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gao_GAO-12-780 | gao_GAO-12-780_0 | Background
Although commonly used, the term “federal fleet” is a misnomer because there is no single entity that is responsible for all of the almost 660,000 civilian, Postal Service, and non-tactical military vehicles (about 449,000 excluding Postal Service vehicles) owned and leased by federal agencies. In addition, GSA and the Department of Energy co-sponsor a Web-based data- reporting portal, in which agencies annually report information about the size and composition of vehicles, fuel consumption, and vehicle mileage. Federal laws, executive orders, and policy decisions have affected agency fleet size and composition. The Number of Federal Vehicles Has Increased since 2005 with Fleet Changes Varying by Agency
Since fiscal year 2005, the number of federal non-postal, non-tactical vehicles has increased about 7 percent, from 420,382 to 449,444 vehicles. In fiscal year 2011, the fleets of 8 federal agencies made up almost 80 percent of total federal vehicles, while 35 agencies made up the remaining 21 percent (fig. Overall, federal agencies increased the proportion of their fleets made up of alternative fuel vehicles (i.e., vehicles that operate using an ethanol blended fuel, compressed natural gas, and batteries, among others) as opposed to conventional fuel vehicles (i.e., vehicles that operate on gasoline and diesel fuel) from about 14 percent to 33 percent from fiscal years 2005 to 2011. Although the number of federal vehicles increased from fiscal years 2005 to 2011, not all agencies’ fleets increased—some agencies experienced a decrease in the number of vehicles, while others changed very little. Specifically, 8 of the 24 agencies with the largest numbers of vehicles decreased their fleets by at least 2 percent over the period. USDA’s fleet grew about 5 percent and VA’s fleet grew about 49 percent from fiscal years 2005 to 2011. In contrast, the Air Force and Interior both decreased the size of their fleets from fiscal years 2005 to 2011. Officials Identified Multiple Factors That Influenced Fleet Size at Selected Agencies
The fleet managers at the four agencies we selected told us that various factors have influenced changes in fleet size. According to officials, USDA and VA increased the size of their fleets from fiscal years 2005 to 2011 to accommodate expanded programs and services, among other factors, while the Air Force and Interior reportedly decreased their fleet size in part by implementing measures to improve fleet management. For example, VA recently acquired more vehicles to provide transportation to and from VA health care facilities—including medical centers and community-based outpatient clinics—for veterans who require health care services but are not able to drive themselves. Interior’s U.S. While the National Park Service’s fleet increased, these additional vehicles did not change the direction of Interior’s overall fleet size changes. Agency Comments
We provided copies of a draft of this report to GSA, Air Force, USDA, Interior, and VA for their review and comment. GSA’s Associate Administrator and VA’s Chief of Staff agreed with our findings and provided written technical comments that were incorporated as appropriate. We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional committees, the Administrator of the General Services Administration, and the Secretaries of Agriculture, Air Force, Defense, the Interior, and Veterans Affairs. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal fleets consist of about 449,000 civilian and non-tactical military (i.e., non-combat) cars, trucks, and other vehicles, excluding postal vehicles. Various legislation and policies have been aimed at reducing the size and changing the composition of federal fleets as a means of improving U.S. energy efficiency. Most recently, in May 2011, the President issued a memorandum calling for federal agencies to reduce oil imports by determining the optimal size of their fleets and eliminating non-essential vehicles.
GAO was asked to provide information about any change in the size and composition of federal fleets and the reasons agencies fleets increased or decreased over time. GAO analyzed agency fleet data compiled by the General Services Administration (GSA) to identify changes in fleet size and vehicle type from fiscal years 2005 to 2011. GAO selected four agenciesUSDA, Interior, VA, and the U.S. Air Forceto discuss with officials the reasons for changes in fleet size. GAO based its selection on factors such as agency mission, fleet size, and changes in the number of vehicles. GAO did not include U.S. Postal Service in its analysis because of GAOs recent report on Postal Services delivery fleet.
GAO is not making recommendations in this report. Although Air Force, USDA, and Interior did not comment on a draft of this report, GSA and VA generally agreed with GAOs findings and provided technical comments that were incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
Since fiscal year 2005, the number of federal non-postal civilian and non-tactical military vehicles has increased about 7 percent, from about 420,000 to 449,000 vehicles. However, from fiscal year 2005 to 2011, some agencies decreased their fleets, and the change in fleet size from agency to agency varied considerably. For example, one-third of the agencies (8 of 24) with the largest number of vehicles decreased their fleets by at least 2 percent during this period. Of the 4 agencies GAO selected for review, the Departments of Agriculture (USDA) and Veterans Affairs (VA) increased their fleets 5 and 49 percent, respectively since fiscal year 2005; the U.S. Air Force and Department of the Interior (Interior) decreased their fleets 7 and 9 percent, respectively. Overall, federal agencies increased the portion of their fleets made up of alternative fuel vehicles (e.g., vehicles that operate using ethanol or batteries) from about 14 percent to 33 percent from fiscal years 2005 to 2011. In addition, GAO found that 8 agencies accounted for almost 80 percent of total federal vehicles in fiscal year 2011, while 35 other agencies held the remaining vehicles.
Fleet managers at the four selected agencies stated that various factors can influence changes in fleet size. USDA and VA reportedly acquired more vehicles from fiscal years 2005 to 2011 to accommodate expanded programs and services, among other factors. For example, VA acquired 5,367 additional vehicles in part to provide transportation to and from VA health care facilities for veterans who require health care services but are not able to drive themselves. In contrast, the Air Force and Interior reportedly decreased the number of vehicles in part through efforts targeted at reducing their fleets and costs. For example, through efforts to identify under-utilized vehicles, Interior eliminated 451 vehicles. |
gao_GAO-08-788 | gao_GAO-08-788_0 | To address safety goals, state highway safety offices distribute Section 402 funding to local agencies and state organizations, known as subgrantees, that carry out traffic safety programs across the state. States Use Section 402 Grants to Address the Main Causes of Traffic Fatalities and State- Specific Safety Problems
Since fiscal year 1999, states have directed about 54 percent of their Section 402 funding to traffic safety programs, such as traffic law enforcement, aimed at reducing alcohol-impaired driving and unbelted driving, the leading national causes of traffic fatalities and injuries. According to a NHTSA official, traffic law enforcement is a strategy used primarily to reduce alcohol-impaired driving and increase safety belt use. NHTSA Has Improved the Consistency of Its Management Review Process and Instituted New Processes That Could Help to Assess the Impact of Its Oversight
NHTSA implemented both the requirement that it conduct management reviews of states and territories on a 3-year schedule as well as our recommendation to improve the consistency with which it uses these reviews. NHTSA’s Management Review Recommendations Address Fundamental Management Principles and Could Be Analyzed at the National Level to Identify Common State Challenges
NHTSA’s management review recommendations—both its compliance- based findings and management considerations—address fundamental management principles, and state officials with whom we spoke said the review recommendations serve as a useful management tool and, in some cases, helped them obtain needed resources from state leadership. We conducted such an analysis and found that states experienced a number of common challenges such as needing to improve monitoring of subgrantees—an issue the DOT IG also identified in its report as a process in need of strengthening—and spending highway safety grant funding in a more timely fashion. These challenges include improving monitoring of subgrantees; resolving financial management issues such as ensuring that expenses submitted by subgrantees were paid promptly and for the correct amounts or that the state used federal planning and administration funds for staff salaries only when appropriate; strengthening planning processes and programming to better address staffing issues such as clearly defining staff functions and the processes staff should use to perform their roles, as well as providing necessary training and development; improving implementation of safety programming, such as ensuring that states have written requirements for subgrantees about how they manage their programs and reports the state expects to receive regarding subgrantee activities and progress toward milestones; and spending grant funding in a timely fashion. These approaches are different from NHTSA’s management reviews in that NHTSA focuses on aspects of a state’s highway safety program that more directly address safety outcomes while management reviews focus on improving grant management processes. Refinements to NHTSA’s Approaches Could Help States Improve Safety, but More Time Is Needed to Assess the Impact of Incentive Grants
While the national traffic fatality rate has declined, the number of traffic fatalities has remained fairly level since 1997, as factors such as increases in population and the number of vehicle miles traveled offset improvements in the fatality rate. From 1997 through 2006, national traffic fatalities per 100 million vehicle miles traveled declined by approximately 14 percent, from 1.65 to 1.41, while the number of fatalities remained fairly level at about 43,000 per year during this time period (see fig. Yet, states with high total numbers of fatalities offer an opportunity to save the greatest number of lives. However, current incentive grants are not specifically designed to target states with low or average fatality rates but high numbers of fatalities. NHTSA has worked to continually make improvements to its oversight of states, including recent steps to further improve the consistency of information available about its recommendations. However, because some states with a high total number of fatalities may not meet NHTSA’s selection criteria for a special management review and may not elect to participate in an assessment, these states may not receive an in-depth programmatic review that could identify additional opportunities to reduce fatalities. To address these issues, we examined (1) how states have used Section 402 funding to achieve national safety goals, (2) the progress NHTSA has made toward addressing consistency in the management review process, (3) how useful NHTSA’s management reviews and recommendations are in improving management of state safety programs, and (4) the approaches currently available to improve safety outcomes. | Why GAO Did This Study
Traffic crashes kill thousands of Americans every year--in 2005, it was the leading cause of death among young Americans. To try to improve highway safety, Congress authorized a grant program overseen by the Department of Transportation's (DOT) National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA). In 2003, GAO recommended that NHTSA improve the consistency of its management reviews, a key aspect of NHTSA's oversight. In response to a legislative mandate, GAO assessed (1) how states have used grant funding to address safety goals, (2) NHTSA's progress in improving consistency in its management reviews, (3) the usefulness of its management review recommendations, and (4) approaches to further improve safety. In performing this work, GAO reviewed traffic safety data, analyzed state spending patterns, conducted site visits with eight states, and interviewed agency officials.
What GAO Found
From fiscal year 1999 through 2007, states directed about 54 percent of NHTSA's State and Community Highway Safety formula grant funding toward programs, including traffic enforcement, that address the leading causes of traffic fatalities--alcohol-impaired driving and driving without a safety belt, both of which are national safety goals. States directed the rest of this grant funding to a variety of safety programs, many of which address national goals but some of which target state-specific safety challenges such as driving safely in winter weather. To address safety goals, state highway safety offices disperse federal funding to "subgrantees," such as local law enforcement or nonprofit agencies that carry out the safety programs. NHTSA implemented both Congress' requirement that it conduct management reviews of states and territories on a 3-year schedule as well as GAO's prior recommendation to improve the consistency with which it uses these reviews. GAO analyzed NHTSA's management reviews and identified some variation in how information was documented. However, in 2007 NHTSA took several steps, such as instituting a team to review the quality of management review reports, which should further improve the consistency of information contained in these reports--information NHTSA could use to assess the impact of its recommendations on state safety programs. GAO found NHTSA's management review recommendations useful because they are designed to address fundamental management principles such as improving program planning and ensuring states' compliance with statutes governing safety grants. Also, state officials said NHTSA's recommendations serve as a useful management tool. However, NHTSA does not analyze the recommendations on a national level to target its technical assistance to common state challenges. GAO conducted such an analysis and found that the recommendations revealed common state challenges such as the need to improve monitoring of subgrantee activities and expenditures, which helps ensure that funds are used for the intended purpose. NHTSA also frequently recommended that states spend grant funding more quickly, which NHTSA officials believed would expand safety programs and, in turn, improve safety. From 1997 through 2006, the national traffic fatality rate--the number of traffic fatalities per 100 million vehicle miles traveled--declined 14 percent, but traffic fatalities remained at about 43,000 per year as factors such as increases in the number of miles driven offset the decrease in the rate. NHTSA uses several approaches to help states reduce fatalities, including requiring program reviews in states that are not making adequate progress in reducing alcohol-impaired driving and increasing safety belt use. Yet some states with low or average fatality rates but a high number of fatalities may not be eligible for a required review under NHTSA's current criteria. States with high total numbers of fatalities offer an opportunity to save the greatest number of lives, but for these states to receive an in-depth program review, the states must request and pay for such safety expertise. |
gao_GAO-06-316 | gao_GAO-06-316_0 | FHA’s Hospital Mortgage Insurance Program generally serves the segment of the market consisting of hospitals that are too risky to obtain private bond insurance but are strong enough to pass FHA’s underwriting tests. FHA uses many of the same techniques that private insurers use to monitor insured hospitals. Agencies Coordinate Key Activities, but FHA Does Not Track Most Performance Measures
FHA and HHS coordinate key activities, including screening applicants, underwriting loans, and monitoring insured hospitals. Program Guidance Is Not Up to Date
FHA’s primary guidance for its hospital mortgage insurance program has not been updated in over 20 years and does not reflect changes to the program over that time. This trend may pose a risk to the program. HUD’s model incorporates factors and assumptions about how loans will perform, including estimated claim and recovery rates, which are consistent with OMB guidance. However, HUD’s model does not explicitly consider the potential impacts of prepayment penalties or restrictions when estimating prepayments, or the debt-service coverage ratios of hospitals at the time of loan origination. According to OMB officials, the use of this artificial default accounts for the risk that exists due to the low number of large size loans insured, potential changes in Medicare or Medicaid reimbursement rates, and the geographic concentration of the program in New York, which make the program vulnerable to regional economic conditions. Figure 9 shows changes in the credit subsidy rate from 1992 to 2005. FHA’s process for reviewing applications for mortgage insurance, while somewhat lengthier and involving more steps compared with those of private bond insurers, appears to be a reasonable response to the generally riskier nature of the applicants. Although it represents a relatively small part of HUD’s GI/SRI fund, the hospital program insures multimillion dollar loans that currently total nearly $5 billion. Specifically, the agency agreed to develop appropriate performance measures and implement data collection procedures to evaluate both program and contract administration; with the need to consolidate updated eligibility requirements, policies, and procedures into an updated handbook, and stated its intention to have the handbook finalized by the end of 2006; to develop a formal strategy to geographically diversify its portfolio of insured hospitals, including such elements as the processes, skills, technologies, and various resources that will be used to reach diversification goals; and to explore the value of explicitly factoring additional information, such as prepayment penalties and the initial debt-service coverage ratio of hospitals as they enter the program, during its annual review of cash flow modeling techniques for the hospital program. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to review (1) the design and management of the program, as compared with private insurance; (2) the nature and management of the relationship between the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) in implementing the program; (3) the financial implications of the program to the General Insurance/Special Risk Insurance (GI/SRI) fund, including risk posed by program and market trends; and (4) how HUD estimates the annual credit subsidy for the program, including the factors and assumptions used. | Why GAO Did This Study
Under its Hospital Mortgage Insurance Program, the Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) Federal Housing Administration (FHA) insures nearly $5 billion in mortgage loans for the renovation or construction of hospitals that would otherwise have difficulty accessing capital. In response to a requirement in the 2005 Consolidated Appropriations Conference Report, GAO examined (1) the design and management of the program, as compared with private insurance, (2) the nature and management of the relationship between HUD and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) in implementing the program, (3) the financial implications of the program to the General Insurance/Special Risk Insurance (GI/SRI) fund, including risk posed by program and market trends, and (4) how HUD estimates the annual credit subsidy for the program, including the factors and assumptions used.
What GAO Found
The Hospital Mortgage Insurance Program insures the mortgages of hospitals that are generally riskier than those that can obtain private bond insurance. While FHA's process for reviewing mortgage insurance applications includes more steps and generally takes longer, the agency monitors active loans with many of the same techniques that private bond insurers use. Under a Memorandum of Agreement, FHA and HHS work together in a variety of ways to review mortgage insurance applications and monitor active loans. However, FHA does not collect data to assess program performance against most performance measures specified in the memorandum, some of which are not objective. Further, FHA has not kept its program handbook of policies and procedures for applicants, lenders, and others up-to-date. The hospital program is small compared with other programs in the GI/SRI fund, and the losses from claims have been relatively low. Despite the program's relatively small size, some program and market trends may pose risks. For example, 61 percent of the program's total insured, outstanding loan amount is concentrated in New York, which makes the program vulnerable to state policies and regional economic conditions. While FHA has goals to diversify the hospital insurance portfolio and has made efforts to do so, it does not have a formal strategy to achieve these goals. To estimate the credit subsidy cost, or program costs, over the life of the outstanding loans insured, HUD uses a model that incorporates factors and assumptions about how loans will perform, including estimated claim and recovery rates, which are consistent with federal guidance. However, HUD's model does not explicitly consider some factors, such as the potential impacts of prepayment penalties or restrictions, which according to some economic studies, are important in modeling default risk. |
gao_RCED-96-54 | gao_RCED-96-54_0 | Different Methodologies Were Agreed Upon for Estimating Benefit and Administrative Costs
To estimate benefit costs, Minnesota agreed to use a research design that (1) randomly assigns applicant families to a control group eligible for traditional welfare program benefits, including food stamps, or to a group eligible for MFIP benefits and (2) uses the cost of food stamp benefits provided to families assigned to the control group to estimate what the cost would have been to provide traditional food stamp benefits to those assigned to MFIP. Minnesota Implemented Agreed-Upon Methodologies and Generated Required Estimates for Fiscal Year 1994
For fiscal year 1994, Minnesota implemented the agreed-upon cost-neutrality methodologies and generated the required estimates of food stamp benefit and administrative costs that would have been incurred in the absence of the demonstration project. While implementing this methodology, Minnesota encountered a data-processing problem that prevented it from obtaining needed data on the cost of the food stamp benefits. Minnesota also implemented the agreed-upon cost allocation methodology to determine what the administrative costs would have been in the absence of the MFIP demonstration project. Methods Used Provided Reasonable Cost Estimates
The methodologies for estimating the costs of the Food Stamp Program in the absence of the MFIP demonstration project, and the manner in which they were implemented, resulted in reasonable estimates of costs for fiscal year 1994. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO examined the methodologies that Minnesota used for estimating the costs that would have been incurred if it had not implemented the Minnesota Family Investment Program (MFIP), focusing on whether: (1) Minnesota implemented the agreed-upon methodologies; (2) Minnesota reasonably estimated fiscal year (FY) 1994 Food Stamp Program costs; and (3) the Department of Agriculture (USDA) paid Minnesota the same amount for food stamp benefits in FY 1994 than it would have paid in the absence of MFIP.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) Minnesota agreed to use two methodologies for estimating food stamp benefit costs that would have been incurred in the absence of MFIP; (2) Minnesota randomly assigned applicant families to either traditional welfare programs or MFIP and estimated the cost of providing MFIP benefits and food stamp benefits in traditional welfare programs; (3) Minnesota excluded all costs unique to MFIP which are paid by the state to achieve cost neutrality; (4) Minnesota used the same methodology to allocate allowable administrative costs among the welfare programs; (5) Minnesota implemented the agreed-upon methodologies and generated reasonable cost estimates for FY 1994, but a data processing problem delayed results for 7 months; and (6) USDA overpaid Minnesota $115,395 in excess food stamp benefits during the first 6 months of MFIP, based on Minnesota's forecasts of what food stamp costs would have been in the absence of MFIP. |
gao_HEHS-97-37 | gao_HEHS-97-37_0 | 1.) (We classify these areas as “lower enrollment.”)
Risk HMO Enrollment Linked to Payment and Other Factors
Our analysis of counties grouped by their AAPCC rates and risk HMO enrollment levels suggests that while AAPCC rates play a role, other factors also affect enrollment. In addition to HMO presence in the health care market, such factors as population density, the number of Medicare beneficiaries, and employers’ policies on retiree health benefits can influence risk enrollment. Most Counties With Lower Payment Rates Are Less Urban and Lack Strong HMO Presence
Medicare risk HMO enrollment in 2,257 counties that had lower AAPCC rates was minimal or nonexistent, but the principal barrier to risk HMO enrollment was not the payment level. Most of these primarily urban counties were in the West, where HMOs have a longer history than in many other parts of the country. A large number of Medicare beneficiaries were enrolled in risk HMOs that serve more urban, lower payment counties. Every county included in 8 of these 10 MSAs had lower AAPCC payments and higher enrollment in risk HMOs—the two exceptions were the Santa Fe MSA (where one of two counties did not have lower AAPCC payments and higher enrollment) and the Denver MSA (where three of five counties did not have lower AAPCC payments and higher enrollment). Lack of HMO Presence Can Impede Risk HMO Enrollment Where Payments Are Higher
Higher payment rates were no guarantee that risk HMO enrollment would also be higher. Our analysis showed that a third of the counties ranked among the highest AAPCC payment areas in the country had no, or virtually no, Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in risk HMOs. All six of these counties were in three MSAs—Ann Arbor, Detroit, and Flint. Despite the presence of these factors, only about 0.5 percent of the eligible Medicare beneficiaries in the three Michigan MSAs were enrolled in risk HMOs. The HMOs plan to target Medicare beneficiaries not covered by rich retiree health benefits. Another company indicated that the payment rate needs to be high enough to adequately pay health care providers. Although the linkage of Medicare payment rates to risk HMO enrollment may be important in some areas, dramatic differences in enrollment are often associated with other factors. The presence of HMOs, the density of population, and the number of Medicare beneficiaries, especially those familiar with managed health care, all facilitate growth in enrollment—and their absence hinders it. In addition to analyzing data for the three study categories, we selected three markets in which to perform more detailed work: (1) Portland, Oregon—a market in the lower AAPCC rate and higher enrollment category; (2) Detroit—a market in the higher AAPCC rate and lower enrollment category; and (3) Boston—a market in which risk enrollment grew considerably in a relatively short time. Clearly, factors other than payment rates affected risk HMO enrollment in these MSAs. HMO presence was generally strong and higher levels of risk HMO enrollment were coupled with lower payment rates in several of the more urban counties in MSAs with a few adjoining counties also having higher enrollments in risk HMOs. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the factors affecting Medicare risk health maintenance organization (HMO) enrollment, focusing on: (1) the patterns in HMO enrollment and Medicare payment rates; (2) selected geographical areas with higher enrollment, lower payment rates and areas with lower enrollment, higher payment rates; and (3) how the presence or absence of certain factors could affect enrollment.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) Medicare payment rates to HMOs are often considered to be the primary influence on Medicare HMO enrollment; (2) however, GAO's analysis suggest that several other factors also play a key, and sometimes, dominant role; (3) these factors include HMO presence, number of Medicare beneficiaries, and employers' policies toward retiree health benefits, and their relative importance varies across the country; (4) moreover, in markets such as Detroit and Portland, the influence of Medicare payment rates is not decisive; (5) enrollment in risk HMOs was virtually nonexistent in most counties with lower Medicare payment rates, but these lower rates were one of a constellation of factors that make such counties unattractive business propositions for Medicare HMOs; (6) GAO's analysis showed that these counties typically had few or no HMOs in their health care markets; (7) lower enrollment counties were primarily rural, only 16 percent fell within a metropolitan statistical area (MSA), and had fewer people overall and, in particular, averaged a small number of Medicare beneficiaries; (8) lower enrollment in risk HMOs did not occur in every county with lower payment rates; (9) risk HMOs enrolled large numbers of beneficiaries in 92 lower payment counties in which factors other than payment rates were more favorable; (10) these counties were mostly in the West, where HMOs are more prevalent and many consumers have embraced this form of health care delivery; (11) in contrast, higher payment rates were no guarantee that risk HMO enrollment would also be high; (12) about one-third of the 100 counties with the highest Medicare HMO payment rates in 1995 had risk HMO enrollments that were slight or nonexistent; (13) most of these higher payment/lower enrollment counties were in the South, where the presence of HMOs was limited; (14) however, several of these counties were in three Michigan urban areas; (15) although the presence of HMOs in the health care market was generally greater in the Michigan MSAs than in the South, employers' provision of richer retiree health benefits made the risk HMO option less attractive to Medicare beneficiaries in Michigan; (16) in addition to population density and other factors external to HMOs, HMOs' individual business strategies for the Medicare market are likely to affect the future direction of risk HMO enrollment; and (17) all these strategies are likely to boost risk enrollment and, sometimes, to change the market dynamics in certain areas. |
gao_GAO-11-600 | gao_GAO-11-600_0 | Most Recovery Act Transportation Funds Have Been Obligated and Expenditures for Infrastructure Continue to Increase, but Long-Term Outcomes Are Largely Unknown
According to DOT data, as of May 31, 2011, DOT had obligated nearly $45 billion (about 95 percent) on over 15,000 projects and had expended more than $28 billion (about 63 percent) of the $48.1 billion it received under the Recovery Act (see table 1). States and other recipients continue to report using Recovery Act funds to improve the condition of the nation’s transportation infrastructure, as well as invest in new infrastructure. For example, according to DOT data, 68 percent of highway funds have been used for pavement improvement projects, such as resurfacing, reconstruction, and rehabilitation of existing roadways, and almost 75 percent of transit funds have been used for upgrading existing facilities and purchasing or rehabilitating buses (see fig. According to data filed by recipients, Recovery Act transportation projects supported between 31,460 and 65,110 FTEs each reporting quarter from October 1, 2009, through March 31, 2011. In addition to the number of jobs funded by Recovery Act transportation funds, federal, state, and local officials describe the following other benefits Better coordination and streamlined processes: DOT officials told us tha er at the Recovery Act encouraged more efficient ways of working togeth the federal, state, and local levels to select projects. Federal, State, and Local Auditors Continue to Review Use of Recovery Act Funds and No Major Issues Have Been Reported
Federal, state, and local oversight entities have continued their efforts to ensure appropriate use of Recovery Act transportation funds, and recently published reviews have not revealed major concerns. Finally, local auditors in states we visited that reviewed compliance with Recovery Act requirements did not find problems with city use of Recovery Act transportation funds. For this report, we focused our review on the quality of data reported by transportation grant recipients and efforts made by FHWA to validate that data. Likewise, as described earlier, the total number of FTEs reported has also decreased over the past two reporting quarters. DOT officials said that the decreases in the number of recipients reporting any FTEs is likely due to several factors, including projects being completed or functionally complete and awaiting financial closeout. DOT Continues to Perform Automated Checks to Help Improve Data but Is Not Planning to Use Recipient- Reported Data Internally
Each quarter, FHWA performs quality assurance steps on the data that recipients provide to FederalReporting.gov and officials reported that the data quality continues to improve. We have reported that there were numerous challenges for DOT and states in implementing the transportation maintenance-of-effort provision in the Recovery Act. A January 2011 preliminary DOT report indicated that 29 states met their planned levels of expenditure, and 21 states did not. States had a monetary incentive to meet their certified planned level of spending in each transportation program area funded by the Recovery Act because those that fail would not be eligible to participate in the August 2011 redistribution of obligation authority under the Federal-Aid Highway Program. The economically distressed area provision proved difficult to implement because of changing economic conditions and the difficulty of targeting assistance to economically distressed areas, and it is unclear that it achieved its intended goal. In our recent reports on the high speed intercity passenger rail and TIGER programs, we found that while DOT generally followed recommended grantmaking practices, DOT could have documented more information about its award decisions. DOT generally agreed with our findings and provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to determine the (1) status, use, and outcomes of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act) transportation funding nationwide and in selected states; (2) actions taken by federal, state, and local agencies to monitor and ensure accountability of Recovery Act transportation funds; (3) changes in the quality of jobs data reported by Recovery Act recipients of transportation funds over time; and (4) challenges faced and lessons learned from the Department of Transportation (DOT) and recipients. The recipient reporting section of this report responds to the Recovery Act’s mandate that we comment on the estimates of jobs created or retained by direct recipients of Recovery Act funds. | Why GAO Did This Study
This report responds to two GAO mandates under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act). It is the latest report on the uses of and accountability for Recovery Act funds in selected states and localities, focusing on the $48.1 billion provided to the Department of Transportation (DOT) to invest in transportation infrastructure. This report also examines the quality of recipients' reports about the jobs created and retained with Recovery Act transportation funds. This report addresses the (1) status, use, and outcomes of Recovery Act transportation funding nationwide and in selected states; (2) actions taken by federal, state, and other agencies to monitor and ensure accountability for those funds; (3) changes in the quality of jobs data reported by Recovery Act recipients of transportation funds over time; and (4) challenges faced and lessons learned from DOT and recipients. GAO analyzed DOT and recipient reported data; reviewed federal legislation, guidance, and reports; reviewed prior work and other studies; and interviewed DOT, state, and local officials.
What GAO Found
As of May 31, 2011, nearly $45 billion (about 95 percent) of Recovery Act transportation funds had been obligated for over 15,000 projects nationwide, and more than $28 billion had been expended. Recipients continue to report using Recovery Act funds to improve the nation's transportation infrastructure. Highway funds have been primarily used for pavement improvement projects, and transit funds have been primarily used to upgrade transit facilities and purchase buses. Recovery Act funds have also been used to rehabilitate airport runways and improve Amtrak's infrastructure. The Recovery Act helped fund transportation jobs, but long-term benefits are unclear. For example, according to recipient reported data, transportation projects supported between approximately 31,460 and 65,110 full-time equivalents (FTE) quarterly from October 2009 through March 2011. Officials reported other benefits, including improved coordination among federal, state, and local officials. However, the impact of Recovery Act investments in transportation is unknown, and GAO has recommended that DOT determine the data needed to assess the impact of these investments. Federal, state, and local oversight entities continue their efforts to ensure the appropriate use of Recovery Act transportation funds, and recent reviews revealed no major concerns. The DOT Inspector General found that DOT generally complied with Recovery Act aviation, highway, and rail program requirements. Similarly, state and local oversight entities' performance reviews and audits generally did not find problems with the use of Recovery Act transportation funds. GAO's analysis of Recovery.gov data reported by transportation grant recipients showed that the number of FTEs reported, number of recipients filing reports, and portion of recipients reporting any FTEs decreased over the past two reporting quarters as an increasing number of projects approached completion or were awaiting financial closeout. The Federal Highway Administration performs automated checks to help ensure the validity of recipient reported data and observed fewer data quality issues than in previous quarters but does not plan to use the data internally. Certain Recovery Act provisions proved challenging. For example, DOT and states faced numerous challenges in implementing the maintenance-of-effort requirement, which required states to maintain their planned level of spending or be ineligible to participate in the August 2011 redistribution of obligation authority under the Federal-Aid Highway Program. In January 2011, DOT reported that 29 states met the requirement while 21 states did not because of reductions in dedicated revenues for transportation, among other reasons. The economically distressed area provision also proved difficult to implement because of changing economic conditions. With regard to the high speed intercity passenger rail and Transportation Investment Generating Economic Recovery (TIGER) grant programs, GAO found that while DOT generally followed recommended grant-making practices, DOT could have better documented its award decisions. GAO updates the status of agencies' efforts to implement its previous recommendations but is making no new recommendations in this report. DOT officials generally agreed with GAO's findings and provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-02-65 | gao_GAO-02-65_0 | For each grant, we also reviewed the most recent award covering 12 months to examine specific monitoring requirements and activities, such as telephone calls and site visits. Four grant files were not found in time to be included in our review. Discretionary Grant Monitoring Process
After OJJDP awards discretionary grants, OJP policies require OJJDP to monitor the grants and related activities and document the monitoring results in the grant managers’ program files and OJP’s Office of the Comptroller official grant files. OJJDP Current Activities
Since April 2001, OJJDP has been engaged in a review of its monitoring practices. We identified some of these same documentation- related problems in May 1996. Progress and Financial Reports. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) provides block grants and discretionary funding to help states and communities prevent juvenile delinquency and improve their juvenile justice systems. OJJDP has specific program monitoring and documentation requirements for its discretionary grants. These monitoring requirements include having the grant manager make quarterly telephone calls, undertake on- and off-site grant monitoring visits, and review interim and final products.
What GAO Found
In a review of OJJDP's most recent award of grants active in fiscal years 1999 and 2000, GAO found that OJJDP's grant monitoring activities were not consistently documented. These findings are similar to those GAO reported in May 1996. |
gao_GAO-05-619T | gao_GAO-05-619T_0 | In October 1998, Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 67 identified the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)—which is responsible for responding to, planning for, recovering from, and mitigating against disasters— as the executive agent for federal COOP planning across the federal executive branch. At your request, we previously reported on federal agency headquarters contingency plans in place in October 2002. In response to these recommendations, DHS reported in July 2004 that it (1) was developing an online system to collect data from agencies on the readiness of their continuity plans that would evaluate compliance with the guidance, (2) had conducted an interagency exercise, and (3) had developed a training program for agency continuity planning managers. Many Agencies Reported Using Sound Continuity Practices, but Few Provided Adequate Supporting Documentation
Based on an analysis of published literature and in consultation with experts on continuity planning, we identified eight sound practices related to essential functions that organizations should use when developing their COOP plans. With regard to COOP plans in place on May 1, 2004, many of the 23 agencies reported using some of the sound practices in developing plans, included identifying and validating essential functions, but few provided documentation sufficient for us to validate their responses. This indicates that agencies—although aware of these practices—may not have followed them thoroughly or effectively. Further, the essential functions identified by agencies varied widely: the number of functions identified in each plan ranged from 3 to 538. For example, a number of essential functions were of clear importance, such as ● “conduct payments to security holders” and ● “carry out a rapid and effective response to all hazards, emergencies, and disasters.”
Other identified functions appeared vague or of questionable importance: ● “champion decision-making decisions” and ● “provide advice to the Under Secretary.”
New Guidance and Review Process Could Result in More Consistent Identification of Essential Functions
The high level of generality in FEMA’s guidance on essential functions contributed to the inconsistencies in agencies’ identification of these functions. Agency COOP Plans Have Improved, but None Address All of FEMA’s Guidance
When compared with our prior assessment, agency continuity plans in place on May 1, 2004, showed improved compliance with FEMA’s guidance in two ways: ● One agency and nine component agencies that did not have documented continuity plans in place at the time of our 2002 had put such plans in place by May 1. ● Tests, training, and exercises. In response, DHS reported that it was developing a readiness reporting system to assist it in assessing agency plans and planned to verify the information reported by the agencies. Although neither of these planned actions was completed by May 1, 2004, FEMA has made subsequent efforts to improve its oversight. They added that once the system becomes fully operational, agencies will be required to periodically provide updated information on their compliance with FEMA’s guidance. Both FEMA’s revision to this guidance and a recently initiated White House effort have the potential, if effectively implemented, to help agencies better identify their essential functions and thus develop better continuity plans. Finally, even though FEMA’s continuity planning guidance in place in May 2004 did not address telework, one agency’s continuity plan at that time included plans to use telework in response to an emergency. In addition, 10 agencies reported that they planned to use telework following a COOP event, but their plans were not clearly documented. We also recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Under Secretary for Emergency Preparedness and Response to ● develop a strategy for short-term oversight that ensures that agencies are prepared for a disruption in essential functions while the current effort to identify essential functions and develop new guidance is ongoing; ● develop and implement procedures that verify the agency-reported data used in oversight of agency continuity of operations planning; and ● develop, in consultation with OPM, guidance on the steps that agencies should take to adequately prepare for the use of telework during a COOP event. | Why GAO Did This Study
To ensure that essential government services are available in emergencies, federal agencies are required to develop continuity of operations plans. According to guidance from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), which is responsible for providing guidance for and assessing agency continuity plans, a key element of a viable capability is the proper identification of essential functions. GAO previously reported on agency continuity plan compliance, and determined that a number of agencies and their components did not have continuity plans in place on October 1, 2002, and those that were in place did not generally comply with FEMA's guidance. GAO was asked to testify on its most recent work in continuity planning, which is discussed in a separate report, being released today (GAO-05-577). In this report, GAO reviewed to what extent (1) major federal agencies used sound practices to identify and validate their essential functions, (2) agencies had made progress since 2002 in improving compliance with FEMA guidance, and (3) agency continuity of operations plans addressed the use of telework arrangements (in which work is performed at an employee's home or at a work location other than a traditional office) during emergencies.
What GAO Found
Many of the 23 agencies that GAO reviewed reported using sound practices for identifying and validating essential functions, but few provided documentation sufficient for GAO to confirm their responses. (GAO identified these sound practices based on published literature and in consultation with experts on continuity planning.) Agency responses indicate that--although aware of the practices--agencies may not have followed them thoroughly or effectively. Further, the essential functions identified by agencies varied widely: the number of functions identified in each plan ranged from 3 to 538 and included ones that appeared to be of secondary importance. The absence in FEMA's guidance of specific criteria for identifying essential functions contributed to this condition. Subsequent guidance significantly addresses the sound practices that GAO identified. Also, the White House has begun a process to improve continuity planning. If this guidance and process are implemented effectively, they could lead to improved identification of essential functions in the executive branch. As of May 1, 2004, agencies had made progress in improving compliance with FEMA guidance, but significant weaknesses remained. Agencies that had plans in place in both years showed significant improvement in the area of tests, training, and exercises. However, although some improvement occurred for other planning areas, important weaknesses remained: for example, 31 of 45 plans did not fully identify mission-critical systems and data necessary to conduct essential functions. Inadequate oversight by FEMA contributed to the level of weaknesses in agency continuity plans. FEMA plans to improve oversight using an online readiness reporting system, which it plans to have fully operational later this year, and it has already taken other steps to help agencies improve their plans, such as conducting an interagency exercise. However, FEMA does not plan to verify the readiness information that agencies will report in the system. Finally, even though FEMA's continuity planning guidance in place in May 2004 did not address telework, one agency's continuity plan at that time included plans to use telework in response to an emergency. In addition, 10 agencies reported that they planned to use telework following a COOP event, but their plans were not clearly documented. In its report, GAO made recommendations aimed at helping to improve continuity planning. These included establishing a schedule for the completion of recently initiated efforts, developing a strategy for short-term oversight in the meantime, and developing and implementing procedures that verify the agency-reported data used in oversight of agency continuity of operations planning. The report includes comments from FEMA. In commenting, FEMA agreed that there has been improvement in COOP plans and that additional oversight is needed. |
gao_T-HEHS-99-86 | gao_T-HEHS-99-86_0 | In evaluating these proposals we must understand
Social Security’s fundamental role in ensuring the income security of our nation’s elderly; the nature, extent, and timing of Social Security’s financing problem; and the differences between the current program and a program that might include individual accounts. Social Security Is the Foundation of Our Nation’s Retirement Income System
Social Security has long served as the foundation of our nation’s retirement income system. In addition, Social Security is the sole source of retirement income for almost a fifth of its beneficiaries. 1.) 2). Even if such actions were taken today, attention would need to be given to their sustainability. Another way to understand the magnitude of the problem is to consider what the system will cost as a percentage of taxable payroll in the future. 3). Some reform proposals incorporating individual accounts address the need for such protection by combining defined contribution and defined benefit approaches into a “two-tiered” structure for Social Security. This approach, however, raises a number of risks and administrative issues which I will discuss later in this statement. Balancing Equity and Adequacy in the Benefit Structure
Because individual accounts cannot contribute to restoring solvency without combining with Social Security in some way, it is useful to focus on the implications of individual accounts for Social Security’s defined benefit program. Centralizing these functions by building on the current system would not be without challenges, however. Some propose that these options be limited to a small set of passive or indexed funds similar to those offered under the federal Thrift Savings Plan, thus minimizing risk to the individual while providing some degree of choice. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed how best to ensure the long-term viability of the nation's social security program.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) social security forms the foundation of the nation's retirement income structure, and in so doing, provides critical benefits to millions of Americans; (2) yet, problems facing this program pose significant policy challenges that need to be addressed soon in order to lessen the need for more dramatic reforms in the future and to demonstrate the federal government's ability to deal with a known major problem before it reaches crisis proportions; (3) some social security proposals include adding individual accounts similar to defined contribution plans, to the current defined benefit program; (4) these individual accounts offer the potential for increased investment returns but they cannot by themselves restore social security's solvency without additional changes to the current system; (5) in assessing the proposals, policymakers must consider the extent to which the proposals offer sustainable financing for the system; (6) also, they must consider how to balance improvements in individual equity while maintaining adequacy of retirement income for those individuals who rely on social security as their primary or sole source of income; and (7) choosing whether to incorporate individual accounts into the social security system will require careful consideration of a number of design and implementation issues if such a system is to function effectively at a reasonable cost. |
gao_AIMD-95-83 | gao_AIMD-95-83_0 | Concerns About the Long-term Viability of the Single-Employer Fund
The Single-Employer Fund is able to meet its near-term benefit obligations because premium receipts presently exceed benefit payments and the Fund held investments having a market value of $7.2 billion and cash of $627 million at September 30, 1994. Material Internal Control Weaknesses
Our work disclosed that the Corporation has continued to make progress in improving internal controls affecting its financial reporting. However, as of September 30, 1994, material weaknesses continued to exist in the Corporation’s internal control structure in the three areas reported in our previous audits: weaknesses in financial systems and related internal controls, inadequate controls over the assessment of the Multiemployer Fund’s liability for future financial assistance, and inadequate controls over nonfinancial participant data. Through substantive audit procedures, we were able to satisfy ourselves that the weaknesses discussed below did not have a material effect on the fiscal year 1994 and 1993 financial statements of the Single-Employer and Multiemployer Funds. Inadequate Controls Over Nonfinancial Participant Data
As previously reported, the Corporation’s controls did not ensure the accuracy of nonfinancial participant data entered into the Pension and Lump Sum (PLUS) system. 95-5/23083-1. However, controls in effect on September 30, 1994, provided reasonable assurance that assets were safeguarded against loss from unauthorized use or disposition and that transactions were executed in accordance with management’s authority and significant provisions of selected laws and regulations. We are also responsible for testing compliance with significant provisions of selected laws and regulations and for performing limited procedures with respect to certain other information appearing in this financial statement. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO audited the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation's (PBGC) Single-Employer Fund and Multiemployer Fund for the fiscal years ended September 30, 1994 and 1993 and evaluated PBGC internal controls and compliance with laws and regulations.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) PBGC financial statements were reliable in all material aspects; (2) weaknesses in PBGC internal controls did not have a material effect on the Corporation's financial statements; (3) PBGC internal controls did provide reasonable assurance that assets were safeguarded from material loss and transactions were executed in accordance with managerial and legal requirements; (4) there was no reportable noncompliance with laws and regulations; (5) while the Single-Employer Fund is able to meet its near-term benefit obligations, it has an unfunded deficit of $1.2 billion; and (6) PBGC has made progress in improving internal controls, but weaknesses remain in financial systems, controls over the assessment of the Multiemployer Fund's liability for future financial assistance are inadequate, and controls over nonfinancial participant data entered into the Pension and Lump Sum system are also inadequate. |
gao_T-GGD-98-121 | gao_T-GGD-98-121_0 | Securities Pricing: Actions Needed for Conversion to Decimals
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: We are pleased to be here today to provide the results of our assessment of the securities industry’s readiness to trade stocks using decimal prices. In 1997, your Subcommittee held a series of hearings on a proposed amendment to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 that would have directed the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to require, within 1 year of enactment, that securities trading be in dollars and cents instead of the fractional increments of a dollar, such as eighths and sixteenths, used today. Shortly after those hearings, various exchanges and markets indicated that they were committed to converting to decimal trading, and Congress took no further action on the legislation. Securities Industry Progress Towards Trading in Decimals Has Been Limited
with others would require less time and fewer resources than many of the other initiatives already under way in the industry, such as the work being done for the Year 2000 date change. An industrywide study done for SIA found that the level of effort required for securities market participants to ready themselves for decimal trading was less than that required for other ongoing information technology efforts. The primary reasons cited were inadequate time and resources, given the demands of the Year 2000 effort and other information technology initiatives already under way. Further, our work reviewing the Year 2000 efforts of numerous federal agencies and other entities has generally found that organizations are avoiding the simultaneous implementation and testing of multiple major systems changes to mitigate the risk of malfunctions. to focus the industry’s efforts. discuss these issues. Attempting a conversion to decimal trading before Year 2000 changes are tested and implemented increases the risks that securities industry systems would fail and adversely affect markets and investors. SEC and the securities industry have been working on several elements that are necessary to help ensure the successful implementation of decimal trading as soon as possible after January 1, 2000. Most considered Year 2000 and EMU changes their top information technology priorities. Status of effort to convert? Performed preliminary assessment, will not start until Year 2000 is complete, many systems decimal ready. (continued)
Status of effort to convert? | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the results of its assessment of the securities industry's readiness to trade stock using decimal prices.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) in 1997, the House Subcommittee on Finance and Hazardous Materials held hearings on proposed legislation that would have directed the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to require that securities be traded using dollars and cents instead of the traditional fractions within 1 year of enactment of the legislation; (2) after industry representatives indicated that they were committed to converting to decimals, Congress took no further action on the legislation; (3) industry progress since the hearings has generally been limited; (4) officials of most of these organizations estimated that the cost to convert their systems for decimal trading would be much less than the cost for information technology efforts, such as the year 2000 conversion; (5) they also estimated that it would take less than 6 months to convert to decimals, but they did not expect to complete the conversion until after year 2000 changes have been tested and implemented; (6) an industry study showed that the securities industry was dedicating most of its available information technology resources and time to readying its systems for the impending date change in 2000, the introduction of a single currency in Europe in January 1999, and other information technology initiatives; (7) in particular, industry officials said the time required to test and resolve any year 2000 problems leaves little time for conducting the industrywide testing necessary for a conversion to decimal trading; (8) GAO's work reviewing the year 2000 efforts of numerous federal agencies and other entities has generally found that organizations are avoiding the simultaneous implementation and testing of multiple major systems changes to mitigate the risk of inadvertent malfunctions; (9) ensuring that securities industry systems are ready for the year 2000 is too important to the continued functioning of the industry to risk failure by attempting to implement decimal trading before the year 2000 effort is completed; and (10) however, GAO is recommending several actions that are needed to ensure that decimal trading is implemented as soon as possible after January 1, 2000. |
gao_RCED-97-27 | gao_RCED-97-27_0 | Introduction
Because public housing represents a $90 billion investment on the part of the federal government since the program’s inception in 1937 and because the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) currently spends $5.4 billion a year on operating subsidies and modernization grants for this housing, interest remains keen in knowing how well local public housing authorities (PHA) are managing their properties. As agreed with the Chairman’s office, we reviewed whether HUD’s field offices are using PHMAP and complying with the program’s statutory and regulatory requirements to monitor and provide technical assistance to housing authorities, whether PHMAP scores have increased and how HUD uses the program to inform HUD’s Secretary and the Congress about the performance of housing authorities, and whether PHMAP scores are consistently accurate and can be considered a generally accepted measure of good property management. After the reorganization, however, the responsibilities of individual field office staff became more specialized to focus on the rules and regulations of specific public housing operations.This specialization confused some staff in field offices and housing authorities as well as impaired the ability of some field offices to provide technical assistance. Over the life of the program, HUD has confirmed 6.7 percent of all PHMAP scores. Recommendation
To make better use of the limited resources it has to devote to the oversight of public housing, we recommend that HUD provide guidance to its field offices that clearly (1) articulates their minimally acceptable roles regarding oversight and assistance to housing authorities and (2) emphasizes the importance of using the results of the independent audits to better target HUD’s limited technical assistance resources. The number of troubled authorities reached 83 in 1995, with half of that total consisting of the smallest housing authorities (those managing fewer than 100 units). As shown in table 3.2, the number of high performing authorities grew each year, rising from 1,033 (33 percent) in 1992 to 1,791 (57 percent) in 1995. Also, by 1995, nearly 50 percent of all public housing units were under the management of high-performing authorities. They said that some PHAs with scores over 90 have management problems that the program’s indicators do not measure. They also believed that other uses would be inappropriate because of the limited number of confirmatory reviews the field offices perform and the proportion of PHMAP scores that have been changed after a review. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) use of its Public Housing Management Assessment Program (PHMAP), focusing on: (1) HUD's use and implementation of the program at its field offices; (2) public housing authorities' PHMAP scores over the first 4 years of the program; and (3) limits on any additional uses for the program.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) most of HUD's field offices are using PHMAP to identify troubled housing authorities and target HUD's limited technical assistance resources; (2) however, the field offices have not been systematically using the assessment program, as required by statutes and regulations, to monitor housing authorities' progress in improving their performance and target technical assistance to them; (3) the impact of a 1995 reorganization of the field offices' functions and current departmental downsizing continue to influence some offices' ability to provide technical assistance; (4) performance scores generally have increased during the first 4 full years of the program; (5) with average scores increasing, the total number of troubled housing authorities has decreased, and the greatest proportion of those that are troubled are the smallest authorities, those managing fewer than 100 units; (6) the proportion of high-performing authorities has increased steadily from about 33 percent in 1992 to over 50 percent in 1995; (7) high-performing authorities manage nearly 50 percent of all public housing units; (8) periodically, HUD officials provide the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development and Congress information on the performance of all housing authorities as well as the number of troubled authorities; (9) HUD's confirmatory reviews of the information underlying assessment scores have shown the scores to be inaccurate in half the instances when such reviews were performed; (10) regardless of the scores' accuracy, HUD and public housing industry officials do not believe that the management assessment program comprehensively assesses how well local housing authorities manage their properties; and (11) this is because the assessment program does not include indicators to specifically measure overall housing quality or the quality of maintenance. |
gao_GAO-05-718T | gao_GAO-05-718T_0 | The space shuttle, NASA’s largest individual program, is an essential element of NASA’s ability to implement the Vision because it is the only launch system presently capable of transporting the remaining components necessary to complete assembly of the ISS. However, NASA is currently examining alternative ISS configurations to meet the goals of the Vision and satisfy NASA’s international partners, while requiring as few space shuttle flights as possible to complete assembly. At the same time, NASA will begin the process of closing out or transitioning its space shuttle assets that are no longer needed to support the program —such as its workforce, hardware, and facilities—to other NASA programs. Retiring the space shuttle and, in the larger context, implementing the Vision, will require that the Space Shuttle Program rely on its most important asset—its workforce. While NASA recognizes the importance of having in place a strategy for sustaining a critically skilled workforce to support space shuttle operations, it has only taken preliminary steps to do so. For example, the program identified lessons-learned from the retirement of programs comparable to the space shuttle, such as the Air Force Titan IV Rocket Program. The Potential Impact of Workforce Problems and Other Challenges the Space Shuttle Program Faces Highlight the Need for Workforce Planning
Making progress toward developing a detailed strategy for sustaining a critically skilled space shuttle workforce through the program’s retirement is important given the impact that workforce problems could have on NASA-wide goals. Impact on the prime contractor for space shuttle operations. Several Factors Have Impeded Workforce Planning Efforts
While the Space Shuttle Program is still in the early stages of planning for the program’s retirement, its development of a detailed long-term strategy to sustain its future workforce is being hampered by several factors: Near-term focus on returning the space shuttle to flight. Uncertainties with respect to implementing the Vision. For example, NASA has not yet determined the final configuration of the ISS, the final number of flights for the space shuttle, how ISS operations will be supported after the space shuttle is retired, or the type of vehicle that will be used for space exploration. In our March 2005 report, we made recommendations aimed at better positioning NASA to sustain a critically skilled space shuttle workforce through retirement. Scenario planning can allow the agency to progress with workforce planning, even when faced with uncertainties such as those surrounding the final number of space shuttle flights, the final configuration of the ISS and the vehicle that will be developed for exploration. Since we issued our report and made our recommendation, NASA has taken action and publicly recognized that human capital management and critical skills retention will be a major challenge for the agency as it moves toward retiring the space shuttle. This recognition was most apparent at NASA’s Integrated Space Operations Summit held in March 2005. Despite a limited focus on human capital management in the past, NASA now acknowledges that it faces significant challenges in sustaining a critically skilled workforce and has taken steps to address these issues. | Why GAO Did This Study
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) space shuttle program is key to implementing the President's vision for space exploration, which calls for completing the assembly of the International Space Station (ISS) by the end of the decade. Currently, the space shuttle, which is to be retired after ISS assembly is completed, is the only launch system capable of transporting ISS components. To meet the goals of the President's vision and satisfy ISS's international partners, NASA is examining alternative launch vehicles and ISS configurations. Retiring the space shuttle and, in the larger context, implementing the President's vision, will require NASA to rely on its most important asset--its workforce. Because maintaining a skilled workforce through retirement will be challenging, GAO was asked to discuss the actions NASA has taken to sustain a skilled space shuttle workforce and the challenges it faces in doing so--findings reported on in March 2005 (see GAO, Space Shuttle: Actions Needed to Better Position NASA to Sustain Its Workforce through Retirement, GAO-05-230).
