of the fiscal year 2003 defense budget, the SAR provided to Congress did not reflect the approved baseline for the DD(X) program. DOD classified about 50 percent of the SARs it submitted to Congress in 2003, involving a total acquisition investment of $454 billion. However, only a small amount of data contained in each classified SAR is actually classified. Because these SARs are classified, special handling procedures must be used by those congressional staff with the appropriate clearances even to access the unclassified cost and schedule data. As a result, congressional oversight of DOD’s adherence to established cost and schedule baselines is unnecessarily constrained. Recommendations for Executive Action
To provide Congress with more complete, timely, and accessible information, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense implement the following four recommendations in the department’s reporting of data on major defense acquisition program baselines (APB) and performance measure and report a full history of unit cost performance in constant dollars by comparing the latest cost and quantity estimates with: the first full estimate (typically the original acquisition program baseline established at Milestone B); the current approved program baseline or, if the program rebaselines, the prior approved program baseline; and the estimate established with the previous year’s budget request. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD has more than $1 trillion worth of major defense acquisition programs, on which it must report to Congress, including a comparison of a current program's costs to a baseline containing its cost, quantity, schedule, and performance goals. When these goals are changed, the program is "rebaselined" to reflect current status. However, measuring current estimates against the most recent baseline without additional perspectives may obscure for Congress how programs are performing over time. Concerned over this, you asked GAO to examine how DOD's use of rebaselining has affected the adequacy of data provided to Congress on major defense acquisition programs.
What GAO Found
DOD could be reporting more complete information beyond what is required by law on the unit cost performance of major defense acquisition programs to Congress for its authorization and appropriations deliberations. DOD does present Congress with valuable information about a program's performance by comparing the latest unit cost estimate against the most recent approved baseline. However, this provides only one perspective on performance because rebaselining shortens the period of performance reported and resets the measurement of cost growth to zero. Other meaningful perspectives are not reported. First, DOD does not report the cumulative unit cost growth, in constant dollars, that a program has experienced since the first full baseline was established. For example, DOD reported in the 2003 Selected Acquisition Report (SAR), the most recent available, that the F/A-22 Raptor program's unit cost decreased by 0.33 percent in the previous 4 months--since the latest rebaselining. DOD did not report that the program's unit cost had cumulatively increased by 72 percent in the last 143 months. Second, the change in unit cost between one budget request to Congress and the next is not measured or reported. For example, DOD reported in the 2003 SAR that unit cost for the Stryker program increased by 1.34 percent in the 2 months since the latest rebaselining; it did not report that unit cost had grown by 21 percent in the previous 12 months. DOD could be more timely in reporting to Congress that it has rebaselined individual programs. A key factor is that DOD is not required by statute or its own policies to report a program's rebaseline to Congress. Although DOD includes the latest rebaselining actions in the April SARs, a rebaseline approved after early April may not be reported to Congress before it enacts the authorization and appropriations legislation. For example, the DD(X) Destroyer program established a new baseline on April 23, 2002, but did not report this new baseline to Congress in a SAR until April 2003. As a result, between April 2002 and the passage of the fiscal year 2003 defense budget, the SAR provided Congress did not reflect the approved baseline for the DD(X) program. Congressional oversight of DOD's adherence to established cost and schedule baselines is unnecessarily constrained because DOD classifies about 50 percent of the SARs it submits to Congress, despite the fact that only a small amount of data in each of these SARs is actually classified. This reporting practice restricts access to the unclassified cost, quantity, and schedule data for congressional staff without security clearances and requires special handling procedures of that unclassified data by those with clearances. |
gao_RCED-97-53 | gao_RCED-97-53_0 | Projected Salvage Volumes Were Achieved, but More Could Have Been Offered for Sale
For fiscal years 1995 and 1996 and the first quarter of fiscal 1997, the Forest Service offered for sale a total of 4.6 billion board feet of salvage timber, which was 1.2 billion board feet above the programmed levels for this period before the salvage rider. In addition, the total volume offered was about 2 percent more than the projected target of 4.5 billion board feet specified in the Secretary of Agriculture’s June 29, 1995, letter to the Speaker of the House. Department of Agriculture’s Actions Delayed the Sale of Significant Volumes of Salvage Timber
The Secretary of Agriculture’s July 2, 1996, memorandum to the Forest Service provided revised direction for the emergency salvage sale program. Selected Provisions of the Salvage Rider Had Little Effect on Timber Volumes
The salvage rider contained numerous provisions designed to help the Forest Service expedite the preparation and award of salvage sales, thus increasing the volume of salvage timber offered for sale. We examined the Forest Service’s implementation of and the effect of four of these provisions dealing with the elimination of the appeals process, expedited judicial review, preparation of combined environmental documents, and use of retired Forest Service employees and contractors at four national forests located in four different Forest Service regions. Although our analysis indicated that the salvage rider provision exempting salvage sales from appeal had little effect on the number of sales or the volume of salvage timber offered for sale under the emergency salvage program, officials from three of the four national forests we visited told us that the provision should be made a permanent part of the Forest Service’s policies and guidelines because it has the potential to expedite the efforts at the national forests to offer salvage timber for sale after the expiration of the salvage rider. However, the forests continued to prepare separate documents and then combined them with a staple or clip. In addition, Payette National Forest officials said that by keeping the environmental assessments and biological evaluations separate, they could plan and prepare their salvage sales faster. Forest Service officials said that combining the two documents resulted in an excessive amount of detailed information that was not needed for the decision-making activities associated with national forest salvage sales. Nationwide, only a total of 10 former employees were hired. Forest Service Had Adequate Documentation on Salvage Sales to Justify Decisions
At three of the forests we visited, we reviewed 14 salvage sales for which the Forest Service had received complaints from environmental organizations that the salvage sales contained excessive volumes of green timber and therefore did not comply with the definition of salvage sales under the salvage rider. The contract files for all of the 14 salvage sales contained sufficient documentation to support the Forest Services’s conclusion that these sales met the definition of a salvage sale in the salvage rider and the Forest Service’s guidelines. However, because of the more stringent criteria imposed by the Secretary’s memorandum, the Clearwater National Forest delayed offering the four salvage sales until after the salvage rider expired because (1) three of the sales had initially been planned as green timber sales prior to the salvage rider’s implementation and (2) in the fourth sale, the green timber comprised over 25 percent of the offering. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Forest Service's emergency salvage timber program, commonly referred to as the salvage rider, focusing on: (1) the volume of salvage timber offered by the Forest Service under the salvage rider from fiscal year (FY) 1995 through December 1996 compared with the volume that it had planned to offer for the same period prior to passage of the rider; (2) the effect of the Secretary of Agriculture's July 2, 1996, memorandum, which placed more restrictions on salvage sales; (3) whether four specific provisions of the salvage rider helped the Forest Service to offer salvage timber for sale more timely; and (4) whether certain salvage sales that were of concern to environmental organizations met the definition of salvage timber as specified in the salvage rider and Forest Service's guidelines.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) under the emergency salvage program, the Forest Service offered for sale a total of 4.6 billion board feet of salvage timber, which was 1.2 billion board feet more than the Forest Service had planned to offer before the rider; (2) the total volume offered under the rider was about 2 percent more than the target of 4.5 billion board feet specified in the Secretary of Agriculture's letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives; (3) the volume of salvage timber offered for sale under the salvage rider could have been significantly greater; (4) four selected provisions of the rider had little effect on either expediting the preparation and award of salvage sales or increasing the volume of the salvage timber offered for sale for the four forests GAO visited; (5) two of the provisions, eliminating the appeals process and expediting judicial review, were of little help because, traditionally, the Forest Service experiences few appeals or legal challenges when selling salvage timber; (6) the rider required that for each salvage sale, the national forest shall prepare a document that combines an environmental assessment and a biological evaluation; (7) this provision was implemented by simply attaching the documents together; (8) Forest Service officials believed that by continuing to prepare separate documents, they could plan and prepare their salvage sales faster and that combining the two documents resulted in an excessive amount of detailed information that was not needed for decisionmaking activities; (9) at the four forests GAO visited, only one retired employee was rehired and a few contractors were used; (10) nationwide, 10 retired employees were rehired and no statistics are available on how may contractors were used: (11) GAO reviewed 14 salvage sales for which the Forest Service had received complaints from environmental organizations that the sales contained excessive volumes of green timber, live and healthy trees, and thus did not comply with the definition of a salvage sale under the salvage rider; (12) GAO's analysis of the contract files for all of the 14 salvage sales showed that they contained sufficient documentation to support the Forest Service's conclusions that these sales met the salvage rider's definition of a salvage sale and the Forest Service's guidelines for implementing the rider; and (13) however, the Forest Service delayed offering 6 of the 14 timber sales until after the salvage rider had expired because of the more restrictive eligibility criteria for salvage sales set forth in the Secretary of Agriculture's memorandum. |
gao_GAO-03-89 | gao_GAO-03-89_0 | However, analysts lowered revenue estimates for a number of reasons, including increased pressure from U.S. lawmakers and the blocking of Internet gambling transactions by many large U.S. credit card issuers. 1). The Legal Framework for Internet Gambling Is Complex
Both federal and state laws apply to Internet gambling in the United States. To date, the Wire Act is the federal statute that has been used to prosecute federal Internet gambling cases, although courts sometimes disagree on the applicability of certain provisions of the statute. These countries take a variety of approaches to regulating Internet gambling. They also agreed that on- line payment providers present a challenge to credit card companies that are trying to restrict the use of their cards for Internet gambling. VISA and MasterCard have each developed a system of coding that allows member institutions, at their discretion, to block Internet gambling transactions. The issuer can then deny authorization. 2). Law enforcement officials believed that money laundering activities could potentially be conducted on both legitimate and complicit Internet gambling sites.Representatives of the credit card and gaming industries believed that Internet gambling was not necessarily more susceptible to money laundering than any other type of on-line transaction. Treasury Enforcement officials also noted with concern how certain gaming merchants have attempted to circumvent the credit card coding system through factoring. In general, gaming industry officials did not believe that Internet gambling was any more or less susceptible to money laundering than other electronic commerce businesses and noted that the financial industry— which is responsible for the payments system—is better suited to monitoring for related suspicious activity in the area than the gaming industry itself. To obtain an understanding of the nature and extent of policies and procedures implemented by the credit card industry to restrict the use of credit cards as a form of payment for Internet gambling, we interviewed officials from the four major credit card organizations, some large issuing and acquiring member banks, third-party processors, on-line payment providers, bank regulators, and banking trade associations. To obtain views on the vulnerability of Internet gambling to money laundering, we interviewed gaming and Internet gambling industry experts, knowledgeable U.S. state representatives, and law enforcement officials (including appropriate officials in Treasury’s Office of the Undersecretary for Enforcement and DOJ’s Criminal Division, the FBI, and the Executive Office of US Attorneys, and the state attorneys general listed above) to obtain their views on the susceptibility of Internet gambling to money laundering and on some of the legal issues pertaining to on-line gaming and betting. Appendix III: Internet Gambling Regulation in Foreign Jurisdictions
The regulation of Internet gambling in foreign countries and jurisdictions varies widely, with some countries permitting it, others banning it, and others taking a mixed approach by prohibiting some forms of Internet gambling and regulating other forms. | Why GAO Did This Study
Internet gambling is a fast-growing industry with estimated 2003 revenues of more than $4 billion. However, concerns have been raised about its social and economic impacts. In light of recent recommendations by a Congressionally appointed commission, which advocated restricting Internet gambling within the United States, GAO was asked to examine the U.S. payments system, particularly credit cards, as it relates to interactive on-line gaming. We examined (1) the legal framework for Internet gambling domestically and abroad; (2) the credit card industry's policies regarding the use of credit cards to pay for Internet gambling and actions taken to restrict such usage; and (3) the views of law enforcement, banking regulators, and the credit card and gaming industries on the vulnerability of Internet gambling to money laundering. We issued an interim report on these issues in September 2002. GAO makes no recommendations in this report.
