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gao_GAO-15-102 | gao_GAO-15-102_0 | Current Agency Policy and Guidance on the Payment of Recruitment Fees Do Not Provide Clear Instructions
Agency policy and guidance on combating trafficking in persons has attempted to address the payment of recruitment fees by foreign workers on certain U.S. government contracts. We found that some agency officials, both on contracts in our sample and on others, and contractors in our sample did not have a common understanding of what constitutes a permissible fee related to recruitment—in terms of components or amount—or whether contractors or subcontractors at any level were permitted to charge such fees to recruited employees. DOD contracting officials in Kuwait said that a definition of recruitment fees would improve their ability to implement the government’s antitrafficking policy. Some Foreign Workers Employed on U.S. Contracts Paid Recruitment Fees to Subcontractors or Recruitment Agencies
On at least two contracts in our sample, including the one employing the largest number of foreign workers, contractors reported that workers have paid for their jobs. According to the subcontractor who employed all 82 of these workers, these fees were likely paid to an agent who assisted foreign workers with transportation and housing prior to being hired for work on the U.S. government contract. Some of these workers reported paying more than 1 year’s salary in such fees. 1). For example, we found that agencies did not specifically monitor for labor practices on some contracts, but rather focused on contractor-provided goods and services, such as building construction. For some contracts in our sample, DOD and State had specific processes to monitor efforts to combat TIP. On Some Contracts, Agencies’ Monitoring Efforts Were Limited to Contractor-Provided Goods and Services
For 4 of the 11 contracts in our sample, agency officials stated that they did not specifically monitor contractor labor practices or efforts to combat TIP, as their monitoring processes were primarily focused on contractor- provided goods and services. However, without efforts to specifically monitor labor practices or efforts to combat TIP, agencies’ ability to detect such concerns is limited, and they cannot ensure that foreign workers are being treated in accordance with the U.S. government’s zero tolerance policy regarding trafficking in persons. Some Contracting Officials Were Unaware of Their Monitoring Responsibilities to Combat TIP
Some DOD and State contracting officials were unaware of relevant acquisitions policy and guidance for combating TIP and did not clearly understand their monitoring responsibilities. For example, State officials reported that a security contract in Iraq required the contractor to provide return travel for its foreign workers and that this requirement was discussed with the contractor at the end of the contract. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help ensure agencies can more fully implement their monitoring policy and guidance related to recruitment of foreign workers, the Secretaries of Defense and State and the Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development should each develop, as part of their agency policy and guidance, a more precise definition of recruitment fees, including permissible components and amounts. Our objectives were to examine (1) policies and guidance governing the recruitment of foreign workers and the fees these workers may pay to secure work on U.S. government contracts overseas and (2) agencies’ monitoring of contractor efforts to combat TIP. On the basis of this comparison, we selected 11 contracts that represent nearly one- third of all reported foreign workers employed on contracts awarded by these three agencies as reported in SPOT. The Department of Defense (DOD), Department of State (State), and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) have developed policy and guidance that provides more specificity on these practices, as outlined in table 6. State noted that the new regulations that will amend the Federal Acquisition Regulation will prohibit charging employees recruitment fees. 2. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since the 1990s, there have been allegations of abuse of foreign workers on U.S. government contracts overseas, including allegations of TIP. In 2002, the United States adopted a zero tolerance policy on TIP regarding U.S. government employees and contractors abroad and began requiring the inclusion of this policy in all contracts in 2007. Such policy is important because the government relies on contractors that employ foreign workers in countries where, according to State, they may be vulnerable to abuse.
GAO was mandated to report on the use of foreign workers. This report examines (1) policies and guidance governing the recruitment of foreign workers and the fees these workers may pay to secure work on U.S. government contracts overseas and (2) agencies' monitoring of contractor efforts to combat TIP. GAO reviewed a nongeneralizable sample of 11 contracts awarded by DOD, State, and USAID, composing nearly one-third of all reported foreign workers on contracts awarded by these agencies at the end of fiscal year 2013. GAO interviewed agency officials and contractors about labor practices and oversight activities on these contracts.
What GAO Found
Current policies and guidance governing the payment of recruitment fees by foreign workers on certain U.S. government contracts do not provide clear instructions to agencies or contractors regarding the components or amounts of permissible fees related to recruitment. GAO found that some foreign workers—individuals who are not citizens of the United States or the host country—had reported paying for their jobs. Such recruitment fees can lead to various abuses related to trafficking in persons (TIP), such as debt bondage. For example, on the contract employing the largest number of foreign workers in its sample, GAO found that more than 1,900 foreign workers reported paying fees for their jobs, including to recruitment agencies used by a subcontractor. According to the subcontractor, these fees were likely paid to a recruiter who assisted foreign workers with transportation to and housing in Dubai before they were hired to work on the contract in Afghanistan (see figure). Some Department of Defense (DOD) contracting officials GAO interviewed said that such fees may be reasonable. DOD, the Department of State (State), and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) have developed policy and guidance for certain contracts addressing recruitment fees in different ways. However, these agencies do not specify what components or amounts of recruitment fees are considered permissible, limiting the ability of contracting officers and contractors to implement agency policy and guidance.
GAO found that agency monitoring, called for by federal acquisition regulations and agency guidance, did not always include processes to specifically monitor contractor efforts to combat TIP. For 7 of the 11 contracts in GAO's sample, DOD and State had specific monitoring processes to combat TIP. On the 4 remaining contracts, agencies did not specifically monitor for TIP, but rather focused on contractor-provided goods and services, such as building construction. In addition, some DOD and State contracting officials said they were unaware of relevant acquisitions policy and guidance for combating TIP and did not clearly understand their monitoring responsibilities. Both DOD and State have developed additional training to help make contracting officials more aware of their monitoring responsibilities to combat TIP. Without specific efforts to monitor for TIP, agencies' ability to implement the zero tolerance policy and detect concerns about TIP is limited.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that agencies (1) develop a more precise definition of recruitment fees and (2) ensure that contract monitoring specifically includes TIP. DOD concurred with the first recommendation, while State and USAID noted that forthcoming regulations would prohibit all recruitment fees. Agencies concurred with the second recommendation. |
gao_NSIAD-98-238 | gao_NSIAD-98-238_0 | 2000 The International Boundary and Water Commission is composed of a U.S. Total funding for the 4-year period, therefore, came to approximately $217.9 million, as shown in table 1. Section received funds totaling approximately $46.7 million in fiscal year 1997. These funds were used for U.S. Section operations, project engineering activities, operation and maintenance of existing projects, and construction activities. These projects had terms that varied from those for the other three. In present value terms, the net cost to the United States to finance Mexico’s share for the two projects is approximately $8.6 million, as shown in table 3. Section and Department of State officials informed us that this type of arrangement was made by the United States, following negotiation with Mexico, in response to the state of the Mexican economy and the dire need to build these joint projects in the United States, which is the preferred location from technical points of view, but where costs and standards are higher than in Mexico. We found that the contract operations representative did not submit these required monthly reports on the performance of the contractors at the international wastewater treatment facilities at South Bay, California, and Nogales, Arizona, to the contract administrator. While the Department of State reviews the U.S. Section’s budget requests and provides foreign policy guidance to the section, the Department told us that it does not have the authority to routinely monitor or oversee the management of the U.S. Section because the Section is not a constituent part of the Department of State. The Commission acts as the project manager for selected EPA-funded projects along the southwest border. Although the U.S. In light of our findings regarding the finance and accounting systems, including the failure to correct previously identified weaknesses, weaknesses in contract administration, and minimal oversight of programs and activities and the significance of the U.S. Section’s activities, we believe greater oversight of the U.S. Section’s financial and program operations is needed. We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of State; the Administrator, EPA; and the U.S. Commissioner of the International Boundary and Water Commission. Section of the International Boundary and Water Commission, (2) certain aspects of the U.S. Section’s system of accounting and internal controls, (3) the cost-sharing arrangements for joint projects between the United States and Mexico, (4) the administration of U.S. Section construction and operations and maintenance contracts, and (5) the extent of oversight over the U.S. Section’s programs and operations. Instead, we focused on key aspects of U.S. Sources and Uses of Funds
To identify the amount of the U.S. Section’s direct appropriation, we reviewed the U.S. Department of State’s appropriation data for fiscal years 1994 to 1998 and its budget request for fiscal year 1999. Section for construction, as well as for operations and maintenance expenses from Mexico, other federal agencies (such as EPA), and state and local municipalities. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the U.S. Section of the International Boundary and Water Commission, focusing on: (1) the sources and uses of the U.S. Section's funds; (2) certain aspects of the U.S. Section's system of accounting and internal controls; (3) the cost-sharing arrangements for joint projects between the United States and Mexico; (4) the administration of U.S Section operations and maintenance contracts; and (5) the extent of oversight over the U.S. Section's programs and operations.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the U.S. Section of the International Boundary and Water Commission has received total funding of approximately $217.9 million over the last 4 years; (2) the funds were from appropriations and grants or payments from other federal agencies and state and local governments; (3) it also received reimbursement from the Mexican government for costs incurred on joint projects; (4) the U.S. Section expended $46.7 million in fiscal year 1997, including $21.9 million from its appropriations and $24.8 million from grants and payments from others; (5) the funds were used for salaries and benefits, administrative costs, operation and maintenance of International Boundary and Water Commission projects, and construction activities; (6) the cost-sharing agreements between the United States and Mexico for two recently completed projects had payment terms that varied from those used on other joint developments; (7) for these two projects, the United States agreed to finance Mexico's share of costs due to Mexico's economic difficulties and in order to cover the cost of meeting environmental standards of the United States, which are higher than those in Mexico; (8) this resulted in $8.6 million worth of increased costs to the United States; (9) the total investment for those two projects--Nogales, Arizona, and South Bay, California--is $321.9 million; (10) there are weaknesses in certain aspects of the U.S. Section's finance and accounting systems; (11) regarding the administration of U.S Section operations and maintenance contracts, required monthly reports on contractor performance were not submitted; (12) oversight of the U.S. Section is minimal; (13) although the Department of State reviews the U.S. Section's budget submission and provides policy guidance to the U.S. Commissioner, the Section is not a constituent part of State and, therefore, the Department does not formally examine the Section's managerial activities because it operates administratively as an independent agency; (14) while the Environmental Protection Agency funds some projects along the southwest border, it only reviews U.S. Section contracts and monitors resulting construction projects where it is a major contributor; and (15) the U.S. Commissioner informed GAO in a July 1998 letter that actions have been taken or are in progress to correct the deficiencies discussed in this report. |
gao_GAO-06-313 | gao_GAO-06-313_0 | The Yucca Mountain project is currently focused on preparing an application to obtain a license from NRC to construct a repository. In the late 1980s, DOE had been challenged to fix and develop adequate plans and procedures related to quality assurance. Currently, in preparing to submit the license application to NRC, DOE is relying on costly and time-consuming rework to resolve lingering quality assurance problems with the transparency and traceability of data and in project design and engineering documents uncovered during audits and after-the-fact evaluations. DOE Has Had Problems Implementing and Maintaining an Effective Quality Assurance Program
DOE has a long-standing history of attempting to address NRC concerns about its quality assurance program. NRC found significant problems. DOE Cannot Be Certain Its Efforts to Improve Quality Assurance Have Been Effective Because of Weaknesses in Tracking Progress and Identifying Problems
DOE cannot be certain that it has met continuous improvement goals for implementing its quality assurance requirements, a commitment DOE made at the closure of its Management Improvement Initiatives (Initiatives) in April 2004. At that time, DOE told us it expected that the progress achieved with the initiatives would continue and that its performance indicators would enable it to assess further progress and direct management attention as needed. However, DOE’s performance indicators, as well as a second management tool—trend evaluation reports—have not been effective for this purpose. The confusion over roles and responsibilities was undermining managers’ accountability for results. For example, in August 2005, the work environment indicator showed good performance. Determining the Extent of Problems with Relevant Documents Will Delay DOE’s Submission of the License Application
In March 2005, after announcing the discovery of USGS e-mails suggesting the possible violation of quality assurance requirements, including the falsification of records, DOE has taken steps to address lingering concerns about the adequacy of the scientific work related to the flow of water into the repository and whether similar quality assurance problems are evident in other e-mails relevant to the licensing application. Requirements management is the process that ensures the broad plans and regulatory requirements affecting the project are tracked and incorporated into specific engineering details. Program complexity and other project characteristics are also likely to pose challenges to managing quality assurance. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve the effectiveness of DOE’s efforts to monitor performance in key areas at the Yucca Mountain project, including quality assurance, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy direct the Director, Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management, to take the following five actions to strengthen the project’s management tools: Reassess the coverage that the management tools provide for the areas of concern identified in the Management Improvement Initiatives and ensure that performance in these important areas is effectively monitored, especially in light of the more recent condition reports and associated cause analyses, trend reports, and other reviews indicating continuing problems. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this review were to determine (1) the history of the Yucca Mountain project’s quality assurance problems since the project’s start in the 1980s, (2) the Department of Energy’s (DOE) tracking of quality problems and progress implementing quality assurance requirements since our April 2004 report, and (3) challenges that DOE faces as it continues to address quality assurance issues within the project. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Energy (DOE) is working to obtain a license from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to construct a nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain in Nevada. The project, which began in the 1980s, has been beset by delays. In a 2004 report, GAO raised concerns that persistent quality assurance problems could further delay the project. Then, in 2005, DOE announced the discovery of employee e-mails suggesting quality assurance problems, including possible falsification of records. Quality assurance, which establishes requirements for work to be performed under controlled conditions that ensure quality, is critical to making sure the project meets standards for protecting public health and the environment. GAO was asked to examine (1) the history of the project's quality assurance problems, (2) DOE's tracking of these problems and efforts to address them since GAO's 2004 report, and (3) challenges facing DOE as it continues to address quality assurance issues within the project.
What GAO Found
DOE has had a long history of quality assurance problems at the Yucca Mountain project. In the 1980s and 1990s, DOE had problems assuring NRC that it had developed adequate plans and procedures related to quality assurance. More recently, as it prepares to submit a license application for the repository to NRC, DOE has been relying on costly and time-consuming rework to resolve lingering quality assurance problems uncovered during audits and after-the-fact evaluations. DOE announced, in 2004, that it was making a commitment to continuous quality assurance improvement and that its efforts would be tracked by performance indicators that would enable it to assess progress and direct management attention as needed. However, GAO found that the project's performance indicators and other key management tools were not effective for this purpose. For example, the management tools did not target existing areas of concern and did not track progress in addressing them. The tools also had weaknesses in detecting and highlighting significant problems for management attention. DOE continues to face quality assurance and other challenges. First, DOE is engaged in extensive efforts to restore confidence in scientific documents because of the quality assurance problems suggested in the discovered e-mails between project employees, and it has about 14 million more project e-mails to review. Second, DOE faces quality assurance challenges in resolving design control problems associated with its requirements management process--the process for ensuring that high-level plans and regulatory requirements are incorporated into specific engineering details. Problems with the process led to the December 2005 suspension of certain project work. Third, DOE continues to be challenged to manage a complex program and organization. Significant personnel and project changes initiated in October 2005 create the potential for confusion over roles and responsibilities--a situation DOE found to contribute to quality assurance problems during an earlier transition. |
gao_RCED-95-164 | gao_RCED-95-164_0 | More specifically, the accuracy of the models’ predictions is limited by (1) incomplete or inadequate representations of the processes affecting climate and (2) insufficient computer power. Global Change Research Program’s fiscal year 1995 research programs are summarized in appendix III. Federal Expenditures for GCMs
Five federal agencies reported spending an estimated $122.6 million during fiscal years 1992 through 1994 to fund modeling activities to improve predictions of the future climate. Conclusions
Although the accuracy of general circulation models’ estimates of climatic change has improved over the past decade, these estimates are still limited by incomplete and inaccurate representations of the processes affecting climate and by insufficient computer power. We have responded to the agencies’ comments by adding information about ongoing research to overcome the models’ scientific and technical limitations and about recent positive results achieved with the models. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The Ranking Minority Member of the House Committee on Commerce asked us to review the factors that affect the accuracy of GCMs’ estimates of future climatic changes and determine the costs of federally funded GCMs for fiscal years 1992 through 1994. 1. 2. 3. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to congressional request, GAO reviewed the accuracy of general circulation models (GCM) in forecasting global warming trends, focusing on the: (1) factors limiting the accuracy of GCM estimates of future climatic changes; and (2) federal expenditures for GCM for fiscal years (FY) 1992 through 1994.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) although GCM have improved their ability to predict future climatic changes over the last decade, their estimates are still limited by their incomplete or inaccurate representations of climate-affecting processes and by insufficient computer power; (2) scientists do not fully understand how the climate system responds to potentially important physical, chemical, and biological processes; (3) the lack of computer power requires scientists to use simplified assumptions and structures that increase the uncertainty of the models' predictions; (4) scientists are conducting research to overcome the limitations of the computer models; and (5) five federal agencies spent about $122.6 million for various global modeling projects, which represented about 3 percent of the global change research program's budget for FY 1992 through 1994. |
gao_GAO-07-202 | gao_GAO-07-202_0 | Federal Program Has a Unique Profit Structure
The federal program has a unique profit structure that is explicitly defined in the contract between OPM and Partners. In contrast to the federal program, profits realized by carriers offering other long-term care insurance plans generally are not based on explicit profit structures. This payment equals 3.5 percent of the premiums collected in a year. For other long-term care insurance plans offered in the group and individual markets, carriers’ profits were generally not guaranteed, according to carrier officials and industry experts. This payment can equal up to 3 percent of the premiums collected in a year. This annual payment—0.3 percent of the average annual assets of the federal program—is defined in the contract between OPM and Partners as a profit payment. For example, the types of marketing efforts used for the federal program and other plans offered in the group market, according to our review of federal program documents and the carrier and state officials we spoke with, included mailing information directly to the homes of eligible individuals, sending e-mails to eligible employees at work, posting information on a Web site, hosting employee and retiree seminars, and working with affinity groups whose membership consists of eligible individuals. As a result of the federal program’s limited ability to send direct mail to many eligible individuals, the federal program relied heavily on marketing efforts that were less direct and less personalized, including sending information to federal employees through agency benefits officers and working with affinity groups. Claims Experience in the Federal Program Increased but Remained Lower Than Expectations
In the federal program’s fourth year, claims experience—the amount of claim payments per enrollee and the number of paid claims per enrollee— increased from that of the program’s third year, but remained lower than Partners’ expectations as established in its contract with OPM. This increase was generally consistent with trends since the federal program began in 2002. As of March 31, 2006, the end of the federal program’s fourth year, the federal program had cumulatively paid 44 percent of the expected amount of claim payments per enrollee and 41 percent of the expected number of claims per enrollee, across the 4 years, as shown in table 2. As of August 2006, Partners had not determined why the claims experience was lower than Partners’ expectations. Concluding Observations
Our findings from two reports together show that the Federal Long Term Care Insurance Program compared favorably with other plans, has a unique profit structure, and used marketing efforts that were generally similar to those of other plans, but faced a significant challenge. Because of this structure, the program does not link Partners’ profits to the overall experience of the program. While it is generally expected that the number of claims submitted in the first few years of a long-term care insurance program will be a small portion of the total number of claims submitted over time, a program’s claims experience is one of several factors that may affect the long-term financial outlook of the program. In response to our recommendation in the initial report that OPM analyze the claims experience and assumptions affecting premiums to inform forthcoming contract negotiations, OPM indicated that it intended to provide updated information on claims experience and premium setting in its written recommendation to Congress before entering into the next contract for the administration of the Federal Long Term Care Insurance Program. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to OPM and Partners. Appendix I: Performance Measures Used for the Federal Long Term Care Insurance Program
The Federal Long Term Care Insurance Program makes some profit payments to Long Term Care Partners LLC (Partners) according to the Office of Personnel Management’s (OPM) evaluation of Partners’ performance. Related GAO Products
Long-Term Care Insurance: Federal Program Compared Favorably with Other Products, and Analysis of Claims Trend Could Inform Future Decisions. GAO-06-401. | Why GAO Did This Study
Spending on long-term care services--about $193 billion in 2004--is expected to rise. In 2000, Congress passed the Long-Term Care Security Act, requiring the federal government to offer long-term care insurance. To do so, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) contracted with Long Term Care Partners LLC (Partners) to create the Federal Long Term Care Insurance Program. This is the second of two reports required by the act on the competitiveness of the federal program. GAO's March 31, 2006, report, Long-Term Care Insurance: Federal Program Compared Favorably with Other Products, and Analysis of Claims Trend Could Inform Future Decisions (GAO-06-401), found that the federal program's benefits and premiums compared favorably with other plans, but enrollment and claims experience--the amount and number of claims payments--were lower than Partners expected. In this report, GAO compared the federal program's profit structure and marketing efforts with those of other plans and updated its analysis of the program's claims experience. GAO reviewed the contract between OPM and Partners and interviewed OPM, Partners, and insurance carrier officials, as well as actuaries and industry experts. GAO also analyzed data on claim payments for the federal program since it began in 2002.
What GAO Found
The Federal Long Term Care Insurance Program has a unique profit structure that is explicitly defined in the contract between OPM and Partners. This profit structure consists of three distinct annual payments to Partners: (1) a guaranteed payment of 3.5 percent of the year's collected premiums, (2) a payment linked to OPM's evaluation of Partners' performance of up to 3 percent of the year's collected premiums, and (3) a guaranteed payment of 0.3 percent of the average annual assets of the program. These payments are separate from other payments made to cover the program's expenses. In contrast to the federal program, profits realized by carriers offering other long-term care insurance plans generally are not based on explicit profit structures, but rather on the experience of the programs they insure. The federal program's marketing efforts were generally similar to those used for other plans sold in the group market, but faced a significant challenge in sending information directly to eligible individuals. The federal program and other plans sold in the group market used such marketing efforts as mailing information to the homes of eligible individuals and hosting employee and retiree seminars. Of these efforts, carrier officials GAO spoke with explained that mailing to the homes of eligible individuals was critical to their marketing strategy. The federal program faced a significant challenge in mailing information to the homes of those eligible for the program because it initially did not have the home addresses for nearly all active federal civilian employees. Because of this challenge, the federal program relied heavily on marketing efforts that were less direct and less personalized, such as sending information to federal employees through agency benefits officers. The federal program's claims experience increased in the program's fourth year, but remained lower than the expectations established by Partners in its contract with OPM. This increase was generally consistent with trends since the federal program began in 2002. Overall, the federal program has paid 44 percent of the expected amount of claim payments per enrollee and 41 percent of the expected number of claims per enrollee. As of August 2006, Partners officials had not determined why the claims experience was lower than Partners' expectations. While it is generally expected that the number of claims submitted in the first few years of a long-term care insurance program will be a small portion of the total number of claims submitted over time, a program's claims experience is one of several factors that may affect its long-term financial outlook. The results of this analysis underscore GAO's prior recommendations that OPM analyze the claims experience and assumptions affecting premiums to inform forthcoming contract negotiations. In commenting on a draft of this report, OPM generally agreed with the report's findings. |
gao_GAO-17-145 | gao_GAO-17-145_0 | 1.) 2.) For example, CMS may require some states to report on the number of beneficiaries served, expenditure data, information on grievances and appeals, or other requirements specific to the state. 3.) Most Selected States Set Incentives for Community-Based Care, but Did Not Link Payment to Performance on MLTSS Goals
Five of our six selected states set financial incentives in their rate structures for providing community-based care, which is a CMS expectation for MLTSS programs. However, we also found that most of the six states did not opt to link payments to MCO performance on MLTSS program goals, such as enhancing the provision of community- based care. Beneficiaries with high-cost institutional care. In addition, federally led efforts to develop outcome measures for long-term services and supports are in the early stages. CMS’s Oversight of MLTSS Payment Structures Is Limited
We found weaknesses in CMS’s oversight of states’ payment structures. Second, it is unclear whether new CMS requirements will sufficiently address issues with the appropriateness and reliability of the data used by states to set MLTSS rates. CMS Does Little to Monitor State Progress toward MLTSS Program Goals, and the Effectiveness of CMS’s Planned Efforts Is Unclear
CMS has not consistently required states to report data on whether their MLTSS payment structures are achieving MLTSS program goals, such as enhancing the provision of community-based care. For three of our selected states—Texas, Arizona, and Delaware—CMS required reporting on the provision of community-based care. Provisions in CMS’s new managed care rule could provide an opportunity for more regular and standardized MLTSS data from states. According to federal internal control standards, federal agencies should use quality information to achieve their objectives. Without consistently requiring information on state progress toward MLTSS goals, CMS will continue to approve programs and pay billions of dollars to states without knowing whether the payment structures are providing sufficient incentives for MCOs to provide community-based care. In addition, under the final rule, the agency will begin to require states to meet additional standards for the appropriateness of the data used to set rates beginning in July 2017. These new regulations also require states to validate encounter data, which are the primary record of managed care services and a key source of data for setting managed care rates, and periodically audit those data, as well as financial data, which states also may use in rate setting. To the extent that states are using data that are not appropriate or reliable, the data may not be a good predictor of expected costs, which could result in rates that are too high or too low. Appropriateness of Data
In the rate certifications we reviewed and our interviews with state officials, we found evidence of concerns with the appropriateness of data used to set rates in two of our selected states:
State did not use recent data to set rates. Without specifying its criteria for what situations would warrant exceptions, CMS may not be able to sufficiently minimize the number of states using data of questionable appropriateness to set rates. We and the HHS Office of Inspector General (OIG) have found evidence of reliability concerns with state encounter data. Similarly, in 2015, we reported reliability issues with the encounter data, from calendar year 2010, reported by 6 states. While the new rule requires states to validate the completeness and accuracy of encounter data, CMS has not issued guidance with minimum standards for state data validation procedures and does not plan to do so. Without minimum standards for such state validation efforts, it is unclear that those efforts will be sufficient to minimize the risk of encounter data being incomplete or inaccurate. Achieving these goals depends, in part, on states establishing payment structures that align financial incentives for MCOs with those goals, and setting rates that are adequate and appropriate. 2. In response to our second recommendation to establish criteria for what situations would warrant exceptions to the federal standards that the data used to set rates be no older than the three most recent and complete years, HHS said it will consider whether additional clarifying guidance is needed. At that time, we will send copies to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, and the Administrator of the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. Appendix I: Characteristics of States’ MLTSS Programs Selected for Our Review
Our six selected states (Arizona, Delaware, Florida, Kansas, Minnesota, and Texas) have managed long-term services and supports (MLTSS) programs that varied in terms of cost and enrollment. | Why GAO Did This Study
The provision of long-term services and supports in Medicaid is a significant challenge, because of the vulnerability and service needs of beneficiaries, as well as the high cost of care. An increasing number of states have MLTSS programs, which can be used to expand community-based care and lower costs. However, whether these programs are an effective strategy depends, in part, on the design of the payment structures.
GAO was asked to review states' MLTSS payment structures and CMS's oversight. This report examines (1) how selected states structured their financial incentives, and (2) CMS policies and procedures for overseeing states' payment structures.
GAO reviewed relevant federal regulations, guidance, and internal control standards. For six states selected for variation in location and experience (AZ, DE, FL, KS, MN, and TX), GAO reviewed the contracts and rate certifications most recently approved by CMS, the terms and conditions set by CMS for the programs, and other payment documentation. GAO also interviewed CMS officials and Medicaid officials from the selected states.
What GAO Found
Out of six states with Medicaid managed long-term services and supports (MLTSS) programs that GAO selected for review, five set clear financial incentives in their payment rates for managed care organizations (MCO) to provide care in the community versus in an institution. However, most of the selected states did not opt to link payments or penalties to MCO performance on MLTSS goals. These goals, which include enhancing the provision of community-based care, are developed by states and the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), the agency in the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) responsible for overseeing Medicaid.
GAO found that CMS's oversight of state payment structures was limited. CMS expects states' MLTSS programs to enhance the provision of community-based care. However, GAO found CMS does not consistently require states to report on whether the payment structures—including payment rates, incentive payments, and penalties—are achieving MLTSS goals. For example, CMS required three of the selected states to report on the provision of community-based care, but did not require any such reporting from the other three states. According to federal internal control standards, federal agencies should use quality information to achieve agency objectives. Without requiring information on states' progress toward MLTSS goals, CMS will continue to pay billions of dollars to states without knowing if states have sufficient incentives for community-based care.
In addition, GAO identified risks with CMS's oversight of the data used to set MLTSS rates, specifically the appropriateness and reliability of those data. Under federal regulations, MLTSS rates must be appropriate and adequate. To the extent that states use data that are not appropriate and reliable to set rates, the resulting rates could be too low, which could provide an incentive for MCOs to reduce care, or too high, which results in more federal spending than necessary.
Appropriateness concerns: GAO found issues with the appropriateness of data used by two of the selected states. For example, one state used data from 2010 and 2011 to set rates for 2015. Beginning in July 2017, CMS will require rates to be based on the three most recent and complete years of data. Although CMS will allow exceptions, it has not specified criteria for what situations would warrant exceptions. Without specifying criteria, CMS's requirements may not sufficiently minimize the number of states using data of questionable appropriateness to set MLTSS rates.
Reliability concerns: GAO and the HHS Office of Inspector General previously found evidence of reliability issues with managed care encounter data, which are the primary record of managed care services and a key source of data used to set MLTSS rates. In addition, GAO's review of state documentation indicated variation in selected states' procedures for validating the reliability of their encounter data, specifically the completeness and accuracy of the data. Beginning in July 2017, CMS will require states to validate encounter data, but CMS has not issued guidance with minimum standards for state procedures. Without minimum standards for state validation efforts, it is unclear that CMS's efforts will sufficiently minimize the risk of encounter data being incomplete or inaccurate .
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends CMS (1) require all states to report on progress toward achieving MLTSS program goals, (2) establish criteria for what situations would warrant exceptions to federal standards for data used to set rates, and (3) provide guidance with minimum standards for validating encounter data. HHS concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-15-605T | gao_GAO-15-605T_0 | Background
Established as a national program in the mid 1970s, WIC is intended to improve the health status of low-income pregnant and postpartum women, infants, and young children by providing supplemental foods and nutrition education to assist participants during critical times of growth and development. National Data on Online Sales of WIC Infant Formula Are Unavailable, but Evidence Suggests Some Participants Attempt Them
USDA does not have data that can be used to determine the national extent of online sales of WIC formula, and department officials told us that USDA has not conducted a comprehensive study to assess these sales. Rather, they said, it is the responsibility of state agencies to establish procedures to prevent and address participant violations, including attempts to sell WIC food benefits. According to state officials, states’ monitoring efforts have revealed some WIC formula offered for sale online. Of the officials we spoke to from 12 states, those from 5 states said that they have found WIC formula offered for sale online by participants. Consistent with these state accounts, our own monitoring of a popular e- commerce website for 30 days in four large metropolitan areas found few posts in which individuals explicitly stated they were attempting to sell WIC-provided formula. However, these posts did not state that the advertised formula was from WIC, and while the formula offered for sale was generally consistent with formula provided through WIC, we could not identify it as such. 1. 2. 2016.”
Through our monitoring efforts, and through interviews with USDA and state and local WIC officials, we identified a number of key challenges associated with distinguishing between WIC-obtained formula sales and other sales:
Each state’s specific WIC-contracted formula brand is typically available for purchase at retail stores by WIC participants and non- WIC participants alike, without an indicator on the packaging that some were provided through WIC. Individuals posting formula for sale online are able to remain relatively anonymous, so WIC staff may not have sufficient information to link the online advertisement with a WIC participant. Advertisements for infant formula sales can be numerous online, and formula for sale originates from varied sources. USDA Has Assisted States in Preventing and Addressing Online Sales, but Monitoring Guidance is Lacking
USDA has taken steps aimed at clarifying that the online sale of WIC benefits is a participant violation. Although WIC regulations require that state agencies establish procedures to control participant violations, we found that states vary in whether their required procedures include informing participants of the prohibition against selling WIC formula. In our review of rights and responsibilities statements from 25 states’ WIC policy and procedure manuals, we found that 7 did not require local agency staff to inform participants that selling WIC benefits is against program rules. USDA agreed with this recommendation, and in April 2015, department officials reported that they intend to revise WIC regulations to require state agencies to include in participant rights and responsibilities statements the prohibition against selling WIC food benefits online. In addition, we found that states vary in the ways they identify attempted sales of WIC formula through monitoring efforts, and USDA has not collected information on states’ efforts to address these sales. However, the method of monitoring and the level of effort devoted to this activity varied across states. Because USDA does not require that state agencies document their procedures for identifying participant sales of WIC foods, including online sales of infant formula, USDA does not know whether or how states are working to ensure program integrity in this area. We recommended in our December 2014 report that USDA require state agencies to articulate their procedures for identifying attempted sales of WIC food benefits in their WIC state plans and analyze the information to ascertain the national extent of state efforts. USDA and the states also lack information to determine cost-effective approaches for monitoring these attempted sales. However, because the use of the Internet as a marketplace has substantially increased in recent years and the national extent of online sales of WIC food benefits is unknown, USDA and the states have insufficient information to assess the benefits of oversight efforts related to this participant violation. Because of this, we recommended in our December 2014 report that USDA collect information to assess the national extent of attempted online sales of WIC formula benefits and determine cost-effective techniques states can use to monitor online classified advertisements. USDA agreed with this recommendation, and department officials reported in April 2015 that they plan to explore ways to assess the extent of online sales of WIC formula and identify and share best practices, cost- effective techniques, or new approaches for monitoring online advertisements with state agencies. We believe this approach will help states to strike the appropriate balance of costs and benefits when determining how to target their program integrity resources. | Why GAO Did This Study
WIC provides supplemental foods—including infant formula—and assistance to low-income pregnant and postpartum women, infants, and young children. WIC regulations prohibit participants from selling the foods they receive from the program. However, the Internet has substantially increased as a marketplace in recent years, and news reports suggest that some participants have attempted to sell WIC formula online.
This testimony addresses: (1) what is known about the extent to which participants sell WIC formula online, and (2) USDA actions to prevent and address online sales of WIC formula. It is based on a December 2014 report, and includes April 2015 updates on actions USDA has taken to address the report's recommendations, which GAO obtained by analyzing USDA documents. For the 2014 report, GAO reviewed relevant federal laws, regulations, and USDA guidance; monitored online advertisements to sell formula in four metropolitan areas; reviewed a non-generalizable sample of policy manuals from 25 states, selected for their varied WIC caseloads and geography; and interviewed USDA and state and local officials.
What GAO Found
The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) does not have data to determine the national extent of online sales of infant formula provided by the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC). Nevertheless, state WIC officials and GAO's own limited monitoring suggest that some WIC participants have offered formula for sale online. Of the officials we spoke with in 12 states, those from 5 states said that they have found WIC formula offered for sale online by participants. GAO monitored one online classified advertisements website in four large metropolitan areas for 30 days and found 2 posts in which individuals attempted to sell formula specifically identified as WIC—from among 2,726 that advertised infant formula generally. A larger number, 481 posts, advertised formula generally consistent with the formula brand, type, container volume, and amount provided to WIC participants, but these posts did not indicate the source of the formula. Because WIC participants purchase the same formula brands and types from stores as non-WIC customers, monitoring attempted online sales of WIC formula can present a challenge. State officials GAO spoke with cited other challenges to monitoring online sales, such as the fact that individuals posting formula for sale online are able to remain relatively anonymous, and their posts may contain insufficient information to allow staff to identify them as WIC participants.
USDA has taken some steps toward helping states prevent and address online sales of WIC formula but has not collected information that could assist states in determining cost-effective approaches for monitoring such sales. In December 2014, GAO found that USDA had not specifically directed states to tell participants that selling WIC formula was a participant violation, which could have led to participants making these sales without realizing doing so was against program rules. GAO also found that states were not required to report their procedures for controlling participant violations—including sales of WIC benefits—to USDA, leaving the department without information on state efforts to ensure program integrity in this area. Through interviews with state and local WIC agency officials from 12 states, GAO found that states varied in the method and level of effort devoted to monitoring these sales and lacked information to determine cost-effective approaches for monitoring. Without information on the national extent of online sales of WIC benefits or effective monitoring techniques, both USDA and the states are unable to target their resources effectively to address related risks. As a result, GAO recommended that USDA require state agencies to inform participants of the prohibition against selling WIC formula and describe to USDA how they identify attempted sales. GAO also recommended that USDA collect information about the national extent of attempted online sales of WIC formula benefits and determine cost-effective techniques states can use to monitor them. In response, USDA issued revised guidance in April 2015 stating that it expects states to (1) inform participants that selling WIC benefits violates program rules and (2) report their procedures for monitoring attempted WIC benefit sales to USDA. Also in April 2015, USDA officials reported that although they had not yet taken action to assess the national extent of online sales and determine cost-effective techniques to monitor them, they planned to explore ways to do so.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommended, in December 2014, that USDA better ensure WIC participants are aware of the prohibition against selling formula, require states to describe how they identify attempted sales, and assess online sales, including techniques for monitoring. USDA agreed, has taken some action, and plans to do more. |
gao_GAO-04-944 | gao_GAO-04-944_0 | By the time the budget approval process is complete and the funds are made available, several things can be said about the appropriated amounts for the individual program: (1) they represent decisions by Congress to approve programs as requested, create new programs, and adjust the requested amounts for others; (2) because of the elapsed time from the point the program manager began formulating the budget request until enactment of the appropriations act, situations may have changed that cause a misalignment between the approved funds and the actual status of the program; (3) the inherent unknowns in research and development will result in some programs not being executed as contemplated by the budget; and (4) unanticipated events will develop during the execution year that were not anticipated in the budget. It is for these and other reasons that Congress recognizes that DOD needs some flexibility to adjust research and development funds after they are appropriated. Because the reports contained classified information, their distribution was limited. Further, the reports did not include detailed information about BTR activity on a program-by-program level, such as whether programs gained or lost funding, and provided no withhold data. The data needed to determine the amount and volume of BTRs for fiscal years 2002 and 2003 were not readily available from some of the systems and some manual data collection was necessary. DOD’s Reports to Congress Have Shortfalls
For fiscal years 2002 and 2003, DOD delivered the DD 1416s to Congress several months after Congress began deliberations on the new budget year. BTRs and Withholds Used Frequently to Adjust or Control Programs’ Funding Levels
We found that the Air Force, Army, Navy, and MDA executed 1,927 BTRs in fiscal year 2003, totaling about $1 billion. Although we did not observe any instances in which DOD’s use of BTRs exceeded the thresholds, our work was not conclusive on this point as we did not design steps to assess compliance with thresholds. Officials from the military departments, MDA, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense cited several reasons for implementing BTRs and withholds, including accommodating unanticipated changes or events, implementing congressional mandates, and, in the case of some withholds, controlling the execution of individual programs. This amounted to about 2 percent of the research and development funds for these organizations. 5, shows percentages for fiscal year 2002.) In fiscal year 2003, the DOD organizations we reviewed withheld a total of about $2.8 billion in appropriated funds. Often, these withholds are in response to a congressional directive contained in authorization or appropriations report language. DOD disagreed that its recent reports to Congress provide BTR information of limited quality and cited other information it provides to Congress in addition to the DD 1416. DOD did note that the issues we raised on the quality of information it provides can be addressed, and that DOD was open to suggestions and will gladly work with the committee staff to satisfy its needs. DOD offered several suggestions to put the findings of the report more in context. DOD’s willingness to work with Congress is a constructive response that can lead to reporting changes that can meet the needs of both Congress and DOD. Congress has required DOD to provide better and more timely information on reprogramming and withhold activities. Scope and Methodology
To determine the quality of the information available about the Department of Defense’s (DOD) use of below-threshold reprogrammings (BTR) and withholds, we reviewed the DOD Financial Management Regulation and recent congressional guidelines on reprogramming and withholds; various DOD internal reports and reports to Congress; and data from financial management systems recorded for the research and development programs from the Army, Air Force, Navy, and Missile Defense Agency (MDA). | Why GAO Did This Study
Congress recognizes that the DOD needs some flexibility to adjust research and development program levels. A key mechanism--below threshold reprogramming (BTR)--enables DOD to adjust program funding levels without seeking prior congressional approval as long as a certain dollar amount or percentage threshold is not exceeded. In response to a mandate by the appropriations committees, this report addresses (1) the quality of the information available about DOD's use of BTRs and withheld funds in fiscal years 2002 and 2003 and (2) the amount and volume of BTRs and temporarily withheld funds for those years. The report also addresses recent congressional direction on providing information on funding adjustments. DOD disagreed that its recent reports to Congress provide BTR information of limited quality but noted that the issues GAO raised in this regard can be addressed and that DOD was open to suggestions and will gladly work with committee staff to satisfy their needs. DOD also offered suggestions to clarify language on certain issues and to put its use of BTRs more in context. DOD's willingness to work with Congress is a constructive response that can lead to reporting changes that can meet the needs of both Congress and DOD. GAO has made appropriate clarifications of language and overall BTR context.
What GAO Found
DOD's recent reports to Congress provide BTR information of limited quality and do not contain data about funds withheld from DOD's research and development programs in fiscal years 2002 and 2003. DOD delivered its reports to Congress months after the time that Congress began considerations for the new budget, and accessibility was limited because the reports were classified. BTR data in the reports to Congress were derived through subtraction, rather than totaling the actual value of BTR transactions. The reports do not provide a complete picture of how BTRs are implemented on a program-by-program level. DOD has no overall system for maintaining detailed BTR and withhold data across organizations, although such data can be reconstructed from DOD's multiple data collection systems. GAO found that DOD organizations used BTRs frequently to increase or decrease research and development program funding levels. The Air Force, Army, Navy, and Missile Defense Agency (MDA) executed 1,927 BTRs, amounting to about $1 billion in fiscal year 2003. This amounted to about 2 percent of the research and development funds for these organizations. Among the programs affected by BTRs, about half lost funds and more than one-fourth gained funds. While the dollar amounts and frequency differed for fiscal year 2002, the patterns were similar. Although GAO did not observe any instances in which DOD's use of BTRs exceeded the thresholds, GAO's work was not conclusive on this point, as GAO did not design steps to assess compliance with thresholds. DOD withheld about $2.8 billion in funds in fiscal year 2003. Officials cited several reasons for implementing BTRs and withholds, including accommodating unanticipated changes or events, implementing congressional mandates, and, in the case of some withholds, controlling the execution of individual programs. Congress has required DOD to provide better and more timely information on reprogramming and withhold activities. |
gao_GAO-11-288 | gao_GAO-11-288_0 | Implementation of Treasury’s Newer Housing Programs Has Been Slow and Capacity of Servicers to Carry Out These Programs Remains Unclear, Raising Uncertainty About the Potential Impact of These Programs
Treasury has recently implemented programs to reduce or eliminate payments on second-lien mortgages, provide incentives for the use of short sales or deeds-in-lieu as alternatives to foreclosure, and provide incentives for the forgiveness of principal for borrowers whose homes are worth significantly less than their mortgage balances. Treasury has taken some steps to address these challenges, but could take further action to ensure that borrowers are aware of their potential eligibility for the program. Similar to the first-lien modification program, Treasury has not established effective performance measures for these three programs, including goals for the number of borrowers it expects to help. Borrowers had to first be evaluated for HAMP. Restrictive short-sale requirements. Treasury Could Do More to Incorporate Lessons Learned from the First- Lien Modification Program in Implementing Newer Programs
In our June 2010 report, we pointed out that it was important that Treasury incorporate lessons learned from the challenges experienced with the HAMP first-lien modification program into the design and implementation of the newer MHA-funded programs. Nonetheless, it is unclear what actions Treasury has taken to ensure that the servicers who did not submit the required documentation have the capacity to effectively implement the programs, making less certain the ability of these servicers to fully participate in offering troubled homeowners second-lien modifications, principal reduction, and foreclosure alternatives. Treasury Has Some Data on the Characteristics of Borrowers in HAMP’s First-Lien Program, but Data Were Sometimes Missing or Questionable
Our analysis of Treasury’s HAMP data through September 30, 2010, indicated that borrowers who entered into trial modifications or received permanent modifications continued to have elevated levels of debt, as evidenced by the median back-end DTI for these two groups (55 and 57 percent, respectively). Most Borrowers Denied or Canceled from Trial Modifications Appear to Have Avoided Foreclosure To Date, but Weaknesses in Treasury’s Data Collection Limit its Ability to Understand the Outcomes of These Borrowers
Because there have been more HAMP trial modification cancellations than conversions to permanent modifications, we evaluated Treasury’s reporting of the disposition paths, or outcomes, of borrowers who were denied or canceled from HAMP trial modifications and obtained additional information from six large MHA servicers to understand the extent to which these borrowers have been able to avoid foreclosure to date. However, 2 years after Treasury first announced that it would use $50 billion in TARP funds for various programs intended to preserve homeownership and protect home values, foreclosure rates remain at historically high levels. Recommendations for Executive Action
As part of its efforts to continue improving the transparency and accountability of MHA, we recommend that the Secretary of the Treasury take actions to require servicers to advise borrowers to notify their second-lien servicers once a first lien has been modified under HAMP to reduce the risk that borrowers with modified first liens are not captured in the LPS matching database and, therefore, are not offered second-lien modifications; ensure that servicers demonstrate they have the operational capacity and infrastructure in place to successfully implement the requirements of the 2MP, HAFA, and PRA programs; and consider methods for better capturing outcomes for borrowers who are denied, canceled, or redefaulted from HAMP, including more accurately reflecting what actions are completed or pending and allowing for the reporting of multiple concurrent outcomes, in order to determine whether borrowers are receiving effective assistance outside of HAMP and whether additional actions may be needed to assist them. We continue to believe that such action is needed to better ensure the likelihood of success of these newer MHA programs. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To examine the status of the Department of Treasury’s (Treasury) second- lien modification, principal reduction, and foreclosure alternatives programs and the design and implementation challenges Treasury and servicers have faced with these programs to date, we spoke with and obtained information from six large Making Homes Affordable (MHA) servicers, including the four largest servicers participating in the Second- Lien Modification Program (2MP) at the start of our review. Without pre-established performance measures and goals, Treasury will not be able to effectively assess the outcomes of its MHA programs or hold servicers accountable for their performance. | Why GAO Did This Study
Two years after the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) first made available up to $50 billion for the Making Home Affordable (MHA) program, foreclosure rates remain at historically high levels. Treasury recently introduced several new programs intended to further help homeowners. This report examines (1) the status of three of these new programs, (2) characteristics of homeowners with first-lien modifications from the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP), and (3) the outcomes for borrowers who were denied or fell out of first-lien modifications. To address these questions, GAO analyzed data from Treasury and six large MHA servicers.
What GAO Found
The implementation of Treasury's programs to reduce or eliminate second-lien mortgages, encourage the use of short sales or deeds-in-lieu, and stimulate the forgiveness of principal has been slow and limited activity has been reported to date. This slow pace is attributed in part to several implementation challenges. For example, servicers told GAO that the start of the second-lien modification program had been slow due to problems with the database Treasury required them to use to identify potentially eligible loans. Additionally, borrowers may not be aware of their potential eligibility for the program. While Treasury recently revised its guidelines to allow servicers to bypass the database for certain loans, servicers could do more to alert HAMP first-lien modification borrowers about the new second-lien program. Implementation of the foreclosure alternatives program has also been slow due to program restrictions, such as the requirement that borrowers be evaluated for a first-lien modification even if they have already identified a potential buyer for a short sale. Although Treasury has recently taken action to address some of these concerns, the potential effects of its changes remain unclear. In addition, Treasury has not fully incorporated into its new programs key lessons from its first-lien modification program. For example, it has not obtained all required documentation to demonstrate that servicers have the capacity to successfully implement the newer programs. As a result, servicers' ability to effectively offer troubled homeowners second-lien modifications, foreclosure alternatives, and principal reductions is unclear. Finally, Treasury has not implemented GAO's June 2010 recommendation that it establish goals and effective performance measures for these programs. Without performance measures and goals, Treasury will not be able to effectively assess the outcomes of these programs. Treasury's data provide important insights into the characteristics of borrowers participating in the HAMP first-lien modification program, but data were sometimes missing or questionable. More homeowners have been denied or canceled from HAMP trial loan modifications than have received permanent modifications. To understand which borrowers HAMP has been able to help, GAO looked at Treasury's data on borrowers in HAMP trial and permanent modifications. These data showed that HAMP borrowers had reduced income and high debt, but the reliability and integrity of some of Treasury's information was questionable.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that Treasury require servicers to advise borrowers to contact servicers about second-lien modifications and ensure that servicers demonstrate the capacity to successfully implement Treasury's new programs. GAO also recommends that Treasury consider methods to better capture outcomes for borrowers denied or canceled from HAMP first-lien modifications. Treasury acknowledged challenges faced by servicers in implementing the program, but felt that certain criticisms of MHA were unwarranted. However, we continue to believe that further action is needed to better ensure the effectiveness of these programs. |
gao_GAO-03-363 | gao_GAO-03-363_0 | Receiverships at Housing Authorities Have Resulted from Severe, Long-standing Problems
The problems that compel HUD and the courts to place public housing authorities in receivership are serious physical, financial, and managerial deficiencies that violate agreements between HUD and the authority and that have persisted despite repeated interventions. Lawsuits over Poor Living Conditions Prompted Judicial Receiverships
To date, all judicial receiverships at PHAs have resulted from lawsuits filed by residents and have involved the very poor physical condition of public housing units. Administrative and Judicial Receiverships Have Operated Similarly, but Specific Remedies Have Varied
Administrative and judicial receiverships have operated similarly in that they usually both involve the complete takeover of a PHA’s management and operations or of an entire program within a PHA. Both types of receivers have the same authority to implement any necessary changes to improve the PHA’s performance. Both Administrative and Judicial Receiverships Have Shown Improvement
According to HUD’s assessed performance scores and/or other evidence, nearly all of the 15 authorities showed improvement during their years of receivership whether under administrative or judicial receivers. Performance scores under judicial receiverships have generally remained high. For example, the Camden Housing Authority, the District of Columbia Housing Authority, the Wellston Housing Authority, and the Housing Authority of Kansas City all had problems with the physical condition of their units prior to being placed in receivership. While HUD’s performance scores do not have a component that captures the progress made in desegregating developments, they do indicate that, in recent years, these housing authorities generally made progress in improving the management of the agency and the physical condition of the housing stock. Improvements Have Been Consistent at Authorities under Judicial Receiverships
All of the four housing authorities that have been or are currently under judicial receivership (Boston, District of Columbia, Kansas City, and Chester) have generally shown consistent improvements. In contrast, while housing authorities under administrative receiverships have also made improvements, some are still experiencing problems. In some cases, the improvements have not been sustained. Criteria for Ending Receiverships Vary
No set guidelines exist for ending either administrative or judicial receiverships because both are handled on a case-by-case basis. The criteria HUD uses to make this decision vary depending on the problems that led to receivership and the severity of those problems. Administrative Receiverships
Beaumont Housing Authority (TX)
The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) took over the public housing authority (PHA) in 2000 because of racial segregation in the public housing developments. When the Beaumont Housing Authority failed to take the necessary steps to desegregate its public housing, HUD assumed control of the PHA’s management and operations. The housing authority now has an executive director in charge, but a HUD official continues to oversee management and operations. HUD also hired a contractor to act as the board. | Why GAO Did This Study
About 3,000 public housing authorities--state, county, and municipal agencies--develop and manage low-income housing in cooperation with the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). Since 1979, 15 housing authorities have been placed in the hands of receivers' outside parties designated to manage the authorities during a specific period of time, usually several years. GAO was asked to identify the circumstances that led to receiverships, any differences in the way they operate and in their results, and the factors that have influenced the termination of receiverships.
What GAO Found
Receiverships at housing authorities have generally resulted from long-standing, severe, and persistent management problems that led to deterioration of the housing stock. Under an administrative receivership, HUD appoints either a contractor or a HUD employee to take over the housing authority's management. Because receiverships generally involve the complete takeover of a housing authority's management and operations, HUD views receiverships as a last resort when other interventions such as technical assistance or sanctions have failed. HUD has made these decisions on a case-by-case basis. In four cases, decisions to appoint receivers were made by courts. These judicial receiverships stemmed from lawsuits filed against housing authorities because of poor living conditions in public housing. Administrative and judicial receiverships have operated similarly, and all of the receivers have had the same authority to make necessary changes. The specific corrective actions receivers have taken depended on the problems at the individual housing authority. Most receivers have found it necessary to oversee the complete reorganization of the housing authority's management and operations, develop and enforce policies and procedures, and improve physical conditions. In some cases, receivers have had to desegregate public housing to address fair housing violations. Whether under administrative or judicial receivers, nearly all of the 15 authorities showed improvement during their years of receivership. The four housing authorities under judicial receiverships generally have continued to demonstrate strong performance; for example, performance scores have improved and have generally remained high. While housing authorities under administrative receiverships have also made improvements, some still demonstrated a significant problem with housing units in very poor physical condition. According to HUD officials, HUD ends administrative receiverships when it is clear not only that conditions at the housing authority have improved but also that the authority's management can sustain the improvements. The decisions to end judicial receiverships are made by judges. To date, four administrative and two judicial receiverships have been terminated. |
gao_GGD-96-17 | gao_GGD-96-17_0 | Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
In August 1995, the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government, House Committee on Appropriations, asked us to (1) identify and describe ATF’s policies for the use of deadly force; (2) determine how ATF conveys its policies to its agents; (3) determine the reasons for and the extent to which ATF uses dynamic entry and the equipment ATF uses to accomplish these entries; and (4) determine whether ATF has complied with its procedures for investigating shooting and alleged excessive use-of-force incidents. The Chairman also asked us to compare how ATF addresses the above issues with the way that Justice’s Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) address them. To determine ATF’s compliance with its investigative procedures, we reviewed ATF’s investigative files for all 38 intentional shooting incidents that were reported to and investigated by ATF from fiscal years 1990 through 1995 as well as for the 25 alleged excessive force incidents we selected. In October 1995, Treasury and Justice adopted uniform policies on the use of deadly force. ATF’s 1988 Policy on the Use of Deadly Force Was Generally Consistent With the 1995 Treasury Policy
“A firearm may be discharged when the special agent believes that there is no other means of control and perceives an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury to himself/herself or other innocent persons.”
The 1988 ATF and 1995 Treasury policies are consistent in that both policies generally authorize the use of such force only when the law enforcement officer reasonably believes or perceives that there is an imminent threat or danger of death or serious physical injury to the officer or another person. Moreover, ATF policy requires that ATF agents be reminded of the deadly force policy at least quarterly throughout their careers. 3.1). During New Agent Training, ATF agents are to be taught to differentiate between situations that require a dynamic or stealth/static entry. Conclusions
Dynamic entry is a common tactic used by ATF, DEA, and FBI when entry to premises is used to execute high-risk search and arrest warrants. Our review also showed that ATF investigations determined that all reported intentional shootings were justified and most reported allegations of excessive force were unsubstantiated. ATF Procedures Are Consistent With Recommended Guidelines and Standards and Are Generally Comparable to Those Employed by DEA and FBI
ATF’s procedures for reporting, investigating, and reviewing shooting incidents and allegations of use of excessive force are consistent with recommended guidelines and/or standards for law enforcement agencies established by IACP, PCIE, and the Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies. ATF is also in the process of implementing lessons learned from the 1993 operation at Waco. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms' (ATF) use of deadly force and dynamic entry, focusing on: (1) ATF policies on the use of deadly force; (2) how ATF conveys its policies to its agents; (3) the reasons for and the extent to which ATF uses dynamic entry and what equipment it uses; (4) ATF compliance with its procedures for investigating shooting and alleged excessive force incidents; and (5) how the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) address similar issues.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) except for a few instances, the 1988 ATF policy on deadly force was consistent with prior DEA and FBI policies and the 1995 Departments of the Treasury and Justice uniform policies which superceded their agencies' policies; (2) agents may use deadly force only when they reasonably believe that suspects pose an imminent threat of death or serious injury to themselves or other persons; (3) the three agencies' new agent training in their deadly force policies is similar and all agents are required to be retrained on a quarterly basis throughout their careers; (4) dynamic entry is used to ensure personal safety when access to premises is needed in high-risk situations or when suspects might swiftly destroy evidence; (5) the three agencies' method of dynamic entry and weaponry and equipment used was similar; (6) ATF reporting, investigating, and review procedures for shooting and excessive force incidents are consistent with recommended standards and similar to the other agencies'; (7) ATF and DEA excessive force procedures are generally comparable, but FBI procedures require that all allegations be submitted to Justice for possible criminal or civil rights violations before the allegations are self-investigated; (8) ATF generally complied with its investigative procedures during fiscal years 1990 through 1995; (9) ATF found that all intentional shootings were justified, most allegations of excessive force were unsubstantiated, and 5 agents warranted sanctioning for misconduct; and (1O) ATF is implementing lessons learned from the incidents, particularly the Waco, Texas, raid. |
gao_GAO-12-700 | gao_GAO-12-700_0 | OCC charters and supervises national banks and federal thrifts. However, research shows that servicemembers are generally less likely to own their own homes. First, some SCRA mortgage protections only apply to servicemembers who took out their mortgage before being placed on active duty. Federal Regulators’ Oversight of SCRA Compliance Has Been Limited
Prudential Regulators Examine for SCRA Compliance Based on Risk Factors
Prudential regulators—FDIC, Federal Reserve, NCUA, and OCC—are responsible for supervising depository institutions’ compliance with various federal consumer laws including SCRA. Based on our review, we estimate that from 2007 through 2011, prudential regulators reviewed SCRA compliance in at least one examination for 48 percent of all the institutions they oversaw that serviced mortgages. Specifically, of these 83 institutions, we found that
6 institutions had examinations during this period that relied on interviews of depository institution staff to assess SCRA compliance as their highest category of examination procedure,
36 institutions had examinations in which the highest category of examination procedure used to assess SCRA compliance was to review the institution’s compliance management system, and
41 institutions had examinations that involved testing of loan files as the highest category of examination procedure—the examination procedure category that provides a greater level of assurance for SCRA compliance than the previous two categories. In May 2011, DOJ took enforcement actions against both mortgage servicers for wrongfully foreclosing upon active duty servicemembers without obtaining court orders. They also explained that while their procedures for conducting these reviews do not address reviewing for compliance with SCRA mortgage protections, VA loan technicians encourage borrowers to review their SCRA mortgage protections with military attorneys. VA officials explained that they rely on federal regulators to investigate and enforce statutory requirements, such as SCRA. 15, 2007). Although FHA, VA, and the enterprises that FHFA oversees have identified limited instances of SCRA violations in recent years, the sharing of information related to SCRA trends, emerging risks, or types of weaknesses found in mortgage servicers’ policies among all agencies that play a role in SCRA compliance oversight could increase awareness of potential problems and improve their ability to identify SCRA violations. As part of their responsibilities, they inform servicemembers about their rights and benefits under SCRA. Additionally, CFPB has held meetings in which representatives from DOD and DHS and other federal agencies, financial institutions, and trade associations discussed issues related to SCRA compliance. DHS officials also told us they have not evaluated the effectiveness of their SCRA education methods to members of the Coast Guard and Coast Guard Reserve. Because the agency’s entire mission is dedicated to benefiting individuals who have served the country through military service, expanding its procedures to review for SCRA compliance at mortgage servicers that participate in its mortgage program could help the agency achieve its mission and better ensure that servicemembers are receiving all benefits to which they are entitled. Because multiple federal agencies’ play a role in ensuring that mortgage servicers provide SCRA protections to eligible servicemembers, sharing information on SCRA compliance could benefit these agencies’ respective SCRA oversight efforts. We have previously found that collaboration among supervisory agencies can lead to more effective supervision and that such collaboration does occur for certain consumer compliance laws. Without such an assessment, such as by using focus groups of servicemembers or testing to reinforce retention of SCRA information, DOD and DHS may not be able to ensure they are reaching servicemembers in the most effective manner. Recommendations for Executive Action
To better ensure SCRA compliance oversight, we recommend that the Comptroller of the Currency, the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and Chairman of the National Credit Union Administration take steps to increase the frequency with which examiners (1) conduct testing of foreclosure files and as applicable, other mortgage loan files; and (2) employ testing methods that provide greater assurance that mortgage servicers are complying with SCRA. DHS concurred and DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that they assess the effectiveness of their efforts to educate servicemembers on SCRA to determine better ways for making servicemembers aware of their SCRA rights and benefits, including improving the ways in which members of the reserve components obtain such information. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to examine (1) what is known about Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA) eligibility, the number of violations that have occurred, and practices financial institutions use to comply with SCRA; (2) what oversight financial regulators and other federal agencies have taken to help ensure depository institutions’ compliance with the act; and (3) actions the Department of Defense (DOD), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), and others have taken to ensure that servicemembers and others are informed of protections provided under the act. We then used these data to select a stratified random sample from the population of depository institutions that service mortgages. Testing loan files for SCRA compliance. These agencies include the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), and VA. We also reviewed the SCRA compliance monitoring efforts of two government-sponsored enterprises—Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. | Why GAO Did This Study
SCRA protects servicemembers whose active duty military service prevents them from meeting financial obligations, by allowing interest rates on certain debts to be reduced and requiring a court order before certain foreclosures on their homes can occur. With foreclosures rising, reports surfaced of instances in which financial institutions failed to comply with SCRA. GAO examined the (1) eligibility for SCRA protections and extent of SCRA mortgage-related violations by depository institutions, (2) SCRA compliance oversight by prudential regulators and other federal agencies, and (3) the military services efforts to educate servicemembers on SCRA. GAO collected data on populations eligible for SCRA from DOD and SCRA violations from banking and law enforcement agencies and reviewed a stratified random sample of prudential regulators examinations of banks and credit unions. GAO also interviewed regulators, law enforcement and military officials, and military service organizations.
What GAO Found
Certain protections under the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA) only apply to those servicemembers who obtained mortgages prior to becoming active duty, but at least 15,000 instances of financial institutions failing to properly reduce servicemembers mortgage interest rates and over 300 improper foreclosures have been identified by federal investigations and financial institutions in recent years. Additional independent reviews of financial institutions compliance are under way, and staff from some of these institutions told GAO that they have implemented improved practicessuch as creating single points of contact familiar with military issues for borrowersto better comply with SCRA.
Federal regulators oversight of SCRA compliance has been limited. GAO estimates that from 2007 through 2011 prudential depository institution regulatorsthe Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal Reserve Board, National Credit Union Administration, and Office of the Comptroller of the Currencyreviewed 48 percent of all banks and credit unions for SCRA compliance. Of these institutions that were reviewed for SCRA compliance, only about half received examinations that involved testing of compliance by reviewing loan files. Further, GAO found that examiners had only reviewed loans identified by the institution as involving servicemembers and had not independently selected a statistical sample of loan files, which would have provided greater assurance of SCRA compliance. Without more testing, which examination and auditing guidance suggest provides increased verification, regulators are less likely to detect SCRA violations. Various other federal agencies are involved in SCRA compliance oversight. The Department of Justice has explicit SCRA enforcement authority and since 2007 has brought three cases against mortgage servicers for violations. The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), Federal Housing Administration, and Federal Housing Finance Agencywhich regulates the government-sponsored enterprisesall obtain information about SCRA compliance at the servicers that participate in the mortgage programs they administer or regulate, but the agencies and the prudential regulators do not share such information among themselves. Collaboration among these agencies could lead to more effective supervision and improve their awareness of potential problems with SCRA compliance. Further, VA oversight of mortgage servicers does not specifically review for SCRA compliance. By increasing its SCRA compliance monitoring efforts, VA could better ensure that servicemembers with VA loans are better protected.
SCRA requires that the Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of Homeland Security (DHS)which oversees the Coast Guardinform servicemembers of their SCRA rights. The military services provide this information in various forms, such as briefings and websites. However, some military officials said that servicemembersparticularly members of the National Guard and reserveoften receive SCRA information as part of briefings with numerous other topics prior to deployment and do not always retain the necessary awareness when they need it later. DOD and DHS do not assess the effectiveness of their SCRA education methods, such as by using focus groups of servicemembers or testing to reinforce retention of SCRA information. Without such assessment, they may not be able to ensure that they are informing servicemembers of their rights in the most effective manner.
What GAO Recommends
Prudential regulators should conduct more extensive loan file testing for SCRA compliance. Regulators and other agencies that oversee mortgage activities should also explore opportunities for information sharing on SCRA compliance oversight, and VA should expand its SCRA compliance monitoring efforts. Finally, DOD and DHS should assess the effectiveness of their efforts to provide SCRA information to servicemembers. The agencies generally agreed and noted actions responsive to GAOs recommendations. |
gao_GAO-12-913T | gao_GAO-12-913T_0 | OMB and Federal Agencies Have Taken Steps to Improve Federal Spending Data
The first federal effort to publicly display comprehensive data on federal awards was USAspending.gov. Among other things, the Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act of 2006 (FFATA) required OMB to establish a free, publicly accessible website containing data on federal awards no later than January 1, 2008. The site included the required data elements and search capabilities, and OMB guidance required periodic updates from agencies consistent with the act’s requirement for timeliness. OMB partially satisfied the act’s requirement to establish a pilot to test the collection of subaward data. Although USAspending.gov included required grant information from 29 agencies for fiscal year 2008, it did not include grant information from 15 programs at 9 other agencies. In a sample of 100 awards from USAspending.gov that we reviewed, each had at least one data error in a required field, consisting of either a blank data field, an inconsistency between the USAspending.gov data and agency records, or a lack of sufficient agency information to determine consistency. We also recommended that OMB develop and implement a plan to collect and report subaward data, as well as a procedure to regularly ensure that agencies report required award information. Since we last evaluated FFATA compliance, OMB has taken steps to improve USAspending.gov and the quality of its data through increased agency-level accountability and government-wide improvements. First, in OMB’s 2009 Open Government Directive, agencies were directed to designate a high-level senior official to be accountable for the quality of, and internal controls over, federal spending information disseminated on public websites. That information is no longer available on the site. OMB has produced only one of the required annual reports to Congress that were to include data on usage of the site and public feedback on its utility. OMB and the Recovery Board Addressed Several Implementation Challenges with Recovery Act Recipient Reporting
As Congress and the administration crafted the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act), they built into it provisions to increase transparency and accountability over spending. It required recipients of Recovery Act funds, including grants, contracts, or loans, to submit quarterly reports with information on each project or activity, including the amount and use of funds and an estimate of the jobs created or retained. The Recovery.gov site was launched in 2009 to fulfill these requirements, and a second site— http://www.FederalReporting.gov—was established for recipients to report their data. The transparency envisioned under the Recovery Act for tracking spending and results was unprecedented for the federal government. As part of our oversight of the Recovery Act and in response to a mandate to comment quarterly on recipient reporting, we issued a number of reports addressing procedures related to recipient reporting and the quality of data on Recovery.gov, and we made several recommendations for improvements. With OMB Oversight, Agencies Took on the Key Role of Ensuring Data Accuracy and Completeness
After we reported that initially there were significant reporting and quality issues, OMB issued guidance to federal agencies that incorporated lessons learned from the first reporting period and addressed recommendations we had made. Additional Approaches Could Streamline Reporting and Oversight
Our analysis of the quality of recipient-reported data showed that recipients made errors in reporting award identification numbers, amount of awards, and other data that agencies already had, and that if those items had been pre-populated for recipients, errors might have been reduced. Initiatives to Improve Transparency Can Benefit from Lessons Learned
There are initiatives under way in Congress and the administration that look to build on these two transparency efforts now in place. For example, legislation has been passed in the House of Representatives and introduced in the Senate to improve the accountability and transparency of federal spending. In addition, in June 2011 the President issued an executive order establishing the Government Accountability and Transparency Board to provide strategic direction for, among other things, enhancing the transparency of federal spending. There are lessons from the implementation of both USAspending.gov and Recovery.gov that can be applied to these new initiatives. Foremost, consideration needs to be given to what objectives are to be achieved and in what priority. However, it is important that ongoing efforts to improve the data provided to the public continue to evolve. Recovery Act: Status of States’ and Localities’ Use of Funds and Efforts to Ensure Accountability. Met The site captured information on all required data elements, such as the entity receiving the award and the award amounts. | Why GAO Did This Study
It is important to ensure the transparency of information detailing how the federal government spends more than $1 trillion annually in the form of contracts, grants, loans, and other awards. Toward this end, the government has multiple initiatives under way to increase such transparency, including publicly accessible websites providing information on federal spending, such as http://www.USAspending.gov and http://www.Recovery.gov. While these efforts have increased the amount of information available, challenges have been identified to better ensure the quality of data on these sites.