What GAO Found
While NASA recognizes the importance of sustaining a critically skilled workforce to support space shuttle operations, it has made limited progress toward developing a detailed long-term strategy to do so. At the time of our March 2005 review, the Space Shuttle Program had identified lessons learned from the retirement of comparable programs, and United Space Alliance--NASA's prime contractor for space shuttle operations--had begun to prepare for the impact of the space shuttle's retirement on its workforce. However, timely action to address workforce issues is critical given their potential impact on NASA-wide goals. Significant delays in implementing a strategy to sustain the space shuttle workforce would likely lead to larger problems, such as overstretched funding and failure to meet NASA program schedules. NASA and United Space Alliance acknowledge that sustaining their workforces will be difficult, particularly if a career path beyond the space shuttle's retirement is not apparent. Fiscal challenges facing the federal government also make it unclear whether funding for retention tools, such as bonuses, will be available. Our March 2005 report identified several factors that have hampered the Space Shuttle Program's workforce planning efforts. For example, the program's near-term focus on returning the space shuttle safely to flight has delayed other efforts that will help the program determine its workforce requirements, such as assessing hardware and facility needs. Program officials also noted that due to uncertainties in implementing the President's vision for space exploration, requirements on which to base workforce planning efforts have yet to be defined. Despite these factors, our work on strategic workforce planning has shown that even when faced with uncertainty, successful organizations take steps, such as scenario planning, to better position themselves to meet future workforce requirements. Since we issued our report and made our recommendation, NASA has publicly recognized, at its Integrated Space Operations Summit, that human capital management and critical skills retention will be a major challenge for the agency as it progresses toward retirement of the space shuttle. |
gao_GAO-13-359T | gao_GAO-13-359T_0 | The five criteria for determining if the high-risk designation can be removed are (1) a demonstrated strong commitment to, and top leadership support for, addressing problems; (2) the capacity to address problems; (3) a corrective action plan; (4) a program to monitor corrective measures; and (5) demonstrated progress in implementing corrective measures. As detailed in our 2013 high risk update report, we are removing the management of interagency contracting from the High Risk List based on the following:
Continued progress in addressing previously identified deficiencies. Strengthened management controls. OMB and the General Services Administration have taken a number of steps to address the need for better data on interagency contract vehicles. We also will continue to monitor developments in this area. We are removing IRS’s Business Systems Modernization program from the High Risk List because of:
Progress in addressing weaknesses. In January 2012, the agency delivered the initial phase of its cornerstone tax processing project and began the daily processing and posting of individual taxpayer accounts. This enhanced tax administration and improved service by enabling faster refunds for more taxpayers, allowing more timely account updates, and faster issuance of taxpayer notices. In July 2011, we reported that IRS had put in place close to 80 percent of the practices needed for an effective investment management process, including all of the processes needed for effective project oversight. Limiting the Federal Government’s Fiscal Exposure by Better Managing Climate Change Risks
Climate change poses risks to many environmental and economic systems—including agriculture, infrastructure, ecosystems, and human health—and presents a significant financial risk to the federal government. These impacts pose significant financial risks for the federal government, which owns extensive infrastructure, insures property through federal flood and crop insurance programs, provides technical assistance to state and local governments, and provides emergency aid in response to natural disasters. However, the federal government is not well positioned to address this fiscal exposure, partly because of the complex, cross-cutting nature of the issue. The federal government owns and operates hundreds of thousands of buildings and facilities, such as defense installations, that could be affected by a changing climate. According to National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration program officials, a satellite data gap would result in less accurate and timely weather forecasts and warnings of extreme events—such as hurricanes, storm surges and floods. We have concluded that the potential gap in weather satellite data is a high-risk area and added it to the High Risk List this year as well. Potential gaps in satellite data need to be effectively addressed. High Risk Areas Narrowing Due to Progress
Since our 2011 update, sufficient progress has been made to narrow the scope of the following three areas. Management of Federal Oil and Gas Resources
In 2011, we added the Department of the Interior’s (Interior) management of oil and gas on leased federal lands and waters to GAO’s High Risk List for three reasons; (1) Interior did not have reasonable assurance that it was collecting its share of revenue from oil and gas produced on federal lands; (2) Interior was unable to hire, train, and retain sufficient staff to provide oversight and management of oil and gas operations on federal lands and waters; and (3) Interior was reorganizing its oversight of offshore oil and gas activities in the immediate aftermath of the Deepwater Horizon incident. Progress on Remaining High-Risk Areas
There has been notable progress on the vast majority of the issues that remain on the High Risk List. Addressing high-risk problems can save billions of dollars each year. Specifically, FDA needs to: strengthen its Drug Shortage Program by assessing program resources, systematically tracking data on shortages, considering the availability of medically necessary drugs as a strategic priority, and developing relevant results-oriented performance metrics to gauge the agency’s response to shortages; improve oversight of medical device recalls by routinely assessing information on device recalls, clarifying procedures for conducting recalls, developing criteria for evaluating the effectiveness of recalls, and documenting the agency’s basis for terminating individual recalls; implement the Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990; conduct more inspections of foreign establishments manufacturing medical products for the U.S. market and utilize new authority to take a risk-based approach in selecting foreign drug establishments to ensure that they are inspected at a frequency comparable to domestic establishments with similar characteristics; emphasize the importance of timely medical product reviews, particularly for medical devices; and track applications to market medical products for children. In support of Congress and to further progress to address high risk issues, GAO continues to review efforts and make recommendations to address high risk areas problems. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government is the world's largest and most complex entity, with about $3.5 trillion in outlays in fiscal year 2012 funding a broad array of programs and operations. GAO maintains a program to focus attention on government operations that it identifies as high risk due to their greater vulnerabilities to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement or the need for transformation to address economy, efficiency, or effectiveness challenges. Since 1990, more than one-third of the areas previously designated as high risk have been removed from the list because sufficient progress was made to address the problems identified.
This biennial update describes the status of high-risk areas listed in 2011 and identifies any new high-risk area needing attention by Congress and the executive branch. Solutions to high-risk problems offer the potential to save billions of dollars, improve service to the public, and strengthen the performance and accountability of the U.S. government.
What GAO Found
In February 2011, GAO detailed 30 high-risk areas. Sufficient progress has been made to remove the high-risk designation from two areas.
Management of Interagency Contracting. Improvements include (1) continued progress made by agencies in addressing identified deficiencies, (2) establishment of additional management controls, (3) creation of a policy framework for establishing new interagency contracts, and (4) steps taken to address the need for better data on these contracts.
Internal Revenue Service Business Systems Modernization. We are removing this area because progress has been made in addressing significant weaknesses in information technology and financial management capabilities. IRS delivered the initial phase of its cornerstone tax processing project and began the daily processing and posting of individual taxpayer accounts in January 2012. This enhanced tax administration and improved service by enabling faster refunds for more taxpayers, allowing more timely account updates, and faster issuance of taxpayer notices. IRS has put in place close to 80 percent of the practices needed for an effective investment management process, including all of the processes needed for effective project oversight.
While these two areas have been removed from the High Risk List, GAO will continue to monitor them.
This year, GAO has added two areas.
Limiting the Federal Government's Fiscal Exposure by Better Managing Climate Change Risks. Climate change creates significant financial risks for the federal government, which owns extensive infrastructure, such as defense installations; insures property through the National Flood Insurance Program; and provides emergency aid in response to natural disasters. The federal government is not well positioned to address the fiscal exposure presented by climate change, and needs a government wide strategic approach with strong leadership to manage related risks.
Mitigating Gaps in Weather Satellite Data. Potential gaps in environmental satellite data beginning as early as 2014 and lasting as long as 53 months have led to concerns that future weather forecasts and warnings--including warnings of extreme events such as hurricanes, storm surges, and floods--will be less accurate and timely. A number of decisions are needed to ensure contingency and continuity plans can be implemented effectively.
In the past 2 years notable progress has been made in the vast majority of areas that remain on GAO's High Risk List. This progress is due to the combined efforts of the Congress through oversight and legislation, the Office of Management and Budget through its leadership and coordination, and the agencies through their efforts to take corrective actions to address longstanding problems and implement related GAO recommendations.
What GAO Recommends
This report contains GAOs views on progress made and what remains to be done to bring about lasting solutions for each high-risk area. Perseverance by the executive branch in implementing GAOs recommended solutions and continued oversight and action by Congress are essential to achieving progress. GAO is dedicated to continue working with Congress and the executive branch to help ensure additional progress is made. |
gao_GAO-12-390 | gao_GAO-12-390_0 | 3. CMS Used Input from External Entities on the Development and Implementation of the Five-Star System, Which Included Three Key Methodological Decisions
CMS developed and implemented the Five-Star System largely during an 8-month period with input from long-term care stakeholders, its Five-Star System contractor, and members of a technical expert panel. CMS’s contractor established this panel, composed of nine members that the contractor and CMS identified as experts in long-term care and that included researchers and an industry representative, to help guide the development and implementation of the Five-Star System. CMS made numerous methodological decisions during the development of the Five-Star System, including three key methodological decisions. The other two key methodological decisions pertain to how to create ratings that account for variation in the type of care provided across nursing homes. One key methodological decision that CMS made was deciding how to best combine the health inspection, quality measure, and staffing component ratings to create an overall rating. CMS Typically Considers Modifying the Five-Star System in Response to Stakeholders, after Routine Monitoring, and When New Data Sources Become Available
CMS generally considers modifying the Five-Star System in response to (1) methodological issues raised by stakeholders, (2) its routine monitoring of the system, and (3) the availability of new data sources. CMS officials explained that when a methodological issue is raised by long-term care stakeholders, they review the Five-Star System to determine whether modifications should be made. Officials further said that each issue raised does not always result in modifications to the Five- Star System, although some minor modifications have been made. CMS also considers making modifications to the Five-Star System based on its periodic analysis of the system’s rating trends; however, to date, no modifications have been made based on these analyses. intended to help CMS evaluate the Five-Star System and determine if modifications are needed. However, CMS has not taken steps to ensure that these efforts will help CMS achieve its goals for the Five-Star System—to inform consumers and improve provider quality. These plans include evaluating its usability, adding information on nursing home capability, revising the staffing component, and developing additional quality measures. Specifically, while CMS officials have given us broad estimates for when they anticipate some of these efforts to be undertaken, CMS does not have planning documents or strategies that outline specific milestones and timelines associated with implementing the agency’s planned efforts to improve the Five-Star System. We have found, in our prior work, that developing and using specific milestones and timelines to guide and gauge progress toward achieving an agency’s desired results is a leading practice for effective strategic planning and management. CMS Has Not Established How Its Planned Efforts Will Help Achieve Goals
CMS has not established, through planning activities or resulting planning documents, how its planned efforts to improve the Five-Star System will help CMS achieve the goals of the system—to inform consumers and improve provider quality. As a result, CMS may not be identifying and prioritizing its efforts in a manner that best ensures that the goals are being achieved. Recommendations for Executive Action
In order to strengthen CMS’s efforts to improve the Five-Star System, we recommend that the Administrator of CMS use strategic planning practices to: establish—through planning documents—how its planned efforts will help CMS achieve the goals of the Five-Star System, and develop milestones and timelines for each of its planned efforts. Appendix I: Methodology for Identifying Key Methodological Decisions Made during Five- Star Quality Rating System Development
To identify the key methodological decisions made during the development of the Five-Star Quality Rating System (Five-Star System), defined as those that caused the most intense discussion and review according to at least six members of the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services’ (CMS) technical expert panel, we solicited the views of panel members through a series of interviews and questionnaires. 2. Appendix II: Overview of CMS’s Five-Star Quality Rating System Methodology
In the Five-Star System, nursing homes are assigned ratings for three components—health inspections, staffing, and quality measures—and an overall rating. These ratings range from one star to five stars, with more stars indicating higher quality. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2008, in an effort to provide helpful information to consumers and improve provider quality, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) developed and implemented the Five-Star Quality Rating System (Five-Star System). The Five-Star System assigns each nursing home an overall rating and three component ratingshealth inspections, staffing, and quality measuresbased on the extent to which the nursing home meets CMSs quality standards and other measures. The rating scale ranges from one to five stars, with more stars indicating higher quality.
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act directed GAO to review CMSs Five-Star System. This report examines (1) how CMS developed and implemented the Five-Star System and what key methodological decisions were made during development, (2) the circumstances under which CMS considers modifying the Five-Star System, and (3) the extent to which CMS has established plans to help ensure it achieves its goals for the Five-Star System. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed CMS documents, interviewed CMS officials and others, and assessed whether CMS uses certain strategic planning practices.
What GAO Found
CMS developed and implemented the Five-Star System largely during an 8-month period in 2008 with input from long-term care stakeholders, CMSs Five-Star System contractor, and members of a technical expert panela panel composed of nine individuals that CMS identified as experts in long-term care research. CMS made numerous methodological decisions during the development of the Five-Star System, including three key methodological decisions. GAO defines key methodological decisions as those that at least six technical expert panel membersof the nine that GAO contactedrecalled as eliciting the most intense review and discussion during the development of the Five-Star System. One key methodological decision was how to combine the component ratings to create an overall rating. The other two key methodological decisions pertained to how to create ratings that account for variation in the type of care provided across nursing homes.
CMS generally considers modifying the Five-Star System in response to (1) methodological issues raised by stakeholders, (2) its routine monitoring of the system, and (3) the availability of new data sources. CMS officials explained that when a methodological issue is raised by long-term care stakeholders, they review the Five-Star System to determine whether modifications should be made. Officials said that each issue raised does not always result in modifications to the Five-Star System, although some minor modifications have been made. CMS also considers making modifications to the Five-Star System based on its periodic analyses of trends of the system; however, to date, no modifications have been made based on these analyses. Lastly, CMS is currently determining how to modify the staffing and quality measure ratings of the Five-Star System based on newly available data.
CMS has several planned efforts intended to improve the Five-Star System, including evaluating the usability of the system, adding nursing home capability information, revising the staffing component, and developing additional quality measures. However, CMS lacks GAO-identified leading strategic planning practicesthe use of milestones and timelines to guide and gauge progress toward achieving desired results and the alignment of activities, resources, and goalsthat could help the agency to more efficiently and effectively accomplish its planned efforts intended to improve the Five-Star System. While CMS officials have given us broad estimates for when they anticipate some of these efforts to be implemented, CMS does not have milestones and timelines associated with implementing the efforts, which could help ensure that appropriate progress is made towards implementation. In addition, CMS has not established, through planning documents, how its planned efforts to improve the Five-Star System will help CMS achieve the goals of the systemto inform consumers and improve provider quality. As a result, CMS may not be identifying and prioritizing its intended improvements in a manner that best ensures that the goals are being achieved.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Administrator of CMS use strategic planning to establish how its planned efforts will help meet the goals of the Five-Star System, and develop milestones and timelines for each of its planned efforts. CMS agreed with these recommendations. |
gao_GAO-05-480 | gao_GAO-05-480_0 | In recognizing this array of challenges, DOD and Congress have established a number of “technology transition” programs, each with a particular focus. Three of the more recent initiatives include the TTI and DACP, both established by Congress in fiscal year 2003, and the Quick Reaction Fund, established by DOD the same year. TTI is focused on speeding the transition of technologies developed by DOD’s S&T programs into acquisition programs, while DACP is focused on introducing innovative and cost-saving technologies developed inside and outside DOD. Nevertheless, it is too early for us to determine the impact that these programs have had on technology transition. In addition, the programs had limited performance measures to gauge success of individual projects or track return on investment over time. However, the missile experiences operational deficiencies in certain weather conditions, and the program has had problems producing components for the optics. At the time we selected projects for review, only 11 of 68 projects started in fiscal years 2003 and 2004 had been completed, and, of those, only 4 were currently available to warfighters. The Ping project, funded by the Quick Reaction Fund, is an example of a project that is considered complete, but a prototype was never field tested by the warfighter. Selection, Management and Oversight, and Assessment Processes Could Be Improved by Adopting Additional Practices
To ensure that new technologies can be effectively transitioned and integrated into acquisitions, transition programs need to establish effective selection, management and oversight, and assessment processes. The three programs we reviewed adopted these practices to varying degrees. Overall, the DACP had disciplined and well-defined processes for selecting and managing, and overseeing projects. Selection
Success in transitioning technologies from a lab to the field or an acquisition program hinges on a transition program’s ability to choose the most promising technology projects. The DACP also solicits technical experts from inside and outside DOD to assess potential benefits and risks. The program’s popularity, however, has had some drawbacks. The program, which is focused on reaching DOD’s S&T community rather than outside industry, had been communicating in a relatively informal manner and it was unclear during our review the extent to which the TTI was reaching its intended audience. The program manager is currently taking steps to improve the management and oversight of projects. Conclusions
The ability to spur and leverage technological advances is vital to sustaining DOD’s ability to maintain its superiority over others and to improve and even transform how military operations are conducted. The three new transition programs are all appropriately targeted on what has been a critical problem in this regard—quickly moving promising technologies from the laboratory and commercial environment into actual use. Moreover, by tailoring processes and criteria to focus on different objectives, whether that may be saving time or money or broadening the industrial base, DOD has had an opportunity to experiment with a variety of management approaches and criteria that can be used to help solve transition problems affecting the approximately $69 billion spent annually on advanced stages of technology development. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following five actions: To optimize DOD’s growing investment in the Technology Transition Initiative, the Defense Acquisition Challenge Program, and the Quick Reaction Fund, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) to develop data and measures that can be used to support assessments of the performance of the three transition programs as well as broader assessments of the return on investment that would track the long-term impact of the programs. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) and Congress both recognize that Defense technology innovations sometimes move too slowly from the lab to the field. Three new programs have been recently created in DOD to help speed and enhance the transition of new technologies. A report accompanying the fiscal year 2003 National Defense Authorization Act required GAO to review two of these programs--the Technology Transition Initiative (TTI) and Defense Acquisition Challenge Program (DACP). The first is designed to speed transition of technologies from DOD labs to acquisition programs and the second is designed to introduce cost-saving technologies from inside and outside DOD. We were also asked to review the Quick Reaction Fund, which is focused on rapidly field testing promising new technology prototypes. We assessed the impact the programs had on technology transition and the programs' selection, management and oversight, and assessment practices.
What GAO Found
The ability to spur and leverage technological advances is vital to sustaining DOD's ability to maintain its superiority over others and to improve and even transform how military operations are conducted. The three new transition programs we reviewed are all appropriately targeted on what has been a critical problem in this regard--quickly moving promising technologies from the laboratory and commercial environment into actual use. Moreover, by tailoring processes and criteria to focus on different objectives, whether that may be saving time or money or broadening the industrial base, DOD has had an opportunity to experiment with a variety of management approaches and criteria that can be used to help solve transition problems affecting the approximately $69 billion spent over the past 3 years on later stages of technology development. However, it is too soon for us to determine the impact the three new DOD technology transition programs are having. At the time of our review, the programs--the TTI, DACP, and Quick Reaction Fund--had completed only 11 of 68 projects funded in fiscal years 2003 and 2004; of those, only 4 were providing full capability to users. Additionally, the programs have limited measures to gauge success of individual projects and return on investment. Nonetheless, reports from the programs have pointed to an array of benefits, including quicker fielding of technological improvements, cost savings, and the opportunity for DOD to tap into innovative technologies from firms that are new to defense work. Some sponsored technologies are bringing benefits to warfighters, such as a small, unmanned aircraft that can detect chemical and biological agents, and a device the size of an ink pen that can be used to purify water on the battlefield or in disaster areas. Furthermore, DOD officials credit the programs with giving senior leaders the flexibility to rapidly address current warfighter needs and for highlighting smaller technology projects that might otherwise be ignored. Long-term success for the programs likely will depend on how well the programs are managed and overseen. The programs must have effective processes for selecting the best projects, and management and oversight processes that will catch potential problems early. Thus far, of the three programs, the DACP has adopted the most disciplined and structured process for selecting and managing projects, and has encountered few problems managing projects. However, the program has had some difficulties processing the large number of proposals it receives. The TTI has also established selection criteria and processes, but it is unclear the extent to which it is reaching its intended audience and has had less success in tracking its projects. The Quick Reaction Fund has the least structured processes of the three programs--a deliberate approach seen as providing the flexibility needed to field innovations rapidly. It has had some difficulty selecting, managing and tracking projects. |
gao_T-GGD-00-33 | gao_T-GGD-00-33_0 | Community Policing: Observations on the COPS Program Midway Through Program Implementation
I am pleased to be here today to discuss the implementation of the Community Policing Act with special attention to statutory requirements for implementing the Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) grants. The Community Policing Act authorized $8.8 billion to be used from fiscal years 1995 to 2000 to enhance public safety. Its goals are to add 100,000 officer positions, funded by grants, to the streets of communities nationwide and to promote community policing. However, the higher the crime rate, the more likely a jurisdiction was to apply for a COPS grant. The result was the creation of the new Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS). COPS Grants Not Targeted to Specific Law Enforcement Agencies
The Community Policing Act does not target grants to law enforcement agencies on the basis of which agency has the greatest need for assistance, but rather to agencies that meet COPS program criteria. In one of our previous reports, among other things, we reviewed alternative strategies for targeting grants. According to the COPS Office, in January 1997, it began taking steps to increase the level of its monitoring. Large cities—with populations of over 1 million—were awarded about 1 percent of the grants, but these grants made up over 23 percent—about $612 million—of the total grant dollars awarded. About 50 percent of the grant funds were awarded to law enforcement agencies serving populations of 150,000 or less, and about 50 percent of the grant funds were awarded to law enforcement agencies serving populations exceeding 150,000, as the Community Policing Act required. This number was less than 3 percent of the 11,434 hiring grants awarded during the 2-year period. New Officers and Redeployments to Community Policing Count Toward the Goal of 100,000 New Officers on the Street
As of June 1997, a total of 30,155 law enforcement officer positions funded by COPS grants were estimated by the COPS Office to be on the street. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the implementation of the Community Policing Act, focusing on statutory requirements for implementing the Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) grants.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the Public Safety Partnership and Community Policing Act authorizes $8.8 billion to be used from fiscal years (FY) 1995 to 2000 to enhance public safety; (2) it has the goals of adding 100,000 officer positions, funded by grants, to the streets of communities nationwide and promoting community policing; (3) among other things, the act required that half the grants go to law enforcement agencies serving populations of 150,000 or less; (4) the Attorney General created the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services to administer community policing grants; (5) at the end of FY 1997, GAO reported on the Department of Justice's implementation of the act and progress toward achieving program goals; (6) GAO found that grants were not targeted to law enforcement agencies on the basis of which agency had the greatest need for assistance, but rather to agencies that met COPS program criteria; (7) previous work had shown that overall, the higher crime rate, the more likely a jurisdiction was to apply for a COPS grant; (8) the primary reasons contacted jurisdictions chose not to apply for a grant were cost related; (9) GAO reported that the COPS Office provided limited monitoring to assure compliance with the act during the period reviewed; (10) COPS officials said they were taking steps to increase the level of monitoring; (11) the majority of the 13,396 grants awarded in FY 1995 and FY 1996 went to law enforcement agencies serving populations of fewer than 50,000; (12) communities with populations of over 1 million were awarded less than 1 percent of the grants, although they were awarded over 23 percent of the total grant dollars; and (13) as of June 1997, the COPS Office estimated that a total of 30,155 law enforcement officer positions funded by COPS grants were on the streets. |
gao_GAO-02-202 | gao_GAO-02-202_0 | In 1999, and again in 2000, Congress passed legislation that increased payment rates in an effort to make participation in the M+C program more attractive for MCOs. MCO Withdrawals
In the years following the implementation of BBA’s payment and other reforms, MCOs terminated approximately 160 Medicare contracts and reduced the size of the geographic areas served under many of the contracts they renewed. Approximately 1.6 million beneficiaries had to switch to a different M+C plan or return to the FFS program because of these withdrawals. MCOs Used BIPA Payment Increase for Stabilizing Access More Frequently Than for Benefit Improvements
MCOs reported that some or all of the BIPA payment increase would be used to stabilize or enhance beneficiary access to providers for the majority of their M+C plans. MCOs put additional money into a benefit stabilization fund for a few of their plans. For Most M+C Plans, Additional Money Used to Stabilize or Enhance Beneficiary Access to Providers
For about 83 percent of the 543 M+C plans, MCOs reported that some or all of the additional money authorized by BIPA would be used to stabilize or enhance beneficiary access to providers (see fig. 1). In about 20 percent of M+C plans, MCOs reported that they would also improve the benefit packages or contribute to a benefit stabilization fund. 2). 1). BIPA Had Little Effect on Beneficiary Access to M+C Plans in 2001
BIPA had little effect on the number of beneficiaries with access to at least one M+C plan in 2001. Seven MCOs, offering a total of 12 M+C plans, either reentered counties they had previously dropped from their service areas or expanded into counties they had not previously served. Representatives of the MCO that both reentered counties and expanded into new ones also stated that the higher payments motivated their decision to increase their plan’s service area. | What GAO Found
The number of contracts under Medicare's managed care program--Medicare+Choice (M+C)--fell from 340 to 180 between 1998 and 2001. The reduction reflected decisions by some managed care organizations (MCOs) to terminate selected contracts or to discontinue service in some covered areas. Although nearly all MCOs renewed at least some of their Medicare contracts over this period, many reduced the geographic areas served. As a result, 1.6 million beneficiaries had to switch MCOs or return to Medicare's traditional fee-for-service program. Other MCOs plan either to terminate or reduce their participation in M+C at the end of 2001. Concerned about MCO withdrawals, Congress sought to make participation in the program more attractive. As a result of the Benefits Improvement and Protection Act of 2000, aggregate Medicare+Choice payments in 2001 are estimated to have increased by $1 billion. The act permitted three basic uses for the higher payment. MCOs could (1) improve their health plans' benefit packages, (2) set aside money for future years in a benefit stabilization fund, or (3) stabilize or enhance beneficiary access to providers. Most MCOs reported that additional money would be used to stabilize or enhance beneficiary access to providers. A minority of MCOs reported that the money would go toward benefit improvements or be placed in a benefit stabilization fund. In 83 percent of M+C plans, MCOs stated that some or all of the additional money would be used to stabilize or enhance beneficiary access. The payment increases had little effect on the availability of M+C plans during 2001. Following passage of the act, three MCOs reentered counties they had dropped from their service areas, three MCOs expanded into counties that they previously had not served, and one MCO both reentered previously served counties and expanded into new ones. |
gao_GAO-09-851 | gao_GAO-09-851_0 | While three labs had all or nearly all of the key security controls we assessed, our September 2008 report demonstrated that two labs had a significant lack of these controls (see table 1 below). As such, we recommended that the Director of the CDC take action to implement specific perimeter controls for all BSL-4 labs to provide assurance that each lab has a strong perimeter security system in place. HHS indicated that the difference in perimeter security at the five labs was the result of risk-based planning; however, they did not comment on the specific vulnerabilities we identified and whether these should be addressed. In regard to requiring specific perimeter controls for all BSL-4 labs, HHS stated that it would perform further study and outreach to determine whether additional federal regulations are needed. CDC Has Taken Limited Action to Require Specific Perimeter Security Controls
Significant perimeter security differences continue to exist among the nation’s five BSL-4 labs operational at the time of our most recent assessment. The WG is chaired by HHS and the Department of Defense (DOD) and includes representatives from several federal agencies and includes a subgroup that is focused on physical and facility security of biolabs. Two Labs Take Action to Improve Perimeter Security Controls
Although CDC has taken limited action to address our original findings, the two deficient BSL-4 labs have made progress on their own. One BSL-4 lab made a significant number of improvements to increase perimeter security, thus reducing the likelihood of intrusion. The second one made three changes and formed a committee to consider and prioritize other changes. Camera coverage includes all exterior lab entrances. The cameras currently cover the exterior of the building. Additional Observations on Federal Oversight of BSL-4 Labs
During the course of our work, we made two additional observations that concern perimeter security differences among the nation’s five BSL-4 labs that were operational at the time of our assessment: All five BSL-4 labs operating in 2008 had a security plan in place when we assessed them. Yet significant perimeter security differences exist among these high-containment labs. For example, Lab B is a military facility subject to far stricter DOD physical security requirements. CDC inspection officials stated their training and experience had been mainly in the area of safety. According to CDC officials, they are developing a comprehensive strategy for safety and security of biosafety labs and will adjust the training and inspection process accordingly to match this comprehensive strategy. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Director of CDC, and other interested parties. Appendix I: Perimeter Security Controls
To perform our perimeter security assessment of biosafety level 4 (BSL-4) labs, we identified 15 key perimeter security controls. | Why GAO Did This Study
Biosafety laboratories are primarily regulated by either the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) or the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), depending on whether the substances they handle pose a threat to the health of humans or plants, animals, and related products, respectively. Currently, all operational biosafety level 4 (BSL-4) labs are overseen by HHS's Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). BSL-4 labs handle the world's most dangerous agents and toxins that cause incurable and deadly diseases. In September 2008, GAO reported that two of the five operational BSL-4 labs had less than a third of the key perimeter security controls GAO assessed and recommended that CDC implement specific perimeter controls for all BSL-4 labs. GAO was asked to (1) provide an update on what action, if any, CDC took to address the 2008 recommendation; (2) determine whether perimeter security controls at the two deficient BSL-4 labs had improved since the 2008 report; and (3) provide other observations about the BSL-4 labs it assessed. To meet these objectives, GAO reviewed CDC's statement to Congress as well as other agency and HHS documentation on actions taken or to be taken with respect to the 2008 recommendation, reviewed new security plans for the two deficient BSL-4 labs, and performed another physical security assessment of these two labs. GAO is not making any recommendations.
What GAO Found
Significant perimeter security differences continue to exist among the nation's five BSL-4 laboratories operational at the time of GAO's assessment. In 2008, GAO reported that three of the five labs had all or nearly all of the 15 key controls GAO evaluated. Two labs, however, demonstrated a significant lack of these controls, such as camera coverage for all exterior lab entrances and vehicle screening. As a result, GAO recommended that CDC work with USDA to require specific perimeter security controls at high-containment facilities. However, to date, CDC has taken limited action on the GAO recommendation. The two labs GAO found to be deficient made progress on their own despite CDC's limited action. One made a significant number of improvements, thus reducing the likelihood of intrusion. The second made a few changes and formed a committee to consider and prioritize other improvements. Two additional observations about BSL-4 labs concern the significant perimeter security differences among the five labs GAO originally assessed for its 2008 report. First, labs with stronger perimeter controls had additional security requirements mandated by other federal agencies. For example, one lab is a military facility subject to far stricter Department of Defense physical security requirements. Second, CDC inspection officials stated their training and experience has been focused on safety. CDC officials said they are developing a comprehensive strategy for safety and security of labs and will adjust the training and inspection process to match this strategy. In commenting on findings from this report, CDC and the two labs provided additional information on steps taken in response to GAO's prior recommendation and findings. |
gao_NSIAD-95-43 | gao_NSIAD-95-43_0 | However, Army regulations related to TAA primarily focused on the validation and management of planning factors. In 1994, the Army revised its regulations to improve the management of planning factors. Commands and schools were requested prior to the TAA workshops to review and validate logistics data. Additional Procedures Needed to Ensure Data Are Validated
The Army’s revised regulation governing the development and validation of logistical data for the TAA process is an improvement. Also, as part of the TAA process, Army components identify theater-unique requirements that may be different from current doctrinal rules. DOD noted that CASCOM is in the process of establishing procedures to improve the validation of data used in TAA. GAO Comments
1. We continue to believe that the Army’s Total Army Analysis (TAA) process did not ensure valid data, based on the problems we found with the process. 2. 3. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Army's Total Army Analysis (TAA) process, focusing on whether its results are based on valid logistical data assumptions.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the Army lacks adequate procedures to govern the development and review of logistical data used in the TAA process; (2) until recently, Army regulations only focused on the management and validation of planning factors, and those regulations were not followed; (3) the Army has revised its regulations to require that all logistical TAA data be validated and that the process be centrally managed, but further guidance is needed to ensure the validity of all data and sufficient oversight of the process; and (4) Army programmers sometimes use data and assumptions in the TAA process that differ from what Army component planners use for war plans, which can result in vastly different requirements. |
gao_GAO-15-194 | gao_GAO-15-194_0 | The cost of DBA insurance premiums, if allocable and reasonable, is generally reimbursable under government contracts. After State received no offers in response to its solicitation, it withdrew the solicitation 3 days before its existing contract expired and transitioned to a system requiring contractors to obtain DBA insurance on the open market. Leading acquisition practices emphasize the importance of allowing enough time to complete a solicitation, adequately documenting market research, and collecting and analyzing data, among other things. As a result, State had to quickly transition to an open market system without evaluating the relative costs and benefits involved. State Had Little Time to Complete Its June 2012 Single Insurer Solicitation and Communicate Its Decision to Transition to an Open Market System
State had little time to complete its 2012 single insurer solicitation, and when it received no offers, State had to withdraw its solicitation only 3 days before its existing DBA contract was due to expire. State Did Not Conduct a Lessons Learned Assessment or Adequately Document Market Research to Inform Its 2012 Solicitation and Transition to the Open Market
State did not conduct a lessons learned assessment to inform its 2012 DBA solicitation, as suggested by leading practices, and though it conducted market research, it took limited measures to document the analysis and conclusions. DBA Premiums Rose in the Open Market, but Increases Were in a Similar Range of Those Likely Had State Continued Its Single Insurer Program
Our analysis of a sample of State contractors’ DBA rates during the transition from a single insurer program to an open market system showed that the rates increased as State moved to the open market system, but the increases fell in a similar range of those that were likely to have occurred if State had continued its single insurer program. Our analysis also showed that the increase in effective DBA premium rates after the transition was comparable to the increase in effective DBA premium rates requested by State’s single DBA insurer, which said it had lost money under the prior contract. Available Data Do Not Allow for Conclusions as to Whether State’s Transition Affected Small Businesses, but Our Analysis Shows a Potential for Adverse Effects
Our analysis of existing federal procurement data did not show a clear effect on contractors that are small businesses resulting from State’s transition to an open market system, but insurers and contractors have expressed concern that the change has had or could have an adverse effect. State’s policy calls for it to maximize opportunities for small businesses. Without conducting an assessment, State cannot be assured that it is meeting its policy goal of maximizing opportunities for small businesses. State awarded $2.1 billion in contracts to small businesses for work performed overseas in fiscal years 2009 through 2013. While we cannot determine what effect State’s transition had on small businesses based on our analysis of federal procurement data, our discussions with insurance industry officials showed that there is a potential for adverse effects. Incorporate leading practices into any future single insurer solicitations by determining whether existing guidance could be used, or by developing guidance based on leading practices in federal and State Department acquisition regulations and State internal control standards. Conduct an assessment to determine how State’s transition to an open market DBA system is affecting small businesses. This report examines (1) how State managed the transition from a single insurer program to an open market system, (2) the extent to which this change affected DBA premium rates paid by State’s contractors, and (3) the extent to which this change affected small businesses. We reviewed State’s 2008 DBA single insurer contract and its 2012 solicitation. Appendix II: Technical Appendix for Analysis of Department of State Contractors’ Defense Base Act Insurance Premium Rates
To examine our second objective, the impact of the Department of State’s (State) transition to the open market system on premiums paid by State’s contractors, we collected data on contractors’ Defense Base Act (DBA) insurance premiums, rates, and payroll during State’s single insurer program and in the open market. | Why GAO Did This Study
DBA requires U.S. government contractors to buy workers' compensation insurance for most employees working overseas. The cost of this insurance, if allowable under federal regulations, is generally reimbursable under government contracts. From 1992 until 2012, State had a contract with a single insurer to supply all State's contractors working overseas with DBA insurance. In July 2012, State's single insurer program ended after State unsuccessfully sought to solicit a new DBA single insurer agreement and State transitioned to a system requiring its contractors to obtain DBA insurance on the open market. However, concerns were raised about the transition and its impact on State's costs and on small businesses' competitiveness. To address these objectives, GAO was asked to review State's transition.
This report assesses (1) State's management of the transition to an open market system, (2) the change's effect on contractors' premium rates, and (3) the change's effect on small businesses. GAO analyzed State documents; reviewed federal and State contracting regulations; analyzed premium rate data and federal contracting data; and interviewed officials from State, the insurance industry, and contracting firms.
What GAO Found
The Department of State (State) did not follow leading acquisition practices in transitioning from a single insurer Defense Base Act (DBA) program to an open market system. Leading practices emphasize adequately documenting market research, allowing enough time to complete a solicitation, and collecting and analyzing data to select among alternatives, but State took limited measures to document the market research it performed and had little time to complete its 2012 solicitation. State included provisions in the solicitation to which insurers strongly objected, received no offers, and had to cancel the solicitation 3 days before its existing single insurer contract was to expire. As a result, State had to quickly transition to an open market system without weighing the relative costs and benefits to determine which insurance system best served its needs. Until State conducts such an evaluation, it cannot be assured that the open market system is the better alternative, and unless State incorporates leading practices into any future single insurer solicitations, it risks a similar outcome.
GAO found that State contractors' DBA premiums increased following the transition, but the increases were in a range similar to those likely to have occurred if State had continued its single insurer program. For example, median DBA premium rates increased by $1.98 per $100 of payroll. GAO analysis also shows that the increase in DBA premium rates after the transition was in a range comparable to the increase in DBA premium rates requested by State's single DBA insurer, which said it had lost money under the prior contract.
Existing data do not show a clear effect on small businesses resulting from State's transition to an open market system, but insurers and contractors have expressed concern that the change has had or could have an adverse effect. GAO analysis of federal procurement data from fiscal years 2009 through 2013 found a decrease in the percentage of contracts awarded to small businesses, but GAO could not link this to State's transition. Information GAO gathered from insurance industry officials and contractors shows that there is a potential for adverse effects, for example, denial of coverage and higher effective premium rates. State's policy is to maximize opportunities for small businesses, but it has not assessed whether its transition to an open market DBA system is affecting those opportunities. Without such an assessment, State cannot be assured that it is meeting its policy goal of maximizing opportunities for small businesses.
What GAO Recommends
State should (1) determine whether an open market system best suits its needs, (2) incorporate leading practices into any future single insurer solicitation, and (3) assess the effects of its transition on small businesses. State concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-12-280 | gao_GAO-12-280_0 | The directive states that JIEDDO shall “focus” (i.e., lead, advocate, and coordinate) all DOD actions in support of the Combatant Commanders’ and their respective Joint Task Forces’ efforts to defeat IEDs as “weapons of strategic influence.”
GAO, Defense Management: More Transparency Needed over the Financial and Human Capital Operations of the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization, GAO-08-342 (Washington D.C.: Mar. DOD Has Not Provided a Results- Oriented Strategic Plan to Manage Its Counter-IED Efforts
Beginning in February 2006, JIEDDO has been responsible for developing DOD’s IED defeat strategic plan for countering the IED threat, but its strategic-planning actions have not followed leading strategic management practices, or have since been discontinued. However, JIEDDO’s 2007 strategic plan did not contain a means of measuring its performance outcomes, which is a leading strategic management practice. For example, JIEDDO’s 2009–2010 strategic plan contained performance measures, but JIEDDO discontinued using these measures because they determined that the data from these measures were not relevant to the organization’s goals. However, those plans did not have outcome-related goals specific enough for JIEDDO and these organizations to be able to develop enduring measures of effectiveness that inform DOD whether its counter-IED mission is being met. Further, according to JIEDDO officials, the strategic plan applies only to counter- IED efforts managed by JIEDDO and does not apply to all other counter- IED efforts departmentwide. Consequently, successful implementation of JIEDDO’s strategic plan alone will not provide the means necessary for determining the effectiveness of all counter-IED efforts across DOD. As JIEDDO moves forward to implement its counter-IED strategic plan, and DOD develops a departmentwide counter-IED strategic plan, DOD will continue to face difficulty in developing measures of effectiveness, if it does not have results-oriented strategic goals to accompany DOD’s general counter-IED mission statement. Without actionable goals and objectives established by DOD, JIEDDO, and other DOD components cannot tie individual performance measures to DOD’s desired outcomes. As a result, DOD and external stakeholders are left without a comprehensive, data-driven assessment as to whether DOD’s counter- IED efforts are achieving DOD’s mission. While JIEDDO has established procedures to assess counter-IED gaps and prioritize and manage its requirements and individual investments—including coordinating and collaborating with various DOD entities—to rapidly pursue these critical lines of effort, JIEDDO and DOD are not informed about the overall effectiveness of their counter-IED efforts and use of resources as they relate to DOD’s mission. However, given the lack of a DOD-wide counter-IED database, there could be more directed energy efforts that we have not identified. Conclusions
Six years after DOD established JIEDDO as its coordinating agency to lead, advocate, and coordinate responses to the IED threat across the department, DOD continues to lack comprehensive visibility of its counter- IED expenditures and investments, including those from JIEDDO, the military services, and relevant DOD agencies. Specifically, DOD has not implemented adequate actions to (1) provide a comprehensive plan to ensure that all DOD counter-IED efforts are strategically managed in order to achieve its goal to defeat IEDs as a weapon of strategic influence, and (2) comprehensively list all DOD-wide counter-IED initiatives in a database that provides internal and external parties with visibility into the department’s counter-IED efforts. Therefore, it is critical that DOD complete this task as soon as possible to enable JIEDDO to develop its planned counter-IED database as described in DOD’s comments. To analyze the extent to which DOD has provided a comprehensive counter-IED strategic plan including strategic results- oriented goals and metrics that determine the effectiveness of efforts across DOD to combat IEDs, we collected and reviewed DOD’s counter- IED strategic-planning documents from JIEDDO. We considered counter-IED efforts from fiscal years 2006 through 2011 managed by DOD components with involvement in counter-IED efforts: JIEDDO, military services, combatant commands, and defense agencies. To determine the extent to which DOD has identified counter-IED initiatives and activities, and coordinated these efforts, we reviewed JIEDDO databases on counter-IED efforts and interviewed OSD, military service and JIEDDO officials to discuss the availability of data about additional counter-IED efforts/initiatives. Warfighter Support: Actions Needed to Improve the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization’s System of Internal Control. | Why GAO Did This Study
Over $18 billion has been appropriated to the Joint Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) to address the improvised explosive device (IED) threat, and there is widespread consensus that this threat will continue to be influential in future conflicts. DOD established the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) in 2006 to lead, advocate, and coordinate all DOD actions in support of the combatant commanders and their respective joint task forces efforts to defeat IEDs. This report, one in a series on JIEDDOs management and operations, addresses the extent to which DOD (1) has provided a comprehensive counter-IED strategic plan including measurable objectives that determine the effectiveness of efforts across DOD to combat IEDs, and (2) has identified counter-IED initiatives and activities, and coordinated these efforts. To address these objectives GAO reviewed counter-IED efforts from fiscal years 2006 through 2011, reviewed and analyzed relevant strategic-planning documents, collected and reviewed data identifying DOD counter-IED efforts, and met with DOD and service officials.