What GAO Found
The global legal framework for Internet gambling is a complicated mix of laws and regulations. In the United States, both federal and state statutes apply. Gambling is generally regulated at the state level, with federal law supporting state laws and regulations to ensure that interstate and foreign commerce do not circumvent them. The Wire Act, which prohibits gambling businesses from using interstate or international telecommunications wires to knowingly transmit or receive bets, is the main federal statute used to prosecute such activity. Foreign countries and jurisdictions have taken a variety of approaches to regulating on-line gaming, including legalizing some forms, seeking effective regulatory approaches, and prohibiting it entirely. The major participants in the credit card industry have tried to restrict the use of their cards for Internet gambling by prohibiting cardholders from using the cards to gamble on line and developing transaction codes that banks can use to block payments at their discretion. Many large U.S. credit card issuers also use codes to deny authorization for Internet gambling transactions, and U.S.-based banks do not accept gambling Web sites as merchants. Despite attempts to circumvent these efforts by using improper coding, the success of these restrictions has caused gaming analysts to lower their 2003 revenue projections for the on-line gaming industry. Representatives of law enforcement agencies told us that Internet gambling could be used to launder money, but others viewed the threat as less serious. Law enforcement representatives said that the anonymity and jurisdictional issues characteristic of Internet gambling make on-line gaming a potentially powerful tool for money launderers. They noted that few money laundering cases involving Internet gambling had been prosecuted but attributed the small number of cases primarily to a lack of regulation and oversight. However, regulatory agencies and officials from the credit card and gaming industries did not believe that Internet gambling was any more susceptible to money laundering than other forms of e-commerce. |
gao_GAO-11-536 | gao_GAO-11-536_0 | To determine the current status of the recommendations, we (1) obtained IRS’s reported status of each recommendation and corrective action taken or planned as of March 2011, (2) compared IRS’s reported status to our fiscal year 2010 audit findings to identify any differences between IRS’s and our conclusions regarding the status of each recommendation, and (3) performed additional follow-up work to assess IRS’s actions taken to address the open recommendations. IRS Faces Significant Financial Management Challenges
IRS continues to make progress in resolving its internal control weaknesses and addressing outstanding recommendations, but it still faces significant financial management challenges. Further, as in previous years’ audits, our fiscal year 2010 audit continued to identify additional internal control issues, resulting in 29 new recommendations for corrective action. As we reported in our audit of IRS’s fiscal year 2010 financial statements, IRS has made progress in addressing numerous weaknesses in information security internal control. We also consider the majority of the recommendations outstanding from prior years to be short-term; however, a few, particularly those concerning the functionality of IRS’s automated systems, are complex and will require several more years to fully and effectively address. Appendix I presents a summary listing of (1) the 85 non-information- systems security–related recommendations based on our financial statement audits and other financial management–related work that we had not previously reported as closed and the 29 new recommendations based on our fiscal year 2010 financial audit, (2) IRS-reported corrective actions taken or planned as of March 2011, and (3) our analysis of whether the issues that gave rise to the recommendations have been effectively addressed, based primarily on the work performed during our fiscal year 2010 financial statement audit. Open Recommendations Grouped by Internal Control Activity
Linking the open recommendations from our financial audits and other financial management–related work, and the issues that gave rise to them, to internal control activities that are central to IRS’s tax administration responsibilities provides insight regarding their significance. Safeguarding of Assets and Security Activities
Given IRS’s mission, the sensitivity of the data it maintains, and its processing of trillions of dollars of tax receipts each year, one of the most important control activities at IRS is the safeguarding of assets. This recommendation is short-term in nature. IRS has made substantial progress in improving its financial management and internal control since its first financial audit, as evidenced by unqualified audit opinions on its financial statements for the past 11 years, resolution of several material internal control weaknesses, significant deficiencies, and other control issues, and actions taken resulting in the closure of hundreds of financial management recommendations. This progress has been the result of hard work by many individuals throughout IRS and sustained commitment of IRS leadership. Nonetheless, more needs to be done to fully address the agency’s continuing financial management challenges— resolving material weaknesses and significant deficiencies in internal control; developing outcome-oriented performance metrics that can facilitate managing operations for outcomes; and correcting numerous other internal control issues. Effective implementation of the recommendations we have made through our financial audits and related work could greatly assist IRS in improving its internal controls and achieving sound financial management. IRS also commented that it is committed to implementing appropriate improvement to ensure that it maintains sound financial management practices. The recommendations in table 12 address these weaknesses. These weaknesses, collectively, represent a material weakness. | Why GAO Did This Study
In its role as the nation's tax collector, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has a demanding responsibility to annually collect trillions of dollars in taxes, process hundreds of millions of tax and information returns, and enforce the nation's tax laws. Since its first audit of IRS's financial statements in fiscal year 1992, GAO has identified a number of weaknesses in IRS's financial management operations. In related reports, GAO has recommended corrective actions to address those weaknesses. Each year, as part of the annual audit of IRS's financial statements, GAO makes recommendations to address any new weaknesses identified and follows up on the status of IRS's efforts to address the weaknesses GAO identified in previous years' audits. The purpose of this report is to (1) provide an overview of the financial management challenges still facing IRS, (2) provide the status of financial audit and financial management-related recommendations and the actions needed to address them, and (3) highlight the relationship between GAO's recommendations and internal control activities central to IRS's mission and goals.
What GAO Found
IRS has made progress in improving its internal controls and financial management since its first financial statement audit in 1992, as evidenced by 11 consecutive years of clean audit opinions on its financial statements, the resolution of several material internal control weaknesses, and actions resulting in the closure of nearly 300 financial management recommendations. This progress has been the result of hard work throughout IRS and sustained commitment at the top levels of the agency. However, IRS still faces significant financial management challenges in (1) resolving its remaining material weaknesses and significant deficiency in internal control, (2) developing outcome-oriented performance metrics, and (3) correcting numerous other internal control issues, especially those relating to safeguarding tax receipts and taxpayer information. At the beginning of GAO's audit of IRS's fiscal year 2010 financial statements, 85 financial management-related recommendations from prior audits remained open because IRS had not fully addressed the underlying issues. During the fiscal year 2010 financial audit, IRS took actions that GAO considered sufficient to close 37 recommendations. At the same time, GAO identified additional internal control issues resulting in 29 new recommendations. In total, 77 recommendations remain open. To assist IRS in evaluating and improving internal controls, GAO categorized the 77 open recommendations by various internal control activities, which, in turn, were grouped into three broad control categories. The continued existence of internal control weaknesses that gave rise to these recommendations represents a serious obstacle for IRS. Effective implementation of GAO's recommendations can greatly assist IRS in improving its internal controls and achieving sound financial management, which are integral to effectively carrying out its tax administration responsibilities. Most recommendations can be addressed within the next year or two. However, a few recommendations, particularly those concerning the functionality of IRS's automated systems, are complex and will require several more years to effectively address.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making any recommendations in this report. In commenting on a draft of this report, IRS stated that it is committed to implementing appropriate improvements to maintain sound financial management practices. |
gao_GAO-11-813T | gao_GAO-11-813T_0 | The Absence of a Risk Management Program Hampers FPS’s Ability to Protect Federal Facilities
For many years we have advocated the use of a risk management approach that entails managing risk through actions, including setting strategic goals and objectives, assessing risk, allocating resources based on risk, evaluating alternatives, selecting initiatives to undertake, and implementing and monitoring those initiatives. Despite the importance of this mission, FPS has not implemented an effective risk management program. In August 2010, we reported that FPS does not use a comprehensive risk management approach that links threats and vulnerabilities to resource requirements. Instead, FPS uses a facility-by- facility approach to risk management: we reported in 2010 that FPS assumes that all facilities with the same security level have the same risk regardless of their location. In response to our recommendations in this area, FPS began developing a new system, the Risk Assessment and Management Program (RAMP). FPS Has Not Fully Addressed Several Key Human Capital Issues
Over the last 3 years we have reported on the challenges FPS has faced in the human capital area since moving to DHS from GSA in 2003. As mandated by Congress, in 2009 FPS increased the size of its workforce to 1,200 full time employees. However, FPS continues to operate without a strategic human capital plan. We recommended in 2009 that FPS develop a human capital plan to guide its current and future workforce planning efforts. In addition, we found that FPS’s workforce planning is limited because FPS headquarters does not collect data on its workforce’s knowledge, skills, and abilities. Without such information, FPS is not able to determine what its optimal staffing levels should be or identify gaps in its workforce needs and determine how to modify its workforce planning strategies to fill these gaps. FPS also has yet to fully ensure that its recent move to an inspector- based workforce does not hinder its ability to protect federal facilities. FPS Faces Longstanding Challenges in Managing Its Contract Guard Workforce
FPS’s contract guard program is the most visible component of the agency’s operations and the agency relies on its guards to be its “eyes and ears” while performing their duties. Since 2009, we have identified weaknesses in FPS’s contract guard program which hamper its ability to protect federal facilities. For example, we reported in 2009 and in 2010 that FPS does not have a reliable system to ensure that its 13,000 guards have the training and certifications required to stand post at federal facilities or comply with post orders once they are deployed. In response to our recommendations, FPS has taken several steps to improve the oversight of its contract guard program. Additionally, FPS began the process of providing additional x-ray and magnetometer training for its workforce. FPS Has Not Reviewed Its Fee Design or Determined an Appropriate Funding Mechanism
We reported in May 2011 that FPS increased its basic security fee 4 times in 6 years to try to cover costs (an increase of over 100 percent). However, FPS has not reviewed its fees to develop an informed, deliberate fee design. FPS has broad authority to design its security fees, but the current fee structure has consistently resulted in total collection amounts less than agency costs, is not well understood or accepted by tenant agencies, and continues to be a topic of congressional interest and inquiry. In 2008, we recommended that FPS evaluate whether its use of a fee- based system or an alternative funding mechanism is the most appropriate manner to fund the agency. Since 2008, we have made 28 recommendations to help FPS to address its challenges with risk management, strategic human capital planning, oversight of its contract guard workforce, and its fee-based funding structure. DHS and FPS have generally agreed with these recommendations. As of July 2011, as shown in Table 1, FPS was in the process of addressing 21 of them, although none were fully implemented. According to FPS officials, the agency has faced difficulty in implementing many of our recommendations because of changes in its leadership, organization, funding, and staffing levels. In addition, FPS officials stated that its progress in implementing our recommendations has been affected by delays in developing several new management systems, such as RAMP. Homeland Security: Ongoing Challenges Impact the Federal Protective Service’s Ability to Protect Federal Facilities. Homeland Security: Preliminary Results Show Federal Protective Service’s Ability to Protect Federal Facilities Is Hampered By Weaknesses in Its Contract Security Guard Program. | Why GAO Did This Study
As part of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Federal Protective Service (FPS) is responsible for protecting federal employees and visitors in approximately 9,000 federal facilities owned or leased by the General Services Administration (GSA). FPS has a budget of approximately $1 billion and maintains approximately 1,200 full-time employees and about 13,000 contract security guards that help accomplish the agency's facility protection mission. This testimony is based on past reports and testimonies and discusses challenges FPS faces in carrying out its mission with regard to (1) risk management, (2) strategic human capital planning, (3) oversight of its contract guard program, and (4) ensuring that its fee-based funding structure is the appropriate mechanism for funding the agency. GAO also addresses the extent to which FPS has made progress in responding to these challenges. To perform this work, GAO used its key facility protection practices as criteria, visited FPS regions and selected GSA buildings, reviewed training and certification data for FPS's contract guards, and interviewed officials from DHS, GSA, guard contractors, and guards.