GAO was asked to provide a statement addressing (1) the status of efforts to improve the quality of publicly available data on government awards and expenditures and (2) lessons that can be learned from the operation of Recovery.gov that can contribute to other spending transparency efforts. In preparing this statement, GAO relied on its previous work in these areas, as well as discussions with OMB officials and officials from the Recovery Accountability and Transparency Board.
What GAO Found
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and other federal agencies have taken steps to improve federal spending data available on USAspending.gov. This effort to publicly display comprehensive data arose from the federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act of 2006, which required OMB to establish a free, publicly accessible website containing data on federal awards and subawards. OMB launched USAspending.gov in December 2007 to meet these requirements. As GAO reported in 2010, while OMB had satisfied most of the requirements associated with the act, such as establishing the site with required data elements and search capability, it had only partially satisfied the requirement to establish a pilot program to test the collection and display of subaward data and had not met the requirements to include subaward data by January 2009, or to report to Congress on the sites usage. Also, GAO found that from a sample of 100 awards on USAspending.gov, each award had at least one data error and that USAspending.gov did not include information on grants from programs at 9 agencies for fiscal year 2008. Subsequently, OMB and agencies have taken steps to improve the site and the quality of its data through increased agency-level accountability and government-wide improvements. These efforts include directing agencies to appoint a senior-level official to be accountable for the quality of federal spending information disseminated on public websites, and increasing the use of automated tools. However, OMB has not yet implemented plans to create a data quality dashboard on USAspending.gov and has produced only one of the required annual reports to Congress on usage of the site.
OMB, the Recovery Accountability and Transparency Board, federal agencies, and funding recipients addressed several challenges in managing reporting under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. Recovery.gov was established in 2009 to provide public access to information on Recovery Act spending. Specifically, it was to provide timely information on projects or activities funded by federal grants, contracts, or loans provided to recipients, such as state or local governments. The transparency envisioned by the act was unprecedented for the federal government, and GAO identified a number of lessons learned from the operation of Recovery.gov:
OMB and the Recovery board used two-way communication with recipients to refine and clarify guidance.
Training and other assistance was provided to recipients to clarify reporting requirements and address early system problems.
After early reporting and quality issues were identified, OMB required agencies to ensure data accuracy and completeness.
Recipients made errors in reporting data, but these could be reduced through pre-populating data fields and other refinements to the reporting process.
Recent legislative proposals and a newly created executive branch board aim to expand and improve upon the transparency of federal spending. The challenges and lessons learned from implementing the existing reporting tools should help inform current and future efforts. In particular, attention should be given to stakeholder involvement, the effort required for reporting and oversight, and the need for clear objectives and priorities.
What GAO Recommends
GAO previously made several recommendations to improve these transparency efforts, including that OMB clarify guidance on reporting award data and develop a procedure to ensure agencies report required information. While GAO is not making new recommendations at this time, it underscores the importance of fully implementing its prior recommendations. |
gao_GAO-12-296 | gao_GAO-12-296_0 | In addition, the enterprises, federal agencies, and servicers have expanded their existing modification programs in an effort to reach additional borrowers. According to Treasury, about 1.9 million borrowers had their HAMP loan modification application denied, as of December 2011. Treasury had paid $8.8 million in PRA incentives to participating servicers as of December 2011. In some cases, state programs funded under Treasury’s HHF program include foreclosure alternatives and transition assistance for borrowers who cannot afford to keep their homes. Millions of Loans Face Elevated Risk of Foreclosure and Indicators Show Housing Market Remains Weak
Based on our analysis of CoreLogic data that cover approximately 65 percent to 70 percent of the prime and approximately 50 percent of the subprime mortgage market, we found that as of June 2011, 1.9-3.0 million loans had characteristics associated with an increased likelihood of foreclosure, including delinquency and significant negative equity (current LTV ratios of 125 percent or higher). Other key housing market indicators, such as home prices and home equity, remained near their recent lows. Enhancing Current Federal Foreclosure Mitigation Efforts Could Improve Their Effectiveness
Most stakeholders we contacted said that enhancing existing federal foreclosure mitigation efforts was the most appropriate action to take to facilitate the recovery of the housing market, and we found that opportunities existed for federal agencies to improve the effectiveness of their efforts. Although federal agencies and the enterprises have taken steps to help ensure that servicers reached struggling borrowers, not all agencies were conducting the necessary analyses to determine which of their foreclosure mitigation actions were most effective. We also found some evidence to suggest that principal forgiveness as a mitigation tool could help some borrowers—those with significant negative equity—but that federal agencies and the enterprises were not using it consistently and some were not convinced of its overall merits. Moreover, there are other policy issues to be considered when determining how widely this option should be used, including moral hazard (borrowers strategically defaulting to become eligible for assistance). Most but Not All Federal Agencies and the Enterprises Have Increased Efforts to Reach Struggling Borrowers Early in a Delinquency
All of the federal agencies—Treasury, FHA, VA, and USDA—as well as the enterprises have policies in place for servicers to follow once a borrower becomes delinquent. Long-term costs include payments by the government to cover defaults and delinquencies, among other things. Further, FHA does not use results from analyses to provide the basis for not offering assistance to struggling homeowners. FHFA, the conservator and regulator of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, has not allowed them to use their own funds to offer principal forgiveness. While these efforts resulted in more than 4 million loan modifications between January 2009 and December 2011, the volume of modifications has declined since 2010 and millions of borrowers have sought but have been unable to receive a permanent modification. Specifically, our analysis of mortgage data showed that 1.9-3 million loans still had characteristics associated with an increased likelihood of foreclosure, such as serious delinquency and significant negative equity (LTV ratio of 125 or higher), as of June 2011. In addition, indicators such as home prices and home equity remain near their postbubble lows. And finally, as of December 2011, total U.S. household mortgage debt was $3.7 trillion greater than households’ equity in their homes. Our analysis found that several agencies and the enterprises could do more to better manage the costs associated with foreclose mitigation efforts and step up their efforts to reach and help borrowers, specifically the following,
Treasury has not reassessed its need for the letter of credit on FHA’s Short Refinance program, which will not likely reach the number of borrowers that it initially estimated it would help. However, FHA, VA, and USDA have not assessed the impact of loan and borrower characteristics on the performance of their foreclosure mitigation efforts. In some cases, these agencies do not have the data needed to conduct these analyses. Given the December 31, 2013, deadline for entry into a HAMP permanent loan modification and the lead time required for the enterprises to implement a principal forgiveness program, it is critical that FHFA take the steps needed to expeditiously make a decision about allowing the enterprises to engage in HAMP principal forgiveness modifications. However, the ability of federal agencies and the enterprises to make such determinations is unclear, unless they collect and analyze the data needed to demonstrate the success and cost- effectiveness of individual actions. This information can help program managers and policymakers decide what further steps, if any, to take in their efforts to mitigate the foreclosure crisis. Treasury, HUD, VA, and FHFA each agreed to consider or concurred with the recommendations and indicated that action was either under way or planned in response to our recommendations. In response, we clarified the text of the report and the associated recommendation to provide additional examples of data that would enhance USDA’s ability to monitor servicers’ borrower outreach and foreclosure mitigation efforts. Specifically, this report examines (1) the federal and nonfederal response to the housing crisis, (2) the number of loans potentially at risk of foreclosure and the current condition of the U.S. housing market, and (3) opportunities to enhance the effectiveness of current foreclosure mitigation efforts. To identify these indicators, we reviewed a wide range of publicly available information and interviewed housing market participants and stakeholders. During the same period, FHA paid incentives on about 67,000 Type I special forbearance plans. Appendix V: Description of GAO’s Econometric Analysis of Redefault of Modified Loans
This appendix provides (1) a summary of the characteristics of loans in the CoreLogic proprietary loan-level servicing database that we used in our econometric analysis of loans that redefaulted (became 90 days or more delinquent or in foreclosure) 6 months after receiving loan modification actions and a comparison of the characteristics of loans in the CoreLogic data set and Treasury’s Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) data set, and (2) the results of our econometric analysis of the relationship between redefault rates and modification actions, controlling for several observable borrower and loan characteristics. Modified loan becomes 90 or more days past due (dpd) or in foreclosure within 6 months Modified loan becomes 90 or more days past due (dpd) or in foreclosure within 12 months Modified loan becomes 90 or more days past due (dpd) or in foreclosure within 18 months Percentage change in monthly payment of principal & interest Payment reduction is less than10% Payment reduction is between 10% and 19% Payment reduction is between 20% and 29% Payment reduction is between 30% and 39% Payment reduction is between 40% and 49% Payment reduction is between 50% and 59% Payment reduction is 60% or higher Change in interest rate (bps)
TERM CHANGE (months) Borrower and loan characteristics at modification CURRENT, AT MOD
Definition FICO greater than or equal to 620 and less than 660 at modification FICO greater than or equal to 660 and less than 680 at modification FICO greater than or equal to 680 and less than 700 at modification FICO greater than or equal to 700 and less than 750 at modification FICO greater than or equal to 750 at modification Current loan-to-value (CLTV) ratio at modification CLTV is greater than or equal to 10% and less than 80% at modification CLTV is greater than or equal to 80% and less than 95% at modification CLTV is greater than or equal to 95% and less than 100% at modification CLTV is greater than or equal to 100% and less than 115% at modification CLTV is greater than or equal to 115% and less than 125% at modification CLTV is greater than or equal to 125% and less than 150% at modification CLTV greater than or equal to 150% at modification Housing backend debt-to-income ratio (DTIBE), at modification DTIBE is greater than or equal to 30% and less than 35% at modification DTIBE is greater than or equal to 35% and less than 40% at modification DTIBE is greater than or equal to 40% and less than 45% at modification DTIBE is greater than or equal to 45% and less than 50% at modification DTIBE is greater than or equal to 50% and less than 55% at modification DTIBE is greater than or equal to 55% and less than 65% at modification DTIBE is greater than or equal to 65% at modification Percentage change in house prices after modification, zip code level Change in unemployment rate after modification, county level Interest rate at modification (basis points)
Variable (unit used) MOD REQUIRES PMI Loan modification start MOD STARTED, 2009Q1
Borrower and loan characteristics at origination FICO CREDIT SCORE, AT ORIGN
Fair Isaac Corporation (FICO) credit score at loan origination FICO greater than or equal to 350 and less than 550 at loan origination FICO greater than or equal to 550 and less than 580 at loan origination FICO greater than or equal to 580 and less than 620 at loan origination FICO greater than or equal to 620 and less than 660 at loan origination FICO greater than or equal to 660 and less than 680 at loan origination FICO greater than or equal to 680 and less than 700 at loan origination FICO greater than or equal to 700 and less than 750 at loan origination FICO greater than or equal to 750 at loan origination Loan-to-value (LTV) ratio at origination LTV greater than or equal to 10% and less than 70% at origination LTV greater than or equal to 70% and less than 80% at origination LTV equal to 80% at origination LTV greater than 80% and less than 90% at origination LTV greater than or equal to 90% and less than 100% at origination LTV greater than or equal to 100% at origination Interest rate at origination (basis points)
Variable (unit used) Other: product characteristics
If loan is owned by government-sponsored enterprises (Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac)
If loan is owned by non-agency private investors If loan is owned by lender Prime loan = 1, subprime loan = 0 Adjustable rate (ARM) = 1, Fixed rate (FRM) = 0 Condominiums, including PUDs (planned unit developments)
Other housing units, including cooperatives Conventional loans (nongovernment owned or guaranteed loans)
Federal Housing Administration (FHA) loans Veterans Affairs (VA)
If owner-occupied housing versus a nonowner occupied Loans for refinance, with cash-out Loans for refinance, without cash-out Loans for refinance, reason unknown Loan originated in 2003 or before The payment change is the result of modification actions, including, rate reduction, balance reduction (from principal forgiveness or principal forbearance), capitalization, and term extension. | Why GAO Did This Study
Historically high foreclosure rates remain a major barrier to the current economic recovery. To assist policymakers and housing market participants in evaluating foreclosure mitigation efforts, GAO examined (1) the federal and nonfederal response to the housing crisis, (2) the current condition of the U.S. housing market, and (3) opportunities to enhance federal efforts. To address these objectives, GAO analyzed government and mortgage industry data, including loan-level data purchased from a private vendor; reviewed academic and industry literature; examined federal policies and regulations; and interviewed housing industry participants and observers.
What GAO Found
In an effort to help the millions of homeowners struggling to keep their homes, a range of federal programs have offered relief in the form of loan modifications and refinancing into loans with lower interest rates, among other things. Under Treasurys Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP), initiated in early 2009, servicers have modified almost 1 million loans between 2009 and 2011. During the same period, servicers modified nearly 1 million additional loans under programs administered by the Departments of Agriculture (USDA) and Veterans Affairs (VA), Federal Housing Administration (FHA), and Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (the enterprises). Servicers have also modified about 2.1 million loans under nonfederal loan modification programs resulting in a total of about 4 million modifications between 2009 and 2011. However, a large number of borrowers have sought assistance, but were unable to receive a modification. For example, approximately 2.8 million borrowers had their HAMP loan modification application denied or their trial loan modification canceled. Further, the volume of federal modifications has declined since 2010. Recent efforts have expanded refinancing programs. However, low participation rates in FHAs program raise questions about the need for Treasurys financial support, which could reach a maximum of $117 million.
In spite of these efforts, the number of loans in foreclosure remains elevated, and key indicators suggest that the U.S. housing market remains weak. GAOs analysis of mortgage data showed that in June 2011 (most current data available for GAOs use and analysis) between 1.9 and 3 million loans still had characteristics associated with an increased likelihood of foreclosure, such as serious delinquency and significant negative equity (a loan-to-value ratio of 125 percent or greater). These loans were concentrated in certain states, such as Nevada and Florida. Further, more recent indicators such as home prices and home equity remain near their postbubble lows. As of December 2011, total household mortgage debt was $3.7 trillion greater than households equity in their homesrepresenting a significant decline in household wealth nationwide.
Despite the scope of the problem, most stakeholders GAO interviewed said that enhancing current foreclosure mitigation efforts would be preferable to new ones. GAO found that agencies could take steps to make their programs more effective. Collectively, FHA and the enterprises had 1.8 million loans in their portfolios that were 90 days or more past due as of December 2011. GAO found that most of the agencies and enterprises, with the exception of USDA, had stepped up their efforts to monitor servicers outreach to struggling borrowers. However, not all the agencies were conducting analyses to determine the effectiveness of their foreclosure mitigation actions. Experiences of Treasury and the enterprises and GAOs econometric analysis strongly suggest that such analyses can improve outcomes and cut program costs. For example, GAOs analysis showed that the size of payment change, delinquency status, and current loan to value ratio, can significantly influence the success of the foreclosure mitigation action taken. In contrast, not all federal agencies consider redefault rates and long-term costs when deciding which loan modification action to take. Nor have they assessed the impact of loan and borrower characteristics. In some cases, agencies do not have the data needed to conduct these analyses. GAO found some evidence to suggest that principal forgiveness could help some homeownersthose with significant negative equitystay in their homes, but federal agencies and the enterprises were not using it consistently and some were not convinced of its merits. In addition, there are other policy issues to consider in how widely this option should be used, such as moral hazard. The Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), for instance, has not allowed the enterprises to offer principal forgiveness. Treasury recently offered to pay incentives to the enterprises to forgive principal, and FHFA is reevaluating its position. Until agencies and the enterprises analyze data that will help them choose the most effective tools and fully utilize those that have proved effective, foreclosure mitigation programs cannot provide the optimal assistance to struggling homeowners or help curtail the costs of the foreclosure crisis to taxpayers.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that: Treasury reevaluate the need for its financial support of FHAs refinance program; USDA increase its efforts to monitor servicers outreach tostruggling borrowers; FHA, VA, and USDA collect and analyze
information needed to fully assess the effectiveness and costs of their foreclosure mitigation efforts; andFHFA expeditiously finalize analysis on whether to allow the enterprises to offer HAMP principal forgiveness modifications. Treasury, FHA, VA and FHFA agreed to consider or concurred with the reports recommendations. USDA provided additional information in its comments. In response, we clarified the text and recommendation on USDAs monitoring of servicers outreach efforts. |
gao_GAO-13-56 | gao_GAO-13-56_0 | State funding is sometimes earmarked for a specific state activity, such as disaster response. CAP Has Performed Certain Homeland Security Missions for Federal, State, and Local Customers
Our review of fiscal year 2011 CAP flight hour data and discussions with officials from 10 CAP wings show that CAP has performed missions that fit within three of the five QHSR homeland security mission areas: (1) preventing terrorism and enhancing security, (2) securing and managing borders, and (3) disaster response. CAP missions related to these areas have accounted for 9 percent of CAP’s flying hours; however, CAP has devoted the majority of its flying hours (approximately 63 percent) to training for these and other missions and cadet and Reserve Officer Training Corps flying orientations. Air Force Auxiliary Missions Include Some Homeland Security Activities, but Consist Primarily of Training and Flight Orientation
CAP flight hour data for fiscal year 2011 show that CAP participated in a variety of homeland security activities, but that a majority of the organization’s Air Force-assigned flying time was devoted to training and flying orientation for cadets and Reserve Officer Training Corps members. CAP also devoted 2,314 Air Force-assigned flight hours to defense support to civilian authorities/disaster relief, corresponding to the homeland security mission area of ensuring resilience to disasters. CAP intends for its training and pilot certification missions to prepare its pilots and other volunteers to perform homeland security-related missions. For example, 9 of the 10 wings had contributed to preventing terrorism and enhancing security by participating in military readiness exercises where CAP aircraft acted as mock targets for airborne interceptors or ground-based radar. While some of these factors were cited by the DHS components we contacted as issues that could affect CAP’s suitability for additional homeland security missions, neither DHS nor the components have assessed how CAP could be used to perform certain homeland security missions. Several Factors May Affect CAP’s Ability to Support Homeland Security Missions
Legal Parameters Guide CAP’s Mission Involvement
As a volunteer auxiliary of the Air Force, CAP is subject to laws and regulations governing the use of the military in support of law enforcement and is thus limited in the types of support it can provide. In providing support to civilian law enforcement agencies, CAP is precluded from participating in the interdiction of vehicles, vessels, or aircraft, or in search, seizure, arrest, apprehension, surveillance, pursuit, or similar activity. U.S. Air Force, Air Force Instruction 10-2701, Organization and Function of the Civil Air Patrol (Jul. According to CAP and DHS officials, CAP’s existing operational capabilities—aircraft and vehicles, personnel, and technology—have been sufficient to support certain homeland security missions, yet they may not be suitable for other types of missions. As an example, FEMA officials cited CAP’s support of the agency’s operations in response to Hurricane Isaac in 2012, specifically stating that CAP’s imagery helped to establish situational awareness. For example, CAP’s single-engine aircraft have limited transport capacity. For example, the Coast Guard Director of Air Operations during the Deepwater Horizon oil spill told us that CAP personnel conducting high profile shoreline and oil boom patrols were well-organized. However, officials from CBP and the Coast Guard also commented on CAP’s limitations in the border and marine environments, citing inadequate imagery capabilities, incompatible communications, and insufficient detection technology. DHS Has Not Assessed CAP’s Ability to Support Additional Homeland Security Missions
DHS has not assessed CAP’s capabilities and resources or determined the extent to which CAP could be used to support future homeland security activities. By establishing such relationships and assessing the ability of CAP to provide additional homeland security capabilities, DHS, in coordination with the Air Force, could position itself to better understand, and potentially utilize, another resource to accomplish its homeland security missions. At the same time, while some concerns exist among DHS components about partnering with CAP, a cost-effective assessment of CAP’s capabilities and resources, in coordination with the Air Force, could help DHS to better identify whether CAP can assist with its future homeland security missions. Recommendation for Executive Action
To determine the extent to which CAP might be able to further assist DHS and its components in conducting homeland security missions, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the Secretary of the Air Force, cost-effectively assess how CAP could be used to accomplish certain homeland security missions based on the factors described in this report, including legal parameters, mission funding and reimbursement, capabilities, and operating capacity. DHS concurred with our recommendation, citing some challenges and constraints to the expanded use of CAP for DHS missions as well as describing its plan to address our recommendation. | Why GAO Did This Study
Homeland security partnerships may grow increasingly important as fiscal constraints provide impetus for federal agencies to look to partners for mission support. One partner is CAP, a congressionally chartered, federally funded, nonprofit corporation with approximately 61,000 volunteer members that can function as the auxiliary of the U.S. Air Force. CAP conducts missions throughout the United States, including counterdrug, disaster relief, and search and rescue, using mostly single-engine aircraft. The conference report accompanying the fiscal year 2012 DHS appropriations act directed that GAO study the functions and capabilities of CAP to support homeland security missions. In response to the mandate, this report addresses (1) the extent to which CAP has been used to perform homeland security missions to date at the local, state, and federal levels, and (2) the factors that should be considered in determining CAP's ability to support additional homeland security missions and the extent to which DHS has assessed CAP's capabilities and resources to accomplish such missions. GAO reviewed laws and guidance; analyzed fiscal year 2011 CAP flight data; and interviewed officials from DHS, the Air Force, CAP, and a nongeneralizable sample of 10 of 52 state-level CAP wings.
What GAO Found
The Civil Air Patrol (CAP) has performed certain homeland security missions for federal, state, and local customers, but devotes the majority of its flying hours to training and youth programs. Several of CAP's mission areas fit within the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) definition of homeland security, as found in the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report (QHSR)--a strategic framework for homeland security. For example, CAP disaster assistance and air defense activities relate to the QHSR mission areas of ensuring resilience to disasters and preventing terrorism and enhancing security, respectively. CAP has performed some of these activities in support of DHS components, including the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and the Coast Guard, as well as state and local governments. For example, CAP has provided disaster imagery to FEMA, performed certain border reconnaissance for CBP, and assisted the Coast Guard in providing air support during the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. CAP has also performed homeland security-related activities for other customers, such as the U.S. Air Force. For example, 9 of the 10 CAP wings GAO spoke with had participated in military readiness exercises where CAP aircraft provided mock targets for military interceptor aircraft or ground-based radar. CAP's participation in homeland security activities accounted for approximately 9 percent of its fiscal year 2011 flying hours, but the majority of its flying hours (approximately 63 percent) were devoted to training and flying orientation, with the remaining devoted to other activities such as counterdrug and maintenance.
Several factors affect CAP's ability to support homeland security missions, and DHS and its components have not yet assessed how CAP could be used to perform certain homeland security missions. These factors--including legal parameters, mission funding, existing capabilities, and capacity--were issues cited by the DHS components and Air Force and CAP officials GAO contacted that could affect CAP's suitability for additional homeland security missions. For example, as an Air Force auxiliary, CAP is subject to laws and regulations governing the use of the military in support of law enforcement, which, among other things, allow CAP to conduct aerial surveillance in certain situations, but preclude its participation in the interdiction of vehicles, vessels, or aircraft. Similarly, while CAP's existing operational capabilities--aircraft and vehicles, personnel, and technology--position it well to support certain homeland security missions, they also limit its suitability for others. For example, FEMA officials cited the role of CAP imagery in providing useful situational awareness during the initial stages of some past natural disasters, while, in contrast, officials from CBP and the Coast Guard noted limitations such as inadequate imagery capabilities and insufficient detection technology. Although the components we contacted provided varying opinions regarding CAP's suitability for certain homeland security activities, DHS has not assessed CAP's capabilities and resources or determined the extent to which CAP could be used to support future homeland security activities. By assessing the ability of CAP to provide additional homeland security capabilities in a budget-constrained environment, DHS in coordination with the Air Force could position itself to better understand, and potentially utilize, another resource to accomplish its homeland security missions.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DHS, in coordination with the Air Force, cost-effectively assess the extent to which CAP can further assist DHS with future homeland security missions. DHS concurred with the recommendation. |
gao_GAO-04-220 | gao_GAO-04-220_0 | Army’s 2003 Proliferation Report Did Not Fully Identify Depot-Level Maintenance Performed outside Public Depots
Although the mandate directed the Army to identify the proliferation of depot-level maintenance performed outside the public depots, the Army’s report on depot-level maintenance proliferation did not fully identify the extent of depot-level maintenance work performed at nondepot facilities. Instead, the report estimated that depot-level maintenance work valued at $188.6 million for fiscal year 2001 was not included in the Army’s depot- level maintenance data and that further validation of this amount was needed. Although the report recognized that the Army has redundant capabilities and capacities, it did not provide any information on the extent of this redundancy or the extent of maintenance activities that could be consolidated. According to the report, two categories of work accounted for about 75 percent of the $188.6 million. These factors include (1) inconsistent application of the congressionally mandated definition of “depot maintenance” and related guidance, (2) weaknesses in the management information systems for collecting and reporting data, and (3) the failure to follow established policies and procedures for authorizing depot-level work at field-level facilities and outsourcing work. Our current analysis and our prior work identify these factors as underlying causes affecting the Army’s determination that it has complied with the 50-50 rule. Underreported Depot-Level Work Performed by Nondepot Maintenance Facilities Affects Accuracy of 50-50 Report
We have reported in the past that by not having complete information on the amount of depot-level maintenance work being performed in nondepot facilities, DOD cannot provide Congress with an accurate and complete report regarding the allocation of depot-level maintenance between the public and private sectors as required by 10 U.S.C. Limitations More Significant for Future Assessment of 50-50 Compliance
As the Army moves closer to the statutory ceiling for the funding for depot-level maintenance work performed in the private sector, the limitations in the Army’s ability to precisely capture its depot-level maintenance work will become more significant. However, our adjustments for known errors in reporting for that year increased the percentage of private-sector work to 49 percent from the 46.5 percent reported by the Army. Efforts have been undertaken to address some of the problem areas; however, no action plan to manage the implementation has been developed. Evaluating the success of the proposed 29 recommendations will be difficult until the Army develops an action plan with priorities, time frames, responsible organizations, evaluation criteria, and the resources required to implement these recommendations. While improvements should be accomplished, the complexity and vastness of the Army’s maintenance system and continuing questions about such issues as the definition of depot-level maintenance and changing maintenance strategies could continue to present challenges in fully recording all depot-level maintenance work. Recommendation
To ensure the timely and effective implementation of the recommendations in the Army’s 2003 proliferation report to help the Army improve its management of maintenance operations, including the proliferation of depot-level maintenance facilities, and more precisely capture and report depot-level maintenance data, we recommend that the Secretary of the Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to establish a specific plan to manage the implementation of the 29 recommendations identified in the 2003 proliferation report. To answer whether the corrective actions identified in the Army’s report are likely to address the proliferation issue and enhance the Army’s reporting, we examined the recommendations to determine how effectively they were linked to the identified problems. We also compared the recommendations with those that we had previously made to test for consistency. Appendix III: Army Report’s Issues and Recommendations
The Army’s Fiscal Year 2002 Study of the Proliferation of Depot Maintenance-Type Activities identified 7 issues and made 29 recommendations for the following improvements to enhance the Army’s ability to (1) evaluate the proliferation of nondepot facilities that perform depot-level maintenance and (2) identify and report on its 50-50 data. Depot Maintenance: Future Year Estimates of Public and Private Workloads Are Likely to Change. | Why GAO Did This Study
Each year, the U.S. Army spends about $3 billion on depot-level maintenance and repair work for weapons systems and other equipment. However, because its data gathering and reporting processes have been limited, the Army historically has been unable to fully identify how much depotlevel maintenance takes place outside its five public depots. As a result, it has not been able to determine with precision how well it was meeting statutory requirements to limit contracted depot-level maintenance work to 50 percent of the program budget. In the House report on the Fiscal Year 2001 Defense Authorization Act, Congress directed the Army to report on the proliferation of depot-level maintenance work at nondepot facilities and asked GAO to review that report. GAO examined the extent to which (1) the Army's report identifies the amount of depot-level maintenance work done outside public depots; (2) the Army can account for its depot-level maintenance workload, as required by statute; and (3) the corrective actions in the report are likely to address the proliferation issue and enhance the Army's reporting.
What GAO Found
The Army's proliferation report, issued in September 2003, did not fully identify the extent of depot-level maintenance work performed outside the Army's public depots. The report estimated that the Army underreported its fiscal year 2001 $2.7 billion depot-level maintenance program by $188.6 million but indicated that this was a rough estimate and that further analysis is needed. It attributed this underreporting largely to work performed in two categories--work that met the criteria for depot-level maintenance work but was not reported as such and work at nondepot field facilities that involved depot-level maintenance tasks. GAO's prior reviews also identified these categories as key contributors to underreporting. While the report noted that the Army has an extensive maintenance infrastructure with redundant capabilities, it did not address the extent of this redundancy. The lack of complete information on the extent of depot-level maintenance workloads limits the Army's ability to fully account for this work in the Department of Defense's (DOD) annual report to Congress on the allocation of public- and private-sector depot-level maintenance spending. The 2003 proliferation report identified key Army limitations, including inconsistencies in applying the congressionally mandated definition of "depot maintenance," weaknesses in its management information systems, and the failure to follow established policies and procedures for authorizing depot-level maintenance work at nondepot facilities. GAO's current analysis and prior work confirmed that these limitations make it difficult for the Army to fully account for its maintenance workload as it moves closer to the 50 percent ceiling for work performed by contractors. GAO's most recent report on the Army's 50-50 reporting for fiscal year 2002 showed that, after adjustments for known underreporting, the percentage of private-sector work increased to 49 percent. If implemented, the 29 recommendations in the 2003 report could enhance the Army's ability to report on its 50-50 data and to evaluate the proliferation of depot-level maintenance work at nondepot facilities. The recommendations, which are consistent with those that GAO has previously made, are focused on key problem areas, such as the need for an improved understanding about the 50-50 rule and for compliance with reporting policies and procedures. Efforts have been undertaken to address some of the problem areas. However, the Army has not yet developed an action plan that identifies priorities, time frames, roles and responsibilities, evaluation criteria, and resources for managing the implementation of the recommendations. Until the Army does this, it will be difficult to assess to what extent the Army is likely to meet its desired objectives. While improvements should be accomplished, the complexity and vastness of the Army's maintenance system and continuing questions about such issues as the definition of "depot maintenance" and changing maintenance strategies could continue to present challenges in fully recording all maintenance work that should be captured. |
gao_GAO-06-579 | gao_GAO-06-579_0 | States can use their CWSRF resources to construct or upgrade wastewater infrastructure, address nonpoint sources of pollution, or develop or implement management plans in federally-designated estuaries. States Have Loaned 96 Percent of Their CWSRF Funds for Wastewater Infrastructure, with 23 Percent Supporting Projects in Small Communities
Taken together, states have loaned the majority of their CWSRF dollars — 96 percent or about $50 billion since 1987—to build, upgrade, or enlarge conventional wastewater treatment facilities and conveyances. Direct CWSRF support for nonpoint source activities represents only 4 percent of CWSRF dollars (about $2 billion), although it accounts for over a quarter of all CWSRF projects financed. Nationwide, 23 percent of CWSRF funds (64 percent of all CWSRF loan agreements) were devoted to water quality projects in communities with populations of less than 10,000 people. From fiscal year 1987 through June 2005, the Clean Water State Revolving Fund program has provided over $52 billion dollars in financial assistance to local governments and others for a variety of water quality improvement projects across the nation. The remainder supports sewers and other conveyances. Nonpoint Source Projects Represent 4 Percent of CWSRFs but Account for Over 25 Percent of All CWSRF-Supported Projects
Direct CWSRF support for nonpoint source pollution control activities represents only 4 percent (about $2 billion) of CWSRFs allocated by the states but accounts for over 25 percent of all CWSRF-supported projects because nonpoint source projects are typically less expensive than wastewater infrastructure projects. To date, 37 states have reported using some portion of their CWSRF funds to directly support nonpoint source projects. This may occur, for example, when a state provides a loan to build a centralized collection system or wastewater treatment plant to replace failing individual septic systems, which EPA and the states define as a nonpoint source of water pollution. Most States Report Using Some of Their CWSRFs to Support Nonpoint Source Projects
As of June 2005, 37 states reported using some portion of their CWSRF funds to support nonpoint source projects, up from only 2 states in 1990. According to EPA and state officials, some CWSRF programs have rules to protect the ability of small communities to access CWSRF funds. Among the factors these officials cite in predicting changes in states’ allocation strategies are (1) aging wastewater infrastructure needing rehabilitation or replacement; (2) population growth and redistribution; (3) changes in EPA enforcement priorities, particularly with regard to limiting sewage discharges during wet weather conditions; (4) pressure to implement EPA’s TMDL program; and (5) stricter EPA and state water quality standards for temperature, nutrients, and sediments. Combined sewer systems collect and transport both sanitary sewage and storm water runoff in a single-pipe system to a wastewater treatment facility. EPA and the States Use Specific Financial and Environmental Measures to Evaluate Efficient and Effective Use of CWSRF Resources
EPA and the states use a uniform set of financial and environmental measures to help determine efficient and effective use of CWSRF resources. According to the EPA’s annual review guidance, the review is intended to, among other things (1) evaluate the success of the state’s performance in achieving goals and objectives identified in its Intended Use Plan (which identifies the intended uses of the amounts available to its CWSRF) and the state’s Annual Report (which describes how the state has met the goals and objectives of the previous fiscal year as identified by the Intended Use Plan), (2) determine how the CWSRF is achieving the intent of the Clean Water Act, (3) assess the financial status and performance of the fund, and (4) evaluate progress in identifying the environmental and public health benefits of the program. Some states are attempting to go beyond EPA’s requirements by gathering data on actual environmental benefits from their CWSRF-funded projects, including nonpoint source projects. What strategies do states use to allocate their CWSRF dollars among qualifying expenses? What measures do states use to ensure that their allocation strategies are resulting in the most efficient and effective use of their CWSRFs? To determine the extent to which states are currently using their CWSRFs to support conventional wastewater infrastructure versus other qualifying expenses, we summarized data from the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) National Information Management System (NIMS), the database EPA uses to track expenditures for all 51 CWSRF programs. | Why GAO Did This Study
Communities will need hundreds of billions of dollars in coming years to construct and upgrade wastewater treatment facilities, sewer systems, and other water infrastructure. To finance these efforts, they will rely heavily on low-interest loans from the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) Clean Water State Revolving Fund (CWSRF) program to supplement their own funds. Through fiscal year 2005, states have used their CWSRFs to provide communities over $52 billion for a variety of water quality projects. The Clean Water Act allows states to use their CWSRFs to (1) construct or improve conventional wastewater infrastructure, (2) control diffuse (nonpoint) sources of pollution such as agricultural runoff and leaking septic systems, and (3) protect federally-designated estuaries. Given the states' flexibility in determining how to spend CWSRF dollars, GAO was asked to examine (1) the extent to which states use their CWSRF dollars to support conventional wastewater treatment infrastructure versus other qualifying expenses, (2) the strategies states use to allocate their CWSRF dollars among qualifying expenses, and (3) the measures states use to ensure that their allocation strategies result in the most efficient and effective use of CWSRF dollars. EPA reviewed a report draft, providing technical comments that were incorporated.
What GAO Found
Since 1987, states have used 96 percent (about $50 billion) of their CWSRF dollars to build, upgrade, or enlarge conventional wastewater treatment facilities and conveyances. Projects to build or improve wastewater treatment plants alone account for over 60 percent of this amount, with the remainder supporting the construction or rehabilitation of sewer and storm water collection systems. CWSRF assistance for nonpoint source activities represents only 4 percent (about $2 billion) of CWSRF dollars, although it accounts for over a quarter of all CWSRF projects financed. To date, 37 states report using some portion of their CWSRF funds to directly support nonpoint source activities. Nationwide, 23 percent of CWSRF funds (64 percent of all CWSRF loan agreements) were devoted to water quality projects in communities with populations of less than 10,000 people. The 50 states (and Puerto Rico) have used a variety of strategies to allocate CWSRF funds to meet their individual needs. For example, the state of Washington sets aside 20 percent of its CWSRF dollars to support nonpoint source projects, while Alabama state law defines only traditional public wastewater treatment facilities as appropriate projects under its CWSRF program. Other states have designed their programs to target selected types of borrowers. Pennsylvania, for example, has targeted borrowers in small or rural communities during the allocation process. According to EPA and state officials, states' allocation strategies may change as certain states' priorities and clean water needs shift. Among the reasons are (1) aging wastewater infrastructure in need of rehabilitation or replacement; (2) population growth and redistribution; (3) changes in EPA enforcement priorities; and (4) stricter EPA and state water quality standards for temperature, nutrients, and sediments. EPA and the states use a uniform set of financial and environmental measures to help determine efficient and effective use of CWSRF resources. Financial measures include, among others, return on federal investment, the pace at which available funds are loaned, and the sustainability of the fund. EPA regional officials conduct annual reviews of each state program to help ensure the fiscal integrity of the state programs. All programs are also subject annually to independent financial audits. To measure environmental outcomes of CWSRF-funded projects, in fiscal year 2005, EPA developed an electronic benefits reporting system that all 51 programs have agreed to use. Currently, the system collects data only on anticipated environmental benefits associated with CWSRF-funded projects. However, to varying degrees, some states such as Oklahoma and Washington are attempting to gather data on actual environmental benefits from their CWSRF-funded projects, including nonpoint source projects. |
gao_GAO-05-47 | gao_GAO-05-47_0 | Funding is requested to support an estimated full-time equivalent (FTE) employment level. In fiscal year 2003, VBA spent about $878 million to administer its compensation and pension programs. VBA’s Budget Justification Did Not Clearly Explain the Basis for Its Fiscal Year 2005 Compensation and Pension Staffing Estimates
VBA officials stated that productivity improvements, workload changes, and attrition of experienced claims processing staff are considered throughout the annual budget process. VBA’s fiscal year 2005 budget justification identified a number of initiatives and projections that could affect its staffing levels. Despite identifying these factors in its 2005 budget justification, VBA does not specify how such initiatives and projections will affect the number of employees it needs to meet its claims processing performance goals. Finally, VBA’s fiscal year 2005 budget justification does not explicitly show the impact of budget decisions to shift funding away from initiatives that could improve productivity; such decisions were based on VBA’s emphasis on meeting the Secretary’s 100-day timeliness goal for deciding rating- related claims. VBA officials identified training and information technology initiatives that have been delayed because of these cuts in nonpayroll funds. Congressional oversight could be enhanced if VBA’s budget justifications were more transparent. VBA Projected Claims Workload Is Based on Historical Trends and Other Factors but VBA Did Not Project Claims Complexity
VBA estimated the number of rating-related claims it would receive in fiscal year 2005 based on historical trends and judgments about the likely impacts of various factors on receipts, but it did not project claims complexity, such as average disabilities per claim. For example, VBA expected an increase in the number of claims received based on the enactment of legislation allowing some military retirees to receive both military retirement pay and VA disability compensation. For fiscal years 2000 through 2004, VBA’s projections of rating-related claims receipts varied from an underprojection of about 11 percent to an overprojection of about 19 percent, as shown in table 1. However, its budget justification does not provide information on VBA’s claims processing productivity or how much VBA expects to improve productivity. Consequently, the effect of complexity on VBA’s workload and staffing requirements is unclear. A more transparent budget justification would better inform the Congress’ oversight of VBA, by making it easier to evaluate whether the agency’s administrative budget requests adequately reflect the resources, particularly staff, needed to achieve expected performance. Recommendation
To assist the Congress in its oversight of VBA’s compensation and pension claims processing operations, we recommend that the Secretary of Veterans Affairs direct the Under Secretary for Benefits to prepare the following information and work with the Committees on Veterans’ Affairs and the Appropriations Subcommittees on Veterans Affairs, Housing and Urban Development, and Independent Agencies on how best to make it available for their use: explanation of the expected impact of specific initiatives and changes in incoming claims workload on requested staffing levels; information on claims processing productivity, including how VBA plans to improve productivity; and explanation of how claims complexity is expected to change and the impact of these changes on productivity and requested staffing levels. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, Senate Committee on Veterans' Affairs, asked GAO to assist the committee in its oversight of the Veterans Benefits Administration's (VBA) disability compensation and pension programs. This report examines (1) VBA's determination and justification of claims processing staffing levels, and the role of productivity in such determinations, and (2) VBA's projections of future claims workload and complexity.
What GAO Found
VBA's fiscal year 2005 budget justification did not clearly explain how the agency would achieve the productivity improvements needed to meet its compensation and pension claims processing performance goals with fewer employees. According to VBA officials, productivity improvements, workload changes, and employee attrition were considered in developing its fiscal year 2005 budget request. While some of these factors were identified in VBA's budget justification, they were not linked to the requested full-time equivalent (FTE) employment levels. Also, VBA's justification did not specifically address its claims processing productivity or how much VBA planned to improve productivity. Finally, VBA does not explain the impacts of VBA budgetary decisions on long-term productivity. VBA officials identified information technology improvements and training programs that could help improve productivity but have been delayed because VBA shifted funding from these initiatives to support higher staffing levels. This was done to help meet VBA's shorter-term goal to improve claims decision timeliness, in particular the Secretary of Veterans Affairs' goal to reduce decision time for rating-related claims to an average of 100 days. More transparent budget justifications would better inform congressional oversight of VBA by making it easier to evaluate whether the agency's budget requests reflect the resources, particularly staffing, needed to achieve expected performance. V BA estimated the number of claims it expects to receive (receipts) in fiscal year 2005 based on historical workload trends, with adjustments for factors that could affect future receipts, notably the impact of legislation allowing some military retirees to concurrently receive Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) disability compensation and military retirement pay. The accuracy of VBA's projections of rating-related receipts for fiscal years 2000 through 2004 was mixed, varying from underprojecting by about 11 percent to overprojecting by about 19 percent. Actual receipts in fiscal year 2004 exceeded VBA's projections. Meanwhile, VBA did not project claims complexity in its fiscal year 2005 budget justification and did not explain how it expected claims complexity to affect its productivity and requested staffing levels. A claim's complexity can be affected by many factors, such as the number and types of disabilities claimed. VBA's budget justification could be improved if the agency explained how changes in complexity affect workload and staffing requirements. |
gao_GAO-12-89 | gao_GAO-12-89_0 | 1). According to State, it reviews all arms sales and exports through FMS and DCS for human rights concerns, among other things. Implementation Gaps Limit the Effectiveness of U.S. Efforts to Safeguard Military Equipment in the Persian Gulf Countries
DOD Monitors Military Equipment Based on Lists of Sensitive Items, while State Monitors it Case-by- Case Based on Sensitivity and Other Risk Factors
DOD Conducts Two Levels of End-Use Monitoring and Periodic Compliance Visits
Under its Golden Sentry program, DOD conducts two levels of monitoring—enhanced end-use monitoring and routine end-use monitoring—based on a list of specific sensitive defense articles. To facilitate these inventories, DOD tracks man-portable NVDs by serial number in the SCIP. However, the required frequency for these inventories was not documented in formal DOD guidance. Less Advanced NVDs Purchased through FMS Have Received More Rigorous End-Use Monitoring than Advanced NVDs Purchased through DCS
As a result of DOD’s and State’s different approaches to end-use monitoring, some less advanced, second-generation NVDs purchased by the Gulf countries through FMS have received more rigorous end-use monitoring than more advanced third-generation NVDs purchased through DCS. Meanwhile, State has approved at least 13 licenses for the sale of more than 11,000 advanced, third- generation NVDs to Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Defense and Aviation through DCS since 2005. State Conducts Human Rights Vetting for Recipients of U.S.- Funded Training in Gulf Countries, but Does Not Conduct Comparable Vetting for Recipients of Equipment
State Conducts Human Rights Vetting for Individuals and Units Nominated for U.S.- Funded Training in the Gulf Countries
Data from State’s new vetting database indicate that State has conducted human rights vetting for about 770 individuals and 12 units in the Gulf countries that were nominated for U.S.-funded training. State Does Not Conduct Individual- and Unit-Level Human Rights Vetting for Recipients of U.S.-Funded Equipment in the Persian Gulf
In contrast to its vetting process for recipients of training, State does not conduct individual- or unit-level human rights vetting for recipients of U.S.- funded equipment in Gulf countries. State has conducted human rights vetting for hundreds of individuals and units that received U.S.- funded training in the Gulf countries, but has not conducted comparable vetting for the anticipated recipients of more than $188 million in U.S.- funded equipment for Bahrain and Oman. State does not currently have procedures in place to conduct vetting later in the acquisition process when the exact recipient unit or individual is known. Gaps in implementing State’s Blue Lantern monitoring program have resulted in State not physically verifying receipt of some items or confirming some end-users’ compliance with license conditions—even though State has identified the need for a postshipment check—thus reducing confidence in the security of arms exported to these entities. Also, the absence of DOD documentation of its efforts both to verify host country security and accountability procedures for sensitive military equipment and to monitor less sensitive items limits assurance that equipment sold through FMS is being used as intended. DOD and State both agreed with our recommendation to take steps to harmonize their approaches to end-use monitoring for NVDs. DOD agreed with our recommendation to develop guidance requiring its personnel to document efforts to verify host country security and accountability procedures for sensitive equipment and activities to monitor less sensitive equipment. Therefore, we continue to believe that our recommendation on the need for policies and procedures on using site visits remains valid. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To assess the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of State (State) safeguard U.S. military technologies sold or exported to Persian Gulf countries through their end-use monitoring programs, we reviewed relevant laws and regulations, interviewed U.S. and host country officials, and analyzed end-use monitoring and licensing data. To assess the extent to which DOD and State provide similar or differing levels of protection for the same military technologies sold or exported to the Gulf countries, we interviewed DOD and State officials in Washington, D.C., and the Gulf countries, as well as host country officials in Saudi Arabia and the UAE. 2. 3. We cited this Blue Lantern check as an example of an instance in which delays in requesting and conducting a check prevented State from conducting a serial number inventory of a shipment of NVDs or verifying that these items were being stored in secure facilities. 10. | Why GAO Did This Study
The United States has authorized billions of dollars in arms sales and exports to six Persian Gulf countries--Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). However, regional tensions and civil conflicts have raised concerns about the security and use of arms sold or exported to these countries. The Departments of Defense (DOD) and State (State) established end-use monitoring programs to ensure that these arms are used as intended. This report assesses the extent to which DOD and State (1) safeguard U.S. military technologies sold or exported to the Gulf countries, (2) provide similar or differing levels of protection for the same military technologies, and (3) vet recipients of U.S.-funded military training and equipment for potential human rights violations. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed laws and regulations, analyzed data and documentation, and interviewed officials in Washington, D.C., and the Gulf countries.
What GAO Found
Gaps in implementation limit the effectiveness of U.S. efforts to safeguard military equipment sold or exported to the Persian Gulf. Under the Golden Sentry program, DOD did not document its efforts to verify host country security and accountability procedures for sensitive military equipment, and DOD personnel in five of six Gulf countries did not document their activities to monitor less sensitive items. Under its Blue Lantern program, State officials conducted postshipment checks without visiting end-users of U.S. military equipment in 10 of 13 cases GAO reviewed, and delays in requesting and conducting checks have prevented State from verifying receipt of some items. In addition, State closed post-shipment checks without receiving confirmation of receipt in 2 of 13 cases GAO reviewed. DOD and State both treat night vision devices (NVD) as a sensitive technology, but their end-use monitoring for these items varies markedly, leaving them prone to diversion. Man-portable NVDs sold through Foreign Military Sales (FMS) must be tracked by serial number, inventoried following delivery, and inventoried periodically thereafter. In contrast, State does not track NVDs by serial number or conduct regular inventories for NVDs exported through direct commercial sales (DCS). As a result, less advanced NVDs purchased through FMS have received more rigorous monitoring than more advanced NVDs purchased through DCS. In Saudi Arabia, DOD officials inventoried thousands of second-generation NVDs that were purchased through FMS in the early 1990s. Meanwhile, State approved licenses for the sale of thousands of advanced, third-generation NVDs to Saudi Arabia since 2005, which are subject to less rigorous end-use monitoring. State has conducted human rights vetting for hundreds of individuals and units that were nominated for U.S.-funded training in the Gulf countries, but has not conducted comparable vetting for anticipated recipients of about $188 million in U.S.-funded equipment for Bahrain and Oman. Such vetting is especially critical given Bahrain's use of its security forces to quell public demonstrations since Spring 2011. In November 2010, State established a new system for human rights vetting in the Gulf countries and has since vetted almost 800 individuals and units nominated for U.S.-funded training. However, recipients of equipment are not screened through this system. According to State, it does not vet recipients of equipment at the individual or unit level because the recipients are not generally known at the time that the assistance is approved, and State does not have procedures in place to conduct vetting later in the acquisition process. DOD and State should harmonize their end-use monitoring for NVDs and strengthen procedures to verify compliance with security and accountability requirements, among other things. Also, State should implement individual- and unit-level human rights vetting for recipients of equipment. DOD agreed with all of the recommendations. State agreed with two of the recommendations, but disagreed that it should develop guidance on the use and timing of site visits and closure of Blue Lantern cases. GAO believes the recommendations remain valid on the need for policies, procedures, and guidance. |
gao_GAO-07-1072 | gao_GAO-07-1072_0 | In December 2006, the Institute for Defense Analyses also endorsed the need for a CMO position at DOD. DOD Has Made Progress in Establishing a Management Framework upon Which to Develop Overall Business Transformation, but the Framework Focuses on Business Systems Modernization
Although DOD has made progress in establishing a management framework upon which to develop overall business transformation efforts, this framework currently focuses on business systems modernization rather than broader business transformation efforts. The Business Transformation Agency reports to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics in his capacity as the vice chair of the Defense Business Systems Management Committee. Until the department institutionalizes a management framework that encompasses all aspects of business transformation, including establishing overall responsibility for and defining what is included in business transformation, DOD will be unable to integrate related initiatives into a sustainable, enterprisewide approach and to resolve weaknesses in business operations that we have shown are at high risk of waste, fraud, and abuse. First, DOD does not have a comprehensive, integrated, and enterprisewide plan or set of linked plans supported by a planning process that sets a strategic direction for overall business transformation efforts and monitors progress. DOD Has Not Developed a Comprehensive, Integrated, and Enterprisewide Plan or Set of Plans Supported by a Planning Process for Business Transformation Efforts
DOD continues to be challenged in its business transformation efforts because it has not developed a comprehensive, integrated, and enterprisewide action plan or set of linked plans for business transformation that is supported by a comprehensive planning process. DOD Has Not Established a Full-time Leadership Position at the Right Level Dedicated Solely to Business Transformation Efforts
DOD continues to lack sustained leadership focused solely on business transformation. A broad-based consensus exists among GAO and others that the status quo is unacceptable and that DOD needs a CMO to provide leadership over business transformation efforts, although there are different views concerning the characteristics of a CMO, such as whether the position should be codified in statute, established as a separate position from the Deputy Secretary of Defense, designated as Executive Level II or Level III, subject to a term appointment, or supported by a deputy CMO. However, this position does not adequately address the key leadership challenge that we discuss in this report—that is, the lack of a senior leader, at the right level, with appropriate authority, to focus full time on overall business transformation. DOD would rather leave the assignment of the CMO role to the discretion of the Secretary of Defense, and DOD plans to formalize the Deputy Secretary’s CMO and business transformation duties in a DOD directive. As noted in our report, during the course of our review, we found that DOD has not clearly defined or institutionalized interrelationships, roles and responsibilities, or accountability for establishing a management framework for overall business transformation, and that differences of opinion exist within the department regarding which of the various senior leadership committees will function as the primary body responsible for overall business transformation. Documents that we used for our review included, but were not limited to, (1) GAO reports related to DOD’s high- risk areas, including business systems modernization, development of the business enterprise architecture, and organizational transformation; (2) DOD products, including the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review and updates to DOD’s enterprise transition plan; (3) DOD’s annual reports on business transformation to Congress (and biannual updates); (4) DOD testimony to Congress on the status of business transformation; and (5) meeting minutes and briefing documents, such as those from the Defense Business Systems Management Committee, the Deputy’s Advisory Working Group, and the Defense Business Board, related to DOD’s business transformation, governance, and management reforms. To assess the challenges DOD faces in maintaining and ensuring success in its overall business transformation efforts, we compared DOD’s efforts to key practices we found to be consistently at the center of successful organizational mergers and transformations, specifically, establishing a coherent mission and integrated strategic goals to guide the transformation and ensuring that top leadership drives the transformation. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2005, GAO added the Department of Defense's (DOD) approach to business transformation to its high-risk list because (1) DOD's improvement efforts were fragmented, (2) DOD lacked an integrated and enterprisewide business transformation plan, and (3) DOD had not designated a senior official at the right level with the right authority to be responsible for overall business transformation efforts. This report assesses (1) the progress DOD has made in setting up a management framework for overall business transformation efforts and (2) the challenges DOD faces in maintaining and ensuring the success of those efforts. GAO conducted this work under the Comptroller General's authority to conduct evaluations under his own initiative. In conducting its work, GAO compared DOD's actions to key practices of successful transformations.
What GAO Found
Although DOD has made progress toward establishing a management framework for overall business transformation, the framework currently focuses on business systems modernization and does not fully address broader business transformation efforts. In 2005, DOD set up the Defense Business Systems Management Committee to review and approve the business enterprise architecture--a transformation blueprint--and new business systems modernization investments. It also established the Business Transformation Agency, which currently reports to the Vice Chair of the Defense Business Systems Management Committee, to coordinate and lead business transformation across the department. Despite these steps, DOD has not clearly defined or institutionalized interrelationships, roles and responsibilities, or accountability for establishing a management framework for overall business transformation. For example, differences of opinion exist within DOD about the roles of various senior leadership committees. Until DOD's business transformation management framework is institutionalized and encompasses broad responsibilities for all aspects of business transformation, it will be challenging for DOD to integrate related initiatives into a sustainable, enterprisewide approach to successfully resolve weaknesses in business operations that GAO has shown are at high risk of waste, fraud, and abuse. DOD also must overcome two critical challenges, among several others, if it is to maintain and ensure success. Specifically, DOD does not have (1) a comprehensive, integrated, and enterprisewide plan or set of linked plans, supported by a planning process that sets a strategic direction for overall business transformation efforts, prioritizes initiatives and resources, and monitors progress, and (2) a full-time leadership position at the right level dedicated solely to the planning, integration, and execution of overall business transformation efforts. A broad-based consensus exists among GAO and others, including the Institute for Defense Analyses and the Defense Business Board, that the status quo is unacceptable and that DOD needs a CMO to provide leadership over business transformation efforts. In a May 2007 letter to Congress, however, DOD stated its view that a separate position is not needed as the Deputy Secretary of Defense can fulfill the chief management officer (CMO) role. Although the Deputy Secretary may be at the right level with appropriate authority to transform business operations, the demands placed on this position make it difficult for the Deputy Secretary to focus solely on business transformation--nor does the position have the necessary term of appointment to sustain progress across administrations. Further, DOD plans to leave the assignment of the CMO role to the discretion of the Secretary of Defense. In GAO's view, codifying the CMO position in statute as a separate, full-time position at the right level with an extended term is necessary to provide sustained leadership, further DOD's progress, and address challenges the department continues to face in its business transformation efforts. |
gao_GAO-03-191 | gao_GAO-03-191_0 | Unemployed individuals, however, generally bore the full cost of the premium. States’ Protections Generally Allow Unemployed Individuals to Purchase Insurance at Full Cost
The six states we reviewed had in place a variety of protections, which were established prior to the economic downturn. Key protections to assist unemployed individuals in maintaining health insurance coverage included: State-mandated continuation coverage, through which states require small businesses to extend their group health coverage to former employees and their families if the former employees pay for it; Guaranteed conversion, through which states require insurers to give eligible individuals the ability to convert their group coverage to an individual health insurance policy; Guaranteed issue, through which states require insurers to offer coverage to individuals who do not have access to group coverage or public insurance; and High-risk pools, in which states create associations that offer comprehensive health insurance benefits to individuals with acute or chronic health conditions. | What GAO Found
The six states reviewed had in place a variety of protections, established prior to the economic downturn, to assist unemployed individuals in maintaining health insurance coverage: State-mandated continuation coverage, which required small businesses to extend their group health coverage to former employees and their families who choose to pay for it. Guaranteed conversion, which required insurers to allow eligible individuals to convert their group coverage to individual health insurance policies. Guaranteed issue, which required insurers to offer coverage to those who did not have access to group coverage or public insurance. High-risk pools, state-created associations that offered comprehensive health insurance benefits to individuals with acute or chronic health conditions. However, individuals usually bore the full cost of the premiums, which was usually higher than their premium cost under employer-sponsored plans. For individuals who relied on unemployment benefits as their principal income, premiums absorbed a significant share of the benefit. |
gao_GAO-07-1058 | gao_GAO-07-1058_0 | In figure 1, for example, the “06” in the first positions indicate this is a research and development effort. Program Element Codes and Budget Exhibits Do Not Consistently Provide Key Information
The program element code structure and budget exhibits do not consistently provide accurate, clear, and complete information regarding RDT&E budget requests. One-Third of the Requested RDT&E Funding Is Not Identified as RDT&E Programs
Programs that were requested in budget activity 7—RDT&E efforts for fielded systems and programs approved for production—presented the greatest visibility problem. This budget activity was used to request $23.5 billion in fiscal year 2007, or about a third of DOD’s entire RDT&E funding request. DOD Guidance and Practices Contribute to Reduced Visibility
We found the RDT&E program element code and the budget exhibits are not always accurate, clear, consistent, and complete for two major reasons. First, DOD’s own regulation for constructing program element codes does not require a large part of the RDT&E effort to be reflected in program element codes. Second, the regulation governing the structuring of the coding and the content of the exhibits is vague. For example, it does not require the coding to be updated from one year to the next to ensure the correct stage of development has been accurately identified. The regulation also does not provide sufficiently detailed guidance to ensure consistency in the format and content of the budget exhibits. Several DOD officials said that one of the reasons that the budget exhibits are insufficient as decision-making tools is the lack of clear and consistent guidance for the budget exhibits in the FMR. To provide Congress with greater understanding of the nature of developmental activities proposed, as well as to improve the consistency and completeness of the justification material provided for the RDT&E funds requested, the Secretary of Defense should ensure that the DOD Comptroller: Revises the Financial Management Regulation to, (1) in the case of programs approved for production or fielded, ensure that the code or the budget exhibit indicates which stage of development—from basic research through system development and demonstration—the effort is undertaking, and (2) ensure that the program element codes reflect the stage of development—that is from basic research through system development and demonstration—of the requested research and development effort. Appendix I: Scope & Methodology
To assess whether DOD’s RDT&E program element code structure provides Congress consistent, complete and clear information, we reviewed relevant guidance while analyzing all 696 program elements contained in the fiscal year 2007 RDT&E budget request. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) asked Congress for $73.2 billion in fiscal year 2007 for research, development, testing, and evaluation (RDT&E). DOD organized this request using program element (PE) codes, which are designed to convey key information about the budget request. DOD also provides documents called budget exhibits detailing the activities for which funds are being requested. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 mandated that GAO examine the program elements and budget exhibits. GAO assessed (1) whether the RDT&E program element code structure and the associated budget exhibits provide accurate, consistent, complete, and clear information, and (2) what factors contribute to any problems found. In conducting this review GAO analyzed all of the fiscal year 2007 program element codes and 47 budget exhibits. GAO also interviewed key DOD officials.
What GAO Found
Neither the RDT&E program element code structure nor the budget exhibits consistently provide accurate, clear, and complete information on the nature of DOD's proposed research and development efforts. First, one-third of the requested RDT&E funding is for efforts that are not identified as research and development in their program element codes. In addition, a majority of the remaining funding request misidentifies the budget activity (which is a classification of the stage of development and ranges from BA 1 for basic research to BA 6 for management support) as it is stated in program element codes. Second, some of the budget exhibits justifying the programs' funding requests do not provide consistent, complete, and clear information with suitable levels of detail needed to understand DOD's research and development efforts. GAO found that DOD budget exhibits were difficult to understand, frequently lacked information about the accomplishments and planned efforts of each project, lacked appropriate cross-references between efforts, and were frequently missing key schedule data. The RDT&E program element codes are not always accurate nor are the budget exhibits always accurate, clear, consistent and complete for two major reasons. First, DOD's regulation does not require identification of any RDT&E effort as such in its program element code if it is taking place on a weapon system that is approved for production or already fielded. This affects over a third of all RDT&E funds. Second, the regulation governing the structuring of the coding and the content of the exhibits is vague. For example, the regulation does not require the coding to be updated from one year to the next to ensure the correct stage of development has been accurately identified. The regulation also does not provide sufficiently detailed guidance to ensure consistency in the format and content of the budget exhibits. This results in budget exhibits being insufficient as decision-making tools, according to DOD officials. |
gao_GAO-03-735T | gao_GAO-03-735T_0 | Research Suggests Significant Benefits, but Some Challenges, to Implementing Congestion Pricing
In theory, using congestion pricing has the potential to enhance economic efficiency, as well as provide other benefits, such as providing market signals that can guide capital investment decisions, and generating revenue to help fund such investment directly from users of the system. In theory, these surcharges could help reduce congestion and the demand for road space at peak periods by providing incentives for travelers to share rides, use transit, and travel at less congested (generally off-peak) times or on less congested routes. Fast and Intertwined Regular (FAIR) lanes is a recent proposal that is another variation of value pricing. Challenges to Implementing Congestion Pricing Include Legal Restrictions and Concerns about Fairness and Equity
One challenge in implementing congestion pricing for transportation systems is that, at present, greater use of pricing is limited by statutory restrictions. Another challenge involves effectively addressing concerns raised about equity and fairness. Because of this issue, political opposition to using this approach to address mobility challenges has been substantial. More generally, there is often opposition to paying a charge to use something that was formerly provided “free.”
Existing Projects Show That Benefits Can Result, and Some Evidence Suggests That Implementation Challenges Can Be Mitigated
A number of existing congestion-pricing transportation projects, both here and abroad, show that pricing can influence travelers’ behavior to the point of reducing congestion and thus increasing economic efficiency. In addition, congestion-pricing mechanisms, in general, have demonstrated that they can generate revenue sufficient to fund their operation and, in some cases, fund investment in transportation alternatives. In addition, some projects were able to shift demand on congested infrastructure to less congested time periods. However, existing projects also contain a few examples of situations in which the revenues generated from congestion pricing have been used to benefit other transportation alternatives. That is, drivers at peak periods may not have readily available alternatives to commute at different times, use a different mode of transportation, or take another route, and therefore have little choice but to use the bridge during the peak period, or the price of the congestion toll was set too low to influence the demand of those users. However, there is also some evidence that pricing can increase congestion on alternative routes. Other pilot projects in Houston and San Diego have also demonstrated public satisfaction. FAIR lanes, as previously discussed, and which have been proposed in New York, would credit users of the adjoining lanes, using revenues generated by the toll lanes, allowing those users to use the toll lanes on another day for a reduced or no charge. Some proposed projects, such as FAIR lanes, which use revenues generated to compensate other users of the transportation system, could help alleviate some of the fairness and equity concerns that have been raised. Experts suggest and some projects demonstrate that public opposition to congestion pricing will lessen as these projects show that equity and fairness concerns can be mitigated. However, if congestion pricing is to be more widely applied to transportation systems, the Congress will need to ease statutory restrictions on the use of congestion-pricing applications on transportation systems. | Why GAO Did This Study
The nation's transportation systems have become increasingly congested, and pressure on them is expected to grow substantially in the future. Most transportation experts think a multifaceted approach is needed to address congestion and improve mobility. One potential tool is congestion pricing, that is, charging users a toll, fee, or surcharge for using transportation infrastructure during certain peak periods of travel. Pilot projects to test this approach are currently under way in the United States and the technique has been used more extensively abroad. Interest in the usefulness of congestion pricing has been growing, as evidenced by several recent proposals. However, there have also been concerns raised about the fairness of such practices to some users of transportation systems. GAO was asked to identify (1) the potential benefits that can be expected from pricing congested transportation systems, approaches to using congestion pricing in transportation systems, and the implementation challenges that such pricing policies pose, and (2) examples of projects in which pricing of congested transportation systems has been applied to date, and what these examples reveal about potential benefits or challenges to implementation. This statement is based on prior GAO reports and other publicly available reports.
What GAO Found
Congestion pricing can potentially reduce congestion by providing incentives for drivers to shift trips to off-peak periods, use less congested routes, or use alternative modes, thereby spreading out demand for available transportation infrastructure. Congestion pricing also has the potential to create other benefits, such as generating revenue to help fund transportation investment. Possible challenges to implementing congestion pricing include current statutory restrictions limiting the use of congestion pricing, and concerns about equity and fairness across income groups. In theory, equity and fairness concerns could be mitigated depending on how the revenues that are generated are used. Evidence from projects both here and abroad shows this approach can reduce congestion. Such projects have also shown they can generate sufficient revenue to fund operations--and sometimes fund other transportation investment as well. However, projects were not necessarily able to demonstrate benefits for the full range of transportation users. For example, those who were able to use the special freeway lane saw a decrease in travel time. But, in some cases, there was little systemwide reduction in travel times, and congestion increased on alternative routes. Nonetheless, there is some evidence that equity and fairness concerns can be mitigated. Some projects have shown substantial usage by low-income groups, and other projects have used revenues generated to subsidize low-cost transportation options. In addition, some recent proposals for refining congestion-pricing techniques have incorporated further strategies for overcoming equity concerns. For example, the Fast and Intertwined Regular (FAIR) lanes proposal in New York suggests crediting users of the non-tolled lanes to partially pay for them to use public transportation, or to use the express lanes on other days. |
gao_GAO-16-787 | gao_GAO-16-787_0 | The Field Collection program is organized to make direct contact with individuals and business officials to enforce tax filing and payment requirements. Group managers select and assign collection cases to revenue officers for resolution. Cases are removed from Field Collection’s inventory of cases for potential selection when they are assigned to a revenue officer for resolution, are shelved; or expire under statute of limitations laws. Specifically, the lack of clearly defined objectives directly impacts IRS’s ability to effectively measure Field Collection performance, assess risks to the achievement of objectives, and assess the continued effectiveness of automated processes. Finally, we identified the lack of adequate procedures to guide group managers’ use of judgment in selecting cases. Specifically, when we asked focus group participants what fairness means to them and how they apply fairness in case selection, managers’ responses included: avoiding conflicts of interest, such as cases where the group manager or revenue officer has a prior relationship with an individual or business; selecting cases with consideration of geography, such as to ensure there are no areas where taxpayers are in a “tax free zone;” and diversifying selections by type of business, selecting cases so that the Field Collection program provides broad coverage, cases selected are representative, and no one group of taxpayers is selected more than others. However, without clearly defined and clearly understood objectives aligned to the Field Collection mission, program management lacks reasonable assurance that case selection processes support achievement of IRS’s mission, including applying tax law with integrity and fairness to all. Automated Processes
The Field Collection program’s automated prioritization and decision support systems are control procedures that are intended to help guide staff to reduce risks in making decisions. Develop, document, and communicate control procedures guidance for group managers to exercise professional judgment in the Field Collection program case selection process to achieve fairness and other program and collection case selection objectives. By evaluating the Field Collection program’s internal control framework for selection, we were able to determine whether IRS has processes in place that provide reasonable assurance of fair case selection. IRS outlines planned actions to address each of our recommendations. However, it is not clear that these actions will be fully responsive to the first recommendation that IRS develop, document, and communicate Field Collection program and case selection objectives, including the role of fairness, in clear and measurable terms. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) describe the Field Collection program’s processes (automated and manual) for prioritizing and selecting cases and (2) assess how well Field Collection case selection processes support the collection program’s mission, including applying tax laws “with integrity and fairness to all.”
To describe the case selection processes, we reviewed program documents and interviewed knowledgeable IRS officials, including officials in the Small Business and Self-Employed Division Collection and Field Collection offices. Our document review included guidance in the Internal Revenue Manual (IRM) and automated system manuals. To evaluate how well the case selection processes support program goals, we compared the selection process and procedures to selected standards in Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, to include the standard that managers define program objectives, assess risks to the objectives, and design controls to support the achievement of the objectives and address the risks. | Why GAO Did This Study
IRS's Field Collection program is where IRS revenue officers make in-person contact with noncompliant individuals and business officials to enforce tax return filing and payment requirements. Sound processes for selecting cases are critical to maintain taxpayer confidence in the tax system and use federal resources efficiently. GAO was asked to review the processes IRS uses to select collection cases for potential enforcement action.