What GAO Found
As the responsible DOD agency for leading, advocating, and coordinating all DOD efforts to defeat improvised explosive devices (IED) the Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) was directed to develop DODs counter-IED strategic plan in February 2006 under DOD Directive 2000.19E. As previously recommended by GAO, JIEDDO has made several attempts to develop such a plan, but its strategic-planning actions have not followed leading strategic-management practices or have since been discontinued. For example, JIEDDOs 2007 strategic plan did not contain a means of measuring its performance outcomesa leading strategic-management practice. In addition, JIEDDOs 20092010 strategic plan contained performance measures, but JIEDDO discontinued using these measures because it later determined that the measures were not relevant to the organizations goals. Although DOD tasked JIEDDO to develop its counter-IED strategic plan, DOD has not translated DODs counter-IED general mission objective of eliminating IEDs as a weapon of strategic influence into actionable goals and objectives. JIEDDO issued a new counter-IED strategic plan in January 2012; however, the new plan does not apply to all other counter-IED efforts departmentwide, only to those managed by JIEDDO. Consequently, JIEDDOs new strategic plan alone will not provide the means necessary for determining the effectiveness of all counter-IED efforts across DOD. Further, as JIEDDO implements its plan, it will continue to face difficulty measuring effectiveness until DOD establishes and provides results-oriented goals to accompany its general mission objective. Without actionable goals and objectives established by DOD, JIEDDO and other DOD components cannot tie individual performance measures to DODs desired outcomes. As a result, DOD and external stakeholders will be left without a comprehensive, data-driven assessment as to whether their counter-IED efforts are achieving DODs mission and will not be informed about the overall effectiveness of its counter-IED efforts or use of resources as they relate to DODs mission.
DOD has not fully identified its counter-IED initiatives and activities, and as a result is not able to effectively coordinate these efforts across DOD. In attempting to develop a comprehensive database, as previously recommended by GAO, JIEDDO has used at least three systems to collect and record complete information on DODs counter-IED efforts but discontinued each of them for reasons including lack of timeliness, comprehensiveness, or cost. For example, beginning in 2009, JIEDDO pursued Technology Matrix as a possible counter-IED database for all efforts within the DOD. However, JIEDDO discontinued support for Technology Matrix as a database since DOD did not require all relevant organizations to provide information to JIEDDO, and therefore it was not comprehensive. Without an automated means for comprehensively capturing data on all counter-IED efforts, the military services may be unaware of potential overlap, duplication, or fragmentation. For example, GAO identified six systems that DOD components developed to emit energy to neutralize IEDs, and DOD spent about $104 million collectively on these efforts, which could be duplicative because the military services did not collaborate on these efforts. Given the lack of a DOD-wide counter-IED database, other efforts may be overlapping.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends four actions for DOD to develop a comprehensive strategic plan with strategic outcome-related goals and a complete listing of counter-IED efforts to maximize its resources. DOD concurred with one of the recommendations but did not concur with three. GAO continues to believe that its recommendations are warranted as discussed in the report. |
gao_GAO-13-293 | gao_GAO-13-293_0 | Geographic Combatant Commands’ Resources Have Grown Considerably over the Last Decade
Since fiscal year 2001, the number of authorized military and civilian positions and mission and headquarters-support costs devoted to the five geographic combatant commands that we reviewed substantially increased. In our analysis of data provided by the commands, we found considerable increases in the number of authorized military and civilian positions—about 50 percent from fiscal year 2001 through fiscal year 2012—and in the costs for mission and headquarters-support—more than doubling from fiscal year 2007 through fiscal year 2012—at the five combatant commands that we reviewed. In addition to data on authorized military and civilian positions, we found that the data on the number of personnel performing contract services across the combatant commands and service component commands varied or was unavailable, and thus trends could not be identified. DOD Has Taken Steps to Manage Combatant Commands’ Resources, but Its Processes to Review Size and to Oversee Commands Have Weaknesses
While DOD has taken some steps to review the combatant commands’ size and structure and to identify the commands’ resources, DOD’s processes have four primary weaknesses that challenge its ability to make informed decisions: (1) the absence of a comprehensive, periodic review of the size and structure of the combatant commands, (2) inconsistent use of personnel management systems to identify and track assigned personnel across the combatant commands, (3) lack of visibility by the combatant commands and Joint Staff over authorized manpower and personnel at the service component commands, and (4) lack of transparent information identifying each combatant command’s personnel or mission and headquarters-support funding in the military departments’ budget documents for operation and maintenance. Our prior work on strategic human capital management found that high-performing organizations periodically reevaluate their human capital practices and use complete and reliable data to help achieve their missions and ensure resources are properly matched to the needs of today’s environment. DOD’s Process for Managing Combatant Commands’ Size and Structure Is Focused on Proposed Increases and Does Not Periodically Evaluate Requirements
DOD has an ongoing process to assess the combatant commands’ requests for additional positions, but does not periodically evaluate whether authorized positions at the combatant commands’ are still needed to support their assigned missions. Specifically, some military service regulations that guide manpower requirements at the service component commands require manpower to be periodically evaluated to ensure they still meet assigned missions. Without a comprehensive, periodic evaluation of the commands’ authorized positions, DOD will not be able to ensure that the combatant commands are properly sized and structured to meet their assigned missions or ensure that the commands identify opportunities for managing personnel resources more efficiently. The department concurred with three of our recommendations that the Secretary of Defense: (1) direct the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to revise Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 1001.01A to require the combatant commands to identify, manage, and track all personnel, including temporary personnel such as civilian overhires and activated reservists, in e-JMAPS and identify specific guidelines and timeframes for the combatant commands to consistently input and review personnel data in the system; (2) direct the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the combatant commanders and secretaries of the military departments, to develop and implement a formal process to gather information on authorized manpower and assigned personnel at the service component commands; and (3) direct the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) to revise volume 2, chapter 1 of DOD’s Financial Management Regulation 7000.14R to require the military departments, in their annual budget documents for operation and maintenance, to identify the authorized military positions and civilian and contractor full-time equivalents at each combatant command and provide detailed information on funding required by each command for mission and headquarters-support, such as civilian pay, contract services, travel, and supplies. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
We conducted this work in response to direction from the congressional committees to review the resources of the combatant commands. This report (1) identifies the trends in the resources devoted to the Department of Defense’s (DOD) geographic combatant commands and their service component commands, and (2) assesses the extent to which DOD has processes in place to manage and oversee the resources of the combatant commands. Authorized military and civilian positions and mission and headquarters-support costs for these two service component commands are represented in Appendix IV. Appendix VI: Resources at U.S. Pacific Command and its Service Component Commands
Appendix VI: Resources at U.S. Pacific Command and its Service Component Commands Other includes authorized military and civilian positions in Special Operations Command Pacific, security cooperation organizations, U.S. | Why GAO Did This Study
To perform its missions around the world, DOD operates geographic combatant commands each with thousands of personnel. In response to direction from the congressional committees to review the resources of the combatant commands, GAO (1) identified the trends in the resources devoted to DOD's geographic combatant commands and their service component commands, and (2) assessed the extent that DOD has processes in place to manage and oversee the resources of the combatant commands. For this review, GAO obtained and analyzed data on resources, to include authorized positions and mission and headquarters-support costs, for five regional combatant commands' and their service component commands, excluding U.S. Central Command. GAO also interviewed officials regarding commands' manpower and personnel policies and procedures for reporting resources.
What GAO Found
GAO's analysis of resources devoted to the Department of Defense's (DOD) geographic combatant commands shows that authorized military and civilian positions and mission and headquarters-support costs have grown considerably over the last decade due to the addition of two new commands and increases in authorized positions at theater special operations commands. Data provided by the commands shows that authorized military and civilian positions increased by about 50 percent from fiscal years 2001 through 2012, to about 10,100 authorized positions. In addition, mission and headquarters support-costs at the combatant commands more than doubled from fiscal years 2007 through 2012, to about $1.1 billion. Both authorized military and civilian positions and mission and headquarters-support costs at the service component commands supporting the combatant commands also increased. Data on the number of personnel performing contract services across the combatant commands and service component commands varied or was unavailable, and thus trends could not be identified.
DOD has taken some steps to manage combatant commands' resources, but its processes to review size and oversee the commands have four primary weaknesses that challenge the department's ability to make informed decisions.
DOD considers the combatant commands' requests for additional positions, but it does not periodically evaluate the commands' authorized positions to ensure they are still needed to meet the commands' assigned missions.
DOD tracks some assigned personnel; however, all personnel supporting the commands are not included in DOD's personnel management system and reviews of assigned personnel vary by command.
The service component commands support both service and combatant command missions. However, the Joint Staff and combatant commands lack visibility and oversight over the authorized manpower and personnel at the service component commands to determine whether functions at the combatant commands can be fulfilled by service component command personnel.
Each military department submits annual budget documents for operation and maintenance to inform Congress of total authorized positions, full-time equivalents, and mission and headquarters-support funding for all combatant commands that they support. However, these documents do not provide transparency into the resources directed to each combatant command.
GAO's work on strategic human capital management found that high-performing organizations periodically reevaluate their human capital practices and use complete and reliable data to help achieve their missions and ensure resources are properly matched to the needs of today's environment. Until DOD effectively manages the resources of the combatant commands, it may be difficult to ensure that the commands are properly sized to meet their assigned missions, or to identify opportunities to carry out those missions efficiently.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends DOD: require a periodic evaluation of the combatant commands' size and structure; use existing systems to manage and track all assigned personnel; develop a process to gather information on authorized manpower and assigned personnel at the service component commands; and require information in the budget on authorized positions, full-time equivalents, and funding for each combatant command. DOD nonconcurred with GAO's first recommendation, but GAO believes it is still needed to add rigor to the manpower requirements process. DOD concurred with GAO's three other recommendations. |
gao_GAO-01-821 | gao_GAO-01-821_0 | Introduction
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is responsible for developing, administering, enforcing, and revising an effective, enforceable set of aviation safety regulations that enhance aviation safety and security and promote the efficient use of airspace. Studies specifically targeting the efficiency of FAA’s rulemaking process over almost 40 years have also identified similar problems. to establish a 16-month time limit for FAA’s finalization of rules after the close of the public comment period and a 45-day requirement for OST’s review of FAA’s significant proposed and final rules (see ch. As shown in figure 8, FAA formally initiated about 60 percent of mandated rulemaking actions and about one-third of NTSB’s recommendations within 6 months. Time FAA Took to Complete Steps in the Rulemaking Process Varied
For significant rules published during the 6-year period from fiscal year 1995 through fiscal year 2000, FAA took a median time of about 2 ½ years to proceed from the formal initiation of the rulemaking process to the publication of the final rule in the Federal Register. Table 2 shows the members and duties of FAA’s steering committee and management council. Rulemaking Reforms Did Not Reduce the Time Taken for Departmental Review and Approval of FAA’s Significant Rules
The time OST took to review and approve rules did not improve after FAA reformed its rulemaking process in 1998. Too often, policy issues were not resolved in a timely manner. However, since the process was reformed in January 1998 through fiscal year 1999, we found that FAA had not documented any evaluations. Recommendations
To improve the efficiency of its rulemaking process and reap the maximum benefits from its rulemaking reform efforts, we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation direct the FAA Administrator to take steps to improve management involvement in the rulemaking process by reducing the number of top-priority projects to a manageable number over time by limiting the number of projects added until existing projects are completed and establishing criteria for ranking the highest priority rules so that the lowest ranked of these priority rules may be tabled if necessary to allow sufficient resources to be applied to emerging, higher-priority projects; providing resources sufficient for rulemaking teams to meet the agency's suggested time frames. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) issues regulations to strengthen aviation safety and security and to promote the efficient use of airspace. FAA's rulemaking is a complicated process intended to ensure that all aspects of any regulatory change are fully analyzed before any change goes into effect. During the last 40 years, many reports have documented problems in FAA's rulemaking efforts that have delayed the formulation and finalization of its rules. This report reviews FAA's rulemaking process. GAO reviewed 76 significant rules and found that FAA's rulemaking process varied widely. These rules constituted the majority of FAA's workload of significant rules from fiscal year 1995 through fiscal year 2000.
What GAO Found
GAO found that FAA had begun about 60 percent of the rulemaking projects by Congress and about a third of the rulemaking projects recommended by the National Transportation Safety Board within six months. For one-fourth of the mandates and one-third of the recommendations however, at least five years passed before FAA began the process. Once the rule was formally initiated, FAA took a median time of two and a half years to proceed from formal initiation of the rulemaking process through publication of the final rule. In 1998, FAA improved the rulemaking process and shortened the time frames for finalizing rules. These reforms included establishing a steering committee and a rulemaking management council to improve management involvement in setting priorities and resolving policy issues. GAO found that after the reforms were implemented, the median time for reviewing and finalizing a rule increased. This suggests that the productivity of FAA's rulemaking process for significant rules decreased after FAA's reforms. |
gao_GAO-04-782T | gao_GAO-04-782T_0 | GLNPO is further responsible for coordinating the agency’s actions both in headquarters and in the regions to improve Great Lakes’ water quality. Many Federal and State Programs Fund Restoration Activities in the Great Lakes Basin
About 200 programs—148 federal and 51 state—fund restoration activities within the Great Lakes Basin. Most of these programs, however, involve the localized application of national or state environmental initiatives and do not specifically focus on basin concerns. However, basin-specific information was available on some of these programs. Officials from seven federal agencies identified 33 Great Lakes-specific programs that had expenditures of $387 million in fiscal years 1992 through 2001. In lieu of such a plan, organizations at the binational, federal, and state levels have developed their own strategies for the Great Lakes, which have inadvertently made the coordination of various programs operating in the basin more challenging. Other Great Lakes strategies address unique environmental problems or specific geographical areas. Although there are many strategies and coordination efforts ongoing, no one organization coordinates restoration efforts. Ultimate responsibility for coordinating Great Lakes restoration programs rests with GLNPO; however, GLNPO has not fully exercised this authority. To improve coordination of Great Lakes activities and ensure that federal dollars are effectively spent, we recommended that the Administrator, EPA, ensure that GLNPO fulfills its responsibility for coordinating programs within the Great Lakes Basin; charge GLNPO with developing, in consultation with the governors of the Great Lakes states, federal agencies, and other organizations, an overarching strategy that, clearly defines the roles and responsibilities for coordinating and prioritizing funding for projects; and submit a time-phased funding requirement proposal to the Congress necessary to implement the strategy. Recent assessments of overall progress, which rely on a mix of quantitative data and subjective judgments, do not provide an adequate basis for making an overall assessment. To fulfill the need for a monitoring system called for in the GLWQA and to ensure that the limited funds available are optimally spent, we recommended that the Administrator, EPA, in coordination with Canadian officials and as part of an overarching Great Lakes strategy, (1) develop environmental indicators and a monitoring system for the Great Lakes Basin that can be used to measure overall restoration progress and (2) require that these indicators be used to evaluate, prioritize, and make funding decisions on the merits of alternative restoration projects. | Why GAO Did This Study
The five Great Lakes, which comprise the largest system of freshwater in the world, are threatened on many environmental fronts. To address the extent of progress made in restoring the Great Lakes Basin, which includes the lakes and surrounding area, GAO (1) identified the federal and state environmental programs operating in the basin and funding devoted to them, (2) evaluated the restoration strategies used and how they are coordinated, and (3) assessed overall environmental progress made in the basin restoration effort.
What GAO Found
There are 148 federal and 51 state programs funding environmental restoration activities in the Great Lakes Basin. Most of these programs are nationwide or statewide programs that do not specifically focus on the Great Lakes. However, GAO identified 33 federal Great Lakes specific programs, and 17 additional unique Great Lakes specific programs funded by states. Although Great Lakes funding is not routinely tracked for many of these programs, we identified a total of about $3.6 billion in basin-specific projects for fiscal years 1992 through 2001. Several disparate Great Lakes environmental strategies are being used at the binational, federal, and state levels. Currently, these strategies are not coordinated in a way that ensures effective use of limited resources. Without such coordination it is difficult to determine the overall progress of restoration efforts. The Water Quality Act of 1987 charged EPA's Great Lakes National Program Office with the responsibility for coordinating federal actions for improving Great Lakes' water quality; however, the office has not fully exercised this authority to this point. With available information, current environmental indicators do not allow a comprehensive assessment of restoration progress in the Great Lakes. Current indicators rely on limited quantitative data and subjective judgments to determine whether conditions are improving, such as whether fish are safe to eat. The ultimate success of an ongoing binational effort to develop a set of overall indicators for the Great Lakes is uncertain because it relies on the resources voluntarily provided by several organizations. Further, no date for completing a final list of indicators has been established. |
gao_GAO-03-625 | gao_GAO-03-625_0 | For example, its National Surgical Quality Improvement Program (NSQIP) examines postoperative outcomes. Accrediting bodies have not been sending these letters to participating institutions. For example, as of May 2003, VA had not decided whether reviewers would examine records from VA’s new outpatients. VA Does Not Determine Whether VA Medical Centers’ Policies Are Consistent with Its National Requirements for Resident Supervision
VA does not know whether all its medical centers have adopted policies that are consistent with the specific requirements in its resident supervision handbook for the supervision of residents’ diagnosis, treatment, and discharge of patients. We found that the requirement of a medical center in one of the four networks that had not conducted this review was less stringent than the requirement in VA’s handbook for supervision of diagnostic and therapeutic procedures. VA’s Plans to Use External Peer Review to Monitor Documentation of Supervision Have Not Been Finalized
To obtain more complete information about the extent to which its requirements for supervision are being followed, VA has begun to test its plans to monitor adherence through external peer review of the documentation of supervision. Without a sample of records from new patients, it will not be possible to assess adherence to VA’s requirement for supervisory involvement during a veteran’s first outpatient visit. VA Is Acting to Obtain Information about Supervision from Accrediting Bodies and Residents
VA is making efforts to obtain consistent access to information provided by accrediting bodies and residents about the quality of resident supervision in VA medical centers. VA headquarters also developed a survey to obtain feedback from residents, but cannot send it to a random sample of residents because VA does not have a complete list of its residents. VA Uses Its Programs for Monitoring Patient Care to Identify and Correct Problems with Resident Supervision
VA headquarters, network, and medical center officials use information from VA’s programs for monitoring the quality and outcomes of patient care to identify and correct problems with resident supervision. In addition to reviewing NSQIP reports, headquarters officials who oversee VA’s surgical services monitor the frequency with which supervising physicians are in the operating or procedural suite when residents perform surgeries. Conclusions
VA cannot assure that the residents who provide care in its facilities receive adequate supervision because its current procedures for monitoring supervision are insufficient. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of Veterans Affairs direct the Under Secretary for Health to take steps to improve VA’s oversight of the supervision of residents by ensuring that all VA medical centers that provide GME adopt and adhere to the requirements for resident supervision established in VA’s handbook and ensuring that external peer review of documentation of resident supervision includes examination of records from VA’s new outpatients. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) provides graduate medical education (GME) to as many as one-third of U.S. resident physicians, but oversight responsibilities spread across VA's organizational components and multiple affiliated hospitals and medical schools could allow supervision problems to go undetected or uncorrected. GAO was asked to examine VA's procedures for (1) monitoring VA medical centers' adherence to VA's requirements for resident supervision, (2) using evaluations of supervision by GME accrediting bodies and residents, and (3) using information about resident supervision drawn from VA's programs for monitoring the quality and outcomes of patient care.
What GAO Found
VA cannot assure that the resident physicians who provide care in its facilities receive adequate supervision because its procedures for monitoring supervision are insufficient. VA does not know whether medical centers have adopted VA's national requirements for supervision of residents' diagnosis, treatment, or discharge of patients. VA officials require a review of only one specific requirement that is intended to ensure availability of supervision when a supervising physician does not need to be in the operating or procedural suite while a resident performs a diagnostic or therapeutic procedure. Four of 11 network officials we interviewed had not conducted this review, and the requirement at one medical center in one of these four networks was less stringent than VA's national requirement. To obtain more complete information about adherence to its national supervision requirements, VA plans to have external peer reviewers examine documentation of supervision in patients' medical records. VA's plans for this review have not been finalized. For example, as of May 2003, VA had not decided whether reviewers would examine records from VA's new outpatients. Without records from new patients, reviewers will not be able to assess documentation of residents' supervision during a veteran's first outpatient visit. To improve its oversight, VA is making efforts to obtain information from accrediting bodies and residents about the quality of resident supervision. For example, VA has taken steps to obtain direct access to letters from accrediting bodies that contain evaluations of the GME programs in which its medical centers participate. To solicit feedback from residents, VA implemented a national survey, but was unable to send this survey to a representative sample of residents from each VA medical center because it does not have a complete central list of its residents. VA is taking action to obtain this information. In addition, VA uses information from its broader programs for monitoring the quality and outcomes of patient care, such as its patient safety and surgical quality improvement programs, to identify and correct problems with resident supervision. Information from these programs has served as the basis for corrective actions by VA officials. |
gao_GAO-07-836 | gao_GAO-07-836_0 | DOD Has Taken Steps to Facilitate the Integration of UAS, but Further Steps Are Needed to Address Integration Challenges
DOD components have developed guidance—such as a Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Tactical Employment of Unmanned Aircraft Systems and a Joint Concept of Operations for UAS— to facilitate UAS integration. Until DOD takes steps to address the need for DOD-wide advance coordination, it may continue to face challenges in successfully integrating UAS into combat operations and may exacerbate existing integration challenges. DOD Has Developed Guidance to Facilitate the Integration of UAS
DOD components have developed guidance to facilitate the integration of UAS into combat operations. As additional ISR assets are rapidly acquired and fielded to meet the increasing demand for ISR support in ongoing operations, CENTCOM has recognized that advance coordination is a critical factor in integrating UAS into combat operations by enabling efficient deployment of assets and effective utilization of them once they are in theater. Until DOD takes steps to address the need for DOD-wide advance coordination, it may be unable to successfully integrate UAS and other ISR assets into combat operations and existing integration challenges may be exacerbated. DOD’s Approach to Allocating and Tasking UAS and Other ISR Assets Does Not Consider the Capabilities of All ISR Assets
DOD’s current approach to allocating and tasking its ISR assets, including UAS, does not consider the capabilities of all ISR assets because it lacks an awareness or visibility over all ISR capabilities available to support the combatant commanders and how DOD ISR assets are being used, which hinders DOD’s ability to optimize the use of its assets. While there are procedures, such as the Air Tasking Order and Airspace Control Order, for tracking where theater- and tactical-level assets are operating for airspace control and deconfliction purposes, a comparable mechanism for tracking the missions these assets are supporting or how they are being used on a daily basis does not exist. A mechanism that provides this visibility would allow tactical units, when appropriate, to leverage other assets operating in their area to optimize the information captured and avoid unnecessary duplicative taskings. DOD Lacks Complete Metrics and Feedback for Fully Evaluating the Performance of Its ISR Assets to Ensure Warfighter’s Needs Are Met
DOD is unable to fully evaluate the performance of its ISR assets because it lacks a complete set of metrics and does not consistently receive feedback from operators and intelligence personnel to ensure the warfighter’s needs are met. Without feedback and a complete set of metrics for evaluating its ISR assets, DOD may not be in the best position to validate how well the warfighter needs are being met, the true demand for ISR assets, and whether it is optimizing the use of existing assets, or to acquire new systems that best support warfighting needs. However, DOD currently assesses its ISR missions with limited quantitative metrics such as the number of targets planned versus the number collected against. While these metrics are a good start, DOD officials acknowledge that the current metrics do not take into account all of the qualitative considerations associated with measuring ISR asset effectiveness such as the cumulative knowledge provided by numerous ISR missions, whether the ISR asset did what it was intended to do, whether it had the intended effect, and whether the intelligence captured contributed towards accomplishment of the mission. The JFCC-ISR is working with the combatant commands to develop additional quantitative ISR metrics as well as qualitative metrics to assess the effectiveness of ISR assets, although DOD officials acknowledge the progress in developing metrics has been limited. To ensure DOD has the information needed to consider all ISR assets when allocating and tasking these assets, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense develop a mechanism for obtaining information on all ISR assets, including all DOD, national, and allied assets, operating in each of the combatant commanders’ area of operations; and allowing users at all levels within DOD to gain real-time situational awareness on where DOD ISR assets are operating and, where not prohibited by the mission, what they are being used to do. To determine the extent to which DOD’s approach to allocating and tasking its intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets, including UAS, considers all available ISR assets to optimize their capabilities, we met with key DOD and service officials, including those from U.S. Central Command and associated Army and Air Force component commands, the Combined Air Operations Center at Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, the Joint Functional Component Command for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance and other organizations. | Why GAO Did This Study
Combatant commanders carrying out ongoing operations rank the need for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities as high on their priority lists. The Department of Defense (DOD) is investing in many ISR systems, including unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), to meet the growing demand for ISR assets to support the warfighter. GAO was asked to evaluate DOD's efforts to integrate UAS into ongoing operations while optimizing the use of all DOD ISR assets. Specifically, this report addresses the extent that (1) DOD has taken steps to facilitate the integration of UAS into combat operations, and (2) DOD's approach to allocating and tasking its ISR assets considers all available ISR capabilities, including those provided by UAS. GAO also reviewed the extent that DOD evaluates the performance of its ISR assets, including UAS, in meeting warfighters' needs. To perform this work, GAO analyzed data and guidance on the use of ISR assets, and interviewed DOD officials, including those supporting ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
What GAO Found
DOD components have developed guidance to facilitate the integration of UAS into combat operations; however, further steps are needed to coordinate the deployment of these assets. For example, DOD developed guidance for the tactical employment of UAS and a Joint UAS Concept of Operations. This guidance is an important first step but does not address coordinating UAS and other ISR assets prior to deploying them to ongoing operations, which U.S. Central Command recognized is a critical factor in integrating UAS into combat operations. Until DOD addresses the need for DOD-wide advance coordination, it may continue to face challenges in successfully integrating UAS and other ISR assets into combat operations and may exacerbate integration challenges such as limited bandwidth. DOD's approach to allocating and tasking its ISR assets, including UAS, hinders its ability to optimize the use of these assets because it does not consider the capabilities of all available ISR assets. The command charged with recommending how theater-level DOD ISR assets should be allocated to support operational requirements does not have awareness of all available ISR assets because DOD does not have a mechanism for obtaining this information. Similarly, the commander responsible for coordinating ongoing joint air operations does not have information on how assets controlled by tactical units are being used or what missions they've been tasked to support. Nor do tactical units have information on how theater-level assets and ISR assets embedded in other units are being tasked, which results in problems such as duplicative taskings. This lack of visibility occurs because DOD does not have a mechanism for tracking the missions both theater- and tactical-level ISR assets are supporting or how they are being used. Without an approach to allocation and tasking that includes a mechanism for considering all ISR capabilities, DOD may be unable to fully leverage all available ISR assets and optimize their use. DOD is unable to fully evaluate the performance of its ISR assets because it lacks a complete set of metrics and does not consistently receive feedback to ensure the warfighter's needs were met. Although the Joint Functional Component Command for ISR has been tasked with developing ISR metrics, DOD currently assesses its ISR missions with limited quantitative metrics such as the number of targets planned versus captured. While these metrics are a good start, DOD officials acknowledge that the current metrics do not capture all of the qualitative considerations associated with measuring ISR asset effectiveness such as the cumulative knowledge provided by numerous ISR missions. There is an ongoing effort within DOD to develop additional quantitative as well as qualitative ISR metrics, but no DOD-wide milestones have been established. Furthermore, DOD guidance calls for an evaluation of the results of joint operations; however, DOD officials acknowledge that this feedback is not consistently occurring due to the fast pace of operations in theater. Without metrics and feedback, DOD may not be able to validate how well the warfighters' needs are being met, whether it is optimizing the use of existing assets, or which new systems would best support warfighting needs. |
gao_GAO-12-360 | gao_GAO-12-360_0 | More Than $794 Million in Undisbursed Balances Remained in Expired Grant Accounts in PMS; More Than $126 Million Also Remained in Dormant Accounts in ASAP
We found that more than $794 million in undisbursed balances remained in expired PMS accounts, including undisbursed balances that remained in accounts several years past their expiration date. We also found that more than $126 million in undisbursed balances remained in dormant grant accounts—accounts for which there had been no activity for 2 years or more—in ASAP, another large federal payment system. These are accounts that were more than 3 months past the grant end date and had no activity for 9 months or more. $70.8 million in undisbursed balances in expired grant accounts that were 5 years or more past the grant end date, including $6.1 million that remained unspent 10 years after the grant end date. The HHS Inspector General issued four reports from 2008 to 2009 on grant closeout in PMS at four selected operating divisions. Individual accounts in the ASAP system can include multiple grant agreements between a federal agency and a grantee; therefore, these reports cannot be used to identify individual grants eligible for closeout or the amount of funds that remain undisbursed for an individual grant agreement. We found that agencies did not have adequate systems and policies in place to properly monitor grant closeout. The Rural Housing Service has We also found that agencies did not deobligate funds from grants eligible for closeout in a timely manner. The legislation specifically required that OMB instruct affected agencies to report on the following information: 1. details on future action the department, agency, or instrumentality will take to resolve undisbursed balances in expired grant accounts, 2. the method that the department, agency, or instrumentality uses to track undisbursed balances in expired grant accounts, 3. identification of undisbursed balances in expired grant accounts that may be returned to the Treasury of the United States, and 4. in the preceding 3 fiscal years, details on the total number of expired grant accounts with undisbursed balances (on the first day of each fiscal year) for the department, agency, or instrumentality and the total finances that have not been obligated to a specific project remaining in the accounts. By instead focusing on undisbursed balances obligated to grant agreements that have reached the end of their period of performance and are eligible for closeout, OMB could better direct agency management focus toward a subset of grants in need of more immediate attention. Instruct agencies with undisbursed balances still obligated to grants several years past their grant end date to develop and implement strategies to quickly and efficiently take action to close out these grants and return unspent funds to the Treasury when appropriate. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives for this report were to evaluate: (1) the amount of undisbursed funding remaining in expired grant accounts including the amounts that have remained unspent for 5 years or more and for 10 years or more, (2) issues raised by GAO and federal inspectors general (IG) related to timely grant closeout by federal agencies, and (3) what actions the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and agencies have taken to track undisbursed balances in grants eligible for closeout. To address the first objective, we analyzed data from two federal payment systems: the Payment Management System (PMS) administered by Department of Health and Human Services’ (HHS) Program Support Center (PSC) and the Automated Standard Application for Payments (ASAP) system administered jointly by the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) and the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond. In 2011, PMS and ASAP disbursed $415 billion and $62 billion in federal grant funding, respectively, or 79 percent of all civilian federal grant disbursements in fiscal year 2011. To identify federal governmentwide guidance related to federal agency performance reporting, we reviewed OMB Circular No. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2008,GAO reported that about $1 billion in undisbursed funding remained in expired grant accounts in the largest civilian payment system for grants, PMS, operated by the Department of Health and Human Services Program Support Center. GAO was asked to update its 2008 analysis evaluating: (1) the amount of undisbursed funding remaining in expired grant accounts, including the amounts that have remained unspent for at least 5 years or more and for 10 years or more; (2) issues raised by GAO and federal inspectors general related to timely grant closeout by federal agencies; and (3) actions OMB and agencies have taken to track undisbursed balances in grants eligible for closeout. To do this, GAO analyzed data from two federal payment systems disbursing 79 percent of all civilian federal grant awardsPMS and the ASAP system, which is operated jointly by the Department of the Treasury and the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond. In addition, GAO also reviewed audit reports that it and federal inspectors general issued; relevant OMB circulars and guidance; and performance reports from federal agencies.
What GAO Found
At the end of fiscal year 2011, GAO identified more than $794 million in funding remaining in expired grant accountsaccounts that were more than 3 months past the grant end date and had no activity for 9 months or morein the Payment Management System (PMS). GAO found that undisbursed balances remained in some grant accounts several years past their expiration date: $110.9 million in undisbursed funding remained unspent more than 5 years past the grant end date, including $9.5 million that remained unspent for 10 years or more. GAO also found $126 million in grant accounts in the Automated Standard Application for Payments (ASAP) for which there had been no activity for 2 years or more, including $11 million that remained inactive for 5 years or more. However, data from these two systems are not comparable because, unlike PMS, ASAP accounts can include multiple grant agreements between a federal agency and a grantee, only some of which may be eligible for closeout.
GAO and agency inspectors general have raised concerns in audit reports about timely grant closeout. These reports found that some agencies lack adequate systems or policies to properly monitor grant closeout or did not deobligate funds from grants eligible for close out in a timely manner.
OMB issued guidance to certain agencies at the direction of Congress for reporting undisbursed balances in expired grant accounts that instructed agencies to report on expired appropriations accounts rather than grant accounts eligible for closeout. By focusing on grants eligible for closeout, OMB could better direct agency management toward grants in need of more immediate attention. Grant closeout makes funds less susceptible to fraud, waste, and mismanagement; reduces the potential costs in fees related to maintaining grants; and may enable agencies to redirect resources to other projects.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that OMB revise future guidance to better target undisbursed balances in grants eligible for closeout and instruct agencies to take action to close out grants that are several years past their end date or have no undisbursed balances remaining. OMB staff said that they generally agreed with the recommendGAO recommends that OMB revise future guidance to better target undisbursed balances in grants eligible for closeout and instruct agencies to take action to close out grants that are several years past their end date or have no undisbursed balances remaining. OMB staff said that they generally agreed with the recommendations and will consider them as they review and streamline grant policy guidance.ations and will consider them as they review and streamline grant policy guidance. |
gao_GAO-13-532T | gao_GAO-13-532T_0 | The nation currently has about 70,000 metric tons of commercial spent nuclear fuel stored at 75 sites in 33 states (see fig. Attributes and Challenges of the Yucca Mountain Repository
In November 2009, we reported on the attributes and challenges of a Yucca Mountain repository. We reported that DOE had spent billions of dollars for design, engineering, and testing activities for the Yucca Mountain site and had submitted a license to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. If the repository had been built as planned, we stated that it would have provided a permanent solution for the nation’s nuclear waste, including commercial nuclear fuel, and would have minimized the uncertainty of future waste safety. Based on a review of key documents and interviews with DOE, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and numerous other officials, we also reported in November 2009 that the construction of a repository at Yucca Mountain could have allowed the government to begin taking possession of the nuclear waste in about 10 to 30 years. If the Yucca Mountain repository was completed and operational sooner than one or more temporary storage facilities or an alternative repository, it could have helped address the federal liabilities resulting from industry lawsuits related to continued storage of spent nuclear fuel at reactor sites. First, centralized interim storage could allow DOE to consolidate the nation’s nuclear waste after reactors are decommissioned, thereby decreasing the complexity of securing and overseeing the waste located at reactor sites around the nation and increasing the efficiency of waste storage operations. Second, by moving spent nuclear fuel from decommissioned reactor sites to DOE’s centralized interim storage facility and taking custody of the spent fuel, DOE would begin to address the taxpayer financial liabilities stemming from industry lawsuits. Fourth, centralized interim storage could also provide the nation with some flexibility to consider alternative policies or new technologies by giving more time to consider alternatives and implement them. First, as we reported in November 2009 and August 2012, a key challenge confronting centralized interim storage is the uncertainty of DOE’s statutory authority to provide centralized storage. Provisions in NWPA that allow DOE to arrange for centralized storage have either expired or are unusable because they are tied to milestones in repository development that have not been met. As we reported in November 2009, even if a community might be willing to host such a facility, finding a state that would be willing to host it could be extremely challenging, particularly since some states have voiced concerns that a centralized interim facility could become a de facto permanent disposal site. Third, centralized interim storage may also present transportation challenges. As we reported in August 2012, it is likely that the spent fuel would have to be transported twice—once to the centralized interim storage site and once to a permanent disposal site. Finally, as we reported in November 2009, developing centralized interim storage would not ultimately preclude the need for final disposal of the spent nuclear fuel. Attributes and Challenges of a Permanent Repository at a Location Other Than Yucca Mountain
As we reported in November 2009, siting, licensing, and developing a permanent repository at a location other than Yucca Mountain could provide the opportunity to find a location that might achieve broader acceptance than the Yucca Mountain repository program. If a more widely accepted approach or site is identified, it carries the potential for avoiding costly delays experienced by the Yucca Mountain repository program. In addition, a new approach that involves a new entity for spent fuel management, as we concluded in our April 2011 report and the Blue Ribbon Commission recommended in January 2012, could add to transparency and consensus building. However, there are also key challenges to developing an alternative repository. First, as we reported in April 2011, developing a repository other than Yucca Mountain will restart the likely time-consuming and costly process of siting, licensing, and developing a repository. Second, it is unclear whether the Nuclear Waste Fund will be sufficient to fund a repository at another site. The fund was established under NWPA to pay industry’s share of the cost for the Yucca Mountain repository and was funded by a fee of one-tenth of a cent per kilowatt- hour of nuclear-generated electricity. | Why GAO Did This Study
Spent nuclear fuel, the used fuel removed from commercial nuclear power reactors, is one of the most hazardous substances created by humans. Commercial reactors have generated nearly 70,000 metric tons of spent fuel, which is currently stored at 75 reactor sites in 33 states, and this inventory is expected to more than double by 2055. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, as amended, directs DOE to investigate the Yucca Mountain site in Nevada--100 miles northwest of Las Vegas--to determine if the site is suitable for a permanent repository for this and other nuclear waste. DOE submitted a license application for the Yucca Mountain site to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in 2008, but in 2010 DOE suspended its licensing efforts and instead established a blue ribbon commission to study other options. The commission issued a report in January 2012 recommending a new strategy for managing nuclear waste, and DOE issued a new nuclear waste disposal strategy in 2013.
This testimony is primarily based on prior work GAO issued from November 2009 to August 2012 and updated with information from DOE. It discusses the key attributes and challenges of options that have been considered for storage or disposal of spent nuclear fuel.
GAO is making no new recommendations at this time.
What GAO Found
In November 2009, GAO reported on the attributes and challenges of a Yucca Mountain repository. A key attribute identified was that the Department of Energy (DOE) had spent significant resources to carry out design, engineering, and testing activities on the Yucca Mountain site and had completed a license application and submitted it to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, which has regulatory authority over the construction, operation, and closure of a repository. If the repository had been built as planned, GAO concluded that it would have provided a permanent solution for the nation's commercial nuclear fuel and other nuclear waste and minimized the uncertainty of future waste safety. Constructing the repository also could have helped address issues including federal liabilities resulting from industry lawsuits against DOE related to continued storage of spent nuclear fuel at reactor sites. However, not having the support of the administration and the state of Nevada proved a key challenge. As GAO reported in April 2011, DOE officials did not cite technical or safety issues with the Yucca Mountain repository project when the project's termination was announced but instead stated that other solutions could achieve broader support.
Temporarily storing spent fuel in a central location offers several positive attributes, as well as challenges, as GAO reported in November 2009 and August 2012. Positive attributes include allowing DOE to consolidate the nation's nuclear waste after reactors are decommissioned. Consolidation would decrease the complexity of securing and overseeing the waste located at reactor sites around the nation and would allow DOE to begin to address the taxpayer financial liabilities stemming from industry lawsuits. Interim storage could also provide the nation with some flexibility to consider alternative policies or new technologies. However, interim storage faces several challenges. First, DOE's statutory authority to develop interim storage is uncertain. Provisions in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, as amended, that allow DOE to arrange for centralized interim storage have either expired or are unusable because they are tied to milestones in repository development that have not been met. Second, siting an interim storage facility could prove difficult. Even if a community might be willing to host a centralized interim storage facility, finding a state that would be willing to host such a facility could be challenging, particularly since some states have voiced concerns that an interim facility could become a de facto permanent disposal site. Third, interim storage may also present transportation challenges since it is likely that the spent fuel would have to be transported twice--once to the interim storage site and once to a permanent disposal site. Finally, developing centralized interim storage would not ultimately preclude the need for a permanent repository for spent nuclear fuel.
Siting, licensing, and developing a permanent repository at a location other than Yucca Mountain could provide the opportunity to find a location that might achieve broader acceptance, as GAO reported in November 2009 and August 2012, and could help avoid costly delays experienced by the Yucca Mountain repository program. However, developing an alternative repository would restart the likely costly and time-consuming process of developing a repository. It is also unclear whether the Nuclear Waste Fund--established under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, as amended, to pay industry's share of the cost for the Yucca Mountain repository--will be sufficient to fund a repository at another site. |
gao_GAO-12-526T | gao_GAO-12-526T_0 | FEMA Has Taken Actions to Address Grant Management Concerns but Needs Better Coordination
DHS and FEMA have streamlined application and award processes, enhanced the use of risk management principles in its grant programs, and proposed consolidation of its various grant programs to address grant management concerns. In February 2012, we reported that better coordination and improved data collection could help FEMA identify and mitigate potential unnecessary duplication among four overlapping grant programs—the Homeland Security Grant Program, the Urban Areas Security Initiative, the Port Security Grant Program, and the Transit Security Grant Program. In November 2011, we reported that DHS had made modifications to enhance the Port Security Grant Program’s risk assessment model’s vulnerability element for fiscal year 2011. Specifically, DHS modified the vulnerability equation to recognize that different ports have different vulnerability levels. FEMA Needs Better Coordination and Improved Data Collection to Reduce Risk of Unnecessary Duplication
Despite these continuing efforts to enhance preparedness grant management, we identified multiple factors in our February 2012 report that contributed to the risk of FEMA potentially funding unnecessarily duplicative projects across the four grant programs we reviewed—the Homeland Security Grant Program, the Urban Areas Security Initiative, the Port Security Grant Program, and the Transit Security Grant Program.and geographic locations, combined with differing levels of information that FEMA had available regarding grant projects and recipients. FEMA made award decisions for all four grant programs with differing levels of information. However, this delegation also contributed to FEMA having less visibility over some grant applications. FEMA lacked a process to coordinate application reviews across the four grant programs. In February 2012, we reported that grant applications were reviewed separately by program and were not compared across each other to determine where possible unnecessary duplication may occur. Thus, we recommended that FEMA take actions to identify and mitigate any unnecessary duplication in these programs, such as collecting more complete project information as well as exploring opportunities to enhance FEMA’s internal coordination and administration of the programs. In commenting on the report, DHS agreed and identified planned actions to improve visibility and coordination across programs and projects. FEMA Has Proposed Changes to Enhance Preparedness Grant Management, but these Changes May Create Challenges
In the President’s Fiscal Year 2013 budget request to Congress, FEMA has proposed consolidating its various preparedness grant programs— with the exception of the Emergency Management Performance Grants and Assistance to Fire Fighters Grants—into a single, comprehensive preparedness grant program called the National Preparedness Grant Program (NPGP) in fiscal year 2013. In March 2012, FEMA’s GPD announced that FEMA has established a website to solicit input from stakeholders on how best to implement the new program. They know the threats to their local areas and the capabilities needed to address them. For example, DHS first developed plans in 2004 to measure preparedness by assessing capabilities, but these efforts have been repeatedly delayed and are not yet complete. DHS and FEMA’s Longstanding Plans to Develop and Implement a National Assessment of Preparedness Have Not Been Fulfilled
Since 2004, DHS and FEMA have initiated a variety of efforts to develop a system of measuring preparedness. For example, we reported in July 2005 that DHS had identified potential challenges in gathering the information needed to assess capabilities, including determining how to aggregate data from federal, state, local, and tribal governments and others and integrating self-assessment and external assessment approaches. Nonetheless, DHS and FEMA have had difficulty overcoming the challenges we reported in July 2005 and April 2009 in establishing a system of metrics to assess national preparedness capabilities. In March 2011, we reported that FEMA’s efforts to develop and implement a comprehensive, measurable, national preparedness assessment of capability and gaps were not yet complete and suggested that Congress consider limiting preparedness grant funding until FEMA completes a national preparedness assessment of capability gaps at each level based on tiered, capability-specific performance objectives to enable prioritization of grant funding. In April 2011, Congress passed the fiscal year 2011 appropriations act for DHS, which reduced funding for FEMA preparedness grants by $875 million from the amount requested in the President’s fiscal year 2011 budget. The consolidated appropriations act for fiscal year 2012 appropriated $1.7 billion for FEMA Preparedness grants, $1.28 billion less than requested. For example, FEMA has not yet developed national preparedness capability requirements based on established metrics for the core capabilities to provide a framework for national preparedness assessments. | Why GAO Did This Study
From fiscal years 2002 through 2011, the federal government appropriated over $37 billion to the Department of Homeland Securitys (DHS) preparedness grant programs to enhance the capabilities of state and local governments to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks. DHS allocated $20.3 billion of this funding to grant recipients through four of the largest preparedness grant programsthe State Homeland Security Program, the Urban Areas Security Initiative, the Port Security Grant Program, and the Transit Security Grant Program. The Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 requires the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to develop a national preparedness system and assess preparedness capabilitiescapabilities needed to respond effectively to disasters. FEMA could then use such a system to help it prioritize grant funding. This testimony addresses the extent to which DHS and FEMA have made progress in managing preparedness grants and measuring preparedness by assessing capabilities and addressing related challenges. GAOs comments are based on products issued from April 2002 through February 2012 and selected updates conducted in March 2012.
What GAO Found
DHS and FEMA have taken actions with the goal of enhancing management of preparedness grants, but better project information and coordination could help FEMA identify and mitigate the risk of unnecessary duplication among grant applications. Specifically, DHS and FEMA have taken actions to streamline the application and award processes and have enhanced their use of risk management for allocating grants. For example, in November 2011, GAO reported that DHS modified its risk assessment model for the Port Security Grant Program by recognizing that different ports have different vulnerability levels. However, in February 2012, GAO reported that FEMA made award decisions for four of its grant programsthe State Homeland Security Grant Program, the Urban Area Security Initiative, the Port Security Grant Program, and the Transit Security Grant Programwith differing levels of information, which contributed to the risk of funding unnecessarily duplicative projects. GAO also reported that FEMA did not have a process to coordinate application reviews across the four grant programs. Rather, grant applications were reviewed separately by program and were not compared across each other to determine where possible unnecessary duplication may occur. Thus, GAO recommended that (1) FEMA collect project information with the level of detail needed to better position the agency to identify any potential unnecessary duplication within and across the four grant programs, weighing any additional costs of collecting this data and (2) explore opportunities to enhance FEMAs internal coordination and administration of the programs to identify and mitigate the potential for any unnecessary duplication. DHS agreed and identified planned actions to improve visibility and coordination across programs and projects. FEMA has proposed consolidating the majority of its various preparedness grant programs into a single, comprehensive preparedness grant program called the National Preparedness Grant Program (NPGP) in fiscal year 2013; however, this may create new challenges. For example, allocations under the NPGP would rely heavily on a states risk assessment, but grantees have not yet received guidance on how to conduct the risk assessment process. FEMA has established a website to solicit input from stakeholders on how best to implement the program.
