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gao_GAO-03-668 | gao_GAO-03-668_0 | By minimizing the amount of the carryover, DOD can use its resources most effectively and minimize the “banking” of funds for work and programs to be performed in subsequent years. Gross Carryover Budget Estimates Were Consistently and Substantially Understated
For fiscal years 1998 through 2002, SPAWAR systems centers’ budgeted gross carryover was significantly less than reported actual gross carryover, thereby providing decision makers, including the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and congressional defense committees, misleading carryover information. The Navy’s budget requests consistently underestimated SPAWAR systems centers’ gross carryover, in part, because the Navy consistently underestimated the amount of orders to be received from customers by hundreds of millions of dollars. Reported Actual Carryover Balances Were Consistently Understated
In addition to understating budgeted gross carryover, SPAWAR systems centers also consistently understated their reported actual carryover. Navy reports show that the systems centers’ fiscal year-end carryover balances for fiscal years 1998 through 2002 did not exceed DOD’s 3-month carryover standard. However, we found that the systems centers’ reported carryover balances were understated because (1) DOD’s guidance for calculating the number of months of carryover allowed this to happen and (2) the systems centers used accounting entries to manipulate customer work orders at year-end to help reduce reported carryover below the 3-month standard. As table 3 shows, these adjustments have allowed the systems centers to significantly reduce actual reported gross carryover by hundreds of millions of dollars, resulting in reported carryover below the 3-month standard. However, as discussed below, until recently DOD had not changed its policy for calculating carryover. Reported Actual Carryover Is Based on Unreliable Underlying Financial Data
In addition to understating budgeted and reported actual carryover information, the two SPAWAR systems centers’ actual carryover data that were reported to the Congress as part of the President’s budget were based on some unreliable underlying financial data. Although, as noted previously, the Comptroller has overall responsibility for the center’s tri-annual reviews, his office has not assessed the adequacy of the reviews that are being conducted by the technical departments. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Navy to issue guidance to all Navy working capital fund activities, including SPAWAR, that prohibits them from deobligating reimbursable customer orders at fiscal year-end and reobligating them in the next fiscal year for the sole purpose of reducing carryover balances that are ultimately reported to the Congress; direct the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) to determine the extent to which working capital fund activities throughout DOD may be similarly manipulating customer order data at fiscal year-end to reduce reported carryover and, if necessary, issue DOD-wide guidance prohibiting this practice as needed; and direct the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) to develop and issue written procedures to implement the December 2002 carryover policy. We also obtained data on the status of unfilled orders and carryover at the end of fiscal year 2001. We did not independently verify this information. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR) has hundreds of millions of dollars of funded work that its working capital fund activities did not complete before the end of the fiscal year. Reducing the amount of workload carryover at fiscal year-end is a key factor in the effective management of Department of Defense (DOD) resources and in minimizing the "banking" of funds for work to be performed in subsequent years. GAO was asked to analyze SPAWAR's carryover balances. GAO assessed the accuracy of the budgeted amounts, the accuracy of the reported actual carryover balance, and the reliability of underlying financial data on which reported actual carryover is based.
What GAO Found
The budgeted and reported actual amounts of SPAWAR gross carryover were consistently understated, resulting in the Congress and DOD decision makers not having reliable information to decide on funding levels for working capital fund customers. First, GAO found that SPAWAR centers' budgeted gross carryover for fiscal years 1998 through 2002 was significantly less than the reported actual year-end gross carryover. Budgeted gross carryover was understated primarily due to problems with estimating the underlying customer order data. For example, for fiscal year 2002, SPAWAR's budgeted amount for customer orders was 88 percent less than the reported actual orders received. Second, SPAWAR's reported actual carryover balances were also unreliable and adjusted downward by hundreds of millions of dollars. These adjustments understated carryover and resulted in Navy reports to the Congress showing that SPAWAR carryover balances for fiscal years 1998 through 2002 did not exceed DOD's 3-month carryover standard. SPAWAR was able to report reduced carryover balances for the following reasons. As GAO previously reported, the DOD guidance for calculating the number of months of carryover allowed carryover to be adjusted and understated. DOD agreed with GAO's previous recommendation and in December 2002 changed its carryover guidance. SPAWAR centers used accounting entries to manipulate the amount of customer orders for the sole purpose of reducing reported carryover below the 3-month standard. For example, the centers did this for at least $50 million at the end of fiscal year 2001. SPAWAR officials issued guidance in September 2002 discontinuing this practice. Finally, SPAWAR had not taken key steps to verify the underlying financial data on which reported actual carryover is based. The SPAWAR centers had only recently begun conducting the required tri-annual reviews of such data, which DOD has required since 1996. However, the reviews were ineffective, including the exclusion of slightly less than half of their reported actual carryover from the review process. |
gao_GAO-16-785 | gao_GAO-16-785_0 | These cities are largely scattered across the Midwest and Northeast regions. For example, Georgia has the Georgia Fund, which provides low-interest loans to water and wastewater utilities for water, wastewater, and solid waste infrastructure projects. The Clean Water Act authorizes states to provide additional subsidization to benefit certain municipalities, including those that meet state affordability criteria, in certain circumstances. Little research has been done on the water and wastewater infrastructure needs of cities with declining populations, but the needs of 10 selected midsize and large cities we reviewed generally reflected the needs of cities nationally. According to EPA’s wastewater needs survey, estimated costs for infrastructure improvements to control combined sewer overflows for wastewater utilities serving 7 of the 10 cities we reviewed ranged from $7.1 million to $1.98 billion. Utilities in Selected Cities Have Been Raising Rates to Help Address Infrastructure Needs and Using Customer Assistance and Cost Control Strategies for Rate Affordability
Our sample of 14 utilities in the 10 cities we reviewed used the traditional strategy of raising rates to increase revenues to address their infrastructure needs, although representatives from half of them said that they had concerns about rate affordability and their future ability to raise rates. All of the Utilities in the Selected Cities Developed Customer Assistance Programs as a Strategy for Addressing Concerns about Affordability of Water and Wastewater Rates
All 14 of the utilities we reviewed had developed one or more types of customer assistance programs as a strategy to make rates more affordable for customers who had financial difficulty paying their bills. Most Utilities Were Using Cost Control and Efficiency Strategies to Address Their Water and Wastewater Infrastructure Needs
Most of the utilities (13 of 14) we reviewed were using or had plans to use one or more strategies to address their water and wastewater infrastructure needs by controlling costs or increasing the efficiency of the physical infrastructure or overall management of the utility. However, as part of rightsizing, representatives we interviewed for five wastewater utilities said that they have incorporated in their plans, or were considering using, vacant lands for green infrastructure to help control stormwater runoff that can lead to sewer overflows. Six Federal Programs and One Policy Could Assist Midsize and Large Cities with Declining Populations in Addressing Their Water Infrastructure Needs
While not specifically designed to address the water infrastructure needs of midsize and large cities with declining populations, six federal programs and one policy we reviewed could provide these cities with some assistance. Economic Development Administration Public Works program. Specifically, the Birmingham Water Works Board received $1.7 million (out of $11.6 million) from the Drinking Water SRF program as an additional subsidy in the form of principal forgiveness for green projects, or water infrastructure projects that include energy and water efficiency improvements, green infrastructure, or other environmentally innovative activities. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to the Environmental Protection Agency, the Economic Development Administration, and the Department of Housing and Urban Development for review and comment. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to examine (1) what is known about the economic characteristics of midsize and large cities with declining populations and their drinking water and wastewater infrastructure needs; (2) strategies that selected midsize and large cities with declining populations and their associated utilities used to address their infrastructure needs and the affordability of their drinking water and wastewater rates; and (3) what existing federal programs and policies, if any, could assist midsize and large cities with declining populations, and their associated utilities, in addressing their water infrastructure needs. To examine what is known about the economic characteristics of midsize and large cities with declining populations, we reviewed relevant studies and interviewed experts about cities that have experienced population declines and water and wastewater infrastructure needs. For this report, we used U.S. Census Bureau and National League of Cities definitions for midsize cities—those with populations from 50,000 to 99,999—and large cities—those with populations of 100,000 and greater. We calculated rates as a share of income in the 10 selected cities using the average residential rate information reported by the cities’ utilities and the median household income and income for the 20th percentile for that city reported in the American Community Survey data (5-year estimates for 2010 through 2014). In addition to national data, we gathered information from our 10 selected cities and from 12 of the 14 drinking water and wastewater utilities on federal, state, and other funding they received to help address their water and wastewater infrastructure needs from state fiscal years 2010 through 2015. Data were compiled from data and information collected from utility officials and American Community Survey data. The five strategies are rightsizing to meet current demands (i.e., reducing treatment capacity or decommissioning water lines and sewer lines in vacant areas), major reorganization, expanding the utility’s customer base, public-private partnerships, and asset management. | Why GAO Did This Study
Many midsize and large cities throughout the United States, including the Midwest and Northeast, have lost a substantial percentage of their population. These cities face the challenge of a corresponding decline in utility revenues from a loss of ratepayers, which makes it difficult to address their water infrastructure needs. Overall, water and wastewater utilities across the United States face substantial costs to maintain, upgrade, or replace aging and deteriorating infrastructure—approximately $655 billion for water and wastewater utilities over the next 20 years according to EPA's most recent estimates.
GAO was asked to review the water and wastewater infrastructure needs in midsize and large cities with declining populations. This report examines (1) the economic characteristics of such cities and their water and wastewater infrastructure needs; (2) strategies that selected cities and utilities have used to address their infrastructure needs and the affordability of their water and wastewater rates; and (3) what existing federal programs and policies, if any, could assist such cities in addressing their needs. GAO analyzed decennial census and American Community Survey data, relevant studies, and utility financial statements for 10 cities with the largest population declines from 1980 through 2010 and 14 water and wastewater utilities in those cities. GAO also reviewed laws, regulations, policies, and guidance for six federal programs; analyzed program and city and utility funding data; and interviewed agency and city officials and representatives from 12 of the 14 utilities.
What GAO Found
Midsize cities (with populations from 50,000 to 99,999) and large cities (with populations of 100,000 and greater) that have experienced a population decline are generally more economically distressed than growing cities. Specifically, GAO's review of American Community Survey data for 674 midsize and large cities showed that the 99 cities with declining population had higher poverty and unemployment rates and lower median income than cities with growing populations. Little research has been done about these cities' overall water and wastewater infrastructure needs, but the needs of the 10 midsize and large cities that GAO reviewed generally reflected the needs of cities nationally, as identified in needs assessments conducted by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Water and wastewater utility representatives whom GAO interviewed described major infrastructure needs, including pipeline repair and replacement and wastewater improvements to control combined sewer overflows (i.e., wastewater discharges to streams and other water bodies during storms).
Utilities for the 10 cities GAO reviewed used the strategy of raising rates to increase revenues to address water and wastewater infrastructure needs and used other strategies to address concerns about rate affordability for low-income customers. Most of the 14 utilities GAO reviewed raised rates annually to cover declines in revenues related, in part, to decreasing water use from declining populations, or to pay for rising operating and capital expenses. To help address rate affordability concerns, all of the utilities reviewed had developed customer assistance programs, a strategy to make rates more affordable, for example, by developing a payment plan agreeable to the customer and the utility. In addition, most utilities were using or had plans to use one or more cost-control strategies to address needs, such as rightsizing system infrastructure to fit current demands (i.e., reducing treatment capacity or decommissioning water or sewer lines in vacant areas). For example, as part of rightsizing, representatives GAO interviewed for 5 wastewater utilities said that they planned or were considering using vacant areas for green infrastructure (vegetated areas that enhance on-site infiltration) to help control stormwater that can lead to sewer overflows.
As of June 2016, six federal programs and one policy could assist midsize and large cities with declining populations in addressing their water and wastewater infrastructure needs. Cities with declining populations may receive funding from the six programs, managed by EPA, the Economic Development Administration, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and the Federal Emergency Management Agency, for such projects. For example, states can use a portion of EPA's Clean Water and Drinking Water State Revolving Funds to provide additional subsidies in the form of principal forgiveness or negative interest loans to cities that meet state affordability criteria, such as median household income. The Birmingham Water Works Board, one of the 14 utilities GAO reviewed, received $11.6 million from the Drinking Water State Revolving Fund in fiscal years 2010 through 2015, including $1.7 million with principal forgiveness to pay for green projects, such as water efficiency projects.
GAO provided a draft of this report to EPA, the Economic Development Administration, and HUD for comment. The agencies provided technical comments that were incorporated, as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-01-975T | gao_GAO-01-975T_0 | Oversight of CIA Activities
Currently, two congressional select committees and the CIA’s Inspector General oversee the CIA’s activities. GAO’s Authority to Review CIA Programs
Generally, we have broad authority to evaluate agency programs and investigate matters related to the receipt, disbursement, and use of public money. Currently, our access to the CIA is limited to requests for information that relates either to governmentwide reviews or programs for which the CIA might have relevant information. In general, we have the most success obtaining access to CIA information when we request threat assessments, and the CIA does not perceive our audits as oversight of its activities. The issue of our access has arisen periodically in the intervening years as our work has required some level of access to CIA programs and activities. Since then, GAO has limited its pursuit of greater access because of limited demand for this work from Congress, particularly from the intelligence committees. Given a lack of Congressional requests and our limited resources, we have made a conscious decision to deal with the CIA on a case-by-case basis. Current Access Falls Into Three Categories
Currently, the CIA responds to our requests for information in three ways: it provides the information, it provides the information or a part of it with some restriction, or it does not provide the information at all. On some of our audits related to national security issues, the CIA provides us with limited access to its written threat assessments and analyses, such as National Intelligence Estimates. Conclusion
Our access to CIA information and programs has been limited by both legal and practical factors. Through the years our access has varied and we have not done detailed audit work at CIA since the early 1960s. GAO’s Access-to- Records Authority
31 U.S.C. | What GAO Found
Oversight of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) generally comes from two select committees of Congress and the CIA's Inspector General. GAO has broad authority to evaluate CIA programs. In reality, however, GAO faces both legal and practical limitations on its ability to review these programs. For example, it has no access to some CIA "unvouchered" accounts and cannot compel its access to foreign intelligence and counterintelligence information. In addition, as a practical matter, GAO is limited by the CIA's level of cooperation, which has varied through the years. GAO has not actively audited the CIA since the early 1960s, when it discontinued such work because CIA was not providing it with enough access to information to allow GAO to do its job. The issue has arisen since then from time to time as GAO's work has required some level of access to CIA programs and information. However, given a lack of requests from Congress for GAO to do specific work at the CIA and its limited resources, GAO made a decision not to pursue the issue further. Today, GAO's dealings with the CIA are mostly limited to information requests that relate either to governmentwide reviews or analyses of threats to U.S. national security on which the CIA might have some information. The CIA provides GAO with the requested information, provides the information with some restrictions, or does not provide the information at all. In general, GAO is most successful in obtaining CIA information when it requests threat assignments and when the CIA does not perceive GAO's audits as oversight of its activities. |
gao_GAO-13-540 | gao_GAO-13-540_0 | Scope and Methodology
As part of our audit of the fiscal years 2012 and 2011 CFS, we considered the federal government’s financial reporting procedures and related internal control. Also, we determined the status of corrective actions taken by Treasury and OMB to address open recommendations relating to the processes used by them to prepare the CFS that were detailed in our previous reports. We have communicated each of the new control deficiencies to your staff. We performed our audit of the fiscal years 2012 and 2011 CFS in accordance with U.S. generally accepted government auditing standards. New Control Deficiencies Identified
During our audit of the fiscal year 2012 CFS, we identified several new internal control deficiencies in Treasury’s and OMB’s processes used to prepare the CFS. Specifically, we found that Treasury’s procedures were not effectively designed to (1) reasonably assure the timely submission of audited material line items for significant calendar year-end federal entities, (2) determine the effect of restatements and reclassifications submitted by significant federal entities on related line items and notes presented in the CFS, and (3) ensure that the budget statements included in the CFS were prepared in a reliable manner. A-136, Financial Reporting Requirements, that may result in inconsistent and inaccurate reporting of compliance with the Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996 (FFMIA). During our audit of the fiscal year 2012 CFS, we found that although Treasury has made changes to its procedures and now documents its process for preparing the CFS budget statements, Treasury had not established and implemented effective processes and procedures to reconcile (1) outlays and receipts as recorded in the CSGL to outlays and receipts reported in the federal entities’ audited financial statements and other financial data, (2) the operating results to the budget results, and (3) changes in cash and other monetary assets to the budget results. To improve the reliability of the information presented in the CFS budget statements, we recommend that the Secretary of the Treasury direct the Fiscal Assistant Secretary, working in coordination with the Controller of OMB’s Office of Federal Financial Management, to establish and implement effective procedures for (1) reporting amounts in the CFS budget statements that are fully consistent with the underlying information in significant federal entities’ audited financial statements and other financial data and (2) identifying and reporting all items needed to prepare the CFS budget statements. OMB’s FFMIA Reporting Requirement
During our audit of the fiscal year 2012 CFS, we notified OMB of a reporting requirement in OMB Circular No. Status of Recommendations from Prior Reports
Of our 48 recommendations from our prior reports regarding control deficiencies in the CFS preparation process that were open at the end of the fiscal year 2011 audit, we closed 17 recommendations during our fiscal year 2012 audit. Thirty-one recommendations from our prior reports remained open as of January 9, 2013, the date of our report on the audit of the fiscal year 2012 CFS. We will continue to monitor Treasury’s and OMB’s progress in addressing our recommendations as part of our fiscal year 2013 CFS audit. This report contains recommendations to you. As the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) is designing its new financial statement compilation process to begin with the fiscal year 2004 consolidated financial statements of the U.S. government (CFS), the Secretary of the Treasury should direct the Fiscal Assistant Secretary, in coordination with the Controller of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), to develop reconciliation procedures that will aid in understanding and controlling the net position balance as well as eliminate the plugs previously associated with compiling the CFS. Treasury is committed to continuing its efforts to address the remaining control deficiencies in this area. The agencies will provide corrective actions based on these meetings. | Why GAO Did This Study
Treasury, in coordination with OMB, prepares the Financial Report of the United States Government, which contains the CFS. Since GAO's first audit of the fiscal year 1997 CFS, certain material weaknesses and other limitations on the scope of its work have prevented GAO from expressing an opinion on the CFS, exclusive of the Statements of Social Insurance (SOSI). Also, GAO was unable to express opinions on the 2012, 2011, and 2010 SOSI and 2012 and 2011 Statements of Changes in Social Insurance Amounts because of significant uncertainties, primarily related to the achievement of projected reductions in Medicare cost growth, reflected in these statements. As part of the fiscal year 2012 CFS audit, GAO identified material weaknesses and other control deficiencies in the processes used to prepare the CFS. The purpose of this report is to (1) provide details on new control deficiencies GAO identified related to the preparation of the CFS, (2) recommend improvements, and (3) provide the status of corrective actions taken by Treasury and OMB to address GAO's prior recommendations relating to the preparation of the CFS that remained open at the end of the fiscal year 2011 audit.
What GAO Found
During its audit of the fiscal year 2012 consolidated financial statements of the U.S. government (CFS), GAO identified new and continuing control deficiencies in the Department of the Treasury's (Treasury) and the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) processes used to prepare the CFS. These control deficiencies contributed to material weaknesses in internal control over the federal government's ability to
adequately account for and reconcile intragovernmental activity and balances between federal entities;
ensure that the federal government's accrual-based consolidated financial statements were (1) consistent with the underlying audited entities' financial statements, (2) properly balanced, and (3) in conformity with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles; and
identify and either resolve or explain material differences between (1) components of the budget deficit that are used to prepare certain information in the CFS and (2) related amounts reported in federal entities' financial statements and underlying financial information and records.
Specifically, for fiscal year 2012, GAO found that Treasury's procedures were not effectively designed to
reasonably assure the timely submission of audited material line items for significant calendar year-end federal entities,
determine the effect of restatements and reclassifications submitted by significant federal entities on related line items and notes presented in the CFS, and
ensure that the budget statements included in the CFS were prepared in a reliable manner.
GAO also notified OMB of a reporting requirement in OMB Circular No. A-136, Financial Reporting Requirements , that may result in inconsistent and inaccurate reporting of compliance with the Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996.
In addition, GAO found that various other control deficiencies identified in previous years' audits with respect to the CFS preparation continued to exist. Specifically, 31 of the 48 recommendations from GAO's prior reports regarding control deficiencies in the CFS preparation process remained open as of January 9, 2013, the date of GAO's report on its audit of the fiscal year 2012 CFS. GAO will continue to monitor the status of corrective actions taken to address the 6 new recommendations as well as the 31 open recommendations from prior years as part of its fiscal year 2013 CFS audit.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making six recommendations -- five to Treasury and one to OMB--to address the new control deficiencies identified by GAO during the fiscal year 2012 CFS audit. In commenting on GAO's draft, OMB and Treasury generally concurred on 5 of the 6 recommendations, and Treasury will consider implementation of the other recommendation. |
gao_GAO-06-710 | gao_GAO-06-710_0 | Background
Medicare Part D coverage is provided through private sponsors that offer a choice of PDPs with different costs and coverage. Characteristics of PDP Sponsors
For 2006, 79 sponsors are offering over 1,400 PDPs, each of which has been approved by CMS to ensure that it meets established standards. CSRs Generally Provided Prompt, Courteous, and Helpful Service
Almost all of the calls we placed were answered by a CSR with minimal delay. Further, we found that most CSRs with whom we spoke were easy to understand, polite, and professional, and many provided helpful suggestions and information. The wait time to reach a CSR was generally short—46 percent of the 864 calls CSRs fielded were answered in less than 1 minute and 96 percent of the calls were answered in less than 5 minutes (see fig. Many CSRs also provided callers with helpful suggestions that related to our questions. For example, during question 1 calls on the PDP comparison for a low-utilization beneficiary, CSRs provided information about a mail-order option to obtain drugs in 22 percent of the calls. PDP Sponsor Call Centers Did Not Consistently Provide Callers with Accurate and Complete Information
CSRs at the 10 PDP sponsor call centers we contacted provided accurate and complete responses to about one-third of the calls they fielded, although the accuracy and completeness rates for each of the 10 sponsor call centers and for each of the five questions varied. CSRs were unable to provide an answer for 15 percent of the questions posed, primarily those related to plan costs. In addition, we found that CSRs within the same call centers sometimes provided inconsistent responses to our questions. About One-Third of CSR Responses Were Accurate and Complete
Excluding the 4 percent of calls for which we did not reach a CSR, we obtained accurate and complete responses to 34 percent of the calls—294 of 864—and obtained incomplete responses to another 29 percent of the calls (see fig. The overall accuracy and completeness rates for each of the 10 PDP sponsor call centers varied widely, ranging from 20 to 60 percent (see fig. 3). In addition, in response to questions 1 and 2, CSRs at three call centers told us that it was against the sponsor’s policies to identify any of their plans as having the lowest annual cost. However, other CSRs at each of these call centers did not cite this policy and did identify a plan as having the lowest annual cost. Concluding Observations
Our calls to 10 of the largest PDP sponsors’ call centers show that Medicare beneficiaries face challenges in obtaining the information needed to make informed choices about the PDP that best meets their needs. Call center CSRs are expected to provide answers to drug benefit questions and comparative information about their sponsors’ PDP offerings. In its comments, CMS characterized our analysis as based on inaccurate, incomplete, and subjective methods that limit the report’s relevance and validity. Furthermore, at a May 2006 meeting with CMS officials, the agency’s Deputy Administrator stated that CSRs should be able to accurately answer all of the specific questions we posed during the study. GAO staff who made contributions to this report are listed in appendix II. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA) established a voluntary outpatient prescription drug benefit, known as Medicare Part D. Private sponsors have contracted with the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) to provide this benefit and are offering over 1,400 stand-alone prescription drug plans (PDP). Depending on where they live, beneficiaries typically have a choice of 40 to 50 PDPs, which vary in cost and coverage. MMA required each PDP sponsor to staff a toll-free call center, which serves as a key source of the information that beneficiaries need to make informed choices among PDPs. GAO examined (1) whether PDP sponsors provide prompt, courteous, and helpful service to Medicare beneficiaries and others and (2) the extent to which PDP sponsor call centers provide accurate and complete information to Medicare beneficiaries and other callers. To address these objectives, we made 900 calls to 10 of the largest PDP sponsor call centers during March 2006, posing one of five questions about their Part D plans during each call. We tracked the amount of time it took to reach a customer service representative (CSR), the number of calls that did not reach a CSR, and the appropriateness and clarity of CSRs' language. We developed criteria for determining accurate and complete responses based on CMS information.
What GAO Found
Call center service was generally prompt and courteous, and many CSRs offered helpful suggestions and information. GAO reached a representative in less than 1 minute for 46 percent of the calls CSRs fielded and in less than 5 minutes for 96 percent of the calls fielded. While GAO did not reach CSRs for 4 percent of the calls it placed, mainly because of disconnections, GAO found that 98 percent of CSRs with whom GAO spoke were easy to understand, polite, and professional. In addition, many CSRs provided helpful suggestions related to GAO's questions, such as details about a mail-order option to obtain drugs or lower-cost drugs. However, CSRs at 10 of the largest PDP sponsor call centers did not consistently provide accurate and complete responses to GAO's five questions, which GAO developed using information from CMS and other sources. GAO obtained accurate and complete responses to about one-third of the 864 calls for which GAO reached a CSR. The overall accuracy and completeness rate for each call center ranged from 20 to 60 percent. CSRs were unable to answer 15 percent of the questions posed, primarily those related to plan costs. Furthermore, CSRs within the same call center sometimes provided inconsistent answers. For example, in response to questions about PDP cost comparisons for specified sets of drugs, CSRs at 3 call centers told GAO that it was against the sponsors' policies to identify any of their plans as lowest cost. However, other CSRs at each of these call centers did not cite this policy and did identify a plan as lowest cost. In commenting on a draft of this report, CMS criticized the analysis as based on inaccurate, incomplete, and subjective methods that limit the report's relevance and validity. GAO maintains that its methods are sound and its findings are accurate. CMS officials told GAO at a May 2006 meeting that CSRs should have been able to accurately answer the questions GAO posed. |
gao_GAO-05-953 | gao_GAO-05-953_0 | Figure 2 shows the three semipostals. Proceeds from the Stop Family Violence stamp are being transferred to HHS for domestic violence programs. In addition to variations in the amounts raised by each of the semipostals, sales patterns were also different, and on the basis of our discussions with Service officials, advocacy groups, and other stakeholders, we identified four key factors that affected sales, including (1) fund-raising cause, (2) support of advocacy groups, (3) stamp design, and (4) Service promotional activities. Semipostal Proceeds and Sales Patterns Varied Substantially
The funds raised by the semipostals vary from $44 million for the Breast Cancer Research stamp to over $10.5 million for the Heroes of 2001 stamp and nearly $2 million for the Stop Family Violence stamp, totaling over $56 million. 4). Sales Patterns Were Influenced by Several Key Factors
Fund-Raising Cause: Awareness, Appeal, and Staying Power
Public awareness about the fund-raising causes represented by the semipostals likely affected sales levels. 5). Semipostal Proceeds Will Be Used for Grants, with Limited Reporting on Specific Uses
The federal agencies receiving semipostal proceeds currently award or plan to award these funds using grants, and although each agency has collected and maintained information on semipostal proceeds, none has reported specifically on their use of proceeds thus far. The laws authorizing these three specific semipostals do not include reporting requirements such as those of the Semipostal Authorization Act. Breast Cancer Research Stamp and Stop Family Violence Stamp Proceeds Are Used for Grants within Established Programs
NIH and DOD: Grants for Breast Cancer Research Under Way
Both NIH and DOD reported that they began receiving Breast Cancer Research stamp proceeds from the Service in November 1998, and breast cancer research grants have been awarded using established programs at both agencies since June 2000 and June 1999, respectively. Agencies Have Not Reported Specifically on the Proceeds’ Use
None of the designated federal agencies receiving semipostal proceeds is required to issue a report to Congress detailing how these funds are used or any accomplishments resulting from semipostal-funded grants. Lesson Learned: The Charitable Cause Selected Can Greatly Affect the Arc of the Fund-Raising Effort and Other Results Achieved
The existing semipostals have been issued for a minimum 2-year sales period, and one—the Breast Cancer Research stamp—has been extended 3 times. Lesson Learned: Early and Continued Involvement of Advocacy Groups Helps to Sustain Semipostal Support
Support of advocacy groups is an important marketing device for semipostals. The extent of promotion and advertising of a semipostal can also greatly affect sales. For example, FEMA’s plan for distributing the Heroes of 2001 stamp proceeds has taken about 3 years to finalize, and while it is clear that the initial intent of the semipostal was to “provide financial assistance to the families of emergency relief personnel killed or permanently disabled in the terrorist attacks of September 11,” other organizations working with these families suggested that currently, the most prevalent needs of this group are programs and services directed at addressing the long-term effects of the terrorist attacks. These agencies included the National Cancer Institute (NCI) within the National Institutes of Health (NIH), the Army Medical Research and Materiel Command within the Department of Defense (DOD), the Federal Emergency Management Agency within the Department of Homeland Security, and the Administration for Children and Families within the Department of Health and Human Services. Semipostal Design
Congress has selected the subject matter for the three semipostals issued to date. Comments from the U.S. | Why GAO Did This Study
Congress has directed the U.S. Postal Service to issue three fund-raising stamps, also called semipostals, since 1998. These stamps are sold at a higher price than First-Class stamps, with the difference going to federal agencies for specific causes. The proceeds from the three stamps address breast cancer research, assistance to families of emergency personnel killed or permanently disabled in the terrorist attacks of September 11, and domestic violence. The law authorizing the Breast Cancer Research stamp directed GAO to report on the fund-raising results. To provide additional information to the Congress, GAO expanded the study to include all three semipostals. GAO's study addressed (1) the amounts raised and the factors affecting sales, (2) how the designated agencies used the proceeds and reported the results, and (3) lessons learned for the Postal Service, agencies receiving the proceeds, and others.
What GAO Found
Over $56 million has been raised through semipostal sales as of June 2005, and sales were likely affected by several key factors. Individually, proceeds totaled $44 million for the Breast Cancer Research stamp, over $10.5 million for the Heroes of 2001 stamp, and nearly $2 million for the Stop Family Violence stamp. Sales patterns and levels differed greatly, with four key factors affecting sales patterns: (1) fund-raising cause, (2) support of advocacy groups, (3) stamp design, and (4) promotion by the Postal Service. The designated federal agencies currently award or plan to award grants with the proceeds; none of the agencies has reported specifically on results. Breast Cancer Research stamp proceeds have been used to award research grants by the National Institutes of Health and the Department of Defense. No grants have yet been awarded with the proceeds from the two other semipostals. The Federal Emergency Management Agency plans to distribute Heroes of 2001 stamp proceeds through grants to families of emergency personnel killed or permanently disabled from the September 11 attacks, while the Department of Health and Human Services plans to use Stop Family Violence stamp proceeds for grants to organizations for projects aimed at enhancing services to children exposed to domestic violence. Key lessons that have emerged from the three semipostals: (1) the nature of the charitable cause can greatly affect sales patterns and other results. A disaster, for example, is more likely to have a brief but intense response, while an ongoing health issue will have a longer one; (2) early and continued involvement of advocacy groups helps sustain semipostal support; (3) stamp design, promotion, and clear understanding about how proceeds will be used can greatly affect consumers' response; (4) semipostals generate proceeds immediately, but the logistics of using the moneys raised takes much longer, and (5) reporting can enhance accountability. Congress included a reporting requirement in the Semipostal Authorization Act of 2000, but these three semipostals are not subject to that requirement. |
gao_GAO-05-454 | gao_GAO-05-454_0 | Background
The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 was enacted to address concerns expressed about federal statutes and regulations that require nonfederal parties to expend resources to achieve legislative goals without being provided funding to cover the costs. Instead, it generates information about the potential impacts of mandates proposed in legislation and regulations. Other parties commented about various other definitional issues involving the exclusion of certain types of costs (indirect costs) and UMRA’s cost thresholds for legislative and regulatory mandates, which result in excluding many federal actions that may significantly impact nonfederal entities. Some in the Academic/Think Tank and Public Interest Advocacy Sectors View UMRA’s Coverage as a Strength and Take Issue with Certain Recommendations to Expand or Change Coverage
Contrary to the view that UMRA’s coverage was too narrow, some parties from academic/think tank and public interest advocacy sectors viewed UMRA’s narrow scope as one of its primary strengths. Sectors Also Provide More General Concerns About Federal Mandates
Parties from all sectors also raised a number of broader issues about federal mandates—namely, the design and funding and evaluation of federal mandates—and suggested a variety of options. First, parties from four of the five sectors commented about the lack of evaluation of the effectiveness (results) of mandates and the implications of mandates, including benefits, non-fiscal effects and costs. Third, parties primarily from the academic/think tank and state and local governments sectors raised issues about the impacts and costs of federal mandates. On broader policy issues concerning federal mandates, most parties supported the need for more evaluation and research on federal mandates. As we move forward, the unfunded mandates issue raises broader questions about the assignment of fiscal responsibilities within our federal system. The federal government, as well as states, faces serious fiscal challenges both in the short and longer term. In February 2005, we issued our report on 21st century challenges. Given the long-term fiscal challenges facing the federal budget as well as numerous other geopolitical changes challenging the continued relevance of existing programs and priorities, we called for a national debate to review what the government does, how it does business and how it finances its priorities. Such a reexamination should usefully consider how responsibilities should be allocated and shared across the many nonfederal entities in our system as well. Specifically, you asked us to consult with a diverse group of knowledgeable parties familiar with the act and to report their views on (1) the significant strengths and weaknesses of UMRA as the framework for addressing federal mandates issues, including why the parties believed the issues they identified were significant, and (2) potential options suggested for reinforcing the strengths or addressing the weaknesses. To address our objectives, we primarily used a structured data collection approach to obtain feedback from a diverse set of organizations and individuals knowledgeable about the implementation of UMRA and/or federal mandate programs. To meet these objectives in the limited time available, the discussions at the symposium were structured to focus mainly on the three themes that appeared to attract the greatest number and/or variety of comments during our initial data collection, as well as to address themes from both the UMRA-specific and general mandate sets: UMRA coverage, UMRA enforcement, and the design and funding of federal mandate programs. Summary of Parties’ Suggested Options
Once the strengths, weaknesses and options were identified and reviewed, GAO developed a thematic framework for classifying and organizing this information. Amend UMRA to include federal preemptions. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA) was enacted to address concerns about federal statutes and regulations that require nonfederal parties to expend resources to achieve legislative goals without being provided federal funding to cover the costs. UMRA generates information about the nature and size of potential federal mandates on nonfederal entities to assist Congress and agency decision makers in their consideration of proposed legislation and regulations. However, it does not preclude the implementation of such mandates. At various times in its 10-year history, Congress has considered legislation to amend various aspects of the act to address ongoing questions about its effectiveness. Most recently, GAO was asked to consult with a diverse group of parties familiar with the act and to report their views on (1) the significant strengths and weaknesses of UMRA as the framework for addressing mandate issues and (2) potential options for reinforcing the strengths or addressing the weaknesses. To address these objectives, we obtained information from 52 organizations and individuals reflecting a diverse range of viewpoints. GAO analyzed the information acquired and organized it into broad themes for analytical and reporting purposes.
What GAO Found
The parties GAO contacted provided a significant number of comments about UMRA, specifically, and federal mandates, generally. Their views often varied across and within the five sectors we identified (academic/think tank, public interest advocacy, business, federal agencies, and state and local governments). Overall, the numerous strengths, weaknesses and options for improvement identified during the review fell into several broad themes, including UMRA-specific issues such as coverage and enforcement, among others, and more general issues about the design, funding, and evaluation of federal mandates. First, UMRA coverage was, by far, the most frequently cited issue by parties from the various sectors. Parties across most sectors that provided comments said UMRA's numerous definitions, exclusions, and exceptions leave out many federal actions that may significantly impact nonfederal entities and should be revisited. Among the most commonly suggested options were to expand UMRA's coverage to include a broader set of actions by limiting the various exclusions and exceptions and lowering the cost thresholds, which would make more federal actions mandates under UMRA. However, a few parties, primarily from the public interest advocacy sector, viewed UMRA's narrow coverage as a strength that should be maintained. Second, parties from various sectors also raised a number of issues about federal mandates in general. In particular, they had strong views about the need for better evaluation and research of federal mandates and more complete estimates of both the direct and indirect costs of mandates on nonfederal entities. The most frequently suggested option to address these issues was more post-implementation evaluation of existing mandates or "look backs." Such evaluations of the actual performance of mandates could enable policymakers to better understand mandates' benefits, impacts and costs among other issues. In turn, developing such evaluation information could lead to the adjustment of existing mandate programs in terms of design and/or funding, perhaps resulting in more effective or efficient programs. Going forward, the issue of unfunded mandates raises broader questions about assigning fiscal responsibilities within our federal system. Federal and state governments face serious fiscal challenges both in the short and longer term. As GAO reported in its February 2005 report entitled 21st Century Challenges: Reexamining the Base of the Federal Government (GAO-05-325SP), the long-term fiscal challenges facing the federal budget and numerous other geopolitical changes challenging the continued relevance of existing programs and priorities warrant a national debate to review what the government does, how it does business and how it finances its priorities. Such a reexamination includes considering how responsibilities for financing public services are allocated and shared across the many nonfederal entities in the U.S. system as well. |
gao_GAO-09-482 | gao_GAO-09-482_0 | Background
The V-22 Osprey is a tilt-rotor aircraft—one that operates as a helicopter for takeoffs and landings and, once airborne, converts to a turboprop aircraft—developed to fulfill medium-lift operations such as transporting combat troops, supplies, and equipment for the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force special operations. Figure 1 depicts V-22 aircraft in various aspects of use. There are two variants of the V-22’s design. MV-22 Operations in Iraq Demonstrated Effectiveness for Assigned Missions but the Aircraft Continues to Experience Challenges
As of January 2009, the 12 MV-22s stationed in Iraq had successfully completed all missions assigned to them in what is considered an established, low-threat theater of operations. The deployments confirmed that the V-22’s enhanced speed and range enable personnel and internal cargo to be transported faster and farther than is possible with the legacy helicopters it is replacing. However, questions have arisen as to whether the MV-22 is best suited to accomplish the full mission repertoire of the helicopters it is intended to replace. Some challenges in operational effectiveness have been noted. Also, suitability challenges, such as unreliable parts and an immature parts supply chain drove availability significantly below minimum required levels. Operational tests and training exercises have provided additional insights into the aircraft’s capabilities and have identified challenges to the MV-22’s ability to conduct operations in high-threat environments, carry the required number of combat troops, transport external cargo, operate from Navy ships, and conduct missions operating in environments throughout the world. While efforts are underway to address these challenges, how successful they will be is uncertain, as some challenges arise from the inherent design of the V-22. Maneuvering limits may affect air crew ability to execute the correct evasive action. Its larger size and large inventory of repair parts constrain hangar deck space. Downwash concerns, however, are not restricted to shipboard operations. However, its current capability to conduct worldwide operations in many environments is limited. The original program cost estimates have changed significantly as research and development and procurement costs have risen sharply above initial projections. With regard to operations and support costs for the V-22, the current Flying Hour Program (FHP) cost per flight hour of the MV-22 today is over $11,000—more than double the target estimate and 140 percent higher than the cost for the CH-46E. Furthermore, operations and support (O&S) cost will be higher than anticipated. To complete the total procurement, the program plans to request approximately $25 billion (in then-year dollars) for aircraft procurement beyond the $29 billion already appropriated and planned for development and procurement. We interviewed officials at the Marine Corps Combat Development Command, the V-22 Program Office, and Commander, Operational Test and Evaluation Force to discuss the V-22 key performance parameters and other performance measures. This allowed us to document the increase in cost and expected funding needs over time and its impact on procurement unit cost. Data is presented in fiscal year 2009 dollars except for figure 8, which is in then-year dollars. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since the 1980s, the V-22, developed to transport combat troops, supplies, and equipment for the U.S. Marine Corps and to support other services' operations, has experienced several fatal crashes, demonstrated various deficiencies, and faced virtual cancellation--much of which it has overcome. Although until recently deployed in Iraq and regarded favorably, it has not performed the full range of missions anticipated, and how well it can do so is in question. In view of concerns about the V-22 program, you asked us to determine if the V-22 will perform as promised, and if it will, at what cost. GAO reviewed (1) current MV-22 operations in Iraq; (2) strengths and deficiencies in terms of the capabilities expected of the V-22; and (3) past, current, and future costs. GAO reviewed a range of program documents and data, interviewed program officials, operators and others; and observed MV-22 operations in Iraq and shipboard.
What GAO Found
As of January 2009, the 12 MV-22s (Marine Corps variant of the V-22) in Iraq successfully completed all missions assigned in a low threat theater of operations--using their enhanced speed and range to engage in general support missions and deliver personnel and internal cargo faster and farther than the legacy helicopters being replaced. Noted challenges to operational effectiveness raise questions about whether the MV-22 is best suited to accomplish the full repertoire of missions of the helicopters it is intended to replace. Additionally, suitability challenges, such as unreliable component parts and supply chain weaknesses, led to low aircraft availability rates. MV-22 operational tests and training exercises identified challenges with the system's ability to operate in other environments. Maneuvering limits and challenges in detecting threats may affect air crew ability to execute correct evasive actions. The aircraft's large size and inventory of repair parts created obstacles to shipboard operations. Identified challenges could limit the ability to conduct worldwide operations in some environments and at high altitudes similar to what might be expected in Afghanistan. Efforts are underway to address these deficiencies, but some are inherent in the V-22's design. V-22 costs have risen sharply above initial projections--1986 estimates (stated in fiscal year 2009 dollars) that the program would build nearly 1000 aircraft in 10 years at $37.7 million each have shifted to fewer than 500 aircraft at $93.4 million each--a procurement unit cost increase of 148 percent. Research, development, testing, and evaluation costs increased over 200 percent. To complete the procurement, the program plans to request approximately $25 billion (in then-year dollars) for aircraft procurement. As for operations and support costs (O&S), the Marine Corps' V-22's cost per flight hour today is over $11,000--more than double the targeted estimate. |
gao_T-RCED-99-89 | gao_T-RCED-99-89_0 | 1). If truck travel continues to increase at this rate, and nothing is done to reduce the fatality rate, the annual number of fatalities could increase to 5,800 in 1999 and to more than 6,000 in 2000 (see fig. 2). In addition, the annual number of crashes involving large trucks that resulted in property damage only increased from 291,000 to 329,000 while the number of these crashes per 100 million miles traveled decreased from 206 to 172. However, large trucks were involved in a greater number of fatal crashes per mile traveled (see fig. 3). In fatal crashes between large trucks and cars in 1997, 98 percent of the fatalities were occupants of the car. Drivers and Mechanical Failures Are Contributing Factors to Fatal Truck Crashes
While no definitive information on the causes of fatal crashes exists, there is information on factors that may contribute to these crashes. Data from the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration’s Fatality Analysis Reporting System show that errors on the part of car drivers have been cited more frequently as contributing factors to crashes between large trucks and cars. Errors by car drivers were reported in 80 percent of the crashes, while errors by truck drivers were reported in 28 percent of the crashes. When truck driver fatigue contributes to truck crashes, truck drivers are killed more often than someone outside the truck. OMCHS Is Not Likely to Meet the 1999 Goal of Reducing Fatalities
The Federal Highway Administration has established a goal for 1999 of reducing the number of fatalities from crashes involving large trucks to fewer than 5,126—the number of fatalities that occurred in 1996. This goal is substantially below the projected figure of 5,800 for 1999 if recent trends continue. OMCHS has undertaken a number of activities that it believes will accomplish this short-term goal. This is because (1) its initiative to target high-risk carriers for safety improvements depends on data that are not complete, accurate, or timely, (2) major components of several activities will not be completed before the end of 1999, and (3) the effectiveness of OMCHS’ educational campaign to improve car driver behavior is unknown. OMCHS’ activities are just one of many factors that affect the level of truck safety. To identify high-risk carriers for these reviews, OMCHS uses a safety status measurement system known as SafeStat. This campaign is intended to reduce crashes between large trucks and cars by educating car drivers about how to safely share the road with large trucks and about trucks’ limitations, such as reduced maneuverability, longer stopping distances, and blind spots. The campaign has a goal of reducing fatal crashes involving large trucks and cars by 10 percent over a 5-year period. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the safety of large commercial trucks on the nation's highways, focusing on: (1) trends in crashes involving large trucks; (2) factors that contribute to such crashes; and (3) the Federal Highway Administration's Office of Motor Carrier and Highway Safety's (OMCHS) activities to improve the safety of large trucks.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) of the nearly 42,000 people who died on the nation's highways in 1997, about 5,400 died from crashes involving large trucks; (2) this represents a 20 percent increase from 1992; (3) at the same time, the annual number of miles traveled by large trucks increased by a similar proportion; (4) if this trend of increasing truck travel continues, the number of fatalities could increase to 5,800 in 1999 and to more than 6,000 in 2000; (5) while trucks are involved in fewer crashes per mile traveled than are cars, crashes involving trucks are more likely to result in a fatality; (6) in 1997, 98 percent of the fatalities from crashes between trucks and cars were the occupants of the car; (7) although no definitive information on the causes of crashes involving large trucks exists, several factors contribute to these crashes; (8) these contributing factors include errors on the part of car and truck drivers, truck driver fatigue, and vehicle defects; (9) of these factors, errors on the part of car drivers are cited most frequently as contributing to crashes involving large trucks; (10) specifically, errors by car drivers were reported in 80 percent of the crashes, while truck drivers errors were reported in 28 percent of the crashes; (11) while many factors outside OMCHS' authority--such as the use of safety belts by car occupants and states' actions--influence the number of fatalities that result from crashes involving large trucks, the Federal Highway Administration has established a goal for 1999 of reducing these fatalities; (12) its goal is to reduce the number of fatalities to below the 1996 level of 5,126--substantially less than the projected figure of 5,800; (13) OMCHS has undertaken a number of activities intended to achieve this goal, such as identifying high-risk carriers for safety improvements and educating car drivers about how to share the road with large trucks; and (14) however, OMCHS is unlikely to reach the goal because: (a) its initiative to target high-risk carriers for safety improvements depends on data that are not complete, accurate, or timely; (b) several activities will not be completed before the end of 1999; and (c) the effectiveness of OMCHS' educational campaign to improve car drivers' behavior is unknown. |
gao_GAO-01-940 | gao_GAO-01-940_0 | Background
Apprenticeship is an employee training approach that combines on-the-job training and formal instruction to teach workers the practical and theoretical aspects of a skilled occupation. Employees benefit from registered apprenticeship by advancing their skills and obtaining a credential recognized throughout an industry. Lack of Systematic Identification of Occupations and the Need to Allay Employers’ Concerns Slow Expansion of Apprenticeships
Progress in expanding apprenticeships to address skill needs in occupations not traditionally apprenticed has been hampered because Labor’s efforts to identify new apprenticeable occupations are not systematic, nor has Labor been able to alleviate some employers’ apprehension about program requirements. Labor has primarily reacted to employers’ requests for apprenticeships in new occupations and has allowed industry to take the lead in requesting new occupations. In the last 5 years, 19 occupations have been recognized by Labor as apprenticeable and a substantial number of these have been in less traditional occupations. Officials commented that once employers fully understand the reasons for apprenticeship requirements, they are often supportive of apprenticeship and can see the benefit to both themselves and the employee. For example, the childcare industry typically has low wages relative to other industries. It also limits Labor’s ability to measure progress on the use of apprenticeship in newly approved occupations. As part of this effort, we recommend that the Secretary of Labor ensure that ATELS Lead a systematic effort to work with state apprenticeship councils and others interested to identify apprenticeable occupations that have shortages of skilled labor and establish plans for promoting apprenticeship programs in these occupations, Work with other federal workforce development programs to identify funding for developing apprenticeships when additional support is needed, Establish a mechanism for sharing among Labor representatives and employers information on apprenticeship programs, particularly those in occupations not traditionally apprenticed, and Ensure that the apprenticeship database contains detailed information on current programs so that accurate and complete information is shared and progress in meeting labor market needs can be evaluated. | What GAO Found
Apprenticeship, which combines supervised on-the-job training with formal instruction, benefits both employers and employees by providing the skills and knowledge necessary for a specific job and a credential recognized throughout an industry. The use of apprenticeship is standard practice in some industries, but expansion beyond traditional occupations has been limited. The Department of Labor has not systematically identified new occupations suitable for apprenticeship programs, nor has it successfully alleviated the concerns of some employers about apprenticeship requirements, which has slowed the expansion of apprenticeship to new occupations. Labor has approved 19 new occupations for apprenticeships in the last five years, and many of these have been in less traditional occupations, such as internetworking technicians. Employers are often wary of apprenticeship programs. For example, some employers are reluctant to commit to incremental increases in wages as required by apprenticeship regulations. GAO identified several apprenticeship programs in which apprenticeship training helped to develop workers with sought-after skills. The key to the establishment of the several programs GAO reviewed was the close interaction between employers and federal or state apprenticeship officials to ensure that employers understood the value of apprenticeships. |
gao_GAO-07-873T | gao_GAO-07-873T_0 | Growth in Average FEHBP Premiums Has Recently Slowed and Was Lower Than That of Other Purchasers
The average annual growth in FEHBP premiums has slowed since 2002— declining each year from 2003 through 2007—and was generally lower than the growth for other purchasers since 2003. After a period of decreases in 1995 and 1996, FEHBP premiums began to increase for 1997, to a peak increase of 12.9 percent for 2002. However, beginning in 2003, the average annual growth rate in FEHBP premiums was slower than that of CalPERS and surveyed employers—7.3 percent compared with 14.2 percent and 10.5 percent, respectively. The premium growth rates for the 10 largest FEHBP plans by enrollment— accounting for about three-quarters of total FEHBP enrollment—ranged from 0 percent to 15.5 percent for 2007. Projected Growth in Several Factors Contributed to Average FEHBP Premium Growth
Projected increases in the cost and utilization of services and in the cost of prescription drugs accounted for most of the average annual premium growth across FEHBP plans for the period from 2000 through 2007, although projected withdrawals from reserves offset much of this growth for 2006 and 2007. Projected decreases in the costs associated with certain other factors, including benefit changes that resulted in less generous coverage and enrollee choice of plans—typically the migration to lower-cost plans—generally helped offset average premium growth for 2000 through 2007 to a small extent. However, projected withdrawals from reserves offset average premium growth by about 2 percentage points for 2006 and 5 percentage points for 2007. Changes in the Cost and Utilization of Services and Enrollee Demographics Accounted for Differing Premium Growth Among FEHBP Plans
Officials we interviewed from most of the FEHBP plans with higher-than- average premium growth in 2006 cited increases in the actual cost and utilization of services and high shares of elderly enrollees and early retirees as key drivers of premium growth. From 2001 through 2005, the average age of enrollees across all eight plans with higher-than-average premium growth increased by 2.7 years—compared with an average increase of 0.5 years across all FEHBP plans. Officials we interviewed from most of the FEHBP plans with lower-than- average premium growth in 2006 cited adjustments for previously overestimated projections of cost growth and benefit changes that resulted in less generous coverage for prescription drugs as factors that limited premium growth. | Why GAO Did This Study
Average health insurance premiums for plans participating in the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP) have risen each year since 1997. These growing premiums result in higher costs to the federal government and plan enrollees. The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) oversees FEHBP, negotiating benefits and premiums and administering reserve accounts that may be used to cover plans' unanticipated spending increases. GAO was asked to discuss its December 22, 2006 report, entitled Federal Employees Health Benefits Program: Premium Growth Has Recently Slowed, and Varies Among Participating Plans (GAO-07-141). In this report, GAO reviewed (1) FEHBP premium trends compared with those of other purchasers, (2) factors contributing to average premium growth across all FEHBP plans, and (3) factors contributing to differing trends among selected FEHBP plans. GAO reviewed data provided by OPM relating to FEHBP premiums and factors contributing to premium growth. For comparison purposes, GAO examined premium data from the California Public Employees' Retirement System (CalPERS) and surveys of other public and private employers. GAO also interviewed officials from OPM and eight FEHBP plans with premium growth that was higher than average and six FEHBP plans with premium growth that was lower than average.
What GAO Found
Growth in FEHBP premiums recently slowed, from a peak of 12.9 percent for 2002 to 1.8 percent for 2007. Starting in 2003, FEHBP premium growth was generally slower than for other purchasers. Premium growth rates for the 10 largest FEHBP plans by enrollment--accounting for about three-quarters of total enrollment--ranged from 0 percent to 15.5 percent for 2007. Projected increases in the cost and utilization of health care services and in the cost of prescription drugs accounted for most of the average annual FEHBP premium growth for 2000 through 2007. Absent other factors, these increases would have raised 2007 average premiums by 9 percent. Other projected factors, including benefit changes resulting in less generous coverage and enrollee migration to lower-cost plans, slightly offset average premium growth. In 2006 and 2007, projected withdrawals from reserves helped offset average premium growth--by 2 percentage points for 2006 and 5 percentage points for 2007. To explain the factors associated with premium growth, officials GAO interviewed from most of the FEHBP plans with higher-than-average premium growth cited increases in the cost and utilization of services as well as a high share of elderly enrollees and early retirees. Officials GAO interviewed from most plans with lower-than-average premium growth cited adjustments made for previously overestimated projections of cost growth, and some officials cited benefit changes that resulted in less generous coverage for prescription drugs. The plans with lower-than-average premium growth also experienced a decline of 0.5 years in the average age of their enrollees compared with an increase of 0.5 years in the average age of all FEHBP enrollees. |
gao_GAO-05-167 | gao_GAO-05-167_0 | This program also helps VR&E staff identify those who could benefit from vocational rehabilitation and employment services. VA Has Taken Steps to Expedite Vocational Rehabilitation and Employment Services for Seriously Injured Servicemembers
VA has instructed its regional offices to make seriously injured servicemembers a high priority for all VA assistance and asked DOD to provide data that would ensure VA’s ability to identify and monitor this population. Because many seriously injured servicemembers are initially treated at major military treatment facilities, VA has deployed staff to these sites to provide information on all veterans’ benefits, including VR&E services. The 12 regional offices we reviewed have developed information of varying completeness and reliability. Nevertheless, some regional offices reported maintaining contact with these servicemembers while others did not. VA Has Instructed Its Regional Offices to Make Seriously Injured Servicemembers a High Priority and Asked DOD for Data to Help Identify Them
In a September 2003 letter, VA instructed its regional offices to provide priority consideration and assistance to seriously injured servicemembers returning from Afghanistan and Iraq. Individual Differences in the Recovery Process Complicate the Timing of Early Intervention
Individual differences and uncertainties in the recovery process make it inherently difficult to determine when a seriously injured servicemember will be ready to consider vocational rehabilitation. VA Is Challenged by DOD’s Concern that Early Intervention Could Work at Cross Purposes to Military Retention
VA is also challenged by DOD’s concern that outreach about VA benefits, including disability compensation and VR&E services, could work at cross purposes to military retention goals. In particular, DOD expressed concern about the timing of VA’s outreach to servicemembers whose discharge from military service is not yet certain. VR&E services could begin earlier for injured members of the National Guard and Reserve since these individuals usually expect to return to their previous civilian employment. It also poses the risk that some who are discharged with disabilities may be overlooked and not afforded the opportunity for VR&E. Recommendations
To improve VA’s efforts to expedite VR&E services to seriously injured servicemembers, we recommend that VA and DOD collaborate to reach an agreement for VA to have access to information that both agencies agree is needed to promote servicemembers’ recovery and return to work. We also recommend that the Secretary of Veterans Affairs direct the Under Secretary for Benefits to develop a policy and procedures for regional offices to maintain contact with seriously injured servicemembers who do not initially apply for VR&E services, in order to ensure that they have the opportunity to participate in the program when they are ready. VA’s written comments are reprinted in appendix I.
DOD also concurred with our findings and recommendations. | Why GAO Did This Study
More than 10,000 U.S. military servicemembers, including National Guard and Reserve members, have been injured in the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. Those with serious injuries are likely to be discharged from the military and return to civilian life with disabilities. The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) offers vocational rehabilitation and employment (VR&E) services to help these injured servicemembers in their transition to civilian employment. GAO has noted that early intervention--the provision of rehabilitation services as soon as possible after the onset of a disability--is a practice that significantly facilitates the return to work. GAO examined how VA expedites VR&E services to seriously injured servicemembers and the challenges VA faces in its efforts to do so.
What GAO Found
VA has taken steps to expedite vocational rehabilitation and employment services for servicemembers returning from Afghanistan and Iraq with serious injuries. The agency has instructed its regional offices to make seriously injured servicemembers a high priority for all VA assistance, including VR&E services, and has asked DOD to provide data that would help VA identify and monitor this population. It has also deployed additional staff to five major Army military treatment facilities where the majority of the seriously injured are treated. Pending an agreement with DOD for sharing data, VA has relied on its regional offices to learn who the seriously injured are and where they are located. We found that the regional offices we reviewed had developed information that varied in completeness and reliability. We also found that VA does not have a policy for maintaining contact with those with serious injuries who may later be ready for VR&E services but did not initially apply for VR&E. Nevertheless, some regional offices did attempt to maintain contact while other regional offices did not. VA faces significant challenges in expediting VR&E services to seriously injured servicemembers. These include: the inherent challenge that individual differences and uncertainties in the recovery process make it difficult to determine when a servicemember will be ready to consider VR&E services; DOD's concerns that VA's outreach, including early intervention with VR&E, could work at cross purposes to military retention goals for servicemembers whose discharge from military service is not yet certain; and the lack of access to data from DOD that would allow VA to readily know which servicemembers are seriously injured and where they are located. VA and DOD generally concurred with our findings and recommendations. |
gao_GAO-05-726 | gao_GAO-05-726_0 | FAA Uses NPG and SEP to Oversee Non-legacy Airlines
NPG and SEP are the main inspection processes that FAA uses to oversee the safety of non-legacy airlines. Due to resource constraints, FAA determined it would not be able to immediately place the remaining passenger airlines in the ATOS program. A strength of this approach, consistent with findings in our past reports, is that teams of inspectors are generally more effective than individual inspectors in their ability to collectively identify concerns. FAA’s Oversight Process Includes Monitoring to Follow Up on Airline Actions Taken in Response to Findings
Another strength of FAA’s oversight of non-legacy airlines is that inspectors monitor the actions that those airlines have taken in response to inspection findings through subsequent inspections and participation in safety partnership programs with the airlines. FAA’s incorporation of system safety into its oversight process is incomplete, as the agency continues to emphasize a nonsafety system-based process, NPG, to identify most of its inspection activities. In addition, FAA lacks a process to continuously evaluate SEP. As a result, most of the required inspection activities are not prioritized based on risk. While NPG also includes planned inspections, which have a risk-based element, these inspections lack the structured approach to risk identification that SEP has. Adding SEP-initiated activities to the required NPG-identified activities may increase the overall workload of inspectors. Fourth, for fiscal years 2005 through 2010, FAA estimated that over 1,100 inspectors of non-legacy airlines and general aviation will leave the agency, with an average loss due to attrition of about 195 inspectors per year. These reductions will be accomplished through attrition. According to an FAA inspector, some inspections are delayed due to lack of staff availability. However, the usefulness of FAA’s system safety approach is reduced by limitations in the implementation of SEP—such as FAA headquarters’ predominant focus on NPG, which has led to only a small percentage of inspection activities being SEP-initiated; the lack of training of geographic inspectors on SEP codes that could make their inspections more useful to identifying risks during the SEP process; and the lack of linkage to national goals and evaluations of SEP. Until SEP is more fully implemented, it is clear that FAA’s approach to overseeing non-legacy airlines is not largely risk based. With FAA operating under a hiring freeze and the number of inspectors available for non-legacy airlines possibly further reduced by attrition and the move of inspection staff to the ATOS program, the need to maximize the effectiveness of inspection activities in ensuring the safety of non-legacy airlines is even more critical. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objective of this report is to assess the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) processes for ensuring the safety of a fast-growing portion of the commercial airline industry—the non-legacy passenger airlines. (2) What issues hinder the effectiveness of FAA’s inspection approach? FAA’s Surveillance and Evaluation Process
SEP Incorporates System Safety into FAA’s Inspection Oversight of Non- legacy Airlines
The Surveillance and Evaluation Program (SEP) is a process designed to introduce a data driven risk analysis system for non-legacy airlines and is guided by a Surveillance and Evaluation Assessment Tool (SEAT). | Why GAO Did This Study
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) uses the Air Transportation Oversight System (ATOS), which was developed around the principles of system safety, to oversee seven "legacy airlines" and nine other airlines. In this report, we refer to airlines that are not in ATOS as non-legacy airlines. Two other processes are used to oversee 99 non-legacy passenger airlines, which represent a fast-growing segment of the commercial aviation passenger industry and carried about 200 million passengers in 2004. The National Work Program Guidelines (NPG) establishes a set of inspection activities for non-legacy airlines. The Surveillance and Evaluation Program (SEP) uses principles of system safety to identify additional risk-based inspections for those airlines. GAO's objective was to assess the processes used by FAA to ensure the safety of non-legacy passenger airlines. GAO reviewed the strengths of FAA's inspection oversight for non-legacy passenger airlines and the issues that hinder its effectiveness.
What GAO Found
A key strength of FAA's inspection oversight of non-legacy airlines is the introduction of system safety concepts to some inspections, which FAA accomplished by adding SEP to its traditional inspection process, NPG. Although NPG has risk-based elements, it lacks the structured approach to risk identification found in SEP. Under SEP, data are used to help determine trends or problems. The SEP process uses a team of inspectors to identify inspection activities, which we have previously reported is generally more effective than the use of individuals due to their collective ability to identify risks. Under SEP, inspectors also ascertain risks internal to FAA, such as staffing shortages. FAA's oversight of non-legacy airlines further incorporates processes to ensure that inspectors follow up on airline actions taken in response to inspection findings. These efforts address several past GAO concerns, including that NPG did not allow FAA to identify risks and allocate inspection resources accordingly. The full potential of FAA's inspection program for non-legacy airlines, however, is not being realized due to incomplete implementation of its system safety approach and other challenges. The inspection workload is still heavily oriented to nonrisk-based activities, with 77 percent of inspection activities being identified through the NPG and the remaining relatively small percentage identified through SEP. The emphasis on NPG, including FAA's guidance that inspectors must complete NPG-required inspection activities, acts as a disincentive to identifying further inspection activities through SEP. Inspectors face workload challenges as staff lost through attrition may not be replaced due to a hiring freeze. FAA estimates that over 1,100 inspectors of non-legacy airlines will leave the agency in fiscal years 2005 to 2010. In addition, some FAA inspectors indicated that a lack of technical training on airline systems and equipment posed potential risks to the agency's oversight process. Finally, FAA lacks a process to communicate information to inspectors on how certain internal risks identified through SEP are being resolved. Moreover, FAA has not established a process to evaluate the effectiveness of SEP. |
gao_GAO-08-269 | gao_GAO-08-269_0 | Risks of Excessive Pass-Through Charges Are Assessed through Routine Evaluations of Contractor Value
DOD contracting officials generally rely on tools in the FAR and DFARS in assessing the risk of excessive pass-through charges when work is subcontracted. For the 32 selected contracts we reviewed, when there was full and open competition, contracting officials assessed contractor value added based on the technical ability to perform the contract, but did not need to separately evaluate costs for value added as market forces generally control the proposed contract cost. We found that conducting assessments of contractor value added is especially challenging in unique circumstances, such as when requirements are urgent in nature and routine contracting practices may be overlooked. Contract pricing is used to determine price reasonableness for the contract, including subcontracting costs. Presence of Competition and Type of Contract Generally Guide the Use of Assessment Tools
According to DOD contracting officials and based on our review of selected contracts, assessments of contractor value added are typically driven by contract risk—the presence of competition and whether the type of contract requires the government to pay a fixed price or costs incurred by the contractor. When using noncompetitive contracts, however, the market forces did not control contract cost and required contracting officers to consider—in addition to cost—the technical ability to perform the work. For the Air Force’s estimated $3 billion satellite program contract, DCAA reviewed the certified cost and pricing data that the contractor was required to provide. In addition, related GAO work and DOD audits on contracts awarded for Hurricane Katrina recovery efforts found multiple layers of subcontractors, questionable value added by contractors, increased costs, and lax oversight. Selected Private Sector Companies Rely on Several Shared Approaches to Minimize The Risk of Excessive Pass- Through Charges
Selected private sector companies we interviewed had several strategies in common for minimizing the risk to them of excessive pass-through charges when purchasing goods and services. These companies focus resources on acquisition planning and knowledge of their supply chains and costs—challenges DOD continues to face. They also seek to optimize competition, preferring fixed-price competitive arrangements. According to several companies, they recognize the financial risks of other types of contracts, such as time-and-materials, and enter into them with proper oversight and accountability. As we have previously reported, DOD’s use of these riskier contracts has not always ensured good acquisition outcomes and prudent expenditure of taxpayer dollars. Private Sector Companies Focus on Acquisition Planning and Knowledge of Supply Chain
The contracting officials we spoke with at selected private sector companies told us that to avoid unnecessary pass-through charges when purchasing goods and services, they devote attention to planning acquisitions. Contracting Officials Lack The Guidance and Insight Needed to Effectively Implement DOD’s Interim Rule
DOD recently issued an interim rule that allows it to recoup contractor payments that contracting officers determine to be excessive on all eligible contracts. The rule requires detailed information from the prime contractor on value added when subcontracting reaches 70 percent or more of the total contract. While the rule aims to provide contracting officers with more information, it will not provide greater insight into DOD’s supply chain and costs. However, contracting officials indicated the importance for newer and less experienced staff to involve DCAA and DCMA as appropriate. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine the Department of Defense’s (DOD) approach to assessing the risk of excessive pass-through charges when work is subcontracted, we reviewed and analyzed tools in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS). We met with DOD officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy, Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA), Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA), and contracting officials from 11 DOD contracting locations to discuss these regulations and their approach to assessing the risk of pass-through charges, evaluating contractor value added, and factors that drive these assessments. | Why GAO Did This Study
One-third of the Department of Defense's (DOD) fiscal year 2006 spending on goods and services was for subcontracts. Concerns have been raised among DOD auditors and Congress about the potential for excessive pass- through charges by contractors that add little or no value when work is subcontracted. To better understand this risk, Congress mandated that GAO assess the extent to which DOD may be vulnerable to these charges. This report examines (1) DOD's approach to assessing the risk of excessive pass-through charges when work is subcontracted, (2) the strategies selected private sector companies use to minimize risks of excessive pass-through charges when purchasing goods and services, and (3) DOD's interim rule to prevent excessive pass-through charges. GAO's work is based on analysis of 32 fiscal year 2005 DOD contract actions at 10 DOD top contracting locations and discussions with DOD acquisition policy, audit, and contracting officials, including Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) and Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) staff. GAO also interviewed nine selected private sector companies with diverse contracting experience.