This report (1) describes the Field Collection program's automated and manual processes for prioritizing and selecting cases and (2) assesses how well Field Collection case selection processes support the collection program's mission, including applying tax laws “with integrity and fairness to all.” To address these objectives, GAO reviewed IRS documents and conducted interviews with IRS officials knowledgeable about the case selection processes, including a series of focus groups with IRS Field Collection managers. GAO evaluated how well the processes adhere to relevant federal standards for internal control.
What GAO Found
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) uses automated processes to prioritize cases to be potentially selected for in-person contact to resolve a tax collection issue (see figure), but group managers in the Field Collection program manually select the cases to assign to revenue officers. For example, when reviewing cases, group managers consider characteristics of the revenue officer available—such as current workload—and case characteristics—such as potential collectability—when deciding whether to assign a case.
GAO found weaknesses in the Field Collection program's internal controls for case selection, including:
Program objectives are not clearly defined and communicated. IRS has not sufficiently developed and communicated specific and measurable program objectives, including fairness. GAO heard different interpretations of program objectives and the role of fairness from focus group participants. Without clearly defined and clearly understood objectives aligned to its mission, Field Collection management does not have reasonable assurance that case selection processes support achievement of that mission. Further, the lack of clearly articulated objectives undercuts the effectiveness of Field Collection management's efforts to measure performance and assess risks.
Documentation and assessment of case selection risks are inadequate. The Field Collection program's automated prioritization and decision support systems are control procedures that may guide staff to reduce risks. However, the Field Collection program does not have documented procedures for periodically reviewing automated aspects of case selection. Further, the Field Collection program lacks sufficient guidance for group managers to exercise judgment in case selection. These deficiencies limit the Field Collection management's ability to provide reasonable assurance that selection decisions effectively support achievement of IRS's mission.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making five recommendations, including that IRS: develop and document objectives in clear and measurable terms, including fairness; provide guidance for group managers' use of judgment in selecting cases; and develop procedures to assess automated and manual processes. IRS agreed with the recommendations and outlined planned steps to address them. |
gao_GAO-13-222 | gao_GAO-13-222_0 | Agencies’ Physical Security Programs Are Largely Informed by Institutional Knowledge and ISC Standards
Agencies draw upon a variety of information sources in developing and continually refining aspects of their physical security programs, such as how and when to conduct risk assessments, what skills security staff should have, and how to determine which countermeasures to implement at their facilities. Although the majority of agencies we surveyed use ISC standards, the extent of their reliance varies—with some agencies using the standards extensively to inform their physical security programs and some using them in a more limited way. For example, officials from the case- study agencies that we interviewed said that certain conditions at their agencies contribute to their limited use of the standards. Furthermore, according to ISC officials, the Criteria do not prescribe specific countermeasures and, as a result, can be used by all agencies regardless of the type of facilities in their portfolio. Clarifying how agencies can use the standards regardless of the types of facilities in their portfolio and in concert with their existing physical security programs may result in the greater use of the standards. Agencies Use a Range of Management Practices to Oversee Physical Security Activities, but Make Limited Use of These Practices to Help Allocate Resources
Agencies Use Several Management Practices to Oversee Physical Security and Ensure Program Effectiveness
Based on responses to our survey and our interviews with agency officials, we found that agencies use a range of management practices that can contribute to effective oversight of physical security programs, including: having a manager responsible for physical security, having agency-wide physical-security policies, using risk management practices that compare physical security measuring the performance of physical security programs. A majority of the agencies (24) we surveyed reported that they have documented agency-wide guidelines for monitoring and overseeing security programs at individual facilities, as shown in figure 4. Agencies Make Limited Use of Management Practices for Allocating Resources
Among the physical security activities we asked about, agencies we surveyed identified allocating physical security resources across an agency’s portfolio as the greatest challenge. For example, as shown in figure 3, of the 30 agencies responding to the survey question on whether they have a manager responsible for physical security aspects we asked about, only 13 reported that they have a manager for allocating resources based on risk assessments. In contrast, a majority of agencies reported having managers for other aspects of physical security, including those related to oversight. The use of management practices for the purposes of resource allocation is particularly relevant given the challenges cited in this area. As the government’s central forum for exchanging information and disseminating guidance on physical security at federal facilities, ISC is well positioned to develop and disseminate guidance on management practices that can help agencies make funding decisions across a portfolio of facilities. ISC’s key physical security standards can help agencies make resource allocation decisions at individual facilities, but the standards do not currently address management practices for allocating resources across an agency’s entire portfolio of facilities. ISC has an opportunity to clarify to agencies how the standards are intended to be used when it disseminates new or updated standards, provides training to agencies on the standards, or engages in other outreach regarding the standards. Furthermore, ISC can use its quarterly meetings with its member agencies as a forum to share best practices on how the standards are to be used. Recommendations
We recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct ISC to take the following two actions:
To help achieve the purpose of Executive Order 12977 to enhance the quality and effectiveness of security of federal facilities, conduct outreach to all executive branch agencies to clarify how the standards can be used in concert with agencies’ existing physical security programs. To help agencies make the most effective use of resources available for physical security across their portfolios of facilities, develop and disseminate guidance on management practices for resource allocation as a supplement to ISC’s existing physical security standards. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to examine (1) the sources that inform how federal agencies conduct their physical security programs and (2) the management practices that agencies use to oversee physical security activities and allocate physical security resources. The remaining 32 agencies are included in our review, and in this report we identify these agencies as the agencies we surveyed. In addition to the survey, we also conducted case studies with five agencies for more in-depth analysis. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO has designated federal real property management as a high-risk area due, in part, to the continued challenge of facility protection. Executive branch agencies are responsible for protecting about 370,000 non-military buildings and structures; the Federal Protective Service (FPS) protects over 9,000 of these. ISC--an interagency organization led by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)--issues physical security standards for agencies' use in designing and updating physical security programs. GAO was asked to review physical security programs at executive branch agencies with facilities that FPS does not protect. This report examines (1) the sources that inform agencies' physical security programs and (2) the management practices agencies use to oversee physical security and allocate resources. GAO reviewed and analyzed survey responses from 32 agencies. GAO also interviewed officials and reviewed documents from 5 of these agencies, which were selected as case studies for more indepth analysis. The survey and results can be found at GAO-13-223SP .
What GAO Found
Agencies draw upon a variety of information sources in developing and updating their physical security programs. The most widely used source, according to survey responses from 32 agencies, is the institutional knowledge or subject matter expertise in physical security that agencies' security staff have developed through their professional experience. The second most used source are standards issued by the Interagency Security Committee (ISC). The standards, which are developed based on leading security practices across the government, set forth a decision-making process to help ensure that agencies have effective physical security programs in place. However, according to survey responses, the extent of agencies' use of ISC standards varied--with some agencies using them in a limited way. Agency officials from the case-study agencies said that certain conditions at their agencies--such as the types of facilities in the agencies' portfolios and their existing physical security requirements--contribute to limited use of the standards. ISC officials said that the standards are designed to be used by all agencies regardless of the types of facilities or their existing security programs; the standards can be customized to the needs of individual facilities and do not require the use of specific countermeasures. ISC has an opportunity to clarify how the standards are intended to be used when it trains agencies on them; during quarterly meetings with member agencies, where ISC can share best practices on the use of the standards; or when ISC engages in other outreach on the standards. Clarifying how agencies can use the standards may result in their greater use. Greater use of the standards may maximize the effectiveness and efficiency of agencies' physical security programs.
Agencies use a range of management practices to oversee physical security activities. For example, 22 surveyed agencies reported that they have a manager at the agency-wide level responsible for monitoring and overseeing physical security at individual facilities. In addition, 22 surveyed agencies reported that they have some documented performance measures for physical security. Such performance measures can help agencies evaluate the effectiveness of their physical security programs and identify changes needed to better meet program objectives. Agencies' use of management practices such as having a physical security manager responsible for allocating resources and using performance measures to justify investment decisions could also contribute to more efficient allocation of physical security resources across an agency's portfolio of facilities. However, some agencies make limited use of such practices to allocate resources. For example, only 13 reported that they have a manager for allocating resources based on risk assessments. In contrast, a majority of agencies reported having managers for other aspects of physical security, including those related to oversight. Greater use of management practices for allocating resources is particularly relevant given that the surveyed agencies identified allocating resources as the greatest challenge. As the government's central forum for exchanging information and disseminating guidance on physical security, ISC is well positioned to develop and disseminate guidance about management practices that can help agencies allocate resources across a portfolio of facilities. However, ISC's key physical security standards do not currently address management practices for allocating resources across an agency's entire portfolio of facilities.
What GAO Recommends
DHS should direct ISC to conduct outreach to executive branch agencies to clarify how its standards are to be used, and develop and disseminate guidance on management practices for resource allocation as a supplement to ISC's existing physical security standards. DHS concurred with these recommendations. |
gao_NSIAD-97-254 | gao_NSIAD-97-254_0 | Formal interagency coordination is managed at the National Security Council (NSC), which also sponsors a number of interagency working groups on certain terrorism matters. The directive was primarily focused on crisis response to terrorist incidents abroad. The strategy consists of three main elements: (1) reduce vulnerabilities and prevent and deter terrorist acts before they occur; (2) respond to terrorist acts that do occur—crisis management—and apprehend and punish terrorists; and (3) manage the consequences of terrorist acts, including restoration of capabilities to protect public health and safety, essential government services, and emergency relief. The strategy incorporates the need to deal with terrorist’s use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) with nuclear, chemical, and biological substances across the three main elements. For crisis management, the PDD also discusses interagency, multidisciplinary Domestic and Foreign Emergency Support Teams, DEST and FEST. Key Federal Agencies Involved in Combating Terrorism
Many intelligence, policy-making, law enforcement, defense, and regulatory agencies are involved in implementing the national policy to combat terrorism. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to review U.S. efforts to combat terrorism by specifically looking at programs and activities to (1) prevent and deter terrorism; (2) respond to terrorist threats or incidents; and (3) manage the consequences of a terrorist act, especially involving weapons of mass destruction. Intelligence Agency Cooperation
To enhance the processing, analyzing, and distributing of intelligence information, more than 40 federal agencies, bureaus, and offices have joined the Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism (see table 2.1). The intelligence community disseminates threat warnings through various channels. These teams can provide special training or assistance to plan or implement a drawdown or evacuate post personnel. Interagency tabletop exercises are conducted under the Interagency Terrorism Response Awareness Program. For a terrorist incident, PDD 39 directs FEMA to (1) appoint an officer to direct the federal consequence management response, (2) issue and track the status of consequence management actions assigned to federal agencies, (3) establish the primary federal operations centers, (4) establish the primary federal centers for information, (5) designate appropriate liaisons, (6) determine when consequences are imminent that warrant consultations with the White House and governor’s office, (7) consult with the White House and governor’s office, and (8) coordinate the federal consequence management response with the lead state and local consequence management agencies. The President and Congress have tasked FEMA and other agencies to assess the capabilities of state and local authorities to respond to terrorist incidents. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed U.S. efforts to combat terrorism, focusing on federal agencies' programs and activities to: (1) prevent and deter terrorism; (2) respond to terrorist threats and incidents; and (3) manage the consequences of a terrorist act, especially involving weapons of mass destruction.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) under sponsorship of the National Security Council (NSC), various interagency groups have been formed to coordinate the efforts of the more than 40 federal agencies, bureaus, and offices that combat terrorism; (2) the intelligence community also has an Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism; (3) these interagency groups and committees meet to coordinate policy, plan interagency activities, share intelligence and other information, and coordinate responses to certain crises; (4) many programs and activities have been developed or used to carry out the three elements of the U.S. strategy for combatting terrorism; (5) key federal efforts to prevent and deter terrorist acts include gathering, sharing, and disseminating intelligence information on terrorist threats and keeping foreign terrorists and materials from entering the United States; (6) federal efforts to respond to terrorist incidents and to manage the consequences of terrorist incidents include designating lead agencies for crisis response, establishing interagency quick-reaction support teams, creating special operating teams or units, developing contingency plans, and conducting interagency or single agency training and exercises; (7) for both crisis management and consequence management, federal efforts include special teams and units to deal with weapons of mass destruction, whether they are nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons; and (8) federal agencies are also involved in programs to assess the capabilities of state and local jurisdictions to immediately respond to and manage the consequences of domestic terrorist incidents involving weapons of mass destruction and provide them training and assistance. |
gao_GAO-05-754T | gao_GAO-05-754T_0 | Regulatory and Oversight Functions Vital to NRC’s Mission Need to be Improved
Our recent analyses of NRC programs identified several areas where NRC needs to take action to better fulfill its mission and made associated recommendations for improvement. With respect to NRC’s security mission, we found that the security of sealed radioactive sources and the physical security at nuclear power plants need to be strengthened. Sealed radioactive sources, radioactive material encapsulated in stainless steel or other metal, are used worldwide in medicine, industry, and research. We were asked to review (1) NRC’s efforts since September 11, 2001, to improve security at nuclear power plants, including actions NRC had taken to implement some of GAO’s September 2003 recommendations to improve security oversight, and (2) the extent to which NRC is in a position to assure itself and the public that the plants are protected against terrorist attacks. Operations Related to NRC’s Public Health and Safety and Environmental Missions Can Be Improved
In October 2003, we reported that NRC needs to more effectively analyze whether nuclear power plant owners are adequately accumulating funds for decommissioning plants. In May 2004, we also issued a report documenting the need for NRC to more aggressively and comprehensively resolve issues related to the shutdown of the Davis-Besse nuclear power plant. The most serious safety issue confronting the nation’s commercial nuclear power industry since Three Mile Island in 1979, was identified at the Davis-Besse plant in Ohio in March of 2002. NRC Faces Several Broad Challenges in Effectively Regulating and Overseeing Nuclear Power Plants
Based on our recent work at NRC, we have identified several cross-cutting challenges that NRC faces as it works to effectively regulate and oversee the nuclear power industry. Third, and finally, NRC must ensure that the agency effectively manages resources to implement its risk- informed strategy and achieve the appropriate regulatory balance in the current context of increasing regulatory and oversight demands as the industry’s interest in expansion grows. NRC has adopted a risk-informed approach because it believes that it can focus its regulatory resources on those areas of the plant that the agency considers the most important to safety. Nevertheless, we believe that NRC faces a significant challenge in effectively implementing its risk-informed strategy, especially with regards to improving the quality of its risk information and identifying emerging technical issues and adjusting regulatory requirements before safety problems develop. NRC has sought to strike a balance between verifying plants’ compliance with requirements through inspections and affording licensees the opportunity to demonstrate that they are operating their plants safely. For example, incidents such as the 2002 discovery of the extensive reactor vessel head corrosion at the Davis-Besse plant and the unaccounted for spent nuclear fuel at several plants across the country, raise questions about whether NRC is appropriately balancing agency involvement and self-monitoring by licensees. NRC’s resources have been challenged by the need to enhance security at nuclear power plants after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, and they will continue to be challenged as the nation’s fleet of nuclear power plants age and the industry’s interest grows in both licensing and constructing new plants, and re-licensing and increasing the output of existing plants. Conclusion
In closing, we recognize and appreciate the complexities of NRC’s regulatory and oversight efforts required to ensure the safe and secure operation of the nation’s commercial nuclear power plants. Whether NRC carries out its regulatory and oversight responsibilities in an effective and credible manner will have a significant impact on the future direction of our nation’s use of nuclear power. Spent Nuclear Fuel: Options Exist to Further Enhance Security. Nuclear Regulatory Commission: NRC Needs to Do More to Ensure that Power Plants Are Effectively Controlling Spent Nuclear Fuel. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has the regulatory responsibility to, among other things, ensure that the nation's 103 commercial nuclear power plants are operated in a safe and secure manner. While the nuclear power industry's overall safety record has been good, safety issues periodically arise that threaten the credibility of NRC's regulation and oversight of the industry. Recent events make the importance of NRC's regulatory and oversight responsibilities readily apparent. The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, focused attention on the security of facilities such as commercial nuclear power plants, while safety concerns were heightened by shutdown of the Davis-Besse nuclear power plant in Ohio in 2002, and the discovery of missing or unaccounted for spent nuclear fuel at three nuclear power plants. GAO has issued a total of 15 recent reports and testimonies on a wide range of NRC activities. This testimony (1) summarizes GAO's findings and associated recommendations for improving NRC mission-related activities and (2) presents several cross-cutting challenges NRC faces in being an effective and credible regulator of the nuclear power industry.
What GAO Found
GAO has documented many positive steps taken by NRC to advance the security and safety of the nation's nuclear power plants. It has also identified various actions that NRC needs to take to better carry out its mission. First, with respect to its security mission, GAO found that NRC needs to improve security measures for sealed sources of radioactive materials---radioactive material encapsulated in stainless steel or other metal used in medicine, industry, and research--which could be used to make a "dirty bomb." GAO also found that, although NRC was taking numerous actions to require nuclear power plants to enhance security, NRC needed to strengthen its oversight of security at the plants. Second, with respect to its public health and safety, and environmental missions, GAO found that NRC needs to conduct more effective analyses of plant owners' funding for decommissioning to ensure that the significant volume of radioactive waste remaining after the permanent closure of a plant are properly disposed. Further, NRC needs to more aggressively and comprehensively resolve issues that led to the shutdown of the Davis-Besse nuclear power plant by improving its oversight of plant safety conditions. Finally, NRC needs to do more to ensure that power plants are effectively controlling spent nuclear fuel, including developing and implementing appropriate inspection procedures. GAO has identified several cross-cutting challenges affecting NRC's ability to effectively and credibly regulate the nuclear power industry. Recently, NRC has taken two overarching approaches to its regulatory and oversight responsibilities. These approaches are to (1) develop and implement a risk-informed regulatory strategy that targets the most important safety-related activities and (2) strike a balance between verifying plants' compliance with requirements through inspections and affording licensees the opportunity to demonstrate that they are operating their plants safety. NRC must overcome significant obstacles to fully implement its risk-informed regulatory strategy across agency operations, especially with regards to developing the ability to identify emerging technical issues and adjust regulatory requirements before safety problems develop. NRC also faces inherent challenges in achieving the appropriate balance between more direct oversight and industry self-compliance. Incidents such as the 2002 shutdown of the Davis-Besse plant and the unaccounted for spent nuclear fuel at several plants raise questions about whether NRC has the risk information that it needs and whether it is appropriately balancing agency involvement and licensee self-monitoring. Finally, GAO believes that NRC will face challenges managing its resources while meeting increasing regulatory and oversight demands. NRC's resources have already been stretched by the extensive effort to enhance security at plants in the wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. Pressure on NRC's resources will continue as the nation's fleet of plants age and the industry's interest in expansion grows, both in licensing and constructing new plants, and re-licensing and increasing the power output of existing ones. |
gao_GAO-04-838 | gao_GAO-04-838_0 | The key dates in the process established by the Coast Guard included the following: By December 31, 2003, those facilities and vessels subject to MTSA’s security plan requirements had to submit security plans to the Coast Guard for review or self-certify that their plans would be developed and implemented by July 1. By July 1, 2005, the Coast Guard intends to complete the remaining on-site compliance inspections for vessels it is not able to inspect by January 1, 2005. However, the bulk of the cost burden is likely to be borne by facility and vessel owners and operators. Extent of Coast Guard Review and Approval of Individual Plans Varies Widely
While the Coast Guard expects owners and operators to implement the approximately 12,300 facility and vessel plans by July 1, 2004, the extent it will have reviewed and approved these plans varies widely, for two main reasons. First, about 5,900 of these plans were developed under an option that essentially deferred Coast Guard review of individual plans until after July 1. Under this option, owners and operators self-certified that their plans would be based on industry-developed, Coast Guard-approved standards and templates. 3.) The Coast Guard was to check to ensure that the owners or operators were members of the organization that developed the program. As table 1 shows, of the 2,913 facility plans and 3,505 vessel plans submitted under option A, more than half were still undergoing the detailed review as of June 2004. Anticipating that plans for some facilities and vessels would still be in process on July 1, the Coast Guard also took steps to allow most of them to continue operating as allowed by MTSA and the regulations. Strategy for Monitoring and Oversight of Plan Implementation Faces Numerous Challenges
In late May 2004, the Coast Guard issued its strategy for monitoring and overseeing the implementation of security plans after July 1. Cost to Comply with MTSA Is Uncertain
Although the Coast Guard made a good-faith effort in preparing its estimate of $7.3 billion for maritime industry compliance with MTSA security-related requirements, the estimate needs to be viewed with some caution, because (1) the Coast Guard had to assume values for a number of cost factors for which there was incomplete data and (2) it had limited time to prepare the estimate. The uncertainty about whether the Coast Guard will be able to meet its timeframes for conducting on-site compliance inspections of the more than 12,300 facilities and vessels and questions about whether it will have enough staff and a sufficient experience base to handle so many inspections will undoubtedly challenge management and staff to effectively implement the strategy. Second, the long-term strategy also needs to reflect a way to ensure that the security inspections assess conditions that represent the normal course of business at facilities and aboard vessels. Specifically, assessing the progress made to develop, review, and approve the security plans for facilities and vessels by July 1, 2004. assessing the U.S. Coast Guard’s monitoring and oversight strategy for ensuring that all necessary port security improvements are implemented. level. cargo. Appendix III: Analysis of Coast Guard’s Compliance Cost Estimates
The Coast Guard estimated the maritime transportation industry will spend $7.3 billion to develop and implement security plans through the year 2012. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, as implemented by the Coast Guard, calls for owners and operators of about 3,150 port facilities (such as shipping terminals or factories with hazardous materials) and about 9,200 vessels (such as cargo ships, ferries, and tugs and barges) to develop and implement security plans by July 1, 2004. The Coast Guard intends to conduct on-site compliance inspections of all facilities by January 1, 2005, and all vessels by July 1, 2005, to ensure plans are adequately implemented. The Coast Guard estimated the act's security improvements would cost $7.3 billion over 10 years--most of it borne by facility and vessel owners and operators. GAO was asked to assess (1) the progress towards developing, reviewing, and approving plans by July 1, 2004, (2) the Coast Guard's monitoring and oversight strategy for ensuring that plans are implemented, and (3) the accuracy of the Coast Guard's cost estimate.
What GAO Found
Owners and operators have made progress in developing security plans for their port facilities and vessels. However, the extent to which the Coast Guard will have reviewed and approved the approximately 12,300 individual plans by July 1, 2004, varies considerably. About 5,900 plans were being developed under an option allowing owners and operators to self-certify that they would develop and implement plans by July 1, using industry-developed, Coast Guard-approved standards and templates. These individual plans will not be reviewed before July 1 unless owners or operators choose to submit them for review. The remaining 6,400 plans went through a review process established by the Coast Guard. Every plan required revisions, some of which were significant. As of June 2004--1 month before the deadline for implementation--more than half of the 6,400 plans were still in process. The Coast Guard took steps to speed up the process and to allow facilities and vessels to continue operating with less than full plan approval after July 1, as long as the Coast Guard was satisfied with their progress. The Coast Guard's strategy for monitoring and overseeing security plan implementation will face numerous challenges. Whether the Coast Guard will be able to conduct timely on-site compliance inspections of all facilities and vessels is uncertain because questions remain about whether the Coast Guard will have enough inspectors; a training program sufficient to overcome major differences in experience levels; and adequate guidance to help inspectors conduct thorough, consistent reviews. Another challenge is to ensure inspections reflect assessments of the normal course of business at facilities and aboard vessels. The accuracy of the Coast Guard's $7.3 billion estimate for implementing security improvements is likewise uncertain. The estimate, while a goodfaith effort on the Coast Guard's part, is based on limited data and on assumptions that are subject to error. The estimate should be viewed more as a rough indicator than a precise measure of costs. |
gao_GAO-03-686 | gao_GAO-03-686_0 | EPA Spent About $27 Million of its Superfund Money to Clean Up the Capitol Hill Anthrax Site
According to EPA, the agency expended about $27 million on the Capitol Hill anthrax cleanup, using Superfund program funding. Over the course of the cleanup, EPA revised its cost estimates several times as the nature and extent of the contamination became fully known and the solutions for removing and properly disposing of the anthrax were agreed upon and carried out. Competitively Awarded Superfund Contracts
When responding to a release of hazardous substances, EPA first relies on its existing Superfund contracts. Specifically, about 50 EPA staff ensured the contractors were on site and performing assigned tasks appropriately. Moreover, our review of the Capitol Hill anthrax incident revealed inconsistencies in oversight practices that could affect the quality of EPA’s contract cost oversight, such as the extent to which regions use the computerized cost-tracking system, the extent to which they assign dedicated administrative specialists to cleanup sites to oversee costs, and regions’ varying approaches to reviewing cost reports for technical contracts. Staff Oversaw Contractors’ Work to Ensure It Was Appropriate and Charges Were Accurate and Reasonable
EPA used emergency technical assessment and hazardous substance removal contractors to conduct the cleanup and dedicated significant staff resources to overseeing their work. In all, according to EPA’s Office of the Chief Financial Officer’s payroll list, about 150 EPA staff participated in the anthrax cleanup, including about 50 staff from nine regional offices who are experienced in leading and overseeing emergency environmental cleanup operations—the on-scene coordinators—and several staff from EPA’s Environmental Response Team who also have experience in emergency cleanup operations. EPA’s Assessments of Its Response to the Capitol Hill Anthrax Incident Identified Contracting Issues, Which EPA Is Addressing
EPA conducted four assessments that either focused on or included the Capitol Hill anthrax cleanup; the reports resulting from each follow: Regional Lessons Learned from the Capitol Hill Anthrax Response, 60-Day Counter-Terrorism Contracting Assessment Final Report, Federal On-Scene Coordinator’s After Action Report for the Capitol Hill Site, August 2002; and Challenges Faced During the Environmental Protection Agency’s Response to Anthrax and Recommendations for Enhancing Response Capabilities: A Lessons Learned Report, September 2002. All regions use the system for removal contracts; however, some regions also use it for some technical contracts also used at cleanup sites. In the case of the Capitol Hill anthrax cleanup, two contractors with key roles in the fumigation of the Hart Senate Office Building informed EPA that they were not able to obtain such insurance at a reasonable cost, and they requested indemnification. As discussed below, EPA agreed to provide the indemnification authorized by CERCLA to the two contractors, protecting them from the financial liability that could result if a third party were injured by the contractors’ release of a harmful substance, including anthrax. In addition, EPA has less assurance that it is providing effective, consistent oversight of its contracts. Specifically, the system is already being used to track the costs of some of EPA’s technical contracts. As our report accurately addresses the extent to which EPA agreed to indemnify contractors against liability for potential damages related to the cleanup, we believe that a broader discussion of indemnification issues is not necessary. Support chlorine dioxide decontamination of congressional mail packages. | Why GAO Did This Study
In September and October 2001, the first cases of anthrax bioterrorism occurred in the United States when letters containing anthrax were mailed to congressional leaders and members of the news media. As the cleanup of the Capitol Hill anthrax site progressed, EPA's estimates of the cleanup costs steadily rose. GAO was asked to describe (1) the costs EPA incurred to conduct the cleanup and how it was funded, (2) the extent to which EPA awarded the cleanup contracts competitively, (3) EPA's oversight of the contractors' work and any suggested changes to EPA's contracting practices, and (4) the extent to which EPA agreed to indemnify contractors against liability for potential damages related to the cleanup.
What GAO Found
EPA spent about $27 million on the Capitol Hill anthrax cleanup, using funds from its Superfund program. From the outset, many uncertainties were associated with the cleanup effort, including how to remove anthrax from buildings. EPA revised its November 2001 estimate of $5 million several times during the cleanup as the nature and extent of the contamination became fully known and the solutions to remove and properly dispose of the anthrax were agreed upon and carried out. To conduct the cleanup, EPA relied extensively on the existing competitively awarded Superfund contracts it routinely uses to address threats posed by the release of hazardous substances. Specifically, about 80 percent of the contract costs were incurred under 10 of EPA's existing Superfund contracts. EPA dedicated significant resources to overseeing the many contractors working on the Capitol Hill anthrax cleanup--including about 50 staff from nine regional offices experienced in leading and overseeing emergency environmental cleanups. Most often, these staff ensured that the contractors were on site and performing assigned tasks efficiently. EPA also assigned an administrative specialist to ensure that contract charges were accurate and reasonable. EPA's assessment of its emergency responses to the anthrax incidents, which focused on or included the Capitol Hill site, concluded that, overall, the agency had used its contracts effectively but that it could improve some areas of its contracting support. In addition, GAO's review of the Capitol Hill cleanup revealed inconsistencies in EPA's cost oversight practices among regions. For example, EPA uses a computerized system for tracking contractor costs for hazardous substance removal contracts, but regions use the system inconsistently for the technical assessment contracts also used during emergency responses. Consistent use of the system would likely improve the quality of EPA's nationwide contract data and enhance EPA's oversight capabilities. EPA agreed to indemnify two contractors with key roles in the fumigation of the Hart Senate Office Building with chlorine dioxide gas against liability that could have resulted if a third party had been injured by the contractors' release of a harmful substance, including anthrax. |
gao_GAO-13-168 | gao_GAO-13-168_0 | Transmission pipelines carry hazardous liquid or natural gas, sometimes over hundreds of miles, to communities and large-volume users, such as factories. PHMSA has estimated there are more than 400,000 miles of hazardous liquid and natural gas transmission pipelines across the United States. Performance-Based Approach Offers Opportunity to Improve Incident Response, but Better Data Are Needed
The ability of transmission pipeline operators to respond to incidents, such as leaks and ruptures, is affected by a number of variables—some of which are under operators’ control—resulting in variances in response time; for a given incident, that time can range from minutes to days. Incident Response Time Depends on Multiple Variables, Some of Which Operators Can Control
According to PHMSA officials, pipeline safety officials, and industry stakeholders and operators, multiple variables—some controllable by transmission pipeline operators—can influence the ability of operators to respond quickly to an incident. Location of qualified operator response personnel. Type of valves. Weather conditions. We and others have recommended that the federal government move toward performance-based regulatory approaches to allow those being regulated to determine the most appropriate way to achieve desired, measurable outcomes. Other organizations in the pipeline industry, including some state regulatory agencies, have developed methods for measuring the performance of operators responding to incidents by using specific incident response times. Although defining performance measures and targets for incident response can be challenging, one way for PHMSA to move toward a more quantifiable, performance-based approach would be to develop strategies to improve incident response based on nationwide data. However, the data currently collected by PHMSA do not enable them to accurately determine incident response times for all recent incidents for two reasons: 1) operators are not required to fill out certain time-related fields in the PHMSA incident-reporting form and 2) when operators do provide these data, they are interpreting the intended content of the data fields in different ways. Improved Information Sharing about Evaluating Automated Valve Advantages and Disadvantages Could Inform Operators’ Decisions
The primary advantage of installing automated valves is reducing the time to shut down and isolate a pipeline segment after a leak or rupture occurs, while disadvantages include the potential for accidental closures and monetary cost. PHMSA has several opportunities to assist operators in making these evaluations, including communicating guidance and sharing information on some methods operators use to make these decisions. Improved Response Times, Potential for Accidental Closures, and Costs Should be Evaluated on a Case-by-Case Basis
Research and industry stakeholders indicate that the primary advantage of installing automated valves is related to the time it takes to respond to an incident. Specifically, automated valves can lead to accidental closures, which can have severe, unintended consequences, including loss of service to residences and businesses. Operators Have Developed Approaches to Evaluate Advantages and Disadvantages of Installing Automated Valves
Operators we met with are using a variety of methods for determining whether to install automated valves. This spill modeling typically considered topography, operating pressure, and placement of existing valves. Reliable data would improve PHMSA’s ability to measure incident response and assist the agency in exploring the feasibility of developing a performance-based approach for improving operator response to pipeline incidents. However, not all operators we spoke with were aware of existing PHMSA guidance and PHMSA does not formally collect or share evaluation approaches used by other operators to make decisions about whether to install automated valves. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of Transportation direct the PHMSA Administrator to take the following two actions:
To improve operators’ incident response times, improve the reliability of incident response data and use these data to evaluate whether to implement a performance-based framework for incident response times. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to determine (1) the opportunities that exist to improve the ability of transmission pipeline operators to respond to incidents and (2) the advantages and disadvantages of installing automated valves in high-consequence areas and ways that the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials and Safety Administration (PHMSA) can assist operators in deciding whether to install valves in these areas. We conducted a literature review of previous research on pipeline incidents. Appendix II: How Select Operators Determined Whether to Install Automated Valves
We conducted site visits to eight hazardous liquid and natural gas pipeline operators with different amounts of pipeline miles in or affecting high-consequence areas. Pipeline operator: Enterprise Products Product type: Hazardous liquid and natural gas Number of pipeline miles: 23,012 (total); 8,783 (could affect or in high- consequence areas)
Decision-making approach: The operator assesses each pipeline segment using spill-modeling software to determine the amount of product release and extent of damage that would occur in the event of an incident. | Why GAO Did This Study
The nation's 2.5 million mile network of hazardous liquid and natural gas pipelines includes more than 400,000 miles of "transmission" pipelines, which transport products from processing facilities to communities and large-volume users. To minimize the risk of leaks and ruptures, PHMSA requires pipeline operators to develop incident response plans. Pipeline operators with pipelines in highly populated and environmentally sensitive areas ("high-consequence areas") are also required to consider installing automated valves.
The Pipeline Safety, Regulatory Certainty, and Job Creation Act of 2011 directed GAO to examine the ability of transmission pipeline operators to respond to a product release. Accordingly, GAO examined (1) opportunities to improve the ability of transmission pipeline operators to respond to incidents and (2) the advantages and disadvantages of installing automated valves in high-consequence areas and ways that PHMSA can assist operators in deciding whether to install valves in these areas. GAO examined incident data; conducted a literature review; and interviewed selected operators, industry stakeholders, state pipeline safety offices, and PHMSA officials.
What GAO Found
The Department of Transportation's (DOT) Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) has an opportunity to improve the ability of pipeline operators to respond to incidents by developing a performance-based approach for incident response times. The ability of transmission pipeline operators to respond to incidents--such as leaks and ruptures--is affected by numerous variables, some of which are under operators' control. For example, the use of different valve types (manual valves or "automated" valves that can be closed automatically or remotely) and the location of response personnel can affect the amount of time it takes for operators to respond to incidents. Variables outside of operators' control, such as weather conditions, can also influence incident response time, which can range from minutes to days. GAO has previously reported that a performance-based approach--including goals and associated performance measures and targets--can allow those being regulated to determine the most appropriate way to achieve desired outcomes. In addition, several organizations in the pipeline industry have developed methods for quantitatively evaluating response times to incidents, including setting specific, measurable performance goals. While defining performance measures and targets for incident response can be challenging, PHMSA could move toward a performance-based approach by evaluating nationwide data to determine response times for different types of pipeline (based on location, operating pressure, and pipeline diameter, among other factors). However, PHMSA must first improve the data it collects on incident response times. These data are not reliable both because operators are not required to fill out certain time-related fields in the reporting form and because operators told us they interpret these data fields in different ways. Reliable data would improve PHMSA's ability to measure incident response and assist the agency in exploring the feasibility of developing a performance-based approach for improving operator response to pipeline incidents.
The primary advantage of installing automated valves is that operators can respond quickly to isolate the affected pipeline segment and reduce the amount of product released; however, automated valves can have disadvantages, including the potential for accidental closures--which can lead to loss of service to customers or even cause a rupture--and monetary costs. Because the advantages and disadvantages of installing an automated valve are closely related to the specifics of the valve's location, it is appropriate to decide whether to install automated valves on a case-by-case basis. Several operators we spoke with have developed approaches to evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of installing automated valves. For example, some operators of hazardous liquid pipelines use spill-modeling software to estimate the amount of product release and extent of damage that would occur in the event of an incident. While PHMSA conducts a variety of information-sharing activities, the agency does not formally collect or share evaluation approaches used by operators to decide whether to install automated valves. Furthermore, not all operators we spoke with were aware of existing PHMSA guidance designed to assist operators in making these decisions. PHMSA could assist operators in making this decision by formally collecting and sharing evaluation approaches and ensuring operators are aware of existing guidance.
What GAO Recommends
DOT should (1) improve incident response data and use these data to evaluate whether to implement a performance-based framework for incident response times and (2) share guidance and information on evaluation approaches to inform operators decisions. DOT agreed to consider these recommendations. |
gao_GAO-06-583T | gao_GAO-06-583T_0 | We subsequently used commercial, off-the-shelf computer software to produce two counterfeit NRC documents authorizing the individual to receive, acquire, possess, and transfer radioactive sources. With Ease, Investigators Purchased, Received, and Transported Radioactive Sources Across Both Borders
Our two teams of investigators each transported an amount of radioactive sources sufficient to manufacture a dirty bomb when making their recent, simultaneous border crossings. For the purposes of our current undercover investigation, we purchased a small amount of radioactive sources and one container for storing and transporting the material from a commercial source over the telephone. One of our investigators, posing as an employee of a fictitious company, stated that the purpose of his purchase was to use the radioactive sources to calibrate personal radiation detectors. Suppliers are not required to exercise any due diligence in determining whether the buyer has a legitimate use for the radioactive sources, nor are suppliers required to ask the buyer to produce an NRC document when making purchases in small quantities. The company mailed the radioactive sources to an address in Washington, D.C.
Two Teams of Investigators Conducted Simultaneous Crossings at the U.S.- Canadian Border and U.S.-Mexican Border
Northern Border Crossing
On December 14, 2005, our investigators placed two containers of radioactive sources into the trunk of their rental vehicle. Our investigators – acting in an undercover capacity – drove to an official port of entry between Canada and the United States. At the primary checkpoint, our investigators were signaled to drive through the radiation portal monitors and to meet the CBP inspector at the booth for their primary inspection. During the secondary inspection, our investigators told the CBP inspector that they had an NRC document and a bill of lading for the radioactive sources. Our investigators drove to an official port of entry at the southern border. They also had in their possession a counterfeit bill of lading in the name of a fictitious company and a counterfeit NRC document. The instrumentation confirmed the presence of radioactive sources. The CBP inspector asked for paperwork authorizing them to transport the equipment to Mexico. At no time did the CBP inspector question the validity of the counterfeit bill of lading or the counterfeit NRC document. Further, we believe that the amount of radioactive sources that we were able to transport into the United States during our operation would be sufficient to produce two dirty bombs, which could be used as weapons of mass disruption. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
To address the threat of dirty bombs and other nuclear material, the federal government has programs in place that regulate the transportation of radioactive sources and to prevent illegal transport of radioactive sources across our nation's borders. The Department of Homeland Security through the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) uses radiation detection equipment at ports of entry to prevent such illicit entry of radioactive sources. The goal of CBP's inspection program is to "...thwart the operations of terrorist organizations by detecting, disrupting, and preventing the cross-border travel of terrorists, terrorist funding, and terrorist implements, including Weapons of Mass Destruction and their precursors." Deploying radiation detection equipment is part of CBP's strategy for thwarting radiological terrorism and CBP is using a range of such equipment to meet its goal of screening all cargo, vehicles, and individuals coming into the United States. Most travelers enter the United States through the nation's 154 land border ports of entry. CBP inspectors at ports of entry are responsible for the primary inspection of travelers to determine their admissibility into the United States and to enforce laws related to preventing the entry of contraband, such as drugs and weapons of mass destruction. Our investigation was conducted at Congressional request as a result of widespread congressional and public interest in the security of our nation's borders, given today's unprecedented terrorism threat environment. Our investigation was conducted under the premise that given today's security environment, our nation's borders must be protected from the smuggling of radioactive sources by terrorists.
What GAO Found
For the purposes of this undercover investigation, we purchased a small amount of radioactive sources and one container used to store and transport the material from a commercial source over the telephone. One of our investigators, posing as an employee of a fictitious company located in Washington, D.C., stated that the purpose of his purchase was to use the radioactive sources to calibrate personal radiation detection pagers. The purchase was not challenged because suppliers are not required to determine whether a buyer has a legitimate use for the radioactive sources, nor are suppliers required to ask the buyer to produce an NRC document when making purchases in small quantities. The radiation portal monitors properly signaled the presence of radioactive material when our two teams of investigators conducted simultaneous border crossings. Our investigators' vehicles were inspected in accordance with most of the CBP policy at both the northern and southern borders. However, our investigators were able to enter the United States with enough radioactive sources to make two dirty bombs using counterfeit documents. Specifically, they were able to successfully represent themselves as employees of a fictitious company and present a counterfeit bill of lading and a counterfeit NRC document during the secondary inspections at both locations. The CBP inspectors never questioned the authenticity of the investigators' counterfeit bill of lading or the counterfeit NRC document authorizing them to receive, acquire, possess, and transfer radioactive sources. |
gao_GAO-14-577 | gao_GAO-14-577_0 | Joint Base Officials Have Reported Varying Levels of Progress in Consolidating Functions, but Cited Limited Opportunities and Challenges from Consolidation Efforts
Joint base officials reported varying levels of progress in consolidating installation-support functions, several limitations that inhibited consolidation, and challenges resulting from consolidation efforts that created inefficiencies and inequities. Overall, we found that the 11 joint bases had reported partially consolidating 80 percent of the functions for which the joint base commander had some responsibility, but the extent of consolidation varied from one joint base to another and among the various installation- support functions. Furthermore, joint base officials reported several challenges resulting from consolidation, such as multiple military service inspections and employees being disadvantaged in competing for promotion opportunities, resulting from service-specific personnel policies. Without a comprehensive evaluation of the suitability of installation-support functions for consolidation—and without guidance to address any negative consequences that emerge from consolidation—individual joint bases will still be expected to merge support functions, which may result in ongoing inefficiencies and inequities. Support functions unique to military service mission. For example:
Port services. Small-arms range management. Officials from Joint Region Marianas were not part of our survey, but we interviewed them to discuss their efforts to consolidate support services. In our November 2012 report, we found that DOD does not have a fully developed method for accurately collecting information on cost savings and efficiencies achieved specifically as a result of joint basing. As a result, to gain insight into the degree to which DOD has gained efficiencies and cost savings, our survey asked respondents to identify the extent to which they have (1) reduced redundant funded positions; (2) reduced redundant contracts or increased contract efficiencies; and (3) merged or consolidated redundant procedures. Lack of Direction Has Hindered Joint Base Progress in Achieving Goals
Joint base and military service officials whom we interviewed said OSD has not provided them with direction on how to achieve greater efficiencies and cost savings as the goals of joint basing, including reporting requirements and milestones. However, the officials noted that they do not yet have detailed plans for such a review. Without a collaborative evaluation of the joint basing program by OSD and the military services to determine if the stated goals of the program are still appropriate and continue to be priorities for DOD—and without clear communication on any revised goals and additional direction on how to achieve such goals, including reporting requirements and milestones—it will be difficult for DOD to demonstrate that the joint basing program has effectively and efficiently achieved its goals. Matter for Congressional Consideration
To help ensure DOD’s approach to joint basing achieves the goals as outlined by DOD in its justification for the 2005 BRAC recommendation and leverages additional opportunities to reduce duplication of effort that could in turn generate cost savings and increased efficiencies, Congress should consider directing the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment), in collaboration with the military services and joint bases, to evaluate the purpose of the program and determine whether the current goals, as stated in the 2005 BRAC Commission recommendation, are still appropriate, or whether goals should be revised; communicate these goals to the military services and joint bases, and adjust program activities accordingly; provide direction to the joint bases on requirements for meeting program goals, including determining reporting requirements and milestones; and determine any next steps for joint basing, including whether to expand it to other installations. DOD did not provide time frames for completing such actions. DOD partially concurred with the second recommendation to take policy actions, as appropriate, such as issuing additional guidance, to address challenges resulting in inefficiencies and inequities in consolidating installation-support functions. Also, as stated in the report, joint base officials told us they are unclear to what extent achieving greater efficiencies and cost savings are still appropriate for the goals of joint basing, and to what extent they are required to pursue additional opportunities beyond the consolidation of installation-support functions in the joint base memorandums of agreement to achieve these goals. Furthermore, we conducted a web-based survey of 11 of the 12 joint bases. To determine the extent to which officials have reported consolidating their installation-support functions, we reviewed DOD’s 2008 Joint Basing Implementation Guidance to identify DOD’s expectations for consolidation. GAO’s 2011 High-Risk Series: An Update. Military Base Realignments and Closures: DOD Needs to Update Savings Estimates and Continue to Address Challenges in Consolidating Supply- Related Functions at Depot Maintenance Locations. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO designated DOD support infrastructure as a high-risk area to address efficiency challenges. In 2005, DOD recommended to the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Commission combining 26 installations into 12 joint bases to generate efficiencies and cost savings, initially estimated to be $2.3 billion. In 2009, DOD reduced this estimate to $273 million. GAO was mandated to assess DOD's progress in consolidating common services across joint bases. This report addresses the extent to which officials reported consolidating installation-support functions, and meeting joint basing goals to achieve greater efficiencies and cost savings. GAO conducted a survey of 11 joint bases, and reviewed applicable guidance. GAO did not survey Joint Region Marianas because it was subject to different expectations.
What GAO Found
Joint base officials reported varying progress in consolidating installation-support functions, and challenges resulting from consolidation efforts that created inefficiencies and inequities. Overall, the joint bases reported partially consolidating 80 percent of their installation-support functions, but the extent of consolidation varied across the bases and among the various functions. None of the joint bases have reported consolidating all functions. However, all 11 joint bases reported consolidating some portion of eight functions, such as custodial services and installation safety. The least consolidated functions were reported to be military service-specific or mission-specific, such as small-arms range management and port services. Also, joint base officials reported several challenges resulting from consolidation, such as multiple inspections and employees being potentially disadvantaged in competing for promotion opportunities due to military service-specific personnel policies. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and military service officials have not evaluated which functions are still suitable for consolidation or taken policy actions to address any challenges resulting from consolidation. Without an evaluation of the suitability of installation-support functions for consolidation and without actions to address any negative consequences that emerged from consolidation, the Department of Defense (DOD) may continue to experience challenges in its efforts to consolidate these functions.
Note: Not all of the joint bases that GAO surveyed have small-arms range management or port services functions.
Joint base officials reported that consolidation of support functions has resulted in some progress toward achieving the goals of joint basing (achieving efficiencies and cost savings), by reducing redundant positions and finding contracting efficiencies. However, as GAO reported in November 2012, DOD does not have a method to collect cost savings information achieved specifically from joint basing. Thus, GAO recommended that DOD develop a plan for doing so. DOD disagreed and has not yet taken action. GAO continues to believe this recommendation has merit and should be addressed. Also, officials said they are uncertain of the extent to which the goals of joint basing are still appropriate, and to what extent they are required to take actions to pursue them. OSD has not collaborated with the military services to evaluate whether the goals of joint basing remain appropriate and has not provided direction to the joint bases on future priorities. Without a collaborative evaluation of the joint basing program by OSD and military service officials to determine if the goals remain appropriate—and without additional direction to help meet reporting requirements—it will be difficult for DOD to determine the extent to which the joint basing initiative is achieving its intended goals.
What GAO Recommends
Congress should consider directing DOD to evaluate joint basing goals, provide direction on requirements to meet the goals, and determine next steps for joint basing. GAO included this matter because DOD did not concur with GAO's recommendations to conduct such an evaluation and provide direction, in part because DOD stated joint bases have achieved savings. GAO also recommended DOD evaluate which installation-support functions remain suitable for consolidation, with which DOD concurred, and take policy actions to address challenges, with which DOD partially concurred, noting its existing processes to address challenges. GAO continues to believe its findings and recommendations are valid as discussed in this report. |
gao_GAO-01-563T | gao_GAO-01-563T_0 | Public Programs and Out-of-Pocket Spending Predominantly Finance Long-Term Care Services
In 1999, spending for nursing home and home health care was about $134 billion. Private long-term care insurance has been viewed as a means of both reducing potential catastrophic financial losses for the elderly and relieving some of the financing burden now shouldered by public long-term care programs. Affordability of Long-Term Care Insurance Concerns Many Elderly Individuals
Many elderly and near-elderly individuals question the affordability and the value of long-term care insurance relative to the premiums charged. While NAIC’s model standards have helped address prior deficiencies in the terms of long-term care policies, whether these have been sufficient to assure consumers that long-term care products are reliable and the terms of the products are easily understood and will be fulfilled. The need for these services will become more critical after 2030, when this population reaches age 85 and older, which is the age group with the greatest need for long-term care. Increased confidence in long-term care insurance and the availability of affordable, reliable products are also crucial components of private insurance if it is expected to play a larger role in financing future generations’ long-term care needs. | What GAO Found
The confluence of the aging baby boom generation, longer life expectancies, and evolving options for providing and financing long-term care services will require substantial public and private investment in long-term care and the development of sufficient capacity to serve this growing population. Spending for long-term care was about $134 billion in 1999. Medicaid and Medicare paid for nearly 58 percent of these services, contributing about $59 billion and $18 billion, respectively. Private long-term care insurance was viewed as a possible way to reduce catastrophic financial risk for the elderly needing long-term care and to relieve some of the financing burden now shouldered by public long-term care programs. Yet private insurance represents only about 10 percent of long-term care spending. Questions remain about the affordability of policies and the value of the coverage relative to the premiums charged. Although many states have adopted standards for long-term care policies, it is uncertain whether these standards have bolstered consumer confidence in the reliability of long-term care insurance. If long-term care insurance is to have a more significant role in addressing the baby boom generation's upcoming chronic health care needs, consumers must view the policies being offered as reliable, affordable products with benefits and limitations that are easy to understand. |
gao_GAO-10-105T | gao_GAO-10-105T_0 | According to fiscal year 2008 Homeland Security Grant Guidance, the program is to bring together community and government leaders, including first responders, nonprofit organizations, and other community stakeholders. The Division also supports the efforts of non-DHS federal “partner programs,” such as the Medical Reserve Corps, that promote preparedness and the use of volunteers to support first responders. FEMA Faces Challenges Measuring Performance of Citizen Corps Programs and the Ready Campaign
FEMA faces challenges in measuring the performance of local community preparedness efforts because it lacks accurate information on those efforts. FEMA is also confronted with challenges in measuring performance for the Ready Campaign because the Ready Campaign is not positioned to control the placement of its preparedness messages or measure whether its message is changing the behavior of individuals. FEMA includes the number of Citizen Corps councils, CERTs, and Fire Corps established across the country as its principal performance measure. However, FEMA faces challenges ensuring that the information needed to measure the number of established, active units is accurate. However, 12 of the 17 registered councils we contacted during our site visits were active and 5 were not. One state official responsible for the Citizen Corps council and CERT programs in the state estimated that as little as 20 percent of the registered councils were active, and the state subsequently removed more than half of its 40 councils from the national Web site. Some change in the number of active local programs can be expected, based on factors including changes in government leadership, voluntary participation by civic leaders, and financial support. FEMA officials said that FEMA plans to adopt a new online registration process for Citizen Corps councils and CERTs in 2010, which will likely result in some programs being removed from FEMA’s registries. They said that FEMA expects to use the new registration process to collect more comprehensive data on membership and council activities. The Ready Campaign Faces Challenges Measuring Performance Because It Is Not Positioned to Control the Distribution of Its Preparedness Messages and Measure Whether Its Message Effects Individual Behavior
Currently, the Ready Campaign measures its performance based on measures such as materials distributed or PSAs shown. We will continue to assess FEMA’s efforts to measure the performance of the Ready Campaign as part of our ongoing work. FEMA Has Not Developed a Strategy Encompassing How Citizen Corps, Its Partner Programs, and the Ready Campaign Are to Operate within the Context of the National Preparedness System
While DHS’s and FEMA’s strategic plans have incorporated efforts to promote community preparedness, FEMA has not developed a strategy encompassing how Citizen Corps, its partner programs, and the Ready Campaign are to operate within the context of the national preparedness system. NPD has not clearly articulated goals for FEMA’s community preparedness programs or a strategy to show how Citizen Corps, its partner programs, and the Ready Campaign are to achieve those goals within the context of the national preparedness system. In April 2009, we reported that NPD had not developed a strategic plan that defines program roles and responsibilities, integration and coordination processes, and goals and performance measures for its programs. We reported that instead of a strategic plan, NPD officials stated that they used a draft annual operating plan and Post-Katrina Act provisions to guide NPD’s efforts. NPD’s draft operating plan also does not include other key elements of an effective national strategy, such as how it will measure progress in meeting its goals and objectives; the roles and responsibilities of those who will be implementing specific programs within the Community Preparedness Division, such as Citizen Corps or Fire Corps; or potential costs and types of resources and investments needed to meet goals and objectives needed to implement civilian preparedness programs. In our April 2009 report we recommended that NPD take a more strategic approach to implementing the national preparedness system to include the development of a strategic plan that contains such key elements as goals, objectives, and how progress in achieving them will be measured. However, NPD officials did not state when the strategy will be completed; thus, it is not clear to what extent it will integrate Citizen Corps, its partner programs, and the Ready Campaign. | Why GAO Did This Study
By preparing their families and property before an event, individuals can reduce a disaster's impact on them and their need for first responder assistance, particularly in the first 72 hours following a disaster. By law, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), located in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), is to develop a national preparedness system (NPS)--FEMA includes community preparedness programs as part of the NPS. FEMA's budget to operate these programs made up less than one half of 1 percent of its $7.9 billion budget for fiscal year 2009. These programs include the Citizen Corps program and its partner programs, such as Fire Corps, and rely on volunteers to coordinate efforts and assist first responders in local communities. DHS's Ready Campaign promotes preparedness through mass media. This testimony provides preliminary observations on (1) challenges FEMA faces in measuring the performance of Citizen Corps, its partner programs, and the Ready Campaign and (2) actions FEMA has taken to develop a strategy to encompass how Citizen Corps, its partner programs, and the Ready Campaign operate within the context of the NPS. This testimony is based on work conducted from February 2008 to October 2009. GAO analyzed documents, such as FEMA's strategic plan, and compared reported performance data with observations from 12 site visits, selected primarily based on the frequency of natural disasters. The results are not projectable, but provide local insights.
What GAO Found
FEMA faces challenges measuring performance for Citizen Corps, partner programs, and the Ready Campaign because it does not have a process to verify that data for its principal performance measure--the registered number of established volunteer organizations across the country--are accurate and the Ready Campaign is not positioned to control the distribution of its message or measure whether its message is changing individuals' behavior. FEMA faces challenges ensuring that the information needed to measure the number of established, active volunteer units is accurate. For example, officials representing 17 councils GAO contacted during its site visits stated that 12 were active and 5 were not. FEMA officials said that the new online registration process FEMA plans to adopt in 2010 will result in some programs being removed from FEMA's registries. They said that FEMA expects to use the new process to collect more comprehensive data on membership and council activities. FEMA counts requests for literature, Web site hits, and the number of television or radio announcements made to gauge performance for the Ready Campaign, but FEMA does not control when its message is viewed because it relies on donated media, such as air time for television and radio announcements. Because changes in behavior can result from a variety of factors, including other campaigns, it is difficult to measure the campaign's effect on changes in individuals' behavior. FEMA's challenges measuring the performance of community preparedness programs is compounded by the fact that it has not developed a strategy to encompass how Citizen Corps, its partner programs, and the Ready Campaign are to operate within the context of the NPS. In April 2009, GAO reported that FEMA's National Preparedness Directorate (NPD), which is responsible for community preparedness, had not developed a strategic plan. GAO reported that instead of a strategic plan, NPD officials stated that they used a draft annual operating plan and Post-Katrina Act provisions to guide NPD's efforts. However, the plan's objectives do not include key elements of a strategy, such as how NPD will measure its progress meeting goals and objectives or the potential costs and types of resources and investments needed. GAO recommended that NPD develop a strategic plan to implement the NPS that contains these key elements. FEMA concurred with GAO's recommendation and told GAO that it is taking actions to strengthen strategic planning. FEMA officials stated that they are reviewing implementation plans and policy documents, such as the National Preparedness Guidelines, and that community preparedness is a key element being considered in this process. FEMA has not set a date for completion of the National Preparedness System strategy, and the extent to which Citizen Corps, its partner programs, or the Ready Campaign will be included in the final strategy is not clear. GAO will continue to assess FEMA's efforts related to community preparedness programs as part of its ongoing work. FEMA provided technical comments on a draft of this testimony, which GAO incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-03-721T | gao_GAO-03-721T_0 | Our review focused on SBA’s first five loan sales through January 2002 in which 110,000 loans with an outstanding balance of $4.4 billion were sold. SBA Expanded and Changed the Terms of Its Disaster Loan Program in Response to the September 11 Attacks
In the weeks and months following the terrorist attacks, SBA and Congress faced the challenge of responding to the lingering effects of the attacks and subsequent federal actions on small businesses throughout the country. SBA and Congress Modified the Disaster Loan Program in Response to Complaints from Small Businesses
In the months after the terrorist attacks, small business owners affected by the terrorist attacks presented a number of concerns to Congress about SBA’s Disaster Loan Program. SBA, however, did not change its underwriting criteria for September 11 victims. SBA officials believed that many of the complaints about the disaster program resulted from the mismatch between victims’ expectations of SBA’s disaster program and the nature of the program. There is a lack of measures for intermediate or end outcomes, and features in SBA’s description of the Disaster Loan Program in its performance plans made assessing the program difficult. But we found that only one of the performance measures SBA was using—customer satisfaction—had the potential to assess a stated outcome of the Disaster Loan Program. SBA’s Performance Plans Had Limitations
We identified several features of the description of the Disaster Loan Program in the 2002 and 2003 performance plans that make it difficult to assess whether SBA is making progress in attaining its strategic goal. SBA’s program to sell disaster loans that it makes directly to borrowers and subsequently services results in private investors owning and servicing the loans over their remaining terms. We identified numerous errors in SBA’s accounting for the loan sales, including unexplained declines in SBA’s loss allowance account for disaster loans. Information on How Selling Disaster Loans Affects Borrowers Is Incomplete
SBA built in some safeguards to protect borrowers when their loans are sold. In addition, SBA does not sell some disaster loans, including those issued to borrowers currently residing in a federally declared disaster area and those that are less than 2 years old. Nevertheless, we were not able to validate the way in which borrowers reacted to the loan sales because SBA could not provide a reliable estimate or information on the number of borrowers who had contacted them about their sold loans. SBA’s Accounting for Loan Sales and the Remaining Portfolio Was Flawed
During our review, we found errors that we believe could have significantly affected the reported results in the budget and financial statements for fiscal years 2000 and 2001. Loan Sales Have Reduced SBA’s Loan Servicing Volume, but Other Operational Benefits May Be Overstated
SBA reported that loan asset sales had benefited the agency’s operations by reducing loan servicing, and that this reduction in loan servicing volume should help allocate resources to other areas necessary to achieving SBA’s mission and help the agency to manage its loan portfolio more effectively. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses the role of the Small Business Administration's (SBA) Disaster Loan Program in responding to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, general performance measures for the program, and the effects of SBA's program to sell loans to private investors on disaster loans and their borrowers. In reviewing SBA's loan sales program, which includes disaster loans, we identified three areas needing improvement: tracking borrower inquiries and complaints; sales budgeting and accounting which affect the reliability of SBA financial statements and budget information; and reporting on the operational benefits of the loans sales. This testimony focuses on SBA's (1) response to the September 11 terrorist attacks; (2) performance plans and measures for its Disaster Loan program; and (3) loan assets sales program, which involves selling disaster and other loans.
What GAO Found
The nature of the September 11 attacks and subsequent government actions presented SBA's Disaster Loan Program with new and difficult challenges. Specifically, small businesses in both the declared disaster areas and around the nation suffered economic injury. SBA sought to respond to the concerns of small businesses in the months following September 11by extending eligibility for economic injury loans nationwide--a marked change from earlier disasters that affected primarily businesses in one geographic location. In addition, SBA modified both the terms and lending practices of its Disaster Loan Program. We found that SBA had adapted its Disaster Loan Program to respond to the needs of September 11 victims but that SBA's performance measures did not provide congressional decisions makers with an accurate description of the program's performance. In addition, some output measures had not kept up with SBA's actual progress in assisting disaster victims. Further we identified features in SBA's description of its Disaster Loan Program in the 2002 and 2003 performance plans that made assessing the agency's progress in attaining its strategic goals difficult. Our review of SBA's five loan sales from August 1999 to January 2002 revealed that 85 percent of the $4.4 billion in loans sold were disaster assistance home and business loans. SBA established some policies to protect borrowers whose loans were sold. In trying to determine how borrowers reacted to having their loans sold, we found that SBA relied on borrower inquiries and complaints to determine whether purchasers of the loans were using prudent loan servicing practices. However, information o n borrowers' reaactions was incomplete because SBA did not have a comprehensive process to capture the inquiries and complaints it recieves. Moreover, we found serious issues in SBA's budgeting and accounting for the loans sold, as well as the remainder of the portfolio. In addition, there were significant unexplained declines in the subsidy allowance for the disaster program. SBA is continuing to work on resolving its accounting and financial reporting problems. Finally, our analysis of the operational benefits from loan sales suggested that some benefits that SBA reported, such as reductions in servicing and workload volume, either had not yet materialized or were overstated. |
gao_GAO-02-196 | gao_GAO-02-196_0 | 5. The Bureau’s Stretch Goals to Complete Nonresponse Follow- up May Have Produced Mixed Results
To help ensure that local census offices completed nonresponse follow-up on schedule, the bureau developed ambitious interim stretch goals. These goals called on local census offices to finish 80 percent of their nonresponse follow-up workload within the first 4 weeks of the operation and be completely finished by the end of the eighth week. Under the bureau’s master schedule, local census offices had 10 weeks to complete the operation. Our review highlighted several strategies that were key to the bureau’s success including (1) an aggressive outreach and promotion campaign and other efforts aimed at boosting the mail response rate and lowering the bureau’s nonresponse follow-up workload; (2) a flexible recruiting strategy that made the bureau a competitive employer in a tight national labor market; (3) advance planning for addressing location-specific enumeration challenges; and (4) ambitious stretch goals that encouraged local managers to accelerate the pace of the operation. It will also be important for the bureau to address the continuing significant challenges that were revealed by the conduct of nonresponse follow-up in 2000, including achieving an acceptable response rate (and thus lowering the bureau’s follow-up workload) while controlling costs; reversing the downward trend in public participation in the census, in part by converting the relatively large number of people who are aware of the census into census respondents; keeping the address list and maps used for nonresponse follow-up finding the right mix of incentives to motivate local census offices to complete nonresponse follow-up on schedule without compromising data quality; and ensuring that reinterview procedures provide sufficient quality assurance coverage through the full duration of enumerators’ employment on nonresponse follow-up. Our draft report stated: “One reason for the errors in the nonresponse follow-up address lists was that the bureau found it was infeasible to remove late-responding households. As a result, enumerators needed to visit over 773,000 households that had already mailed back their questionnaires. We verified this information and added it to the report. | What GAO Found
Nonresponse follow-up--in which Census Bureau enumerators go door-to-door to count individuals who have not mailed back their questionnaires--was the most costly and labor intensive of all 2000 Census operations. According to Bureau data, labor, mileage, and administrative costs totaled $1.4 billion, or 22 percent of the $6.5 billion allocated for the 2000 Census. Several practices were critical to the Bureau's timely competition of nonresponse follow-up. The Bureau (1) had an aggressive outreach and promotion campaign, simplified questionnaire, and other efforts to boost the mail response rate and thus reduce the Bureau's nonresponse follow-up workload; (2) used a flexible human capital strategy that enabled it to meet its national recruiting and hiring goals and position enumerators where they were most needed; (3) called on local census offices to identify local enumeration challenges, such as locked apartment buildings and gated communities, and to develop action plans to address them; and (4) applied ambitious interim "stretch" goals that encouraged local census offices to finish 80 percent of their nonresponse follow-up workload within the first four weeks and be completely finished by the end of the eighth week, as opposed to the ten-week time frame specified in the Bureau's master schedule. Although these initiatives were key to meeting tight time frames for nonresponse follow-ups, the Bureau's experience in implementing them highlights challenges for the next census in 2010. First, maintaining the response rate is becoming increasingly expensive. Second, public participation in the census remains problematic. Third, the address lists used for nonresponse follow-up did not always contain the latest available information because the Bureau found it was infeasible to remove many late-responding households. Fourth, the Bureau's stretch goals appeared to produce mixed results. Finally, there are questions about how reinterview procedures aimed at detecting enumerator fraud and other quality problems were implemented. |
gao_GAO-06-967 | gao_GAO-06-967_0 | Rogue River-Siskiyou National Forest Staff Followed the Forest Service’s Postfire Recovery Approach, but Unique Circumstances Affected the Time Taken and Alternatives Considered for the Biscuit Fire Recovery Project
In developing the Biscuit Fire Recovery Project, the Rogue River-Siskiyou National Forest staff followed the Forest Service’s general approach for postfire recovery efforts, but several unique circumstances, combined, affected the time taken to develop the Project and the alternatives included in it. First, the size of the burned area—and subsequently the Project—complicated the environmental analysis and the time needed to complete and review it. Authorized Management Activities in Inventoried Roadless Areas Changed over the Course of Planning for the Project
The second circumstance unique to the Biscuit Fire that affected the development of the Project was the uncertainty of the regulations and guidance governing road building and salvage harvest activities in inventoried roadless areas, which affected the alternatives in the Project EIS and the time needed to analyze them. Salvage Sales Are Nearly Complete, but a Full Comparison of Financial and Economic Results with Initial Estimates Is Difficult
As of December 2005, the forest staff had nearly completed 12 salvage sales in the matrix and late-successional reserve areas; however, incomplete sales information and a lack of comparable economic data make a comparison of the financial and economic results of the sales with the agency’s initial estimates difficult. For fiscal years 2003 through 2005, the Forest Service and other agencies spent about $5 million on the sales and related activities such as law enforcement. In return, the agency collected about $8.8 million from the sales. From these receipts, the Forest Service plans to spend an additional $5.7 million in the next several years to remove brush, reforest, and conduct other work in sale areas. In the EIS, the sale expenditures and receipts were estimated to be about $24 million and $19.6 million, respectively, and the salvage harvest was expected to generate about 6,900 local jobs and $240 million in regional economic activity. However, it is premature to compare the results through 2005 with the estimates because the Forest Service will generate additional expenditures, revenues, and potential economic activity from two sales in June and August 2006. Forest Service and Other Agencies Spent an Estimated $5 Million for the Biscuit Fire Salvage Sales from Fiscal Years 2003 through 2005, and Forest Service Plans to Spend $5.7 Million of the $8.8 Million in Receipts from Sales
From fiscal years 2003 through 2005, the Forest Service reported that it spent an estimated $4.6 million to plan, prepare, and administer the salvage sales in the Biscuit Fire Recovery Project, while other agencies spent an estimated $350,000. For example, the amount of brush disposal work—an estimated 18,939 acres in the records of decision—will be reduced because the acres where salvage harvest will be done have been reduced. The forest staff do not have a schedule for developing fuel management zones and have not requested additional funds for the work. The forest staff are still planning these activities and completing them depends on schedules and funding sources. Completion of the study depends on the completion of other Project activities. The forest staff confirmed three instances of improper logging and determined that two were the result of errors on the part of the forest staff, and one was an error by the timber purchaser. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine (1) how the development of the Biscuit Fire Recovery Project compared with the Forest Service’s general approach to postfire recovery; (2) the status of the Biscuit Fire Recovery Project salvage sales and how the reported financial and economic results of the sales compared with the Forest Service’s initial estimates; (3) the status of other activities identified in the Biscuit Fire Recovery Project; and (4) the extent and cause of improper logging within the Biscuit Fire Recovery Project, as reported by the Forest Service, and changes the agency made to prevent such occurrences in the future. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2002, the Biscuit Fire burned almost 500,000 acres of the Rogue River-Siskiyou National Forest in southwestern Oregon. In its wake, the Biscuit Fire Recovery Project (Project) is one of the largest, most complex postfire recovery projects undertaken by the Forest Service. Considerable controversy exists over the Project and its salvage sales to harvest dead trees. GAO was asked to determine (1) how the Project compares with the Forest Service's general approach to postfire recovery, (2) the status of the Project's salvage sales and how the reported financial and economic results of the sales compare with initial estimates, (3) the status of other Project activities, and (4) the extent of reported improper logging and the agency's response. To answer these objectives, GAO reviewed Project environmental analysis documents, plans, and activity reports and interviewed agency officials.