DHS and FEMA have had difficulty implementing longstanding plans and overcoming challenges in assessing capabilities, such as determining how to validate and aggregate data from federal, state, local, and tribal governments. For example, DHS first developed plans in 2004 to measure preparedness by assessing capabilities, but these efforts have been repeatedly delayed. In March 2011, GAO reported that FEMAs efforts to develop and implement a comprehensive, measurable, national preparedness assessment of capability and gaps were not yet complete and suggested that Congress consider limiting preparedness grant funding until FEMA completes a national preparedness assessment of capability gaps based on tiered, capability-specific performance objectives to enable prioritization of grant funding. In April 2011, Congress passed the fiscal year 2011 appropriations act for DHS that reduced funding for FEMA preparedness grants by $875 million from the amount requested in the Presidents fiscal year 2011 budget. For fiscal year 2012, Congress appropriated $1.28 billion less than requested in the Presidents budget.
What GAO Recommends
GAO has made recommendations to DHS and FEMA in prior reports to strengthen their management of preparedness grants and enhance their assessment of national preparedness capabilities. DHS and FEMA concurred and have actions underway to address them. |
gao_GAO-07-104 | gao_GAO-07-104_0 | OST Estimates that Almost All of Its Key Trust Reforms Will Be Completed by November 2007, but Has Yet to Prepare a Timetable for Completing Its Remaining Reforms
OST has implemented several key trust fund management reforms, but OST has not prepared a timetable for completing its remaining trust reform activities or identified a date for its termination under the 1994 Act. OST estimates that almost all of the key reforms needed to develop an integrated trust management system and to provide improved trust services will be completed by November 2007, but OST believes some additional improvements are important to make. In particular, once the validation of BIA’s new trust asset and accounting management system (TAAMS) leasing information for Indian lands with recurring income is completed, BIA and OST plan to validate the leasing information for Indian lands that do not have recurring income. The Special Trustee expects these validation activities will be completed by December 2009. Trust Funds Receivable. However, the Special Trustee has yet to provide the Congress with a timetable for completing the remaining trust reform activities and a date for OST’s termination, even though OST’s most recent strategic plan—the Comprehensive Trust Management Plan—issued in March 2003, stated that OST would be able to forecast a date for termination within the next 14 months. If OST is terminated, it is unclear where OST responsibilities—including trust fund management and accounting operations, beneficiary services, trust records management, and land appraisals—will be transferred. OST has not developed a workforce plan that reexamines the expenditures and staffing levels needed for trust fund operations—including managing and accounting for trust funds, providing trust services, maintaining trust records, and conducting land appraisals—once trust reforms are completed. OST Has Relied on Contractors to Implement Many of Its Trust Reform Activities
Since its inception, OST has relied on contractors to perform many of its trust reform activities as a way to minimize the size of its permanent staff. In fiscal years 2004 and 2005, OST obligated nearly 21 percent of its appropriated funds to contracting. About 66 percent of contracting dollars from fiscal years 2004 and 2005 went to 2 firms. Most of the contracting with CNI, an Indian-owned 8(a) small business, was based on an indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity contract. For example, OST’s fiscal year 2007 budget request proposed to reduce funding by about $4.9 million as a result of the completion of certain contract efforts, including the following reductions: $1,400,000 from the Office of Trust Accountability for contract costs related to defining, developing, facilitating, and delivering trust training programs; $1,050,000 from the Office of Trust Accountability for contract costs related to the development of policies and procedures and upgrades of systems for the reengineering of trust processes; $885,000 from the Office of Trust Accountability for contract costs related to the modeling of business practices for the purposes of risk management; $675,000 from the Office of Trust Review and Audit for contract costs related to the development of the Indian Trust Examiner certification; and $425,000 and $450,000 from the Offices of Field Operations and Trust Services, respectively, for contractors that were providing accounting services, such as data cleanup and encoding. Conclusions
OST is in the final stages of implementing the trust fund management reforms that the 1994 Act required. However, the Special Trustee has not provided the Congress with a timetable for completing these reforms, as required by the act. We reviewed the 47 reform efforts on Interior’s list and, while they are important activities for the implementation of OST’s trust reforms, we believe they are not key components of OST’s integrated information system that interfaces the trust funds accounting system with BIA’s land title records and asset management systems for Indian lands. | Why GAO Did This Study
The American Indian Trust Fund Management Reform Act of 1994 established the Office of the Special Trustee for American Indians (OST), within the Department of the Interior, to oversee the implementation of management reforms for funds--derived primarily from Interior's leasing of Indian lands--that Interior holds in trust for many Indian tribes and individuals. Specifically, the act directs that an integrated information system be developed that interfaces the trust fund accounting system with the land title records and asset management systems maintained by Interior's Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA). GAO examined (1) OST's progress in implementing the trust fund management reforms and (2) the extent to which OST has used contractors in implementing these reforms. GAO reviewed OST's strategic plans and contracting documents and interviewed OST and BIA managers.
What GAO Found
OST has implemented several key trust fund management reforms, but has not prepared a timetable for completing its remaining trust reform activities and a date for OST's termination, as required by the 1994 Act. OST estimates that almost all key reforms needed to develop an integrated trust management system and to provide improved trust services will be completed by November 2007. Specifically, OST implemented a new trust funds accounting system for processing trust account funds, and BIA and OST are currently validating data for the trust asset and accounting management system for managing Indian land title records and leases for land with recurring income. However, the Special Trustee estimates that data verification for leasing activities will not be completed for all Indian lands until December 2009. OST's most recent strategic plan, issued in 2003, did not include a timetable for implementing trust reforms or a date for OST's termination. The Special Trustee notes that many OST functions, including trust fund operations, trust records management, and appraisal services, need to be performed after reforms are completed. If OST is terminated, these responsibilities would have to be transferred to another Interior office. OST plans to reduce expenditures primarily by terminating contracts once trust reforms are completed. However, OST has not yet developed a workforce plan that reexamines the expenditures and staffing levels needed for trust fund operations once trust reforms are completed. OST has used contractors to perform many of its trust reform activities as a way to minimize the size of its permanent staff. In fiscal years 2004 and 2005, OST allocated $89.7 million, or nearly 21 percent, of its appropriated funds to contracting. About 66 percent of contracting dollars from these 2 fiscal years went to two firms. Over $31 million during this period went to the largest contractor, an Indian-owned 8(a) small business, by adding task orders through an existing contract. OST has primarily relied on Interior's National Business Center to award and manage contracts. |
gao_GAO-15-310 | gao_GAO-15-310_0 | The LD-2s contain information that includes: the name of the lobbyist reporting on quarterly lobbying activities and the name of the client for whom the lobbyist lobbied; a list of individuals who acted as lobbyists on behalf of the client during the reporting period; whether any lobbyists served in covered positions in the executive or legislative branch in the previous 20 years; codes describing general issue areas, such as agriculture and education; a description of the specific lobbying issues; houses of Congress and federal agencies lobbied during the reporting reported income (or expenses for organizations with in-house lobbyists) related to lobbying activities during the quarter (rounded to the nearest $10,000). The LDA also requires lobbyists to report certain political contributions semiannually in the LD-203 report. Figure 1 shows lobbyists filed disclosure reports as required for most new lobbying registrations from 2010 through 2014. For Most LD-2 Reports, Lobbyists Provided Documentation for Key Elements but for Some LD-2 Reports, Lobbyists Rounded Their Income or Expenses Incorrectly
For selected elements of lobbyists’ LD-2 reports that can be generalized to the population of lobbying reports, unless otherwise noted, our findings have been consistent from year to year. For this year’s review, lobbyists for an estimated 93 percent of LD-2 reports provided written documentation for the income and expenses reported for the third and fourth quarters of 2013 and the first and second quarters of 2014. In 2014, 6 percent of lobbyists reported the exact amount of income or expenses. For Most Lobbying Disclosure Reports (LD-2), Lobbyists Filed Political Contribution Reports (LD-203) for All Listed Lobbyists
Lobbyists for an estimated 94 percent of LD-2 reports filed year-end 2013 reports for all lobbyists listed on the report as required. This year, we estimate that 14 percent of all LD-2 reports did not properly disclose one or more previously held covered positions as required. Most LD-203 Contribution Reports Disclosed Political Contributions Listed in the FEC Database
As part of our review, we compared contributions listed on lobbyists’ and lobbying firms’ LD-203 reports against those political contributions reported in the FEC database to identify whether political contributions were omitted on LD-203 reports in our sample. We estimate that overall for 2014, lobbyists failed to disclose one or more reportable contributions on 4 percent of reports. Most lobbying firms we surveyed rated the definitions of terms used in LD-2 reporting as “very easy” or “somewhat easy” to understand with regard to meeting their reporting requirements. This is consistent with prior reviews. According to officials USAO is close to finalizing a settlement with another firm for repeated failure to file. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to the Attorney General for review and comment. The Department of Justice provided a technical comment, which we incorporated into the draft as appropriate. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine the extent to which lobbyists are able to demonstrate compliance with the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 as amended (LDA) by providing documentation to support information contained on registrations and reports filed under the LDA; to identify challenges and potential improvements to compliance, if any; and to describe the resources and authorities available to the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia (USAO), its role in enforcing LDA compliance, and the efforts it has made to improve enforcement of the LDA. To assess the extent to which lobbyists could provide evidence of their compliance with reporting requirements, we examined a stratified random sample of 100 LD-2 reports from the third and fourth quarters of 2013 and the first and second quarters of 2014. To describe the resources and authorities available to the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia (USAO) and its efforts to improve its enforcement of the LDA, we interviewed officials from USAO. 2008 Lobbying Disclosure: Observations on Lobbyists’ Compliance with Disclosure Requirements. 2012 Lobbying Disclosure: Observations on Lobbyists’ Compliance with Disclosure Requirements. 2013 Lobbying Disclosure: Observations on Lobbyists’ Compliance with Disclosure Requirements. | Why GAO Did This Study
LDA requires lobbyists to file quarterly lobbying disclosure reports and semiannual reports on certain political contributions. The law also requires that GAO annually audit lobbyists' compliance with the LDA. GAO's objectives were to (1) audit the extent to which lobbyists can demonstrate compliance with disclosure requirements, (2) identify challenges to compliance that lobbyists report, and (3) describe the resources and authorities available to USAO in its role in enforcing LDA compliance, and the efforts USAO has made to improve enforcement. This is GAO's eighth report under the mandate.
GAO reviewed a stratified random sample of 100 quarterly disclosure LD-2 reports filed for the third and fourth quarters of calendar year 2013 and the first and second quarters of calendar year 2014. GAO also reviewed two random samples totaling 160 LD-203 reports from year-end 2013 and midyear 2014. This methodology allowed GAO to generalize to the population of 46,599 disclosure reports with $5,000 or more in lobbying activity, and 30,524 reports of federal political campaign contributions. GAO also met with officials from USAO to obtain status updates on its efforts to focus resources on lobbyists who fail to comply.
GAO provided a draft of this report to the Attorney General for review and comment. The Department of Justice provided a technical comment, which GAO incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
For the 2014 reporting period, most lobbyists provided documentation for key elements of their disclosure reports to demonstrate compliance with the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 as amended (LDA). For lobbying disclosure (LD-2) reports and political contributions (LD-203) reports filed during the third and fourth quarter of 2013 and the first and second quarter of 2014, GAO estimates that
90 percent of lobbyists filed initial LD-2 reports as required for new lobbying registrations (lobbyists are required to file LD-2 reports for the quarter in which they first register).
93 percent could provide documentation for income and expenses. However, 21 percent of these LD-2 reports were not properly rounded to the nearest $10,000 and 6 percent of those reports listed the exact amount.
94 percent filed year-end 2013 reports as required.
14 percent of all LD-2 reports did not properly disclose one or more previously held covered positions (certain positions in the executive and legislative branches) as required.
4 percent of all LD-203 reports omitted one or more reportable political contributions that were documented in the Federal Election Commission database.
These findings are generally consistent with prior reports GAO issued for the 2010 through 2013 reporting periods and can be generalized to the population of disclosure reports.
Over the past several years of reporting on lobbying disclosure, GAO has found that most lobbyists in the sample rated the terms associated with LD-2 reporting as “very easy” or “somewhat easy” to understand with regard to meeting their reporting requirements. However, some disclosure reports demonstrate compliance difficulties, such as failure to disclose covered positions or misreporting of income or expenses. In addition, lobbyists amended 19 of 100 original disclosure reports in GAO's sample, changing information previously reported.
The U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia (USAO) stated it has sufficient resources and authority to enforce LD-2 and LD-203 compliance with LDA. It has one contract paralegal working full time and six attorneys working part time on LDA enforcement issues.
USAO continued its efforts to follow up on referrals for noncompliance with lobbying disclosure requirements by contacting lobbyists by e-mail, telephone, and letter. Also, USAO has finalized a settlement with a lobbyist to resolve multiple instances of noncompliance and is in the process of finalizing another settlement. |
gao_AIMD-96-110 | gao_AIMD-96-110_0 | Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) provide a general overview of the adequacy of federal information security at major federal agencies based on reported information, (2) identify and categorize the most significant information security weaknesses reported, (3) identify the general causes of reported weaknesses, and (4) assess OMB’s efforts to oversee agency information security practices. Audits and Self Assessments Have Identified Serious Weaknesses That Increase Risks
Recent audits show that weak information security is a serious governmentwide problem that is putting major federal operations at risk. Of the 10 agencies with reported weaknesses, FMFIA reports for 5 showed that the problems had remained uncorrected for 5 years or longer. However, in our reviews of information security controls, we found that the major underlying factor was lack of a well managed information security program with senior management support. However, the documented information that OMB routinely obtains on the design and effectiveness of agency information security programs varies significantly in quality, quantity, and usefulness. Further, the reporting formats varied considerably among agencies. Another is the recently established CIO Council, which can serve as a forum for addressing governmentwide information security issues and raising security awareness. Initiatives that the CIO Council should consider incorporating in its strategic plan include developing information on the existing security risks associated with nonclassified systems currently in use; developing information on the risks associated with evolving practices, such as Internet use; identifying best practices regarding information security programs so that they can be adopted by federal agencies; establishing a program for reviewing the adequacy of individual agency information security programs using interagency teams of reviewers; ensuring adequate review coverage of agency information security practices by considering the scope of various types of audits and reviews performed and acting to address any identified gaps in coverage; developing or identifying training and certification programs that can be shared among agencies; and identifying proven security tools and techniques. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided a general overview of the adequacy of information security at 15 major federal agencies, focusing on: (1) recent reviews and self-audits of information security at these agencies; (2) the most significant information security weaknesses and their causes; and (3) the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) oversight of federal agency practices and opportunities for improvement.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) recent audits and reviews indicate that weak information security is a serious governmentwide problem, with serious weaknesses reported for over two-thirds of the agencies reviewed; (2) commonly reported weaknesses include information access control problems and inadequate disaster planning; (3) at half of the agencies reviewed, information security problems remained uncorrected for 5 years or longer; (4) many agencies lack a well-managed information security program with senior management support; (5) although OMB has improved federal information security guidance and its monitoring of agency efforts to address identified weaknesses, the scope and depth of its oversight efforts varies considerably among agencies; (6) information that OMB obtains on federal information security programs varies significantly in terms of the quality, quantity, and usefulness of the information; (7) OMB could use expanded requirements under the Chief Financial Officers Act to further monitor agencies' information security programs and weaknesses; and (8) the recently established Chief Information Officers (CIO) Council can serve as a forum for addressing governmentwide information security issues. |
gao_GAO-08-229T | gao_GAO-08-229T_0 | USERRA Claims Processing under the Demonstration Project
Under a demonstration project established by VBIA, from February 8, 2005, through September 30, 2007, and subsequently extended through November 16, 2007, OSC and DOL share responsibility for receiving and investigating USERRA claims and seeking corrective action for federal employees. The demonstration project gave OSC, an independent investigative and prosecutorial agency, authority to receive and investigate claims for federal employees whose social security numbers end in odd numbers. VETS investigated claims for individuals whose social security numbers end in even numbers. Key Findings on the Demonstration Project and Actions Taken to Address Recommendations
Under the demonstration project, VETS and OSC used two different models to investigate federal employee USERRA claims. Both DOL and OSC officials have said that cooperation and communication increased between the two agencies concerning USERRA claims, raising awareness of the issues related to servicemembers who are federal employees. However, we found that DOL did not consistently notify claimants concerning the right to have their claims referred to OSC for further investigation or to bring their claims directly to MSPB if DOL did not resolve their claims. We also found data limitations at both agencies that made claim outcome data unreliable. DOL agreed with our findings and recommendations and has begun to take corrective action. VETS had no internal process to routinely review investigators’ determinations before claimants are notified of them. Since that time, DOL has taken the following additional actions: reviewed and updated policy changes to incorporate into the revised Operations Manual and prepared the first draft of the revised Manual; issued a memo in July 2007 from the Assistant Secretary for Veteran’s Employment and Training to regional administrators, senior investigators, and directors requiring case closing procedure changes, including the use of standard language to help ensure that claimants (federal and nonfederal) are apprised of their rights; and began conducting mandatory training on the requirements contained in the memo in August 2007. In addition, according to DOL officials, beginning in January 2008, all claims are to be reviewed before the closure letter is sent to the claimant. These are positive steps. Considerations Related to Extending the Demonstration Project
You asked us about factors that could be considered in deciding whether to extend the demonstration project and to conduct a follow-up review. If the demonstration project were to be extended, it would be important to have clear objectives. Legislation creating the current demonstration project was not specific in terms of the objectives to be achieved. Having clear objectives would be important for the effective implementation of the extended demonstration project and would facilitate a follow-on evaluation. In this regard, our report provides baseline data that could inform this evaluation. Given adequate time and resources, an evaluation of the extended demonstration project could be designed and tailored to provide information to inform congressional decision making. Congress also may want to consider some potential benefits and limitations associated with options available if the demonstration is not extended. At a time when the nation’s attention is focused on those who serve our country, it is important that employment and reemployment rights are protected for federal servicemembers who leave their employment to perform military or other uniformed service. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA) protects the employment and reemployment rights of federal and nonfederal employees who leave their employment to perform military or other uniformed service. Under a demonstration project from February 8, 2005, through September 30, 2007, and subsequently extended through November 16, 2007, the Department of Labor (DOL) and the Office of Special Counsel (OSC) share responsibility for receiving and investigating USERRA claims and seeking corrective action for federal employees. In July 2007, GAO reported on its review of the operation of the demonstration project through September 2006. This testimony describes the findings of our work and actions taken to address our recommendations. In response to the request from Congress, GAO also presents views on (1) factors to consider in deciding whether to extend the demonstration project and the merits of conducting a follow-up review and (2) options available if the demonstration is not extended. In preparing this statement, GAO interviewed officials from DOL and OSC to update actions taken on recommendations from our July 2007 report and developments since we conducted that review.
What GAO Found
Under the demonstration project, OSC receives and investigates claims for federal employees whose social security numbers end in odd numbers; DOL investigates claims for individuals whose social security numbers end in even numbers. Among GAO's findings were the following: DOL and OSC use two different models to investigate federal USERRA claims, with DOL using a nationwide network and OSC using a centralized approach, mainly within its headquarters. Since the demonstration project began, both DOL and OSC officials have said that cooperation and communication increased between the two agencies concerning USERRA claims, raising awareness of the issues related to servicemembers who are federal employees. DOL did not consistently notify claimants concerning the right to have their claims referred to OSC for further investigation or to bring their claims directly to the Merit Systems Protection Board if DOL did not resolve their claims. DOL had no internal process to routinely review investigators' determinations before claimants were notified of them. Data limitations at both agencies made claim outcome data unreliable. DOL officials agreed with GAO's findings and recommendations and are taking actions to address the recommendations. In July 2007, DOL issued guidance concerning case closing procedures, including standard language to ensure that claimants (federal and nonfederal) are apprised of their rights,and began conducting mandatory training on the guidance in August 2007. In addition, according to DOL officials, beginning in January 2008, all claims are to be reviewed before the closure letter is sent to the claimant. These are positive steps and it will be important for DOL to follow through with these and other actions. If the demonstration project were to be extended, it would be important that clear objectives be set. Legislation creating the current demonstration project was not specific in terms of the objectives to be achieved. Clear project objectives would also facilitate a follow-on evaluation. In this regard, GAO's July 2007 report provides baseline data that could inform this evaluation. Given adequate time and resources, an evaluation of the extended demonstration project could be designed and tailored to provide information to inform congressional decision making. GAO also presents potential benefits and limitations associated with options available if the demonstration project is not extended. |
gao_GAO-11-473 | gao_GAO-11-473_0 | The 1977 amendments to the Clean Air Act discouraged the use of dispersion techniques to help attain NAAQS. Specifically, section 123 prohibits states from counting the dispersion effects of stack heights in excess of a stack’s GEP height when determining a source’s emissions limitation. The Clean Air Act defines GEP as “the height necessary to insure that emissions from the stack do not result in excessive concentrations of any air pollutant in the immediate vicinity of the source as a result of atmospheric downwash, eddies, or wakes which may be created by the source itself, nearby structures, or nearby terrain obstacles.” According to federal regulations, a stack’s GEP height is the higher of 65 meters, measured from the ground-level elevation at the base of the stack; a formula based on the height and width of nearby structure(s) (height plus 1.5 times the width or height, whichever is lesser); or the height demonstrated by a fluid model or field study that ensures the emissions from a stack do not result in excessive concentrations of any air pollutant as a result of atmospheric downwash created by the source itself, nearby structures, or nearby terrain features. 1). At coal power plants, these controls are generally installed in either the boiler, where coal is burned, or the duct work that connects a boiler to the stack. While about half of the tall stacks began operating more than 30 years ago, there has been an increase in the number of tall stacks that have begun operating in the last 4 years, which several stakeholders attributed to the need for new stacks when retrofitting existing plants with pollution control equipment. 284 Tall Stacks Were Operating at about 170 Coal Power Plants, with Approximately One-Third Located in the Ohio River Valley
As of December 31, 2010, we found a total of 284 tall stacks were operating at 172 coal power plants in the United States. We found that 207 tall stacks (73 percent) are between 500 and 699 feet tall and that 63 stacks (22 percent) are between 700 and 999 feet tall. Stack Height Contributes to Interstate Transport of Air Pollution, and the Emissions from Several Tall Stacks Remain Uncontrolled for Certain Pollutants
Stack height is one of several factors that contribute to the interstate transport of air pollution. According to reports and stakeholders with expertise on this topic, tall stacks generally disperse pollutants over longer distances than shorter stacks and provide pollutants with more time to react in the atmosphere to form ozone or particulate matter. However, the interstate transport of air pollution is a complex process that involves several variables—such as total emissions from a stack, the temperature and velocity of the emissions, and weather—in addition to stack height. As a result, stakeholders had difficulty isolating the exact contribution of stack height to the interstate transport of air pollution, and we found limited research on this specific topic. Use of Pollution Controls at Coal Power Plants Has Increased in Recent Years, but Emissions from Some Plants, Including Several with Tall Stacks, Remain Uncontrolled for Certain Pollutants
The use of pollution control equipment, particularly for SO and NO emissions, has increased over time, largely in response to various changes in air regulations, according to stakeholders and reports we reviewed. Collectively, we found that these boilers without post-combustion controls accounted for 54 percent of the total generating capacity of boilers attached to tall stacks. Based on Available Information, 17 of 48 Tall Smokestacks Built Since 1988 Exceed Their GEP Height, and A Variety of Factors Can Influence Height Decisions
We identified 48 tall stacks built since 1988 that states reported are subject to the GEP provisions of the Clean Air Act and for which states could provide GEP height information. Of these 48 stacks, we found that 17 exceed their GEP height, 19 are at their GEP height, and 12 are below their GEP height. When we followed up with utility officials regarding why these stacks were built above GEP, they reported that a variety of factors can influence stack height decisions. These factors included helping a plant’s emissions clear local geographic features, such as valley walls. We were unable to obtain GEP height information for an additional 25 stacks that were built since 1988 for two reasons. First, some of these stacks replaced stacks that were exempt from the GEP regulations, according to state officials. Second, states did not have GEP information readily available for some stacks. Both EPA and DOE stated they had no comments. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To identify the number and location of smokestacks at coal power plants that were 500 feet or higher as of December 31, 2010, we analyzed data on power plants from the Department of Energy’s (DOE) Energy Information Administration (EIA). We also used these data to determine when these stacks began operating. Other stakeholders reported that they considered a stack built above GEP to be “tall.”
To determine what is known about tall stacks’ contribution to the interstate transport of air pollution, we reviewed reports from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and academics and spoke with stakeholders with expertise on this topic. | Why GAO Did This Study
Tall smokestacks--stacks of 500 feet or higher, which are primarily used at coal power plants--release air pollutants such as sulfur dioxide (SO2) and nitrogen oxides (NOx) high into the atmosphere to help limit the impact of these emissions on local air quality. Tall stacks can also increase the distance these pollutants travel in the atmosphere and harm air quality and the environment in downwind communities. The 1977 amendments to the Clean Air Act encourage the use of pollution control equipment over dispersion techniques, such as tall stacks, to meet national air standards. Section 123 of the Act does not limit stack height, but prohibits sources of emissions from using the dispersion effects of stack heights in excess of a stack's good engineering practice (GEP) height to meet emissions limitations. GAO was asked to report on (1) the number and location of tall stacks of 500 feet or higher at coal power plants and when they began operating; (2) what is known about such stacks' contribution to the interstate transport of air pollution and the pollution controls installed at plants with these stacks; and (3) the number of stacks that were built above GEP height since 1988 and the reasons for this. GAO analyzed Energy Information Administration (EIA) data on power plants, surveyed states with tall stacks, and interviewed experts on the transport of air pollution. GAO is not making recommendations in this report. The Environmental Protection Agency and the Department of Energy stated they had no comments on this report
What GAO Found
According to analysis of EIA data, which were updated with GAO's survey results, a total of 284 tall smokestacks were operating at 172 coal power plants in 34 states, as of December 31, 2010. Of these stacks, 207 are 500 to 699 feet tall, 63 are 700 to 999 feet tall, and the remaining 14 are 1,000 feet tall or higher. About one-third of these stacks are concentrated in 5 states along the Ohio River Valley. While about half of tall stacks began operating more than 30 years ago, there has been an increase in the number of tall stacks that began operating in the last 4 years, which air and utility officials attributed to the need for new stacks when plants installed pollution control equipment. Stack height is one of several factors that contribute to the interstate transport of air pollution. According to reports and stakeholders with expertise on this topic, tall stacks generally disperse pollutants over greater distances than shorter stacks and provide pollutants greater time to react in the atmosphere to form ozone and particulate matter. However, stakeholders had difficulty isolating the exact contribution of stack height to the transport of air pollution because this is a complex process that involves several other variables, including total emissions from a stack, the temperature and velocity of the emissions, and weather. The use of pollution controls, which are generally installed in boilers or the duct work that connects a boiler to a stack, has increased in recent years at coal power plants. However, GAO found that many boilers remain uncontrolled for certain pollutants, including several connected to tall stacks. For example, GAO found that 56 percent of boilers attached to tall stacks lacked scrubbers to control SO2 and 63 percent lacked post-combustion controls to capture NOx emissions. In general, GAO found that boilers without these controls tended to be older, with in-service dates prior to 1980. GAO identified 48 tall stacks built since 1988--when GEP regulations were largely affirmed in court--that states reported are subject to the GEP provisions of the Clean Air Act and for which states could provide GEP height information. Of these 48 stacks, 17 exceed their GEP height, 19 are at their GEP height, and 12 are below their GEP height. Section 123 of the Clean Air Act defines GEP as the height needed to prevent excessive downwash, a phenomenon that occurs when nearby structures disrupt airflow and produce high local concentrations of pollutants. Officials reported that a variety of factors can influence stack height decisions. For example, some utility officials reported that stacks were built above GEP to provide greater protection against downwash or to help a plant's emissions clear local geographic features, such as valley walls. GAO was unable to obtain GEP height information for an additional 25 stacks that were built since 1988 for two reasons: (1) some of these stacks were exempt from GEP regulations, and (2) states did not have GEP information readily available for some replacement stacks because the GEP calculation was sometimes made decades earlier and a recalculation was not required at the time the replacement stack was built. |
gao_GAO-04-454 | gao_GAO-04-454_0 | A subset of contract consolidation is contract bundling. Further, the four agencies reported only a total of 24 bundled contracts—far fewer than the 928 contracts reported as bundled in FPDS. For example, about 33 percent of FPDS-coded bundled contract actions were also shown as being awarded to small businesses. By definition, a small business is essentially precluded from being awarded a bundled contract. According to OSDBU officials at the Departments of Defense (DOD), Veterans Affairs, Interior, Health and Human Services, and Transportation—the five agencies with the largest number of FPDS-reported bundled actions in fiscal year 2002—the inaccuracies in FPDS were coding errors made as the result of confusion about the statutory definition of contract bundling, inadequate verification of data, and ineffective controls in the FPDS reporting process. DOD similarly had its military departments and defense agencies review the 109 contracts originally identified as bundled, and they determined that only 8 out of the 109 contracts met the statutory definition of a bundled contract. Effect of Regulatory Changes on Small Business Contracting Opportunities Will Be Difficult to Gauge, Although Certain Changes May Yield Increases
According to OFPP, the primary goal of its strategy—and the recent FAR changes—is to increase small business federal contracting opportunities. However, it will be difficult to determine whether any increases in small business opportunities are the result of the recent regulatory changes or other factors, such as continuing agency efforts. While some aspects of the changes have the potential to help achieve desired goals, the new regulations do not provide for metrics to measure agency accountability for improving small business participation in federal procurement. Further, SBA has yet to disseminate best practices to agencies—an action item in OFPP’s strategy. The other three agencies also have a history of efforts to address contract bundling and increase small business contracting opportunities. Finally, the recent regulations relate primarily to contract bundling—an activity most agencies report they do not engage in. However, because 16 of the 23 agencies held accountable by the OFPP strategy reported that they had no bundled contracts in fiscal year 2002 and the bundling that was reported was limited, it is unclear to what extent the regulations will help increase small business contracting opportunities at these agencies. For example, the FAR now requires OSDBUs to conduct periodic reviews to assess (1) the extent to which small businesses are receiving their fair share of federal procurements under the Small Business Act, (2) the adequacy of contract bundling documentation and justification, and (3) the actions taken to mitigate the effects of necessary and justified bundling on small businesses. Despite our findings, the new contract bundling regulatory changes do not establish metrics or identify the information needed to determine the extent to which agencies bundle contracts and measure the impact of bundling on small businesses—a weakness exacerbated by the fact that past data on bundling has been limited and unreliable. Recommendations for Executive Action
We are recommending that the Director, Office of Management and Budget, ensure that planned FPDS reliability improvements include accurate agency reporting to provide uniform and reliable contract bundling information and direct the Administrator, OFPP, to establish metrics to measure contract bundling and the extent to which contract bundling impacts contracting opportunities for small businesses. Appendix I: Status of Nine Action Items Contained in OFPP’s Report
In October 2002 in response to the President’s tasking to develop a strategy to hold agencies accountable for contract bundling practices, the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) issued “Contract Bundling: A Strategy for Increasing Federal Contracting Opportunities for Small Business.” The status of the strategy’s nine action items, as of February 25, 2004, is presented below. Reliability Federal Procurement Data. | Why GAO Did This Study
To achieve efficiencies and respond to procurement reforms, agencies have consolidated their procurement contracts--that is, combined existing smaller contracts into fewer larger contracts. To ensure contract bundling--a subset of contract consolidation--does not unfairly disadvantage small businesses, the President tasked the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to develop a strategy that would hold agencies accountable for contract bundling practices. In October 2002, the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) within OMB issued its strategy. This report discusses the extent to which contracts were bundled in fiscal year 2002 and assesses the potential effectiveness of regulatory changes that have recently resulted from OFPP's strategy.
What GAO Found
In contrast to data captured in the Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS), only 4 of the 23 agencies held accountable by OFPP's strategy reported a total of 24 bundled contracts in fiscal year 2002--far fewer than the 928 contracts identified as bundled in FPDS. Agency officials, after researching their contracts, determined that the bundling data in FPDS were miscoded due to confusion about the statutory definition of contract bundling, inadequate verification of information, and ineffective controls in the FPDS reporting process. For example, about 33 percent of FPDS contract actions identified as bundled were miscoded, because they were awarded to small businesses. By definition, a small business is essentially precluded from being awarded a bundled contract. The Department of Defense, which reported the second largest number of bundled contracts, determined that only 8 of the 109 contracts identified as bundled in FPDS met the statutory definition of a bundled contract. Although the actual number of bundled contracts reported by agencies is small, concerns about the effect of contract bundling on small businesses remain. According to OFPP, the primary goal of its strategy--and the resulting regulatory changes--is to increase small business federal contracting opportunities. Because new regulations have only recently been established, it is too early to determine whether agencies are achieving this goal. In addition, part of OFPP's strategy--to identify and disseminate best practices for maximizing small business contract opportunities--has not been implemented. Yet even with time and guidance, it could be difficult to assess the effect of the recent regulations, in part because any increases in small business contracting opportunities could be attributed to other factors. For example, the largest procuring agencies have a history of seeking opportunities to increase small business contracting, and according to the General Services Administration, nearly 80 percent of Federal Supply Schedule contracts are awarded to small businesses. Further, because the regulations primarily relate to contract bundling--an activity most agencies report they do not engage in--the regulations may have little impact on increasing small business contracting opportunities. Nevertheless, certain regulatory changes--especially those related to oversight--have the potential to promote greater small business opportunities. For example, the new regulations require agencies to annually assess the extent to which small businesses receive a fair share of federal procurements, the adequacy of contract bundling documentation and justifications, and actions taken to mitigate the effects on small businesses of necessary and justified contract bundling. However, the new regulations do not establish metrics to measure agency accountability, and past data on bundling and its effects on small businesses have been limited and unreliable. Without metrics and reliable data, it will be difficult to gauge agency efforts to identify and eliminate contracts that are unnecessarily bundled. |
gao_GAO-08-503T | gao_GAO-08-503T_0 | Key Actions Have Been Taken to Implement the Act
Several key actions have been taken to implement the law since it was enacted over 14 months ago. Some of the actions taken to implement the act had a direct impact on the Service’s 2007 financial condition, while others facilitated the transition to a new financial, operating, and regulatory environment. Specific actions in the act that have affected the Service’s 2007 financial condition include: prefunding the Service’s significant unfunded retiree health obligations. This revenue increase, however, was largely attributable to the January 2006 and May 2007 rate increases—not mail volume increases. These increases were primarily used to finance year-end worker compensation and retiree health payments. The net income reported for 2007 was a $5.1 billion loss. Remaining Implementation Challenges Exacerbated by Economic Uncertainty
The financial, operational, human capital, and regulatory challenges facing the Service and other stakeholders as they take actions to continue implementing the act are exacerbated by the current uncertain economic environment. The Service has updated its strategies for addressing challenges under the new law related to generating sufficient revenues, achieving efficiencies through automation, and improving service. Some of the key areas for continued oversight include changes in mail volumes in response to more frequent, predictable rate increases; efforts to control costs by modernizing and optimizing the Postal Service’s infrastructure and workforce; the transition to new automation and mail-tracking systems; the level of transparency in measuring and reporting delivery performance; and the implementation of the new rate-setting processes and regulations. This challenge became more evident after the Service’s revenue and volume results for the first quarter of 2008 were released. While actions taken to implement the reform act put pressure on costs—the Service expects a net increase of $1 billion in costs in 2008—the act also eliminates other payments and provides opportunities to offset some of these cost pressures through efficiency gains that could restrain future rate increases. Managing Its Workforce
The Service will be challenged to manage its workforce as it transitions to operating in a new postal environment. Required Information Can Guide Future Postal Reform Discussions
Information required under the act can be used to facilitate constructive dialogue and debate about postal reform issues related to universal service, the postal monopoly, fair competition, consumer protection, and transparency and accountability. Specifically, the act included provisions for reports required over the next 5 to 10 years related to key postal reform issues aimed at continually examining and reporting on the Postal Service’s mission, role, and oversight structure in an increasingly competitive environment. The information can be useful to Congress when it is considering key postal reform issues including: What universal postal service will be needed in the future and how should it be defined, given past changes and future challenges? While the act requires the PRC to provide annual reviews of service quality and the estimated costs of providing universal service, the act requires a more comprehensive study from the PRC on the scope and standards of universal postal service and the postal monopoly. These comments will assist the PRC in fulfilling the act’s requirement to establish accounting practices and principles for the Service to follow, and issue regulations for the Service’s reporting of its costs, revenue, rates, and volumes. | Why GAO Did This Study
In December 2006, Congress passed the first comprehensive postal reform legislation in over 30 years. The Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act (the act) provided opportunities to address many of the financial, operational, and human capital challenges facing the Postal Service (the Service), which contributed to GAO's decision to remove the Service's transformation efforts from its High-Risk List last year. Specifically, the act provides tools and mechanisms that can be used to establish an efficient, flexible, fair, transparent, and financially sound Postal Service--one that can more effectively operate in an increasingly competitive environment not anticipated under the Postal Reorganization Act of 1970. This testimony focuses on (1) the actions to date resulting from implementing the act and how it affected the Service's 2007 financial condition, (2) the implementation challenges and areas for continued oversight, and (3) how information required under the law can contribute to future postal reform decisions. The testimony is based on GAO's past work; a review of the implementation of the postal reform law, including actions already taken; and updated information on the Service's financial and operational condition. The Postal Service had no comments on this testimony.
What GAO Found
Over the last 14 months, key actions have been taken to implement the act. For example, a new rate-setting system and regulatory agency were established, the Service began prefunding its retiree health benefit obligations, service standards were updated, and key reports were issued. These actions have required the collective efforts of many postal stakeholders including the Service and the Postal Regulatory Commission. The Service reported a $5.1 billion net loss for fiscal year 2007. Some of the actions taken to implement the act, such as funding changes to its retiree health benefit obligations and pension requirements, directly impacted these results, as did other events such as the January 2006 and May 2007 rate increases. The uncertain economic environment serves to exacerbate the challenges facing the Service and contributed to lower than expected mail volumes and revenues in the first quarter of fiscal year 2008. The Service projects a $600 million net loss for 2008 as it faces challenges such as generating volumes as rates increase again in May; managing its costs and improving operational efficiencies through accelerated cost reduction strategies; maintaining, measuring, and reporting service; and managing its workforce. Some key areas for continued oversight include changes to mail volumes and revenues, efforts to control costs by optimizing the Service's infrastructure and workforce, transition to new automation and technology to enhance mail sorting and tracking, transparency in measuring and reporting delivery performance, and implementation of the new rate-setting regulations. Information required under the act can be used to facilitate constructive dialogue about complex postal reform issues that may eventually need to be revisited by Congress. The act requires multiple reports and studies over the next 5 to 10 years that can be used to continually examine and assess the Postal Service's position in an environment of increasing competition and technological advances. Specifically, these reports and studies will provide key information on the Service's mission and role, monopoly protections, universal service requirements, rate-setting and other regulatory issues, oversight structure, competition issues, and consumer protection. |
gao_GGD-96-113 | gao_GGD-96-113_0 | For 19 of the 22 commemorative coin programs for 1982 through 1995, Congress directed that a portion of the coins’ sales proceeds, namely the surcharges that were specific amounts added to the price of coins, be paid to the sponsoring organizations. Starting in 1984, Congress authorized a commemorative coin sponsor to receive surcharges on coin prices. We focused on commemorative coins that were issued since 1982. 2). According to many coin collectors, the Director of the Mint, and a commemorative coin advisory committee, in recent years the number of commemorative coins has proliferated and may have saturated the market, coin prices are higher than the customers want to pay, and some coin themes have not been well accepted in the market. Profits
From 1982 through 1995, sponsors were paid $309.6 million in surcharges, while the Mint earned $114.6 million in profit from commemorative coins and the Treasury received almost $64 million in surcharges for debt reduction. Options for Improving the Commemorative Coin Program
To help reduce a proliferation of commemorative coins and government losses, CCCAC has recommended the commemorative coin program be changed by limiting the number of commemorative coin programs per year, restricting the maximum authorized mintage levels, implementing a profit-sharing arrangement between the Mint and the sponsors, and transferring the authority to select themes to the Treasury Department. Congress has adopted 1 of CCCAC’s 11 recommended coin themes. CCCAC also recommended that Congress consider authorizing circulating commemorative coins. From 1982 to 1995, the four programs that sold the most coins did not compete with any other new programs. At current 30-year annual borrowing rates of about 7 percent, generating $225 million in seigniorage would reduce interest costs by about $16 million annually. Of CCCAC’s recommendations, one would seem to address some of the program’s problems while also helping to reduce the national debt. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the U.S. Mint's Commemorative Coin Program, focusing on the profitability and proliferation of the coin program.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) Congress authorized 22 commemorative coin programs from 1982 to 1995, and directed that part of the proceeds from four programs be used to reduce the national debt; (2) 19 of the commemorative coin programs included surcharges that were to be paid to coin sponsors; (3) the U.S. government earned $178 million from these commemorative coin programs, while the sponsors earned $310 million; (4) coin collectors believe that there are too many commemorative coin programs, coin prices are higher than customers are willing to pay, and some coin themes are not readily accepted on the market; (5) coin sponsors still receive profits from surcharges despite losses in some coin programs; (6) the U.S. Mint lost more than $4 million on one commemorative coin program in 1994; (7) the Citizens' Commemorative Coin Advisory Committee (CCCAC) recommended 11 coin programs for 1995 to 1999, but Congress only adopted one of the programs; (8) these recommendations included replacing the surcharge on coins with a profit-sharing arrangement between the Mint and the program sponsors and empowering the Treasury to select coin themes; (9) these recommendations do not adequately address the proliferation of coins, their high price, or unacceptability on the market; and (10) CCCAC also recommended that Congress authorize circulating commemorative coins, which could provide $225 million in seigniorage and save about $16 million on annual debt interest. |
gao_GAO-15-437 | gao_GAO-15-437_0 | FEMA Is Taking Steps to Address Long- standing Human Capital Management Challenges, but Success Hinges on the Effective Completion and Integration of These Efforts
In recent years, we and others have identified long-standing human capital management challenges at FEMA and made a number of recommendations to strengthen the agency’s efforts. In 2011, we again recommended that FEMA develop a comprehensive workforce plan that meets Post-Katrina Act requirements to identify agency staffing needs and skills requirements.to conduct a baseline assessment of its workforce to inform the agency’s future workforce planning efforts, including the development of a strategic workforce plan for fiscal years 2012 to 2016. However, FEMA did not issue a new strategic workforce plan. New incident workforce planning model—In September 2014, FEMA entered into a contract to develop a new incident workforce planning model to determine the optimal mix of workforce components to include in FEMA’s disaster workforce. However, because FEMA’s efforts related to improving FQS are ongoing, it is too soon to determine whether they will address challenges experienced. In April 2012, we reported that FEMA’s efforts related to workforce planning have been independently conducted by various offices across the agency, concluding that having integrated workforce planning and training could help FEMA ensure that it has the properly sized and skilled workforce to effectively carry out its mission. Given that FEMA’s efforts are ongoing, it is too early to assess their effectiveness in addressing long-standing workforce-related challenges over the long term. The groups agreed in general that DHS components will not be able to meet recruitment goals without additional resources, guidance, marketing, and senior DHS and FEMA leadership engagement to help recruit and manage additional Surge Capacity Force volunteers. Because the Surge Capacity Force has a key role in augmenting FEMA’s workforce in catastrophic disasters, having such a plan or strategy to strengthen recruitment efforts would help ensure that FEMA has the information it needs to identify the availability of Surge Capacity Force volunteers needed to fully support its efforts. However, FEMA does not collect or consider data on other costs to DHS components, related to the Surge Capacity Force, that are not reimbursed by FEMA. These components paid the salaries and benefits of these employees during their deployment. To better enable FEMA to track and evaluate the performance of the FEMA Corps program, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the FEMA Administrator to establish performance measures for all program goals, such as the rates of employment among program graduates in the emergency management field, and the rates of deployment of FEMA Corps members during disaster response; collect complete and reliable program performance data, such as tracking the number of FEMA Corps members who leave the program early for failing background investigations, and obtaining survey responses from as many participants of the FEMA Corps as possible, including those who have left the program or not graduated; and develop, in conjunction with NCCC, a plan, with milestones, to create an automated system or process by which managers can assess project completion reports against service project requests. In its comments, DHS concurred with our recommendations and described actions planned to address them. With regard to our second and third recommendations, for FEMA to collect and account for all costs associated with the new workforce components, DHS stated that the department will work with FEMA’s Office of the Chief Security Officer and Surge Capacity Force program, respectively, to identify all costs associated with managing its two new disaster response workforce components—FEMA Corps and the Surge Capacity Force. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to determine the extent to which (1) the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has taken steps to address long-standing challenges in managing its workforce, and (2) these challenges affected FEMA’s deployment and management of its new disaster workforce components—the Surge Capacity Force and the FEMA Corps. To assess the extent to which FEMA has taken steps to address these challenges, we reviewed documentation that describes FEMA’s workforce planning and management efforts, such as the FEMA Strategic Plan 2014-2018, the statement of work for the contract for FEMA’s updated strategic workforce management plan (expected to be finalized in September 2015), and the statement of work for FEMA’s contract for its new incident workforce planning model—expected imminently, pending final approval. We also interviewed OCCHCO officials to obtain information on the agency’s progress and challenges with addressing employee morale issues. The results of these focus groups are not generalizable. | Why GAO Did This Study
FEMA historically has relied on both permanent and temporary disaster-related employees to respond to presidentially declared disasters. FEMA's total workforce increased by about 144 percent—7,558 to 18,449 employees—from fiscal year 2005 to September 2014. In 2012, FEMA deployed two new components to its disaster response workforce—the DHS Surge Capacity Force and the FEMA Corps. However, an after-action report from Hurricane Sandy indicated that FEMA exhausted its staff resources during its response and that FEMA faced additional challenges related to its disaster response workforce.
GAO was asked to examine FEMA's efforts to manage its current and future workforce needs. This report addresses (1) FEMA's actions to address long-standing workforce challenges, and (2) the challenges that have affected FEMA's new disaster workforce components. GAO reviewed after-action reports, strategic plans, and program documentation for FEMA Corps and the Surge Capacity Force. GAO also interviewed agency officials and conducted 23 nongeneralizable focus groups with members of FEMA's workforce who provided important insights.
What GAO Found
The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is taking steps to address various long-standing workforce management challenges identified by GAO. Since 2007, GAO has found that FEMA faced challenges in completing and integrating its strategic workforce planning efforts. As a result, GAO recommended that FEMA develop a plan that identifies workforce gaps and includes performance metrics for monitoring progress. GAO has also identified other workforce challenges at FEMA, including low employee morale. FEMA has not yet resolved these challenges and fully addressed GAO's workforce-related recommendations but, according to agency officials, plans to do so through several efforts:
a new incident workforce planning model—pending final approval—that will determine the optimal mix of workforce components to include in FEMA's disaster workforce,
a new Human Capital Strategic Plan to be finalized in September 2015—that will help ensure it has the optimal workforce to carry out its mission, and
an executive-level steering committee to help ensure that these workforce planning efforts are completed and integrated.
FEMA's ability to address long-standing challenges hinges on its ability to effectively coordinate with agency stakeholders and integrate its workforce-related new efforts into a strategic human capital management approach. Given that the agency's efforts are ongoing, it is too soon to determine whether these challenges will be addressed.