What GAO Found
FPS continues to face challenges in carrying out its mission. Specifically: (1) The absence of a risk management program hampers FPS's ability to protect federal facilities. For many years, GAO has advocated the importance of a risk management approach. GAO reported in August 2010 that FPS does not use a comprehensive risk management approach that links threats and vulnerabilities to resource requirements. Instead, FPS uses a facility-by-facility approach which assumes that facilities with the same security level have the same risk regardless of their location. Without a risk management approach that identifies threats and vulnerabilities and the resources required to achieve FPS's security goals, as GAO has recommended, there is limited assurance that programs will be prioritized and resources will be allocated to address existing and potential security threats in an efficient and effective manner. (2) FPS has not fully addressed several key human capital issues. FPS continues to operate without a strategic human capital plan to guide its current and future workforce planning efforts, as GAO recommended in 2009. Further, FPS is not able to determine what its optimal staffing levels should be because FPS headquarters does not collect data on its workforce's knowledge, skills, and abilities. FPS has yet to fully ensure that its recent move to an inspector-based workforce does not hinder its ability to protect federal facilities. (3) FPS faces longstanding challenges in managing its contract guard workforce. Weaknesses in FPS's contract guard program hamper its ability to protect federal facilities. GAO reported in 2009 and 2010 that FPS cannot ensure that its contract guards have required training and certifications. FPS is in the process of addressing GAO recommendations. For example, FPS revised its x-ray and magnetometer training for its inspectors and guards. (4) FPS has not reviewed its fee design or determined an appropriate funding mechanism. FPS increased its basic security fee four times in 6 years to try to cover costs, but has not reviewed its fees to develop an informed, deliberate design. FPS's current fee structure has consistently resulted in total collection amounts less than agency costs and continues to be a topic of congressional interest and inquiry. FPS has yet to evaluate whether its fee-based structure or an alternative funding mechanism is most appropriate for funding the agency, as GAO recommended in 2008 and 2011. FPS has made some progress in improving its ability to protect federal facilities. For example, in response to GAO recommendations, FPS is developing the Risk Assessment and Management Program (RAMP), which could enhance its ability to comprehensively assess risk at federal facilities and improve oversight of its contract guard program. DHS and FPS have initiatives in process to address 21 of the 28 recommendations GAO has made related to the challenges above, although none are yet fully implemented. According to FPS officials, this is in part because of changes in the agency's leadership, organization, funding, staffing levels, and delays in developing several new management systems, such as RAMP. DHS and FPS have generally concurred with GAO's past recommendations. DHS and FPS have initiatives in process, for example, to address risk management, strategic human capital planning, and oversight of its contract guard program. |
gao_GAO-06-380 | gao_GAO-06-380_0 | Background
The Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants and Children (WIC) was established in 1972 to provide food, nutrition education, and health care referrals to low-income pregnant and postpartum women, infants, and young children. Both funding and participation have increased each year since fiscal year 2000. FNS Review of Contracts
Contracts for WIC infant formula are between states and infant formula manufacturers. Use of Non-Contract Infant Formula Increases Formula Costs
Although non-contract infant formula, including both exempt and non- contract, non-exempt infant formula, accounts for less than 10 percent of infant formula purchased through WIC, its use can have a significant impact on total infant formula spending because it can cost as much as 10 to 20 times more per can than rebated formula. Rebate Savings Have Been Used to Serve about a Quarter of All Participants in Recent Years, but If Rebate Savings Continue to Decline, Fewer People Will Be Able to Participate
Rebate savings have remained relatively stable since 1997 after adjusting for inflation, but if recent increases in the amount states pay for each can of infant formula they purchase through WIC continue, fewer participants will likely be served with rebates in the future. We estimated that in 2004, if all states had paid as much per can of infant formula as the two states with the lowest rebates, approximately 400,000 fewer children would have been able to enroll in WIC nationwide. In 2004, some 2 million participants were served using rebate dollars. New York implemented a contract in 2004 that provided milk-based concentrate for a net price of $0.80 per can, a discount of 75 percent off the wholesale price. State and Federal Agencies Take Steps to Contain Costs; however, FNS also Focuses on Sustaining the Competitive Bidding System
While both states and FNS try to contain costs, FNS also works to sustain the competitive bidding system while states work to maximize their own savings. Despite these state efforts to contain costs, opportunities remain for more states to further reduce the use of non-rebated infant formulas. FNS Has Taken Steps to Reduce Infant Formula Costs
In its oversight capacity, FNS has helped states increase their cost- containment savings by providing technical assistance to states as they develop their cost-containment contracts, and by implementing regulations that help states achieve cost savings. FNS actions have not always maximized the cost savings of individual states, but by ensuring that all interested manufacturers can compete for WIC contracts, it has helped to ensure the long-run sustainability of the WIC cost-containment system. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
This appendix provides a detailed description of the scope and methodology we used to determine (1) what factors influence program spending on infant formula, including the role of rebates that states receive through infant formula cost-containment contracts; (2) how the level of savings resulting from infant formula cost containment has changed over the past 5 years and the implications of these changes for the number of participants served; and (3) how federal and state policies and guidance have influenced state spending on infant formula. Food Assistance: Financial Information on WIC Nutrition Services and Administrative Costs. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants and Children (WIC) provides food, nutrition education, and health care referrals to close to 8 million low-income pregnant and postpartum women, infants, and young children each year. About a quarter of these participants are served using rebate savings from contracts with infant formula manufacturers. WIC is administered by the Department of Agriculture's Food and Nutrition Service (FNS). To better understand infant formula cost containment, this report provides information on: (1) factors that influence program spending on infant formula, (2) how the level of savings resulting from infant formula cost containment has changed and the implications of these changes for the number of participants served; and (3) steps federal and state agencies have taken to contain state spending on infant formula.
What GAO Found
Rebates drive state spending on infant formula but use of non-rebated formula increases state costs. In fiscal year 2004, states paid an average of $0.20 per can for milk-based concentrate formula, a savings of 93 percent off the wholesale price. However, states also allow some use of non-rebated formula that can cost states more than 10 times as much as contract formulas. For example, in 2004, 8 percent of infant formula provided to WIC participants was non-rebated. Rebate savings from infant formula cost-containment contracts have allowed WIC to serve an additional 2 million participants per year, but recent increases in the cost per can of formula could lead to reductions in the number of participants served with rebates. Rebate savings have remained near $1.6 billion per year since 1997 after adjusting for inflation, but the amount states pay per can of infant formula has increased since 2002. We estimated that in 2004, if the cost per can of formula increased in every state by as much as it did in two states, approximately 400,000 fewer participants would have been able to enroll in WIC nationwide. State and federal agencies have both taken steps to contain WIC infant formula costs, but FNS also focuses on sustaining the cost-containment system. States have sought to increase their costs savings through their infant formula contracts--for example, by joining coalitions to leverage greater discounts. Some also try to restrict the use of the more expensive non-contract formulas. FNS, in turn, helps states to contain costs through its review of contracts and through policy and guidance. For example, FNS reduced--but did not eliminate--the price increases that can result from the introduction of new, more costly formulas. FNS has also used its oversight authority to ensure that all interested manufacturers can compete for state infant formula contracts in an effort to maintain the long-run sustainability of the infant formula cost-containment system. |
gao_GAO-14-320 | gao_GAO-14-320_0 | The total budgetary resources of the Commission OIG increased from fiscal years 2011 through 2013, from $310,000 to $331,000, for an increase of about 7 percent (see fig. During this 3-year period, the OIG consisted of one full-time employee, the IG, who obtained additional support through contracts with both auditors and others to assist with his oversight responsibilities, such as interviews related to ongoing inspections, and to mediate disputes between Commission officials and grant recipients regarding grant payments. Commission OIG’s Reported Work Products
During fiscal years 2011 through 2013, the Commission OIG issued six semiannual reports to the Congress, as required by the IG Act, and conducted 12 inspections. OIG Provided Limited Oversight of the Commission’s Major Programs and Operations
During fiscal years 2011 through 2013, the OIG provided limited oversight of the Commission’s major programs and operations. Per the IG Act, OIG oversight includes assessing the effectiveness and efficiency of agency programs and operations; providing leadership and coordination to detect fraud and abuse; and making recommendations to management to promote the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the administration of these programs. In these 2 inspections, the OIG provided oversight for $150,000 of grant funds disbursed for training programs, all of which were reported in fiscal year 2012. The $150,000 of grant funds inspected by the OIG represented less than 1 percent of the total grants awarded by the Commission during fiscal years 2011 through 2013. However, the OIG did not conduct any inspections that assessed the effectiveness and efficiency of the agency’s other major programs— energy, transportation, and health facilities—or make recommendations to management promoting the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the administration of these programs, which is one of the major OIG goals established in the IG Act. OIG Oversaw the Commission’s Annual Financial Statement Audit but Did Not Conduct Audits or Investigations of Commission Programs
As part of its oversight duties, the OIG is responsible for selecting and overseeing the IPA responsible for performing the Commission’s annual financial statement audit. OIG Did Not Have Documented Policies and Procedures for Office Operations and Management, and Its Work Products Did Not Fully Adhere to Professional Standards
Our review of the OIG’s policies and procedures in place during fiscal years 2011 through 2013 found that the OIG did not document its policies and procedures for its management and operations as an OIG. However, the Commission OIG did not implement the following four quality standards that are critical for the management and operations of the OIG: planning and coordinating, maintaining quality assurance, ensuring internal control, and receiving and reviewing allegations. We found that the OIG did not prepare an annual work plan or strategic plan. Additionally, we found no documented evidence in the OIG’s workpapers to support the inspection conclusions and recommendations for its reports. Although the limitations of a single- person office can create challenges to developing and implementing policies and procedures to ensure effective oversight, if corrective actions are taken to address the issues identified in this report, the current DFE OIG structure can provide a viable option for oversight of the Commission. Consolidation into a Larger IG Office
The Commission OIG could be consolidated into a larger IG office. This option would consolidate the Commission OIG with a regional commission OIG. Another alternative is to divide OIG oversight responsibilities for the agency performance audits, investigations, and inspections and the agency financial statement audits between two separate federal OIGs, such as a regional commission OIG or a larger OIG. Implement the OIG’s policies and procedures developed in accordance with CIGIE’s Quality Standards for Federal Offices of Inspector General to ensure that the OIG’s management and operation of its office includes the following: annual work and strategic plans that identify goals, objectives, and performance measures to be accomplished by the OIG within a specific period; a quality assurance framework that includes both internal and external quality assurance reviews; an internal control structure that includes all elements of internal control, such as the control environment, risk assessment, control activities, information and communication, and monitoring; and an OIG hotline to receive and review anonymous tips, referrals, and allegations to help prevent and detect potential fraud, waste, and abuse. The Commission concurred with the report’s conclusions and recommendations, and provided its perspective of the IG’s performance as well as the challenges for a one-person DFE OIG. To determine the extent to which the IG provided oversight of the Commission’s major programs and operations, we compared the grant funds awarded and disbursed by the Commission for fiscal years 2011 through 2013 to the work products issued by the OIG. To determine whether the design of the OIG’s policies and procedures adhered to applicable professional standards, we reviewed the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended (IG Act), and the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency’s (CIGIE) Quality Standards for Federal Offices of Inspector General and Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation, and compared the OIG’s inspection policies and procedures to these professional standards. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Commission was established to promote sustainable infrastructure improvement, job training, and other economic development services in Alaska. The Commission is a designated federal entity under the IG Act and is required to have an IG. IG oversight includes assessing the effectiveness and efficiency of agency programs and operations; providing leadership and coordination to detect fraud and abuse; and making recommendations to management to promote the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of program and agency operations. GAO was asked to review the management and operations of the Commission's OIG. GAO's objectives were to (1) identify the resources appropriated to and expensed by the OIG and the OIG's work products reported for fiscal years 2011 through 2013, (2) assess the extent to which the OIG provided oversight of the Commission's programs and operations, (3) determine the extent to which the design and implementation of the OIG's policies and procedures and its work products were consistent with professional standards, and (4) identify alternatives for OIG oversight of the Commission.
What GAO Found
The Denali Commission (Commission) Office of Inspector General (OIG) received budgetary resources of approximately $1 million from fiscal years 2011 through 2013. OIG budgetary resources increased approximately 7 percent from fiscal years 2011 through 2013, from approximately $310,000 to $331,000. During this period, the OIG consisted of one full-time employee, the Inspector General (IG), who obtained additional support through contracts with auditors and others. The OIG issued six semiannual reports to the Congress and conducted 12 inspections during fiscal years 2011 through 2013.
The OIG provided limited oversight of the Commission's major programs (energy, transportation, health facilities, and training) and operations. GAO's analysis of the 12 inspections completed by the OIG found that the OIG provided oversight for $150,000 of the $167 million in grant funds disbursed during fiscal years 2011 through 2013. The $150,000 of grant funds inspected by the OIG represented less than 1 percent of total grants awarded by the Commission during this period. The $167 million in disbursed grant funds are subject to the Single Audit Act, as applicable. While the OIG oversaw the Commission's annual financial statement audit, it did not conduct any performance audits or investigations related to the Commission's major programs and operations.
The OIG did not have documented policies and procedures for its office operations and management that adhered to the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency's Quality Standards for Federal Offices of Inspector General . The OIG did not implement the following four quality standards that are critical for the management and operations of the OIG: planning and coordinating; maintaining quality assurance; ensuring internal control; and receiving and reviewing allegations of potential fraud, waste, and abuse. For example, the OIG did not conduct any investigations for potential criminal prosecution. Also, the OIG did not prepare an annual work or strategic plan to document the office's planned activities. Additionally, the OIG's work products were not fully consistent with applicable professional standards, its own policies and procedures for inspections, or section 5 of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended (IG Act). For example, there was insufficient evidence in the OIG's inspection case files to support the conclusions and recommendations reported, and the semiannual reports prepared by the OIG did not provide information on the status of OIG recommendations as required by the act.
If corrective actions are taken to mitigate the challenges faced by a one-person office, the current structure of the Commission OIG is one option for OIG oversight. GAO has also identified three alternative OIG oversight structures that could be applied to the Commission: (1) consolidation into a larger OIG; (2) consolidation into a regional commission OIG; and (3) division of OIG oversight responsibilities between two separate federal OIGs, such as a regional commission OIG or a larger OIG.
The Commission IG resigned on December 28, 2013. On May 28, 2014, the Commission entered into an agreement with the Department of Commerce's OIG to provide oversight services pursuant to the IG Act. The agreement expires on September 30, 2014, but may be extended or amended by mutual written consent of the parties.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making nine recommendations to the OIG to improve the operating effectiveness and efficiency of the OIG, including steps that the OIG should take to develop and implement policies and procedures consistent with professional standards to provide oversight of Commission programs and operations.