What GAO Found
The Rogue River-Siskiyou National Forest staff followed the Forest Service's general approach to postfire recovery in developing the Biscuit Fire Recovery Project, but several unique circumstances affected the time taken and the alternatives it included. For example, the size of the burned area--and, subsequently, the size of the Project--complicated the environmental analysis and increased the time needed to complete and review it. Also, the regulations and guidance governing timber harvest and road building in the forest's inventoried roadless areas changed several times, in part due to litigation, affecting the amount of timber available for harvest. As of December 2005, the forest staff had nearly completed 12 salvage sales; however, incomplete sales and a lack of comparable economic data, among other things, make comparing the financial and economic results with the agency's initial estimates difficult. For fiscal years 2003 through 2005, the Forest Service and other agencies spent about $5 million on the sales and related activities. In the next several years, the Forest Service also plans to spend an additional $5.7 million to remove brush and reforest the sale areas. In return, the agency collected about $8.8 million from the sales. While the agency estimated that the salvage sales would generate about $19.6 million for restoration, 6,900 local jobs, and $240 million in regional economic activity, it is premature to compare these estimates with the results because the sales are not complete. The Forest Service will generate additional expenditures, revenues, and economic activity from two sales sold in the summer of 2006. Even when complete sales' results are available, however, a comparison will be complicated by a lack of comparable financial and economic data. Through December 2005, the forest staff began work on most of the other activities identified in the Project but completing them depends on the amount of salvage harvest, funding sources, and work schedules. For example, the amount of brush disposal work--estimated at 18,939 acres--will be reduced because the acres of salvage harvest have been reduced. Other activities, such as establishing fuel management zones to help fight future fires, depend on the Forest Service funding and scheduling the work over many years. In addition, a large-scale study and monitoring activities are still being planned and yet unfunded. Although the forest staff identified the importance of making Project results available to the public, they do not separately report on Project activities and results from other programs. During salvage harvest operations in 2004 and 2005, the Forest Service reported three incidents of improper logging and took action to prevent such occurrences in the future. Two of the incidents were caused by Forest Service errors in marking its boundaries. Forest staff have since developed procedures to better mark boundaries of sale areas. A third incident was caused by an error on the part of the company that purchased the sale; the company was fined $24,000, and the trees were left on the ground. |
gao_GAO-13-131 | gao_GAO-13-131_0 | Background
Closing out contracts involves a number of tasks, such as verifying that goods or services were provided, making final payment to the contractor, and deobligating excess funds. DCAA Implemented Initiative to Focus on High Risk Incurred Cost Proposals, but Has Not Yet Fully Developed Measures to Evaluate the Initiative’s Results
To address the backlog of incurred cost audits, DCAA implemented a new, risk-based initiative in 2012 which focuses DCAA’s resources on incurred cost proposals that have high dollar values or are determined by auditors to be high risk. In doing so, DCAA will significantly reduce the number of audits performed on incurred cost proposals that are determined to be low risk. Under its risk-based initiative, DCAA raised the threshold by which an incurred cost audit is automatically performed on a contractor’s incurred cost proposal, revised the criteria used to determine a proposal low risk, and decreased the percentages of low risk proposals that will be randomly selected for audit. DCAA plans to track certain data to help assess progress in eliminating the backlog, but DCAA has not fully developed measures to determine whether key features of the initiative, such as revised criteria for determining a proposal is low risk and revised sampling percentages, should be adjusted in the future. Further, DCAA estimates it will reach a steady state of audits, which DCAA defines as two fiscal years of proposals awaiting review, by 2016, but whether DCAA will achieve its goals will depend on a number of factors, including the number of proposals determined to be high risk and the completion of subsequent audits. Of 13,522 risk assessments completed, DCAA determined that 7,815 proposals were high risk, or about two-and-a-half times more than anticipated. The military departments generally do not have data on the extent or nature of their contract closeout backlog, while DCMA is missing key information that would allow it to identify contracts on which it could take action. Additionally, the military departments generally lack performance metrics on contract closeout. In contrast, DCMA has established two agency-wide performance metrics related to contract closeout with regular reporting to the head of the agency on progress in meeting goals. DOD Has Limited Data on Its Contract Closeout Backlog
Data on the extent and nature of the contract closeout backlog can help organizations identify or tailor approaches to address the backlog. At the local level, seven out of the nine contracting offices we spoke with collected some information about their over-age contracts, such as the total number of contracts in the backlog and the type of contracts, but the offices generally were unable to provide us with detailed information as to where the contracts were in the closeout process, such as the number awaiting a DCAA incurred cost audit. We found that the Army recently communicated a goal to its commands for closing over- age contracts, but the Navy and Air Force did not have established performance metrics for closing out contracts within their organization. Conclusions
DOD has fallen far behind in closing out its contracts, in part due to the large backlog of incurred cost audits that must be performed by DCAA. The Army is just starting to collect the information necessary to determine if it can realistically meet its goal of closing over-age contracts and has not issued an implementation plan. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve DCAA’s ability to assess whether its incurred cost backlog initiative is achieving the objectives of reducing the incurred cost audit backlog while continuing to protect the taxpayer’s interests, we recommend that the Director, DCAA, develop a plan that includes time frames and measures to assess progress towards achieving its objectives, and as appropriate, to identify how it will assess whether the changes in DCAA’s procedures and criteria are appropriate or require further revisions. DOD concurred with the four recommendations and identified a number of ongoing and planned actions to address them. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The Senate Armed Services Committee report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 directed us to review the Defense Contract Audit Agency’s (DCAA) criteria and procedures for conducting incurred cost audits and recommend steps DCAA could take to reduce the backlog, and to consider the feasibility and advisability of three options aimed at reducing the contract closeout backlog. In response, this report addresses (1) DCAA’s efforts to reduce the backlog of incurred cost audits, and (2) the challenges the Department of Defense (DOD) faces in addressing the contract closeout backlog. We also reviewed prior GAO and DOD Inspector General reports pertaining to challenges at DCAA and the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA), and contract closeout at DOD, including contract closeout in a contingency environment. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD has a large volume of contracts that have not been closed on time. Closing a contract includes tasks such as verifying that the goods and services were provided and making final payment to the contractor. Closing contracts within required time frames can limit the governments exposure to certain financial risks. One reason why some contracts are not being closed is the large backlog of incurred cost audits that must first be completed. These audits, conducted by DCAA, ensure that the costs contractors have incurred are permissible under government regulations.
The Senate Armed Services Committee report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 directed GAO to review the criteria and procedures for conducting incurred cost audits, among other things. In response, GAO assessed (1) efforts to reduce the backlog of incurred cost audits and (2) the challenges DOD faces in addressing the contract closeout backlog. GAO reviewed DCAAs policies and procedures for incurred cost audits; analyzed data on the audit and contract closeout backlogs; and interviewed officials in the military departments and agencies.
What GAO Found
To reduce the backlog of incurred cost audits, the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) implemented an initiative to focus its resources on auditing contractors' incurred costs that involve high dollar values or are otherwise determined to be high risk. Incurred cost audits are conducted on a contractor's annual proposal that includes all costs incurred on certain types of contracts in that fiscal year. Under the initiative, DCAA raised the dollar threshold that triggers an automatic audit on a contractor's incurred cost proposal from $15 million to $250 million, revised the criteria used to determine a proposal's risk level, and significantly reduced the number of low risk audits that will be randomly sampled. This initiative appears promising, and DCAA plans to track certain characteristics, such as the number of risk determinations made and audits completed. But DCAA has not fully developed the measures by which it will assess whether the initiative reduces the backlog in a manner that protects the taxpayers' interests. Specifically, DCAA does not have a plan for how it will determine whether key features of the initiative, such as the revised risk criteria and the revised sampling percentages, should be adjusted in the future. By 2016, DCAA estimates it will reduce the backlog and reach a steady state of audits, which it defines as two fiscal years of proposals awaiting review. DCAA's ability to achieve this goal will depend on a number of factors, including the number of proposals determined to be high risk, which as of September 2012 was about two-and-a-half times more than anticipated.
Reducing the backlog of incurred cost audits will ease one obstacle to closing over-age contracts, but other obstacles, such as limited data and performance metrics, must still be overcome. The military departments have limited data on the extent and nature of their contract closeout backlog, and the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA)--which performs contract administration services for the Department of Defense (DOD)--is missing information that would allow it to identify contracts that it could act on. Such data can cue agencies on how to identify or tailor approaches to address the backlog. Further, the military departments generally do not have performance metrics to measure progress in closing out contracts. The Army recently announced a goal of closing over 475,000 contracts by September 2014; however, it does not yet have the information necessary to know if it can reach this goal and does not have an implementation plan. The Navy and the Air Force had not established any department-wide performance metrics for contract closeout. In contrast, DCMA has established two agency-wide performance metrics related to contract closeout that are regularly monitored. While many officials said contract closeout was not a priority, GAO found some local contracting activities taking action to bring attention to contract closeout.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is recommending that DCAA develop a plan to assess its incurred cost audit initiative; that DCMA improve data on over-age contracts; and that the military departments develop contract closeout data and establish performance measures. DOD concurred with the recommendations and identified ongoing and planned actions to address them. |
gao_GAO-05-212 | gao_GAO-05-212_0 | The safety and quality of the U.S. food supply is governed by a complex system that is administered by 15 agencies. USDA and FDA have primary responsibility for ensuring the safety of foods. Many proposals have been made to consolidate the U.S. food safety system, but to date no action has been taken. Although the seven countries whose food safety systems we reviewed are much smaller in population than the United States, they, like the United States, are high-income countries where consumers have very high expectations for food safety. While the extent to which countries consolidated their food safety systems varied considerably, each country established a single agency to lead food safety management or enforcement of food safety legislation. Although most countries incurred some consolidation start-up costs, government officials, as well as food industry and consumer stakeholders, generally agree that consolidation has led to significant qualitative improvements in the effectiveness or efficiency of their food safety systems. First, many countries faced a similar decision regarding whether to place the new agency within the existing health or agriculture ministry or establish it as a stand-alone agency while also determining what responsibilities the new agency would have. A second challenge, cited by officials in several countries, was helping employees assimilate into the new agency’s culture and support its priorities. Although countries have not formally analyzed consolidation results, the government officials and stakeholders we interviewed in each of the seven countries cited improvements in food safety system operations and stated that the net effect of consolidation has been or will likely be positive. However, government officials in each of the seven countries believe the benefits of their consolidations have exceeded or will likely exceed the costs. Concluding Observations
Although different in many respects, the seven countries’ experiences provide information on the reform and consolidation of food safety systems that can be useful to U.S. policymakers. Comments from the Seven Countries Examined
We provided relevant excerpts from a draft of this report to officials of food safety agencies in Canada, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom for their review. In commenting on this report, both HHS and USDA stated that U.S. food safety agencies are working together effectively. HHS also commented that the countries included in our report have smaller food and agriculture industries than the United States. As a result, we believe the consolidation experiences of the countries reviewed have applicability to the United States. Scope and Methodology
This report describes the approaches the seven countries have taken in consolidating food safety functions, the challenges they faced, and the results of the countries’ efforts, including benefits and costs cited by government officials and industry or consumer stakeholders. Reasons for Consolidating Food Safety Responsibilities
Canada consolidated its food safety system to (1) improve effectiveness by making inspections and enforcement more consistent, clarifying responsibilities, and enhancing reporting to the Canadian parliament, (2) improve efficiency by reducing duplication and overlap in food safety activities, and (3) reduce federal spending. Inspections were consolidated within the DVFA in 1999 and 2000. Challenges
According to officials, in deciding where to place the new food safety agency within the government, Ireland chose to place it under its existing Department of Health and Children specifically to separate food safety responsibilities from food and agriculture promotion efforts, which is the responsibility of the Department of Agriculture and Food. Challenges
Officials in the Netherlands faced three challenges in changing the country’s food safety system. | Why GAO Did This Study
The safety and quality of the U.S. food supply are governed by a complex system that is administered by 15 agencies. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), have primary responsibility for food safety. Many legislative proposals have been made to consolidate the U.S. food safety system, but to date no other action has been taken. Several countries have taken steps to streamline and consolidate their food safety systems. In 1999, we reported on the initial experiences of four of these countries--Canada, Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom. Since then, additional countries, including Germany, the Netherlands, and New Zealand, have undertaken consolidations. This report describes the approaches and challenges these countries faced in consolidating food safety functions, including the benefits and costs cited by government officials and other stakeholders. In commenting on a draft of this report, HHS and USDA said that the countries' consolidation experiences have limited applicability to the U.S. food safety system because the countries are much smaller than the United States. The two agencies believe that they are working together effectively to ensure the safety of the food supply.
What GAO Found
In consolidating their food safety systems, the seven countries we examined--Canada, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom--varied in their approaches and the extent to which they consolidated. However, the countries' approaches were similar in one respect--each established a single agency to lead food safety management or enforcement of food safety legislation. These countries had two primary reasons for consolidating their food safety systems--public concern about the safety of the food supply and the need to improve program effectiveness and efficiency. Countries faced challenges in (1) deciding whether to place the agency within the existing health or agriculture ministry or establish it as a stand-alone agency while also determining what responsibilities the new agency would have and (2) helping employees adjust to the new agency's culture and support its priorities. Although none of the countries has analyzed the results of its consolidation, government officials consistently stated that the net effect of their country's consolidation has been or will likely be beneficial. Officials in most countries stated their new food safety agencies incurred consolidation start-up costs. However, in each country, government officials believe that consolidation costs have been or will likely be exceeded by the benefits. These officials and food industry and consumer stakeholders cited significant qualitative improvements in the effectiveness or efficiency of their food safety systems. These improvements include less overlap in inspections, greater clarity in responsibilities, and more consistent or timely enforcement of food safety laws and regulations. In addition to these qualitative benefits, officials from three countries, Canada, Denmark, and the Netherlands, identified areas where they believe financial savings may be achieved as a result of consolidation. For example, in the Netherlands officials said that reduced duplication in food safety inspections would likely result in decreased food safety spending and that they anticipate savings from an expected 25 percent reduction in administrative and management personnel. Although the seven countries we reviewed are much smaller than the United States, they are also high-income countries where consumers have very high expectations for food safety. Consequently, we believe that the countries' experiences in consolidating food safety systems can offer useful information to U.S. policymakers. |
gao_GAO-04-30 | gao_GAO-04-30_0 | In 1987, the Corps began work on a comprehensive study of flood protection alternatives for Sacramento. Design Modifications Have Greatly Raised Costs for the Common Features Project
Estimated costs for the Common Features Project grew from $57 million in 1996, when the project was first authorized, to between $270 million and $370 million in 2002, primarily because the Corps changed the design of the levee improvements. Estimated Costs for the American River Levee Improvements Authorized in 1996 Have More Than Tripled Because of Design Changes
The Corps’ cost estimate for the American River levee improvements authorized in 1996 has more than tripled, from $44 million in 1996 to about $143 million in July 2002, as shown in table 1. Natomas Basin Costs Are Expected to Increase Significantly, and Lack of Funds Has Halted Planning and Cost Estimating Efforts
The Corps’ preliminary cost estimates for the Natomas Basin component of the project increased from $13 million in 1996 to between $112 million and $212 million in 2002, as shown in table 2. The Corps Did Not Adequately Analyze Likely Cost Increases for the Common Features Project or Communicate Them to Congress in a Timely Manner
After the 1997 storm demonstrated vulnerabilities in the American River levees, the Corps significantly changed the design of the levee improvements but did not analyze the likelihood of cost increases for the Common Features Project. Furthermore, despite experiencing significant cost increases for the 1996 work, the Corps did not conduct a cost risk analysis to determine its exposure to potentially significant cost increases for the 1999 work. The Corps Did Not Provide Congress with Timely Information about Significant Potential Cost Increases for the American River Levee Improvements
The Corps’ planning guidance generally directs the Corps to seek new spending authority from Congress if it determines that a project’s estimated costs exceed the maximum project cost before it has awarded a project’s initial contract. In addition, the Corps made mistakes in its 2002 analysis in estimating the value of the residential properties the American River levee improvements would protect. Additionally, for the Natomas Basin project component, we recommend that the Secretary of the Army direct the Corps of Engineers to analyze the costs and benefits of alternatives to the current levee improvement plan and identify the flood protection plan that provides the greatest net benefits and submit a report to Congress that includes a cost estimate for all of the planned Natomas Basin work, and wait until Congress authorizes funding that is based on the report before beginning construction of any Natomas Basin levee improvements. After making these design changes, though, the Corps did not estimate the potential for cost increases due to tripling the depth of some cut-off walls or closing the gaps in cut-off walls at bridges and other areas. As this report documents, the Corps’ review process was ineffective in detecting and correcting the mistakes in the benefit analyses we identified. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 1996 and 1999, Congress authorized the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps) to strengthen sections of the American River and Natomas Basin levees that provide flood protection for Sacramento, California. In 2002, the Corps reported that the cost of this work, known as the Common Features Project, had increased significantly. GAO was asked to determine why costs increased, the extent to which the Corps analyzed and reported the potential cost increases to Congress in a timely manner, and whether the Corps correctly estimated economic benefits.
What GAO Found
Estimated costs for the Common Features Project rose from $57 million in 1996 to between $270 million and $370 million in 2002--primarily because of design changes. For the American River, costs more than tripled from $44 million to $158 million in 2002, primarily due to changes such as deepening the walls built in the levees (cut-off walls) to prevent seepage and closing gaps in the walls at bridge crossings. Cost estimates for the Natomas Basin--still in planning--increased from $13 million in 1996 to between $112 million and $212 million in 2002. The Corps has yet to analyze alternative flood protection approaches for the Natomas Basin that might be more cost-effective. Furthermore, it has not analyzed its exposure to potentially significant cost increases for the Natomas Basin work. The Corps did not fully analyze, or report to Congress in a timely manner, the potential for significant cost increases for the American River levee improvements authorized in 1996. Specifically, a severe storm in the Sacramento area in January 1997 indicated some cut-off walls would need to be much deeper and therefore would be more costly. Corps guidance generally directs the Corps to seek new spending authority from Congress if it determines, before issuing the first contract, that it cannot complete the project without exceeding its spending limit. However, the Corps began construction in 1998 without analyzing or reporting potential cost increases. By 2003, it had committed most of the funding authorized for the entire Common Features Project to the 1996 American River work, leaving the additional 1999 work and the Natomas Basin improvements without funding. In 1996, the Corps incorrectly estimated the economic benefits for the American River levee improvements by overcounting the residential properties to be protected. In 2002, it incorrectly estimated benefits for the 1999 improvements by, among other things, miscalculating the size of the area that the improvements would protect. The Corps' quality control process was ineffective in identifying and correcting these mistakes. |
gao_GAO-10-405T | gao_GAO-10-405T_0 | DOD’s Efforts to Address Our Recommendations from 2008 Reflect Varying Levels of Progress
DOD has taken steps to implement our August 2008 recommendations to improve its sexual assault prevention and response program; however, its efforts reflect various levels of progress, and opportunities exist for further program improvements. To its credit, DOD has implemented four of the nine recommendations in our August 2008 report. Further, while OSD has introduced some changes in DOD’s annual report to Congress, it has not completed the process of developing a standardized set of sexual assault data elements and definitions. We also found that OSD cannot assess training programs as we recommended, because OSD’s strategic plans and draft oversight framework do not contain measures against which to benchmark performance, and DOD has not implemented our recommendation to evaluate processes for staffing key installation-level positions because, according to OSD officials, they were advised that the Defense Task Force on Sexual Assault in the Military Services would be making related recommendations. Finally, OSD officials stated that they will not address our recommendation to collect installation-level data—despite its availability and the military services’ willingness to provide them—until they have implemented the Defense Sexual Assault Incident Database to maintain these data. Coast Guard Has Partially Implemented One of Our Two Recommendations from 2008
While the Coast Guard has partially implemented one of our recommendations to further develop its sexual assault prevention and response program, it has not implemented the other. In August 2008, we reported that the Coast Guard’s sexual assault prevention and response program was hindered by several issues, and we made two recommendations to strengthen its program’s implementation. Further, the Coast Guard lacks a systematic process to collect, document, and maintain its sexual assault data and related program information, and it lacks quality control procedures to ensure that program data being collected are reliable. Additionally, while the Coast Guard’s instruction requires that all Coast Guard Sexual Assault Response Coordinators be trained to perform relevant duties, officials stated that they have not developed a curriculum or implemented training for the Coast Guard’s 16 Sexual Assault Response Coordinators, as they had elected alternatively to develop a training curriculum for other program personnel. Thus, to ensure that the Coast Guard can provide proper advice to its personnel, in our February 2010 report we recommend that it establish and administer a curriculum for all key program personnel. In summary, we want to reiterate our recognition that both DOD and the Coast Guard have taken a number of positive steps toward addressing our recommendations from 2008 to further strengthen their respective sexual assault prevention and response programs. Additionally, each service has proactively developed and implemented a variety of initiatives—beyond what we recommended—to increase program awareness and to improve prevention of and response to occurrences of sexual assault. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
This report discusses our efforts to evaluate the Department of Defense's (DOD) and the U.S. Coast Guard's oversight and implementation of their respective sexual assault prevention and response programs. Our findings build upon our previous work related to sexual assault in the military services. DOD and the Coast Guard have taken a number of positive steps to increase program awareness and to improve their prevention and response to occurrences of sexual assault, but additional actions are needed to strengthen their respective programs. As we have previously reported, sexual assault is a crime with a far-reaching negative impact on the military services in that it undermines core values, degrades mission readiness and esprit de corps, subverts strategic goodwill, and raises financial costs. Since we reported on these implications in 2008, incidents of sexual assault have continued to occur; in fiscal year 2008, DOD reported nearly 3,000 alleged sexual assault cases, and the Coast Guard reported about 80. However, it remains impossible to accurately analyze trends or draw conclusions from these data because DOD and the Coast Guard have not yet standardized their respective reporting requirements.
What GAO Found
DOD has taken steps to implement our August 2008 recommendations to improve its sexual assault prevention and response program; however, its efforts reflect various levels of progress, and opportunities exist for further program improvements. To its credit, DOD has implemented four of the nine recommendations in our August 2008 report. Further, while the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) has introduced some changes in DOD's annual report to Congress, it has not completed the process of developing a standardized set of sexual assault data elements and definitions. We also found that OSD cannot assess training programs as we recommended, because OSD's strategic plans and draft oversight framework do not contain measures against which to benchmark performance, and DOD has not implemented our recommendation to evaluate processes for staffing key installation-level positions because, according to OSD officials, they were advised that the Defense Task Force on Sexual Assault in the Military Services would be making related recommendations. Finally, OSD officials stated that they will not address our recommendation to collect installation-level data--despite its availability and the military services' willingness to provide them--until they have implemented the Defense Sexual Assault Incident Database to maintain these data. While the Coast Guard has partially implemented one of our recommendations to further develop its sexual assault prevention and response program, it has not implemented the other. In August 2008, we reported that the Coast Guard's sexual assault prevention and response program was hindered by several issues, and we made two recommendations to strengthen its program's implementation. Further, the Coast Guard lacks a systematic process to collect, document, and maintain its sexual assault data and related program information, and it lacks quality control procedures to ensure that program data being collected are reliable. Additionally, while the Coast Guard's instruction requires that all Coast Guard Sexual Assault Response Coordinators be trained to perform relevant duties, officials stated that they have not developed a curriculum or implemented training for the Coast Guard's 16 Sexual Assault Response Coordinators, as they had elected alternatively to develop a training curriculum for other program personnel. Thus, to ensure that the Coast Guard can provide proper advice to its personnel, in our February 2010 report we recommend that it establish and administer a curriculum for all key program personnel. |
gao_RCED-99-29 | gao_RCED-99-29_0 | Background
The Congress established the Empowerment Zone (EZ) and Enterprise Community program in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 (P.L. USDA requires the rural EZs to submit weekly progress reports to the field offices and semiannual progress reports to the headquarters Office of Community Development, which is responsible for the rural program’s overall implementation. Progress Varies in Implementing the Empowerment Zone Program
The six EZs that we visited—Atlanta, Baltimore, the Kentucky Highlands, the Mississippi Mid-Delta, New York City, and the Rio Grande Valley—have reported on their progress in implementing a variety of activities involving economic development, housing, public safety, health care, public transportation, education, and family self-sufficiency. All six EZs reported that they are making progress in implementing their economic development activities; however, the extent of their progress varies. Planned Activities Vary Among Empowerment Zones
Each of the six EZs has reported to either HUD or USDA on its progress in implementing the first phase of its planned activities. However, the extent of their progress varies. Four of the EZs—Baltimore, the Kentucky Highlands, New York, and the Rio Grande Valley—have reported that they have initiated or completed many of their economic development activities. Experience and Agreement Among Stakeholders Promote Progress
Officials involved in implementing the EZs told us that two factors facilitated their progress—obtaining agreement among stakeholders and experience in implementing similar economic development activities. Both HUD and USDA Monitor the Empowerment Zones’ Progress
Both HUD and USDA said that they use progress reports from the EZs, together with visits by their own field office staff, to monitor the performance of the EZs and evaluate their fitness to continue in the EZ program. In addition, both agencies have sponsored studies, which were performed by organizations that were not involved in implementing the program, to help them monitor implementation efforts. The reports are reviewed in headquarters and by field office representatives. HUD field and headquarters staff told us that under HUD’s management reform initiative, the field offices will have an increased role in assisting the EZs and monitoring their activities. They also issued regulations covering the program. USDA officials told us that they will allocate $2 million to each new rural EZ.Both agencies are evaluating communities’ applications for designation. Program officials from both agencies told us that they expect the designations to be made no later than January 1, 1999, the statutory deadline. Table I.1: Atlanta EZ’s Economic Development Activities—Status and SSBG Allocation Marketing Business Incentives—to market EZ business incentives to existing and prospective zone businesses Vacant Property Strategy—to identify and redevelop vacant EZ buildings Old Fourth Ward Commercial Property Redevelopment—to redevelop a building located at 551 Ralph McGill Boulevard Manufactured Housing Study—to assess the use of manufactured housing in the zone Female Power Demonstration—to educate and empower female zone residents to move them toward self-sufficiency through employment Atlanta One-Stop Capital Shop—to provide comprehensive technical and financial assistance in a single location to the area’s small businesses Community Empowerment Advisory Board Revolving Loan Fund—to provide loans of up to $50,000 to home, community-based, and start-up businesses Atlanta Empowerment Zone Corporation Revolving Loan Fund—to provide loans in excess of $50,000 to businesses that locate or expand in the zone Autocraft Body and Paint Shop—to renovate and expand a business in its current location Corporate Courier—to finance businesses that expand in or relocate to the zone Creative Fine Arts—to finance businesses that expand in or relocate to the zone Fulton Cotton Bag Mill—to renovate a vacant property for commercial, retail, and residential use Miss Piggy’s Southern Cuisine—to create a new business in the zone Sweet Auburn Curb Market—to renovate an historic food market Leveraged Loan Fund—to provide loans to existing small businesses that have little or no collateral and are service-oriented Job Training-Career Day—to provide job information and solicit job interests Job Training-Computer Jobs Bank—to identify all jobs available in the state of Georgia Job Training-Renewal Atlanta—to recruit, train, and track applicants for jobs in EZ businesses Ongoing Atlanta Hawks/Atlanta Thrashers Arena—to reconstruct a sports arena Centennial Olympic Park Area Business Park—to redevelop a 1-million-square-foot office park MLK and Ashby Shopping Center—to develop vacant land into a shopping center Turner Field—to renovate the Olympic stadium for use as a baseball field (Table notes on next page)
This activity, which is part of the Vacant Property Strategy, is listed as a separate activity in the Atlanta EZ’s 1997 performance review but has no additional funds associated with it. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Empowerment Zone and Enterprise Community program, focusing on the: (1) progress made by the federal empowerment zones in implementing the program; (2) steps taken by the two responsible federal agencies--the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and the Department of Agriculture (USDA)--to monitor and evaluate the existing zones' progress; and (3) status of steps to designate the second group of empowerment zones.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the six empowerment zones that GAO visited have reported on their implementation of a variety of planned activities in the areas of economic development, housing, public safety, health care, public transportation, education, and family self-sufficiency; (2) while the mix of activities varies among the zones, economic development activities generally account for the largest portion of their planned expenditures; (3) the six zones reported that they are making progress in implementing their economic development activities; however, the extent of their progress varies; (4) four of the zones have initiated or completed many of their economic development activities and two zones have established organizations that provide comprehensive technical and financial assistance in a single location to small businesses; (5) officials involved in implementing the empowerment zone program told GAO that two factors facilitated their progress--experience in implementing activities and agreement among stakeholders; (6) both HUD and USDA have sponsored studies of the empowerment zone program to help them monitor implementation efforts; (7) both agencies use progress reports from the zones, together with visits by their own field office staff, to monitor the performance of the zones and evaluate their fitness to continue in the program; (8) HUD required reports from the urban zones in the summers of 1996 and 1997, while USDA has generally required semiannual reports from the rural zones; (9) both agencies perform field reviews and site visits to check the accuracy of the progress reports; (10) while field staff from both agencies said they provide assistance upon request, the extent of their involvement in monitoring and evaluation has varied; (11) HUD field staff told GAO they have not had a routine role in monitoring and evaluating the program; (12) under HUD's management reform initiative, the field offices will have a greater role in assisting the zones and monitoring their activities; (13) USDA involved its field office representatives in monitoring and evaluating the program by requiring the rural zones to submit weekly progress reports to field office representatives for their review; (14) HUD and USDA subsequently issued regulations covering the program, provided guidance to potential applicants, and conducted informational workshops across the country; and (15) both agencies are currently evaluating communities' applications for designation, and expect them to be made by January 1, 1999. |
gao_GAO-15-692T | gao_GAO-15-692T_0 | Within DHS, the National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) is responsible for working with public and industry infrastructure partners and leads the coordinated national effort to mitigate risk to the nation’s infrastructure through the development and implementation of the infrastructure protection program. Preliminary Findings Indicate that DHS Actions to Address Electromagnetic Threats were Conducted Independently of the EMP Commission Recommendations
As of July 2015, DHS reported taking several actions that could help address electromagnetic threats to the electric grid, but these efforts were conducted independently of the 2008 EMP Commission recommendations. Our preliminary analysis of DHS’s actions indicates that they generally fell under four categories of effort: (1) developing reports, (2) identifying mitigation efforts, (3) strategy development and planning, and (4) conducting training exercises. Impacts of Severe Space Weather on the Electric Grid. This 2011 report assessed the impacts of space weather on the electric grid, seeking to understand how previous solar storms have affected some power grids, and what cost-effective mitigation efforts are available to protect the electric grid, among other topics. RecX. In 2012, S&T partnered with industry to develop a prototype transformer that could significantly reduce the time to transport, install, and energize a transformer to aid recovery from power outages associated with transformer failures from several months to less than one week. For example, DHS’s efforts to clearly identify agency roles and responsibilities to date have been limited. We recognize that DHS does not have a statutory obligation to address the specific recommendations of the EMP Commission and many of these recommendations were also directed to DOE. Nevertheless, we believe that implementation of them could help mitigate electromagnetic impacts to the electric grid, such as helping to assure the protection of high-value transmission assets. To date, our preliminary analysis suggests that DHS has not fully addressed some key responsibilities related to effectively preparing for and responding to electromagnetic threats to the electric grid, in conjunction with DOE as the sector-specific agency for the energy sector, which is responsible for critical electrical infrastructure. We will continue to assess the extent to which DHS’s efforts align with the EMP Commission recommendations as well as the extent to which DHS’s current and planned actions align with its own risk management framework, as identified in the NIPP, as we complete our work. We will report our final results later this year. Preliminary Analysis Indicates DHS Has Not Fully Coordinated with Stakeholders to Address some Risks to the Electric Grid
Our preliminary analysis indicates that since the EMP Commission issued its recommendations in 2008, DHS has coordinated with federal and industry stakeholders to address some, but not all risks to the electric grid. Specifically, DHS has not fully coordinated with stakeholders in certain areas such as identifying critical assets or collecting information necessary to assess electromagnetic risks. Our preliminary work has identified eight projects in which DHS coordinated with other federal agencies or industry to help protect the electric grid. These projects encompass a range of different protective efforts, including the development of plans to address long term power outages, participation in exercises, and research and development activities which address the resiliency of electrical infrastructure (See Appendix II for a list of projects we identified.) DHS has not identified any efforts to specifically provide EMP-related threat information to industry stakeholders. and other federal agencies regarding the identification of key infrastructure assets. Collecting risk information. Funding could be directed through a number of avenues, including the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and National Science Foundation. 2. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
The threat posed by an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) or solar weather event could have a debilitating impact on the nation's critical electrical infrastructure, as well as other key assets that depend on electricity. These events could lead to power outages over broad geographic areas for extended durations. Addressing these risks requires collaboration among multiple government and industry stakeholders; with DHS in the lead role for overall infrastructure protection efforts, working in coordination with DOE.
The EMP Commission, established by statute and comprised of subject matter experts, issued recommendations in 2008 addressing the preparation, protection and recovery of critical infrastructures against a possible EMP attack. The majority of these recommendations were made to DHS and DOE.
This testimony is based on preliminary observations from GAO's ongoing review of DHS's efforts to address electromagnetic threats. Specifically, this testimony addresses the extent to which DHS has: (1) taken action to address recommendations from the 2008 EMP Commission Report and (2) coordinated with other principal federal agencies, such as DOE and industry stakeholders to mitigate risks to the electric grid from electromagnetic threats.
GAO reviewed EMP Commission recommendations and DHS program documents, and interviewed relevant stakeholders who provided insights on key issues and coordination activities with the federal government to address these threats.
What GAO Found
As of July 2015, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) reported taking several actions that could help address electromagnetic threats to the electric grid. GAO's preliminary analysis of DHS's actions indicates that they generally fell under four categories: (1) developing reports, (2) identifying mitigation efforts, (3) strategy development and planning, and (4) conducting exercises. For example:
Impacts of Severe Space Weather on the Electric Grid . This 2011 report evaluated how previous solar storms have affected electric grids, and identified potential cost-effective mitigation equipment available to protect these grids, among other topics.
RecX . In 2012, DHS Science &Technology partnered with industry to develop a prototype transformer that could significantly reduce the time to transport, install, and energize a transformer to aid recovery from power outages associated with transformer failures from several months to less than one week.
DHS reported its actions were not taken in response to the 2008 recommendations of the Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse Attack (EMP Commission). GAO also recognizes that DHS does not have a statutory obligation to specifically address the recommendations, but implementation of them could help mitigate electromagnetic impacts to the electric grid, such as helping to assure the protection of high-value transmission assets. Moreover, GAO's preliminary work suggests that DHS, in conjunction with the Department of Energy (DOE), has not fully addressed a key critical infrastructure protection responsibility—identification of clear internal agency roles and responsibilities related to addressing electromagnetic threats. For example, although DHS recognized one component as the lead for assessing solar weather risks, the component has not yet identified any specific roles related to collecting or analyzing risk information.
DHS has also coordinated with federal and industry stakeholders to address some, but not all risks to the electrical grid since the EMP Commission issued its recommendations. GAO preliminarily identified eight projects in which DHS coordinated with stakeholders to help protect the grid including developing plans to address long term power outages, participation in exercises, and research and development activities. Although these are positive steps, GAO's preliminary work indicates that DHS has not effectively coordinated with stakeholders to identify critical assets or collect necessary risk information, among other responsibilities. GAO will continue to assess the issues in this statement as it completes its work and will issue a report with the final results later this year. |
gao_GAO-11-659 | gao_GAO-11-659_0 | Programming Rules for Broadcasters
To help broadcasters select and air programming that serves children’s educational and informational needs, FCC established a definition and other criteria for such programming, known as “core programming” or “core children’s programming.” Core children’s programming is defined by FCC rules and is a subset of children’s programming, which is all programming directed at children, including programming that is or is not educational and informational. To increase children’s access to educational and informational programming, FCC’s rules state that broadcast stations that air a minimum of 3 hours of core children’s programming per week are eligible to have the children’s programming portion of their license renewal application approved by FCC staff rather than by the full Commission. In anticipation of the digital television transition, FCC expanded this incentive to include multicast channels—that is multiple channels aired by a single broadcast station. Children’s programming on cable and satellite services has also increased, expanding the impact of the act’s advertising limits, which restricts the duration of commercials and requires their separation from children’s programming. FCC Relies on Broadcasters to Self- Report Violations but Lacks a Corresponding Oversight Approach for Cable Operators and Satellite Providers
FCC’s Oversight of Broadcasters Generally Relies on Stations to Self- Report Violations
CTA tasks FCC with overseeing broadcast stations’ efforts to provide educational and informational television programming for children. Additionally, unlike the license renewal application process for broadcasters, FCC lacks a mechanism for cable operators or satellite providers to certify compliance with the act and identify advertising violations, even though cable operators and satellite providers are required to maintain records in their public inspection file that are sufficient to verify compliance with FCC rules, and are subject to investigations of consumer complaints by FCC. As we discuss later in this report, parents in our focus groups believed that there should be independent standards or oversight and that station involvement in designating core children’s programming represented a conflict of interest. FCC has previously collaborated with the media industry to implement CTA and address other concerns. Parents in Focus Groups Were Generally Unaware of the Act and May Draw Incorrect Conclusions about Core Children’s Programming, but Valued Educational Children’s Programming
Despite FCC Efforts, Parents Are Uninformed about the Act and Its Requirements, Potentially Leading to Incorrect Conclusions about Core Children’s Programming
FCC has emphasized the importance of parents’ knowledge of CTA and taken steps to educate parents about the act’s provisions. Their beliefs about the requirements that should apply to such programming were more stringent than current rules. Focus Group Parents Valued Appropriate and Educational Content in Children’s Programming, but Found Cable and Satellite Programming to Be More Trustworthy Than Broadcast
When discussing children’s programming in general, parents in our focus groups stated that important aspects of such programming include that it be educational, generally appropriate for children, and entertaining. During the same period, FCC has only identified seven violations by cable operators and satellite providers even though they face these same requirements and generally televise much more children’s programming than any individual broadcaster. However, FCC has effectively worked with industry stakeholders in the past to develop voluntary guidelines in other contentious areas, such as the voluntary television rating system. To better inform parents about core children’s programming and how it is designated as such, coordinate with broadcasters, associations, parents, and other stakeholders to (1) identify additional mechanisms—such as the recently launched ‘Parents’ Place’ Web site—for educating the public about core children’s programming on commercial broadcast television stations and assisting parents in making well-informed decisions about their use of core children’s programming; (2) implement these mechanisms; and (3) measure and assess the effectiveness of these mechanisms. FCC generally concurred with our recommendations and discussed planned and ongoing actions to address them. This report discusses (1) the trends in children’s programming since the Children’s Television Act of 1990 (CTA) was enacted, (2) FCC’s efforts to enforce the act, and (3) the extent to which parents value and use core children’s programming. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Children's Television Act of 1990 (CTA) and related Federal Communications Commission (FCC) rules restrict advertising during children's programs, whether aired by broadcast stations, cable operators, or satellite providers, and encourage broadcasters to air at least 3 hours per week of educational and informational programming for children (known as "core children's programming"). Broadcasters that certify in their license renewal application that they aired the minimum amount of core children's programming are eligible for expedited review. As requested, this report discusses (1) trends in children's programming, (2) FCC efforts to enforce the act, and (3) the extent to which parents value and use core children's programming. GAO analyzed FCC data, interviewed FCC and broadcast station officials, and conducted focus groups with parents.
What GAO Found
Broadcasters aired significantly more core children's programming in 2010 than in 1998, primarily because there are more broadcast channels and stations than there were then. An important source is multicasting, or the multiple channels aired by broadcasters since the digital television transition. Moreover, households increasingly rely on cable and satellite providers--to which core children's programming requirements do not apply--increasing the number of channels specifically targeted to children, but also increasing the impact of CTA and FCC's rules on advertising, which limit the duration of commercials and require their separation from children's programming on broadcast, cable, and satellite. Other media platforms, such as the Internet and MP3 players, are outside CTA's reach. FCC's reliance on broadcasters to self-report violations of CTA when they renew their operating licenses has resulted in about 7,000 violations of the advertising or public file rules resulting in fines of almost $3 million. The vast majority of violations were for exceeding advertising time limits. FCC has no comparable self-reporting enforcement approach to oversee cable operators' or satellite providers' compliance with these same advertising limits. Instead, FCC's oversight efforts have identified only seven violations by cable and satellite providers even though they televise much more children's programming than broadcasters. FCC has avoided developing specific standards for core children's programming or judging program content, due to free speech concerns, relying instead on a broad definition and oversight by the public. A lack of widely accepted standards to assess such programming makes it difficult for parents and broadcasters to evaluate the educational content of core children's programming, potentially leading to wide variation in its quality. In the past, FCC and the media industry have collaborated to resolve concerns about program content in other areas. Parent focus groups were largely unaware of CTA's requirements despite FCC's public education efforts. Once informed about the act and core children's programming, focus group parents believed requirements governing such programming should be more stringent than current rules. Core children's programming is designated as such by broadcast stations, but focus group parents believed independent standards or assessments of programming should be required, and parents in all focus groups perceived broadcast station involvement in the process to be a potential conflict of interest. Parents in our focus groups stated that important aspects of children's programming were that it be educational, age appropriate, and entertaining. Focus group parents had differing views on the importance and definition of educational television, but generally agreed that child-dedicated cable networks are more trustworthy for children's programming than broadcast stations and that a gap exists in appropriate programming for school-age children.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that FCC (1) implement a strategy to oversee cable operators' and satellite providers' compliance, (2) work with industry to develop voluntary guidelines for assessing core children's programming, and (3) implement and assess the effectiveness of additional mechanisms to inform parents about core children's programming. FCC generally concurred with GAO's recommendations and discussed planned and ongoing actions to address them. |
gao_GAO-14-76 | gao_GAO-14-76_0 | Based on tools used to analyze the military value of installations as part of the Base Realignment and Closure process, the Army developed a military value analysis model to support stationing decisions for six new BCTs that were established as part of the 2007 Grow the Army initiative, and has adapted that model for use in a number of other The Army’s military value brigade stationing decisions since that time.analysis model was developed by the Center for Army Analysis, which reports to the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Programs, and is a decision analysis tool that is designed to rank-order installations based on attributes that the Army has identified as being operationally important to the type of unit in question for each stationing decision. The Army’s BCT Stationing Decision Was Informed by Quantitative and Qualitative Analyses and Included an Effort to Obtain Community Input, Which May Provide Benefits for Future Stationing Decisions
The Army’s BCT stationing decision regarding the installations at which to inactivate BCTs was informed by a number of quantitative and qualitative analyses, including a military value analysis of installations, an environmental assessment, and a qualitative analysis of different stationing options. An Army Force Management official said that he is currently developing proposed guidelines for when community listening sessions should be proposed for consideration by Army senior leaders in making stationing decisions, but was uncertain how such guidelines would be incorporated into the stationing process and related guidance. Principles for effective stakeholder participation have shown that effective stakeholder involvement includes actively soliciting stakeholder input from those potentially affected by a decision, involving stakeholders early and throughout the decision-making process, and fostering responsive, interactive communication between stakeholders and decision makers. Incorporating this type of communication with external stakeholders into its stationing process could help to ensure that the Army takes into account the views of external stakeholders and lead to potentially greater buy-in from local communities for Army stationing decisions. While the Army has taken steps to validate the model, it has not yet formalized the use of the military value analysis model within its stationing process by establishing guidance related to the use of the model, including guidance related to when the model should be used for stationing decisions or the processes through which key aspects of the model are reviewed, updated, and approved for each use of the model, and data collected and validated. The Army Has Taken Steps to Validate the Model, but Has Not Established Consistent Formal Processes and Guidance Related to How the Model Is Reviewed, Updated, and Approved for Each Use
The Army has taken steps to ensure the validity of the military value analysis model and its results, but has not established consistent formal processes to guide how (a) the attributes of the model should be reviewed and selected for use in the model, (b) attribute definitions should be reviewed to determine if they are still relevant for a particular decision and updated, and (c) data should be collected and validated. The Army also lacks guidance related to the level of input or approval that is necessary for changes to key elements of the model, and how non- contiguous training areas should be treated within the model. Internal control standards state that control activities, such as consistent processes or policies, can help to ensure that actions to mitigate risks are carried out. The official additionally said that there was potential for growth at certain installations resulting from the BCT inactivation and subsequent reorganization. Conclusions
The Army recognizes that its decision to meet part of its planned active component force reductions through the inactivation of 10 BCTs currently stationed in the United States, coupled with the reorganization of the remaining BCTs in the continental United States, will have strategic, operational, and cost implications. For instance, without formalizing the military value analysis model in its stationing process guidance or as part of other guidance, including when it should be used and how it should be considered within the stationing process, the transparency of the model’s role in stationing decisions may be limited. To better ensure the Army military value analysis model’s analytical rigor and credibility, minimize risk, and further enhance the transparency of the process used to make stationing decisions, we recommend that the Secretary of the Army direct the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, in coordination with the Center for Army Analysis, to take the following four actions to formalize the model as part of its stationing process:
Develop and implement guidance that establishes the circumstances the model should be used in stationing decisions and update stationing regulations or related documents accordingly; key elements of the model or changes to the model require input or approval from Army leaders, such as through the use of a general officer steering committee; and, non-contiguous training areas should be considered within the model that are specific to the stationing decision under consideration and communicate those policies to subject matter experts. The Army concurred with our recommendation to develop and implement guidance related to when community listening sessions or other similar efforts to obtain community input should be conducted as part of the Army’s process for making future stationing decisions. To evaluate the extent to which the Army has established guidance and processes related to the use of the military value analysis model as a part of its stationing decisions, including the recent BCT decision, we examined the Army’s stationing guidance, stationing report to Congress, and reports and briefings that documented previous uses of the model. | Why GAO Did This Study
As part of its plan to reduce its active duty force by 80,000 personnel by 2017, the Army will be inactivating 10 BCTs currently stationed in the United States and reorganizing the remaining BCTs. The Army conducted analyses of different stationing options, which included the use of its military value analysis model to compare installations based on their ability to support BCTs. GAO was asked to review the decision making process the Army used for its BCT stationing decision, including its military value analysis model. This report (1) describes the analyses the Army conducted to make its BCT decision and (2) evaluates the extent to which the Army has established guidance and processes related to the use of the military value analysis model as a part of its stationing decisions. GAO reviewed the Army's stationing guidance, current and previous versions of the military value analysis model, documents on the BCT decision, and spoke with cognizant officials.
What GAO Found
To make decisions regarding the installations at which to inactivate 10 Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) and reorganize others, the Army conducted quantitative and qualitative analyses and obtained community input. Specifically, in 2012 the Army established a BCT Reorganization Operational Planning Team to assess factors such as strategic considerations, military construction costs, and environmental and socioeconomic impacts, among others, and develop stationing options for decision makers. The Army also considered other factors, or attributes--such as training ranges, geographic distribution, and proximity to embarkation points--in its military value analysis model. In addition, the Army conducted community input sessions at installations with 5,000 or more military and civilian personnel, including the 15 under consideration for inactivation of a BCT. Several Army officials said that the sessions were valuable and could serve as a tool for future stationing decisions. However, the Army's stationing regulation does not include guidance on obtaining community input beyond what may be required in the context of environmental analysis. An Army official said that he is developing proposed guidelines for when such input should be considered, but was uncertain how they will be incorporated into formal guidance. Effective stakeholder involvement includes actively soliciting ongoing stakeholder input and fostering communication between stakeholders and decision makers. Incorporating this type of communication with external stakeholders into its stationing guidance for future decisions could lead to potentially greater buy-in from local communities for Army stationing decisions.
The Army expects to continue using its military value analysis model for major stationing decisions and has taken steps to validate the model, but has not established guidance and consistent formal processes related to its use, including when the model should be used or how it should be reviewed, updated, and approved. Standards for internal control state that control activities, such as established and consistent processes or policies, can help to ensure actions to mitigate risks are carried out. Army officials said that the model has generally been used for large-impact stationing decisions and may not be appropriate for minor decisions. However, the Army's stationing regulation does not discuss the model or provide guidance on the circumstances when the model should be used. Also, the Army has not established consistent processes for reviewing and updating attributes and attribute definitions within the model or for collecting and validating data, nor has it established guidance related to the level of input or approval required for changes to the model or how geographically distant training areas should be treated in the model. For instance, subject matter experts noted that the definitions of a couple of attributes should be updated or reviewed, but GAO found that there is no consistent process in place for addressing such issues. Army officials told GAO that the attributes and weighting of the attributes within the model may also change depending on the type of stationing decision, but there is no guidance on when revisions should be approved by Army leaders. Without consistent formal processes for updating and reviewing the model and data used, and guidance related to the level of approval required for changes to the model, the Army risks potential decline in the rigor and consistency of the model over time.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends the Army develop and implement guidance related to when community input should be obtained for stationing decisions, and related to the use of its military value analysis model, such as when it should be used, the level of approval required for changes to the model, and how certain training areas should be considered, as well as processes for updating and reviewing the model. The Army concurred with GAOs recommendations and explained how they will be implemented. |
gao_GAO-03-419SP | gao_GAO-03-419SP_0 | Little progress has been made in moving toward a more comprehensive reporting model that would include both financial information (financial statements and related disclosures) and nonfinancial information (such as high-level operating and performance measures used by management and forward-looking information about opportunities, risks, and management’s plans). Participants stated that the current model is too driven by accountants, regulators, corporate management, and boards of directors who have historically focused on the technical aspects of financial reporting and are more likely to move slowly and cautiously in making changes. As a result, the current model has failed to get adequate “traction” to move toward a more comprehensive reporting model. There was general agreement that (1) a combination of principle-based and rule-based standards would be needed and (2) principle-based accounting rules were not a panacea to solve financial reporting problems. The Accounting Profession
An expectation gap between what an audit is and is not continues to exist, especially with regard to the auditor’s responsibility for detecting fraud. It was recognized that the standard auditor’s report could be made more useful to users who are seeking greater information about what the auditor did and found, as well as expanded assurances. Regulation and Enforcement
A strong, viable Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is needed to maintain investor confidence in the markets. The new Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) needs to officially get up and running. Suggested priorities for the PCAOB included establishing policies and procedures for disciplinary actions and conducting inspections of registered public accounting firms. Users of these products will need to step forward to help ensure the value of an enhanced financial reporting model and related auditor assurances for the effective functioning of U.S. capital markets. Corporate Governance
Defining the Roles and Responsibilities of the Board of Directors
Recent legislative and regulatory initiatives, such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) proposals and rules, and proposed revised stock exchange listing requirements, have addressed weaknesses in corporate governance exposed by the major financial reporting issues raised by restatements and corporate failures, placing greater emphasis on the roles and responsibilities of boards of directors. Although these reforms are not yet fully in place and not all issues have been addressed, many corporate boards are reassessing their roles. However, participants agreed that there is no “silver bullet” and that it is difficult at this time to say what is working and what is not working. In addition to focusing on what accountants, regulators, and corporate management and boards of directors (the “supply side”) should do, boards need to focus more on what investors and other users of financial information (the “demand side”) want from corporate governance. For example, management is responsible for the operations of the company and members of the board in their oversight function should have the ability to challenge the CEO in managing the company. Participants discussed the lack of investor confidence in the current financial reporting model and the need to first improve the reliability of financial reporting before adding any new reporting. Participants offered that an “artful” blend of both principles and rules would be useful. The Accounting Profession
An Expectation Gap Exists Concerning the Role of Auditing
The participants discussed the auditor’s responsibility for detecting fraud and the meaning of the assurances provided by the auditor’s report on the financial statements. Participants also believed that a challenge facing the new PCAOB will be dealing with the complex relationship between federal and state governments involved in regulating the accounting profession. GAO’s Governance and Accountability Forum
Participants
Gaston L. Gianni, Jr.
A.W. | Why GAO Did This Study
On December 9, 2002, GAO convened a governance and accountability forum to discuss challenges facing regulators, the accounting profession, and boards of directors and management of public companies in effectively implementing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and related regulatory actions to improve public confidence in U.S. corporate governance and accountability systems. Major accountability breakdowns recent years, exacerbated in the last 2 years by the unprecedented massive breakdowns and bankruptcy of Enron and WorldCom, have contributed to the decline in investor confidence in U.S. capital markets. The forum focused on the four interrelated areas of corporate governance, the financial reporting model, the accounting profession, and regulation and enforcement that the accountability breakdowns have surfaced as critical areas to be strengthened. Addressing these challenges will involve the public, private, and not-for-profit sectors. In general, there must be the proper incentives, transparency, and accountability mechanisms in place to ensure the effectiveness of any system. As a result, these overarching principles were considered in connection with the issues discussed. Forum participants included individuals from federal and state government, the private sector, standards setting and oversight bodies, and a variety of other interested parties.
What GAO Found
There was general agreement among the participants that the root causes of the accountability breakdowns are systemic in nature, complex, and will require leadership and alterations to the current models in each of the four interrelated areas to transition to an overall system that is more focused on protecting the public interest and, in that regard, accountability. They also agreed that considerable actions have been taken and/or proposed towards achieving those objectives, but that having the "right people" and "stakeholders" involved was critical to successfully achieve and effectively maintain the necessary reforms. Several other key observations follow. Many boards of directors are reassessing their roles and responsibilities, and currently it is difficult to determine what is working and what is not working. Participants agreed there is no "silver bullet" to enhancing the effectiveness of boards of directors in their role of overseeing management and protecting the public interest. However, for a board to effectively perform its responsibilities, it must have the "right people" who possess an "independent spirit" and are "knowledgeable" of the company/industry and the company's constituencies. Little progress has been made moving toward a more comprehensive financial reporting model that would include such information as operating and performance measures and forward-looking information about opportunities, risks, and management's plans. The impetus for changing the financial reporting model needs more involvement of investors and other users of financial information as the current model is too driven by those who have historically focused more on the technical aspects of financial reporting, such as accountants, regulators, corporate management, and boards of directors. An "artful blend" of principle-based and rule-based accounting standards, as well as a financial reporting model with different tiers of reporting that provides full disclosure, are fundamental changes needed to improve the financial reporting model. An "expectation gap" of what an audit is and what users expect continues to exist, especially with the auditor's responsibility for fraud detection. Supplementing the traditional financial statement audit with a "forensic audit" as well as with a more informative auditor's report could help to narrow the "expectation gap." A strong, viable Securities and Exchange Commission is needed to maintain investor confidence. Concern was raised that the Commission is not fully at that status and that funding issues need to be resolved. The new Public Company Accounting Oversight Board needs to officially get up and running with immediate priorities focusing on establishing policies and procedures for performing its disciplinary, inspection, and standard-setting functions. |
gao_GAO-17-720 | gao_GAO-17-720_0 | Nonetheless, according to several experts we interviewed, the methods can convey useful insight into broad themes about potential climate damages across sectors in the United States. National-Scale Studies and Experts Suggested That Potential Economic Effects of Climate Change in the United States Could Be Significant and Unevenly Distributed
The two national-scale studies—the American Climate Prospectus and the Climate Change Impacts and Risk Analysis—and many of the experts we interviewed suggested that although the methods are developing and produce imprecise results, the potential economic effects of climate change could be significant in many sectors across the U.S. economy and unevenly distributed across U.S. sectors and regions. For example, the study estimated that coastal property losses from sea level rise and increases in the frequency and intensity of storms could range from $4 billion to $6 billion per year in the near term (i.e., 2020 through 2039), increasing to a range of $51 billion to $74 billion per year by late century. Figure 2 shows examples of potential economic effects in different U.S. geographic areas. According to Leading Practices and Experts, Information on the Potential Economic Effects of Climate Change Could Help Decision Makers Better Manage Climate Risks
Information on the potential economic effects of climate change could help federal decision makers better manage climate risks, according to leading practices for climate risk management and economic analysis we reviewed and the views of several experts we interviewed. The federal government has not undertaken strategic, government-wide planning to manage climate risks, using the best available information, including information on the potential economic effects of climate change, to identify and assess significant risks. By using information on the potential economic effects of climate change to assess and identify significant climate risks and craft appropriate federal responses, the federal government could take an initial step in establishing government- wide priorities to manage significant climate risks, which we recommended in May 2011 to reduce federal fiscal exposure and continue to believe is important. Conclusions
Climate change impacts are already costing the federal government money, and these costs will likely increase over time as the climate continues to change. Under the National Academies’ 2010 leading practices, climate change risk management efforts need to be focused on where immediate attention is needed, and by prioritizing federal climate risk management activities well, the federal government can help to minimize negative impacts and maximize opportunities associated with climate change. Recommendation for Executive Action
We are making the following recommendation to the Executive Office of the President: The appropriate entities within the Executive Office of the President, including the Council on Environmental Quality, Office and Management and Budget, and Office of Science and Technology Policy, should use information on the potential economic effects of climate change to help identify significant climate risks facing the federal government and craft appropriate federal responses. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
In this report, we examine (1) what is known about methods used to estimate the potential economic effects of climate change in the United States; (2) what is known about the potential economic effects of climate change in the United States; and (3) to what extent have leading practices and experts found that information about the potential economic effects of climate change could inform efforts to manage climate risks across the federal government. | Why GAO Did This Study
Over the last decade, extreme weather and fire events have cost the federal government over $350 billion, according to the Office of Management and Budget. These costs will likely rise as the climate changes, according to the U.S. Global Change Research Program. In February 2013, GAO included Limiting the Federal Government's Fiscal Exposure by Better Managing Climate Change Risks on its High-Risk List.
GAO was asked to review the potential economic effects of climate change and risks to the federal government. This report examines (1) methods used to estimate the potential economic effects of climate change in the United States, (2) what is known about these effects, and (3) the extent to which information about these effects could inform efforts to manage climate risks across the federal government. GAO reviewed 2 national-scale studies available and 28 other studies; interviewed 26 experts knowledgeable about the strengths and limitations of the studies; compared federal efforts to manage climate risks with leading practices for risk management and economic analysis; and obtained expert views.
What GAO Found
Methods used to estimate the potential economic effects of climate change in the United States—using linked climate science and economics models—are based on developing research. The methods and the studies that use them produce imprecise results because of modeling and other limitations but can convey insight into potential climate damages across sectors in the United States.
The two available national-scale studies that examine the economic effects of climate change across U.S. sectors suggested that potential economic effects could be significant and unevenly distributed across sectors and regions. For example, for 2020 through 2039, one study estimated between $4 billion and $6 billion in annual coastal property damages from sea level rise and more frequent and intense storms. Also, under this study, the Southeast likely faces greater effects than other regions because of coastal property damages (see figure).
Information about the potential economic effects of climate change could inform decision makers about significant potential damages in different U.S. sectors or regions. According to several experts and prior GAO work, this information could help federal decision makers identify significant climate risks as an initial step toward managing such risks. This is consistent with, for example, National Academies leading practices, which call for climate change risk management efforts that focus on where immediate attention is needed. The federal government has not undertaken strategic government-wide planning to manage climate risks by using information on the potential economic effects of climate change to identify significant risks and craft appropriate federal responses. By using such information, the federal government could take an initial step in establishing government-wide priorities to manage such risks.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the appropriate entities within the Executive Office of the President (EOP), including the Office of Science and Technology Policy, use information on potential economic effects to help identify significant climate risks and craft appropriate federal responses. EOP entities and the Environmental Protection Agency did not provide official comments on the report. |
gao_GAO-04-107 | gao_GAO-04-107_0 | Background
Title IV of HEA authorizes federal student aid programs, including the Direct Loan Program and FFELP. In the ensuing years, competition between the two loan programs has been credited with improving service to schools and benefits for borrowers. About One-Third of Postsecondary Schools That Provided Federal Loans since 1994-95 Have Participated in the Direct Loan Program
Of the schools that provided federal student loans in each year since 1994-95, approximately 1,200—or 29 percent—provided loans through the Direct Loan Program, and most of those schools continued to participate in the Direct Loan Program in school year 2001-02. Since 1998-99, the Direct Loan Program’s share of total new loan volume has steadily decreased from its peak of 34 percent to 28 percent in 2001-02. During this same time period, the number of schools that began to participate in the program was smaller than the number of schools that stopped participating. Four factors—(1) streamlined loan delivery, (2) greater control over loan processes, (3) timely delivery of money to students, and (4) ease of tracking loans over time—were extremely or very important in influencing 70 percent of Direct Loan schools’ decision to participate in the Direct Loan Program. A Variety of Factors Influenced Schools’ Decision to End Participation in the Direct Loan Program
A number of schools that joined the Direct Loan Program but subsequently stopped participating reported that different factors influenced their decision to do so. FSA Does Not Collect Information on the Factors Influencing Schools’ Decision to Stop Participating
FSA does not systematically collect information about the factors that influence schools’ decision to stop participating in the Direct Loan Program, although this information could be used to identify needed program improvements. Direct Loan Schools Are Satisfied with Steps Taken by FSA to Make the Program User-Friendly but Identified Opportunities for FSA to Improve These Services
FSA has made the Direct Loan Program more user-friendly for schools and students by (1) using Web sites to disseminate and collect information and forms, (2) implementing a new information system to originate and disburse Direct Loans, and (3) designating regional staff to assist Direct Loan schools. FSA officials stated that they are aware of schools’ concerns and are developing a strategy to redesign its Web sites. Direct Loan Schools Reported That FSA’s Web Sites Have Helped Them Administer the Program, but Navigating among Multiple Sites Can Be Challenging
Many Direct Loan schools reported on our survey that FSA’s Web sites helped them administer the Direct Loan Program but that navigating among FSA’s Web sites was challenging. Matters for Congressional Consideration
In light of questions about provisions in the HEA concerning Direct Loan Program origination fees, Congress should consider clarifying the extent to which Education may regulate the loan origination fees charged to borrowers during its reauthorization of the HEA. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 1993, Congress authorized the William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program as an alternative to the Federal Family Education Loan Program (FFELP). While the Direct Loan Program was originally mandated to replace FFELP, Congress revised the law allowing both loan programs to continue. Since that time, competition between the programs has been credited with improving borrower benefits and service for schools. The Department of Education's (Education) Office of Federal Student Aid (FSA) and its contractors administer the Direct Loan Program, and one of its goals is to improve customer service. In light of the upcoming reauthorization of the Higher Education Act (HEA), which authorizes the loan programs, this report examines the extent to which schools participate in the Direct Loan Program, factors that influenced schools' decision to begin--and for some schools end--participation, and steps that FSA has taken to increase the userfriendliness of the program.
What GAO Found
Of schools that provided federal loans in every year since 1994-95, approximately 1,200 postsecondary schools--or 29 percent--have provided loans through the Direct Loan Program, and most continued to participate in school year 2001-02. The Direct Loan Program's share of total new loan volume has steadily decreased from its peak of 34 percent in 1998-99 to 28 percent in 2001-02, and the number of schools that have joined the program is much smaller than the number of school that have stopped participating. Four factors--(1) streamlined loan delivery, (2) greater control over loan processes, (3) timely delivery of money to students, and (4) ease of tracking loans over time--were extremely or very important in influencing schools' decision to participate in the Direct Loan Program. Schools that joined and subsequently left the Direct Loan Program reported a number of factors that influenced their decision, including difficulties fulfilling certain program requirements and reduced or no loan origination fees offered by FFELP lenders. Education has reduced origination fees for Direct Loan borrowers, but its regulatory authority to do so has been challenged. FSA does not systematically collect information from schools about the reasons why they stop participating in the Direct Loan Program, although this information could be used to identify needed program improvements. FSA has taken a number of steps to increase the user-friendliness of the program, such as using Web sites to disseminate and collect information and forms. Many Direct Loan schools reported that FSA's Web sites are effective in helping them administer the program and have simplified the process for Direct Loan borrowers, but it is challenging to navigate among multiple Web sites. FSA officials are aware of schools' concerns and are developing a plan to redesign its Web sites. FSA has also implemented a new information system that originates and disburses Direct Loans to students faster, and 72 percent of Direct Loan schools were generally or very satisfied with this system. |
gao_GAO-05-101 | gao_GAO-05-101_0 | The remaining cases were discovered in 26 countries, including Canada and the United States. According to our analysis, this new approach and data system are designed to more reliably track feed-ban inspection results. As a result, FDA has a better management tool for overseeing compliance with the feed-ban rule and a data system that better conforms to standard database management practices. These problems should not occur with FDA’s new system. Program Weaknesses Continue to Limit the Effectiveness of FDA’s Animal Feed Ban
While FDA has made many improvements to its oversight and enforcement of the feed ban in response to our 2002 report recommendations, we found a number of oversight weaknesses that limit the effectiveness of the ban and could place U.S. cattle at risk for BSE. Specifically, we found that FDA does not have a uniform procedure to identify all firms subject to the feed ban, require firms to notify FDA if they process with prohibited material, routinely use tests to verify compliance with the feed ban, alert USDA or states when cattle may have been fed with feed containing prohibited material, and adequately overseeing the procedures for cleaning vehicles that haul cattle feed. We found that 2,833 or about 19 percent, of these firms FDA has identified as subject to the feed-ban rule have not been reinspected in 5 or more years. For example, the feed-ban inspection guidance does not instruct inspectors to routinely sample cattle feed to verify firms’ claims that they do not use prohibited materials or exempt ingredients, or to ensure that firms’ cleanout and flushing procedures to prevent commingling are followed and are effective. Research suggests that cattle can get BSE from ingesting even a small amount of infected material—an amount that could be introduced in feed that was transported in a poorly cleaned vehicle. This information has also been used to cite high industry compliance. However, FDA said the report did not identify material weaknesses to support our position that oversight weaknesses limit FDA’s program effectiveness and place U.S. cattle at risk of spreading BSE. Although FDA noted implementation concerns, it did not take issue on the need for (1) developing uniform procedures for identifying firms subject to the feed ban, (2) collecting test results from the states that sample feed, (3) including a cautionary statement on feed and feed ingredients intended for export, (4) notifying USDA and states when feed or feed ingredients containing prohibited material may have been fed to cattle, and (5) modifying the inspection form to include questions to better oversee the cleanliness of vehicles used to transport cattle feed or feed ingredients. Scope and Methodology
As discussed below, to assess the effectiveness of the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) actions to ensure industry compliance with the feed ban and protect U.S. cattle from bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), we (1) analyzed 404 inspection reports for BSE inspections performed during fiscal year 2003 and 2004; (2) observed 19 inspections in 12 states that were conducted by either FDA or state inspectors; (3) assessed the reliability of FDA’s feed-ban inspection database; (4) interviewed officials at FDA headquarters and district offices, state agencies, and industry associations, as well as reviewed documents provided by these officials concerning oversight of the animal feed ban; and (5) surveyed state agency officials in 38 states. of animal feed to test for prohibited materials as part of BSE inspections that are done for FDA? A well enforced feed ban is even more critical now that BSE has been discovered in cattle in North America. In fact, FDA acknowledges that there are millions of firms potentially subject to the feed-ban rule. FDA has no basis for that assertion. | Why GAO Did This Study
More than 5 million cattle across Europe have been killed to stop the spread of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), commonly called mad cow disease. Found in 26 countries, including Canada and the United States, BSE is believed to spread through animal feed that contains protein from BSE-infected animals. Consuming meat from infected cattle has also been linked to the deaths of about 150 people worldwide. In 1997, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) issued a feed-ban rule prohibiting certain animal protein (prohibited material) in feed for cattle and other ruminant animals. FDA and 38 states inspect firms in the feed industry to enforce this critical firewall against BSE. In 2002, GAO reported a number of weaknesses in FDA's enforcement of the feed ban and recommended corrective actions. This report looks at FDA's efforts since 2002 to ensure industry compliance with the feed ban and protect U.S. cattle.