FEMA faces challenges in implementing and managing its two new workforce components: the Surge Capacity Force and the FEMA Corps. For example, as of January 2015, the Surge Capacity Force was at 26 percent of its staffing target of 15,400 personnel, and FEMA does not have a plan for how it will increase the number of volunteers to meet its goals. Developing such a plan would help ensure that the Surge Capacity Force has a sufficient number of personnel available to support FEMA's efforts. Further, GAO found that FEMA does not collect full cost information, including the costs of FEMA Corps background investigations and the salaries and benefits of Surge Capacity Force volunteers who are paid by DHS components while they are deployed. Collecting this information would help provide a more accurate accounting of the cost of conducting both programs. Further, FEMA does not assess all aspects of program performance because it does not have performance measures that correspond to all program goals. The agency also does not collect reliable performance data, or have an automated system for comparing performance against FEMA Corps project goals. Doing so would better enable FEMA to assess whether it is meeting its program goals.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends, among other things, that FEMA develop a plan to increase Surge Capacity Force volunteer recruitment and collect additional cost and performance information for its two new workforce components. DHS concurred with the recommendations and identified related actions the department is taking to address them. |
gao_GAO-06-234T | gao_GAO-06-234T_0 | All of these DOD areas are on our high-risk list. ● DOD had not established common investment criteria for system reviews. DOD’s Efforts to Comply with National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 Indicate Progress and a Foundation Upon Which to Build
As defined in Section 332 of the defense authorization act for fiscal year 2005, DOD is required to satisfy several conditions relative to its approach to managing its business systems modernization program. The act also requires us to assess DOD’s efforts to comply with the act within 60 days after approval of the business enterprise architecture and transition plan. On September 28, 2005, the Acting Deputy Secretary of Defense approved Version 3.0 of the business enterprise architecture and approved the associated enterprise transition plan. Our preliminary work suggests that Version 3.0 of DOD’s business enterprise architecture may partially satisfy the major conditions specified in the act. Without this element, DOD would not be able to develop a gap analysis identifying performance shortfalls, which as discussed in the next section , is a critical input to a comprehensive transition plan. For example, it may not yet be fully integrated with the enterprise transition plan. In particular, we are currently attempting to determine why 21 syste identified in the architecture are not included in the “Master List of Systems and Initiatives” in the transition plan (the master list serves as the baseline of currently planned—”To Be”—systems that begin to address the transformational objectives of the program). In addition, DOD has itself disclosed certain limitations. According to DOD officials, the department is taking an incremental approach to developing the architecture and meeting the act’s requirements. Similarly, our preliminary work suggests that the plan identifies some of the legacy systems that are to be replaced by ongoing programs (for example, it identifies the Defense Cash Accountability System as a target system and lists several legacy systems that it would replace), and it provides a list of legacy systems that will be modified to provide capabilities associated with the target architecture environment. Finally, the plan appears to include some of the required information on milestones, performance metrics, and resource needs. On the basis of our preliminary work, it appears that DOD has satisfied some aspects of these conditions, and is potentially in the process of satisfying other aspects. DOD’s Business Transformation Agency Could Help Strengthen Systems Modernization Management and Oversight if it is Effectively Implemented
On October 7, 2005, DOD established the Business Transformation Agency (BTA) to advance defense-wide business transformation efforts in general but particularly with regard to business systems modernization. In our view, BTA offers potential benefits relative to the department’s business systems modernization efforts, if the agency can be properly organized, resourced, and empowered to effectively execute its roles and responsibilities, and if it is held accountable for doing so. In this regard, the agency faces a number of challenges as described below. As the department moves forward with implementing this new agency, it will important for it to address these issues. Effective DOD Business Transformation Will Require Broader Focus than Recently Launched Business Systems Modernization Management Structures and Activities
For DOD to successfully transform its overall business operations, it will need senior level management accountability, a comprehensive and integrated business transformation plan that covers all of its key business functions; people with needed skills, knowledge, experience, responsibility, and authority to implement the plan; an effective process and related tools; and results-oriented performance measures that link institutional, unit, and individual performance goals and expectations to promote accountability for results. As I discussed earlier, DOD has taken several actions, including setting up the DBSMC, publishing a business enterprise transition plan and most recently, establishing the Business Transformation Agency. While these management structures and plan are positive steps, their primary focus, at this point, appears to be on business systems modernization. However, business transformation is much broader and encompasses not only the supporting systems, but also the planning, management, organizational structures, and processes related to all DOD’s major business areas. Recognizing that DOD is continuing to evolve its efforts to plan and organize itself to achieve business transformation, critical to the success of these efforts will be management attention and structures that focus on transformation from a broad perspective and a clear strategic and integrated plan that, at a summary level, addresses all of the department’s major business areas. | Why GAO Did This Study
For years, the Department of Defense (DOD) has embarked on a series of efforts to transform its business operations, including modernizing underlying information technology (business) systems. GAO has reported on inefficiencies and inadequate accountability across DOD's major business areas, resulting in billions of dollars of wasted resources annually. Of the 25 areas on GAO's 2005 list of high-risk federal programs and operations that are vulnerable to fraud, waste, abuse or mismanagement and in need of reform, 8 are DOD programs or operations, and 6 are government-wide high risk areas for which DOD shares responsibility. The Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 required DOD to satisfy several conditions relative to its approach to managing its business system modernization program, including developing an enterprise transition plan, which GAO is currently assessing. DOD also recently established a Business Transformation Agency intended to advance defense-wide business transformation. GAO was asked to testify on DOD's business transformation, including its preliminary observations on 1) DOD's efforts to satisfy fiscal year 2005 defense authorization act requirements; 2) the Business Transformation Agency; and 3) DOD's efforts to provide the leadership, structures, and plans needed to effect transformation.
What GAO Found
GAO's preliminary observation based on its ongoing work is that DOD has made progress in establishing needed business system modernization management capabilities and appears to have complied with some of the act's provisions, but more needs to be done. To comply with the act's requirement that it develop a business enterprise architecture and transition plan meeting certain requirements, DOD approved Version 3.0 of its architecture and associated transition plan on September 28, 2005. GAO's work so far suggests that this version of the architecture may satisfy the conditions of the act to some extent, but not entirely. For example, while Version 3.0 includes a target architecture, as required, it does not include a current architecture. Without this element, DOD could not analyze the gaps between the two architectures--critical input to a comprehensive transition plan. In addition, the transition plan appears to include certain required information (such as milestones for major projects), but it appears to be inconsistent with the architecture in various ways, such as including some systems that are not in the target architecture and vice versa, and it does not include system performance metrics aligned with the plan's strategic goals and objectives. Finally, GAO's preliminary work suggests that DOD may have satisfied some of the act's requirements regarding the review and approval of investments in business systems, but it either has not satisfied or is still in the process of satisfying others. For example, it has delegated authority and largely established review structures and processes as required. However, some of these structures do not yet appear to be in place, and some reviews and approvals to date may not have followed the criteria in the act. GAO expects to report on these issues shortly. DOD's Business Transformation Agency offers potential benefits relative to the department's business systems modernization efforts if the agency can be properly organized, resource, and empowered to effectively execute its roles and responsibilities and is held accountable for doing so. The agency faces several challenges, including standing up a functioning acquisition organization within a short period of time. As DOD moves forward with implementing this agency, it will be important for it to address these issues. DOD has taken several actions intended to advance transformation, such as establishing management structures like the Business Transformation Agency, and developing the enterprise transition plan. While these steps are positive, their primary focus appears to be on business system modernization. Business transformation is much broader and encompasses planning, management, structures, and processes related to all key business areas. As DOD continues to evolve its transformation efforts, critical to successful reform are sustained leadership, structures, and a clear strategic and integrated plan that encompass all major business areas. GAO believes a chief management official, responsible for business transformation, could provide the strong and sustained executive leadership needed in this area. |
gao_GGD-98-41 | gao_GGD-98-41_0 | Selected Credit Programs Established Goals, Measures, and Targets to Monitor Their Progress
In their efforts to implement the Results Act, the five credit programs established goals and performance measures that appeared to be generally related to the programs’ intended purposes. Thus, if the selected programs collect accurate corresponding data on their actual performance, they should be able to monitor their progress in achieving desired results on those measures and have fiscal year 1998 baseline data to use in setting future targets for those measures. USDA reported in its fiscal year 1998 budget presentation that it was working to develop the data for its SFH direct and guaranteed loan programs’ measure on the “cost of housing a family per recipient household.”
Progress in Developing Common Performance Measures Has Been Limited
According to OMB and the Working Group, comparing results using common measures across credit programs allows program managers and other decisionmakers to identify best practices among those programs that have the potential for improving other credit programs’ performance. However, two general problems have limited the Working Group’s progress in developing common performance measures for credit programs. The Working Group has focused on developing common financial and programmatic performance measures for credit programs and anticipated that agencies that administer credit programs could include such measures in their annual performance plans and reports under the Results Act. OMB does not intend to require credit agencies to adopt common performance measures when consensus about the appropriateness of such measures has not been achieved. We agree that OMB should not force the use of common measures when concerns about their appropriateness exist. However, at the time of our review, the Working Group had not resolved those concerns and had yet to decide how and when those concerns would be addressed; thus, it is unclear whether OMB and the credit agencies will maintain their current level of attention to developing common measures. Also unclear is the extent to which agencies that administer credit programs will include common measures for those programs in their annual performance plans that could provide useful information to decisionmakers interested in making performance and cost comparisons. However, we believe the potential benefits that could be realized from developing common performance measures, where appropriate, underscore the importance of OMB and the credit agencies continuing their efforts to develop and reach consensus on such measures. In doing so, we recommend that beginning with those agencies’ fiscal year 2000 annual performance plans, the Director of OMB require each agency that administers credit programs to identify in their plans (1) performance measures the agency is using for its credit program(s) that are the same as those used by other credit programs and the strengths and limitations of using those measures to make performance and cost comparisons among those programs; and (2) what actions, if any, are being taken or could be taken to refine the agency’s performance measurement efforts to address the identified limitations to using existing measures to make performance and cost comparisons across credit programs. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our first objective was to identify goals and measures established by the selected credit programs that related to the programs’ intended purposes and determine whether the programs had set target levels of performance for assessing their progress in achieving their desired results. Our second objective was to identify the challenges agency officials cited in developing performance information, including goals and measures, for the selected programs and any approaches those programs were taking to address those challenges. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed major credit agencies' efforts to implement the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA), focusing on: (1) goals and measures established by the selected credit programs that related to the programs' intended purposes; (2) whether the programs had set target levels of performance for assessing their progress in achieving their desired results; (3) the challenges agency officials cited in developing performance information, including goals and measures, for the selected programs and any approaches those programs were taking to address those challenges; and (4) the status of the Federal Credit Policy Working Group's effort to develop common performance measures for federal credit programs.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) in their efforts to implement GPRA, the five credit programs established goals and performance measures that appeared to be generally related to the programs' intended purposes; (2) if the selected programs collect accurate corresponding data on their actual performance, they should be able to monitor their progress in achieving desired results on those measures and have fiscal year (FY) 1998 baseline data to use in setting future targets for those measures; (3) although the selected programs have established goals, measures, and targets in their efforts to implement GPRA, GAO identified three general challenges the programs have been facing in developing performance information; (4) according to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Working Group, comparing results using common measures across credit programs allows program managers and other decisionmakers to identify best practices among those programs that have the potential for improving other credit programs' performance; (5) two general problems have limited the Working Group's progress in developing common performance measures for credit programs; (6) the Working Group anticipated that agencies that administer credit programs could include common financial and programmatic measures in their annual performance plans and reports under the Results Act; (7) however, OMB does not intend to require credit agencies to adopt common performance measures when consensus about the appropriateness of such measures has not been achieved; (8) GAO agreed that OMB should not force the use of common measures when concerns about their appropriateness exist, but the Working Group had not resolved those concerns and had not decided how and when those concerns would be addressed; (9) thus, it is unclear whether OMB and the credit agencies will maintain their current level of attention to developing common measures; (10) also unclear is the extent to which agencies that administer credit programs will include common measures for those programs in their annual performance plans that could provide useful information to decisionmakers interested in making performance and cost comparisons; and (11) GAO believes the potential benefits that could be realized from developing common performance measures, where appropriate, underscore the importance of OMB and the credit agencies continuing their efforts to develop and reach consensus on such measures. |
gao_GAO-02-706T | gao_GAO-02-706T_0 | CMS Had Not Implemented a Risk- Based Approach in Reviewing Expenditures
Our review found that CMS had only recently begun to assess areas at greatest risk for improper payments. As a result, controls were not in place that focused on the highest risk areas and resources had not yet been deployed to areas of greatest risk. Since 1998, financial auditors responsible for the annual financial statement audit of Medicaid expenditures have noted that CMS failed to institute an oversight process that effectively reduced the risk of inappropriate Medicaid claims and payments. Regarding the auditor’s findings and recommendations, CMS officials attributed most of the weaknesses in its oversight to reductions in staff at the same time Medicaid expenditures and oversight responsibilities increased. CMS could gain valuable information for more accurately assessing the level of risk for improper payments in these 16 states as well as the appropriate level of federal oversight required. In fiscal year 2000, using neural networking, the Texas’ Medicaid Fraud and Abuse Detection System recovered $3.4 million. Within CMS, three units share responsibility for audit resolution activities related to the Medicaid program. This information is key to establishing a sound internal control environment for Medicaid finances throughout CMS. | What GAO Found
The Medicaid program served 33.4 million low-income families as well as elderly, blind, and disabled persons at a cost of $119 billion to the federal government and $88 billion to the states in fiscal year 2000. States are responsible for safeguarding Medicaid funds by making proper payments to providers, recovering misspent funds, and accurately reporting costs for federal reimbursement. At the federal level, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) is responsible for overseeing state financial activities and ensuring the propriety of expenditures reported for federal reimbursement. Audits of state Medicaid finances have identified millions of dollars of questionable or unallowable costs. In addition, annual financial statement audits have identified many internal control weaknesses in CMS oversight of state Medicaid operations. CMS has only recently begun to assess areas at greatest risk for improper payments. As a result, controls that focus on the highest risk areas and resources had not yet been deployed for areas of greatest risk. Since 1998, auditors have noted that CMS failed to institute an oversight process that effectively reduced the risk of inappropriate medical claims and payments. CMS attributed most of the weaknesses in its oversight to staff reductions at the same time Medicaid expenditures and oversight responsibilities have increased. |
gao_GAO-14-755 | gao_GAO-14-755_0 | According to USDA’s 2012 Census of Agriculture, of this $395 billion, about half is from sales of crops, and half is from livestock sales. USDA’s Climate Change Priorities Include Providing Better Information to Farmers and Generally Align with National Priorities
USDA’s climate change priorities include providing better information on future climate conditions to help farmers in their decision making, conducting research, and delivering decision support tools and technical assistance to farmers. USDA’s Climate Change Priorities for Agriculture Generally Align with National Climate Change Priorities
National climate change priorities, as articulated by the Administration and the USGCRP, are to promote mitigation actions, advance climate science, develop tools and translate information, better predict future climate conditions, and ensure that federal agencies are incorporating climate change into agency programs and operations. USDA Has Engaged in Climate Change Efforts for Several Years
USDA’s climate efforts have consisted of research, conservation, and energy programs. For example, the Third National Climate Assessment provided information on possible future climate conditions across nine regions in the United States under different greenhouse gas emissions scenarios. USDA Is Not Using Its Strategic Planning and Reporting Process to Provide Information on Its Climate Change Efforts
Helping to make farms more resilient to climate change is part of one of USDA’s four strategic goals, but the agency is not using its performance planning and reporting process to provide information on how it intends to accomplish this goal or the status of its efforts. According to GPRA, as amended by the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010, an agency’s performance plan is supposed to explain how the agency will accomplish its performance goals, and its performance reports are supposed to review the extent to which performance goals have been met, and if the performance goals are not met, explain why. When asked, USDA officials were uncertain as to why this linkage was not included in the department’s performance plan. Performance reports. USDA provided information on its other measures for its strategic objectives. Performance measures. To address some of these challenges, USDA is, among other things, developing tools that summarize climate information and communicate research findings to farmers. USDA Faces Challenges in Encouraging Farmers to Adapt to Climate Change and Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sequester Carbon
As mentioned earlier, USDA is developing and delivering technical assistance on climate change to farmers, and we found that the agency faces challenges in these efforts. However, to provide additional help to farmers, Another challenge USDA faces is the incentive structure that farmers consider when making decisions. Also under these standards, in addition to internal communications, management should ensure that there are adequate means of communicating with, and obtaining information from, external stakeholders that may have a significant impact on the agency achieving its goals. Without information that is readily accessible to farmers on the farm-level economic costs and returns of taking certain actions in response to climate change, farmers may be reluctant to take climate adaptation or mitigation actions. However, the agency does not have associated performance measures that reflect the breadth of USDA efforts in the climate area. In addition, its performance plans and performance reports do not provide adequate information on how the agency planned to accomplish its goals or the status of its efforts. Without a more robust performance measurement system, USDA will have difficulty assessing its progress in meeting its strategic goal on climate change and providing information to Congress and the public on the status of its efforts. Farmers weigh the financial costs and returns of taking certain actions carefully. USDA has taken some steps in this area, but without communicating more accessible information on the economic costs and returns to farmers of taking certain adaptation or mitigation actions on their farms consistent with federal internal control standards, farmers may be reluctant to take certain actions. In addition, to provide relevant information to farmers, we recommend that the Secretary of Agriculture direct the Climate Change Program Office to work with relevant USDA agencies to develop and provide readily accessible information to farmers on the farm-level economic costs and returns of taking certain actions in response to climate change. We also provided a copy to the U.S. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to examine (1) U.S. Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) priorities related to climate change and agricultural production and how these align with national priorities; (2) the status of USDA’s climate change efforts; and (3) the challenges, if any, USDA faces in implementing its climate efforts and the steps it has taken to overcome these challenges. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2012, the United States produced about $395 billion in agricultural commodities, with about half of this revenue from crop sales and half from livestock. According to the Third National Climate Assessment, climate change has the potential to negatively affect agricultural productivity in the United States through warmer temperatures and an increase in weather extremes. In recent years, USDA has taken actions to help U.S. farmers adapt to climate change and reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
GAO was asked to review USDA's climate change efforts. This review examines (1) USDA's climate change priorities and how these align with national priorities, (2) the status of USDA's climate change efforts, and (3) the challenges USDA faces in implementing its climate efforts and the steps it has taken to overcome these challenges. To conduct this work, GAO analyzed USDA documents and data and interviewed USDA officials and other knowledgeable stakeholders, such as farmers and environmental groups.
What GAO Found
The U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) climate change priorities for agriculture include, among other things, providing better information to farmers on future climate conditions. These priorities generally align with national priorities set by the Administration, which include promoting actions that reduce greenhouse gas emissions, advancing climate science, developing tools for decision makers, and developing better projections of future climate conditions. USDA is engaged in research efforts aimed at better understanding climate change's impacts on agriculture and providing technical assistance to farmers. Through the use of existing conservation and energy programs, USDA aims to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and sequester (store) carbon so it is not released, or is actively withdrawn, from the atmosphere.
Helping to make farmers more resilient to climate change is one of USDA's four strategic goals, but the agency is not using its performance planning and reporting process to provide information on how it intends to accomplish this goal or to assess the status of its efforts in this area. According to the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, as amended, an agency's performance plan is supposed to explain how the agency will accomplish its performance goals, and its performance reports are supposed to review the extent to which those goals have been met. However, USDA performance plans for recent years have not provided a link between the agency's climate efforts and performance goals, and its recent performance reports have not provided information on whether the agency was meeting its performance measures related to climate change. In addition, USDA performance measures do not capture the breadth of the agency's climate efforts. Agency officials told GAO that developing measures for the strategic goal on climate change was difficult. However, USDA has developed measures for other areas, such as conservation, where similar challenges existed. Without developing performance plans and reports that better reflect USDA's climate change efforts, USDA will have difficulty fully assessing its progress in meeting its climate change strategic goal and providing information on its progress to Congress and the public.
USDA faces challenges in encouraging farmers to take measures to adapt to climate change and reduce emissions. For example, USDA faces the challenge of turning the large amount of often technical climate research into readily understandable information. To address this challenge USDA is, among other things, developing tools that summarize climate information and communicate research findings to farmers in a more accessible format. USDA also faces a challenge related to the incentive structure that farmers consider when making decisions for their farms. Farmers weigh the financial costs and returns of taking certain actions, but USDA has not provided much information to farmers on the economic costs and returns of taking certain adaptation or emissions reduction actions, such as changing the extent to which they plow their fields. Under federal internal control standards, agencies are to ensure there are adequate means of communicating with external stakeholders when it may have a significant impact on the agency achieving its goals. Without information that is readily accessible to farmers on the farm-level economic costs and returns of taking certain actions in response to climate change, farmers may be reluctant to take these measures.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that USDA develop performance measures that better reflect the breadth of USDA climate change efforts and use its performance plans and reports to provide information on how the agency plans to achieve its goals and the status of its efforts. GAO also recommends that USDA develop and provide information to farmers on the economic costs and returns of taking certain actions in response to climate change. USDA concurred with these recommendations. |
gao_HEHS-99-48 | gao_HEHS-99-48_0 | The Congress and others are interested in the employment status of former welfare recipients, changes in family composition resulting from marriage and pregnancy, and the overall well-being of these families and their children. The data these states are reporting are the major source of information currently available on the condition of families who have left welfare. State Studies Reported Some Information on the Status of Families Who Have Left Welfare
Seventeen states have collected data and reported on the status of some former welfare families in the key areas of economic status, family composition, or family and child well-being. We determined that studies in 7 of the 17 states had enough data on a sample of families who had left welfare to generalize sample findings to the population of former welfare families from which the sample was drawn. Seventeen States Reported Some Information on Economic Status, Family Composition, or Family and Child Well-Being
We identified a total of 18 state-sponsored or -conducted studies in 17 states—2 studies in Wisconsin and 1 in each of the other states—that reported on the status of families who left welfare in 1995 or later. None of the studies reported specifically on families who had left welfare because of time limits. Findings From Most State Studies Were Not Generalizable to the Population of Former Welfare Families in the State
We determined that eight tracking studies, covering seven states, (1) were designed to include most families who left welfare in the state at the time of the study and (2) had sufficient data on the sample of families tracked for the sample to be considered representative of families studied. In the three studies for which such data were available, the percentage of the families who initially left welfare and then returned to the rolls ranged from 19 percent after 3 months in Maryland to 30 percent after 15 months in Wisconsin. The studies in five states reported on the extent to which former welfare families say they receive noncash public assistance. Federal Efforts Are Helping States to Improve the Usefulness of the Data Being Collected on Families Leaving Welfare
To increase the usefulness of state tracking efforts in providing a more complete picture of the status of former welfare families, HHS is supporting some states and counties with funds and technical assistance. Many more states have tracking studies in progress or planned and efforts are under way at the state and federal levels to improve the usefulness of these efforts. Although some of the studies reported employment rates only for adults who left welfare and were still off the rolls at the time of follow-up, others included all families who left the rolls during the study period—even those who had returned to welfare at the time of follow-up. Information on Selected Grants Awarded by the Department of Health and Human Services to Study Families Leaving Welfare
This appendix provides information on the study methodologies planned by the jurisdictions receiving grants from HHS to study families who have left welfare. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on families no longer receiving welfare, focusing on: (1) the extent to which states have reported information on the condition of families who have left welfare in the following key areas: (a) economic status; (b) family composition; and (c) family and child well-being; (2) generalizable state studies on what is known about the status of former welfare families in the key areas; and (3) federal and state efforts to improve the usefulness of the data obtained through these state efforts.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) 17 states have published information on the status of their families who have left welfare; (2) each of these states reported on the economic status of former welfare recipients, and the majority reported on family composition and family and child well-being; (3) the studies differed in important ways, including the categories of families studied, geographic scope, the time during which families who had left welfare were tracked, and the extent to which the families for whom data were available are representative of all families in the sample; (4) taking these factors into account, GAO determined that studies from only 7 of the 17 states had enough information on a sample of families to generalize findings to most families who had left welfare in the state at the time of the study; (5) these seven states' studies reported that most of the adults in families remaining off the welfare rolls were employed at some time after leaving welfare, but significant numbers of families also returned to the rolls; (6) in the three studies that reported the information, from 19 to 30 percent of the families who left welfare returned to the rolls at some time during the follow-up period; (7) although the seven states' studies generally had limited data on total household income, five reported that many families who had left welfare subsequently received noncash public assistance, such as Medicaid and food stamps, indicating that families' incomes were low enough to keep them eligible for these forms of government assistance; (8) none of the studies reported on changes in family composition resulting from marriage or pregnancy after leaving welfare; (9) regarding measures of well-being, six states' studies included data on homelessness or separation of children from their parents and reported no indication of increased incidence of these outcomes at the time of the followup; (10) efforts are under way at both the federal and state levels to improve the usefulness of the data being collected to assess the status of former welfare families; (11) most states either are studying or plan to study former welfare families, and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has recently funded 14 projects to track and monitor families who have left welfare; (12) these projects will receive technical assistance through HHS and from other states on developing their tracking efforts; and (13) in the future, these ongoing state efforts, many supported by HHS, should provide a more complete picture of the status of families who have left welfare. |
gao_GAO-04-784 | gao_GAO-04-784_0 | In May 2003, P.L. 1). Global AIDS Coordinator is based and reports directly to the Secretary of State; USAID; and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). Leadership Act established the position of the U.S. The U.S. U.S. Government Faces Five Major Challenges to Expanding ARV Treatment in Resource- poor Settings
In our structured interviews, we identified the following major challenges to U.S. government agencies in expanding ARV treatment in resource-poor settings: (1) difficulties coordinating with other groups involved in combating HIV/AIDS; (2) U.S. government policy constraints; (3) shortages of qualified health workers; (4) host government constraints; and (5) weak infrastructure (see fig. These challenges were also highlighted by numerous government and nongovernment experts whom we interviewed and in documents we reviewed. Coordinator’s Office Has Taken Steps to Address Challenges, but Continued Effort Is Needed
The Office of the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator has acknowledged each of the five challenges to expanding ARV treatment programs and has taken certain steps to address them, but some of these challenges require additional effort, longer-term solutions, and the support of others involved in providing ARV treatment. First, the Coordinator’s Office has devised means to improve coordination among U.S. agencies and with host governments and other organizations; however, it is too soon to tell whether they will be effective and the PEPFAR strategy does not state whether the means will be monitored. Third, the Coordinator’s Office proposed short-term assistance to address health worker shortages, including the use of paid workers and volunteers from the United States and other countries, and the PEPFAR strategy proposes several longer-term interventions. However, U.S. officials said that using international volunteers for the short-term activities is not cost effective. However, this guidance leaves key issues unresolved. Global AIDS Coordinator’s ability to address challenges in expanding AIDS treatment in PEPFAR focus countries, we recommend that the Secretary of State direct the Coordinator to monitor implementing agencies’ efforts to coordinate PEPFAR activities with stakeholders involved in ARV treatment, including taking adequate steps to actively solicit the input of host government officials and respond to their input; collaborate with the Administrator of USAID and the Secretary of HHS to address contracting capacity constraints in the field and resolve any negative effects resulting from the differing laws governing the funds appropriated to these agencies in the areas of procurement and foreign taxation of U.S. assistance, as well as differing requirements for auditing non-U.S. grantees; specify the activities that PEPFAR can fund and support in national treatment programs that use ARV drugs not approved for purchase by the Coordinator’s Office; and work with national governments and international partners to address the underlying economic and policy factors creating the crisis in human resources for health care. Response
To assess the Global AIDS Coordinator’s response to these challenges, we reviewed The President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief: U.S. Five Year Global HIV/AIDS Strategy (February 2004); administration guidance, including several communications to the field on ARV procurement; and information on the emerging structure and initial activities of the Coordinator’s Office. | Why GAO Did This Study
The President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), announced January 2003, aims to provide 2 million people with anti-retroviral (ARV) treatment in 14 of the world's most severely affected countries. In May 2003 legislation established the position of the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator in the State Department. GAO was asked to (1) identify major challenges to U.S. efforts to expand ARV treatment in resource-poor settings and (2) assess the Global AIDS Coordinator's response to these challenges.
What GAO Found
GAO interviewed 28 field staff from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), who most frequently cited the following five challenges to implementing and expanding ARV treatment in resource-poor settings: (1) coordination difficulties among both U.S. and non-U.S. entities; (2) U.S. government policy constraints; (3) shortages of qualified host country health workers; (4) host government constraints; and (5) weak infrastructure, including data collection and reporting systems and drug supply systems. These challenges were also highlighted by numerous experts GAO interviewed and in documents GAO reviewed. Although the Global AIDS Coordinator's Office has begun to address these challenges, resolving some challenges requires additional effort, longer-term solutions, and the support of others involved in providing ARV treatment. First, the Office has taken steps to improve U.S. coordination and acknowledged the need to collaborate with others, but it is too soon to tell whether these efforts will be effective. Second, to address policy constraints, U.S. agencies are working to enhance contracting capacity in the field and resolve differences on procurement, foreign taxation of U.S. assistance, and auditing of non-U.S. grantees. However, the Office's guidance did not address key issues related to the use of PEPFAR funds to buy certain ARV drugs. Third, the Office has proposed short-term solutions to the health worker shortage, such as using U.S. and other international volunteers for training and technical assistance; however, agency field officials said that using such volunteers is not cost effective. The Office is discussing with other donors certain longer-term interventions. Fourth, the Office has taken steps to encourage host countries' commitment to fight HIV/AIDS, but it is not addressing systemic challenges outside its authority, such as poor delineation of roles among government bodies. Finally, the Office is taking steps to improve data collection and reporting and better manage drug supplies. |
gao_GAO-07-870 | gao_GAO-07-870_0 | The scope of the program includes the pre-entry, entry, status management, and exit of foreign national travelers who enter and leave the United States at 285 air, land, and sea ports of entry, and the provision of new analytical capabilities across the overall process. Significant Weaknesses Place US- VISIT Data at Risk
Although CBP has implemented information security controls that are designed to safeguard US-VISIT data, its systems supporting US-VISIT have significant weaknesses in access controls and other controls designed to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of its sensitive and personal information. CBP did not sufficiently limit access to US-VISIT information and information systems. However, DHS did not ensure that controls adequately protected external and internal boundaries. However, CBP did not effectively implement physical security at several locations. DHS did not consistently apply encryption to protect sensitive data traversing the communication network. CBP did not provide adequate logging or user accountability for the mainframe, workstations, or servers. CBP did not always ensure that responsibilities for systems development and system operations or production were sufficiently segregated. However, CBP did not consistently maintain secure configurations on the mainframe, applications servers, and workstations we reviewed at the data center and ports of entry. These weaknesses increase the risk that unauthorized individuals could read, copy, delete, add, and modify sensitive information—including personally identifiable information—on systems supporting the US-VISIT program. They make it possible for intruders, as well as government and contractor employees, to bypass or disable computer access controls and undertake a wide variety of inappropriate or malicious acts. These risks are not confined to US-VISIT information. The CBP mainframe and network resources that support US-VISIT also support other programs and systems. As a result, the vulnerabilities identified in this report could expose the information and information systems of the other programs to the same increased risks. Information Security Program Is Not Fully Implemented
A key reason for these weaknesses is that, although CBP has made important progress in implementing the department’s information security program, it has not effectively or fully implemented key program activities for systems supporting the US-VISIT program. Conclusions
CBP systems supporting the US-VISIT program were riddled with significant information security control weaknesses that place sensitive information—including personally identifiable information—at increased risk of unauthorized and possibly undetected disclosure and modification, misuse, and destruction, and place program operations at increased risk of disruption. Weaknesses existed in all control areas and computing device types reviewed. Deficiencies in identification and authentication controls, authorization controls, boundary protection measures, physical security, use of cryptography, audit and monitoring practices, segregation of duties, and configuration assurance controls exposed CBP’s mainframe computer, network infrastructure, servers, and workstations to insider and external threats. Until DHS and CBP act to mitigate the weaknesses in CBP systems supporting the US-VISIT program and CBP effectively and fully implements its information security program, limited assurance exists that sensitive information will be sufficiently safeguarded against unauthorized disclosure, modification, and destruction, and that the US- VISIT program will achieve its goals. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help the Department effectively and fully implement information security program activities for CBP systems supporting the US-VISIT program, we are recommending that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Commissioner, U.S. Customs and Border Protection to 1. fully characterize risks in risk assessments for systems supporting US- 2. update the interconnection security agreements in the TECS security 3. enhance the procedures and documentation for testing and evaluating the effectiveness of security controls; 4. ensure remedial action plans address all significant security vulnerabilities, accurately report status of remedial actions, and identify necessary resources for completing actions; 5. fully develop and implement policies and tools for the timely detection and handling of security incidents; and 6. update and complete privacy documents for systems supporting the US-VISIT program. | Why GAO Did This Study
Intended to enhance the security of U.S. citizens and visitors, United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) program encompasses the pre-entry, entry, status management, and exit of foreign national travelers who enter and leave the United States at 285 air, sea, and land ports of entry. GAO was asked to determine whether Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has implemented appropriate controls to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the information and systems used to support the US-VISIT program. To do this, GAO examined the controls over the systems operated by Customs and Border Protection (CBP) that support the US-VISIT program.
What GAO Found
The systems supporting the US-VISIT program have significant information security control weaknesses that place sensitive and personally identifiable information at increased risk of unauthorized and possibly undetected disclosure and modification, misuse, and destruction. Weaknesses existed in all control areas and computing device types reviewed. Deficiencies in access controls and other system controls exposed mainframe computer, network infrastructure, servers, and workstations to insider and external threats. For example, CBP did not implement controls to effectively prevent, limit, and detect access to computer networks, systems, and information. To illustrate, it did not (1) adequately identify and authenticate users in systems supporting US-VISIT; (2) sufficiently limit access to US-VISIT information and information systems; (3) ensure that controls adequately protected external and internal network boundaries; (4) effectively implement physical security at several locations; (5) consistently encrypt sensitive data traversing the communication network; and (6) provide adequate logging or user accountability for the mainframe, workstations, or servers. In addition, CBP did not always ensure that responsibilities for systems development and system production were sufficiently segregated and did not consistently maintain secure configurations on the application servers and workstations at a key data center and ports of entry. These weaknesses collectively increase the risk that unauthorized individuals could read, copy, delete, add, and modify sensitive information, including personally identifiable information, and disrupt the operations of the US-VISIT program. They make it possible for intruders, as well as government and contractor employees, to bypass or disable computer access controls and undertake a wide variety of inappropriate or malicious acts. These risks are not confined to US-VISIT information. The CBP mainframe and network resources that support US-VISIT also support other programs and systems. As a result, the vulnerabilities identified in this report could expose the information and information systems of the other programs to the same increased risks. A key reason for these weaknesses is that, although CBP has made important progress in implementing elements of the department's information security program, it did not effectively or fully implement essential program activities. For example, CBP did not fully characterize the risks facing critical systems, update interconnection security agreements in security plans, sufficiently test and evaluate security controls, incorporate required elements in remedial action plans, adequately implement incident detection and handling procedures, and consistently address privacy issues. Until DHS and CBP act to mitigate the weaknesses in CBP systems supporting the US-VISIT program and CBP effectively and fully implements its information security program, limited assurance exists that the US-VISIT program will achieve its goal of enhancing the security of U.S. citizens and its visitors. |
gao_GAO-11-279 | gao_GAO-11-279_0 | As a result of this act, the CDC Childhood Lead Poisoning Prevention Program (CLPPP) was created. While the 2004 MMWR article discussed some limitations to its findings, it did not discuss other limitations that addressed how information in the 2004 MMWR article could be used. CDC Has Issued Statements to Address Confusion It Created Related to the 2004 MMWR Article, but Has Not Published an Overview of the Effects of Lead in Tap Water on BLLs in Children
Although CDC does not have a policy to monitor the use of or clarify information in public health publications, such as the information in the 2004 MMWR article, the agency issued statements to address confusion it created related to elevated lead levels in the District’s tap water. Specifically, CDC has not published an overview of what is known and not known about tap water as a source of lead exposure and the potential health effects on children, as suggested by the CDC internal incident analysis. In February 2008, a CDC official corresponded with the District’s Water and Sewer Authority officials about a statement in a February 2008 fact sheet published by the water authority that incorrectly characterized information in the 2004 MMWR article. The CDC official requested that the statement be corrected. CDC Has Not Published an Overview of the Effects of Lead in Tap Water on BLLs in Children
Although CDC has taken actions to address confusion specific to the 2004 MMWR article, as of January 2011, CDC had not taken action to publish an overview of the current knowledge about the contribution of elevated lead levels in tap water to BLLs in children and the associated health effects. CDC Has Begun an Initiative and Revised Procedures to Help Ensure That CDC Information Is Accessible and Clear, but These Procedures Do Not Address Confusion after Publication
CDC officials told us they had begun an initiative and revised procedures to help ensure the accessibility and clarity of CDC public health communications prior to publication, both agencywide and in NCEH. Specifically, an official from the Office of the Director told us that the CDC Office of the Associate Director of Science has begun an initiative to revise existing procedures to help ensure that information that CDC publishes, such as guidelines and recommendations, is easily accessible by a common portal on CDC’s Web site. Because CDC does not have procedures for addressing confusion after publication, the agency runs the risk that its staff will provide inconsistent responses to interpretations of its information that differ from what CDC intended. Conclusions
Although CDC has taken some belated actions to clarify confusion related to the 2004 MMWR article on BLLs of residents in the District, the agency does not plan to publish a comprehensive review of the role of tap water as a source of lead exposure that would communicate what is known about the contribution of lead in water to elevated BLLs in children. CDC’s credibility as the nation’s premier public health agency relies on presenting accurate, reliable, and timely information to the public. CDC can mitigate the risk of such misinterpretations as well as the resulting risk to its credibility by developing procedures that allow it to address confusion in a timely, consistent manner. Recommendations for Executive Action
We are recommending that the Director of CDC take two actions, the first to clarify confusion about the contribution of lead in tap water to elevated BLLs, and the second to improve the clarity of CDC’s published information on public health issues. 1. 2. CDC agreed with our first recommendation to publish an article in an MMWR Recommendations and Reports. Appendix I: 2004 Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report Article about Blood Lead Levels of District Residents
On April 2, 2004, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) published the following article in the Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report, which presented results of the investigation on the effect of lead in the District’s tap water on the blood lead levels of residents. | Why GAO Did This Study
In February 2004, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) was asked to assess the effects of elevated lead levels in tap water on Washington, D.C., residents. In April 2004, CDC published the results. However, an inaccurate statement and incomplete descriptions of the limitations of the analyses resulted in confusion about CDC's intended message. GAO was asked to examine (1) CDC's actions to clarify its published results and communicate current knowledge about the contribution of lead in tap water to elevated blood lead levels (BLL) in children and (2) CDC's changes to its procedures to improve the clarity of the information in its public health communications. GAO reviewed CDC communication policies and procedures and interviewed CDC officials.
What GAO Found
CDC officials told GAO that although the agency does not have a policy to monitor the use of or clarify information in public health publications, the agency took actions to address confusion it created related to the 2004 Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (MMWR) article about elevated lead levels in Washington, D.C., tap water. For example, in 2008, CDC officials contacted District of Columbia Water and Sewer Authority officials requesting corrections to a statement in a fact sheet published by the water authority that incorrectly characterized information from the 2004 MMWR article. In addition, CDC also published articles in the 2010 MMWR intended to clarify the confusion, such as a June 25, 2010, article that discussed limitations about how information in the 2004 article could be used. While CDC took these actions, among others, to clarify confusion about the effect of elevated lead levels in District tap water, as of January 2011, CDC had no plans to publish an overview of the current knowledge about the contribution of elevated lead levels in tap water to BLLs in children, as suggested by a CDC internal incident analysis of issues surrounding the 2004 MMWR article. CDC officials told GAO they had begun an initiative and revised procedures designed to help ensure the accessibility and clarity of CDC public health communications, both agencywide and in the National Center for Environmental Health, the center responsible for lead poisoning prevention programs. For example, under the new initiative, CDC will revise existing procedures to help ensure that information that CDC publishes, such as guidelines and recommendations, is easily accessible by a common portal on CDC's Web site. While the initiative and revised procedures focus on making CDC information more accessible and on preventing errors or unclear statements in CDC communications, they do not include actions to address confusion that may arise after information is published, such as occurred with the 2004 MMWR article. Without agency procedures specifically addressing how and when to take action about confusion after publication, CDC runs the risk of inconsistent responses across the agency when its published information is not interpreted as CDC intended. CDC's mission to promote the nation's public health relies on its credibility in presenting accurate, reliable, and timely information. Communicating the agency's current knowledge about the health effects of lead levels in tap water and developing procedures that allow it to address confusion in a timely, consistent manner could improve the public's understanding of the effect of lead in water and help CDC mitigate the risk of confusion in other situations and protect its credibility.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making two recommendations to CDC: (1) publish an article providing a comprehensive overview of tap water as a source of lead exposure and communicating the potential health effects on children and (2) develop procedures to address any confusion after information is published. CDC generally concurred with GAO's recommendations. For the second recommendation, while CDC described procedures it is developing, the agency did not explicitly address all components of the recommendation. |
gao_GAO-11-853 | gao_GAO-11-853_0 | RSIA’s Requirements Increased Rest Time and Decreased Fatigue Risk While Leaving Opportunities for Further Reductions in Fatigue Risk from Night Work
New Hours of Service Requirements Have Led to Changes in Covered T&E Employees’ Work Schedules and Increased Rest Opportunity While Decreasing Hours Worked
RSIA’s new hours of service requirements have led to changes in covered T&E employees’ work schedules. Both the limits on consecutive work days without required rest (referred to hereafter as consecutive work day limits) and the new requirements for rest, including the requirements for increasing the minimum rest at the end of a shift from 8 to 10 hours, and for this rest to occur during the 24 hours before the start of a new shift and be undisturbed (referred to hereafter as the increased rest requirements) have contributed to the schedule changes. According to our analysis of covered T&E employee work schedules, the potential for covered employees to work at high risk of fatigue—a level associated with reduced alertness and an increased risk of errors and accidents— decreased after RSIA took effect. It is still early in the implementation process, yet class I railroad officials and rail labor officials we spoke with said that RSIA’s requirements, including longer, undisturbed rest time should contribute to a better rested workforce. New Hours of Service Requirements Have Led to Operational and Administrative Changes That Have Increased Some Railroads’ Costs
Operational Changes Have Affected Railroads’ Scheduling, Staffing, and Customer Service
According to our survey results, RSIA’s hours of service requirements led to a number of effects on railroads’ operations, as would be expected with any significant change in statutory or regulatory requirements aimed at improving safety by reducing covered employee fatigue. Costs for additional staff could also be related to service increases responding, at least in part, to improvements in the economy that followed RSIA’s implementation in July 2009. Nevertheless, even though we did not determine the specific financial effects of RSIA’s changes on railroads, it is likely the changes affected the costs, revenues, and earnings for some railroads, at least temporarily. Railroad officials we spoke with largely attributed these effects to RSIA’s consecutive work day limits and requirements for increased rest. This was one of these railroads’ main issues with RSIA’s changes. Too Soon to Assess FRA’s Hours of Service Oversight, but Implementation of Pilot Project and Waiver Provisions Could Yield More Data to Address Fatigue
FRA Uses a Risk-Based Approach to Oversee Compliance with Hours of Service Requirements
To plan its oversight of railroads’ compliance with hours of service requirements, FRA applies the same risk-based approach that it uses to assess compliance generally. FRA has been unable to implement two pilot projects mandated under RSIA because no railroads have chosen to participate, and has not exercised its pre-RSIA authority to approve voluntary pilot projects designed to examine the fatigue- reduction potential of alternatives to the current hours of service laws because of flaws in the applications it received. RSIA did not require FRA to collect data or report on the safety effects of approved waiver petitions, as it did for the voluntary pilot projects, and FRA has not taken steps to do so. Our work shows that some covered employees saw reductions in their work hours and, according to information from our survey of the railroad industry and related interviews, many railroads made changes in crew and train schedules, incurred additional costs to hire new employees or bring employees back from furlough to maintain operations and comply with the law, and saw reductions in their ability to provide service to customers when and where needed. More important, although the time spent working at a high risk of fatigue decreased for some T&E employees, RSIA did not address work performed during night hours, which, according to both scientific literature and our analysis of covered T&E employee work schedules, represents a major factor in fatigue risk. Recommendations for Executive Action
To ensure that FRA’s implementation of hours of service requirements in the freight railroad industry maximizes opportunities to reduce the risks of accidents and incidents related to fatigue, we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation direct the Administrator of FRA to take the following action: Evaluate and develop recommendations about the relative impact of consecutive days worked and work performed during night hours on the potential for fatigue and risk of accidents in the freight railroad industry. Also, collect safety indicator and accident and incident data from participants in pilot projects and railroads with waivers of compliance with hours of service requirements to determine the effects of such pilot projects and waivers on covered employee fatigue and participant safety performance. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To better understand the changes to freight railroad hours of service requirements made by the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008 (RSIA), we reviewed the (1) impacts of the hours of service changes on the covered train and engine (T&E) workforce, including potential impacts on fatigue; (2) operational and administrative impacts of the hours of service changes on the railroad industry; and (3) actions taken by the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) to oversee compliance with hours of service requirements and implement RSIA provisions related to hours of service pilot projects and waivers. Both of these models require similar data on railroad workers’ work schedules and provide generally similar outputs. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008 (RSIA) overhauled requirements for how much time certain freight railroad workers can spend on the job (called "hours of service"). Changes included limiting the number of consecutive days on duty before rest is required, increasing minimum rest time from 8 to 10 hours, and requiring rest time to be undisturbed. RSIA also provided for pilot projects and waivers. RSIA's changes became effective for freight railroads in July 2009. GAO was asked to assess (1) the impact of these changes on covered train and engine (T&E) employees, including implications for fatigue, (2) the impact of the changes on the rail industry, and (3) actions the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) has taken to oversee compliance with hours of service requirements and implement RSIA provisions for pilot projects and waivers. To perform this work, GAO analyzed covered employee work schedules and used models to assess fatigue, surveyed the railroad industry, analyzed FRA inspection and enforcement data, and interviewed federal and railroad officials as well as fatigue and sleep experts.