What GAO Found
Although no specific criteria exist for evaluating contractor value added, DOD contracting officials generally rely on tools in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) to assess the risk of excessive pass-through charges when work is subcontracted. For the 32 selected contract actions GAO reviewed, DOD contracting officials generally applied these tools to their assessments. The degree of assessment depended on whether the contract was competed and whether the contract type required the government to pay a fixed price or costs incurred by the contractor. When using full and open competition, contracting officials assessed contractor value added based on the technical ability to perform the contract, but did not separately evaluate cost since market forces generally control contract costs, potentially minimizing the risk of excessive pass-through charges. However, when using noncompetitive contracts, contracting officials were required to evaluate more detailed cost information in assessing value added, as market forces did not determine the contract cost. For example, for a $3 billion noncompetitive contract for an Air Force satellite program, contracting officials assessed detailed cost or pricing data that included subcontractor costs, and received DCAA and DCMA support to negotiate lower overall contract costs. However, assessing contractor value added is especially challenging in unique situations where requirements are urgent in nature and routine contracting practices may be overlooked. Related GAO work and DOD audits on contracts awarded for Hurricane Katrina recovery efforts found multiple layers of subcontractors, questionable contractor value added, increased costs, and lax oversight. The selected private sector companies GAO interviewed rely heavily on acquisition planning, knowledge of supply chain, and managing contractual relationships to minimize risk of excessive pass-through charges when purchasing goods and services. They seek to optimize competition to minimize overall contract costs, and several companies indicated that they prefer fixed-price competitive arrangements. In addition, some form collaborative business relationships with contractors and subcontractors that provide greater insight into their supply chains and costs--a challenge DOD continues to face. When using other than fixed-price contracts, they recognize the financial risks and ensure proper oversight and accountability. As GAO has reported in the past, DOD's use of riskier contracts, such as time-and-materials contracts, has not always ensured good acquisition outcomes. DOD recently issued an interim rule requiring a contract clause in all eligible contracts, which allows it to recoup contractor payments that contracting officers determine to be excessive. The rule also requires detailed information from contractors on their value added when subcontracting costs reach 70 percent or more of total contract cost. However, the rule alone will not provide greater insight into DOD's supply chain and costs--information companies told us they use to mitigate excessive costs. Further, contracting officials indicated the need for guidance to ensure effective implementation and consistent application of tools in the FAR as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-13-740 | gao_GAO-13-740_0 | The programs provide matching funds to support U.S. industry efforts to build, maintain, and expand commercial overseas markets for U.S. agricultural products, with the overarching goal of increasing agricultural exports. MAP is the largest of the five programs, with a current annual authorization of $200 million—about 80 percent of USDA’s total annual market development funding. Participants in MAP and FMD Have Remained Relatively Consistent in Recent Years
Participants in USDA’s market development programs use program funds to support a variety of activities intended to raise awareness or acceptance of U.S. agricultural products in overseas markets. MAP and FMD participants, their share of program expenditures, and the countries where they spent the majority of program funds remained relatively consistent from 2007 through 2011. Unlike funds for the other programs, a portion of MAP funds is used for promotion of branded products. In 2011, MAP participants spent about 85 percent of program funding on overseas promotion of generic commodities; more than 600 small companies and seven agricultural cooperatives spent the remaining 15 percent of MAP funding to promote branded products. Common activities undertaken included, among others, market research, consumer and retail promotion, participation in international trade shows, and reverse trade missions, in which foreign buyers visit U.S. agricultural producers. FAS Uses Management Processes to Reduce Duplication Risks, but Some Participants’ Annual Progress Reports Have Not Identified Assessment Methodologies
FAS has established processes to reduce risks of duplication among the five market development programs, to monitor participant expenditures, and to assess program results. Selected MAP and FMD Progress Reports Generally Reflected FAS Requirements and Key Attributes of Successful Performance Measurement, but Some Reports Did Not Identify Assessment Methodology as Required
The performance measures in the progress reports that we reviewed generally met criteria based on FAS guidance for progress reports and key attributes of successful performance measures that we previously identified. 1. 5. For the 149 performance measures with no identified methodology (40 percent), it would be difficult for FAS to determine the reliability of the reported results. FAS Cost-Benefit Analysis Asserts That MAP and FMD Benefit U.S. Economy, but Methodological Limitations May Affect the Magnitude of Estimated Benefits
A 2007 cost-benefit analysis of MAP and FMD, commissioned by FAS, found that the programs increased U.S. agricultural exports and benefitted the U.S. economy. Overall, the study asserted that the government’s expenditures for the two programs had resulted in greater increases in U.S. agricultural exports and greater benefit to the U.S. economy than would have occurred without the expenditures. FAS officials reported that they plan to commission a new cost-benefit analysis in fiscal year 2014, but they indicated that they have not yet identified the methodologies that the new study will use. However, the model has limitations related to its exclusion of important variables and its lack of a sensitivity analysis of key assumptions. 2. Accurate cost benefit analyses help decision makers determine how best to allocate program funding and provide a better picture of the potential effect on U.S. exports and the economy if funding is increased or decreased. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of Agriculture direct FAS to take the following three actions: To improve MAP and FMD participants’ annual reporting of the results of their market development activities, use appropriate means to emphasize the importance of participants’ identifying the methodologies used to assess results for each performance measure in their annual country progress reports. To improve the accuracy of future cost-benefit analyses of FAS’s market development programs, ensure that any econometric model used for the cost-benefit analysis, such as the market share model, includes industry- specific variables that could have a significant role in determining the U.S. market share—for example, commodity prices, production volumes, and number of export competitors; and conduct a sensitivity analysis, in accordance with best practices for cost estimates, of the key assumptions that are applied in any economic models used in the cost-benefit analysis, such as the market share model and spillover effect model. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
We were asked to review several aspects of the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) five market development programs, which USDA’s Foreign Agriculture Service (FAS) administers. This report (1) describes participation and expenditures in these market development programs, particularly the Market Access Program (MAP) and Foreign Market Development Program (FMD); (2) examines FAS’s management and monitoring of its market development programs; and (3) assesses FAS’s cost-benefit analysis of MAP’s and FMD’s impact on the U.S. economy. To describe agricultural groups’ participation in FAS’s five market development programs and the programs’ expenditures from 2002 through 2011—our first objective—we reviewed program participants’ applications, country progress reports, and program evaluations to identify examples of the activities that participants undertook with market development funding. | Why GAO Did This Study
USDA administers five programs to assist U.S. agricultural industry efforts to build, maintain, and expand overseas markets. However, members of Congress continue to debate the level of funding for this assistance and its impact on agricultural exports. USDA provides about $250 million annually for the five market development programs. MAP and FMD received about 90 percent of this funding in fiscal year 2012, with allocations of $200 million and $34.5 million, respectively.
GAO was asked to review USDA's market development programs. This report (1) describes participation and expenditures in these market development programs, particularly MAP and FMD; (2) examines FAS's management and monitoring of its market development programs; and (3) assesses FAS's cost-benefit analysis of MAP's and FMD's impact on the U.S. economy. GAO analyzed USDA expenditure data from 2002 through 2011 and reviewed key agency and program participant documents. GAO also assessed a sample of participants' annual progress reports and assessed economic cost-benefit analyses of MAP and FMD commissioned by USDA.
What GAO Found
Market development program participants use program funds to support a variety of activities intended to raise awareness or acceptance of U.S. agricultural products in overseas markets. Common activities include, among others, market research, consumer and retail promotion, and participation in international trade shows. GAO's analysis of expenditure data from 2007 through 2011 shows that participants in the Market Access Program (MAP) and the Foreign Market Development Program (FMD)--the largest of the five market development programs--remained generally consistent during that period. The program participants with the largest shares of funding and the countries where the largest shares of funds were spent also remained relatively consistent. Expenditure data for 2011 show that MAP and FMD participants met or exceeded FAS contribution requirements that they match minimum percentages of the program funding they receive. Unlike funding for the other programs, a portion of MAP funds is used for promotion of branded products. In 2011, MAP participants spent about 85 percent of program funding on overseas promotion of generic commodities. More than 600 small companies and seven agricultural cooperatives spent the remaining 15 percent of MAP funding to promote branded products.
The U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS) uses several management and monitoring processes to reduce the risk of duplication among the five programs. FAS uses an integrated system to process funding applications for multiple programs and to monitor expenditures, which reduces the risk of duplication. According to FAS officials, FAS also monitors participants' expenses for all programs through its compliance review process. In addition, FAS guidance requires program participants to submit annual progress reports on the results of their market development activities. GAO found that performance measures in a sample of progress reports generally reflected selected FAS guidance and key attributes of successful performance measures that GAO had identified. However, the sampled reports did not always outline the methodologies used to assess activity results as required by FAS guidelines. In these cases, it would be difficult for FAS to determine the reliability of the reported results and the impact of market development activities.
A 2007 cost-benefit analysis of MAP and FMD, commissioned by FAS, found that the programs increased U.S. agricultural exports and benefited the U.S. economy, but methodological limitations may affect the magnitude of the estimated benefits. Overall, the analysis asserted that the government's expenditures for the two programs resulted in greater increases in U.S. agricultural exports and greater benefit to the U.S. economy than would have occurred without the expenditures. However, an economic model used to estimate the programs' impact on U.S. market share omitted important variables, such as commodity prices. Also, the study did not include sensitivity analyses of certain key assumptions underlying its estimates of impacts on U.S. exports. For example, analyses of the possible effects of varying levels of program funding would provide a clearer picture of the potential impact of increased or decreased funding on U.S. exports and the economy. FAS officials reported that they plan to commission a new cost-benefit analysis in 2014 but have not yet identified the methodologies that the new analysis will use.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that USDA (1) emphasize that market development program participants' annual progress reports should identify the methodologies used to assess results and (2) ensure that any economic models used in future cost-benefit analyses of the programs include industry-specific variables and sensitivity analyses of key assumptions. USDA concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-07-761 | gao_GAO-07-761_0 | Cleanup Agreements Require DOE to Address Sites Where Transuranic Wastes Are Buried
The cleanup agreements DOE entered into with federal and state environmental agencies require DOE to investigate and take action as necessary to clean up sites where transuranic and other wastes were buried. However, the sites where these wastes are buried have since become subject to CERCLA and other environmental laws. With this designation, CERCLA requires DOE to evaluate the nature and extent of contamination at these sites and determine what cleanup actions, if any, are necessary to protect human health and the environment. As shown in table 1, DOE is currently scheduled to complete cleanup actions at all five sites by 2025. DOE Is Containing Buried Transuranic Wastes in Place at Two Sites but Is Still Developing Cleanup Plans at the Largest Waste Sites
DOE has made cleanup decisions and is addressing transuranic wastes at Oak Ridge and Savannah River, but the department is still investigating cleanup options at the other three locations where most of DOE’s transuranic wastes are buried. 3). DOE Is Still Developing Cleanup Plans at the Three Locations Where Most Transuranic Wastes Are Buried, but Some Waste Removal Is Already Under Way
DOE is still evaluating cleanup options for most of the waste at the three remaining sites––the Hanford Site, the Idaho National Laboratory, and the Los Alamos National Laboratory––where about 90 percent of DOE’s transuranic wastes are buried. Estimated Costs to Address Waste Disposal Areas in Which Transuranic Wastes Are Buried Will Likely Increase
DOE’s preliminary cost estimates for addressing the five waste sites where transuranic and other hazardous wastes have been buried total about $1.6 billion (in fiscal year 2006 dollars). DOE’s estimates are based on the costs of managing most of these wastes in place rather than removing them for off- site disposal. As shown in table 2, DOE’s estimated lifecycle baseline costs to address the burial grounds containing transuranic wastes range from $36 million at the Savannah River Site—where officials are in the final stages of completing construction of a cap to contain the wastes—to $1 billion at the Idaho National Laboratory, where DOE has begun to remove selected wastes for disposal off-site, but is still evaluating options to address most of the remaining buried waste. This is typically the lowest-cost approach for addressing buried waste. If DOE is required to retrieve substantial portions of the buried transuranic wastes and dispose of it off- site at WIPP or elsewhere, costs could increase dramatically. As DOE moves forward to further evaluate the risks, benefits, and costs of various buried waste cleanup options, DOE’s cost estimating and project management policies expect staff to refine the estimates.According to DOE guidance, the cost uncertainty is greatest during the period that site investigations and evaluations of cleanup options are being conducted. In its comments, the department generally agreed with our report. To determine the extent to which legal requirements and policies govern DOE’s efforts to address buried transuranic wastes, we reviewed the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, as amended (CERCLA), the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, as amended (RCRA), the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and DOE regulations and guidance concerning radioactive and hazardous wastes. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since the 1940s, the development of nuclear weapons technologies has generated transuranic wastes--materials contaminated by certain man-made radioactive elements. These wastes can remain dangerous for thousands of years. Until 1970, the Department of Energy's (DOE) predecessors buried these wastes in shallow pits and trenches. Today, state officials and communities near DOE's major disposal sites have expressed concerns that such wastes might contaminate important ground and surface water resources. GAO was asked to (1) determine the legal requirements and policies affecting DOE's efforts to address transuranic wastes buried before 1970, (2) determine what DOE is doing to address sites where these transuranic wastes are buried, and (3) assess the reliability of DOE's estimated costs to address these sites. We met with federal and state officials at five DOE sites containing buried transuranic wastes, reviewed environmental laws and guidance, and obtained buried waste cleanup cost estimates from each site. In commenting on this report, DOE generally agreed with our findings, and provided some clarifying comments.
What GAO Found
Cleanup agreements with federal and state agencies require DOE to investigate and clean up the five major DOE sites where transuranic and other hazardous wastes were buried. While DOE has long considered pre-1970s buried wastes permanently disposed, in 1989, the sites where most of these wastes are buried were listed as "Superfund" sites subject to the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA). CERCLA requires that DOE determine the nature and extent of contamination at each waste site and determine what cleanup action, if any, is needed to protect human health and the environment. All five disposal sites are scheduled to have cleanup completed by 2025. DOE is addressing the transuranic wastes buried at two sites, but it is still investigating cleanup options at the other three locations. At Oak Ridge and Savannah River, DOE is leaving the transuranic wastes in place under an earthen cap designed to prevent the wastes from migrating and taking steps to prevent animal and human access to the sites. In contrast, DOE is still investigating cleanup options at the Idaho National Laboratory, the Hanford Site, and the Los Alamos National Laboratory--where about 90 percent of DOE's transuranic wastes are buried. DOE has begun to remove a small amount of waste at the Idaho and Hanford sites, but how much buried transuranic wastes eventually will be removed or treated in place at these sites is currently undetermined. DOE's preliminary estimate of the cost to address the five waste sites where transuranic wastes are buried is about $1.6 billion in 2006 dollars, but the estimate is likely to increase for several reasons. For example, the estimates reflect the costs of leaving most waste under earthen barriers--typically the least expensive approach. If DOE is required to retrieve substantial portions of these wastes, costs would increase dramatically. In addition, the estimates exclude unknown costs, such as the cost of disposing wastes off-site, if necessary. For example, DOE's lifecycle cost estimate to remove transuranic wastes buried near the Columbia River at the Hanford site could triple once options and costs for disposal are fully evaluated. As DOE further evaluates the risks, benefits, and costs of cleanup options, its policies require it to improve the reliability of cost estimates. Thus, GAO is not making recommendations at this time. |
gao_GAO-01-329 | gao_GAO-01-329_0 | Employers’ participation in the program was greatly influenced by such factors as the opportunity to obtain the credit, address a labor shortage, and be a good corporate citizen. Approximately 66 percent of the credit was earned by corporations with gross receipts of $1 billion or more. Most of the credit was reported by businesses engaged in nonfinancial services, such as hotel, motel, and other personal services, and retail trade. A Relatively Small Number of Employers Accounted for Most WOTC Hires in California and Texas
Our analysis of WOTC certification data in California and Texas for 1997 through 1999 showed that a few employers did most of the hiring in the WOTC program. Several Factors Influenced Participation in the WOTC Program
The employers that we surveyed in two states reported that the opportunity to obtain a tax credit was by far the factor that most influenced their decisions to participate in the WOTC program, followed by the opportunity to address labor shortages and be a good corporate citizen. Based on our survey, we estimate that for 71 percent of participating employers in those two states, retaining employees after the maximum tax credit has been secured is very important. | What GAO Found
In 1997, 4,369 corporations earned a total of $135 million in Work Opportunity Tax Credits (WOTC). The employers who earned most of the credit were large companies with gross receipts exceeding $1 billion and engaged in nonfinancial services and retail trade. GAO's analysis of state agency data for California and Texas from 1997 through 1999 showed that three percent of participating employers accounted for 82 percent of all hires of WOTC-certified workers. Many employers who participated in the tax credit program in those two states in 1999 say that, besides the opportunity to obtain the credit, their participation in the program was also greatly influenced by such factors as the need to address a labor shortage and the opportunity to be a good corporate citizen. The results of GAO's two state analysis indicate a low probability of replacing employees who were not eligible for the tax credit. |
gao_GAO-16-201 | gao_GAO-16-201_0 | The Navy requested $1.4 billion for three LCS seaframes in its fiscal year 2016 budget request. The Navy has 10 mission packages in its inventory and currently plans to buy 64 mission packages. Both variants have now completed rough water trials; the Freedom variant completed total ship survivability testing in 2014, but the Independence variant has not yet conducted this testing. The Navy provided Congress with a report in May 2014 assessing the expected survivability attributes and the concept of operations for the ships, but in terms of comparing the two variants the Navy essentially suggested that since the two variants are built to the same requirements they perform the same way. Survivability and Lethality Requirements Less Than Other Combatants, and Have Been Reduced over Time
The Navy designed LCS with survivability and lethality capabilities that are not aligned with the projected operational environment in which the ship will operate, and over time it has lessened or removed some survivability and lethality requirements. Since 2004, the Navy has also reduced some LCS lethality requirements. This is due to the following considerations:
LCS did not demonstrate it could meet all its requirements in these
Testing only demonstrated that LCS could meet its requirements in one operational test event and is inadequate to provide statistical confidence in the ship’s performance; the test environment was not operationally stressing and the crew got extensive training and practice;
Only one of the two variants were tested; and
Meeting threshold capability will require missile integration. According to current plans, the Navy will not have completed its test plan to demonstrate the survivability of LCS until approximately 2018, at which point it plans to have more than 24 ships either in the fleet or under construction. This test—where both variants will be subject to an underwater explosion and assessed for damage—is planned for 2016. For the Independence variant, the Navy conducted a seakeeping and structural loads trial event on LCS 2 in January-February 2014. The Navy has not yet provided us with the analysis reports, stating that the report is still undergoing revisions. In December 2014, the former Secretary of Defense announced that he approved the Navy’s recommendation. The former Secretary of Defense further directed the Navy to provide his office by May 1, 2015: (1) an acquisition strategy to support the design and procurement of the new small surface combatant no later than fiscal year 2019 and sooner if possible; and (2) an assessment of the cost and feasibility of back-fitting the existing LCS with enhanced survivability and lethality systems. However, according to Navy documentation, the Navy is notionally planning on 20 modified LCS—the costs of which have not been fully determined. The House report on the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 includes a provision that we analyze the Small Surface Combatant Study and the Navy’s plans moving forward; we just began this work after receiving the Navy’s study, and we plan on issuing a separate report on these issues. Conclusions
The actual lethality and survivability performance of LCS is still largely unproven through realistic testing, 6 years after delivery of the lead ships, with 2 additional ships delivered and 20 more ships under construction and/or under contract. The Navy is quickly embarking on an effort to redesign the LCS to address lethality and survivability concerns. Direction from the former Secretary of Defense to develop an acquisition strategy for the new small surface combatant— and to assess back-fitting some systems on the current LCS—by May 2015 with the first ship procured in 2019 leaves little time to develop important knowledge about current limitations of the ships in these areas. Further, given the uncertainties over the long term about the ship’s survivability and lethality and proposed changes to future ships, consider not fully funding the Navy’s request for future LCS ships beyond fiscal year 2016, pending the completion and analysis of the final survivability assessments for both variants due in 2018. In the classified version of this report, we make a separate recommendation to the Secretary of the Navy related to defining a currently vague SUW requirement that we redacted because it contained classified information. DOD did not concur with our recommendation to solicit an independent technical assessment of the survivability of the Independence variant from an organization such as a ship classification society, stating that such an organization could not provide an independent look and would not have the technical competence to perform a threat weapon-based assessment of the survivability of any Navy ship. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Although this report is dated December 2015, our findings are current as of July 2015 to be consistent with a classified report issued in July 2015. To assess the extent to which LCS meets its current survivability requirements, we analyzed Navy and DOT&E test reports for both developmental and operational test events on LCS and reviewed the LCS test and evaluation master plan and the Navy’s Capstone Enterprise Air Warfare Ship Self-Defense test and evaluation master plan. To assess the recent decisions pertaining to upcoming changes to the program in response to the Secretary of Defense’s concerns with LCS lethality and survivability, we analyzed available Navy documentation on the proposed modified LCS. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO has reported extensively on LCS—an over $34 billion Navy program (in 2010 dollars) consisting of two different ships and interchangeable mission packages. In February 2014, the Secretary of Defense, citing survivability concerns, directed the Navy to assess design alternatives for a possible LCS replacement.
House and Senate reports for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 included a provision for GAO to analyze LCS survivability. Based on congressional interest, GAO also examined lethality. This report examines (1) the extent to which LCS survivability and lethality requirements are aligned with the ship's threat environments and if they have changed, (2 and 3) and if LCS meets its current requirements. GAO also (4) assessed recent decisions pertaining to the Navy's plans to address the Secretary of Defense's concerns. GAO analyzed relevant documents and interviewed Navy officials.
What GAO Found
The lethality and survivability of the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) is still largely unproven, 6 years after delivery of the lead ships. LCS was designed with reduced requirements as compared to other surface combatants, and the Navy has since lowered several survivability and lethality requirements and removed several design features—making the ship both less survivable in its expected threat environments and less lethal than initially planned. The Navy is compensating for this by redefining how it plans to operate the ships.
In 2014, the Navy conducted its first operational test of an early increment of the surface warfare mission package on a Freedom variant LCS, demonstrating that LCS could meet an interim lethality requirement. The Navy declared LCS operationally effective. However, the Navy's test report stated that the ship did not meet some key requirements. Further, the Department of Defense's Director of Operational Test and Evaluation has stated that there is insufficient data to provide statistical confidence that LCS can meet its lethality requirements in future testing or operations, and further testing is needed to demonstrate both variants can meet requirements in varied threat environments.
The Navy also has not yet demonstrated that LCS will achieve its survivability requirements, and does not plan to complete survivability assessments until 2018—after more than 24 ships are either in the fleet or under construction. The Navy has identified unknowns related to the use of aluminum and the hull of the Independence variant, and plans to conduct testing in these areas in 2015 and 2016. However, the Navy does not plan to fully determine how the Independence variant will react to an underwater explosion. This variant also sustained some damage in a trial in rough sea conditions, but the Navy is still assessing the cause and severity of the damage and GAO has not been provided with a copy of the test results. Results from air defense and cybersecurity testing also indicate concerns, but specific details are classified.
In February 2014 the former Secretary of Defense directed the Navy to assess options for a small surface combatant with more survivability and combat capability than LCS. The Navy conducted a study and recommended modifying the LCS to add additional survivability and lethality features. After approving the Navy's recommendation, the former Secretary of Defense directed the Navy to submit a new acquisition strategy for a modified LCS for his approval. He also directed the Navy to assess the cost and feasibility of backfitting lethality and survivability enhancements on current LCS. Nevertheless, the Navy has established a new frigate program office to manage this program, and the Navy has requested $1.4 billion for three LCS in the fiscal year 2016 President's budget, even though it is clear that the current ships fall short of identified survivability and lethality needs. GAO has an ongoing review of the Navy's small surface combatant study and future plans for the LCS program.
This report is a public version of a classified report issued in July 2015. Throughout this report, GAO has indicated where information has been omitted or redacted due to security considerations. All information in this report reflects information current as of July 2015 to be consistent with the timeframe of the classified report.
What GAO Recommends
GAO suggests Congress delay funding for fiscal year 2016 LCS until the Navy submits a completed rough water trials report, acquisition strategy, and backfit plan; and consider not fully funding some or all LCS procurement pending analysis of these documents and the final survivability assessments. GAO also recommends several actions for DOD. The department concurred with two recommendations and partially concurred with two others, but did not concur with soliciting an independent technical assessment of the Independence variant. GAO continues to believe that such an independent assessment is warranted. |
gao_GAO-01-683 | gao_GAO-01-683_0 | In carrying out this dual mission, the exchanges operate retail stores, similar to department stores, and provide a host of other services and specialty stores, including furniture stores, florist shops, barber and beauty shops, optical shops, liquor stores, and fast-food restaurants. The sales occurred at about 2,200 food outlets operated by three military exchanges—the Army and Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES), the Navy Exchange Service Command (NEXCOM), and the Marine Corps Community Services (MCCS). The Indirect Method Has Been More Profitable for the Exchange Services
Our analysis of fiscal year 1998 and 1999 financial data showed that the indirect method of operating name-brand, hamburger restaurants provided greater profitability than the direct method. This was true regardless of whether the restaurants were grouped and analyzed by sales volume, restaurant type (stand-alone or part of a food court), or location (continental United States or overseas). We also projected that if new name-brand, hamburger restaurants were to be built, the indirect method would result in a higher return on investment over a 20-year period. Investment Analysis Projected That the Indirect Method Would Provide a Greater Return on Investment if New Restaurants Were Built
In addition to our profitability analysis of fiscal year 1998 and 1999 financial data, we performed a 20-year, cash flow analysis for a capital investment in a new name-brand, hamburger restaurant. The exchange service provides the capital for building and periodically updating the restaurant, assumes all financial risks of operations, and generally pays the name-brand company an annual licensing fee and a royalty or commission on its annual sales. Under the direct method, these issues fall primarily with the exchange service. In general, each exchange service has adopted the operating method that it believes best fits its particular circumstances. As a result, the exchange services have not always had a compelling reason to analyze the financial and operational benefits of the two operating methods. Recommendation for Executive Action
To properly weigh profitability and other factors in selecting operating approaches for name-brand, fast-food operations on military installations, we are recommending that the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness), in conjunction with the secretaries of the military services, revise the Department’s name-brand, fast-food policy by incorporating a standard methodology that considers both profitability and other factors to be used by the exchange services to identify the most appropriate method for operating fast-food restaurants, including criteria to approve deviations from any preferred operating method specified in the revised policy guidance, and clarifying how the instruction on public-private ventures affects the policy. The ability of a restaurant to recover these costs will depend on the expected profitability of the restaurant as well as financial and operational risks associated with the restaurant’s operations. License agreement
A term for the legally binding agreement between a franchisee and a franchiser. Profitability
Refers to economic earnings for the direct method of operation or net profit for the indirect method of operation and is expressed as a percentage of restaurant sales. Under the indirect method, profitability represents the revenues (sales commissions, signing bonuses, and licensing fees) received from the name-brand company less the exchange service’s overhead costs. | What GAO Found
The military exchange services operate a wide range of retail activities, such as department stores, florist shops, barber and beauty shops, gas stations, and restaurants. Hamburger restaurants represent a major segment of the exchange services' name-brand, fast-food sales. The exchange services use either a direct or an indirect method to operate these restaurants. Under the direct method, the exchange service enters into a franchise agreement with a name-brand company to sell its product on a military installation. As the franchisee, the exchange service builds and operates the restaurant and directly employs and trains the personnel. In turn, the exchange service receives all of the revenues and profits and usually pays the company a licensing fee plus a percentage of the restaurant's sales. Under the indirect method, the exchange service contracts with a name-brand company that, in turn, builds the restaurant and either operates it as a company restaurant or provides a licensed operator. The company or its licensed operator hires, trains, and pays the restaurant personnel and usually pays annual fees and commissions to the exchange service on the basis of restaurant's sales. Under this agreement, the exchange service receives a percentage of the restaurant's annual sales; annual licensing fees; and, in some cases, a signing bonus or minimum guaranteed commissions. GAO's analysis of fiscal year 1998 and 1999 financial data from the Army and Air Force Exchange Service and the Navy Exchange Service Command showed that the indirect method of operating name-brand hamburger restaurants was more profitable than the direct method, regardless of the restaurants' sales volume, restaurant type (free-standing or part of a food court), or location. GAO's investment analysis projected that if new name-brand, hamburger restaurants were to be built, the indirect method would provide a greater return on investment over a 20-year period. Other factors important in choosing between direct and indirect methods include financial and operating risks, customer service issues, employment opportunities for military dependents, and management control of a restaurant's operations. Although the Department of Defense's (DOD) policy on name-brand, fast-food restaurants establishes preferences for when the direct and indirect methods should be used, it does not provide enough guidance or criteria to determine which method to use or when it is appropriate to deviate from the policy. Also, DOD has not been actively involved in monitoring compliance with the policy. As a result, the exchanges have, over time, adopted operating philosophies and business models they believe best suit their particular circumstances. |
gao_GAO-02-827 | gao_GAO-02-827_0 | We did not independently verify the statistical and cost data provided by IRS and FMS. To assess implementation of the advance tax refund program, we collaborated with TIGTA staff who reviewed various aspects of the program, such as the accuracy of IRS’s computer programming and taxpayer eligibility for advance refunds;analyzed advance tax refund procedures, including IRS procedures for meeting expected increases in telephone demand and FMS procedures for handling undeliverable refund checks, refund offsets, and claims for nonreceipt of refunds; discussed with officials of IRS’s Office of the Taxpayer Advocate, that office’s involvement in the advance tax refund program; and obtained statistics on undeliverable advance refund notices and checks; taxpayer contacts with IRS concerning advance tax refunds and the level of telephone service provided by IRS during the advance tax refund period; claims for nonreceipt of refunds; and duplicate, altered, and counterfeit advance tax refund checks. Over $36 Billion in Advance Tax Refunds Were Issued at a Cost of at Least $138 Million
Between July and December 2001, about $36.4 billion in advance tax refunds were issued to about 86 million taxpayers. However, according to the official, IRS did not track the number of taxpayers who were affected. Taxpayers and return preparers made various types of errors related to the rate reduction credit during the 2002 tax filing season. Am I eligible for an advance payment? Appendix III: Excerpts from the Tax Year 2001 Form 1040 Instructions Related to the Rate Reduction Credit
Appendix IV: Comments from the Internal Revenue Service
Appendix V: Comments from the Financial Management Service | Why GAO Did This Study
The Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 replaced the 15-percent tax rate for individual taxpayers with a 10-percent rate. To stimulate the economy quickly, the act provided for an advance refund in 2001. Between July and December 2001, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), working with the Department of the Treasury's Financial Management Service (FMS), mailed out 86 million advance refund checks totaling $36.4 billion. IRS spent $104 million to run the advance tax refund program, and FMS spent $34 million to issue checks; IRS expects to spend another $12 million during fiscal year 2002.
What GAO Found
Overall, GAO found that IRS and FMS did a good job carrying out the program. However, the advance refunds and related rate reduction led to increased errors during the 2002 tax-filing season because of taxpayer confusion about the tax credit. In GAO's view, an independent review of the computer programming used to carry out a major effort such as the advance tax refund program might help avoid future problems. At the same time, clearer tax return instructions might reduce the number of returns filed in error. |
gao_GAO-07-716 | gao_GAO-07-716_0 | End-users of credit derivatives include hedge funds, insurance companies, pension funds, and mutual funds. 1). According to data provided to regulators by 14 of the largest credit derivatives dealers— which include U.S. and foreign banks and securities broker-dealers—these dealers collectively executed around 130,000 trades in September 2005, and dealers’ backlogs of confirmations outstanding had risen to over 150,000 (table 2). Two Factors Largely Caused the Confirmation Backlogs at Dealers
A major factor contributing to the backlogs was dealer and end-user reliance on largely manual processes for confirming credit derivative trades that could not keep up with the rapidly growing trade volume. For example, a dealer would receive a premium payment from a party other than the party with which it had entered into the trade. Confirmation Backlogs and Unilateral Assignments Increased Dealers’ Operational Risks
Although dealers were capturing their credit derivatives trades in their risk management systems to manage the associated market and credit risks, the substantial backlog of unconfirmed trades heightened dealers’ operational risk, potentially hampering their ability to effectively manage other risks. For this reason, trades should be confirmed as soon as possible. Having unconfirmed trades could allow errors to go undetected that might subsequently lead to losses and other problems. Because dealers were typically more creditworthy than the end-users assigning the trades, the original dealers ended up with more creditworthy counterparties after an assignment, according to dealers and examiners. The data that the dealers have been providing to regulators showed that they collectively exceeded each of the reduction goals they had agreed to meet and had reduced by 94 percent the total number of confirmations outstanding over 30 days from the September 2005 level to the October 2006 level (table 3). Bank regulators were also reviewing the banks’ efforts to ensure the security and resiliency of their information technology systems. Through the Joint Regulatory Initiative, Regulators Are Obtaining Data to More Effectively Track Industrywide Progress on Reducing Confirmation Backlogs
Although both U.S. banking and securities regulators were individually overseeing aspects of U.S. dealers’ credit derivatives activities, the joint regulatory initiative provided U.S. and foreign regulators with information that enabled them to better oversee the progress being made by the major dealers to address the backlog issue. Such data will assist regulators in monitoring the operational and other risks raised by OTC derivative products. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To identify what caused the credit derivatives dealers’ trade confirmation backlogs and how the backlogs are being addressed, we analyzed credit derivatives trading volume, confirmation backlog, and other transaction data provided by the major dealers to Markit Group, a provider of independent data, portfolio valuations, and over-the-counter derivatives trade processing. We also reviewed reports and relevant publications from industry associations, industry working groups, international organizations, companies, and academics on the credit derivatives market. | Why GAO Did This Study
Over-the-counter (OTC) credit derivatives are privately negotiated contracts that allow a party to transfer the risk of default on a bond or loan to another party without transferring ownership. After trading in these products grew dramatically in recent years, backlogs of thousands of trades developed for which dealers had yet to formally confirm the trade terms with end-users--such as hedge funds, pension funds, and insurance companies--and other dealers. Not confirming these trades raised the risk that losses could arise. GAO was asked to review (1) what caused the trade confirmation backlogs and how they were being addressed and (2) how U.S. financial regulators were overseeing dealers' credit derivative operations, including the security and resiliency of the information technology systems used for these products. GAO analyzed data on credit derivatives operations that dealers submitted to regulators, reviewed regulatory examination reports and work papers, and interviewed regulators, dealers, end-users, and industry organizations.
What GAO Found
After trading volumes grew exponentially between 2002 and 2005, the 14 largest credit derivatives dealers--including U.S. and foreign banks and securities broker-dealers--accumulated backlogs of unconfirmed trades totaling over 150,000 in September 2005. These backlogs resulted from reliance on inefficient manual confirmation processes that failed to keep up with the rapidly growing volume and because of difficulties in confirming information for trades that end-users transferred to other parties without notifying the original dealer. Although these trades were being entered into the systems that dealers used to manage the risk of loss arising from price changes (market risk) and counterparty defaults (credit risk), the credit derivatives backlogs increased dealers' operational risk by potentially allowing errors that could lead to losses or other problems to go undetected. In response, a joint regulatory initiative involving U.S. and foreign regulators directed the 14 major dealers to work together to reduce the backlogs and address the underlying causes. By increasing automation and requiring end-users to obtain counterparty consent before assigning trades, the 14 dealers reduced their total confirmations outstanding more than 30 days by 94 percent to 5,500 trades by October 2006. Through ongoing supervision and examinations, U.S. banking and securities regulators became aware of the credit derivatives backlogs as early as late 2003 and had been monitoring efforts taken by each dealer to reduce its backlog. Under the joint regulatory initiative, regulators obtained aggregate data from the dealers that allowed regulators to better monitor how backlogs were being resolved. Recognizing the potential for similar problems to arise in other OTC derivatives markets, regulators began obtaining similar data for other OTC derivative products in November 2006. |
gao_GAO-16-737T | gao_GAO-16-737T_0 | DEA Registrants
The CSA requires businesses, entities, or individuals that import, export, manufacture, distribute, dispense, conduct research with respect to, or administer controlled substances to register with the DEA. For example, a registrant must keep accurate records and maintain inventories of controlled substances, among other requirements, in compliance with applicable federal and state laws. Confidential Informants
Confidential informants provide information and take action at the direction of law enforcement agencies to further investigations. DEA Has Taken Some Actions but Has Not Yet Implemented Most of GAO’s Recommendations Regarding the Quota Process and Efforts to Address Drug Shortages
In our February 2015 report, we found that DEA had not effectively administered the quota process, nor had DEA and FDA established a sufficiently collaborative relationship to address shortages of drugs containing controlled substances subject to quotas. Since then, DEA has taken some actions to address the seven recommendations we made in our February 2015 report with respect to the agency’s administration of the quota process and efforts to address drug shortages, but DEA has only fully implemented two of the seven recommendations. DEA Had Not Effectively Administered the Quota Process Due to Missed Time Frames and a Lack of Internal Controls
As we reported in February 2015, DEA had not proposed or established quotas within the time frames required by its regulations for any year from 2001 through 2014. To address these deficiencies, our February 2015 report recommended that DEA take four actions to ensure it is best positioned to administer the quota process. In response to our second recommendation, DEA stated in October 2015 that it would develop performance standards that outline time frames for when manufacturers should expect DEA to respond to their quota applications, as well as develop web-based training to help manufacturers improve the quality of the information submitted to the agency. Lastly, in response to our fourth recommendation, in June 2016, DEA said that it established internal policies for the quota process and is in the process of updating its employee training materials for new staff to help ensure that each staff member has the information needed to issue quotas in accordance with the CSA and DEA’s regulations. DEA Has Provided More Information to Registrants about Their Controlled Substances Roles, but Additional Actions Are Needed to Fully Address Our Recommendations
In June 2015, we reported that DEA provided information to its registrants regarding their roles and responsibilities for preventing abuse and diversion through conferences, training, and other initiatives. We also found that DEA provided additional resources, such as manuals for specific registrant groups and DEA’s Know Your Customer guidance for distributors. However, based on our generalizable survey of four DEA registrant groups, we reported that many registrants were not aware of these resources or they would like additional guidance, information, or communication from DEA to better understand their roles under the CSA. We recommended that DEA take three actions to address registrants’ concerns. For example, DEA had created guidance manuals for pharmacists and practitioners to help them understand how the CSA and its implementing regulations pertain to these registrants’ professions. As of April 2016, DEA reported that it had taken steps towards addressing this recommendation. However, DEA did not mention any plans to develop and distribute additional guidance for distributors. We plan to continue to monitor the agency’s efforts in this area, and this recommendation remains open. In April 2016, DEA reported that it continues to work with the National Association of Boards of Pharmacy regarding issues raised during stakeholder discussions, which resulted in a March 2015 consensus document published by stakeholders entitled “Stakeholders’ Challenges and Red Flag Warning Signs Related to Prescribing and Dispensing Controlled Substances.” DEA also described other ways in which the agency works with pharmacists or associations representing pharmacists, such as during regional one-day Pharmacy Diversion Awareness Conferences, and noted that it was still working to update the Pharmacist’s Manual regarding changes related to the rescheduling of hydrocodone and new drug disposal regulations. DEA Agreed to Update Its Confidential Informants Policy to Be More Consistent with Attorney General Guidelines
In September 2015, we reported that DEA’s confidential informants policy required agents to consider most of the factors identified in the Attorney General’s Guidelines for conducting initial suitability reviews prior to using a person as an informant. However, we determined that DEA’s policy was either partially consistent with or did not address some provisions in the Guidelines regarding oversight of informants’ authorized illegal activities. We recommended that DEA update its policy and corresponding monitoring processes to address these provisions from the Guidelines. As of June 2016, DEA had made progress, but had not fully implemented our recommendation. According to an April 2016 memo, the Criminal Division has reviewed a revised version of DEA’s agents manual, which contains DEA’s policies and practices regarding confidential informants, and the Criminal Division determined that the revised manual is fully consistent with the Guidelines. Based on follow up discussions with DOJ, as of June 2016, DEA’s Office of the Chief Counsel was preparing the language needed to incorporate the new policy and expects to complete this process in summer 2016. | Why GAO Did This Study
DEA administers and enforces the CSA to help ensure the availability of controlled substances, including certain prescription drugs, for legitimate use while limiting their availability for abuse and diversion. The CSA requires DEA to set quotas that limit the amount of certain substances that are available in the United States. The CSA also requires those handling controlled substances to register with DEA. In addition, DEA works to disrupt and dismantle major drug trafficking organizations and uses confidential informants to help facilitate its investigative efforts.
This testimony addresses DEA's efforts to address prior GAO recommendations concerning: (1) administration of the quota process, (2) information provided to registrants on their roles and responsibilities under the CSA, and (3) compliance with guidelines regarding confidential informants. This statement is based on findings from three GAO reports issued during 2015, and selected status updates from DEA through June 2016. In its prior work, GAO analyzed quota data, surveyed DEA registrants, reviewed DEA policy documents and interviewed DEA officials. For selected updates, GAO reviewed DEA documentation and held discussions with agency officials.
What GAO Found
In three reports issued during 2015, GAO made eleven recommendations to the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) related to administering the quota process for controlled substances, providing information and guidance to registrants, and complying with guidelines for overseeing confidential informants. As of June 2016, DEA had taken some actions to address these recommendations but had fully implemented only two of them.
Administering the quota process. In February 2015, GAO found that DEA had not effectively administered the quota process that limits the amount of certain controlled substances available for use in the United States. For example, manufacturers apply to DEA for quotas needed to make drugs annually. GAO found that DEA did not respond within the time frames required by its regulations for any year from 2001 through 2014, which, according to some manufacturers, caused or exacerbated shortages of drugs. GAO recommended that DEA take seven actions to improve its management of the quota process and to address drug shortages. In March 2015, DEA implemented one recommendation to finalize an information sharing agreement with the Food and Drug Administration regarding drug shortages. In June 2016, DEA implemented a second recommendation strengthening internal controls in the quota system. DEA has not fully implemented the other five recommendations. In October 2015, DEA identified steps it planned to take, including developing performance standards for responsiveness to manufacturers, but has not yet completed these actions.
Providing information to registrants. In June 2015, based on four nationally representative surveys of DEA registrants, GAO reported that many registrants were not aware of various DEA resources, such as manuals for pharmacists and practitioners. In addition, some distributors, individual pharmacies, and chain pharmacy corporate offices wanted improved guidance from, and additional communication with, DEA about their roles and responsibilities under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA). GAO recommended that DEA take three actions to increase registrants' awareness of DEA resources and to improve the information DEA provides to registrants. In April 2016, DEA reported that it had taken some steps towards addressing these recommendations, such as developing web-based training and updating the Pharmacist's Manual to reflect new regulations. However, DEA did not mention plans to develop and distribute additional guidance for distributors or pharmacies and therefore has not yet fully implemented GAO's recommendations.
Compliance with confidential informant guidelines. In September 2015, GAO reported that DEA's confidential informant policies were not fully consistent with provisions in the Attorney General's Guidelines . For example, DEA did not fully address the requirements to provide the informant with written instructions about authorized illegal activity and require signed acknowledgment from the informant. GAO recommended that DEA update its policy and corresponding monitoring processes to explicitly address these particular provisions in the Guidelines. According to an April 2016 memo and subsequent follow up, DEA has revised its policy accordingly, and it is undergoing internal processing, which is expected to be completed in summer 2016. Until GAO can review the new policy and verify that it complies with the Guidelines, this recommendation remains open.
What GAO Recommends
GAO previously made eleven recommendations to DEA related to the quota process, guidance to registrants, and confidential informants. DEA generally agreed with and has begun taking actions to address the recommendations, and has so far fully implemented two. |
gao_GAO-17-320 | gao_GAO-17-320_0 | One of the recommendations was to establish a national network of manufacturing innovation institutes as public-private partnerships. The functions that the RAMI Act identifies for the national office include:
Overseeing the planning, management, and coordination of the
Entering into memorandums of understanding with federal departments and agencies whose missions contribute to or are affected by advanced manufacturing, to carry out the program’s statutory purposes;
Developing, not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of the RAMI Act, and updating not less frequently than once every 3 years thereafter, a strategic plan to guide the program;
Establishing such procedures, processes, and criteria as may be necessary and appropriate to maximize cooperation and coordinate the activities of the program with programs and activities of other federal departments and agencies whose missions contribute to or are affected by advanced manufacturing;
Establishing a clearinghouse of public information related to the activities of the program; and
Acting as a convener of the network. Seven of these eleven institutes were operating (i.e., supporting research projects in their technology focus areas) as of December 2016. Institute members receive a variety of benefits and rights, such as networking opportunities. Four institutes—three DOD institutes and one DOE institute—were established prior to the enactment of the RAMI Act in 2014. About 780 Manufacturers and Other Entities Were Members of the Operating Institutes in 2016
Our analysis of institutes’ membership data showed that about 520 manufacturers (mostly small manufacturers according to a Commerce official) were members of the seven DOD and DOE institutes that were operating as of December 2016. Length of federal financial assistance. Commerce, DOD, and DOE Have Developed Performance Measures and Commerce Is Taking Steps to Address Potential Challenges in Assessing Program Progress
AMNPO led a collaboration with DOE and DOD to develop an initial set of performance measures to assess the Manufacturing USA program’s progress toward furthering its eight statutory purposes. They also told us that, subsequently, they plan to work with DOD and DOE to reach agreement on these revised measures to allow the Secretary of Commerce to report the data collected on the revised measures in the Manufacturing USA annual report to Congress for fiscal year 2017. Commerce Has Taken Steps or Has Identified Options to Address Challenges in Measuring Program Performance
Institute officials identified challenges related to measuring progress toward achieving the Manufacturing USA program’s statutory purposes, including measuring outcomes within a short timeframe, and Commerce has taken steps to address these challenges. Commerce Used Various Mechanisms to Help Coordinate the Manufacturing USA Program, but It Has Not Included All Relevant Agencies in Fully Identifying Roles and Responsibilities
AMNPO uses a variety of collaborative mechanisms to coordinate the efforts of the agencies that contribute to the Manufacturing USA program, including a network governance system that defines some roles and responsibilities for agencies that sponsor institutes as well as for agencies that do not sponsor institutes (non-sponsoring agencies). These mechanisms incorporate several key practices for enhancing and sustaining interagency collaboration. The Process for Developing the Governance System Did Not Include All Relevant Non-sponsoring Agencies or Ensure That Their Roles and Responsibilities Are Fully Identified
Although the governance system was developed by an interagency team, the process used to develop the governance system did not ensure that all relevant non-sponsoring agencies were included or that their roles and responsibilities for contributing to the Manufacturing USA program were fully identified. For example, the governance system does not specify any responsibility for non-sponsoring agencies to provide information or expertise related to their activities to the program. In addition, DOL administers discretionary grant programs, which can help increase the number of skilled workers in advanced manufacturing. Working with other agencies to revise the governance system, including ensuring that all relevant agencies are involved in the process to fully identify non-sponsoring agencies’ roles and responsibilities, would strengthen AMNPO’s efforts to leverage and coordinate agencies’ contributions to the Manufacturing USA program, consistent with key practices for interagency collaboration, and would improve implementation of its function to coordinate the program. In response to the comments received from Commerce and DOD, we followed up with DOD. | Why GAO Did This Study
The RAMI Act includes a provision for GAO to assess the program every two years, with a final assessment in 2024. This is GAO's first report in response to the statutory provision. Among other objectives, GAO examined (1) the status of the network and use of the institutes, (2) the extent to which performance measures are in place to assess progress toward achieving the statutory program purposes, and (3) the extent to which Commerce has taken steps to coordinate agencies contributing to the program.
GAO reviewed documentation and interviewed officials from Commerce, DOD, DOE, DOL, the Department of Education, and Manufacturing USA institutes; and held discussion groups with a nongeneralizable sample of institute member representatives.
What GAO Found
As of December 2016, the Departments of Defense (DOD), Energy (DOE), and Commerce (Commerce) collectively had signed agreements to establish 11 manufacturing innovation institutes. Four of these institutes were established prior to enactment of the Revitalize American Manufacturing and Innovation Act of 2014 (RAMI Act), which requires Commerce to establish a network of institutes for manufacturing innovation. Since 2014, the network—called the Manufacturing USA network—has grown as DOD, DOE, and Commerce have established seven more institutes, and Commerce, DOD, and DOE plan to sponsor up to four more institutes. Each institute is a public-private partnership between the sponsoring federal agency and a nonfederal entity in charge of operations, with the nonfederal entity matching or exceeding the federal financial assistance. GAO's analysis of institute membership from May through September 2016 shows that about 780 members had joined the seven institutes that were operating during GAO's review (i.e., supporting research projects in their technology focus areas). Members receive a variety of benefits, such as access to intellectual property and networking opportunities.
Commerce, DOD, and DOE worked together to develop initial performance measures to track progress toward the Manufacturing USA program's statutory purposes. Additionally, DOD, working with Commerce and DOE, hired a consultant to review the Manufacturing USA program. The consultant's January 2017 report included recommendations on revised measures to track program progress. After considering the results of this review, Commerce plans to work with DOD and DOE to reach agreement on a revised set of measures. While Commerce may face challenges with assessing the program, such as the timeframe over which results may need to be measured, it has taken steps or has identified options to address these challenges.
Commerce has used a variety of mechanisms to coordinate the Manufacturing USA program. These mechanisms incorporate several key practices GAO has identified for enhancing and sustaining interagency collaboration. However, GAO found that the process used to develop a governance system that outlines agencies' responsibilities for contributing to the program did not include all relevant non-sponsoring agencies (agencies that do not sponsor institutes), or ensure that their roles and responsibilities for contributing to the program are fully identified. Specifically, non-sponsoring agencies, such as the Department of Labor (DOL)—which administers discretionary grant programs that can help increase the number of skilled workers in advanced manufacturing—were not actively involved in developing the governance system. Additionally, the governance system does not specify any responsibility for non-sponsoring agencies to provide information or expertise related to their activities to the program. A Commerce official told GAO that the governance system is subject to revision, but participation in the program is up to each agency. However, including all relevant agencies in the process of revising the system and fully identifying non-sponsoring agencies' roles and responsibilities could strengthen Commerce's efforts to leverage and coordinate agencies' contributions to the program, consistent with key practices for interagency collaboration.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that Commerce work with all relevant federal agencies to fully identify roles and responsibilities for how agencies that do not sponsor institutes could contribute to the Manufacturing USA program. Commerce agreed, but suggested an alternative recommendation. GAO modified the recommendation to clarify its intent. |
gao_GAO-06-45 | gao_GAO-06-45_0 | Furthermore, state program requirements and standards are sometimes more stringent and inclusive than those under the federal program. Table 1 shows key tank-related data reported by EPA as of March 31, 2005. EPA, however, does not require states to provide specific data on all known abandoned underground storage tanks. In addition, although one of the primary purposes of the LUST Trust Fund is to provide money for cleaning up abandoned tank sites, EPA lacks information—such as the number of releases from known abandoned tanks in each state and how many of these releases have been or are being cleaned up—to help it determine how to most efficiently and effectively allocate funds to the states for this purpose. Several Funding Sources Exist For Cleaning Up Tank Releases, but Some States’ Resources for Remediating Abandoned Tank Sites Are Limited
While tank owners and operators are primarily responsible for cleaning up contamination from leaks in their underground storage tanks, some states assist them through financial assurance or indemnification funds. EPA estimates that the average remediation cost per site has been about $125,000, but costs sometimes have exceeded $1 million. According to EPA program officials, states historically have used about two-thirds of the federal trust fund money allocated to them each year to oversee and support the cleanups paid for by state funds, tank owners/operators, and other financial assurance mechanisms, while the states have used the remaining one-third to directly pay for cleanups of abandoned tanks that are not covered by the other funding sources. For example, in fiscal year 2004, EPA awarded $61.7 million in trust funds to assist states’ leaking tank cleanup efforts. While neither California nor Pennsylvania are experiencing significant problems funding cleanups of leaking tank sites, officials in both states said that they could use more federal funding for leak prevention initiatives and welcome the flexibility to use federal trust funds for that purpose, as provided by the Energy Policy Act of 2005. States Identify, Assess, and Clean Up Leaking Tank Sites Using Similar Means
States become aware of leaking underground storage tanks through a variety of methods, including owner/operator reports, complaints by local residents, incidental discovery during land redevelopment or removal of tanks for upgrading or replacement, and compliance inspections. Regular and frequent tank inspections also can detect new leaks—and potentially prevent future ones—before they can lead to serious environmental or health damage, and lessen or avoid the need for costly cleanups. In this regard, in 1988, EPA issued regulations governing leak detection, among other things. Tanks must generally be monitored for leaks at least once every 30 days. State officials told us that California requires annual inspections of all tanks; Maryland inspected its state’s tanks every 3 years; Michigan generally inspected every 3 years, depending upon the location of the tanks and state inspection staffing levels; North Carolina inspected once every 4 or 5 years, due to funding limits; and Pennsylvania inspected at least once every 5 years. States Use Risk-Based Assessments to Determine Cleanup Priorities
The 5 states we contacted all use risk-based systems to prioritize leaking underground storage tank sites for cleanup according to the immediate threat they pose to human health, safety, and/or the environment. However, EPA notes that the process that states must conduct to establish that a tank is abandoned—that its owner is unknown or unwilling or unable to pay for leak cleanups—may involve ownership searches to identify the potentially responsible party and assessment of their financial ability and willingness to pay for cleanup. Because a limited portion of these data—information on abandoned tanks being cleaned up using LUST Trust Fund resources—is currently broken out and provided to EPA’s regions, the UST Program could easily utilize these existing data and EPA would only have to require states to break out the remaining data on the number and cleanup status of their known abandoned sites. Status as of August 2005: Cleanup was completed. Impacts of contamination: Soil and groundwater contamination occurred at the site but was contained within the property. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency involvement: None. Tanks at this site were subsequently removed. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this review were to identify (1) information available on the number and cleanup status of leaking underground storage tanks, (2) existing sources of funding for cleanups at contaminated tank sites, and (3) processes used to identify, assess, and clean up sites in 5 states with large numbers of leaking tanks—California, Maryland, Michigan, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania. | Why GAO Did This Study
Leaking underground storage tanks that contain hazardous products, primarily gasoline, can contaminate soil and groundwater. To address this problem, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), under its Underground Storage Tank (UST) Program, required tank owners to install leak detection equipment and take measures to prevent leaks. In 1986, the Congress created a federal trust fund to assist states with cleanups. Cleanup progress has been made, but, as of early 2005, cleanup efforts had not yet begun for over 32,000 tanks, many of which may require state and/or federal resources to address. GAO identified (1) data on the number and cleanup status of leaking tanks, (2) funding sources for tank cleanups, and (3) processes used by five states with large numbers of leaking tanks--California, Maryland, Michigan, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania--to identify, assess, and clean up sites.
What GAO Found
Data submitted to EPA by the states show that, as of March 31, 2005, more than 660,000 tanks were in use and about 1.6 million were no longer in use. In addition, states identified about 449,000 tank releases (leaks) and about 416,000 initiated cleanups, with almost 324,000 of those cleanups completed. States also compile limited data on abandoned tanks--tanks whose owners are unknown, or unwilling or unable to pay for their cleanup--but EPA does not require states to provide separate data on all of their known abandoned tanks. Without this separate data, EPA cannot effectively determine the number and cleanup status of these tanks, or how to most efficiently and effectively allocate federal cleanup funds to the states. Tank owners and operators are primarily responsible for paying to clean up their own sites, but abandoned tanks are cleaned up using state resources, that may be limited, and federal trust funds. EPA estimates that the average remediation costs per site have been about $125,000, but costs sometimes have exceeded $1 million. Officials from two of the five states we contacted reported that their state funds may be inadequate to address contamination at abandoned tank sites. In this regard, Michigan and North Carolina officials told GAO that, because of resource constraints, they let contamination at abandoned tank sites attenuate (diminish) naturally once immediate threats are addressed. Furthermore, due to limited resources, states must sometimes find other options for cleaning up sites. For example, Pennsylvania officials asked EPA to take over the cleanup work at the abandoned Tranguch site in 1996 because the owner was bankrupt and the state could not pay the expected cleanup costs. The five states that GAO contacted identify, assess, and clean up leaking tank sites using similar processes. Generally, owners and operators are responsible for conducting these activities under state oversight. Leaking tanks are identified when tank owners report leaks; land redevelopment activities uncover unknown tanks; or state agencies investigate contamination complaints or inspect tanks for regulatory compliance. While regular tank inspections can detect new leaks and potentially prevent future ones, as of early 2005, only two of the five states GAO contacted--California and Maryland--consistently inspected all the state's tanks at least once every 3 years, the minimum rate of inspection that EPA considers adequate. The Energy Policy Act, enacted in August 2005, among other things, requires inspections at least once every 3 years and provides federal trust funds for this and other leak prevention purposes. EPA and some state officials told GAO that increasing inspection frequency could require additional resources. Being able to use trust fund allocations for this purpose will help in this regard. The five states GAO contacted, once they become aware of leaking tanks, identify responsible parties and require them to hire consultants to conduct site assessments and plan and implement cleanup work. The states generally prioritize sites for cleanup according to the immediate threat they pose to human health, safety, and/or the environment. |
gao_HEHS-00-185 | gao_HEHS-00-185_0 | Firms adopted cash balance formulas for a variety of reasons, including reducing total pension costs, increasing portability to enhance the recruitment of younger or more mobile workers, and adding a lump sum benefit feature that can be used to better explain pension benefits to workers. About One of Five Fortune 1000 Firms Sponsors Cash Balance Plans
About 19 percent of Fortune 1000 firms sponsor cash balance plans that cover an estimated 2.1 million active participants. Firms sponsoring these plans exist in many sectors of the economy, but the greater concentrations are found in the financial services, health care, and manufacturing industries. Most firms in our survey that sponsor cash balance plans previously covered their workers under another defined benefit plan. For example, converting to a cash balance plan can extend the period of time a firm would not have to make a contribution to the pension plan while still having the plan considered to be fully funded or overfunded—that is, the value of plan assets meet or exceed the value of currently accrued pension benefits. Conversions Can Be Advantageous for Some Workers but Can Result in Lower Benefits at Retirement for Others
Conversions to cash balance plans can result in higher pension benefits accruing earlier in a worker’s career and increased portability of benefits, which can be advantageous to younger or more mobile workers. Defined Benefit Plans With Final Average Pay Formulas Accumulate Benefits Differently Than Cash Balance Plans
Cash balance plans provide a larger share of a participant’s accrued benefit earlier in the worker’s career than a traditional defined benefit plan based on a final average pay formula. Our comparative design scenarios illustrate the declining rate of normal retirement benefit accrual inherent in cash balance plans. 3.) This is especially important for workers who change jobs frequently or move in and out of the workforce. Conversions to Cash Balance Plans Can Reduce Older Workers’ Future Benefits
Depending on the age of a participant at conversion and a plan’s design features, conversions of defined benefit plans with final average pay formulas to cash balance plans can result in lower annuities for some participants than they would receive if no conversion occurs. 4). 5.) 6). We found wide variation in the type and amounts of information workers receive about plan changes. In many instances of conversions to cash balance plans, sponsors did not ensure that participants received sufficient information about plan changes that can reduce future benefit accruals. Consequently, the communications provided to employees typically vary from general statements about plan changes to specific examples of how conversions to cash balance plans might affect workers of different ages and tenure. We selected the firms randomly. Our survey of 1999 Fortune 1000 firms indicates that there is a wide variety of cash balance plan designs among the firms that sponsor these plans. 1. 2. 3. 1. 2. 7). 8). | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the implications of converting traditional private pensions to cash balance plans, focusing on: (1) the prevalence and major features of cash balance plans, and reasons why firms adopt them; (2) how the use of cash balance plans affect the pension benefits for workers of different ages and tenure, particularly after conversion; and (3) what information employers converting to cash balance plans typically provide to plan participants and how disclosure might be improved.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) GAO's survey of 1999 Fortune 1000 firms indicates that the number of firms sponsoring cash balance plans has increased within the last few years, with few firms sponsoring such plans prior to the early 1990s, but increasing to about 19 percent of all Fortune 1000 firms this year; (2) these plans cover an estimated 2.1 million workers; (3) firms in many sectors of the economy sponsor these plans but greater concentrations are found in the financial services, health care, and manufacturing industries; (4) about 90 percent of the firms GAO surveyed that sponsor such plans previously covered their workers under a traditional defined benefit plan; (5) most of the conversions occurred within the past 5 years; (6) key reasons firms gave for converting include lowering total pension costs, adding a lump sum feature to increase the portability of pension benefits, thereby improving the firm's ability to recruit more mobile workers, and facilitating communication of the value of plan benefits; (7) as with traditional pension plans, cash balance plan designs vary significantly; (8) conversions to cash balance plans can be advantageous to certain groups of workers, for example, to those who switch jobs frequently, but can lower pension benefits for others; (9) cash balance plans provide a larger share of a participant's accumulated benefit earlier in a career, compared with a traditional defined benefit plan that is based on final average pay; (10) as a result, conversions can increase the value of some workers' benefits, especially younger or short-tenured workers who leave firms before retirement; (11) unlike traditional defined benefit plans, cash balance plans can result in a declining rate of normal retirement benefit accrual over time; (12) this declining accrual rate can result in older workers receiving lower benefits at retirement from a cash balance plan than they would have from a traditional final average pay plan if it had not been converted; (13) current disclosure requirements provide minimum standards for the information plan sponsors must give participants about plan changes; (14) GAO found wide variation in the type and amounts of information workers receive; (15) the communications provided to employees vary from general statements about plan changes to specific examples of how a conversion to a cash plan might affect workers of different ages and tenure; and (16) often, sponsors did not ensure that participants received sufficient information about plan changes that can reduce future benefit accruals. |
gao_GAO-07-736 | gao_GAO-07-736_0 | 1 and 2). 3). To reduce the workload and burden on LUCA participants, the Bureau provided a longer period for reviewing and updating LUCA materials; provided options to submit materials for the LUCA Program; combined the collection of addresses from two separate operations into one integrated and sequential operation; and created MTPS, which is designed to assist LUCA participants in reviewing and updating address and map data. In addition, many participants experienced problems with converting Bureau-provided address files. Building on the progress it has already made, the Bureau can take additional steps to address new challenges in reducing workload and burdens for LUCA participants. First, although the Bureau performed internal tests of the software, the Bureau did not test MTPS as part of the LUCA Dress Rehearsal and tested MTPS with only one locality in preparation for the 2010 LUCA Program. The 2010 LUCA Program faces challenges caused by the continuous changes in the housing stock in areas affected by storm damage or population influxes, which may hinder the ability of local governments to accurately update their address lists and maps. Further, the condition of the housing stock is likely to present additional challenges for address canvassing and other decennial census operations in the form of decreased productivity for Bureau staff, issues associated with identifying vacant and uninhabitable structures, and workforce shortages. These local governments are focused on reconstruction, and officials we spoke with in two localities questioned their ability to participate in the LUCA Program. The effects of hurricanes Katrina and Rita caused a major shift in population away from the hurricane-affected areas. In addition to the changes in the 2010 LUCA Program, the Bureau has considered changes to the address canvassing and subsequent operations in the Gulf Coast region. The Bureau’s plans for how it may adjust address canvassing operations in the Gulf Coast region can also have implications for subsequent operations. However, Bureau officials stated that there are “no concrete plans” to implement changes to address canvassing or subsequent decennial operations in the Gulf Coast region. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To assess the current status of the U.S. Census Bureau’s (Bureau) Local Update of Census Addresses (LUCA) Program, we requested and obtained source documents from the Bureau’s headquarters in Suitland, Maryland, and the Bureau’s Web site regarding the updated timelines of the 2010 LUCA Program and the LUCA Dress Rehearsal. To assess how the Bureau is addressing prior issues and new challenges associated with implementing the LUCA Program, we performed a review of publications created by GAO and other entities (i.e., the National Research Council, the Department of Commerce’s Office of the Inspector General, and Anteon Corporation) regarding the LUCA Program to ascertain critiques of the program and recommendations for improving the program for the 2010 Census. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Commerce's (Commerce) U.S. Census Bureau (Bureau) seeks updated information on the addresses and maps of housing units and group quarters from state, local, and tribal governments through the Local Update of Census Addresses (LUCA) Program. Prepared under the Comptroller General's authority, this report assesses (1) the status of the LUCA Program, (2) the Bureau's response to prior recommendations by GAO and others and new challenges related to the program, and (3) the Bureau's plans for conducting the program in areas affected by hurricanes Katrina and Rita. GAO reviewed LUCA program documents, met with and surveyed participants in the LUCA Dress Rehearsal, and interviewed Bureau officials and local officials in the Gulf Coast region.