What GAO Found
FDA has made needed improvements to its management and oversight of the feed-ban rule in response to GAO's 2002 report, but program weaknesses continue to limit the effectiveness of the ban and place U.S. cattle at risk of spreading BSE. Improvements made include FDA establishing a uniform method of conducting compliance inspections and training FDA inspectors, as well as state inspectors who carry out inspections under agreements with FDA, on the new method. FDA also implemented new data-entry procedures that are designed to more reliably track feed-ban inspection results. Consequently, FDA has a better management tool for overseeing compliance with the feed-ban rule and a data system that better conforms to standard database management practices. However, various program weaknesses continue to undermine the nation's firewall against BSE. FDA acknowledges that there are more feed manufacturers and transporters, on-farm mixers, and other feed industry businesses that are subject to the feed ban than the approximately 14,800 firms inspected to date; however, it has no uniform approach for identifying additional firms. FDA has not reinspected approximately 2,800, or about 19 percent, of those businesses, in 5 or more years; several hundred are potentially high risk. FDA does not know whether those businesses now use prohibited material in their feed. FDA's feed-ban inspection guidance does not include instructions to routinely sample cattle feed to test for potentially prohibited material as part of the compliance inspection. Instead, it includes guidance for inspectors to visually examine facilities and equipment and review invoices and other documents. Feed intended for export is not required to carry a caution label "Do not feed to cattle or other ruminants," when the label would be required if the feed were sold domestically. Without that statement, feed containing prohibited material could be inadvertently or intentionally diverted back to U.S. cattle or given to foreign cattle. FDA has not always alerted USDA and states when it learned that cattle may have been given feed that contained prohibited material. This lapse has been occurring even though FDA's guidance calls for such communication. Although research suggests that cattle can get BSE from ingesting even a small amount of infected material, inspectors do not routinely inspect or review cleanout procedures for vehicles used to haul cattle feed. |
gao_GAO-01-1142T | gao_GAO-01-1142T_0 | Two inhalation therapy drugs accounted for 88 percent of the Medicare billing volume for pharmacy- supplied drugs administered in a patient’s residence. Medicare Payments for Drugs Are Based on Published AWPs
Medicare’s payment for part B-covered drugs is based on the product’s AWP, which is a price assigned by the product’s manufacturer and may be neither “average” nor “wholesale.” Instead, the AWP is often described as a “list price,” “sticker price,” or “suggested retail price.”
The term AWP is not defined in law or regulation, so the manufacturer is free to set an AWP at any level, regardless of the actual price paid by purchasers. In paying claims, Medicare carriers use published AWPs to determine Medicare’s payment amount, which is 95 percent of AWP.Thus, given the latitude manufacturers have in setting AWP, these payments may be unrelated to market prices that physicians and suppliers actually pay for the products. Medicare’s Payment for Part B-Covered Drugs Is Significantly Higher Than Prices Widely Available to Providers
For the part B-covered drugs accounting for the bulk of Medicare spending and claims, Medicare payments in 2001 were almost always considerably higher than wholesalers’ prices that were widely available to physicians and suppliers. Wide Disparities Exist Between Drug Acquisition Costs and Medicare Payments
Our study shows that there can be wide disparities between a drug’s estimated acquisition cost and Medicare’s payment for that drug. As with physician-billed drugs, Medicare’s payments for pharmacy supplier-billed drugs generally far exceeded the prices available to these suppliers. Policies to Pay for Related Delivery and Administration Services Vary by Provider
Medicare payment policies for administering or delivering a drug vary, depending on who provides the drug to the patient. No explicit payments are made to pharmacy suppliers for dispensing other drugs, but they may receive payments for equipment and supplies associated with DME-administered drugs. The implementation of this fee schedule, however, has been controversial. Oncologists, who represent the majority of physicians billing for drugs, argue that Medicare’s payments for administering chemotherapy are inappropriately low and that the excess Medicare drug payments are needed to offset their losses. Moreover, they increased payments on average for services involving physicians. Similar to the physicians who bill for part B drugs, pharmacy suppliers and their representatives contend that the margin on the Medicare drug payment is needed to compensate them for costs not covered by Medicare—that is, the clinical, administrative, and other labor costs associated with delivering the drug. Other Purchasers’ Practices Are Instructive for Reforming Medicare’s Method of Paying for Part B-Covered Drugs
Private insurers and federal agencies, such as VA, employ different approaches in paying for or purchasing drugs that may provide useful lessons for Medicare. In general, these payers make use of the leverage of their volume and competition to secure better prices. | Why GAO Did This Study
The pricing of Medicare's part B-covered prescription drugs--largely drugs that cannot be administered by patients themselves--has been under scrutiny for years. Most of the part B drugs with the highest Medicare payments and billing volume fall into three categories: those that are billed for by physicians and typically provided in a physician office setting, those that are billed for by pharmacy suppliers and administered through a durable medical equipment (DME) item, and those that are also billed by pharmacy suppliers but are patient-administered and covered explicitly by statute. Studies show that Medicare sometimes pays physicians and other providers significantly more than their actual costs for the drugs. In September 2000, the Health Care Financing Administration's (HCFA)--now the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services--took steps to reduce Medicare's payment for part B-covered drugs by authorizing Medicare carriers, the contractors that pay part B claims, to use prices obtained in the Justice Department investigations of providers' drug acquisition costs. HFCA retracted this authority in November 2000 after providers raised concerns.
What GAO Found
GAO found that Medicare's method for establishing drug payments is flawed. Medicare pays 95 percent of the average wholesale price (AWP), which, despite its name, may be neither an average nor what wholesalers charge. It is a price that manufacturers derive using their own criteria; there are no requirements or conventions that AWP reflect the price of any actual sale of drugs by a manufacturer. Manufacturers report AWPs to organizations that publish them in drug price compendia, and Medicare carriers that pay claims for part B drugs base providers' payments on the published AWPs. In 2001, widely available prices at which providers could purchase drugs were substantially below AWP, on which Medicare payments are based. For both physician-billed drugs and pharmacy supplier-billed drugs, Medicare payments often far exceeded widely available prices. Physicians and pharmacy suppliers contend that the excess payments for covered drugs are necessary to offset what they claim are inappropriately low or nonexistent Medicare payments for services related to these drugs. For delivery pharmacy supplier-billed drugs, Medicare's payment policies are uneven. Pharmacy suppliers billing Medicare receive a dispensing fee for one drug type--inhalation therapy drugs--but there are no similar payments for other DME-administered or oral drugs. Other payers and purchasers, such as health plans and the Department of Veterans Affairs, use different approaches to pay for or purchase drugs that may be instructive for Medicare. In general, they make use of the leverage from their volume and competition to secure better prices. |
gao_GAO-03-236 | gao_GAO-03-236_0 | This represented about 70 percent of participants in these employers’ plans. FEHBP’s premium increases in recent years would have been higher but for increased cost-sharing requirements for employees and retirees as well as shifts in enrollment to plans with lower premiums. Increases in Expenditures for Prescription Drugs and Hospital Outpatient Care Drove Most of Recent Rise in Premiums for FEHBP’s Largest Plans
FEHBP premium increases are related to prior years’ increased claims expenditures, which for the three largest FEHBP plans from 1998 to 2000 were in large part driven by increasing expenditures for prescription drugs and hospital outpatient care. Increasing plan payments per drug dispensed accounted for most of the increase in expenditures for drugs, while increasing utilization accounted for the increase in hospital outpatient care expenditures. OPM’s Reliance on Competition among Plans and Annual Negotiations to Contain Premium Increases Differs in Some Ways from Other Large Purchasers
Consistent with the design of FEHBP, which encourages enrollee choice, OPM relies on competition among plans and its annual negotiations with participating plans to moderate FEHBP plans’ premium increases. To maximize enrollees’ choices among plans, OPM contracts with all plans meeting minimum standards and allows plans to propose varying benefit designs. OPM encourages plans to consider implementing cost containment strategies each year as they draft their FEHBP benefit and premium proposals. OPM asked plans to propose innovative ideas to help contain these increases. On September 17, 2002, OPM announced that FEHBP premiums would increase by an average of about 11.1 percent for 2003, about 2 percentage points less than in 2002. Three Other Large Purchasers Offer Standardized Benefits, Facilitating Comparisons for Purchasers and Enrollees, and May Not Contract with All Plans
The three large purchasers we reviewed rely on a standardized benefits package when conducting negotiations, particularly in negotiations with HMOs. Like FEHBP, some other large purchasers vary the premiums some employees pay to encourage enrollment in certain plans. OPM generally concurred with our study findings, highlighting its negotiating strategy as contributing to average FEHBP premiums for 2003 being below national trends. Appendix I: Methodology
To compare premium trends for the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP) and other large purchasers over the last decade, we obtained data from the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), the California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS), and surveys of private employer-sponsored health benefits conducted by the Kaiser Family Foundation and the Health Research and Educational Trust (Kaiser/HRET). | Why GAO Did This Study
Federal employees' health insurance premiums have increased at double-digit rates for 3 consecutive years. GAO was asked to examine how the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program's (FEHBP) premium trends compared to those of other large purchasers of employer-sponsored health insurance, factors contributing to FEHBP's premium growth, and steps the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) takes to help contain premium increases compared to those of other large purchasers. GAO compared FEHBP to the California Public Employees' Retirement System (CalPERS), General Motors, and a large private-employer purchasing coalition in California as well as data from employee benefit surveys.
What GAO Found
FEHBP's premium trends from 1991 to 2002 were generally in line with other large purchasers--increasing on average about 6 percent annually. OPM announced that average FEHBP premiums would increase about 11 percent in 2003, 2 percentage points less than in 2002 and less than some other large purchasers are expecting. FEHBP enrollees would likely have paid even higher premiums in recent years if not for modest benefits reductions and enrollees who shifted to less expensive plans. Increasing premiums are related to the plans' higher claims expenditures. For FEHBP's three largest plans, about 70 percent of increased claims expenditures from 1998 to 2000 was due to prescription drugs and hospital outpatient care. Most of the increase in drug expenditures was due to higher plan payments per drug, while the increase in hospital outpatient care expenditures was due to higher utilization. OPM relies on enrollee choice, competition among plans, and annual negotiations with participating plans to moderate premium increases. Whereas some large purchasers require plans to offer standardized benefit packages and reject bids from plans not offering satisfactory premiums, OPM contracts with all plans willing to meet minimum standards and allows plans to vary benefits, maximizing enrollees' choices. Each year, OPM suggests cost containment strategies for plans to consider and relies on participating plans to propose benefits and premiums that will be competitive with other participating plans. OPM generally concurred with our findings. |
gao_GAO-17-475T | gao_GAO-17-475T_0 | Background
VHA’s health care mission is broad in that it provides veterans with a wide range of health care services. Our 2016 report found that for the 5 VHA clinical occupations with the largest staffing shortages (as identified by the VA Office of Inspector General in January 2015), the number of employees that VHA lost increased each year, from about 5,900 employees in fiscal year 2011 to about 7,700 in fiscal year 2015 (the 5 occupations were physicians, registered nurses, physician assistants, psychologists, and physical therapists). However, for some occupations, voluntary resignations and retirements accounted for a smaller proportion of employee losses. For example, respondents from these 10 occupations also said that advancement issues (34 percent) and dissatisfaction with certain aspects of the work (20 percent) were among their primary reasons for leaving. Oversight Improvements Needed for Nurse Recruitment and Retention Initiatives
We and others have highlighted the need for an adequate and qualified nurse workforce to provide quality and timely care to veterans. In our 2015 report—which included staff interviews at four medical centers—we found that VHA had multiple system-wide initiatives to recruit and retain its nurse workforce, but three of the four VA medical centers in our review faced challenges offering them. In addition, VHA has not evaluated the training resources provided to nurse recruiters at VA medical centers or the overall effectiveness of the initiatives in meeting its nurse recruitment and retention goals, or whether any changes are needed. Nor can VHA ultimately determine whether it has an adequate and qualified nurse workforce at its medical centers that is sufficient to meet veterans’ health care needs. VA Has Exempted 108 VHA Occupations from the Hiring Freeze
On January 23, 2017, the administration issued an across-the-board 90- day hiring freeze applicable to federal civilian employees in the executive branch. VHA Needs to Strengthen Its HR Capacity to Better Serve Veterans
The recruitment and retention challenges VHA is experiencing with its clinical workforce are due, in part, to VHA’s limited HR capacity, including (1) attrition among its HR employees and unmet staffing targets, and (2) weak HR-related internal control functions. Moreover, as shown in figure 5, the twin challenges of weak internal controls and limited HR capacity have had a compounding effect, creating an environment that undermines VHA’s HR operations and impedes its ability to improve delivery of health care services to veterans. This lack of oversight contributes to issues with VHA’s capacity to provide HR functions and limits VHA’s ability to monitor HR improvement efforts and ensure that HR offices apply policies consistently. In conclusion, VHA’s challenges recruiting and retaining clinical and HR employees are making it difficult for VHA to meet the health care needs of our nation’s veterans. The prior reports on which this testimony is based made three recommendations to VA aimed at improving the oversight of nurse recruitment and retention initiatives and seven recommendations directed at strengthening VHA’s HR capacity. VA concurred with our recommendations and said they are taking steps to implement them. We will monitor VA’s progress in addressing our recommendations and report the results of those efforts to Congress. | Why GAO Did This Study
VHA's ability to attract, hire, and retain top talent is critical to its mission to provide quality and timely care for our nation's veterans. GAO's prior work has found that VHA faces long-standing, systemic human capital challenges that limit its ability to improve delivery of health care services to veterans.
This statement is based on GAO reports issued between September 2015 and December 2016 and discusses (1) the difficulties VHA is facing in recruiting and retaining staff for key clinical positions; and (2) VHA's capacity to perform key HR functions essential to addressing these difficulties.
To conduct these studies, GAO reviewed VHA policies, directives, and other documents; analyzed VHA data; applied relevant federal internal control standards; and interviewed VA and VHA officials and staff in headquarters offices, as well as in eight VHA medical centers across the country.
What GAO Found
Challenges in recruiting and retaining both clinical and human resources (HR) employees along with weak HR-related internal control practices are undermining the Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) Veterans Health Administration's (VHA) ability to meet the health care needs of veterans.
In July 2016, GAO found that VHA losses in its 5 clinical occupations with the largest staffing shortages, including physicians, registered nurses, and psychologists, increased from about 5,900 employees in fiscal year 2011 to about 7,700 in fiscal year 2015. Voluntary resignations and retirements were the primary drivers. VHA's exit survey indicated that advancement issues or dissatisfaction with certain aspects of the work were commonly cited as the primary reasons people left.
In September 2015, GAO found that VHA had multiple initiatives to recruit and retain its nurse workforce, but three of the four VA medical centers GAO reviewed faced challenges offering the initiatives due to, for example, a lack of sufficient HR support and competition with private sector medical facilities. GAO also found that VHA had not evaluated the training resources provided to nurse recruiters at VA medical centers. As a result, VHA is unable to determine to what extent its nurse recruitment and retention initiatives are effective and whether VHA has an adequate and qualified nurse workforce to meet veterans' health care needs.
In December 2016, GAO found that VHA's limited HR capacity combined with weak internal control practices undermined VHA's HR operations and its ability to improve delivery of health care services to veterans.
VA has exempted 108 clinical and administrative occupations from the recent hiring freeze; however, HR occupations are not among the exempt positions. A prolonged freeze could further erode VHA's capacity to provide HR services such as recruiting and hiring of staff who provide medical care to veterans.
What GAO Recommends
GAO previously made three recommendations to VA aimed at improving oversight of nurse recruitment and retention initiatives and seven recommendations directed at strengthening VHA's HR capacity. VA concurred with GAO's recommendations and is taking steps to implement them. GAO will monitor VA's progress. |
gao_GAO-01-754 | gao_GAO-01-754_0 | FDA has conducted its own studies on the inclusion of women in clinical drug trials. Conclusions
We found that women were a majority of the clinical trial participants in the NDAs we examined and that every NDA included enough women in the pivotal studies to be able to demonstrate statistically that the drug is effective in women. While these findings are welcome, we also found three areas of concern. The first is the relatively small proportion of women in early small-scale safety studies. These early studies provide important information on a drug’s toxicity and safe dosing levels for later stages of clinical development, and many of the NDAs we examined found significant sex differences in a drug’s pharmacokinetics, or how it is absorbed, distributed, metabolized, excreted, and concentrated in the bloodstream. Second, we are not confident that either NDA sponsors or FDA’s reviewers took full advantage of the available data to learn more about the effects of the drug in women and to explore potential sex differences in dosing. This is because NDA summary documents are not required to include analyses of sex differences, and some of them do not. Third, FDA does not now have appropriate management systems to monitor how many women are in clinical trials, to be assured that NDAs and IND annual reports are in compliance with pertinent regulations for presenting outcome data by sex and tabulating the number of women included in ongoing trials, or to confirm that its medical officers have adequately addressed sex-related issues in their reviews. While FDA has taken some promising initial steps to address these deficiencies, it is important that the agency finalize the pilot programs it has underway and give sustained attention to these management issues. | Why GAO Did This Study
This report reviews the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) inclusion of women in clinical drug trials.
What GAO Found
GAO found that women were a majority of the clinical trial participants in the new drug applications (NDA) it examined and that every NDA included enough women in the pivotal studies to be able to statistically demonstrate that the drug is effective in women. Although these findings are welcome, GAO also found three areas of concern. The first is the relatively small proportion of women in early small-scale safety studies. These early studies provide important information on drugs' toxicity and safe dosing levels for later stages of clinical development, and many of the NDAs GAO examined found significant sex differences in a drug's pharmacokinetics, or how it is absorbed, distributed, metabolized, excreted, and concentrated in the bloodstream. Second, GAO is not confident that either NDA sponsors or FDA's reviewers took full advantage of the available data to learn more about the effects of the drug in women and to explore potential sex differences in dosing. This is because NDA summary documents are not required to include analyses of sex differences, and many of them do not. Third, FDA lacks appropriate management systems to monitor how many women are in clinical trials, to be certain that NDAs and investigational new drug applications (IND) annual reports comply with regulations for presenting outcome data by sex and tabulating the number of women included in ongoing trials, and to confirm that its medical officers have adequately addressed sex-related issues in their reviews. Although FDA has taken some promising initial steps to address these deficiencies, it is important that the agency finalize the pilot programs it has underway and give sustained attention to these management issues. |
gao_GAO-12-551 | gao_GAO-12-551_0 | CBP Uses a Three- Part Process to Detect and Deter AD/CV Duty Evasion
CBP detects and deters AD/CV duty evasion through a three-part process that involves (1) identifying potential cases of evasion, (2) attempting to verify if evasion is occurring, and (3) taking enforcement action. These include, but are not limited to, the following: targeting additional shipments made by the importer of record and conducting further data analysis to look for other anomalies that may be evidence of evasion; requesting that the importer provide further information, such as product invoices and other documents that can help CBP understand the transactions involved in producing and importing a good and ascertain if evasion occurred; sending referrals to ICE to initiate criminal investigations and gather evidence of evasion from foreign countries, such as by visiting production facilities overseas and collecting customs documents from foreign counterparts; performing cargo exams to inspect shipments arriving at ports of collecting samples of products potentially brought in through evasion and conducting laboratory analysis of these samples to attempt to identify their true country of origin and other technical details that can help CBP determine if the products should be subject to AD/CV duties; and auditing importers suspected of evading AD/CV duties by collecting company records (such as purchase orders, shipping documents, and payment records) and examining them for discrepancies. In cases where CBP is able to verify evasion, its options for taking enforcement action to deter evasion include (1) pursuing the collection of evaded duties, (2) imposing civil penalties, (3) conducting seizures, and (4) referring cases to ICE for criminal investigation. From fiscal years 2007 to 2011, CBP assessed 252 civil penalties totaling about $208 million against 237 importers that evaded AD/CV duties. External Obstacles and Gaps in Information Sharing Hamper CBP Efforts to Address Evasion
Two types of factors affect CBP’s efforts to detect and deter AD/CV duty evasion. First, CBP faces several external challenges in attempting to gather conclusive evidence of evasion and deter parties from evading duties. These challenges include (1) the inherent difficulty of verifying evasion conducted through clandestine means; (2) limited access to evidence of evasion located in foreign countries; (3) the highly specific and sometimes complex nature of products subject to AD/CV duties; (4) the ease of becoming an importer of record, which evaders can exploit; and (5) the limited circumstances under which CBP can seize goods brought in through evasion. CBP has encouraged the use of higher bonding requirements, called single transaction bonds (STB), to protect AD/CV duty revenue from the risk of evasion; however, it has not ensured that a port requiring an STB shares this information with other ports in case an importer withdraws its shipment and attempts to make entry at another port to avoid the STB. CBP Has Made Some Performance Management Improvements but Does Not Systematically Track or Report on Its Efforts to Detect and Deter Evasion
While CBP has improved its performance measures for addressing AD/CV duty evasion and enhanced its monitoring of STBs, it does not systematically track or report key outcome information that CBP leadership and Congress could use to assess and improve CBP’s efforts to detect and deter AD/CV duty evasion. First, CBP cannot readily produce key data on AD/CV duty evasion, such as the number of confirmed cases of evasion, which it could use to better inform and manage its efforts. Second, CBP does not consistently track or report on the outcomes of allegations of evasion it receives from third parties. Specifically, as we reported in March 2011, the Government Performance and Results Modernization Act of 2010 underscores the importance of ensuring that performance information will be both useful and used in decision making. Without improved tracking and reporting, agency leadership, Congress, and industry stakeholders will continue to have insufficient information with which to oversee and evaluate CBP’s efforts. In commenting on a draft of this report, the Department of Homeland Security concurred with our recommendations addressed to the department that CBP (1) create a policy and a mechanism for information sharing among ports regarding the use of higher bond requirements and (2) develop and implement a plan to track and report systematically instances of AD/CV duty evasion and the results of CBP’s enforcement actions. CBP needs information from Commerce on when final court decisions are reached to help enable the agency to better plan its workload and help mitigate the administrative burden it faces in processing AD/CV duties—an effort that diminishes the resources it has available to address evasion. To assess the extent to which CBP tracks and reports on its efforts to detect and deter AD/CV duty evasion, we reviewed CBP annual plans that identify its performance measures for addressing AD/CV duty evasion; documents that show CBP’s performance against these measures; CBP testimony and videos publicizing successful efforts to address evasion; a CBP report to Congress on fiscal year 2010 efforts to enforce AD/CV duties; and a report by the Department of Homeland Security Inspector General on CBP’s bonding process, including its use and tracking of single transaction bonds. | Why GAO Did This Study
The United States imposes AD/CV duties to remedy unfair foreign trade practices, such as unfairly low prices or subsidies that cause injury to domestic industries. Examples of products subject to AD/CV duties include honey from China and certain steel products from South Korea. Importers that seek to avoid paying appropriate AD/CV duties may employ methods of evasion such as illegally transshipping an import through a third country to disguise its true country of origin or falsifying the value of an import to reduce the amount of duties owed, among others. AD/CV duty evasion can harm U.S. companies and reduces U.S. revenues. CBP, within the Department of Homeland Security, leads efforts to detect and deter AD/CV duty evasion.
GAO was asked to examine (1) how CBP detects and deters AD/CV duty evasion, (2) factors that affect CBPs efforts, and (3) the extent to which CBP tracks and reports on its efforts. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed CBP data and documents; met with government and private sector representatives in Washington, D.C.; and conducted fieldwork at three domestic ports.
What GAO Found
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) detects and deters evasion of antidumping and countervailing (AD/CV) duties through a three-part process that involves (1) identifying potential cases of evasion, (2) attempting to verify if evasion is occurring, and (3) taking enforcement action. To identify potential cases of evasion, CBP targets suspicious import activity, analyzes trends in import data, and follows up on allegations from external sources. If CBP identifies a potential case of evasion, it can use various techniques to attempt to verify whether evasion is occurring, such as asking importers for further information, auditing the records of importers suspected of evasion, and inspecting shipments arriving at ports of entry. If CBP is able to verify evasion, its options for taking enforcement action include (1) pursuing the collection of evaded duties, (2) imposing civil penalties, (3) conducting seizures, and (4) referring cases for criminal investigation. For example, between fiscal years 2007 to 2011, CBP assessed civil penalties totaling about $208 million against importers evading AD/CV duties.
Two types of factors affect CBPs efforts to detect and deter AD/CV duty evasion. First, CBP faces several external challenges in attempting to gather conclusive evidence of evasion and take enforcement action against parties evading duties. These challenges include (1) the inherent difficulty of verifying evasion conducted through clandestine means; (2) limited access to evidence of evasion located in foreign countries; (3) the highly specific and sometimes complex nature of products subject to AD/CV duties; (4) the ease of becoming an importer of record, which evaders can exploit; and (5) the limited circumstances under which CBP can seize goods evading AD/CV duties. Second, gaps in information sharing also affect CBP efforts. Although communication between CBP and the Department of Commerce (Commerce) has improved, CBP lacks information from Commerce that would enable it to better plan its workload and help mitigate the administrative burden it faces in processing AD/CV dutiesan effort that diminishes its resources available to address evasion. Additionally, CBP has encouraged the use of larger bond amounts to protect AD/CV duty revenue from the risk of evasion, but CBP has neither a policy nor a mechanism in place for a port requiring a larger bond to share this information with other ports in case an importer withdraws its shipment and attempts to make entry at another port to avoid the higher bond amount.
While CBP has made some performance management improvements, it does not systematically track or report key outcome information that CBP leadership and Congress could use to assess and improve CBPs efforts to deter and detect AC/CV duty evasion. First, CBP cannot readily produce key data, such as the number of confirmed cases of evasion, which it could use to better inform and manage its efforts. Second, CBP does not consistently track or report on the outcomes of allegations of evasion it receives from third parties. As GAO reported in March 2011, the Government Performance and Results Modernization Act of 2010 underscores the importance of ensuring that performance information will be both useful and used in decision making. Without improved tracking and reporting, agency leadership, Congress, and industry stakeholders will continue to have little information with which to oversee and evaluate CBPs efforts to detect and deter evasion of AD/CV duties..
What GAO Recommends
To enhance CBPs efforts to address AD/CV duty evasion and facilitate oversight of these efforts, GAO makes several recommendations, including that CBP create a policy and a mechanism for information sharing among ports regarding the use of higher bond amounts and develop and implement a plan to track and report on these efforts. CBP and the Department of Commerce generally concurred with GAOs recommendations. |
gao_GAO-16-700 | gao_GAO-16-700_0 | As of 2014, 70 percent of SNFs were for-profit, 24 percent were nonprofit, and 5 percent were operated by government agencies. Because of their advanced training and ability to provide skilled nursing care, RNs are paid more than other nursing staff. Finally, the act required CMS to make information on SNFs’ expenditures “readily available to interested parties upon request.”
CMS Has Not Made SNF Expenditure Data Readily Accessible and Does Not Adequately Ensure Data Reliability
CMS Has Not Taken Steps Needed to Make SNF Expenditure Data Posted on Its Website Readily Accessible
CMS collects detailed SNF expenditure data in Medicare cost reports and posts the raw data on its website for the public. Second, CMS has not provided the expenditure data in a place that is easy to find on its website. In making data accessible to public stakeholders, federal internal control standards related to external communication suggest that agencies consider the audience, nature of information, availability, cost, and legal or regulatory requirements to ensure that information is communicated in a quality manner. Until CMS takes steps to make SNF expenditure data easier to use and locate, public stakeholders will have difficulty accessing the only publicly available source of financial data for many SNFs. CMS Does Not Adequately Ensure the Reliability of SNF Expenditure Data
Despite CMS’s statement that it has made a reasonable effort to ensure the accuracy of SNF cost report data, we found that the agency performs minimal quality control of the SNF expenditure data in the Medicare cost reports to ensure data reliability. CMS requires SNFs to self-certify to the accuracy and completeness of their cost report data. For-Profit SNFs Generally Had Lower Direct and Indirect Care Costs as a Percentage of Revenue and Higher Margins than Did Nonprofit and Government SNFs
Our analysis found that, for each fiscal year from 2011 through 2014, direct and indirect care costs were lower as a percentage of revenue, on average, at for-profit SNFs compared with nonprofit and government SNFs. Costs were similarly lower at chain SNFs compared with independent SNFs. 1.) For for-profit and nonprofit SNFs, both overall costs and total revenues increased, on average, in each of the 4 years we examined. Both overall costs and direct care costs decreased, on average, at government SNFs in each fiscal year from 2011 through 2014. In addition, median margins were higher for for-profit and chain SNFs than for other SNFs. 2.) After our adjustment for resident case-mix, we continued to observe the same trends. Examining each fiscal year separately, we estimated that a SNF’s margin generally had a small, but statistically significant, effect on its nursing time per resident day. In each of the 3 fiscal years, which we examined separately, the relationship between SNF nursing time and margins varied by ownership type. For example, we estimated that for each percentage point increase in a SNF’s margin, the case-mix adjusted total nurse time per resident day decreased by 6.9 minutes at chain-affiliated SNFs and by 4.3 minutes at independent SNFs in fiscal year 2014. However, public stakeholders have experienced difficulty accessing the data—including locating and using the data—and CMS efforts to ensure data accessibility and reliability have been limited. 2. HHS disagreed with our recommendation that it take steps to ensure the accuracy and completeness of the SNF expenditure data. Officials from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) said the categories we used included the appropriate expenses listed on the cost reports. Examining How SNF Nurse Staffing Levels Vary by Facility Characteristics and the Relationship between SNF Nurse Staffing Levels and Margins
To examine how SNF nurse staffing levels vary by facility characteristics and the relationship between SNF nurse staffing levels and margins, we performed statistical analyses to identify factors associated with each SNF’s total nurse and registered nurse (RN) staffing levels. | Why GAO Did This Study
Medicare paid $28.6 billion to SNFs for nearly 1.7 million beneficiaries in 2014. About 15,000 SNFs provide short-term skilled nursing and rehabilitative care after an acute care hospital stay. As of 2014, 70 percent of SNFs were for-profit, 24 percent were nonprofit, and 5 percent were government-operated. About three-fifths of the SNFs were affiliated with chains. The average SNF Medicare margin was 12.5 percent. Some researchers have questioned whether SNF margins come at the expense of patient care in the form of low nurse staffing levels.
GAO was asked to provide information on how SNFs spend their Medicare and other revenues. GAO examined (1) the extent to which the expenditure data CMS collects from SNFs and provides to the public are accessible and reliable, (2) how SNF costs and margins vary by facility characteristics, and (3) how SNF nurse staffing levels vary by facility characteristics and the relationship between SNF nurse staffing levels and margins. GAO analyzed Medicare cost report data for fiscal years 2011 through 2014, the most recent years with complete data available. GAO also interviewed CMS officials, researchers, and beneficiary advocates.
What GAO Found
The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS)—the agency within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) that administers Medicare—collects and reports expenditure data from skilled nursing facilities (SNF), but it has not taken key steps to make the data readily accessible to public stakeholders or to ensure their reliability. SNFs are required to self-report their expenditures in annual financial cost reports, and CMS posts the raw data on its website. However, CMS has not provided the data in a readily accessible format and has not posted the data in a place that is easy to find on its website, according to public stakeholders and GAO's observations. In addition, CMS does little to ensure the accuracy and completeness of the data. Federal internal control standards suggest that agencies should make data accessible to the public and ensure data reliability. Until CMS takes steps to make reliable SNF expenditure data easier to use and locate, public stakeholders will have difficulty accessing and placing confidence in the only publicly available source of financial data for many SNFs.
GAO found that, for each fiscal year from 2011 through 2014, direct and indirect care costs were lower as a percentage of revenue, on average, at for-profit SNFs compared with nonprofit and government SNFs. Direct and indirect care costs were similarly lower at chain SNFs compared with independent SNFs. In addition, the median margin, which measures revenue relative to costs, was higher for for-profit and chain SNFs than for other SNFs in each of the 4 years.
The relationship between SNFs' nurse staffing levels (hours per resident day) and their margins varied by ownership type in each fiscal year from 2012 through 2014, the 3 years with complete staffing data. For-profit SNFs generally had lower nurse staffing ratios than did nonprofit and government SNFs. Examining each fiscal year separately, GAO estimated that a SNF's margin had a small, but statistically significant, effect on its case-mix adjusted (that is, adjusted for residents' health care needs) nurse staffing ratios. For example, for each percentage point increase in a for-profit SNF's margin in fiscal year 2014, GAO estimated that the SNF's total nurse staffing ratio (including registered nurses, licensed practical nurses, and certified nursing assistants) decreased by 4.1 minutes per resident day after controlling for other factors. However, in GAO's analyses, these other factors, such as geographic location, were more important predictors of a SNF's case-mix adjusted nurse staffing ratios.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that CMS (1) improve public stakeholders' ability to locate and use SNF expenditure data and (2) ensure the accuracy and completeness of the data. HHS concurred with the first but not the second recommendation, citing resource considerations. GAO continues to believe that CMS should provide reliable SNF expenditure data. |
gao_GAO-12-594 | gao_GAO-12-594_0 | Students with Disabilities Face Several Longstanding Challenges Accessing Federal Transition Services
Students with disabilities face several challenges accessing federally funded programs that can provide transition services as they leave high school for postsecondary education or the workforce. These include difficulty navigating multiple programs that are not always coordinated; possible delays in service as they wait to be served by adult programs; limited access to transition services; a lack of adequate information or awareness on the part of parents, students, and service providers of available programs that may provide transition services after high school; and a lack of preparedness for postsecondary education or employment. Some officials said that the shift from being automatically entitled to services under IDEA if identified as disabled while in high school to having to apply as adults and be found eligible for multiple programs after exiting high school is difficult for students and their parents to understand. Many stakeholders said that students with disabilities and their parents do not always receive enough information about the full range of service options after high school. In addition, in all five states we heard that schools’ emphasis on academic achievement has left little time for vocational and life skills training, even though these skills may be key to gaining and retaining employment—especially for students with disabilities. Federal Agency Coordination of Transition Activities Has Limitations
Federal Agencies Coordinate on Specific Transition Activities but Face Some Barriers
Education, HHS, Labor, and SSA coordinate transition activities to some degree, but their coordination has limitations and they do not assess the effectiveness of their efforts. However, this workgroup is informal and primarily involves information sharing among staff-level representatives, according to agency officials. Indeed, officials identified a lack of compatible outcome goals for transitioning students with disabilities as one of the key barriers that hinder their coordination efforts. Agencies Lack a Government-wide Strategy or Framework for Coordinating Transition Services
Although federal agencies are engaged in some coordination efforts, these efforts represent a patchwork approach and officials at all four agencies indicated there is no single, formal, government-wide strategy for coordinating transition services. Recommendation for Executive Action
To improve the provision of transition services to students with disabilities through enhanced coordination among the multiple federal programs that support this population, we recommend that the Secretaries of Education, HHS, and Labor, and the Commissioner of SSA direct the appropriate program offices to work collaboratively to develop a federal interagency transition strategy. This strategy should address: 1. compatible policies, procedures, and other means to operate across agency boundaries towards common outcomes for transitioning youth and their families; 2. methods to increase awareness among students, families, high school teachers, and other service providers on the range of available transition services; and 3. ways to assess the effectiveness of federal coordination efforts in providing transition services. Moreover, this group would assess the impact of its coordination efforts by developing common outcome goals. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Our review examined the (1) challenges students with disabilities may face accessing federally funded transition services; and (2) extent to which federal agencies coordinate their transition activities. To determine the challenges students with disabilities may face accessing transition services as they leave high school for postsecondary education or the workforce, we selected a nongeneralizable sample of five states and interviewed state and local officials responsible for administering the key federal programs that provide transition services. To assess the extent to which the four key federal agencies that administer programs providing transition services—the Departments of Education (Education), Health and Human Services (HHS), and Labor (Labor), and the Social Security Administration (SSA)—coordinate their transition activities, we interviewed agency officials, obtained their written responses to questions about their coordination efforts, and reviewed agency documents. In addition, with the exception of Nevada, staff from parent training and information centers in each state assisted us by organizing discussion groups with parents and students with disabilities that were in the process of planning their transition from high school to postsecondary education or employment or had recently made the transition out of high school. | Why GAO Did This Study
The transition out of high school to postsecondary education or the workforce can be a challenging time, especially for students with disabilities. Multiple federal agencies fund programs to support these students during their transition. In 2003, GAO reported that limited coordination among these programs can hinder a successful transition. GAO was asked to provide information on the (1) challenges students with disabilities may face accessing federally funded transition services; and (2) extent to which federal agencies coordinate their transition activities. GAO reviewed relevant federal laws, regulations, and agency documents from Education, HHS, Labor, and SSA, which administer the key programs that provide transition services. GAO also administered a data collection instrument to gather program information from these agencies. Finally, GAO interviewed various stakeholders, including state and local officials, service providers, parents, and students with disabilities, in five states selected based on the number of federal grants they received to fund transition services.
What GAO Found
Students with disabilities face several longstanding challenges accessing services that may assist them as they transition from high school into postsecondary education or the workforce--services such as tutoring, vocational training, and assistive technology. Eligible students with disabilities are entitled to transition planning services during high school, but after leaving high school, to receive services that facilitate their transition they must apply as adults and establish eligibility for programs administered by multiple federal agencies. Students with disabilities may face delays in service and end up on waitlists if these programs are full. In addition, while all five states GAO contacted have taken steps to coordinate their transition services and assist families with the transition process, officials said that it is still difficult for students and their parents to navigate and for providers to coordinate services across different programs. Officials and parents GAO spoke with also noted a lack of sufficient information or awareness of the full range of service options available after high school on the part of students with disabilities, parents, and service providers. In addition, state and local officials said students with disabilities may not be adequately prepared to successfully transition to life after high school. This may be due, in part, to limited opportunities to engage in vocational and life skills training or obtain work experience while in school.
The Departments of Education (Education), Health and Human Services (HHS), and Labor (Labor), and the Social Security Administration (SSA) coordinate transition activities to some degree, but their coordination has limitations and they do not assess the effectiveness of their efforts. One coordinating body involves all four agencies and focuses on transition services. However, that group's primary coordination activity is information sharing among staff-level representatives rather than developing common outcome goals and establishing compatible policies for operating across agencies. Agency officials told GAO that a lack of compatible outcome goals for transitioning students and differences in statutory eligibility criteria are among the barriers that hinder interagency coordination for this population. While agencies collaborate to some extent, their efforts represent a patchwork approach and there is no single, formal, government-wide strategy for coordinating transition services for students with disabilities. Moreover, it is unclear what impact coordination has on service provision because agencies do not assess the effectiveness of their coordination activities.
What GAO Recommends
To improve the provision of transition services for students with disabilities, GAO recommends that Education, HHS, Labor, and SSA develop an interagency transition strategy that addresses (1) operating toward common outcome goals for transitioning youth; (2) increasing awareness of available transition services; and (3) assessing the effectiveness of their coordination efforts. All four agencies agreed with the recommendation. |
gao_GAO-06-894 | gao_GAO-06-894_0 | Background
The Department of State is the lead agency in formulating and implementing U.S. foreign policy. About 65 percent of Foreign Service employees serve overseas. The department has implemented new incentives to address the chronic mid-level shortfalls at hardship posts; however, since implementing these incentives, State has not yet evaluated their effectiveness. In our review, we found that mid- level staffing gaps persist; bids for mid-level positions at hardship posts have not increased significantly since we reported in 2002; and positions normally held by mid-level officers are typically staffed by junior officers, sometimes on their first assignment, with few mid-level officers to provide supervision or guidance. State Has Made Progress in Increasing Its Foreign Language Capabilities, but Significant Language Gaps Remain
State has made several efforts in recent years to enhance its foreign language capabilities, in particular by increasing the number of its language-designated positions and its efforts to recruit and hire staff with foreign language skills, as well as by creating additional language requirements and incentives for staff. The skills gap was even greater at some critical posts; for example, 59 percent in Cairo, Egypt; and 60 percent in Sana’a, Yemen. State’s Assignment and Promotion System May Hinder Efforts to Improve Its Foreign Language Capability
Several FSOs we met with said they believe State’s current assignment and promotion system may hinder officers’ ability to enhance and maintain their language skills over time, as well as State’s ability to take advantage of those skills and the investment it makes in training. There is also a perception among some officers that spending too much time in one region can lead to being labeled as too narrowly specialized, which could adversely impact the officers’ career. Without taking a risk-based approach to the allocation of these limited resources, these gaps will continue to compromise State’s ability to carry out its foreign policy objectives and execute critical mission functions, including reaching out to foreign audiences in regions of critical importance to the war on terror. Recommendations for Executive Action
To enhance staffing levels and skills at hardship posts as well as the language proficiency of FSOs and other staff, this report recommends that the Secretary of State take the following five actions: Consider using directed assignments, as necessary, using a risk-based approach, to fill critical positions with fully qualified officers who have the skills and experience necessary to effectively manage and supervise essential mission functions at hardship posts; Systematically evaluate the effectiveness of the department’s incentive programs for hardship post assignments, establishing specific indicators of progress and adjusting the use of the incentives based on this analysis; Consider an assignment system that allows for longer tours, consecutive assignments in certain countries, and more regional specialization in certain areas, in order to hone officers’ skills in certain superhard languages and better leverage the investment State makes in language training; Systematically evaluate the effectiveness of its efforts to improve the language proficiency of its FSOs and specialists, establishing specific indicators of progress in filling language gaps and adjusting its efforts, accordingly; and Conduct a risk assessment of critical language needs in regions and countries of strategic importance, make realistic projections of the staff time and related training float necessary to adequately train personnel to meet those needs, and target its limited resources for language training, as needed, to fill these critical gaps. State described a number of programs that it has initiated to address staffing and foreign language shortfalls. GAO Comments
1. 2. However, State continues to fill language-designated positions with staff who do not meet the language requirement. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO has reported in recent years on a number of human capital issues that have hampered the Department of State's ability to carry out U.S. foreign policy priorities and objectives, particularly at posts central to the war on terror. In 2002, State implemented the Diplomatic Readiness Initiative (DRI) to address shortfalls in the number and skills of State employees. This report discusses State's progress in (1) addressing staffing shortfalls since the implementation of DRI and (2) filling gaps in the language proficiency of foreign service officers and other staff. To accomplish these objectives, GAO analyzed staffing and language data and met with State officials.
What GAO Found
State has made progress in addressing staffing shortages since implementing the DRI. However, the initiative did not fully meet its goals, and mid-level vacancies remain a problem at many posts, including some critical to the war on terror. State implemented various incentives to attract more mid-level officers to these locations, including offering extra pay to officers who serve an additional year at certain posts. However, it has not evaluated the effectiveness of these incentives and continues to have difficulties attracting qualified applicants. Mid-level positions at many posts are staffed by junior officers who lack experience, have minimal guidance, and are not as well-equipped to handle crises as more seasoned officers. This experience gap can severely compromise the department's readiness to carry out foreign policy objectives and execute critical post-level duties. State has made progress in increasing its foreign language capabilities, but serious language gaps remain. State initiated a number of efforts to improve its foreign language capabilities. However, it has not evaluated the effectiveness of these efforts, and it continues to experience difficulties filling its language-designated positions with language proficient staff. Almost one third of the staff in these positions do not meet the language requirements. The percentage is much higher at certain critical posts--for example, 60 percent in Sana'a, Yemen. Several factors--including the perception that spending too much time in one region may hinder officers' and specialists' promotion potential--may discourage employees from bidding on positions where they could enhance and maintain their language skills over time and limit State's ability to take advantage of those skills and the investment it makes in training. Gaps in language proficiency can adversely impact State's ability to communicate with foreign audiences and execute critical duties. |
gao_HEHS-00-161 | gao_HEHS-00-161_0 | Consequently, if a plan attracted a disproportionate share of beneficiaries in better-than-average health, an outcome known as favorable selection, Medicare’s payments to the plan would exceed the expected FFS cost of providing Medicare-covered benefits to the plan’s enrollees.Our 1997 study of Medicare payments to California HMOs found that, on average, payments exceeded the expected FFS costs of the plans’ enrollees by approximately 19 percent in 1995.Other studies have also found substantial excess plan payments. 1998 Medicare+Choice Payments Exceeded Estimated FFS Costs
Our analysis shows that Medicare+Choice payments in 1998 were 21 percent, or $5.2 billion, higher than the amount Medicare would have spent if plan beneficiaries had received care in the traditional FFS program. That is, Medicare payments were not adjusted sufficiently to account for the generally better health, and lower expected costs, of plan enrollees.Excess payments due to inadequate risk adjustment will persist as long as there is favorable selection and plan payment rates do not sufficiently account for beneficiary health status. While health plans tended to enroll less-expensive beneficiaries, Medicare’s payments were too generous because they were based on the expected costs of enrollees in average health.Consequently, we estimate that in 1998 Medicare paid plans an average of 13.2 percent more than it would have spent if the plans’ enrollees had received care under the traditional FFS arrangement. Our analysis indicates that the combination of a spending forecast error and the BBA payment provisions resulted in aggregate plan payments that exceeded enrollees’ estimated FFS costs by approximately 8 percent, or $2 billion, in 1998. Thus, even without considering the effects of favorable selection, the combination of the forecast error in the 1997 rates and the minimum annual rate increase resulted in $2 billion in excess payments to Medicare+Choice plans in 1998. Medicare+Choice plans must, at a minimum, provide all of the services available to beneficiaries under the traditional FFS program. 1). The largest estimated excess payment to an individual plan totaled $334 million, or 40 percent more than Medicare would have spent if the plan’s enrollees had been covered under FFS. Among the nine plans that were paid less than their enrollees’ estimated FFS costs, the largest difference between estimated costs and payments was $8.4 million (see table 3). However, when excess payments due to forecast error are included, only 2 plans were paid less ($1.7 million and $175,000) than their enrollees’ expected costs. However, Medicare+Choice plans may not be paid enough for what they have been offering to attract beneficiaries—a more comprehensive benefit package beyond that covered for FFS beneficiaries for only modest or no premiums. HCFA noted that it is phasing in a risk adjustment method based on hospital diagnosis data to help reduce excess payments caused by favorable selection. 1. 3. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed Medicare Choice program payment issues, focusing on: (1) whether program spending for Medicare Choice plan enrollees has exceeded what Medicare-covered care for these beneficiaries would have cost in the fee-for-service (FFS) Medicare program; and (2) the extent to which payments to individual plans differ from expected FFS costs.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) Medicare Choice has not been successful in achieving Medicare savings; (2) Medicare Choice plans attracted a disproportionate selection of healthier and less-expensive beneficiaries relative to traditional FFS Medicare (a phenomenon known as favorable selection), while payment rates largely continued to reflect the expected FFS costs of beneficiaries in average health; (3) consequently, in 1998 GAO estimated that the program spent about $3.2 billion, or 13.2 percent, more on health plan enrollees than if they had received services through traditional FFS Medicare; (4) this year the Health Care Financing Administration implemented a new methodology to adjust payments for beneficiary health status; (5) however, GAO's results suggest that this new methodology, which will be phased in over several years, may ultimately remove less than half of the excess payments caused by favorable selection; (6) in addition, the combination of spending forecast errors built into plan payment rates and Balanced Budget Act payment provisions caused an additional $2.0 billion, or 8 percent, in excess payments to plans; (7) instead of paying less for health plan enrollees, GAO estimates that aggregate payments to Medicare Choice plans in 1998 were about $5.2 billion (21 percent), or approximately $1,000 per enrollee, more than if the plans' enrollees had received care in the traditional FFS program; (8) it is largely these excess payments, and not managed care efficiencies, that enable plans to attract beneficiaries by offering a benefit package that is more comprehensive than the one available to FFS beneficiaries, while charging modest or no premiums; (9) nearly all of the 210 plans in GAO's study received payments in 1998 that exceeded expected FFS costs because their enrollees were healthier than average beneficiaries; (10) however, the percentage of estimated excess payments varied substantially among plans; (11) about two-thirds of the plans received payments that were at least 10 percent more than enrollees would have cost Medicare in the traditional program, even without considering excess payments due to forecast errors; (12) the largest estimated excess payment to an individual plan totalled $334 million, or 40 percent more than Medicare would have spent if the plan's enrollees had been covered under FFS; (13) GAO also estimated that nine plans received payments below its enrollees' expected FFS costs; and (14) however, when excess payments due to forecast error are included, only 2 of the 210 plans were paid less ($1.7 million and $175,000) than its enrollees' expected FFS costs. |
gao_GAO-07-745 | gao_GAO-07-745_0 | Since accepting the ASDS in June 2003, SOCOM has continued to invest millions of dollars to fix both old and new problems. The prime contractor has had little incentive to control costs given the Navy’s choice of certain cost-reimbursable contract types. Much of the funding has been for efforts to correct design deficiencies and to improve ASDS’s reliability. While the Navy officials acknowledged that it was too early to quantify the results of these approaches, preliminary indications are that the contractor’s performance has improved and that the arrangements are providing sufficient risk sharing and monetary incentives to motivate contractor performance. Authorizing Work before Reaching Agreement on Key Terms and Conditions Increased the Navy’s Risk
Our analysis also found that the Navy often initiated work using undefinitized contract actions; that is, before the Navy and contractor had reached agreement on key terms and conditions of the delivery order, such as the scope of the work to be performed and the price of that work. The existing boat is currently available only for limited operational use. In April 2006, DOD canceled plans to procure follow-on ASDS boats and directed the Navy and SOCOM to (1) establish an ASDS-1 improvement program to increase the performance of the existing boat to the required level, to insert technologies to avoid obsolescence, and to complete operational testing and (2) assess alternate material solutions to fulfill remaining operational requirements. In May 2006, DOD reported to the congressional defense committees that the first ASDS would be maintained as an operational asset, and that an ASDS improvement program was planned through fiscal year 2008. DOD Expects to Make a Program Decision in mid-2008
DOD also directed the Navy and SOCOM to conduct an assessment of alternate material solutions to fulfill remaining operational requirements. An independent cost and capability trade study is under way for the purpose of developing models for both the ASDS and a hybrid combatant submersible to support concept design-level trade studies. A program decision is planned in mid-2008, after the ASDS improvement program and alternate material solutions analysis are completed. According to SOCOM and Navy officials, the results of the alternate material solutions analysis, in conjunction with the operational testing of the changes made in response to the reliability improvement program, should provide DOD by mid-2008 with sufficient information to make an informed decision on the direction DOD should take to meet its operational needs. Require the Navy to include provisions in the ASDS contracting strategy chosen when the existing BOA expires that (1) appropriately balance risk between the government and the contractor through the contract types selected, (2) incentivize the contractor’s performance and promote accountability for achieving desired outcomes by properly structuring the award and incentive fees, and (3) provide the kind of management and oversight of the program necessary to hold the contractor accountable for performance. To determine the status of major ASDS technical issues and program restructuring, we examined program status documents and briefings, test results, technical reports, and various memos and guidance. We did not assess the appropriateness of accepting the first ASDS boat in an “as is” condition. Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense | Why GAO Did This Study
The Advanced SEAL Delivery System (ASDS) is a hybrid combatant submersible providing clandestine delivery and extraction of Navy SEALs and equipment in high-threat environments. The first ASDS has had significant performance issues and has cost, to date, over $885 million. In May 2006, Congress requested that GAO review ASDS. This report examines (1) how the Navy managed ASDS risks through its contracts and (2) the status of major technical issues and program restructuring.
What GAO Found
The Navy did not effectively oversee the contracts to maintain, repair, and upgrade the ASDS and failed to hold the prime contractor accountable for results. The Navy took responsibility for correcting the boat's deficiencies while continuing to pay the costs and fees of the prime contractor under cost reimbursable contracts to execute the corrections. Before accepting the boat, the Navy went to sources other than the prime contractor to obtain better designs for the propeller and battery and then paid the prime contractor to install them. When the Navy accepted the ASDS in 2003 in an "as is" condition, it relieved the contractor from having to take any additional actions to correct known problems. Since then, the U.S. Special Operations Command has continued to invest millions of dollars to fix existing problems and address new ones in an attempt to make the boat operational. In making this additional investment, the Navy entered into contracts with the prime contractor that provided little incentive to control costs, authorized work before reaching agreement on the scope and price of the work to be performed, and failed to finalize the terms of the work within required time frames. Meanwhile, the contractor's performance continued to be poor, often exceeding initial estimates for the time and cost required to perform the work. ASDS officials took actions over the past 2 years to address these issues, but acknowledge that it is too early to determine the effectiveness of more recent actions to incentivize the contractor's performance. Continuing problems with the existing ASDS led to the Department of Defense's (DOD) April 2006 decision to cancel plans to buy additional ASDS boats, establish an improvement program for the in-service ASDS, and conduct an assessment of alternative material solutions to fulfill remaining operational requirements. The problems have seriously degraded the boat's reliability and performance, and the boat is only available for limited operational use. The results of these improvement and assessment efforts are expected to provide DOD the knowledge needed to determine whether ASDS's reliability can be improved cost-effectively to make ASDS an operational asset and whether an alternative development program is needed to meet the remaining operational requirements. A program decision is planned in mid-2008, after the ASDS improvement program and assessment of alternate material solutions are completed. |
gao_GAO-02-876 | gao_GAO-02-876_0 | Committee System Has Unique Features and Makes Important Contributions
The advisory committee system is unique in U.S. trade policy because it provides a forum in which business and other interested groups can consult confidentially with and provide advice to the executive branch on trade negotiations, U.S. trade policy, and implementation of trade agreements. The formal nature of advisory meetings helps ensure that representatives of the private sector and other groups have regular access to officials engaged in U.S. trade policy. Many participants said the advisory committee system serves an important role in U.S. trade policy. Nevertheless, our review of existing agency records indicates that such informal consultation is active. In addition, accountability for the use or consideration of advice could be improved. Despite reporting general satisfaction with many aspects of the system, more than a quarter of survey respondents felt that the system has not realized its potential contribution to U.S. trade policy (see app. Our analysis of documents provided by USTR revealed that USTR negotiators have not been actively working with some committees. Advisory Committee System’s Structure and Composition Do Not Fully Reflect U.S. Economy and Trade Policy Needs
Mismatches between the advisory committee system and the U.S. economy and trade policy issues suggest that the system is not positioned to provide the executive branch with all the advice it needs or to assure Congress that negotiated agreements are fully in U.S. interests. New trade issues and stakeholders have emerged since 1974, as trade negotiations expanded beyond tariffs to include nontariff barriers to trade and other complex trade-related issues, such as intellectual property rights and health and safety. The limited resources USTR and the other key agencies devote to managing the advisory committee system have not been sufficient to position them to maximize input from the committees. Members devote time and contribute much to the process and report generally high satisfaction with many aspects of committee operations and effectiveness. Recommendations for Executive Action
As Congress seeks to provide new direction to the President on U.S. trade policy, we recommend that the U.S. Trade Representative, as the lead agency for the committee system, work with the Secretaries of Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor and the EPA Administrator to make the existing system’s consultation process more meaningful and reliable. This point of view is supported by the GAO survey, in Commerce’s opinion. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 1974, Congress mandated creation of a private sector advisory system to ensure that representatives from private business and other groups with a stake in trade policy could provide input as negotiations unfolded. The hope was that such involvement would result in trade agreements that Congress could approve with confidence. The law established a three-tier structure of committees to advise the President on overall U.S. trade policy, general policy area, and technical aspects of trade agreements. Four agencies, led by the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), currently administer the committee system. According to many negotiators, agency officials, and committee members, the trade policy advisory committee system plays an important role in U.S. trade policy and has made valuable contributions to U.S. trade agreements. Although GAO's survey of committee members found high levels of satisfaction with many aspects of committee operations and effectiveness, more than a quarter of respondents indicated that the system has not realized its potential to contribute to U.S. trade policy.
What GAO Found
GAO found that consultations could be more timely and meaningful and that the consultation process needs greater accountability. The structure and composition of the committee system have not been fully updated to reflect changes in the U.S. economy and U.S. trade policy. In general, the system's committee structure is largely the same as it was in 1980, even though the focus of U.S. trade policy has shifted from border taxes toward other complex trade issues, such as protection of intellectual property rights and food safety requirements. Leadership direction and administrative support by USTR and the other managing agencies have not been sufficient to ensure that the advisory committee system works reliably. GAO found that negotiators have used inconsistent approaches to solicit committee member views, with some negotiators not consulting with committees at all. |
gao_GAO-14-785T | gao_GAO-14-785T_0 | No Federal Entity Is Responsible for Expansion and Oversight of High- Containment Laboratories
The number of biosafety level (BSL)-3 and BSL-4 laboratories (high- containment laboratories) began to rise in the late 1990s, accelerating after the anthrax attacks throughout the United States. Our work has found that expansion of high-containment laboratories was not based on a government-wide coordinated strategy. The expansion was based on the perceptions of individual agencies about the capacity required for their individual missions and the high-containment laboratory activities needed to meet those missions, as well as the availability of congressionally approved funding. We have not found any national research agenda linking all these agencies, even at the federal level, that would allow for a national needs assessment, strategic plan, or coordinated oversight. As we last reported in 2013, after more than 12 years, we have not been able to find any detailed projections based on a government-wide strategic evaluation of research requirements based on public health or national security needs. Without this information, there is little assurance of having facilities with the right capacity to meet our national needs. National Standards for Designing, Constructing, Commissioning, Operating, and Maintaining High- Containment Laboratories Are Needed
Our work on this issue has found a continued lack of national standards for designing, constructing, commissioning, and operating high- containment laboratories. For example, we noted in our 2009 report that the absence of national standards means that the laboratories may vary from place to place because of differences in local building requirements or standards for safe operations. This incident highlighted the risk of relying on local building codes to ensure the safety of high-containment laboratories in the absence of national standards or testing procedures specific to those laboratories. Some guidance exists about designing, constructing, and operating high- containment laboratories. The Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories guidance, often referred to as BMBL recommends various design, construction and operations standards, but our work has found it is not universally followed. of whether the suggested design, construction, and operations standards are achieved. As we have recommended, national standards would be valuable for not only new laboratory construction but also periodic upgrades. Many experts agree that as the number of high-containment laboratories has increased, so the overall risk of an accidental or deliberate release of a dangerous pathogen will also increase. The June 2014 Incident at the CDC Laboratories and GAO’s Preliminary Observation
The June 2014 incident in which live anthrax bacteria were transferred from a BSL-3 contained environment to lower-level (BSL-2) containment laboratories at CDC in Atlanta resulted in the potential exposure of tens of workers to the highly virulent Ames strain of anthrax. CDC’s July 11, 2014, Report on the Potential Exposure to Anthrax describes a number of actions that CDC plans to take within its responsibilities to avoid another incident like the one in June. However, we continue to believe that a national strategy is warranted that would evaluate the requirements for high-containment laboratories, set and maintain national standards for such laboratories’ construction and operation, and maintain a national strategy for the oversight of laboratories that conduct important research on highly infectious pathogens. Related GAO Products
High-Containment Laboratories: Assessment of the Nation’s Need Is Missing. High-Containment Biosafety Laboratories: Preliminary Observations on the Oversight of the Proliferation of BSL-3 and BSL-4 Laboratories in the United States. Biological Research Laboratories: Issues Associated with the Expansion of Laboratories Funded by the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases. | Why GAO Did This Study
Recent biosecurity incidents—such as the June 5, 2014, potential exposure of staff in Atlanta laboratories at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) to live spores of a strain of anthrax—highlight the importance of maintaining biosafety and biosecurity protocols at high-containment laboratories. This statement summarizes the results of GAO's past work on the oversight of high-containment laboratories, those designed for handling dangerous pathogens and emerging infectious diseases. Specifically, this statement addresses (1) the need for governmentwide strategic planning for the requirements for high-containment laboratories, including assessment of their risks; (2) the need for national standards for designing, constructing, commissioning, operating, and maintaining such laboratories; and (3) the oversight of biosafety and biosecurity at high-containment laboratories. In addition, it provides GAO's preliminary observations on the potential exposure of CDC staff to anthrax. For this preliminary work, GAO reviewed agency documents, including a report on the potential exposure, and scientific literature; and interviewed CDC officials.
What GAO Found
No federal entity is responsible for strategic planning and oversight of high-containment laboratories. Since the 1990s, the number of high-containment laboratories has risen; however, the expansion of high-containment laboratories was not based on a government-wide coordinated strategy. Instead, the expansion was based on the perceptions of individual agencies about the capacity required for their individual missions and the high-containment laboratory activities needed to meet those missions, as well as the availability of congressionally approved funding. Consequent to this mode of expansion, there was no research agenda linking all these agencies, even at the federal level, that would allow for a national needs assessment, strategic plan, or coordinated oversight. As GAO last reported in 2013, after more than 12 years, GAO has not been able to find any detailed projections based on a government-wide strategic evaluation of research requirements based on public health or national security needs. Without this information, there is little assurance of having facilities with the right capacity to meet the nation's needs.
GAO's past work has found a continued lack of national standards for designing, constructing, commissioning, and operating high-containment laboratories. As noted in a 2009 report, the absence of national standards means that the laboratories may vary from place to place because of differences in local building requirements or standards for safe operations. Some guidance exists about designing, constructing, and operating high-containment laboratories. Specifically, the Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories guidance recommends various design, construction, and operations standards, but GAO's work has found it is not universally followed. The guidance also does not recommend an assessment of whether the suggested design, construction, and operational standards are achieved. As GAO has reported, national standards are valuable not only in relation to new laboratory construction but also in ensuring compliance for periodic upgrades.
No one agency is responsible for determining the aggregate or cumulative risks associated with the continued expansion of high-containment laboratories; according to experts and federal officials GAO interviewed for prior work, the oversight of these laboratories is fragmented and largely self-policing.
On July 11, 2014, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) released a report on the potential exposure to anthrax that described a number of actions that CDC plans to take within its responsibilities to avoid another incident like the one in June. The incident in June was caused when a laboratory scientist inadvertently failed to sterilize plates containing samples of anthrax, derived with a new method, and transferred them to a facility with lower biosecurity protocols. This incident and the inherent risks of biosecurity highlight the need for a national strategy to evaluate the requirements for high-containment laboratories, set and maintain national standards for such laboratories' construction and operation, and maintain a national strategy for the oversight of laboratories that conduct important work on highly infectious pathogens.
What GAO Recommends
This testimony contains no new recommendations, but GAO has made recommendations in prior reports to responsible agencies. |
gao_GAO-12-659T | gao_GAO-12-659T_0 | Funding Increases Have Expanded or Created Programs with Varying Results
From fiscal years 2007 through 2012, DOE’s budget requests rose in nominal terms from about $23.6 billion to $29.5 billion, and its appropriations rose over that time from about $23.8 billion to $26.3 billion, increasing to almost $33.9 billion in fiscal year 2009. DOE Programs Funded by the Recovery Act
Through the Recovery Act, Congress provided approximately $8 billion for three existing DOE programs: (1) $0.4 billion in initial funding for the Advanced Research Projects Agency-Energy to support advanced energy research, (2) $2.5 billion for the Loan Guarantee Program to guarantee loans for innovative energy projects, and (3) $5 billion for the Weatherization Assistance Program to make energy efficiency improvements to the homes of low-income families. In addition, under the Advanced Technology Vehicles Manufacturing loan program, which received some Recovery Act funds, DOE can provide up to $25 billion in loans for fuel-efficient vehicle projects, but at the time of our review, it could not be assured that projects would be delivered as agreed. According to ARPA-E’s budget director, as of March 1, 2012, the program has awarded no more than the $521.7 million that, as we reported in January 2012, was provided to universities, public and private companies, and national laboratories to fund 181 projects that attempt to make transformational advances to a variety of energy technologies, including high-energy batteries and renewable fuels. ARPA-E is required by statute to achieve its goals through energy technology projects that, among other things, accelerate transformational technological advances in areas that industry by itself is not likely to undertake because of technical and financial uncertainty. In January 2012, we reported that ARPA-E uses several selection criteria in making awards, although its requirements for information on private sector funding could be improved. DOE agreed with our recommendations. However, we also reported that the program does not have the consolidated data on application status needed to facilitate efficient management and program oversight. In addition, the program adhered to most of its established process for reviewing applications, but we reported that its actual process differed from its established process at least once on 11 of the 13 applications we reviewed. Weatherization Assistance Program
The Recovery Act appropriated $5 billion for the Weatherization Assistance Program to help low-income families reduce their energy bills by making long-term energy efficiency improvements to their homes. Advanced Technology Vehicles Manufacturing Loan Program
In December 2007, Congress enacted the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, which mandates more stringent average fuel economy standards for newly manufactured passenger vehicles sold in the United States by model year 2020 and established in DOE the Advanced Technology Vehicles Manufacturing (ATVM) loan program, to provide loans for projects to produce more fuel-efficient passenger vehicles and their components. Opportunities May Exist to Achieve Savings and Enhance Revenue
We have previously reported on several areas at DOE that may provide opportunities for achieving increased savings and enhancing government revenue. Areas that may provide opportunities for increased savings include (1) contractor support costs and (2) potential overlap of effort across certain activities for programs to reduce diesel emissions from mobile sources. An area that may provide an opportunity for enhanced government revenue concerns DOE’s uranium inventories, which are worth potentially billions of dollars to commercial nuclear power plants that can use the material as fuel in their reactors. Also in February 2012, in our annual report on overlap and duplication of federal programs that may result in inefficient use of taxpayer funds, we recommended that DOE assess whether further opportunities could be taken to streamline support functions, estimated to cost over $5 billion, at its contractor-managed laboratories and other sites, including Office of Science sites, in light of contractors’ historically fragmented approach to providing these functions. DOE agreed with the recommendation. Table 6 shows funding, by program, for DOE activities to reduce diesel emissions from mobile sources. In February 2012, we reported that federal grant and loan funding for activities that reduce mobile source diesel emissions is fragmented across 14 programs at DOE, the Department of Transportation (DOT), and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). DOE agreed with our recommendation. Excess Uranium Inventories
Uranium is used in fuel for nuclear power plants. | Why GAO Did This Study
Understanding the impact of budget-related considerations has become particularly important as Congress and the administration seek to decrease the cost of government while improving its performance. In recent years, Congress has authorized large increases in funding for DOE. For example, the Recovery Act, which Congress enacted to, among other things, preserve and create jobs and promote economic recovery, provided DOE with more than $41.7 billion in areas such as energy efficiency, renewable energy, and environmental cleanup.
This testimony focuses on several key programs and related budget issues at DOE, including (1) the management of selected programs expanded or created by recent funding increases and (2) potential opportunities to achieve savings or enhance revenue. This testimony is based on prior GAO reports from February 2011 to March 2012, and updated with readily available data from DOE.
What GAO Found
Recent GAO work found that funding increases have expanded or created Department of Energy (DOE) programs with varying results. For example:
Advanced Research Projects Agency-Energy (ARPA-E) awards grants to projects that help develop high-risk energy technologies. Since fiscal year 2009 the program has received $855 million to fund energy projects that industry by itself was not likely to undertake. GAO found that ARPA-E uses several selection criteria in awarding funds, but its requirements for information on private funding could be improved.
The Loan Guarantee Program provides loan guarantees for innovative energy technologies. DOE has made about $15 billion in loan guarantees and is authorized to make up to $34 billion in additional loan guarantees. GAO found that the program does not have sufficient data to facilitate oversight, and its actual process for reviewing applications has differed from the established process.
The Weatherization Assistance Program helps low-income families reduce their energy bills by making long-term energy efficiency improvements to their homes. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act) provided $5 billion to enhance the programs ability to make energy efficiency improvements to low-income family homes. GAO made recommendations to DOE to clarify the programs production targets (e.g., the number of homes weatherized) and guidance.
The Advanced Technology Vehicles Manufacturing Loan Program provides loans for projects to produce more fuel-efficient passenger vehicles and their components. DOE can make up to $25 billion in loans for fuel-efficient vehicles; at the time of GAOs review, DOE could not be assured that projects would be delivered as agreed.
GAO also reported that improvements at DOE may provide opportunities for increasing savings and enhancing revenue. For example:
Contractor support costs. DOEs management of contractors, who operate DOE sites and represent 90 percent of DOEs budget, has historically been decentralized, or fragmented. This adds to inefficiencies in support functions. Since 2007, DOE and contractors at some DOE sites have had efforts to streamline these functions. GAO recommended that DOE assess whether further opportunities could be taken to streamline such functions.
Diesel emissions. DOE, the Department of Transportation, and the Environmental Protection Agency receive federal funding to reduce diesel emissions from mobile sources14 programs in all, which also overlap on certain activities. DOE received $572 million for its 3 programs. GAO recommended that the three agencies establish a strategy for collaboration to reduce diesel emissions from mobile sources.