What GAO Found
According to GAO's analysis of covered employee work schedules, RSIA's requirements led to changed work schedules, increased rest time, and reduced risk of fatigue for covered T&E employees. RSIA's consecutive work day limits and rest requirements contributed to work schedule changes and increases in rest time. Increased rest time also led to equivalent decreases in the hours that covered employees worked. Overall, GAO found, using an FRA-validated fatigue model, that the time covered employees spent working at a high risk of fatigue-- a level associated with reduced alertness and an increased risk of errors and accidents--decreased by about 29 percent for employees of class I railroads (those with the largest revenues) and by about 36 percent for employees of selected class II railroads (those with smaller revenues). GAO's analysis also shows that there are further opportunities to reduce fatigue risk. Specifically, RSIA's changes did not result in material decreases in night work, yet scientific literature and GAO's analysis show night work represents a major factor in fatigue risk. As might be expected from changes aimed at improving safety by reducing covered employee fatigue, the railroad industry reported that RSIA's hours of service changes had operational and administrative effects on it, some of which increased some railroads' one-time or ongoing costs. GAO did not determine how RSIA's changes affected railroads' earnings; but the act took effect as the economy was starting to recover from the recession that began in late 2008. Through its industry survey and interviews, GAO found that RSIA's changes affected railroad operations, including changes to crew and train schedules and increases in staffing levels. Railroad officials GAO spoke with attributed these changes to RSIA's consecutive work day limits and rest requirements, both of which acted to reduce people's availability to work. To maintain operations while complying with the law, railroad officials told GAO they, among other things, hired new employees or brought employees back from furlough. GAO estimated that adding people--120 to 500 each by some class I railroads--increased these railroads' annual costs by $11 million to $50 million. Administrative effects reported by railroads included a need for railroads to revise their hours of service timekeeping systems. FRA uses a risk-based approach to oversee compliance with hours of service and other safety requirements, analyzing inspection and accident data to help target inspections to activities where noncompliance is associated with a greater risk of accidents. GAO's analysis of inspection and enforcement data for the years before RSIA took effect and for the following year show it is too early to determine if FRA has changed the priority it assigns to overseeing hours of service requirements or if a change in priority is warranted. FRA has not been able to implement RSIA-required pilot projects because no railroads have chosen to participate. Nor has it approved voluntary pilot projects designed to test the fatigue-reduction potential of alternatives to RSIA requirements. FRA has approved petitions for waivers of compliance with hours of service requirements for some railroads, but is not required by RSIA to collect data on the safety effects of the approved alternatives. Data from pilot projects--if implemented-- and waivers could be used to improve FRA's assessment of fatigue issues. FRA should, among other things, assess the fatigue risk of work performed during night hours and develop data from pilot projects and waivers to help assess fatigue issues. The Department of Transportation raised concerns about findings related to the oversight process and provided additional clarifying information. Based in part on this additional information, GAO withdrew part of a recommendation. GAO also made other clarifications in the report. |
gao_GAO-12-46 | gao_GAO-12-46_0 | FDA Has Many Efforts to Address Economic Adulteration but Has Missed Opportunities to Communicate and Coordinate
FDA primarily approaches economic adulteration as part of its broader efforts to detect and prevent adulteration of food and medical products in general. Such efforts include, for example, the agency’s actions to ensure the safety of imported products. Agency officials noted that the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act does not distinguish among motives or require motive to be established to determine whether a product is adulterated. Rather, when the agency detects any form of adulteration that poses an adverse public health effect, it can conduct an investigation, request a recall to get the product off the market, and take enforcement action. A senior FDA official told us there is value in making a distinction between economic adulteration and other forms of adulteration to guide the agency’s thinking about how to be more proactive in addressing this issue. In addition to these broader efforts, some FDA entities have undertaken efforts specific to economic adulteration. Key Challenges Include Increased Globalization and Lack of Information from Industry
FDA officials and stakeholders told us that responding to increased globalization and the expanding complexity of the supply chains for both food and medical products is a key challenge in addressing economic adulteration. Globalization has led to an increase in the variety, complexity, and volume of imported food and drugs, which complicates FDA’s task of ensuring their safety. In addition to globalization, an increase in supply chain complexity—the growth in the networks of handlers, suppliers, and middlemen—also complicates FDA’s task. However, agency officials and industry representatives said industry is often reluctant to share such information when an adulterated ingredient has not entered into commerce. Some Stakeholders Cited Greater Oversight and Information Sharing as Options to Address Economic Adulteration
Some stakeholders supported increased oversight by FDA, in particular, as an option to obtain more information on supply chains—information that is useful in tracing the source of economic adulteration. For example, one stakeholder suggested that the use of track-and-trace technology— such as using standard numerical identifiers on prescription drug packages—could facilitate FDA’s oversight of the supply chain by making it easier for FDA and industry to trace adulterated ingredients back to the point of contamination. Many stakeholders also suggested that FDA increase its regulatory and enforcement actions to address economic adulteration. These stakeholders said that public health risk should be FDA’s priority in taking such actions, but many also told us that FDA should pursue those who adulterate for economic gain, including in instances that may not have a large negative public health impact. Even with the challenges related to the disclosure of proprietary information, stakeholders also suggested that greater communication with industry could enhance FDA efforts to gather information on economic adulteration. In the view of these stakeholders, this type of information may help both industry and FDA better target their efforts to detect and prevent economic adulteration. Some entities have undertaken efforts that specifically focus on economic adulteration, but they have not always communicated or coordinated their efforts with other FDA entities. Recommendations for Executive Action
To enhance FDA’s efforts to combat the economic adulteration of food and medical products, we recommend that the Commissioner of FDA take the following three actions: adopt a working definition of economic adulteration, provide written guidance to agency centers and offices on the means of addressing economic adulteration, and enhance communication and coordination of agency efforts on economic adulteration. HHS neither agreed nor disagreed with our recommendations. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report examines (1) the approaches the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) uses to detect and prevent economic adulteration of food and medical products, and (2) the challenges, if any, FDA faces in detecting and preventing economic adulteration and stakeholder views on options for FDA to enhance its efforts to address economic adulteration. | Why GAO Did This Study
In recent years, the United States experienced public health crises suspected to have been caused by the deliberate substitution or addition of harmful ingredients in food and drugs--specifically melamine in pet food and oversulfated chondroitin sulfate in the blood thinner heparin. These ingredients were evidently added to increase the apparent value of these products or reduce their production costs, an activity GAO refers to as economic adulteration. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA), an agency within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), has responsibility for protecting public health by ensuring the safety of a wide range of products that are vulnerable to economic adulteration. This report examines (1) the approaches that FDA uses to detect and prevent economic adulteration of food and medical products and (2) the challenges FDA faces in detecting and preventing economic adulteration and views of stakeholders on options for FDA to enhance its efforts to address economic adulteration. GAO reviewed FDA documents and interviewed FDA officials and stakeholders from academia and industry, among others..
What GAO Found
FDA primarily approaches economic adulteration as part of its broader efforts to combat adulteration in general, such as efforts to ensure the safety of imported products. Agency officials noted that the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act does not distinguish among motives or require motive to be established to determine whether a product is adulterated. However, a senior FDA official told GAO that there is value in making a distinction between economic adulteration and other forms of adulteration to guide the agency's thinking about how to be more proactive in addressing this issue. An FDA official told GAO when the agency detects any form of adulteration that poses an adverse public health effect, it can conduct an investigation, request a recall to get the product off the market, and take enforcement action. In addition to these broader efforts, some FDA entities also have undertaken efforts that specifically focus on economic adulteration. For example, FDA's Office of Regulatory Affairs has contracted with a research center to model risk factors for improved detection of economic adulteration of food. However, FDA entities have not always communicated or coordinated their economic adulteration efforts. For example, FDA's Center for Veterinary Medicine was unaware of and did not participate in two other entities' economic adulteration efforts involving products the veterinary center regulates. FDA officials and stakeholders GAO interviewed cited several key challenges to detecting and preventing economic adulteration, including increased globalization and lack of information from industry. Globalization has led to an increase in the variety, complexity, and volume of imported food and drugs, which complicates FDA's task of ensuring their safety. In addition to globalization, an increase in supply chain complexity--the growth in the networks of handlers, suppliers, and middlemen--also complicates FDA's task, making it difficult to trace an ingredient back to its source. FDA officials and stakeholders also said that gathering information from industry, such as information on potentially adulterated ingredients, presents challenges for FDA in detecting and preventing economic adulteration due to industry's reluctance to share such information because it is proprietary. Stakeholders cited greater oversight and information sharing as options to improve FDA's ability to combat economic adulteration. Specifically, some stakeholders supported increased oversight, such as the use of technology to trace adulterated ingredients back to the point of contamination, as an option to obtain more information on supply chains. Many stakeholders also suggested that FDA increase its regulatory and enforcement actions to address economic adulteration, including in instances that may not have a large negative public health impact. Stakeholders also suggested that greater communication with industry, through such means as an information clearinghouse or more informal interactions, could enhance FDA efforts to gather information on economic adulteration.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that FDA adopt a working definition of economic adulteration, enhance communication and coordination of agency efforts, and provide guidance to agency centers and offices on the means of addressing economic adulteration. HHS neither agreed nor disagreed with GAO's recommendations, but cited planned actions related to adopting a definition and enhancing communication and coordination. |
gao_GAO-08-594 | gao_GAO-08-594_0 | It Is Important to Consider Many Issues in Four Key Areas When Developing a Regulatory Framework for Offshore Aquaculture
A wide array of issues within four key areas—program administration, permitting and site selection, environmental management, and research— are important to consider when developing an offshore aquaculture program for the United States. Site selection is also an important component of regulating offshore aquaculture. Key Program Administration Issues
Aquaculture stakeholders that we contacted and key studies that we reviewed identified specific roles and responsibilities for federal agencies, states, and regional fishery management councils. In addition, stakeholders and three of the key studies we reviewed recommended that states be involved in the development and implementation of a regulatory framework for offshore aquaculture. Roles and Responsibilities of Federal Agencies
Most stakeholders that we contacted and the four key studies that we reviewed agreed that NOAA should be the lead federal agency for offshore aquaculture, both to manage a new permitting or leasing program for aquaculture in federal waters and to coordinate federal responsibilities for offshore aquaculture. About half of the stakeholders who agreed with this approach told us that offshore aquaculture is a completely different enterprise from fishing and does not result in an increase or decrease of the wild stocks managed by councils. For example, a few stakeholders said permits should have shorter time frames to ensure compliance with regulations and best management practices while leases should grant a long-term right to occupy a given area of the ocean to encourage investment. Hawaii issued 20-year leases to its two existing nearshore open-ocean aquaculture facilities. Currently at the state level, Hawaii, Maine, and Washington all use the case-by-case approach for approving sites within their state waters. In addition, stakeholders generally supported monitoring environmental conditions at offshore aquaculture facilities once they begin operations. For instance, a majority of stakeholders recognized the value of reviewing the potential environmental impacts of offshore aquaculture over a broad ocean area before any aquaculture facilities are sited—which involves preparing a PEIS. Some stakeholders said that an adaptive monitoring approach would provide regulators the flexibility to respond to new information on environmental risks and change monitoring requirements accordingly. Mitigating the Potential Impact of Escaped Fish and Remediating Environmental Damage
Stakeholders had varied opinions about other policies related to offshore aquaculture that could be used to mitigate the potential environmental impact of escaped aquaculture-raised fish, including restricting the types of fish that could be raised in offshore cages, requiring fish to be marked or tagged, and requiring facilities to develop plans outlining how they would respond to fish escapes. Priorities for Aquaculture Research and Limitations of Current Programs
It is also important for a regulatory framework to include federally funded research to address gaps in current knowledge on a variety of issues related to offshore aquaculture. In addition, while NOAA and USDA fund research on marine aquaculture through, for instance, competitive grants, some researchers said that these grants are funded over time periods that are too short to accommodate certain types of research. Many stakeholders also supported federal research that would help develop hatchery technologies to breed and grow the fish that ultimately populate offshore cages, while effectively managing disease. Research into how escaped aquaculture-raised fish might impact wild fish populations is an example of this type of research. NOAA said that by indicating that the environmental impacts of an offshore aquaculture industry are uncertain due to a lack of data specific to such facilities, we were diminishing the importance of the findings from environmental monitoring of the small-scale open ocean aquaculture operations in state waters. To address this objective, we reviewed key academic and government-sponsored studies that analyzed proposed regulatory frameworks for offshore aquaculture in federal waters; reviewed existing federal laws that include provisions that are applicable to offshore aquaculture, as well as federal agencies’ regulations, policies, and guidance for marine aquaculture; reviewed laws, regulations, policies, and guidance for marine aquaculture in selected states; visited aquaculture facilities in selected states; and administered questionnaires to, and conducted follow-up structured interviews with, a variety of aquaculture stakeholders. If a study is not cited for a particular policy issue, it is because the study did not address that issue. The final questionnaire covered a range of topics including which federal agencies should be responsible for various program administration activities such as program management and agency coordination; how a potential permitting or leasing program should be structured, including to what extent various stakeholders should be involved in the process; opinions on the types of environmental review and monitoring that should be required as part of a regulatory framework; and what should be the priority areas for potentially federally funded aquaculture research. Appendix II: Stakeholders Consulted by GAO Regarding a Regulatory Framework for Offshore Aquaculture
The following stakeholders responded to our questionnaire and participated in follow-up interviews regarding administrative and environmental issues that should be addressed in the development of an effective regulatory framework for U.S. offshore aquaculture: Sue Aspelund, Special Assistant to the Commissioner, Alaska Department of Fish and Game; Brian E. Baird, Assistant Secretary, Ocean and Coastal Policy, California Sebastian M. Belle, Executive Director, Maine Aquaculture Association; John Connelly, President, National Fisheries Institute; Cora Crome, Fisheries Policy Advisor, Office of the Governor, State of Bill Dewey, Manager of Public Affairs, Taylor Shellfish Company; Robin Downey, Executive Director, Pacific Coast Shellfish Growers Kathleen Drew, Executive Policy Advisor, Office of Washington Governor Tim Eichenberg, Former Director, Pacific Regional Office, Ocean John Forster, Ph.D., President and Aquaculture Consultant, Forster Rebecca Goldburg, Ph.D., Senior Scientist, Environmental Defense Fund; Samantha D. Horn Olsen, Aquaculture Policy Coordinator, Maine Department of Marine Resources; Dr. Richard Langan, Director, Atlantic Marine Aquaculture Center and Open Ocean Aquaculture Program, University of New Hampshire; George H. Leonard, Ph.D., Aquaculture Director, Ocean Conservancy; John R. MacMillan, Ph.D., President, National Aquaculture Association; Dr. Larry McKinney, Director of Coastal Fisheries, Texas Parks and Rosamond Naylor, William Wrigley Senior Fellow and Director, Program on Food Security and the Environment, Stanford University; J.E. GAO Comments
1. 4. GAO Comment
1. | Why GAO Did This Study
U. S. aquaculture--the raising of fish and shellfish in captivity--has generally been confined to nearshore coastal waters or in other water bodies, such as ponds, that fall under state regulation. Recently, there has been an increased interest in expanding aquaculture to offshore waters, which would involve raising fish and shellfish in the open ocean, and consequently bringing these types of operations under federal regulation. While the offshore expansion has the potential to increase U.S. aquaculture production, no comprehensive legislative or regulatory framework to manage such an expansion exists. Instead, multiple federal agencies have authority to regulate different aspects of offshore aquaculture under a variety of existing laws that were not designed for this purpose. In this context, GAO was asked to identify key issues that should be addressed in the development of an effective regulatory framework for U.S. offshore aquaculture. In conducting its assessment, GAO administered a questionnaire to a wide variety of key aquaculture stakeholders; analyzed laws, regulations, and key studies; and visited states that regulate nearshore aquaculture industries. Although GAO is not making any recommendations, this review emphasizes the need to carefully consider a wide array of key issues as a regulatory framework for offshore aquaculture is developed. Agencies that provided official comments generally agreed with the report.
What GAO Found
In developing a regulatory framework for offshore aquaculture, it is important to consider a wide array of issues, which can be grouped into four main areas. (1) Program administration: Addressing the administration of an offshore program at the federal level is an important aspect of a regulatory framework. Stakeholders that GAO contacted and key studies that GAO reviewed identified specific roles and responsibilities for federal agencies, states, and regional fishery management councils. Most stakeholders and the studies agreed that the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) should be the lead federal agency and emphasized that coordination with other federal agencies will also be important. In addition, stakeholders and some of the studies recommended that the states play an important role in the development and implementation of an offshore aquaculture program. (2) Permitting and site selection: It will also be important to establish a regulatory process that clearly identifies where aquaculture facilities can be located and for how long. For example, many stakeholders stated that offshore facilities will need the legal right, through a permit or lease, to occupy an area of the ocean. However, stakeholders varied on the specific terms of the permits or leases, including their duration. Some stakeholders said that longer permits could make it easier for investors to recoup their investments, while others said that shorter ones could facilitate closer scrutiny of environmental impacts. This variability is also reflected in the approaches taken by states that regulate aquaculture in their waters. One state issues 20-year leases while another issues shorter leases. Stakeholders supported various approaches for siting offshore facilities, such as case-by-case site evaluations and prepermitting some locations. (3) Environmental management: A process to assess and mitigate the environmental impacts of offshore operations is another important aspect of a regulatory framework. For example, many stakeholders told GAO of the value of reviewing the potential cumulative environmental impacts of offshore operations over a broad ocean area before any facilities are sited. About half of them said that a facility-by-facility environmental review should also be required. Two states currently require facility-level reviews for operations in state waters. In addition, stakeholders, key studies, and state regulators generally supported an adaptive monitoring approach to ensure flexibility in monitoring changing environmental conditions. Other important areas to address include policies to mitigate the potential impacts of escaped fish and to remediate environmental damage. (4) Research: Finally, a regulatory framework needs to include a federal research component to help fill current gaps in knowledge about offshore aquaculture. For example, stakeholders supported federally funded research on developing (1) alternative fish feeds, (2) best management practices to minimize environmental impacts, (3) data on how escaped aquaculture fish might impact wild fisheries, and (4) strategies to breed and raise fish while effectively managing disease. A few researchers said that the current process of funding research for aquaculture is not adequate because the research grants are funded over periods that are too short to accommodate certain types of research, such as hatchery research and offshore demonstration projects. |
gao_GAO-03-20 | gao_GAO-03-20_0 | In some cases, DOD retained some of the property and created military enclaves on closed installations. The Navy retained exclusive federal jurisdiction over about 270 acres as a military enclave. Together, the Navy-retained and Navy-transferred property is called the Philadelphia Naval Business Center. The City of Philadelphia is responsible for providing fire protection services to private development on non-Navy property at the business center. The DOD Fire and Emergency Services Program provides policy that governs fire protection at military installations. Using these criteria, the federal enclave at the business center is required to have a fully staffed on-site federal fire-fighting force; however, some of the fire-fighting force may be satisfied by city assets based on a mutual aid agreement. According to Navy officials, federal fire protection was retained because the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania did not respond to the Navy’s request in 1999 to change the jurisdictional status of the property from exclusive federal to proprietary jurisdiction in anticipation of the Navy transferring the ownership of excess land. Fire Protection at the Business Center Is Similar to That Provided Elsewhere in Philadelphia
The level of fire protection at the business center is similar to that available elsewhere in the City of Philadelphia, but the arrangements for providing that protection are different. When a fire occurs on non-Navy property within the business center, both the City of Philadelphia Fire Department and the firefighters from the Navy’s enclave automatically respond to the call. When a fire occurs at the Navy’s enclave at the business center, only the Navy firefighters automatically respond to the alarm. According to the Philadelphia Fire Department Commissioner, as development in the business center continues to expand, his office is expected to reevaluate the location of fire stations located near the business center. This jurisdictional change would have been similar to what occurred at most other military enclaves created during the base closure and realignment process. | What GAO Found
When the Department of Defense closed military installations as a part of the base realignment and closure process and transferred properties to public and private ownership, it in some cases retained a portion of an installation as a military enclave. During this process, legal jurisdiction over an enclave may be transferred from the federal government to the local government. Such a transfer may incorporate provisions for fire protection and other services by local and state governments. A federal fire-fighting service provides fire protection services at the Navy's enclave located at the Philadelphia Naval Business Center. This is one of the three military enclaves, formed during the base closure and realignment process, which is still protected by federal firefighters. Twenty-four other military enclaves were converted from federal to local fire protection during the base closure process. The Navy retained a federal fire-fighting force at its enclave at the Philadelphia Naval Business Center because of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania did not respond to the Navy's request to change the jurisdiction of the Navy-retained land. The level of fire protection at the Philadelphia Naval Business Center is similar to that available elsewhere in the City of Philadelphia, but the arrangements for providing that protection differ. If a fire occurs on non-Navy property within the business center, both the Navy and the Philadelphia fire departments will automatically respond to the call, with the Navy as the first responder. However, if the fire is located on Navy-owned property at the business center, only Navy firefighters will automatically respond to the alarm. As private development at the Philadelphia Naval Business Center continues, the fire protection arrangements are expected to be reassessed. The Commissioner of the Philadelphia Fire Department stated that, as development at the business center continues to increase, his office will need to reevaluate the location of city-owned fire stations in the area around the business center. |
gao_GAO-16-405 | gao_GAO-16-405_0 | The Air Force Has Made Limited Progress Developing Plans to Implement the Commission’s Recommendations and Is Revising Its Management Approach
As of February 2016, two years after the commission issued its report, the Air Force closed six recommendations—five were implemented and the Air Force did not agree with the sixth. According to Air Force officials, internal challenges included: expected completion dates not identified; difficulties in coordinating implementation efforts across offices; and inter-related recommendations. Air Force’s Revised Approach Requires Tasks and Milestones, but Does Not Require Performance Measures Containing Key Attributes
The Air Force’s revised approach requires that tasks and milestones be developed to manage implementation of the commission’s recommendations, which is consistent with leading practices on program management and our prior work on business process reengineering. Through our prior work on performance measurement, we have identified key attributes of performance measures that can help managers monitor progress toward achieving program goals and priorities. For example, the performance measures did not consistently include clear, measurable, objective measures and a baseline assessment of current performance. These options are presented to Air Force senior leaders for their consideration, and the leaders’ decisions inform the first phase of the multi-year budget development or Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution process. The Air Force developed its force mix option process to evaluate the mix of active and reserve component forces across the Air Force. As part of this process, the Air Force developed customized, classified data analyses for 44 aircraft types and mission areas. The process combines data analysis and stakeholder inputs. However, it is not clear at this time how many of the proposed force mix options from all the analyses completed by December 2015 may ultimately be implemented since the budget development and execution cycle spans up to four years. However, the revised approach is new and unproven and does not require that performance measures be developed for each commission recommendation in order to assess progress and effects. Without complete implementation plans that include performance measures, Air Force leaders may lack key information they could use to monitor progress and assess whether performance is meeting expectations for the 36 recommendations that are still open. Recommendation for Executive Action
To facilitate implementation of the commission’s recommendations and provide managers with information to gauge progress and identify areas that may need attention, we recommend that the Secretary of the Air Force in coordination with the Chief of Staff of the Air Force direct the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force to develop complete implementation plans that include performance measures for all 36 commission recommendations that remain open. The Air Force agreed with our recommendation to develop complete implementation plans that include performance measures for the 36 remaining open National Commission on the Structure of the Air Force (commission) recommendations. 2. Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report (1) evaluates the extent to which the Air Force has made progress in implementing the commission’s recommendations and (2) describes how the Air Force has assessed the potential for increasing the proportion of reserve to active component forces as discussed in the commission’s report. To evaluate the extent to which the Air Force has made progress in implementing the commission’s recommendations, we reviewed Air Force documents, such as briefings to the Executive Committee on the status of the commission’s recommendations, the Executive Committee Charter, and a draft template designed by the Air Force’s Total Force Continuum office for describing milestones, tasks, and other details related to implementing each group of recommendations and individual recommendations. Also, Air Force officials said that plans for these 3 recommendations were the only implementation plans that had been developed under the original approach. We compared the implementation plans for the 3 recommendations with leading practices for program management that included the use of milestones and tasks. To describe how the Air Force has assessed the potential for increasing the proportion of reserve to active component forces as discussed in the commission’s report, we identified the scope, content, and process for the Air Force’s High Velocity Analysis (referred to in the report as the force mix option process) which is the process the Air Force developed to identify and assess force mix options. | Why GAO Did This Study
In January 2014, the National Commission on the Structure of the Air Force (commission) issued its report, which included 42 recommendations for improving how the Air Force manages its total force. The report also discussed the feasibility of shifting 36,600 personnel from the active to the reserve component and estimated that doing so could save $2 billion annually.
Senate Report 114-49 included a provision for GAO to review matters related to the Air Force's efforts to implement the commission's recommendations. This report (1) evaluates the extent to which the Air Force has made progress in implementing the commission's recommendations and (2) describes how the Air Force has assessed the potential for increasing the proportion of reserve to active component forces. GAO reviewed documentation of the Air Force's efforts and compared Air Force implementation plans with leading practices for program management derived from the public and private sectors and GAO's prior work. GAO also reviewed documentation and interviewed officials in order to describe the Air Force's process for assessing its active and reserve component mix.
What GAO Found
As of February 2016, the Air Force had made limited progress in implementing the commission's recommendations—it had closed 6 recommendations and had taken action to revise its approach for managing implementation of the remaining 36 open recommendations. Air Force officials encountered challenges as they began implementing the commission's recommendations which the revised approach may address. For example, the Air Force had difficulty coordinating across components and offices and coordinating among teams working on inter-related recommendations. Under the revised approach, the Air Force has grouped related recommendations together and placed responsibility for each group under senior officials to improve coordination. According to Air Force officials, the revised approach requires development of milestones and tasks for each recommendation but does not require development of performance measures. Federal internal control standards, leading program management practices, and GAO's prior work have shown that performance measures which contain key attributes—such as baseline and trend data—can help managers monitor progress toward achieving program goals and identify areas for corrective actions. Since the revised approach was not fully in place as of January 2016, the Air Force had not developed complete implementation plans with milestones, tasks, and performance measures to monitor and oversee progress on the remaining 36 open recommendations. Under its original management approach, the Air Force had developed implementation plans for 3 recommendations. These plans generally contained milestones and tasks but were incomplete, since they did not consistently include performance measures that were clear, measurable, or contained a baseline from which implementation progress could be measured. While the Air Force's revised approach includes some positive steps, it is new, its effectiveness is unknown, and it does not require performance measures to gauge progress. Without complete implementation plans that include performance measures which reflect the key attributes, the Air Force will continue to lack important information to monitor progress and assess whether performance is meeting expectations for the 36 recommendations that are still open.
Several of the commission's recommendations related to the feasibility of shifting a portion of the active to the reserve component forces. The Air Force has assessed potential changes to its force mix using a process it developed for this purpose. The process combines quantitative and qualitative analysis with stakeholder input and judgment to identify options for changing the mix of active and reserve component forces. These options are then presented to senior Air Force leaders for their consideration, and the leaders' decisions inform the planning phase of the budget development process. To support its process, the Air Force has developed customized, classified data analyses for 44 aircraft types and mission areas. The Air Force finished these analyses in December 2015, and officials said the results informed planning for the fiscal year 2018 budget. However, since the budget development and execution cycle spans up to four years, it is not clear at this time how many of the proposed force mix options may ultimately be implemented.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that, for the 36 remaining open commission recommendations, the Air Force develop complete implementation plans that include performance measures. The Air Force agreed with GAO's recommendation. |
gao_GAO-03-799 | gao_GAO-03-799_0 | Under DHS, the INS mission has been split between three bureaus within the department, and the INS procurement organization will continue to procure goods and services under the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement. In fiscal year 2002, INS contracted for $1.7 billion in goods and services. INS Lacks the Infrastructure Needed to Manage Its Procurement Activities Effectively
INS does not have in place a basic infrastructure to effectively manage its contracts. INS has not developed a strategic acquisition workforce plan to help ensure that acquisition personnel across the agency have the right skills and that gaps in the workforce are addressed proactively. Further, INS has not made effective use of cross-functional teams— consisting of procurement, program, legal, budget, and financial representatives—throughout the acquisition process. INS Lacks Information It Needs to Make Strategic Procurement Decisions
INS managers are unable to make strategic procurement decisions because they do not have sufficient information about the goods and services being procured across the agency and who their major vendors are. INS’s Acquisition Workforce Is Inadequate to Manage Increased Workload
INS’s mission and overall workforce have expanded greatly in the past decade, and spending on contracts has also increased significantly. Further, the agency has not been able to fill many of its existing vacancies. Acquisition Planning, Competition, and Contractor Monitoring Have Been Inadequate in Some Cases
Our review of 42 contracts, randomly selected from a total of 185 active contracts awarded by headquarters and each administrative center, found that INS did not adequately plan for several of its large acquisitions or effectively involve key stakeholders, such as the program and legal offices. In some cases, this lack of advanced planning and collaboration limited opportunities for full and open competition. Further, INS did not consistently monitor contractor performance on many of the contracts we reviewed, meaning that INS could not be assured that it received the goods and services it paid for or that the contractors met the quality standards in the contract. We did not find significant or widespread compliance problems with FAR requirements and INS’s own acquisition policies in the areas of market research, evaluation of contractors’ proposals, documentation of source selection decisions, and contract modifications. INS, one of the largest agencies coming under DHS, brings with it a procurement function that needs attention. Its acquisition workforce is struggling to effectively manage the large and mission-critical procurements for which it is responsible. The creation of DHS brings an opportunity to address these problems. To improve the effectiveness of the procurement function, we recommend that the Under Secretary for Management ensure that cross-functional acquisition teams, consisting of program, procurement, legal, budget, and financial officials, effectively collaborate in planning and administering contracts; create and review meaningful procurement performance measures and indicators to ensure that management directives are carried out by the large number of field activities in the department; and as part of its assessment of existing information systems coming into the department, determine what procurement and financial information must be gathered to obtain strategic knowledge of spending behavior across the department. To determine if INS has followed sound contracting policies and regulations, we reviewed 42 of 185 contracts on INS’s active contracts list. | Why GAO Did This Study
With annual obligations for goods and services totaling $1.7 billion, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) is one of the largest of 23 entities coming into the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). INS's procurement organization will continue to acquire goods and services under DHS. GAO was asked to review INS's contracting processes to assess whether INS has an adequate infrastructure to manage its acquisitions and to determine whether INS is following sound contracting policies and procedures in awarding and managing individual contracts.
What GAO Found
INS does not have the basic infrastructure--including oversight, information, and an acquisition workforce--in place to ensure that its contracting activity is effective. Oversight of procurement is difficult because procurement managers are placed at a low level within the organization, and they do not have the leverage to hold employees across the agency accountable for compliance with procurement policies. Further, procurement activities are not coordinated well because INS has not made effective use of cross-functional teams--consisting of procurement, program, budget, financial, and legal representatives--throughout the acquisition process. Procurement managers are unable to make strategic decisions that would allow them to maximize spending power across the agency because INS's information systems do not provide visibility into what is being spent agencywide for goods and services and who the major vendors are. INS's acquisition workforce is struggling to manage effectively large and mission-critical procurements. Despite growth in mission requirements and the overall workforce during the past decade, the agency has not been able to attract and retain the necessary contracting staff. Further, INS lacks a strategic acquisition workforce plan to help identify the knowledge, skills, and abilities the agency needs to ensure it can meet current and future requirements. In addition, acquisition planning, competition, and contractor monitoring have been inadequate on some large contracts. The lack of adequate advanced planning for several detention center contracts and one large information technology management contract limited opportunities for full and open competition. Contractor performance monitoring has, in some cases, been inadequate to provide assurance that INS received the goods or services it paid for or that quality standards were met. GAO did not find significant or widespread compliance problems with other contract criteria we reviewed. Because INS has become a significant part of DHS and brings with it a procurement function that needs attention, it is imperative for DHS leadership to address these problems early in the development of the new department. |
gao_GAO-15-441 | gao_GAO-15-441_0 | Local television stations benefit from being the exclusive providers in their markets of high-demand network content, such as professional sports and primetime dramas. Local television stations provide compensation to their affiliated national broadcast networks and to the providers of syndicated content in exchange for the rights to be the exclusive provider of that content in their market. FCC Rulemaking on Exclusivity Rules
In 2014, FCC issued a FNPRM to consider eliminating or modifying the exclusivity rules, in part to determine if the rules are still needed given changes to the video marketplace since the rules were first promulgated. Industry Stakeholders Have Differing Views of the Need for and Effects of Exclusivity Rules
Broadcast Industry Stakeholders Report That Exclusivity Rules Are Needed to Protect Exclusive Rights and Support Production of Local Content
All 13 broadcast industry stakeholders (local television stations, national broadcast networks, and relevant industry associations) we interviewed and whose comments to FCC we reviewed report that the exclusivity rules are needed to help protect stations’ exclusive contractual rights to air network and syndicated content in their markets. By contrast, if cable operators could import duplicative content on a distant signal, even on a temporary basis to avoid not showing national network content during a retransmission consent impasse, these stakeholders report that the bargaining position of local television stations will decline, with a commensurate decline in retransmission consent fees and the value of the local television station, as the station will no longer be the exclusive content provider. These broadcasting industry stakeholders also reported that by strengthening local stations’ revenues, the rules help them invest in developing and providing local news, emergency alerts, and community-oriented content, in support of FCC’s localism goals. Cable Industry Stakeholders Report That Exclusivity Rules Lead to Increased Retransmission Consent Fees
Eight of 12 cable industry stakeholders we interviewed and whose comments to FCC we reviewed reported that because the rules help local television stations be the exclusive provider of network content in their market, the rules allow local television stations to demand increasingly higher retransmission consent fees from cable operators, which some said can lead to higher fees that households pay for cable television service. Broadcast networks could provide such assistance. The potential ability of a cable operator to import a distant signal, and the potential weakening of exclusivity that could result, may lead to a series of effects on the distribution of content—including local content—and on households and the fees they pay for cable television service (see fig. However, if during retransmission consent negotiations, a cable operator can provide certain content by retransmitting the signal of a station affiliated with the same broadcast network in another market, the local station’s bargaining position declines because it is no longer the exclusive provider of the national network content available to the cable operator in the station’s market. However, without the rules, the local television station may be less willing to pull its signal from the cable operator, as the cable operator could provide the same high-demand content to its customers by importing a station from a distant market. Each television program may have multiple copyright holders, and rebroadcasting an entire day of content may require obtaining permission from hundreds of copyright holders. The transaction costs of doing so make this impractical for cable operators. With contracts clearly protecting the exclusivity of local television stations and preventing cable operators from retransmitting signals to distant markets, cable operators may be unlikely to import distant signals as doing so would be a clear contractual violation of their retransmission consent contract. In this scenario, local television stations may retain their exclusivity and may not have any change to their bargaining position during retransmission consent negotiations. For example, if the compulsory copyright license for distant signals were eliminated, as some broadcast industry stakeholders suggest, removing the exclusivity rules may have little effect. FCC provided technical comments via email that we incorporated as appropriate. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to examine (1) industry stakeholder views on the need for and effects of the exclusivity rules and (2) the potential effects that removing the exclusivity rules may have on the production and distribution of content, including local news and community-oriented content. To address both objectives, we reviewed all public comments filed by industry stakeholders with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) as part of its further notice of proposed rulemaking (FNPRM)— FCC docket 10-71—considering elimination or modification of the network non-duplication and syndicated exclusivity rules (exclusivity rules). We also interviewed FCC officials regarding these rules and FCC’s rulemaking process. For our second objective, in addition to gathering information about industry stakeholder views on the potential effects of eliminating the exclusivity rules, we also analyzed those views in light of general economic principles to understand more fully the potential effects of eliminating the exclusivity rules. | Why GAO Did This Study
Local television stations negotiate with content providers—including national broadcast networks, such as ABC—for the right to be the exclusive provider of content in their markets. FCC's network non-duplication and syndicated exclusivity rules (“exclusivity rules”) help protect these contractual rights. In 2014, FCC issued a further notice of proposed rulemaking (FNPRM) to consider eliminating or modifying the rules in part to determine if the rules are still needed given changes in recent years to the video marketplace.
GAO was asked to review the exclusivity rules and the potential effects of eliminating them. This report examines (1) industry stakeholder views on the need for and effects of the exclusivity rules and (2) the potential effects that removing the exclusivity rules may have on the production and distribution of content, including local news and community-oriented content.
GAO reviewed all 31 comments filed by industry stakeholders with FCC in response to its FNPRM. GAO also interviewed 27 of those industry stakeholders and FCC officials. GAO also analyzed—in light of general economic principles—stakeholder views on the potential effects of eliminating the rules.
FCC reviewed a draft of this report and provided technical comments that GAO incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
Broadcast industry stakeholders that GAO interviewed (including national broadcast networks, such as ABC, and local television stations) report that the exclusivity rules are needed to protect local television stations' contractual rights to be the exclusive providers of network content, such as primetime dramas, and syndicated content, such as game shows, in their markets. These stakeholders report that by protecting exclusivity, the rules support station revenues, including fees from cable operators paid in return for retransmitting (or providing) the stations to their subscribers (known as retransmission consent fees). Conversely, cable industry stakeholders report that the rules limit options for providing high-demand content, such as professional sports, to their subscribers by requiring them to do so by retransmitting the local stations in the markets they serve. As a result, these stakeholders report that the rules may lead to higher retransmission consent fees, which may increase the fees households pay for cable service.
Based on GAO's analysis of industry stakeholder views, expressed in comments to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and interviews, eliminating the exclusivity rules may have varying effects.
If the rules were eliminated and cable operators can provide television stations from other markets to their subscribers (or “import” a “distant station”), local stations may no longer be the exclusive providers of network and syndicated content in their markets. This situation could reduce stations' bargaining position when negotiating with cable operators for retransmission consent. As a result, stations may agree to lower retransmission consent fees. This potential reduction in revenues could reduce stations' investments in content, including local news and community-oriented content; the fees households pay for cable television service may also be affected. Because multiple factors may influence investment in content and fees, GAO cannot quantify these effects.
If the rules were eliminated, other federal and industry actions could limit cable operators' ability to import distant stations. For example, if copyright law was amended in certain ways, cable operators could face challenges importing distant stations. A cable operator could be required to secure approval from all copyright holders (such as the National Football League) whose content appears on a distant station the cable operator wants to import; with possibly hundreds of copyright holders in a day's programming, the transaction costs would make it unlikely that a cable operator would import a distant station. Also, broadcast networks may be able to provide oversight of retransmission consent agreements if FCC rules were to allow it. Cable operators may only import distant stations if retransmission consent agreements with those stations permit it, and stations' agreements with broadcast networks generally prohibit stations from granting such retransmission. If FCC rules allowed it, broadcast networks could provide oversight to help ensure such agreements do not grant retransmission outside the stations' local markets. Under these two scenarios, local stations may remain the exclusive providers of content in their markets, their bargaining position may remain unchanged, and there may be limited effects on content and fees for cable service. |
gao_T-HEHS-98-162 | gao_T-HEHS-98-162_0 | Unlike other large health care purchasing organizations, HCFA has not routinely provided plan-specific information directly to beneficiaries. Standard Benefit Descriptions Could Help Beneficiaries Compare Plans’ Benefits and Ease Burden on Plans and Agency Staff
Although HCFA has efforts under way to publish comparative information on Medicare+Choice plans, it has not taken the steps needed to enable beneficiaries to make similar comparisons using individual plans’ marketing materials. The absence of standards for format and terminology used to describe benefits and out-of-pocket costs limits the usefulness of these materials for comparison purposes. Lack of Standard Format and Terminology in Marketing Materials Hinders Ready Comparison of Plans’ Benefits and Costs
Federal employees and retirees can readily compare benefits among health plans in the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP) because the Office of Personnel Management, which administers FEHBP, requires plan brochures to follow a common format and use standard terminology. Without required standards from HCFA, HMOs are left to their individual discretion, as we reported in 1996. To learn what “formulary” means when it is not defined in the marketing literature, beneficiaries would have to ask plan representatives or read the plan’s “evidence of coverage”—a document normally provided to beneficiaries after they enroll in a plan. Individual HCFA staff have wide discretion in approving and rejecting plans’ marketing materials. HMOs report that this discretion leads to inconsistent decisions and unnecessary delays in the development and distribution of plan materials. HMO representatives reported that corporate purchasers often require plans to use standard language. Standard Format and Terminology in Plans’ Contract Submissions Could Facilitate HCFA’s Development of Comparative Information
The lack of standards for benefit descriptions in plans’ contract submissions hinders HCFA’s efforts to produce benefit comparison charts and complicates the agency’s reviews of plans’ marketing materials. HCFA’s Center for Health Plans and Providers reviews these packages and approves plans’ Medicare contracts. HCFA staff said this would reduce the administrative burden on health plans and the agency. HCFA could act sooner, however, to provide this information to beneficiaries. Although HCFA is working to produce information to help beneficiaries compare their health plan options, the agency could leverage its resources by setting information standards, especially for plans’ marketing materials. Similarly, HCFA could also take immediate advantage of the data it already collects to publish such performance indicators as annual disenrollment rates. 10, 1997). Additional copies are $2 each. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the extent to which the Health Care Financing Administration's (HCFA) Medicare Choice information development efforts are likely to: (1) enable beneficiaries to readily compare benefits and out-of-pocket costs using plan brochures; and (2) facilitate the agency's approval of plans' marketing materials and other administrative work required of both HCFA and the health plans.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) HCFA has begun making certain plan-specific information available to beneficiaries; (2) these efforts, however, do not address the problem beneficiaries face in trying to carefully evaluate their health plan choices using the plans' summaries of benefits and other marketing materials; (3) these materials are a major source of health plan information; (4) currently, plans use widely varied formats and definitions of benefits in the materials they distribute to beneficiaries; (5) this lack of common formatting and language made it difficult, if not impossible, for beneficiaries to rely on health maintenance organizations' (HMOs) marketing literature to compare benefits and premiums; (6) preliminary results from GAO's current work on HMOs' prescription drug benefit suggest this situation continues to exist; (7) GAO's current work also suggests that critical information is sometimes missing from plans' marketing materials; (8) the diverse formats and terms also cause problems for health plans and HCFA staff; (9) without HCFA's specifying common standards for plans' marketing materials, agency staff have wide discretion when deciding to approve or reject these documents; (10) plan representatives and HCFA staff stated that this latitude leads to inconsistent HCFA decisions, unnecessary delays, and extra costs; (11) the lack of required standards similarly affects the efficient development of comparative benefits information; (12) to help beneficiaries evaluate their health plan options, HCFA could move faster to publish readily available plan performance indicators such as plans' disenrollment rates; (13) with this information, beneficiaries could then decide to seek more information about a plan before enrolling; (14) HCFA could better serve beneficiaries, reduce burdens on health plans, and leverage its own resources by setting information standards for health plans' marketing literature; (15) GAO believes, therefore, that HCFA should adopt the recommendations it made in 1996 and require plans to use standard formats and terminology in their benefit descriptions; and (16) in addition, HCFA should use plan performance data it already collects to help inform beneficiaries' health plan decisions. |
gao_GGD-00-37 | gao_GGD-00-37_0 | Introduction
This report responds to a request from the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Oversight of the House Committee on Ways and Means that we assess the Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS) performance during the 1999 tax filing season. In addition to providing data on various indicators that IRS uses to measure its filing season performance, this report discusses (1) IRS’ telephone service; (2) service provided at IRS walk-in sites; (3) other IRS efforts to assist taxpayers; (4) IRS efforts to reduce Earned Income Credit (EIC) noncompliance; (5) electronic filing; (6) IRS’ implementation of certain tax law changes; and (7) implementation of IRS’ new return and remittance processing system. Also, in 1999, IRS implemented new procedures, as mandated by the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 (TRA97), that require certain taxpayers to document their eligibility for the EIC before IRS approves their claim. To achieve our objective, we analyzed filing-season data from various IRS management information systems, such as the Management Information System for Top Level Executives; IRS data on processing errors, including errors involving the EIC and the child tax credit; and data on IRS’ toll-free telephone assistance and IRS’ Web site; obtained data on IRS’ goals and accomplishments for various performance measures and discussed the methodology for computing many of those measures with cognizant officials; assessed IRS’ methodology for measuring the quality of assistance provided taxpayers who call IRS with tax law questions and analyzed the results of that methodology; interviewed officials who were responsible for managing IRS’ toll-free telephone operations as well as officials at telephone call sites in Atlanta, GA, and Fresno, CA, and analyzed the results of toll-free telephone service customer satisfaction surveys; interviewed officials at IRS walk-in assistance sites in the Georgia and Northern California District Offices; observed walk-in services provided at shopping centers, grocery stores, and mobile van sites by the Georgia, Northern California, and Central California District Offices; and analyzed the results of walk-in customer satisfaction surveys; interviewed IRS National Office officials about the Taxpayer Education Program, with an emphasis on volunteer tax preparation services that are supported by IRS; interviewed officials in IRS’ Office of Electronic Tax Administration about various initiatives undertaken in 1999 in an effort to increase the use of electronic filing, reviewed data on taxpayer participation in the initiatives, and reviewed data on the results of those initiatives; interviewed officials in IRS’ EIC Project Office and in the Atlanta, Fresno, and Kansas City, MO, Service Centers about various efforts to improve the level of compliance associated with EIC claims; analyzed data on the results of those efforts; and interviewed National Office officials located at the Brookhaven, NY, Service Center who were responsible for national EIC compliance efforts; reviewed IRS’ returns processing guidance relating to the child tax credit, interviewed service center officials about their processing procedures, and discussed potential changes to IRS’ forms and instructions with officials at IRS’ National Office; obtained filing-season information from the largest national tax return reviewed reports issued by the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration on filing-season activities. In 1999, according to IRS’ own data, it met or exceeded its performance goals for five measures, came close to its goals for two measures, and fell short of its goals for two measures (i.e., quality of responses to tax law questions and level of access to the taxpayer service telephone system).As shown in table 2.1, there were four other measures for which IRS had no goal in 1999. IRS’ accomplishment in one of those areas, that is, timeliness of refunds for paper returns, raised some questions that IRS did not have the necessary data to answer. But, service did not improve; it deteriorated. Our discussions with IRS officials and analysis of relevant documentation indicated that the deterioration resulted from (1) unrealistic assumptions about the implementation and impact of IRS’ changes and (2) other problems managing staff training and scheduling and implementing new technology. For example, IRS enhanced the availability of services at its walk- in offices and expanded the availability of assistance to taxpayers who did not have convenient access to a walk-in office. However, while IRS made progress in assessing customer satisfaction with walk-in services in 1999, it made little progress in measuring the quality and timeliness of those services. In that regard, our review identified certain opportunities to streamline the recertification process and thus make it less burdensome to taxpayers and IRS. Our review also found that IRS service centers were not consistently following national guidelines for recertification, which could result in disparate treatment of taxpayers. To make electronic filing paperless and thus more attractive to potential users, IRS tested four initiatives in 1999. The other one-half erred in calculating the credit amount. Significant Changes to Computer Systems Accomplished Without Processing Disruptions
For the 1999 filing season, IRS made significant changes to the computer hardware and software that it uses to process returns and remittances. IRS identified many erroneous claims by validating SSNs and scrutinizing certain EIC claims. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, the GAO discussed the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) performance during the 1999 tax filing season, focusing on: (1) telephone service; (2) availability of walk-in services; (3) other taxpayer service efforts; (4) Earned Income Credit (EIC) noncompliance; (5) electronic filing; (6) implementation of recent tax law changes; and (7) implementation of a new return and remittance processing system.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) IRS met or exceeded its 1999 goals for several performance measures, but fell short of its goals in two key areas - taxpayers' ability to access IRS' toll-free telephone service and the quality of IRS' responses to taxpayers tax law questions; (2) certain features of IRS' methodology for measuring the quality of responses to tax law questions also warranted IRS' attention; (3) the timeliness of refunds for paper returns raised some questions about IRS' timeliness that IRS could not answer; (4) IRS attempted to improve telephone service in 1999, however, service did not improve, but deteriorated; (5) GAO's work indicated this deterioration resulted from (a) unrealistic assumptions about the implementation and impact of IRS' changes, and (b) other problems managing staff training and scheduling and implementing new technology; (6) IRS enhanced the availability of its walk-in services by increasing Saturday hours and making services more accessible to taxpayers who did not have convenient access to a walk-in office; (7) IRS did a better job of measuring walk-in customer satisfaction in 1999 than 1998; (8) however, IRS made little progress in measuring the quality and timeliness of its walk-in services; (9) use of IRS' World Wide Web site on the Internet increased significantly during the 1999 filing season, but IRS data pointed to problems with taxpayers getting answers to tax law questions via electronic mail; (10) IRS stopped millions of dollars in erroneous EIC claims in 1999 by validating social security numbers and scrutinizing certain claims; (11) IRS implemented new procedures (called recertification) in 1999 that require certain taxpayers to document their eligibility for the EIC before IRS approves their claim; (12) GAO identified certain opportunities to streamline the recertification process and thus make it less burdensome to taxpayers and IRS; (13) IRS service centers were not consistently following the national guidelines for recertification, which could result in disparate treatment of taxpayers; (14) IRS implemented several initiatives in 1999 directed at making electronic filing paperless and thus more appealing to potential users; (15) 20 percent of the returns filed in 1999 included the new child tax credit; (16) many of those taxpayers erred in calculating the credit amount, while others who were eligible for the credit failed to claim it; (17) correction of these errors increased IRS' processing workload; (18) IRS made significant changes to the computer systems it uses to process returns and remittances; and (19) IRS accomplished those changes without any discernible processing disruptions. |
gao_GAO-13-872T | gao_GAO-13-872T_0 | In the long term, USPS will be challenged to pay for its liabilities on a smaller base of profitable First-Class Mail. We have previously reported that Congress needs to modify USPS’s retiree health benefit payments in a fiscally responsible manner.we also stated that USPS should prefund any unfunded retiree health benefit liability to the maximum extent that its finances permit. Deferring funding for postal retiree health benefits could increase costs for future ratepayers and increase the risk that USPS may be unable to pay for these costs. Key considerations for Congress regarding the requirements for funding postal retiree health benefits include the following:
Trade-offs regarding USPS’s current financial condition and long-term prospects: One of the rationales for prefunding retirement benefits is to protect the future viability of the organization by paying for retirement benefits as they are being earned, rather than after employees have already retired. However, USPS currently lacks liquidity and postal costs would need to decrease, or postal revenues to increase, or both, to fund required payments for prefunding retiree health benefits. To the extent prefunding payments are postponed, larger payments will be required later, when they likely would be supported by less First-Class Mail volume. No prefunding approach will be viable unless USPS can make the required payments. Possible consequences to USPS employees and retirees: Funded benefits protect against an inability to make payments later, make promised benefits less vulnerable to cuts, and reduce the risk that employee pay and benefits may not be sustainable and could be reduced. Allocating costs between current and future ratepayers: Deferring payments until later can have the effect of passing costs from current to future postal ratepayers. The appropriate allocation of costs among different generations of postal ratepayers is complicated by what might be called the “legacy” unfunded liability that was not paid for in prior years. If an 80 percent funding target were implemented because of concerns about USPS’s ability to achieve a 100 percent target level within a particular time frame, an additional policy option to consider could include a schedule to achieve 100 percent funding in a subsequent time period after the 80 percent level is achieved. We have reported that USPS would likely realize large financial gains from its proposed health care plan. According to USPS’s estimates, USPS would reduce its health benefits expenses and eliminate its unfunded retiree health benefit liability, primarily by increasing the use of Medicare by postal retirees once they are eligible for Medicare generally beginning at age 65. As Congress considers proposals for a USPS health care plan, it should weigh the impact on Medicare as well as other issues, including establishing safeguards for plan assets and ensuring FEHBP-comparable protections for plan participants. Specifically, Congress should consider: safeguards for USPS health plan fund assets by placing appropriate constraints on their asset allocations (for example, limiting investments to Treasury securities, including inflation-indexed Treasury securities; or, to the extent that more risky assets are permitted, using a conservative approach to setting the prefunding discount rate); standards for the disposition of any surplus health plan assets that reduce the risk of a new unfunded liability emerging in the future (for example, standards for amortizing any surplus to mirror the amortization of any unfunded liability); designation of an independent entity responsible for selecting actuarial assumptions used to determine the health plan’s funded status; and protections for postal employees and retirees that are comparable to those under FEHBP, including a formula for retirees’ contribution to health costs. conservative approach to permit USPS to access any FERS surplus would be to use it to reduce USPS’s annual FERS contribution by amortizing the surplus over 30 years (which would mirror the legally required treatment of deficits). Otherwise, returning surpluses whenever they develop would likely eventually result in an unfunded liability. Key issues for Congress to consider in connection with the potential USPS FERS surplus include:
Fluctuations in estimated liabilities: Estimates of liabilities for retirement benefits contain a significant degree of uncertainty and can change over time. __________________________________________________________ In closing, we continue to believe that a comprehensive package of legislative actions is needed so that USPS can achieve financial viability and assure adequate benefits funding for more than 1 million postal employees and retirees. Under one option of USPS’s proposal (which USPS refers to as “Scenario 2”),a its health plan would be financed by a newly created fund called the Health Benefits Fund (HBF) that would include: (1) the entire Postal Service Retiree Health Benefits Fund that would be abolished upon its transfer to the HBF; (2) the balance of the fund that finances FEHBP allocable to contributions by USPS, postal employees and retirees, including any reserve fund amounts; (3) USPS contributions under its health plan; (4) contributions of postal employees and retirees under the USPS health plan; (5) any interest on HBF investments; (6) any other USPS receipts allocable to the USPS health benefits plan; and (7) appropriations based on the service of officers and employees of the former U.S. Post Office Department. | Why GAO Did This Study
USPS continues to be in a serious financial crisis, with little liquidity in the short term and a challenging financial outlook in the long term as profitable First-Class Mail volume continues to decline. Critical decisions by Congress are needed on postal reform legislation that has been proposed in both the U.S. Senate and the House of Representatives. Various proposals would restructure the financing of postal retiree health benefits, including required payments to prefund these benefits; enable USPS to introduce a new health plan for postal employees and retirees; and restructure the funding of postal pensions, including addressing a potential surplus in funding postal pensions under FERS.