What GAO Found
The Bureau has conducted its planned LUCA operations in accordance with its published timeline. The Bureau has also taken steps to reduce workloads and burdens and improve training for localities that participate in LUCA--all areas GAO and others had identified as needing improvement. For instance, to reduce participant workload and burden, the Bureau provided a longer period for reviewing and updating LUCA materials; provided options for submitting materials for the LUCA Program; combined the collection of LUCA addresses from two separate operations into one integrated program; and created MTPS, which is designed to assist LUCA Program participants in reviewing and updating address and map data. Also, the Bureau has planned improvements to the 2010 LUCA Program training (i.e., specialized workshops for informational and then technical training) and plans to supplement the workshops with CBT. However, the Bureau faces new challenges. For instance, the Bureau tested MTPS with only one local government. Other local officials we spoke with had problems converting Bureau-provided address files. In addition, the Bureau did not test its CBT software in the LUCA Dress Rehearsal. Additional challenges stem from the damage to the Gulf Coast region caused by hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Officials in localities in hurricane-affected areas questioned their ability to participate in the LUCA Program. The continuous changes in housing stock may hinder local governments' ability to accurately update their address lists and maps. The condition of the housing stock is likely to present additional challenges for the Bureau's address canvassing operation (in which the Bureau verifies addresses) in the form of decreased productivity for Bureau staff, workforce shortages, and issues associated with identifying vacant and uninhabitable structures. The Bureau created a task force to assess the implications of storm-related issues that proposed a number of mitigating actions. However, the Bureau has no plans for modifying the address canvassing operation or subsequent operations in the Gulf Coast region. |
gao_GAO-16-565 | gao_GAO-16-565_0 | The State Department coordinates the United States’ financial and policy relationship with IAEA. Safeguards activities include on-site inspections, environmental sampling, and remote monitoring. IAEA Has Been Asked to Verify and Monitor Iran’s Implementation of a Range of Nuclear-Related Commitments under the JCPOA
The JCPOA commitments IAEA has been asked to verify include limits on Iran’s nuclear program, including those on numbers of centrifuges (for example, no more than 5,060 of specified centrifuges at Natanz for 10 years); uranium enrichment levels (no more than 3.67 percent for 15 years); stocks of enriched uranium (no more than 300 kilograms for 15 years); heavy water inventories; and centrifuge manufacturing. IAEA Is Using Its Safeguards Authorities and Conducting Additional Activities to Verify and Monitor Iran’s Commitments
According to officials in IAEA’s Office of Legal Affairs, the agency draws on its safeguards authorities to verify and monitor Iran’s implementation of its nuclear-related commitments. Under the JCPOA, Iran agreed to provisionally apply, and seek ratification of the Additional Protocol, which gives the agency’s inspectors access to an expanded range of locations, including those where the agency seeks assurance regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities. Under the JCPOA, IAEA is also conducting certain additional verification and monitoring activities agreed to by Iran, such as containment and surveillance measures for monitoring Iran’s uranium mines and mills, according to IAEA officials. The JCPOA includes a mechanism in which its participants commit to resolve access issues with the agency regarding an undeclared location within 24 days after the request is made. IAEA Has Identified the Financial, Human, and Technical Resources Necessary to Verify and Monitor Iran’s Nuclear- Related Commitments in the JCPOA
IAEA has estimated the financial, human, and technical resources necessary to verify and monitor Iran’s implementation of its nuclear- related commitments in the JCPOA. Financial Needs
IAEA has estimated that it needs approximately $10 million per year for 15 years in additional funding above its current safeguards budget to fund additional inspections, among other things, under the JCPOA. IAEA officials said that consistent with its Statute, the Director General intends to propose to the Board of Governors that the approximately $5.7 million in costs associated with Additional Protocol activities and inspector and other direct staff costs attributable to the JCPOA be funded through IAEA’s regular budget after 2016. Consequently, according to a 2015 IAEA report, all of IAEA’s JCPOA work through 2016 will be funded through extra-budgetary contributions. According to State Department officials, the balance of JCPOA-related costs not covered by IAEA’s 2017 regular budget will require extra-budgetary contributions from member states. These potential challenges include (1) detecting undeclared nuclear materials and activities, (2) accessing sites in Iran, and (3) managing safeguards budgetary, human, and technical resources. According to current U.S. and IAEA officials, some former U.S. officials, some former IAEA officials, and officials from several expert organizations, IAEA faces inherent challenges and limitations in identifying indicators of undeclared activity. Efforts to Mitigate Challenges in Detecting Undeclared Nuclear Material and Activities
Current IAEA and U.S. officials as well as a former IAEA official said that IAEA has taken steps to improve its ability to detect undeclared nuclear activities and materials and told us that there are other mitigating factors to the challenges IAEA faces in this area. For example, according to U.S. officials, IAEA has adapted its inspector training program to focus on potential indicators of undeclared activity beyond the agency’s traditional safeguards focus on nuclear materials accountancy. Officials and expert organizations we interviewed discussed two potential challenges regarding the mechanism. Specifically, IAEA’s strategy of transferring inspectors to its Office of Safeguards Verification in Iran from other safeguards divisions may pose a challenge to IAEA and its safeguards work in other countries because of the extensive time it takes IAEA to hire and train new inspectors for those divisions. Agency Comments
We are not making any recommendations in this report. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report examines (1) the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) commitments that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has been asked to verify and monitor and its authorities to do so, (2) the resources IAEA has identified as necessary to verify and monitor Iran’s nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA, and (3) potential challenges and mitigating actions, if any, IAEA and others have identified with regard to verifying Iran’s nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA. We also analyzed IAEA documentation concerning the safeguards legal framework, including the Statute of the IAEA, which authorizes the agency to apply safeguards, at the request of parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement; “The Structure and Content of Agreements Between the Agency and States Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons” (information circular (INFCIRC)/153), which provides the basis for the comprehensive safeguards agreement that most countries have concluded with IAEA and that covers all of the countries’ nuclear material in peaceful activities; Iran’s Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/214); the Model Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540), which provides the basis for an Additional Protocol that most countries with a CSA have concluded with IAEA to provide additional information about countries’ nuclear and nuclear-related activities; and the November 2011 IAEA Safeguards Report, which details items concerning “possible military dimensions” of Iran’s nuclear program; IAEA’s report on its investigation of the possible military dimensions; and the related Board of Governors’ resolution. | Why GAO Did This Study
In July 2015, multilateral talks with Iran culminated in an agreement called the JCPOA, through which Iran committed to limits on its nuclear program in exchange for relief from sanctions put in place by the United States and other nations. IAEA, an independent international organization that administers safeguards designed to detect and deter the diversion of nuclear material for nonpeaceful purposes, was requested to verify and monitor Iran's implementation of these commitments. The U.S. Department of State coordinates the United States' financial and policy relationship with IAEA.
GAO was asked to review the authorities and resources IAEA has to carry out its activities regarding the JCPOA. This report, which updates the preliminary findings from an interim report released in February 2016 (GAO-16-417), examines (1) the JCPOA commitments that IAEA has been asked to verify and monitor and its authorities to do so, (2) the resources IAEA has identified as necessary to verify and monitor those JCPOA commitments, and (3) potential challenges and mitigating actions IAEA and others have identified with regard to verifying and monitoring the JCPOA. GAO analyzed the JCPOA and key IAEA documents and interviewed current and former IAEA officials, U.S. government officials, national laboratory representatives, and experts from research institutions.
What GAO Found
As outlined in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was asked to verify and monitor Iran's implementation of a range of nuclear-related commitments. IAEA is using its safeguards authorities and conducting additional activities agreed to by Iran under the JCPOA to do so. Iran's commitments include limits on uranium enrichment levels and on enriched uranium inventories. IAEA is verifying and monitoring Iran's implementation of these commitments through a range of activities conducted by its Safeguards Department, such as inspecting Iran's nuclear facilities, analyzing environmental samples, and monitoring Iran's uranium mines and mills. Under the JCPOA, Iran agreed to provisionally apply the Additional Protocol, an agreement that will give IAEA's inspectors access to an expanded range of locations, including where the agency seeks assurance regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. The JCPOA also includes a mechanism in which participants to the agreement commit to resolve an access request from the agency within 24 days after the request is made.
IAEA has identified the financial, human, and technical resources necessary to verify and monitor Iran's nuclear-related commitments in the JCPOA. IAEA has estimated that it needs approximately $10 million per year for 15 years in additional funding above its current safeguards budget for JCPOA verification. According to IAEA documents, this $10 million will be entirely funded through extra-budgetary contributions through 2016. IAEA officials said that the agency intends to propose that of the $10 million approximately $5.7 million for all Additional Protocol activities and inspector costs attributable to the JCPOA be funded through IAEA's regular budget after 2016; approximately $4.4 million will be supported through extra-budgetary contributions from member states, such as the United States. IAEA also plans to transfer 18 experienced inspectors to its Office of Safeguards Verification in Iran from other safeguards divisions and to hire and train additional inspectors. According to IAEA officials, existing safeguards technical resources are sufficient to implement the JCPOA.
IAEA may face potential challenges in verifying and monitoring Iran's implementation of certain nuclear-related commitments in the JCPOA. According to current and former IAEA and U.S. officials and expert organizations, these potential challenges include (1) integrating JCPOA-related funding into IAEA's regular budget and managing human resources in the safeguards program, (2) access challenges depending on Iran's cooperation and the untested JCPOA mechanism to resolve access issues, and (3) the inherent challenge of detecting undeclared nuclear materials and activities. IAEA has identified mitigating actions, such as utilizing remote monitoring and cost-free experts to address potential understaffing of IAEA safeguards activities in other countries as additional experienced inspectors are transferred to work on Iran-related safeguards. In addition, according to IAEA and U.S. officials as well as a former IAEA official GAO interviewed, IAEA has improved its capabilities in detecting undeclared activity. For example, according to U.S. officials, IAEA has adapted its inspector training program to focus on potential indicators of undeclared activities.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making any recommendations. |
gao_NSIAD-98-97 | gao_NSIAD-98-97_0 | Each military service manages reparable parts that are used for their operations. Private Sector Practices Streamline Logistics Operations
We previously reported that several commercial airlines have cut costs and improved customer service by streamlining their logistics operations. The most successful improvements include using highly accurate information systems to track and control inventory; employing various methods to speed the flow of parts through the pipeline; shifting certain inventory tasks to suppliers; and having third parties handle parts repair, storage, and distribution functions. Current DOD Initiatives Seek to Improve Logistics Systems
Each of the military services has programs underway to improve logistics operations and make its processes faster and more flexible. The program’s goals, concepts, and top management support parallel improvement efforts found in private sector companies. The Air Force describes Lean Logistics as the cornerstone of all future logistics system improvements. However, a wider application of best practices by DOD must be accomplished within the current legislative framework and regulatory requirements. Military Services and DLA Responsibilities for Adopting Best Practices
Section 395 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 requires the Director of DLA to develop and submit to Congress a schedule for implementing best practices for the acquisition and distribution of categories of consumable-type supplies and equipment listed in the section. Conclusions
Our work shows it is feasible for the list of items covered by section 395 to be expanded to include reparable parts. For example, each of the services and DLA have initiatives underway designed to improve their logistics operations by adopting best practices. However, if section 395 were expanded, the responsibility for the development and submission of a schedule to implement these practices would go beyond the purview of the Director of DLA. Matters for Congressional Consideration
If Congress decides it wants to expand the provisions of section 395 to include reparable parts, it may wish to consider (1) broadening the responsibility for responding to this legislation to include the military services and (2) developing provisions, similar to those in section 395, to encourage DOD to test combinations of best practices using a supply-chain management approach. We are sending copies of this report to other congressional committees; the Secretaries of Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; the Directors of the Defense Logistics Agency and the Office of Management and Budget; and other interested parties. The Department of Defense Logistics Pipelines
The Department of Defense’s (DOD) depot repair pipelines for reparable parts are slow and inefficient. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reported on the feasibility of adding reparable parts to the list of consumable-type supplies and equipment covered by Section 395 of the National Defense Authorization Act of 1998, focusing on: (1) private-sector practices that streamline logistics operations; (2) Department of Defense (DOD) initiatives to improve its logistics systems; and (3) best practices that can be used to improve the military services' aircraft reparable parts pipeline.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) it is feasible for the list of items covered by section 395 to be expanded to include reparable parts; (2) in fact, all of the services and the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) have initiatives under way designed to improve their logistics operations by adopting best practices; (3) however, if section 395 were expanded to include reparable parts, the responsibility for the development and submission of a schedule to implement best practices would also have to be expanded to include the military services, since responsibility for service-managed reparable parts is beyond the purview of the Director of DLA; (4) private-sector companies have developed new business strategies and practices that have cut costs and improved customer service by streamlining logistics operations; (5) the most successful improvement efforts included a combination of practices that are focused on improving the entire logistics pipeline--an approach known as supply-chain management; (6) the combination of practices that GAO has observed includes the use of highly accurate information systems, various methods to speed the flow of parts through the pipeline, and the shifting of certain logistics functions to suppliers and third parties; (7) DOD recognizes that it needs to make substantial improvements to its logistics systems; (8) the Army's Velocity Management program, the Navy's regionalization and direct delivery programs, and the Air Force's Lean Logistics initiative are designed to improve logistics operations and make logistics processes faster and more flexible; (9) although these initiatives have achieved some limited success, significant opportunities for improvement remain; (10) GAO's work indicates that best practices developed by private-sector companies are compatible with DOD improvement initiatives; and (11) however, GAO recognizes the use of these best practices must be accomplished within the existing legislative framework and regulatory requirements relating to defense logistics activities, such as the Office of Management and Budget Circular A-76. |
gao_NSIAD-98-182 | gao_NSIAD-98-182_0 | Flight Safety Aircraft Parts Program
DOD also has a program to identify and prevent parts with potential flight safety risks from being sold through the disposal process. This situation occurred because (1) the military services assigned the wrong demilitarization codes to parts with military technology that needed to be protected, (2) an initiative intended to correct inaccurately assigned demilitarization codes did not ensure that data systems were updated with the corrected codes, and (3) the methods DOD used to demilitarize some parts did not adequately destroy the military technology contained in the parts. 2). Conclusions
While DOD recognizes the dangers associated with selling surplus parts with military technology to the public and has taken certain actions to address the problem, DOD’s disposal offices have inadvertently sold surplus parts with military technology intact. These sales occurred for three reasons. Because guidance was inadequate, codes assigned to parts with military technology incorrectly indicated that the parts did not contain the technology. DOD has been considering ways to address this situation but has not yet reached a final decision. As a result, disposal offices continued to sell parts with military technology intact after the codes for the parts were determined to be inaccurately assigned. Personnel responsible for correcting the inaccurately assigned codes did not always update their data systems with the corrected codes. Guidance to disposal offices on how to destroy the military technology inherent in some items was not adequate. DOD and its components have not aggressively pursued implementation of initiatives to prevent the sale of potentially dangerous flight safety critical aircraft parts through the disposal system. DOD and the components have not set timelines for implementing the flight safety program. Also, none of the components have fully implemented all of the program initiatives, but some have made greater progress than others. For example, at the time our fieldwork was completed, the Army had identified over 4,500 aircraft parts with flight safety implications, whereas the Navy had not identified any aircraft parts with these implications. DOD plans to increase its interaction and involvement in the program, but the military services and the Defense Logistics Agency continue to have problems accomplishing flight safety program initiatives. Recommendations
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following actions to prevent the sale of parts with military technology and flight safety implications. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) disposal process for surplus parts with both military technology and flight safety risks, focusing on DOD's efforts to: (1) identify and destroy parts with military technology; and (2) implement a flight safety program to prevent aircraft parts with potential flight safety risks from being sold through the disposal process.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) while DOD recognizes the dangers associated with selling surplus parts with military technology to the public and has taken certain actions to address the problem, DOD's disposal offices have inadvertently sold surplus parts with military technology intact; (2) these sales occurred for three reasons; (3) the military services assigned the wrong demilitarization codes to the parts; (4) because guidance was inadequate, codes assigned to parts with military technology incorrectly indicated that the parts did not contain the technology; (5) DOD has been considering ways to address this situation but has not yet reached a final decision; (6) an initiative intended to correct inaccurately assigned demilitarization codes did not ensure that data systems were updated with the corrected codes; (7) as a result, disposal offices continued to sell parts with military technology intact after the codes for the parts were determined to be inaccurately assigned; (8) personnel responsible for correcting the inaccurately assigned codes did not always update their data systems with the corrected codes; (9) the methods that the disposal offices used to demilitarize some parts did not adequately destroy the military technology contained in the parts; (10) guidance to disposal offices on how to destroy the military technology inherent in some items was not adequate; (11) DOD and its components have not aggressively pursued implementation of initiatives to prevent the sale of potentially dangerous flight safety critical aircraft parts through the disposal system; (12) DOD and the components have not set timelines for implementing the flight safety program; (13) also, none of the components have fully implemented all of the program initiatives, but some have made greater progress than others; (14) for example, at the time GAO's fieldwork was completed, the Army had identified over 4,500 aircraft parts with flight safety implications, whereas the Navy had not identified any aircraft parts with these implications; and (15) DOD plans to increase its interaction and involvement in the program, but the military services and the Defense Logistics Agency continue to have problems accomplishing flight safety program initiatives. |
gao_GAO-10-249 | gao_GAO-10-249_0 | Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM). FCC Uses OMB- Approved Collection Instruments to Gather a Wide Variety of Information on the Industries That It Regulates
As of April 2009, FCC used 413 OMB-approved information collection instruments to gather information, maintain records, or disclose information; however, the amount of information collected and managed varied by bureau or office. Requirements. FCC regulations require companies to provide a variety of information. For example, the Media Bureau gathers license application information from companies seeking to provide radio and television broadcast service. Complaints. Financial and accounting. Other. FCC Bureaus and Offices Collect and Manage Most of the Commission’s Information Following Commissionwide Programs, Policies, and Procedures
FCC has established commissionwide programs, policies, and procedures for the collection and management of information; FCC articulates these policies and procedures in its records management program, forms management program, security policies and procedures, and information system protection. These directives help ensure FCC’s compliance with governmentwide laws and regulations pertaining to information collection and management, such as the PRA and FISMA. 2. As the primary users of information, FCC’s bureaus and offices manage most of the commission’s information collected through OMB-approved collection instruments. Information dissemination. Of the 15 respondents, 11 reported that some of the information collected is disseminated to the public on FCC’s Web site. FCC’s Bureaus and Offices Follow Commission- and Governmentwide Guidance, but Prior GAO Reports and Some Stakeholders Identified Certain Weaknesses in FCC’s Information Collection and Management Practices
According to our review of 30 OMB-approved information collections, FCC’s bureaus and offices appear to follow commission- and governmentwide policies and procedures for the collection and management of information. In particular, these reported weaknesses concern FCC’s information collection processes and the estimated burden hours associated with FCC’s information collections. FCC bureaus and offices responsible for the collections reported using a variety of quality control procedures for managing the collections to ensure the accuracy and integrity of the information in the collections. Prior GAO Reports and Some Stakeholders Identified Certain Weaknesses in FCC’s Information Collection and Management Practices
As mentioned previously, in several reports, we have found weaknesses in certain information collection, management, and reporting processes at FCC. In several instances, FCC has not implemented our recommendations. For example, four stakeholders said that FCC does not initially specify the information that it wants to gather through a proposed collection instrument in the NPRM. The lack of specificity in the NPRM makes it harder for stakeholders and the public to provide meaningful input on the proposed information collection instrument. In its request, OMB noted that agencies’ estimation methodologies can sometimes produce imprecise and inconsistent estimates of the burdens associated with information collection instruments. In particular, the Chairman sought information on whether any (1) new information should be collected to support the commission’s mission, (2) existing information reporting requirements could be streamlined or eliminated because they are unduly burdensome or no longer relevant, and (3) existing technological platforms and management processes could be modernized in order to make the commission’s use of information more efficient and effective. According to FCC officials, OSPPA has taken several steps to carry out the Chairman’s request. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report examines (1) the information the Federal Communication Commission (FCC) collects; (2) how FCC collects and manages information; (3) the strengths and weaknesses, if any, in FCC’s information collection and management practices; and (4) the status of FCC’s internal review of its information collection and management practices. To describe the steps FCC is taking to address information management weaknesses, we reviewed a memoranda dated July 22, 2009, from the FCC Chairman initiating a review of the commission’s information management collections and processes. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) regulates industries that affect the lives of virtually all Americans. FCC-regulated industries provide Americans with daily access to communications services, including wireline and wireless telephone, radio, and television. To ensure FCC is carrying out its mission, the commission requires a significant amount of information, such as ownership and operating information from radio and television stations. In prior reports, GAO has found weaknesses with FCC's information collection, management, and reporting processes. While FCC has taken action, the commission has not implemented all the recommendations associated with information collection, management, and reporting. As requested, this report provides information on (1) the information FCC collects; (2) how FCC collects and manages information; (3) the strengths and weaknesses, if any, in FCC's information collection and management practices; and (4) the status of FCC's internal review of its information collection and management practices. To complete this work, GAO gathered information on FCC's information collection efforts, reviewed information collection and management practices for 30 collection instruments, interviewed agency officials and industry stakeholders, and reviewed relevant laws and guidance. FCC provided comments which discuss its efforts to improve data management.
What GAO Found
FCC gathers a wide variety of information though information collection instruments. FCC gathers information through 413 collection instruments approved by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). Through these OMB-approved collection instruments, FCC gathers information pertaining to (1) required company filings, such as the ownership of television stations; (2) applications for FCC licenses; (3) consumer complaints; (4) company financial and accounting performance; and (5) a variety of other issues, such as an annual survey of cable operators. FCC estimates that it receives nearly 385 million responses with an estimated 57 million burden hours associated with the 413 collection instruments. FCC's bureaus and offices collect and manage most commission information following commissionwide programs, policies, and procedures. FCC articulates its commissionwide programs, policies, and procedures in several directives, including its records management program. These directives help ensure FCC's compliance with governmentwide laws and regulations. Since FCC's bureaus and offices are the primary users of information, implementing decisions generally occur at that level. According to GAO's review of 30 information collections, FCC's bureaus and offices collect and manage information in a variety of ways. For example, FCC collects and manages 14 of the 30 information collections electronically, while it collects and manages some information in paper format. FCC disseminates information from 11 of the 30 information collections on its Web site, while it disseminates some information upon request, but in a redacted format. According to GAO's review of 30 information collections, FCC's bureaus and offices appear to follow commission- and governmentwide guidance, such as quality control procedures and safeguards for sensitive information. However, prior GAO reports and some stakeholders identified certain weaknesses with FCC's information collection and management practices. These weaknesses concern FCC's information collection processes and the accuracy of the estimated burden hours associated with FCC's information collections. For example, GAO recently reported that FCC rarely includes the text of a proposed rule in its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, and stakeholders similarly noted that FCC does not initially specify the information that it wants to gather in the notice; the lack of specificity makes it harder for stakeholders and the public to provide meaningful input on the proposed information collection instrument. Recognizing the need to improve the commission's information practices, in July 2009, FCC's Chairman initiated a review of the commission's systems and processes. The Chairman sought to address whether (1) new information should be collected, (2) existing information reporting requirements could be streamlined or eliminated, and (3) existing technology and management processes could be modernized in order to make the commission's use of information more efficient and effective. FCC staff have taken several steps to implement the review and the effort continues. |
gao_GAO-16-177 | gao_GAO-16-177_0 | The Act also required, among other things, that the Secretary: consider “actors relevant to the ease of use of and ability to co- circulate of new coinage materials, including the effect on vending machines and commercial coin processing equipment and making certain, to the greatest extent practicable, that any new coins work without interruption in existing coin acceptance equipment without modification;” “include detailed recommendations for any appropriate changes to the metallic content of circulating coins in such a form that the recommendations could be enacted into law as appropriate;” “to the greatest extent possible, may not include any recommendation for new specifications for producing a circulating coin that would require any significant change to coin accepting and coin-handling equipment to accommodate changes to all circulating coins simultaneously;” and submit a biennial report to Congress “analyzing production costs for each circulating coin, cost trends for such production, and possible new metallic materials or technologies for the production of circulating coins.”
The Secretary of the Treasury issued the first biennial report in December 2012 and another in December 2014. Some industries sell products or services through the use of coin machines, such as vending and coin- operated laundry machines. The U.S. Mint’s Analysis Indicates Potential for Government Savings from Changing the Composition of Coins
The U.S. Mint’s Analysis of Viable Metal Alternatives Shows Potential for Savings
The U.S. Mint’s analysis estimates that the government could potentially save from about $8 million to about $39 million per year through different changes in coin composition to the nickel, dime, and quarter. According to the U.S. Mint, this alternative would not require any changes to coin acceptance machines and would not affect industry. A change to steel-based coins would require the coin industry to make modifications to current coin acceptance machines to recognize and accept both new and existing coins, because the new coins would have a different weight and EMS than existing coins and would also be magnetic. When including the quarter, the U.S. Mint had estimated that the government could save $83 million per year by changing the quarter, nickel, and dime to multi-ply plated steel. According to U.S. Mint officials, it is viable to change the nickel and dime to multi-ply plated steel because these coins are lower in value and therefore do not provide a similar incentive to counterfeiters. The U.S. Mint’s Cost- Estimating Process Does Not Fully Align with Best Practices
Although these estimates can provide an understanding of the general magnitude of potential government savings, our analysis found that the U.S. Mint’s cost-estimating process and resulting analyses are limited because they did not fully align with best practices for estimating costs, as outlined in the Cost Guide. While U.S. Mint officials discussed a sensitivity analysis, it was not conducted. Also, when documenting estimates, the U.S. Mint used 2014 metal prices to determine its estimates. Such a change in metal prices impacts the U.S. Mint’s costs and therefore can significantly impact its savings estimates. For example, a 2012 Navigant study that was commissioned by a supplier of coin material estimated that the U.S. government could achieve savings of up to $207.5 million per year by changing the current coin compositions of the nickel, dime, and quarter to multi-ply plated steel, which is the same composition used in Canadian coins. Industry Costs Could Be Significant, but Estimates May Be Overstated
Industry Estimates Find Significant Costs Associated with Changes in Coin Composition
The six selected industry associations that provided cost estimates to the U.S. Mint stated that there would be significant cost impacts ranging from $2.4 billion to $10 billion. Specifically, these published estimates assumed that the characteristics of the quarter would change, but U.S. Mint officials have determined that it is not viable to produce a steel-based quarter. First, the vending association reported in its 2014 written response to the U.S. Mint that there were about 7-million food, beverage, and product vending machines in the United States. Coin Compositions That Increase Government Savings Also May Increase Industry Costs
Although the estimates of potential government savings and industry cost may not be precise, the estimates provide enough information to show that metal compositions that increase the potential government savings may also increase the potential industry costs. As discussed previously, the U.S. Mint has determined that it is not viable to change the quarter to a steel-based coin. Specifically, industries that only accept the quarter— such as the coin laundry and amusement industries— would not incur any costs if the quarter did not change. The U.S. Mint estimates that this option could save the government from $32 million to $39 million per year. However, U.S. Mint officials told us that if and when the Department of the Treasury makes any recommendations to Congress, the U.S. Mint and Treasury officials will ensure that the recommendations are within the framework of the Act. (2) What is known about potential industry costs from changes to the metal composition of coins? (3) How potential coin composition options could affect government savings and industry costs? To determine what is known about the potential government savings from changes to the metal composition of circulating coins, we reviewed savings estimates reported by the U.S. Mint in its December 2012 and 2014 biennial reports to Congress, which were required by the Coin Modernization, Oversight, and Continuity Act of 2010 Act (the Act). Appendix II: Summary Assessment of the U.S. Mint’s Cost-Estimating Process Compared to Best Practices
We developed the GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide in order to establish a consistent methodology that is based on best practices and that can be used across the federal government for developing, managing, and evaluating program cost estimates. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. Mint, a bureau of the Treasury, produced about 13 billion coins in 2014. Since 2006, metal prices have risen to where the unit costs of a penny and nickel exceed their face value. The U.S. Mint was directed by statute to develop and evaluate the use of new metals that would reduce the costs of coin production while minimizing the impact on coin accepting equipment. Treasury is authorized to recommend coin changes to Congress based on the U.S. Mint's analysis and has not yet done so. GAO was asked to examine the U.S. Mint's efforts.
This report examines (1) what is known about potential government savings from changes to the metal composition of coins; (2) what is known about potential industry costs from changes to the metal composition of coins; and (3) how potential coin composition options could affect government savings and industry costs. GAO reviewed legislative provisions and U.S. Mint estimates of government savings; compared the U.S. Mint's estimating process to best practices; and reviewed cost estimates from associations that represent selected businesses that submitted estimates to the U.S. Mint, such as the vending and laundry industries. GAO interviewed U.S. Mint officials and industry representatives to understand how their estimates were developed.
GAO is not making recommendations in this report. In comments, the U.S. Mint questioned GAO's use of the Cost Guide to assess the U.S. Mint's estimates. GAO continues to believe it is appropriate to use the Cost Guide to assess the U.S. Mint's estimates.
What GAO Found
The U.S. Mint estimated that the government could potentially save between $8 million and $39 million per year by changing the metal composition of the nickel, dime, and quarter. The estimated savings of $8 million would come from slightly changing the current metal in coins, which would decrease metal costs and retain the characteristics of existing coins. The savings of $39 million would come from changing the nickel and dime to a plated steel coin, which would change the coin's weight and other characteristics. While the U.S. Mint previously estimated potential savings of $83 million per year by changing the nickel, dime, and quarter to a plated steel-based coin, the U.S. Mint determined that it was not viable to change the quarter because less-valuable foreign coins would have similar characteristics to a steel quarter and could be used as counterfeit quarters. GAO found that the U.S. Mint's cost-estimating process does not fully align with best practices outlined in the GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide ( Cost Guide ) and as such may not result in precise estimates. For example, U.S. Mint officials discussed but did not conduct a sensitivity analysis—a best practice— that would have allowed them to know how savings estimates could be affected by changes in metal prices. However, the U.S. Mint's estimates can provide insight into the general magnitude of potential savings.
Associations representing selected industries that use coin acceptance machines estimated a cost impact ranging from $2.4 billion to $10 billion to modify an estimated 22-million coin machines, such as vending machines, to accommodate steel-based coins. According to these associations, these costs would be incurred because coin machines would require modifications to accept new coins while continuing to accept current coins. However, GAO found that these estimates may be overstated for several reasons. For example, the vending industry assumed 7-million vending machines would require modification, but a 2015 industry study estimated that there are 4.5-million vending machines in the United States. Second, the cost estimates assumed steel changes to all coins, but the U.S. Mint has determined it is not viable to change the quarter. Therefore, machines that only accept quarters (such as coin laundry machines) would not require modification. However, any change in coin composition that requires changes to coin acceptance machines will result in some industry costs.
Although government savings and industry cost estimates may not be precise indicators of savings and costs, they nonetheless show that metal compositions that would increase government savings also increase industry costs. U.S. Mint estimates show that one change could result in no industry costs but show a savings of only $8 million annually. In contrast, changing the nickel and dime to multi-ply plated steel coins could save $39 million annually but result in substantial industry costs. The Coin Modernization, Oversight, and Continuity Act of 2010 requires that any new coins work in existing machines that accept coins “to the greatest extent practicable.” U.S. Mint officials have not yet analyzed whether the options they are considering meet these criteria for making recommendations to Congress. U.S. Mint officials said when and if the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) makes recommendations to Congress, they will ensure that recommendations are within the framework of the Act. |
gao_GAO-12-721 | gao_GAO-12-721_0 | In 2009, State began another hiring effort called Diplomacy 3.0 to increase its Foreign Service workforce by 25 percent by 2013. Even with Increased Hiring, State Faces Persistent Midlevel Experience Gaps Overseas
State increased the size of the Foreign Service by about 17 percent in fiscal years 2009 and 2010, but overseas experience gaps—the percentage of positions that are vacant or filled with upstretch assignments—have not declined since 2008 because State increased the total number of overseas positions in response to increased needs and emerging diplomatic priorities. According to State officials, the department takes special measures to fill high-priority positions. Both percentages, as well as the total percentage of positions facing experience gaps, are unchanged since 2008. Additionally, State officials noted that most Foreign Service employees hired in fiscal year 2010 would not have been placed in overseas assignments as of October 31, 2011, when we acquired staffing data. State Has Taken Steps to Address Midlevel Experience Gaps Overseas but Has Not Included These Steps in Its Workforce Plan
State has taken steps to implement goals highlighted in the QDDR to increase its reliance on Civil Service employees and retirees, and expand mentoring to help address midlevel experience gaps overseas. State also hires retirees on a limited basis to help fill gaps overseas. In addition, State began a pilot program offering a workshop with mentoring for first-time supervisors overseas. The Human Resources Bureau began a pilot program in November 2011 to expand opportunities for Civil Service employees to serve in overseas positions. Most of these assignments are for midlevel positions. The department has limited authority to hire retirees for full-time positions and also for temporary assignments. State’s efforts to draw on its pool of retirees and Civil Service employees to fill midlevel gaps are examples of the use of such flexibilities; however, it is not clear that State has developed a strategy to take full advantage of its authority to use them. Conclusions
State faces persistent Foreign Service experience gaps at overseas posts, particularly at the midlevels, and these gaps put its diplomatic readiness at risk. Recommendation for Executive Action
To help guide State’s efforts to address midlevel gaps in the Foreign Service, we recommend that the Secretary of State direct the Bureau of Human Resources to update its Five Year Workforce Plan to include a strategy to address these gaps and a plan to evaluate the success of this strategy. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
In this report, we assess: (1) the extent to which the Department of State’s (State) overseas midlevel Foreign Service experience gaps have changed since 2008 and (2) State’s efforts to address these gaps. To assess State’s approach to addressing midlevel Foreign Service gaps through expanded use of Civil Service employees, retirees, and mentoring, we reviewed GAO and State Office of Inspector General reports; reviewed relevant State documents, such as State’s Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR), State’s Five Year Workforce Plan, and the Bureau of Human Resources’ Bureau Strategic and Resource Plan; reviewed federal laws, policies, and regulations governing Limited Non-Career Appointments (LNA) of Civil Service Employees, conversion from Civil Service to Foreign Service, and hiring of retired Foreign Service and Civil Service annuitants; and interviewed officials in State’s Bureau of Human Resources, Bureau of Consular Affairs, and six regional bureaus, the American Foreign Service Association, and the American Academy of Diplomacy regarding overseas experience gaps and the potential to address gaps through the use of Civil Service, retirees, and mentoring. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2009, GAO reported on challenges that State faced in filling its increasing overseas staffing needs with sufficiently experienced personnel and noted that persistent Foreign Service staffing and experience gaps put diplomatic readiness at risk. State is currently undertaking a new hiring plan, known as Diplomacy 3.0, to increase the size of the Foreign Service by 25 percent to close staffing gaps and respond to new diplomatic priorities. However, fiscal constraints are likely to delay the plans full implementation well beyond its intended target for completion in 2013. In addition, States first Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review highlighted the need to find ways to close overseas gaps. GAO was asked to assess (1) the extent to which States overseas midlevel experience gaps in the Foreign Service have changed since 2008 and (2) States efforts to address these gaps. GAO analyzed States personnel data; reviewed key planning documents, including the Five Year Workforce Plan; and interviewed State officials in Washington, D.C., and at selected posts.
What GAO Found
The Department of State (State) faces persistent experience gaps in overseas Foreign Service positions, particularly at the midlevels, and these gaps have not diminished since 2008. In fiscal years 2009 and 2010, State increased the size of the Foreign Service by 17 percent. However, these new hires will not have the experience to reach midlevels until fiscal years 2014 and 2015. GAO found that 28 percent of overseas Foreign Service positions were either vacant or filled by upstretch candidatesofficers serving in positions above their gradeas of October 2011, a percentage that has not changed since 2008. Midlevel positions represent the largest share of these gaps. According to State officials, the gaps have not diminished because State increased the total number of overseas positions in response to increased needs and emerging priorities. State officials noted the department takes special measures to fill high-priority positions, including those in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan.
State has taken steps to increase its reliance on Civil Service employees and retirees, as well as expand mentoring, to help address midlevel experience gaps overseas; however, State lacks a strategy to guide these efforts. State is currently implementing a pilot program to expand overseas assignments for Civil Service employees. Efforts to expand the limited number of these assignments must overcome some key challenges, such as addressing new gaps when Civil Service employees leave their headquarters positions and identifying qualified Civil Service applicants to fill overseas vacancies. State also hires retirees on a limited basis for both full-time and short-term positions. For example, State used limited congressional authority to offer dual compensation waivers to hire 57 retirees in 2011. As a step toward mitigating experience gaps overseas, State began a pilot program offering workshops that include mentoring for first-time supervisors. State acknowledges the need to close midlevel Foreign Service gaps, but it has not developed a strategy to help ensure that the department is taking full advantage of available human capital flexibilities and evaluating the success of its efforts to address these gaps.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that State update its Five Year Workforce Plan to include a strategy to address midlevel Foreign Service gaps and a plan to evaluate the success of this strategy. State reviewed a draft of this report and agreed with GAOs recommendation. |
gao_GAO-10-340 | gao_GAO-10-340_0 | In addition, the number of sectors that the system is to be deployed to has been reduced from three to two, and the stringency of the system performance measures that the deployed system is to meet has been reduced. According to program officials, the decreases are due to poorly defined requirements and limitations in the capabilities of commercially available system components. The result will be a deployed and operational system that, like Project 28, does not live up to user expectations and provides less mission support than was envisioned. As a result, the requirement in the radar specification was also deviated. As of September 2008, the initial Block 1 deployment was to span three border patrol sectors: Tucson, Yuma, and El Paso—a total of 655 miles. However, plans for the next increment have not been developed. For example, the system will meet its detection and identification performance requirements if it identifies 70 percent of the 70 percent of items that it detects, thus producing a 49 percent probability of identifying items of interest that cross the border. Without having a reliable schedule, it is unlikely that actual program execution will track to plans, thus increasing the risk of cost, schedule, and performance shortfalls. Second, the schedule does not include key activities to be performed by the government. However, this Block 1 cost estimate is not reliable because it does not sufficiently possess any of the above four characteristics. Further, the estimate has not been updated with actual cost data available from the contractor. Program officials attributed these limitations in the cost estimate’s comprehensiveness, documentation, accuracy, and credibility to a range of factors, including competing program office priorities and the department’s limited cost estimating capabilities. For example, program officials stated that the DHS Cost Analysis Division did not prepare an independent estimate because it did not have, among other things, the people and tools needed to do so. However, it has not effectively implemented these processes. Key Block 1 Requirements Have Not Been Adequately Developed and Managed
Well-defined and managed requirements are essential to successfully acquiring large-scale systems, like SBInet. Risk Management Approach Has Been Adequately Defined
According to relevant guidance, effective risk management includes defining a process that, among other things, proactively identifies and analyzes risks on the basis of likelihood of occurrence and impact, assigns ownership, provides for mitigation, and monitors status. Conclusions
DHS has yet to demonstrate that its proposed SBInet solution is a cost- effective course of action, and thus whether the considerable time and money being invested to acquire and deploy it is a wise and prudent use of limited resources. Because of SBInet’s decreased scope, uncertain timing, unclear costs relative to benefits, and limited life cycle management discipline and rigor, in combination with its size and mission importance, the program represents a risky undertaking. With respect to the first condition, we further recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection to have the SBI Executive Director make it a program priority to ensure that the integrated master schedule for delivering Block 1 capabilities to TUS-1 and AJO-1 is revised to address the key schedule estimating practices discussed in this report; the currently defined Block 1 requirements, including key performance parameters, are independently validated as complete, verifiable, and affordable and any limitations found in the requirements are addressed; the Systems Engineering Plan is revised to include or reference documentation templates for key artifacts required at milestone gate reviews; all parent requirements that have been closed are supported by evidence of the closure of all corresponding and associated child requirements; and all significant risks facing the program are captured, mitigated, tracked, and periodically reported to DHS and congressional decision makers. With respect to the second condition, we further recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection to have the SBI Executive Director make it a program priority to ensure that a life cycle cost estimate for any incremental block of SBInet capabilities that is to include capabilities and cover locations beyond those associated with the TUS-1 and AJO-1 deployments is developed in a manner that reflects the four characteristics of a reliable estimate discussed in this report; a forecast of the qualitative and quantitative benefits to be derived from any such incremental block of SBInet over its useful life, or reasons why such forecasts are not currently possible, are developed and documented; the estimated life cycle costs and benefits and associated net present value of any such incremental block of SBInet capabilities, or reasons why such an economic analysis cannot be performed, are prepared and documented; and the results of these analyses, or the documented reasons why such analyses cannot be provided, are provided to the Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection and the DHS Acquisition Review Board. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine the extent to which the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has (1) defined the scope of its proposed Secure Border Initiative Network (SBInet) solution, (2) developed a reliable schedule for delivering this solution, (3) demonstrated the cost- effectiveness of this solution, (4) acquired this solution in accordance with key life cycle management processes, and (5) addressed our recent SBInet recommendations. | Why GAO Did This Study
The technology component of the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Secure Border Initiative (SBI), referred to as SBInet, is to put observing systems along our nation's borders and provide Border Patrol command centers with the imagery and related tools and information needed in deciding whether to deploy agents. SBInet is being acquired and deployed in incremental blocks of capability, with the first block to cost about $1.3 billion. Because of the program's importance, size, and challenges, GAO was asked to, among other things, determine the extent to which DHS has (1) defined the scope of its proposed SBInet solution, (2) developed a reliable schedule for this solution, (3) demonstrated the cost-effectiveness of this solution, and (4) acquired the solution using key management processes. To do this, GAO compared key program documentation to relevant guidance and industry practices.
What GAO Found
DHS has defined the scope of the first incremental block of SBInet capabilities; however, these capabilities have continued to shrink from what the department previously committed to deliver. For example, the geographical "footprint" of the initially deployed capability has been reduced from three border sectors spanning about 655 miles to two sectors spanning about 387 miles. Further, the stringency of the performance capabilities has been relaxed, to the point that, for example, system performance will be deemed acceptable if it identifies less than 50 percent of items of interest that cross the border. The result is a system that is unlikely to live up to expectations. DHS has not developed a reliable integrated master schedule for delivering the first block of SBInet. Specifically, the schedule does not sufficiently comply with seven of nine key practices that relevant guidance states are important to having a reliable schedule. For example, the schedule does not adequately capture all necessary activities, assign resources to them, and reflect schedule risks. As a result, it is unclear when the first block will be completed, and continued delays are likely. DHS has also not demonstrated the cost-effectiveness of this first system block. In particular, it has not reliably estimated the costs of this block over its entire life cycle. To do so requires DHS to ensure that the estimate meets key practices that relevant guidance states are important to having an estimate that is comprehensive, well-documented, accurate, and credible. However, DHS's cost estimate for the initial block does not sufficiently possess any of these characteristics. Further, DHS has yet to identify expected benefits from the initial block, whether quantitative or qualitative, and analyze them relative to costs. As a result, it does not know whether its planned investment will produce mission value commensurate with costs. DHS has also not acquired the initial SBInet block in accordance with key life cycle management processes. While processes associated with, among other things, requirements development and management and risk management, have been adequately defined, they have not been adequately implemented. For example, key risks have not been captured in the risk management repository and thus have not been proactively mitigated. As a result, DHS is at increased risk of delivering a system that does not perform as intended. SBInet's decreasing scope, uncertain timing, unclear value proposition, and limited life cycle management discipline and rigor are due to a range of factors, including limitations in both defined requirements and the capabilities of commercially available system components, as well as the need to address competing program priorities, such as meeting aggressive system deployment milestones. As a result, it remains unclear whether the department's pursuit of SBInet is a cost effective course of action, and if it is, that it will produce expected results on time and within budget. |
gao_GAO-12-393 | gao_GAO-12-393_0 | IRS Is the Tax Collector for the United States
IRS has demanding responsibilities in collecting taxes, processing tax returns, and enforcing federal tax laws, and relies extensively on computerized systems to support its financial and mission-related operations. IRS Has Made Progress, but Control Weaknesses Continue to Place Financial and Taxpayer Information at Risk
Despite IRS’s efforts, weaknesses in controls over key financial and tax- processing systems continue to jeopardize the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of financial and taxpayer information. Specifically, IRS continues to face challenges in controlling access to its information resources. In addition, outdated and unsupported software exposes IRS to known vulnerabilities, and shortcomings in performing system backup place the availability of data at risk. However, IRS did not fully implement effective controls in these areas. FISMA requires each agency to develop, document, and implement an information security program that, among other things, includes periodic assessments of the risk and magnitude of harm that could result from the unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of information and information systems; policies and procedures that (1) are based on risk assessments, (2) cost-effectively reduce information security risks to an acceptable level, (3) ensure that information security is addressed throughout the life cycle of each system, and (4) ensure compliance with applicable requirements; plans for providing adequate information security for networks, facilities, and systems; security awareness training to inform personnel of information security risks and of their responsibilities in complying with agency policies and procedures, as well as training personnel with significant security responsibilities for information security; periodic testing and evaluation of the effectiveness of information security policies, procedures, and practices, to be performed with a frequency depending on risk, but no less than annually, and that includes testing of management, operational, and technical controls for every system identified in the agency’s required inventory of major information systems; and a process for planning, implementing, evaluating, and documenting remedial action to address any deficiencies in its information security policies, procedures, or practices. However, despite establishing a comprehensive framework for its information security program, IRS has not fully implemented all components of its program. Nevertheless, IRS indicated that it had not yet implemented this recommendation. IRS had a process in place to evaluate and track remedial actions and had developed remedial action plans to address previously reported weaknesses, but it did not promptly correct known vulnerabilities, and its process was not always working as intended. For example, the agency indicated that 76 of the 105 previously reported weaknesses open at the end of our prior-year audit had not yet been corrected. In addition, it did not always validate that its actions to resolve known weaknesses were effectively implemented. More specifically, of the 29 weaknesses IRS indicated were corrected, we determined that 13 (about 45 percent) had not yet been fully addressed. Conclusions
Although IRS implemented numerous controls and procedures intended to protect key financial and tax-processing systems, control weaknesses continue to jeopardize the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of financial and sensitive taxpayer information. The new and unresolved deficiencies from previous audits, along with a lack of fully effective compensating and mitigating controls, impair IRS’s ability to ensure that its financial and taxpayer information is secure from internal threats, reducing its assurance that its financial statements and other financial information are fairly presented or reliable and that sensitive IRS and taxpayer information is being sufficiently safeguarded from unauthorized disclosure and modification. These deficiencies are the basis of our determination that IRS had a material weakness in internal control over financial reporting related to information security in fiscal year 2011. Recommendations for Executive Action
In addition to implementing our previous recommendations, we are recommending that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue take the following six actions to fully implement key components of the IRS comprehensive information security program: document a baseline configuration standard for tasks initiated on the document monitoring procedures that staff use to review audit logs for a key financial system; fully document monitoring procedures for the procurement system, specifically, supervisory review procedures to ensure access privileges are appropriate for segregation of duties; expand tests associated with the agency’s enterprise continuous monitoring process to include tests of access controls and system tests, such as testing the system’s configuration, where appropriate, to ensure comprehensive testing of key controls for financial and tax- related systems; implement a compliance verification application to ensure appropriate security patches have been applied in the UNIX environment; and implement a compliance verification application, or other appropriate process, to ensure configuration policies are comprehensively tested on the mainframe. We are also making 23 detailed recommendations in a separate report with limited distribution. However, as we noted in this report, although IRS has provided a comprehensive framework for its information security program, an underlying reason for the information security weaknesses in IRS’s financial and tax-processing systems is that it has not yet fully implemented critical components of its comprehensive information security program. This work was performed in connection with our audit of IRS’s fiscal years 2011 and 2010 financial statements for the purpose of supporting our opinion on internal control over the preparation of those statements. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has a demanding responsibility in collecting taxes, processing tax returns, and enforcing the nations tax laws. It relies extensively on computerized systems to support its financial and mission-related operations and on information security controls to protect financial and sensitive taxpayer information that resides on those systems.
As part of its audit of IRSs fiscal years 2011 and 2010 financial statements, GAO assessed whether controls over key financial and tax-processing systems are effective in ensuring the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of financial and sensitive taxpayer information. To do this, GAO examined IRS information security policies, plans, and procedures; tested controls over key financial applications; and interviewed key agency officials at seven sites.
What GAO Found
IRS implemented numerous controls and procedures intended to protect key financial and tax-processing systems; nevertheless, control weaknesses in these systems continue to jeopardize the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the financial and sensitive taxpayer information processed by IRSs systems. Specifically, the agency continues to face challenges in controlling access to its information resources. For example, it had not always (1) implemented controls for identifying and authenticating users, such as requiring users to set new passwords after a prescribed period of time; (2) appropriately restricted access to certain servers; (3) ensured that sensitive data were encrypted when transmitted; (4) audited and monitored systems to ensure that unauthorized activities would be detected; or (5) ensured management validation of access to restricted areas. In addition, unpatched and outdated software exposed IRS to known vulnerabilities, and the agency had not enforced backup procedures for a key system.
An underlying reason for these weaknesses is that IRS has not fully implemented a comprehensive information security program. IRS has established a comprehensive framework for such a program, and has made strides to address control deficienciessuch as establishing working groups to identify and remediate specific at-risk control areas; however, it has not fully implemented all key components of its program. For example, IRSs security testing and monitoring continued to not detect many of the vulnerabilities GAO identified during this audit. IRS also did not promptly correct known vulnerabilities. For example, the agency indicated that 76 of the 105 previously reported weaknesses open at the end of GAOs prior year audit had not yet been corrected. In addition, IRS did not always validate that its actions to resolve known weaknesses were effectively implemented. Although IRS had a process in place for verifying whether each weakness had been corrected, this process was not always working as intended. Of the 29 weaknesses IRS indicated were corrected, GAO determined that 13 (about 45 percent) had not yet been fully addressed.
Considered collectively, these deficiencies, both new and unresolved from previous GAO audits, along with a lack of fully effective compensating and mitigating controls, impair IRS's ability to ensure that its financial and taxpayer information is secure from internal threats. This reduces IRS's assurance that its financial statements and other financial information are fairly presented or reliable and that sensitive IRS and taxpayer information is being sufficiently safeguarded from unauthorized disclosure or modification. These deficiencies are the basis of GAOs determination that IRS had a material weakness in internal control over financial reporting related to information security in fiscal year 2011.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that IRS take 6 actions to fully implement key components of its comprehensive information security program. In a separate report with limited distribution, GAO is recommending that IRS take 23 specific actions to correct newly identified control weaknesses. In commenting on a draft of this report, IRS agreed to develop a detailed corrective action plan to address each recommendation. |
gao_GAO-10-952 | gao_GAO-10-952_0 | The Majority of U.S. Defense Articles Are Exported through Direct Commercial Sales, with About Half Going to Relatively Few Countries
From calendar years 2005 through 2008, the value of U.S. exports of defense articles remained relatively stable, from about $19 billion and $20 billion, with an increase to about $22 billion in 2009. Of the approximately $101 billion total in U.S. defense articles exported from 2005 through 2009, about 60 percent were exported through DCS, as shown in figure 1. The second largest category was satellites, communications, and electronics equipment and their related parts—accounting for about 20 percent of defense articles. State officials noted that developing countries may benefit from the FMS logistics, infrastructure, and other support that come with the FMS program. Egypt
Although Congress requires reporting on various aspects of U.S. defense exports, State’s and DOD’s annual reports on “military assistance and military exports”—as required by Section 655 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended—do not provide a complete picture of the magnitude and nature of defense exports because the agencies use different reporting methodologies and have information inconsistencies and gaps—in part, because of the separate purposes of their data systems. Although the data we obtained and analyzed were sufficiently reliable to develop high-level, overall information on the magnitude and nature of defense exports, the differences in agencies’ data—including the lack of information for defense services exported under DCS licenses, differences in agencies’ item and country categorizations, and the inability to separate some permanent and temporary exports—hinder the ability to provide a comprehensive and transparent picture of defense exports. State has overall responsibility to report on exports of defense articles and defense services. For example, one difference between State’s and DOD’s reporting is the lack of data on defense services exported under DCS licenses. However, State does not report on the value of defense services exported under license authorizations because it does not have such information. Conclusions
A complete picture of defense exports—including which method of export is used more often by individual countries or for certain types of items—is not available under current reporting to Congress. Gaps and limitations in these data—including the lack of information on defense services exported under DCS, which could be substantial given the high dollar value of such services authorized by State—may inhibit congressional oversight and transparency into the entirety of U.S. defense exports. Matter for Congressional Consideration
In order to obtain a more complete picture of defense exports, Congress should consider whether it needs specific data on exported defense services similar to what it currently receives on defense articles and, if so, request that State provide such data as appropriate. Recommendation for Executive Action
To improve transparency and consistency of reporting on defense exports required by the Foreign Assistance Act, we recommend that the Secretary of State direct the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls to coordinate with the Departments of Defense and Commerce to identify and obtain relevant defense export information under existing agency data systems and provide a consolidated report to Congress on DCS and FMS that specifies articles exported using a common category system; separates U.S. government end users from foreign entities; separates permanent and temporary exports; incorporates all defense exports, including U.S. government-funded programs; and is made public through the Internet. However, State did not agree with our recommendation to report consolidated defense export data on FMS and DCS in a consistent manner. We also reviewed relevant laws and regulations regarding the export of defense articles and requirements for reporting export information through AES. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. government exports billions of dollars of defense articles and services annually to foreign entities, generally through direct commercial sales (DCS) from U.S. companies under licenses issued by the State Department (State) or through the Department of Defense (DOD) Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program. GAO has previously reported on weaknesses in the export control system. As requested, GAO (1) identified the magnitude and nature of defense articles and services exported and (2) assessed information currently reported on defense exports and any gaps and limitations in defense export data. To conduct this work, GAO analyzed export data from DOD for FMS and the Department of Commerce's U.S. Census Bureau (Census) for DCS for 2005 through 2009; reviewed relevant laws and regulations; assessed State and DOD reports on defense exports; reviewed agency data systems documentation; and interviewed officials from State, DOD, Homeland Security, and Census.
What GAO Found
U.S. exports of defense articles--such as military aircraft, firearms, and explosives--ranged from about $19 billion to $22 billion annually in calendar years 2005 to 2009. Of these defense articles, about 60 percent have been exported by companies to foreign entities through DCS licenses, while the remaining 40 percent were exported under the FMS program. Aircraft and related parts constitute the largest category of such exports--about 44 percent--followed by satellites, communications, and electronics equipment and their related parts. U.S. exports of defense articles were concentrated in a few countries: about half went to Japan, the United Kingdom, Israel, South Korea, Australia, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates. Although no data are available on the export of defense services--such as technical assistance and training--provided through DCS, exports of defense services through FMS were stable, accounting for about one-third of the value of FMS exports. Congress does not have a complete picture of defense exports under current reporting--including which method of export is used more often by individual countries or for certain types of items. State--which has overall responsibility for regulating defense exports--and DOD, report to Congress in response to various requirements. However, their annual reports on DCS and FMS exports have several information gaps and inconsistencies--in part, because of the differing purposes of the agencies' data systems and different reporting methodologies. For example, State does not obtain data from U.S. companies on the export of defense services under DCS licenses, although it authorizes several billion dollars of such exports annually. State officials noted that they do not have an operational requirement to collect such information and doing so could be burdensome on exporters. Other limitations on defense export data include differences in agencies' item and country categorizations and the inability to separate data on some permanent and temporary exports. Further, while State's report is available on its Web site, DOD's is not. These differences and limitations may inhibit congressional oversight and transparency into the entirety of U.S. defense exports. GAO suggests that Congress consider whether it needs specific data on exported defense services and is recommending that State publicly report consolidated defense export data on DCS and FMS in a consistent manner. In the absence of additional direction and resources from Congress, State did not agree. GAO believes the recommendation remains valid. |
gao_GAO-14-731T | gao_GAO-14-731T_0 | VBA staff in 57 regional offices process disability compensation claims. Under the STAR program, VBA reviews a stratified random sample of completed claims, and certified reviewers use a checklist to assess specific aspects of each claim. Specifically, for each of the 57 regional offices, completed claims are randomly sampled each month and the data are used to produce estimates of the accuracy of all completed claims. The QRT also conducts in- process reviews before claims are finalized to help prevent inaccurate decisions by identifying specific types of common errors. VBA’s Approach to Measuring and Reporting Accuracy of Claim Decisions Has Limitations
When calculating accuracy rates, VBA does not follow generally accepted statistical practices. In addition, VBA’s accuracy reporting lacks methodological details that would help users understand the distinction between its two accuracy measures and their associated limitations. 1). Finally, VBA’s approach to measuring accuracy is inefficient because it reviews more claims than needed to estimate accuracy. According to VBA, this uniform approach allows the agency to achieve a desired level of precision of its accuracy estimates for each regional office. According to our analysis of fiscal year 2013 regional office workload and accuracy results, VBA could reduce the overall number of claims it reviewed annually by about 39 percent (over 5,000 claims) and still achieve its desired precision for its regional office accuracy estimates. More efficient sampling could allow VBA to select fewer cases for review and free up limited resources for other important quality assurance activities, such as additional targeted accuracy reviews on specific types of error-prone or complex claims. VBA Has Enhanced and Coordinated Its Quality Assurance Activities, Although Gaps in Effectiveness Exist
VBA Enhanced Other Quality Assurance Activities, but Shortcomings Exist and Effectiveness is Unclear
In addition to its STAR reviews, VBA’s quality assurance framework includes other complementary activities, some of which have been enhanced to help meet its 98-percent goal for fiscal year 2015. VBA officials told GAO they do not know how many regional offices include or exclude claims processed during overtime, or the extent to which excluding cases worked during overtime occurs nationally. VBA’s efforts to assess consistency of claims decisions have also expanded in recent years. Although VBA has enhanced its approach to measuring consistency, VA officials told us that consistency questionnaires to date have been developed and implemented without any prior pre-testing which would allow VA to examine the clarity of questions or the validity of the expected questionnaire results. Specifically, VBA officials told us that, although they have not seen an increase in the national accuracy rate in the current fiscal year, the number of errors related to claim development—specifically, to ensuring the claim reflected sufficient / appropriate medical examinations)—has declined, showing the success of QRT efforts in targeting these errors through in-process reviews and providing related training. In our ongoing work, we plan to further review how VBA uses the results of its consistency studies to improve quality and whether and how VBA could further leverage its vast amount of claims data to identify error trends and opportunities for improvement. VBA Has Taken Steps to Coordinate Quality Assurance Activities, but Key Supports Have Not Been Updated
VA has taken steps to coordinate its quality assurance efforts, in part, by systematically disseminating information on national accuracy and consistency trends to regional office management and QRTs, which in turn used this information to provide feedback. At the same time, staff in all four offices said that key supports were not sufficiently updated to help quality review staff and claims processors efficiently and effectively do their jobs. Staff at these offices consistently described problems with data systems, central guidance and training. As a result, staff must search numerous sources of guidance to locate current policy, which is time-consuming and difficult. VBA officials acknowledged that there are several ways it provides guidance to regional offices—such as guidance letters; periodic quality calls (and notes from those calls); various bulletins; and training materials maintained on VBA’s Intranet site—and that this could be confusing to staff. This makes it difficult to provide claims processors with the information they need to avoid future errors. VBA has bolstered regional attention to quality and national consistency efforts, but several shortcomings—such as excluding claims worked during overtime from regional office quality reviews, or the lack of pretesting of consistency questionnaires—may detract from their overall effectiveness. Moreover, VBA does not systematically track the impact of these efforts on accuracy rates, again creating a gap in information that could help focus future quality assurance efforts. | Why GAO Did This Study
With a growing workload of disability claims due, in part, to recent wars, VBA faces difficulties in improving the accuracy and consistency of its claims decisions by VBA staff in 57 regional offices. To help achieve its goal of 98 percent accuracy by fiscal year 2015, VBA recently implemented a new way of measuring accuracy, and changed several quality assurance activities to assess the accuracy and consistency of claims decisions and to provide feedback and training to claims processors.
In this statement, GAO discusses initial observations from its ongoing review of VBA's quality assurance efforts, addressing the extent to which (1) VBA effectively measures and reports the accuracy of its compensation claim decisions; and (2) VBA's other quality assurance activities are complementary and coordinated. For this work, GAO analyzed STAR accuracy and VBA claims data from fiscal year 2013 (the most recent fiscal year for which complete data are available); reviewed relevant federal laws, regulations, guidance and other documents relevant to quality assurance activities; and interviewed VBA staff from headquarters and four VBA regional offices (selected to achieve variety in geography, size of workload and reported accuracy rates), and Veterans Service Organization officials. GAO has no recommendations at this time. GAO plans to issue its final report later in 2014, along with any related recommendations.
What GAO Found
The Veterans Benefit Administration (VBA) within the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) now measures and reports the accuracy of its claim decisions in two ways—by claim and by medical issue—but its approach has limitations. When calculating accuracy rates for either measure through its Systematic Technical Accuracy Review (STAR) program, VBA does not always follow generally accepted statistical practices. For example, VBA does not adjust its accuracy estimates to reflect that it samples the same number of claims for review from each regional office despite their varying workloads, and thus, produces imprecise estimates of national and regional accuracy. Further, because VBA does not clearly explain differences in how its two accuracy measures are calculated or their associated limitations, reported information about accuracy performance lacks clarity and may be confusing. Finally, VBA reviews 39 percent (over 5,000) more claims nationwide than necessary to achieve its desired precision in reported accuracy rates, thereby diverting limited resources from other important quality assurance activities, such as targeted reviews of error-prone cases. VBA could achieve its desired precision by reviewing fewer claims for offices with smaller workloads or higher performance levels.
Overall, VBA has made enhancements to its other quality assurance activities, although GAO identified implementation shortcomings that may detract from their effectiveness. To improve local quality, VBA recently created quality review teams (QRTs) comprised of certified staff in each regional office. QRTs review a sample of claims before they are finalized to identify specific error types and help prevent inaccurate decisions. QRTs also assess individual staff performance; however, claims processed during overtime were excluded from such reviews in three of the four offices GAO visited, which may undermine regional quality for a portion of claims. VBA officials told GAO they do not know the extent to which this occurs nationally. Recent VBA data shows that about 10 percent of claims were processed during overtime. Also, to help ensure claims processors make consistent decisions when presented with the same evidence, VBA began using a questionnaire approach to test for consistency. Although these questionnaires allow VBA to reach more staff and require fewer resources to administer, VBA did not pre-test them to ensure the clarity of questions or validity of the expected results. For each enhancement, their effectiveness is unclear because VBA has done little to date to assess their impact on improving accuracy.
VBA has also taken steps to coordinate its quality assurance efforts, but has not maintained centralized guidance and other key supports that might help prevent future errors. VBA coordinates quality assurance efforts by disseminating national accuracy and consistency results, trends and related guidance to regional offices, which use this information to train staff. Further, VBA uses the results of STAR reviews for other quality assurance activities, such as focusing QRT in-process reviews on commonly made errors. However, regional office staff told GAO that there are multiple sources of guidance, that searching these sources is time-consuming and difficult, and that VBA's policy manual and national training are not sufficiently updated to help claims processors avoid future errors. In addition, regional office data systems do not allow managers to readily track error trends, resulting in ad-hoc and inefficient work-arounds. |
gao_GAO-06-402 | gao_GAO-06-402_0 | ODS has a primary focus on postmarket drug safety and provides consultation to OND. ODS has been reorganized several times over the years, and there has been an absence of stable leadership. OND Has Decision-making Responsibility for Postmarket Drug Safety
Since OND is responsible for approving or disapproving drug applications, its staff are involved in safety activities throughout the life cycle of a drug (that is, premarket and postmarket), and it has the ultimate responsibility to take regulatory action concerning the postmarket safety of drugs. OND receives information about safety issues in several ways. There has been high turnover of ODS directors—there have been eight different directors of the office and its various predecessors—in the past 10 years. FDA Lacks a Clear and Effective Decision-making Process for Postmarket Drug Safety
FDA’s postmarket drug safety decision-making process has been limited by a lack of clarity, insufficient oversight by management, and data constraints. We observed that there is a lack of established criteria for determining what safety actions to take and when. Aspects of ODS’s role in the process are unclear, including its role in participating in scientific advisory committee meetings organized by OND. A lack of communication between ODS and OND’s review divisions and limited oversight of postmarket drug safety issues by ODS management has hindered the decision-making process. Decision-making Process on Drug Safety Lacks Clarity about Criteria for Action and the Role of ODS
While acknowledging the complexity of the postmarket drug safety decision-making process, we observed in our interviews with OND and ODS staff and in our case studies that the process lacked clarity about how drug safety decisions are made and about the role of ODS. Data Constraints Contribute to Difficulty in Making Postmarket Safety Decisions
Data constraints—such as weaknesses in data sources and limitations in requiring certain studies and obtaining data—contribute to FDA’s difficulty in making postmarket drug safety decisions. FDA Initiatives Are an Improvement, but Will Not Address All Gaps
FDA has undertaken several initiatives to improve the postmarket drug safety decision-making process, but these are unlikely to address all the gaps. FDA’s newly created Drug Safety Oversight Board (DSB) may help provide oversight of important, high-level safety decisions, but it does not address the need for systematic tracking of ongoing safety issues. Other initiatives, such as FDA’s draft policy on major postmarket drug safety decisions and communication initiatives may help improve the clarity and effectiveness of the process, but they have not been fully implemented. FDA Is Taking Steps to Identify Additional Data Sources, but Constraints Remain
FDA is taking steps to identify additional data sources that it may obtain with its current authority and resources. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve the postmarket drug safety decision-making process, we recommend that the Commissioner of FDA take the following four actions: establish a mechanism for systematically tracking ODS’s recommendations and subsequent safety actions; with input from the DSB and the Process Improvement Teams, revise and implement the draft policy on major postmarket drug safety decisions; improve CDER’s dispute resolution process by revising the pilot program to increase its independence; and clarify ODS’s role in FDA’s scientific advisory committee meetings involving postmarket drug safety issues. Nonetheless, ODS does not have any independent decision-making responsibility while OND has the ultimate responsibility to make decisions about regulatory actions concerning the postmarket safety of drugs. In this case there was general agreement about the safety concern between the Office of New Drugs (OND) and the Office of Drug Safety (ODS), but differing opinions within the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) over what safety actions should be taken regarding the drug. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2004, several high-profile drug safety cases raised concerns about the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) ability to manage postmarket drug safety issues. In some cases there have been disagreements within FDA about how to address safety issues. In this report GAO (1) describes FDA's organizational structure and process for postmarket drug safety decision making, (2) assesses the effectiveness of FDA's postmarket drug safety decision-making process, and (3) assesses the steps FDA is taking to improve postmarket drug safety decision making. GAO conducted an organizational review and case studies of four drugs with safety issues: Arava, Baycol, Bextra, and Propulsid.