Excess uranium inventories. Uranium is used in fuel for nuclear power plants. GAO reported DOEs excess uranium inventories could be worth billions of dollars in additional revenue as fuel for commercial nuclear power plants.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making no new recommendations in this testimony but continues to believe that implementing the recent recommendations made in the reports discussed should improve DOE program management, achieve savings, and enhance revenue. DOE has generally agreed with most of our recommendations, but disagreed on certain points related to the timing of implementing our recommendations. |
gao_GAO-11-272 | gao_GAO-11-272_0 | Federal law permits the Secretary of State to deny or revoke the issuance of passports only in certain circumstances, including, but not limited to, when the individual is subject to a criminal court order, condition of probation, or condition of parole, any of which forbids departure from the United States and the violation of which could result in the issuance of a federal warrant of arrest, including a warrant issued under the Federal Fugitive Felon Act; is over $2,500 delinquent in child support; is delinquent in certain Department of State debts; has an outstanding felony warrant; has an outstanding foreign felony warrant; is subject to an extradition request that has been presented to a foreign country; has been declared legally incompetent; used a passport or crossed an international border to commit an act based on which the individual was subsequently convicted of certain drug trafficking crimes, but only during the period the individual is imprisoned or on parole or supervised release; or used a passport or crossed an international border to commit an act based on which the individual was subsequently convicted under the federal “sex tourism” statute, but only during the period the individual is imprisoned or on parole or supervised release. Magnitude of Unpaid Taxes Owed by Individuals Issued a Passport
The State Department issued passports to over 224,000 individuals who owed over $5.8 billion in known unpaid federal taxes as of September 30, 2008. This represented over 1 percent of the approximately 16 million individuals issued a passport during fiscal year 2008. Currently, federal law does not authorize State to deny the issuance of passports to individuals who owe federal taxes. Because IRS’s database does not include amounts owed by taxpayers who have not filed tax returns and for which IRS has not assessed tax amounts due, the estimated amount of unpaid federal taxes is likely understated. The dollar amount of these debts was about $1.3 billion. Unpaid Federal Taxes of Individuals Issued a Passport Are Substantially Understated
Although the over $5.8 billion in unpaid federal taxes owed by individuals issued a passport as of September 30, 2008, is a significant amount, it likely substantially understates the full extent of unpaid taxes owed by these or other individuals. State issues millions of passports each year. Of these cases, we identified several passport recipients for which IRS had assessed trust fund recovery penalties due to these individuals’ willful failure to remit payroll taxes withheld from their employees’ paychecks to the federal government. Rather than fulfill their role as “trustees” of this money and forward it to IRS as required by law, these passport recipients diverted the money for other purposes. Our investigations also found that two individuals committed identity theft by using the identities of deceased individuals to fraudulently obtain passports. Our investigations found that these individuals used their passports to travel to Mexico, France, and Africa. We referred these two cases to IRS for further investigation. Our investigations also revealed that at least four passport recipients currently reside in another country while owing federal taxes. At least 10 passport recipients had been indicted or convicted of violating federal laws. In addition, IRS officials explained the impact 26 U.S.C. IRS officials stated that 26 U.S.C. Matter for Congressional Consideration
If Congress is interested in pursuing the policy strategy of linking federal tax debt collection to passport issuance as an approach to help reduce the federal deficit and to increase taxpayer compliance with tax laws, it may wish to consider taking steps to enable and require the Secretary of State to screen and prevent individuals who owe federal taxes from receiving passports, to include establishing criteria for specific categories of passport holders and waivers as appropriate. To do this, Congress may wish to ask the Secretary of State and Commissioner of Internal Revenue to jointly study policy and practical issues and develop options for further consideration, including developing appropriate criteria and safeguards. State provided technical comments, which we have incorporated as appropriate. We matched the passport data to IRS unpaid assessment data using the Social Security number (SSN) field. To identify examples of abuse or criminal activity, we selected 25 passport recipients with federal tax debts for detailed audit and investigation. The 25 cases were chosen using a nonrepresentative selection approach based on our judgment, data mining, and a number of other criteria, such as total amount of taxes owed by passport recipients, number of tax years that the passport recipient did not pay all taxes, types of taxes, and location of the tax recipient. While these case studies were among the more egregious and cannot be generalized beyond the cases presented, they serve to illustrate the sizeable amounts of taxes owed by some individuals and the other characteristics of the cases that could extend beyond the tax system, including the use of passports by individuals involved in crimes such as money laundering. | Why GAO Did This Study
According to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), as of the end of fiscal year 2010, the balance of reported unpaid federal taxes was about $330 billion. Given the many challenges that IRS faces, the enforcement of the tax laws and the tax code is on GAO's list of high-risk areas. GAO was asked to (1) determine, to the extent possible, the magnitude of known unpaid federal taxes for individuals who were issued passports in fiscal year 2008; and (2) identify examples of passport recipients who have known unpaid federal taxes. GAO reviewed data from the Department of State (State) and IRS. To identify examples for detailed audit and investigation, GAO chose a nonrepresentative selection of 25 passport recipients based on a number of factors, including amount of taxes owed. These case studies were chosen, among other things, by the more egregious amount of federal taxes owed and cannot be generalized beyond the cases presented.
What GAO Found
State issued passports to about 16 million individuals during fiscal year 2008; of these, over 224,000 individuals (over 1 percent) owed over $5.8 billion in unpaid federal taxes as of September 30, 2008. State is not authorized to restrict the issuance of passports to individuals because they owe federal taxes. In addition, federal law does not permit IRS to disclose taxpayer information, including unpaid federal taxes, to State officials unless the taxpayer consents. In contrast, federal law permits certain restrictions on the issuance of passports to individuals, such as individuals owing child support debts over $2,500. For 2008, the estimated amount of unpaid federal taxes is likely understated because it excludes individuals who have not filed tax returns or underreported income. In addition, according to State officials, State cannot compel a passport applicant to provide a Social Security Number (SSN). As a result, State's records sometimes did not contain a valid SSN, which is necessary to match passport data to IRS data. Also, the number of passport holders and dollars owed only includes 1 year of passports that were issued, substantially understating the total tax debt for all passport holders. GAO judgmentally selected 25 passport recipients to investigate for abuse related to the federal tax system or criminal activity. Of these cases, at least 10 passport recipients had been indicted or convicted of federal laws. In addition, IRS assessed trust fund recovery penalties on several passport recipients when the individual did not remit payroll taxes to the federal government. Rather than fulfill their role as trustees of this money and forward it to IRS, they diverted the money for other purposes. Willful failure to remit payroll taxes is a felony under U.S. law. Some of these individuals accumulated substantial wealth and assets, including million-dollar houses and luxury vehicles, while failing to pay their federal taxes. At least 16 passport recipients traveled outside the country while owing federal taxes. At least 4 passport recipients resided in another country at the time of GAO's investigation. Two individuals used the identities of deceased individuals to fraudulently obtain passports and then used these passports to travel to Mexico, France, and Africa. In one case, the unpaid tax debt belonged to a deceased individual, and in the other case, the debt was incurred by the imposter. We referred these 2 cases to IRS for further investigation. If Congress is interested in pursuing a policy of linking federal tax debt collection to passport issuance, it may consider taking steps to enable State to screen and prevent individuals who owe federal taxes from receiving passports. This could include asking State and IRS to jointly study policy and practical issues and develop options with appropriate criteria and privacy safeguards. State provided technical comments which we incorporated into the report as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-03-465 | gao_GAO-03-465_0 | These efforts were aimed at improving the department’s financial management and related business operations. The report stated that “The Defense Travel System was being substantially developed without the requisite requirements, cost, performance, and schedule documents and analyses needed as the foundation for assessing the effectiveness of the system and its return on investment.” The report further noted there was increased risk that the $114.8 million and 6 years of effort already invested will not fully realize all goals to reengineer temporary duty travel, make better use of IT, and provide an integrated travel system. For fiscal year 2003, DOD has requested approximately $26 billion in IT funding to support a wide range of military operations as well as DOD business system operations. As shown in table 3, approximately $18 billion—the nearly $5.2 billion for business systems and the $12.8 billion for business systems infrastructure—relates to the operation, maintenance, and modernization of DOD’s 1,731 business systems. Investment Management and Oversight of Key DFAS Accounting Systems Has Not Been Effective
DOD management and oversight authorities for the four case study projects are DFAS, the DOD Comptroller, and the DOD CIO. Table 4 highlights these cost increases and schedule delays. However, these analyses had not been updated to reflect schedule delays, cost increases, and changes in scope that have occurred— each of which has an impact on the projected benefits that were originally justified. DOD Oversight of DFAS IT Projects Has Not Been Effective
DOD’s oversight over the four DFAS projects we reviewed has been ineffective. In fact, as previously noted, after an investment of over $126 million and 7 years of effort, the DOD Comptroller terminated DPPS in December 2002. We reported that this stovepiped decision-making process has contributed to the department’s current complex, error prone environment of over 1,700 systems. In each of the four system projects we discuss in the report, DOD has invested millions of dollars without economically justifying its investments, in large part because those entities responsible for managing and overseeing these investments have not required such justification despite schedule slippages, cost overruns, and reductions in planned capability. Scope and Methodology
To obtain an overview of DOD’s current business systems environment we met with representatives of the then Financial Management Modernization Program Office to obtain information on the number of systems that are part of the current systems environment. To determine if DOD was effectively managing and overseeing its IT investments, we focused on the four system projects previously noted. Order by Mail or Phone
To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
Public Affairs | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense's (DOD) long-standing financial management and business systems modernization problems result in a lack of information needed to make sound decisions, hinder the efficiency of operations, and leave the department vulnerable to fraud, waste, and abuse. Such problems led us in 1995 to put financial management and business systems modernization at DOD on our list of high risk areas in the federal government, a designation that continues today. GAO was asked to (1) provide information on the number and cost of DOD's current business systems and (2) determine if DOD is effectively managing and overseeing selected accounting system investments.
What GAO Found
DOD estimated that it had 1,731 business systems for its day-to-day operations as of October 2002. As GAO previously reported, these systems have evolved over time into the overly complex, error prone, duplicative, stovepiped environment that exists today. To support the operation, maintenance, and modernization of its business systems, the department requested approximately $18 billion for fiscal year 2003. Funding is only part of the solution to improving DOD's current system environment. A key ingredient to success is effectively managing and overseeing these investments. DOD has invested approximately $316 million in four key Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) projects. However, DOD has not demonstrated that this substantial investment will markedly improve DOD financial management information needed for decision-making and financial reporting purposes. In fact, the DOD Comptroller terminated one project in December 2002, after an investment of over $126 million, citing poor program performance and increasing costs. Continued investment in the other three projects has not been justified because requisite analyses of the costs, benefits, and risks of each one do not reflect cost increases and/or schedule delays. DOD oversight of the four DFAS projects has not been effective. Collectively, DFAS, the DOD Comptroller, and the DOD Chief Information Officer share investment management responsibility for these four projects. However, these DOD oversight entities have not questioned the impact of the cost increases and schedule delays and allowed the projects to proceed absent the requisite analytical justification. |
gao_T-AIMD-98-195 | gao_T-AIMD-98-195_0 | Recent Progress to Identify and Refer Delinquent Nontax Debt for Offset
The Subcommittee’s November 1997 oversight hearing on DCIA’s implementation underscored the need for progress in referring delinquent nontax debts to Treasury for offset. At about the time of the hearing, agencies had referred $9.4 billion of nontax debt over 180 days delinquent to Treasury for administrative offset. As of April 1998, the CFO Act agencies had referred about $16.7 billion of delinquent nontax debt to Treasury for administrative offset—a 78 percent increase over about 7 months. According to Treasury reports, in April 1998, these agencies held $43.1 billion of nontax debt over 180 days delinquent, including the $16.7 billion of referred debt. Treasury and the CFO Act agencies have determined that $19.4 billion, or almost 75 percent, of the $26.4 billion in unreferred nontax delinquent debt would not be referred for administrative offset, at least not in the near term, for the following reasons: about $12.3 billion relates to nontax delinquent debts that are involved with bankruptcies, foreclosures, statutory forbearance, or formal appeals. Accordingly, these debts have not yet been referred to Treasury for offset. In addition to federal payments made by Treasury, more than 50 Non-Treasury Disbursing Offices (NTDO) make federal payments. Moreover, Treasury has not yet fully determined the extent to which payments will be exempt from administrative offset. According to Treasury data, during fiscal year 1997, agencies collected over $42 million through these programs. Treasury’s lack of progress in consolidating the offset programs is primarily the result of its problems with the development of a new administrative offset system. Systems Development Problems Must Be Effectively Addressed
Treasury does not have a system that can perform all the administrative offset functions envisioned as a result of DCIA. Although Treasury has recently taken several actions to address systems development issues, it will be some time before enough information is available to accurately assess the effectiveness of those actions. This system was to be used to consolidate the administrative, tax refund, and federal salary offset programs, and was to include all eligible delinquent federal nontax debt and federal payments. GTOP was scheduled to be implemented in January 1998. Currently, Treasury is focusing its efforts on enhancing ITOP to handle all eligible debts and payments for the administrative offset program, as well as the consolidation of the administrative, tax refund, and federal salary offset programs. GTOP’s Development
Treasury has concluded that it currently cannot use GTOP for the administrative offset program primarily because Treasury did not apply a disciplined system development process for that system. Thus, Treasury has not placed the system into operation. Fourth, Treasury has not yet completed a risk management plan. But it will be important for Treasury’s top management to ensure that the planned corrective actions are effectively and expeditiously completed prior to making any significant investment in the development of an administrative offset system. Otherwise, Treasury is significantly exposed to the risk of costly systems modifications and additional delay in developing a system to implement the administrative offset provision of DCIA. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the Department of the Treasury's implementation of the administrative offset provision of the Debt Collection Improvement Act (DCIA) of 1996, focusing on: (1) the status of referrals by agencies of delinquent nontax debts to Treasury for administrative offset; (2) actions Treasury has taken and plans to take to include all eligible federal payments in the administrative offset program; and (3) actions Treasury has taken, or plans to take, to consolidate the administrative, tax refund, and federal salary offset programs.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) Treasury has recently made progress in getting the 24 agencies covered by the Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act of 1990 to refer nontax debt over 180 days delinquent for administrative offset; (2) as of April 1998, the CFO Act agencies had referred to Treasury about $16.7 billion in nontax debt over 180 days delinquent, and Treasury has entered these delinquencies into its debtor database; (3) this is a substantial increase over the $9.4 billion that had been referred to Treasury about 7 months earlier, at about the time the congressional subcommittee held DCIA oversight hearings in November 1997; (4) as of April 1998, about $26.4 billion of reported nontax debt over 180 days delinquent had not been referred to Treasury and is unlikely to be referred in the near future; (5) on the payment side, Treasury does not yet have a system capable of matching all federal payments against the delinquent debtor database; (6) as of April 1998, 2 years after DCIA's enactment, Treasury had collected about $1.2 million of delinquent nontax federal debt through its administrative offset program; (7) payments subject to offset through the administrative offset program are limited to those made by Treasury to vendors and to federal retirees by Treasury disbursing offices in fiscal year 1997; (8) also, Treasury has made little progress in fully determining the extent to which federal payments can be made available for offset; (9) Treasury has not yet consolidated the administrative, tax refund, and federal salary offset programs; (10) Treasury's systems development problems have also caused delay in consolidating these programs and thus, any debt collection efficiencies envisioned by such a consolidation have not yet been realized; (11) in developing an administrative offset system, Treasury did not apply a disciplined systems development process; (12) the resulting system, which was planned for implementation in January 1998, was not placed into operation, and a subsequent systems development effort is under way; (13) in efforts to develop an administrative offset system, Treasury has recently taken several actions to address systems development issues; (14) it will be important for Treasury's top management to ensure that the planned corrective actions are effectively and expeditiously completed prior to making any significant investment in the development of an administrative offset system; and (15) otherwise, Treasury is significantly exposed to risks that it may experience costly modifications and additional delays in developing a system for implementing the administrative offset provision of DCIA. |
gao_GAO-14-555 | gao_GAO-14-555_0 | Some oil and gas can be developed by drilling a well and relying on the natural pressure in the formation to push the oil or gas to the surface. Enforcement of state class II regulations. Resources for State and EPA-Managed Class II Programs Include EPA Grants, State Funds, and Federal and State Personnel
EPA and states provide a mix of resources to support the class II program, including EPA grants, state funding, and EPA and state personnel. Officials who manage the eight programs we reviewed reported few known instances of contamination from the injection of fluids into class II wells in the last 5 years; however, EPA’s class II program does not require monitoring of groundwater for contamination nor do most of the eight states we reviewed. Without similar reviews of other emerging risks, class II programs may not have the information necessary to fully protect underground drinking water. EPA Is Not Consistently Performing Oversight and Enforcement Activities
EPA is not consistently performing two key activities associated with its oversight and enforcement responsibilities for class II programs. First, EPA does not consistently conduct annual on-site reviews of state programs, which EPA guidance identifies as a key activity needed to conduct effective oversight and to ensure that state and EPA-managed class II programs are protecting underground sources of drinking water. Without evaluating its guidance, EPA does not know what oversight activities are most effective and should be priorities—or even necessary—given current program conditions and funding. EPA Is Not Consistently Incorporating State Program Changes into Federal Regulations, Hindering Its Ability to Enforce Program Requirements
EPA has not consistently incorporated state program requirements, or changes to state program requirements, into federal regulations, as required by agency regulations; as a result, where it has not done so, EPA does not have the ability to enforce these state program requirements if necessary. Without incorporating state program requirements, or changes to state program requirements, into federal regulations, EPA may not be able to take enforcement action, if a state does not take such action or requests EPA’s assistance to take action, against well operators that are violating state regulations. EPA officials said that they do not often have to step in to enforce a state class II program regulation, but as the oil and gas industry continues to develop its resources and use innovative technologies, state programs may change their regulations, and EPA may have increasing numbers of state program changes to review, approve, incorporate into federal regulations, and enforce. EPA officials told us that incorporating changes into federal regulations, particularly through the rulemaking process, was burdensome and time- consuming. EPA officials told us that the database will not be complete and widely populated enough to report national data for at least 2 to 3 years. Without information on emerging risks on a national scale, such as through a UIC Technical Workgroup review, state class II programs may not have the information necessary to address these risks and ensure that their programs are designed to be effective at protecting underground sources of drinking water. Recommendations for Executive Action
To ensure that EPA’s oversight of the class II program is effective at protecting drinking water sources from the underground injection of large amounts of wastewater that will be produced with increasing domestic oil and gas production, we recommend that the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency take the following four actions:
Task the UIC Technical Working Group with reviewing emerging risks, and related program safeguards, including overpressurization of formations and information on use of diesel fuels in hydraulic fracturing. To support nationwide reporting goals until the national UIC database improve the 7520 data for reporting purposes, as well as to help with quality assurance for the national UIC database, by developing and implementing a protocol for states and regions to enter data consistently and for regions to check 7520 data for consistency and completeness to ensure that data collected from state and EPA-managed class II programs are complete and comparable for purposes of reporting at a national level, and in the interim, develop a method to use the 7520 database to report UIC data, including data on class II wells, until the national UIC database is fully populated with state data. In response to the second part of this recommendation, that EPA consider alternative processes to review and approve state program revisions and to incorporate state programs into federal regulations without rulemaking, EPA stated that (1) the Safe Drinking Water Act specifically requires that state UIC program revisions made in response to changes in EPA UIC regulations be approved by rule, and (2) the agency would need to revise its regulations to be able to approve state program changes without a rulemaking. EPA has not, however, codified some state programs. Appendix III: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report are to examine: (1) EPA and state roles, responsibilities, and resources in management the class II program; (2) safeguards select states have in place to ensure the protection of underground drinking water; (3) EPA’s regulation and oversight of class II programs; and (4) the reliability of data to report on the class II program nationwide. The programs in two of these states— Kentucky and Pennsylvania—are managed by EPA regions under EPA regulations, while the remaining six programs are state programs approved by EPA. | Why GAO Did This Study
Every day in the United States, at least 2 billion gallons of fluids are injected into over 172,000 wells to enhance oil and gas production, or to dispose of fluids brought to the surface during the extraction of oil and gas resources. These wells are subject to regulation to protect drinking water sources under EPA's UIC class II program and approved state class II programs. Because much of the population relies on underground sources for drinking water, these wells have raised concerns about the safety of the nation's drinking water.
GAO was asked to review EPA's oversight of the class II program. This report examines (1) EPA and state roles, responsibilities, and resources for the program, (2) safeguards to protect drinking water, (3) EPA oversight and enforcement of class II programs, and (4) the reliability of program data for reporting. GAO reviewed federal and state laws and regulations. GAO interviewed EPA and state officials and reviewed class II programs from a nongeneralizable sample of eight states selected on the basis of shale oil and gas regions and the highest number of class II wells.
What GAO Found
The Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) role in the Underground Injection Control (UIC) class II program is to oversee and enforce fluid injection into wells associated with oil and gas production, known as class II wells. EPA has approved 39 states to manage their own class II programs, and EPA regions are responsible for managing the programs in remaining states. EPA regions and states use a mix of resources to manage class II programs, including EPA grant funding, state funding, and federal and state personnel. EPA's UIC grant funding has remained at about $11 million for at least the past 10 years.
Class II programs from the eight selected states that GAO reviewed have safeguards, such as construction requirements for injection wells, to protect against contamination of underground sources of drinking water. Programs in two states are managed by EPA and rely on EPA safeguards, while the remaining six programs are state managed and have their own safeguards that EPA deemed effective at preventing such contamination. Overall, EPA and state program officials reported that these safeguards are protective, resulting in few known incidents of contamination. However, the safeguards do not address emerging underground injection risks, such as seismic activity and overly high pressure in geologic formations leading to surface outbreaks of fluids. EPA officials said they manage these risks on a state-by-state basis, and some states have additional safeguards to address them. EPA has tasked its UIC Technical Workgroup with reviewing induced seismicity associated with injection wells and possible safeguards, but it does not plan reviews of other emerging risks, such as high pressure in formations. Without reviews of these risks, class II programs may not have the information necessary to fully protect underground drinking water.
EPA is not consistently conducting two key oversight and enforcement activities for class II programs. First, EPA does not consistently conduct annual on-site state program evaluations as directed in guidance because, according to some EPA officials, the agency does not have the resources to do so. The agency has not, however, evaluated its guidance, which dates from the 1980s, to determine which activities are essential for effective oversight. Without such an evaluation, EPA does not know what oversight activities are most effective or necessary. Second, to enforce state class II requirements, under current agency regulations, EPA must approve and incorporate state program requirements and any changes to them into federal regulations through a rulemaking. EPA has not incorporated all such requirements and changes into federal regulations and, as a result, may not be able to enforce all state program requirements. Some EPA officials said that incorporating changes into federal regulations through the rulemaking process is burdensome and time-consuming. EPA has not, however, evaluated alternatives for a more efficient process to approve and incorporate state program requirements and changes into regulations. Without incorporating these requirements and changes into federal regulations, EPA cannot enforce them if a state does not take action or requests EPA's assistance to take action.
EPA collects a large amount of data on each class II program, but the data are not reliable (i.e., complete or comparable) to report at a national level. EPA is working on a national database that will allow it to report UIC results at a national level, but the database will not be fully implemented for at least 2 to 3 years.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that, among other things, EPA review emerging risks related to class II program safeguards and ensure that it can effectively oversee and efficiently enforce class II programs. EPA agreed with all but the enforcement recommendation. GAO continues to believe that EPA should take actions to ensure it can enforce state class II regulations, as discussed in the report. |
gao_RCED-98-94 | gao_RCED-98-94_0 | In part to fulfill the requirements of the Results Act, the Department of Energy (DOE) announced the development of its Strategic Management System in 1996. Specifically, we evaluated how well (1) DOE’s program and field units linked their subordinate plans to the departmental strategic plan and (2) DOE linked the goals of its strategic plan to its annual performance plan and the goals for its performance-based management and operating contracts. Because the business lines in DOE’s strategic plan are not aligned with the organizational structure, more than one DOE organization contributes to the same business line. For example, DOE’s three main headquarters program offices are Defense Programs, Energy Research, and Environmental Management. Each of these offices may contribute to the business lines through various headquarters offices. Subordinate Plans Are Not Clearly Linked to DOE’s Strategic Plan
While extensive planning is going on at different levels of DOE, it is not clear how all of the plans prepared by the programs, field offices, and contractors are linked to DOE’s departmental strategic plan. However, DOE’s Strategic Management System does not provide specific directions on how to link the goals of subordinate strategic and multiyear plans to the goals, objectives, and strategies of the departmental strategic plan. As a result, the contractors managing DOE’s facilities began their work before approved goals and incentive fees were made a part of their contracts. 1999 Annual Performance Goals Could Be Linked Better to Requested Budgetary Resources
In its first annual performance plan under the Results Act, DOE met the act’s requirement that an agency’s performance plan be consistent with the agency’s strategic plan by aligning the performance plan’s goals and measures with those in its strategic plan. DOE, in its performance-based management contracts, seeks to have performance goals and incentive fees incorporated in the contracts by the start of the fiscal year. Moreover, incorporating performance goals and incentive fees in performance-based management contracts after contractors have already begun the work reduces the effectiveness of these contracts. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed certain aspects of the Department of Energy's (DOE) implementation of the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, focusing on the Department's strategic and annual planning.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) subordinate strategic and multiyear plans prepared by DOE's programs, field offices, and contractors are not clearly linked to the goals, objectives, and strategies of the Department's strategic plan; (2) although DOE's Strategic Management System guidance provides a basic outline of the planning process, it does not provide clear directions on how these subordinate plans should be linked to DOE's strategic plan; (3) additionally, DOE formed its Strategic Management System around its business lines and its organizations are not aligned with the business lines; (4) for example, DOE has three main program offices--Defense Programs, Energy Research, and Environmental Management--whose work is done through various field organizations and management and operating contractors; (5) as a result, these different program offices and their supporting organizations often contribute to the fulfillment of the same business lines through a variety of different, complex, crosscutting relationships; (6) DOE, in its first annual performance plan under the Results Act, links the annual performance plan's goals and measures to those in the strategic plan; (7) DOE also provides a description of how budgetary resources are linked to its strategic goals; (8) however, the annual performance plan could be more useful if it described how the requested budgetary resources are linked to the annual performance goals in the plan; (9) in addition, DOE did not incorporate the approved performance goals and incentive fees in its performance-based management and operating contracts--accounting for 70 percent of DOE's obligations--until after the start of the current fiscal year and after the contractors had already begun their work; (10) the goals and incentive fees agreed to in these contracts are intended to guide and enhance the contractors' performance; and (11) not incorporating the goals and incentive fees until after the contractors begin work reduces the usefulness of performance-based contracting. |
gao_RCED-97-7 | gao_RCED-97-7_0 | Introduction
The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), through the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), insures mortgages on both single-family homes and multifamily rental housing properties for low- and moderate-income households. 1.3.) HUD’s Proposals to Address Problems With the Insured Section 8 Portfolio
In May 1995, HUD proposed to address the key problems affecting the insured Section 8 portfolio through a process that it called “mark-to-market.” The principal steps in this process were to reset rents to market levels and reduce mortgage debt if necessary to permit a positive cash flow, terminate FHA’s mortgage insurance, and replace project-based Section 8 subsidies with portable tenant-based subsidies. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To assist the Congress in evaluating HUD’s proposal for reengineering the insured Section 8 multifamily housing portfolio, we examined the (1) problems affecting the properties in the portfolio and HUD’s proposals for addressing them; (2) results and reasonableness of a HUD-contracted study carried out by Ernst & Young LLP that assesses, on the basis of a national sample of 558 randomly selected properties, the effects of HUD’s proposal on the portfolio; and (3) key issues facing the Congress in assessing HUD’s proposal. 2.) The study further indicates that about 80 percent of the properties would need to have their debt reduced in order to continue operations after reengineering. Over the next 10 years, according to Ernst & Young’s data, this reduction would result in claims costs, calculated on a present value basis, of between $6 billion and $7 billion. However, some assumptions used in Ernst & Young’s financial model may not reflect the way in which insured Section 8 properties would actually be affected by portfolio reengineering. Ernst & Young’s assumptions about the transition period for reengineered properties may be overly optimistic. Ernst & Young’s data indicate that between 22 and 29 percent of the properties in the portfolio could not cover their immediate deferred maintenance and short-term capital needs even if their mortgage debt were fully written off. What Should Be Done to Address Properties That Have Difficulty Sustaining Operations? Any approach that is implemented should address not only the high costs of Section 8 subsidies but also the government’s high exposure to insurance loss, the poor physical condition of some of the properties, and the underlying causes of these long-standing problems with the portfolio. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) proposals to reengineer its portfolio of insured Section 8 multifamily rental housing properties, focusing on the: (1) problems affecting the properties in the HUD insured Section 8 portfolio and HUD plans for addressing them; (2) results and reasonableness of a study performed by Ernst & Young to assess the effects of the HUD proposal on the portfolio's properties; and (3) key issues facing Congress in assessing the HUD proposal.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the HUD insured Section 8 portfolio suffers from high subsidy costs, high exposure to insurance loss, and the poor physical condition of some properties; (2) under the HUD mark-to-market proposal, property owners would set rents at market levels, and HUD would reduce mortgages as necessary to achieve positive cash flows, terminate Federal Housing Administration (FHA) mortgage insurance, and replace Section 8 project-based rental subsidies with portable tenant-based subsidies; (3) the Ernst & Young study concluded that under the reengineering proposal, about 80 percent of the properties would need to have their mortgages reduced to some degree and that between 22 and 29 percent of the properties would have difficulty sustaining operations even if their mortgages were totally written off; (4) the study data indicated that the cost to the government of writing down mortgages and addressing deferred maintenance needs at reengineered properties would be high; (5) based on Ernst & Young's assumptions, FHA insurance fund claims would be between $6 billion and $7 billion in present value over the next 10 years and subsidy costs would be comparable to the existing program's subsidy costs if all of the properties were reengineered when their Section 8 contracts expire; and (6) Ernst & Young's financial model was generally reasonable, but some assumptions about the properties' deferred maintenance needs were questionable and some financing assumptions may not reflect the way in which insured Section 8 properties would actually be affected by portfolio reengineering. |
gao_GAO-13-50 | gao_GAO-13-50_0 | One contractor reviews states’ paid claims data to identify aberrant claims or billing anomalies. A different audit contractor conducts targeted provider audits to determine whether or not the provider received an overpayment. In addition to the NMAP, the MIG has implemented three activities that are the core of its support and oversight of state program integrity—the Medicaid Integrity Institute, comprehensive reviews, and SPIA. In 2007, the MIG established the Medicaid Integrity Institute, the first national Medicaid training program for state program integrity officials. 3.) Annually, the MIG collects information through a web-based portal from each state about its program integrity activities, which results in a publication of a one-page summary that provides statistics on states’ program integrity staffing, expenditures, audits for improper payments, and recoveries.officials, the SPIA represent the first national baseline collection of data According to MIG on state Medicaid integrity activities for the purpose of program evaluation and technical assistance. Return on Investment. Use of Separate Review and Audit Contractors Was Inefficient, Led to Duplication, and Contributed to a Longer Audit Process
The MIG’s decision to establish separate review and audit contractors for each state was inefficient and led to duplication because key functions such as data analysis were performed by both types of contractors. In turn, these inefficiencies contributed to lengthy MSIS audits, which, on average, took almost 2 years to complete. State Medicaid policies. Although MIG officials told us that they were sensitive to the burden placed on states by the establishment of NMAP, the use of separate review and audit contractors nonetheless increased states’ administrative burden because both types of contractors performed the same function and states had to review the contractors’ work to ensure that state policies were applied correctly. The HHS-OIG reported a similar finding that the MIG’s communication policy also contributed to a duplication of contractor functions. 4). Other MIG Activities Show Mixed Results in Overseeing and Supporting States’ Program Integrity Activities
The MIG’s modest spending on the Medicaid Integrity Institute enhances states’ capabilities. But, the data collected through the SPIA, another MIG oversight activity, has been of limited value as it is inconsistently reported, not validated, and overlaps with information collected through comprehensive reviews and other state reporting mechanisms. Furthermore, officials from three states recommended that the institute offer Medicaid audit certification to state program integrity staff. The MIG’s Comprehensive Reviews Could Help Inform the Selection of States for NMAP Audits
Comprehensive reviews yield important information about all aspects of states’ program integrity capabilities and vulnerabilities, and such information could be used to target NMAP audits towards states with serious vulnerabilities. In its comprehensive reviews of 51 states, the MIG identified 7 states as having serious program integrity infrastructure vulnerabilities, such as not maintaining a centralized program integrity function, yet 5 of these states had less than the typical number of audits Two of the 7 states had no NMAP audits assigned, 3 states assigned.had less than 1 percent of assigned audits in their states, and 2 other states had 16 and 23 audits, respectively; these last 2 states ranked 29th and 22nd in the assignment of 1,662 NMAP audits as of February 2012. Reporting on Program Integrity Results Is Inadequate
CMS’s limited reporting on the ROI from the Medicaid Integrity Program is inadequate. State reporting of recoveries is similarly insufficient because we found that most states were not fully reporting recoveries according to specific program integrity activities and that almost half appeared to underreport aggregate annual recoveries. Another state reported aggregate recoveries of about $195,000 over 3 years to CMS—$0, $130,000, and $65,000—but about $36 million in its annual report to the governor for 2 of these years. To date, CMS has provided a misleading picture of the ROI for NMAP audits and its unpublished methodology incorporates a percentage of identified overpayments reported on the SPIA, which is questionable. A full accounting of state and NMAP-related recoveries is an important yardstick for measuring the effectiveness of efforts to reduce improper payments. The apparent gaps in state reporting of such recoveries, however, hamper federal efforts to quantify the results of state and federal activities and make it difficult to determine whether states are returning the federal share of recovered overpayments. To ensure the most effective use of federal Medicaid program integrity funding, the CMS Acting Administrator should reevaluate the agency’s methodology for calculating an ROI for the Medicaid Integrity Program, including reporting separately on the NMAP, and share its methodology with Congress and the states. In response to our five recommendations, HHS concurred with three recommendations and partially concurred with two others. ROI methodology and reporting. We continue to believe that separately reporting an NMAP ROI is essential to hold CMS accountable for the effective operation of those audits, which constituted about half of CMS’s annual expenditures on the Medicaid Integrity Program. Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Health and Human Services. | Why GAO Did This Study
Medicaid has the second-highest estimated improper payments of any federal program that reports such data. The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 created the Medicaid Integrity Program to oversee and support state program integrity activities. CMS, the federal agency within HHS that oversees Medicaid, established the MIG to implement this new program. This report assesses (1) the MIG's use of two types of contractors to review and audit state Medicaid claims, (2) the MIG's implementation of other oversight and support activities, and (3) CMS and state reporting on the results of their program integrity activities. GAO analyzed MIG data on its contractors' audits, training program for state officials, comprehensive state reviews, and state assessments; analyzed reports that summarized the monetary returns from MIG and state program integrity activities; and interviewed MIG officials, contractors, and state program integrity officials.
What GAO Found
The Medicaid Integrity Group's (MIG) hiring of separate review and audit contractors for its National Medicaid Audit Program (NMAP) was inefficient and led to duplication because key functions were performed by both entities. Review contractors analyze state claims data to identify aberrant claims or billing anomalies while audit contractors conduct postpayment audits to determine if payments to providers were improper. Because both types of contractors had to assess whether payments were improper under state Medicaid policies, having separate contractors doubled states' burden in ensuring that state policies were being correctly applied. Also, poor coordination and communication between the two types of contractors resulted in duplicative data analysis. In turn, these inefficiencies added to the length of audits, which on average took almost 23 months to complete. By contrast, the average duration of six audits using a more collaborative and coordinated approach was 16 months, and the amount of identified overpayments increased significantly.
Other MIG oversight and support activities--the free training provided to state officials through the Medicaid Integrity Institute, the evaluation of state program integrity procedures through triennial comprehensive reviews, and the collection of data from states through annual assessments--show mixed results in enhancing program integrity efforts. According to state officials, the modest expenditures on the institute result in valuable training and networking opportunities. The MIG, however, has not taken advantage of the potential for comprehensive reviews to inform the selection of states for federal audits. Although the MIG's comprehensive reviews yield considerable information about state program integrity vulnerabilities, states with serious program integrity vulnerabilities often had few NMAP audits. Furthermore, the data collected through state program integrity assessments (SPIA) duplicate data collected through comprehensive reviews and other reports, are not validated, and, even if the data were accurate, are less current than similar data from other sources.
Reporting by the Centers for Medicaid & Medicaid Services (CMS) on the return on investment (ROI) from the activities of the MIG is inadequate. CMS's annual reports to Congress provide a limited picture of ROI for NMAP audits, which account for over half of the MIG's annual expenditures, and it is difficult to calculate an ROI with the expenditure and activity information provided. The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) recently announced that it will discontinue reporting a separate ROI for NMAP. In addition, CMS's ROI methodology includes a percentage of state-identified overpayments reported on the SPIA, which is questionable. To date, CMS has not published an ROI methodology. Regarding state reporting of recoveries, we found that most states were not fully reporting recoveries according to specific program integrity activities and that a sizable number appeared to underreport aggregate recoveries compared to other sources. For example, one state reported aggregate recoveries of about $195,000 over 3 years to CMS but about $36 million in its annual report to the governor for 2 of these years. The apparent gaps in state reporting of such recoveries make it difficult to determine whether states are returning the federal share of recovered overpayments. A full accounting of state and NMAP related recoveries is vital for measuring the effectiveness of efforts to reduce improper payments.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the CMS Administrator (1) eliminate duplication by merging contractor functions, (2) use comprehensive reviews to better target audits, (3) follow up with states to ensure reliable reporting of their program integrity recoveries, (4) discontinue the SPIA, and (5) reevaluate and publish its ROI methodology. In response, HHS concurred with three of GAO's recommendations and partially concurred with the need to eliminate SPIA-related duplication and to reevaluate CMS's ROI methodology. As discussed in this report, GAO continues to believe that its recommendations are valid. |
gao_GAO-05-966 | gao_GAO-05-966_0 | Over the last few years, DOD has issued guidance on the implementation of performance-based logistics. The aim of the business case analysis is to justify the decision to enter into a performance-based logistics contract. DOD Program Offices Could Not Demonstrate Cost Savings and Performance Improvement Resulting from the Use of Performance-Based Logistics
DOD program offices could not demonstrate that their use of performance- based logistics arrangements had achieved cost savings and performance improvements because they had not updated their business case analysis as suggested by DOD guidance. Two DOD agencies, DCMA and DCAA, have the capability to assist program offices in monitoring fixed-price performance- based contracts, verifying the reliability of contractors’ information systems, and collecting cost and performance data. Although an updated business case analysis based on actual cost and performance data might show that cost savings and performance improvements were being achieved, only 1 of the 15 program offices had updated its business case analysis consistent with DOD guidance. Program officials did not follow DOD guidance to update and validate their business case analyses because they assumed that costs incurred under fixed-price performance-based logistics arrangements would always be lower than costs incurred under more traditional contracting arrangements, and several program officials cited a lack of reliable data needed to validate expected costs savings and improved performance. The results of these updates could be used by DOD to assess the implementation of performance-based logistics arrangements and evaluate the extent to which performance-based logistics arrangements are achieving expected benefits. DOD Program Offices Relied on Contractors’ Data Without Verifying the Reliability of the Data
DOD program offices included in our review stated that because of limitations in their own information systems, they typically relied on cost and performance data generated by the contractors’ information systems to monitor performance-based logistics contracts. The program offices, however, had not determined whether the contractor-provided data were sufficiently reliable to update their business case analyses. In addition, during our review of the private sector’s use of performance-based logistics, we noted that private-sector companies that use performance-based logistics contracts, whether fixed price or cost-plus, closely monitor cost and performance information to effectively manage their contracts. DCMA and DCAA officials said that they have a greater role in monitoring cost information for cost-plus contracts because such contracts are considered high risk. DOD guidance states that program offices, after entering into performance-based logistics arrangements, should update their original business case analysis using actual cost and performance data to validate their assumptions, but most of the program offices we reviewed had not followed this guidance, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense was not monitoring whether program offices were following the guidance. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) contracts with private sector companies to perform depot maintenance of weapon systems using performance-based logistics--that is, purchasing a defined level of performance over a defined time period at a fixed cost to the government. After implementing such contracts, program offices are to validate their efficacy using cost and performance data; DOD cannot otherwise ensure cost savings and improved performance are being achieved through the use of performance-based logistics. GAO was asked to review the implementation of performance-based logistics to determine whether DOD could demonstrate cost savings and improved responsiveness from these arrangements. In conducting its review, GAO analyzed the implementation of performance-based logistics arrangements for 15 weapon system programs.
What GAO Found
DOD program offices could not demonstrate that they have achieved cost savings or performance improvements through the use of performance-based logistics arrangements. Although DOD guidance on implementing these arrangements states program offices should update their business case analysis based on actual cost and performance data, only 1 of the 15 program offices included in GAO's review had performed such an update consistent with DOD guidance. In the single case where the program office had updated its business case analysis, it determined that the performance-based logistics contract did not result in expected cost savings and the weapon system did not meet established performance requirements. In general, program offices had not updated their business case analysis after entering into a performance-based logistics contract because they assumed that the costs for weapon system maintenance incurred under a fixed-price performance-based logistics contract would always be lower than costs under a more traditional contracting approach and because they lacked reliable cost and performance data needed to validate assumptions used. Furthermore, the Office of the Secretary of Defense has not established procedures to monitor program offices to ensure they follow guidance and update the business case analysis. Additionally, program officials said because of limitations in their own information systems, they typically relied on cost and performance data generated by the contractors' information systems to monitor performance-based logistics contracts. The program offices, however, had not determined whether contractor-provided data were sufficiently reliable to update their business case analysis. Although the Defense Contract Management Agency and the Defense Contract Audit Agency are most commonly used to monitor higher risk contracts, such as cost plus contracts, they are potential resources available to assist program offices in monitoring fixed-price performance-based contracts. In doing so, these DOD agencies have the capability to verify the reliability of contractors' information systems and collect cost and performance data needed to update their business case analysis. Until program offices follow DOD's guidance and update their business case analysis based on reliable cost and performance data, DOD cannot evaluate the extent to which performance-based logistics arrangements are achieving expected benefits and being effectively implemented within DOD. |
gao_GAO-04-895T | gao_GAO-04-895T_0 | 1.) 2.) Most Alaska Native Villages Are Affected to Some Extent by Flooding and Erosion
Flooding and erosion affects 184 out of 213, or 86 percent, of Alaska Native villages to some extent, according to studies and information provided to us by federal and Alaska state officials. Villages on the coast are affected by flooding and erosion from the sea. While flooding and erosion has been documented in Alaska for decades, various studies and reports indicate that coastal villages in Alaska are becoming more susceptible. Even villages that do meet the Corps’ cost/benefit criteria may still not receive assistance if they cannot provide or find sufficient funding to meet the cost-share requirements for the project. 4.) Four Villages in Imminent Danger Are Planning to Relocate, and the Remaining Five Villages Are Taking Other Actions
Four of the nine villages we reviewed are in imminent danger from flooding and erosion and are making plans to relocate, while the remaining five are taking other actions. Of the four villages relocating, Kivalina, Newtok, and Shishmaref are working with relevant federal agencies to locate suitable new sites, while Koyukuk is just beginning the planning process for relocation. Because of the high cost of construction in remote parts of Alaska, the cost of relocation for these villages is expected to be high. Table 3 summarizes the status of the nine villages’ efforts to respond to their specific flooding and erosion problems. Alternatives for Addressing Barriers That Villages Face in Obtaining Federal Services
The unique circumstances of Alaska Native villages and their inability to qualify for assistance under a variety of federal flooding and erosion programs may require special measures to ensure that the villages receive certain needed services. Federal and Alaska state officials and Alaska Native village representatives that we spoke with identified several alternatives for Congress that could help mitigate the barriers that villages face in obtaining federal services. These alternatives include (1) expanding the role of the Denali Commission to include responsibilities for managing a new flooding and erosion assistance program, (2) directing the Corps and NRCS to include social and environmental factors in their cost/benefit analyses for projects requested by Alaska Native villages, and (3) waiving the federal cost- sharing requirement for flooding and erosion projects for Alaska Native villages. In addition, we identified a fourth alternative—authorizing the bundling of funds from various agencies to address flooding and erosion problems in these villages. They must nonetheless find ways to respond to these problems. | Why GAO Did This Study
Approximately 6,600 miles of Alaska's coastline and many of the low-lying areas along the state's rivers are subject to severe flooding and erosion. Most of Alaska's Native villages are located on the coast or on riverbanks. In addition to the many federal and Alaska state agencies that respond to flooding and erosion, Congress established the Denali Commission in 1998 to, among other things, provide economic development services and meet infrastructure needs in rural Alaska communities. This testimony is based on GAO's report, Alaska Native Villages: Most Are Affected by Flooding and Erosion, but Few Qualify for Federal Assistance ( GAO-04-142 , December 12, 2003). Specifically, GAO identified (1) the number of Alaska Native villages affected by flooding and erosion, (2) the extent to which federal assistance has been provided to those villages, (3) the efforts of nine villages to respond to flooding and erosion, and (4) alternatives that Congress may wish to consider when providing assistance for flooding and erosion.
What GAO Found
Flooding and erosion affects 184 out of 213, or 86 percent, of Alaska Native villages to some extent. While many of the problems are long-standing, various studies indicate that coastal villages are becoming more susceptible to flooding and erosion caused in part by rising temperatures. Small and remote Alaska Native villages have generally not received federal assistance under federal flooding and erosion programs largely because they do not meet program eligibility criteria. Even villages that do meet the eligibility criteria may still not receive assistance if they cannot meet the cost-share requirements for the project. Of the nine villages that GAO reviewed, four--Kivalina, Koyukuk, Newtok, and Shishmaref--are in imminent danger from flooding and erosion and are planning to relocate, while the remaining five are in various stages of responding to these problems. Costs for relocating are expected to be high. GAO, other federal and state officials, and village representatives identified alternatives that could increase service delivery for Alaska Native villages. These alternatives include (1) expanding the role of the Denali Commission; (2) directing federal agencies to consider social and environmental factors in analyzing project costs and benefits; (3) waiving the federal cost-sharing requirement for these projects; (4) authorizing the "bundling" of funds from various federal agencies. Although the Denali Commission and two federal agencies raised questions about expanding the role of the Denali Commission in commenting on GAO's report, GAO still believes it continues to be a possible alternative for helping to mitigate the barriers that villages face in obtaining federal services. |
gao_GAO-17-282T | gao_GAO-17-282T_0 | Data Governance and the Transition to a New Administration
OMB and Treasury have established a new Data Standards Committee that will be responsible for maintaining established standards and developing new data elements or data definitions that could affect more than one functional community (e.g., financial management, financial assistance, and procurement). Although this represents progress in responding to GAO’s prior recommendation, more remains to be done to establish a data governance structure that is consistent with leading practices to ensure the integrity of data standards over time. The transition to a new administration presents risks to implementing the DATA Act, including potential shifted priorities or loss of momentum. The lack of a robust and institutionalized data governance structure for managing efforts going forward presents additional risks regarding the ability of agencies to meet their statutory deadlines in the event that priorities shift over time. In reviewing the 24 CFO Act agencies’ August 2016 implementation plan updates, we found that 19 of the 24 CFO Act agencies continue to face challenges implementing the DATA Act. We identified four overarching categories of challenges reported by these agencies that may impede their ability to effectively and efficiently implement the DATA Act: systems integration issues, lack of resources, evolving and complex reporting requirements, and inadequate guidance. To address these challenges, most agencies reported taking mitigating actions, such as making changes to internal policies and procedures, leveraging existing resources, utilizing external resources, and employing manual and temporary workarounds. However, the information reported by the CFO Act agencies in their implementation plan updates indicates that some agencies are at increased risk of not meeting the May 2017 reporting deadline because of these challenges. In addition, inspectors general for some agencies, such as the Departments of Labor and Housing and Urban Development, have issued readiness review reports indicating that their respective agencies are at risk of not meeting the reporting deadline. Operationalizing Data Standards and Technical Specifications for Data Reporting
In May 2016, in response to a prior GAO recommendation, OMB released additional guidance on reporting financial and award information required under the act to address potential clarity, consistency, and quality issues with the definitions of standardized data elements. In August 2016, OMB released additional draft guidance on how agencies should report financial information involving specific transactions, such as intragovernmental transfers, and how agency senior accountable officials should provide quality assurances for submitted data. Although OMB has made some progress with these efforts, other data definitions lack clarity which still needs to be addressed to ensure that agencies report consistent and comparable data. On September 30, 2016, Treasury updated its version of the broker, which it stated was fully capable of performing the key functions of extracting and validating agency data. Treasury officials told us that although they plan to continue to refine the broker to improve its functionality and overall user experience, they have no plans to alter these key functions. Agencies have reported making progress creating their data submissions and testing them in the broker, but work remains to be done before actual reporting can begin. However, some of these interim solutions rely on manual processing, which can be burdensome and increase the risk for errors. Pilot to Reduce Recipient Reporting Burden
The Section 5 Pilot is designed to develop recommendations to reduce the reporting burden for federal funds recipients. Our review of the revised design for both the grants and procurement portions of the pilot found that they partly met each of the leading practices for effective pilot design (shown in the text box below). Although this represented significant progress since April 2016, we identified an area where further improvement is still needed. Specifically, the plan for the procurement portion of the pilot does not clearly describe and document how findings related to centralized certified payroll reporting will be more broadly applicable to the many other types of required procurement reporting. However, in late November 2016, OMB staff and General Services Administration officials informed us that they decided to delay further implementation of the procurement portion of the pilot in order to ensure that security procedures designed to protect personally identifiable information were in place. In our report being released today, we made a new recommendation to OMB that would help ensure that the procurement portion of the Section 5 Pilot better reflects leading practices for effective pilot design. In commenting on the report being released today, OMB neither agreed nor disagreed with the recommendation, but provided an overview of its implementation efforts since passage of the DATA Act. GAO-17-156. DATA Act: Data Standards Established, but More Complete and Timely Guidance Is Needed to Ensure Effective Implementation. | Why GAO Did This Study
The DATA Act requires OMB and Treasury to establish government-wide data standards and requires federal agencies to begin reporting financial and payment data in accordance with these standards by May 2017. The act also requires establishment of a pilot program to develop recommendations for simplifying federal award reporting for grants and contracts. Consistent with GAO’s mandate under the act, the report being released today is one in a series that GAO will provide to the Congress. This statement discusses steps taken by OMB, Treasury, and federal agencies to implement the act and highlights key findings and the recommendation from GAO’s report ( GAO-17-156 ). As part of this work, GAO reviewed DATA Act implementation plan updates and interviewed staff at OMB, Treasury, and other selected agencies.
What GAO Found
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the Department of the Treasury (Treasury), and federal agencies have taken steps to implement the Digital Accountability and Transparency Act of 2014 (DATA Act); however, more work is needed for effective implementation.
Data governance and the transition to a new administration . OMB and Treasury have established a new Data Standards Committee responsible for maintaining established standards and developing new data elements or data definitions. Although this represents progress, more remains to be done to establish a data governance structure that is consistent with leading practices to ensure the integrity of data standards over time. The transition to a new administration presents risks to implementing the DATA Act, including a potential shift in priorities. The lack of a robust and institutionalized data governance structure for managing efforts going forward also presents risks regarding the ability of agencies to meet the statutory deadlines in the event that priorities shift over time.
Implementation plan updates . According to the 24 Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act agencies’ implementation plan updates, most of them continue to face challenges implementing the DATA Act. GAO identified four overarching categories of challenges reported by agencies that may impede their ability to effectively and efficiently implement the DATA Act: systems integration issues, lack of resources, evolving and complex reporting requirements, and inadequate guidance. To address these challenges, most agencies reported taking mitigating actions, such as making changes to internal policies and procedures, leveraging existing resources, and employing manual and temporary workarounds. However, the information reported by the CFO Act agencies in their implementation plan updates indicates that some agencies are at increased risk of not meeting the May 2017 reporting deadline because of these challenges. In addition, inspectors general for some agencies have issued readiness review reports indicating that their respective agencies are at risk of not meeting the reporting deadline.
Operationalizing data standards and technical specifications for data reporting . In November 2016, OMB issued additional guidance on how agencies should report financial information involving specific transactions, such as intragovernmental transfers, and how agency senior accountable officials should provide quality assurances for submitted data. Although OMB has made some progress with these efforts, other data definitions lack clarity which still needs to be addressed to ensure that agencies report consistent and comparable data. In September 2016, Treasury updated its version of the DATA Act broker, which it stated was fully capable of performing the key functions of extracting and validating agency data. Treasury officials stated that although they plan to continue to refine the broker to improve its functionality and overall user experience, they have no plans to alter key functions. Agencies have reported making progress creating their data submissions and testing them in the broker, but work remains before actual reporting can begin. Some agencies reported in their implementation plan updates that they developed plans for interim solutions, but some of these interim solutions rely on manual processing, which can be burdensome and increase the risk for errors.
Pilot to reduce recipient reporting burden . GAO's review of the revised design for both the grants and procurement portions of the pilot found that they partly met each of the leading practices for effective pilot design. Although this represented significant progress since April 2016, GAO identified an area where further improvement is still needed. Specifically, the plan for the procurement portion of the pilot does not clearly describe and document how findings related to centralized certified payroll reporting will be applicable to other types of required procurement reporting. Further, in November 2016, this portion of the pilot was delayed to ensure that security procedures were in place to protect personally identifiable information.
What GAO Recommends
In addition to prior recommendations that GAO has made, in its most recent report, GAO recommends that OMB take steps to help ensure that the procurement portion of the pilot better reflects leading practices for effective pilot design. OMB neither agreed nor disagreed with the recommendation. |
gao_GAO-13-432 | gao_GAO-13-432_0 | DOD programs have a materiel solution analysis phase during which DOD analyzes and recommends materiel solutions for the identified need; a technology development phase, during which DOD reduces technology risk and determines the appropriate set of technologies to be integrated into the full system; a product development phase, formally known as engineering and manufacturing development, which represents program initiation, and during which the program focuses on integrating the system design, developing system capability, and demonstrating the manufacturing processes; a production and deployment phase for the purpose of achieving an operational capability that satisfies the mission need; and an operations and support phase, where DOD works to sustain the system in the most cost-effective manner. Congress and DOD have taken steps to address concerns over MDA’s acquisition management strategy, accountability, and oversight. We have reported that without AOAs, programs may not select the best solution for the warfighter, are at risk for cost increases, and can face schedule delays. MDA could look to that office for support should it decide to undertake more robust analyses of alternatives. While MDA has conducted some analyses that consider alternatives, it has not conducted robust AOAs for its new programs—the Aegis BMD SM-3 Block IIB and PTSS programs. Challenge: Expand on Steps Already Taken to Place Investments on a Sound Footing
MDA gained important knowledge through its test program and took some positive steps to reduce acquisition risks for two of its programs. In addition, we reported in April 2012 that risk reduction flight tests are conducted the first time a system is tested in order to confirm that it works before adding other test objectives and that MDA’s flight test program had been disrupted by the lack of those risk reduction flight tests. By delaying the start of product development, the program increased the amount of technical knowledge it plans to achieve prior to committing to development. Using these new targets puts this major test at risk of not being able to obtain key information should the targets not perform as expected. Challenge: Ensure Program Baselines Support Oversight
While MDA made substantial improvements to the clarity of its reported cost and schedule baselines in fiscal year 2012, the information underlying these baselines is not yet sufficiently reliable. Until MDA’s baselines are based on reliable information and are comprehensive, they will not be useful for decision makers to understand progress. By not including military service costs, the life cycle costs for some MDA programs could be significantly understated. However, MDA has not yet had time to fully address our recommendations. MDA still needs to deliver some of the capability planned for the first phase of the U.S. missile defense in Europe and is grappling with delays to some systems and/or capabilities planned in each of the next three major deployments. MDA also is challenged by the need to develop the tools, the models and simulations, to understand the capabilities and limitations of the individual systems before they are deployed. MDA officials stated they are working to resolve this issue. MDA continues to have difficulty credibly assessing operational performance using models and simulations. MDA declared the first phase of U.S. missile defense in Europe operational in December 2011, but did so without the benefit of all planned supporting data because of problems with a key modeling and simulation event. Second, our 2012 recommendation to make adjustments to acquisition schedules to reduce concurrency could help reduce the acquisition risks in the U.S. missile defense in Europe. Recommendations for Executive Action
In order to strengthen investment decisions, place the chosen investments on a sound acquisition footing, provide a better means of tracking investment progress, and improve the management and transparency of the U.S. missile defense approach in Europe, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct MDA’s new Director to take the following four actions: 1. Include in its resource baseline cost estimates all life cycle costs, specifically the operations and support costs, from the military services in order to provide decision makers with the full costs of ballistic missile defense systems. DOD concurred with two of our four recommendations and partially concurred with the remaining two. We also continue to believe that including these costs in that report will aid both departmental and congressional decision makers as they make difficult choices of where to invest limited resources. To assess the progress made as well as any remaining challenges MDA faces in establishing program baselines that support oversight, we examined MDA’s reported baselines in the 2010, 2011, and 2012 BMDS Accountability Reports (BAR). We also interviewed officials with U.S. Strategic Command’s Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense and U.S. Northern Command as well as MDA program offices and MDA functional directorates about MDA’s progress in developing and deploying ballistic missile defense systems needed for the defense of Europe and the United States. Although MDA is not required to do an AOA for its programs because of its acquisition flexibilities, we have previously reported that an AOA can be a key step to ensure that new programs have a sound acquisition basis. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 2002 MDA has spent approximately $90 billion to provide protection from enemy ballistic missiles by developing battle management systems, sensors that identify incoming threats, and missiles to intercept them. MDA plans to spend about $8 billion per year through 2017. For nearly a decade, we have reported on MDA's progress and challenges in developing and fielding the Ballistic Missile Defense System.
GAO is mandated by law to assess the extent to which MDA has achieved its acquisition goals and objectives, as reported through acquisition baselines. This report examines the agency's progress and remaining challenges in (1) selecting new programs in which to invest; (2) putting programs on a sound development path; (3) establishing baselines that support oversight; and (4) developing and deploying U.S. missile defense in Europe for defense of Europe and the United States. To do this, GAO examined MDA's acquisition reports, analyzed baselines reported over several years to discern progress, and interviewed a wide range of DOD and MDA officials.
What GAO Found
Although the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has made some progress, the new MDA Director faces challenges developing and deploying new systems to achieve increasingly integrated capabilities as well as supporting and upgrading deployed systems while providing decision makers in the Department of Defense (DOD) and Congress with key oversight information in an era of fiscal constraints.
Challenge: Improve Investment Decisions
Determining the most promising and cost effective new missile defense systems to buy--considering technical feasibility and cost--remains a challenge for MDA. While MDA has conducted some analyses that consider alternatives in selecting which acquisitions to pursue, it has not conducted robust analyses of alternatives for two of its new programs. Because of its acquisition flexibilities, MDA is not required to do so. Robust analyses, however, could be particularly useful to DOD and congressional decision makers as they decide how to manage the portfolio of missile defense acquisitions. GAO has reported in the past that without analyses of alternatives, programs may not select the best solution for the warfighter, are at risk for cost increases, and can face schedule delays.
Challenge: Expand on Steps Taken to Place Investments on a Sound Footing
In the past year, MDA gained important knowledge by successfully conducting several important tests, including a test to show how well its systems will operate together. MDA has also taken steps to lower the acquisition risks of two newer programs by adding more development time. However, development issues discovered after three programs prematurely committed to production continue to disrupt both interceptor production and flight test schedules. In addition, two other programs plan to make premature commitments to production before testing confirms their designs work as intended. MDA is planning to fly targets for the first time in its first operational test using several systems, adding risk that key information may not be obtained in this major test.
Challenge: Ensure Program Baselines Support Oversight
While MDA has made substantial improvements to the clarity of its cost and schedule baselines since first reporting them in 2010, they are still not useful for decision makers to gauge progress. For example, the information they include is not sufficiently comprehensive because they do not include operation and support costs from the military services. By not including these costs, the life cycle costs for some MDA programs could be significantly understated.
Challenge: Developing and Deploying U.S. Missile Defense in Europe
DOD declared the first major deployment of U.S. missile defense in Europe operational in December 2011, but MDA is faced with resolving some issues to provide the full capability and is facing delays to some systems planned in each of the next three major deployments. MDA has also struggled for years to develop the tools--the models and simulations--to credibly assess operational performance of systems before they are deployed. It recently committed to a new approach to resolve this problem.
What GAO Recommends
GAO makes four recommendations to DOD to ensure MDA (1) fully assesses alternatives before selecting investments, (2) takes steps to reduce the risk that unproven target missiles can disrupt key tests, (3) reports full program costs, and (4) stabilizes acquisition baselines. DOD concurred with two recommendations and partially concurred with two, stating the decision to perform target risk reduction flight tests should be weighed against other programmatic factors and that its current forum for reporting MDA program costs should not include non-MDA funding. GAO continues to believe the recommendations are valid as discussed in this report. |
gao_GAO-02-1027 | gao_GAO-02-1027_0 | Section 506(a)(1) of the Foreign Assistance Act authorizes the President to “drawdown” defense articles, services, and military education and training from DOD and the military services’ inventories and provide such articles and services to foreign countries or international organizations. DSCA Does Not Meet Congressional Reporting Requirements
Overall, DSCA’s reports to the Congress on the status of drawdowns are inaccurate and incomplete. Its information system for tracking the status of drawdowns is outmoded, and the military services do not regularly provide DSCA updated information on the transfers they are implementing. Drawdowns Benefit the United States and Foreign Recipients
Drawdowns are an additional tool for the President to address U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives. Drawdowns also allow the United States to provide additional or improved military capability to foreign recipients. According to State officials, the transfer of defense articles under drawdowns and excess defense articles help to expand markets for U.S. defense firms. Military Services Are Not Being Reimbursed for Costs Associated with Drawdowns
According to DOD and military service officials, the services are not reimbursed for the defense articles provided or the associated costs of drawdowns, and the articles are usually not replaced. Consequently, the recipients’ ability to conduct military or police missions in support of U.S. foreign policy diminishes as vehicles and weapons break down and as parts for these older defense articles become more difficult to obtain. Conclusions
Drawdowns give the President the ability to provide defense articles, training, and services to foreign countries and international organizations without first seeking specific appropriations from the Congress. Recommendation for Executive Action
To help ensure that the Congress has accurate and complete information on the use of drawdowns, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Director of DSCA and the Secretaries of the military services, develop a system that will enable DSCA to report to the Congress on the cost, type, quantity, and delivery status of defense articles and services transferred to foreign recipients through drawdowns, as required. Over the years, over 55 countries and other organizations such as the United Nations have been authorized U.S. military assistance through drawdowns. | What GAO Found
Since 1961, the President has had special statutory authority to order the "drawdown" of defense articles--such as aircraft, vehicles, various weapons, and spare parts--and services or military education and training from Department of Defense (DOD) and military service inventories and transfer them to foreign countries or international organizations. Drawdowns give the President the ability to respond to U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives, such as counternarcotics efforts, peacekeeping needs, and unforeseen military and nonmilitary emergencies, by providing military assistance without first seeking additional legislative authority or appropriations from Congress. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency's reports to Congress on the costs and delivery status of drawdowns are inaccurate and incomplete. Two principal problems contribute to the agency's inability to meet the reporting requirements. First, its information system for recording drawdown data is outmoded and difficult to use--service drawdown reports are in different formats, and any conversion errors have to be manually corrected. Second, the services do not regularly provide updates to the agency on drawdown costs and deliveries, and available information sometimes does not get into the system. Drawdowns benefit the United States and foreign recipients primarily by providing the President the flexibility to address foreign policy and national security objectives quickly. Drawdowns also allow the President to provide defense articles and services to improve foreign recipients' capability to conduct military and police missions in support of U.S. foreign policy. Other benefits cited include improved military-to-military relations between the U.S. military services and the foreign recipients and expanded markets for U.S. defense firms. According to U.S. and foreign military officials, the use of drawdowns presents some concerns. Because drawdowns are used to quickly address U.S. national interests and emergencies, the costs associated with a drawdown, such as refurbishment and transportation, are not budgeted for by the services and are not reimbursed. |
gao_GAO-05-399 | gao_GAO-05-399_0 | Some of this research investigates drugs used to prevent and treat various diseases, including HIV. Federal Agencies Have Researched the Safety and Effectiveness of N-9 as a Microbicide, While Manufacturers Reviewed Its Safety
Federal agencies have undertaken a variety of efforts to research the safety and effectiveness of N-9 as a microbicide. For example, in 1996, CDC and others began a major 4-year study on the effectiveness of N-9 vaginal contraceptive products in preventing the transmission of STDs, including HIV, among female sex workers located in four countries. Like CDC, NIH conducted and funded research during the 1990s on N-9’s safety and effectiveness as a microbicide. For example, among the studies compiled in CDC’s bibliography on microbicide research, some found that the use of N-9 vaginal contraceptives reduced the incidence of HIV as well as other STDs, while other studies indicated that frequent use of N-9 vaginal contraceptives may have irritated subjects’ vaginal tissue, which may result in subjects being more susceptible to HIV infection. In 2000, after the preliminary results of a major clinical study—known as the COL-1492 study—were reported, CDC and NIH stopped conducting and funding research on N-9 as a microbicide out of concern for participants’ safety. Compared to the results of earlier studies, the preliminary results of the COL-1492 study suggested more strongly that N-9 did not prevent HIV infection and, in addition, that N-9 may increase the risk of infection among frequent users. After 2000, FDA Continued to Review Research on the Safety of N-9 as Part of Its Regulation of N-9 Contraceptive Products
Although federal agencies stopped conducting and funding research on N-9 as a potential microbicide in 2000, FDA continued to review research on the safety of N-9 as part of the agency’s regulation of vaginal contraceptive products under the monograph process. As of March 2005, FDA was in the process of finalizing the rule for new warning labels for vaginal contraceptive products containing N-9. Manufacturers of N-9 Contraceptive Products Have Researched the Safety of N-9
Two manufacturers of N-9 contraceptive products that we interviewed have researched the safety of N-9. The Information Provided to the Public about the Use of N-9 as a Microbicide Has Been, at Times, Inconsistent
The information CDC and FDA provided the public about the use of N-9 as a microbicide has been, at times, inconsistent. By 1998, in response to new research, CDC informed the public that N-9 vaginal contraceptive products did not prevent HIV. During the same period, FDA also cautioned that N-9 had not been proven to prevent HIV transmission, but in 1999, a brochure on its Web site stated that N-9, along with a condom, may be used to prevent HIV transmission. By 2000, CDC stated that N-9 may actually increase the risk of contracting HIV when used frequently. FDA, in contrast, did not revise the brochure on its Web site that stated some experts believe N-9 may prevent HIV and suggested using N-9 along with a condom. At Times, CDC and FDA Provided Inconsistent Information about the Use of N-9 to Prevent HIV
In the early 1990s, based on the information that was available at the time, CDC cautioned that there was insufficient information to conclude that N-9 may prevent HIV transmission. However, FDA left its brochurewhich stated that some experts believe that N-9 may prevent HIV transmissionon its Web site until this information was deleted in September 2003 when FDA officials realized the information in the brochure on the Web site was inconsistent with the proposed warning labels for N-9 vaginal contraceptive products. FDA is also developing proposed warning labels for N-9 condoms. Agency Comments
HHS provided written comments on a draft of this report. The draft report noted the role FDA has in labeling oversight and described FDA’s proposed warning labels for N-9 vaginal contraceptive products and its efforts to develop proposed warning labels for N-9 condoms. The results indicate that N-9 is not effective as a microbicide against HIV and may increase certain users’ risk of contracting the virus. | Why GAO Did This Study
Preventing the transmission of HIV, the virus that causes AIDS, is an important public health challenge. Researchers have sought to develop a microbicide--a substance to help users protect themselves against HIV. In the mid-1980s, researchers found that Nonoxynol-9 (N-9), a spermicide found in various contraceptive products, showed potential as a microbicide. However, more recent studies raised concerns that N-9 may increase certain users' risk of contracting HIV. GAO was asked to describe federal agencies' and contraceptive product manufacturers' actions related to N-9 and HIV. In this report, GAO reviewed (1) the efforts by federal agencies and manufacturers of contraceptive products to assess the safety of N-9 and its effectiveness as a microbicide for preventing HIV transmission and (2) the information provided to the public about the safety of N-9 and its effectiveness as a microbicide. GAO reviewed journal articles, Federal Register notices, product packaging, educational materials, and other documents. GAO also interviewed officials from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the National Institutes of Health (NIH), and selected manufacturers of N-9 contraceptive products.