The Commission concurred with the report's conclusions and recommendations. |
gao_GAO-13-216 | gao_GAO-13-216_0 | In 2006, PAEA eliminated USPS’s authority to offer nonpostal services unless they were offered as of January 1, 2006, and expressly grandfathered by the PRC. One such agreement allows USPS to accept passport applications on behalf of the U.S. Department of State (State Department). USPS plans to complete a multiyear revenue plan in the spring of 2013 that will include details on its competitive strategies. USPS Offers 12 Grandfathered Nonpostal Services, 8 Experimental Postal Products, and at Least 4 Discretionary Services for Federal Agencies
Nonpostal Services
At the time PAEA was enacted, USPS was offering 12 nonpostal services that it has continued to offer as a result of these services being grandfathered by the PRC. Experimental Postal Products
Since the enactment of PAEA, USPS has received approval from the PRC to market test a total of eight experimental postal products. The remaining four experimental products are competitive products, including USPS’s Gift Cards—experimental product to test the feasibility of selling gift cards loaded with a specified sum of money to consumers who could choose to mail the cards. Discretionary Services Performed for Other Federal Agencies
USPS has the authority to perform services for other federal agencies on a discretionary basis by entering into written agreements with these agencies. USPS’s Efforts to Generate Additional Revenue Include Ongoing and Planned Postal and Nonpostal Initiatives
As of November 2012, USPS was pursuing 55 stakeholder-identified initiatives that it believes respond to the changing needs of consumers and businesses and strengthen the relevance of USPS and the mail. Forty-eight initiatives are extensions of USPS’s existing lines of postal products and services; three are extensions of grandfathered nonpostal services; and four are experimental postal products. Nonpostal Services and Experimental Postal Products
USPS is pursuing three stakeholder-identified initiatives that are extensions of its existing nonpostal services. Two of these initiatives are ongoing, including an effort to allow customers to change their addresses using mobile devices, which expands the ways a customer can request address changes through MoverSource. USPS is also pursuing four stakeholder-identified initiatives involving experimental postal products. Market tests for the two other experimental postal products—prepaid postage on the sale of greeting card and a campaign to involve selected companies in direct mail advertising—are under way. Reasons for Pursuing the 55 Initiatives
USPS pursued these 55 initiatives for reasons including revenue generation and adding value to the mail, among others, as shown in figure 1. USPS Did Not Pursue 25 Initiatives because of Financial and Other Reasons, and Believes Additional Statutory Authorities Would Provide Opportunities to Increase Revenue
USPS decided not to pursue 25 additional stakeholder-identified initiatives because of financial and other reasons. Specifically, 12 of 25 initiatives, or 48 percent, were abandoned because of financial reasons. USPS decided not to pursue the remaining 13 stakeholder-identified initiatives for other reasons. According to USPS officials, they would like to pursue additional revenue- generating opportunities in three areas—nonpostal services; shipments of beer, wine, and spirits; and cooperation with state and local governments—if provided with additional statutory authority. USPS emphasized, however, that additional innovations in these areas will not be sufficient to solve USPS’s dire financial situation. Results will also be constrained by the economic climate and by changing use of the mail. USPS generated a net income of $141 million in 2011 from its offerings of nonpostal services and products. In its written comments, reprinted in appendix V, USPS stated that its financial viability is dependent not only on cutting costs but also generating additional revenue. Available services include (1) conference-related services such as food and the rental of audio-visual equipment, and (2) hospitality- related services such as lodging, fitness-related services, banquet services, and the onsite sale of sundries. According to USPS officials, USPS initiated this service to generate additional revenue. The Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act of 2006 required USPS’s market-dominant products to cover their costs and any price increases for these products must be tied to the rate of inflation. | Why GAO Did This Study
USPS continues to face a dire financial situation. Reducing costs is essential, but USPS also must generate additional revenue through the sale of products and services. PAEA, enacted in 2006, eliminated USPS's authority to offer nonpostal services unless they were offered as of January 1, 2006, and expressly grandfathered by the PRC. USPS may, however, offer new nonpostal services if they are related to the grandfathered nonpostal services. It may also offer experimental postal products that meet certain conditions. As requested, this report describes: (1) the nonpostal services grandfathered after the enactment of PAEA, experimental postal products offered since enactment of PAEA, and discretionary services USPS currently performs for other federal agencies; (2) initiatives--including nonpostal services and experimental postal products--USPS is pursuing to generate additional revenue and the status of these initiatives; and (3) the reasons USPS decided not to pursue other revenue-generating initiatives that it had identified.
GAO reviewed PAEA provisions and PRC decisions pertaining to nonpostal services, experimental postal products, and services performed for other federal agencies and USPS documents related to the initiatives that USPS chose to pursue and those it decided not to pursue. GAO interviewed USPS officials regarding these issues.
In commenting on a draft of this report, USPS agreed that its financial viability is dependent not only on cutting costs, but also on generating additional revenue.
What GAO Found
The U.S. Postal Service (USPS) currently offers 12 nonpostal services (i.e., services not directly related to mail delivery) that were grandfathered by the Postal Regulatory Commission (PRC) after enactment of the Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act (PAEA). These services--which include Passport Photo Services, the sale of advertising to support change-of-address processing, and others--generated a net income of $141 million in 2011. Since enactment of PAEA, USPS has received approval from PRC to offer eight experimental postal products, which are products that differ significantly from other offered products, such as the sale of gift cards loaded with a specified sum of money. Lastly, USPS performs at least four discretionary services (i.e., services it chooses, rather than is required, to perform) for other federal agencies, such as accepting passport applications for the State Department.
USPS is currently pursuing 55 new initiatives that it identified based on outreach to postal stakeholders. USPS chose to pursue these initiatives because of their potential to increase revenue and add value to the mail, among other reasons. Forty-eight initiatives are extensions of existing lines of postal products and services, such as offering Post Office Box customers a suite of service enhancements (e.g., expanded lobby hours and earlier pickup times) at selected locations and increasing public awareness of the availability of postal services at retail stores. Three initiatives are extensions of existing nonpostal services, including allowing customers to forward their mail to a new address using mobile devices. Finally, four of the initiatives involve experimental postal products, such as prepaid postage on the sale of greeting cards. These four experimental products are among the total of eight experimental products that have received PRC approval since enactment of PAEA. Forty-five of the 55 initiatives are ongoing; the remaining are under development.
USPS considered but decided not to pursue 25 other stakeholder-identified initiatives, primarily because of financial reasons. Twelve initiatives were abandoned because USPS determined they were not likely to be profitable or the initial investment was too high. Reasons for not pursuing other initiatives included insufficient stakeholder interest or lack of statutory authority. USPS would like to pursue revenue-generating opportunities in three areas--nonpostal services, shipments of alcoholic beverages, and services performed for state and local governments--if it is provided with statutory authority to do so. USPS officials said opportunities in these areas could improve USPS's financial position, but they emphasized that additional innovations will not be sufficient to return USPS to financial solvency. Results will also be constrained by the economic climate and by changing use of the mail. USPS's multiyear revenue plan detailing its competitive strategies is expected in the spring of 2013. |
gao_GAO-13-764 | gao_GAO-13-764_0 | CSI is a program that aims to identify and examine U.S.-bound cargo container shipments that could pose a high risk of concealing WMDs or other terrorist contraband by reviewing advanced cargo information about the shipments. In addition to the CSI ports where CBP placed targeters, CBP also entered into arrangements with Australia and New Zealand to remotely target U.S.-bound cargo container shipments from the United States. CBP partially concurred with the recommendations but did not implement them. DHS Has Developed Models to Assess Foreign Port Risks, but CBP Has Not Assessed Whether Its CSI Locations Remain Valid
The Coast Guard and CBP, DHS components with maritime security responsibilities, have developed models to assess the risks of foreign ports and the cargo carried by vessels from these ports. The Coast Guard Has Developed a Model to Regularly Assess Risks of Foreign Ports and Inform Operational Decisions
The Coast Guard has developed a risk-informed model as part of its IPS program to regularly assess the potential threat foreign ports pose to the maritime supply chain and make operational decisions regarding foreign ports’ security measures. The Coast Guard updates its risk model annually. CBP Considered Risk in Establishing Some CSI Ports, but Has Not Assessed Whether CSI Currently Covers the Riskiest Ports
CBP Selected Initial CSI Ports Largely on the Basis of Volume and Used More Risk Factors when Expanding CSI Locations
In 2002, CBP selected the initial 23 CSI ports largely on the basis of the volume of U.S.-bound container cargo, but increased the number of risk factors in selecting additional ports as it expanded the CSI program beginning in 2003. Comparing the CSI ports with the results shows that CSI did not have a presence at about half of the ports CBP considered higher risk, and about one-fifth of the existing CSI ports were at lower-risk locations. Because the CSI program depends on the willingness of sovereign host countries to participate in the program, there are challenges to implementing CSI and CBP efforts to negotiate with other countries to expand the CSI program, and these efforts have not always been successful. CBP has not assessed the risk of foreign ports that ship cargo to the United States for its CSI program since completing the CSI expansion analysis in 2005. In particular, the officials stated that (1) removing CSI from a country might negatively affect political relations with the host government, and (2) uncertain CSI funding in future years could make it difficult for CBP to make plans to close lower-risk CSI ports and open new CSI ports at higher-risk locations. DHS Has Taken Steps to Improve the Efficiency and Effectiveness of Its Maritime Container Security Programs, but Faces Constraints
DHS, through the Coast Guard and CBP, has taken a number of steps to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of its maritime security programs to reduce global supply chain risks. CBP has continued its efforts to expand or refine its C-TPAT and CSI programs, but faces host country political and legal constraints. In addition to prioritizing resources through its IPS risk model, the Coast Guard has worked with foreign governments to mutually recognize each other’s maritime security programs, which can more efficiently use IPS resources and reduce risks. To help foreign countries establish AEO programs, CBP officials stated that the C-TPAT program provides training and technical assistance for foreign Customs agencies that request technical assistance. Further, according to CBP and government officials in one country, a national law precludes the transmission of electronic scanned images other than to host government Customs officials. As a result, CSI targeters must be present at each CSI port in order to view the scanned container images. Periodically assessing the risk level of cargo shipped from foreign ports and using the results of these risk assessments to inform any future expansion of CSI to additional locations as well as determining whether changes need to be made to existing CSI ports would help ensure that CBP is allocating its resources to provide the greatest possible coverage of high-risk cargo to best mitigate the risk of importing WMD or other terrorist contraband into the United States through the maritime supply chain. Recommendations for Executive Action
To better ensure the effectiveness of the CSI program, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection to periodically assess the supply chain security risks from all foreign ports that ship cargo to the United States and use the results of these risk assessments to (1) inform any future expansion of CSI to additional locations and (2) determine whether changes need to be made to existing CSI ports and make adjustments as appropriate and feasible. | Why GAO Did This Study
Foreign ports and the cargo carried by vessels from these ports are critical to the U.S. economy, but can be exploited by terrorists. Within DHS, CBP and the Coast Guard are responsible for maritime security. Through CSI, CBP identifies and examines U.S.-bound cargo that may conceal WMD, and through C-TPAT, CBP partners with international trade community members to secure the flow of U.S.-bound goods. Under the IPS program, Coast Guard officials visit foreign ports to assess compliance with security standards. GAO was asked to review DHS's maritime security programs. This report addresses (1) the extent to which DHS has assessed the foreign ports that pose the greatest risk to the global supply chain and focused its maritime container security programs to address those risks, and (2) actions DHS has taken to help ensure the efficiency and effectiveness of its maritime security programs. GAO analyzed DHS risk models and maritime security program strategies, met with program officials, and visited six foreign countries selected on the basis of participation in CSI, varied cargo shipment risk levels, and other factors.
What GAO Found
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) components have developed models to assess the risks of foreign ports and cargo, but not all components have applied risk management principles to assess whether maritime security programs cover the riskiest ports. The U.S. Coast Guard uses its risk model to inform operational decisions for its International Port Security (IPS) program and annually updates its assessment. In contrast, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has not regularly assessed ports for risks to cargo under its Container Security Initiative (CSI) program. CBP's selection of the initial 23 CSI ports was primarily based on the volume of U.S.-bound containers, but beginning in 2003, CBP considered more threat information when it expanded the number of CSI ports. CBP has not assessed the risk posed by foreign ports that ship cargo to the United States for its CSI program since 2005. In 2009, CBP developed a model that ranked 356 potential expansion ports for a related program on the basis of risk, but it was never implemented because of budget cuts. By applying CBP's risk model to fiscal year 2012 cargo shipment data, GAO found that CSI did not have a presence at about half of the ports CBP considered high risk, and about one fifth of the existing CSI ports were at lower risk locations. Since the CSI program depends on cooperation from sovereign host countries, there are challenges to implementing CSI in new foreign locations, and CBP's negotiations with other countries have not always succeeded. For example, CBP officials said it is difficult to close CSI ports and open new ports because removing CSI from a country might negatively affect U.S. relations with the host government. However, periodically assessing the risk level of cargo shipped from foreign ports and using the results to inform any future expansion of CSI to additional locations, as well as determine whether changes need to be made to existing CSI ports, would help ensure that CBP is allocating its resources to provide the greatest possible coverage of high-risk cargo to best mitigate the risk of importing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or other terrorist contraband into the United States through the maritime supply chain.