What GAO Found
Two organizationally distinct FDA offices, the Office of New Drugs (OND) and the Office of Drug Safety (ODS), are involved in postmarket drug safety activities. OND, which holds responsibility for approving drugs, is involved in safety activities throughout the life cycle of a drug, and it has the decision-making responsibility to take regulatory actions concerning the postmarket safety of drugs. OND works closely with ODS to help it make postmarket decisions. ODS, with a primary focus on postmarket safety, serves primarily as a consultant to OND and does not have independent decision-making responsibility. ODS has been reorganized several times over the years. There has been high turnover of ODS directors in the past 10 years, with eight different directors of the office and its predecessors. In the four drug case studies GAO examined, GAO observed that the postmarket safety decision-making process was complex and iterative. FDA lacks clear and effective processes for making decisions about, and providing management oversight of, postmarket safety issues. The process has been limited by a lack of clarity about how decisions are made and about organizational roles, insufficient oversight by management, and data constraints. GAO observed that there is a lack of criteria for determining what safety actions to take and when to take them. Certain parts of ODS's role in the process are unclear, including ODS's participation in FDA's scientific advisory committee meetings organized by OND. Insufficient communication between ODS and OND has been an ongoing concern and has hindered the decision-making process. ODS does not track information about ongoing postmarket safety issues, including the recommendations that ODS staff make for safety actions. FDA faces data constraints in making postmarket safety decisions. There are weaknesses in the different types of data available to FDA, and FDA lacks authority to require certain studies and has resource limitations for obtaining data. Some of FDA's initiatives, such as the establishment of a Drug Safety Oversight Board, a draft policy on major postmarket decision making, and the identification of new data sources, may improve the postmarket safety decision-making process, but will not address all gaps. FDA's newly created Drug Safety Oversight Board may help provide oversight of important, high-level safety decisions, but it does not address the lack of systematic tracking of ongoing safety issues. Other initiatives, such as FDA's draft policy on major postmarket decisions and regular meetings between OND divisions and ODS, may help improve the clarity and effectiveness of the process, but they are not fully implemented. FDA has not clarified ODS's role in certain scientific advisory committee meetings. FDA's dispute resolution processes for disagreements about postmarket safety decisions have not been used. FDA is taking steps to identify additional data sources, but data constraints remain. |
gao_GAO-10-511T | gao_GAO-10-511T_0 | In addition, the board directed the SBInet System Program Office (SPO) to deliver a range of program documentation, including an updated Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP), detailed test plans, and a detailed schedule for deploying Block 1 to two initial sites in the Tucson Sector of the southwest border. DHS has not effectively managed key aspects of SBInet testing, which has in turn increased the risk that the system will not perform as expected and will take longer and cost more than necessary. While the department’s testing approach appropriately consists of a series of progressively expansive test events, some of which have yet to be completed, test plans and test cases for recently executed test events were not defined in accordance with relevant guidance. For example, none of the plans for tests of system components addressed testing risks and mitigation strategies. Further, SBInet test procedures were generally not executed as written. While some of these changes were relatively minor, others were significant, such as adding requirements or completely rewriting verification steps. This concern is underscored by a program office letter to the prime contractor stating that changes made to system qualification test procedures appeared to be designed to pass the test instead of being designed to qualify the system. These limitations are due, among other things, to a lack of detailed guidance in the TEMP, the program’s aggressive milestones, schedule, and ambiguities in requirements. SBInet Testing Results Have Identified a Growing Number of System Performance and Quality Problems
The number of new SBInet defects that have been discovered during testing has increased faster than the number that has been fixed. DHS Science and Technology Directorate Testing Process Is Being Used to Leverage Maturing Technologies for SBInet
The SPO does not have its own process for testing the relevance to SBInet of technologies that are maturing or otherwise available from industry or other government entities. GAO Is Making Recommendations to Improve SBInet Test Management and Problem Resolution
To improve the planning and execution of future test events and the resolution and disclosure of system problems, we are making the following four recommendations to DHS: ● Revise the SBInet Test and Evaluation Master Plan to include explicit criteria for assessing the quality of test documentation and for analyzing, prioritizing, and resolving defects. In written comments on a draft of our report, DHS stated that the report was factually sound, and it agreed with our last three recommendations and agreed with all but one aspect of the first one. Given that major test events remain to be planned and conducted, which in turn are likely to identify additional system problems, it is important to correct these testing and problem resolution weaknesses. Our objectives are to determine the extent to which DHS has (1) defined the scope of its proposed system solution, (2) developed a reliable schedule for delivering this solution, (3) demonstrated the cost effectiveness of this solution, (4) acquired this solution in accordance with key life cycle management processes, and (5) addressed our recent recommendations. Security Border Initiative Financial Management Controls Over Contractor Oversight. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony is based on our report "Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Address Testing and Performance Limitations That Place Key Technology Program at Risk." In September 2008, we reported to Congress that important aspects of SBInet were ambiguous and in a continuous state of flux, making it unclear and uncertain what technology capabilities were to be delivered when. In addition, the program did not have an approved integrated master schedule to guide the program's execution, and key milestones continued to slip. This schedule-related risk was exacerbated by the continuous change in and the absence of a clear definition of the approach used to define, develop, acquire, test, and deploy SBInet. Furthermore, different levels of SBInet requirements were not properly aligned, and all requirements had not been properly defined and validated. Also, the program office had not tested the individual system components to be deployed to initial locations, even though the contractor had initiated integration testing of these components with other system components and subsystems, and its test management strategy did not contain, among other things, a clear definition of testing roles and responsibilities; or sufficient detail to effectively guide planning for specific test events, such as milestones and metrics. Accordingly, we made recommendations to address these weaknesses which DHS largely agreed to implement. In light of SBInet's important mission, high cost, and risks, you asked us to conduct a series of four SBInet reviews. This statement and report being released today provide the results for the first of these reviews. Specifically, they address (1) the extent to which SBInet testing has been effectively managed, including identifying the types of tests performed and whether they were well planned and executed; (2) what the results of testing show; and (3) what processes are being used to test and incorporate maturing technologies into SBInet.
What GAO Found
SBInet testing has not been adequately managed, as illustrated by poorly defined test plans and numerous and extensive last-minute changes to test procedures. Further, testing that has been performed identified a growing number of system performance and quality problems--a trend that is not indicative of a maturing system that is ready for deployment anytime soon. Further, while some of these problems have been significant, the collective magnitude of the problems is not clear because they have not been prioritized, user reactions to the system continue to raise concerns, and key test events remain to be conducted. Collectively, these limitations increase the risk that the system will ultimately not perform as expected and will take longer and cost more than necessary to implement. For DHS to increase its chances of delivering a version of SBInet for operational use, we are recommending that DHS improve the planning and execution of future test events and the resolution and disclosure of system problems. DHS agreed with our recommendations. |
gao_GAO-05-711 | gao_GAO-05-711_0 | In fiscal years 2002-2004, State and USAID formally reviewed existing bilateral economic assistance programs in the Middle East and North Africa. State and USAID have used the reviews of existing U.S. bilateral economic assistance programs, as well as information obtained from other U.S. entities providing assistance in the region, to realign many existing programs, strategic plans, and coordination mechanisms to conform to the new U.S. policy of promoting democracy and reform in the Middle East and North Africa. MEPI and its administrative partners negotiated agreements with NGOs, the private sector, and other U.S. government entities to implement more than 100 projects. MEPI and Administrative Partners Have Obligated 2002-2003 Funds
MEPI and its administrative partners have obligated the $129 million that MEPI received for fiscal years 2002 and 2003. Reviews and Other Information Have Led MEPI to Target New Reform Opportunities
Responding to the reviews of U.S. bilateral economic assistance in the region, as well as information provided by other U.S. entities, MEPI has initiated reform activities that were not being addressed by U.S. agencies in the region, including countries where USAID does not operate. For example: Political reform: The reviews found that in many countries where MEPI operates, little progress had been made in political reform, including women’s political involvement. MEPI officials told us that these observations made MEPI management aware of the need to monitor projects’ short-term performance and hold project implementers accountable for results. Unclear Roles and Responsibilities and Incomplete Information Have Inhibited MEPI’s Project Monitoring
MEPI’s ability to monitor the performance of its projects and measure results has been limited by (1) unclear communication of monitoring roles and responsibilities and (2) a lack of complete project information. MEPI and USAID officials in Washington, D.C., acknowledged that confusion exists regarding roles and responsibilities for project monitoring. Conclusion
In accordance with the U.S. foreign policy of promoting democracy and reform in the Middle East and North Africa , State established MEPI to design and fund projects supporting political, economic, and educational reform and the empowerment of women. Without the ability to evaluate its projects’ performance with certainty, and lacking access to complete information, MEPI’s capacity to meet its strategic goals of producing tangible results and making results-based decisions is limited. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
In this report, we (1) describe MEPI’s structure for administering projects and obligating funds, (2) examine MEPI’s uses of the reviews of U.S. bilateral economic assistance in the region, and (3) evaluate MEPI’s monitoring of its projects. | Why GAO Did This Study
In December 2002, the U.S. Department of State (State) established the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) to promote democracy in the Middle East and North Africa. MEPI provides assistance for political, economic, and educational reform and women's empowerment. In fiscal years 2002-2004, State and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) reviewed U.S. bilateral economic assistance programs in the region to ensure they were aligned with the new U.S. policy focus on promoting democracy and reform. In this report, GAO (1) describes MEPI's structure for managing projects and allocating funding, (2) examines MEPI's uses of the reviews, and (3) evaluates MEPI's project monitoring.
What GAO Found
MEPI has worked with U.S. embassies, USAID headquarters in Washington, D.C., and USAID missions overseas to manage projects and obligate funding. In turn, MEPI and its partners have negotiated agreements with nongovernmental organizations, the private sector, and other U.S. agencies to implement the projects. MEPI has obligated about 45 percent of the $129 million that it received for fiscal years 2002-2003, and its partners have obligated the remainder. MEPI used the State and USAID reviews of existing U.S. bilateral economic assistance programs in the Middle East and North Africa in two ways. First, in response to the reviews, MEPI targeted reform activities in the Middle East and North Africa that were not being addressed by other U.S. agencies. For example, responding to the reviews' finding that little progress had been made in supporting women's political involvement, MEPI provided funds to assist women candidates. Second, MEPI shaped its strategy in response to the reviews, particularly regarding the need to monitor projects' short-term results and hold project implementers accountable for project performance. Despite its strategic emphasis on monitoring projects' performance, MEPI's monitoring has been limited by unclear communication of roles and responsibilities and a lack of complete project information. MEPI has acknowledged these deficiencies and begun to address them; in July 2005, State and USAID agreed on a framework for project monitoring roles and responsibilities. Without the ability to evaluate its projects' performance with certainty and access to complete information, MEPI's capacity to meet its strategic goals of producing tangible results and making results-based decisions is limited. |
gao_GAO-16-667 | gao_GAO-16-667_0 | Justice Reports Annually on FOIA Litigation Lawsuits
As previously mentioned, Justice annually publishes a litigation and compliance report that is required by FOIA. Agencies’ Costs Associated with FOIA Lawsuits Where the Plaintiffs Prevailed Could Not Be Fully Determined
For the 112 selected FOIA lawsuits where the plaintiffs had prevailed, litigation-related costs could not be fully determined. Litigation-related costs associated with such lawsuits are comprised of (1) Justice’s costs for defending the lawsuits on behalf of agencies, (2) the agencies’ respective costs for the lawsuits, and (3) any attorneys’ fees and costs as assessed by a court or based on settlement agreements awarded to plaintiffs. Justice Does Not Collect Litigation Cost Data for Individual Lawsuits
While Justice defends FOIA lawsuits on behalf of the federal government, it does not track all costs that the department incurs in defending individual lawsuits in which the plaintiffs prevailed. Accordingly, of the 112 selected lawsuits, Justice provided cost information, totaling about $97,000 for 8 lawsuits in which the plaintiffs substantially prevailed. According to this information, the agencies incurred approximately $1.3 million in FOIA litigation-related costs for these lawsuits during fiscal years 2009 through 2014. Officials representing these agencies generally stated that they did not have mechanisms in place to track FOIA litigation- related costs where the plaintiffs prevailed. Moreover, they pointed to the fact that Justice’s guidance does not require them to collect and report this information. However, for these 10 lawsuits, Justice’s reported cost information differed from the cost information provided by agencies for 8 lawsuits. According to the department, the differences in the awards of attorneys’ fees and costs are due to the appeals process and the settlement agreements between the respective agencies and the plaintiffs. However, it should be noted that such a requirement could be costly to Justice. Conclusions
Each year, federal agencies are subject to hundreds of lawsuits from FOIA requesters whose requests were denied or not responded to in a timely manner. Although requiring Justice and agencies to report actual cost information on lawsuits, and tracking the appeals process and settlement agreements between agencies and plaintiffs could lead to better transparency and openness in federal operations, there would be costs associated with doing so. Considering these costs relative to the potential benefits could help in determining whether establishing such a requirement would be an effective means of enhancing FOIA litigation- related operations. Matters for Congressional Consideration
To provide greater transparency in the reporting of FOIA litigation costs, Congress could consider requiring Justice to provide a cost estimate for collecting and reporting information on costs incurred when defending lawsuits in which the plaintiffs prevailed. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We received written comments on a draft of this report from Justice. In its comments (reprinted in appendix V), Justice stated that, in the face of ever-increasing numbers of FOIA requests, the department appreciated our recognition of the need to balance the cost of additional reporting against the benefit it could provide to achieve the goal of good FOIA administration. This resulted in our selection of 112 lawsuits across 28 federal agencies where the courts had awarded attorneys’ fees and costs. To determine attorney fees and costs for the 112 lawsuits, we reviewed Justice’s annual litigation and compliance reports, where information on attorney fees and costs awarded by the court to the plaintiff is reported. Appendix III: Examples of FOIA Litigation Lawsuits
Of the 112 lawsuits selected where the plaintiff substantially prevailed, a lawsuit was filed either because (1) the agency failed to respond within the statutory time frame (58 lawsuits); (2) the agency failed to provide all of the documentation in the FOIA request (46 lawsuits); or (3) for other reasons, such as denial of a fee waiver or appealing a dismissal of a claim (8 lawsuits). | Why GAO Did This Study
FOIA requires federal agencies to provide the public with access to government information and each year, agencies release information. Nevertheless, many FOIA requests are denied or not responded to in a timely manner. The act allows requesters to litigate if the agency does not respond to a request within the statutory time frames. Over the last decade, Justice reported 3,350 FOIA lawsuits filed against agencies, with a 57 percent increase in lawsuits filed since 2006 (see figure).
GAO was asked to determine FOIA litigation-related costs incurred by federal agencies for lawsuits in which the plaintiffs substantially prevailed. To do so, GAO reviewed Justice's data on FOIA-related lawsuits with a decision rendered from 2009 through 2014, and identified 112 lawsuits across 28 federal agencies where the plaintiff substantially prevailed. GAO reviewed cost data from Justice and the selected agencies, and interviewed agency officials to discuss the availability and reliability of these data.
What GAO Found
Of the 1,672 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) lawsuits with a decision rendered between 2009 and 2014, GAO identified 112 lawsuits where the plaintiff substantially prevailed. Litigation-related costs for these 112 lawsuits could not be fully determined. Costs associated with such lawsuits are comprised of (1) the Department of Justice's (Justice) costs for defending the lawsuits on behalf of agencies, (2) the agencies' respective costs for the lawsuits, and (3) any attorneys' fees and costs as assessed by a court or based on settlement agreements awarded to the plaintiffs' attorneys.
Of the 112 lawsuits, Justice provided information on its costs for defending 8 lawsuits totaling about $97,000. Justice officials stated that the department does not specifically track costs for lawsuits in which the plaintiffs substantially prevailed and that its attorneys are not required to track such costs for individual lawsuits. Regarding individual agencies, 17 of the 28 in GAO's study had a system or process in place that enabled them to provide cost information on 57 of the 112 selected lawsuits. According to this information, the agencies incurred approximately $1.3 million in FOIA litigation-related costs for these lawsuits during fiscal years 2009 through 2014. The remaining agencies did not have a mechanism in place to track FOIA litigation-related costs where the plaintiffs prevailed. These agencies said costs were not tracked because Justice's guidance does not require agencies to collect and report costs related to specific lawsuits, or if the plaintiff prevailed as a result of a lawsuit.
As required by FOIA, Justice has reported annually on the results of all lawsuits, including any awards of attorneys' fees and costs to the plaintiffs. However, for 11 of the 112 selected lawsuits, Justice reported an amount of attorneys' fees and costs awarded that differed from the amounts reported by the defending agencies. According to Justice, the differences in the award of attorney's fees and costs were due to the appeals process and settlement agreements between the respective agencies and the plaintiffs.
Although requiring Justice and agencies to report actual cost information could lead to better transparency regarding federal operations, costs would be associated with such reporting. Considering these costs, as well as potential benefits, could help Congress in determining whether such a requirement would be cost-effective for enhancing oversight of FOIA litigation-related operations.
What GAO Recommends
If Congress determines that transparency in the reporting of FOIA litigation costs outweighs increased costs for systems and processes to be developed, then it could consider requiring Justice to provide a cost estimate for collecting and reporting information on costs incurred when defending lawsuits in which the plaintiffs prevailed. In commenting on a draft of this report, Justice stated that it appreciated GAO's recognition of the need to balance the cost and benefit of additional reporting to achieve good FOIA administration. |
gao_HEHS-95-15 | gao_HEHS-95-15_0 | Both parties signed (1) a sharing agreement in December 1993 to treat CHAMPUS-eligible beneficiaries in the Asheville VAMC and (2) a memorandum of understanding in February 1994 providing an overall framework for future CHAMPUS/VA health care resource-sharing agreements. To date, however, neither DOD nor VA has conducted a systemwide search to identify noncatchment areas with VA hospitals where sharing agreements can be implemented. CHAMPUS Funds Have Not Been Used for Catchment Area Sharing Agreements Between Military Hospitals and VA Hospitals
In addition to the delay in implementing CHAMPUS/VA sharing agreements in noncatchment areas, such as Asheville, North Carolina, military hospital commanders in DOD catchment areas have not proposed using CHAMPUS funds for sharing agreements between their hospitals and VA hospitals. Recommendations
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) and the military services to fully inform and explain to military hospital commanders the authority to propose using CHAMPUS funds for sharing agreements with VA and their roles and authorities under this program, to provide specific instructions on developing and implementing such agreements, and to identify sharing opportunities in which CHAMPUS funds can be used to buy available VA services. DOD does not agree, however, that disagreements between DOD and VA have delayed the implementation of sharing agreements. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the extent to which Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS) funds are being used for health care resource-sharing agreements between the Departments of Veterans Affairs (VA) and Defense (DOD).
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) in February 1994, after nearly 3 years of negotiation, VA and DOD agreed on a framework for VA to treat CHAMPUS-eligible beneficiaries and receive reimbursement from CHAMPUS funds; (2) implementation of CHAMPUS/VA sharing agreements has been delayed because of disagreements between DOD and VA over VA hospital requirements; (3) neither DOD nor VA has conducted a systemwide search to identify additional opportunities for sharing agreements; (4) potential sharing opportunities have been missed because DOD hospital commanders have not used CHAMPUS funds for sharing agreements between their hospitals and VA hospitals and are unclear about their authority to do so; and (5) DOD needs to clarify the authority of DOD hospital commanders to propose sharing agreements using CHAMPUS funds, and it needs to provide instructions on developing and implementing such agreements. |
gao_GAO-13-785 | gao_GAO-13-785_0 | DOD Does Not Anticipate Future Budget or Force Structure Changes and 2013 Report to Congress Provides Results of Previous Analyses We Reported on in February 2013
In its April 2013 report to Congress, in response to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 requirement that DOD provide a cost-benefit analysis and a risk-based assessment of the Aerospace Control Alert mission as it relates to expected future changes to the budget and force structure of such mission,report on any new analyses because, according to DOD officials, DOD was not weighing competing Aerospace Control Alert basing location alternatives in response to any future budget or force structure changes. DOD reported on its previous analyses that consisted of (1) three risk assessments DOD conducted to support the 2012 decision that determined which two alert basing locations could be reduced with the least amount of risk and (2) cost savings estimates DOD developed after making the 2012 decision to take two alert basing locations (one in Duluth, Minnesota, and the other in Langley, Virginia) off 24-hour alert status. Following a decision by DOD that two alert basing locations should be taken off 24- hour alert status, three risk assessments were conducted to support the 2012 decision of which two locations, once removed from 24-hour alert status, would have the least amount of increase in risk to the overall Aerospace Control Alert mission. DOD’s April 2013 report provided a summary of the final results of these three risk assessments. These risk assessments were performed by NORAD, the Office of the Secretary of Defense Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, and the Continental U.S. NORAD Region, which included consideration of threat, vulnerability, and consequence. According to DOD officials, DOD does not expect to make future changes to the budget and force structure of the mission beyond the decision already made to remove two sites from 24-hour alert status. DOD Has Not Reported Comprehensive Cost Information for the Aerospace Control Alert Mission
DOD has reported Air Force cost information for the Aerospace Control Alert mission in its budget displays but has not yet reported the comprehensive cost of the mission. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government notes that financial information is needed for periodic external reporting and, on a day-to-day basis, to make operating decisions, monitor performance, and allocate resources. The Air Force budget justification displays submitted for fiscal years 2010-14 include personnel costs for Air Force, Air National Guard, and Air Force Reserve personnel, but do not include costs, such as military personnel costs, that other military services have in conjunction with the Aerospace Control Alert mission. In addition to the 2009 requirement, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 requires that DOD provide a consolidated budget justification display that fully identifies the Aerospace Control Alert budget for each of the military services and encompasses all programs and activities of the Aerospace Control Alert mission for each of the following: (1) procurement; (2) operations and maintenance; (3) research, development, testing, and evaluation; and (4) military construction. However, according to DOD officials, such a display is being developed for inclusion with the department’s fiscal year 2015 budget submission to include the four budget categories specifically identified by the act. The consolidated budget displays required by the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 and the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 should help provide Congress and senior DOD decision makers with a more complete picture of Aerospace Control Alert mission costs. However, in addition to Air Force, Air National Guard, and Air Force Reserve personnel costs, personnel costs from the other DOD components also support the mission—including the Army and the Army National Guard personnel providing ground-based air defense capabilities in support of the mission. Unless this additional information is included in DOD’s revised budget display, DOD decision makers will not have comprehensive cost information to make fully informed resource allocation decisions to support the Aerospace Control Alert mission. Conclusions
The Aerospace Control Alert mission is critical to defending U.S. airspace. Recommendation for Executive Action
As DOD expands its cost reporting in the consolidated budget justification displays as required by section 354 of the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 and section 352 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and responsible DOD organizations, as appropriate, to ensure that all Aerospace Control Alert program and activity costs for each of the military services are captured, including military personnel costs of the Army and Army National Guard. | Why GAO Did This Study
To protect U.S. airspace, DOD performs the Aerospace Control Alert mission, which includes military forces arrayed in a rapid response posture to conduct both air sovereignty and air defense operations against airborne threats over the United States and Canada. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 required that the Secretary of Defense submit a report to Congress that provides a cost-benefit analysis and risk-based assessment of the Aerospace Control Alert mission as it relates to expected future changes to the budget and force structure of the mission. The act also requires that GAO review DOD's report and submit any findings to the congressional defense committees. In response to this mandate, GAO examined (1) DOD's April 2013 reporting of a risk-based assessment and cost-benefit analysis of the Aerospace Control Alert mission as they relate to expected future changes to the budget and force structure of that mission and (2) the extent to which DOD has reported the total cost of the Aerospace Control Alert mission. GAO reviewed DOD's April 2013 report to Congress and Aerospace Control Alert budget justification displays, and interviewed knowledgeable DOD officials.
What GAO Found
In its April 2013 report to Congress, the Department of Defense (DOD) did not provide any new analyses, but provided the results of previous analyses related to the Aerospace Control Alert mission because, according to DOD officials, DOD was not expecting any future changes to the budget or force structure of the mission, including consideration of any basing location alternatives. DOD's April 2013 report summarized the results of three risk assessments that were conducted to support DOD's 2012 decision on which two alert basing locations could be removed from 24-hour alert status with the least amount of risk. The North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), the Office of the Secretary of Defense Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, and the Continental U.S. NORAD Region performed these assessments and all concluded that, given the 2012 DOD decision that two alert basing locations would be removed from 24-hour alert status, the removal of the locations at Duluth, Minnesota, and Langley, Virginia, would provide the least increase in risk. DOD's April 2013 report also summarized a cost savings estimate developed after the decision to remove these basing locations from 24-hour alert status.
Along with the submission of DOD's budget requests for fiscal years 2010-14, the Air Force reported cost information for components of the Aerospace Control Alert mission in budget displays required by the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, but DOD did not report the comprehensive cost of the Aerospace Control Alert mission. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government notes that financial information is needed for periodic external reporting and, on a day-to-day basis, to make operating decisions, monitor performance, and allocate resources. The Air Force provided budget displays containing information related to Air Force and Air National Guard military personnel costs, flying hours, and certain other costs along with DOD's budget justification materials for fiscal years 2010-14. However, DOD did not report other military service costs associated with the Aerospace Control Alert mission. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 now requires, in addition to the Air Force cost information required by the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, that DOD provide a consolidated budget justification display that fully identifies the Aerospace Control Alert budget for each of the military services and encompasses all programs and activities of the Aerospace Control Alert mission for each of the following: procurement; operations and maintenance; research, development, testing, and evaluation; and military construction. According to DOD officials, such a display is being developed for inclusion with the fiscal year 2015 budget submission. These consolidated budget displays should help provide a more complete picture of Aerospace Control Alert mission costs. However, other military personnel costs, including those associated with the Army and the Army National Guard personnel providing ground-based air defense capabilities, support the mission as well. Inclusion of this information, in addition to the information required in the budget justification displays, could provide decision makers with more comprehensive cost information to make fully informed resource allocation decisions to support the Aerospace Control Alert mission.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD, as it expands its cost reporting in response to current reporting requirements, ensure that all personnel costs related to the Aerospace Control Alert mission, including those of the Army and Army National Guard, are included in DOD's budget displays. DOD concurred with GAO's recommendation. |
gao_T-NSIAD-96-151 | gao_T-NSIAD-96-151_0 | DOE’s Authority for Conducting Trade Missions and Role in Export Promotion Activities
Before discussing the specifics of DOE trade missions, I would first like to provide some context by reviewing DOE’s statutory authority for conducting overseas trade missions and its role within the federal export promotion apparatus. DOE’s high-level advocacy on behalf of U.S. energy companies is conducted in emerging energy markets like China, India, and Pakistan. Value of the Business Agreements Reported by DOE
Despite the difficulties in measuring the impact of federal advocacy activities, DOE has reported the results of its advocacy based on the value of signed business agreements. In a December 28, 1995, letter to the Chairman of this Committee, the Secretary of Energy stated that the Secretary’s four trade missions resulted in $19.7 billion in potential and finalized agreements. These agreements include memorandums of intent or understanding (the first and necessary step to any business deal), fuel supply and power purchase agreements for power plants, oil and gas exploration and production agreements, and other steps necessary to advance business deals. Finalized Agreements
DOE has reported that of the $19.7 billion in agreements, about $2.03 billion in business agreements have reached either “financial closure” or “sales agreement,” that is, have been finalized. According to program officials, the planning for these missions was complicated by time constraints and frequent, last-minute changes in plans. These planning difficulties were further compounded by DOE’s lack of familiarity with the requirements for conducting large, overseas trade missions. These new procedures are designed to help assure that DOE’s future international missions are more cost-effective and better managed, but they have yet to be fully tested in practice. DOE’s total cost of the four missions was about $2.8 million (see app. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed four trade missions sponsored by the Department of Energy (DOE), focusing on: (1) DOE authority and role in these missions; (2) the results of the missions; and (3) management weaknesses inherent in DOE-sponsored trade missions.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the Secretary of Energy has explicit statutory authority to undertake export promotion activities; (2) in 1995, DOE funding for export promotion totalled $14 million; (3) DOE performed advocacy on behalf of U.S. energy companies seeking to capture some of the emerging energy markets in China, India, and Pakistan; (4) it is difficult to measure the impact of these federal advocacy activities because sales forecasts are unclear, of the numerous participants involved, and of problems in calculating the value of sales agreements and maintenance contracts; (5) the four trade missions resulted in $19.7 billion in potential and finalized fuel supply and power purchase agreements and oil and gas exploration agreements; (6) DOE subsequently reported that finalized agreements totalled $2.03 billion, but export data show that the value of these agreements seem to be overstated by over 50 percent; (7) most companies participating in DOE trade missions support DOE efforts, but a few said that they could complete their business agreements without DOE involvement; (8) the planning for these missions is complicated by time constraints, last minute changes in plans, and lack of familiarity with conducting large, overseas trade missions; and (9) DOE has introduced new procedures to correct DOE management weaknesses, but they have not been fully tested in practice. |
gao_GAO-10-225 | gao_GAO-10-225_0 | Compared to paper, electronic filing allows taxpayers to receive refunds faster, is less prone to transcription and other errors, and provides IRS with significant cost savings. RALs are short-term, high interest rate bank loans. IRS uses its many tools to identify and correct noncompliance, whether intentional or unintentional. IRS gets most of the information returns during the filing season. Access to Telephone Assistors Remained Low, and IRS Has a Limited Understanding of Why Taxpayers Call and Has Not Clearly Integrated TAB into Its Planning Documents
As of October 2, 2009, IRS processed 139 million individual income tax returns. It helps taxpayers to receive their refunds faster and aids IRS in achieving the electronic filing goal of having 80 percent of all federal tax and information returns filed electronically by 2012. This increase is important, because direct deposit is faster, more convenient for taxpayers, and less expensive for IRS than mailing paper checks. This accounts for about 29 percent of all returns processed. Access to Telephone Assistors Remained Low for the Second Year in a Row and IRS Decreased Its 2010 Access Goal
As shown in table 3, taxpayers’ access to IRS’s telephone assistors was better than last year, but was below IRS’s original goal for 2009 and remains well below 2005 through 2007 performance. Despite the heavy call volume, the accuracy of the telephone assistors’ responses to tax law and account questions was higher by a statistically significant amount compared to the same period last year and exceeded IRS’s fiscal year 2009 goals (see table 5). To help obtain better information on why taxpayers call, IRS recently implemented a major data collection effort called Contact Analytics at all its 26 call sites. In contrast, IRS’s mystery shopping reviews resulted in a 68 percent accuracy rate. Figure 1 also shows that refund processing time varies by day of the week and is shorter for refunds processed on CADE than on IRS’s legacy individual master file, three entities--IRS, Treasury’s Financial Management Service (FMS) and Automated Clearing House (ACH)—share responsibility for issuing refunds (see table 8 below). IRS runs pre-refund tax law compliance checks, FMS checks for non tax debt owed to the federal government, and ACH distributes the funds. IRS Has Not Studied the Use of Debit Cards for Unbanked Taxpayers
While IRS offers paper check and direct deposit options for delivering refunds to taxpayers, it has not studied the feasibility of distributing refunds electronically through debit cards. Millions of taxpayers claim the Hope and Lifetime Learning tax credits to offset qualified education expenses. However, the information currently reported by educational institutions on tuition statements sent to IRS and taxpayers (on Form 1098-T) may be confusing for taxpayers who use the form to prepare their tax returns and not very useful to IRS. According to IRS officials, because the amount billed may not be the amount taxpayers are eligible to claim as a credit, IRS does not compare tuition statement information to the information reported on a tax return. Matters for Congressional Consideration
Congress should consider providing IRS with MEA to use prior years’ tax return information to automatically verify taxpayers’ compliance with the limit on the number of years the Hope credit can be claimed. To reduce taxpayer confusion and enhance compliance with the eligibility requirements for higher education benefits, IRS should Determine the feasibility of using current information reported on Form 1098-T, such as school location and taxpayer identification number or SSN, in IRS’s compliance programs; and Revise Form 1098-T to improve the usefulness of information on qualifying education expenses. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) filing season is an enormous undertaking that includes processing tax returns, issuing refunds, and responding to taxpayer questions. IRS's efforts to ensure compliance begin during the filing season. GAO was asked to assess IRS's 2009 filing season performance, identify ways to reduce taxpayers' use of short-term, high-interest refund anticipation loans (RAL) offered by paid preparers or banks, and identify ways to enhance compliance during processing. GAO analyzed IRS performance data, reviewed IRS operations, interviewed IRS officials, and reviewed its compliance programs and relevant statutes.
What GAO Found
IRS processed 139 million returns and issued $298 billion in refunds as of October 2, 2009. Electronic filing, which provides IRS with significant cost savings and taxpayers with faster refunds, increased to 68 percent of all returns filed. While taxpayers' access to telephone assistors was better than last year, it remained lower than in 2007 in part because of calls about tax law changes. Compared to 2005 through 2007, IRS reduced its goal for assistor answered calls in 2009 and set its 2010 goal at 71 percent. Despite heavy call volume, the accuracy of IRS responses to taxpayers' questions remained above 90 percent. IRS started a major data collection effort on why taxpayers call, but lacks a plan to analyze the data and improve telephone service. According to IRS, issuing refunds faster reduces taxpayers' use of RALs, high-interest loans made by paid tax preparers or banks in anticipation of a refund. Issuing refunds is a joint effort by IRS, Treasury's Financial Management Service, which checks for non-tax debt owed to the federal government, and the Automated Clearing House, which distributes funds. However, IRS has not coordinated extensively with them to expedite refunds. Further, IRS has not studied the use of debit cards for unbanked taxpayers, which could also reduce taxpayers' use of RALs by providing faster and more secure refunds. IRS automatically identifies and corrects select types of errors while processing tax returns. It could also correct tax returns that claim the Hope credit, a tax credit to help offset qualified education expenses, for longer than the number of years allowed. However, IRS lacks the authority to use prior years' tax return information for this purpose. Also, information reported by education institutions to taxpayers and IRS about qualifying educational expenses on the Form 1098-T is confusing for taxpayers and not useful for IRS. Many institutions report the total amount billed to students, but not what is actually paid after taking into account scholarships and grants. This results in some taxpayers under-claiming benefits, while others over-claim. Finally, because Form 1098-T can show the amount billed, which may not be the amount paid, IRS is unable to use the information to automatically verify taxpayers' claims for the credit through its computerized matching program. |
gao_T-RCED-98-67 | gao_T-RCED-98-67_0 | However, research suggests that, for a number of reasons, state and local governments may be reluctant to take actions to mitigate natural hazards. The reasons include local sensitivity to such measures as building code enforcement and land-use planning, conflict between hazard mitigation and development goals, the lack of an understanding of mitigation and political support, and the perception that mitigation is costly and involves solutions that are overly technical and complex. FEMA’s Hazard Mitigation Efforts
FEMA provides state and local governments with hazard mitigation grants and training in support of the agency’s endeavors to instill a community-based approach to implementing disaster mitigation efforts. FEMA also attempts to reduce flood losses through buying-out flood-prone properties throughout the country and converting the properties to open spaces. FEMA’s September 1997 strategic plan, entitled “Partnership for a Safer Future,” states that the agency is concentrating its activities on reducing disaster costs through mitigation because “no other approach is as effective over the long term.” One of the strategic plan’s three goals is to “protect lives and prevent the loss of property from all hazards.” The strategic objectives under this goal are to reduce, by fiscal year 2007, (1) the risk of loss of life and injury from hazards by 10 percent and (2) the risk of property loss and economic disruption from hazards by 15 percent. FEMA expects that these strategic goals and objectives will be reflected in its future performance partnership agreements with the states. However, on the basis of our past work, we believe that a number of issues are pertinent to the Congress’ consideration of the cost-effective use of federal dollars for hazard mitigation. As noted above, our work has identified a variety of approaches with potential for increasing mitigation. These include regulatory and financial incentives proposed by FEMA, the National Research Council, and the National Performance Review. These or other proposals would require analysis to determine their relative costs and effectiveness. Among existing programs, it is uncertain that, collectively, federal funds are effectively targeted to projects where the risk of loss is greatest. First, it is often difficult to determine the cost-effectiveness of specific actions because of limited data concerning risks. Second, federal hazard mitigation funds are provided through a number of different programs and agencies—some limited to particular hazards. Finally, it is important to note that the extent to which mitigation projects will result in federal dollar savings is uncertain; savings depend upon the actual incidence of future disaster events and the extent to which the federal government would bear the resulting losses. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) disaster mitigation efforts, focusing on: (1) the reasons why disaster mitigation efforts are not always undertaken by state and local governments and individuals; (2) FEMA's efforts to encourage mitigation; and (3) issues that GAO believes are pertinent to ensuring the cost-effective use of federal dollars for hazard mitigation.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) hazard mitigation is primarily the responsibility of state and local governments, and individuals; however, mitigation actions are not always taken; (2) the reasons for this include local sensitivity to such measures as: (a) building code enforcement and land use planning; (b) conflict between mitigation and developmental goals; and (c) individuals' perceptions that the possibility of a disaster's occurrence is low; (3) FEMA's hazard mitigation efforts include grants and training for state and local governments, funding for mitigating damage to public facilities and purchasing and converting flood-prone properties to open space, federal flood insurance, and programs targeted at reducing the loss of life and property from earthquakes and fires; (4) in recent years, FEMA has taken a strategic approach to mitigation by publishing a 15-year national mitigation strategy and establishing 5-year mitigation objectives in its strategic plan pursuant to the Government Performance and Results Act; (5) FEMA expects to reflect its strategic goal and objectives in future performance partnership agreements with states; (6) GAO's work has identified several issues pertinent to ensuring the cost-effective use of federal dollars for hazard mitigation; (7) studies have shown a variety of approaches with the potential for increasing the level of mitigation, including regulatory and financial incentives proposed by FEMA, the National Research Council, and the National Performance Review; however, these and other proposals require analysis to determine their relative costs and benefits; (8) under existing approaches, it is uncertain that, collectively, federal funds are effectively targeted to projects where the risk of loss is greatest because: (a) limitations on data needed to estimate risks often make it difficult to determine the cost-effectiveness of specific actions; and (b) federal hazard mitigation funds are provided through a number of different programs and agencies--some limited to particular hazards; and (9) the extent to which cost-effective mitigation projects will result in federal dollar savings is uncertain, depending upon the actual incidence of future disaster events and the extent to which the federal government would bear the resulting losses. |
gao_GAO-06-771 | gao_GAO-06-771_0 | The number of newly filed cases grew about 44 percent, from about 252,000 in fiscal year 2000, to about 363,000 in fiscal year 2005. The number of on-board immigration judges increased by 6 (about 3 percent), from 206 to 212 between fiscal years 2000 and 2005, while the immigration courts’ caseload increased about 39 percent during the same period. Our analysis of the immigration courts’ proceedings data shows that while the courts have achieved success in reducing the number of proceedings older than 4 years between fiscal year 2003 and December 31, 2005, the courts did not meet their goal of completing all proceedings more than 3 years old by December 31, 2005 (see table 2). OCIJ Monitors Caseload to Assign Cases to Judges Accordingly, and Uses a Variety of Means to Address Growing Caseload
OCIJ Monitors Caseload and Assigns Cases to Judges within Courts
OCIJ monitors immigration courts’ caseload to assign cases to judges within a court. Specifically, OCIJ considers the number of newly filed cases and cases awaiting adjudication from prior years, historical data, and the nature of the caseload, such as the type of cases prevalent in the court and their complexity. According to OCIJ, it primarily addresses immigration judge staff shortages at immigration courts through detailing judges from their assigned court to a court in need of assistance. EOIR provided several reasons for the inconsistency, as follows: (1) the EOIR case management system is a live data base that is constantly changing as events occur to immigration cases in the courts; (2) changes occur to the number of cases awaiting adjudication from one quarter to another when categories of cases are exempted from the case completion goals, since once a case is exempted it is no longer included in the reports; (3) cases double entered by DHS in the automated scheduling system were deleted; (4) reconciliations were necessary due to changes to date fields to update cases in the data base; (5) delays in data entry occurred; and (6) programming errors occurred in the calculation of the data. As a result, we could not replicate the past reports to determine the accuracy of the case completion goal data. The inconsistencies indicate that EOIR should maintain appropriate documentation to demonstrate the accuracy of data reported by EOIR. OCIJ established a Court Evaluation Unit (CEU) to manage the coordination and operation of the court evaluation program. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Our objectives in this report are to answer the following questions: (1) in recent years, what has been the trend in immigration courts’ caseload, (2) how does the Office of the Chief Immigration Judge (OCIJ) assign and manage immigration court caseload, and (3) how does the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR)/OCIJ evaluate the immigration courts’ performance? To address these objectives, we met with officials from the Department of Justice’s EOIR headquarters to obtain information and documentation on caseload trends, caseload management, and evaluation of immigration courts. However, we could not evaluate the reasonableness of EOIR’s explanations of the inconsistencies or the overall reliability of each of its quarterly reports because EOIR has changed its criteria for compiling the reports over time and only maintains documentation on the current set of queries used to run the reports. | Why GAO Did This Study
Within the Department of Justice's (DOJ) Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), the Office of the Chief Immigration Judge (OCIJ) is responsible for managing the 53 immigration courts located throughout the United States where over 200 immigration judges adjudicate individual cases involving alleged immigration law violations. This report addresses: (1) in recent years, what has been the trend in immigration courts' caseload; (2) how does OCIJ assign and manage the immigration court caseload; and (3) how does EOIR/OCIJ evaluate the immigration courts' performance? To address these issues, GAO interviewed EOIR officials; reviewed information on caseload trends, caseload management, and court evaluations; and analyzed caseload data, case completion goal data, and OCIJ court evaluation reports.
What GAO Found
From fiscal years 2000 to 2005, despite an increase in the number of immigration judges, the number of new cases filed in immigration courts outpaced cases completed. During this period, while the number of on-board judges increased about 3 percent, the courts' caseload climbed about 39 percent from about 381,000 cases to about 531,000 cases. The number of completed cases increased about 37 percent while newly filed cases grew about 44 percent. EOIR attributes this growth in part to enhanced border enforcement activities. The courts reduced the number of proceedings awaiting adjudication for more than 4 years, but did not meet their goal to complete all proceedings more than 3 years old by December 31, 2005. OCIJ relies primarily on an automated system to assign cases to immigration judges within a court. To balance the judges' caseload, OCIJ considers the number of newly filed cases and cases awaiting adjudication from prior years, historical data, and the type and complexity of cases. To manage its growing caseload, OCIJ, among other means, details judges from their assigned court to a court in need of assistance and uses available technology such as video conferencing. According to OCIJ, if it recognizes a pattern of sustained need, it recommends that EOIR establish a court in a new location. EOIR evaluates the performance of the immigration courts based on the immigration courts' success in meeting case completion goals. GAO's review of EOIR's quarterly reports on these goals identified a recurring inconsistency between reports as well as other inconsistencies. EOIR explained that these inconsistencies were due to a variety of factors, including the exemption of different categories of cases from the goals in different quarters, delays in data entry, and programming errors in the calculation of the data. Because EOIR has changed its criteria for cases covered by these goals and only maintained the queries for its current reporting process, GAO could not replicate past case completion reports to determine their accuracy. The inconsistencies indicate that EOIR should maintain appropriate documentation to demonstrate the reports' accuracy. |
gao_GAO-14-560T | gao_GAO-14-560T_0 | CMS Has Strengthened Provider Enrollment Provisions since PPACA, but Further Actions Needed to Help Ensure Potentially Fraudulent Providers Do Not Participate in Medicare
PPACA authorized and CMS has implemented new provider enrollment procedures that address past weaknesses identified by GAO and HHS’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) that allowed entities intent on committing fraud to enroll in Medicare. Further, depending on the risks presented, PPACA authorizes CMS to require fingerprint-based criminal history checks. Specifically, we are assessing the process used to enroll and verify the eligibility of Medicare providers in Medicare’s Provider Enrollment, Chain, and Ownership System (PECOS) and the extent to which CMS’s controls are designed to prevent and detect the continued enrollment of ineligible or potentially fraudulent providers in PECOS. They include issuing a rule to implement surety bonds for certain providers, issuing a rule on provider and supplier disclosure requirements, and establishing the core elements for provider and supplier compliance programs. In light of the moratoria that CMS has placed on enrollment of home health agencies in fraud “hot spots,” implementation of this rule could help the agency address potential concerns for these at-risk providers across the Medicare program. Providers and Suppliers Disclosure: CMS has not yet scheduled a proposed rule for publication for increased disclosures of prior actions taken against providers and suppliers enrolling or revalidating enrollment in Medicare, as authorized by PPACA, such as whether the provider or supplier has been subject to a payment suspension from a federal health care program. Additional Improvements to Prepayment and Postpayment Claims Review May Better Identify or Recover Improper Payments
Medicare uses prepayment review to deny claims that should not be paid and postpayment review to recover improperly paid claims. Increased use of prepayment edits could help prevent improper Medicare payments. Based on an analysis of a limited number of national policies and local coverage determinations (LCD), we identified $14.7 million in payments in fiscal year 2010 that appeared to be inconsistent with four national policies and therefore improper. FPS identifies investigative leads for CMS’s Zone Program Integrity Contractors (ZPIC), the contractors responsible for detecting and investigating potential fraud. Our prior work found that postpayment reviews are critical to identifying and recouping overpayments. In 2011, we found that the Integrated Data Repository (IDR)—a central data store of Medicare and other data needed to help CMS program integrity staff and contractors detect improper payments of claims—did not include all the data that were planned to be incorporated by fiscal year 2010, because of technical obstacles and delays in funding. Addressing Identified Vulnerabilities Could Help Reduce Fraud
Having mechanisms in place to resolve vulnerabilities that could lead to improper payments, some of which are potentially fraudulent, is critical to effective program management, but our work has shown weaknesses in CMS’s processes to address such vulnerabilities. We also recently made recommendations to CMS to address the millions of Medicare cards that display beneficiaries’ Social Security numbers, In August which increases beneficiaries’ vulnerability to identity theft.2012, we recommended that CMS (1) select an approach for removing Social Security numbers from Medicare cards that best protects beneficiaries from identity theft and minimizes burdens for providers, beneficiaries, and CMS and (2) develop an accurate, well-documented cost estimate for such an option. However, the department also said that CMS could not proceed with changes without agreement from other agencies, such as the Social Security Administration, and that funding was also a consideration. Thus, CMS has not yet taken action to address these recommendations. In addition, we and others have identified concerns with CMS oversight of fraud, waste, and abuse in Medicare’s prescription drug program, Part D, including the contractors tasked with this work. Concluding Observations
Although CMS has taken some important steps to identify and prevent fraud, the agency must continue to improve its efforts to reduce fraud, waste, and abuse in the Medicare program. Notably, we are currently assessing the potential use of electronic-card technologies, which can help reduce Medicare fraud. We are also examining CMS’s oversight of some of the contractors that conduct reviews of claims after payment. These studies are focused on additional actions for CMS that could help the agency more systematically reduce potential fraud in the Medicare program. Fraud Detection Systems: Additional Actions Needed to Support Program Integrity Efforts at Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO has designated Medicare as a high-risk program, in part because the program's size and complexity make it vulnerable to fraud, waste, and abuse. In 2013, Medicare financed health care services for approximately 51 million individuals at a cost of about $604 billion. The deceptive nature of fraud makes its extent in the Medicare program difficult to measure in a reliable way, but it is clear that fraud contributes to Medicare's fiscal problems. More broadly, in fiscal year 2013, CMS estimated that improper payments—some of which may be fraudulent—were almost $50 billion.
This statement focuses on the progress made and important steps to be taken by CMS and its program integrity contractors to reduce fraud in Medicare. These contractors perform functions such as screening and enrolling providers, detecting and investigating potential fraud, and identifying improper payments and vulnerabilities that could lead to payment errors. This statement is based on relevant GAO products and recommendations issued from 2004 through 2014 using a variety of methodologies. In April 2014, GAO also received updated information from CMS on its actions related to the laws, regulations, and guidance discussed in this statement. Additionally, GAO updated information by examining public documents and relevant policies and procedures.
What GAO Found
The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS)—the agency within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) that oversees Medicare—has made progress in implementing several key strategies GAO identified in prior work as helpful in protecting Medicare from fraud; however, important actions that could help CMS and its program integrity contractors combat fraud remain incomplete.
Provider Enrollment : The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) authorized, and CMS has implemented, actions to strengthen provider enrollment that address past weaknesses identified by GAO and HHS's Office of Inspector General. For example, CMS has hired contractors to determine whether providers and suppliers have valid licenses and are at legitimate locations. CMS also recently contracted for fingerprint-based criminal history checks for high-risk providers and suppliers. CMS could further strengthen provider enrollment by issuing a rule to require additional provider and supplier disclosures of information and establishing core elements for provider and supplier compliance programs, as authorized by PPACA.
Prepayment and Postpayment Claims Review : Medicare uses prepayment review to deny claims that should not be paid and postpayment review to recover improperly paid claims. GAO has found that increased use of prepayment edits could help prevent improper Medicare payments. For example, prior GAO work identified millions of dollars of payments inconsistent with selected coverage and payment policies and therefore improper. Postpayment reviews are also critical to identifying and recouping payments. GAO recommended better oversight of both the information systems analysts use to identify claims for postpayment review, in a 2011 report, and the contractors responsible for these reviews, in a 2013 report. CMS has addressed some of these recommendations.
Addressing Identified Vulnerabilities : Having mechanisms in place to resolve vulnerabilities that could lead to improper payments is critical to effective program management and could help address fraud. However, GAO work has shown weaknesses in CMS's processes to address such vulnerabilities, placing the Medicare program and its beneficiaries at risk. For example, GAO has made multiple recommendations to CMS to remove Social Security numbers from beneficiaries' Medicare cards to help prevent identity theft, and, while HHS agreed with these recommendations, the department also reported that CMS could not proceed with the changes for a variety of reasons, including funding limitations. Thus, to date, CMS has not taken action on these recommendations.
GAO has work underway addressing these key strategies, including assessing the potential use of electronic-card technologies to help reduce Medicare fraud. GAO is also examining the extent to which CMS's information system can prevent and detect the continued enrollment of ineligible or potentially fraudulent providers in Medicare. Additionally, GAO is studying CMS's oversight of program integrity efforts for prescription drugs and is examining CMS's oversight of some of the contractors that conduct reviews of claims after payment. These studies are focused on additional actions for CMS that could help the agency more systematically reduce potential fraud in the Medicare program. |
gao_GAO-11-625 | gao_GAO-11-625_0 | The instruction also sets out tenets of joint training, including “train the way you operate” and states that joint training must be based on relevant conditions and realistic standards. Some Integrating Ballistic Missile Defense Training Occurs but Gaps May Exist and Current Efforts Are Not Guided by a Holistic Strategy
DOD has identified roles and responsibilities and developed training plans for individual ballistic missile defense elements and combatant commands, but it has not developed an overarching strategy for integrating ballistic missile defense that specifies requirements for training across and among commands and multiple elements. The services and combatant commands conduct some integrating training; however, our analysis showed that there are some training gaps such as limited training across more than two tiers and simulated rather than live participation in exercises. DOD Has Not Developed a Strategy for Integrating BMDS Training
GAO’s guide for assessing training programs states that a training program should include the development of an overall training strategy and an organization that is held accountable for achieving training goals. Further, without a strategy, DOD runs the risk that organizations that need to work together may have limited opportunities to realistically interact prior to an actual engagement and this risk may increase over the next few years as more elements are fielded. Ballistic Missile Defense Training Funds Are Dispersed and Total Resources Not Easily Identified
DOD lacks visibility over the total resources that may be needed to support ballistic missile defense training since the funds are currently dispersed across MDA and the services, and some of the services’ budget estimates do not separately identify ballistic missile defense training. An additional complication is that agreements between MDA and the services on funding responsibilities and life-cycle cost estimates— which include training—have not been completed and approved for all elements. We also found examples of gaps between training requirements and budgeted resources, such as a $300 million requirement in the THAAD Program that is not included in MDA’s budget plans. DOD and MDA policies identify the need to complete cost estimates and funding responsibilities for elements as they are developed. However, DOD has not yet identified the total resources necessary to support ballistic missile defense training and has not determined the long-term funding responsibilities because there are no procedures or firm deadlines in place requiring that MDA and the services agree on funding responsibilities and complete training cost estimates before elements are fielded. As a result, DOD and congressional decision makers do not have a full picture of the resources that will be needed over time and risk training gaps. We compiled available budget documents and data from MDA and the services and estimated about $4 billion is planned to support ballistic missile defense training from fiscal years 2011 through 2016. Conclusions
Defending against ballistic missile attacks requires quick responses and an integrating training strategy is important to connect seams where commands, tiers, or elements must work together. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following three actions: To enhance DOD’s ability to identify and resolve issues in integrating ballistic missile defense training across and among combatant commands and services and to improve training realism, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, issue guidance that: designates an entity to be responsible for integrating training across and among combatant commands and elements and provide that entity with the authority to develop an overall ballistic missile defense training strategy which includes specific requirements and standards for integrating training and identifying and resolving any gaps in capabilities to enhance integrating training across and among all tiers (or combatant commands and elements). To improve the transparency of the resources to support ballistic missile defense training requirements and to inform budget development, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force and the Director of the Missile Defense Agency to: set a firm deadline to complete training cost estimates and element- specific agreements for elements already fielded and establish procedures that require the training cost estimates and element- specific funding agreements delineating funding responsibilities between MDA and the services be completed before additional elements are fielded; and establish procedures that require annual development and reporting of the total BMDS training budget (i.e., all Missile Defense Agency and service costs for individual, unit, and sustainment training and combatant command and service exercise costs). | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 2002, the Department of Defense (DOD) has spent over $80 billion on developing and fielding a Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) comprised of various land-and sea-based elements employed by multiple combatant commands and services. Since the time available to intercept a missile is short, integrating training among all organizations involved is important to connect seams where commands and elements must work together. In response to House Report 111-491 which accompanied H.R. 5136, GAO assessed the extent to which DOD has (1) developed a plan for integrating ballistic missile defense training across and among commands and multiple elements, and identified training roles, responsibilities, and commensurate authorities; and (2) identified and budgeted for the resources to support training. To do so, GAO analyzed DOD training instructions, plans, exercises, and budgets and assessed the extent to which the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and the services have agreed on training cost estimates and funding responsibilities.
What GAO Found
DOD has identified roles and responsibilities and developed training plans for individual ballistic missile defense elements and combatant commands, but has not developed a strategy for integrating training among ballistic missile defense organizations and elements in a manner that requires them to operate as they would in an actual engagement. A Joint Staff Instruction sets out tenets of joint training including "train the way you operate" and DOD guidance requires synchronization of training among the services and combatant commands. The services and combatant commands are conducting some integrating training--training across and among combatant commands and services--but our analysis of exercises shows that there may be some training gaps. For example, although some exercises included more than one combatant command, few included multiple live elements. GAO's guide for assessing training programs states that a training program should include an overall training strategy and an organization that is held accountable for achieving training goals. However, DOD has not developed an overall strategy that includes requirements and standards for integrating ballistic missile defense training because DOD has not clearly designated an entity to be responsible for integrating training across and among all organizations involved and provided it with the authority to do so. Without an overall strategy that includes requirements and standards for integrating training, DOD runs the risk that the organizations that need to work together may have limited opportunities to realistically interact prior to an actual engagement. DOD lacks visibility over the total resources that may be needed to support ballistic missile defense training since the funds are currently dispersed across MDA and the services, and some of the services' budget estimates do not separately identify ballistic missile defense training. A further complication is that agreements between MDA and the services on funding responsibilities and life-cycle cost estimates--which include training--have not been completed and approved for all elements. GAO compiled budget documents and data from various sources and estimated about $4 billion has been planned for ballistic missile defense training from fiscal years 2011 through 2016. However, some of the services' resources for ballistic missile defense training are not easily identifiable since some training is funded as part of a more comprehensive training program. GAO found examples of gaps between training requirements and budgeted resources, such as a $300 million requirement in the Terminal High Altitude Air Defense program that is not included in MDA's budget plans. DOD and MDA policies identify the need to complete cost estimates and funding responsibilities for elements as they are developed; however, there are no procedures or deadlines in place requiring that MDA and the services agree on funding responsibilities and complete training cost estimates before elements are fielded. As a result, DOD and congressional decision makers do not have a full picture of the resources that will be needed over time and risk training gaps.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD designate an entity with authority to develop a strategy for integrating training, and set a deadline to complete training cost estimates and funding agreements and report total BMDS training cost estimates. DOD generally concurred with the merits of our recommendations but did not commit to a timeframe for implementation. |
gao_GAO-11-703 | gao_GAO-11-703_0 | As a nondiscriminatory program, it cannot exclude any individual from participation. This decentralized management structure—in which certain oversight responsibilities are assigned to division offices—is consistent with FHWA’s approach for the federal-aid highway program in general. State Programs Provide a Range of Different Opportunities for Enhancing Skills and Vary in Their Results
The overall extent that FHWA’s on-the-job program has helped women, minorities, and the economically disadvantaged reach journey-level status in the highway construction trades is unclear, primarily because a limited amount of usable information is available on program results. Depending on what is available in the state, some trainees participate in the on-the- job training program as part of preexisting training programs—such as apprenticeship programs—or training that was designed and managed by the contractor or an industry group (see fig. III for information on the on- the-job training opportunities created by the Recovery Act.) However, using available data, we nevertheless estimate that several thousand people are trainees in any given year nationally. FHWA’s Oversight Approach Does Little to Assess Program Results
FHWA has done little to assess its on-the-job training program nationally and has not determined whether states’ efforts have led to increased opportunities for workers traditionally underrepresented in the highway construction workforce. Moreover, FHWA does not attempt to determine how effective division offices are in their oversight of states efforts. We have reported that federal program standards that successfully address important and varied aspects of program performance are key aspects of a results oriented performance management. FHWA Does Not Assess States’ Results
Although FHWA division offices receive results information from state transportation agencies annually, the type of information that states submit does not help determine the overall effectiveness of state programs. Second, states submit accomplishment information with a wide range of different output terms and different demographic and trade classification categories (see fig. FHWA Provides Funding for Activities Supporting Job Training Programs, but Overall Stewardship is Limited
FHWA grants about $10 million each year for supportive services that directly and indirectly support job training activities. Supportive Services Provide Direct and Indirect Support to Training Programs, but It Is Unclear How Many People Receive Such Services
Currently, FHWA provides about $5 million to $6 million each year for services that directly support job training programs (through the discretionary grant program) and about $4 million each year for programs that indirectly support job training programs (through the discretionary grant program, summer institutes, and internships). 3). Although states are required to provide reports on their accomplishments to FHWA division offices, this information is not typically relayed to the FHWA officials making grant decisions. Program results are important for making budgetary and programmatic decisions. Furthermore, agencies are responsible for ensuring that grantees use federal funds for eligible activities. However, past performance information is not required of applicants in the application nor is past performance one of the criteria scored during funding reviews. Given that many of the activities funded through the program are funded repetitively, good practices suggest that the use of performance information can inform and improve recipient selection approaches, even for a smaller program. Recommendations for Executive Action
To establish accountability for meeting the programs’ goal of increasing the participation of traditionally underrepresented groups in the highway construction workforce, we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation direct the FHWA Administrator to take the following three actions: Strengthen criteria—through regulations, guidelines, or other mechanisms—so that states have a clear understanding of how the on-the-job training program should be implemented and the results state programs are intended to accomplish. For the supportive services program, develop an approach to (1) evaluate the extent to which grantees have met their proposed annual goals and (2) integrate the results of this evaluation into FHWA’s funding decisions for supportive services programs. The Department of Transportation generally agreed with the recommendations and provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. To do so, we focused on the extent to which (1) states’ implementation of the FHWA on-the-job training program provides training and career enhancement opportunities for traditionally underrepresented groups to work on federal-aid highway projects, (2) FHWA has overseen the program and demonstrated results, and (3) the supportive services program established by FHWA has assisted state job training and apprenticeship programs. We also used this data, along with our interviews with FHWA and state transportation officials, to provide examples and illustrations of the type of data collected by the states for these programs, including activities implemented, the financial incentives and penalties used by states, and the extent to which the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act) provided job opportunities. FHWA Oversight of Job- Training Programs
To assess how FHWA oversees job training programs to determine program achievement, we reviewed the program standards and outcome measures required in FHWA’s regulations and program guidance and compared them to good management practices, such as the assessment of oversight activities we have identified in other programs. Our calculation represents a very rough estimate of the number of participants in this program. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Federal Highway Administration's (FHWA) on-the-job training program-- a relatively small part of the federal aid highway program--requires states to implement job training programs to provide traditionally underrepresented groups with opportunities in highway construction. To increase the effectiveness of state job training programs, FHWA grants up to $10 million annually for supportive services, such as job placement assistance. This report examines the extent to which (1) FHWA's job training program enhances training and career opportunities for these groups, (2) FHWA oversees the job training programs, and (3) supportive services provide assistance to these programs. To address these topics GAO reviewed federal legislation, good management practices identified in prior GAO reports, FHWA documents, and proposals and reports submitted by states. GAO conducted an in-depth examination of these efforts in four states, and interviewed a cross-section of FHWA staff, state officials, and industry groups.
What GAO Found
It is unclear the extent to which FHWA's on-the-job training program enables women, minorities, and economically disadvantaged individuals to reach journeylevel status in the highway construction trades, although stakeholders believe it can create some opportunities. FHWA's decentralized management of the program--in which state transportation agencies and FHWA's division offices are generally responsible for program implementation--has led to a wide range of practices. As a result, the types of training opportunities created by the program vary from state to state in terms of, for example, the length of training and the entities involved in providing training. In addition, the extent that state programs focus on creating training opportunities for traditionally underrepresented groups differs. The limited amount of useable information available on program results varies among states. As a result, FHWA does not know how well the program is doing, and GAO could not accurately determine how many trainees participate in the program or the demographics of those trainees; however, GAO estimates that several thousand likely participate in any one year. FHWA's oversight approach does little to assess program results. FHWA lacks clear criteria that articulate what states are supposed to accomplish through their job training programs. While some broad program expectations are stipulated in guidance and regulations, FHWA acknowledges some of these are outdated. Furthermore, FHWA's oversight approach does not determine the overall effectiveness of state programs or measure state progress. For example, although state transportation agencies are required to submit achievement information on an annual basis to FHWA division offices, states submitted this information using a wide range of different output terms and different demographic and trade classification categories. GAO has reported that program criteria are key aspects of results-oriented performance management. Through a separate program, FHWA provides funding for a variety of activities intended to increase the overall effectiveness of the on-the-job training program, but its overall stewardship of the program is limited. FHWA's supportive services program provides grants for locally tailored initiatives, such as skills training, child care, and career awareness events, that directly and indirectly link to job training programs. However, there is insufficient data to determine how effective these efforts have been in enhancing job training opportunities. Although FHWA has articulated the types of data states should collect and report, the agency does not know, and GAO could not determine, the number of participants in the supportive services program or its effect, in part because grantees do not always provide information about their program results. However, GAO estimated that there are about 10,000 people participating in any one year. Furthermore, past performance information is not required of applicants or scored during funding reviews. Given that many grantees are funded repeatedly, good management practices suggest that using past performance information can inform and improve recipient selection approaches. Program results are important for making budgetary and programmatic decisions. Without insight into program activities, FHWA cannot ensure that funding is used effectively.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that FHWA (1) strengthen on-the-job training program criteria, (2) create and implement an oversight approach for its job training program, and (3) evaluate the extent to which supportive services programs have met their goals and use this information to inform future funding decisions. The agency generally agreed with these recommendations and provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-08-664T | gao_GAO-08-664T_0 | ACF and OPA administer the three main federal abstinence-until-marriage education programs. Federal and State Efforts to Assess the Scientific Accuracy of Materials Used in Abstinence-until- Marriage Education Programs Have Been Limited
In October 2006 we reported that efforts by HHS and states to assess the scientific accuracy of materials used in abstinence-until-marriage education programs had been limited. ACF—whose grants to the State and Community-Based Programs accounted for the largest portion of federal spending on abstinence-until-marriage education—did not review its grantees’ education materials for scientific accuracy and did not require grantees of either program to review their own materials for scientific accuracy. ACF Neither Reviewed Nor Required Grantees to Review Program Materials for Scientific Accuracy, Although Some State Grantees Had Conducted Such Reviews
As of October 2006, there had been limited efforts to review the scientific accuracy of educational materials used in ACF’s State and Community- Based Programs—the two programs that accounted for the largest portion of federal spending on abstinence-until-marriage education. While not all grantees of the State Program had chosen to review the scientific accuracy of their educational materials, officials from 5 of the 10 states in our review reported that their states chose to do so. We recommended that in order to provide such assurance, the Secretary could consider alternatives such as (1) extending the approach currently used by OPA to review the scientific accuracy of the factual statements included in abstinence-until-marriage education to materials used by grantees of ACF’s Community-Based Program and requiring grantees of ACF’s State Program to conduct such reviews or (2) requiring grantees of both programs to sign written assurances in their grant applications that the materials they propose using are accurate. In addition, this official reported that ACF is implementing a process to review the accuracy of the proposed curricula of fiscal year 2007 Community-based grantees. The official also reported that, in the future, ACF will require states to provide the agency with descriptions of their strategies for reviewing the accuracy of their abstinence-until- marriage education programs. A Variety of Efforts Were Made to Assess the Effectiveness of Abstinence-until- Marriage Education Programs, but a Number of Factors Limit the Conclusions That Can Be Drawn
HHS, states, and researchers have made a variety of efforts to assess the effectiveness of abstinence-until-marriage education programs; however, a number of factors limit the conclusions that can be drawn. ACF and OPA have required their grantees to report on various outcomes used to measure the effectiveness of grantees’ abstinence-until-marriage education programs. To assess the effectiveness of the State and Community-Based Programs, ACF has analyzed national data on adolescent birth rates and the proportion of adolescents who report having had sexual intercourse. In addition, the results of some efforts that meet the criteria of a scientifically valid assessment have varied. Several Factors Limit the Conclusions That Can Be Drawn about the Effectiveness of Abstinence-until-Marriage Education Programs
Most of the efforts of HHS, states, and other researchers to evaluate the effectiveness of abstinence-until-marriage education programs included in our review have not met certain minimum criteria that experts have concluded are necessary in order for assessments of program effectiveness to be scientifically valid. Statutory Requirement to Include Information on Condom Effectiveness Would Apply to Certain Abstinence-until- Marriage Education Materials
During the course of our work on abstinence-until-marriage education, we identified a federal statutory provision—section 317P(c)(2) of the Public Health Service Act—relevant to the grants provided by HHS’s State Program, Community-Based Program, and AFL Program. However, we concluded that this requirement would apply to abstinence-until-marriage education materials prepared by and used by federal grant recipients, depending upon the substantive content of those materials. Therefore, we recommended in a letter dated October 18, 2006, that HHS reexamine its position and adopt measures to ensure that, where applicable, abstinence education materials comply with this requirement. An ACF official also told us that future State and Community-Based Program announcements would include this language. | Why GAO Did This Study
Among the efforts of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to reduce the incidence of sexually transmitted diseases and unintended pregnancies, the agency provides funding to states and organizations that offer abstinence-until-marriage education. GAO was asked to testify on the oversight of federally funded abstinence-until-marriage education programs. This testimony is primarily based on Abstinence Education: Efforts to Assess the Accuracy and Effectiveness of Federally Funded Programs, GAO-07-87 (Oct. 3, 2006). In this testimony, GAO discusses efforts by (1) HHS and states to assess the scientific accuracy of materials used in abstinence-until-marriage education programs and (2) HHS, states, and researchers to assess the effectiveness of abstinence-until-marriage education programs. GAO also discusses a Public Health Service Act requirement regarding medically accurate information about condom effectiveness. GAO focused on the three main federally funded abstinence-until-marriage programs and reviewed documents and interviewed HHS officials in the Administration for Children and Families (ACF) and the Office of Population Affairs (OPA). To update certain information, GAO contacted officials from ACF and OPA.