GAO has previously testified that a comprehensive package of legislative actions is needed so that USPS can achieve financial viability and assure adequate benefits funding for more than 1 million postal employees and retirees. GAO has also previously reported on various approaches Congress could consider to restructure the funding of USPS retiree health benefits and pensions.
This testimony discusses (1) funding USPS retiree health benefits; (2) USPS's proposal to withdraw its employees and retirees from FEHBP and establish its own health plan; and (3) a potential surplus in funding postal pensions under FERS. This testimony is based primarily on GAO's past work.
What GAO Found
GAO has reported that Congress needs to modify the U.S. Postal Service's (USPS) retiree health benefit payments in a fiscally responsible manner. GAO also has reported that USPS should prefund any unfunded retiree health benefit liability to the maximum extent that its finances permit. Deferring funding for postal retiree health benefits could increase costs for future ratepayers and increase the risk that USPS may not be able to pay for these costs. Key considerations for funding postal retiree health benefits include:
Trade-offs regarding USPS's current and long-term financial condition: One rationale for prefunding is to protect USPS's future viability by paying for retirement benefits as they are being earned. However, USPS currently lacks liquidity to fund required payments for prefunding retiree health benefits. To the extent prefunding is postponed, larger payments will be required later, when they likely would be supported by less First-Class Mail volume. No prefunding approach will be viable unless USPS can make the payments.
Possible consequences to USPS employees and retirees: Fully funded benefits protect against an inability to make payments later and make promised benefits less vulnerable to cuts.
Allocating costs between current and future ratepayers : Deferring payments can pass costs from current to future postal ratepayers. Allocating costs among different generations of ratepayers is complicated by the unfunded liability that was not paid for in prior years.
Funding targets : An 80 percent funding target for postal retiree health benefits would effectively lead to a permanent unfunded liability of roughly 20 percent. An option could be to build in a schedule to achieve 100 percent funding in a later time period after the 80 percent level is achieved.
GAO has reported that USPS would likely realize large financial gains from its proposal to withdraw its employees and retirees from the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP) and establish its own health plan. According to USPS's estimates, these financial gains would significantly reduce its health benefits expenses and eliminate its unfunded retiree health benefit liability--with increased use of Medicare by retirees comprising most of the projected liability reduction. USPS also has projected that its proposal will increase Medicare spending. As Congress considers proposals for a USPS health care plan, it should weigh the impact on Medicare, which also faces fiscal pressure, and other issues, including establishing safeguards for assets of the USPS health plan and ensuring protections for plan participants are comparable to those in FEHBP.
GAO has also reported on key considerations regarding the release of any Federal Employees Retirement System (FERS) surplus to USPS. First, estimates of retirement benefits liabilities contain a significant degree of uncertainty and can change over time. Second, returning surpluses whenever they develop would likely result in an eventual unfunded liability. Alternative options to address funding surpluses include reducing USPS's annual FERS contribution either by amortizing the surplus over 30 years (which would mirror the treatment of deficits) or by offsetting the contribution against the full surplus each year until the surplus is used up. |
gao_GAO-09-863 | gao_GAO-09-863_0 | While Weak Enforcement Is a Key IP Issue, Weaknesses also Persist in IP Laws and Regulations
The U.S. government has identified weak enforcement as a key IP issue in the three case study countries; however, weaknesses also persist in their IP laws and regulations. According to the U.S. government, enforcement of existing IP laws and regulations and adjudication of suspected infringements are limited and inconsistent and penalties are not typically sufficient to serve as an effective deterrent. U.S. government documents and U.S. officials we interviewed cited several factors that contribute to this limited and inconsistent enforcement including flawed enforcement procedures; a lack of technical skills and knowledge of IP among police, prosecutors, and judges; a lack of resources dedicated to IP enforcement efforts; and the absence of broad-based domestic support for strong IP enforcement. The IP Attachés Generally Collaborated Effectively with Others at the Posts; the IPLEC Collaborated Via IP Forums
The USPTO IP attachés were generally effective in collaborating with other agencies at the four posts primarily by acting as IP focal points, establishing IP working groups, and leveraging resources through joint activities. The DOJ IPLEC collaborated on IP with post and agency headquarters personnel via country and regional forums such as training U.S. and foreign, police, prosecutors, and customs officials on enforcement practices. With regard to case work, his primary focus was on his responsibilities as the DOJ attaché in which he works with U.S. and foreign law enforcement officials, prosecutors, and judges on an array of mostly non-IP criminal cases and investigations in the region that involve, among other things, money laundering, fraud, human trafficking, and child exploitation. Existing post guidance on IP is high level and does not generally guide agencies’ day-to-day efforts to reach IP goals. Joint strategies can help agencies prioritize among existing IP efforts, avoid duplication of IP efforts, convey a common message on IP to foreign governments, and maintain focus on IP given numerous competing issues and periodic changes in key IP personnel at the posts. While the four posts have adopted several practices to collaborate on IP, only one has adopted such a joint strategy. The U.S. embassy in New Delhi has developed a joint strategy in the form of an interagency IP work plan that translates key IP issues into a clear set of objectives and provides details on the post’s planned IP activities. Recommendation for Executive Action
To more effectively ensure that activities at U.S. posts with USPTO IP attachés consistently address the key IP protection and enforcement issues identified by the U.S. government, we recommend that the Secretary of State direct post leadership in countries with USPTO IP attachés to work with the USPTO IP attachés to take the following action: Develop annual IP interagency work plans to be used by the post IP working groups with input from relevant agencies, which set objectives and identify activities for addressing key IP protection and enforcement issues defined by the U.S. government, taking into account the range of expertise of responsible agencies, available resources, and agency specific IP goals. Specifically, this report (1) describes the key IP protection and enforcement issues that the U.S. government has identified in China, India, and Thailand; (2) assesses the extent to which the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) IP attachés and the Department of Justice (DOJ) Intellectual Property Law Enforcement Coordinator (IPLEC) effectively collaborated with other agencies at posts in China, India, and Thailand to improve IP protection and enforcement; and (3) evaluates the extent to which each of the four posts has undertaken interagency planning in collaborating on their IP- related activities. | Why GAO Did This Study
Intellectual property (IP) protection and enforcement is inadequate in parts of the world, resulting in significant losses to U.S. industry and increased public health and safety risks. GAO was asked to evaluate U.S. government efforts to enhance protection and enforcement of IP overseas. Using a case study approach, this report (1) describes the key IP protection and enforcement issues at four posts in China, India, and Thailand; (2) assesses the extent to which the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) IP attach?s and the Department of Justice (DOJ) IP Law Enforcement Coordinator (IPLEC) effectively collaborate with other agencies at the posts; and (3) evaluates the extent to which each of the posts has undertaken interagency planning in collaborating on its IP-related activities. GAO examined U.S. government documents and interviewed headquarters and post agency officials as well as U.S. private-sector and host-country representatives.
What GAO Found
The U.S. government has identified weak enforcement as a key IP issue in the three case study countries; however, weaknesses also persist in their IP laws and regulations. According to the U.S. government, enforcement of existing IP laws and regulations and adjudication of suspected infringements are limited and inconsistent, and penalties are not typically sufficient to serve as an effective deterrent. U.S. government documents and U.S. officials we interviewed cited several factors that contribute to this limited and inconsistent enforcement, including flawed enforcement procedures; a lack of technical skills and knowledge of IP among police, prosecutors, and judges; a lack of resources dedicated to IP enforcement efforts; and the absence of broad-based domestic support for strong IP enforcement. The USPTO IP attach?s were generally effective in collaborating with other agencies at the four posts, primarily by acting as IP focal points, while the DOJ IPLEC collaborated with both post agencies and agency headquarters via IP forums. The IP attach?s shared common characteristics that made them effective, such as IP expertise, the ability to work full time on IP, and having roles and responsibilities for which there was general agreement among post agencies and leadership. At two posts, several agency officials stated that the IP attach?s were instrumental in establishing and maintaining interagency IP working groups to share ideas and coordinate on activities, enabling the agencies to speak with one voice on IP. The IPLEC collaborated through country and regional IP forums that provided technical assistance to foreign law enforcement agencies and judges on IP law enforcement issues and facilitated a network among U.S. and foreign government officials for sharing information on IP criminal investigations. The IPLEC also collaborated on case work for an array of mostly non-IP criminal activities, including money laundering, fraud, human trafficking, and child exploitation, in fulfilling his other duties as DOJ attach?. While the four posts have adopted several practices to collaborate effectively on IP, three out of the four have not adopted interagency plans to address key IP issues. Current policy guidance on IP at the posts, such as the annual Special 301 report and embassy mission strategic plans, is high level and not generally used for planning agencies' day-to-day IP efforts. Posts could potentially enhance collaboration by developing joint strategies to translate the key IP issues identified by the U.S. government into specific objectives and activities. One post, the U.S. embassy in New Delhi, has developed a joint strategy in the form of an interagency IP work plan with specific objectives and prescribed activities for addressing key IP issues. Joint strategies can help agencies prioritize existing efforts, avoid duplication of efforts, formulate a common IP message to foreign governments, and maintain focus on IP given competing issues and personnel changes at posts. |
gao_GAO-02-696 | gao_GAO-02-696_0 | The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families block grant, which was created 2 years earlier by the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) and replaced the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) Program, gave states greater flexibility to design employment and training services for clients receiving cash assistance. Most States and Localities Coordinated TANF and WIA Services and Some Coordination Efforts Increased between 2000 and 2001
Nearly all states reported coordinating TANF and WIA services at the state or local level, and some of these coordination efforts increased between 2000 and 2001. A Variety of Conditions Influence State and Local Coordination Efforts, but Little Is Known about the Effectiveness of Coordinated Service Delivery on TANF Clients’ Outcomes
A variety of conditions—including historical relationships, geographic considerations, adequate facilities, and different perspectives on how best to serve TANF clients—influence how states and localities choose to coordinate services with one-stop centers. Different Information Systems Used by Welfare and Workforce Agencies Complicate Coordination
Welfare and workforce agencies often use different information systems, complicating efforts to coordinate TANF services with one-stop centers. Workforce Investment Act: Coordination between TANF Services Through One-Stops Has Increased Despite Challenges. | What GAO Found
The 1998 Workforce Investment Act (WIA) required states to provide most federally funded employment-related services through one-stop centers. Two years earlier, welfare reform legislation created the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant which provided flexibility to states to focus on helping needy adults with children find and maintain employment. Nearly all states reported some coordination of their TANF and WIA services at the state or local level, and the use of some of these coordination methods increased between 2000 and 2001. Historical relationships, geographic considerations, adequacy of facilities, and different perspectives on how best to serve TANF clients influenced how states and localities choose to coordinate services with one-stop centers. Several challenges, including program differences between TANF and WIA and different information systems used by welfare and workforce agencies, inhibit state and local coordination efforts. Though some states and localities have found creative ways to work around these issues, the differences remain barriers to coordination for many others. |
gao_GAO-08-478T | gao_GAO-08-478T_0 | This looming fiscal crisis requires a fundamental reexamination of all government programs and commitments. Future transportation funding is uncertain. Revenues to support the Highway Trust Fund—the major source of federal highway and transit funding—are eroding. Recognizing many of these challenges and the importance of the transportation system to the nation, Congress established The National Surface Transportation Policy and Revenue Study Commission (Commission) in the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act—A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU). The mission of the Commission was, among other things, to examine the condition and future needs of the nation’s surface transportation system and short and long- term alternatives to replace or supplement the fuel tax as the principal revenue source to support the Highway Trust Fund. In January 2008, the Commission released a report with numerous recommendations to place the trust fund on a sustainable path and to reform the current structure of the nation’s surface transportation programs. Principles to Assess Proposals for Restructuring the Surface Transportation Program
Through our prior analyses of existing programs, we identified a number of principles that could help drive an assessment of proposals for restructuring the federal surface transportation programs. These principles include (1) defining the federal role based on identified areas of national interest, (2) incorporating performance and accountability for results into funding decisions, and (3) ensuring fiscal sustainability and employing the best tools and approaches to improve results and return on investment. To what extent do the proposals reexamine current and future spending on surface transportation programs? Preliminary Observations on the Commission’s Recommendations
The Commission makes a number of recommendations designed to restructure the federal surface transportation program so that it meets the needs of the nation in the 21st century. The recommendations include significantly increasing the level of investment by all levels of government in surface transportation, consolidating and reorganizing the current programs, speeding project delivery, and making the current programs more performance- and outcome-based and mode-neutral, among other things. We are currently analyzing the Commission’s recommendations using the principles that we have developed for evaluating proposals to restructure the surface transportation program. Although our analysis is not complete, our preliminary results indicate that some of the Commission’s recommendations address issues included in the principles. We and others have also identified some of these and other issues as possible areas of national interest for the surface transportation program. Rather, the proposed cost share arrangements appear to reflect the historical funding levels of many surface transportation programs without considering whether this level of funding reflects the national interest or should vary by program or project. For example, the Commission recommends that the federal government pay for 80 percent of the proposed intercity passenger rail system. Although the principles do not prescribe a specific approach to restructuring, they do provide key attributes that will help ensure that a restructured surface transportation program addresses current challenges. Performance and Accountability: Transportation Challenges Facing Congress and the Department of Transportation. | Why GAO Did This Study
The nation has reached a critical juncture with its current surface transportation policies and programs. Demand has outpaced the capacity of the system, resulting in increased congestion. In addition, without significant changes in funding mechanisms, revenue sources, or planned spending, the Highway Trust Fund--the major source of federal highway and transit funding--is projected to incur significant deficits in the years ahead. Furthermore, the nation is on a fiscally unsustainable path. Recognizing many of these challenges and the importance of the transportation system to the nation, Congress established The National Surface Transportation Policy and Revenue Study Commission (Commission) to examine current and future needs of the system and recommend needed changes to the surface transportation program, among other things. The Commission issued its report in January 2008. This testimony discusses 1) principles to assess proposals for restructuring the surface transportation program and 2) GAO's preliminary observations on the Commission's recommendations. This statement is based on GAO's ongoing work for the Ranking Member of this Committee, the Chairman of the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, Senator DeMint, as well as a body of work GAO has completed over the past several years for Congress.
What GAO Found
GAO has called for a fundamental reexamination of the nation's surface transportation program because, among other things, the current goals are unclear, the funding outlook for the program is uncertain, and the efficiency of the system is declining. A sound basis for reexamination can productively begin with identification of and debate on underlying principles. Through prior analyses of existing programs, GAO identified a number of principles that could help drive an assessment of proposals for restructuring the federal surface transportation program. These principles include (1) defining the federal role based on identified areas of national interest, (2) incorporating performance and accountability for results into funding decisions, and (3) ensuring fiscal sustainability and employing the best tools and approaches to improve results and return on investment. GAO developed these principles based on prior analyses of existing surface transportation programs as well as a body of work that GAO developed for Congress, including its High-Risk, Performance and Accountability, and 21st Century Challenges reports. The principles do not prescribe a specific approach to restructuring, but they do highlight key attributes that will help ensure that a restructured surface transportation program addresses current challenges. In its report, the Commission makes a number of recommendations for restructuring the federal surface transportation program. The recommendations include significantly increasing the level of investment by all levels of government in surface transportation, consolidating and reorganizing the current programs, speeding project delivery, and making the current program more performance- and outcome-based and mode-neutral, among other things. GAO is currently analyzing the Commission's recommendations using the principles that GAO developed for evaluating proposals for restructuring the surface transportation program. Although this analysis is not complete, GAO's preliminary results indicate that some of the Commission's recommendations appear to be aligned with the principles, while others may not be aligned. For example, although the Commission identifies areas of national interest and recommends reorganizing the individual surface transportation programs around these areas, it generally recommends that the federal government pay for 80 percent of project costs without considering whether this level of funding reflects the national interest or should vary by program or project. |
gao_GAO-12-422T | gao_GAO-12-422T_0 | CBP Has Various Tools for Targeting U.S.-Bound Cargo Containers for Inspections
As part of its efforts to target high-risk cargo containers for inspection, CBP uses various sources of information to screen containers in advance of their arrival in the United States. To further enhance CBP’s ability to target high-risk shipments, in 2006 the SAFE Port Act required CBP to collect additional data related to the movement of cargo to identify high-risk cargo for inspection, and in 2009 CBP implemented the Importer Security Filing and Additional Carrier Requirements, collectively known as the 10+2 rule. The cargo information required by the 10+2 rule comprises 10 data elements from importers, such as country of origin, and 2 data elements from vessel carriers, such as the position of each container transported on a vessel, all of which are to be provided to CBP in advance of arrival at a U.S. port. In response to this recommendation, CBP took steps in January 2011 to improve targeting efforts by updating its targeting criteria in to include risk factors present in the 10+2 data. DHS Has Made Some Progress in Implementing Technologies to Improve Container Security
Container Security Technologies Are Intended to Detect Intrusion and Track Movement
As we reported in September 2010, DHS’s Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) initiated four container security technology projects, in part, in response to general MTSA requirements, as well as CBP’s need for technologies to detect intrusion and track the movement of containers through the supply chain. Radiation Detection and Nonintrusive Imaging Technology Can Help Identify Container Contents
To prevent the smuggling of nuclear and radiological materials, as of September 2010, CBP in coordination with DHS’s Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), has deployed over 1,400 radiation portal monitors (RPM) at U.S. ports of entry. Since 2006, we have been reporting on long-standing problems with DNDO’s efforts to deploy advanced spectroscopic portal (ASP) radiation detection monitors, a more-advanced and significantly more-expensive type of RPM designed to replace the RPMs CBP currently uses. DNDO officials stated that they planned to update the cost-benefit analysis; however, after spending more than $200 million on the program, in February 2010, DHS announced that it was scaling back its plans for development and use of the ASP, and subsequently announced in July 2011 that it was ending the ASP program, which means DHS continues to face limitations in radiation detection. CBP has since implemented these recommendations. As The Deadline for 100 Percent Scanning Approaches, Uncertainty Persists over the Future of 100 Percent Scanning
The Scope of the Secure Freight Initiative Has Decreased after Facing Numerous Challenges
In response to the SAFE Port Act requirement to implement a pilot program to determine the feasibility of scanning 100 percent of U.S.- bound containers with both radiation detection and nonintrusive equipment, CBP, the Department of State, and the Department of Energy jointly announced the formation of the Secure Freight Initiative (SFI) pilot program in December 2006. In October 2009, we reported that while CBP and the Department of Energy had made progress in integrating new technologies as part of the SFI program, progress in implementing and expanding the scanning of U.S.-bound cargo containers at participating ports was limited. Logistical, technological, and other problems at participating ports have prevented any of the participating ports from achieving 100 percent scanning, as ultimately required by the 9/11 Act, leaving the feasibility and efficacy of 100 percent scanning largely unproven. In addition to the challenges CBP faced in implementing 100 percent scanning at the select SFI pilot ports, CBP also faces a number of potential challenges in integrating the 100 percent scanning requirement with the existing container security programs that make up CBP’s layered security strategy. We recommended that CBP perform analyses to determine whether 100 percent scanning is feasible, and if so, the best way to achieve it; or, alternatively, if it is not feasible, present acceptable alternatives. To date, however, CBP has not conducted such a feasibility assessment. Further, CBP has not provided any details about any alternatives to 100 percent scanning that DHS or CBP may be considering. As we previously reported, in the short term, DHS acknowledged it will not be able to meet this deadline for full-scale implementation of the 9/11 Act’s scanning requirement and will need to grant extensions to those foreign ports unable to meet the scanning deadline in order to maintain the flow of trade and comply with the 9/11 Act. Therefore, DHS expects to grant a blanket extension to all foreign ports pursuant to the statue, thus extending the target date for compliance with this requirement by 2 years, to July 2014. As a result, DHS will need to notify Congress by May 2, 2012, of any extensions it plans to grant. Supply Chain Security: DHS Should Test and Evaluate Container Security Technologies Consistent with All Identified Operational Scenarios to Ensure the Technologies Will Function as Intended. Cargo Container Inspections: Preliminary Observations on the Status of Efforts to Improve the Automated Targeting System. | Why GAO Did This Study
Cargo containers that are part of the global supply chainthe flow of goods from manufacturers to retailersare vulnerable to threats from terrorists. The Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) of 2002 and the Security and Accountability For Every (SAFE) Port Act of 2006 required the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to take actions to improve maritime transportation security. Also, the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (9/11 Act) required, among other things, that by July 2012, 100 percent of all U.S.-bound cargo containers be scanned. Within DHS, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is responsible for container security programs to address these requirements. This testimony addresses, among other things, (1) efforts to gather advance information about container shipments to assess risks, (2) technologies used to protect the integrity of containers and scan them, and (3) the status of efforts to scan 100 percent of U.S.-bound containers. GAOs statement is based on products issued from April 2005 through July 2011, along with selected updates conducted from January to February 2012. Updates involved collecting information from CBP on the status of efforts to address GAOs prior recommendations on these issues and its plans to implement 100 percent scanning.
What GAO Found
As part of its efforts to identify high-risk cargo for inspection, CBP uses various sources of information to screen containers in advance of their arrival in the United States. For example, in 2009, CBP implemented the Importer Security Filing and Additional Carrier Requirements to collect additional information for targeting. The additional cargo information required, such as country of origin, is to be provided to CBP in advance of arrival of the cargo containers at U.S. ports. In September 2010, GAO recommended that CBP establish milestones and time frames for updating its targeting criteria to include additional information. In response, CBP updated its targeting criteria in January 2011.
DHS has made some progress in developing and implementing container security technologies to protect the integrity of containers and to scan them. GAO reported in September 2010 that DHSs Science and Technology Directorate initiated four container security technology projects to detect and report intrusions into cargo containers. However, operational testing had not occurred to ensure the prototypes would function as intended. Therefore, GAO recommended that testing and evaluation occur in all environments in which DHS planned to implement the technologies. DHS concurred and has made progress implementing this recommendation. To prevent the smuggling of nuclear and radiological materials, CBP, in coordination with the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), has deployed over 1,400 radiation portal monitors (RPM) at U.S. ports of entry to detect the presence of radiation in cargo containers. Since 2006, GAO reported on problems with DNDOs efforts to deploy a more-advanced and significantly more-expensive type of RPM. Among other things, GAO reported that an updated cost-benefit analysis might show that DNDOs program to replace existing equipment with the advanced technology was not justified. After spending more than $200 million, DHS ended the program in July 2011.
Uncertainty persists over how DHS and CBP will fulfill the mandate for 100 percent scanning given that the feasibility remains unproven in light of the challenges CBP has faced implementing a pilot program for 100 percent scanning. In response to the SAFE Port Act requirement to implement a pilot program to determine the feasibility of 100 percent scanning, CBP, the Department of State, and the Department of Energy announced the formation of the Secure Freight Initiative (SFI) pilot program in December 2006. However, logistical, technological, and other challenges prevented the participating ports from achieving 100 percent scanning and CBP has since reduced the scope of the SFI program from six ports to one. In October 2009, GAO recommended that CBP perform an assessment to determine if 100 percent scanning is feasible, and if it is, the best way to achieve it, or if it is not feasible, present acceptable alternatives. However, to date, CBP has not conducted such an assessment or identified alternatives to 100 percent scanning. Further, as GAO previously reported, DHS acknowledged it will not be able to meet the 9/11 Acts July 2012 deadline for implementing the 100 percent scanning requirement, and therefore, it expects to grant a blanket extension to all foreign ports pursuant to the statute, thus extending the target date to July 2014. To do so, DHS is required to report to Congress by May 2, 2012, of any extensions it plans to grant.
What GAO Recommends
GAO has made recommendations in past reports to DHS to strengthen its container security efforts. DHS concurred with GAOs recommendations and has either addressed them or is undertaking efforts to address them. |
gao_GAO-17-606 | gao_GAO-17-606_0 | Express Consignment Operators and USPS Work with CBP to Inspect Inbound International Items, but USPS’s Pilot Programs Lack Assessment Plans
Express Consignment Operators Work with CBP to Screen Inbound International Items
Express consignment operators accept items for delivery to the United States at points of sale in foreign countries and maintain control of items until they are delivered to addressees in the United States. However, as of February 2017, CBP officials involved in the pilot did not agree that it was ready for expansion based on USPS’s frequent inability to provide targeted mail to CBP for inspection. Because USPS and CBP have not agreed to specific performance goals or targets, it is difficult to make well-informed decisions regarding the possible expansion of these pilots in the future. USPS and CBP Have Not Evaluated Relative Costs and Benefits of Increased Use of Electronic Advance Data
According to USPS and CBP officials, increasing the use of EAD to target mail for inspection may have benefits, such as reducing the volume of inspected mail and increasing the percentage of inspections that result in identification of a threatening or illegal item. Regarding the costs of collecting EAD, USPS has not calculated the current costs of collecting EAD from countries with which USPS has data- sharing agreements, but USPS officials stated that USPS does not incur significant additional costs for each new designated postal operator or type of mail for which USPS begins collecting EAD. While some of the costs of obtaining EAD may be borne by designated postal operators in other countries, rather than directly by USPS, costs to USPS to use EAD to target mail for inspection may include:
Equipment and personnel required to identify targeted mail (such as equipment required to sort through hundreds of pieces of mail to identify a single piece of mail): For example, USPS estimated that the cost for software upgrades needed for Pilots 1 and 2 (currently the only efforts USPS and CBP have underway to use EAD to target mail for inspection) to identify individual pieces of mail within larger sacks was about $150,000. Although CBP has been using EAD to target express cargo for inspection since approximately 2004, it has not evaluated whether this method results in benefits relative to other methods of choosing express cargo, or cargo more generally, for inspection. As USPS and CBP contemplate the expansion of pilot programs to other ISCs and types of mail, existing pilots could be used as an opportunity for CBP and USPS: (1) to articulate performance goals for the pilots, (2) to collect data and assess the pilots on their success in enabling USPS to provide targeted mail to CBP for inspection, and (3) to assess the costs and benefits of various methods of choosing mail for inspection. Postal Service and Departments of State and Homeland Security for review and comment. GAO staff making key contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
In this report, we address (1) types of items CBP has seized from mail and express cargo sent to the United States; (2) how inbound international items are inspected as they arrive in the United States; and (3) options to collect electronic advance data for mail and the costs and benefits of using electronic advance data for targeting mail for inspection. We conducted site visits to all five USPS International Service Centers (ISC)—the facilities at which USPS receives the majority of inbound international mail to interview officials, observe the CBP inspection process, and identify associated challenges. We interviewed officials from USPS, CBP’s Office of Field Operations and National Targeting Center, and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and representatives from the three largest express consignment operators (based on CBP cargo volume data for fiscal year 2015): UPS, FedEx, and DHL. USPS is required to present all inbound international mail, with some exceptions, to U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) for inspection. U.S. While USPIS does not have primary responsibility for inspecting inbound international mail, it coordinates with USPS and U.S. Customs and Border Protection to facilitate the inspection of inbound international mail. | Why GAO Did This Study
Expanding international use of e-commerce has increased the volume of global trade, potentially increasing threats sent to the United States via international mail and express cargo. Some in Congress have called for additional measures to identify prohibited items, such as increased collection of EAD that may provide CBP with information to better focus its screening efforts by targeting mail for inspection. GAO was asked to review the security of inbound international mail.
In this report, GAO addresses, among other objectives, (1) how inbound international items are inspected as they arrive in the United States; and (2) what options exist to collect EAD and the costs and benefits of using it to target mail for inspection. GAO reviewed documentation and interviewed officials from CBP, USPS, the U.S. Department of State, and, based on 2015 inbound international volume, the three largest express consignment operators. GAO also conducted site visits to all of USPS's International Service Centers and two express consignment operators' facilities, to observe screening operations and interview officials.
What GAO Found
Express consignment operators (like FedEx and DHL) and the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) work with U.S. Customs and Border Protection to inspect inbound international express cargo and mail. Express consignment operators are required to provide “electronic advance data” (EAD)—such as the shipper's and recipient's name and address—for all inbound express cargo. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) uses this information to target inspections. USPS is not required to provide this information to CBP. Nonetheless, as of March 2017, advance data are unavailable for roughly half of inbound international mail. Although USPS and CBP have two pilot programs under way to target mail for inspection based on EAD, they have not established specific and measureable goals and therefore lack the performance targets needed to evaluate the effectiveness of the pilots. Without these performance targets, USPS and CBP are unable to make well-informed decisions about the possible expansion of these pilots in the future. While USPS officials reported in November of 2016 that they planned to expand one of the pilots, CBP officials stated that the pilot was not ready for expansion because of USPS's inability to provide 100 percent of targeted mail to CBP for inspection. USPS stated that it is working to address challenges related to identifying targeted mail within sacks containing hundreds of individual pieces of mail (see figure).
Options for collecting EAD include negotiating agreements with foreign postal operators and legally requiring EAD, but the costs and benefits of using EAD to target mail for inspection are unclear. USPS and CBP officials stated that having EAD to target mail for inspection could result in saving time and resources and increase the percentage of inspections that identify threatening items. However, USPS has not calculated the cost of collecting EAD from countries with which it has data-sharing agreements, and neither USPS nor CBP has collected the necessary information to determine the extent to which the use of EAD would provide benefits relative to current methods of choosing mail for inspection. For example, CBP has collected data on the rate of seizures per inspection for current pilot programs, but it has not collected comparable data for other screening methods it uses to target mail for inspection. As such, USPS and CBP risk spending resources on efforts that may not increase the security of inbound international mail or that may not result in sufficient improvement to justify the costs.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that CBP, in coordination with USPS: (1) establish measureable performance goals to assess pilot programs and (2) evaluate the costs and benefits of using EAD to target mail for inspection compared with other targeting methods. CBP and USPS agreed with these recommendations. |
gao_GAO-03-263 | gao_GAO-03-263_0 | Although all levels of government are involved in transit security, the primary responsibility for securing transit systems has rested with the transit agencies. Specifically, TEA-21 prohibits transit agencies that serve urbanized areas with populations of 200,000 or more from using urbanized area formula funding for operating expenses. Throughout the world, public surface transportation systems have been targets of terrorist attacks. Certain characteristics of transit systems, such as their high ridership and open access, make them both vulnerable to attack and difficult to secure. Moreover, because of the numerous stakeholders involved in transit security, coordination can become a problem. Characteristics of Transit Systems Pose Security Challenges
According to transit officials and transit security experts, certain characteristics of mass transit systems make them inherently vulnerable to terrorist attacks and difficult to secure. For example, the number of riders that pass through a mass transit system—especially during peak hours—make some security measures, such as metal detectors, impractical. Funding Security Improvements Is a Key Challenge
Funding security improvements is a key challenge for transit agencies. Our survey results and our interviews with transit agency officials indicate that insufficient funding is the most significant challenge in making transit systems as safe and secure as possible. Factors contributing to funding challenges include high security costs, tight budgets, competing budget priorities, and a provision prohibiting transit agencies in large urbanized areas from using federal urbanized area formula funds for operating expenses, such as security training. Transit Agencies Are Taking Steps to Enhance Security
Prior to September 11, all 10 transit agencies we visited and many of the transit agencies we surveyed were implementing measures to enhance transit safety and security, such as revising emergency plans and training employees on emergency preparedness. Since September 11, transit agencies have taken additional steps to improve transit safety and security. FTA has expanded its role in transit security since September 11 by launching a multipart security initiative and increasing the funding for its safety and security activities. In addition, the Aviation and Transportation Security Act gave TSA responsibility for transit security; however, TSA’s role and responsibilities have not yet been defined. As the federal government’s role in transit safety and security initiatives evolves, policymakers will need to address several issues, including (1) the roles of stakeholders in funding transit security, (2) federal funding criteria, (3) goals and performance indicators for the federal government’s efforts, and (4) the appropriate federal policy instrument to deliver assistance deemed appropriate. These components are needed to ensure accountability and results. | Why GAO Did This Study
About one-third of terrorist attacks worldwide target transportation systems, and transit systems are the mode most commonly attacked. In light of the history of terrorism against mass transit and the terrorist attacks on September 11, GAO was asked to examine challenges in securing transit systems, steps transit agencies have taken to improve safety and security, and the federal role in transit safety and security. To address these objectives, GAO visited 10 transit agencies and surveyed a representative sample of transit agencies, among other things.
What GAO Found
Transit agencies have taken a number of steps to improve the security of their systems since September 11, such as conducting vulnerability assessments, revising emergency plans, and training employees. Formidable challenges, however, remain in securing transit systems. Obtaining sufficient funding is the most significant challenge in making transit systems as safe and secure as possible, according to GAO survey results and interviews with transit agency officials. Funding security improvements is problematic because of high security costs, competing budget priorities, tight budget environments, and a provision precluding transit agencies that serve areas with populations of 200,000 or more from using federal urbanized area formula funds for operating expenses. In addition to funding challenges, certain characteristics of transit agencies make them both vulnerable to attack and difficult to secure. For example, the high ridership and open access of some transit systems makes them attractive for terrorists but also makes certain security measures, like metal detectors, impractical. Moreover, because all levels of the government and the private sector are involved in transit decisions, coordination among all the stakeholders can pose challenges. While transit agencies are pursuing security improvements, the federal government's role in transit security is expanding. For example, the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) launched a multipart security initiative and increased funding of its safety and security activities after September 11. In addition, the Aviation and Transportation Security Act gave the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) responsibility for the security of all transportation modes, including transit. TSA anticipates issuing national standards for transit security. As the federal government's role expands, goals, performance indicators, and funding criteria need to be established to ensure accountability and results for the government's efforts. |
gao_GAO-13-457 | gao_GAO-13-457_0 | Federal agencies that need the specific products and services on the Procurement List are generally required to purchase them through the program. The AbilityOne Commission consisted of a 15-member presidentially appointed Commission and 27 full-time staff as of the end of fiscal year 2012. Its responsibilities include (1) establishing rules, regulations, and policies to assure the effective implementation of the program; (2) adding new projects to the Procurement List, after determining whether they can be suitably provided by people who are blind or have severe disabilities; and (3) setting prices for these projects that reflect the market (fair market prices) and appropriately revising them over time. The CNAs are funded almost entirely through fees they charge their affiliates as a percentage of the revenues the affiliates earn from federal customers on AbilityOne contracts. Even though the Commission has ultimate responsibility for program management and oversight because of the unique public-private structure of the program it cannot control how CNAs (1) spend their funds, (2) set and manage their performance goals, or (3) set and implement governance policies and other internal controls. Because the CNAs are independent nonprofit agencies, the Commission’s influence over their budgets does not and cannot extend to (1) controlling CNA cost areas, such as employee salaries and benefits or lobbying costs; (2) establishing a policy on the appropriate level of CNA reserves; and (3) ensuring that the CNAs provide sufficient funding to support key program initiatives designed to promote employment opportunities for people with severe disabilities. CNAs Assign Affiliates to Develop Potential Projects and Recommend Projects for Review to the Commission
Federal law gives the AbilityOne Commission the authority to add projects to the AbilityOne Program Procurement List and federal regulations give the Commission the authority to approve which agencies affiliated with the program can provide the projects. AbilityOne officials also told us that their involvement in determining which affiliate should provide a project is limited. Our review of the Commission’s policy shows that although it describes some desired outcomes regarding CNA assignment decisions, it does little to indicate how these outcomes can be achieved. The Commission Does Not Track How the Program’s Distribution of Projects Affects Job Creation for Its Target Population
The AbilityOne Commission has not determined how the assignment of projects among affiliates has affected the creation of employment opportunities for people who are blind or have severe disabilities and, according to Commission officials, has not done so at least in part because of limited resources. The AbilityOne Commission Has Final Approval of Project Prices, but Procedures Could Be Strengthened
The Commission’s Review and Approval of Price Recommendations for New Projects Lacks Transparency
While the AbilityOne Commission is ultimately responsible for determining the fair market price of projects in the program, it permits the CNAs, affiliates, and federal customers to negotiate pricing and recommend a fair market price for each project. Commission staff also told us that they conduct these reviews in accordance with written policies and procedures, but acknowledged that these instructions are not sufficiently explicit and transparent. Such limitations can make it difficult for the CNAs and affiliates to understand how and why decisions are made. CNA managers and some affiliates told us, for example, that they sometimes do not understand the Commission’s price reviewing procedures and by extension, its reasons for rejecting prices. This lack of understanding about Commission reviews of recommended prices may partially explain the relatively high rejection rate of initial packages (see fig. Commission staff and CNA officials reported that they do not have procedures in place to ensure that affiliates comply with the policy that affiliates report to the Commission, through their CNA, any price revisions that do not conform with approved contract pricing mechanisms. Without an independent IG, this major procurement program lacks an office to independently audit and investigate waste, fraud, and abuse and to make recommendations for enhancing program integrity and operations. Matter for Congressional Consideration
To enhance program effectiveness, efficiency, and integrity in the AbilityOne Program, Congress may wish to consider establishing an independent inspector general for the program with the authority to audit and investigate the Commission and the CNAs. To further improve oversight and transparency in the AbilityOne Program, the Chairperson of the U.S. AbilityOne Commission should:
Routinely obtain from the CNAs any audits and reports of alleged misconduct or other internal controls violations, and information on corrective actions taken by the CNAs. They also provided additional information and disagreed with several findings. Nonetheless, the Commission agreed with our assessment that its pricing review procedures are not sufficiently explicit or transparent and that this can make it difficult for the CNAs and affiliates to prepare acceptable pricing packages. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 1938, Congress created a program providing employment opportunities for people who are blind and expanded it in 1971 to include people with severe disabilities. Now known as AbilityOne, the programs public-private structure consists of the federal, independent U.S. AbilityOne Commission (15 part-time presidentially-appointed members supported by 27 staff) to oversee the program; two central nonprofit agencies (CNAs) to administer much of the program; and hundreds of affiliated nonprofit companies employing people who are blind or severely disabled to provide products and services to federal agencies. Federal agencies are generally required to purchase such products and services through the program.
GAO examined how the AbilityOne Commission: (1) directs and oversees the CNAs; (2) adds products and services (hereafter called projects) to the program and assigns affiliates to provide them; and (3) prices program projects. GAO reviewed policies, procedures, relevant federal laws and regulations, and other documents; interviewed CNA and AbilityOne officials; held five focus groups with affiliates; and analyzed data on program products, services, and pricing reviews.
What GAO Found
Federal agencies need to exercise strong oversight to promote effectiveness and efficiency and prevent waste, fraud, and abuse--especially in a federal procurement program such as this, which is exempt from full and open competition requirements. However, although the AbilityOne Commission is ultimately responsible for overseeing the program, the Commission cannot control how CNAs (1) spend their funds, (2) set and manage their performance goals, or (3) set and implement governance policies and other internal controls. The Commission's authority to direct CNA budget priorities--including how much they compensate their executives and the level and growth of their reserves--is limited. As independent entities, the CNAs are responsible for determining their spending. Most of their money comes from fees they charge their affiliates as a percent of revenue earned from AbilityOne contracts. Moreover, the Commission does not have sufficient authority to set CNA performance and governance standards, so it depends on the CNAs to set and enforce such standards. Although the CNAs have instituted their own internal controls, the Commission does not have procedures to monitor alleged CNA control violations, nor is there an inspector general to provide independent audit and investigative capabilities for the program, including at the CNAs.
The AbilityOne Commission is responsible for determining which products and services can be suitably provided by the program. It delegates to the CNAs most of the responsibility for deciding which affiliates should develop and provide these projects. According to CNA and affiliate officials, the CNAs often do not fully disclose how they make these decisions. This limited transparency could increase the risk of biased decisions because CNA officials have wide latitude in determining which affiliate should be awarded a project. Although AbilityOne Commission officials have acknowledged the importance of transparency and equity in assigning projects, they have done little to indicate how these outcomes can be achieved.
The Commission has statutory responsibility for determining the fair market price of projects in the program, but: (1) its written pricing review policies and procedures are limited and (2) it does not have sufficient internal controls to ensure that prices are appropriately revised over time. The Commission sets procedures that encourage affiliates and federal customers to negotiate prices that reflect the market. Although Commission staff review these prices in accordance with written policies and procedures, they acknowledged that these instructions are not sufficiently explicit or transparent. Such limitations can make it difficult for the CNAs and affiliates to understand the Commission's pricing review procedures and, by extension, its reasons for rejecting prices. This lack of understanding may partially explain the 77 percent rejection rate for initial pricing packages. Commission policy also states that CNAs submit for Commission review any request for adjusting the price of a project beyond a single contract period that does not conform with the prior Commission-approved mechanism. Occasionally customers and affiliates implement non-conforming price revisions without requesting Commission approval. This negates the Commission's internal controls for ensuring fair market prices and results in the Commission not knowing the actual price being charged. Neither the AbilityOne Commission nor the CNAs have procedures in place to systematically identify such instances.