DHS has taken steps to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of its maritime security programs, but faces host country political and legal constraints. The Coast Guard has implemented a risk-informed model that prioritizes the countries to visit and assist. Also, the Coast Guard and CBP have made arrangements with foreign government entities to mutually recognize inspections of each other's ports and maritime supply chains through the IPS and Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) programs. CBP has also utilized technological improvements to target some U.S.-bound cargo shipments remotely from the United States to reduce CSI staff in foreign countries. However, CBP faces political and legal constraints in host countries. For example, according to CBP and government officials in one country, a national law precludes the transmission of electronic scanned images other than to host government Customs officials. As a result, CSI officials must be present at each CSI port in that country to view the scanned images. Further, in some ports, CBP has made efforts to expand the scope of its CSI targeting to include contraband other than WMD, but that is subject to approval by the host governments.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that CBP periodically assess the supply chain security risks from foreign ports that ship cargo to the United States and use the results to inform any future expansion of CSI and determine whether changes need to be made to existing CSI ports. DHS concurred with GAO's recommendation. |
gao_RCED-96-92 | gao_RCED-96-92_0 | In fiscal year 1992 (the most recent year for which private sector data were available), agricultural research expenditures totaled about $6.3 billion. Finally, private companies and commodity groups provide funding to land grant universities and, to a lesser extent, to USDA to conduct research. USDA’s Involvement in the Research, Education, and Extension System
USDA is involved in the research, education, and extension system primarily through ARS and the Cooperative State Research, Education, and Extension Service (CSREES). Funding for the Research Component
In fiscal year 1992, the federal government funded about 25 percent of all agricultural research, state governments about 15 percent, and the private sector about 60 percent. Federal agricultural research funds supported USDA’s in-house research and research conducted at land grant and other institutions. Funding for Extension and Education Activities
Overall, federal, state, and county governments provided almost $1.4 billion in fiscal year 1994 for extension activities. Specifically, we agreed to (1) provide an overview of the system; (2) obtain the views of various users of agricultural research on the extent to which USDA and the land grant universities are meeting their research needs and on how effectively research results are being disseminated; and (3) assess USDA’s processes for planning and establishing research priorities. 2.5.) In connection with these programs, we found that the following problems hamper the effectiveness and efficiency of USDA’s processes for identifying research priorities, allocating resources among those priorities, and achieving accountability for research expenditures:
USDA lacks a Department-wide research agenda to guide priority setting. Although CRIS is the only national database with information on publicly funded agricultural research, it has significant limitations, according to USDA and university officials. Congressional committees’ directives have also affected ARS’ ability to reallocate resources. It is too soon, however, to evaluate the effectiveness of these steps. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided an overview of the U.S. agricultural research, education, and extension system, focusing on: (1) how well certain agricultural research users believe the Department of Agriculture (USDA) and land grant universities are meeting users' research needs and disseminating their research results; and (2) USDA approaches to setting research priorities.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the U.S. agricultural research, education, and extension system is diverse and decentralized and has both governmental and private components; (2) USDA is a key player in that it conducts in-house research and funds in partnership with states activities at 74 land-grant universities and other institutions; (3) the private sector also conducts and funds research, usually for proprietary purposes; (4) in fiscal year (FY) 1992, agricultural research expenditures totaled about $6.3 billion with the private sector contributing 60 percent, the federal government 25 percent, and states 15 percent; (5) in FY 1994, the federal government spent $419 million on extension activities while states and counties spent almost $1 billion; (6) most agricultural research users believe that USDA and land grant universities' research and information dissemination is effective in meeting their needs, but many also believe that the research's level of public funding and dissemination are inadequate; (7) users, USDA, and universities have formed partnerships and collaborative efforts to stretch limited research resources; (8) USDA lacks a departmentwide research agenda, adequate priority-setting and accountability processes, adequate information systems, and the ability to shift resources among priorities to plan and implement research priorities; and (9) USDA is developing actions to address these problems, but it is too soon to determine their effectiveness. |
gao_GAO-03-237 | gao_GAO-03-237_0 | An overarching strategic vision is needed that identifies the kind of capabilities that DOD will need in the future, the best way to provide those capabilities, and the changes in human resources planning and programs that will be required.”
In view of these studies, the Office of the Secretary of Defense published the Military Personnel Human Resource Strategic Plan (referred to in this report as the military personnel strategic plan) in April 2002 to establish military personnel priorities for the next several years. In this regard, the two plans constitute a positive step forward in DOD’s strategic management of the military workforce. The Social Compact indicates that benefits are important to alleviating some of the hardships of military life and emphasizes that providing consistent, high-quality benefits that meet the needs of service members and their families can yield a committed and long-term workforce. While progress has been made, DOD’s human capital plans do not yet satisfy the two factors we identified in our model as critical to the success of strategic human capital planning (one of the four cornerstones of sound strategic human capital management). First, the plans do not specifically address how DOD will integrate and align benefits and other human capital approaches to meet its overall organizational goals. It is also unclear how the initiatives, many of which are studies, will work in conjunction with one another to meet DOD’s goals. For example, one of the initiatives is to study alternatives to the military retirement system. The plan does not explain how retirement reform may be integrated and aligned with other initiatives such as DOD’s study of variable career lengths for officers. Thus, DOD lacks an overarching framework integrating its human capital plans for military personnel. Secondly, the plans do not satisfy the critical success factor of using data in human capital decisions. In addition, DOD’s plans do not discuss, at a strategic level, military workforce needs or gaps. Moreover, DOD lacks a process for enabling senior DOD officials to oversee the progress and implementation of its human capital plans from a strategic vantage point. Conclusions
DOD, in developing its human capital plans addressing military personnel and quality of life, has made progress in adopting a more strategic approach to human capital management. Such a process could assist in the integration and alignment of benefits and other human capital approaches to meet organizational goals and in promoting a fact-based, performance-oriented approach to human capital management. Recommendation for Executive Action
To improve DOD’s strategic human capital management, we recommend that you direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to establish an oversight process by which senior DOD officials may integrate and align benefits and other human capital approaches and promote a fact-based, performance-oriented approach to human capital management. We focused on the two critical success factors that correspond to strategic human capital planning, namely (1) the integration and alignment of human capital approaches to meet organizational goals and (2) the use of data to make human capital decisions. We reviewed DOD’s human capital plans to determine the extent they satisfied these two critical success factors with respect to active duty military benefits. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) has, in the past, lacked a strategic approach to human capital management. In April 2002, DOD issued two human capital strategic plans for military personnel. One plan addresses military personnel management and policies; the second addresses quality of life issues affecting service members and their families. As a follow-on to its recent work on benefits for military personnel, GAO reviewed the extent that these two plans, in addressing military benefits, promote (1) the integration and alignment of human capital approaches to meet organizational goals and (2) the use of reliable data to make human capital decisions--two critical success factors for human capital planning. GAO also reviewed DOD's plans for overseeing the progress and implementation of its human capital plans.
What GAO Found
DOD's human capital plans addressing military personnel and quality of life represent a positive step forward in fostering a more strategic approach to human capital management. The two plans lay some of the groundwork needed to incorporate benefits into the strategic management of human capital. The plans, for example, recognize that benefits are important elements to meeting recruiting and retention goals and to alleviating some of the hardships of military life. However, the two plans do not satisfy the two critical success factors GAO has identified for human capital planning. The plans do not specifically address how DOD will integrate and align benefits with other human capital approaches to meet organizational goals. DOD's plans identify a number of initiatives, but the plans do not describe how individual initiatives, many of which are studies, will work in conjunction with one another to meet DOD's goals and objectives. For example, one of DOD's initiatives is to study alternatives to the military retirement system, and another initiative is to study variable career lengths for officers. However, the human capital plans do not explain how these two initiatives may be integrated and aligned with each other to achieve desired outcomes. The military personnel strategic plan also does not identify outcome-oriented performance measures or discuss, at a strategic level, military workforce needs or gaps in meeting these needs--the kinds of data used by high-performing organizations to manage their human capital. DOD lacks a process for overseeing the progress and implementation of its human capital plans from a strategic vantage point. Without such a process, DOD may have difficulty integrating and aligning benefits and other human capital approaches to meet organizational goals and promoting a data-driven, performance-oriented approach to human capital management. Moreover, an oversight process could help DOD officials maintain the momentum of their strategic human capital planning efforts. DOD is considering establishing a Defense Human Resources Board to maintain the viability of its strategic human capital planning, but DOD officials have not determined the roles and responsibilities of the board. |
gao_GAO-05-956 | gao_GAO-05-956_0 | 3). These systems are also designed not to allow overvotes. HAVA established the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) and gave this commission responsibility for activities and programs related to the administration of federal elections. Accrediting laboratories. Certifying systems. 4). However, in a series of recent reports, election officials, computer security experts, citizen advocacy groups, and others have raised significant concerns about the security and reliability of electronic voting systems, citing instances of weak security controls, system design flaws, inadequate system version control, inadequate security testing, incorrect system configuration, poor security management, and vague or incomplete standards, among other issues. In viewing these concerns, it is important to note that many involved vulnerabilities or problems with specific voting system makes and models or circumstances in a specific jurisdiction’s election, and that there is a lack of consensus among elections officials, computer security experts, and others on the pervasiveness of the concerns. System failures during elections. Recommended Practices Address Electronic Voting Systems’ Security and Reliability
Several federal, academic, and nongovernmental organizations have issued guidance to help state and local election officials improve the election and voting processes. This compendium, among many suggested practices, includes activities to help ensure a secure and reliable voting process throughout a voting systems’ life cycle. EAC, with the support of TGDC and NIST, is in the process of updating voluntary voting system standards, is establishing federal processes to accredit independent test laboratories and certify voting systems to national standards, and is supporting state and local election management by providing a library for certified software and acting as a clearinghouse for information on voting system problems and recommended election administration and management practices. Federal Initiatives to Improve Voting Systems Security and Reliability Are Under Way
EAC, in collaboration with NIST and TGDC, has initiated efforts on several of its key responsibilities relating to the security and reliability of electronic voting systems, including improving voting system standards, developing a process to facilitate testing systems against the standards, and supporting state and local governments’ election management. EAC has not yet determined when it will have a national program for voting system certification in place. Software library. These concerns have led to action. Further, EAC has not consistently defined plans, processes, and time frames for completing these activities, and as a result, it is unclear when their results will be available to assist state and local election officials. 2. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) determine significant security and reliability concerns that have been identified for electronic voting systems; (2) identify recommended practices relevant to the security and reliability of such systems; and (3) describe the actions that federal agencies and other organizations have taken, or plan to take, to improve the security and reliability of electronic voting systems. Federal Information System Controls Audit Manual (FISCAM). | Why GAO Did This Study
The Help America Vote Act of 2002 established the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) to help improve state and local administration of federal elections and authorized funding for state and local governments to expand their use of electronic voting systems. EAC began operations in January 2004. However, reported problems with electronic voting systems have led to questions about the security and reliability of these systems. GAO was requested to (1) determine the significant security and reliability concerns identified about electronic voting systems, (2) identify recommended practices relevant to ensuring the security and reliability of these systems, and (3) describe actions taken or planned to improve their security and reliability.