What GAO Found
Efforts by HHS and states to assess the scientific accuracy of materials used in abstinence-until-marriage education programs have been limited. As of October 2006, HHS's ACF--which awards grants under two programs that account for the largest portion of federal spending on abstinence education--did not review its grantees' education materials for scientific accuracy, nor did it require grantees of either program to do so. Not all states that receive funding from ACF had chosen to review their program materials for scientific accuracy. OPA reviewed the scientific accuracy of grantees' proposed education materials, and any inaccuracies found had to be corrected before those materials could be used. The extent to which federally funded abstinence-until-marriage education materials are inaccurate was not known, but OPA and some states reported finding inaccuracies. GAO recommended that the Secretary of HHS develop procedures to help assure the accuracy of abstinence-until-marriage education materials. An ACF official reported that ACF is currently implementing a process to review the accuracy of Community-based grantees' curricula and has required those grantees to sign assurances that the materials they propose using are accurate. The official also reported that, in the future, state grantees will have to provide ACF with descriptions of their strategies for reviewing the accuracy of their programs. As of August 2006, HHS, states, and researchers had made a variety of efforts to assess the effectiveness of abstinence-until-marriage education programs, but a number of factors limit the conclusions that can be drawn about the programs' effectiveness. ACF and OPA have required their grantees to report on various outcomes used to measure program effectiveness. To assess the effectiveness of its grantees' programs, ACF has analyzed national data on adolescent birth rates and the proportion of adolescents who report having had sexual intercourse. Additionally, 6 of the 10 states in GAO's review worked with third-party evaluators to assess the effectiveness of abstinence-until-marriage programs in their states. However, the conclusions that can be drawn are limited because most of the efforts to evaluate program effectiveness have not met certain minimum criteria that experts have concluded are necessary for such assessments to be scientifically valid. Additionally, the results of some efforts that do meet such criteria have varied. While conducting work for its October 2006 report, GAO identified a legal matter that required the attention of HHS. Section 317P(c)(2) of the Public Health Service Act requires certain educational materials to contain medically accurate information about condom effectiveness. GAO concluded that this requirement would apply to abstinence education materials prepared and used by federal grant recipients, depending on their substantive content, and recommended that HHS adopt measures to ensure that, where applicable, abstinence education materials comply with this requirement. The fiscal year 2007 program announcement for the Community-based Program provides information about the applicability of this requirement, and future State and Community-based Program announcements are to include this information. |
gao_GAO-07-1035 | gao_GAO-07-1035_0 | Schools in Corrective Action and Restructuring Were More Often Located in Urban School Districts and Served Higher Percentages of Minority, Poor, and Middle-School Students Than Other Title I Schools
Schools in corrective action and restructuring status in the 2005-2006 school year were more frequently located in urban school districts and a few states and served higher percentages of minority, poor, and middle- school students than other Title I schools. 1). The Number of Schools in Corrective Action and Restructuring Has Increased Considerably from Last Year and May Continue to Do So
Data for the 2006-2007 school year showed that the number of schools in corrective action and restructuring has increased. As proficiency targets continue to increase up to 100 percent by 2014, many schools identified for improvement may not make AYP. Most Schools Used a Corrective Action or Restructuring Option, but Some May Not be Meeting NCLBA Requirements
Our survey results indicated that a majority of schools in corrective action and restructuring implemented required activities; however, in some cases schools may not be in compliance with NCLBA requirements. Based on our survey, we estimate that 6 percent of schools in corrective action status did not take corrective actions. These schools took corrective action in earlier years of improvement and did not implement any further corrective actions after entering corrective action status. Under NCLBA, states are required to annually submit to Education and make widely available the measures taken to address the achievement problems of schools in improvement status, including schools in corrective action. However, Education does not require states to report on the measures taken for each school. Nonetheless, about half of the schools that did not take one of the five restructuring options engaged in a variety of school improvement efforts. Many Schools in Corrective Action and Restructuring Did Not Receive All Required Assistance through Their School Districts; However, Most Received Assistance from Their State
We estimate that more than 40 percent of the schools in corrective action and restructuring did not receive all of the required technical assistance, such as data analysis and professional development, through their school district, but most of the schools received some technical assistance from their state. While states generally are not required to provide specific kinds of assistance to schools, they are required to develop a statewide system of support that is available to schools and districts and to provide technical assistance to schools if the district fails to do so. Although state educational agencies generally are not required to provide specific kinds of technical assistance to schools in corrective action and restructuring, they are required to ensure that districts are providing all of the required assistance to schools identified for improvement, and if the district has not, state educational agencies must step in and provide the assistance. In addition to the Comprehensive Centers and What Works Clearinghouse programs, Education implemented a variety of other initiatives that may assist officials in their efforts to improve schools. These schools typically serve low-income students, and many report that factors such as neighborhood violence and student mobility pose additional challenges to engaging students and improving their academic performance. While this course of action may be a reasonable and appropriate path for some schools to take, Education has not provided guidance to districts delineating when continuing a corrective action—and not taking an additional one—is appropriate and when it is not. Objectives 2 and 3: Implementation of Corrective Action and Restructuring and State and District Assistance
To address the second objective on school’s implementation of corrective action and restructuring and the third objective on district and state assistance, we designed and administered two Web-based surveys to a nationally representative sample of school principals: one for schools in corrective action and one for schools in restructuring, as of the 2005-2006 school year. No Child Left Behind Act: States Face Challenges Measuring Academic Growth. | Why GAO Did This Study
The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLBA) focused national attention on improving schools so that all students reach academic proficiency by 2014. In the 2006- 2007 school year, about 4,500 of the 54,000 Title I schools failed to make adequate yearly progress (AYP) for 4 or more years. Schools that miss AYP for 4 years are identified for corrective action, and after 6 years, they must be restructured. GAO examined (1) the characteristics of Title I schools in corrective action and restructuring; (2) the actions that schools in corrective action and restructuring implemented; (3) the assistance those schools received from districts and states; and (4) how Education supports states in their efforts to assist these schools. GAO administered two Web-based surveys to a nationwide sample of schools in corrective action and restructuring status and conducted site visits to five states.
What GAO Found
Nationwide, the 2,790 Title I schools that were in corrective action or restructuring status in the 2005-2006 school year were more frequently located in urban areas and in a few states. These schools served higher percentages of minority, poor, and middle-school students than other Title I schools, and many report that factors such as neighborhood violence and student mobility pose additional challenges to improving student academic performance. As state proficiency targets continue to increase to 100 percent in 2014, the number of schools in corrective action and restructuring may increase. A majority of schools in corrective action or restructuring status implemented required activities. However, in some cases, schools may not be meeting NCLBA requirements. GAO estimates that 6 percent of schools did not take any of the required corrective actions and that about a third continued corrective actions implemented during earlier years of school improvement but did not take a new action after entering corrective action status. While this course of action may be an appropriate path for some schools to take, the Department of Education has not provided guidance to districts delineating when continuing a corrective action is appropriate and when it is not. In addition, about 40 percent of schools did not take any of the five restructuring options required by NCLBA. While states are required to report annually to the Department of Education the measures taken by schools in improvement status, Education does not require states to report on the specific measures taken for each school. GAO estimates that 42 percent of the schools in corrective action or restructuring did not receive all required types of assistance through their school districts, although most received discretionary assistance from their state educational agencies. Districts are required to ensure that several types of assistance are provided to all schools in improvement status, including those in corrective action and restructuring status. This assistance includes help in analyzing students' assessment data and revising school budgets so that resources are allocated to improvement efforts. NCLBA generally does not require states to provide specific kinds of assistance to schools in corrective action or restructuring; however, they are required to develop a statewide system of support, including school support teams to provide technical assistance to schools and districts. Most schools received some type of assistance from the state educational agency. Education provides technical assistance and research results to states primarily through its Comprehensive Centers Program. Education also has provided more material in its Web-based clearinghouse to address a greater number of topics and is developing an initiative to outline practical steps for schools in improvement, including those in restructuring. |
gao_GAO-15-648T | gao_GAO-15-648T_0 | The Uniform Mental Health Services in VA Medical Centers and Clinics handbook (Handbook), which defines VA’s minimum clinical requirements for mental health services, requires that VA facilities provide evidence-based treatment through the administration of medication, when indicated, consistent with the MDD clinical practice guideline (CPG) recommendations. intended to improve VA’s suicide prevention efforts by identifying demographic, clinical, and other related information on veteran suicides that VA Central Office can use to develop policy and procedures to help prevent future veteran deaths. Veterans in Our Review Often Did Not Receive Recommended Care, and VA Lacks Methods to Track Whether Recommended Care Is Provided
Our recent work, based on the three CPG recommendations we selected, has found almost all of the 30 veterans with MDD in our review who had been prescribed antidepressants received care that deviated from the MDD CPG recommendations. For example, we found that although the CPG recommends that veterans’ depressive symptoms be assessed at 4-6 weeks after initiation of antidepressant treatment using a standard assessment tool to determine the efficacy of the treatment, 26 of the 30 veterans were not assessed using such a tool within this time frame. Additionally, 10 veterans did not receive follow up within the time frame recommended in the CPG. VA Central Office and some VAMCs have implemented limited methods to determine the extent to which veterans are receiving care that However, without is consistent with some of the CPG recommendations.a system-wide process in place to identify and fully assess whether the care provided is consistent with the CPG, VA does not know the extent to which veterans with MDD who have been prescribed antidepressants are receiving care as recommended in the CPG and whether appropriate actions are taken by VAMCs to mitigate potentially significant risks to veterans. Diagnostic coding discrepancies further complicate VA’s ability to know if veterans with MDD are receiving care consistent with the CPG. result, VA’s ability to monitor veterans with MDD and assess its performance in treating veterans as recommended in the MDD CPG and measuring health outcomes for veterans is further limited because VA may not be fully aware of the population of veterans with MDD. VA’s review of the accuracy of diagnostic codes is ongoing. Data VA Collects on Veteran Suicides Were Not Always Complete, Accurate, or Consistent
Our recent work has found that demographic, clinical, and other data submitted to VA Central Office on veteran suicides were not always completely or correctly entered into the BHAP Post-Mortem Chart Analysis templates (BHAP templates)—a mechanism by which VA Central Office collects veteran suicide data from VAMCs’ review of veterans’ medical records. We found that over half of the 63 BHAP templates we examined had incomplete or inaccurate information (see fig. For example, we found 6 BHAP templates that included a date of death that was incorrect based on information in the veteran’s medical record. We also found several situations where VAMCs interpreted and applied instructions for completing the BHAP templates differently, resulting in inconsistent data being reported across VAMCs. To improve VA’s efforts to inform its suicide prevention activities, we made three recommendations in our November 2014 report that directed VA to (1) clarify guidance on how to complete the BHAP templates to ensure that VAMCs are submitting consistent data on veteran suicides, (2) ensure that VAMCs have a process in place to review data on veteran suicides for completeness, accuracy, and consistency before the data are submitted to VA Central Office, and (3) implement processes to review data on veteran suicides submitted by VAMCs for accuracy and completeness. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2013, VA estimated that about 1.5 million veterans required mental health care, including for MDD. MDD is a debilitating mental illness related to reduced quality of life and increased risk for suicide. VA also plays a role in suicide risk assessment and prevention.
This testimony addresses the extent to which (1) veterans with MDD who are prescribed an antidepressant receive recommended care and (2) VAMCs are collecting information on veteran suicides as required by VA. The testimony is based on GAO's November 2014 report, VA Health Care: Improvements Needed in Monitoring Antidepressant Use for Major Depressive Disorder and in Increasing Accuracy of Suicide Data ( GAO-15-55 ). For that report GAO analyzed VA data, interviewed VA officials, and conducted site visits to six VAMCs selected based on geography and population served. GAO also reviewed randomly selected medical records for five veterans from each of the six VAMCs, for veterans diagnosed with MDD and prescribed an antidepressant in 2012, as well as all completed BHAP templates. The results cannot be generalized across VA. GAO followed up in May 2015 to determine the status of GAO's previous recommendations.
What GAO Found
Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) policy states that antidepressant treatment must be consistent with VA's current clinical practice guideline (CPG) for major depressive disorder (MDD); however, GAO's recent review of 30 veterans' medical records found that most contained deviations. For example, although the CPG recommends that veterans' depressive symptoms be assessed at 4-6 weeks after initiation of antidepressant treatment using a standardized assessment tool, 26 of the 30 veterans were not assessed in this manner within this time frame. Additionally, 10 veterans did not receive follow up within the time frame recommended in the CPG. GAO found that VA (1) does not have a system-wide process in place to identify and fully assess the extent to which veterans with MDD who have been prescribed antidepressants are receiving care as recommended in the CPG and (2) does not know whether appropriate actions are being taken by VA medical centers (VAMC) to mitigate potentially significant risks to veterans. GAO also found that VA's data may underestimate the prevalence of MDD among veterans being treated through VA as a result of imprecise coding by clinicians, further complicating VA's ability to know if veterans with MDD are receiving care consistent with the CPG.
GAO's recent work has found that the demographic and clinical data that VA collects on veteran suicides were not always complete, accurate, or consistent. VA's Behavioral Health Autopsy Program (BHAP) is a quality initiative to improve VA's suicide prevention efforts by identifying information that VA can use to develop policy to help prevent future suicides. The BHAP templates are a mechanism by which VA collects suicide data from VAMCs' review of veteran medical records. GAO's review of the 63 completed BHAP templates at five VAMCs found that (1) over half of the templates that VAMCs submitted to VA had incomplete or inaccurate data, and (2) VAMCs submitted inconsistent information because they interpreted VA's guidance differently. Lack of complete, accurate, and consistent data—coupled with GAO's finding of poor oversight of the review of BHAP templates—can inhibit VA's ability to identify, evaluate, and improve ways to better inform its suicide prevention efforts.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommended that VA implement processes to assess deviations from recommended care; identify and address MDD coding issues; and implement processes to improve veteran suicide data. VA has made progress on these recommendations and has fully implemented one. |
gao_GGD-98-156 | gao_GGD-98-156_0 | There are separate occupational taxes for alcohol producers, wholesalers, and retailers. Failure to comply with the alcohol SOT provisions can result in the assessment of civil and criminal penalties against the proprietors. ATF Uses a Combination of Efforts to Enforce SOT Compliance
ATF has implemented a combination of efforts to enforce compliance with the alcohol SOTs. These efforts include (1) sending known alcohol businesses their annual registration and stamp renewal returns, (2) matching ATF and state information on retailers, (3) publicizing occupational tax information, (4) licensing producers and wholesalers, (5) assessing civil and criminal penalties and interest, and (6) verifying SOT compliance during on-site inspections. ATF uses several methods to inform the public about the SOT requirements. The two offices also used different definitions of compliance. ATF’s Estimated Compliance Rates
ATF estimated that, as of April 3, 1998, 93 percent of the producers with permits, 95 percent of the wholesalers with permits, and 89 percent of the retailers known to ATF filed timely returns and timely paid the taxes due for tax year 1998. IG’s Estimated Retailer Compliance Rate
The IG reported an estimated average compliance rate of about 83 percent for retailers over tax years 1993, 1994, and 1995. A total of 43 states and the District provided usable data. Arguments for the SOT
Supporters of the SOTs have justified the taxes as a general source of revenue and as providing revenues intended to offset the costs of regulating the alcohol industry. Second, the tax rates are not likely to reflect the current costs of regulation because they are rarely changed. ATF Has Justified the SOTs as Facilitating ATF’s Enforcement of Laws and Regulations
The SOTs have been justified as facilitating ATF’s enforcement efforts by giving the agency the authority to enter the premises of alcohol dealers and to require that the dealers keep certain records. ATF officials said that ATF uses this authority in its efforts to control the alcohol distribution system, prevent illegal sales of alcohol, and enforce all federal taxes on alcohol. ATF officials believe that the access and recordkeeping authority provided by the SOTs is necessary for ATF enforcement efforts. SOTs Have Been Criticized for High Administrative Costs and Low Compliance
We concluded in two separate reports that the administrative costs of the SOTs were high relative to the costs of administering the alcohol and tobacco excise taxes and that compliance among retailers may have been low. Opponents Have Criticized the SOTs for Being Unfair
Opponents of the SOTs have criticized the taxes for being unfair. Because the taxes are a fixed amount per location, they may take more income from those with less ability to pay the tax, and, if compliance rates are low, compliant taxpayers would pay an unfair share of the tax burden. Special Tax Stamp Registration and Return Process
In May of each year, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) sends a notification package to each alcohol business known to ATF. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO studied the alcohol special occupational taxes (SOT), focusing on: (1) the methods that the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) uses to enforce compliance with the taxes and the costs incurred in these efforts; (2) compliance rates for alcohol producers, wholesalers, and retailers; and (3) arguments that have been made for and against these occupational taxes.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) ATF uses a variety of methods to enforce compliance with the alcohol SOTs; (2) among other information preprinted on the special tax renewal registration and return, ATF lists each known operating location and the total amount of taxes due; (3) ATF also informs the public about alcohol occupational tax requirements using a variety of media; (4) all but five states routinely provide retailer licensing information that ATF can compare with federal records to identify retailers who may not be in compliance; (5) ATF has assessed civil and criminal penalties, as well as interest, to enforce compliance with the SOT provisions; (6) ATF estimated that it cost a total of $1.9 million to administer the SOT programs for alcohol, tobacco, and firearm businesses in fiscal year 1997; (7) ATF and the audit staff at the Department of the Treasury's Office of the Inspector General (IG) have estimated rates of taxpayer compliance with the alcohol SOTs; (8) however, the two offices used different data, methods, and definitions of compliance to make their estimates; (9) ATF estimated that, as of April 3, 1998, 93 percent of the producers and 95 percent of the wholesalers with federal permits and 89 percent of the retailers known to ATF were compliant for tax year 1998; (10) IG estimated the average compliance rate for retailers over tax years 1993, 1994, and 1995 to be 83 percent; (11) supporters of the alcohol SOTs have justified the taxes both as a general source of revenue and as providing revenues to offset the costs to the government of regulating the industry; (12) however, the SOTs are not likely to accurately reflect the current costs of regulation because the tax rates have rarely been changed; (13) the SOTs give ATF the authority to enter the premises of alcohol dealers and require that retailers keep certain records; (14) ATF believes that the access and recordkeeping authority provided by the SOTs is necessary for its efforts to control the alcohol distribution system, prevent illegal sales of alcohol, and enforce other federal taxes on alcohol; (15) the SOTs have been criticized in the past because of relatively high administrative costs and low compliance rates among retailers; (16) opponents of the SOTs have criticized the taxes for being unfair; and (17) because the SOTs are a fixed amount per location, the SOTs may take more income from those with less ability to pay the tax, and, if compliance is low, compliant taxpayers may bear an unfair share of the tax burden. |
gao_GAO-03-385 | gao_GAO-03-385_0 | SBA, through its Disaster Loan Program, is part of this concerted effort. SBA and the Congress Responded to Small Businesses Affected by the September 11 Attacks
In the weeks and months following the terrorist attacks, SBA and the Congress faced the challenge of responding to the lingering effects of the attacks and subsequent federal actions on small businesses throughout the country. As of the end of fiscal year 2002, on average,SBA processed September 11 business loans in 13 days, compared with 16 days for disaster assistance business loans processed in fiscal year 20. Disaster Loan Program Performance Measures and Plans Have Limitations
As stated earlier, the strategic plan describes the multiyear strategic goals. We attribute some of these limitations to the specific nature of the measures SBA uses to describe the performance of the disaster lending program, while other limitations can be attributed to the description of program’s performance in the plan itself. First, the three output measures do not capture the notable progress the program has made in improving its loan processing; improvements that ultimately benefit disaster loan applicants and borrowers, such as better staffing processes and management of staff duties. For example, as part of its response to September 11 borrowers, the Niagara Falls DAO reduced the amount of documentation required for September 11 victims from the World Trade Center and Pentagon disaster areas to receive disbursements of between $25,000 and $50,000, so that the DAO could more quickly disburse the remaining amounts. Conclusions
The September 11 terrorist attacks presented SBA with challenges it had never before faced. Viewing the performance measures in light of SBA’s response to the September 11 attacks underscores this finding. Moreover, the limitations in the program’s performance measures and plans mean that congressional decisionmakers do not have an accurate description of SBA’s progress to help them make informed decisions in directing and funding the Disaster Loan Program. To review and analyze SBA’s performance plans and measures for its Disaster Loan Program, we reviewed SBA’s strategic plan for the 2001-2006 period and performance plan for fiscal years 2002 and 2003. | Why GAO Did This Study
The September 11 terrorist attacks and subsequent federal action had a substantial impact on businesses in both the declared disaster areas and around the nation. In the aftermath of the attacks, the Congress, among other actions, appropriated emergency supplemental funds to the Small Business Administration (SBA) to aid September 11 victims. Given the uniqueness of this disaster and changes in the program, GAO analyzed SBA's lending to September 11 victims, as well as the loan program's performance goals and measures.
What GAO Found
As part of its response to the September 11 terrorist attacks, SBA modified several aspects of its Disaster Loan Program and its processes. For example, SBA increased the maximum loan amounts available and decreased the amount of documentation required for certain loans. By the end of fiscal year 2002, approximately $1 billion in loans had been approved for victims of the attacks. On average, SBA processed business loans to September 11 victims in an average 13 days compared with 16 days for business loans to other disaster victims in fiscal year 2001. Like other federal programs, SBA has developed a multiyear strategic goal for the Disaster Loan Program--helping families and businesses recover from disasters--and has developed annual goals and measures to assess its yearly progress toward attaining their strategic goals. GAO reviewed the measures and found that they have numerous limitations. For instance, these measures do not capture the notable progress the program has made in improving its loan processing--progress that ultimately affects disaster loan applicants and borrowers. The inadequacies of SBA's measures are especially evident when considered in light of the agency's performance in responding to the September 11 terrorist attacks. GAO attributes some of these limitations to the nature of the measures SBA uses to describe the performance of the Disaster Loan Program, while others can be attributed to the description of the program's performance. Without better performance measures and plans, the Congress does not have an accurate description of SBA's annual progress toward helping Americans recover from disasters. |
gao_T-HEHS-98-219 | gao_T-HEHS-98-219_0 | As part of this role, DHS (1) licenses nursing homes to do business in California; (2) certifies to the federal government, by conducting reviews of nursing homes, that the homes are eligible for Medicare and Medicaid payment; and (3) investigates complaints about care provided in licensed homes. Review of Records for 1993 Deaths Uncovered Serious Care Problems
Our work indicates that 34 residents—more than half of our sample of 62 of California’s nursing home residents who died in 1993—received unacceptable care. In certain of those cases, the unacceptable care endangered residents’ health and safety; however, without an autopsy that establishes the cause of death, we cannot be conclusive about whether the unacceptable care directly led to any individual’s death. Predictability of Surveys, Questionable Records, and Survey Limitations Hinder Efforts to Identify Care Problems
The deficiencies that state surveyors identified and documented only partially capture the extent of care problems in California’s homes, for several reasons. However, a subsequent HCFA-conducted poll of nursing home resident advocates in most states and a 1998 nine-state study by the National State Auditors Association found that predictable timing of inspections continues to be a problem. HCFA’s Enforcement Policies Ineffective in Bringing Homes With Serious, Repeated Violations Into Sustained Compliance
We also examined the efforts of the state and HCFA to ensure that the homes cited for serious deficiencies were correcting their problems and sustaining compliance with federal requirements over time. However, HCFA enforcement policies have led to relatively few federal disciplinary actions taken against these homes in California. Since July 1995, when the federal enforcement scheme established in OBRA 87 took effect, 59 California nursing homes have been cited for immediate jeopardy deficiencies and about 25 have been designated poor performers. HCFA policy permits granting a grace period to this group of noncompliant homes, regardless of their past performance. Between July 1995 and May 1998, California’s DHS gave about 98 percent of noncompliant homes a grace period to correct deficiencies. For the few California homes that have had federal sanctions imposed, HCFA has been less than vigilant. Eleven have been reinstated under the same ownership they had before termination. In a number of cases, this responsibility has not been met in California. Together, these factors can mask significant care problems from the view of federal and state regulators. In summary, we are recommending that HCFA revise its guidance to states in order to reduce the predictability of on-site reviews, possibly by staggering the schedule or segmenting the survey into two or more reviews; revise methods for sampling resident cases to better identify the potential for and prevalence of care problems; and, for those homes with a history of serious and repeated deficiencies, eliminate the offer of a grace period for resuming compliance and substantiate all of the home’s reports of resumed compliance with an on-site review. However, we also believe that continued vigilance by the Congress is needed to ensure that the promised changes in federal and state oversight of nursing home care are implemented. Additional copies are $2 each. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed its findings on nursing home care in California, focusing on: (1) care problems identified in recent state and federal quality reviews that California conducted in the last 2 or 3 years; (2) obstacles to federal and state efforts to identify care problems; and (3) implementation of federal enforcement policies to ensure that homes correct problems identified and then sustain compliance with federal requirements.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) despite the presence of a considerable federal and state oversight infrastructure, a significant number of California nursing homes were not and currently are not sufficiently monitored to guarantee the safety and welfare of nursing home residents; (2) GAO came to this conclusion by using information from California's Department of Health Services (DHS) reviews of nursing home care covering 95 percent of the state's nursing homes, and Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) data on federal enforcement actions taken; (3) looking back at medical record information from 1993, GAO found that, of 62 resident cases sampled, residents in 34 cases received care that was unacceptable; (4) however, in the absence of autopsy information that establishes the cause of death, GAO cannot be conclusive about whether this unacceptable care may have contributed directly to individual deaths; (5) as for the extent of care problems currently, between July 1995 and February 1998, California surveyors cited 407 homes for care violations they classified as serious under federal or state deficiency categories; (6) moreover, GAO believes that the extent of current serious care problems portrayed in the federal and state data is likely to be understated; (7) the predictable timing of on-site reviews, the questionable accuracy and completeness of medical records, and the limited number of residents' care reviewed by surveyors in each home have each likely shielded some problems from surveyor scrutiny; (8) even when the state identifies serious deficiencies, HCFA enforcement policies have not been effective in ensuring that the deficiencies are corrected and remain corrected; (9) California's DHS, consistent with HCFA's guidance on imposing sanctions, grants 98 percent of noncompliant homes a 30- to 45-day grace period to correct deficiencies without penalty, regardless of their past performance; (10) only the few homes that qualify as posing the greatest danger are not provided such a grace period; (11) in addition, only 16 of the roughly 1,400 California homes participating in Medicare and Medicaid have been terminated from participation, most of them have been reinstated quickly, and many have had subsequent compliance problems; and (12) recognizing shortcomings in enforcement, California officials told GAO that they launched a pilot program in July 1998 intended to target for increased vigilance certain of the state's nursing homes with the worst compliance records. |
gao_GAO-03-572T | gao_GAO-03-572T_0 | The long-term fiscal pressures created by the retirement of the baby boom generation and new homeland security and defense commitments, including the ongoing Operation Iraqi Freedom, sharpen the need to look at competing claims on federal budgetary resources and new priorities. Highlights of Major Issues Relating to the U.S. Government’s Consolidated Financial Statements for Fiscal Years 2002 and 2001
As I mentioned earlier, as has been the case for the past 5 fiscal years, the federal government continues to have a significant number of material weaknesses related to financial systems, fundamental recordkeeping and financial reporting, and incomplete documentation. Several of these material weaknesses (referred to hereafter as material deficiencies) resulted in conditions that continued to prevent us from expressing an opinion on the U.S. government’s consolidated financial statements for the fiscal years ended September 30, 2002 and 2001. Providing Sustained Leadership and Oversight for Effective Implementation of Financial Management Reform
Over the past year, the JFMIP Principals continued our efforts, begun in August 2001, to accelerate progress in financial management reform. Also, President Bush has implemented the President’s Management Agenda to provide direction to, and to closely monitor, management reform across government, which encompasses improved financial performance. In fiscal year 2002, JFMIP Principals continued the series of regular, deliberative meetings that focused on key financial management reform issues such as defining success measures for financial management performance that go far beyond an unqualified audit opinion on financial statements and include measures such as financial management systems that routinely provide timely, reliable, and useful financial information and no material internal control weaknesses or material noncompliance with laws and regulations and Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996 (FFMIA) requirements; restructuring the Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board’s (FASAB) composition to enhance the independence of the Board and increase public involvement in setting standards for federal financial accounting and reporting; significantly accelerating financial statement reporting to improve timeliness for decision making and to discourage costly efforts designed to obtain unqualified opinions on financial statements without addressing underlying systems challenges; establishing audit advisory committees for selected major federal addressing difficult accounting and reporting issues, including impediments to an audit opinion on the U.S. government's consolidated financial statements and reporting updated social insurance financial information in the U.S. government’s consolidated financial statements. Building on the Success of Unqualified Audit Opinions
Building on the success that has been achieved in obtaining unqualified audit opinions, federal agency management must continue to work toward fully resolving the pervasive and generally long-standing material weaknesses that have been reported for the past 6 fiscal years. It recognized that “most federal agencies that obtain clean audits only do so after making extraordinary, labor-intensive assaults on financial records.” Further, the President’s Management Agenda stated that without sound internal control and accurate and timely financial information, it is not possible to accomplish the President’s agenda to secure the best performance and highest measure of accountability for the American people. Irrespective of the unqualified opinions on their financial statements, many federal agencies do not have timely, accurate, and useful financial information and sound controls with which to make informed decisions and to ensure accountability on an ongoing basis. Three major impediments to an opinion on the consolidated financial statements are (1) serious financial management problems at DOD, (2) the federal government’s inability to fully account for and reconcile billions of dollars of transactions between federal entities, and (3) the federal government’s inability to properly prepare the consolidated financial statements. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO is required by law to audit the consolidated financial statements of the U.S. government. Timely, accurate, and useful financial information is essential for making informed operating decisions day to day, managing the federal government's operations more efficiently and effectively, meeting the goals of federal financial management reform legislation, supporting results-oriented management approaches, and ensuring accountability on an ongoing basis. The importance of such information is heightened by the unprecedented demographic challenge of an aging population. Federal spending on the elderly, health care, and new homeland security and defense commitments increases the need to look at competing claims on the budget and at new priorities. Over the past year, the Principals of the Joint Financial Management Improvement Program continued efforts to accelerate progress in financial management reform. Also, President Bush has implemented the President's Management Agenda to provide direction to, and closely monitor, management reform across government, which encompasses improved financial management performance. To effectively implement federal financial management reform, sustained leadership and oversight are essential.
What GAO Found
As in the 5 previous fiscal years, the federal government continues to have a significant number of material weaknesses related to financial systems, fundamental recordkeeping and financial reporting, and incomplete documentation. Several of these material weaknesses resulted in conditions that continued to prevent us from expressing an opinion on the U.S. government's consolidated financial statements for the fiscal years ended September 30, 2002 and 2001. Three major impediments to an opinion on the consolidated financial statements are (1) serious financial management problems at DOD, (2) the federal government's inability to fully account for and reconcile billions of dollars of transactions between federal entities, and (3) the federal government's inability to properly prepare the consolidated financial statements. Federal agencies have continued to make progress in obtaining unqualified audit opinions--21 of 24 Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act agencies for fiscal year 2002, up from 6 for fiscal year 1996. Irrespective of the unqualified opinions, many federal agencies do not have timely, accurate, and useful financial information and sound controls with which to make informed decisions and to ensure accountability on an ongoing basis. Building on the success achieved in obtaining unqualified audit opinions, federal agency management must continue to work toward fully resolving the pervasive and generally long-standing material weaknesses that have been reported for the past 6 fiscal years. The President's Management Agenda stated that without sound internal control and accurate and timely financial information, it is not possible to accomplish the President's agenda to secure the best performance and highest measure of accountability for the American people. |
gao_GAO-07-741T | gao_GAO-07-741T_0 | Our reports were among the resources that Congress drew on in enacting the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) of 2002, which provided a framework for fundamental election administration reform and created the EAC mission to oversee the election administration reform process. Actions EAC has taken since 2004 to improve voting systems include publishing the Best Practices Toolkit and specialized management guides to assist states and local jurisdictions with managing election-related activities and equipment; issuing voting system standards in 2005, referred to as the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines; establishing procedures for certifying voting systems; establishing a program for accreditation of independent testing laboratories, with support from NIST’s National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program; disbursing to states approximately $2.3 billion in appropriations for the replacement of older voting equipment and election administration improvements under Title III of HAVA; and conducting national surveys of the 2004 general election, uniformed and overseas voters, and other studies. Contextual Role and Performance Characteristics of Electronic Voting Systems Are Important to Understanding Their Use
Voting systems are one facet of a multifaceted, continuous elections process that involves the interplay of people, processes, and technology. All levels of government—federal, state, and local— share responsibilities for aspects of elections and voting systems. Such performance can be viewed in terms of several characteristics, such as security, reliability, ease of use, and cost effectiveness. Management of Electronic Voting System Performance Is a Continuous Process
The performance of any information technology system, including electronic voting systems, is heavily influenced by a number of factors, including how well the system is defined, developed, acquired, tested, and implemented. Among other things, this phase includes activities associated with the physical environments in which the system operates. Reliability. Ease of use depends on how well jurisdictions design ballots and educate voters on the use of the equipment. Widespread Concerns about Electronic Voting Systems Have Been Reported
Election officials, computer security experts, citizen advocacy groups, and others have raised significant security and reliability concerns with electronic voting systems, citing, for example, inadequacies in standards, system design and development, operation and management activities, and testing. In 2005, we examined the range of concerns raised by these groups and aligned them with their relevant life cycle phases. We also examined EAC’s efforts related to these concerns. Inadequate System Operation and Management Activities
Several reports raised concerns about the operational practices of local jurisdictions and the actual performance of their respective electronic voting systems during elections. These include incorrect system configurations, inadequate security management programs, and poor implementation of security procedures. Several reports indicated that state and local officials did not always follow security procedures. Regarding voting systems, states’ and jurisdictions’ responses to our surveys showed that differing versions of the national voting system standards were used (not always the most current version); voting system life cycle management practices were not consistently implemented; and certain types of system testing were not widely performed. Roles and responsibilities. Addressing Voting System Challenges Requires the Combined Efforts of All Levels of Government
The challenges in ensuring that voting systems perform securely and reliably are not unlike those faced by any technology user— application of well-defined standards for system capabilities and performance; effective integration of the people, processes, and technology throughout the voting system life cycle; rigorous and disciplined performance of security and testing activities; objective measurement to determine whether the systems are performing as intended; and analytical and economically justified bases for making informed decisions about voting system investment options. These challenges are complicated by other conditions common to both the national elections community and other information technology environments: the distribution of responsibilities among various organizations, technology changes, funding opportunities and constraints, changing requirements and standards, and public attention. Therefore, all levels of government need to work together to address these challenges, under the leadership of the EAC. To assist the EAC in executing its leadership role, we previously made recommendations to the commission aimed at better planning its ongoing and future activities relative to, for example, system standards and information sharing. While the EAC agreed with the recommendations, it told us that its ability to effectively execute its role is resource constrained. The challenge facing all voting jurisdictions will be to ensure that these activities are fully and properly performed, particularly in light of the security and reliability concerns that have been reported with electronic voting systems. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since the 2000 national elections, concerns have been raised by various groups regarding the election process, including voting technologies. Beginning in 2001, GAO published a series of reports examining virtually every aspect of the elections process. GAO's complement of reports was used by Congress in framing the Help America Vote Act of 2002, which, among other things, provided for replacement of older voting equipment with more modern electronic voting systems and established the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) to lead the nation's election reform efforts. GAO's later reports have raised concerns about the security and reliability of these electronic voting systems, examined the EAC's efforts to address these concerns, and surveyed state and local officials about practices used during the 2004 election, as well as plans for their systems for the 2006 election. Using its published work on electronic voting systems, GAO was asked to testify on (1) the contextual role and characteristics of electronic voting systems, (2) the range of security and reliability concerns that have been reported about these systems, (3) the experiences and management practices of states and local jurisdictions regarding these systems, and (4) the longstanding and emerging challenges facing all levels of government in using these systems.
What GAO Found
Voting systems are one facet of a multifaceted, year-round elections process that involves the interplay of people, processes, and technology, and includes all levels of government. How well these systems play their role in an election depends in large part on how well they are managed throughout their life cycles, which begins with defining system standards; includes system design, development, and testing; and concludes with system operations. Important attributes of the systems' performance are security, reliability, ease of use, and cost effectiveness. A range of groups knowledgeable about elections or voting systems have expressed concerns about the security and reliability of electronic voting systems; these concerns can be associated with stages in the system life cycle. Examples of concerns include vague or incomplete voting system standards, system design flaws, poorly developed security controls, incorrect system configurations, inadequate testing, and poor overall security management. For the 2004 national elections, states' and local governments' responses to our surveys showed that they did not always ensure that important life cycle and security management practices were employed for their respective electronic voting systems. In particular, responses indicated that the most current standards were not always adopted and applied, security management practices and controls were employed to varying degrees, and certain types of system testing were not commonly performed. Moreover, jurisdictions' responses showed that they did not consistently monitor the performance of their systems. In GAO's view, the challenges faced in acquiring and operating electronic voting systems are not unlike those faced by any technology user--adoption and application of well-defined system standards; effective integration of the technology with the people who operate it and the processes that govern the operation; rigorous and disciplined performance of system security and testing activities; reliable measurement of system performance; and the analytical basis for making informed, economically justified decisions about voting system investment options. These challenges are complicated by other conditions such as the distribution of responsibilities among various organizations and funding opportunities and constraints. Given the diffused and decentralized allocation of voting system roles and responsibilities across all levels of government, addressing these challenges will require the combined efforts of all levels of government, under the leadership of the EAC. To assist the EAC in executing its leadership role, GAO has previously made recommendations to the commission aimed at better planning its ongoing and future activities relative to, for example, system standards and information sharing. While the EAC agreed with the recommendations, it stated that its ability to effectively execute its role is constrained by a lack of adequate resources. |
gao_GAO-01-1014T | gao_GAO-01-1014T_0 | Background
The complexity of the environment in which CMS and its contractors operate the Medicare program cannot be overstated. About 50 Medicare claims administration contractors carry out the day-to- day operations of the program and are responsible not only for paying claims but for providing information and education to providers and beneficiaries that participate in Medicare. HIPAA earmarked increased funds for the prevention and detection of health care fraud and abuse and increased sanctions for abusive providers. Based on the agency’s estimates, MIP saved the Medicare program more than $16 for each dollar spent in fiscal year 2000. DOJ has placed a high priority on identifying patterns of improper billing by Medicare providers. DOJ investigates cases that have been referred by the HHS OIG and others to determine if health care providers have engaged in fraudulent activity, and it pursues civil actions or criminal prosecutions, as appropriate. As a result, providers are concerned that they may inadvertently violate Medicare billing rules. Last year, HCFA conducted a one-time limited survey of contractors to determine the number of physicians subject to complex medical reviews in fiscal year 2000. CMS’ Oversight of Contractors Is Key to Balancing Program Safeguards and Provider Concerns
CMS’ oversight of its contractors is essential to ensuring that the Medicare program is administered efficiently and effectively. Historically, the agency’s oversight of contractors has been weak, although it has made substantial improvements in the past 2 years. | What GAO Found
In fiscal year 2000, Medicare made more than $200 billion in payments to hundreds of thousands of health care providers who served nearly 40 million beneficiaries. Because of the program's vast size and complexity, GAO has included Medicare on its list of government areas at high risk for waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement. GAO first included Medicare on that list in 1990, and it remains there today. GAO has continually reported on the efforts of the Health Care Financing Administration -- recently renamed the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) -- to safeguard Medicare payments and streamline operations. CMS relies on its claims administration contractors to run Medicare. As these contractors have become more aggressive in identifying and pursuing inappropriate payments, providers have expressed concern that Medicare has become to complex and difficult to navigate. CMS's oversight of its contractors has historically been weak. In the last two years, however, CMS has made substantial progress. GAO has identified several areas in which CMS still need improvement, especially in ensuring that contractors provide accurate, complete, and timely information to providers on Medicare billing rules and coverage policies. |
gao_GAO-02-67 | gao_GAO-02-67_0 | The Medicare Subvention Demonstration
The Medicare subvention demonstration permitted DOD to create managed care organizations that participate in the Medicare+Choice program and enroll older retirees. Instead, it was mostly due to Senior Prime enrollees’ heavy use of services. A smaller part of the difference reflected DOD’s coverage of prescription drugs. Prescription drugs for enrollees—not included in the Medicare benefit package—cost DOD on average $55 per month per enrollee. The Capitated Rate Exceeded What Medicare Would Have Spent on Senior Prime Enrollees Without the Demonstration
Without the demonstration, Medicare in 1999 would have spent 55 percent of the Senior Prime capitation rate on retirees enrolled in Senior Prime. BBA Payment Rules Resulted in No Medicare Payment to DOD
The BBA payment rules for the demonstration limited what Medicare could pay DOD for care rendered to Senior Prime enrollees, reflecting the fact that DOD had an additional source of funds for retiree health care—its appropriations. Under these rules, DOD was required to spend as much as it had historically spent on all seniors in the demonstration areas before it could be paid by Medicare. The rules also required that the payment be adjusted upward or downward according to whether Senior Prime enrollees were sicker or healthier than comparable Medicare beneficiaries. The BBA rules prevented the government from paying twice for the same care and protected the Medicare program from a large increase in its spending for Senior Prime enrollees. The LOE requirement applied only to Medicare-covered services, for which DOD incurred high costs. | What GAO Found
The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 authorized the Department of Defense (DOD) to conduct the Medicare subvention demonstration for a three-year period. Under this demonstration, DOD formed Medicare managed care organizations--collectively called TRICARE Senior Prime--at six sites that provided the full range of Medicare-covered services as well as additional DOD-covered services, notably prescription drugs. The Medicare program was to pay DOD for Medicare-covered care of the enrolled military retirees if DOD continued to spend on all aged military retirees at least as much as it had historically. Under the subvention demonstration, Senior Prime enrollees' care in 1999 cost DOD far more than the Medicare capitation rate that was established for the demonstration. This mainly resulted from enrollees' heavy use of medical services, but DOD coverage of prescription drugs--not included in the Medicare benefit package--also contributed to its high costs. Without the demonstration, Medicare spending in 1999 for retirees who enrolled in Senior Prime would have been, on average, about 55 percent of the Senior capitation rate. The Balanced Budget Act's payment rules resulted in no Medicare payment to DOD in 1999. This was because they were designed to prevent the government from paying twice for the same care--once through DOD appropriations and again through Medicare. The rules also required that the payment be adjusted to account for Senior Prime enrollees' health status. |
gao_GAO-17-305 | gao_GAO-17-305_0 | The Medicare EHR Program requires that participants make certain types of information available, such as laboratory test results and current medications. For example patient-purchased personal health records (PHR) can enable patients to aggregate electronic information from disparate sources into a single record. Few Patients of Providers Participating in the Medicare EHR Program Electronically Accessed Their Health Information, and Providers Reported Taking Steps to Encourage Access
Less than One-third of Patients Electronically Accessed Their Health Information, and Patients Reported Such Access Generally Occurs Before or After Seeing a Provider
Providers participating in the Medicare EHR Program in 2015 reported that relatively few patients electronically accessed their health information when it was made available to them. 1.) 2.) 3.) According to patients we interviewed, patients who electronically access their health information typically do so before or after a health care encounter. HHS Has Taken Steps to Increase Patients’ Electronic Access to Health Information but Lacks Outcome Measures to Determine the Effectiveness of These Efforts
HHS Programs and Other Efforts Aim to Further Patients’ Ability to Access Health Information Electronically, Including Longitudinal Health Information
HHS officials said that two agencies, CMS and ONC, have programs or other efforts aimed at increasing the ability of patients to electronically access their health information, including the ability to access longitudinal health information and aggregate it in a single location. While ONC’s data analyses and commissioned evaluation provide information concerning patient access to electronic health information and patient engagement, these efforts do not measure the impact of the Medicare EHR Program on patients’ ability to access their health information electronically. Without outcome-focused performance measures, HHS cannot determine whether, or to what extent, each of its efforts are contributing to the department’s overall goals, or if these efforts need to be modified in any way. HHS’s investment in these efforts has been significant— since 2009 HHS has spent over $35 billion on the development and adoption of health information technology. While HHS’s investment in health information technology is significant, HHS lacks the ability to determine whether, or to what extent, CMS’s and ONC’s efforts are helping HHS achieve its goals. With regard to our first recommendation, which calls for HHS to develop performance measures to assess the outcomes of key efforts related to patients’ electronic access to longitudinal health information, HHS noted that ONC is committed to assessing the effects of health IT adoption and use. Methodology for Analysis of Medicare EHR Program Data
We analyzed data from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) as supplemented with other government data to (1) determine the number of providers—that is, hospitals and health care professionals (e.g., physicians)—that participated in the 2015 Medicare EHR Program; (2) determine the number of program participants who reported each of two measures related to patient electronic access to health information; (3) determine the extent to which program participants are offering patients, and patients are using, the ability to electronically access their health information; and (4) examine the characteristics of providers that were associated with higher or lower percentages of patients who actually accessed their available health information. Appendix II: ONC Efforts to Further Patients’ Ability to Access Longitudinal Electronic Health Information
Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology (ONC) Effort Blue Button Pledge Program
Voluntary pledge where organizations, such as providers and hospitals, commit to advance efforts to increase patient access to and use of their health data. | Why GAO Did This Study
HHS's goal is that all Americans will be able to electronically access their longitudinal health information, that is, their health information over time. HHS's efforts to achieve this goal include the Medicare EHR Program and other efforts to encourage providers to make patient health information available and for patients to access such information.
GAO was asked to review the state of patients' electronic access to their health information. This report (1) describes the electronic access to health information available to patients, and patients' views of this access, (2) describes the extent to which patients electronically access their health information, and actions providers reported taking to encourage such access, and (3) evaluates HHS's efforts to advance patients' ability to electronically access their health information. GAO analyzed data from HHS and other sources; reviewed applicable strategic planning documents; surveyed a generalizable sample of providers that participated in the Medicare EHR program; and interviewed HHS officials and a nongeneralizable sample of patients, providers, and health information technology product developers.
What GAO Found
Since 2009, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has invested over $35 billion in health information technology, including efforts to enhance patient access to and use of electronic health information. One of the largest programs is the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services' (CMS) Medicare Electronic Health Record Incentive Program (Medicare EHR Program), which, among other things, encourages providers to make electronic health information available to patients. Program data for 2015 show that health care providers that participated in the program (3,218 hospitals and 194,200 health care professionals such as physicians) offered most of their patients the ability to electronically access health information. Patients generally described this access as beneficial, but noted limitations such as the inability to aggregate their longitudinal health information from multiple sources into a single record.
Data from the 2015 Medicare EHR Program show that relatively few patients electronically access their health information when offered the ability to do so. Patients GAO interviewed described primarily accessing health information before or after a health care encounter, such as reviewing the results of a laboratory test or sharing information with another provider.
While HHS has multiple efforts to enhance patients' ability to access their electronic health information, it lacks information on the effectiveness of these efforts. The Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology (ONC) within HHS collaborates with CMS to assess CMS's Medicare EHR Program as well as its own efforts to enhance patient access to and use of electronic health information. However, ONC has not developed outcome measures for these efforts consistent with leading principles for measuring performance. Without such measures, HHS lacks critical information necessary to determine whether each of its efforts are contributing to the department's overall goals, or if these efforts need to be modified in any way.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that HHS 1) develop performance measures to assess outcomes of key efforts related to patients' electronic access to longitudinal health information, and 2) use the information from these measures to help achieve program goals. HHS concurred with the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-12-333 | gao_GAO-12-333_0 | Since 2006, CMS has had three contractors to perform most of its administrative activities within the MSP process: the Coordination of Benefits Contractor (COBC), the Medicare Secondary Payer Recovery Contractor (MSPRC), and the Workers’ Compensation Review Contractor (WCRC). Figures 2, 3, and 4 illustrate how the process could work for MSP situations that involve an auto liability insurer, a no-fault insurer, and a workers’ compensation plan, respectively. MSP Contractor Workloads, Payments, and Medicare Savings Increased during the Initial Implementation of Mandatory Reporting for NGHPs
During the initial implementation of mandatory reporting for NGHPs, the workloads of and CMS payments to MSP contractors, and Medicare savings, all increased. For example, since fiscal year 2008, CMS payments to the MSP contractors have increased by about $21 million while Medicare savings from NGHP MSP situations—including savings from claims denials and conditional payment recoveries—have increased by about $124 million. The NGHP workloads of all three MSP contractors increased to varying degrees during the initial implementation of mandatory reporting. For example, from fiscal year 2008 through fiscal year 2011, the number of MSP situations involving NGHPs that were voluntarily reported to the COBC increased by 176 percent and the number of WCMSAs submitted to the WCRC increased by 42 percent (see table 1). Medicare Savings Increased during the Initial Implementation of Mandatory Reporting, but the Total Impact on Savings Could Take Years to Determine
Medicare savings increased during the initial implementation of mandatory reporting for NGHPs, but an accurate estimate of savings could take years to determine because of the lag time between initial notification of MSP situations and recovery, the fact that not all reported situations result in recoveries, and the fact that mandatory reporting is still being phased in. MSP savings from known NGHP situations that CMS is able to track—including savings from claims denials and conditional payment recoveries—increased by about $124 million from fiscal year 2008 through fiscal year 2011. CMS Is Addressing Some but Not All of the Key Challenges We Identified within the Process for MSP Situations Involving NGHPs
Within the process for MSP situations involving NGHPs, we identified key challenges related to contractor performance, demand amounts, aspects of mandatory reporting, and CMS guidance and communication. CMS has addressed, or is taking steps to address some, but not all, of these challenges. CMS Is Taking Steps to Address Challenges Related to MSPRC and WCRC Timeliness
Challenges related to the timeliness of the MSPRC and WCRC were identified, including recent significant increases in the time required to complete certain processes or tasks, and CMS reported taking steps to address the challenges with each of these contractors’ performance. They include challenges related to the timing of the final demand amounts, the cost-effectiveness in recovery efforts, and the amounts demanded in liability settlements. The cost-effectiveness of recovery has improved greatly. CMS Is Taking Steps to Address Some Key Challenges We Identified with Aspects of Mandatory Reporting
We identified three key challenges related to aspects of mandatory reporting for NGHPs: determining whether individuals are Medicare beneficiaries, supplying diagnostic codes related to individuals’ injuries, and reporting all settlement amounts. CMS reported that it is taking steps to address some, but not all, of these challenges. CMS Has Taken Few Steps to Address Challenges Related to Insufficient and Confusing CMS Guidance and Communication about NGHP MSP Situations
We identified key challenges related to CMS guidance and communication of information on the MSP process, guidance on MSAs, and beneficiary rights and responsibilities related to MSP recoveries, resulting in communication of information that does not meet GAO standards for internal control. CMS has taken few steps to address these challenges. Some of these NGHPs and NGHP stakeholder groups have raised concerns about long- standing MSP process and policies. CMS has been responsive to some of the concerns expressed by NGHPs, in particular by continuing to delay the start of mandatory reporting for various types of liability settlements. Additionally, there are several areas related to the MSP program and process that still need improvement. Additionally, CMS has opportunities to improve the MSP program by reducing specific reporting requirements for NGHPs and improving communication with stakeholders. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) is responsible for protecting Medicares fiscal integrity. Medicare Secondary Payer (MSP) situations exist when Medicare is a secondary payer to other insurers, including non-group health plans (NGHP), which include auto or other liability insurance, no-fault insurance, and workers compensation plans. CMS attempts to recover Medicare payments made that were the responsibility of NGHPs, but CMS has not always been aware of these MSP situations. In 2007, legislation added mandatory reporting requirements for NGHPs that should enable CMS to be aware of these situations. NGHPs reported concerns about the MSP process, and CMS delayed the start of mandatory reporting by NGHPs, in part because of these concerns. This report examines (1) how the initial implementation of mandatory reporting for NGHPs has affected the workload of and payments to MSP contractors, and Medicare savings, and (2) key challenges within the process for MSP situations involving NGHPs and the steps CMS is taking to address those challenges. GAO reviewed relevant MSP-related documents and data on MSP costs, workload, Medicare savings, and contractor performance. GAO also interviewed CMS officials, MSP contractor officials, and NGHP stakeholders.
What GAO Found
During the initial implementation of mandatory reporting for non-group health plans (NGHP), the workloads of and Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) payments to Medicare Secondary Payer (MSP) contractors, and Medicare savings, all increased. From 2008 through 2011, the NGHP workloads of all three contractors CMS uses to implement the process for MSP situationsthe Coordination of Benefits Contractor (COBC), the Medicare Secondary Payer Recovery Contractor (MSPRC), and the Workers Compensation Review Contractor (WCRC)increased to varying degrees. For example, from 2008 through 2011, the number of NGHP MSP situations voluntarily reported to the COBC increased from about 142,000 to about 392,000, the number of NGHP cases established by the MSPRC increased from about 238,000 to about 480,000, and the number of Medicare set-aside proposals submitted to the WCRC increased from about 20,000 to almost 29,000. From 2008 through 2011, the total CMS payments to the MSP contractors increased by about $21 million, and Medicare savings from known NGHP situations that CMS is able to trackincluding savings from claims denials and conditional payment recoveriesincreased by about $124 million. The total impact of mandatory reporting on Medicare savings could take years to determine for various reasons, including that mandatory reporting is still being phased in.
Within the process for MSP situations involving NGHPs, GAO identified key challenges related to contractor performance, demand amounts, aspects of mandatory reporting, and CMS guidance and communication. CMS has addressed or is taking steps to address some, but not all, of these challenges.
Contractor performance. Challenges related to the timeliness of the MSPRC and WCRC were identified, including significant increases in the time required to complete important tasks. CMS reported taking steps to address the challenges with each of these contractors performance.
Demand and recovery issues. Challenges were identified related to the timing of demand amounts, the cost-effectiveness of recovery efforts, and the amounts of Medicare demands from liability settlements. CMS reported taking steps to address some, but not all, of these challenges.
Mandatory reporting. Key challenges were identified with certain aspects of mandatory reporting: determining whether individuals are Medicare beneficiaries, supplying diagnostic codes related to individuals injuries, and reporting all liability settlement amounts. CMS reported taking steps to address some, but not all, of these challenges.
CMS guidance and communication. Key challenges were identified related to CMS guidance and communication about the MSP process, guidance on Medicare set-aside arrangements, and beneficiary rights and responsibilities. CMS has taken few steps to address these challenges.
While CMS has taken, or reported it is in the process of taking, additional steps to address these key challenges, there are several areas related to the MSP program and process that still need improvement.
What GAO Recommends
To improve the MSP program, GAO is making recommendations to improve the cost-effectiveness of recovery, decrease the reporting burden for NGHPs, and improve communications with NGHP stakeholders. CMS agreed with these recommendations. |
gao_GAO-01-792 | gao_GAO-01-792_0 | Because of the lack of explanation in the plan and report regarding how these strategies relate to helping businesses succeed, we were unable to assess whether they are clear and reasonable. Comparison of SBA’s Fiscal Year 2000 Performance Report and Fiscal Year 2002 Performance Plan With the Prior Year Report and Plan for Selected Key Outcomes
For the selected key outcomes, this section describes major improvements or remaining weaknesses in SBA’s (1) fiscal year 2000 performance report in comparison with its fiscal year 1999 report and (2) fiscal year 2002 performance plan in comparison with its fiscal year 2001 plan. For example, the 2000 performance report includes a section that summarizes SBA’s programs and a section that exclusively discusses SBA’s goals, resources, and outcomes. However, several weaknesses we previously noted remain in SBA’s report. We had significant difficulty assessing SBA’s progress in achieving its outcomes because of weaknesses in the report and plan. SBA’s performance report also lacks information about time frames or schedules and strategies for achieving unmet goals. Recommendations
To make SBA’s plan and report more useful for decisionmakers and more consistent with GPRA, OMB Circular A-11, and related guidance, we recommend that the Administrator of SBA ensure that the fiscal year 2001 performance report and fiscal year 2003 performance plan (1) clearly link strategies to outcomes, indicators, and measures; (2) present criteria or a performance indicator to explain the accomplishment of the goal when using qualitative measures; and (3) provide information about strategies, time frames, and schedules for achieving unmet targets. | Why GAO Did This Study
This report reviews the Small Business Administration's (SBA) fiscal year 2000 performance report and fiscal year 2002 performance plan required by the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 to assess SBA's progress in achieving selected key outcomes that are important to its mission.
What GAO Found
SBA's reported progress in achieving its outcomes is mixed. However, GAO had difficulty assessing SBA's progress due to weaknesses in its performance measures and data. GAO was unable to assess SBA's lack of an explanation about how the strategies relate to the outcomes or a discussion regarding strategies for the outcome. GAO identified some improvements from SBA's prior year report and plan, but several weaknesses persist in SBA's fiscal year 2000 performance report and performance plan. The performance report includes a section that summarizes SBA's programs, a matrix that identifies ongoing and closed audit reviews, and several recommendations associated with each. However, SBA omitted time frames or schedules for achieving unmet goals, lacked strategies for meeting unmet goals, and failed to adequately link strategies to indicators and measures. |
gao_GAO-14-32 | gao_GAO-14-32_0 | Although small vessels are generally unregulated, the federal government has put in place some requirements for these vessels. CBP has taken actions to help address this issue as part of its Small Vessel Reporting System initiative, which is discussed later in this report. In March 2009, we reported on the challenges of tracking small vessels using available technologies. DHS and Its Components Are Taking Actions, but DHS Is Not Tracking Progress in Addressing the SVSS Implementation Plan
DHS Components Have Various Initiatives to Address Small Vessel Security Concerns
DHS components have completed some initiatives and have other initiatives under way to address small vessel security concerns. DHS component officials we met with identified the following key initiatives that they have completed or have under way to enhance small vessel security. According to Coast Guard officials, the Coast Guard performed 11,399 small vessel security boardings in 2012, and with the assistance of other port security stakeholders, an additional 789 small vessels security boardings were conducted that year. The SVSS Implementation Plan states that DHS is to assess and update the plan annually and focus on realigning the plan with the activities under way by its components and other federal agencies. Officials we spoke with from four of the key DHS components that have responsibility for leading the majority of the action items in the SVSS Implementation Plan (the Coast Guard, CBP, DNDO, and DHS S&T) stated that while they are tracking efforts and initiatives of their component-specific missions that may address risks posed by small vessels, they are not systematically tracking these efforts as they relate to the specific action items listed in the plan. Although it may be too early to measure the effectiveness of some action items in the SVSS Implementation Plan, updating the progress made in addressing the action items could help DHS and its components prioritize their efforts given constrained budgets; better identify successes and lessons learned; and enhance collaboration with federal, state, and local stakeholders regarding small vessel security issues. Conclusions
Recognizing the risks posed by terrorists using small vessels to attack targets or as a conveyance for terrorists and their contraband to enter the United States, DHS issued its SVSS Implementation Plan in January 2011 to help guide efforts to mitigate the security risks arising from small vessels. DHS component agencies have completed some initiatives and have other initiatives under way to address the risk of a small vessel attack, but DHS is not gathering information on the progress its components or relevant stakeholders are making to address action items in the SVSS Implementation Plan and has no plans to do so. Given that internal controls call for federal agencies to design and implement control activities to enforce management’s directives, DHS could better prioritize initiatives and identify successes if it was to regularly update the progress its components and other relevant stakeholders are making to address the action items in the SVSS Implementation Plan. Recommendation for Executive Action
To improve DHS’s ability to monitor progress, prioritize action items, and identify successes, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security systematically gather information from the department’s components and other relevant stakeholders to regularly update the progress they are making in addressing action items in the SVSS Implementation Plan. Miami was selected as the pilot location because of the large population of small vessels operating in that area. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Coast Guard estimates that there were more than 22 million small vessels operating in the United States in 2012. Terrorists, smugglers, and other criminals can use small vessels as platforms for their activities because small vessels are generally unregulated and largely anonymous. Law enforcement agencies face the challenge of distinguishing between legitimate small vessel operators and the relatively few individuals estimated to be engaged in illicit activities. DHS issued its SVSS in April 2008 and its follow-on SVSS Implementation Plan in January 2011 to help guide actions to mitigate the security risks arising from small vessels. Given the importance of small vessel security, GAO was asked to review DHS's efforts in developing and implementing the SVSS Implementation Plan .
This report examines what actions, if any, DHS and its components have taken to address small vessel security concerns, and the extent to which they have implemented action items in the SVSS Implementation Plan . GAO analyzed DHS documents; interviewed DHS officials; and visited two ports selected on the basis of the volume of small vessel traffic and security initiatives in place, among other things. While the results of the port visits cannot be generalized across all ports, they provided insights on small vessel security issues and operations.
What GAO Found
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its components--such as the U.S. Coast Guard and Customs and Border Protection (CBP)--have started or completed initiatives to address small vessel security risks, but DHS is not tracking the progress being made to address action items in the Small Vessel Security Strategy (SVSS ) Implementation Plan . "Small vessels" are characterized as any watercraft--regardless of method of propulsion--less than 300 gross tons, and used for recreational or commercial purposes. DHS component officials GAO met with identified examples of key initiatives that they have completed or have under way to enhance small vessel security, including an initiative to help CBP better track small vessels arriving from foreign locations and another to assist the Coast Guard in assessing and monitoring small vessel launch sites. Although the SVSS Implementation Plan states that DHS is to assess and update the plan, DHS has not determined the progress its components and other relevant stakeholders--such as the Department of Defense--are making in completing the action items and has no current plans to do so. DHS officials stated that this is due, in part, to budget constraints that make this a low priority. DHS officials stated that updating the SVSS Implementation Plan would be valuable, and doing so is particularly important since more than one component could be responsible for action items in the plan. Accordingly, by systematically gathering information from its components and other relevant stakeholders to regularly update the progress they are making in addressing the action items in the plan, DHS could help prioritize initiatives given constrained budgets and better identify successes and lessons learned, among other things.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DHS regularly update the progress its components and other relevant stakeholders are making in addressing action items in the SVSS Implementation Plan . DHS concurred with the recommendation. |
gao_GAO-16-748T | gao_GAO-16-748T_0 | In addition to investigating and prosecuting human trafficking crimes, federal agencies, primarily DOJ and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), support state and local efforts to combat human trafficking and assist victims. Several components within DOJ’s Office of Justice Programs, including the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Office for Victims of Crime, Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA), and National Institute of Justice (NIJ), administer grants to help support state and local law enforcement in combating human trafficking and to support nongovernmental organizations and others in assisting trafficking victims or conducting research on human trafficking in the United States. Federal Entities Have Taken Actions to Implement Most of the Provisions across Six Human Trafficking-Related Statutes
In our May 2016 report, we identified 105 provisions across the six statutes that we reviewed that called for the establishment of a program or initiative. Many of the provisions identified more than one entity that is responsible for implementing the programs or initiatives. The breakdown of whether or not federal entities reported taking actions to implement these provisions is as follows:
For 91 provisions, all responsible federal entities reported taking action to implement the provision. For 11 provisions, all responsible federal entities reported that they had not taken action to implement the provision. For 2 provisions, at least one of the responsible federal entities reported that they had not taken action to implement the provision or they did not provide a response. For 1 provision, none of the responsible federal entities provided a response. With respect to training, we reported that federal agencies have implemented several initiatives to train judges, prosecutors, investigators and others on human trafficking. Some Overlap Exists Across Human Trafficking Grant Programs, but Agencies Have Processes to Minimize Grant Duplication
In June 2016, we also reported that in addition to training and public awareness, federal agencies have established grant programs to, among other things, increase the availability of services to assist human trafficking victims. We identified 42 grant programs with awards made in 2014 and 2015 that may be used to combat human trafficking or to assist victims of human trafficking, 15 of which are intended solely for these purposes. In response to these recommendations, DOJ also requires grant applicants to identify in their applications any federal grants they are currently operating under as well as federal grants for which they have applied. For instance, HHS officials noted that DOJ and HHS meet bi-weekly during co-chair meetings for the Senior Policy Operating Group (SPOG) Victim Services Committee and both agencies participate in the SPOG Grantmaking Committee meetings, which provide opportunities to share information for the purposes of coordination and collaboration. | Why GAO Did This Study
Human trafficking involves the exploitation of a person typically through force, fraud, or coercion for the purpose of forced labor, involuntary servitude, or commercial sex. Human trafficking victims include women, men and transgender individuals; adults and children; and foreign nationals and U.S. citizens or nationals who are diverse with respect to race, ethnicity, and sexuality, among other factors. Over the few decades, Congress has taken legislative action to help combat human trafficking and ensure that victims have access to needed services. The executive branch also has several initiatives to address human trafficking in the United States and assist victims. The Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act of 2015 (JVTA) includes two provisions for GAO to study efforts to combat human trafficking. This testimony summarizes GAO’s May 2016 and June 2016 reports that were related to the JVTA. Specifically, this testimony addresses (1) federal efforts to implement certain provisions across six human trafficking-related statutes, including the JVTA; (2) any challenges faced by federal and selected state law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies when addressing human trafficking; and (3) federal grant programs to combat trafficking and assist trafficking victims, as well as the extent to which there is any duplication across these grant programs.