What GAO Found
Federal agencies have undertaken a variety of efforts to research N-9 as a potential microbicide--including conducting, funding, or reviewing studies on the safety and effectiveness of N-9. In the 1990s, CDC and NIH conducted and funded research on the effectiveness and safety of N-9 as a microbicide to prevent HIV infection. For example, in 1996 CDC and others began a 4-year study on the effectiveness of an N-9 vaginal contraceptive product in preventing the transmission of sexually transmitted diseases, including HIV. The results of the research by the agencies during this period were inconsistent--some research indicated that N-9 reduced the incidence of HIV while other research suggested that frequent use of N-9 may increase the risk of contracting the virus. Then in 2000, the preliminary results of a major clinical study suggested more strongly that N-9 vaginal contraceptive products did not prevent HIV infection and may increase the risk of infection among frequent users. As a result of the study, CDC and NIH stopped conducting and funding research on N-9 as a microbicide out of concern for participants' safety. FDA continued to review available research on the safety of N-9 as part of its regulation of vaginal contraceptive products and, in 2003, proposed new warning labels for N-9 vaginal contraceptive products. As of March 2005, FDA was also in the process of developing a proposal for new warning labels for N-9 condoms. As of that date, FDA had not finalized the new warning labels for N-9 vaginal contraceptive products and had not proposed new warning labels for N-9 condoms. Representatives from two manufacturers of N-9 contraceptive products have reviewed research on N-9's safety for the purpose of commenting on FDA's proposed warning labels. The information CDC and FDA have provided to the public about the use of N-9 as a microbicide has been, at times, inconsistent. In the early 1990s, CDC cautioned that there was insufficient information to conclude that N-9 may prevent HIV transmission. By 1998, in response to new research, the agency informed the public that N-9 vaginal contraceptive products did not prevent HIV. During the same period, FDA also cautioned that N-9 had not been proven to prevent HIV transmission, but in 1999, a brochure posted on its Web site stated that N-9, along with a condom, may be used to prevent HIV transmission. By 2000, CDC had responded to new research findings and had revised its educational publications to state that N-9 may actually increase the risk of contracting HIV when used frequently. In contrast, FDA did not revise the brochure on its Web site that stated that some experts believe N-9 may prevent HIV and suggested using N-9 along with a condom. FDA left this information on its Web site until these statements were deleted in September 2003 when FDA officials realized the information was inconsistent with proposed warning labels. In commenting on a draft of this report, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) provided clarification that GAO incorporated where appropriate. |
gao_HEHS-95-26 | gao_HEHS-95-26_0 | Families and friends provide the bulk of long-term care services to people who need them. The remaining 10 million individuals live at home or in small community residential settings, such as group homes or supervised apartments. Most people needing long-term care are elderly, a total of about 7.3 million. Overall, approximately three-fifths of the long-term care population are elderly. 1.) Nonetheless, a sizable proportion of people needing long-term care is under age 65—about 5.1 million working-age adults and 400,000 children with long-term care needs either reside in institutions or live in the community. The most severely disabled population—those who need substantial assistance—comprises approximately 5.1 million individuals. In addition, estimates of future long-term care need among the nonelderly disabled are difficult to project. While the sheer number of future elderly is expected to drive up demand for long-term care services, projections of the number of elderly needing long-term care in the next century vary because of different assumptions about the future prevalence of disability. However, as members of this generation become disabled themselves and need assistance, they may have fewer family members available to care for them. Conclusions
The current long-term care population’s size and diversity have implications for how public and private programs are designed and administered. Within the long-term care population severity of need varies, with some people needing only occasional aid and a much smaller number requiring substantial assistance. We visited several state and local programs providing long-term care services for the elderly and nonelderly to identify disability groups currently receiving long-term care services, to examine the prevalence of their needs, and to learn about the diversity of long-term care needs within and among disability groups. These data will be published in an upcoming ASPE Research Note, “Population Estimates of Disability and Long-Term Care.”
Adults With ADL and IADL Limitations
Researchers at ASPE used data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), conducted by the Bureau of the Census, to estimate that 4,380 working-age (aged 18 to 64) and 5,690 elderly adults need assistance with one or more activities of daily living (ADL) or instrumental activities of daily living (IADL). 12, 1994). 4, 1994). 6, 1993). | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided estimates of the current and future numbers of people needing long-term care, focusing on the: (1) characteristics of the population needing long-term care; (2) prevalence of current long-term care needs; (3) factors that may influence future long-term care needs; and (4) diversity of needs among different groups.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) currently, there are over 12 million people with chronic conditions who need assistance with everyday activities; (2) about 5 million of the long-term care population are working-age adults and about 420,000 are children under age 18; (3) nearly 10 million people needing long-term care live at home or in small community residences; (4) family and friends provide most long-term care services without compensation; (5) long-term care needs range from occasional help with household chores to daily help with self-care activities; (6) about 5.1 million people need substantial assistance with basic self-care activities because of severe disabilities and about one-half of these persons are institutionalized; (7) long-term care need could double within the next 25 years as the baby boomers age, but meaningful projections are difficult to make due to uncertainties pertaining to life expectancy, life styles, and health status, the size of the future nonelderly disabled population, and technological and medical advances; (8) the nonelderly disabled population will probably increase as more low-birth-weight babies and young adults survive previously fatal conditions and events; (9) the diversity in ages, disabling conditions, and needs among the long-term care population will require greater flexibility in the design and administration of long-term care programs to match individual needs; and (10) increased government subsidized long-term care will be needed as fewer family members and friends have the resources and time to care for the disabled. |
gao_GAO-10-696 | gao_GAO-10-696_0 | Military medical personnel are essential to maintaining DOD’s large and complex health system and are in great demand because of the need to treat injured or ill servicemembers and due to advances in medical technologies that require specialized personnel. DOD’s Policy Emphasizes Jointness, although the Services’ Collaborative Efforts in Determining Medical Personnel Requirements Have Been Limited
While DOD has emphasized jointness and undertaken joint initiatives across the department, the extent to which the services have incorporated cross-service collaboration in their planning efforts for determining their medical personnel requirements has been limited. Officials, however, have faced challenges in consolidating and realigning the medical manpower portion of this newly formed joint medical effort within the National Capital Region. DOD and the Services Collaborated to Develop a Recently Released Cross- Service Medical Manpower Standard for Mental Health Providers
A second joint medical personnel effort, quite different from that of the realignment previously described, is DOD and the services’ ongoing development and implementation of a cross-service medical manpower standard known as the Psychological Health Risk-Adjusted Model for Staffing (PHRAMS). Health Affairs sponsored the development of the cross-service PHRAMS manpower standard to address the growth in demand for mental health services, as well as to give the services a standard by which to develop mental health requirements needed to meet the common, day-to-day psychological health needs of eligible beneficiaries across the services. Service-Specific Medical Requirements Determination Processes Are Not Consistent with Collaborative Planning
To the extent that PHRAMS represents a positive collaborative initiative, to date it is the only model of its kind. With leadership emphasis and expectations that the services will continue to explore opportunities to develop cross-service medical manpower standards, such as PHRAMS, and consistent management focus on collaboration within DOD’s Military Health System, the services will have more opportunities to develop collaborative work force planning efforts for common medical capabilities that they share throughout their military treatment facilities—an approach that is consistent with the Military Health System Human Capital Strategic Plan’s vision of a more integrated approach across service lines. The Services’ Respective Processes for Developing Requirements Are Not Validated and Verifiable in All Cases and Do Not Centrally Account for Civilian Personnel Requirements
While a need exists for the services to work more collaboratively to determine their medical personnel requirements, the services’ also maintain processes to address service-specific needs. While all of the services currently are taking steps to update and refine their medical personnel requirement processes, these processes, however, are not yet fully validated or verifiable. Army’s Model Contains Some Outdated Information and Is in the Process of Being Updated and Validated
The Army uses its Automated Staffing Assessment Model to determine manpower requirements for Army fixed military treatment facility and other Army Medical Command organizations. The model uses the current population of the various military treatment facilities as the major determinant of the number of medical personnel needed at each facility. Instead, Navy officials explained that, the Navy’s process is to use current manning as a baseline and adjust the figure based on emerging needs or major changes in its medical mission. While the Navy routinely employs this approach to determine its medical personnel requirements, it is not a validated or verified methodology as required by DOD guidance. Air Force officials recognized that their recent efforts to develop medical manpower standards stem from the Air Force’s need for a validated and verifiable manpower requirements determination process. If the services do not identify civilian personnel requirements for military treatment facilities in the overall requirements planning process, the services may be missing the opportunity to make a strategic determination of how many medical professionals—military or civilian—are needed in total to carry out their expected missions and workloads. Areas of improvement exist within the services’ medical requirements processes, and until these processes are up-to-date, fully validated, and verifiable, it is not clear whether the services can be certain they are determining their medical personnel requirements in an effective and efficient manner. Recommendations for Executive Action
Consistent with DOD emphasis on developing human capital solutions across the services to enable departmentwide decision making and analyses within its Military Health System, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs and the Service Secretaries to take the following two actions. Agency Comments and our Evaluation
In written comments provided in response to a draft of this report, DOD concurred or partially concurred with all of our recommendations. | Why GAO Did This Study
Military medical personnel, who are essential to maintaining one of the largest and most complex health systems in the nation, are in great demand due to the need to treat injured or ill servicemembers, and advances in technology that require specialized personnel. To determine how well the Department of Defense (DOD) and the services are developing their medical and dental personnel requirements, GAO evaluated (1) the extent to which the services have incorporated cross-service collaboration in their medical personnel requirement processes, and (2) the service-specific processes for determining their requirements for military and civilian medical personnel. To conduct this review, GAO evaluated manpower policies, analyzed the services' requirements data and determination processes, and interviewed officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and each of the services.
What GAO Found
While DOD's 2007 Military Health System Human Capital Strategic Plan emphasizes developing human capital solutions across the services to enable departmentwide decision making and analyses, the services' collaborative planning efforts regarding requirements determination for medical personnel working in fixed military treatment facilities have been limited. In one effort to integrate operations, DOD is consolidating medical facilities in the Washington, D.C., area under a joint task force that calls for joint staffing of the military treatment facilities in the region. However, officials have faced challenges in developing the manpower requirements for the joint facilities due to the use of outdated planning assumptions. Separately, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) sponsored another joint medical effort to develop a cross-service medical manpower standard for mental health personnel. This standard is being used to determine the amount of personnel needed to meet common, day-to-day psychological health needs of eligible beneficiaries across the services. However, to date, this standard is the only one of its kind, and OSD officials said that no other similar efforts currently exist. The services' continued focus on separate medical personnel requirements processes may not be consistent with the DOD strategic plan's vision of a more integrated approach, and the services may have missed opportunities to collaborate and develop cross-service manpower standards for common medical capabilities that are shared across military treatment facilities. Sustained and committed leadership emphasis on developing more effective ways of doing business, such as the use of cross-service medical manpower standards, is key to successful, collaborative human capital strategic planning. To the extent that the services need to maintain separate processes, GAO also found that their requirements processes are not, in all cases, validated and verifiable, as DOD policy requires. Selected specialty modules in the Army's model contain some outdated assumptions, such as the level of care currently being provided, and only a portion of the modules have been completely validated. While the Navy has employed an approach that uses current manning as a baseline and adjusts its requirements based on emerging needs or major changes to missions, the approach is not validated or verified as required by DOD guidance. The Air Force said it may not know its true medical requirements as the model it has relied on also is not currently validated or verified. Each of the services has recognized the need to have processes that can be validated and verified, and has taken steps to address these issues in recent years. However, without processes that are validated and verifiable, the services cannot be certain they are determining their medical personnel requirements in the most effective and efficient manner. Also, the services do not centrally manage their processes for their civilian medical personnel requirements. While local commanders determine these requirements, the services may be missing the opportunity to make a strategic determination of how many civilian medical professionals are needed to carry out their expected workloads.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that OSD and the services emphasize a long-term joint approach to medical personnel requirements determination by identifying the common medical capabilities shared across the services and developing cross-service medical manpower standards, where applicable; and that the services take actions to improve their respective medical requirements determination processes. In written comments to a draft of this report, DOD generally concurred with these recommendations. |
gao_GAO-08-1162T | gao_GAO-08-1162T_0 | PBGC Guarantees Pension Benefits for Millions and is Funded by Premiums and Assets of Terminated Plans
PBGC plays a critical role in protecting the pension benefits of private sector workers—it is responsible for administering current or future pension benefit payments to just over 1.3 million plan participants. PBGC’s budget can be confusing, especially in the short-term, as apparent federal budget gains may be offset by long-term liabilities that are not reported to on-budget accounts. PBGC administers current or future pension benefit payments to a growing number of plan participants, from just under one- half million in fiscal year 2000 to 1.3 million in fiscal year 2007. PBGC receives no funds from general tax revenues. Operations are financed by insurance premiums set by Congress and paid by sponsors of defined benefit plans, investment income of assets from pension plans trusteed by PBGC ($4.8 billion in investment income from $68.4 billion in assets for its combined programs in 2007) and recoveries from the companies formerly responsible for the plans. PBGC’s Budget Only Partly Flows through the Federal Government
The treatment of PBGC in the federal budget is complicated by the use of two accounts—an on–budget revolving fund and a non-budgetary trust fund. Generally, the proportion of benefit payments that is reimbursed from the trust fund depends on the aggregate funding level of the plans that PBGC has taken over and is adjusted periodically. PBGC has seen recent improvements to its net financial position and recent legislative changes have raised premiums, changed certain plan funding rules and limited PBGC guarantees. However, the legislation has only been recently implemented and it did not completely address a number of the risks that PBGC faces going forward. Further, PBGC has recently implemented a new investment policy which adds significant variability and risk to the assets it manages. GAO has generally focused its work on the single-employer pension insurance program with respect to PBGC’s overall financial challenges. Underfunding among large plans (as reuired by ERISA section 4010)
In 2003, GAO designated PBGC’s single-employer program as high-risk, or as a program that needs urgent Congressional attention and agency action. As part of our monitoring of PBGC as a high-risk agency we have highlighted additional challenges faced by the single-employer program. GAO recently reported on a newly developing financial challenge facing PBGC due to the recent change to its investment policy. Improvements Needed to PBGC’s Governance, Oversight and Management
Improvements are needed to PBGC’s governance structure, to oversight of the corporation, and to its strategic approach to program management. PBGC’s three member board of directors is limited in its ability to provide policy direction and oversight. Finally, we found that PBGC lacks a strategic approach to its acquisition and human capital management needs. In addition, PBGC may also be exposed to challenges as the board, board members’ representatives, and the director will likely change with the upcoming presidential transition in January 2009, limiting the board’s institutional knowledge of the corporation. Specifically, Congress has asked GAO to conduct assessments of policy, management, and the financial condition of PBGC. Three-quarters of PBGC’s budget was spent on contracts and nearly two-thirds of its personnel are contractors, as shown in figure 6. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation: Statutory Limitation on Administrative Expenses Does Not Provide Meaningful Control. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) insures the retirement future of nearly 44 million people in more than 30,000 private-sector defined benefit pension plans. In July 2003, GAO designated PBGC's single-employer pension insurance program--its largest insurance program--as "high risk," including it on GAO's list of major programs that need urgent attention and transformation. The program remains on the list today with a projected financial deficit of just over $13 billion, as of September 2007. Because Congress exercises oversight of PBGC, GAO was asked to testify today on 1) the critical role PBGC plays in protecting the pension benefits of workers and how PBGC is funded, 2) the financial challenges facing PBGC, and 3) the PBGC's governance, oversight and management challenges. To address these objectives, we are relying on our reports from the last several years that, as part of our designation of PBGC's single-employer program as high-risk, explored the financial and management challenges facing the agency. GAO has made a number of recommendations and matters for Congressional consideration in these past reports. PBGC generally agreed with these past recommendations and is implementing many of them. No new recommendations are being made as part of this testimony.
What GAO Found
PBGC administers the current or future pension benefits for a growing number of participants of plans that have been taken over by the agency--from 500,000 in fiscal year 2000 to 1.3 million participants in fiscal year 2007. PBGC is financed by insurance premiums set by Congress and paid by sponsors of defined benefit (DB) plans, investment income, assets from pension plans trusteed by PBGC, and recoveries from the companies formerly responsible for those trusteed plans; PBGC receives no funds from general revenues. The treatment of PBGC in the federal budget is complicated by the use of two accounts--an on-budget revolving fund and a non-budgetary trust fund. Ultimately this budget treatment can be confusing--especially in the short-term--as on-budget gains may be offset by long-term liabilities that are not reported to on-budget accounts. PBGC's single-employer program faces financial challenges from a history of weak plan funding rules that left it susceptible to claims from sponsors of large, severely underfunded pension plans. PBGC had seen recent improvements to its net financial position due to generally better economic conditions and from statutory changes that raised premiums and took measures designed to strengthen plan funding and PBGC guarantees. However, certain improvements have only just begun phasing-in and the changes did not completely address a number of the risks that PBGC faces going forward. Further, PBGC just began implementing a new investment policy that, while offering the potential for higher returns, also adds significant variability and risk to the assets it manages. Also, changing economic conditions could further expose PBGC to future claims. Improvements are needed to PBGC's governance structure and to its strategic approach to program management. PBGC's three member board of directors is limited in its ability to provide policy direction and oversight. PBGC may also be exposed to challenges as the board, its representatives, and the director will likely change with the upcoming presidential transition in January. In addition, PBGC lacks a strategic approach to its acquisition and human capital management needs. Three-quarters of PBGC's administrative budget is spent on contractors, yet PBGC's strategic planning generally does not recognize contracting as a major aspect of PBGC activities. |
gao_HEHS-97-35 | gao_HEHS-97-35_0 | Background
Support for employment-based health insurance by employers contributes to the health and financial security of employees and their families. Today, private health insurance offered through employment is the main source of health insurance coverage in the United States—in 1995, more than 90 percent of people under 65 years old with private insurance—150 million people—were insured through their employment. In the late 1980s, the cost of employment-based health insurance premiums significantly outpaced inflation. Between 1988 and 1989, employer costs for health insurance rose 18 percent in one year. 1.) Some employers stopped offering health insurance coverage altogether. These changes can provide significant savings for companies. By 1993, more than 29 million employees—almost one-fourth of the workforce—could not get employment-based health insurance for their families. From 1984 to 1993, the number of employees in large firms who were enrolled in managed care plans, such as HMOs, increased from 5 percent to 50 percent. Employers Increased Employees’ Contributions for Health Insurance, Particularly for Family Coverage
To offset increases in health insurance costs, some employers opted to have employees share in the costs of their insurance premium or increased their share of these costs. 3.) Median Monthly Premium Contributions (in Dollars)
Health Insurance Is Expensive for Some Families
For some families, the overall rise in health insurance costs has made the current price of employment-based health insurance difficult to afford. In 1992, 36 percent of state and local employees paid $150 or more per month for family health insurance. Employers Use Other Strategies to Reduce Costs, Especially Those Associated With Family Coverage
Some changes that employers have made to their benefits packages may discourage employees from choosing family coverage. 6.) Loss of Dependent Coverage Accounts for Most of the Recent Loss in Private Coverage
As employers dropped coverage or raised the cost of coverage for employees and families, the percentage of people with private health insurance coverage declined. In 1989, 76 percent of working-age adults and almost 74 percent of children under 18 years old had private insurance. Both children and adults lost coverage as dependents. 7.) In contrast to the loss of adult dependent coverage, the percentage of working-age adults as the primary holder of private health insurance was similar in 1989 and 1995—51.6 percent compared with 51.4 percent. Unless the decline in private insurance coverage abates, public payers may be facing increased costs for health care—either for uncompensated care or public insurance. But more commonly, employers increased the amount employees had to pay to gain coverage, particularly for family coverage. The percentage of Americans under 65 years old with private health insurance decreased. If the availability of both public and private coverage continues to erode, the number of uninsured will inevitably continue to grow. Therefore, we focused on large and major firms. Additional copies are $2 each. A recorded menu will provide information on how to obtain these lists. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the decline in employment-based health insurance, focusing on: (1) recent trends in employment-based private health insurance, particularly for family coverage; (2) any corresponding changes in the number of adults and children with private insurance coverage as dependents; and (3) the potential effect of these changes, if any, on public costs for health care coverage.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) eroding employer financial support for providing health insurance to employees' families has contributed to the overall decline in private health insurance coverage; (2) each year between the late 1980s and 1994, increases in employers' costs to provide health insurance to their employees and their employees' families outpaced inflation, with cost growth of 18 percent one year; (3) as health insurance reached 10 percent of employees' payroll costs, many employers began to reconsider the amount of support they would provide to employees, particularly for family coverage; (4) acquiring or maintaining health insurance has become more difficult for some families because of changes that some employers made to their firms' health coverage; (5) some employers, particularly smaller employers, dropped coverage altogether; (6) in 1993, over 29 million employees, almost one-fourth of the workforce, were employed by firms that did not offer group health insurance for employees' families; (7) most employers continued to offer coverage, but many raised employees' premium contributions significantly, especially for family coverage; (8) in 1993, 16 percent of employees in large private firms paid $150 or more per month for family health insurance premiums and 36 percent of state and local government employees paid as much in 1992; (9) some employers have used other mechanisms that could discourage employees from two-worker families from purchasing family coverage from them; (10) as these changes occurred, the percentage of Americans under 65 years old with private health insurance coverage decreased from 75 percent in 1989 to about 71 percent in 1995; (11) of this general decline, about 70 to 90 percent was due to fewer working-age adults and children being covered as dependents; (12) between 1989 and 1995, the percentage of working-age adults (18 to 64 years old) with private insurance coverage decreased from 76 percent to 73 percent; (13) over these 6 years, the percentage of children under 18 years old with private health insurance decreased from more than 73 percent to 66 percent; (14) declines in employment-based dependent coverage can increase the number of uninsured Americans and shift a greater burden for health care onto public payers; (15) between 1994 and 1996, health insurance premium costs have been relatively stable, which may help slow the erosion of private coverage; and (16) however, unless the decline in employment-based insurance coverage abates, public payers could face increased costs for health care, either for uncompensated care or for public insurance. |
gao_GAO-14-228T | gao_GAO-14-228T_0 | Fully Implementing GAO’s Prior Recommendations for Better Determining Causes of Morale Problems Would Assist in Targeting Action Plans
In September 2012, we found that DHS employees reported having lower average morale than the average for the rest of the federal government, but morale varied across components and employee groups within the department. Specifically, we found that DHS employees as a whole reported lower satisfaction and engagement—the extent to which employees are immersed in their work and spending extra effort on job performance—than the rest of the federal government according to several measures. In particular, the 2011 FEVS showed that DHS employees had 4.5 percentage points lower job satisfaction and 7.0 percentage points lower engagement. As we reported in September 2012, the Partnership for Public Service analysis of FEVS data also indicated consistent levels of low employee satisfaction for DHS relative to those of other federal agencies. We further reported that several components with lower morale, such as TSA and ICE, made up a substantial share of FEVS respondents at DHS, and accounted for a significant portion of the overall difference between the department and other agencies. In our September 2012 report, we also found that DHS and the selected components had taken steps to determine the root causes of employee morale problems and implemented corrective actions, but that the department could strengthen its survey analyses and metrics for action plan success. We therefore recommended that DHS’s OCHCO and component human capital officials examine their root cause analysis efforts and, where absent, add the following: comparisons of demographic groups, benchmarking against similar organizations, and linkage of root cause findings to action plans. DHS concurred with our two recommendations and has taken steps since September 2012 to address them. However, as of December 2013, DHS has not yet fully implemented these recommendations. Establishing metrics of success: OCHCO officials stated that, as of December 2013, they had directed component human capital officials to reevaluate their action plans to ensure that metrics of success were clear and measurable. For example, as shown in figure 1, 2013 FEVS data show that DHS employee satisfaction decreased 7 percentage points since 2011, which is more than the government-wide decrease of 4 percentage points over that same period of time. As a result, DHS employee satisfaction in 2013 is 7 percentage points lower than the government-wide average, a difference not seen since 2006. In addition, DHS has also consistently scored lower than the government- wide average on the FEVS Leadership and Knowledge Management Index, which indicates the extent to which employees hold their leadership in high regard, both overall and on specific facets of leadership. While government-wide scores for this index have declined 3 percentage points since 2011, DHS’s scores have decreased 5 percentage points, widening the gap between DHS and the government-wide average to 9 percentage points. In December 2013, DHS senior officials provided a recent analysis they performed of 2012 FEVS results that indicated DHS low morale issues may persist because of employee concerns about senior leadership and supervisors, among other things, such as whether their talents are being well-used. Senior Leadership Vacancy Rates Generally Declined, but Components’ Rates Varied
In February 2012, we reported that DHS SES vacancy rates, while reaching a peak of 25 percent in 2006, had generally declined since that time—from 25 percent in fiscal year 2006 to 10 percent at the end of fiscal year 2011, as shown in figure 3. Since February 2012, DHS data indicate that SES vacancy percentages have remained relatively stable. In particular, according to DHS data, at the end of fiscal year 2012 the SES vacancy rate was approximately 9 percent, and approximately 11 percent at the end of fiscal year 2013. events like presidential transitions, and organizational factors such as reorganizations. DHS has efforts under way to enhance senior leadership training and hiring, but it is too early to assess their effectiveness at reducing vacancy rates. In February 2012, we reported that DHS had (1) implemented a simplified pilot hiring process aimed at attracting additional qualified applicants and planned to expand the method for all SES, and (2) implemented a centralized SES candidate development program aimed at providing a consistent approach to leadership training. | Why GAO Did This Study
DHS is the third-largest cabinet-level department in the federal government, with more than 240,000 employees situated throughout the nation. Employees engage in a broad range of jobs to support its missions, including aviation and border security, emergency response, cybersecurity, and critical infrastructure protection, among others. Since it began operations in 2003, DHS has faced challenges in implementing human capital functions, and its employees have reported having low job satisfaction. In addition, Congress has raised questions about DHS's ability to hire and retain senior executives.
This testimony addresses (1) how DHS's employees' workforce satisfaction compares with that of other federal government employees and the extent to which DHS is taking steps to improve employee morale, and (2) vacancies in DHS senior leadership positions. This statement is based on products GAO issued in February 2012 and September 2012 and selected updates conducted in December 2013. GAO analyzed FEVS results and DHS vacancy data for fiscal years 2012 and 2013 and interviewed DHS officials.
What GAO Found
In September 2012, GAO reported that Department of Homeland Security (DHS) employees identified having lower average morale than the average for the rest of the federal government, but morale varied across components. Specifically, GAO found that, according to the Office of Personnel Management's 2011 Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey (FEVS), DHS employees had 4.5 percentage points lower job satisfaction and 7.0 percentage point lower engagement--the extent to which employees are immersed in their work and spending extra effort on job performance. Several components with lower morale, such as the Transportation Security Administration, made up a substantial share of FEVS respondents at DHS and accounted for a significant portion of the overall difference between the department and other agencies. In September 2012, GAO recommended that DHS take action to better determine the root cause of low employee morale, and where absent, add benchmarking against similar organizations, among other things. Since September 2012, DHS has taken a number of actions intended to improve employee morale, such as directing component human capital officials to reevaluate their action plans to ensure that metrics of success are clear and measurable. In December 2013, GAO found that DHS has actions underway to address GAO's recommendations but DHS has not fully implemented them. It will be important to do so, as DHS employee job satisfaction declined in fiscal years 2012 and 2013 FEVS results. Specifically, 2013 FEVS data show that DHS employee satisfaction decreased 7 percentage points since 2011, which is more than the government-wide decrease of 4 percentage points over the same time period. As a result, the gap between average DHS employee satisfaction and the government-wide average widened to 7 percentage points. DHS has also consistently scored lower than the government-wide average on the FEVS Leadership and Knowledge Management index, which indicates the extent to which employees hold their leadership in high regard. Since 2011, DHS's scores for this index have decreased 5 percentage points, widening the gap between the DHS average and the government-wide average to 9 percentage points.
In February 2012, GAO reported that DHS Senior Executive Service (SES) vacancy rates, while reaching a peak of 25 percent in 2006, had generally declined, reaching 10 percent at the end of fiscal year 2011. GAO also reported that component officials identified a number of factors that may have contributed to component SES vacancy rates during that time period, including increases in SES allocations, events like presidential transitions, and organizational factors such as reorganizations. To help reduce SES vacancy rates, DHS has (1) implemented a simplified pilot hiring process aimed at attracting additional qualified applicants and planned to expand the method for all SES, and (2) implemented a centralized SES candidate development program aimed at providing a consistent approach to leadership training. As of December 2013, DHS had made the pilot process available to all components, but had not yet performed analysis of these efforts' effectiveness at reducing SES vacancy rates which, according to DHS data, have remained relatively steady since GAO's February 2012 report--11 percent at the end of fiscal year 2013.
What GAO Recommends
GAO has made recommendations in prior reports for DHS to strengthen its analysis of low employee morale, and identify clear and measurable metrics for action plan success. DHS concurred with these recommendations and has reported actions under way to address them. GAO provided a copy of new information in this statement to DHS for review. DHS confirmed the accuracy of this information. |
gao_GAO-01-785 | gao_GAO-01-785_0 | Expectations and Experiences of Retention-Critical Personnel Were Similar to Other Enlisted Personnel
The expectations and experiences of personnel serving in retention- critical occupations were similar to those of other enlisted personnel (see fig. More detailed information about the top reasons retention-critical personnel stay in and leave the military may be found in occupational appendices III through V.
Intent to Make the Military a Career
The intent of those in retention-critical occupations to remain in the military for a 20-year career was virtually the same as for other enlisted personnel. The perceptions of personnel serving in retention-critical occupations were mixed. To the extent they have marketable skills, the perceptions of those in retention-critical occupations were equally or more positive than other enlisted personnel. In addition, most enlisted personnel also believed promotion opportunities would be better in the civilian world. Appendix II contains DOD's comments on this report. DOD's 1999 Survey of Active Duty Personnel helped us identify differences in these areas. Assessing Retention- Critical Personnel
We compared the survey responses of personnel serving in retention- critical occupations to those of other enlisted personnel. This set of beliefs leads to the conclusion that these personnel are being pulled out of the military rather than pushed out, as some have thought. Satisfaction and Career Intentions
Overall, electronic equipment repair personnel were generally as satisfied with the military way of life as were other enlisted personnel (see fig. Nearly half (47 percent) of the communications and intelligence specialists were satisfied with the military way of life. | Why GAO Did This Study
This report reviews the Department of Defense's 1999 broad-based survey of active duty personnel to help shed light on why servicemembers in critical occupational areas might be leaving the military. From comparing the responses of retention-critical personnel against other enlisted personnel, GAO concludes that personnel in retention-critical occupations are not being "pushed out" of the military by their experiences at a greater rate than other enlisted personnel. Rather, to the extent they possess marketable skills, it is more likely they are being "pulled out" of the military by more attractive civilian opportunities.
What GAO Found
Comparing retention-critical personnel against other enlisted personnel, GAO found that the expectations and experiences of personnel serving in retention-critical occupations were often similar to those of other enlisted personnel. Personnel in retention-critical occupations were generally as satisfied with military life as were other enlisted personnel and each group's career intentions were similar. Nearly half of both retention-critical and other enlisted personnel were satisfied with the military way of life. Perceptions of civilian life for those serving in retention-critical occupations were mixed. Overall, most enlisted personnel had a positive perception about work-related opportunities and the quality of life available in the civilian world. Those in retention-critical occupations that had highly marketable skills, such as electronics equipment repairers, were especially optimistic about their prospects for civilian employment. |
gao_GAO-07-1019 | gao_GAO-07-1019_0 | We made four recommendations to VA: (1) complete a comprehensive security management program that included actions related to central security management functions, risk assessments, security policies and procedures, security awareness, and monitoring and evaluating computer controls; (2) develop a process for managing the department’s updated security plan to remediate identified weaknesses; (3) regularly report to the Secretary, or his designee, on progress in implementing VA’s security plan; and (4) ensure consistent use of information security performance standards when appraising the department’s senior executives. VA Has Not Fully Implemented GAO and IG Recommendations
Although VA has made progress, it has not yet fully or effectively implemented two of four GAO recommendations and has not fully implemented 20 of 22 IG recommendations to strengthen its information security practices. Because these recommendations have not yet been implemented, unnecessary risk exists that personal information of veterans and others would be exposed to data tampering, fraud, and inappropriate disclosure. However, it has not fully implemented two other GAO recommendations. However, the department has not completed critical management activities to implement 15 of the 17 recommendations made by the IG in September 2006, which were carried forward from its March 2005 report, to appropriately restrict access to data, networks, and VA facilities; ensure that only authorized changes and updates to computer programs are made; strengthen critical infrastructure planning to ensure information security requirements are addressed; and ensure that background investigations are conducted on all applicable employees and contractors. By Not Fully Implementing GAO and IG Recommendations, VA Leaves Personal Information Vulnerable
The need to fully implement GAO and IG recommendations to strengthen information security practices is underscored by the prevalence of security incidents involving the unauthorized disclosure, misuse, or loss of personal information of veterans and other individuals, such as medical providers. VA Is Undertaking Several Major Initiatives to Strengthen Information Security, but Implementation Has Shortcomings
VA has begun or continued several major initiatives since the May 2006 security incident to strengthen information security practices and secure personal information within the department, but more remains to be done. Since October 2005, VA has been reorganizing its management structure to provide better oversight and fiscal discipline over its IT systems, and it has undertaken a series of new initiatives. For example, although VA has developed a remedial action plan that includes tasks to develop, document, revise, or update a policy or program, 87 percent of these do not have an established time frame for implementation across the department. Until the process and responsibilities for coordinating the management and implementation of IT security policies and procedures throughout the department are clearly documented, VA will have limited assurance that the management and implementation of security policies and procedures are effectively coordinated and communicated. For 87 percent of action items related to policies and procedures, the action plan included no corresponding task with an established time frame for departmentwide implementation. As a result, the office lacks a process to ensure that its examination of internal controls is consistent across VA facilities. Until VA addresses recommendations to resolve identified weaknesses, it will have limited assurance that it can adequately protect its systems and information. Document clearly defined responsibilities in the organization book for the Director of Field Operations and Security and the Director of Cyber Security for coordinating the implementation of IT security policies and procedures within the department. Act expeditiously to fill the position of the Chief Information Security Officer. Develop, document, and implement clear guidance for identifying devices that require encryption functionality. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to evaluate (1) whether the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) has effectively addressed GAO and VA Office of Inspector General (IG) recommendations to strengthen its information security practices and (2) actions VA has taken since the May 2006 security incident to strengthen its information security practices and secure personal information. An office determined it was missing a backup tape containing sensitive information. | Why GAO Did This Study
In May 2006, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) announced that computer equipment containing personal information on approximately 26.5 million veterans and active duty military personnel had been stolen. Given the importance of information technology (IT) to VA's mission, effective information security controls are critical to maintaining public and veteran confidence in its ability to protect sensitive information. GAO was asked to evaluate (1) whether VA has effectively addressed GAO and VA Office of Inspector General (IG) information security recommendations and (2) actions VA has taken since May 2006 to strengthen its information security practices and secure personal information. To do this, GAO examined security policies and action plans, interviewed pertinent department officials, and conducted testing of encryption software at select VA facilities.
What GAO Found
Although VA has made progress, it has not yet fully implemented most of the key GAO and IG recommendations to strengthen its information security practices. Specifically, VA has implemented two GAO recommendations: to develop a process for managing its plan to correct identified weaknesses and to regularly report on progress in updating its security plan to the Secretary. However, it has not fully implemented two other GAO recommendations: to complete a comprehensive security management program and to ensure consistent use of information security performance standards for appraising senior VA executives. In addition, the department has not yet fully implemented 20 of 22 recommendations made by the IG in 2006. For example, VA has not completed activities to appropriately restrict access to data, networks, and department facilities; ensure that only authorized changes and updates to computer programs are made; and strengthen critical infrastructure planning. Because these recommendations have not yet been implemented, unnecessary risk exists that the personal information of veterans and others, such as medical providers, will be exposed to data tampering, fraud, and inappropriate disclosure. Since the May 2006 security incident, VA has continued or begun several major initiatives to strengthen its information security practices and secure personal information within the department, but more remains to be done. These initiatives include continuing efforts begun in October 2005 to reorganize its management structure to provide better oversight and fiscal discipline over its IT systems; developing an action plan to correct identified weaknesses; establishing an information protection program; improving its incident management capability; and establishing an office responsible for oversight of IT within the department. However, implementation shortcomings limit the effectiveness of these initiatives. For example, no documented process exists between the Director of Field Operations and Security and the chief information security officer (CISO) to ensure the effective coordination and implementation of security policies and procedures within the department. In addition, the position of the CISO has been unfilled since June 2006. Although, 39 percent of items in the department's remedial action plan are tasks to develop, document, revise, or update a policy or program, 87 percent of these items have no corresponding task with an established time frame for implementation across the department. VA also did not have clear guidance for identifying devices that require encryption functionality, and it lacked adequate procedures for incident response and notification. Finally, VA's Office of IT Oversight and Compliance lacks a standard methodology and established criteria to ensure that its examination of internal controls is consistent across VA facilities. Until the department addresses recommendations to resolve identified weaknesses and implements the major initiatives it has undertaken, it will have limited assurance that it can protect its systems and information from the unauthorized disclosure, misuse, or loss of personal information of veterans and other personnel. |
gao_GAO-03-378 | gao_GAO-03-378_0 | To summarize trends in the number and rate of individual taxpayer audits and other enforcement contacts in total and by taxpayer income, we analyzed available IRS data from fiscal year 1993 to fiscal year 2002 on each type of contact. For the math error program, we based the contact rate on the proportion of math error notices to the returns filed in that year because the notices are sent to taxpayers as IRS processes tax returns. We also interviewed responsible IRS officials. Because this number is preliminary, the final math error contact rate for fiscal year 2002 may differ somewhat from what we report. In addition, the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act (RRA) of 1998 (P.L. In our discussions, these officials agreed that both types of errors are identified under the same math error authority, are indistinguishable to taxpayers being contacted, and should be similarly counted and reported. As a result, we did not include this information in figure 2. IRS’s Public Reporting on Its Enforcement Programs Is Incomplete
IRS’s public reporting on its enforcement programs for individual taxpayers does not provide a complete perspective on its efforts to enforce tax laws because that reporting heavily focuses on audits. However, over time the audit rate has become increasingly less complete as a measure of IRS’s efforts to enforce tax laws because IRS’s other enforcement programs have expanded their coverage of issues once covered under audits. Limited Public Reporting on IRS’s Enforcement Programs
IRS publishes extensive data on audits but only limited data on other enforcement programs in its Data Book. However, the Commissioner said that he did not believe the audit rate needed to increase to the same level as a number of years ago because IRS has other programs to enforce the tax laws that were not available, or as broad in scope, in past years. However, policymakers and taxpayers could be better informed about of the extent of IRS’s efforts to enforce the tax laws without combining data on all of IRS’s enforcement programs into one set of aggregate measures. However, the readily available data for the nonaudit programs is incomplete compared to data reported on audits. IRS Audit Rates: Rate for Individual Taxpayers Has Declined But Effect on Compliance Unknown. | Why GAO Did This Study
Reported declines in the rate at which the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) audits (also referred to as "examines") individual income tax returns have raised concerns that taxpayers may have a false perception of the true level of IRS's tax enforcement efforts. In addition, many observers are concerned these reported declines may reduce taxpayers' motivation to voluntarily pay their taxes. Because of these concerns, GAO was asked to review a number of issues surrounding IRS's enforcement efforts. GAO determined the trends in the percent of returns filed that are audited (contact rate) compared with similar data on taxpayer contacts through other enforcement programs for fiscal years 1993 through 2002. In addition, GAO reviewed whether IRS's reporting on its enforcement programs should be expanded.
What GAO Found
IRS's often-cited audit rate has been declining for several years, as shown below. However, the audit rate portrays only a portion of IRS's efforts to enforce tax laws and not all of those efforts have been declining. For IRS's three nonaudit enforcement programs, the contact rates in 2002 compared to 1993, after year to year variations, declined for one, essentially remained the same for one, and significantly increased for one--math error. A complete math error contact trend is unavailable because IRS did not capture one type of data on a substantial number of contacts prior to 1997. For years where complete data are available, IRS has not included all math errors in external reports. IRS officials agreed that all types of errors are identified under the same math error authority and should be similarly counted and reported. IRS annually reports extensive data on audits but only limited, or no, data on its other enforcement programs. This limited reporting does not provide policymakers or taxpayers information on the full extent of IRS's enforcement efforts. To the extent that taxpayers do, as is widely believed, take the level of enforcement into account when self-reporting their tax obligations, the audit rate alone may mislead them. IRS officials believe that more reporting is desirable and intend to report readily available, but incomplete, information on nonaudit programs in future reports. |
gao_GAO-01-297 | gao_GAO-01-297_0 | The number of women in intercollegiate sports increased by 81 percent (from 90,000 to 163,000 participants) and the number of men increased by 5 percent (from 220,000 to 232,000 participants) between 1981–82 and 1998–99. Gender equity considerations also often influenced decisions to add women’s teams and discontinue men’s teams, particularly at schools with large athletic programs. Most Schools Added Women’s Teams Without Discontinuing Teams
Overall, among the 1,191 college and universities responding to the questionnaire, 963 added at least one team and 307 discontinued at least one (see fig. Among the 272 responding schools that discontinued a men’s team, 91 (33 percent) cited lack of student interest as a great or very great influence, 83 (31 percent) cited the need to meet gender equity goals or requirements, and 82 (30 percent) cited the need to reallocate budget resources to other sports. Schools Typically Discontinued Teams Quickly and Assisted Athletes in the Transition
The 307 responding schools that discontinued a team during the 1992–93 to 1999–2000 period typically spent 3 months or less between making the proposal to discontinue a team and making a final decision. Affected athletes usually continued to receive athletic financial aid after the sport was discontinued. Members of Campus Community Were Usually Involved Before the Final Decision Was Made
Most colleges and universities (186 of the 307 schools discontinuing a team) informed the campus community of the possibility of discontinuing the team before the decision was final. Schools with smaller programs, particularly those in NCAA Division III and NAIA, most often used additional funds from the institution’s general fund. Rental fees. Another revenue-generating strategy was to rent out athletic facilities for other purposes and use the fees to expand the athletic program. Some schools were members of both associations. | What GAO Found
The number of women participating in intercollegiate athletics at four-year colleges and universities increased substantially between school years 1981-82 and 1998-99, while the number of men participating increased more modestly. The total number of women's teams increased by 3,784 teams, compared to an increase of 36 men's teams. In all, 963 schools added teams and 307 discontinued teams since 1992-93. The two factors cited most often as greatly influencing the decision to add or discontinue teams were the need to address student interest in particular sports and the need to meet gender equity goals and requirements. Schools that discontinued men's teams also found the need to reallocate the athletic budget to other sports. Colleges and universities that discontinued a team typically took three months or less between originating the proposal and making the final decision. Most schools informed members of the campus community of the possibility that the team would be discontinued, and most held meetings with campus groups before making the final decision. Most schools offered to help affected athletes transfer to other schools, and students receiving athletics-related financial aid continued to receive financial aid for at least some period after the team was disbanded. Schools that were able to add one or more teams without discontinuing others used various strategies to increase athletic program revenue and contain costs. Some schools relied on the institution's general fund, while others used private sources and athletic facility rental fees. |
gao_GAO-08-979 | gao_GAO-08-979_0 | The Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2007 states that “none of the funds appropriated … shall be obligated for full scale procurement of monitors until the Secretary of Homeland Security has certified … that a significant increase in operational effectiveness will be achieved.” Congress enacted a similar requirement in DHS’s fiscal year 2008 appropriation. DNDO conducted the tests at NTS in two phases. DNDO’s Phase 3 Test Report Frequently Overlooks the Limitations Associated with the Tests’ Small Sample Sizes
Because the limitations of the Phase 3 test results are not properly discussed in the Phase 3 test report, the report does not accurately portray the results from the Phase 3 tests and could be misleading. The purpose of the Phase 3 tests was to identify areas in which the ASPs needed improvement. The narrative of the report often presents each test result as a single value, although, because of the limited number of test runs, the results would be more thoroughly and appropriately stated as a range of potential values. In addition, the report’s narrative sometimes omits key facts that conflict with DNDO’s analysis of the results. To allow for more substantial variation among test cases, the test plan called for a smaller number of trials over a larger range of objects and configurations rather than running sufficient number of repetitions for each individual test case to provide higher statistically significan results.” (p. 2)
In these comparisons , results are small sample sizes induce large uncertainties in the estimates of the probabilities being compared [for example: n ≤ 5].” (p.9) “For at 2 mph, the ASP system performances are statistically indistinguishable.” (p.13) “For shielded , performance for all three systems is statistically indistinguishable with probabilities of correct alarm varying approximately between 0.84 and .0.92.” (p.11)
The statements imply that the performances of the ASPs were similar because the results were “statistically indistinguishable.” However, given the small number of test runs, it is impossible to determine with a high degree of confidence whether or not the performances were actually similar. Phase 3 Test Results Provide Little Evidence as To Whether ASPs Represent an Improvement Over Currently Deployed Technology
In our view, it is not appropriate to use the Phase 3 test report in determining whether the ASPs represent a significant improvement over currently deployed radiation equipment because the limited number of test runs does not support many of the comparisons of ASP performance made in the Phase 3 report. This is true even if the ASP was successful every time a test was conducted. For example, as noted in the Phase 3 test report, if the ASP correctly identified a source material 100 percent of the time, but the test was run only five times, the most DNDO can estimate is that the ASP should be able to correctly identify the source no worse than about 60 percent of the time. The Phase 3 test results do not help to determine an ASP’s “true” level of performance because DNDO did not design the tests to assess ASP performance with a high degree of statistical confidence. On this point, the special test report acknowledges that “the special tests were never intended to demonstrate conformity of the systems against specific performance requirements.”
From the special tests, SNL concluded 1. However, SNL does not comment on the biased testing methods we identified during the Phase 1 ASP tests at the Nevada Test Site in 2007. Testing radiation detection equipment to understand its capabilities and limitations is an important part of preventing nuclear smuggling. The Phase 3 test results are relevant to DNDO’s original objective for the Phase 3 tests—to identify areas in which the ASPs needed improvement. Overall, because of the limitations discussed in this report, it is our view that neither the Phase 3 tests nor the special tests should serve as a basis for the Secretary of DHS whether the ASPs represent “a significant increase in operational effectiveness” over current radiation detection equipment. However, if the Secretary of DHS intends to consider the results of the Phase 3 tests, along with other test data information, in making a certification decision regarding ASPs, then we recommend that the Secretary take the following actions: Direct the Director of DNDO to revise and clarify the Phase 3 test report to more fully disclose and articulate the limitations present in the Phase 3 tests—particularly the limitations associated with making comparisons between detection systems from a small number of test runs. Using an example from the Phase 3 report, if DNDO notes that an ASP successfully identified a specific source material 34 percent of the time during the tests, it should also indicate that, given the small number of test runs, DNDO can only estimate that the ASP would be able to correctly identify the specific source material between 10 and 65 percent of the time. We continue to believe that the Phase 3 tests should be used only for the intended purpose stated in its test plan—to improve the software of ASPs. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) is responsible for addressing the threat of nuclear smuggling. Radiation detection portal monitors are part of the U.S. defense against such threats. In 2007, Congress required that funds for new advanced spectroscopic portal (ASP) monitors could not be spent until the Secretary of DHS certified that these machines represented a significant increase in operational effectiveness over currently deployed portal monitors. In addition to other tests, DNDO conducted the Phase 3 tests on ASPs to identify areas in which the ASPs needed improvement. GAO was asked to assess (1) the degree to which the Phase 3 test report accurately depicts the test results and (2) the appropriateness of using the Phase 3 test results to determine whether ASPs represent a significant improvement over current radiation detection equipment. GAO also agreed to provide its observations on special tests conducted by Sandia National Laboratories (SNL).
What GAO Found
Because the limitations of the Phase 3 test results are not appropriately stated in the Phase 3 test report, the report does not accurately depict the results from the tests and could potentially be misleading. In the Phase 3 tests, DNDO performed a limited number of test runs. Because of this, the test results provide little information about the actual performance capabilities of the ASPs. The report often presents each test result as a single value; but considering the limited number of test runs, the results would be more appropriately stated as a range of potential values. For example, the report narrative states in one instance that an ASP could identify a source material during a test 50 percent of the time. However, the narrative does not disclose that, given the limited number of test runs, DNDO can only estimate that the ASP would correctly identify the source from about 15 percent to about 85 percent of the time--a result that lacks the precision implied by DNDO's narrative. DNDO's reporting of the test results in this manner makes them appear more conclusive and precise than they really are. The purpose of the Phase 3 tests was to conduct a limited number of test runs in order to identify areas in which the ASP software needed improvement. While aspects of the Phase 3 report address this purpose, the preponderance of the report goes beyond the test's original purpose and makes comparisons of the performance of the ASPs with one another or with currently deployed portal monitors. In GAO's view, it is not appropriate to use the Phase 3 test report in determining whether the ASPs represent a significant improvement over currently deployed radiation equipment because the limited number of test runs do not support many of the comparisons of ASP performance made in the Phase 3 report. As the report shows, if an ASP can identify a source material every time during a test, but the test is run only five times, the only thing that can be inferred with a high level of statistical confidence is that the probability of identification is no less than about 60 percent. Although DNDO states in the Phase 3 test report that the results will be relevant to the Secretary's certification that the ASPs represent a significant increase in operational effectiveness, it does not clarify in what ways the results will be relevant. Furthermore, DNDO offers no explanation as to why it changed its view from the Phase 3 test plan, which states that these tests will not be used to support a certification decision. The goal of SNL's special tests was, among other things, to identify potential vulnerabilities in the ASPs by using different test scenarios from those that DNDO planned to use in other ASP tests. SNL concluded in its test report that the ASPs' software and hardware can be improved and that rigor could be added to DNDO's testing methods. Furthermore, the report acknowledges that (1) a specific objective of the testing at the Nevada Test Site was to refine and improve the ASP's performance and (2) the special tests were never intended to demonstrate conformity of the ASPs with specific performance requirements. In GAO's view, these statements appear to accurately describe the purpose, limitations, and results of the special tests. |
gao_GAO-09-418 | gao_GAO-09-418_0 | In February 2006, the Task Force of the Homeland Security Advisory Council defined resiliency as “the capability of a system to maintain its functions and structure in the face of internal and external change and to degrade gracefully when it must.” Later in 2006, the Department of Homeland Security’s National Infrastructure Protection Plan—again focusing on critical infrastructure, not agencies—defined resilience as “the capability of an asset, system, or network to maintain its function during or to recover from a terrorist attack or other incident.” In May 2008, the House Committee on Homeland Security held a series of hearings focusing on resilience at which government and private sector representatives, while agreeing on the importance of the concept, presented a variety of definitions and interpretations of resilience. For example, in 2004, the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) Hurricane Pam exercise simulated a category 3 hurricane. Furthermore, during a disruption, some attributes may prove to be more important than others. During the peak of the 2008 taxpayer filing season, IRS also had to process payments to taxpayers as directed by the 2008 economic stimulus legislation. As a result, even with this increased workload, IRS was also able to deliver a generally successful filing season. In response to the need to improve exercises across IRS and implement new requirements from the Federal Continuity Directives, IRS assembled its Emergency Management and Preparedness Working Group, which coordinates emergency activities among its business units, for a 2-day workshop. The simulations involved in these types of exercises create more realistic conditions and a better experience to prepare employees to contend with an actual emergency event. In past disruptions, IRS has used its seasonal workforce to respond to changing circumstances. IRS has also demonstrated the ability to be flexible after disruptions and reallocate physical resources quickly. Although IRS has a number of programs in place to build staff motivation, less than half of respondents in the 2008 IRS Employee Survey agree with the statement, “In my organization, leaders generate high levels of motivation and commitment in the workforce.” This is lower than the percentage of IRS employees responding positively to most other survey questions, with which an average of more than 65 percent agreed. However, IRS currently has no requirement for including external stakeholders in tests and exercises. IRS’s strategic flexibilities and tools to distribute leadership capabilities through the workforce and hold individuals accountable are additional ways that IRS builds its capacity for resilience. While IRS has been generally successful in the face of past disruptions, its current test and exercise strategy does not include simulations of real events through functional or full-scale exercises, which limits the ability of IRS staff to gain experience in responding to more realistic circumstances. In addition, we interviewed 11 academic and practitioner experts—in emergency preparedness and disaster management, management and organizational psychology, critical infrastructure, and strategic planning— regarding organizational resilience. These attributes were then arranged into five broad categories: emergency planning, organizational flexibility, leadership, committed workforce, and networks. To identify the ways that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) exhibits the attributes of organizational resilience and the opportunities that IRS has to take on additional practices which would make it more resilient we selected relevant parts of IRS, completed a document review, observed organizational meetings, and held interviews with IRS officials. For each of the four business units and IRS headquarters, the Commissioner or designated representatives as well as representatives from the offices of human capital and emergency planning were interviewed. Additionally IRS provided documentation and analysis related to the IRS Employee Engagement Index, which is based on the IRS Employee Survey data. Appendix II: Expanded Discussion of Organizational Resilience Attributes
Organizational resilience is the quality that would enable an organization to restore itself or thrive following a disruption, by which we mean a sudden and externally imposed circumstance that has the potential to substantially compromise an organization’s ability to accomplish its mission. Test and Exercise Requirements that Challenge Employees to Respond to Unexpected and Stressful Circumstances that Require Adjustments to Established Plans and Procedures
An organization that performs regular tests and exercises of their emergency plans will likely better know how to handle a real disruption. This attribute can be observed through employee feedback and employee involvement in organization-wide initiatives. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) collects the revenues that fund the federal government and issues billions of dollars in refunds. Consequently, IRS's ability to demonstrate agility and speed in restoring its functions after a disruption is vital to the government and the economy. GAO (1) identified the definition and attributes of organizational resilience; (2) examined the extent to which these attributes are exhibited within IRS; and (3) reviewed the challenges and opportunities faced by the IRS in becoming more resilient. GAO gathered and analyzed the attributes of resilience based on discussions with academic and practitioner experts in the field. GAO then reviewed IRS human capital and emergency preparedness policies and strategic plans, observed campus operations and emergency working group meetings, and interviewed officials from headquarters and each of the four business units.
What GAO Found
Organizational resilience is the quality that would enable an organization to restore itself or thrive following a disruption that substantially compromises its ability to accomplish its mission. Five categories of attributes can help an organization be more resilient: robust emergency planning, flexible organizational assets that can be accessed during times of change, leadership capacity distributed through the organization, a committed and skilled workforce, and strong relationships with internal networks and outside organizations. Although each of these categories is important, the characteristics of whatever disruption an organization faces may make some attributes more valuable than others. In its emergency planning, IRS has learned from experiences requiring organizational resilience. For example, during the peak operations of the 2008 filing season, the economic stimulus legislation required that the IRS process stimulus payments totaling $94 billion. Through adjustments to the workforce, IRS was able to implement the change and delivered a generally successful filing season, while making key trade-offs. Although the IRS has learned from past events, its current test and exercise strategy is limited. Functional or full-scale exercises--which are not part of IRS's strategy-- provide more realistic conditions and a better experience to prepare the leadership and emergency personnel to contend with an actual event. Demonstrating the ways that IRS has flexible organizational assets that can be accessed during times of change, IRS strategically has made some operations redundant, which allows work to be shifted between offices when needed. The IRS has also exhibited the capability to use seasonal workers to increase its workforce after a disruption, as was the case in the support it provided to the Federal Emergency Management Agency after Hurricane Katrina. In building leadership and a committed workforce, the IRS has numerous formal training and development initiatives to build the leadership capability of both its management team as well as its non supervisory employees. While IRS employees understand how their work contributes to the IRS's goals and priorities, currently less than half of IRS employees believe that agency leaders and managers generate motivation and commitment in the workforce. A number of IRS initiatives are now in place to address this issue, including coaching of managers based on employee feedback survey data and outreach by managers to IRS employees. Lastly, IRS is highly networked both within and outside of IRS, which provides opportunities for accessing additional resources after a disruption. IRS has requirements for including internal stakeholders in tests and exercises. When IRS has involved external stakeholders in tests and exercises, it has proven useful, but this practice is neither formalized nor widespread. |
gao_GAO-02-490T | gao_GAO-02-490T_0 | Improvements to Homeland Security Are in Process
Legislative and executive branch action has led to a variety of governmentwide and agency-specific initiatives, started and ongoing, to enhance homeland security. Public and Private Sectors Seek Both Direction From and Partnership With the Office of Homeland Security
Our ongoing work indicates that federal agencies, state and local governments, and the private sector are looking for guidance from the Office of Homeland Security on how to better integrate their missions and more effectively contribute to the overarching homeland security effort. Some of these officials believed that it was essential that the concept and related terms be defined, particularly because homeland security initiatives are crosscutting, and a clear definition promotes a common understanding of operational plans and requirements, and can help avoid duplication of effort and gaps in coverage. Although some agencies are looking to the Office of Homeland Security for guidance on how their agencies should be integrated into the overall security effort and to explain what else they should be doing beyond their traditional missions, they also want their viewpoints incorporated as this guidance evolves. If it is to be comprehensive, a national strategy should address many of these issues. Y2K Style Partnerships Can Be Useful in Promoting Public-Private Participation for Homeland Security
Once the homeland security strategy is developed, participating public and private sector organizations will need to understand and prepare for their defined roles under the strategy. | What GAO Found
Enhancing homeland security is a complex effort that involves all 50 states, the District of Columbia, and the territories; thousands of municipalities; and countless private entities. Since September 11, the nation has taken many actions to combat terrorism and enhance homeland security. It is well known that the U.S. military is conducting operations in Afghanistan. Various legislative and executive branch actions to enhance homeland security have been taken or were underway prior to and since September 11. Government and nongovernment activities are looking to the Office of Homeland Security for further guidance on how to better integrate their missions and more effectively contribute to the overarching homeland security effort. Having a common definition can help avoid duplication of effort and gaps in coverage by identifying agency roles and responsibilities. Although the agencies are looking for guidance, they also want to ensure that their unique missions are factored in as guidance is developed. At the same time, some agencies are unsure what they should be doing beyond their traditional missions. Once the national strategy is issued, federal, state, and local government agencies and private sector groups will need to work together to achieve the goals and objectives. Public-private partnerships used to address Y2K concerns can also be used to promote the national strategy. |
gao_GAO-05-532T | gao_GAO-05-532T_0 | NFIP Is Not Designed to Cover All Flood Losses
As a result of coverage limits, restrictions, and exclusions in NFIP policies, insurance payments for flood damage may not pay all of the costs of repairing or replacing flood-damaged property. Certain NFIP limitations are embedded in statute; others have been promulgated by FEMA pursuant to its statutory authority. FEMA officials said that the coverage limitations are necessary to keep the NFIP self-supporting and actuarially sound. Thus, the program is designed to strike a balance between premium prices and coverage. The value of physical depreciation is based on the age and condition of the item. A homeowner may choose not to insure personal property under the program. Basements, which are defined as building areas below grade level on all sides, have limited coverage that does not include payment to repair or replace finished walls, floors, furniture, and other personal property. It was insured under the NFIP for $30,000. Private Insurers Sell, Service, and Adjust Claims under FEMA Management and Oversight
The work of selling, servicing, and adjusting claims on NFIP policies is carried out by thousands of private sector insurance agents and adjusters who work independently or are employed by insurance companies or vendors under subcontract to insurance companies to handle their flood business. In contrast, according to a FEMA official, about 40 FEMA employees are responsible for regulating, managing, and overseeing the program, which is expected to grow to about 4.7 million policies in 2005. FEMA is assisted in this effort by about 170 contractor employees. Independent Agents Are the Main Point of Contact for Policyholders
It is clear that some agents do not understand the program. However, other than requiring that agents meet basic state insurance licensing requirements, neither FEMA nor the four insurance companies have historically required that agents complete training or demonstrate a basic level of knowledge of the NFIP to sell flood policies. Unlike agents who sell flood insurance policies, adjusters must be certified by FEMA to work on NFIP claims. I have seen the NFIP do great good for many people.”
Each of the interviewees, when asked how the NFIP could be improved, said that FEMA should look for ways to make the program less complex and more similar to other property insurance programs. FEMA Continues Efforts to Comply with Legislative Mandates
Congress mandated that within 6 months of the enactment of the Flood Insurance Reform Act, FEMA establish (1) insurance agent education and training requirements, (2) new processes for explaining coverage to policyholders when they purchase and renew policies, and (3) an appeals process for claimants who are dissatisfied with the settlement of their claims. FEMA Is Coordinating with the States to Establish Training and Education Requirements
To address the requirement in the Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2004 to establish insurance agent education and training requirements, FEMA is working with state insurance commissions. An official said FEMA is still in the planning stages of meeting the requirement and is discussing options with state insurance commissions, but has not yet developed an action plan. The draft material includes: a supplemental form that would explain the policy, such as the amount of deductibles, the exact coverage being purchased, exclusions from coverage, and an explanation of how lost items and damages will be valued under the policy at the time of loss; a flood insurance handbook to describe procedures to be followed to file a claim and provide detailed information on an appeals process that FEMA is to develop; and an acknowledgment form that the policyholder has received the flood insurance policy and that the policy only covers building property for the dwelling and does not provide coverage for contents or personal property. FEMA expects to have these forms and handbook finalized by October 2005. | Why GAO Did This Study
According to the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), 90 percent of all natural disasters in the United States involve flooding. Because of the catastrophic and unpredictable nature of floods, private insurance companies do not typically cover flood losses. Congress established the NFIP in 1968 to provide an insurance alternative to disaster assistance in response to the escalating costs of repairing flood damage. During congressional hearings on provisions of the Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2004, several legislators testified on NFIP shortcomings, as reported by constituents whose properties had been flooded by Hurricane Isabel in September 2003. The act required GAO to study coverage provided under the NFIP. It also required the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the administrator of the NFIP, to take steps to address concerns about coverage and claims procedures. Today's testimony is based on work in progress to address this mandate. It provides preliminary information on (1) the types of coverage limits, restrictions, and exclusions under the NFIP; (2) how FEMA, in partnership with private insurers, manages and oversees the NFIP and the views of selected private sector program managers on how the program is working; and (3) the status of FEMA's efforts to comply with provisions of the Flood Insurance Reform Act.
What GAO Found
As a result of policy limits, restrictions, and exclusions, insurance payments to claimants for flood damage may not cover all of the costs of repairing or replacing damaged property. Some limitations are embedded in statute and others have been promulgated by FEMA pursuant to its statutory authority. FEMA officials said that the coverage limitations are necessary to keep the NFIP self-supporting and actuarially sound. Thus, the program is designed to strike a balance between premium prices and coverage. For example, homeowners may choose not to insure personal property under the program. If they do elect to have this coverage, the value of personal property is depreciated. Basement coverage does not include payment to repair or replace finished walls and floors. The work of selling, servicing, and adjusting claims on NFIP policies is carried out by thousands of private sector insurance agents and adjusters under the regulation, management, and oversight of about 40 FEMA employees assisted by about 170 contractor employees. Agents are the main point of contact for policyholders. Four private sector NFIP managers we interviewed said that the agents have varying levels of NFIP knowledge. While training and support are available, historically neither FEMA nor the insurance companies have required completion of training or demonstration of basic program knowledge. Flood-certified adjusters are responsible for assessing damage and estimating losses when flooding occurs. Unlike agents, adjusters have mandatory training requirements. FEMA has oversight mechanisms in place to review the operations of the insurance companies and the work of adjusters. The private sector NFIP managers GAO interviewed were generally supportive of the program. However, they said that FEMA should find ways to make it less complex than and more similar to other property insurance programs. FEMA has taken steps to address its mandates in the Flood Insurance Reform Act, but it did not meet the 6-month timeframe specified. For example, to establish an insurance agent training requirement, an official said FEMA is discussing options but has not developed an action plan. To meet the requirement to provide "simple and complete information" to NFIP policyholders, FEMA has drafted materials explaining coverage, deductibles, and claim- and appeals-related procedures that it expects to have finalized by October 2005. |
gao_GAO-07-1117 | gao_GAO-07-1117_0 | For these individuals, Medicare covers the cost of lifetime dialysis treatments, or for individuals who receive kidney transplants, the cost of the transplants and 3 years of follow-up care—including immunosuppressive medications needed to sustain the transplants. For an individual who is eligible for Medicare solely because of ESRD and who has a kidney transplant, Medicare coverage ends on the last day of the 36th month after the individual receives the transplant unless the individual is entitled to Medicare other than because of ESRD. However, after 36 months, a transplant recipient can become eligible for Medicare again after a transplant failure and subsequently receive a retransplant or dialysis. However, once individuals turn 19, they may lose access to their parents’ private insurance coverage as well as coverage under SCHIP and Medicaid. Recipients who do not take their immunosuppressive medications according to the prescribed regimens are more likely to have their transplanted kidneys fail. Transplant Recipients in All Age Groups Had Similar Demographic Characteristics, but Fewer Pediatric and Transitional Recipients Had Medicare Coverage
Pediatric, transitional, and adult kidney transplant recipients were similar with respect to sex, race, and income level. A Higher Percentage of Transitional Recipients Experienced Transplant Failure and Received Dialysis
Our analysis of data from the USRDS show that after the first year posttransplant, a higher percentage of transitional recipients experienced a transplant failure compared with their pediatric and adult counterparts. In addition, the largest increase in transplant failure among the three age groups occurred in the first 3 years posttransplant—before termination of Medicare coverage—and the increase was substantially higher for transitional recipients than for pediatric and adult recipients. 1). For example, we found that by 5 years posttransplant, the percentage of transitional recipients who experienced a transplant failure (33 percent) was about twice as high as the percentage of pediatric recipients (16 percent) and somewhat higher than adult recipients (28 percent). Beneficiaries with Functioning Transplants Were Substantially Less Costly to Medicare Than Those with Transplant Failures
Based on our analysis of USRDS data, we found that Medicare beneficiaries with functioning transplants cost substantially less per year to treat than those beneficiaries who experienced transplant failures. Specifically, we found that overall, the median annual Medicare cost for a beneficiary with a functioning transplant was $8,550, compared with a median annual Medicare cost of $50,938 for a beneficiary after a transplant failure—a difference of 500 percent. For pediatric beneficiaries, the percentage difference was even higher—the median annual Medicare cost after a transplant failure was 750 percent higher than for a functioning transplant (see table 5). Concluding Observations
The substantial cost of treating transplant recipients who experience transplant failures underscores the importance of maintaining functioning kidney transplants. While there are many reasons that could account for transplant failures during the first 3 years posttransplant—including medication noncompliance—the large percentage increase in transplant failures from 1 year to 3 years posttransplant for transitional recipients cannot be attributed to an inability to access immunosuppressive medications due to a lack of Medicare coverage. | Why GAO Did This Study
For individuals with end-stage renal disease (ESRD), the permanent loss of kidney function, Medicare covers kidney transplants and 36 months of follow-up care. Kidney transplant recipients must take costly medications to avoid transplant failure. Unless a transplant recipient is eligible for Medicare other than on the basis of ESRD, Medicare coverage, including that for medications, ends 36 months posttransplant. Pediatric transplant recipients, including those who were under 18 when transplanted but are now adults (transitional recipients), may be more likely than their adult counterparts to lose access to medications once Medicare coverage ends because they may lack access to other health insurance coverage. GAO was asked to examine (1) the percentage of transplant failures and subsequent outcomes--retransplant, dialysis, or death--among pediatric, transitional, and adult kidney transplant recipients and (2) how the cost to Medicare for a beneficiary with a functioning transplant compares with the cost for a beneficiary with a transplant failure. To do this, GAO analyzed 1997 through 2004 data from the United States Renal Data System (USRDS) and interviewed officials from pediatric transplant centers. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services--the agency that administers Medicare--commented that it is concerned about beneficiary outcomes and has an education program to help them.