What GAO Found
While electronic voting systems hold promise for improving the election process, numerous entities have raised concerns about their security and reliability, citing instances of weak security controls, system design flaws, inadequate system version control, inadequate security testing, incorrect system configuration, poor security management, and vague or incomplete voting system standards. It is important to note that many of these concerns were based on specific system makes and models or a specific jurisdiction's election, and there is no consensus among election officials and other experts on their pervasiveness. Nevertheless, some have caused problems in elections and therefore merit attention. Federal organizations and nongovernmental groups have issued both election-specific recommended practices for improving the voting process and more general guidance intended to help organizations manage information systems' security and reliability. These recommended practices and guidelines (applicable throughout the voting system life cycle) include having vendors build security controls and audit trails into their systems during development, and having election officials specify security requirements when acquiring systems. Other suggested practices include testing and certifying systems against national voting system standards. The federal government has begun efforts intended to improve life cycle management of electronic voting systems and thereby improve their security and reliability. Specifically, EAC has led efforts to (1) draft changes to existing federal voluntary standards for voting systems, including provisions addressing security and reliability; (2) develop a process for certifying voting systems; (3) establish a program to accredit independent laboratories to test electronic voting systems; and (4) develop a library and clearinghouse for information on state and local elections and systems. However, these actions are unlikely to have a significant effect in the 2006 federal election cycle because important changes to the voting standards have not yet been completed, the system certification and laboratory accreditation programs are still in development, and a system software library has not been updated or improved since the 2004 election. Further, EAC has not consistently defined specific tasks, processes, and time frames for completing these activities; as a result, it is unclear when their results will be available to assist state and local election officials. |
gao_GAO-08-132T | gao_GAO-08-132T_0 | In addition, DOD shares responsibility for 7 governmentwide high-risk areas. GAO designated DOD’s approach to business transformation as high risk in 2005 because (1) DOD’s improvement efforts were fragmented, (2) DOD lacked an enterprisewide and integrated business transformation plan, and (3) DOD had not appointed a senior official at the right level with an adequate amount of time and appropriate authority to be responsible for overall business transformation efforts. DOD’s Pervasive and Long-standing Financial Management and Business Weaknesses Affect the Department’s Efficiency and Effectiveness and Ultimately Impact DOD’s Ability to Support the Warfighter
The persistence and magnitude of DOD’s business transformation challenges underscore the fact that the status quo is unacceptable, and without focused and sustained leadership to guide business transformation, the department will continue to waste billions of dollars every year. Within DOD, business transformation is broad, encompassing people, planning, processes, organizational structures, and technology in all of DOD’s major business areas. DOD’s pervasive and long-standing weaknesses in its financial management and business operations adversely affect the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of DOD’s operations, and have resulted in a lack of adequate accountability across all the department’s major business areas. DOD Has Made Progress in Addressing Its Business Transformation Efforts, but Critical Actions are Needed to Provide Comprehensive, Integrated, and Strategic Planning and Focused and Sustained Leadership
Due to the impact of the department’s business weaknesses on both the department and the warfighter, DOD’s leaders have demonstrated a commitment to making the department’s business transformation a priority and have made progress in establishing a management framework for these efforts. In addition, DOD lacks two crucial features that are integral to successful organizational transformation—(1) a strategic planning process that results in a comprehensive, integrated, and enterprisewide plan or interconnected plans, and (2) a senior leader who is responsible and accountable for business transformation and who can provide full-time focus and sustained leadership. Furthermore, a broad-based consensus exists among GAO and others that the status quo is unacceptable and that DOD needs a full-time and term- based senior management official to provide focused and sustained leadership for its overall business transformation efforts, although differing views exist concerning the specifics of the position, such as term limit and the level of the position within the department. Most recently, DOD issued a directive on September 18, 2007, that assigned CMO responsibilities to the current Deputy Secretary of Defense. Furthermore, the assignment of CMO duties to an individual with a limited term in the position does not ensure continuity of effort or that sustained success will be ensured both within and across administrations. Therefore, we continue to believe that the CMO position at DOD should be: Codified in statute as a separate and full-time position. In the absence of a CMO with these characteristics to focus solely on the integration and execution of business transformation efforts, and an enterprisewide plan to guide these efforts, it is highly unlikely that DOD will ever resolve its pervasive weaknesses and get the most out of every dollar it invests in these times of growing fiscal constraint to better support the warfighter. Each area was added to our high-risk list due to weaknesses that make DOD more vulnerable to waste, fraud, and abuse. Appendix I: Systemic Acquisition Challenges at the Department of Defense
1. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) continues to face significant challenges in resolving its many long-standing business challenges. DOD is solely responsible for eight high-risk areas and shares responsibility for another seven governmentwide areas on GAO's high-risk list. GAO designated DOD's approach to business transformation as high risk in 2005 because (1) DOD's improvement efforts were fragmented, (2) DOD lacked an enterprisewide and integrated business transformation plan, and (3) DOD had not appointed a senior official at the right level with an adequate amount of time and appropriate authority to be responsible for overall business transformation efforts. A recent DOD directive designated the current Deputy Secretary of Defense as DOD's chief management officer (CMO). Successful overall business transformation, however, will require full-time leadership that is focused solely on the integration and execution of these efforts, over the long term, to resolve pervasive weaknesses that have left DOD vulnerable to waste, fraud, and abuse at a time of increasing fiscal constraint. This testimony is based on previous and ongoing GAO work and discusses (1) the impact of DOD's long-standing business challenges on DOD and the warfighter, and (2) the progress DOD has made and actions needed to achieve sustainable success in its business transformation efforts. This testimony also provides an update on DOD-specific high-risk areas.
What GAO Found
The persistence and magnitude of DOD's business transformation challenges highlight the fact that the status quo is unacceptable and that, without focused and sustained leadership to guide the overall business transformation effort, the department will continue to waste billions of dollars annually. Within DOD, business transformation is broad, encompassing people, planning, processes, organizational structures, and technology. DOD's pervasive and long-standing business weaknesses adversely affect the department's economy, efficiency, and effectiveness, and have resulted in a lack of adequate accountability across all of its major business areas. Ultimately, these weaknesses affect the department's ability to support the warfighter, including the availability of equipment and weapon systems, the cost and performance of contractors supporting the warfighter, and the assessment of resource requirements. DOD's senior leadership has shown a commitment to transforming the department's business operations. Two critical actions, among others, however, are still needed to change the status quo. DOD has yet to establish (1) a strategic planning process that results in a comprehensive, integrated, and enterprisewide plan or set of plans to help guide transformation, and (2) a senior official who can provide full-time attention and sustained leadership to transformation. Broad-based consensus exists among GAO and others that DOD needs a full-time and term-based senior management official to provide focused and sustained leadership over its overall business transformation efforts, both within and across administrations. Also, various legislative proposals call for senior-level attention to these efforts. While DOD recently assigned CMO duties to the current Deputy Secretary of Defense, this does not ensure full-time attention or continuity of leadership. GAO continues to believe a CMO position should be codified in statute as a separate position, at the right level, and with the appropriate term in office. In the absence of a CMO with these characteristics, and an enterprisewide plan to guide business transformation efforts, it is highly unlikely that DOD will ever get the most out of every taxpayer dollar it invests to better support the warfighter in times of growing fiscal constraint. |
gao_GAO-06-16 | gao_GAO-06-16_0 | Background
OSC, which does not have in-house contracting staff, has an agreement with ARC, an office within Treasury’s Bureau of the Public Debt, to provide contracting support for a fee. Order for Organizational Assessment Did Not Comply with Rules
In contracting with MPRI for the organizational assessment, several required steps were not taken: competition was not sought among Schedule vendors, and there was no convincing demonstration of why a sole-source order was necessary, the determination of the reasonableness of MPRI’s price was not OSC officials performed duties normally done by contracting officer’s representatives without authorization or training and, further, performed other duties that should have been reserved for the contracting officer. ARC contracting officials did not question or validate OSC’s justification, but told us they relied to a great extent on OSC’s input in justifying the sole- source order. They said that they are now paying closer attention to requests from customer agencies, including OSC, for sole-source orders. ARC officials told us that they relied on OSC to conduct the price reasonableness assessment by reviewing a breakout of MPRI’s price by skill mix, number of hours, and rates for each labor category. OSC officials said that ARC, as their contracting office, never told them they were not following proper contracting practices. Tasks Specified for OSC-Appointed Intermittent Employee Were Consistent with OPM Criteria
The tasks specified in the statement of work for the consultant that OSC hired on March 17, 2004, and that he completed before his departure were consistent with OPM criteria for appropriate uses of expert and consultant appointments. The employee, who was employed on an intermittent basis, was tasked with two major lines of work related to efficiency and curriculum development. OSC management expressed confidence in his qualifications and used its discretion to both hire him and set his compensation rate. OSC employees who believe that a prohibited personnel practice has occurred may seek redress from OSC. When an employee raises a prohibited personnel practice allegation against the Special Counsel, addressing such an allegation within OSC becomes unworkable because, OSC officials stated, all OSC employees ultimately report to the Special Counsel. Other Agencies with Redress Roles Have Addressed Procedures for Complaints Against Them by Their Own Employees
Two other agencies in the executive branch with major roles in ensuring the protection of employee rights, the MSPB and EEOC, have taken steps to address potential conflicts of interest when their own employees use their agencies’ respective redress processes. Additional Redress Options Could Be Made Available to OSC Employees
Steps can be taken to ensure that OSC employees have alternative avenues of recourse when their prohibited personnel practice allegations involve the Special Counsel or the Deputy Special Counsel. Potential options are discussed below. Steps could be taken to ensure that OSC employees, who cannot effectively obtain the services of OSC in addressing allegations of prohibited personnel practices, have alternative avenues of redress. These means could include establishing (1) a right to an external investigation through an independent entity, where the entity would forward its findings to the President, who would decide the appropriate action, as is done when OSC handles allegations of prohibited personnel practices against Senate- confirmed presidential appointees; or (2) an expansion of the personnel actions that could be the basis for an appeal directly to the MSPB. | Why GAO Did This Study
In January 2005, the U.S. Office of Special Counsel (OSC) implemented a plan, in part, to address a backlog of pending cases. This report discusses actions related to the development of this plan, including whether required practices and procedures were followed in contracting for the services of a management consulting company and in hiring an intermittent employee as a consultant. Also, the report identifies avenues of redress available to OSC employees for filing prohibited personnel practice allegations against OSC, and other redress options that could be made available.