What GAO Found
GAO identified 105 provisions across six human trafficking-related statutes that called for the establishment of a program or initiative. Many of the provisions identified more than one entity that is responsible for implementing the programs or initiatives. The breakdown of whether or not federal entities reported taking actions to implement these provisions is as follows:
For 91 provisions, all responsible federal entities reported taking action to implement the provision.
For 11 provisions, all responsible federal entities reported that they had not taken action to implement the provision.
For 2 provisions, at least one of the responsible federal entities reported that they had not taken action to implement the provision or they did not provide a response.
For 1 provision, none of the responsible federal entities provided a response.
GAO identified 42 grant programs with awards made in 2014 and 2015 that may be used to combat human trafficking or to assist victims of human trafficking, 15 of which are intended solely for these purposes. Although some overlap exists among these human trafficking grant programs, federal agencies have established processes to help prevent unnecessary duplication. For instance, in response to recommendations in a prior GAO report, DOJ requires grant applicants to identify any federal grants they are currently operating under as well as federal grants for which they have applied. In addition, agencies that participate in the grantmaking committee of the Senior Policy Operating Group (SPOG)—an entity through which federal agencies coordinate their efforts to combat human trafficking—are to share grant solicitations and information on proposed grant awards, allowing other agencies to comment on proposed grant awards and determine whether they plan to award funding to the same organization. |
gao_GAO-15-169 | gao_GAO-15-169_0 | In addition to these technical requirements, CMS specified operational requirements—known as critical success factors—to help states prioritize the many changes that they were making to their eligibility systems to comply with PPACA. For example, states running their own exchanges would not need to implement the factor relating to sending and receiving applications to and from the FFE. Nationally, States Reported Spending More Than $1.8 Billion to Replace or Modify Medicaid Eligibility It Systems
Reported spending of 90/10 funding across all 50 states and the District of Columbia totaled more than $1.8 billion for Medicaid eligibility IT system changes as of September 30, 2014, with the federal government contributing more than $1.6 billion and states contributing about $200 million. Similarly, the amount of spending reported for each quarter has also grown steadily, with the most significant increases reported over the most recent quarters. According to CMS, 34 states implemented full system replacements, while 17 states implemented system modifications. Selected States Met Most Critical Success Factors, Often by Using Alternative Approaches
Officials from the selected states reported that they were largely able to implement three critical success factors that applied to all states—the abilities to (1) accept a single, streamlined application; (2) verify applicant eligibility based on electronic data sources, such as the federal data services hub; and (3) convert existing income standards to MAGI, and process Medicaid applications based on these rules—by the beginning of the initial open enrollment period, October 1, 2013. In some states, the use of these alternative approaches reflected unique program aspects of states’ Medicaid programs or IT systems, as illustrated by the following examples. While none of the 36 states using the FFE was able to establish this connection by the first day of the initial open enrollment period, 22 states were able to do so at some point in October 2013, and were joined The experiences in by another 3 states by the end of December 2013.our selected states largely mirrored the experiences of states nationally. CMS officials noted that they continue to work with these states to ensure implementation as soon as possible. CMS Modified Existing Monitoring Practices and Added A New Framework to Oversee Spending of 90/10 Funding
CMS’s oversight of states’ use of 90/10 funding largely mirrored—but further modified—its existing oversight of states’ MMIS IT changes, which are also eligible for a 90 percent federal match. To provide more timely information on the amount of 90/10 funding that had been spent, CMS implemented a new financial management process in 2013 to monitor funding for Medicaid eligibility IT system changes each federal fiscal year. The Department also highlighted actions it has undertaken to expedite states’ access to 90/10 funding and to enhance its review of related state spending, among other activities. In addition, HHS provided technical comments that were incorporated, as appropriate. Appendix I: Total State Reported Spending for Medicaid Eligibility IT System Changes and Maintenance
The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) expanded the availability of an enhanced federal financial participation (FFP) matching rate of 90 percent—which we refer to as 90/10 funding—to states’ expenditures related to the design, development, and installation of new or improved Medicaid eligibility IT systems incurred from April 19, 2011, through December 31, 2015. | Why GAO Did This Study
Medicaid eligibility IT systems play a key role in states' efforts to coordinate eligibility and enrollment processes for Medicaid, the Children's Health Insurance Program, and health insurance exchanges, as required by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA). However, many states' eligibility IT systems were outdated and lacked the technical capacity to support such efforts. CMS expanded the availability of a federal financial participation matching rate of 90 percent (90/10 funding) to states for costs associated with such IT system changes. With these funds, CMS required states to implement certain requirements—known as critical success factors—by October 1, 2013.
GAO was asked to provide information on states' receipt and use of these funds and related federal oversight. This report examines: (1) 90/10 funding states have spent on eligibility IT system changes; (2) states' use of this funding to implement critical success factors, and whether any implementation challenges remain; and (3) CMS's oversight of this funding and related system changes.
GAO analyzed state-reported expenditures of 90/10 funding from June 30, 2011, through September 30, 2014; interviewed state Medicaid officials from six states, which were selected from states reporting the most expenditures of 90/10 funding; reviewed relevant laws, regulations and CMS guidance; and interviewed CMS officials.
In responding to a draft of this report, HHS concurred with our findings and provided technical comments that were incorporated, as appropriate.
What GAO Found
Reported spending across all 50 states and the District of Columbia totaled more than $1.8 billion for Medicaid 90/10 funds—funds for eligibility information technology (IT) system changes—through September 30, 2014. Spending has grown steadily, with the most significant increases over the most recent quarters. According to the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), 34 states used 90/10 funds to implement full system replacements of their eligibility systems, while 17 states used these funds to implement modifications to their existing systems.
Using alternative approaches that reflected unique program aspects, selected states reported implementing most factors identified by CMS as being critical to enrolling individuals by October 1, 2013. However, the requirement that states transfer—send and receive—applications with the federally facilitated exchange (FFE) was the most challenging factor for states to implement, and none of the 36 states using the FFE was able to do so by October 1, 2013. One year later, 4 states remained unable to transfer applications one or both ways, but CMS continues to work with them to ensure implementation as soon as possible.
CMS modified its existing oversight to expedite states' access to these 90/10 funds and to enhance its review of state spending. CMS also followed a new practice for incrementally reviewing IT system changes. While selected states were not always clear on new requirements under the framework, they appreciated such timely reviews, enabling them to make technical changes throughout the process. |
gao_GAO-03-1009T | gao_GAO-03-1009T_0 | The management of real property is an area where State could achieve major cost savings and other operational efficiencies. In total, between fiscal years 1997 through 2002, State sold 129 properties for more than $459 million. State estimates it will sell additional properties between fiscal years 2003 and 2008 valued at approximately $300 million. These measures have the potential to result in significant cost savings and other efficiencies. We reported in January 2003 that these cost-cutting efforts allowed OBO to achieve $150 million in potential cost savings during fiscal year 2002. Staffing Requirements for New Embassy Compounds
In addition to ensuring that individual construction projects meet cost and performance schedules, State must also ensure that new embassies are appropriately sized. Thus, State has been unable to ensure that it has “the right people in the right place at the right time with the right skills to carry out America’s foreign policy”—its definition of diplomatic readiness. However, since 2001, State has directed significant attention to improving weaknesses in the management of its workforce planning and staffing issues that we and others have noted. In addition, State has already taken some rightsizing actions to improve the cost effectiveness of its overseas operating practices. For example, State plans to spend at least $80 million to purchase and renovate a 23-acre, multi-building facility in Frankfurt, Germany—slated to open in mid- 2005—for use as a regional hub to conduct and support diplomatic operations; has relocated more than 100 positions from the Paris embassy to the regional Financial Services Center in Charleston, South Carolina; and is working with OMB on a cost-sharing mechanism, as previously mentioned, that will give all U.S. agencies an incentive to weigh the high costs to taxpayers associated with assigning staff overseas. In addition to these rightsizing actions, there are other areas where the adoption of industry best practices could lead to cost reductions and streamlined services. In March 2003, we testified that the department invested $236 million in fiscal year 2002 on key modernization initiatives for overseas posts and plans to spend $262 million over fiscal years 2003 and 2004. State’s OIG and GAO have raised a number of concerns regarding the department’s management of information technology programs. As State continues to modernize information technology at overseas posts, it is important that the department employ rigorous and disciplined management processes on each of its projects to minimize the risks that the department will spend large sums of money on systems that do not produce commensurate value. In recent years, State has made improvements to its strategic planning process both at headquarters and overseas that are intended to link staffing and budgetary requirements with policy priorities. Continued improvements to strategic and performance planning will ensure that State is setting clear objectives, tying resources to these objectives, and monitoring its progress in achieving them—all of which are essential to efficient operations. U.S. Agency for International Development
Now I would like to discuss some of the challenges USAID faces in managing its human capital, evaluating its programs and measuring their performance, and managing its information technology and financial systems. Meanwhile, USAID’s program budget has increased from $7.3 billion in 2001 to about $12 billion in fiscal year 2003, due primarily to significant increases in HIV/AIDS funding and supplemental funding for emerging programs in Iraq and Afghanistan. USAID is aware of its human capital management and workforce planning shortcomings and is now beginning to address some of them with targeted hiring and other actions. USAID management has acknowledged these weaknesses and the agency is making efforts to correct them. Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of State. | Why GAO Did This Study
In recent years, funding for the Department of State has increased dramatically, particularly for security upgrades at overseas facilities and a major hiring program. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has also received more funds, especially for programs in Afghanistan and Iraq and HIV/AIDS relief. Both State and USAID face significant management challenges in carrying out their respective missions, particularly in areas such as human capital management, performance measurement, and information technology management. Despite increased funding, resources are not unlimited. Thus, State, USAID, and all government agencies have an obligation to ensure that taxpayer resources are managed wisely. Long-lasting improvements in performance will require continual vigilance and the identification of widespread opportunities to improve the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of State's and USAID's existing goals and programs. GAO was asked to summarize its findings from reports on State's and USAID's management of resources, actions taken in response to our reports, and recommendations to promote cost savings and more efficient and effective operations at the department and agency.
What GAO Found
Overall, State has increased its attention to managing resources, and its efforts are starting to show results, including potential cost savings and improved operational effectiveness and efficiency. For example, in 1996, GAO criticized State's performance in disposing of its overseas property. Between fiscal years 1997 through 2002, State sold 129 properties for more than $459 million with plans to sell additional properties between fiscal years 2003 through 2008 for approximately $300 million. Additional sales would help offset costs of replacing about 160 unsecure and deteriorating embassies. State is now taking a more businesslike approach with its embassy construction program, which is estimated to cost an additional $17 billion beginning in fiscal year 2004. Cost-cutting efforts allowed State to achieve $150 million in potential cost savings during fiscal year 2002. State should continue its reforms as it determines requirements for, designs, and builds new embassies. The costs of maintaining staff overseas are generally very high. In response to management weaknesses GAO identified, State has begun addressing workforce planning issues to ensure that the government has the right people in the right places at the right times. State should continue this work and adopt industry best practices that could reduce costs and streamline services overseas. GAO and others have highlighted deficiencies in State's information technology. State invested $236 million in fiscal year 2002 on modernization initiatives overseas and plans to spend $262 million over fiscal years 2003 and 2004. Ongoing oversight of this investment will be necessary to minimize the risks of spending large sums of money on systems that do not produce commensurate value. State has improved its strategic planning to better link staffing and budgetary requirements with policy priorities. Setting clear objectives and tying resources to them will make operations more efficient. GAO and others have also identified some management weaknesses at USAID, mainly in human capital management and workforce planning, program evaluation and performance measurement, information technology, and financial management. While USAID is taking corrective actions, better management of critical systems is essential to safeguard the agency's funds. Given the added resources State and USAID must manage, current budget deficits, and new requirements since Sept. 11, 2001, oversight is needed to ensure continued progress toward effective management practices. This focus could result in cost savings or other efficiencies. |
gao_GAO-02-75 | gao_GAO-02-75_0 | Special Programs Obtained Property They Should Not Have Received
Between 1995 and 2000, the three special programs obtained items valued at millions of dollars that they were not eligible to receive. We also found that the programs’ lists of eligible property were not comprehensive and did not include other mission-related items that were similar to items already permitted. Some Program Officials Were Unaware of Receiving Ineligible Hazardous and Restricted Property
All of the special programs received restricted and/or hazardous excess property, although not all of the program officials were aware that their programs had obtained the items. Control Weaknesses Allowed Special Programs to Obtain Ineligible Items
The three special programs obtained ineligible excess property partly because of internal control weaknesses at the Defense reutilization facilities, which are not required to determine whether a program is allowed to have a requested item, and partly because program officials do not consistently follow guidelines when approving requests for property. This lack of accountability increases the property’s vulnerability to misuse, loss, and theft. Items for sale included office equipment and supplies, paper products, hand tools, and furniture. Further, because these programs have obtained property that they are not eligible to have, the property is unavailable for reuse by federal agencies or other special programs. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix VII. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
We selected the Military Affiliate Radio System, the Civil Air Patrol, and the 12th Congressional Regional Equipment Center for review because they (1) were found by our Office of Special Investigations to have obtained and used some excess property that was not consistent with their mission, (2) store their data in relatively few locations, (3) are subject exclusively to Department of Defense oversight, and (4) have information about their excess property that is readily available from the Defense Reutilization and Marketing Service. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Defense Department (DOD) encourages the reuse of excess property, including vehicles, weapons, hand tools, lumber, medical equipment, and furniture. DOD components, civilian federal agencies, and "special programs" have equal priority and first rights to excess property. This report discusses excess property issued to three of 12 special programs--the Military Affiliate Radio System, the Civil Air Patrol, and the 12th Congressional Regional Equipment Center.
What GAO Found
Between 1995 and 2000, these programs obtained $34 million worth of items that they were not eligible to receive. The three programs were able to obtain the items because the DOD facilities that store the property are not required to verify which items the programs are eligible to receive, and because program officials do not consistently follow applicable guidelines. GAO also noted that the programs' lists of property they are allowed to obtain are not comprehensive because the lists exclude mission-related items similar to those already permitted. Furthermore, these programs did not have reliable records for more than three-quarters of their excess property. Together, the three special programs obtained more than 80,000 hazardous supplies. In many cases, program officials were unaware that their programs had received such items. GAO found similar problems in other special programs. This lack of accountability increases the risk of mishandling excess property and the potential for waste, fraud, and abuse. |
gao_NSIAD-95-128 | gao_NSIAD-95-128_0 | FBO’s responsibilities include (1) overseeing the acquisition, design, construction, sales, operations, and maintenance of properties and (2) establishing policies and procedures for overseas posts to follow in managing real property programs. Since the early 1960s, we have reported serious deficiencies in FBO’s management of overseas real property. Our December 1992 report on overseas real property identified the chronic and long-standing management weaknesses that had affected overseas real property programs, including insufficient maintenance, lax oversight of overseas operations, inadequate information systems, and poor planning. Progress cited by the Inspector General included a new group of skilled maintenance professionals in the State Department responsible for overseeing post maintenance and repair operations, a systematic global facility review program to assess the condition of U.S.-owned and long-term leased facilities, a 5-year plan for major rehabilitations, a comprehensive maintenance plan for newly constructed buildings, and additional funding for maintenance programs. These problems include the questionable and/or inappropriate use of routine maintenance funds by overseas posts and the failure of some posts to either conduct or complete annual surveys documenting the condition of government-owned and long-term leased facilities. Overall, FBO estimates that its financial audit program has resulted in nearly $4 million in uncommitted post funds being returned to FBO for use in other projects and programs. For example, we found that State has kept undeveloped properties in Nassau without adequate justification or plans for their use. Its current value is not identified in the real estate management system. FBO has also developed an information resource management system, which consists of several integrated applications, including project management and budget planning and allocation. We reviewed pertinent records and documents, including the FAM and FBO’s guidance on use of funds; global maintenance surveys and facilities evaluation and assistance program reports; FBO’s financial audit, real estate management system, and area management trip reports; and posts’ status of obligation reports, purchase orders, and work order reports. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the Department of State's management of its overseas properties, focusing on: (1) the problems State faces in managing its overseas real property; and (2) how State can strengthen its overseas real property management.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) many of State's improvements in overseas real property management have focused on facility maintenance; (2) State's maintenance improvements include assigning skilled maintenance personnel overseas, conducting global maintenance surveys, a 5-year major rehabilitation plan, a comprehensive maintenance plan for new buildings, additional maintenance funding, establishing maintenance assistance centers, and implementing a facilities evaluation and assistance program; (3) although State has strengthened its real property management program, significant problems still exist including questionable or inappropriate use of routine maintenance funds, and overseas posts' failure to conduct or complete annual assessments of government-owned and long-term leased facilities, deobligate unneeded funds, properly use the real estate management system to manage routine and preventive maintenance programs, and adequately plan for the sale or use of undeveloped properties in State's inventory; (4) State implemented a financial audit program in 1990 that improved its oversight of overseas posts' real property programs and resulted in the return of nearly $4 million in unused funds; and (5) State has implemented an information resources management system to strengthen its budgeting and planning process and has continued to upgrade its real estate management system, but its information systems still contain weaknesses. |
gao_GAO-15-83 | gao_GAO-15-83_0 | According to OMB staff, plans for updating the inventories are on indefinite hold as OMB re-evaluates next steps for what type of information will be presented in the inventories and how it will be presented based on (1) recent legislative actions that could affect the information required for the inventories; (2) a lack of stakeholder feedback; and (3) insufficient funding for,related to, presenting the inventories in a web-based format on and technological challenges Performance.gov. Agencies Used Various Approaches to Define Their Programs, Which Limits the Comparability of Programs within and across Agencies
Agencies Used Different Approaches to Define Their Programs Based on OMB’s Guidance
GPRAMA requires agencies to identify how they define the term “program,” consistent with guidance provided by the Director of OMB. In addition, the lack of comparability may also be the result of agencies not working across organizational boundaries when developing their inventories. One of OMB’s stated purposes for the inventories is to facilitate coordination among programs that contribute to similar outcomes. In a Few Instances, Several Agencies Did Not Include Activities in Their Inventories Based on OMB’s Criteria for Determining What Constitutes a Program
OMB’s guidance directed agencies to work with OMB to determine the appropriate primary approach (or mix of approaches) and level of aggregation/disaggregation to be used to define their programs. Agencies Generally Did Not Present Program-level Budget Information in Their Inventories but DATA Act Implementation Could Provide More Detailed and Consistent Data
GPRAMA requires agencies to identify for each program in their inventories: the program activities that are aggregated, disaggregated, or consolidated to be considered a program by the agency; and funding for the current and two previous fiscal years (for the inventories published in May 2013, that would have been fiscal years 2013, 2012, and 2011). According to OMB’s 2014 update to its guidance, it is working with agencies to merge implementation of the DATA Act and federal program inventory requirements to the extent possible, but has not yet determined its implementation strategy. Agency reporting for both sets of requirements is web-based, which could more easily enable linkages between the two sites or incorporating information from each other. The Senate version of the Taxpayers Right-to-Know Act would require this linkage in lieu of incorporating this budget information on the program inventory site. Agencies Defined the Purposes of Their Programs but Did Not Consistently Show How Programs Contribute to Agency Missions, Goals, and Results
GPRAMA requires agencies to describe for each program in their inventories the purposes of the program and the program’s contribution to the agency’s mission and goals. OMB’s review of the inventories did not always identify instances where agencies omitted this information. Agencies Did Not Take Steps to Ensure Inventories Provide Useful Information for Stakeholders, including Congress
OMB’s 2012 guidance directed agencies to work with key stakeholders, which can include Congress, state and local governments, third party service providers, and the public, to validate that their program inventories would be both internally and externally recognizable. Identifying All Federal Programs and Providing Sorting Capabilities Could Help Provide a More Coherent Picture of Federal Involvement in Particular Areas
GPRAMA requires OMB to ensure that the inventory information provided by agencies and published on Performance.gov presents a coherent As our annual reports on fragmentation, picture of all federal programs.overlap, and duplication have stated, the federal program inventory could be a key tool for addressing crosscutting issues. As noted earlier in the report, the lack of such a comprehensive list makes it difficult to determine the scope of the federal government’s involvement in particular areas and, therefore, where action is needed to address crosscutting issues. While the inventories published in May 2013 were individual agency documents, OMB’s guidance and staff have stated that eventually the inventory would move to a more dynamic, web- based approach—originally planned for the May 2014 update and now on hold. This web-based approach could make it easier to tag and sort related or similar programs. In commenting on a draft of the report, OMB staff agreed with this recommendation. Such a list, along with related budget and performance information, could help decision makers determine the scope of the federal government’s involvement, investment, and performance in a particular area, which in turn could help pinpoint where action is needed to better address or avoid fragmentation, overlap, and duplication. The executive branch has taken some initial steps to develop program inventories with related budget and performance information. In May 2013, the 24 agencies published inventories, providing information about 1,524 programs they collectively identified. As a result, agencies used different approaches to identify their programs, which, in turn, led to a lack of comparability for similar programs across agencies. This was illustrated by our analysis of agency inventories for STEM education and nuclear nonproliferation programs, in which we could only exactly match a small fraction of the programs covered by our past work on fragmentation, overlap, and duplication in those areas. According to OMB staff, the flexibility provided in guidance is derived from lessons learned from the pilot effort—that agencies are different for valid and legitimate reasons and a one-size-fits-all approach would not work for all agencies. If agencies worked together to more consistently define their programs, it could also help them identify where they have programs that contribute to similar outcomes, and therefore opportunities to collaborate. In addition, OMB did not include tax expenditures in the inventory effort. To be useful, information must meet various users’ needs for accuracy, completeness, consistency, reliability, and validity, among other factors. Agency officials also told us they did not consult with external stakeholders, including Congress. Although OMB’s 2012 guidance instructed agencies to seek this input, none of them did. By consulting with stakeholders to understand their needs, agencies would better ensure that the information provided in the inventories is useful for stakeholder decision making. To better present a more coherent picture of all federal programs, we recommend the Director of OMB take the following five actions: direct agencies to collaborate with each other in defining and identifying programs that contribute to common outcomes, and provide a time frame for what constitutes “persistent over time” that agencies can use as a decision rule for whether to include short-term efforts as programs; define plans for when additional agencies will be required to develop include tax expenditures in the federal program inventory effort by designating tax expenditure as a program type in relevant developing, in coordination with the Secretary of the Treasury, a tax expenditure inventory that identifies each tax expenditure and provides a description of how the tax expenditure is defined, its purpose, and related performance and budget information. To help ensure that the information agencies provide in their inventories is useful to federal decision makers and key stakeholders, and to provide greater transparency and ensure consistency in federal program funding and performance information, we recommend the Director of OMB take the following three actions: revise relevant guidance to direct agencies to consult with relevant congressional committees and stakeholders on their program definition approach and identified programs when developing or updating their inventories, and identify in their inventories the performance goal(s) to which each program contributes; and ensure, during OMB reviews of inventories, that agencies consistently identify, as applicable, the strategic goals, strategic objectives, agency priority goals, and cross-agency priority goals each program supports. OMB staff told us that until they had firmer plans on how program inventory and DATA Act implementation would be merged, they could not determine if implementing these three recommendations would be feasible. This report is part of our response to that mandate. Our specific objectives for this report were to (1) assess how OMB and agencies defined and identified the programs contained in the inventories, (2) examine the extent to which the inventories provide useful information for federal decision makers, and (3) examine the extent to which the inventories provide a coherent picture of the scope of federal involvement in particular areas. To address all three objectives, we assessed the implementation of relevant GPRAMA requirements by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the 24 agencies that developed program inventories, which were published on Performance.gov in May 2013. requires OMB to make publicly available on a central governmentwide website, a list of all federal programs identified by agencies. A-11, Part 6) and related leading practices from our past work on managing for results, such as those related to involving Congress and stakeholders in performance management activities and ensuring performance information is useful to decision makers. Additionally, to address our first objective, we selected two areas of fragmentation, overlap, and duplication from our annual reports—science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) education and nuclear nonproliferation programs—and compared the lists of programs developed by our work to those contained in agency inventories. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO's reports over the past 4 years have found more than 90 areas where opportunities exist for the executive branch or Congress to better manage, reduce, or eliminate fragmentation, overlap, and duplication. GPRAMA calls for the creation of a list (inventory) of all federal programs, along with related budget and performance information, which could make it easier to determine the scope of the federal government's involvement in particular areas and, therefore, where action is needed to address crosscutting issues, including instances of fragmentation, overlap, or duplication.
GPRAMA requires GAO to periodically review its implementation. This report is part of GAO's response to that mandate and examines (1) how OMB and agencies defined programs, (2) the extent to which inventories provide useful information for decision makers, and (3) the extent to which inventories provide a coherent picture of the scope of federal involvement in particular areas. To address these objectives, GAO analyzed the 24 inventories using GPRAMA requirements, OMB guidance, and related leading practices from GAO's past work, and interviewed OMB staff and agency officials. For the first objective, GAO also selected two areas of fragmentation, overlap, and duplication identified in past GAO work—STEM education and nuclear nonproliferation—and compared the lists of programs developed in its past work to those contained in agency inventories. The two areas were selected based on various factors, including the number of agencies involved and whether those agencies published an inventory.
What GAO Found
To date, the approach used by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and agencies has not led to the inventory of all federal programs, along with related budget and performance information, envisioned in the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 (GPRAMA). In developing the inventory, OMB allowed for significant discretion in several areas—leading to a variety of approaches for defining programs and inconsistencies in the type of information reported. The inconsistent definitions, along with agencies not following an expected consultation process, led to challenges in identifying similar programs in different agencies. As a result of these limitations, the inventory is not a useful tool for decision making. OMB is considering options for enhancing the inventory.
GPRAMA requires OMB to publish a list of all federal programs on a central governmentwide website. It also requires OMB to issue guidance, and agencies to identify and provide to OMB for publication information about each program— including how they defined their programs in line with OMB's guidance. OMB is taking an iterative approach to implement these requirements. Based on experiences from a pilot involving 11 agencies in 2012, OMB issued guidance allowing agencies flexibility to define their programs using different approaches, but within a broad definition of what constitutes a program—a set of related activities directed toward a common purpose or goal. According to OMB staff, this was based on a lesson learned from the pilot effort: a one-size-fits-all approach does not work well; agencies and their stakeholders use the term “program” in different ways because agencies achieve their missions through different programmatic approaches. In May 2013, OMB published the inventories developed by 24 agencies, which used various approaches to define and identify 1,524 programs (see table below).
Because agencies used different approaches, similar programs across agencies may not be identifiable. To illustrate the shortcomings of the inventory, GAO attempted to locate in relevant agencies' inventories the various science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) education and nuclear nonproliferation programs identified in GAO's past work. GAO was unable to identify in the inventories a large majority of the programs previously identified in its work: 9 of the 179 programs matched exactly and 51 others were identified based on program descriptions.
The lack of comparability may also be the result of agencies not working with each other when developing their inventories. One of OMB's stated purposes for the inventories is to facilitate coordination among programs that contribute to similar outcomes. However, agencies did not work together to consistently define their programs. Increased coordination could help agencies identify where they have programs that contribute to similar goals and thus, opportunities to collaborate in achieving desired outcomes.
The 24 inventories developed by agencies in 2013 did not provide the programs and related budget and performance information required by GPRAMA. This limits the usefulness of the inventories to various decision makers, including Congress and stakeholders. To be useful, the inventories must meet various users' needs for accuracy, completeness, consistency, reliability, and validity, among other factors. Specific steps OMB and agencies could take to ensure the inventories are more useful to decision makers include:
Presenting program-level budget information. Although GPRAMA requires agencies to identify program-level funding, OMB did not direct agencies to include this information in their 2013 inventories—it was to be part of a planned May 2014 update. However, OMB subsequently put the 2014 update on hold to determine how to merge these requirements with implementation of the federal spending information to be reported under the Digital Accountability and Transparency Act of 2014 (DATA Act). Reporting for both laws is web-based, which could more easily enable linkages between the two sites or incorporating information from each other. The Senate version of a bill, the Taxpayers Right-to-Know Act of 2014, which is currently under consideration, would require this linkage in lieu of incorporating budget information on the program inventory site.
Providing complete performance information . GPRAMA and OMB's guidance require agencies to describe each program's contribution to the agency's goals. However, there are instances where agencies omitted that information. For example, agencies did not consistently show how some or all of their programs supported strategic goals (in 7 of 24 inventories) or strategic objectives (in 13 of 24 inventories). Ensuring agencies illustrate this alignment would better explain how programs support the results agencies are achieving.
Consulting with stakeholders . None of the agencies sought input on their inventories from external stakeholders, such as Congress, state and local governments, and third-party service providers, although OMB's 2012 guidance instructed agencies to do so. In several instances, agency officials stated that they thought OMB was soliciting feedback on all inventories. By consulting with stakeholders to understand their needs, agencies would better ensure that the information provided in the inventories is useful for stakeholder decision making.
Other features of OMB's approach further limit the program inventories' ability to present a coherent picture of all federal programs, as required by GPRAMA. First, to date, OMB has only included 24 agencies in this effort. Second, while not specified by GPRAMA, tax expenditures were not included in the 2013 inventory. Tax expenditures, which represent a reduction in a taxpayer's tax liability through credits, deductions, or other means, resulted in $1.1 trillion in forgone revenue in fiscal year 2013, nearly the same amount as discretionary spending that year. By including tax expenditures, OMB could help ensure that agencies are properly identifying their contributions to the achievement of agency goals, as OMB's guidance directs them to do. Finally, OMB's guidance and staff have stated that eventually the inventory will move to a more dynamic, web-based presentation. This could make it easier to tag and sort related or similar programs, for instance, by type of program or contribution to the same or similar goals. Covering additional agencies and tax expenditures in the federal program inventory, along with web-based sorting capabilities, would help decision makers determine the scope of the federal government's involvement in a particular area, and therefore where action is needed to better address fragmentation, overlap, or duplication.
What GAO Recommends
GAO makes several recommendations to OMB. To present a more coherent picture of all federal programs, GAO recommends OMB revise its guidance to direct agencies to collaborate when defining and identifying programs that contribute to a common outcome, define plans for expanding implementation beyond the current 24 agencies, and include tax expenditures in the federal program inventory. In addition, to improve the usefulness of the information in inventories GAO recommends OMB ensure agencies consistently identify the various goals each program supports, and consult with stakeholders when developing or updating their inventories.
OMB staff generally agreed with these recommendations, although they neither agreed nor disagreed with three of GAO's recommendations related to including tax expenditures and additional performance information. OMB staff stated that until they had firmer plans on how program inventory and DATA Act implementation would be merged, they could not determine if implementing those recommendations would be feasible. |
gao_GAO-11-54 | gao_GAO-11-54_0 | The eight federal transit programs we reviewed, which represent 97 percent of FTA’s total fiscal year 2010 grant funds (excluding funds provided under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act) and their respective goals are as follows: The Urbanized Area Formula Grant Program makes funding available to urbanized areas and to states for public transportation capital projects and operating assistance for equipment and facilities in urbanized areas and for transportation-related planning. Some Federal Transit Programs Distribute Funds Based Partly on Performance, but Opportunities to Improve Grant Recipients’ Performance Accountability Remain
Of the eight SAFETEA-LU transit programs we reviewed, two are generally funded by congressional direction, while the remaining six are funded through legislatively defined grant formulas. Funding for Nonformula Programs under SAFETEA-LU, Including New Starts, Is Based Partly on Performance
Funding for the New Starts Program and the Bus and Bus Related Equipment and Facilities Program—the two non-formula-based SAFETEA- LU programs we reviewed—is based partly on performance. Only a Small Percentage of Federal Transit Funding for Formula Programs under SAFETEA-LU Is Awarded Based on Performance Considerations
According to our analysis, the SAFETEA-LU formulas require that about 5 percent, on average, of fiscal year 2010 funding be awarded based on transit agency performance for the six formula programs we reviewed (see table 1). As a result, FTA is missing a valuable opportunity to evaluate the end results of its program activities and SAFETEA-LU funding formulas. Performance Accountability Mechanisms Can Improve Performance of Transit Agencies, and although They Potentially Present Disadvantages, Most of These Can Be Mitigated by Following Key Strategies
Potential Advantages of Using Performance Accountability Mechanisms Are Encouraging Good Performance, Deterring Poor Performance, and Helping Agencies Allocate Limited Funds
Through our literature review, we identified major financial and nonfinancial mechanisms for making federal transit programs more performance based. Most notably, to demonstrate that an incentive has been achieved or that a penalty is not warranted, agencies have to gather, maintain, and analyze data, and these tasks require resources. Ensure mechanisms are of sufficient value. Ensure appropriate measures are selected. Expanding the use of performance accountability mechanisms in the area of transit could help make transit grants more performance based. As noted earlier in this report, Congress and the administration are currently debating reauthorization of the entire surface transportation program, including transit programs. However, without FTA analysis of the appropriateness, feasibility, and potential impact of using various transit performance mechanisms, Congress may lack the information needed to identify and implement the most effective mechanisms and better help transit agencies maximize their potential. Selected Transit Agencies Use Performance Measurement to Varying Degrees and See a Role for the Federal Government in Transit but Cited Challenges in Linking Performance with Planning and Decision Making
All Transit Agencies We Interviewed Measure Performance in Some Categories, but the Extent to Which They Measure It in Others Varies Widely
While officials from all 12 of the transit agencies we interviewed told us they measure performance in certain categories, the extent to which they measure other categories varied widely (see table 5). Similarly, officials from 5 of the transit agencies said it was challenging to measure environmental impact generally because it was difficult to determine a method for measuring it or to obtain relevant data. The transit agency officials and transit experts we interviewed offered a variety of suggestions for consideration in developing federal transit program goals, including the following: encourage economic growth and access to jobs; increase the safety of transit systems; provide increased mobility for populations, particularly in regions with encourage modal shift from automobiles to public transit; and promote livable communities around transit that reduces dependence on foreign oil, encourage economic growth, and addresses environmental challenges. As part of this analysis, FTA may want to identify and evaluate, when applicable, the extent to which transit grant programs are accomplishing their established goals, the areas of performance in which FTA should concentrate its program activities to increase the performance of local transit agencies and the federal transit program in general, and the extent to which formula incentives and other performance accountability mechanisms have influenced the activities and performance of local transit agencies. DOT officials provided technical clarifications, which we incorporated into the report as appropriate, and DOT said it would consider our recommendations. To address the second objective, on mechanisms that exist for making federal transit programs more performance based and strategies for supporting their successful implementation, we conducted a literature review to identify pertinent studies and reports and interviewed transit agency officials and industry experts. To address the third objective, describing how selected U.S. and foreign transit agencies incorporate performance measurement into their planning and decision making and their views on the federal role in transit, we conducted semistructured interviews with 12 transit agencies—10 from the United States and 2 from foreign countries (see table 6). | Why GAO Did This Study
Public demand and federal funding for transit have grown in recent years, yet most of this funding is not tied to performance. As Congress prepares for reauthorization of the federal surface transportation programs, GAO was asked to report on (1) the extent to which federal transit programs use performance information in making decisions about funding distribution and in evaluating the programs' effectiveness; (2) mechanisms for making these programs more performance based, and strategies for supporting their successful implementation; and (3) how selected U.S. and foreign transit agencies have used performance measurement in their planning and decisions, and their views on the federal role in transit. To do so, GAO analyzed legislation, federal documents, and literature; interviewed federal officials and transit experts; and conducted semistructured interviews with selected transit agencies using criteria that, for U.S. agencies, covered a variety of regions and population sizes and, for foreign agencies, multiple transit modes and English language capability.
What GAO Found
Some federal transit programs distribute funds based partly on performance, but opportunities to improve grant recipients' performance accountability remain. Of the eight transit programs GAO reviewed--which represent 97 percent of total federal transit grants in fiscal year 2010 (excluding funds provided under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act)--two are generally funded by congressional direction, while the remaining six are funded through legislatively defined grant formulas. Federal funding for the two nonformula programs GAO reviewed--the New Starts Program and the Bus and Bus Related Equipment and Facilities Program--is awarded in part according to performance. A small percentage of federal transit funding for the six formula programs is apportioned based on performance--according to GAO's analysis, about 5 percent, on average, of fiscal year 2010 funding. FTA does not, in general, analyze fully or use the performance data it collects from transit agencies to evaluate the effectiveness of its transit grant programs; thus, FTA is missing a valuable opportunity to evaluate the end results of its program activities and programs' funding formulas. GAO identified three performance accountability mechanisms for making federal transit programs more performance based, including providing financial rewards or penalties/sanctions, increasing or decreasing program flexibility as a performance incentive, and recognizing entities that achieve certain performance goals. These mechanisms have both potential advantages--most notably, they can encourage improved performance and help agencies make sound decisions when allocating limited funds--and potential disadvantages that can produce inequitable results or burden transit agencies with requirements to gather, maintain, and analyze data. GAO also identified several key strategies that can support the use of these mechanisms and mitigate their disadvantages, such as ensuring that mechanisms are of sufficient value and that appropriate measures are selected, among others. However, without FTA analysis of the appropriateness, feasibility, and potential impact of using various transit performance mechanisms, Congress may lack information to determine whether and how these mechanisms could be used to make transit funding more performance based as it prepares for the upcoming surface transportation reauthorization. Transit agencies that GAO interviewed use performance measurement to varying degrees, but they face challenges in linking performance with planning and decision making. All of these agencies measure performance in certain categories, such as ridership and on-time performance, but the extent to which they measure it in others--such as environmental impact, energy usage, and economic development--varies widely. Transit agency officials reported that measuring performance presents challenges, in part because it can be difficult to obtain relevant data and develop a sound methodology. They also said that linking performance to planning and decision making is challenging because of either limited funding or political priorities. These transit agencies and other experts suggested a variety of changes to the federal role in transit, including increasing investment in existing transit infrastructure; developing federal transit program goals that generally address broader issues, such as encouraging a shift from automobiles to public transit; and promoting livable communities around transit systems. The Federal Transit Administration (FTA) should (1) report to Congress on options for adding performance accountability mechanisms to transit programs to ensure efficient and effective federal transit programs and (2) further analyze and use transit agency data, when applicable, for evaluating federal transit program performance. DOT reviewed a draft of this report, provided technical clarifications, and said it would consider our recommendations. |
gao_HEHS-96-87 | gao_HEHS-96-87_0 | More specifically, the objectives of our assignment were to determine (1) those factors contributing to the growth in the backlog of appealed cases, (2) what steps SSA has taken in the past to address this backlog problem, (3) what SSA is currently doing to reduce the appellate backlog, and (4) what needs to be done in the long term to make the disability appeals process more timely and efficient. IV); examined SSA’s previous initiatives to address OHA backlogs and improve the hearings and appeals process; and reviewed SSA’s Short-Term Disability Plan (STDP) and the agency’s longer-term Plan for a New Disability Claim Process (redesign plan). We also reviewed the above studies, and several other government and nongovernment reviews conducted over the last several decades, and categorized the key long-standing problems affecting SSA’s disability programs as (1) multiple levels of claims development and decision-making, (2) fragmented accountability for claims processing, (3) decisional disparities between DDS and OHA adjudicators, and (4) SSA’s failure to consistently define and communicate its management authority over the ALJs. As a result, SSA has experienced numerous legal and operational challenges to its efforts to better manage the appeals process. Our most recent field work confirmed that SSA still has not consistently defined and communicated the types of management actions that are legally permissible under APA. Previous SSA Efforts Did Not Reduce Backlog
Over the last decade, SSA attempted to address the growth in OHA’s backlog of pending cases. Screening Units Are Not Sufficiently Reducing the Number of Cases Requiring an ALJ Hearing
A second major initiative under STDP is intended to further reduce the flow of cases from DDSs to OHA hearing offices by increasing the effectiveness of SSA regional screening units. In the near term, STDP is designed to expedite the disability appeals process and reduce OHA’s pending case backlog to a manageable level. To ensure decisional accuracy, SSA intends to monitor the quality of STDP decisions and the overall allowance rate for its disability programs. However, the agency questioned the statement in our report that many ALJs believe they are exempt from nearly all management control. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO examined the growth in the backlog of pending cases at the Social Security Administration's (SSA) Office of Hearings and Appeals (OHA), focusing on SSA initiatives to: (1) reduce backlogged cases; and (2) make the disability appeals process more timely and efficient.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the growth in OHA backlogs is a direct result of increased applications and appeals to OHA, as well as SSA inattention to long-standing problems; (2) these problems include multiple levels of claims development and decisionmaking, fragmented program accountability, decisional disparities between disability determination services and OHA adjudicators, and SSA failure to communicate its management authority over administrative law judges (ALJ); (3) SSA initiated short-and long-term efforts to manage its disability determination and appeals process in 1994; (4) the SSA Short-Term Disability Plan (STDP) should reduce OHA backlogs to a manageable level by December 1996; (5) STDP relies on the temporary reallocation of SSA resources and process changes to stem the flow of cases requiring ALJ hearings; (6) start-up delays and limited timeframes have affected SSA ability to reduce the number of backlogged cases; (7) SSA tracks and monitors STDP allowances to ensure decisional accuracy; (8) the SSA redesign plan is aimed at addressing systemic problems within the SSA disability program and reducing claims processing; (9) the redesign plan is still in its early stages, and does not address the types of management actions that are legally permissible for ALJ hearings; and (10) many ALJ believe that they are legally exempt from management control, and SSA is frustrated in its efforts to manage the appeals process and reduce the number of pending cases. |
gao_GAO-05-722T | gao_GAO-05-722T_0 | Although the task force’s initial priority was to ensure the continuity of medical care for injured servicemembers as they transitioned from military to VA health care, it also coordinated efforts to ensure access to all other VA benefits, including vocational rehabilitation. The Privacy Rule permits VA and DOD to share servicemembers’ health data under certain circumstances. VA Has Taken Steps to Expedite Vocational Rehabilitation Services, but Lack of Systematic Data from DOD Poses a Challenge
VA has given priority consideration and assistance to seriously injured servicemembers returning from Afghanistan and Iraq. Despite efforts by VA’s regional offices to identify and obtain medical information on seriously injured OEF/OIF servicemembers, lack of systematic data from DOD poses a challenge. Although VA requested in the spring of 2004 that DOD provide on a systematic basis personal identifying data, medical data, and DOD’s injury classification for seriously injured servicemembers, DOD and VA have not developed a data sharing agreement. As a result, VA cannot provide reasonable assurance that some seriously injured servicemembers who may benefit from vocational rehabilitation services have not been overlooked. In our review of 12 VA regional offices, we found that the nature of the local relationship between VA staff and MTF staff was a key factor in the completeness and reliability of the information that the MTF provided on seriously injured servicemembers. Several VA headquarters’ officials and regional office staff we interviewed said that systematic data from DOD would provide them with a way to reliably identify and follow up with seriously injured servicemembers. Additionally, VA officials said these data would help them plan for projected increases in services for newly returning OEF/OIF servicemembers. Unresolved Issues Continue to Delay a Data Sharing Agreement
After more than 2 years of discussion, DOD and VA have not developed a data sharing agreement. Although DOD and VA officials agree that the HIPAA Privacy Rule permits the exchange of individually identifiable health data if the individual signs a proper authorization, the departments have not pursued this as an alternative to a data sharing agreement. However, DOD and VA differ in their understanding of HIPAA Privacy Rule provisions that govern the sharing of individually identifiable health data for servicemembers currently receiving treatment in MTFs without an authorization, and the extent to which the Privacy Rule would permit that exchange. DOD’s and VA’s inability to resolve these differences has impeded coming to an agreement on exchanging servicemembers’ individually identifiable health data. VA officials also said they believe that DOD and VA provide public benefits. According to DOD officials, it would be premature for VA to begin working with servicemembers who may eventually return to active duty. Despite being unable to agree on an exchange of individually identifiable health data, DOD and VA are currently reviewing a draft memorandum of understanding. However, we found that the draft memorandum of understanding restates many of the legal authorities contained in the Privacy Rule for the use and disclosure of individually identifiable health data. As a result, even if the memorandum of understanding is finalized, DOD and VA will still not have a data sharing agreement that specifies what types of individually identifiable health data can be exchanged and when the data can be shared. Related GAO Products
Vocational Rehabilitation: VA Has Opportunities to Improve Services, but Faces Significant Challenges. Vocational Rehabilitation: More VA and DOD Collaboration Needed to Expedite Services for Seriously Injured Servicemembers. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since the onset of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the Department of Defense (DOD) reported that more than 12,000 servicemembers have been injured in combat. While many return to active duty, others with more serious injuries are likely to be discharged from the military. To ensure the continuity of medical care and access to all other Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) benefits, such as vocational rehabilitation, VA formed its Seamless Transition Task Force. In January 2005, GAO reported that VA had given high priority to OEF/OIF servicemembers, but faced challenges in identifying, locating, and following up with seriously injured servicemembers. GAO recommended that VA and DOD reach an agreement for VA to obtain systematic data from DOD, and the departments concurred. However, DOD raised privacy concerns. GAO was asked to review VA's efforts to expedite vocational rehabilitation services to seriously injured servicemembers and to determine the status of an agreement between DOD and VA to share health data. GAO relied on its prior work; interviewed VA and DOD officials; and reviewed the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) and the HIPAA Privacy Rule, which govern the sharing of individually identifiable health data.
What GAO Found
While VA has taken steps to expedite services to seriously injured servicemembers, VA does not have systematic data from DOD on seriously injured servicemembers who may need VA vocational rehabilitation and other benefits. As a result, VA has had to rely on its regional offices to develop informal data sharing arrangements with local military treatment facility (MTF) staff to identify servicemembers who may need vocational rehabilitation services. However, VA staff have no official data source from DOD from which to confirm the completeness and reliability of the data they obtain. Furthermore, they cannot provide reasonable assurance that some seriously injured servicemembers who may have benefited from vocational rehabilitation services have not been overlooked. Although several VA headquarters officials and regional office staff GAO interviewed said that systematic data from DOD would provide them with a way to reliably identify and follow up with seriously injured servicemembers, DOD and VA have not developed a data sharing agreement. Additionally, VA officials said these data would help VA plan for projected increases in the need for services for newly returning OEF/OIF servicemembers. VA has requested that DOD provide systematic data on seriously injured servicemembers who may need vocational rehabilitation. DOD and VA have been working on a data sharing agreement for over 2 years, but have not reached an agreement. DOD and VA differ in their understanding of HIPAA Privacy Rule provisions that govern the sharing of individually identifiable health data for servicemembers currently receiving treatment at MTFs, and the extent to which the Privacy Rule would permit that exchange. DOD's and VA's inability to resolve these differences has impeded coming to an agreement on exchanging seriously injured servicemembers' individually identifiable health data. Despite being unable to agree on an exchange of individually identifiable health data, DOD and VA are reviewing a draft memorandum of understanding, which the departments believe will move them closer to a data sharing agreement. However, GAO found that the draft memorandum restates many of the legal authorities contained in the Privacy Rule for the use and disclosure of individually identifiable health data. As a result, even if the memorandum of understanding is finalized, DOD and VA will still have to agree on what types of individually identifiable health data can be exchanged and when the data can be shared. DOD and VA generally agreed with GAO's findings. |
gao_GAO-12-937 | gao_GAO-12-937_0 | The Progress of Recovery Act Broadband Projects Is Difficult to Measure because of Data Limitations
NTIA and RUS both use the amount of funds disbursed to awardees as one method of tracking progress, and less than half of all the awarded funding has been disbursed to Recovery Act BTOP and BIP awardees. Of the roughly $3.8 billion available for the BTOP projects, NTIA has disbursed approximately $1.9 billion (50 percent) to its awardees. Of the roughly $3.3 billion available for the BIP projects, RUS has disbursed approximately $1 billion (30 percent) to its awardees. NTIA and RUS disburse awarded funds for projects as payment becomes due, sometimes only as contracts are completed. In addition, the Recovery Act did not require RUS to collect performance metrics from awardees. Without reliable information on the progress of BIP projects in expanding infrastructure and moving toward completion of projects, RUS may not be able to demonstrate the progress and effectiveness of the BIP program. NTIA Has Expanded Access to Broadband through BTOP Projects; However, Data Limitations Make it Difficult to Measure the Effects of BTOP and BIP on Broadband Adoption
NTIA collects data on network miles deployed, community anchor institutions connected, and workstations added at public computer centers, which helps illustrate that BTOP expanded broadband infrastructure and provided increased access to the public. As of March 31, 2012, BTOP’s 117 infrastructure projects reported that they have established over 57,000 new or upgraded network miles, with connections to over 8,000 community anchor institutions. As of March 2012, PCC awardees reported that they provided nearly 34,000 new workstations for public use. For more information see, the sidebar titled “Example of PCC Project: State Library of Louisiana.”
Measurement and Data Limitations Make It Difficult to Assess the Programs’ Effects on Broadband Adoption
NTIA and RUS have faced difficulties in ensuring that awardees provide reliable data regarding broadband subscribership for their BTOP and BIP projects, which makes it challenging to fully and accurately determine the effects of the programs on broadband adoption. NTIA and RUS Have Acted to Address the Variety of Challenges Awardees Identified in Completing Projects
BTOP and BIP awardees identified multiple challenges in completing projects, including compliance with regulations and construction related challenges. NTIA and RUS have taken a number of actions to help awardees address these challenges, including providing awardees with regular contact, expertise, webinars, and guidance. PCC and SBA projects faced staffing and expertise challenges, such as high staff turnover, or the need for additional staff to handle tasks such as providing technical support for computers or manning computer labs. While NTIA established performance measures and collected data on non-financial measures of progress, RUS did not initially collect comparable data, and once it did begin collecting these data, it could not ensure their quality. Because both agencies have taken steps to improve the quality of the subscribership data reported by awardees, we are not making a recommendation to address this issue in this report. Recommendation for Executive Action
To ensure RUS is collecting reliable information regarding the effect of investments in broadband, we recommend that the Secretary of Agriculture direct RUS to take steps to improve the quality of its data on the number of fiber miles and wireless access points created by BIP projects. The department disagreed with our characterization that RUS does not collect adequate data to measure the progress of BIP and noted that RUS collects financial data as well as contract-level data with information on planned construction for each project. Thus, non-financial data, such as fiber miles and wireless access points deployed, provide an additional indicator of BIP’s progress. Although the department neither agreed or disagreed with our recommendation that RUS should improve the quality of its data on the number of fiber miles and wireless access points created by BIP projects, the department stated that RUS has already taken steps to improve the quality of its data. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
This appendix provides information on the methodologies that we used to assess (1) the progress made in implementing broadband projects funded by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act), (2) the effect of the projects on expanding access to and adoption of broadband service, and (3) the challenges that grant and loan recipients face in completing broadband projects, and the actions that agencies are taking to help address these challenges. Progress of Programs
To determine the progress made in implementing the projects funded by the Recovery Act, we obtained data that allowed us to calculate the amount of funds awarded and the amount of funds disbursed to projects participating in the Broadband Technology Opportunities Program (BTOP) administered by the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), and the Broadband Initiatives Program (BIP) administered by the Rural Utilities Service (RUS). Both NTIA and RUS have reliable financial measures of progress. | Why GAO Did This Study
Access to affordable broadband service is seen as vital to economic growth and improved quality of life, yet residents in many areas of the country lack access to or do not use broadband. To extend broadband access and adoption, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act) provided over $7 billion to NTIA and RUS for grants or loans to support broadband projects. NTIA and RUS made all awards by September 30, 2010.
This report responds to mandates under the Recovery Act for GAO to examine the use of Recovery Act funds and report on the quarterly estimates of jobs funded. This report addresses (1) the progress of broadband projects, (2) their effect on expanding access to and adoption of broadband, and (3) any challenges awardees face in completing projects and agency actions to address these challenges. GAO analyzed program documentation and data and interviewed agency officials and BTOP and BIP awardees.
What GAO Found
The progress of the broadband projects is difficult to measure because of data limitations. As projects progress, the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) and the Rural Utilities Service (RUS) disburse awarded funds to projects on, for example, a reimbursement basis. As of July 2012, NTIA has disbursed approximately $1.9 billion of the $3.8 billion it awarded for projects under the Broadband Technology Opportunities Program (BTOP), and as of June 2012, RUS has disbursed approximately $1 billion of the $3.3 billion it awarded for projects under the Broadband Initiatives Program (BIP). These disbursements are one measure of progress, and the disbursements indicate that the projects in aggregate are less than half complete. However, disbursements sometimes lag behind actual progress for a number of reasons, such as contracts that provide for payment after work is completed. In addition, the agencies have been inconsistent in collecting non-financial data on project progress. While NTIA has collected data on BTOP projects, RUS did not collect data until recently. According to NTIA data, 76 percent of planned network miles are complete. According to RUS, the data it has recently collected are not reliable measures of fiber miles and wireless access points deployed by BIP projects. Without reliable information on the progress of BIP projects in expanding infrastructure, RUS may struggle to demonstrate the progress and effectiveness of the BIP program.
Data limitations make it difficult to fully measure the effect of BTOP and BIP on expanding access to and adoption of broadband. NTIAs non-financial data indicate that BTOP awardees have established over 57,000 new or upgraded network miles, with connections to over 8,000 community anchor institutions, such as schools, libraries, and hospitals, and nearly 34,000 new computer workstations for use in public computer centers, such as libraries. RUS initially did not collect comparable non-financial data for BIP projects, and the data it has are not reliable; therefore, it is not possible to fully assess the effect of BIP on expanding access to broadband. With respect to broadband adoption, however, both NTIA and RUS have faced difficulties collecting reliable data from awardees on subscribership for BTOP and BIP projects. Both agencies have taken steps to address this issue, with NTIA providing guidance to awardees and RUS developing a tool for staff reviews of subscribership data reported by awardees.
Both NTIA and RUS helped awardees address multiple challenges in completing their broadband projects. Specifically, awardees identified challenges complying with regulations and obtaining permits, as well as handling construction-related issues such as broadband fiber shortages. BTOPs non-infrastructure projectswhich provide computers to libraries or encourage broadband adoptionfaced a different set of challenges, including staffing, contracting, and procurement. NTIA and RUS have taken a number of actionsincluding providing regular contact and expertise, webinars, and guidanceto help awardees address these challenges. In addition, RUS hired additional staff to address delays in its review and approval of contracts, a challenge that delayed some BIP projects.
What GAO Recommends
To ensure RUS is collecting reliable information regarding the effect of its investments in broadband, GAO recommends that RUS take steps to improve the quality of its data on the number of fiber miles and wireless access points created by BIP projects. RUS disagreed with GAOs characterization that it does not collect adequate data, and stated it has already taken steps to improve data quality. GAO believes that more reliable data will permit RUS to better assess the progress of the BIP program. |
gao_RCED-98-41 | gao_RCED-98-41_0 | Once approved, these waivers may be renewed if the areas covered continue to have high unemployment or insufficient jobs. Most States Taking Actions to Address Changes in Food Stamp Program
At the time of our survey of states in the summer of 1997, the states were pursuing a variety of options to address changes in the Food Stamp Program that affected able-bodied adults without dependents and legal immigrants. Some state actions, such as job training assistance, although primarily intended to move individuals toward self-sufficiency, may have the effect of allowing some able-bodied adults without dependents to retain food stamps by meeting the act’s work requirements. Other state actions are intended to replace the food stamp benefits that individuals have lost. At the time of our survey, 20 states provided or planned to provide legal immigrants—who were scheduled to lose their food stamps—with information on how to become U.S. citizens. Because it takes an average of over 1 year to process applications for citizenship and legal immigrants were not eligible to receive food stamps after August 22, 1997, many legal immigrants have lost their federal food stamp benefits. However, as of December 1997, estimates are that over one-quarter, or about 241,000, of these individuals are receiving food stamps funded by the states. Ten states decided to purchase federal food stamps with their own funds for certain legal immigrants—primarily children and the elderly. According to FNS and the states, 9 of the 10 states have estimated that about 241,000 legal immigrants are now receiving state-funded food stamps. Most nonprofit organizations that we contacted said that although it is too soon to assess the impact of welfare reform, they anticipate an increased need for their services. Specifically, we describe the (1) actions, if any, that states have taken to assist those individuals who lose eligibility for the Food Stamp Program and (2) related actions, if any, taken by other organizations in selected localities—local governments and nonprofit organizations—to assist those individuals who lose their eligibility for the Food Stamp Program. To address the second objective, we visited five localities. V-IX for individual reports on the food assistance provided in these localities.) Finally, we met with officials from the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) to obtain program information and statistics. (continued)
Manages a kosher food pantry that provides food for those who meet income requirements. However, if participants in these programs meet income and work requirements, they may still qualify for food stamps. According to an FIA official, the state is not planning to create a new food assistance program to assist legal immigrants who lost food stamp benefits. According to officials of 10 nonprofit agencies, able-bodied adults without dependents and legal immigrants who lose their food stamps as a result of welfare reform will look for food assistance from these nonprofit organizations. At the time of our visit, most of the organizations reported that their ability to provide food assistance for those needing it had not yet been affected by welfare reform. Most organizations did not have planned approaches for dealing with the expected increase in the need for their services. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the impact of welfare reform on the Food Stamp Program, focusing on: (1) the actions, if any, that states have taken to assist those individuals who lose eligibility for the Food Stamp Program; and (2) related actions, if any, taken by other organizations in selected localities--local governments and nonprofit organizations--to assist those individuals who lose their eligibility for the Food Stamp Program.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) most states are taking a variety of measures to address the changes in the Food Stamp Program as a result of welfare reform; (2) for able-bodied adults without dependents, many states are providing employment and training assistance; (3) this assistance, although primarily intended to move these individuals toward self-sufficiency, may still allow them to qualify for food stamp benefits if they meet both income and work requirements; (4) most states have obtained the authority from the Department of Agriculture, if they choose to exercise it, to continue providing food stamp benefits for individuals in areas with high unemployment or in areas with insufficient jobs; (5) 20 states are providing or plan to provide legal immigrants with information on how to become U.S. citizens; (6) because it takes over 1 year on average to process citizenship applications, many legal immigrants lost their food stamp benefits as of August 22, 1997; (7) the Food and Nutrition Service estimated that 935,000 legal immigrants had lost their federal food stamp benefits; (8) some states have existing programs that provide food assistance for the needy--such as food pantries--that able-bodied adults without dependents and legal immigrants who have lost their food stamps already had access to; (9) some states have developed new programs to specifically meet the needs of individuals who lose their food stamps; (10) 10 states--including 4 states estimated to have about 70 percent of the legal immigrants who receive food stamps in the U.S.--are purchasing or planning to purchase federal food stamps with their own funds--primarily for legal immigrant children and the elderly; (11) in December 1997, the states involved indicated that about 241,000 of these individuals are now receiving food stamp benefits funded by the states; (12) the extent to which any of these actions will meet the food assistance needs of those affected remains unknown; (13) in the five localities GAO visited, government officials are implementing their state's efforts to address changes in the Food Stamp Program and, in some cases, are working with local nonprofit organizations to plan for an expected increase in the need for food assistance; (14) most of the nonprofit organizations GAO visited said that it is too early to assess the impact of welfare reform on their food assistance programs; and (15) however, the organizations fear that their limited resources may be insufficient to meet the needs of the individuals who have lost their food stamps, which included the basic foods that the program provided. |
gao_GAO-07-528 | gao_GAO-07-528_0 | However, 4 years into the implementation of FISMA, many agencies continue to exhibit weaknesses in carrying out the act’s requirements. The reasons that the departments are challenged in these areas vary. Until the departments address these challenges and fully implement an effective departmentwide information security program, they increase the risk that they may not effectively protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of their information and information systems. Of the four departments, Homeland Security and Justice reported having complete system inventories. In addition, the department reported that it was unable to accurately report on the percentage of employees who have received specialized training because its reporting tool counts each course taken, instead of tracking that an individual has taken a specialized course. As a result, it could not be assured that all users had completed required training. Departments Have Weaknesses in the Testing and Evaluation of Their Information Security Programs
FISMA requires that department information security programs include periodic testing and evaluation of the effectiveness of information security policies, procedures, and practices. As a result, the department is challenged in accurately tracking information security weaknesses. Conclusions
Defense, Homeland Security, Justice, and State face challenges in implementing key information security control activities required by FISMA and OMB, which include maintaining complete and accurate system inventories, implementing common security configurations for all system platforms, training personnel, establishing and consistently implementing complete policies and processes for testing security controls, and fully certifying and accrediting information systems. Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and Methodology
Our objective was to determine the challenges or obstacles that inhibit the implementation of the information security provisions of the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 (FISMA) at the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, Justice, and State. To do this, we reviewed and analyzed FISMA (Public Law 107-347) and mapped these requirements to (1) National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) guidelines and (2) Office of Management and Budget (OMB) reporting requirements. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 (FISMA) strengthened security requirements by, among other things, requiring federal agencies to establish programs to provide cost-effective security for information and information systems. In overseeing FISMA implementation, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has established supporting processes and reporting requirements. However, 4 years into implementation of the act, agencies have not yet fully implemented key provisions. In this context, GAO determined what challenges or obstacles inhibit the implementation of the information security provisions of FISMA at the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, Justice, and State. To do this, GAO reviewed and analyzed department policies, procedures, and reports related to department information security programs and interviewed agency officials.
What GAO Found
Defense, Homeland Security, Justice, and State face challenges in implementing key information security control activities required by FISMA and by OMB in its oversight role. These activities include creating and maintaining an inventory of major systems, implementing common security configurations, ensuring that staff receive information security training, testing and evaluating controls, taking remedial actions where deficiencies are found, and certifying and accrediting systems for operation. The four departments were challenged in several of these areas. For example, Defense is challenged in developing a complete FISMA inventory of systems because it has different definitions of what constitutes a "system." As another example, Homeland Security reported that the tool it uses to report security training counts each course taken, instead of tracking that an individual has taken a specialized course. As a result, the department lacks assurance that all users have received appropriate training. Until the departments address their challenges and fully implement effective departmentwide information security programs, increased risk exists that they will not be able to effectively protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of their information and information systems. |
gao_GAO-08-343 | gao_GAO-08-343_0 | Federal Laws and Guidance Provide a Foundation for Agencies to Protect Personally Identifiable Information
The primary laws that provide privacy protections to personal information are the Privacy Act of 1974 and the E-Government Act of 2002; these laws describe, among other things, agency responsibilities with regard to personally identifiable information, which include providing security. The security of information held by the federal government is specifically addressed by FISMA, which requires agencies to develop, document, and implement agencywide programs to provide security for their information and information systems, including personally identifiable information. In the wake of recent incidents of security breaches involving personal data, OMB has issued guidance reiterating the requirements of these laws and guidance, drawing particular attention to those associated with personally identifiable information. Specifically, the act requires that these information security programs include, among other things, periodic assessments of the risk and magnitude of harm that could result from the unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of information or information systems; risk-based policies and procedures that cost-effectively reduce information security risks to an acceptable level and ensure that information security is addressed throughout the life cycle of each information system; subordinate plans for providing adequate information security for networks, facilities, and systems or groups of information systems, as appropriate; security awareness training for agency personnel, including contractors and other users of information systems that support the operations and assets of the agency; periodic testing and evaluation of the effectiveness of information security policies, procedures, and practices, performed with a frequency depending on risk, but no less than annually, and that includes testing of management, operational, and technical controls for every system identified in the agency’s required inventory of major information systems; a process for planning, implementing, evaluating, and documenting remedial action to address any deficiencies in the information security policies, procedures, and practices of the agency; procedures for detecting, reporting, and responding to security incidents; plans and procedures to ensure continuity of operations for information systems that support the operations and assets of the agency. FIPS 200, Minimum Security Requirements for Federal Information and Information Systems. In recent guidance, OMB directed agencies to encrypt and otherwise protect personally identifiable information that is either accessed remotely or physically transported outside an agency’s secured physical perimeter. Specifically, agencies were required to encrypt all data on mobile computers or devices that carry agency data, unless the data are determined to be nonsensitive; allow remote access only with two-factor authentication, where one of the factors is provided by a device separate from the computer gaining access; use a “time-out” function for remote access and mobile devices that requires that users re-authenticate after 30 minutes of inactivity; and log all instances in which computer-readable data are extracted from databases holding sensitive information, and verify that each extract including sensitive data has been erased within 90 days or that its use is still required. However, not all agencies had developed policies and procedures reflecting OMB guidance for protecting personally identifiable information that is accessed remotely or physically transported outside an agency’s secured perimeter. Of the 24 major agencies, 22 had developed policies requiring personally identifiable information to be encrypted on mobile computers and devices. Fewer agencies (11) had established policies to log computer-readable data extracts from databases holding sensitive information and erase the data within 90 days after extraction. However, several of the agencies that had not established such policies indicated that they were researching technical solutions to address these issues. Gaps in their policies and procedures reduce agencies’ ability to protect personally identifiable information from improper disclosure. The loss of personally identifiable information can result in substantial harm, embarrassment, and inconvenience to individuals and may lead to identity theft or other fraudulent use of the information. According to OMB, it will continue working with agencies to help them strengthen their information security and privacy programs, especially as they relate to the protection of personally identifiable information. In view of OMB’s recent actions in this area, we are making no recommendations at this time. Agencies’ implementation of OMB’s guidance on personally identifiable information, as well as our previous recommendations on improving agency information security and implementation of FISMA requirements, will be essential in improving the protection of personally identifiable information. Agency Comments
In providing oral comments on a draft of this report, OMB representatives stated that they generally agreed with the report’s contents. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) identify the federal laws and guidance issued to protect personally identifiable information from unauthorized use or disclosure and (2) describe agencies’ policies and documented procedures that respond to recent Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance to protect personally identifiable information that is either accessed remotely or physically transported outside an agency’s secured physical perimeter. | Why GAO Did This Study
The loss of personally identifiable information can result in substantial harm, embarrassment, and inconvenience to individuals and may lead to identity theft or other fraudulent use of the information. As shown in prior GAO reports, compromises to such information and long-standing weaknesses in federal information security raise important questions about what steps federal agencies should take to prevent them. As the federal government obtains and processes information about individuals in increasingly diverse ways, properly protecting this information and respecting the privacy rights of individuals will remain critically important. GAO was requested to (1) identify the federal laws and guidance issued to protect personally identifiable information from unauthorized use or disclosure and (2) describe agencies' progress in developing policies and documented procedures that respond to recent guidance from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to protect personally identifiable information that is either accessed remotely or physically transported outside an agency's secured physical perimeter. To do so, GAO reviewed relevant laws and guidance, surveyed officials at 24 major federal agencies, and examined and analyzed agency documents, including policies, procedures, and plans. In commenting on a draft of this report, OMB stated that it generally agreed with the report's contents.