What GAO Found
The percentage of kidney transplant recipients who experience a transplant failure varies by age group as do the percentages who experience dialysis, retransplant, or death. After the first year posttransplant, a higher percentage of transitional recipients (those younger than 18 at the time of their transplants and at least 18 as of December 31, 2004) experienced a transplant failure and subsequently received dialysis compared with their pediatric (those younger than 18 as of December 31, 2004) and adult (those at least 18 at the time of their transplants) counterparts. By 5 years posttransplant, the percentage of transitional recipients who experienced a transplant failure (33 percent) was about twice as high as pediatric recipients (16 percent) and somewhat higher than adult recipients (28 percent). The largest increase in transplant failures for each age group occurred in the first 3 years posttransplant--before the termination of Medicare coverage on the basis of ESRD--and the increase was substantially higher for transitional recipients (133 percent) than for pediatric (83 percent) and adult (100 percent) recipients. Medicare beneficiaries with functioning transplants cost substantially less per year to treat than those who experienced a transplant failure. GAO found that the median annual Medicare cost for a beneficiary whose transplant failed ($50,938) was 500 percent more than the median annual Medicare cost for a beneficiary with a functioning transplant ($8,550). This percentage difference was consistent across transplant recipient age groups. The substantial cost of treating transplant recipients who experience a transplant failure underscores the importance of maintaining functioning kidney transplants. While there are many reasons that could account for transplant failures, the large percentage increase in transplant failures from 1 year to 3 years posttransplant for transitional recipients cannot be attributed to an inability to access medications due to a lack of Medicare coverage. |
gao_GAO-07-427T | gao_GAO-07-427T_0 | Finally, agency analyses indicate that climate change and related drought may also be responsible for significant increases in the occurrence of, and costs of responding to, wildland fire. Increases in the size and severity of wildland fires, and in the cost of fighting them, have led federal agencies to fundamentally reexamine their approach to wildland fire management. Five federal agencies—the Forest Service within the Department of Agriculture and the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Bureau of Land Management, Fish and Wildlife Service, and National Park Service within the Department of the Interior—fight wildland fires. Agencies Need a Cohesive Strategy to Address Wildland Fire Problems
Agencies need a cohesive strategy that identifies the available long-term options and associated funding for reducing excess vegetation and responding to wildland fires if the agencies and the Congress are to make informed decisions about an effective and affordable long-term approach for addressing problems that have been decades in the making. We first recommended that the agencies develop such a strategy for addressing fuels in 1999. After we evaluated a number of related wildland fire management issues, we reiterated our recommendation in 2005 and 2006 but also recognized that a comprehensive solution needs to address not only reducing fuels but also an overall response to wildland fire. Specifically, these weaknesses included the following: the agencies lacked basic data, such as the extent and location of lands needing fuel reduction; the agencies needed to identify and prioritize fuel reduction projects; many federal land management units did not have fire management plans that met agency requirements designed to restore fire’s natural role in ecosystems consistent with human health and safety; and the agencies were unable to assess the extent to which they were reducing wildland fire risks, to establish meaningful fuel reduction performance measures, or to determine the cost-effectiveness of these efforts because they lacked needed data. Phase II was to be focused on additional activities, including fuel reduction and large-fire suppression. Although the agencies had made progress on these three primary tasks at the time of our 2006 update, they had not developed either a cohesive strategy identifying options for reducing fuels or a joint tactical plan outlining the critical steps, together with related time frames, the agencies would take to complete a cohesive strategy, as we recommended in our 2005 report. Better Guidance Needed to Clarify Sharing of Suppression Costs between Federal and Nonfederal Entities
Federal agencies need to take steps to improve the framework for sharing wildland fire suppression costs between federal and nonfederal entities. We recommended in our 2006 report that federal agencies work with relevant state entities to clarify the financial responsibilities for suppressing fires that burn, or threaten to burn, across multiple jurisdictions and provide more specific guidance as to when particular cost-sharing methods should be used. As of January 2007, the agencies were updating guidance on options for sharing costs and under what circumstances each would typically be used, but it is unclear how the agencies will ensure that such guidance is followed. The type of cost-sharing method ultimately used can have significant financial consequences for the entities involved, potentially amounting to millions of dollars. Lack of Clear Goals and Cohesive Strategy Hinders Agencies’ Efforts to Contain Wildland Fire Costs
Preliminary findings from our ongoing work for the committee show that, despite dozens of federal and nonfederal studies issued since 2000 that consistently identified similar areas needing improvement to help contain wildland fire costs, the agencies have made little progress in addressing these areas. The steps the agencies have taken to date to contain wildland fire costs lack several key elements fundamental to sound program management, such as clearly defining cost- containment goals, developing a strategy for achieving those goals, and measuring progress toward achieving them. First, the agencies have not clearly articulated the goals of their cost-containment efforts. For cost- containment efforts to be effective, the agencies need to integrate cost- containment goals with the other goals of the wildland fire program—such as protecting life, property, and resources. At the same time, to help address the rising cost of protecting the growing number of homes built in the wildland urban interface—a cost that may be disproportionately borne by the federal government—federal agencies also need to work with relevant state entities to ensure that appropriate methods are used for sharing the costs of suppressing fires that burn, or threaten to burn, across multiple jurisdictions. | Why GAO Did This Study
Over the past two decades, the number of acres burned by wildland fires has increased, often threatening human lives, property, and ecosystems. The cost of responding to wildland fires has also grown, especially as more homes are built in or near wildlands, an area called the wildland-urban interface. Past management practices, including a concerted federal policy in the 20th century of suppressing fires to protect communities and ecosystems, unintentionally resulted in steady accumulation of dense vegetation that can fuel large, intense, and often costly wildland fires. GAO was asked to identify actions that federal wildland fire agencies need to take to help contain federal wildland fire expenditures. GAO has identified these actions in three of its reports addressing fuel reduction and cost-sharing efforts and as part of an ongoing review of federal agencies' efforts to contain wildland fire preparedness and suppression costs for this committee. Specifically, GAO focused on examining agencies' efforts to (1) reduce accumulated fuels and address wildland fire problems, (2) share with nonfederal entities the costs of responding to multijurisdictional fires, and (3) contain the costs of preparing for and responding to wildland fires.
What GAO Found
Over the past 7 years, GAO has recommended a number of actions federal wildland fire agencies should take to improve their management of wildland fire activities, actions that could also help contain the rising federal expenditures for responding to wildland fires. These agencies--the Forest Service within the Department of Agriculture and land management agencies within the Department of the Interior--concurred with GAO's recommendations but have not completed, or in some cases have not yet begun, needed actions. GAO's ongoing review of federal agencies' efforts to contain wildland fire preparedness and suppression costs has also identified other actions that may be needed. Specifically, the agencies need to: (1) Develop a cohesive strategy that identifies the options and associated funding to reduce fuels and address wildland fire problems. In 1999, to address the problem of excess fuels and their potential to increase the severity of wildland fires and the cost of suppression efforts, GAO recommended that a cohesive strategy be developed that identified the available long-term options and associated funding for reducing these fuels. In 2005 and 2006, because the agencies had not yet developed one, GAO reiterated the need for such a strategy but broadened its focus to better address the interrelated nature of fuel reduction efforts and wildland fire response. GAO also recommended that, as an interim step, the agencies develop a tactical plan outlining the steps and time frames needed for completing a cohesive strategy. As of January 2007, the agencies had not developed either a cohesive strategy or a tactical plan. (2) Clarify their guidance for sharing wildland fire suppression costs with nonfederal entities. In 2006, to address the rising costs of responding to fires that threaten both federal and nonfederal lands and resources, GAO recommended that the federal agencies provide more specific guidance as to when particular cost-sharing methods should be used. The cost-sharing method used can have significant financial consequences for the entities involved--potentially amounting to millions of dollars. As of January 2007, the agencies were updating their guidance on possible cost-sharing methods and when each typically would be used, but it is unclear how the agencies will ensure that the guidance is followed. (3) Establish clear goals, strategies, and performance measures to help contain wildland fire costs. Preliminary findings from GAO's ongoing work indicate that the effectiveness of agencies' efforts to contain costs may be limited because the agencies have not clearly defined their cost-containment goals, developed a strategy for achieving those goals, or developed related performance measures. For these efforts to be effective, the agencies need to integrate cost-containment goals with the other goals of the wildland fire program--such as protecting life and property--and to recognize that trade-offs will be needed to meet desired goals within the context of fiscal constraints. |
gao_GGD-98-120 | gao_GGD-98-120_0 | Congress has also given OIRA other statutory responsibilities related to regulatory management. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to assess how OIRA has implemented three of its information collection responsibilities under the PRA:
We looked at how OIRA reviews and controls paperwork, including (1) reviewing and approving agencies’ information collection requests; (2) establishing and overseeing guidance for estimating information collection burden; (3) setting annual governmentwide goals for the reduction of that burden by at least 10 percent in fiscal years 1996 and 1997, 5 percent during the next 4 fiscal years, and setting annual agency goals that reduce paperwork to the “maximum practicable opportunity”; and (4) conducting pilot projects to test alternative policies and procedures to minimize information collection burden. OIRA officials said that they have not formally established any pilot projects specifically for this purpose. However, they said that they do not view this section of the act as requiring OIRA or OMB to undertake any special action or review. OIRA Has Not Kept Congress Fully and Currently Informed of Certain Major PRA Activities
Section 3514(a) of the PRA states that OIRA must “keep Congress and congressional committees fully and currently informed of the major activities under ,” and it requires OIRA to “submit a report on such activities to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives annually and at such other times as [OIRA] determines necessary.” The PRA says that any such report must contain a description of the extent to which agencies have reduced information collection burdens on the public and should specifically include (1) a summary of accomplishments and planned initiatives; (2) a list of all violations of the act’s requirements; (3) a list of any increases in the collection of information burden (including the authority for each such collection); and (4) a list of agencies that did not reduce information collection burdens in accordance with the goals established in section 3505(a)(1), a list of the programs and statutory responsibilities of those agencies that precluded that reduction, and recommendations to assist those agencies to reduce their information collection burdens. Although the ICBs in these reports presented the changes in burden-hour estimates from year to year, neither of the reports clearly stated that the governmentwide burden-reduction goals contemplated in the act were unlikely to be met. Neither did those reports indicate that OIRA believes that the sum of the individual reduction goals that is the maximum practicable for each agency need not equal the governmentwide goal. Conclusions
This report examines some, but not all, of OIRA’s specific responsibilities under the 1995 PRA. Although OIRA officials noted a variety of actions that the agency had taken regarding those responsibilities, we do not believe that OIRA has fully satisfied the act’s requirements in any of the three areas we examined: (1) reviewing and controlling paperwork, (2) developing and overseeing federal IRM policies, and (3) keeping Congress and congressional committees fully and currently informed about major activities under the act. Although OIRA’s August 1996 and September 1997 reports on the PRA and the CIO Council’s strategic plan contain some of the elements that the PRA requires in an IRM strategic plan, none of these documents describe, in a clear and comprehensive manner, (1) the objectives and means by which the federal government should use information resources to improve agency and program performance or (2) agencies’ progress in applying IRM to improve their performance—two of the three basic elements that the act says an IRM strategic plan should have. The office has less than two dozen staff who review between 3,000 and 5,000 PRA information collection requests each year, analyze the substance of about 500 significant rules each year under Executive Order 12866, and perform other duties pursuant to other statutes and executive orders. To date, OIRA has not done so. The PRA requires OIRA to set both governmentwide and agency specific burden-reduction goals. The act does not require agencies to meet the burden-reduction goals, only that OIRA and the agencies establish them. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed how the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) has implemented selected responsibilities assigned to it by the 1995 Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA), focusing on: (1) how OIRA reviews and controls paperwork; (2) OIRA's oversight of federal information resources management (IRM) activities; and (3) how OIRA keeps Congress and congressional committees fully and currently informed about major activities under the act.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) OIRA has taken between 3,000 and 5,000 actions on agencies' information collection requests in each year since the 1995 PRA was enacted; (2) at the same time, 20 to 25 OIRA staff members assigned to this task were responsible for reviewing the substance of about 500 significant rules each year and carrying out other statutory, executive order, and policy responsibilities; (3) although OIRA has provided agencies with some guidance on how they can estimate paperwork burden, the guidance is not very specific; (4) as required by the PRA, OIRA has set both governmentwide and agency-specific burden-reduction goals; (5) however, OIRA officials said they do not believe the act requires that the agencies' burden-reduction goals need to total to the governmentwide goal; (6) also, OIRA established the agencies' goals for fiscal years 1996 and 1997 at nearly the end of each of those years; (7) OIRA has not formally designated any pilot projects under the PRA to test alternative policies and procedures to minimize information collection burden; (8) OIRA officials said that other burden reduction efforts are under way, and pilot projects used to satisfy another statute meet the PRA's requirements; (9) OIRA's annual reports do not provide a central focus on how agencies should use information resources to improve agency and program performance, and they only partially describe agencies' progress in applying IRM to improve their performance and the accomplishment of their missions--elements that the PRA requires in a governmentwide IRM strategic plan; (10) however, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) does not explicitly require agencies' information collection requests and budget submissions to contain all of the elements that the PRA specifically mentions as agencies' general IRM responsibilities; (11) OIRA officials said that they keep Congress and congressional committees fully and currently informed of major activities under the act through their annual reports, the Chief Information Officer Council's strategic plan, and other reports and informational mechanisms; (12) however, OIRA's and other reports do not contain all of the specific information that the act requires; and (13) although the annual reports present the changes in burden-hour estimates from year to year, OIRA has not clearly notified Congress in those reports or elsewhere that the burden reduction goals contemplated in the PRA are unlikely to be met, or that OIRA believes that the sum of the agency-specific goals need not equal the governmentwide goal, or that other PRA-required actions have not been taken. |
gao_AIMD-97-39 | gao_AIMD-97-39_0 | We did not validate the accuracy of the information provided by DOD on the numbers and costs of computer centers, the alternatives analyses, funding plans, and processing capacities. Further, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 requires the Secretary of Defense to report the Department’s plan for establishing an integrated framework for management of information resources within the Department by March 1, 1997. Consolidation Strategies Do Not Meet OMB Requirements
Most of the consolidation strategies submitted by the military services and components to OMB failed to fully address all of the planning elements addressed in the Bulletin. Therefore, DOD and OMB do not have assurance that the services and components are addressing these critical planning elements in carrying out their strategies or that the approaches they have chosen are sound. First, it has not set targets or established policy for basic things, such as how many computer centers the Department actually needs, the numbers and skill mix of staff that are required to operate the centers, and what constitutes an optimum computer center. It also has no mechanism for ensuring that the best money-saving opportunities have been considered by the individual services and components or that consolidation efforts will conform to federal requirements or even the needs of the Department as a whole. Under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 and the Clinger-Cohen Act, passed in 1996, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence, as DOD’s Chief Information Officer (CIO), is supposed to develop and implement management policy and procedures to ensure that major information technology related efforts conform to departmentwide goals. Conclusions
Without better coordination and oversight of computer center consolidation efforts, the best Defense can hope to achieve from its computer center consolidations is optimization at or below the component level. Moreover, millions of dollars in computer center investments and operating expenses may well end up being wasted since individual components and services are planning without departmentwide information processing needs in mind and without the benefit of clearly defined organizationwide policies and procedures for the consolidation efforts and effective oversight mechanisms. They should be for Defense as well. We also recommend that as a basis for this plan and for future decisions concerning consolidation, modernization, and outsourcing of computer centers, Defense’s Chief Information Officer develop policies and related procedures that address the following: (1) what constitutes an optimum computer center in terms of processing capacity and staff numbers and skills; (2) how many computer centers are needed; (3) which of its computer center operations are inherently governmental and/or require component-unique centers solutions and thus cannot be consolidated or outsourced; (4) how DOD should compare its computer center services with those of other public-sector and private-sector services in terms of cost, speed, productivity, and quality of outputs and outcomes; and (5) which cost and performance goals are relevant for comparing departmentwide alternatives. A high-level implementation approach was submitted to OMB. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed: (1) the Department of Defense's (DOD) plans to consolidate, outsource, and modernize its computer center operations; and (2) whether DOD has an effective framework in place for making and executing these decisions. GAO did not validate the accuracy of the information provided by DOD on the numbers and costs of computer centers, the alternative analyses, funding plans, and processing capacities.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) DOD has recognized the need to continue reductions in the cost of its computer centers' operations through consolidation, modernization, and outsourcing, but it has not yet established an effective framework for making these decisions; (2) this framework would include departmentwide policies and procedures critical to the success of its efforts to improve computer centers; (3) these policies and procedures would establish targets for how many computer centers DOD actually needs, define how mainframes and mid-tier computer operations should be consolidated, and identify the numbers and skill mix of staff that are required to operate the centers, and what constitutes an optimum computer center; (4) DOD also has no mechanism for ensuring that the best money-saving opportunities have been considered by the individual services and components or that consolidation efforts will conform to federal requirements or even meet the needs of DOD as a whole; (5) as a result, DOD services and components have developed individual strategies for consolidating and modernizing their computer centers that are inconsistent and contradictory to DOD as a whole and may well cause DOD to waste millions of dollars in computer center expenditures; (6) in addition, the consolidation strategies of the military services and DOD components did not always fully address critical planning elements required by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) requirements that could help reduce the risk of waste, including alternative analyses, high-level implementation plans, and funding plans; (7) further, GAO found that the OMB and departmental guidance, particularly addressing mid-tier computer centers, was unclear; (8) this resulted in inconsistent interpretation and reporting for these centers; (9) therefore, OMB and DOD do not have assurance that the computer consolidation strategies are sound; (10) without better management over the implementation of its computer center strategies, DOD at best will only achieve optimization at the component level and forgo optimization for DOD as a whole; and (11) moreover, DOD's chief information officer (CIO) is now required by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996, and the Fiscal Year 1997 DOD Authorization Act to develop and implement a plan for a management framework with policies and procedures as well as effective oversight mechanisms for ensuring that major technology related efforts, such as the computer center consolidations, conform to departmentwide goals. |
gao_GAO-17-101 | gao_GAO-17-101_0 | HUD and VA established the HUD-VASH program in 1992. VA Uses Supportive- Housing EULs to Provide Homeless Veterans with Affordable Housing and a Range of Services on VA Campuses
VA Uses EULs to Provide a Mix of Permanent and Transitional Housing
As of September 2016, VA had developed 35 active supportive-housing EULs for veterans who were homeless or at risk of homelessness with low cost rental housing and coordinated access to medical, rehabilitative, and mental healthcare, as well as other services on VA campuses. A few lessee officials we interviewed said access to federal property and land at little or no cost helped them to rehabilitate or construct facilities, in addition to providing needed services to homeless veterans. In addition, lessees we interviewed said the close proximity to VA medical, rehabilitative, and mental health services allowed them to invest in other needed services for homeless veterans, such as employment training and quality-of-life amenities. Federal Standards for Internal Control states that documentation is required for the effective design, implementation, and operating effectiveness of a federal program, and that management considers the impact of deficiencies identified in achieving documentation requirements. VA’s EUL Policies and Procedures Are Outdated and Are Not Specific to Supportive-Housing for Homeless Veterans
VA’s existing policies for the EUL program are outdated and reference the EUL authority from 1991, which is no longer in effect. However, it does not specifically provide direction on how to determine whether a proposed supportive-housing EUL meets the need for homeless veteran housing in the local area or discuss VA’s limited authority to provide housing for homeless veterans. Without policies and procedures that address needs specific to supportive-housing for homeless veterans, VA may not be well positioned to identify viable supportive-housing EUL projects and help ensure that those projects are successfully developed. VA officials stated that VA tracks the number of veterans participating in HUD-VASH, GPD, and SSVF, but generally does not track the number of veterans using the individual services in association with each program. Each Year Since 2012, HUD’s and VA’s Supportive-Housing Vouchers Have Housed More Chronically Homeless and Vulnerable Veterans, but Locating Housing in Some Markets Is Difficult
From fiscal year 2012 to fiscal year 2016, almost twice as many chronically homeless and vulnerable veterans used HUD-VASH vouchers to find housing, from about 37,000 in fiscal year 2012 to about 72,500 in fiscal year 2016, as reported by VA (see table 5). Rental assistance made up the majority of the temporary financial assistance provided through SSVF, followed by funding for housing security deposits (see table 8). However, VA officials did not completely document their decision-making process for selecting properties, or other key information, as required by standards for internal control and their own policy. Further, VA has not updated its policy to reflect the 2012 change in its EUL authority limiting it to solely developing supportive-housing EULs for veterans. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve VA’s supportive-housing EUL program and meet the needs of homeless veterans, we recommend that the Secretary of Veterans Affairs should direct the Office of Asset Enterprise Management to take the following two actions: clearly and completely document the selection process for all supportive-housing EULs from pre-development through completion of VA’s development phase in keeping with internal control standards and VA policy, and; update its EUL policy to (1) address the current authority for developing supportive-housing; and (2) specify how to identify properties for supportive-housing EULs to meet the needs of homeless veterans. VA concurred with both of our recommendations, and discussed planned actions to address them; however, VA disagreed with some of our findings. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report examines: (1) how the U.S. Department of Veteran’s Affairs (VA) uses enhanced-use leases (EUL) to provide supportive-housing and services; (2) VA’s plans to develop additional supportive- housing through EULs and how past plans have been implemented, and (3) how the Department of Housing and Urban Development and Department of Veterans Affairs Supportive-Housing (HUD-VASH) program; the Grant and Per Diem (GPD) program; and the Supportive Services for Veteran Families (SSVF) program have helped support the goal of ending veterans’ homelessness. We also reviewed the Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government. To describe how VA leverages key programs to support the goal of ending veterans’ homeless, we examined three key housing programs: HUD-VASH, GPD, and SSVF. | Why GAO Did This Study
In August 2016, HUD and VA announced that the number of homeless veterans in the United States had been cut nearly in half since 2010 to less than 40,000. Part of this effort is the EUL program, which uses unneeded federal property (land or buildings) for housing for homeless veterans.
GAO was asked to review VA's EUL program and other efforts to end veteran homelessness. This report examines: (1) how VA uses EULs to provide supportive-housing and services, (2) VA's plans to develop additional supportive-housing through EULs and how past plans have been implemented, and (3) how HUD-VASH, GPD, and SSVF have helped support the goal of ending veterans' homelessness. GAO analyzed agency documents, VA data on enhanced-use leases, and VA data on the HUD-VASH, GPD, and SSVF programs. GAO visited 13 active supportive-housing EUL sites, selected to provide a range of locations and housing types. GAO interviewed VA and HUD officials, lessee representatives, service providers, and veteran organizations.
What GAO Found
As of September 2016, for veterans who were homeless or at risk of homelessness, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) had developed 35 enhanced-use leases (EUL) for supportive-housing with low cost rental housing and coordinated access to medical, rehabilitative, mental healthcare, and other services. Each supportive-housing EUL is located on a VA medical center campus. Some lessee representatives told GAO that having access to federal property at little or no cost helped them to rehabilitate or build facilities to create supportive-housing. Furthermore, they noted that the close proximity to VA healthcare services allowed them to invest in other needed services for homeless veterans, such as counseling, job training, and quality-of-life amenities.
VA has plans to develop additional supportive-housing EULs, 6 of which are under construction and 16 in development. However, VA needs to improve its documentation and update its policies to develop additional EULs. VA officials did not provide clear and complete documentation for the selection of supportive-housing EUL projects, as required by VA policy, and Standards for Internal Controls in the Federal Government. Completely documenting this decision-making process for selecting properties could provide institutional knowledge to inform future decisions. Also, Standards for Internal Controls in the Federal Government states that management should periodically review policies and procedures for continued relevance and effectiveness of a federal program, and that management considers the impact of deficiencies identified in achieving documentation requirements. VA's existing policy on EUL projects is outdated. For example, it refers to an EUL authority that previously allowed the development of a full range of EUL projects. However, this authority is no longer in effect. VA is updating its EUL policy; however, the updated draft policy still does not discuss VA's limited authority to provide housing for homeless veterans. Further, the updated draft policy does not specifically provide direction on how to determine whether a proposed supportive-housing EUL meets the needs of homeless veterans. Without documented policies and procedures that address these needs, VA may not be well positioned to identify viable supportive-housing EUL projects and help ensure that those projects are successfully developed.
Three programs—Housing and Urban Development and VA Supportive-Housing (HUD-VASH), VA's Grant and Per Diem (GPD), and Supportive Services for Veteran Families (SSVF)—were used in conjunction with supportive-housing EULs to help support the goal of ending veteran homelessness. From fiscal years 2012 to 2016, the number of chronically homeless and vulnerable veterans housed through the HUD-VASH program increased from about 37,000 to 72,500. Community officials GAO interviewed stated that the HUD-VASH program has been instrumental in reducing chronic veteran homelessness. From fiscal years 2012 to 2016, veterans served by the transitional housing-focused GPD program remained relatively steady. Veterans and their family members participating in the SSVF program increased from about 33,000 in fiscal year 2012 to 149,000 in fiscal year 2016. According to the VA, rental assistance made up the majority of the temporary financial assistance provided by the SSVF program.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that VA (1) document its decision-making process in selecting projects as required by VA's policy and (2) update its policy to address the current authority and specify how to identify properties for supportive-housing EULs to meet the needs of homeless veterans. VA concurred with both recommendations but disagreed with some of GAO's findings. GAO believes its findings are valid based on the evidence presented. |
gao_GAO-06-218 | gao_GAO-06-218_0 | Knowledge point 2 occurs when a developer determines that a product’s design is stable—that is, it will meet customer requirements and cost and schedule targets. NASA’s Revised Policy Does Not Fully Support a Knowledge- Based Approach to Acquisitions
NASA’s revised acquisition policy for developing flight and ground support systems incorporates some of the elements of a knowledge-based acquisition approach. NASA’s policy defines a phased life cycle approach and requires a major decision review to move from project formulation to implementation. NASA’s policy emphasizes many elements needed at the NAR (or KP1) to match needs to resources, such as validating requirements, developing realistic cost and schedule estimates and human capital plans, and establishing a preliminary design. The policy does not, however, require projects to demonstrate technologies at high levels of maturity before launching a project. While NASA requires projects to develop plans that describe how technologies will be matured and to provide alternative development strategies for technologies that do not mature as expected, it does not establish a minimum threshold for technology maturity. NASA’s policy also does not require a major decision review before beginning manufacturing. Furthermore, lacking a major decision review to ensure that projects have gained the appropriate levels of knowledge at KP2 and KP3, NASA decision makers cannot be provided a high level of certainty that the project will meet cost, schedule, and performance requirements and have no assurance that the provisions of the key management documents required by NPR 7120.5C are being executed after the NAR. As a result, each center reports a different level and type of knowledge about a project at key decision points. These situations make it difficult for NASA decision makers to evaluate center projects on a common foundation of knowledge and make sound investment decisions and tradeoffs based on those evaluations. A standardized, knowledge- based approach would prepare NASA to face competing budgetary priorities and make difficult decisions regarding the investment in and termination of projects. Some centers have developed center-specific policies and criteria for implementing NASA’s project management policies and system engineering guidance, while others have not. Some NASA centers have also developed criteria in their policies that are similar to the criteria used to ensure a knowledge-based approach is followed; other centers lack such criteria. In addition to individual policy requirements, centers may rely on project managers and systems engineers to employ good project management and systems engineering practices. Reliance on project managers to implement good practices, however, could be problematic given the diminishing number of experienced project managers available to lead projects and the decline of in-house systems engineering and technical capabilities agencywide caused by increasing retirements and outsourcing. NASA estimates that it will cost approximately $104 billion over the next 13 years to accomplish these initial goals. The complex technical requirements associated with fulfilling the President’s Vision, the fiscal constraints under which NASA will be required to operate, the diminished number of experienced project managers and systems engineers, and the potential for increased production make following a knowledge-based approach for flight systems and ground support projects all the more critical. Since NASA is currently in the process of revising its program and project management policies and developing an agencywide systems engineering policy, we believe this presents a unique opportunity for the agency to correct some of the problems identified during our review. Key contributors to this report are acknowledged in appendix IV. Defense Acquisitions: Despite Restructuring, SBIRS High Program Remains at Risk of Cost and Schedule Overruns. Defense Acquisitions: DOD Faces Challenges in Implementing Best Practices. | Why GAO Did This Study
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) plans to spend over $100 billion on capabilities and technologies to achieve the initial goals of the President's 2004 Vision for Space Exploration. In the past, NASA has had difficulty meeting cost, schedule, and performance objectives for some of its projects because it failed to adequately define project requirements and quantify resources. NASA will be further challenged by a constrained federal budget and a shrinking experienced NASA workforce. To help face these challenges and manage projects with greater efficiency and accountability, NASA recently updated its program and project management policy and is developing an agencywide systems engineering policy. GAO has issued a series of reports on the importance of obtaining critical information and knowledge at key junctures in major system acquisitions to help meet cost and schedule objectives. This report (1) evaluates whether NASA's policy supports a knowledge-based acquisition approach and (2) describes how NASA centers are implementing the agency's acquisition policies and guidance.
What GAO Found
While NASA's revised policy for developing flight systems and ground support projects incorporates some of the best practices used by successful developers, it lacks certain key criteria and major decision reviews that support a knowledge-based acquisition framework. For example, NASA's policy requires projects to conduct a major decision review before moving from formulation to implementation. Further, before moving from formulation to implementation, projects must validate requirements and develop realistic cost and schedule estimates, human capital plans, a preliminary design, and a technology plan--key elements for matching needs to resources. However, NASA's policies do not require projects to demonstrate technologies at high levels of maturity before program start. By not establishing a minimum threshold for technology maturity, NASA increases the risk that design changes will be required later in development, when such changes are typically more costly to make. In addition, although NASA's policy does require project managers to establish a continuum of technical and management reviews, it does not specify what these reviews should be, nor does it require major decision reviews at other key points in a product's development. Acquiring knowledge at key junctures will become increasingly important as NASA proceeds to implement elements of the Vision. Without a major decision review at key milestones to ensure that the appropriate level of knowledge has been achieved to proceed to the next phase, the risk of cost and schedule overruns, as well as performance shortfalls, increases. NASA centers have varying approaches for implementing the agency's policies and guidance. Some centers have established product development criteria that are similar to the criteria used in a knowledge-based acquisition, while other centers have not. As a result, each center reports a different level and type of knowledge about a project at key decision points. Centers also rely on project managers and systems engineers to employ good project management and systems engineering practices. However, given the loss of experienced project managers and the decline of in-house systems engineering and technical capabilities, that reliance could be problematic. These situations make it difficult for decision makers to evaluate projects on the same basis and make sound investment decisions and tradeoffs based on those evaluations. A standardized, knowledge-based approach would prepare NASA to face competing budgetary priorities and better position the agency to make difficult decisions regarding the investment in and termination of projects. |
gao_GAO-13-476T | gao_GAO-13-476T_0 | Background
Ten states concentrated in the western, midwestern, and southeastern United States—all areas where the housing market had experienced strong growth in the prior decade—experienced 10 or more bank failures between 2008 and 2011 (see fig.1). Within these 10 states, 86 percent (257) of the failed banks were small institutions with assets of less than $1 billion at the time of failure, and 52 percent (155), had assets of less than $250 million. The rising level of nonperforming loans, particularly ADC loans, appears to have been the key factor in the failures of small and medium banks in the 10 states between 2008 and 2011. Our analysis showed that small failed banks in the 10 states had often pursued aggressive growth strategies using nontraditional and riskier funding sources such as brokered deposits. The IG reviews noted that in the majority of failures, management exercised poor oversight of the risks associated with high CRE and ADC concentrations and engaged in weak underwriting and credit administration practices. Credit Losses and Charge- offs from Nonperforming Loans Contributed Significantly to Bank Failures Nationwide, but Losses Due to Fair Value Accounting Did Not
We found that losses related to bank assets and liabilities that were subject to fair value accounting contributed little to bank failures overall, largely because most banks’ assets and liabilities were not recorded at fair value. We analyzed the assets and liabilities on the balance sheets of failed banks nationwide that were subject to fair value accounting between 2007 and 2011. However, state banking associations said that the magnitude of the losses was exacerbated by federal bank examiners’ classification of collateral-dependent loans and evaluation of appraisals used by banks to support impairment analysis of these loans. Federal banking regulators noted that regulatory guidance in 2009 directed examiners not to require banks to write down loans to an amount less than the loan balance solely because the value of the underlying collateral had declined and that examiners were generally not expected to challenge the appraisals obtained by banks unless they found that any underlying facts or assumptions about the appraisal were inappropriate or could support alternative assumptions. GAO, Banking Regulation: Enhanced Guidance on Commercial Real Estate Risks Needed, GAO-11-489 (Washington, D.C.: May 19, 2011). FDIC Used Shared Loss Agreements to Attract Bidders at Least Cost to the Deposit Insurance Fund
FDIC is required to resolve a bank failure in a manner that results in the least cost to the Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF). During the most recent financial crisis, FDIC facilitated these sales by including a loss share agreement, under which FDIC absorbed a portion of the loss on specified assets purchased by the acquiring bank. From January 2008 through December 31, 2011, FDIC was appointed as receiver for the 414 failed banks, with $662 billion in book value of failed bank assets. From 2008 to the end of 2011, FDIC resolved 281 of the 414 failures (68 percent) by providing a shared loss agreement as part of the purchase and assumption. In addition, future payments under DIF receiverships are estimated at an additional $26.6 billion over the duration of the shared loss agreements, resulting in total estimated lifetime losses of $42.8 billion (see fig. 2). Impact of Bank Failures on Local Communities Was Mixed
The acquisitions of failed banks by healthy banks appear to have mitigated the potentially negative effects of bank failures on communities, although the focus of local lending and philanthropy may have shifted. However, the effects could be significant for those limited areas that were serviced by one bank or where few banks remain. Second, our econometric analysis of call report data from 2006 through 2011 found that failing small banks extended progressively less net credit as they approached failure, but that acquiring banks generally increased net credit after the acquisition, albeit more slowly. For example, several noted that in the wake of the bank failures, underwriting standards had tightened, making it harder for some borrowers who might have been able to obtain loans prior to the bank failures to obtain them afterward. Acquiring bank officials we interviewed told us that they had generally increased philanthropic activities compared with the failed community banks during the economic downturn and in the months before failure. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
Between January 2008 and December 2011--a period of economic downturn in the United States--414 insured U.S. banks failed. Of these, 85 percent (353) had less than $1 billion in assets. These small banks often specialize in small business lending and are associated with local community development and philanthropy. These small bank failures have raised questions about the contributing factors, including the possible role of local market conditions and the application of fair value accounting under U.S. accounting standards.
This statement is based on findings from the 2013 report on recent bank failures (GAO-13-71). This testimony discusses (1) the factors that contributed to the bank failures in states with the most failed institutions between 2008 and 2011 and what role, if any, fair value accounting played in these failures; (2) the use of shared loss agreements in resolving troubled banks; and (3) the effect of recent bank failures on local communities. To do this work, GAO relied on issued report GAO-13-71 and updated data where appropriate.
GAO did not make recommendations in the report.
What GAO Found
Ten states concentrated in the western, midwestern, and southeastern United States--all areas where the housing market had experienced strong growth in the prior decade--experienced 10 or more commercial bank or thrift (bank) failures between 2008 and 2011. The failures of the smaller banks (those with less than $1 billion in assets) in these states were largely driven by credit losses on commercial real estate (CRE) loans. The failed banks also had often pursued aggressive growth strategies using nontraditional, riskier funding sources and exhibited weak underwriting and credit administration practices. Fair value accounting also has been cited as a potential contributor to bank failures, but between 2007 and 2011 fair value accounting losses in general did not appear to be a major contributor, as over two-thirds of small failed banks' assets were not subject to fair value accounting. During the course of our work, some state banking associations said that the magnitude of the credit losses were exacerbated by federal bank examiners' classification of collateral-dependent loans and evaluation of appraisals used by banks to support impairment analysis of these loans. Federal banking regulators noted that regulatory guidance on CRE workouts issued in October 2009 directed examiners not to require banks to write down loans to an amount less than the loan balance solely because the value of the underlying collateral had declined, and that examiners were generally not expected to challenge the appraisals obtained by banks unless they found that underlying facts or assumptions about the appraisals were inappropriate or could support alternative assumptions.
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) used shared loss agreements to help resolve failed banks at the least cost during the recent financial crisis. Under a shared loss agreement, FDIC absorbs a portion of the loss on specified assets of a failed bank that are purchased by an acquiring bank. FDIC officials, state bank regulators, community banking associations, and acquiring banks of failed institutions GAO interviewed said that shared loss agreements helped to attract potential bidders for failed banks during the financial crisis. During 2008- 2011, FDIC resolved 281 of 414 failures using shared loss agreements on assets purchased by the acquiring bank. As of December 31, 2011, Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF) receiverships are estimated to pay $42.8 billion over the duration of the shared loss agreements.
The acquisitions of failed banks by healthy banks appear to have mitigated the potentially negative effects of bank failures on communities, although the focus of local lending and philanthropy may have shifted. For example, GAO's analysis found limited rural and metropolitan areas where failures resulted in significant increases in market concentration. GAO's econometric analysis of call report data from 2006 through 2011 found that failing small banks extended progressively less net credit as they approached failure, and that acquiring banks generally increased net credit after the acquisition. However, acquiring bank and existing peer bank officials GAO interviewed noted that in the wake of the bank failures, underwriting standards had tightened and thus credit was generally more available for small business owners who had good credit histories and strong financials than those that did not. Moreover, the effects of bank failures could be significant for those limited areas that were serviced by one bank or where few banks remain. |
gao_GAO-06-898T | gao_GAO-06-898T_0 | Consequently, the Staggers Rail Act recognized the need for railroads to use demand-based differential pricing in the deregulated environment. Such a shipper is referred to as a “captive shipper.”
Railroad Industry Increasingly Healthy and Rates Down Since Enactment of the Staggers Rail Act, but Competition and Captivity Concerns Remain
The changes that have occurred in the railroad industry since the enactment of the Staggers Rail Act are widely viewed as positive. The railroad industry’s financial health improved substantially as it cut costs, boosted productivity, and “right-sized” its networks. Rates generally declined between 1985 and 2000 but increased slightly from 2001 through 2004. While it is difficult to precisely determine the number of shippers who are “captive” to one railroad, our preliminary analysis indicates that while the extent of potential captivity may be dropping, the share of potentially captive shippers who are paying the highest rates— those substantially above the threshold for rate relief—has increased. Competition and Captivity Concerns Remain
Concerns about competition and captivity in the railroad industry remain because traffic is concentrated in fewer railroads and even though rates have declined for most shippers since the enactment of the Staggers Rail Act, some shippers are paying significantly higher rates than other shippers—a reflection of differential pricing. Proposed Alternative Approaches To Address Remaining Competition and Captivity Concerns Should Be Carefully Considered
A number of alternative approaches have been suggested by shipper groups, economists, and other experts in the rail industry to address remaining concerns about competition and captivity—however, any alternative approaches should be carefully considered. Two areas—an assessment of competition and addressing problems with the rate relief process—are particularly integral to further improvement. Any alternative approaches to address competition and captivity should be carefully considered to ensure that the approach achieves the important balance set out in the Staggers Act of allowing the railroads to earn adequate revenues and invest in its infrastructure while assuring protection for captive shippers from unreasonable rates. Although the STB has broad legislative authority to investigate industry practices, it has generally limited its reviews of competition to merger cases. Given the disagreement about the adequacy of competition in the industry and the fact that proxy measures can understate or overstate captivity, an assessment of competition and how changes in industry concentration might be resulting in the inappropriate exercise of market power would allow decisionmakers to identify areas where competition is lacking and to assess the need for and merits of targeted approaches to address it. The targeted approaches most frequently proposed by shipper groups and others include reciprocal switching arrangements, which allow one railroad to switch railcars of another railroad, and terminal access agreements, which permits one railroad to use another’s terminals. The Staggers Rail Act recognized that some shippers may not have access to competitive alternatives and may therefore be subject to unreasonably high rates. First, Congress required STB to develop simplified guidelines. Second, STB worked to improve the standard rate relief process. During our preliminary work we identified a number of different approaches that have been suggested by shipper organizations and others that could make the rate relief process less expensive and more expeditious, and therefore potentially more accessible. Each of the proposed approaches has both advantages and drawbacks. For example, shifting truck freight traffic to railroads can reduce highway congestion and reduce or avoid public expenditures that otherwise would be needed to build additional highway capacity or provide additional maintenance to accommodate growth in truck traffic. In pursuit of these public gains, the federal and state governments have been increasingly participating in freight rail improvement projects. In addition, in 2005, Congress provided $100 million to the Chicago CREATE project to improve the rail infrastructure and ease congestion in and around Chicago— the busiest freight rail center in the U.S. In the years ahead Congress is likely to face additional decisions regarding potential federal policy responses and the federal role in the nation’s freight railroad infrastructure. Third, federal involvement should only occur where demonstrable wide-ranging public benefits and a mechanism to appropriately allocate the cost of financing these benefits between the public and private sectors exists and, to the extent possible, focuses on benefits that are more national than local in scope. Shipper Rail Rates: Interstate Commerce Commission’s Handling of Complaints. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Staggers Rail Act of 1980 largely deregulated the freight railroad industry, giving the railroads freedom to price their services according to market conditions and encouraging greater reliance on competition to set rates. The act recognized the need for railroads to use demand-based differential pricing in the deregulated environment and to recover costs by setting higher rates for shippers with fewer transportation alternatives. The act also recognized that some shippers might not have access to competitive alternatives and might be subject to unreasonably high rates. It established a threshold for rate relief and granted the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Surface Transportation Board (STB) the authority to develop a rate relief process for those "captive" shippers. This testimony provides preliminary results on GAO's ongoing work and addresses (1) the changes that have occurred in the freight railroad industry since the enactment of the Staggers Rail Act, including changes in rail rates and competition in the industry, (2) the alternative approaches that have been proposed and could be considered to address remaining competition and captivity concerns, and (3) the projections for freight traffic demand over the next 15 to 25 years, the freight railroad industry's projected ability to meet that demand, and potential federal policy responses. To fulfill these objectives, GAO examined STB data, interviewed affected parties, and held an expert panel.
What GAO Found
The changes that have occurred in the railroad industry since the enactment of the Staggers Rail Act are widely viewed as positive. Railroad industry financial health improved substantially and rates generally declined between 1985 and 2000, but increased slightly from 2001 through 2004. Concerns about competition and captivity remain because traffic is concentrated in fewer railroads and some shippers are paying significantly higher rates than others. It is difficult to precisely determine the number of shippers that are "captive" because proxy measures can overstate or understate captivity. However, GAO's preliminary analysis indicates that while captivity may be dropping, the share of potentially captive shippers that are paying the highest rates--those substantially above the threshold for rate relief--has increased. A number of alternative approaches have been suggested by shipper groups and others to address remaining concerns about competition and captivity; however, any alternative approaches should be carefully considered. Two areas are particularly integral to further improvement. First, while STB has broad authority to investigate industry practices and has assessed competition--generally in railroad merger cases--there has been little assessment by any federal agency of the state of competition and of where specific areas of inadequate competition and the inappropriate exercise of market power might exist. Such an assessment would allow decisionmakers to identify areas where competition is lacking and to assess the need for and merits of targeted approaches to address this situation. These approaches include requiring reciprocal switching arrangements, which allow one railroad to switch railcars of another railroad, and/or terminal access agreements, which permit one railroad to use another's terminals. Second, a number of different approaches have been suggested that could make the rate relief process less expensive and more expeditious, and thus potentially more accessible, such as arbitration and increased use of simplified guidelines. Each of the proposed approaches has both advantages and drawbacks. Any alternative approach to address competition and captivity should be carefully considered to ensure that the approach will achieve the important balance set out in the Staggers Rail Act of allowing the railroads to earn adequate revenues while assuring protection for captive shippers from unreasonable rates. Significant increases in freight traffic over the next 15 to 25 years are forecasted, and the railroad industry's ability to meet future demand is largely uncertain. Investments in rail projects can produce benefits for the public--for example, shifting truck freight traffic to railroads can reduce highway congestion. As a result, the federal and state governments have been increasingly participating in freight rail improvement projects--for example, Congress provided $100 million to the CREATE project in 2005 to improve the rail network in Chicago. Congress is likely to face additional decisions in the years ahead regarding federal policy toward the nation's freight railroad system. GAO would note, based on past work, that federal involvement should occur only where demonstrable public benefits exist, and where a mechanism is in place to appropriately allocate the cost of financing these benefits between the private and public sectors, and between national, state, and local interests. |
gao_NSIAD-98-214 | gao_NSIAD-98-214_0 | DOD announced this new competition in the Commerce Business Daily in June 1997. However, DOD provided adequate notice of its interest in identifying improved chemical protective materials through three different mechanisms. DOD tested 57 material combinations, submitted by 13 companies, in the JSLIST program. However, reliance on informal communications—common in a research and development environment—resulted in some companies getting different information about deadlines for material submissions. Outside of the research and development programs, a company submitted an unsolicited proposal to the Marine Corps for an improved chemical defense material. The company had developed this improved material after its initial submission to the MCLIST program. However, the subsequent annual report to Congress, issued in February 1998, did not address the issue of qualifying additional sources of supply. The addendum cited DOD’s ongoing pre-planned product improvement program as a potential mechanism for identifying additional sources of supply for the requirements that were not achieved in the JSLIST program. Conclusions
Because the MCLIST program and the Army’s exploratory development efforts—which ultimately became the JSLIST program—were research and development activities, they were not subject to the same procedural requirements that apply to acquisition programs. In this context, we believe that the MCLIST and JSLIST programs were conducted fairly. DOD provided industry adequate notice of the government’s interest in improved chemical defense garment materials and sufficient opportunity to participate in the programs. The basic requirement for a lightweight, less bulky overgarment that could be reused after laundering did not change in the transition from MCLIST to JSLIST, although each service added certain unique requirements. Although the informal nature of communications that characterizes the research and development environment may have contributed to a missed opportunity for DOD to evaluate the complainant’s improved chemical defense garment material, the Marine Corps’ rejection of the unsolicited proposal was consistent with the Federal Acquisition Regulation governing such proposals. Scope and Methodology
To determine whether DOD provided sufficient notice to industry of its interest in new chemical defense materials and industry had sufficient opportunity to participate in the MCLIST demonstration, the Army’s exploratory development effort, and the JSLIST program, we obtained and analyzed Broad Agency Announcements and information about DOD’s formal and informal communications with industry regarding the programs. To report on DOD’s response to the congressional reporting requirement in the Fiscal Year 1998 National Defense Authorization Act conference report, we interviewed officials at the Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs and the Marine Corps Systems Command. We did not attempt to assess the accuracy of the JSLIST test results or determine whether the outcome of the JSLIST program would have differed if additional chemical defense materials had been evaluated. Marine Corps fielded Saratoga suits. Deadline for submissions to Army demonstration program. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO examined the Department of Defense's (DOD) research and development programs for improved chemical defense garment materials for U.S. armed forces, focusing on whether DOD: (1) provided sufficient notice to industry of the government's interest in identifying improved chemical defense materials; (2) provided industry sufficient opportunity to participate in the programs; (3) changed requirements in the transition of the Marine Corps Lightweight Integrated Suit Technology (MCLIST) program to the Joint Service Lightweight Integrated Suit Technology (JSLIST) program; and (4) responded to a congressional reporting requirement concerning sources of supply for the military's chemical defense materials.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) because the MCLIST program and the Army's exploratory development efforts--which ultimately became the JSLIST program--were research and development activities, they were not subject to the same procedural requirements that apply to acquisition programs; (2) in this research and development context, DOD provided sufficient notice to industry of its interest in improved chemical defense materials through market research, direct industry contacts, ongoing exploratory development projects, and Broad Agency Announcement notices published in the Commerce Business Daily; (3) DOD provided industry an adequate opportunity to participate in the research and development programs; (4) on the basis of the notice DOD provided to industry, a total of 57 material combinations, submitted by 13 companies, were evaluated in JSLIST after initial testing in MCLIST and the Army demonstration; (5) however, reliance on informal communications resulted in companies receiving different information about submission deadlines to MCLIST and the Army programs; (6) due in part to the lack of formal communications regarding deadlines of material submissions, the complainant company did not get an improved material into JSLIST for evaluation; (7) the complainant company, which already had one material in the MCLIST demonstration, submitted an unsolicited proposal to the Marine Corps for an improved chemical defense material after entry into MCLIST was closed; (8) the Marine Corps rejected the proposal in accordance with the Federal Acquisition Regulation because the material duplicated an existing Marine Corps effort; (9) GAO could not determine whether the outcome of JSLIST would have differed if this material had been assessed; (10) the basic requirements for a lightweight, launderable, chemical protective garment did not change in the transition from MCLIST to JSLIST; (11) however, the individual military services added certain mission-specific requirements under JSLIST; (12) DOD overlooked the congressional reporting requirement in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 conference report; and (13) a May 1998 addendum to DOD's February 1998 Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense Annual report to Congress stated that the preplanned product improvement program might identify additional sources of supply to meet those requirements that were not achieved in the JSLIST program. |
gao_GAO-08-797 | gao_GAO-08-797_0 | Visitor services. Refuge Funding and Staffing Levels Fluctuated, New Policies Were Introduced, and the Influence of Various External Factors Affecting Refuges Increased from Fiscal Years 2002 through 2007
From fiscal years 2002 through 2007, the refuge system experienced fluctuations in funding and staffing levels, the introduction of several new refuge system policy initiatives, and increases in the influence of external factors such as extreme weather and development that affect refuge operations. Inflation-adjusted funding for core refuge system activities— measured as obligations for refuge operations, maintenance, and fire management—increased by 6.8 percent from fiscal year 2002 to fiscal year 2003 for the celebration of the refuge system’s centennial, then declined quickly to 4.7 percent below peak levels by fiscal year 2005, before increasing again to 2.3 percent below peak levels in fiscal year 2007, when adjusted for inflation (in 2002 dollars); it ended the period 4.3 percent above fiscal year 2002 levels. Core refuge system staffing levels peaked in fiscal year 2004 after increasing 10.0 percent, and then declined more slowly than funding to 4.0 percent below this level by the end of fiscal year 2007; they ended the period 5.5 percent above fiscal year 2002 levels. During the same period, several refuge system policy initiatives were implemented to reduce staff levels and reprioritize funding among refuges, ensure the completion of required conservation plans, shift focus toward constructing a greater number of smaller visitor facilities, and increase the number of full-time law enforcement officers and associated training; other initiatives increased the administrative workload on refuges. By fiscal year 2007, inflation-adjusted core obligations rebounded somewhat to about $382 million—still 2.3 percent below peak levels, but 4.3 percent above fiscal year 2002 levels. 5). In addition, various refuge system, FWS, and Interior policies increased administrative work for nonadministrative refuge staff during this period. While some refuges have been able to increase the time spent on visitor services, refuge managers are concerned about their ability to provide high-quality visitor services to the public given recent funding and staffing changes. However, managers are concerned that staffing and funding constraints will inhibit the refuges’ ability to maintain quality habitat in the future. 19). 20). As might be expected given reported improvements in habitat quality during our study period, refuge managers reported increasing the time spent on basic habitat management activities such as haying, mowing, prescribed burning, or manipulating water levels on 43 percent of refuges and increasing time spent on habitat restoration activities, such as planting native grasses or trees, and creating water control structures, such as levees, at about 48 percent of refuges since fiscal year 2002. Even though our survey showed that a large number of refuges increased staff time on habitat management activities, some refuge managers we interviewed explained that staff were simply working longer hours to get the work done. Several refuge managers repeatedly indicated that they are still trying to do everything possible to maintain adequate habitat, especially habitats for key species, such as waterfowl, other migratory birds, and threatened and endangered species, despite growing habitat problems and other factors affecting refuge habitats and an increasing administrative workload that reduces the amount of time refuge staff can spend performing habitat management work. The Quality of Visitor Service Programs Improved More Often Than Worsened between Fiscal Years 2002 and 2007, but Some Programs Were Poor Quality in 2007 and Refuge Managers Are Concerned about the Quality of Visitor Services in the Future
The quality of visitor services improved on one-fifth to nearly one-half of refuges between fiscal years 2002 and 2007, but environmental education and interpretation programs worsened at some refuges and were of poor quality at about one-third of refuges in 2007. Agency Comments and Our Response
GAO provided Interior with a draft of this report for its review and comment. The department provided technical comments that we have incorporated as appropriate. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
The objectives of this study were to (1) describe changing factors that the National Wildlife Refuge System experienced from fiscal years 2002 through 2007, including funding and staffing changes, and (2) examine how habitat management and visitor services changed during this period. Fish and Wildlife Service’s (FWS) Refuge Annual Performance Planning System. 1. | Why GAO Did This Study
The National Wildlife Refuge System, which is administered by the Fish and Wildlife Service in the Department of the Interior, comprises 585 refuges on more than 96 million acres of land and water that preserve habitat for waterfowl and other migratory birds, threatened and endangered species, and other wildlife. Refuges also provide wildlife-related activities such as hunting and fishing to nearly 40 million visitors every year. GAO was asked to (1) describe changing factors that the refuge system experienced from fiscal years 2002 through 2007, including funding and staffing changes, and (2) examine how habitat management and visitor services changed during this period. We surveyed all refuges; visited 19 refuges in 4 regions; and interviewed refuge, regional, and national officials. In commenting on a draft of this report, the Department of the Interior made technical comments that we have incorporated as appropriate. GAO is not making recommendations in this report.
What GAO Found
Between fiscal years 2002 and 2007, the refuge system experienced funding and staffing level fluctuations, the introduction of several new policy initiatives, and the increased influence of external factors such as extreme weather that threaten wildlife habitat and visitor infrastructure. Although core funding--measured as obligations for refuge operations, maintenance, and fire management--increased each year, inflation-adjusted core funding peaked in fiscal year 2003 at about $391 million--6.8 percent above fiscal year 2002 funding. Inflation-adjusted core funding ended the period 2.3 percent below peak levels, but 4.3 percent above fiscal year 2002 levels by fiscal year 2007. Core refuge staffing levels peaked in fiscal year 2004 at 3,610 full-time equivalents--10.0 percent above the fiscal year 2002 level--and then declined more slowly than funding levels. By fiscal year 2007, staffing levels fell to 4.0 percent below peak levels, but 5.5 percent above fiscal year 2002 levels. Through fiscal year 2007, the number of permanent employees utilized by the refuge system declined to 7.5 percent below peak levels. During this period, refuge system officials initiated new policies that: (1) reduced staff positions and reallocated funds and staff among refuges to better align staff levels with funding; (2) required refuge staff to focus on a legislative mandate to complete refuge conservation plans by 2012; (3) shifted to constructing a larger number of smaller visitor structures, such as informational kiosks, and fewer large visitor centers to spread visitor service funds across more refuges; (4) increased the number of full-time law enforcement officers and their associated training and experience requirements; and (5) resulted in additional administrative work. During this period, external factors that complicate refuge staffs' ability to protect and restore habitat quality also increased, including severe storms and development around refuges. Our survey showed that the quality of habitat management and visitor service programs varied across refuges during our study period. Habitat conditions for key types of species improved about two times more often than they worsened, but between 7 percent and 20 percent of habitats were of poor quality in 2007. Certain habitat problems increased at more than half of refuges during this period, and managers reported that they increased the time spent on certain habitat management activities, such as addressing invasive plants, despite declining staffing levels. However, several managers we interviewed told us that staff were working longer hours without extra pay to get work done, and managers expressed concern about their ability to sustain habitat conditions. While the quality of four key visitor service programs was reported to be stable or improving between fiscal years 2002 and 2007 at the vast majority of refuges, the other two key programs--environmental education and interpretation--were considered poor quality at one-third of refuges in 2007. Changes in the time spent on visitor services varied considerably across refuges, and managers noted that visitor services generally are cut before habitat management activities when resources are limited. Managers are concerned about their ability to provide high-quality visitor services in the future given staffing and funding constraints. |
gao_GAO-12-447 | gao_GAO-12-447_0 | In particular, the F-22A was originally designed to fly primarily air-to-air missions; however, since that time the Air Force has decided to add air-to-ground capabilities to the F-22A. In 2003, the Air Force established a modernization program to develop and insert new and enhanced capabilities considered necessary to meet the threat. F-22A Modernization Costs Have Increased and Deliveries of New Capabilities to the Warfighter Have Been Delayed
Total projected cost of the F-22A modernization program has more than doubled since it started. The content, scope, and phasing of planned capabilities also shifted over time with changes in requirements, priorities, and annual funding decisions. Visibility and oversight of the program’s cost and schedule is hampered by a management structure that does not directly track and account for the full cost of specific capability increments. The Air Force plans to separately break out and manage the fourth increment as a major defense acquisition program, which should improve management and oversight. F-22A Modernization Costs Have Risen Sharply Since the Program Began
The Air Force is now expected to spend around $11.7 billion to modernize and improve the reliability of the F-22A, compared with the $5.4 billion projected soon after the start of development. Figure 1 shows increased cost estimates over time for the modernization program and other related costs. The content, scope, and phasing plan changed over time, contributing to cost and schedule problems. Visibility and Oversight of the Program’s Cost and Schedule Is Hampered by a Management Structure and Funding Mechanism
Tracking and accounting for the full and accurate cost of each modernization increment, and individual projects within each increment, are limited by the way the modernization program is structured, funded, and executed. Performance Outcomes Have Been Judged Satisfactory, but Testing and Improving Reliability and Affordability of the Fleet Will be Challenging
Testing how well new capabilities perform is ongoing; results to date have been satisfactory but development and operational testing of the largest and most challenging sets of capabilities have not yet begun. Going forward, major challenges will be developing, integrating, and testing new hardware and software to counter emerging future threats. Other risks are associated with availability of unique test assets, greater reliance on laboratory ground tests, and relocation of a key F-22A lab that is needed to help support testing of software for the new capabilities. Parallel efforts to improve F-22A reliability and maintainability are critical to ensure life- cycle sustainment of the fleet is affordable and to justify future modernization investments. Projected operational and support costs are much higher than earlier estimates. Recommendation for Executive Action
As new and enhanced capabilities are proposed and vetted beyond Increment 3.2B in the F-22A modernization program, we recommend that the Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics evaluate those capabilities in accordance with DOD policy and statutory criteria to determine if they should be established as separate major defense acquisition programs, each with its own milestones, business case, and cost baseline that includes all applicable direct and indirect support costs required to complete the program. DOD concurred with the revised recommendation. To determine what progress has been made in completing developmental and operational testing, and resolving system deficiencies, we reviewed DOT&E annual test report summaries and briefings to DOD oversight and requirements officials. We reviewed summaries of recent operational test results provided by Air Force test officials and program risk information related to developmental and operational testing for F-22A modernization. GAO-11-325. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Air Force currently plans to spend $11.7 billion to modernize and improve reliability of the F-22A, its fifth generation air superiority fighter. GAO was asked to evaluate (1) cost and schedule outcomes and (2) testing results and risks going forward in the F-22A modernization program and related efforts. To do this, GAO examined the programs budgets and schedule estimates over time and discussed any changes with program officials, and reviewed progress and results from developmental and operational testing, and plans to mitigate risks and resolve system deficiencies. fighter. Originally designed to counter air threats posed by the former Soviet Union, the post-Cold War era spurred efforts to add new missions and capabilities to the F-22A, including improved air-to-air and robust air-to-ground attack capabilities. In 2003, the Air Force established the F-22A modernization program to develop and insert new capabilities in four increments.
GAO was asked to evaluate (1) cost and schedule outcomes and (2) testing results and risks going forward in the F-22A modernization program and related efforts. To do this, GAO examined the programs budgets and schedule estimates over time and discussed any changes with program officials, and reviewed progress and results from developmental and operational testing, and plans to mitigate risks and resolve system deficiencies.
What GAO Found
Total projected cost of the F-22A modernization program and related reliability and maintainability improvements more than doubled since the program startedfrom $5.4 billion to $11.7 billionand the schedule for delivering full capabilities slipped 7 years, from 2010 to 2017. The content, scope, and phasing of planned capabilities also shifted over time with changes in requirements, priorities, and annual funding decisions. Visibility and oversight of the programs cost and schedule is hampered by a management structure that does not track and account for the full cost of specific capability increments. Substantial infrastructure costs for labs, testing, management, and other activities directly support modernization but are not charged to its projects. The Air Force plans to manage its fourth modernization increment as a separate major acquisition program, as defined in DOD policy and statutory requirements.
Testing of new capabilities to ensure operational effectiveness and suitability is ongoing. Results to date have been satisfactory but development and operational testing of the largest and most challenging sets of capabilities have not yet begun. Going forward, major challenges will be developing, integrating, and testing new hardware and software to counter emerging future threats. Other risks are associated with greater reliance on laboratory ground tests and relocating an F-22A lab needed to conduct software testing. While modernization is under way, the Air Force has undertaken parallel efforts to improve F-22A reliability and maintainability to ensure life-cycle sustainment of the fleet is affordable and to justify future modernization investments. But the fleet has not been able to meet a key reliability requirement, now changed, and operating and support costs are much greater than earlier estimated.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD evaluate capabilities to determine if future F-22A modernization efforts meeting DOD policy and statutory requirements should be established as separate major acquisition programs.
DOD concurred with our recommendation. |
gao_GAO-09-151 | gao_GAO-09-151_0 | This geographic displacement of emissions is a concept known as leakage. EU Emissions Trading Scheme Established a Carbon Market and Provides Lessons That Could Inform U.S. Decision Making on Climate Change Policy
According to available information and experts, the primary effect of the first ETS phase was to establish a functioning carbon market for emissions allowances, but its effects on emissions, the European economy, and technology investment are less certain. Nonetheless, experts suggest that phase I offers important lessons about program design and implementation that may prove useful in informing congressional decision making. By limiting the total number of allowances under the program and enabling covered entities to sell or buy allowances to cover their emissions, the ETS used market forces to set a price on carbon emissions that fluctuated based on changes in supply and demand. The Effect of ETS Phase I on Emissions Is Uncertain Because of Data Limitations
Although the first ETS phase was overallocated—the overall emissions cap exceeded actual emissions by more than 3 percent in phase I—the ETS’s cumulative effect on emissions across the EU member states is uncertain largely because of data limitations. The researchers stated that some covered entities likely reduced emissions by, for example, switching to cleaner fuels to generate power or improving energy efficiency, in response to the allowance price in the early stages of phase I. Impacts of concern under the ETS have included leakage—the shifting of covered entities’ economic activities to countries that have not adopted binding emission limits—and the competitiveness of covered entities, compliance costs, and price changes for consumer goods and services, such as electricity. Specifically, the duration of phase I was not compatible with investment decision timelines. Baseline Data
First, available information indicated that accurate baseline data are essential to setting an effective emissions cap and achieving the intended environmental objectives. Experts identified design features that would provide incentives to reduce emissions even if the cap initially exceeds emissions. Allocation method. The experts commenting on timelines stated that a trading program should cover a long enough time period to influence technology investment decisions. The CDM’s Environmental and Economic Effects Provide Important Lessons That Can Inform Congressional Deliberations on Climate Change Policy
According to available information and experts, the CDM has enabled industrialized countries to make progress toward achieving their emissions targets at less cost and has involved developing countries in these efforts; however, the program’s effect on emissions is uncertain, and its impact on sustainable development has been limited. Nonetheless, the international experience with the CDM has provided key lessons that may help inform congressional decision making. The CDM Has Enabled Covered Entities to Pursue Lower-Cost Reductions and Involved Developing Countries in the Global Carbon Market
Beginning operation in 2002, the CDM can allow countries to make progress toward their emissions targets under the Kyoto Protocol at less cost through the use of carbon offset credits. Despite Rigorous Review Process, the Net Effect of the CDM on Emissions Is Unclear
The overall effect of the CDM on international emissions is uncertain, largely because it is nearly impossible to determine the level of emissions that would have occurred in the absence of each project. The Scale and Cost- Effectiveness of the CDM Is Limited by the Current Project-by-Project Approval Process, but Proposed Reforms Could Improve Its Effectiveness
The CDM’s project-by-project approval process may not be a cost-effective model for achieving emission reductions. Specific lessons from the ETS that the Congress may wish to consider include: (1) the importance of ensuring the availability and reliability of historic emissions data, with an accuracy compatible with the program’s point of regulation, from entities that will be affected by the regulatory scheme prior to its establishment; (2) the importance of long-term certainty in encouraging investments in low-carbon technologies; and (3) the importance of understanding how the means of distributing allowances to emit greenhouse gases—such as free allocation versus auctioning—may create and redistribute substantial wealth. Specific lessons from the CDM that the Congress may wish to consider include: (1) that it may be possible to achieve the CDM’s sustainable development goals and emissions cuts in developing countries more directly and cost-effectively through a means other than the existing mechanism; (2) that the use of carbon offsets in a cap-and-trade system can undermine the system’s integrity, given that it is not possible to ensure that every credit represents a real, measurable, and long-term reduction in emissions; and (3) that while proposed reforms may significantly improve the CDM’s effectiveness, carbon offsets involve fundamental tradeoffs and may not be a reliable long-term approach to climate change mitigation. | Why GAO Did This Study
International policies to address climate change have largely relied on market-based programs; for example, under the European Union's Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) phase I (2005 to 2007) carbon dioxide emissions reductions were sought by setting a cap on each member state's allowable emissions and distributing tradable allowances to covered entities, such as power plants. Beginning operation in 2002, the Kyoto Protocol's Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) has relied on offsets, allowing certain industrialized nations to pay for emission reduction projects in developing countries--where the cost of abatement may be less expensive--in addition to reducing emissions within their borders. Legislative proposals to limit greenhouse gas emissions are under consideration in the United States. In this context, GAO was asked to examine the effects of and lessons learned from (1) the ETS phase I and (2) the CDM. GAO worked with the National Academy of Sciences to identify experts in market-based programs and gathered their opinions through a questionnaire, interviewed stakeholders, and reviewed available information.
What GAO Found
According to available information and experts, the ETS phase I established a functioning market for carbon dioxide allowances, but its effects on emissions, the European economy, and technology investment are less certain. Nonetheless, experts suggest that it offers lessons that may prove useful in informing congressional decision making. By limiting the total number of emission allowances provided to covered entities under the program and enabling these entities to sell or buy allowances, the ETS set a price on carbon emissions. However, in 2006, a release of emissions data revealed that the supply of allowances--the cap--exceeded the demand, and the allowance price collapsed. Overall, the cumulative effect of phase I on emissions is uncertain because of a lack of baseline emissions data. The long-term effects on the economy also are uncertain. One concern about design and implementation was that the economic activities associated with emissions from covered entities would shift from the European Union to countries that do not have binding emission limits--a concept known as leakage. However, leakage does not appear to have occurred, in part because covered entities did not purchase allowances but received them for free. The effect of the ETS on technology investment also is uncertain but was likely minimal, in part because phase I was not long enough to affect such investments. Phase I of the ETS offers three key lessons: (1) accurate emissions data are essential to setting an effective emissions cap; (2) a trading program should provide enough certainty to influence technology investment; and (3) the method for allocating allowances may have important economic effects, namely, free allocation may distribute wealth to covered entities whereas auctioning could generate revenue for governments. According to available information and experts, the CDM has provided flexibility to industrialized countries with emission targets and has involved developing countries in efforts to limit greenhouse gas emissions, but the program's effects on emissions are uncertain, and its effects on sustainable development have been limited. Nonetheless, the CDM's effects reveal key lessons that can help inform congressional decision making. Specifically, the CDM has provided a way for industrialized countries to meet their targets that may cost less than reducing emissions at home; however, available evidence suggests that some offset credits were awarded for projects that would have occurred even in the absence of the CDM, despite a rigorous screening process. Such projects do not represent net emission reductions and can compromise the integrity of programs--including the ETS--that allow the use of CDM credits for compliance. We also found that the cost-effectiveness and overall scale of emission reductions are limited by the current project approval process, although proposed changes may improve its effectiveness. Key lessons from the CDM include: (1) the resources necessary to obtain project approval may reduce the cost-effectiveness and quality of projects; (2) the need to ensure the credibility of emission reductions presents a significant regulatory challenge; and (3) due to the tradeoffs with offsets, the use of such programs may be, at best, a temporary solution. |
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