What GAO Found
At OSC's request, the Administrative Resource Center (ARC), an office within the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Bureau of the Public Debt which provides OSC with contracting support for a fee, issued a $140,000 sole-source task order for an organizational assessment to a consulting firm, Military Professional Resources, Inc. (MPRI). In doing so, several required steps were not taken: competition was not sought among Schedule vendors and there was no convincing demonstration of why a sole-source order was necessary; the determination of the reasonableness of MPRI's price was not documented; and OSC officials performed duties normally done by contracting officer's representatives without authorization or training and, further, performed other duties that should have been reserved for the contracting officer. ARC officials told us they relied largely on OSC's input in justifying the sole-source order and determining MPRI's price to be reasonable and that they were unaware that the OSC officials had performed contracting-related duties. They told us that they are now paying particular attention to requests from their customers, including OSC, for sole-source orders. OSC officials said that they relied on ARC's expertise, as their contracting office, to ensure that proper contracting procedures were followed. The tasks specified in the statement of work for the consultant that OSC hired as an intermittent employee and that he completed before his departure were consistent with Office of Personnel Management criteria for appropriate uses of expert and consultant appointments. The intermittent employee was tasked with two major lines of work related to efficiency and curriculum development. OSC management expressed confidence in the individual's qualifications and was within its discretion to both hire him and set his level of compensation. While OSC employees, like other federal employees, are protected against prohibited personnel practices and may seek redress from OSC in making such allegations, this option becomes unworkable because of potential conflicts of interest when an OSC employee raises such an allegation of a prohibited personnel practice against either of the two top OSC officials. Two other federal agencies with redress roles, the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, have taken steps to address potential conflicts of interest when their own employees use their agency's respective redress processes. Steps could be taken to ensure that OSC employees have alternative avenues of recourse; for example, they could have an external investigation conducted through an independent body or broader appeal rights to the MSPB. OSC could not independently implement these options, and would need to be given authority to do so. |
gao_HEHS-98-27 | gao_HEHS-98-27_0 | Between fiscal years 1996 and 1997, each of the seven states increased its overall expenditures on child care subsidy programs, with most of them also increasing the number of children served under these programs. States Are Expanding Child Care Subsidy Programs to Meet Current Needs
In response to welfare reform, the seven states are expanding their funding for child care programs. Detailed data on the number of children served in fiscal years 1996 and 1997 that are comparable across all seven states are not available. States Use Various Means to Allocate Limited Child Care Resources
Even though the seven states are expanding their programs, they are still unable to provide child care subsidies for all families meeting federal eligibility criteria who might benefit from such assistance. To allocate resources, states have controlled access to their child care subsidy programs through state-defined criteria or by the manner in which they distribute child care subsidies to families. Although all seven states expect their child care resources to be sufficient to meet welfare-related child care needs in fiscal year 1997, they vary in the extent to which they can provide subsidies to the nonwelfare working poor. The states’ ability to fund child care programs adequately in the long term, however, remains unknown. States Are Initiating Efforts to Ensure Adequate Supply of Providers
The seven states we reviewed expect demand for child care subsidies to increase under welfare reform as more families become subject to work requirements and as states attempt to provide assistance to other nonwelfare working poor families. Although the provider supply appears to be adequate to meet families’ immediate needs, the states do not know whether it will be adequate to meet low-income families’ long-term child care needs. States Are Addressing Shortages and Preparing for Increased Demand Through Various Initiatives
Recognizing the challenges of the increasing child care demand among welfare families required to work and the difficulties in finding certain types of care, the seven states are pursuing diverse activities to expand the supply of child care. States’ Success in Expanding Provider Supply Is Unknown
Welfare and child care program officials in six of the seven states report that with the additional funds available under the CCDF, the supply of child care appears so far to have kept pace with increases in demand. Therefore, for the near term, the supply of providers appears adequate to meet demands resulting from welfare reform. Some of the seven states are making incremental changes to their standards for child care providers as they expand their child care subsidy programs. To be effective, standards for child care providers must be enforced. HHS officials said that the report’s findings reflect some of the child care issues that they have heard across the country, such as states facing difficult choices in balancing the child care needs of welfare and nonwelfare families to best support these families’ work efforts; concerns about the ability of and opportunity for all families to select safe, high-quality child care; the gap between the supply and demand for infant and school-aged child care and child care during nonstandard work hours; and the impact of economic conditions, work participation requirements under federal welfare reform, and capped federal child care funds on state efforts to expand the supply of safe, high-quality child care. Priority is given to (1) TANF families, (2) transitional families, and (3) families at risk of welfare dependency. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed states' implementation of child care subsidy programs, focusing on: (1) how much federal and state funding is being spent on child care subsidy programs and how they are allocating these resources among welfare families, families making the transition from welfare to work, and working poor families; (2) how states are trying to increase the supply of child care to meet the projected demand under welfare reform; and (3) the extent to which states are changing standards for child care providers in response to welfare reform.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the seven states it reviewed have used federal and state funding to increase overall expenditures on their fiscal year (FY) 1997 child care subsidy programs, with increases ranging from about 2 percent to 62 percent over FY 1996 expenditures; (2) six of the seven states also reported an increase in the number of children served under these programs, although detailed data on the extent of this expansion are not available; (3) all seven states expected to meet the FY 1997 child care needs of families required to work under welfare reform and those of families transitioning off welfare; (4) states vary, however, in the extent to which they will provide subsidies to nonwelfare, working poor families, and all seven states are unable to fund child care for all families meeting the federal eligibility criteria who might benefit from such assistance; (5) to allocate their limited resources, states are controlling access to their child care programs through various state-defined criteria or by the manner in which they distribute subsidies to families; (6) the seven states' ability to meet child care needs beyond FY 1997 is unknown and will depend partially on future state funding levels for child care as well as changes in demand for child care subsidies resulting from welfare reform's work participation requirements; (7) to meet the future demand for child care among welfare families required to work and to address existing difficulties with finding certain types of child care, states have initiated various efforts to expand the supply of providers; (8) the seven states report that the supply of child care providers will generally be sufficient to meet the needs of welfare parents required to work; (9) however, in the future, additional providers may be needed as states comply with increasing numbers of welfare families become employed; (10) the seven states do not know whether their efforts to expand the supply of providers will be sufficient to meet the increased demand expected to result from welfare reform; (11) as state child care subsidy programs expand, some states are making incremental changes to strengthen their standards for child care providers; (12) some child care advocates and officials remain concerned that efforts to expand the supply of providers will result in larger numbers of children in care of unknown quality; and (13) the effect of welfare reform on states' efforts to protect children in child care still needs to be assessed. |
gao_GAO-07-65 | gao_GAO-07-65_0 | Reviewing agency information security programs, at least annually. Agencies’ Policies Do Not Fully Address Elements Important for Effective Testing and Evaluation
Agencies’ policies for periodically testing and evaluating security controls have not been adequately designed and effectively implemented. Specifically, none of the federal agencies’ policies fully addressed six important elements included in OMB and NIST guidelines and standards for performing effective security testing and evaluations. As a result, agencies have limited assurance that controls are implemented correctly, operating as intended, and producing the desired outcome. In addition, agencies may not be fully aware of security control weaknesses in their systems, thereby leaving the agencies’ operations and systems at risk. Specifically, the (1) frequency of periodic testing was not always identified, (2) roles and responsibilities of personnel performing tests often were not clearly defined, (3) selection of a minimum set of security controls evaluated during periodic tests was not always fully addressed, (4) instructions on identification and testing of common security controls were not addressed, (5) instructions on determining the depth and breadth of testing were not included, and (6) descriptions of a process for documenting remedial actions to address deficiencies were not always addressed. Six Case Study Agencies Did Not Effectively Implement Policies
None of the six case study agencies fully implemented their policies for periodic information security testing. Agencies did not fully define the assessment methods used to evaluate their system controls for 7 of the 30 systems reviewed. Agencies Did Not Always Adequately Test Security Controls
Once employed within an information system, security controls should be tested to determine the extent to which the controls are correctly implemented, operating as intended, and producing the desired outcome with respect to meeting the security requirements for the system. For example, testing documentation for some systems did not address the remedial actions that agencies had identified from prior assessments in their test plans. Conclusions
Agencies have not adequately designed and effectively implemented policies for periodically testing information security controls. Also, agency officials reported that they did not understand this method. To determine the adequacy and effectiveness of federal agencies’ policies and procedures for testing and evaluating security controls for their information systems, we conducted a survey of the 24 major agencies, which included 21 questions for the agencies and 4 questions for the agencies’ Inspectors General. To assess the implementation of Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 (FISMA) requirements, we reviewed 30 systems at the six case study agencies to determine whether policies for testing and evaluating security controls were effectively implemented. | Why GAO Did This Study
Agencies rely extensively on computerized information systems and electronic data to carry out their missions. To ensure the security of the information and information systems that support critical operations and infrastructure, federal law and policy require agencies to periodically test and evaluate the effectiveness of their information security controls at least annually. GAO was asked to evaluate the extent to which agencies have adequately designed and effectively implemented policies for testing and evaluating their information security controls. GAO surveyed 24 major federal agencies and analyzed their policies to determine whether the policies address important elements for periodic testing. GAO also examined testing documentation at 6 agencies to assess the quality and effectiveness of testing on 30 systems.
What GAO Found
Federal agencies have not adequately designed and effectively implemented policies for periodically testing and evaluating information security controls. Agencies' policies often did not include important elements for performing effective testing. For example, none of the agencies' policies addressed how to determine the depth and breadth of testing according to risk. Also, agencies did not always address other important elements, including the identification and testing of security controls common to multiple systems, the definition of roles and responsibilities of personnel performing tests, and the frequency of periodic testing. The six case study agencies did not effectively implement policies for periodically testing and evaluating information security controls for the 30 systems reviewed. The methods and practices for testing and evaluating controls at the six agencies were not adequate to ensure that assessments were consistent, of similar quality, and repeatable. For example, these agencies did not always sufficiently document their test methods and results, did not define the assessment methods to be used when evaluating security controls, did not test security controls as prescribed, and did not include previously reported remedial actions or weaknesses in their test plans to ensure they had been addressed. As a result, agencies may not have reasonable assurance that controls are implemented correctly, operating as intended, and producing the desired outcome with respect to meeting the security requirements of the agency. In addition, agencies may not be fully aware of the security control weaknesses in their systems, thereby leaving the agencies' information and systems vulnerable to attack or compromise. |
gao_GAO-06-31 | gao_GAO-06-31_0 | As DOD’s supply chain manager, DLA provides food, fuel, medical supplies, clothing, spare parts for weapon systems, and construction materials to sustain DOD military operations and combat readiness. DLA Has Not Yet Fully Implemented Its Security Program
DLA has implemented important elements of an information security program—including establishing a central security management group, appointing a senior information security officer to manage the program, and providing security awareness training for its employees. However, DLA has not yet fully implemented other essential elements of an effective information security program to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of its information and information systems that support its mission. However, employees with significant information security responsibilities did not receive sufficient training. DLA did not annually test and evaluate the management and operational security controls of its systems. However, this documentation was not always adequate. In addition, data on key information security activities contained in the primary reporting tool were inaccurate or incomplete. Until DLA takes steps to address these weaknesses and fully implements its information security program, it will have limited assurance that agency operations and assets are adequately protected. Recommendations for Executive Actions
To assist DLA in fully implementing its information security program, we are making recommendations to the Secretary of Defense to direct the DLA Director to implement key information security practices and controls by: consistently assessing risks that could result from the unauthorized access, use, disclosure or destruction of information and information; ensuring that training is provided for employees who have significant responsibilities for information security; ensuring that security training plans are updated and maintained; ensuring appropriate monitoring of the agency’s security training ensuring that annual security test and evaluation activities include management, operational, and technical controls of every information system in DLA’s inventory; documenting and reporting complete plans of action and milestones; establishing specific guidance or instructions to information assurance managers and information assurance officers on what—or how—to document and report plans of action and milestones for system deficiencies; discontinuing the practice of issuing “time-limited” authorization to operate accreditation decisions when certification tasks have not been completed; ensuring that the DLA central review team verifies that certification tasks have been completed; and maintaining the accuracy and completeness of the data contained in the agency’s primary reporting tool for recording, tracking, and reporting performance metrics on information security practices and controls. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Defense Logistics Agency's (DLA) mission is, in part, to provide food, fuel, medical supplies, clothing, spare parts for weapon systems, and construction materials to sustain military operations and combat readiness. To protect the information and information systems that support its mission, it is critical that DLA implement an effective information security program. GAO was asked to review the efficiency and effectiveness of DLA's operations, including its information security program. In response, GAO determined whether the agency had implemented an effective information security program.
What GAO Found
Although DLA has made progress in implementing important elements of its information security program, including establishing a central security management group and appointing a senior information security officer to manage the program, it has not yet fully implemented other essential elements. For example, the agency did not consistently assess risks for its information systems; sufficiently train employees who have significant information security responsibilities or adequately complete training plans; annually test and evaluate the effectiveness of management and operational security controls; or sufficiently complete plans of action and milestones for mitigating known information security deficiencies. In addition, DLA has not implemented a fully effective certification and accreditation process for authorizing the operation of its information systems. Key reasons for these weaknesses are that responsibilities of information security employees were not consistently understood or communicated and DLA has not adequately maintained the accuracy and completeness of data contained in its primary reporting tool for overseeing the agency's performance in implementing key information security activities and controls. Until the agency addresses these weaknesses and fully implements an effective agency-wide information security program, it may not be able to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of its information and information systems, and it may not have complete and accurate performance data for key information security practices and controls. |
gao_GAO-15-449 | gao_GAO-15-449_0 | This number includes an estimated 1.3 million adults with a serious mental illness who did not receive any mental health services. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
The number of states that have expanded Medicaid includes the District of Columbia, which we refer to as a state of for the purposes of this report. State BHAs manage behavioral-health-related federal grants and may work with other state agencies—such as state Medicaid agencies—to identify and treat mental health and substance use conditions. An Estimated 3 Million Low-Income Uninsured Adults Had a Behavioral Health Condition, with Half Living in States that Have Not Expanded Medicaid
Nationwide, estimates using data from 2008 to 2013 indicated that of 17.8 million low-income, uninsured adults, approximately 3 million (17 percent) had a behavioral health condition prior to the Medicaid expansion in 2014. Underlying these national estimates was considerable variation at the state level. The estimated prevalence of behavioral health conditions overall among low-income, uninsured adults was about 17 percent, on average, in both expansion and non-expansion states. Selected Non- Expansion States Offered Treatment Options for Uninsured Adults, but Primarily Provided Treatment to Those with the Most Serious Behavioral Health Needs
State BHAs in the non-expansion states we examined offered a variety of behavioral health treatments for low-income, uninsured adults. coverage. States Set Priorities to Focus Care on Those with the Most Serious Behavioral Health Needs and Used Waiting Lists for the Remaining Individuals
The selected non-expansion states established priority populations for providing behavioral health treatment to those with the most severe behavioral health needs. Texas officials said that they triage individuals eligible for behavioral health treatment, and those with less urgent needs may have to wait. Selected Expansion States Generally Managed Behavioral Health Separately from Other Benefits, Reporting Increased Treatment Availability, but Some Continuing Access Concerns
Selected states generally managed behavioral health benefits for newly eligible Medicaid enrollees separately from physical benefits through carve-outs or separate contracts. According to state officials, expanding Medicaid has increased the availability of behavioral health treatment, although some access concerns continue. Selected Expansion States Reported Increased Availability of Behavioral Health Treatment, but Cited Some Ongoing Access Concerns
Officials we interviewed from the six expansion states generally reported that Medicaid expansion had resulted in greater availability of behavioral health treatment, and changes were greater in states without previous coverage options for low-income adults. Officials from all six states cited behavioral health workforce shortages as a challenge to providing behavioral health treatment for low- income adults in their states. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Health and Human Services for review. HHS provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. | Why GAO Did This Study
Research has shown that low-income individuals disproportionately experience behavioral health conditions and may have difficulty accessing care. Expansions of Medicaid under PPACA raise questions about states' capacity to manage the increased demand for treatment. Additional questions arise about treatment options for low-income adults in non-expansion states.
GAO was asked to provide information about access to behavioral health treatment for low-income, uninsured, and Medicaid-enrolled adults. This report examines (1) how many low-income, uninsured adults may have a behavioral health condition; (2) options for low-income, uninsured adults to receive behavioral health treatment in selected non-expansion states; and (3) how selected Medicaid expansion states provide behavioral health coverage for newly eligible enrollees, and how enrollment in coverage affects treatment availability.