What GAO Found
Two primary laws (the Privacy Act of 1974 and the E-Government Act of 2002) give federal agencies responsibilities for protecting personal information, including ensuring its security. Additionally, the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 (FISMA) requires agencies to develop, document, and implement agencywide programs to provide security for their information and information systems (which include personally identifiable information and the systems on which it resides). The act also requires the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to develop technical guidance in specific areas, including minimum information security requirements for information and information systems. In the wake of recent incidents of security breaches involving personal data, OMB issued guidance in 2006 and 2007 reiterating agency responsibilities under these laws and technical guidance, drawing particular attention to the requirements associated with personally identifiable information. In this guidance, OMB directed, among other things, that agencies encrypt data on mobile computers or devices and follow NIST security guidelines regarding personally identifiable information that is accessed outside an agency's physical perimeter. Not all agencies had developed the range of policies and procedures reflecting OMB guidance on protection of personally identifiable information that is either accessed remotely or physically transported outside an agency's secured physical perimeter. Of 24 major agencies, 22 had developed policies requiring personally identifiable information to be encrypted on mobile computers and devices. Fifteen of the 24 agencies had policies to use a "time-out" function for remote access and mobile devices requiring user reauthentication after 30 minutes of inactivity. Fewer agencies (11) had established policies to log computer-readable data extracts from databases holding sensitive information and erase the data within 90 days after extraction. Several agencies indicated that they were researching technical solutions to address these issues. Gaps in their policies and procedures reduced agencies' ability to protect personally identifiable information from improper disclosure. At the conclusion of GAO's review, OMB announced in November 2007 that agencies that did not complete certain privacy and security requirements, including those just described, received a downgrade in their scores for progress in electronic government initiatives. According to OMB, it will continue working with agencies to help them strengthen their information security and privacy programs, especially as they relate to the protection of personally identifiable information. In view of OMB's recent actions in this area and GAO's previous recommendations on improving agency information security and implementation of FISMA requirements, GAO is making no further recommendations at this time. |
gao_GAO-10-909 | gao_GAO-10-909_0 | FTA Procures Contractor Services to Provide Input into Its Decisions and Monitors These Contractors through Various Methods
PMOCs and FMOCs Provide Critical Input to FTA on Decisions to Advance and Fund New Starts Projects
FTA officials rely on PMOCs and FMOCs to provide critical input into FTA’s decisions on project advancement and funding. Furthermore, these efforts keep FTA informed of a project’s status and support FTA’s decision on whether to advance the project to the next phase of development or recommend the project for an FFGA. Separately, FMOCs help ensure that project sponsors have sufficient financial capacity to build and operate the proposed project as well as the existing system. FTA Procures PMOC and FMOC Services Using Federal Acquisition Regulation Procurement Procedures, and Recently Revised Its Procurement Approach
FTA procures project management and financial management oversight services in accordance with the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), which prescribes uniform policies and procedures for all executive agencies to acquire goods and services. The change in FTA’s PMOC procurement procedures has increased the number of available contractors. In their view, the competitive negotiation process has affected their staffing for FTA work and puts more emphasis on cost than did the Brooks Act process. FTA officials have recently taken steps to improve their multilayered performance evaluation system for PMOCs. Stakeholders Identified Benefits of and Challenges to FTA’s Oversight, and FTA Is Taking Actions to Address Some Stakeholder Concerns
Stakeholders Cited Benefits of FTA’s Use of PMOCs and FMOCs, Including Improved Management and Access to Additional Expertise and Technical Assistance
FTA officials, contractors, and project sponsors cited numerous examples of how FTA’s use of oversight contractors has improved project and financial management. PMOCs and FMOCs also provide FTA with additional expertise. For example, FTA officials in an FTA region told us that they did not require the PMOC working on a project in their region to conduct a technical capacity and capability review because the PMOC was familiar with the project sponsor’s technical capacity and capability, the project sponsor had recently completed three other New Starts projects on time and within budget, and there was no change in project sponsor staff. Despite FTA’s efforts to tailor its oversight, four project sponsors we spoke with said that the level of oversight and PMOC involvement in a project sometimes seem excessive or detailed, making it difficult for them to spend time developing the project. Specifically, through this ANPRM, FTA is seeking comments from stakeholders on how FTA should best use its PMOCs to provide specialized expertise when needed; how the agency should use PMOCs to supplement its limited staff in overseeing increasingly complex, major capital projects; whether the use and role of PMOCs should be expanded to overseeing projects other than major capital projects; and at what stage FTA should assign PMOCs to New Starts projects, among other things. FTA and PMOCs Have Multiple Ways to Communicate with Project Sponsors during the Oversight Process, but Project Sponsors Say Communication Challenges Still Exist
Effective oversight management of FTA’s New Starts program and project sponsors’ advancement of transit projects through the New Starts program depend, in part, on effective communication. Sponsors have indicated they found this tool and the meetings to be very helpful in understanding FTA’s and PMOC’s oversight requirements. FTA has acknowledged that its current New Starts process can be lengthy and frustrating. An FTA official indicated that the PMOCs are expected to share the facts with the project sponsor, and that project sponsors are “generally aware” of the issues identified in the oversight reports because of its communications with PMOC and FTA officials. DOT officials generally agreed with our findings and provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. Accordingly, the objectives of this report were to review (1) how the FTA uses contractors to oversee New Starts projects and how the agency procures, monitors, and evaluates the contractors’ services, and (2) the benefits of FTA’s oversight approach and the challenges FTA faces in conducting its oversight. Our review focused on oversight activities that project management oversight contractors (PMOC) and financial management oversight contractors (FMOC) conduct between the preliminary engineering stage of the New Starts project development process and the full-funding grant agreement (FFGA) stage that inform FTA’s recommendations for New Starts funding. | Why GAO Did This Study
Many states, cities, and localities are building or planning mass transit projects to meet the nation's transportation needs. The New Starts program--administered by the U.S. Department of Transportation's (DOT) Federal Transit Administration (FTA)--is an important source of new capital investment in mass transportation, providing grants to project sponsors (e.g., state and local government authorities), for the construction of major transit facilities. FTA uses contractors--known as project management oversight contractors (PMOC) and financial management oversight contractors (FMOC)--to help oversee the planning, construction, and financing of major capital projects, including those funded under the New Starts program. This report, as mandated by law, discusses (1) how FTA uses PMOCs and FMOCs to oversee New Starts projects and how the agency procures, monitors, and evaluates the contractors' services; and (2) the benefits of FTA's oversight approach and the challenges FTA faces in conducting its oversight. GAO reviewed applicable statutes, FTA guidance, regulations, and budget data, and interviewed DOT officials, project sponsors, contractors, and industry stakeholders. GAO is not making any recommendations in this report. DOT officials generally agreed with GAO's findings and provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
FTA procures PMOC and FMOC services to provide critical input into FTA's decisions regarding New Starts projects. Specifically, the reviews that PMOCs conduct keep FTA informed of a project's status and support the agency's decision on whether to advance or fund the project. Separately, financial assessments conducted by FMOCs help the agency ensure that project sponsors--which can be state or local government authorities that implement New Starts projects--have sufficient financial capacity to build and operate their projects. Although PMOCs and FMOCs have different oversight roles, services for both are procured in accordance with the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR). FTA recently changed how it procures PMOC services. Prior to 2009, FTA awarded PMOC contracts only to architectural and engineering firms for their services using specialized procedures in the FAR; however, in part to expand the pool of available PMOCs, FTA revised its procurement approach and now uses the competitive negotiation procedures in the FAR which permit cost and noncost tradeoffs. Using competitive negotiations has increased the pool of contractors available for FTA projects, and while some PMOC officials expressed concerns that the changes have affected the quality of staff provided for FTA work and put more emphasis on cost, FTA officials said that they have not observed any negative effects. FTA monitors PMOCs and FMOCs by setting performance expectations and using a multilayered system to evaluate their performance. Recently, FTA has taken steps to improve its contractor performance evaluation system to help ensure that its regional offices conduct evaluations consistently. FTA officials, contractors, and project sponsors identified benefits of FTA's oversight approach. For example, FTA officials and project sponsors said that FTA's oversight approach has improved project management, supplemented existing FTA staff, and provided insights through technical assistance and expertise from PMOCs and FMOCs. However, FTA's oversight program faces some challenges, including balancing project management oversight and advancing projects, managing the larger, more complex projects entering the New Starts portfolio, and communicating with project sponsors. FTA has taken some actions to address these challenges. To more effectively balance oversight and project advancement, FTA developed procedures to assist PMOCs with their oversight responsibilities and issued an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on, among other things, the extent to which the level of its oversight should be based on risk. As part of FTA's effort to oversee larger, more complex projects, FTA has directed its PMOCs and FMOCs to conduct oversight activities earlier in project development, helping identify potential problems earlier. To improve communications, FTA developed checklists which project sponsors found helpful in understanding FTA's oversight requirements. However, some project sponsors we spoke with said that FTA's communications were not consistently timely or clearly documented, thus delaying sponsors' responses and, sometimes, project time frames. FTA recognizes that the New Starts process can be lengthy, but officials indicate that project sponsors do not always provide FTA needed information. |
gao_GAO-17-123 | gao_GAO-17-123_0 | In addition, a federal entity with independent disposal authority may request GSA to dispose of a building under the Property Act. The Scope of Both Disposal and Retention of Proceeds Authorities Varies Widely
Twenty Federal Entities Reported Having Building Disposal Authority and 15 Reported Having Authority to Retain Proceeds from Building Disposals
In all, 20 federal entities in our review reported having at least one statutory disposal authority that allowed them to dispose of domestic buildings. The Scope of Disposal Authorities Varies, with Some Providing Broad Authority While Others Are Narrow
About half of the federal entities have broad authority to dispose of buildings, an authority that applies to the entities’ entire portfolios, but those portfolios only account for about 9 percent of the federally owned civilian buildings reported to FRPP. The other federal entities’ authorities are limited based on factors such as facility type or program. Most Federal Entities Reported Limited Opportunities to Use Their Authorities to Dispose of Buildings and Retain Proceeds
About One-Third of Federal Entities Reported Using Their Disposal Authorities during Fiscal Years 2011 through 2015 but for a Minority of Their Total Building Disposals
From fiscal years 2011 through 2015, 7 of the 20 federal entities that reported having building disposal authority reported using that authority. The other two entities, GSA and USPS, which have very broad disposal authority, used their disposal authority for all of the buildings they disposed of that year—which was 12 and 15 buildings, respectively. Five Federal Entities That Reported Having Authority to Retain Proceeds Reported Gross Proceeds from Buildings Disposed of by Sale
Five federal entities that reported having authority to retain proceeds from buildings disposed of by sale reported gross proceeds of about $557 million from these sales during the selected 5-year time frame of our review. USPS and GSA retained proceeds from all of their building sales but GSA’s use of those proceeds was restricted to specific purposes. In some cases, a federal entity is not making the disposal decision because it is directed in law to dispose of property. These funds generally come from the entity’s operations and maintenance account, meaning that preparing a building for disposal competes with ongoing program requirements for funding. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to examine: (1) the scope of disposal authorities held by civilian CFO Act agencies and the United States Postal Service (USPS); (2) the results of these federal entities’ use of their disposal authorities during fiscal years 2011 through 2015; and (3) the factors that drive building disposal decisions, and what additional authorities selected officials at selected federal entities believe could help facilitate these disposals. To identify those federal entities with disposal authority and determine the scope of those authorities—including the authority to retain the proceeds from disposals––we surveyed 22 of the 23 civilian CFO Act Agencies, asking if they possessed statutory authority to dispose federally owned buildings and to retain any proceeds resulting from those disposals. We also interviewed agency officials about the scope and applicability of these authorities, and the extent to which they were utilized during the fiscal year 2011 through 2015 time frame. 22 U.S.C. Federal Real Property: Excess and Underutilized Property Is an Ongoing Challenge. | Why GAO Did This Study
Federal property management has been on GAO's High-Risk list since 2003, in part because the government maintains too much excess and underutilized property. GSA has the authority to dispose of property for all federal entities under the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, as amended. However, some federal entities (either departments or departmental components) have been provided with independent statutory authority to dispose of buildings and other types of property and, in some cases, retain proceeds from such disposals.
GAO was asked to review the extent to which federal entities have disposal authority independent of the Property Act, including the authority to retain proceeds. This report examines (1) the scope of building disposal authorities held by civilian Chief Financial Officer Act (CFO Act) agencies and USPS; (2) the results of these federal entities' use of their disposal authorities during fiscal years 2011 through 2015; and (3) the factors that drive building disposal decisions, and what additional authorities officials at selected federal entities believe could help facilitate these disposals. GAO surveyed 22 CFO Act agencies, interviewed officials from 12 federal entities that reported having disposal authority, reviewed statutory authorities and guidance materials, and analyzed disposal data from fiscal years 2011 through 2015 for these entities.
GAO provided a draft of this product to 15 agencies for comment and 8 provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
Twenty civilian federal entities reported they have at least one statutory authority that allows them to dispose of federally owned buildings under their control. Fifteen entities reported the authority to retain proceeds from building disposals. However, most of these federal entities reported limited use of their independent authorities during fiscal years 2011 through 2015. Seven entities that reported having disposal authority used it during this time frame, and 5 entities that reported having authority to retain proceeds did so (see figure below). The scope of disposal authorities varies among entities; about half have broad authority but these entities only account for about 9 percent of domestic federal buildings. Other authorities are limited, for example, to specific types of facilities or methods of disposal. In addition, statutory authorities to retain proceeds also vary, with most restricting how a federal entity may use the proceeds.
Five of the 7 entities that reported using their independent disposal authority reported using it for only about 8 percent of the buildings they disposed of in fiscal year 2015. The General Services Administration (GSA) and the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) have broad authorities that were used for all of their disposals. The five federal entities that retained proceeds reported about $557 million from all building sales, not just those in which they used their authority from fiscal years 2011 through 2015. Of this amount, USPS's building disposals accounted for $446 million, GSA for $89 million, and the other 3 entities accounted for the remaining $22 million.
Officials from most of the federal entities GAO interviewed said building disposal decisions are mainly based on mission needs rather than the authorities. Officials from 5 entities said they would like the authority to use proceeds from building sales to cover costs of preparing buildings for disposal, such as the cost of environmental remediation. Currently, up-front disposal costs compete with ongoing operations and maintenance costs for budget resources. |
gao_GAO-01-851 | gao_GAO-01-851_0 | In 1997 and 1998, four states—Florida, Minnesota, Mississippi, and Texas—settled their lawsuits by negotiating independent agreements with the tobacco industry. States Have Received Billions to Date From the Master Settlement Agreement
As of April 2001, 45 of the 46 states that signed the Master Settlement Agreement had received nearly $13.5 billion in payments from the tobacco companies. Types of MSA-Related Payments
Currently, states receive two types of payments as a result of the MSA— annual payments and initial payments. (See appendix IV for estimated payment amounts for the first 25 years of the MSA.) As part of the decision- making process, some states established planning commissions and working groups to develop recommendations that resulted in a strategic plan for the state’s use of the funds. Forty-two of the 46 states have made decisions about the allocation of MSA payments, and in 30 of these states the legislature enacted laws to ensure that these payments are restricted or used for specific purposes. Wyoming has dedicated its settlement payments to an endowment fund and all of the interest in fiscal years 2000 and 2001 was allocated to tobacco control. The agreement includes the 13 tobacco states that are a party to the MSA and the state of Florida, which reached an earlier, independent settlement with the tobacco industry. 2. “Disbursements from the fund to programs funded by the state or with federal funds administered by the state shall be used solely to supplement, and not to supplant, funds otherwise available for the programs under federal or state law as provided in this section.”
Massachusetts Established the Tobacco Settlement Fund to receive 30% of tobacco settlement payments received by the state and 30% of the earnings on the Health Care Security Trust as well as other sources of funding. | Why GAO Did This Study
The attorneys general of 46 states signed a settlement agreement in 1998 with the nation's largest tobacco companies. The agreement requires the tobacco companies to make annual payments to the states in perpetuity as reimbursement for past tobacco-related costs. Florida, Minnesota, Mississippi, and Texas reached earlier individual settlements with the tobacco companies. States are free to use the money for any purpose. This report examines (1) the amount of payments received by the states and the states' decision-making processes on the allocation of payments in fiscal years 2000 and 2001 and (2) the types of programs that states funded with their payments in those two fiscal years.
What GAO Found
As of April 2001, GAO found that 45 of the 46 states received nearly $13.5 billion of the $206 billion estimated to be paid by the tobacco companies during the first 25 years of the agreement. Many states established dedicated funds to receive at least part of the payments. Other states passed legislation to ensure that payments are used to supplement existing state funds, enacted laws governing the future use of the payments, established voter approved initiatives to decide how to allocate the payments, and created special commissions to develop recommendations and long-term plans for the payments. The types of programs that states tended to fund were tobacco control and health care. |
gao_GAO-16-50 | gao_GAO-16-50_0 | If USCIS grants asylum to the applicant, the asylee is eligible to apply for adjustment to lawful permanent resident (LPR) status after 1 year. The Number of Asylum Applications Filed per Fiscal Year Has Increased Every Year from 2010 to 2014
The Number of Asylum Applications Filed in Fiscal Year 2014 Is More than Double the Total Filed in Fiscal Year 2010
The total number of asylum applications (principal applicants and their eligible dependents), including affirmative and defensive applications, increased from 47,118 in fiscal year 2010 to 108,152 in fiscal year 2014, an increase of 130 percent. USCIS’s backlog of principal affirmative asylum applications as of September 2015 was 106,121. DHS and DOJ Have Limited Capabilities to Detect and Prevent Asylum Fraud
DHS and DOJ Have Established Dedicated Antifraud Entities
Both DHS and DOJ have established dedicated antifraud entities, a leading practice for managing fraud risks. For example,
As of March 2014, a joint fraud investigation led by the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the New York City Police Department, and USCIS, known as Operation Fiction Writer, resulted in charges against 30 defendants, including 8 attorneys, for their alleged participation in immigration fraud schemes in New York City. Without regularly identifying and assessing fraud risks and determining the fraud risk tolerance in immigration courts, EOIR does not have complete information on the inherent fraud risks that may affect the integrity of the defensive asylum process and therefore does not have reasonable assurance that it has implemented controls to mitigate those risks. USCIS Has Limited Capability to Detect Fraud in Affirmative Asylum Applications
USCIS’s Capability to Identify Patterns of Fraud across Asylum Applications is Limited
USCIS uses various tools to attempt to identify fraud in specific affirmative asylum applications. Further, USCIS’s tools for detecting patterns of fraud across affirmative asylum applications are limited because USCIS relies on a paper-based system for asylum applications. Asylum officers and FDNS immigration officers told us that they can identify potential fraud by manually analyzing trends across asylum applications they review. FDNS Has Not Established Clear Responsibilities for Fraud Detection in Asylum Offices
FDNS has not established clear responsibilities related to fraud detection for its immigration officers in asylum offices, and FDNS fraud detection activities vary widely by asylum office. FDNS immigration officers we spoke with in all eight asylum offices stated that they have limited guidance about their roles and responsibilities with respect to fraud detection, and officers at seven of the eight offices stated that the limited guidance creates challenges for them in addressing asylum fraud. USCIS data indicate that USCIS terminated the asylum status of 374 individuals for fraud from fiscal years 2010 through 2014. In August 2015, the Asylum Division adopted a new target of 180 days for conducting initial termination reviews that applies solely for cases with pending applications for adjustment to LPR. USCIS’s new 180-day target for conducting initial termination review for cases with pending applications to adjust to LPR is a positive step; however, developing and implementing timeliness goals for all pending termination reviews of asylees granted affirmative asylum would help USCIS to better identify the staffing resources needed to address the terminations workload and better utilize existing resources to address potential fraud before asylees adjust to LPR or receive other immigration or federal benefits. DHS and DOJ could be better positioned to assess and address fraud risks across their asylum processes. To provide reasonable assurance that USCIS’s fraud prevention controls are adequate and effectively implemented, and ensure that asylum officers and FDNS immigration officers have the capacity to detect and prevent fraud, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct USCIS to take the following ten actions: conduct regular fraud risk assessments across the affirmative asylum application process; develop and implement a mechanism to collect reliable data, such as the number of referrals to FDNS from asylum officers, about FDNS’s efforts to combat asylum fraud; identify and implement tools that asylum officers and FDNS immigration officers can use to detect potential fraud patterns across affirmative asylum applications; require FDNS immigration officers to prescreen all asylum applications for indicators of fraud to the extent that it is cost-effective and feasible; develop asylum-specific guidance on the fraud detection roles and responsibilities of FDNS immigration officers working in asylum offices; develop and deliver additional training for asylum officers on asylum fraud; develop and implement a mechanism to regularly collect and incorporate feedback on training needs from asylum officers and supervisory asylum officers; develop and implement a method to collect reliable data on asylum officer attrition; include a review of potential fraud indicators in future random quality assurance reviews of asylum applications; and develop and implement timeliness goals for all pending termination reviews of affirmative asylum cases. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) describe what Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Department of Justice (DOJ) data indicate about trends in the characteristics of asylum claims, (2) evaluate the extent to which DHS and DOJ have designed mechanisms to prevent and detect fraud in the asylum system, and (3) evaluate the extent to which DHS and DOJ have designed and implemented processes to address any fraud that has been identified in the asylum system. | Why GAO Did This Study
Each year, tens of thousands of aliens in the United States apply for asylum, which provides refuge to those who have been persecuted or fear persecution on protected grounds. Asylum officers in DHS's USCIS and immigration judges in DOJ's EOIR adjudicate asylum applications.
GAO was asked to review the status of the asylum system. This report addresses (1) what DHS and DOJ data indicate about trends in asylum claims, (2) the extent to which DHS and DOJ have designed mechanisms to prevent and detect asylum fraud, and (3) the extent to which DHS and DOJ designed and implemented processes to address any asylum fraud that has been identified. GAO analyzed DHS and DOJ data on asylum applications for fiscal years 2010 through 2014, reviewed DHS and DOJ policies and procedures related to asylum fraud, and interviewed DHS and DOJ officials in Washington, D.C., Falls Church, VA, and in asylum offices and immigration courts across the country selected on the basis of application data and other factors.
What GAO Found
The total number of asylum applications, including both principal applicants and their eligible dependents, filed in fiscal year 2014 (108,152) is more than double the number filed in fiscal year 2010 (47,118). As of September 2015, the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) has a backlog of 106,121 principal applicants, of which 64,254 have exceeded required time frames for adjudication. USCIS plans to hire additional staff to address the backlog.
USCIS and the Department of Justice's (DOJ) Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) have limited capabilities to detect asylum fraud. First, while both USCIS and EOIR have mechanisms to investigate fraud in individual applications, neither agency has assessed fraud risks across the asylum process, in accordance with leading practices for managing fraud risks. Various cases of fraud illustrate risks that may affect the integrity of the asylum system. For example, an investigation in New York resulted in charges against 30 defendants as of March 2014 for their alleged participation in immigration fraud schemes; 829 applicants associated with the attorneys and preparers charged in the case received asylum from USCIS, and 3,709 received asylum from EOIR. Without regular assessments of fraud risks, USCIS and EOIR lack reasonable assurance that they have implemented controls to mitigate those risks. Second, USCIS's capability to identify patterns of fraud across asylum applications is hindered because USCIS relies on a paper-based system for asylum applications and does not electronically capture some key information that could be used to detect fraud, such as the applicant's written statement. Asylum officers and USCIS Fraud Detection and National Security (FDNS) Directorate immigration officers told GAO that they can identify potential fraud by analyzing trends across asylum applications; however, they must rely on labor-intensive methods to do so. Identifying and implementing additional fraud detection tools could enable USCIS to detect fraud more effectively while using resources more efficiently. Third, FDNS has not established clear fraud detection responsibilities for its immigration officers in asylum offices; FDNS officers we spoke with at all eight asylum offices told GAO they have limited guidance with respect to fraud. FDNS standard operating procedures for fraud detection are intended to apply across USCIS, and therefore do not reflect the unique features of the asylum system. Developing asylum-specific guidance for fraud detection, in accordance with federal internal control standards, would better position FDNS officers to understand their roles and responsibilities in the asylum process.
To address identified instances of asylum fraud, USCIS can, in some cases, terminate an individual's asylum status. USCIS terminated the asylum status of 374 people from fiscal years 2010 through 2014 for fraud. In August 2015, USCIS adopted a target of 180 days for conducting initial reviews, in which the asylum office reviews evidence and decides whether to begin termination proceedings, when the asylee has applied for adjustment to lawful permanent resident status; however, this goal applies only to a subset of asylees and pertains to initial reviews. Further, asylees with pending termination reviews may be eligible to receive certain federal benefits. Developing timeliness goals for all pending termination reviews would help USCIS better identify the staffing resources needed to address the terminations workload.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DHS and DOJ conduct regular fraud risk assessments and that DHS, among other things, implement tools for detecting fraud patterns, develop asylum-specific guidance for fraud detection roles and responsibilities, and implement timeliness goals for pending termination reviews. DHS and DOJ concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-14-221 | gao_GAO-14-221_0 | SCRA provides the following mortgage-related protections to servicemembers: Interest rate cap. Some servicemembers also appeared to have benefitted from the SCRA interest rate cap. Financial institutions we contacted could not provide sufficient data to assess the impact of different protection periods, but our analysis indicates that mortgage delinquencies appeared to increase in the first year after active duty. Actual Number of Servicemembers Eligible for SCRA Mortgage Protections Unknown
Based on our interviews and the data sources we reviewed, the number of servicemembers with mortgages eligible for SCRA protections is not known because servicers have not systematically collected this information, although limited data are available. According to these data, a small percentage of the financial institutions’ total loan portfolios were identified as being eligible for SCRA protections. At two servicers, we found that SCRA-protected borrowers had delinquency rates from 16 to 20 percent. In contrast, non-SCRA- protected military borrowers had delinquency rates that ranged from 4 to 8 percent. According to data provided by this institution—which included the initial interest rate and a current interest rate for 9 consecutive months in 2013—some SCRA-eligible borrowers saw their interest rates reduced to 6 percent or less, but almost 82 percent of the loans for those eligible for such a reduction retained rates above 6 percent. Because most of the institutions we interviewed reported that they made enhancements to their data systems in 2012 to better identify SCRA-eligible borrowers, they were unable to provide data for both SCRA-eligible borrowers and a comparison group of other military borrowers before the end of 2011, when the protection periods were shorter. Analyzable data from one institution on the mortgage status of all its military borrowers for a 9-month period in 2013, including those who had left active duty service within the last year, indicated that SCRA-protected borrowers who were within the 1-year protection period after leaving active duty service had a higher chance of curing their delinquencies than did the institution’s other military borrowers who had left active duty service. DOD and Various Partners Provide Financial Education, but Limited Information on Effectiveness of Efforts Exists
DOD has entered into partnerships with many federal agencies and nonprofit organizations to help provide financial education to servicemembers, but limited information on the effectiveness of these efforts exists. In addition, DOD officials noted that some partners provide SCRA outreach and support to servicemembers. For example, the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection has an Office of Servicemember Affairs that provides SCRA outreach to servicemembers and mortgage servicers responsible for complying with the act. But they also told us that obtaining additional information about the educational resources available through the partnerships and their performance would be helpful. Without an assessment of the effectiveness of its educational methods (for example, by using focus groups of servicemembers or results of testing to reinforce retention of SCRA information), we noted that DOD might not be able to ensure it reached servicemembers in the most effective manner. We recommended that DOD assess the effectiveness of its efforts to educate servicemembers on SCRA and determine better ways for making servicemembers aware of their SCRA rights and benefits, including improving the ways in which reservists obtain such information. In response to our recommendation, as of December 2013, DOD was reviewing the results of its recent surveys on the overall financial well- being of military families. Our findings for this report—that many servicemembers appeared not to have taken advantage of their ability to reduce their mortgage interest rates as entitled—appear to reaffirm that DOD’s SCRA education efforts could be improved and that an assessment of the effectiveness of these efforts is still warranted. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report examines (1) available information on changes in the financial well-being of servicemembers who received foreclosure-prevention and mortgage-related interest rate protections under SCRA, including the extent to which servicemembers became delinquent on their mortgages after leaving active duty and the impact of protection periods; and (2) the Department of Defense’s (DOD) partnerships with public- and private- sector entities to provide financial education and counseling about SCRA mortgage protections to servicemembers and views on the effectiveness of these partnerships. We obtained and analyzed loan- level data, institution-specific summary data, or both, from four financial institutions (three large single-family mortgage servicers and a large credit union). Information on DOD Partnerships
To examine the effectiveness of DOD’s partnerships, we analyzed documentation on DOD’s partnerships with public and private entities that provide financial education and counseling to servicemembers. We reviewed the nature of such partnerships, including information or efforts related to SCRA mortgage protections. | Why GAO Did This Study
SCRA seeks to protect eligible active duty military personnel in the event that their military service prevents them from meeting financial obligations. Mortgage-related protections include prohibiting mortgage servicers from foreclosing on servicemembers' homes without court orders and capping fees and interest rates at 6 percent. Traditionally, servicemembers received 90 days of protection beyond their active duty service, but this period was extended to 9 months in 2008 and to 1 year in 2012. The legislation that provided the 1-year protection period also mandated that GAO report on these protections.
This report examines (1) available information on changes in the financial well-being of servicemembers who received foreclosure-prevention and mortgage-related interest rate protections under SCRA, including the extent to which they became delinquent and the impact of protection periods; and (2) DOD's partnerships with public- and private-sector entities to provide financial education and counseling about SCRA mortgage protections to servicemembers and views on the effectiveness of these partnerships. To address these objectives, GAO sought and received data from three large mortgage servicers and a large credit union covering a large portion of all mortgage loans outstanding and potentially SCRA-eligible borrowers. GAO also reviewed documentation on DOD's partnerships and relevant education efforts related to SCRA mortgage protections. GAO interviewed DOD officials and partners who provided SCRA mortgage education and counseling.
What GAO Found
The number of servicemembers with mortgages eligible for Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA) mortgage protections is unknown because servicers have not collected this information in a comprehensive manner. Based on the limited and nongeneralizeable information that GAO obtained from the three mortgage servicers and the credit union, a small percentage of the total loan portfolios were identified as eligible for SCRA protections. Two large servicers had loan-level data on delinquency rates. For those identified as SCRA-eligible, rates ranged from 16 to 20 percent and from 4 to 8 percent for their other military borrowers. Delinquencies at the credit union were under 1 percent. Some servicemembers appeared to have benefitted from the SCRA interest rate cap of 6 percent, but many eligible borrowers had apparently not taken advantage of this protection. For example, at one institution 82 percent of those who could benefit from the interest rate caps still had mortgage rates above 6 percent. The data also were insufficient to assess the impact of SCRA protections after servicemembers left active duty, although one institution's limited data indicated that military borrowers had a higher risk of delinquency in the first year after leaving active duty. But those with SCRA protections also were more likely to cure delinquencies during this period than the institution's other military borrowers. Given the many limitations to the data, these results should only be considered illustrative. Most of these institutions indicated that they made recent changes to better identify SCRA-eligible borrowers and improve the accuracy of the data.
The Department of Defense (DOD) has partnerships with many federal agencies and nonprofit organizations to help provide financial education to servicemembers, but limited information on the effectiveness of these partnerships exists. DOD and its partners have focused on promoting general financial fitness rather than providing information about SCRA protections. But some partners provide SCRA outreach and support to servicemembers. For example, the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection has an Office of Servicemember Affairs that provides SCRA outreach to servicemembers and mortgage servicers responsible for complying with the act. Although stakeholders GAO interviewed generally offered favorable views of these partnerships, some said obtaining additional information about educational resources and partnership performance could improve programs. However, DOD has not undertaken any formal evaluations of the effectiveness of these partnerships. This finding is consistent with GAO's July 2012 review of SCRA education efforts, which found that DOD had not assessed the effectiveness of its educational methods and therefore could not ensure it reached servicemembers in the most effective manner. GAO recommended in July 2012 that DOD assess the effectiveness of its efforts to educate servicemembers on SCRA to determine better ways for making servicemembers (including reservists) aware of SCRA rights and benefits. In response to that recommendation, as of December 2013, DOD was reviewing the results of its recent surveys on the overall financial well-being of military families and planned to use these results to adjust training and education for SCRA, as appropriate. GAO's current finding that many servicemembers did not appear to be taking advantage of the SCRA interest rate cap appears to reaffirm that DOD's SCRA education efforts could be improved and that an assessment of the effectiveness of these efforts is still warranted. |
gao_HEHS-97-51 | gao_HEHS-97-51_0 | In response to complaints by employees who raised health and safety concerns that they were not being protected from discrimination, NRC has studied and reported on the employee protection system. System for Protecting Employees Involves Multiple Steps in Two Agencies
NRC has the overall responsibility for ensuring that the nuclear plants it licenses are operated safely. Under the Atomic Energy Act, as amended, NRC may take action against the employers it licenses when they are found to have discriminated against individual employees for raising health and safety concerns. Accordingly, NRC has established a process for investigating discrimination complaints and, if appropriate, taking enforcement action against licensees. The ERA, as amended, authorizes the Secretary of Labor to order employers to make restitution to the victims of such discrimination, and Labor has instituted a process for investigating and adjudicating discrimination complaints. Memorandum of Understanding Explains How Labor and NRC Coordinate Activities
NRC and Labor recognized that in view of Labor’s complementary responsibilities, coordination was warranted. Recommendations Implemented Should Improve the System
Many of the implemented recommendations from these studies led to actions at NRC to improve monitoring of cases, expand communication with employees about their cases, and increase the agency’s involvement in allegation investigations; they also led to changes at Labor to improve its timeliness in processing allegation cases. Some recommendations, which could be implemented through administrative procedural changes, could significantly improve the system; these address timeliness standards, case monitoring, and NRC’s knowledge of the employee environment in licensees’ facilities. In response to these concerns, both NRC and Labor have acted on OIG and agency recommendations to enhance their management of nuclear employee discrimination cases. Many changes made by NRC were intended to increase its involvement in the protection system and to make the agency proactive in its role. To obtain the perspective of employees and licensees, we visited two nuclear power plants and, at those facilities and elsewhere, spoke with (1) 10 nuclear industry employees who had filed discrimination complaints with Labor, NRC, or both, including members of the National Nuclear Safety Network; (2) 8 attorneys who have represented employees and licensees in the process; (3) officials of 3 nuclear licensees that have been the subject of numerous discrimination complaints; and (4) officials of the Nuclear Energy Institute, a nuclear power industry association. Recommendation II.E-4
In appropriate cases, the Executive Director for Operations (or other senior NRC management) should notify the licensee’s senior management by letter, noting that NRC has not taken a position on the merits of the allegation but emphasizing the importance NRC places on a quality-conscious environment where people believe they are free to raise concerns, and the potential for adverse impact on this environment if the allegation is not appropriately resolved; requesting the personal involvement of senior licensee management in the matter to ensure that the employment action taken was not prompted by the employee’s involvement in protected activity, and to consider whether action is needed to address the potential for a chilling effect; requiring a full report of the actions that senior licensee management took on this request within 45 days; and noting that the licensee’s decision to adopt a holding period will be considered as a mitigating factor in any enforcement decision should discrimination be determined to have occurred. Recommendation II.C-2
The Commission should support legislation to amend section 211 as follows: (1) revising the statute to provide 120 days from the filing of the complaint to conduct the Labor investigation, 30 days from the investigation finding to request a hearing, 240 additional days to issue an ALJ decision, and 90 days for the Secretary of Labor to issue a final decision, thus allowing a total of 480 days from when the complaint is filed to complete the process; (2) revising the statute to provide that reinstatement decisions be immediately effective following a Labor finding based on an administrative investigation; (3) revising the statute to provide that Labor defend its findings of discrimination and ordered relief in the adjudicatory process if its orders are contested by the employer (this would not preclude the complainant from also being a party in the proceeding). | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) and Department of Labor's implementation of legislation pertaining to the protection of nuclear power industry workers who raise health and safety issues, focusing on: (1) how federal laws and regulations protect nuclear power industry employees from discrimination for raising health and safety concerns; (2) the implementation status of recommendations made in recent NRC and Labor internal reviews and audits of the system for protecting workers; and (3) the resulting changes to the system.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) NRC has overall responsibility for ensuring that the nuclear plants it licenses are operated safely, and the Department of Labor also plays a role in the system that protects industry employees against discrimination for raising health and safety concerns; (2) the Atomic Energy Act, as amended, gives NRC responsibility for taking action against the employers it licenses when they are found to have discriminated against individual employees; (3) NRC can investigate when a harassment and intimidation allegation is filed with NRC or when it receives a copy of a discrimination complaint filed with Labor; (4) NRC's Office of Enforcement may use the results of the NRC investigation or a decision from Labor to support enforcement action; (5) in addition, the Energy Reorganization Act, as amended, authorizes the Secretary of Labor to order employers to make restitution to the victims of such discrimination; (6) restitution can include such actions as reinstatement to a former position, reimbursement of all expenses related to the complaint, and removal from personnel files of any adverse references to complaint activities; (7) concerns raised by employees about a lack of protection under the existing process led to studies begun by NRC and Labor in 1992; (8) these concerns included the inordinate amount of time it took Labor to act on some discrimination complaints and NRC's lack of involvement in cases during Labor's decision process; (9) in response to recommendations in reports from these groups, both NRC and Labor have taken actions intended to improve the system for protecting employees; (10) for example, NRC has established a senior position to centrally coordinate and oversee all phases of allegation management, and it has taken other actions to improve overall management of the system, such as establishing procedures to improve communication and feedback among employees, NRC, and licensees; (11) it has also increased its involvement in allegation cases through several actions, including investigating a greater number of allegations; (12) while NRC and Labor have been responsive to these recommendations, other recommendations, which could be implemented through administrative procedural changes and would further improve the system, still need to be addressed; (13) in addition, NRC and Labor have yet to complete action on recommendations requiring statutory and regulatory changes; and (14) these include recommendations to reduce the financial burden on workers with cases pending and to increase the dollar amount of civil penalties. |
gao_GGD-98-128 | gao_GGD-98-128_0 | If taxpayers do not pay the taxes that are assessed, IRS can take action to collect the taxes. To determine how much of the recommended additional tax amounts had been settled, assessed, and collected as of September 27, 1997, for audits closed in fiscal years 1992 through 1997, we matched the recommended amounts to actions taken in Appeals or the Office of Chief Counsel. Disputes on the final 26 percent of the additional recommended taxes had yet to be settled. As of September 27, 1997, IRS had collected $6.1 billion—or 72 percent of the additional taxes assessed and 25 percent of the additional taxes recommended. Since 1992, the results of the audits were less complete because larger percentages are unsettled for each succeeding year, reaching 55 percent in 1997. Because of the incomplete results for audits closed in these more recent years, our analyses focused on 1992 audits. Collection and Assessment Rates Vary by Type of Audit
Table 2 shows how much of the recommended additional taxes had been settled, assessed, and collected as of September 27, 1997, for seven types of audits closed in fiscal year 1992. For fiscal year 1992 audits, the percentage of recommended taxes that IRS had collected as of September 27, 1997, ranged from 20 percent for CEP audits to 43 percent for service center audits. IRS’ Performance Measures Do Not Fully Reflect All Audit Revenues and Costs
IRS’ performance measures do not fully reflect all audit-based revenues and costs. Although IRS measures the staff time directly spent on audits, it does not measure the dollar costs of this direct time or the indirect costs incurred by the Examination Division for such things as training time or office space. Compiling complete and reliable data on the indirect revenues and costs from outside IRS can be very difficult because of limitations with the data sources and research. Further, IRS does not use its available data to develop and report measures that would provide a fuller, more balanced picture of audit results. However, IRS does not measure and report all its existing data on audit revenues, such as additional taxes assessed and collected on the basis of taxes recommended in audits. IRS was more likely to assess taxes recommended in simpler audits of individuals than in complex audits of corporations. These comments dealt with issues such as (1) the need to carefully analyze and interpret ERIS data; (2) the challenges of allocating IRS’ costs; (3) the value of the activity-based costing model in allocating costs; (4) the ongoing use of ERIS data; (5) IRS’ efforts since 1992 to improve the audit and dispute resolution processes; (6) concerns about misinterpretations of the analyses on how much of the recommended tax amounts were settled, assessed, and collected; and (7) the need to analyze new measures. Status of Additional Amounts Recommended for Audits Closed in Fiscal Years 1993-1997 Across Seven Types of Audits
As percent of amount recommended “Other” includes audits of returns for employment tax, estate tax, excise tax, and gift tax; audits conducted in IRS training; and audits categorized by IRS as other. Detailed Information on Audit Results
As percent of amount recommended (continued)
Assessed = Tax and penalty assessed less related abatements 1040A = Nonbusiness returns filed by individuals TPI = Total positive income (income reported as a positive on tax return tables) C-TGR = Form 1040 Schedule C (profit or loss from business) total gross receipts F-TGR = Form 1040 Schedule F (profit or loss from farming) total gross receipts 1040A TPI < $25,000 Non-1040A TPI < $25,000 TPI $25,000 < $50,000 TPI $50,000 < $100,000 TPI $100,000 and over C-TGR < $25,000 C-TGR $25,000 < $100,000 C-TGR $100,000 and over F-TGR < $100,000 F-TGR $100,000 and over (continued)
The Amount of Time IRS Takes to Collect Additional Taxes Assessed After Audits
In developing ratios of the amount of taxes collected to the direct costs for the audit, assessment, and collection activities, we could not include IRS’ direct staff costs for the collection activity. For audits closed in fiscal year 1992, IRS had collected $6.1 billion of the $8.5 billion in additional assessments, as of September 27, 1997. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) measures of the results of its audits of tax returns, focusing on: (1) how much of the additional taxes recommended in all types of audits that were closed in fiscal year (FY) 1992 through FY 1997 had been settled or were still in dispute and, if settled, how much had been assessed and collected as of September 27, 1997; (2) how much of the recommended additional taxes had been assessed and collected for audits closed in FY 1992; and (3) whether broad IRS measures of audit results fully represented audit revenues and costs.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) for audits closed in FY 1992 through FY 1997, IRS recommended tens of billions of dollars in additional taxes for each year; (2) however, not all recommended taxes are assessed; and not all assessed taxes are collected; (3) IRS had settled 40 percent of FY 1992 audits without assessing the recommended taxes, usually because of IRS Office of Appeals' decisions, and had yet to settle the assessment status of the other 26 percent; (4) of the $8.5 billion assessed, IRS had collected 72 percent, which means that 25 percent of all recommended taxes for FY 1992 audits had been collected as of September 27, 1997; (5) for audits closed in FY 1993 through FY 1997, assessment and collection results were less complete because less time had elapsed for these actions to occur compared with 1992; (6) the assessment and collection rates varied by the type of audit closed in FY 1992; (7) in general, IRS assessed a higher percentage of the assessed taxes for simpler audits compared with complex audits; (8) however, IRS collected a higher percentage of the recommended taxes from the simpler audits than complex audits; (9) for simpler service center audits, IRS had assessed 76 percent of the recommended taxes but had collected 56 percent of the assessed taxes as of September 27, 1997; (10) at the other extreme, after audits of complex returns from Coordinated Examination Program (CEP) corporations, IRS had assessed 20 percent of the recommended taxes but had collected 97 percent of the assessed taxes; (11) as of September 27, 1997, 39 percent of the amounts recommended in CEP audits were still in dispute; (12) IRS' existing performance measures do not cover all audit-based revenues or costs; (13) measuring the taxes recommended does not account for the related assessments and collections; nor does it account for indirect revenue gains; (14) measuring other types of revenues are important because not all recommended taxes are assessed or collected; (15) IRS measures the staff time directly charged to audits but not the dollar costs of this direct time; (16) compiling complete and reliable data on the indirect revenues and taxpayer costs can be very difficult to do because of limitations in the data sources; (17) beyond these limitations, IRS did not use other existing data to develop and report measures that more fully represented audit results; (18) for additional measure, audit revenues could be compared with related costs; and (19) to develop such measures, IRS would need more data on both direct and indirect costs. |
gao_GAO-13-604T | gao_GAO-13-604T_0 | MDA Has Made Progress on Testing, Reducing Some Acquisition Risks, and Improving the Clarity of the Baselines
In April 2013, we reported that in the past year MDA gained important knowledge through its test program, including successfully conducting its most complex integrated air and missile defense flight test to date, and it took some positive steps to reduce acquisition risks for two of its programs. We also reported in April 2013 that MDA took steps to reduce acquisition risk by decreasing the overlap between technology and product development for two of its programs—the Aegis BMD SM-3 Block IIA and Block IIB programs. MDA Continues to Face a Variety of Acquisition Challenges
Although the MDA has made some progress, the new MDA Director faces considerable challenges in executing acquisition programs; strengthening accountability; assessing alternatives before making new investment commitments; developing and deploying U.S. missile defense in Europe and using modeling and simulations to understand capabilities and limitations of the BMDS. We also reported in April 2013 that MDA was continuing to follow high risk acquisition strategies for its Aegis Ashore, PTSS, and Targets and Countermeasures programs. For example, this year we reported that the Targets and Countermeasures acquisition strategy is adding risk to an upcoming complex, costly operational flight test involving multiple MDA systems because it plans to use unproven targets. DOD agreed and partially addressed the recommendation. Challenge: Strengthening Accountability by Ensuring Program Baselines Support Oversight
In April 2013 we reported that while MDA made substantial improvements to the clarity of its reported resource and schedule baselines in fiscal year 2012, it has made little progress improving the quality of its cost estimates that support its resource baseline since we made a recommendation to improve these estimates in our March 2011 report.resource baselines are not yet sufficiently reliable, in part because they do not include costs from military services in reported life cycle costs for its programs. Instability due to MDA’s frequent adjustments to its acquisition baselines also makes assessing progress over time extremely difficult and, in many cases, impossible. DOD did not identify how the full life cycle costs should be reported. DOD concurred with this recommendation. Second, during the past several years, MDA has been responding to a mandate from the President to develop and deploy new missile defense systems in Europe for defense of Europe and the United States. Our work continues to find that a key challenge facing DOD is to keep individual system acquisitions synchronized with the planned time frames of the overall U.S. missile defense capability planned in Europe. Third, MDA also is challenged by the need to develop the tools—the models and simulations—to understand the capabilities and limitations of the individual systems before they are deployed, which will require the agency to overcome technical limitations in the current approach to modeling missile defense performance. While MDA recently committed to a new approach in modeling and simulation that could enable them to credibly model individual programs and system-level BMDS performance, warfighters will not benefit from this effort until two of the currently planned three phases for U.S. missile defense in Europe have already been deployed in 2011 and 2015 respectively. Both of these programs were recently proposed for cancellation in the Fiscal Year 2014 President’s Budget Submission. DOD declared the first phase of U.S. missile defense in Europe operational in December 2011. DOD concurred with this recommendation. However, especially in light of growing budget pressures, additional actions are needed, including sufficiently analyzing alternatives before making major new investment commitments; stabilizing acquisition baselines and ensuring they are comprehensive and reliable; ensuring acquisition strategies allow for the right technical and programmatic knowledge to be in place before moving into more complex and costly phases of development; and demonstrating new types of targets in less critical tests before they are used in a major test in order to lower testing risks The appointment of a new Director provides an opportunity to address these challenges, but doing so will not be easy as MDA is still under significant schedule pressures and the agency is undergoing a transition to respond to new Secretary of Defense direction to expand the GMD capabilities. | Why GAO Did This Study
In order to meet its mission, MDA is developing a highly complex group of systems comprised of land-, sea-, and space-based sensors to track missiles, as well as ballistic missile interceptors and a battle management system. These systems can be integrated in different ways to provide protection in various regions of the world. Since its initiation in 2002, MDA has been given a significant amount of flexibility in executing the development and fielding of the ballistic missile defense system. This statement addresses recent MDA progress and the challenges it faces with its acquisition management. It is based on GAO's April 2013 report and reports on missile defense issued from September 2008 through July 2012.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense's (DOD) Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has made some recent progress gaining important knowledge for its Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) by successfully conducting several important tests. In addition, the agency made substantial improvements to the clarity of its cost and schedule baselines since first reporting them in 2010, and declared the first major deployment of U.S. missile defense in Europe operational in December 2011. MDA also took steps to reduce acquisition risk by decreasing the overlap between technology and product development for two of its programs.
MDA faces considerable challenges in executing acquisition programs; strengthening accountability; assessing alternatives before making new investment commitments; developing and deploying U.S. missile defense in Europe and using modeling and simulations to understand capabilities and limitations of the BMDS. The appointment of a new director for MDA provides an opportunity to address these challenges. More specifically:
Interceptor production for three of MDA's systems has been significantly disrupted during the past few years due to high-risk acquisition strategies which have resulted in delaying planned deliveries to the warfighter, raising costs, and disrupting the industrial base. Further, MDA continues to follow high-risk acquisition strategies for other programs. For example, its Targets and Countermeasures program is adding risk to an upcoming complex, costly operational flight test involving multiple MDA systems because it plans to use unproven targets.
While MDA made substantial improvements to the clarity of its reported cost and schedule baselines, MDA's estimates are not comprehensive because they do not include costs from military services in reported life-cycle costs for its programs. Instability due to MDA's frequent adjustments to its acquisition baselines makes assessing progress over time using these baselines extremely difficult and, in many cases, impossible.
While MDA has conducted some analyses that consider alternatives in selecting which acquisitions to pursue, it did not conduct robust analyses of alternatives for two of its new programs, both of which were recently proposed for cancellation.
During the past several years, MDA has been responding to a mandate from the President to develop and deploy new missile defense systems in Europe for the defense of Europe and the United States. GAO's work continues to find that a key challenge facing DOD is to keep individual system acquisitions synchronized with the planned deployment time frames.
MDA has also struggled for years to develop the tools--the models and simulations--to understand the capabilities and limitations of the individual systems before they are deployed. While MDA recently committed to a new approach that could enable them to credibly model individual programs and system-level BMDS performance, warfighters will not benefit from this effort until after the first two of the currently planned three phases for U.S. missile defense in Europe have been deployed in 2011 and 2015 respectively.
What GAO Recommends
GAO makes no new recommendations in this statement. In the April 2013 report, GAO made four recommendations to DOD to ensure MDA (1) fully assesses alternatives before selecting investments, (2) takes steps to reduce the risk that unproven target missiles can disrupt key tests, (3) reports full program costs, and (4) stabilizes acquisition baselines. DOD concurred with two recommendations and partially concurred with two, stating the decision to perform target risk reduction flight tests should be weighed against other programmatic factors and that its current forum for reporting MDA program costs should not include non-MDA funding. GAO continues to believe the recommendations are valid as discussed in that report. |
gao_T-GGD-97-88 | gao_T-GGD-97-88_0 | My testimony will (1) focus on the performance of the Postal Service and the need for improving internal controls and protecting revenue in an organization that takes in and spends billions of dollars each year and (2) highlight some of the key reform and oversight issues that continue to challenge the Postal Service and Congress as they consider how U.S. mail service will be provided in the future. I will also provide some observations from our ongoing work relating to labor-management relations at the Postal Service and other areas. According to the Postal Service’s 1996 annual report, its fiscal year 1996 net income was $1.6 billion. Additionally, during fiscal year 1996, the Postal Service’s volume exceeded 182 billion pieces of mail and generated more than $56 billion in revenue. While these results are encouraging, other performance data suggest that some areas of concern warrant closer scrutiny. For example, last year’s delivery of 2-day and 3-day mail—at 80 and 83 percent respectively—did not score as high as overnight delivery. Such performance has raised a concern among some customers that the Postal Service’s emphasis on overnight delivery is at the expense of 2-day and 3-day mail. Additionally, although its mail volume continues to grow, the Postal Service is concerned that customers increasingly are turning to its competitors or alternative communications methods. In 1996, mail volume increased by about one-half of the Service’s anticipated increase in volume. The Postal Service’s continued success in both operational and financial performance will depend heavily on its ability to control operating costs, strengthen internal controls, and ensure the integrity of its services. However, we found several weaknesses in the Postal Service’s internal controls that contributed to unnecessary increased costs. Key Reform Issues
changes to the Private Express Statutes. Another key reform issue is the future role of the Postal Service in the constantly changing and increasingly competitive communications market. Oversight of the Postal Service Remains Important
oversight is labor-management relations. Generally, the long-standing labor-management problems we identified in 1994 still remain unresolved, despite the initiatives that have been established to address them. The Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) provides a mechanism that may be useful in focusing a dialogue that could lead to a framework agreement. Finally, several other areas will likely continue to require the attention of both the Postal Service and Congress. One such area is the Postal Service’s automation efforts. The Postal Service has spent billions of dollars to ensure that an increase in productivity and an adequate return on planned investments are realized. The Postal Service has made considerable progress in improving its financial and operational performance. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed: (1) the performance of the Postal Service (USPS) and the need for improving internal controls and protecting revenue in an organization that takes in and spends billions of dollars each year; (2) key reform and oversight issues that continue to challenge USPS and Congress as they consider how U.S. mail service will be provided in the future; and (3) its ongoing work relating to labor-management relations at USPS and other issues.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) USPS reported that fiscal year (FY) 1996 represented the second year in a row that its financial performance was profitable and operational performance improved; (2) USPS's 1996 net income was $1.6 billion and it delivered 91 percent of overnight mail on time; (3) additionally, for FY 1996, USPS's volume exceeded 182 billion pieces of mail and generated more than $56 billion in revenue; (4) while these results are encouraging, other performance data suggest that some areas warrant closer scrutiny; (5) last year's delivery of 2-day and 3-day mail, at 80 and 83 percent respectively, did not score as high as overnight delivery; (6) the concern among customers is that USPS's emphasis on overnight delivery is at the expense of 2-day and 3-day mail; (7) additionally, although its mail volume continues to grow, USPS is concerned that customers increasingly are turning to its competitors or alternative communications methods; (8) in 1996, mail volume increased by about one-half of USPS's anticipated increase in volume; (9) containing costs is another key challenge that GAO has reported on previously; (10) GAO has also found several weaknesses in USPS's internal controls that contributed to increased costs; (11) USPS's continued success in both financial and operational performance will depend heavily on controlling operating costs, strengthening internal controls, and ensuring the integrity of its services; (12) the prospect that pending postal legislation may place USPS in a more competitive arena with its private sector counterparts has prompted congressional consideration of some key reform issues; (13) these issues include how proposed changes to the Private Express statutes may affect universal mail service, postal revenues, and rates; (14) another reform issue is the future role of USPS in an increasingly competitive, constantly changing communications market; (15) congressional oversight remains a key tool for improving the organizational performance of USPS; (16) one of the most important areas for oversight is labor-management relations; (17) despite the initiatives that have been established to address them, the long-standing labor-management relations problems GAO identified in 1994 remain unresolved; (18) the Government Performance and Results Act provides an important avenue for stakeholders in reaching a consensus for addressing such problems; and (19) also, USPS's automation efforts will continue to require the attention of both USPS and Congress to ensure that increased productivity and an adequate return on investments are realized. |
gao_GAO-01-857 | gao_GAO-01-857_0 | Background
California moved to a deregulated electricity market in April 1998. Average prices rose dramatically in May 2000 and remained high. They argue that generating firms have withheld supplies of electricity by staging outages in order to drive up prices, and point to higher-than-normal levels of outages since summer 2000. Studies Used Differing Methodologies and Reached Different Conclusions
FERC’s study differed from the other two in its methodological approach and reached different conclusions. FERC performed an audit of specific generating plants and companies that had experienced outages during December 2000. On the basis of these audits, FERC found that there was no evidence that the audited companies were incurring physical outages in an effort to drive up prices. The other two studies examined market prices and compared them with estimates of the costs of producing electricity to determine if prices were consistent with generating companies’ exercising market power. The second study, by Joskow and Kahn, examined electricity prices during summer 2000. FERC’s Study Not Thorough Enough to Support Its Conclusion
FERC’s study of electricity generator outages was not thorough enough to support its overall conclusion that the audited companies did not physically withhold electricity supplies to influence prices. Scope and Methodology
To develop an understanding of the issues surrounding market power in the electricity industry, we interviewed numerous economists from Stanford University, the University of California, Berkeley, and the University of California, Irvine, and reviewed written studies of market power and related issues. We also interviewed officials from state and federal energy agencies, including the California Public Utilities Commission, the California Independent System Operator, and FERC. To compare the FERC outage study and the other two studies on market power, we reviewed the three studies, evaluating the methodologies used and the results. Edward Kahn is a principal at Analysis Group/Economics, a private consulting firm. Appendix II: Comments From the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission | Why GAO Did This Study
Wholesale electricity prices in California rose sharply in May 2000 and have remained high. In addition, there were disruptions in service--blackouts--this winter and spring. The California Independent System Operator, the state agency in charge of balancing electricity supply with demand, expects high prices and service disruptions to continue and perhaps worsen this summer. In response to concerns about high prices and generator outages in California, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) undertook a study, released in February 2001, to determine whether outages were being used to withhold power and drive up prices of electricity in California. Other studies of the electricity market in California have been conducted by economists and industry experts. One study, conducted by three economists from Stanford University, the University of California at Berkeley, and the University of California Energy Institute examined whether market prices of electricity in California in 1998 and 1999 were higher than competitive levels. A second, similar study by two economists--one from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and one from a private consulting firm--examined the California market during 2000. This report reviews the FERC study, as well as the two studies on the California electricity market to determine (1) how the methodologies and results of the three studies compare and (2) if FERC's study was thorough enough to support its conclusions that audited companies did not physically withhold electricity supplies to influence prices.
What GAO Found
GAO found that FERC's study used a very different methodological approach from the approach used by the other two studies and reached different conclusions. FERC's study performed an audit of specific generating plants and companies that experienced outages to determine if audited companies were incurring outages in an effort to drive up prices, while the other two studies compared market prices with estimates of the costs of producing electricity. GAO further found that FERC's study was not thorough enough to support its conclusion that audited companies were not withholding electricity supply to influence prices. |
gao_GAO-04-911 | gao_GAO-04-911_0 | Case Studies Illustrate Pay Problems
We identified significant pay problems at all eight of the Army Reserve case study units we audited. Overall, 332 of the 348 soldiers (95 percent) in our eight case study units that were mobilized, deployed, and demobilized at some time during the 18- month period from August 2002 through January 2004 had at least one pay problem associated with their mobilization to active duty. Problems lingered unresolved for considerable lengths of time. Soldiers were sometimes required to spend considerable time and were frustrated in their efforts to determine the exact sums owed or to establish a repayment plan. Significant Weaknesses Exist in Mobilized Army Reserve Pay Processes
The pay problems we found were caused, at least in part, by design weaknesses in the extensive, complex set of processes and procedures relied on to provide active duty pays, allowances, and related tax benefits to mobilized Army Reserve soldiers. Such a human capital strategy supporting accurate and timely active duty payments to mobilized Army Reserve soldiers must encompass potentially hundreds of DOD components that are now involved in carrying out the extensive coordination, manual intervention, and reconciliations required to pay mobilized Army Reserve soldiers. The fact that mobilized Army Reserve soldiers received any of their entitled active duty pays, allowances, and tax benefits accurately and on-time is largely due to the dedication and tireless efforts of many of these pay-support personnel to do the right thing for these mobilized Army Reserve soldiers. Servicing soldiers and their families with pay inquiries and problems is particularly critical in light of the error-prone processes and limited automated system processing capabilities. For example, in response to our recommendations in the Army National Guard report, DOD reported taking actions to (1) automate manual monthly hardship duty pay in April 2004, (2) eliminate the use of the miscellaneous code for processing hardship duty pay and instead process these payments using a unique transaction code to facilitate implementing a system edit to identify and stop erroneous payments, (3) compare active duty release dates in the Army’s system used to generate Release From Active Duty orders with soldiers’ end of active duty tour dates shown in DJMS-RC to identify and stop any erroneous active duty pays, and (4) increase the reliability and timeliness of documentation used to support soldiers’ arrival at and departure from designated overseas locations. Instead, we used a case study approach to provide a more detailed perspective of the nature of any deficiencies in the three key areas of processes, people (human capital), and automated systems relied on to pay mobilized Army Reserve soldiers. Additionally, 3 soldiers experienced overpayments and underpayments related to the combat zone tax exclusion. In addition, all of the soldiers received their combat zone tax exclusion benefit at least 1 month late. | Why GAO Did This Study
In light of GAO's November 2003 report highlighting significant pay problems experienced by Army National Guard soldiers mobilized to active duty in support of the global war on terrorism and homeland security, GAO was asked to determine if controls used to pay mobilized Army Reserve soldiers provided assurance that such payments are accurate and timely. GAO's audit used a case study approach to focus on controls over three key areas: processes, people (human capital), and automated systems.
What GAO Found
The processes and automated systems relied on to provide active duty pays, allowances, and tax benefits to mobilized Army Reserve soldiers are so error-prone, cumbersome, and complex that neither DOD nor, more importantly, Army Reserve soldiers themselves, could be reasonably assured of timely and accurate payments. Weaknesses in these areas resulted in pay problems, including overpayments, and to a lesser extent, late and underpayments, of soldiers' active duty pays and allowances at eight Army Reserve case study units. Specifically, 332 of 348 soldiers (95 percent) we audited at eight case study units that were mobilized, deployed, and demobilized at some time during the 18-month period from August 2002 through January 2004 had at least one pay problem. Many of the soldiers had multiple problems associated with their active duty pays and allowances. Some of these problems lingered unresolved for considerable lengths of time, some for over 1 year. Further, nearly all soldiers began receiving their tax exemption benefit at least 1 month late. These pay problems often had a profound adverse impact on individual soldiers and their families. For example, soldiers were required to spend considerable time, sometimes while deployed in remote, hostile environments overseas, seeking help on pay inquiries or in correcting errors in their active duty pays, allowances, and related tax benefits. The processes in place to pay mobilized Army Reserve soldiers, involving potentially hundreds of DOD, Army, and Army Reserve organizations and thousands of personnel, were deficient with respect to (1) tracking soldiers' pay status as they transition through their active duty tours, (2) carrying out soldier readiness reviews, (3) after-the-fact report reconciliation requirements, and (4) unclear procedures for applying certain pay entitlements. With respect to human capital, weaknesses identified at our case study units included (1) insufficient resources allocated to key unit-level pay administration responsibilities, (2) inadequate training related to existing policies and procedures, and (3) poor customer service. Several automated systems issues also contributed to the significant pay errors, including nonintegrated systems and limited processing capabilities. |
gao_GAO-05-351 | gao_GAO-05-351_0 | Treasury officials stated that they make a positive determination on currency manipulation only when all the conditions specified in the Trade Act are satisfied. According to these officials, to reach a positive finding of currency manipulation under the Trade Act, Treasury must find that the economies have a material global current account surplus and a significant bilateral trade surplus with the United States, and they are manipulating their currency with the intent of gaining trade advantage. Treasury issued its report on March 11, 2005. Treasury did not find that Japan was manipulating its currency in 2003 and 2004. Treasury’s Recent Reporting on China and Japan
In recent reports Treasury has not found that either China or Japan meets the statutory criteria for currency manipulation. Treasury Has Generally Complied with Reporting Requirements, but Its Approach to Assessing the Impact of Exchange Rates on the U.S. Economy Has Changed
Treasury has generally complied with the reporting requirements mandated by the 1988 Trade Act (see table 1), although its discussion of U.S. economic impacts has become less specific over time. Treasury’s impact-related analysis after the 1990’s cited the importance of broader macroeconomic and structural factors behind global trade imbalances. Estimates of the Undervaluation of China’s Currency Vary Widely, and Views on Policy Steps Differ
Many experts maintain that China’s currency is significantly undervalued, while some believe that undervaluation is not substantial or that calculating reliable estimates is not possible. The significant variation in estimates of remninbi undervaluation can be attributed in part to different methodological approaches, but similar methodologies can also yield differences. IV for a discussion of China’s capital controls.) With respect to whether and when China should change its exchange rate policy, there are varying views even among experts who believe the currency is undervalued. Analysts have also identified a number of challenges for China. The U.S. Impact of a Renminbi Revaluation Would Depend on Multiple Factors
A revaluation of the renminbi could have implications for various aspects of the U.S. economy—with both costs and benefits—although the impacts are hard to predict. Some key factors include the following: How much of the exchange rate appreciation is “passed-through” to higher prices for U.S. purchasers. Since then, Members of Congress have continued to propose legislation to address China currency issues. Treasury also emphasized several aspects of its exchange rate assessments and its reports. We examined (1) the process Treasury uses to conduct its assessments of currency manipulation and the results of recent assessments, particularly with respect to China and Japan; (2) the extent to which Treasury has met the 1988 Trade Act reporting requirements; (3) experts’ views on whether or by how much China’s currency is undervalued; and (4) the implications of a revalued Chinese currency for the United States. (b) Contents of Report—Each report submitted under subsection (a) shall contain (1) an analysis of currency market developments and the relationship between the United States dollar and the currencies of our major trade competitors; (2) an evaluation of the factors in the United States and other economies that underline conditions in the currency markets, including developments in bilateral trade and capital flows; (3) a description of currency intervention or other actions undertaken to adjust the actual exchange rate of the dollar; (4) an assessment of the impact of the exchange rate of the United States dollar on (A) the ability of the United States to maintain a more appropriate and sustainable balance in its current account and merchandise trade account; (B) production, employment, and noninflationary growth in the United States; (C) the international competitive performance of United States industries and the external indebtedness of the United States; (5) recommendations for any changes necessary in United States economic policy to attain a more appropriate and sustainable balance in the current account; (6) the results of negotiations conducted pursuant to section 3004; (7) key issues in United States policies arising from the most recent consultation requested by the International Monetary Fund under article IV of the Fund’s Articles of Agreement; and (8) a report on the size and composition of international capital flows, and the factors contributing to such flows, including, where possible, an assessment of the impact of such flows on exchange rates and trade flows. Instead, U.S. imports from other low-wage foreign suppliers would increase. | Why GAO Did This Study
The 1988 Trade Act requires the Department of the Treasury to annually assess whether countries manipulate their currencies for trade advantage and to report semiannually on specific aspects of exchange rate policy. Some observers have been concerned that China and Japan may have maintained undervalued currencies, with adverse U.S. impacts, which has brought increased attention to Treasury's assessments. In 2004, Congress mandated that Treasury provide additional information about currency manipulation assessments, and Treasury issued its report in March 2005. Members of Congress have continued to propose legislation to address China currency issues. We examined (1) Treasury's process for conducting its assessments and recent results, particularly for China and Japan; (2) the extent to which Treasury has met legislative reporting requirements; (3) experts' views on whether or by how much China's currency is undervalued; and (4) the implications of a revaluation of China's currency for the United States. In commenting on a draft of this report, Treasury emphasized it does consider the impact of the exchange rate on the economy, and factors influencing exchange rates also affect U.S. production and competitiveness.
What GAO Found
Treasury has not found currency manipulation under the terms of the 1988 Trade Act since it last cited China in 1994. Treasury officials make a positive finding of currency manipulation only when all the conditions in the Trade Act are satisfied--when an economy has a material global current account surplus and a significant bilateral trade surplus with the United States, and is manipulating its currency with the intent to gain an unfair trade advantage. Treasury said that in its 2003 and 2004 assessments, China did not meet the criteria for manipulation, in part because it did not have a material global current account surplus and had maintained a fixed exchange rate regime through different economic conditions. Japan did not meet the criteria in 2003 and 2004 in part because its exchange rate interventions were considered to be part of a macroeconomic policy to combat deflation. Treasury has generally complied with the reporting requirements for its exchange rate reports, although its discussion of U.S. economic impacts has become less specific over time. Recent reports stress the importance of broad macroeconomic and structural factors behind global trade imbalances, which Treasury officials contend meets the intent of economic impact requirements. Many experts have concluded that China's currency is undervalued, but by widely varying amounts, while some maintain that undervaluation cannot be determined. The significant variation in estimates can be attributed in part to different methodological approaches, but experts also believe that exchange rate assessments are especially challenging for rapidly developing economies such as China's. Among experts who believe China's currency is undervalued, views on policy steps to correct the imbalance differ. A revaluation of China's currency could have implications for various aspects of the U.S. economy, although the impacts are hard to predict. They depend on multiple factors, including how much appreciation is passed through to higher prices for U.S. purchasers and the extent to which reduced imports from China are replaced with imports from other countries. In addition to affecting trade-related sectors, a revaluation could have implications for U.S. capital flows. |
gao_GAO-16-738T | gao_GAO-16-738T_0 | The Coast Guard Has Assessed Its Arctic Capabilities and Taken Actions to Mitigate Gaps but Has Not Systematically Assessed Its Progress
In our June 2016 report, we found that although the Coast Guard had assessed its Arctic capabilities and worked with its Arctic partners—such as other federal agencies— to carry out actions to help mitigate Arctic capability gaps—it had not systematically assessed how its actions have helped to mitigate these gaps. According to Coast Guard officials, through the agency’s role in implementing the various Arctic strategies and implementation plans, the Coast Guard has taken actions, along with its Arctic partners, that have helped to mitigate capability gaps. For example, during Arctic Shield operations, the Coast Guard tested communications equipment belonging to the Department of Defense—extending communications capabilities further north than previously possible—and conducted Arctic oil spill response exercises. However, we found in our June 2016 report that the Coast Guard had not systematically tracked the extent to which its actions agency-wide have helped mitigate Arctic capability gaps. Coast Guard officials attributed this, in part, to not being able to unilaterally close the gaps. As a result, we recommended in our June 2016 report that the Coast Guard develop measures, as appropriate, and design and implement a process for systematically assessing the extent to which its actions have helped mitigate Arctic capability gaps. DHS concurred with our recommendations, and in response, the Coast Guard reported that it planned to develop specific measures for some of its Arctic activities and systematically assess how its actions have helped to mitigate the capability gaps for which the Coast Guard is the lead agency, such as icebreaking capacity. Although the Coast Guard may not be the lead for these gaps, assessing the impact of Coast Guard actions for such capability gaps would better enable the Coast Guard to understand the effectiveness of its actions and the status of all capability gaps. Coast Guard Has Been Unable to Fulfill All Polar Icebreaking Operations and Is Taking Steps to Begin Icebreaker Acquisition
Our June 2016 report found the Coast Guard has been unable to fulfill some of its polar icebreaking responsibilities with its aging polar icebreaking fleet, and had efforts underway to acquire a heavy icebreaker—which has greater icebreaking capability than a medium icebreaker. Specifically, in 2011 and 2012 when its heavy icebreakers were not active, the Coast Guard was unable to maintain assured, year- round access to the Arctic and did not meet 4 of 11 requests for polar icebreaking services. The Coast Guard reported that increased heavy icebreaking capacity is needed to fully meet requirements in the Arctic and Antarctic regions. We also found that the Coast Guard initiated a program in 2013 to acquire a new heavy icebreaker to maintain polar icebreaking capability after the Polar Star’s projected service life ends between 2020 and 2023. Currently, the Coast Guard is working to determine the optimal acquisition strategy. Availability. Anticipating a likely gap of 3 to 6 years in heavy icebreaker capability between the expected end of the Polar Star’s service life between 2020 and 2023 and the deployment of a new icebreaker in 2026, we reported in June 2016 that the Coast Guard is developing a bridging strategy, as required by law, to determine how to address this expected gap (see fig. 2). This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
The retreat of polar sea ice in the Arctic, as reported by the U.S. National Snow and Ice Data Center, combined with an expected increase in human activity there, has heightened U.S. and other nations' interests in the Arctic region in recent years. Growth in Arctic activity is expected to increase demand for services such as search and rescue and maritime navigation support, which can be a challenge to provide given the harsh and unpredictable weather and vast distances that responding agencies must travel to reach the Arctic. The Coast Guard plays a significant role in U.S. Arctic policy and issued its Arctic strategy in May 2013.
This statement addresses the extent to which the Coast Guard has (1) assessed its Arctic capabilities and taken actions to mitigate any identified gaps, and (2) reported being able to carry out polar icebreaking operations. This testimony is based on a June 2016 GAO report. GAO reviewed relevant laws and policies and Coast Guard documents that detail Arctic plans, among other things. Detailed information on GAO's scope and methodology can be found in the June 2016 report.
What GAO Found
GAO reported in June 2016 that the U.S. Coast Guard, within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), had assessed its Arctic capabilities and worked with its Arctic partners—such as other federal agencies— to mitigate Arctic capability gaps, including communications and training. Although Coast Guard officials stated that the agency's actions, such as testing communication equipment in the Arctic and conducting Arctic oil spill response exercises, have helped to mitigate Arctic capability gaps, the Coast Guard has not systematically assessed the impact of its actions on these gaps. GAO recommended in June 2016 that the Coast Guard develop measures, as appropriate, and design and implement a process, for systematically assessing the extent to which its actions have helped mitigate Arctic capability gaps. DHS concurred with GAO's recommendations, and the Coast Guard reported that it planned to develop specific measures for some of its Arctic activities and systematically assess how its actions have helped to mitigate the capability gaps for which the Coast Guard is the lead agency. While officials stated they are unable to unilaterally close capability gaps for which the Coast Guard is not the lead agency, assessing the impact of Coast Guard actions for such capability gaps would better enable the Coast Guard to understand the effectiveness of its actions and the status of all capability gaps, as well as plan its Arctic operations.
GAO's June 2016 report also found that the Coast Guard has been unable to fulfill its polar icebreaking responsibilities with its aging icebreaker fleet, which currently includes two active icebreakers. In 2011 and 2012, the Coast Guard was unable to maintain year-round access to the Arctic and did not meet 4 of 11 requests for polar icebreaking services. With its one active heavy icebreaker—which has greater icebreaking capability—nearing the end of its service life, the Coast Guard initiated a program in 2013 to acquire a new one and is working to determine the optimal acquisition strategy. However, the Coast Guard's efforts to acquire an icebreaker, whether by lease or purchase, will be limited by legal and operational requirements. In addition, current projections show that the Coast Guard is likely to have a 3- to 6-year gap in its heavy icebreaking capability before a new icebreaker becomes operational, as shown below. The Coast Guard is developing a strategy to determine how to address this expected gap.
Coast Guard's Heavy Icebreaker Availability and Expected Capability Gap, Present until 2030 |
gao_GAO-15-88 | gao_GAO-15-88_0 | For example, as of September 2014, 32 of the 33 components certified that they had reviewed their inventory of contracted services and, overall, more components addressed more of DOD’s required reporting elements than in fiscal year 2011. DOD also continues to face challenges in fully implementing the CMRA-based common data system that is intended to collect the required data for the inventories DOD components must review, thus jeopardizing its plan to have all components using this system to collect manpower data reported by contractors by 2016. As we reported in May 2014, DOD officials noted that the lack of dedicated resources has been a key factor hindering implementation of its planned ECMRA, the common data system based on the Army’s CMRA system. As we concluded in our May 2014 report, DOD did not have a comprehensive plan with timeframes and milestones to measure its progress toward developing a common contractor manpower data system and associated business processes. This review raises a question about whether DOD will continue to implement a DOD-wide inventory data collection system modeled after the Army’s CMRA system or attempt to develop a new system. The Military Departments Have Not Developed Statutorily Required Plans or Identified Specific Responsibilities to Facilitate the Use of the Inventory
The military departments have not developed plans or enforcement mechanisms to use the inventory of contracted services to inform strategic workforce planning, workforce mix, and budget decision-making processes, as statutorily required. Disparate offices are responsible for the various decision-making processes at the military departments, and the secretaries of the military departments have not assigned specific responsibility for coordinating among these offices to develop plans to use the inventory to inform such decisions. In part, the absence of accountable officials to integrate the use of the inventory leaves the department at continued risk of not complying with the applicable legislative requirements to use the inventory to support management decisions. The Air Force failed to submit an inventory review certification letter while the Army submitted incomplete review data for several major commands. DOD’s fiscal year 2013 guidance does not fully address some of the shortcomings our review identified, including how to identify contracts to review or the methodologies or approaches to use to ensure the components’ inventory reviews adequately assess contractor activities. As a result, components may not fully identify instances of contractors providing services that are closely associated with inherently governmental functions. Without a thorough review of contractor activities, DOD risks becoming overly reliant on contractors to support core missions. We had previously recommended that DOD develop a plan of action with timeframes and milestones to measure DOD’s progress in implementing a common data system, but DOD has yet to do so. Internal control standards state that management should establish an organizational structure, delegate authority for key roles, and assign responsibility to enable an organization to achieve management objectives and to comply with laws. In response to our recommendation to revise its inventory review guidance to provide more clarity on which contracted functions should be reviewed and to provide approaches the components may use to ensure that the nature of how the contract is being performed is considered, the department noted it is currently enhancing its guidance for the fiscal year 2014 inventory of contracted services and intends to have components review and certify 100 percent of the services reported in their respective inventory. To assess the extent to which DOD components—to include the three military departments and the defense agencies— implemented the required review of contracts and activities in the inventory of contracted services pursuant to subsection(e), for the fiscal year 2012 inventory, we examined the guidance related to the fiscal year 2012 inventory review process which the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (AT&L) and the Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (P&R) issued on February 4, 2013. We discussed identification of a cognizant official for the plans and processes with acquisition, manpower, programming, and budgeting officials. Appendix II: Comparison of Components’ Identification of Contractors Providing Services Closely Associated With Inherently Governmental Functions in their Fiscal Year 2011 and 2012 Certification Letters
Appendix II: Comparison of Components’ Identification of Contractors Providing Services Closely Associated With Inherently Governmental Functions in their Fiscal Year 2011 and 2012 Certification Letters The Navy did not identify the number of FTEs, but noted they have 25 contracts that contained these functions. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD is the government's largest purchaser of contractor-provided services. In 2008, Congress required DOD to compile and review an annual inventory of its contracted services to include the number of contractors providing services to DOD and the functions these contractors performed, and in 2011, amended this statute to require DOD to plan to use that inventory to inform certain department-wide decision making processes. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 mandated GAO to report on the required reviews and plans to use these inventories.
For this report, GAO assessed the extent to which DOD components (1) reviewed contracts and activities in the fiscal year 2012 inventory of contracted services and (2) developed plans to use the inventory for decision-making. GAO reviewed relevant laws and guidance, reviewed component certification letters from 32 components, and interviewed DOD acquisition, manpower, programming, and budgeting officials.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense (DOD) continues to face challenges in assuring that it conducts and reports on the results of its required inventory reviews. As of September 2014, 32 of the 33 components that were required to conduct an inventory review certified that they had done so and generally addressed more of the required reporting elements than in fiscal year 2011. However, GAO found limitations with the inventory review results. For example, the Air Force did not submit a fiscal year 2012 inventory certification letter and the Army's review was incomplete at the time its Secretary signed the certification. Further, components may not have fully identified all instances in which contractors were providing services that are closely associated with inherently governmental functions, a key review objective to help ensure that the DOD is not overly reliant on contractors to support core missions. DOD's March 2014 guidance, which is applicable to the fiscal year 2013 inventory, does not fully address some of the shortcomings GAO identified, including how to identify contracts for review or approaches to ensure that components adequately assess contractor activities. As a result, components may not fully identify instances of contractors providing services that are closely associated with inherently governmental functions.
A key factor hindering the components' inventory reviews is the lack of accurate and reliable data. DOD has not resolved issues with implementing its planned common data system based on the Army's existing system. Further, in September 2014, DOD initiated a new review, due by December 2014, to identify and develop options to collect these data. This review raises a question of whether DOD will continue to implement a common data system modeled after the Army's system or attempt to develop a new system. DOD continues to lack a plan with timeframes and milestones to measure its progress toward implementing a common data system. These factors jeopardize DOD's goal to have all components, by 2016, collect statutory-required contractor manpower data. Further delays in resolving these issues will undermine the inventory's usefulness.
The military departments generally have not developed plans to use the inventory of contracted services to facilitate DOD's strategic workforce planning, workforce mix, and budget decision-making processes, as statutorily required. Numerous offices are responsible for the various decision-making processes at the military departments, and the Secretaries of the military departments have not assigned specific responsibility for coordinating among these offices to do so. The absence of officials who are accountable for integrating the use of the inventory leaves the department at continued risk of not complying with the applicable legislative requirements to use the inventory to support management decisions. Internal control standards state that management should assign responsibility to enable an organization to achieve management objectives and to comply with laws.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends DOD revise inventory guidance to improve the review of contract functions, approve a plan of action with milestones and timeframes to establish a common data system to collect contractor manpower data, and designate a senior management official at the military departments to develop plans to use inventory data to inform management decisions. DOD concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-05-684 | gao_GAO-05-684_0 | Background
The federal government helps students and families save, pay for, and repay the costs of postsecondary education through grant and loan programs authorized under title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965, and through tax preferences—reductions in federal tax liabilities that result from preferential provisions in the tax code, such as exemptions and exclusions from taxation, deductions, credits, deferrals, and preferential tax rates. In fiscal year 2004, Education made approximately $14 billion in grants and provided another $56 billion in loan assistance (face value) through the title IV programs. 1.) Additionally, although student aid programs and tax preferences assist students and families across a wide range of income levels, some title IV programs, such as the Pell Grant and subsidized Stafford student loan programs, provide much of their financial assistance to students and families whose incomes are lower, on average, than students who receive unsubsidized Stafford loans, tax deductions, or make use of tax-exempt saving vehicles. Students and Families Have More Responsibility for Obtaining Benefits of Tax Preferences in Comparison to Title IV Aid
The federal government and postsecondary institutions have significant responsibilities in assisting students and families in obtaining assistance provided under title IV programs but only minor roles with respect to tax filers’ use of education-related tax preferences. Higher education tax preferences, in contrast to federal grants and student loans, require more responsibility on the part of students and families. In contrast, the primary responsibility for selecting among and properly using tax preferences rests with tax filers: they must understand the rules in light of their own situation, identify applicable tax preferences, understand how these tax preferences interact with one another and with federal student aid, keep records sufficient to support their tax filing, and correctly claim the credit or deduction on their return. Some Tax Filers May Not Effectively Use Postsecondary Tax Preferences, Possibly Due to Complexity
According to our analysis of IRS data on the use of Hope and Lifetime tax credits and the tuition deduction, some tax filers appear to make less-than- optimal choices among them. The amount by which these tax filers failed to reduce their tax averaged $169; 10 percent of this group could have reduced their tax liabilities by over $500. Concluding Observations
Congress has adopted a range of tools to help students and families pay for postsecondary education, including grants, loans, and tax preferences. Many title IV financial aid programs have a long history, while most of the tax preferences do not. Also, although millions of tax filers are receiving billions of dollars in assistance with postsecondary costs through both title IV programs and tax preferences, little is known about the effectiveness of any of these forms of assistance in part because of data and methodological issues. (3) What is known about the effectiveness of federal assistance in promoting college attendance, providing students with a wider range of choices among postsecondary institutions, or encouraging students to persist in their studies? We considered different explanations for why those tax filers with education expenses did not claim an education tax credit or tuition deduction. | Why GAO Did This Study
Federal assistance helps students and families pay for postsecondary education through several policy tools--grant and loan programs authorized by title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965 and more recently enacted tax preferences. In fiscal year 2004, about $14 billion in grants and $56 billion in loans were made under title IV while estimated outlay equivalents for postsecondary tax preferences amounted to $10 billion. In light of the relative newness and financial significance of tax preferences, this report examines (1) how title IV assistance compares to that provided through the tax code, (2) the extent to which tax filers effectively use postsecondary tax preferences, and (3) what is known about the effectiveness of federal assistance.
What GAO Found
Title IV student aid and tax preferences provide assistance to a wide range of students and families in different ways. While both help students meet current expenses, tax preferences also assist students and families with saving for and repaying postsecondary costs. While both serve students and families with a range of incomes, some forms of title IV aid--grant aid, in particular--provide assistance to those whose incomes are lower, on average, than is the case with tax preferences. While both require students and families to fill out forms, tax preferences require more responsibility on the part of students and families because they must identify applicable tax preferences, understand complex rules concerning their use, and correctly calculate and claim credits or deductions. While the tax preferences are a newer policy tool, the number of tax filers using them has grown quickly, surpassing the number of students aided under title IV in 2002. Some tax filers do not appear to make optimal education-related tax decisions. For example, among the limited number of tax returns available for our analysis, 27 percent of eligible tax filers did not claim either the tuition deduction or a tax credit. In so doing, these tax filers failed to reduce their tax liability by $169, on average, and 10 percent of these filers could have reduced their tax liability by over $500. One explanation for these taxpayers' choices may be the complexity of postsecondary tax provisions, which experts have commonly identified as difficult for tax filers to use. Little is known about the effectiveness of title IV aid or tax preferences in promoting, for example, postsecondary attendance or choice, in part because of research data and methodological challenges. As a result, policymakers do not have information that would allow them to make the most efficient use of limited federal resources to help students and families. |
gao_GAO-14-270 | gao_GAO-14-270_0 | Over this period, the number of self-referred PT services was generally flat, while the number of non-self-referred PT services increased. Expenditures for Self- Referred PT Services Increased About 10 Percent; Expenditures for Non-Self-Referred Services Increased Nearly 60 Percent
Expenditures for both self-referred and non-self-referred PT services grew from 2004 to 2010, but the increase was smaller for self-referred services (see fig. PT Referral Patterns Differed on the Basis of Whether the Providers Self- Referred
The overall relationship between provider referral status and the average number of PT services referred per provider was mixed and varied on the basis of referring provider specialty, Medicare beneficiary practice size, and geography. For example, self-referring family practice and internal medicine providers in urban areas, on average, generally referred more PT services in 2010 than their non-self-referring counterparts. In addition, self- referring providers generally referred more beneficiaries for PT services, on average, than non-self-referring providers after accounting for differences in provider specialty, Medicare beneficiary practice size, and geography.fewer PT services per beneficiary than non-self-referring providers. Overall Relationship between Provider Referral Status and Average Number of PT Services Referred Was Mixed
In 2010, the relationship between provider referral status and number of PT services referred across all beneficiaries differed on the basis of geography, provider specialty, and Medicare beneficiary practice size. In 2010, Self-Referring Providers Generally Referred More Beneficiaries, on Average, but Referred Fewer PT Services per Beneficiary
Self-referring providers generally referred more beneficiaries for PT services during 2010, on average, but referred fewer PT services per beneficiary compared with non-self-referring providers. For example, the average number of beneficiaries referred by self- referring orthopedic surgeons was 13 to 29 percent higher than for their non-self-referring counterparts, depending on the beneficiary practice size category, while the average number of beneficiaries referred by self- referring family practice providers was approximately 43 to 87 percent higher than for their non-self-referring counterparts, depending on the beneficiary practice size category (see table 3). For example, in urban areas, beneficiaries referred by self- referring family practice providers received 12 to 28 percent fewer PT services, on average, compared with beneficiaries referred by non-self- referring family practice providers, depending on the beneficiary practice size category (see table 5). Providers’ Referrals for PT Services Increased the Year After They Began to Self-Refer
PT service referrals for providers in family practice, internal medicine, and orthopedic surgery increased the year after they began to self-refer at a higher rate relative to non-self-referring providers of the same specialty. The percentage increase in average PT service referrals for switchers between 2008 and 2010 ranged from approximately 7 percent for orthopedic surgeons to 33 percent for family practice providers. HHS thanked GAO for the opportunity to review the draft and stated that it had no comments. This method allowed us to examine utilization and spending for each PT service—self-referred and non-self-referred. According to APTA, our findings that self- referring providers referred more beneficiaries for PT services, and that PT referrals for switchers in the three specialties we examined increased relative to non-self-referring providers, are consistent with other studies that found that providers have a financial interest to self-refer. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
This appendix describes the scope and methodology used to analyze our study objectives: (1) trends in the number of and expenditures for self- referred and non-self-referred Medicare physical therapy (PT) services from 2004 through 2010, and (2) how provision of these services differs among providers on the basis of whether they self-refer. | Why GAO Did This Study
Rising Medicare expenditures for PT services have long been of concern, and questions have been raised about the role of self-referral in this growth. Self-referral occurs when a provider refers patients to entities in which the provider or the provider's family members have a financial interest.
GAO was asked to examine self-referral for PT services and Medicare spending for these services. This report examines (1) trends in the number of and expenditures for self-referred and non-self-referred Medicare PT services and (2) how provision of these services differs among providers on the basis of whether they self-refer. GAO analyzed Medicare Part B claims data from 2004 through 2010 and examined three measures of PT referral for each referring provider: number of PT services referred, number of beneficiaries referred, and number of PT services provided per beneficiary. GAO compared PT referrals for self-referring and non-self-referring providers after accounting for referring provider specialty, Medicare beneficiary practice size, and geographic (urban or rural) location. GAO also compared selected characteristics of the beneficiaries referred by self-referring and non-self-referring providers.
The Department of Health and Human Services stated that it had no comments on a draft of this report.
What GAO Found
From 2004 to 2010, non-self-referred physical therapy (PT) services increased at a faster rate than self-referred PT services. During this period, the number of self-referred PT services per 1,000 Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries was generally flat, while non-self-referred PT services grew by about 41 percent. Similarly, the growth rate in expenditures associated with non-self-referred PT services was also higher than for self-referred services.
The relationship between provider self-referral status and PT referral patterns was mixed and varied on the basis of referring provider specialty, Medicare beneficiary practice size, and geography. GAO examined three measures of PT referral for each referring provider for the three provider specialties that referred nearly 75 percent of PT services in 2010—family practice, internal medicine, and orthopedic surgery.
The overall relationship between provider referral status and the first measure of PT referrals—the average number of PT services referred per provider—was mixed. GAO found that self-referring family practice and internal medicine providers in urban areas, on average, generally referred more PT services than their non-self-referring counterparts. In contrast, self-referring orthopedic surgeons, on average, generally referred fewer PT services than non-self-referring orthopedic surgeons.
Self-referring providers in all three specialties that GAO examined generally referred more beneficiaries for PT services, on average, but for fewer PT services per beneficiary compared with non-self-referring providers. For these two measures of PT referrals, differences between self-referring and non-self-referring providers generally persisted after accounting for referring providers' specialty, Medicare beneficiary practice size, and geographic location, although the magnitude of these differences varied on the basis of these factors. For example, the average number of beneficiaries referred by self-referring family practice providers in urban areas was approximately 43 to 87 percent higher than for their non-self-referring counterparts, depending on Medicare practice size. In contrast, beneficiaries referred by self-referring family practice providers in urban areas received 12 to 28 percent fewer PT services, on average, depending on practice size, compared with their non-self-referring counterparts.
GAO also found that in the year a provider began to self-refer, PT service referrals increased at a higher rate relative to non-self-referring providers of the same specialty. For example, family practice providers that began self-referring in 2009 increased PT referrals 33 percent between 2008 and 2010. In contrast, non-self-referring family practice providers increased their PT service referrals 14 percent during this same period. |
gao_GAO-06-227T | gao_GAO-06-227T_0 | We continue to believe that many of the basic principles underlying DOD’s final regulations are generally consistent with proven approaches to strategic human capital management. Today, I will provide our observations on the following elements of DOD’s human resources management system as outlined in the final regulations—pay and performance management, staffing and employment, workforce shaping, adverse actions and appeals, and labor management relations. The final regulations were not modified to provide such details. However, the final regulations do not offer details on how DOD would, among other things, (1) promote consistency and provide general oversight of the performance management system to ensure it is administered in a fair, credible, and transparent manner; and (2) incorporate predecisional internal safeguards to achieve consistency and equity, and ensure nondiscrimination and nonpoliticization of the performance management process. A chief management officer or similar position could effectively provide the sustained and committed leadership essential to successfully completing these multiyear business transformation initiatives. The active involvement of all stakeholders will be critical to the success of NSPS. However, as we noted earlier in this statement, DOD still has considerable work to define the details for implementing its system. DOD’s final NSPS regulations are intended to align individual performance and pay with the department’s critical mission requirements; provide meaningful distinctions in performance; and give greater priority to employee performance in connection with workforce rightsizing and reductions-in-force. DOD’s regulations are especially critical and need to be implemented properly because of their potential implications for related governmentwide reform. However, compensation, pay, compensation, critical hiring, and workforce restructuring reforms should be the first step in any governmentwide reforms. DOD will face multiple implementation challenges. GAO has several areas of concern: the proposed regulations do not (1) define the details of the implementation of the system, including such issues as adequate safeguards to help ensure fairness and guard against abuse; (2) require, as GAO believes they should, the use of core competencies to communicate to employees what is expected of them on the job; and (3) identify a process for the continuing involvement of employees in the planning, development, and implementation of NSPS. On February 14, 2005, DOD and the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) released for public comment the proposed NSPS regulations. This testimony (1) provides GAO’s preliminary observations on selected provisions of the proposed regulations, (2) discusses the challenges DOD faces in implementing the new system, and (3) suggests a governmentwide framework to advance human capital reform. Going forward, GAO believes that (1) the development of the position of Deputy Secretary of Defense for Management, who would act as DOD’s Chief Management Officer, is essential to elevate, integrate, and institutionalize responsibility for the success of DOD’s overall business transformation efforts, including its new human resources management system; (2) DOD would benefit if it develops a comprehensive communications strategy that provides for ongoing, meaningful two-way communication that creates shared expectations among employees, employee representatives, and stakeholders; and (3) DOD must ensure that it has the institutional infrastructure in place, including a modern performance management system and an independent, efficient, effective, and credible external appeals process, to make effective use of its new authorities before they are operationalized. For instance, the proposed regulations provide for (1) elements of a flexible and contemporary human resources management system—such as pay bands and pay for performance; (2) DOD to rightsize its workforce when implementing reduction-in-force orders by giving greater priority to employee performance in its retention decisions; and (3) continuing collaboration with employee representatives. Thus, while it is imperative that we take steps to better link employee pay and other personnel decisions to performance across the federal government, how it is done, when it is done, and the basis on which it is done, can make all the difference in whether or not we are successful. Human capital challenges are severe in certain areas. | Why GAO Did This Study
People are critical to any agency transformation because they define an agency's culture, develop its knowledge base, promote innovation, and are its most important asset. Thus, strategic human capital management at the Department of Defense (DOD) can help it marshal, manage, and maintain the people and skills needed to meet its critical mission. In November 2003, Congress provided DOD with significant flexibility to design a modern human resources management system. On November 1, 2005, DOD and the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) jointly released the final regulations on DOD's new human resources management system, known as the National Security Personnel System (NSPS). Several months ago, with the release of the proposed regulations, GAO observed that some parts of the human resources management system raised questions for DOD, OPM, and Congress to consider in the areas of pay and performance management, adverse actions and appeals, and labor management relations. GAO also identified multiple implementation challenges for DOD once the final regulations for the new system were issued. This testimony provides GAO's overall observations on selected provisions of the final regulations.
What GAO Found
GAO believes that DOD's final NSPS regulations contain many of the basic principles that are consistent with proven approaches to strategic human capital management. For instance, the final regulations provide for (1) a flexible, contemporary, market-based and performance-oriented compensation system--such as pay bands and pay for performance; (2) giving greater priority to employee performance in its retention decisions in connection with workforce rightsizing and reductions-in-force; and (3) involvement of employee representatives throughout the implementation process, such as having opportunities to participate in developing the implementing issuances. However, future actions will determine whether such labor relations efforts will be meaningful and credible. Despite these positive aspects of the regulations, GAO has several areas of concern. First, DOD has considerable work ahead to define the important details for implementing its system--such as how employee performance expectations will be aligned with the department's overall mission and goals and other measures of performance, and how DOD would promote consistency and provide general oversight of the performance management system to ensure it is administered in a fair, credible, transparent manner. These and other critically important details must be defined in conjunction with applicable stakeholders. Second, the regulations merely allow, rather than require, the use of core competencies that can help to provide consistency and clearly communicate to employees what is expected of them. Third, although the regulations do provide for continuing collaboration with employee representatives, they do not identify a process for the continuing involvement of individual employees in the implementation of NSPS. Going forward, GAO believes that (1) DOD would benefit from developing a comprehensive communications strategy, (2) DOD must ensure that it has the necessary institutional infrastructure in place to make effective use of its new authorities, (3) a chief management officer or similar position is essential to effectively provide sustained and committed leadership to the department's overall business transformation effort, including NSPS, and (4) DOD should develop procedures and methods to initiate implementation efforts relating to NSPS. While GAO strongly supports human capital reform in the federal government, how it is done, when it is done, and the basis on which it is done can make all the difference in whether such efforts are successful. DOD's regulations are especially critical and need to be implemented properly because of their potential implications for related governmentwide reform. In this regard, in our view, classification, compensation, critical hiring, and workforce restructuring reforms should be pursued on a governmentwide basis before and separate from any broad-based labor-management or due process reforms. |
gao_GAO-12-712 | gao_GAO-12-712_0 | Not all ambulatory care settings are subject to CMS’s health and safety standards. Limited Data Are Available on the Extent and Cost of Blood-borne Pathogen Outbreaks Resulting from Unsafe Injection Practices in Ambulatory Care Settings
Data on the extent of blood-borne pathogen outbreaks related to unsafe injection practices in ambulatory care settings are limited and likely underestimate the full extent of such outbreaks. Additionally, comprehensive data on the cost of blood-borne pathogen outbreaks to the health care system do not exist, but CDC and other officials believe these costs can be substantial for those affected by such outbreaks, including individuals, state and local health departments, and clinicians and health care facilities. According to CDC records, from 2001 through 2011, there were 18 known outbreaks—episodes of infection transmission where 2 or more patients became infected—of viral hepatitis associated with unsafe injection practices at ASCs and other ambulatory care settings in the United States. For a number of reasons, CDC officials and others we interviewed believe that the known outbreaks do not represent the full extent of blood-borne pathogen outbreaks related to unsafe injection practices in ambulatory care settings. However, according to health department officials we interviewed, tracking an infection to a specific health care facility can be difficult because treatment in a health care facility is not generally considered to be an important risk factor for these types of infections. Clinicians and health care facilities. CMS Has Increased Oversight of Injection Practices in ASCs, but Its Decision to Stop Data Collection Will Limit Effectiveness
In 2009, CMS substantially expanded its oversight of unsafe injection practices in ASCs by increasing both the intensity of the examination of safe injection and other infection control practices and the number of on- site surveys conducted in ASCs to determine compliance with CMS’s health and safety standards. Safe injection practices are included under several of CMS’s broader health and safety standards, which also address a number of other topics related to infection control and medication administration. As part of implementing the expanded oversight of ASCs, CMS collected and plans to analyze detailed information from the Infection Control Surveyor Worksheets, but only for fiscal years 2010 and 2011. Additionally, CMS officials said that the agency has provided CDC with the surveyor worksheet data to examine the extent of infection control problems, including unsafe injection practices, in a sample of ASCs nationwide, from which CDC officials expect to create a baseline assessment of unsafe injection practices in these settings. HHS Communicates Information on Safe Injection Practices to Clinicians, but Efforts Do Not Target Certain Higher-Risk Settings
In order to help encourage safe injection practices, various HHS agencies have developed efforts to communicate information on these practices to clinicians since our last report on HAIs was released in 2009. Though CDC and the Safe Injection Practices Coalition have targeted the One and Only Campaign at certain types of clinicians and health care settings that have experienced blood-borne pathogen outbreaks in the past, these targeted efforts at the national level have generally not included other settings that have experienced outbreaks and are not overseen by CMS. Without some form of continued data collection, CMS will lose its capacity to monitor ASC compliance with its health and safety standards related to safe injection practices and to monitor how well the state surveyors collect and assess information about unsafe injection practices. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help strengthen HHS efforts aimed at protecting patients from infection by preventing unsafe injection practices in ambulatory care settings, we recommend that the Secretary of HHS take the following three actions:
Direct CMS and CDC to work together to resume collecting data on unsafe injection practices from the Infection Control Surveyor Worksheet, or from any alternative source of comparable data, that will permit continued monitoring and assessment of unsafe injection practices in ASCs beyond fiscal year 2011. Direct CDC to strengthen its targeting of the One and Only Campaign to health care settings that CDC has identified as having blood-borne pathogen outbreaks related to unsafe injection practices that are not overseen by CMS. | Why GAO Did This Study
Recent outbreaks of blood-borne pathogens--specifically hepatitis B and C--that were linked to a specific health care facility or clinician have resulted when clinicians use unsafe injection practices. Such infections can have serious long-term consequences for patients, including cirrhosis or liver cancer. Of the known incidents of blood-borne pathogen outbreaks attributed to unsafe injection practices--which include reusing syringes for multiple patients--most have occurred in ambulatory care settings, such as ASCs and physician offices. CMS oversees injection practices by setting and enforcing health and safety standards that apply to ASCs but not physician offices. GAO was asked to examine (1) available information on the extent and cost of blood-borne pathogen outbreaks related to unsafe injection practices in ambulatory care settings, (2) the changes in federal oversight to prevent unsafe injection practices in ambulatory care settings since 2009, and (3) other federal efforts to improve injection safety practices in ambulatory care settings. GAO reviewed CDC and CMS documentation and CDC data, and interviewed officials from various HHS agencies and other stakeholders.
What GAO Found
Data on the extent and cost of blood-borne pathogen outbreaks related to unsafe injection practices in ambulatory care settings are limited and likely underestimate the full extent of such outbreaks. An agency within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), collects data on outbreaks identified by state and local health departments. These data show that from 2001 through 2011, there were at least 18 outbreaks of viral hepatitis associated with unsafe injection practices in ambulatory settings, such as physician offices or ambulatory surgical centers (ASC). CDC officials and others believe that the known outbreaks do not represent the full extent of such outbreaks for a number of reasons, such as infections often being difficult to detect and trace to specific health care facilities. Additionally, comprehensive data on the cost of blood-borne pathogen outbreaks to the health care system do not exist, but CDC and other officials believe these costs can be substantial for those affected. For example, individuals may face treatment costs and health departments may face costs for investigating and notifying patients of potential exposure to infection.
Another HHS agency, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), has expanded its oversight of unsafe injection practices in ASCs since 2009 by requiring surveyors who inspect these facilities to use its Infection Control Surveyor Worksheet to document the extent to which ASCs are following safe injection practices and to survey more facilities to determine compliance with CMS's health and safety standards. Safe injection practices are included under several of CMS's broader health and safety standards that also address a number of other topics related to infection control and medication administration. As part of implementing the expanded oversight of ASCs, CMS collected and plans to analyze detailed information from these surveyor worksheets for fiscal years 2010 and 2011. This information will be used to assess CMS's oversight efforts to improve infection control and also allow CDC--with which CMS shared its data--to determine a baseline assessment of the extent of unsafe injection practices in ASCs nationally. However, in part because of concerns that collecting these data is a burden to surveyors, CMS officials said the agency stopped collecting data from surveyor worksheets after fiscal year 2011. Without some form of continued collection and analysis of injection safety data, CMS will lose its capacity to oversee how well surveyors monitor unsafe injection practices, and CDC will be unable to determine the extent of these practices.
To improve injection practices, various HHS agencies have taken steps to communicate information on safe injection practices to clinicians. For example, CDC has developed tools to communicate its evidence-based guidelines to clinicians in ambulatory care settings. In partnership with other health-care-related organizations, CDC also developed an educational campaign--the One and Only Campaign--that seeks to broadly educate both clinicians and patients about safe injection practices. While the campaign has targeted some types of clinicians and health care settings that have experienced a blood-borne pathogen outbreak related to unsafe injection practices, additional targeted outreach is needed for health care settings not overseen by CMS.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that HHS (1) resume collecting data on unsafe injection practices that will permit continued monitoring of such practices, (2) use those data for continued monitoring of ASCs, and (3) strengthen the targeting efforts of the One and Only Campaign for health care settings not overseen by CMS. HHS agreed with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-01-827 | gao_GAO-01-827_0 | Assessment of the Department of Education’s Progress in Accomplishing Selected Key Outcomes
This section discusses our analysis of Education’s performance in achieving the six selected key outcomes. In general, given the lack of performance data, explanations, and strategies to meet unmet goals in the future, it was difficult to assess progress. Specifically, we found that it was difficult to assess Education’s progress in achieving the six outcomes due to the lack of fiscal year 2000 data for many of its indicators. Consistent with our findings in reviewing Education’s performance report from last year, we found that Education had no goals or measures associated with the outcome of preventing fraud, waste, mismanagement, and error in the student financial assistance programs. While OSFA has established a target of being removed from GAO’s high-risk list, there were no corresponding goals or measures in the department’s interim report. However, Education has revised its strategic plan to incorporate an objective of ensuring financial integrity within the department. We found that similarly for this year, there was no discussion in the interim report on strategic human capital management. | Why GAO Did This Study
This report reviews the Department of Education's performance report for fiscal year 2000. Specifically, GAO examines Education's progress in achieving selected key outcomes that are important to its mission. Given the lack of performance data, explanations, and strategies to meet unmet goals in the future, it was difficult for GAO to assess progress. The lack of a performance plan also hindered GAO's efforts.
What GAO Found
Specifically, GAO found that it was difficult to assess Education's progress in achieving the six selected outcomes because of the lack of fiscal year 2000 data for many of its indicators. Consistent with its findings in reviewing Education's performance report from last year, GAO found that Education had no goals or measures for preventing fraud, waste, mismanagement, and error in the student financial assistance programs. Although the Office of Student Financial Assistance has established a target of being removed from GAO's high-risk list, there were no corresponding goals or measures in the department's interim report. However, Education has revised its strategic plan to incorporate an objective of ensuring financial integrity within the department. Like last year's report, GAO found that there was no discussion in the interim report on strategic human capital management. |
gao_GAO-08-1034T | gao_GAO-08-1034T_0 | Our review of IRS tax records showed that over 1.6 million businesses owed over $58 billion in unpaid payroll taxes to the federal government as of September 30, 2007, and over 100,000 businesses currently owe for more than 2 years (8 quarters) of payroll taxes. For example, 70 percent of all unpaid payroll taxes are owed by businesses with more than a year (4 tax quarters) of unpaid payroll taxes, and over a quarter of unpaid payroll taxes are owed by businesses that have tax debt for more than 3 years (12 tax quarters). IRS’s Collection Approach Does Not Always Prevent the Accumulation of Unpaid Payroll Taxes
Our audit of payroll tax cases identified several issues that adversely affect IRS’s ability to prevent the accumulation of unpaid payroll taxes and to collect these taxes. IRS’s Approach Focuses on Voluntary Compliance, Even for Egregious Payroll Tax Offenders
We have previously reported that IRS subordinates the use of some of its collection tools in order to seek voluntary compliance and that IRS’s repeated attempts to gain voluntary compliance often results in minimal or no actual collections. Businesses Engaged in Abusive and Potentially Criminal Activity Related to the Federal Tax System
Our analysis of unpaid payroll tax debt found substantial evidence of abusive and potentially criminal activity related to the federal tax system by businesses and their owners or officers. While much of the tax debt may be owed by those with little ability to pay, some abuse the tax system, willfully diverting amounts withheld from their employees’ salaries to fund their business operations or their own personal lifestyle. In total, IRS records indicate that over 1,500 owners/officers had been found by IRS to be responsible for non-payment of payroll taxes at 3 or more businesses and that 18 business owners/officers were found by IRS to be responsible for not paying the payroll taxes for over 12 separate businesses. First, allowing businesses to continue to not remit payroll taxes affects the general public’s perception regarding the fairness of the tax system, a perception that may result in lower overall compliance. The recommendations include (1) developing a process and performance measures to monitor collection actions taken by revenue officers against egregious payroll tax offenders and (2) developing procedures to more timely file notice of federal tax liens against egregious businesses and assess penalties to hold responsible parties personally liable for not remitting withheld payroll taxes. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO previously reported that federal contractors abuse the tax system with little consequence. While performing those audits, GAO noted that much of the tax abuse involved contractors not remitting to the government payroll taxes that were withheld from salaries. As a result, GAO was asked to review the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) processes and procedures to prevent and collect unpaid payroll taxes and determine (1) the magnitude of unpaid federal payroll tax debt, (2) the factors affecting IRS's ability to enforce compliance or pursue collections, and (3) whether some businesses with unpaid payroll taxes are engaged in abusive or potentially criminal activities with regard to the federal tax system. To address these objectives, GAO analyzed IRS's tax database, performed case study analyses of payroll tax offenders, and interviewed collection officials from IRS and several states.
What GAO Found
IRS records show that, as of September 30, 2007, over 1.6 million businesses owed over $58 billion in unpaid federal payroll taxes, including interest and penalties. Some of these businesses took advantage of the existing tax enforcement and administration system to avoid fulfilling or paying federal tax obligations--thus abusing the federal tax system. Over a quarter of payroll taxes are owed by businesses with more than 3 years (12 tax quarters) of unpaid payroll taxes. Some of these business owners repeatedly accumulated tax debt from multiple businesses. For example, IRS found over 1,500 individuals to be responsible for non-payment of payroll taxes at three or more businesses, and 18 were responsible for not remitting payroll taxes for a dozen different businesses. Although IRS has powerful tools at its disposal to prevent the further accumulation of unpaid payroll taxes and to collect the taxes that are owed, IRS's current approach does not provide for their full, effective use. IRS's overall approach to collection focuses primarily on gaining voluntary compliance--even for egregious payroll tax offenders--a practice that can result in minimal or no actual collections for these offenders. Additionally, IRS has not always promptly filed liens against businesses to protect the government's interests and has not always taken timely action to hold responsible parties personally liable for unpaid payroll taxes. GAO selected 50 businesses with payroll tax debt as case studies and found extensive evidence of abuse and potential criminal activity in relation to the federal tax system. The business owners or officers in our case studies diverted payroll tax funds for their own benefit or to help fund business operations. |
gao_GAO-07-87 | gao_GAO-07-87_0 | Federal and State Efforts to Assess the Scientific Accuracy of Materials Used in Abstinence-until- Marriage Education Programs Have Been Limited
Efforts by HHS and states to assess the scientific accuracy of materials used in abstinence-until-marriage education programs have been limited. ACF—which awards grants to two programs that account for the largest portion of federal spending on abstinence-until-marriage education—does not review its grantees’ education materials for scientific accuracy and does not require grantees of either program to review their own materials for scientific accuracy. In addition, not all states funded through the State Program have chosen to review their program materials for scientific accuracy. In contrast to ACF, OPA has reviewed the scientific accuracy of grantees’ proposed educational materials and corrected inaccuracies in these materials. Officials from 5 of the 10 states in our review reported that their states have chosen to conduct such reviews. Officials from two of the five states reported that they have found inaccuracies as a result of their reviews. In addition, this official cited an instance where materials incorrectly suggested that HIV can pass through condoms because the latex used in condoms is porous. A Variety of Efforts Have Been Made to Assess the Effectiveness of Abstinence-until- Marriage Education Programs, but a Number of Factors Limit the Conclusions That Can Be Drawn
HHS, states, and researchers have made a variety of efforts to assess the effectiveness of abstinence-until-marriage education programs; however, a number of factors limit the conclusions that can be drawn about the effectiveness of these programs. ACF and OPA have required their grantees to report on various outcomes used to measure the effectiveness of grantees’ abstinence-until-marriage education programs, though the reporting requirements for each of the three abstinence-until-marriage programs differ. In addition, the results of some efforts that meet the criteria of a scientifically valid assessment have varied, and two key studies that meet these criteria have not yet been completed. HHS, States, and Researchers Have Made a Variety of Efforts to Assess the Effectiveness of Abstinence-until-Marriage Education Programs
Efforts of HHS, states, and researchers to assess the effectiveness of abstinence-until-marriage education programs have included ACF and OPA requiring grantees to report data on outcomes of their abstinence- until-marriage education programs; ACF analyzing national data on adolescent behavior and birth rates; and other HHS agencies, states, and researchers funding or conducting studies to assess the effectiveness of abstinence-until-marriage education programs. Several Factors Limit the Conclusions That Can Be Drawn about the Effectiveness of Abstinence-until-Marriage Education Programs
Most of the efforts of HHS, states, and other researchers to evaluate the effectiveness of abstinence-until-marriage education programs included in our review have not met certain minimum criteria that experts have concluded are necessary in order for assessments of program effectiveness to be scientifically valid. As we noted in the draft report, key studies funded by HHS that experts anticipate will meet the criteria of a scientifically valid effectiveness study are not yet completed, but when completed these HHS funded studies may add substantively to the body of research on the effectiveness of abstinence-until-marriage education programs. | Why GAO Did This Study
Reducing the incidence of sexually transmitted diseases and unintended pregnancies is one objective of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). HHS provides funding to states and organizations that provide abstinence-until-marriage education as one approach to address this objective. GAO was asked to describe the oversight of federally funded abstinence-until-marriage education programs. GAO is reporting on (1) efforts by HHS and states to assess the scientific accuracy of materials used in these programs and (2) efforts by HHS, states, and researchers to assess the effectiveness of these programs. GAO reviewed documents and interviewed HHS officials in the Administration for Children and Families (ACF) and the Office of Population Affairs (OPA) that award grants for these programs.
What GAO Found
Efforts by HHS and states to assess the scientific accuracy of materials used in abstinence-until-marriage education programs have been limited. This is because HHS's ACF--which awards grants to two programs that account for the largest portion of federal spending on abstinence-until-marriage education--does not review its grantees' education materials for scientific accuracy and does not require grantees of either program to review their own materials for scientific accuracy. In contrast, OPA does review the scientific accuracy of grantees' proposed educational materials. In addition, not all states that receive funding from ACF have chosen to review their program materials for scientific accuracy. In particular, 5 of the 10 states that GAO contacted conduct such reviews. Officials from these states reported using a variety of approaches in their reviews. While the extent to which federally funded abstinence-until-marriage education materials are inaccurate is not known, in the course of their reviews OPA and some states reported that they have found inaccuracies in abstinence-until-marriage education materials. For example, one state official described an instance in which abstinence-until-marriage materials incorrectly suggested that HIV can pass through condoms because the latex used in condoms is porous. HHS, states, and researchers have made a variety of efforts to assess the effectiveness of abstinence-until-marriage education programs; however, a number of factors limit the conclusions that can be drawn about the effectiveness of abstinence-until-marriage education programs. ACF and OPA have required their grantees to report on various outcomes that the agencies use to measure the effectiveness of grantees' abstinence-until-marriage education programs. In addition, 6 of the 10 states in GAO's review have worked with third-party evaluators to assess the effectiveness of abstinence-until-marriage education programs in their states. Several factors, however, limit the conclusions that can be drawn about the effectiveness of abstinence-until-marriage education programs. Most of the efforts to evaluate the effectiveness of abstinence-until-marriage education programs included in GAO's review have not met certain minimum scientific criteria--such as random assignment of participants and sufficient follow-up periods and sample sizes--that experts have concluded are necessary in order for assessments of program effectiveness to be scientifically valid, in part because such designs can be expensive and time-consuming to carry out. In addition, the results of efforts that meet the criteria of a scientifically valid assessment have varied and two key studies funded by HHS that meet these criteria have not yet been completed. When completed, these HHS-funded studies may add substantively to the body of research on the effectiveness of abstinence-until-marriage education programs. |
gao_GAO-14-821 | gao_GAO-14-821_0 | For example, BOP cost BOP also tracks its obligations and expenditures by budget object and subobject classification. Correctional Services Is BOP’s Largest Operational Cost, and BOP Has Initiated a Number of Efforts to Reduce Costs
BOP’s Correctional Services, Private Prison Contracts, Medical Care, and Food Services Account for the Majority of Its Costs, with the Largest Share of Spending on Personnel
During fiscal year 2013, BOP obligated approximately $6.6 billion for all its programs and operations. Key initiatives for which BOP has estimated cost savings over the last 3 fiscal years are listed in table 1. BOP Has Designed Internal Processes to Identify Opportunities for Additional Cost Efficiencies, but Could Improve the Monitoring of Corrective Actions
BOP Has Designed Mechanisms to Identify Opportunities for Cost Efficiencies
BOP has various mechanisms to identify opportunities for cost efficiencies, including the following:
Strategic Plan. Cost Efficiencies and Innovations Catalog. Best practices internal site. BOP’s Internal Control System Helps Identify Opportunities to Achieve Efficiencies, but Lacks a Mechanism to Consistently Monitor Bureau-wide Corrective Actions
We found that BOP’s internal control system is designed to identify additional opportunities for cost efficiencies, but BOP did not provide specifics or documentation on a mechanism to consistently monitor bureau-wide corrective actions. BOP has processes to identify and share information about these frequent and significant deficiencies. Authorities within BOP’s Control to Reduce Costs Are Limited; Options outside of BOP’s Authority Could Have a Larger Impact on Costs
BOP’s Current Authority to Reduce Inmate Sentences Results in Limited Cost Savings Relative to Its Overall Budget
See 18 U.S.C. Compassionate Release. No cost savings estimate could be provided for earlier releases because, according to the IG report, BOP did not maintain cost data associated with the custody of inmates eligible for consideration under the program, and BOP had not conducted any analysis of cost savings achieved by releasing such inmates. Potential Actions outside of BOP’s Authority Could Reduce Prison Populations and Costs, and Experts Say There Are Advantages and Disadvantages to These Options
We examined cost-saving options that are outside BOP’s authority and that are widely discussed among criminal justice policy experts, the USSC, and DOJ, such as instructing federal prosecutors to decline to charge certain defendants in certain drug cases in such a manner as to trigger mandatory minimum prison sentences, reducing the lengths of sentences specified by federal guidelines for drug offenders, or applying the provisions of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 retroactively in order to provide sentences for cocaine base (“crack”) offenders that are less Toward disparate from those applied for possession of powder cocaine.this end, we reviewed selected reports and analyses from entities chosen for their expertise in criminal justice issues, and had discussions with officials from DOJ, BOP, and the USSC. Through this review, we identified eight options outside BOP’s authority that could reduce the size of the inmate population. In particular, these options may have additional effects, such as on public safety. As table 4 shows, a number of options outside of BOP’s current authority exist by which the sentence lengths of prospective and incarcerated offenders could be reduced (producing bed year savings), as well as the number of offenders to be incarcerated, such as under the Attorney General’s August 2013 Smart on Crime direction (option 3). However, establishing a mechanism for relevant Central Office divisions to consistently monitor bureau-wide corrective actions and assess their progress in the presence of repeated frequent or significant findings could help BOP better ensure that it is resolving such deficiencies promptly and, ultimately, operating more efficiently. BOP’s inmate population is its primary cost driver; however, BOP’s ability to reduce its population, and thus its costs, are limited. Recommendation for Executive Action
To enable BOP to promptly address repeated frequent deficiencies and other significant findings it identifies through its program reviews in areas of high cost across multiple institutions, we recommend that the Director of the Bureau of Prisons establish a mechanism for relevant Central Office divisions to consistently monitor bureau-wide corrective actions. GAO is not taking a position on any of these options, but presents information on estimated cost savings and experts’ views of advantages and disadvantages for such options to inform policymakers as they weigh whether and how to address rising costs at BOP. For some options that could result in reduced sentences and earlier releases of about 78,000 or more offenders, we also calculated per capita savings, as such population reductions that could allow BOP to reduce its staff or close facilities. 3. 4. 1::!.2. | Why GAO Did This Study
BOP is responsible for the custody and care of 216,000 federal inmates—an almost 9-fold increase since 1980. At the same time, BOP appropriations increased more than 20-fold. DOJ states that the costs of the growing population are BOP's greatest challenge. BOP's population size is driven by several factors, such as law enforcement policies and sentencing laws.
GAO was asked to review BOP's opportunities to save costs. This report (1) describes BOP's major costs and actions to achieve savings, (2) assesses the extent to which BOP has mechanisms to identify additional efficiencies, and (3) describes potential changes within and outside of BOP's authority that might reduce costs.
GAO analyzed BOP financial data for fiscal years 2009 through 2013, reviewed but did not test its internal control system and processes for achieving efficiencies, and interviewed BOP officials. On the basis of sentencing reform options identified by experts and actions by the Attorney General, GAO developed a list of policy options that could reduce BOP's population. GAO gathered views on their potential effects from entities and 4 states selected for their criminal justice expertise. The views are not generalizable, but provide insights.
What GAO Found
Correctional services—which includes salaries and benefits for correctional officers—is the Department of Justice's (DOJ) Bureau of Prisons' (BOP) largest operational cost, and BOP has undertaken a number of initiatives to reduce costs. Specifically, on the basis of GAO's analysis of BOP's fiscal year 2013 obligations of approximately $6.6 billion, BOP obligated the largest share—about $3.9 billion, or 59 percent—for personnel compensation and benefits. Further, BOP has undertaken a number of initiatives, such as renegotiated contracts, to achieve cost savings of about $61 million over the last 3 years.
BOP has designed internal processes to identify opportunities for additional cost efficiencies, but could improve the monitoring of corrective actions to achieve them. For example, BOP focuses on cost efficiency and innovation in its strategic plan and has developed mechanisms for staff to share information on best practices and cost savings efforts. BOP also employs an internal control system with processes, such as program reviews, that allows it to identify opportunities for cost efficiencies. However, when program reviews repeatedly cited frequent deficiencies or significant findings that could increase costs—such as insufficient contract monitoring—responsible BOP Central Office divisions did not provide specifics or documentation for how they always monitor the effectiveness of corrective actions to prevent the same deficiency or issue from reoccurring. Establishing a mechanism for relevant Central Office divisions to consistently monitor the progress of bureau-wide corrective actions in the presence of repeated frequent deficiencies or significant findings could help BOP better ensure that it is resolving such deficiencies or issues promptly and, ultimately, operating more efficiently.
BOP's current authorities to reduce inmate sentence length result in limited cost savings, but potential actions outside of its authority could have a greater impact on costs. GAO has reported previously on BOP authorities to reduce inmate sentences, and thus its costs, in detail, and found that inmate eligibility for certain programs and lack of capacity affect BOP's use of them. For example, greater use of programs such as Compassionate Release for terminally ill inmates could reduce sentences, but cost savings relative to BOP's budget would be small—about $651,000 in 2013. Additional opportunities outside of BOP's authority, including those requiring legislative or executive action, such as options to reduce sentence length, could reduce BOP's population, and thus potentially significantly reduce its costs. For example, an option to reduce sentences of incarcerated drug offenders by an average of 44 percent could save about $4.1 billion. Potential savings could be even higher if the changes sufficiently reduced the inmate population to allow BOP to reduce its staff or close facilities. Expert entities GAO consulted reported that all of the options GAO reviewed also have advantages and disadvantages unrelated to costs that should be taken into consideration, such as potential effects on public safety if released inmates reoffend. GAO is not taking a position on any of these options, but presents information on estimated cost savings and experts' views of advantages and disadvantages for such options to inform policymakers as they weigh whether and how to address rising costs at BOP.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that BOP establish a mechanism to consistently monitor if bureau-wide corrective actions address repeated deficiencies and findings. DOJ concurred. |
gao_T-NSIAD-98-44 | gao_T-NSIAD-98-44_0 | With this overview, let me talk about the security environment for U.S. forces overseas. First, DOD has a large presence in many countries around the world, offering a plethora of potential targets. Second, predictive intelligence on terrorist attacks is difficult to obtain. Commanders, therefore, may not be in a position to prevent an attack from occurring; they can only prepare to minimize the consequences from an attack. Third, DOD installations are often located on host nation installations and as a result there are limitations on the security measures DOD can undertake. DOD designates the terrorist threat level faced by personnel in each country. Forces Has Improved, but Vulnerabilities Remain
During our review, we found the U.S. Central Command and its service component commands had taken a number of steps to improve the protection of U.S. forces from terrorist attacks. Among the actions taken, the command had determined the range of specific terrorist threats it needed to counteract in its area of responsibility, including a 20,000-pound truck bomb—the estimated approximate size of the bomb that struck Khobar Towers; devised threat-based standards, such as stand-off, to guide the design and construction of new facilities and modifications to existing structures; established an office that coordinates antiterrorist activities in the region and reports directly to the Deputy Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command; and identified a need for and filled hundreds of additional security positions. DOD Has Taken Steps to Improve the Antiterrorism Program
At the time of our review, DOD had initiated a number of changes in its overall antiterrorism program in response to the Khobar Towers bombing. The Secretary of Defense directed that the five geographic combatant commanders take on increased antiterrorism responsibilities. Under the direction of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Defense Special Weapons Agency began to conduct vulnerability assessments at installations. DOD mandated more robust antiterrorism training for personnel deploying to medium- and high-threat countries. The Secretary of Defense established a centrally controlled fund to support emergency high-priority antiterrorism requirements not funded by the services. The services also had planned or instituted changes in their approach to antiterrorism. Nevertheless, Mr. Chairman, our work raised concerns that DOD’s initiatives were falling short of establishing a comprehensive and consistent approach to antiterrorism. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the Department of Defense's (DOD) efforts to protect overseas forces from terrorist attack, focusing on Turkey and the Middle East and on: (1) the environment U.S. forces overseas are facing , including the terrorist threat and the relationship with the host nation governments; (2) the measures DOD has taken to enhance the security of personnel in the countries GAO visited; and (3) DOD initiatives to improve its overall force protection program.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) DOD has a large presence in many countries around the world, offering a plethora of potential targets; (2) predictive intelligence on terrorist attacks is difficult to obtain, and commanders may not be in a position to prevent an attack from occurring and can only prepare to minimize the consequences from an attack; (3) DOD installations are often located on host nation installations and, as a result, there are limitations on the security measures DOD can undertake; (4) the U.S. Central Command and its service component commands had taken a number of steps to improve the protection of U.S. forces from terrorist attacks, including: (a) determining the range of specific terrorist threats it needed to counteract in its area of responsibility, including a 20,000-pound truck bomb, the estimated approximate size of the bomb that struck Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia; (b) devising threat-based standards, such as stand-off, to guide the design and construction of new facilities and modifications to existing structures; (c) establishing an office that coordinates antiterrorist activities in the region and reports directly to the Deputy Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command; and (d) identifying a need for and filling hundreds of additional security positions; (5) DOD had initiated a number of changes in its overall antiterrorism program in response to the Khobar Towers bombing, including: (a) the assignment of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to be the Secretary of Defense's principal advisor on antiterrorism; (b) the direction of the five geographic combatant commanders to take on increased antiterrorism responsibilities; (c) vulnerability assessments at installations by the Defense Special Weapons Agency; (d) mandated, more robust antiterrorism training for personnel deployed to medium- and high-threat countries; (e) the establishment of a centrally controlled fund to support emergency high-priority antiterrorism requirements not funded by the services; and (f) changes in the services' approach to antiterrorism; and (6) despite these changes, GAO's work raised concerns that DOD's initiatives were falling short of establishing a comprehensive and consistent approach to antiterrorism. |
gao_GAO-03-430 | gao_GAO-03-430_0 | The report recognized two key aspects of treatment activities: short-term treatments to remove hazards and stabilize soils and slopes, such as constructing dams to hold soil on slopes, and longer-term treatments to repair or improve lands unlikely to recover naturally from severe fire damage by, for example, reforesting desired tree species. Interior and the Forest Service have attempted to adopt the same policies and procedures for treating burnt lands, even though the National Fire Plan does not require them to do so and recently agreed to work towards standardizing certain aspects of their programs. Interior requires that treatments be implemented within 3 years. The Forest Service Has Different Processes to Identify Emergency Stabilization and Rehabilitation Treatments
The Forest Service distinguishes between short-term emergency treatments to stabilize lands burnt by wildland fires and longer-term rehabilitation treatments. These treatments include those necessary to protect life and property and to prevent additional damage to resources. This included an effort to develop an interagency handbook that agencies in both departments could use. Rehabilitation Plans Vary Widely in Cost and in the Number and Types of Treatments
Following the calendar years 2000 and 2001 fires, Interior and USDA’s Forest Service approved 421 plans for stabilization and rehabilitation treatments for an estimated total of more than $310 million. While the two departments implemented the same types of treatments on their lands following wildland fire, such as seeding, the frequency with which they relied on these treatments varied, primarily because of the types of lands they manage. This runoff can consist of water, soil, rocks, branches, and trees. Similarly, trail work includes regrading or repairing trails to reduce erosion and protect public safety. However, neither department specifies how land units should conduct such monitoring or how they should document monitoring results. The departments have not implemented these recommendations, however. Conclusions
Most lands burned by catastrophic wildfires will recover naturally, without posing a threat to public safety or ecosystems. Recommendations for Executive Action
In order to better ensure that funds for emergency stabilization and rehabilitation treatments on burnt lands are used as effectively as possible, we recommend that the Secretaries of Agriculture and of the Interior require the heads of their respective land management agencies to specify the type and extent of monitoring data that local land units are to collect and methods for collecting these data, and develop an interagency system for collecting, storing, analyzing, and disseminating information on monitoring results for use in management decisions. In commenting on our recommendation that the departments obtain better data on treatment effectiveness, the departments said that they were aware that some of their own studies had previously identified the need to obtain and disseminate better data for determining treatment effectiveness. Scope and Methodology
To describe the Department of the Interior’s and the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Forest Service processes for implementing their emergency stabilization and rehabilitation programs, we obtained departmental manuals, handbooks, and other guidance that describe Interior’s process for implementing emergency stabilization and rehabilitation and the Forest Service’s emergency stabilization program. | Why GAO Did This Study
Wildfires burn millions of acres annually. Most burnt land can recover naturally, but a small percentage needs short-term emergency treatment to stabilize burnt land that threatens public safety, property, or ecosystems or longer-term treatments to rehabilitate land unlikely to recover naturally. The Department of the Interior (Interior) and the Department of Agriculture's (USDA's) Forest Service--the two departments that manage most federal land--spend millions of dollars annually on such treatments. GAO was asked to (1) describe the two departments' processes for implementing their programs, (2) identify the costs and types of treatments implemented, and (3) determine whether these treatments are effective.
What GAO Found
Both Interior and USDA's Forest Service use multidisciplinary teams of experts, such as ecologists and soil scientists, to assess damage and potential risks burnt land poses and to develop emergency stabilization and rehabilitation plans that identify needed treatments to reduce or eliminate those risks. The two departments differ in how they manage their programs, however. Interior uses a single process to assess damage and identify treatments for short-term emergency stabilization and longer-term rehabilitation, while USDA's Forest Service uses different processes for each of these two treatment types. The two departments recognize these differences and recently agreed to work toward standardizing certain aspects of their programs, such as definitions and time frames. Following the 2000 and 2001 fires, the Forest Service obligated $192 million and Interior $118 million for 421 emergency stabilization and rehabilitation treatment plans GAO reviewed. Treatments included seeding; fencing; installing soil erosion barriers such as straw bundles, or wattles; and road or trail work. Most of Interior's land--managed by the Bureau of Land Management--consists of rangeland. Thus, the bureau primarily seeded native grasses to retain soils and forage for cattle and wildlife and fenced to prevent grazing. Forest Service land is often steeply sloped and includes watersheds used for drinking water and timber. The Forest Service primarily seeded fast-growing grasses and built soil erosion barriers for emergency stabilization, and worked on roads, trails and reforested for rehabilitation. Neither the departments nor GAO could determine whether emergency stabilization and rehabilitation treatments were achieving their intended results. The departments require that treatments be monitored, but they do not specify how and the type of data to collect or analyze for determining effectiveness. The departments have stressed the need to systematically collect and share monitoring data for treatment decisions. Yet neither has developed a national interagency system to do so. Therefore, the nature and extent of data collection, analysis, and sharing vary widely. The departments recognize that they need better information on treatment effectiveness. However, they have not yet committed to this effort. |
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