GAO obtained estimates of low-income adults who may have a behavioral health condition from the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration. GAO also selected four non-expansion and six expansion states based on, among other criteria, geographic region and adult Medicaid enrollment. GAO reviewed documents from all selected states, and interviewed state Medicaid and BHA officials to understand how uninsured and Medicaid-enrolled adults receive behavioral health treatment. The Department of Health and Human Services provided technical comments on a draft of this report, which GAO incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
Nationwide, estimates using 2008-2013 data indicated that approximately 17 percent of low-income, uninsured adults (3 million) had a behavioral health condition, defined as a serious mental illness, a substance use condition, or both. Underlying these national estimates is considerable variation at the state level.
The estimated number of low-income, uninsured adults with behavioral health conditions was divided evenly between states that did and did not subsequently expand Medicaid under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA).
Behavioral health agencies (BHA) in four selected non-expansion states offered various treatment options for low-income, uninsured adults, focusing care primarily on those with the most serious behavioral health needs. To do so, BHAs in all four selected states established priority populations of those with the most serious behavioral health needs. Also, BHAs in three of the four states maintained waiting lists for adults with less serious behavioral health needs.
Six selected states that expanded Medicaid generally managed behavioral health and physical health benefits separately for newly eligible enrollees, and state officials reported increased availability of behavioral health treatment, although some access concerns continue. Four of the six selected states explicitly chose separate contractual arrangements for behavioral health and physical benefits. Officials from all six selected states said that enrollment in Medicaid increased the availability of behavioral health treatment for newly eligible enrollees. Officials also reported some ongoing access concerns, such as workforce shortages. |
gao_AIMD-99-12 | gao_AIMD-99-12_0 | Background
Each year, the federal government, through the Internal Revenue Service, collects tax revenue to fund government operations. The objective of this report is to provide detailed information on the composition and collectibility of IRS’ September 30, 1997, balance of unpaid assessments based on the work we performed as part of our audit of IRS’ fiscal year 1997 custodial financial statements. Write-offs are comprised largely of amounts owed for corporate income taxes and payroll taxes by businesses or corporations that have subsequently become bankrupt or defunct. In one case, over 60 percent of the $1 billion balance of amounts owed by the failed financial institution consisted solely of accrued interest and penalties. Many of these unagreed assessments resulted from IRS’ various compliance efforts, such as its examinations or audits and its various computer matching programs, in which IRS uses third-party information to identify potential underreporting of tax liabilities. Specifically, we noted less than $75,000 in collections since 1995 on the $2.6 billion balance of amounts owed for the 90 unpaid assessment sample items that were ultimately wholly or partially classified as compliance assessments. The remaining balance of IRS’ unpaid assessments as of September 30, 1997, $90 billion (42 percent) represent amounts that are considered to be taxes receivable under federal accounting standards. These amounts meet the definition of taxes receivable because they represent amounts for which IRS has obtained concurrence, either by the taxpayer or a court, that the amounts are in fact owed to the federal government. In these cases, we found no evidence of either ability or willingness on the part of the taxpayers to pay some or all of the amounts owed. Growth in Unpaid Assessments Balance Largely a Result of Continued Accrual of Penalties and Interest
Because IRS continues to accrue penalties and interest through the statutory collection period of a delinquent tax assessment, regardless of the likelihood of collecting on even the original tax assessment owed, this has, over time, contributed substantially to the buildup of IRS’ balance of unpaid assessments. Because much of IRS’ inventory of unpaid assessments consists of (1) write-offs, which have no future collection potential, (2) compliance assessments, which have little likelihood of being collected, and (3) taxes receivable with no estimated collectibility, and because these items are mostly penalties and interest, a substantial portion of the $136 billion in accumulated interest and penalties is not collectible. Conclusions
Less than half of IRS’ balance of unpaid assessments as of September 30, 1997, was considered taxes receivable, and only about one-third of the taxes receivable, about 13 percent of the $214 billion total unpaid assessments balance, was estimated to be collectible. Our objectives in the unpaid assessment segment of the audit were to determine (1) whether IRS had properly classified its balance of unpaid assessments between taxes receivable, compliance assessments, and write-offs, (2) whether the balances for taxes receivable, compliance assessments, and write-offs were accurate, and (3) in conjunction with IRS, an estimate of the amount IRS could reasonably expect to collect on its balance of taxes receivable. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the composition and collectibility of the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) September 30, 1997, balance of unpaid assessments.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) most of IRS' $214 billion in unpaid assessments as of September 30, 1997, are not taxes receivable and are not collectible; (2) of this balance, $76 billion, or 36 percent, consists of write-offs, which are typically over 6 years old and have no potential for collection; (3) write-offs consist primarily of corporate income and payroll taxes owed by bankrupt or defunct businesses, including failed financial institutions resolved by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and former Resolution Trust Corporation during the savings and loan and banking crises of the 1980s and early 1990s; (4) another $48 billion, or 22 percent, of the unpaid assessments represents compliance assessments, which are amounts IRS has identified as owed to the federal government, but which have not been agreed to by taxpayers or a court; (5) many of these unagreed assessments result from IRS' various compliance efforts; (6) the lack of acknowledgement by the taxpayer or courts of the amounts owed, and evidence of little or no payment activity on compliance assessments, diminish prospects for their collection; (7) GAO noted less than $75,000 in collections since 1995 on $2.6 billion of unpaid compliance assessments; (8) only $90 billion, or 42 percent of the September 30, 1997, balance of unpaid assessments, represents taxes receivable under federal accounting standards; (9) these are distinguished from compliance assessments in that they are amounts that either taxpayers or courts have agreed are owed to the federal government; (10) however, of this amount, only an estimated $28 billion, or 13 percent of the total balance of unpaid assessments, will likely be collected; (11) the accounts comprising this $28 billion balance show evidence of both willingness and ability on the part of the taxpayers to pay their tax liability; (12) GAO found little or no evidence of payments made on these uncollectible taxes receivable; (13) these cases are older debts, with most predating the 1990 tax year; (14) growth in the overall unpaid assessments balance reported by IRS in the last several years is largely due to the accrual of interest and penalties; (15) regardless of collection potential, IRS accrues interest through the statutory collection period of the delinquent tax debt, which can last 10 years or more; (16) as of September 30, 1997, $136 billion, or 64 percent, of IRS' balance of unpaid assessments represented interest and penalties; and (17) most of these amounts will not likely be collected. |
gao_GAO-04-1068T | gao_GAO-04-1068T_0 | Background
Although people across the country were exposed through the media to the emotional trauma of the WTC attack, the residents, office workers, and others living, working, or attending school in the WTC area and the WTC responders not only experienced the traumatic event in person but also were exposed to a complex mixture of potentially toxic contaminants in the air and on the ground, such as pulverized concrete, fibrous glass, particulate matter, and asbestos. Varied Physical and Mental Health Effects Have Been Observed and Reported across a Wide Range of People
A wide variety of physical and mental health effects have been observed and reported across a wide range of people in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks. The health effects include various injuries, respiratory conditions, reproductive health effects, and mental health effects. Unlike the physical health effects, the mental health effects of the September 11 attacks were not limited to responders and people who were in the WTC area but were also experienced by people across the nation. Because most of the information about mental health effects comes from questionnaire or survey data, what is reported in most cases are symptoms associated or consistent with a disorder, such as PTSD, rather than a clinical diagnosis of a disorder. The most commonly reported mental health effects were symptoms associated with PTSD, depression, stress, and anxiety, as well as behavioral effects such as increases in substance use and difficulties coping with daily responsibilities. In addition, thousands of responders were treated for injuries, a small proportion of which were classified as serious, during the 10-month cleanup period. Respiratory Health Effects
A range of respiratory health effects, including a new syndrome called WTC cough and chronic diseases such as asthma, were observed among people exposed to the WTC collapse and its aftermath. The most commonly reported conditions include cough, wheezing, shortness of breath, sinusitis, and asthma. FDNY Firefighters
Almost all of the FDNY firefighters who had responded to the attack experienced respiratory effects, and hundreds had to end their firefighting careers due to WTC-related respiratory illness. PTSD is an often debilitating and potentially chronic disorder that can develop after experiencing or witnessing a traumatic event. Programs Established to Monitor and Understand Health Effects Vary in Eligibility Requirements, Methods, Treatment Referrals, and Duration
The programs established to monitor and understand the health effects of the attack vary in terms of which people are eligible to participate, methods for collecting information about the health effects, options for treatment referral, and number of years people will be monitored. Program Eligibility
The six programs that have been created to monitor people who were exposed to the WTC attack and its aftermath vary in terms of populations eligible to participate. Although five of the programs focus on various responder populations, the largest program—the WTC Health Registry—is open not only to responders but also to people living or attending school in the vicinity of the WTC site, or working or present in the vicinity on September 11. Monitoring Methods and Options for Treatment Referral
The monitoring programs vary in their methods for identifying those who may require treatment, and although none of these programs are funded to provide treatment, they provide varying options for treatment referral. Under current plans, HHS funding for the programs will not extend beyond 2009. Health experts involved in the monitoring programs, however, cite the need for long-term monitoring of affected groups because some possible health effects, such as cancer, do not appear until several decades after a person has been exposed to a harmful agent. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this testimony to DHS, DOL, EPA, and HHS. HHS provided written comments, in which it noted that the testimony does not include significant discussion on the ways in which mental health symptoms have changed over time. In the absence of these results, the evidence we examined did not support a full discussion of changes in mental or physical health effects over time. “Posttraumatic Stress Reactions in New York City Children after the September 11, 2001, Terrorist Attacks.” Ambulatory Pediatrics, 3, no. | Why GAO Did This Study
When the World Trade Center (WTC) buildings collapsed on September 11, 2001, nearly 3,000 people died and an estimated 250,000 to 400,000 people who were visiting, living, working, and attending school nearby, or responding to the attack, were exposed to a mixture of dust, debris, smoke, and various chemicals. In the months to follow, thousands of people who returned to the area to live and work, as well as responders who were involved in the search for remains and site cleanup, were also exposed. In addition, people in New York City and across the country were exposed to the emotional trauma of a terrorist attack on American soil. Concerns have been raised about the short- and long-term physical and mental health effects of the attack. Various government agencies and private organizations established efforts to monitor and understand these health effects. GAO was asked to describe the health effects that have been observed in the aftermath of the WTC attack and the efforts that are in place to monitor and understand those health effects. GAO searched bibliographic databases such as Medline to determine the pertinent scientific literature, reviewed that literature, and interviewed and reviewed documents from government officials, health professionals, and officials of labor groups.
What GAO Found
In the aftermath of the September 11 attack on the World Trade Center, a wide variety of physical and mental health effects have been reported in the scientific literature. The primary health effects include various injuries, respiratory conditions, and mental health effects. In the immediate aftermath of the attack, the primary injuries were inhalation and musculoskeletal injuries. During the 10-month cleanup period, despite the dangerous work site, responders reported few injuries that resulted in lost workdays. A range of respiratory conditions have also been reported, including wheezing, shortness of breath, sinusitis, asthma, and a new syndrome called WTC cough, which consists of persistent cough accompanied by severe respiratory symptoms. Almost all the firefighters who responded to the attack experienced respiratory effects, and hundreds had to end their firefighting careers due to WTC-related respiratory illness. Unlike the physical health effects, the mental health effects were not limited to people in the WTC area but were also experienced nationwide. Because most of the information about mental health effects comes from questionnaire or survey data, what is reported in most cases are symptoms associated with a psychiatric disorder, rather than a clinical diagnosis of disorder. The most commonly reported mental health effects include symptoms associated with depression, stress, anxiety, and posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD)--a disorder that can develop after experiencing or witnessing a traumatic event and includes such symptoms as intrusive memories and distressing dreams--as well as behavioral effects such as increased use of alcohol and tobacco and difficulty coping with daily responsibilities. Six programs were established to monitor and understand the health effects of the attack, and these programs vary in terms of which people are eligible to participate, methods for collecting information about the health effects, options for treatment referral, and number of years people will be monitored. Although five of the programs focus on various responder populations, the largest program--the WTC Health Registry--is open not only to responders but also to people living or attending school in the vicinity of the WTC site, or working or present in the vicinity on September 11. The monitoring programs vary in their methods for identifying those who may require treatment, and although none of these programs are funded to provide treatment, they provide varying options for treatment referral. Under current plans, HHS funding for the programs will not extend beyond 2009. Some long-term health effects, such as lung cancer, may not appear until several decades after a person has been exposed to a harmful agent. GAO provided a draft of this testimony to DHS, EPA, HHS, and the Department of Labor. In its written comments, HHS noted that the testimony does not include significant discussion of ways in which mental health symptoms have changed over time. The evidence GAO examined did not support a full discussion of changes in mental or physical health effects over time. |
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