What GAO Recommends
We are presenting a matter for Congressional consideration to establish an inspector general and several recommendations to the Commission to enhance program oversight. The Commission and CNAs agreed with our recommendations, but disagreed with several findings or provided additional information, which we incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-06-406T | gao_GAO-06-406T_0 | The Nation’s Fiscal Imbalance
The Financial Report of the United States Government provides useful information on the government’s financial position at the end of the fiscal year and changes that have occurred over the course of the year. The federal government’s gross debt in the U.S. government’s consolidated financial statements was about $8 trillion as of September 30, 2005. This number excludes such items as the current gap between the present value of future promised and funded Social Security and Medicare benefits, veterans’ health care, and a range of other liabilities (e.g., federal employee and veteran benefits payable), commitments, and contingencies that the federal government has pledged to support. Including these items, the federal government’s fiscal exposures now total more than $46 trillion, representing close to four times gross domestic product (GDP) in fiscal year 2005 and up from about $20 trillion or two times GDP in 2000. Rather, a fundamental reexamination, reprioritization, and reengineering of major spending programs, tax policies, and government priorities will be important to recapture our fiscal flexibility and update our programs and priorities to respond to emerging social, economic, and security changes. Ultimately, this will likely require a national discussion about what Americans want from their government and how much they are willing to pay for those things. We continue to have concerns about the identification of misstatements in federal agencies’ prior year financial statements. Frequent restatements to correct errors can undermine public trust and confidence in both the entity and all responsible parties. Material internal control weaknesses discussed in our fiscal year 2005 audit report serve to increase the risk that additional errors may occur and not be identified on a timely basis by agency management or their auditors, resulting in further restatements. These material deficiencies were the federal government’s inability to satisfactorily determine that property, plant, and equipment and inventories and related property, primarily held by the Department of Defense (DOD), were properly reported in the consolidated financial statements; reasonably estimate or adequately support amounts reported for certain liabilities, such as environmental and disposal liabilities, or determine whether commitments and contingencies were complete and properly reported; support significant portions of the total net cost of operations, most notably related to DOD, and adequately reconcile disbursement activity at certain federal agencies; adequately account for and reconcile intragovernmental activity and balances between federal agencies; ensure that the federal government’s consolidated financial statements were consistent with the underlying audited agency financial statements, balanced, and in conformity with GAAP; and resolve material differences that exist between the total net outlays reported in federal agencies’ Statements of Budgetary Resources and the records used by Treasury to prepare the Statements of Changes in Cash Balance from Unified Budget and Other Activities. Addressing Major Impediments to an Opinion on Consolidated Financial Statements
Three major impediments to our ability to render an opinion on the U.S. government’s consolidated financial statements continued to be: (1) serious financial management problems at DOD, (2) the federal government’s inability to adequately account for and reconcile intragovernmental activity and balances between federal agencies, and (3) the federal government’s ineffective process for preparing the consolidated financial statements. Closing Comments
In closing, given the federal government’s overall financial condition and long-term fiscal imbalance, the need for the Congress and the President to have timely, reliable, and useful financial and performance information is greater than ever. Sound decisions on the current results and future direction of vital federal government programs and policies are made more difficult without such information. Until the problems discussed in our audit report are adequately addressed, they will continue to have adverse implications for the federal government and the taxpayers. Appendix II: Other Material Weaknesses
Other Material Weaknesses
The federal government did not maintain effective internal control over financial reporting (including safeguarding assets) and compliance with significant laws and regulations as of September 30, 2005. Weaknesses in controls over tax collection activities continue to affect the federal government’s ability to efficiently and effectively account for and collect revenue. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO is required by law to annually audit the consolidated financial statements of the U.S. government. The Congress and the President need to have timely, reliable, and useful financial and performance information. Sound decisions on the current results and future direction of vital federal government programs and policies are made more difficult without such information. Until the problems discussed in GAO's audit report on the U.S. government's consolidated financial statements are adequately addressed, they will continue to (1) hamper the federal government's ability to reliably report a significant portion of its assets, liabilities, costs, and other information; (2) affect the federal government's ability to reliably measure the full cost as well as the financial and nonfinancial performance of certain programs and activities; (3) impair the federal government's ability to adequately safeguard significant assets and properly record various transactions; and (4) hinder the federal government from having reliable financial information to operate in an economical, efficient, and effective manner.
What GAO Found
For the ninth consecutive year, certain material weaknesses in internal control and in selected accounting and financial reporting practices resulted in conditions that continued to prevent GAO from being able to provide the Congress and American people an opinion as to whether the consolidated financial statements of the U.S. government are fairly stated in conformity with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles. Three major impediments to an opinion on the consolidated financial statements continued to be (1) serious financial management problems at the Department of Defense, (2) the federal government's inability to adequately account for and reconcile intragovernmental activity and balances between federal agencies, and (3) the federal government's ineffective process for preparing the consolidated financial statements. Further, in our opinion, as of September 30, 2005, the federal government did not maintain effective internal control over financial reporting and compliance with significant laws and regulations due to numerous material weaknesses. More troubling still is the federal government's overall financial condition and long-term fiscal imbalance. While the fiscal year 2005 budget deficit was lower than 2004, it was still very high, especially given the impending retirement of the "baby boom" generation and rising health care costs. Importantly, as reported in the fiscal year 2005 Financial Report of the United States Government, the federal government's accrual-based net operating cost--the cost to operate the federal government--increased to $760 billion in fiscal year 2005 from $616 billion in fiscal year 2004. This represents an increase of about $144 billion or 23 percent. The federal government's gross debt was about $8 trillion as of September 30, 2005. This number excludes such items as the gap between the present value of future promised and funded Social Security and Medicare benefits, veterans' health care, and a range of other liabilities, commitments, and contingencies that the federal government has pledged to support. Including these items, the federal government's fiscal exposures now total more than $46 trillion, representing close to four times gross domestic product (GDP) in fiscal year 2005 and up from about $20 trillion or two times GDP in 2000. Given these and other factors, a fundamental reexamination of major spending programs, tax policies, and government priorities will be important and necessary to put us on a prudent and sustainable fiscal path. This will likely require a national discussion about what Americans want from their government and how much they are willing to pay for those things. We continue to have concerns about the identification of misstatements in federal agencies' prior year financial statements. Frequent restatements to correct errors can undermine public trust and confidence in both the entity and all responsible parties. The material internal control weaknesses discussed in this testimony serve to increase the risk that additional errors may occur and not be identified on a timely basis by agency management or their auditors, resulting in further restatements. |
gao_GAO-08-213T | gao_GAO-08-213T_0 | Evolution of the Single Audit Act and Its Underlying Principles
In the early 1980s, Congress had concerns about a lack of adequate oversight and accountability for federal assistance provided to state and local governments. In response to concerns that large amounts of federal financial assistance were not subject to audit and that agencies sometimes overlapped on oversight activities, Congress passed the Single Audit Act of 1984. The Single Audit Act adopted the single audit concept to help meet the needs of federal agencies for grantee oversight as well as grantees’ needs for single, uniformly structured audits. Federal grant awards to state and local governments have increased significantly since the Single Audit Act was passed in 1984. As shown in figure 1, the federal government’s use of grants to state and local governments has risen substantially, from $7 billion in 1960 to almost $450 billion budgeted in 2007. GAO supported the passage of the Single Audit Act, and we continue to support the single audit concept and principles behind the act as a key accountability mechanism over federal grant awards. However, the quality of single audits conducted under this legislation has been a longstanding area of concern since the passage of the Single Audit Act in 1984. The federal Inspectors General as well have found similar problems with single audit quality. As shown in table 2, the PCIE study estimated that, overall, approximately 49 percent of the universe of single audits fell into the acceptable group. Specifically, 63.5 percent of the audits of entities in stratum 1 (those expending $50 million or more in federals awards) were deemed acceptable, while 48.2 percent of audits in stratum 2 (those expending at least $500,000 but less than $50 million) were deemed acceptable. We are concerned that audits are not being conducted in accordance with professional standards and requirements. These audits may provide a false sense of assurance and could mislead users of audit reports regarding issues of compliance and internal control over federal programs. PCIE Recommendations to Improve Single Audit Quality Are Based on Three-Pronged Approach
The PCIE report recommended a three-pronged approach to reduce the types of deficiencies noted and improve the quality of single audits: 1. revise and improve single audit standards, criteria, and guidance; 2. establish minimum continuing professional education (CPE) as a prerequisite for auditors to be eligible to conduct and continue to perform single audits; and 3. review and enhance the disciplinary processes to address unacceptable audits and for not meeting training and CPE requirements. GAO Analysis of PCIE Recommendations
While we support the recommendations made in the PCIE report, it will be important to resolve a number of issues regarding the proposed training requirement. Additional Factors for Consideration When Determining Actions to Improve Audit Quality
In addition to the findings and recommendations of the PCIE report, we believe there are two other critical factors that need to be considered in determining actions that should be taken to improving audit quality: (1) the distribution of unacceptable audits and audits of limited reliability across the different dollar amounts of federal expenditures by grantee, as found in the PCIE study; and (2) the distribution of single audits by size in the universe of single audits. The PCIE report presents compelling evidence that a serious shortfall in the quality of single audits continues to exist. We believe that there may be opportunities for considering size characteristics when implementing future actions to improve the effectiveness and quality of single audits as an accountability mechanism. In addition to the considerations surrounding the specific recommendations for improving audit quality, a separate effort taking into account the overall framework for single audits may be warranted. Is the current federal oversight structure for single audits adequate and consistent across federal agencies? What role can the auditing profession play in increasing single audit quality? A-133 and the Single Audit Act need updating? | Why GAO Did This Study
Federal government grants to state and local governments have risen substantially, from $7 billion in 1960 to almost $450 billion budgeted in 2007. The single audit is an important mechanism of accountability for the use of federal grants by nonprofit organizations as well as state and local governments. However, the quality of single audits conducted under the Single Audit Act, as amended, has been a longstanding area of concern since the passage of the act in 1984. The President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency (PCIE) recently issued its Report on National Single Audit Sampling Project, which raises concerns about the quality of single audits and makes recommendations aimed at improving the effectiveness and efficiency of those audits. This testimony provides (1) GAO's perspective on the history and importance of the Single Audit Act and the principles behind the act, (2) a preliminary analysis of the recommendations made by the PCIE for improving audit quality, and (3) additional considerations for improving the quality of single audits.
What GAO Found
In the early 1980s, Congress had concerns about a lack of adequate oversight and accountability for federal assistance provided to state and local governments. In response to concerns that large amounts of federal financial assistance were not subject to audit and that agencies sometimes overlapped on oversight activities, Congress passed the Single Audit Act of 1984. The act adopted the single audit concept to help meet the needs of federal agencies for grantee oversight as well as grantees' needs for single, uniformly structured audits. GAO supported the passage of the Single Audit Act, and continues to support the single audit concept and principles behind the act as a key accountability mechanism for federal grant awards. However, the quality of single audits has been a longstanding area of concern since the passage of the act in 1984. In its June 2007 Report on National Single Audit Sampling Project, the PCIE found that, overall, approximately 49 percent of single audits fell into the acceptable group, with the remaining 51 percent having deficiencies severe enough to classify the audits as limited in reliability or unacceptable. PCIE found a significant difference in results by audit size. Specifically, 63.5 percent of the large audits (with $50 million or more in federal award expenditures) were deemed acceptable compared with only 48.2 percent of the smaller audits (with at least $500,000 but less than $50 million in federal award expenditures). The PCIE report presents compelling evidence that a serious problem with single audit quality continues to exist. GAO is concerned that audits are not being conducted in accordance with professional standards and requirements. These audits may provide a false sense of assurance and could mislead users of the single audit reports. The PCIE report recommended a three-pronged approach to reduce the types of deficiencies found and to improve the quality of single audits: (1) revise and improve single audit standards, criteria, and guidance; (2) establish minimum continuing professional education (CPE) as a prerequisite for auditors to be eligible to be able to conduct and continue to perform single audits; and (3) review and enhance the disciplinary processes to address unacceptable audits and for not meeting training and CPE requirements. In this testimony, GAO supports PCIE's recommendations and points out issues that need to be resolved regarding the proposed training and other factors that merit consideration when determining actions to improve audit quality. GAO believes that there may be opportunities for considering size when implementing future actions to improve the effectiveness and quality of single audits. In addition, a separate effort considering the overall framework for single audits could answer such questions as whether simplified alternatives can achieve cost-effective accountability in the smallest audits; whether current federal oversight processes for single audits are adequate; and what role the auditing profession can play in increasing single audit quality. |
gao_GAO-17-156 | gao_GAO-17-156_0 | OMB and Treasury have taken significant steps toward implementing the act’s various requirements including standardizing data element definitions, issuing guidance to help agencies develop their implementation plans, and designing a pilot for developing recommendations to reduce recipient reporting burden. However, additional effort is needed to address 11 previous GAO recommendations that remain open. Initial Steps Taken to Develop a Governance Structure but Further Steps Needed to Maintain the Integrity of Data Standards
OMB and Treasury are developing a governance structure, but more work will be needed to ensure that this structure is consistent with key practices for developing and maintaining the integrity of data standards over time. Key Practices for Data Governance Structures i. One reason why having a robust, institutionalized data governance structure is important is to provide consistent data management during times of change and transition. The transition to a new administration presents one such situation. Based on our review of the 24 CFO Act agency implementation plan updates, we identified four overarching categories of challenges reported by agencies that may impede their ability to effectively and efficiently implement the DATA Act: systems integration issues, lack of resources, evolving and complex reporting requirements, and inadequate guidance. Reporting. Based on our review, we identified seven overarching categories of mitigating strategies reported by these agencies to address DATA Act implementation challenges: making changes to internal policies and procedures, leveraging existing resources, using external resources, continuing communications, employing manual and temporary workarounds, monitoring and developing guidance, and enhancing existing systems. 2016-03 directs agencies to leverage existing procedures for providing assurances of the quality of their DATA Act data submissions and directs agency SAOs to provide reasonable assurance that their internal controls support the reliability and validity of the data submitted to Treasury for publication on USASpending.gov. Although OMB has made some progress with these efforts, other data definitions lack clarity—including primary place of performance and award description—which still needs to be addressed to ensure agencies report consistent and comparable data. This was followed, in July 2016, by a revised version of the design for the procurement portion. Design of the Procurement Portion of the Pilot Does Not Clearly Document How its Focus on Certified Payroll Reporting Will Apply to Other Procurement Reporting Requirements
We found some areas where the revised procurement design does not fully reflect leading practices for effective pilot design. This is of particular concern given the diversity of reporting requirements contained in the FAR. However, the revised design does not provide any details on how this will be done. As a result of these additional steps, GSA officials expect to be able to begin collecting data through the centralized reporting portal sometime between late January 2017 and late February 2017. For example, OMB and Treasury can build upon the initial step of establishing a data standards committee responsible for maintaining already established standards and identifying new standards towards the goal of establishing an institutionalized system of data management that follows key practices and ensures the integrity of the data standards over time. By addressing issues such as this and continuing to focus on implementing the act, the administration greatly increases the likelihood of creating a system that will achieve the goals of the act—to increase the transparency of financial information and improve the usefulness of that data to Congress, federal managers, and the American people. Recommendation for Executive Action
In order to ensure that the procurement portion of the Section 5 Pilot better reflects leading practices for effective pilot design, we recommend that the Director of OMB clearly document in the pilot’s design how data collected through the centralized certified payroll reporting portal will be used to test hypotheses related to reducing reporting burden involving other procurement reporting requirements. OMB neither agreed nor disagreed with GAO’s recommendation. This report examines: (1) steps taken to establish a clear data governance structure which is particularly important during the upcoming transition to a new administration; (2) challenges reported by Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990 (CFO Act) agencies in their implementation plan updates; (3) the operationalization of government-wide data standards and the technical specifications for data reporting; and (4) updated designs for the Section 5 Pilot for reducing recipient reporting burden and progress made in its implementation. To assess the extent to which the Section 5 pilot designs adhered to leading practices for effective pilot design, we reviewed the documented designs for both the grants and procurement portions of the pilot. Appendix II: Status of GAO’s Recommendations Related to the DATA Act
Appendix III: Information Included in Chief Financial Officers Act Agencies’ Implementation Plan Updates
In May 2015, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) directed federal agencies to submit Digital Accountability and Transparency Act of 2014 (DATA Act) implementation plans to OMB concurrent with the agencies’ fiscal year 2017 budget requests. | Why GAO Did This Study
Effective implementation of the DATA Act will allow federal funds to be better tracked and greatly increase the types of data made publicly available. OMB and Treasury have taken significant steps to implement the act, but challenges remain as the critical deadline of May 2017 approaches. Consistent with GAO's mandate under the act, this report is one in a series of products GAO will provide to Congress providing oversight of DATA Act implementation. This report examines (1) steps taken to establish a clear data governance structure which is important during the upcoming transition to a new administration, (2) challenges reported by major agencies in their implementation plan updates, (3) the operationalization of government-wide data standards and technical specifications for data reporting, and (4) updated designs for the Section 5 pilot for reducing recipient reporting burden and progress made in its implementation. GAO reviewed key implementation documents, compared the Section 5 Pilot to leading practices, and interviewed staff at OMB, Treasury, and other selected agencies.
What GAO Found
Data governance and the transition to the new administration. Consistent with a July 2015 GAO recommendation to establish clear policies and processes that follow leading practices for data governance under the Digital Accountability and Transparency Act of 2014 (DATA Act), the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) have taken the initial step of convening a committee to maintain established standards and identify new standards. Although this represents progress, more needs to be done to establish a data governance structure that is consistent with key practices to ensure the integrity of standards over time. The upcoming transition to a new administration presents risks to implementing the DATA Act, potentially including shifted priorities or lost momentum. The lack of a data governance structure for managing efforts going forward jeopardizes the ability to sustain progress as priorities shift over time.
Implementation plan updates. The 24 Chief Financial Officers Act agencies continue to face challenges implementing the DATA Act, according to information in their implementation plan updates. GAO identified four categories of challenges reported by agencies that may impede their ability to implement the act: systems integration issues, lack of resources, evolving and complex reporting requirements, and inadequate guidance. To address these challenges, agencies reported changing internal policies and procedures; leveraging existing resources; and using external resources, and manual and temporary workarounds, among other actions.
Operationalizing data standards and technical specifications for data reporting. OMB issued additional guidance on how agencies should report data involving specific transactions, such as intragovernmental transfers, and how agencies should provide quality assurances for submitted data. However, this guidance does not provide sufficient detail in areas such as the process for providing assurance on data submissions and it does not address others, such as how agencies should operationalize the definitions for data elements (e.g., primary place of performance and award description). Treasury released a new version of the DATA Act Broker—a system that collects and validates agency data—in October 2016 and is making minor adjustments to its functionality. Agencies have reported making progress creating and testing their data submissions, but some report needing to rely on interim solutions for initial reporting while they wait for automated processes to be developed.
Pilot to reduce recipient reporting burden. GAO reviewed the revised design for both the grants and procurement portions of the pilot and found that they partly met each of the leading practices for effective pilot design. Although this represented significant progress since April 2016, GAO identified an area where further improvement is still needed. Specifically, the plan for the procurement portion of the pilot does not clearly document how findings related to the centralized certified payroll reporting portal will be applicable to other types of required procurement reporting. This is a particular concern given the diversity of federal procurement reporting requirements. To date, all six components of the grant portion are underway. Data collection for the procurement portion is delayed and is not expected to begin until January or February 28, 2017.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making one new recommendation: that for the Section 5 Pilot, OMB clearly document in its design of the procurement portion how data collected through the centralized certified payroll reporting portal will be applied to other required procurement reporting. Moving forward, additional progress needs to be made to address GAO's 11 previous DATA Act recommendations that remain open. OMB neither agreed nor disagreed with GAO's recommendation. |
gao_GGD-99-132 | gao_GGD-99-132_0 | This is because, using NMVTIS, the copy of the motor vehicle title presented for retitling would be electronically validated against the database of the state that originally titled the vehicle. AAMVA will provide the brand file. AAMVA expects completion of the test within the first quarter of calendar year 2000 and its evaluation of the results shortly thereafter. AAMVA’s Estimated Cost of NMVTIS
AAMVA’s March 19, 1999, cost estimate for a fully implemented NMVTIS is $33.9 million—that is, $24.2 million for states to develop new systems or adapt existing ones to link with NMVTIS and $9.7 million for AAMVA and its contractors to develop and implement NMVTIS. We found the following:
43 of the 47 total respondents (participants and nonparticipants) thought NMVTIS could be implemented in their state;
32 of 40 nonparticipating states responding to our survey expressed interest in participating in NMVTIS, and, of the 8 other states, 2 said they were planing to express interest in participating and 6 said resources or other priorities precluded their participation; and
27 of 47 states indicated that funding or resources could be a barrier to their successful implementation of NMVTIS. Justice Has Not Determined If NMVTIS Warrants Additional Federal Investment
Justice has not evaluated NMVTIS’ expected life-cycle costs and benefits to ensure that additional federal funding is justified. The Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 and the best practices used by public and private organizations to manage information technology investment would provide an analytical basis for informed investment management decisions. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) determine the current status of the National Motor Vehicle Title Information System (NMVTIS) and (2) determine whether Justice had evaluated NMVTIS’ expected costs and benefits to ensure that additional federal investment in the system is justified. We spoke with officials from the Department of Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators (AAMVA), and AAMVA’s two contractors—The Polk Company and the National Insurance Crime Bureau. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Justice's (DOJ) development and implementation of the National Motor Vehicle Title Information System (NMVTIS), focusing on: (1) the status of NMVTIS; and (2) whether DOJ had evaluated NMVTIS' expected costs and benefits to ensure that additional federal investment in NMVTIS is justified.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) DOJ has not evaluated NMVTIS' expected life-cycle costs and benefits to ensure that additional federal funding is justified; (2) the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 and best practices used by public and private organizations to manage information technology investments suggest that such an evaluation will provide an analytical basis for informed investment decisions; (3) as of March 1999, the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators (AAMVA) expected the development and implementation of NMVTIS to cost about $34 million; (4) AAMVA is expected to update this estimate when its seven-state test of NMVTIS is finished; (5) AAMVA estimated that test would be completed within the first quarter of calendar year 2000; (6) through FY 1999, Congress has provided DOJ and the Department of Transportation with about $8 million of an expected $22 million federal investment in NMVTIS; (7) the states and AAMVA and its contractors would be expected to provide the remaining $12 million; (8) NMVTIS was designed to allow users to electronically validate an existing vehicle title and title-related information; (9) however, a potential barrier to electronically validating titles and title-related information could be the lack of full participation by all state departments of motor vehicles; and (10) although 43 states of the 47 states responding to GAO's survey thought that they could implement NMVTIS and 32 states of the 40 nonparticipating states had expressed an interest in doing so, 27 of the 47 states were concerned about how they would fund NMVTIS. |
gao_GAO-15-662T | gao_GAO-15-662T_0 | Examples, in chronological order, of the problems on which we have reported and where ineffective oversight was identified as a cause include the following: 2004: a suspension—or stand-down—of operations at one NNSA laboratory to address systemic safety and security concerns identified after an undergraduate student was partially blinded in a laser accident and two classified computer disks were reported missing; 2006: the discovery of a large number of classified documents and electronic files that had been unlawfully removed from an NNSA laboratory as a result of a drug raid on a private residence; 2007: nearly 60 serious accidents or near misses including worker exposure to radiation, inhalation of toxic vapors, and electrical shocks at three nuclear weapons laboratories from 2000 through 2007; 2008: the identification of significant protective force weaknesses (i.e., 13 specific deficiencies) during an independent physical security evaluation of an NNSA laboratory that included a force-on-force exercise to simulate an attack on a sensitive facility; 2012: 11 public hearings held since 2002 to address concerns about DOE’s safety practices by the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board—an independent executive branch agency created by Congress to independently assess safety conditions and operations at defense nuclear facilities at DOE’s sites, including NNSA and EM; 2012: a serious security breach at an NNSA production plant—the Y- 12 National Security Complex (Y-12) near Oak Ridge, Tennessee—in which three trespassers gained access to the protected area directly adjacent to one of the nation’s most critically important nuclear weapon-related facilities before being interrupted by the security measures in place, resulting in the identification of multiple and unprecedented security system failures; and 2014: operations were shut down at WIPP following an underground fire involving a vehicle and, 9 days later, an unrelated radiological event occurred when a nuclear waste container breached underground at WIPP, contaminating a portion of the WIPP facility and releasing a small amount of contamination into the environment. The focus of this DOE policy and order was to drive continuous improvement through contractor self-assurance and effective federal oversight. While the previous DOE oversight policy and order were focused on driving continuous improvement, the 2011 versions—which are still in use—focus on improving the efficiency and effectiveness of DOE oversight programs by leveraging the processes and outcomes of CAS to reduce direct, hands-on oversight, when appropriate. NAP-21, which similarly focuses on the oversight efficiencies that can be gained by appropriately leveraging information from CAS, specifically applies to NNSA and its M&O contractors and elaborates on the more general DOE oversight policy and order by (1) developing an approach for federal officials to use in determining the appropriate mix of oversight activities for different contractor-performed functions and (2) by establishing a process by which NNSA would affirm the effectiveness of both CAS implementation by the contractor and the federal oversight approach at each site in the nuclear security enterprise. On the other side of the spectrum is “systems-based oversight,” where federal overseers rely on contractors’ processes and information from their CAS. NNSA Has Not Fully Established Policy or Guidance for Using Information from CAS to Conduct Contractor Oversight
In our May 2015 report, we found that NNSA has not fully established policy or guidance to support determining appropriate approaches to overseeing its M&O contractors, including for using information from CAS. We did not, however, identify any headquarters-level policy or guidance for assessing CAS maturity, for assessing contractors’ past performance to inform an oversight approach, or for assessing risk in other areas. Without such policy or guidance, NNSA officials responsible for conducting assessments may do so inconsistently, and thus treat similar risks differently. As a result of our findings, we recommended that NNSA establish comprehensive oversight polices including for using information from CAS to conduct oversight of M&O contractors and describing how to conduct assessment of risk, CAS maturity, and the level of the contractor’s past performance in determining an appropriate oversight approach. NNSA’s Field Offices Developed Procedures for Determining Appropriate Oversight Approaches, but the Procedures Are Not Always Complete and Differ
In the absence of sufficiently detailed and comprehensive guidance from NNSA headquarters for determining an appropriate mix of oversight approaches, NNSA field offices responsible for day-to-day oversight of M&O contractors reported developing their own procedures for this purpose. For example, the five field offices that reported having complete procedures for assessing CAS maturity used different processes and scales for rating maturity. While each of these procedures may be effective for each field office’s purposes, these differences could affect the consistency with which NNSA’s field offices are determining an appropriate mix of oversight approaches across the nuclear security enterprise. NNSA concurred with our recommendation and stated that field offices will develop new or modify existing procedures, as appropriate, to support the new requirements and estimated the completion date for these activities is September 2016. We recommended that NNSA reestablish a process for reviewing the effectiveness of field offices’ oversight approaches, including their determinations for how and when to use information from CAS. Preliminary Observations from Ongoing Work on DOE’s Processes for Oversight of WIPP
Our preliminary observations on NNSA’s oversight of waste packaging activities at LANL parallel two of the findings from our recently released May 2015 report. According to the accident investigation board report, the NNSA field office’s overreliance on the contractor-generated information in CAS was not consistent with a 2011 NNSA review that observed CAS was still maturing and that a strong NNSA field office oversight presence should continue. This is because NNSA does not have complete policy or guidance to implement the oversight framework and has discontinued its reviews intended to evaluate the effectiveness of field offices’ oversight approaches; also, in the absence of headquarters policy or guidance, its field offices have developed procedures that are not fully complete and differ. | Why GAO Did This Study
A 2005 DOE policy required the department's M&O contractors to implement assurance systems to drive continuous improvement through contractor self-assessment and effective federal oversight. A policy change in 2011 sought to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of DOE oversight programs by leveraging the contractor-generated information from CAS to reduce hands-on oversight, when appropriate. Also, in 2011, NNSA developed a framework for overseeing its M&O contractors, including a three-pronged evaluation for determining how and when to use information from CAS by evaluating the risk of contractors' activities, contractor's past performance, and the maturity of their CAS. Recent security and safety incidents at DOE and NNSA sites, including a 2014 nuclear waste accident, have caused some to question the extent to which information from CAS can be relied on for overseeing M&O contractors.
This testimony discusses NNSA's policy and procedures for implementing the framework, including its use of information from CAS and its process for evaluating oversight effectiveness. Based mainly on GAO's May 2015 report ( GAO-15-216 ), it also discusses preliminary observations from ongoing work related to the 2014 accident for which GAO is analyzing NNSA and DOE policies and guidance on oversight and accident investigation reports completed by DOE and others
What GAO Found
In May 2015, GAO found that the Department of Energy's (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) had not fully established policy or guidance for using information from contractor assurance systems (CAS) to conduct oversight of management and operating (M&O) contractors. NNSA did not provide comprehensive guidance to agency officials on how to conduct assessments required by its oversight framework. In particular, NNSA did not provide guidance for assessing the maturity of contractors' CAS to determine whether information from these systems is sufficiently reliable for oversight purposes. As a result, NNSA cannot ensure that it is appropriately relying on information from CAS in overseeing these contractors. NNSA agreed with GAO's recommendation to establish a comprehensive oversight policy, including for assessments to determine how to use information from CAS for oversight.
In the absence of headquarters level policy or guidance, GAO found in May 2015 that NNSA field offices established their own procedures for determining appropriate oversight approaches, but these procedures were not always complete, and they differed. For example, five of NNSA's seven field offices reported having complete procedures for assessing CAS maturity, but these procedures described different processes and rating scales for conducting such assessments, which could affect the consistency of how field offices determine oversight approaches. NNSA agreed with GAO's recommendation for field offices to develop new or modify existing procedures consistent with new headquarters policy.
NNSA's 2011 policy included a process for validating the effectiveness of field offices' oversight approaches, including the extent to which their approaches appropriately used information from CAS, but GAO found in May 2015 that NNSA discontinued this process after determining that it had not been effective. Discontinuing this process without replacing it eliminated NNSA's internal control for ensuring the effectiveness and consistency of oversight approaches. NNSA agreed with GAO's recommendation to reestablish such a process.
Preliminary observations from GAO's ongoing work to evaluate the 2014 nuclear waste accident at DOE's Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in New Mexico parallel GAO's findings on NNSA's framework for contractor oversight. For example, DOE's accident investigation board reported that the NNSA field office responsible for overseeing waste packaging and processing overrelied on contractor-generated information from CAS instead of directly conducting assessments and that the decision to do so was inconsistent with a 2011 NNSA review, which concluded the contractor's CAS was still maturing.
What GAO Recommends
GAO made several recommendations in its May 2015 report with which NNSA concurred and for which it plans to take action. |
gao_GAO-07-1075T | gao_GAO-07-1075T_0 | Most Sector Plans We Reviewed Met NIPP and DHS Sector- Specific Plan Guidance, but Varied Depending on Their Maturity and How They Define Their Assets
The nine sector-specific plans we reviewed generally met NIPP requirements and DHS’s sector-specific plan guidance; however, the extent to which the plans met this guidance, and therefore their usefulness in enabling DHS to identify gaps and interdependencies across the sectors, varied depending on the maturity of the sector and on how the sector defines its assets, systems, and functions. In addition to these NIPP risk management plan elements outlined above and according to DHS’s sector-specific plan guidance, the plans are also to address the sectors’ efforts to (1) implement a research and development program for critical infrastructure protection and (2) establish a structure for managing and coordinating the responsibilities of the federal departments and agencies—otherwise known as sector-specific agencies—identified in HSPD-7 as responsible for critical-infrastructure protection activities specified for the 17 sectors. For example, all of the plans described the threat analyses that the sector conducts, but only one of the plans described any incentives used to encourage voluntary risk assessments, as required by the NIPP. The plans also varied in how comprehensively they addressed their physical, human, and cyber assets, systems, and functions because sectors reported having differing views on the extent to which they were dependent on each of these assets, systems, and functions. According to DHS’s sector-specific plan guidance, a comprehensive identification of such assets is important because it provides the foundation on which to conduct risk analysis and identify the appropriate mix of protective programs and actions that will most effectively reduce the risk to the nation’s infrastructure. Yet, only one of the plans—drinking water and water treatment—specifically included all three categories of assets. Given the disparity in the plans, it is unclear the extent to which DHS will be able to use them to identify gaps and interdependencies across the sectors in order to plan future protective measures. DHS officials said that to make this determination, they will need to review the sectors’ annual progress reports, due in this month, that are to provide additional information on plan implementation as well as identify sector priorities. Council Representatives Disagreed on the Value of the Plans and the Review Process
Representatives of 10 of 32 councils said the plans were valuable because they gave their sectors a common language and framework to bring the disparate members of the sector together to better collaborate as they move forward with protection efforts. However, representatives of 8 of the 32 councils said the plans were not useful to their sectors because (1) the plans did not represent a true partnership between the federal and private sectors or were not meaningful to all the industries represented by the sector or (2) the sector had already taken significant protection actions, thus, developing the plan did not add value. The remaining council representatives did not offer views on this issue. Representatives of 11 of 32 councils said the review process associated with the plans was lengthy. Long-standing Relationships Continue to Facilitate Councils, but Some Council Representatives Reported Information- Sharing Challenges
Nine of 32 sector representatives said that their preexisting relationships with stakeholders helped in establishing and maintaining their sector councils, and two noted that establishing the councils had improved relationships. We also reported previously that long-standing relationships were a facilitating factor in council formation and that 10 sectors had formed either a government council or sector council that addressed critical infrastructure protection issues prior to DHS’s development of the NIPP. This is important because previously, meetings between the private sector and the government had to be open to the public, hampering the private sector’s willingness to share information. Conversely, seven sector council representatives reported difficulty in achieving and maintaining sector council membership, thus limiting the ability of the councils to effectively represent the sector. Eleven of the 32 council representatives reported continuing challenges with sharing information between the federal government and the private sector. For example, six council representatives expressed concerns about the viability of two of DHS’s main information-sharing tools—the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) or the Protected Critical Infrastructure Information (PCII) program. 3. 9. 15. 17. | Why GAO Did This Study
As Hurricane Katrina so forcefully demonstrated, the nation's critical infrastructures--both physical and cyber--have been vulnerable to a wide variety of threats. Because about 85 percent of the nation's critical infrastructure is privately owned, it is vital that public and private stakeholders work together to protect these assets. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is responsible for coordinating a national protection strategy and has promoted the formation of government and private councils for the 17 infrastructure sectors as a collaborating tool. The councils, among other things, are to identify their most critical assets, assess the risks they face, and identify protective measures in sector-specific plans that comply with DHS's National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP). This testimony is based primarily on GAO's July 2007 report on the sector-specific plans and the sector councils. Specifically, it addresses (1) the extent to which the sector-specific plans meet requirements, (2) the council members' views on the value of the plans and DHS's review process, and (3) the key success factors and challenges that the representatives encountered in establishing and maintaining their councils. In conducting the previous work, GAO reviewed 9 of the 17 draft plans and conducted interviews with government and private sector representatives of the 32 councils, 17 government and 15 private sector.
What GAO Found
Although the nine sector-specific plans GAO reviewed generally met NIPP requirements and DHS's sector-specific plan guidance, eight did not describe any incentives the sector would use to encourage owners to conduct voluntary risk assessments, as required by the NIPP. Most of the plans included the required elements of the NIPP risk management framework. However, the plans varied in how comprehensively they addressed not only their physical assets, systems, and functions, but also their human and cyber assets, systems and functions, a requirement in the NIPP, because the sectors had differing views on the extent to which they were dependent on each of these assets. A comprehensive identification of all three categories of assets is important, according to DHS plan guidance, because it provides the foundation on which to conduct risk analyses and identify appropriate protective actions. Given the disparity in the plans, it is unclear the extent to which DHS will be able to use them to identify security gaps and critical interdependencies across the sectors. DHS officials said that to determine this, they will need to review the sectors' annual reports. Representatives of the government and sector coordinating councils had differing views regarding the value of sector-specific plans and DHS's review of those plans. While 10 of the 32 council representatives GAO interviewed reported that they saw the plans as being useful for their sectors, representatives of eight councils disagreed because they believed the plans either did not represent a partnership among the necessary key stakeholders, especially the private sector or were not valuable because the sector had already progressed beyond the plan. In addition, representatives of 11 of the 32 councils felt the review process was too lengthy, but 8 thought the review process worked well. The remaining council representatives did not offer views on these issues. As GAO reported previously, representatives continued to report that their sector councils had preexisting relationships that helped them establish and maintain their sector councils. However, seven of the 32 representatives reported continuing difficulty achieving and maintaining sector council membership, thus limiting the ability of the councils to effectively represent the sector. Eleven council representatives reported continuing difficulties sharing information between the public and private sectors as a challenge, and six council representatives expressed concerns about the viability of the information system DHS intends to rely on to share information about critical infrastructure issues with the sectors or the effectiveness of the Protected Critical Infrastructure Information program--a program that established procedures for the receipt, care, and storage of information submitted to DHS. GAO has outstanding recommendations addressing this issue, with which DHS generally agreed and is in the process of implementing. |
gao_GAO-12-266 | gao_GAO-12-266_0 | 1). offers potential personnel cost savings to the federal government. TSA Has Made Progress in Deploying Optimal Checked Baggage Screening
TSA Has Collaborated with Airports to Install Optimal Baggage Screening Systems at 76 Percent of TSA-Regulated Airports
TSA reports that 337 of 446 airports (76 percent) the agency regulates for security have optimal baggage screening systems. According to TSA and airport officials, this is because the larger airports generally need to install more complex in-line systems, which are more time and resource intensive to install and often require a significant amount of airport infrastructure modification and construction, while the smaller airports, particularly the category IV airports that rely on the smaller ETD machines, require far less time and resources to install these systems. As a result, to ensure that 100 percent of checked bags continue to be screened as required by ATSA, TSA revised its focus from replacing stand-alone EDS in airport lobbies with in-line systems to replacing its aging fleet of EDS and ETD machines, a process it calls recapitalization. The plan notes that many in-line recapitalization projects will include an optimization component. Reducing the Federal Cost Share for Eligible Airport Facility Modification Projects Could Reduce TSA’s Costs
Reducing the Federal Cost Share
Consistent with current law, TSA enters into reimbursable agreements through which it generally funds 90 percent of the cost of an eligible airport facility modification project to support the installation of an optimal system, with an airport or airline funding the remaining 10 percent of the project’s cost. Airport Officials Acknowledge Benefits from In-line Systems but Oppose Increasing Their Cost Share
Representatives of all 10 airports we visited told us that they benefit from the installation of integrated, in-line baggage screening systems. Specifically, officials from 9 of the 10 airports cited the reduction of passenger congestion in airport terminals because stand-alone EDS machines were removed from the lobby or ticketing areas, officials from half of the airports noted that in-line systems reduce the number of lost or stolen bags by creating a streamlined process for moving checked baggage directly from where baggage is checked by the passenger and airline to the aircraft, and officials from 3 of 10 airports noted that in-line systems facilitate airport growth. TSA’s Cost Estimation Processes Do Not Fully Comply with Best Practices, and TSA and DHS Are Working Together to Establish an Acquisition Program Baseline
TSA Estimates That the EBSP Will Cost Close to $50 Billion through 2030
TSA’s August 25, 2011, life cycle cost estimate identified a total program cost for EBSP of $49.2 billion through fiscal year 2030. As highlighted in our past work, a high-quality, reliable cost estimation process provides a sound basis for making accurate and well-informed decisions about resource investments, budgets, assessments of progress, and accountability for results and thus is critical to the success of a program. Partially documented because TSA used relevant data to help develop the estimate. For example, TSA’s estimated price for the equipment is based on existing contracts for EBSP equipment purchases, maintenance costs, LOI agreements, and OTAs. Partially accurate because while the estimate is properly adjusted for inflation, differences between planned and actual costs are not fully documented, explained, or reviewed. According to DHS’s acquisition guidance, the program baseline is the contract between the program and departmental oversight officials and must be established at program start to document the program’s expected cost, deployment schedule, and technical performance. TSA officials stated that TSA is currently working with DHS to amend the draft program baseline for approval. Recommendation for Executive Action
In order to strengthen the credibility, comprehensiveness, and reliability of TSA’s cost estimates and related savings estimates for the EBSP, we recommend that the Administrator of TSA ensure that its life cycle cost estimates conform to cost estimating best practices. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
We examined the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) operation of the Electronic Baggage Screening Program (EBSP) to assess the program’s current status, alternative cost sharing options, and cost estimates. How would reducing the current federal cost share for eligible airport modification projects from 90 percent to its previous level of 75 percent affect the amount that TSA pays for these modifications, and what benefits, if any, do airports report receiving from in-line baggage screening systems? To determine the status of TSA’s efforts to install optimal checked baggage screening systems, we obtained data as of December 2011 and January 2012 from TSA, such as the current number of airports with at least one in-line system, and the number of airports with optimal systems. These projections represent TSA’s best estimate for how much it will spend on airport modifications for in-line systems each year from fiscal years 2012 through 2030. We chose these airports based on the size of airport, type of checked baggage screening systems installed, and status of airport facility modification completion. Specifically, we used best practices in the GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide to evaluate TSA’s estimating methodologies, assumptions, and results to assess whether the official cost estimates were comprehensive (i.e., includes all costs), accurate, well documented, and credible. | Why GAO Did This Study
TSAs EBSP, one of DHSs largest acquisition programs, aims to improve security and lower program life cycle costs by optimizing checked baggage screening systems that best meet the needs of the nations airports. This includes, among other things, the integration of baggage screening equipment into baggage handling systems, referred to as in-line systems. Installing in-line systems typically requires airports to undertake costly facility modification projects, for which TSA will generally reimburse up to the applicable federal cost share. As requested, GAO examined (1) the status of TSAs efforts to install optimal checked baggage screening systems in collaboration with airports, (2) how reducing the federal cost share for eligible airport modification projects from 90 percent to its previous level of 75 percent would affect the amount that TSA pays for modifications, and (3) whether TSAs methods for estimating and validating costs for the EBSP are consistent with best practices. GAO reviewed EBSP planning and status documents, compared TSAs cost estimation approach against GAO best practices, and visited 10 airports selected in part based on the status of the EBSP optimization at these airports. Although the results from these visits are not generalizable, they provided insights into the program.
What GAO Found
The Transportation Security Administrations (TSA) Electronic Baggage Screening Program (EBSP) reports that 76 percent of the airports (337 of 446) the agency regulates for security have a mix of in-line and stand-alone baggage screening configurations that best meet airport needs (i.e., optimal systems). However, only 36 percent (10 of 28) of the nations larger airportsbased on factors such as the total number of takeoffs and landings annuallyhave complete optimal systems. This is because the larger airports generally need more complex in-line systems and often require a significant amount of airport infrastructure modification and construction. In August 2011, TSA shifted its focus from installing optimal baggage screening systems to replacing aging machines (recapitalization). However, TSA plans to continue to optimize systems during many of its recapitalization projects.
Using TSA cost estimates, GAO estimates that reducing the portion of costs that TSA pays for facility modifications associated with the installation of optimal baggage screening systems, from 90 percent to 75 percent, would lower the federal governments cost for airport modification projects it supports by roughly $300 million from fiscal year 2012 through fiscal year 2030. Officials from all 10 airports with whom GAO spoke stated that airports benefit from the installation of integrated, in-line baggage screening systems. The primary benefitcited by representatives from 9 of the airports GAO visitedis that passenger congestion is reduced by removing stand-alone machines from lobbies or ticketing areas. Other benefits cited by airports included a reduction in lost baggage and increased screening and passenger throughput. However, for a variety of reasons, representatives from 8 of 10 airports GAO visited opposed a reduction in the federal cost share for related airport modifications.
TSA established cost estimates for the EBSP to help identify total program cost, recapitalization cost, and potential savings resulting from installing optimal systems, but its processes for developing these estimates do not fully comply with best practices. These include, among other things, ensuring that the estimates comprise all costs and are well documented. For example, TSAs estimates were properly adjusted for inflation and were developed using relevant data, such as existing contracts for equipment purchases and maintenance costs. However, the estimates did not include all costs, for example, the costs associated with detecting all security threats, and many assumptions and methodologies underlying the cost model were not clearly documented. As highlighted in GAOs past work, a high-quality, reliable cost estimation process provides a sound basis for making accurate and well-informed decisions about resource investments and budgets and thus is critical to the success of a program. Developing accurate cost estimates would help ensure that the program does not experience unanticipated cost growth and program funding needs resulting from future recapitalization and facility modification activities. In addition, TSA is working with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to develop an approved acquisition program baseline, which according to DHS guidance is the contract between program and departmental oversight officials for what will be delivered, how it will perform, and what it will cost. TSA expects the baseline to be approved in May 2012.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that TSA ensure that its life cycle cost estimates conform to cost estimating best practices. DHS concurred with GAOs recommendation. |
gao_T-HEHS-96-127 | gao_T-HEHS-96-127_0 | Many participants lack a high school diploma or have limited basic skills or English proficiency; have few, if any, marketable job skills; have a history of substance abuse; or have been victims of domestic violence. Three of the sites had placement rates above 90 percent—two placed virtually all those who completed their training. Ensuring Commitment to Training and Getting a Job
One important feature of these projects’ common strategy is ensuring that clients are committed to participating in training and getting a job. For example, all projects require clients to sign an agreement of commitment outlining the client’s responsibilities while in training and all projects monitor attendance throughout a client’s enrollment. Each project coaches students in employability skills through on-site workshops or one-on-one sessions. Linking Occupational Skills Training With the Local Labor Market
All the projects have strong links with the local labor market. Five of the six projects provide occupational skills training, using information from the local labor market to guide their selection of training options to offer clients. Project staff strive to ensure that the training they provide will lead to self-sufficiency—jobs with good earnings potential as well as benefits. This reputation leads employers to trust their referrals. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the merits of 6 highly successful employment training programs for economically disadvantaged adults.
What GAO Found
GAO found that the programs: (1) serve adults with little high school education, limited basic skills and English language proficiency, few marketable job skills, and past histories of substance abuse and domestic violence; (2) have a fairly successful placement rate, with three of the programs placing 90 percent of their clientele; (3) ensure that the clients are committed to training and getting a good job, and as a result, require them to sign an agreement of commitment outlining their responsibilities; (4) provide child care, transportation, and basic skills training to enable clients to complete program training and acquire employment; (5) improve their clients employability through on-site workshops and one-on-one sessions; (6) have strong links with the local labor market and use information from the local market to guide training options; and (7) aim to provide their clients with training that will lead to higher earnings, good benefits, and overall self-sufficiency. |
gao_GAO-06-249T | gao_GAO-06-249T_0 | These images, products, and models are all used by weather forecasters, the military, and the public. Figure 1 illustrates the current operational polar satellite configuration. The converged program, NPOESS, is considered critical to the United States’ ability to maintain the continuity of data required for weather forecasting and global climate monitoring through the year 2020. In addition, the NPOESS Preparatory Project (NPP), which is being developed as a major risk reduction and climate data continuity initiative, is a planned demonstration satellite to be launched several years before the first NPOESS satellite is to be launched. Before the contract was awarded in 2002, the life cycle cost estimate for the program was estimated to be $6.5 billion over the 24-year period from the inception of the program in 1995 through 2018. NPOESS has continued to experience problems in the development of a key sensor, resulting in schedule delays and anticipated cost increases. Regarding NPOESS schedule, the program office anticipated at least a 10-month delay in the launch of the first satellite (totaling at least a 17-month delay from the time the contract was awarded) and a 6-month delay in the launch of the second satellite. This is significant because if the last POES satellite fails on launch, it will be at least 3 years before the first NPOESS satellite could be launched. Adding our projected $1.4 billion overrun to the prior $8.1 billion life cycle cost estimate and the project office’s estimated need for $225 million in additional management costs brings the total life cycle cost of the program to about $9.7 billion. Given the history of large cost increases and the factors that could further affect NPOESS costs and schedules, continued oversight, strong leadership, and timely decision making are more critical than ever. Options for Moving Forward Are under Consideration, but Cost, Schedule, and Impact on Users Are Not Fully Understood
In August 2005, the program office briefed its Executive Committee on the program’s cost, schedule, and risks. New Options Under Consideration Would Affect Cost, Schedule, and System Users; Full Extent Unknown
Last week, we learned that in addition to the five options presented in August 2005, program executives are considering nine new options. Until a decision is made, the program remains without a plan for moving forward. Further, there are opportunity costs in not making a decision—that is, some options may no longer be viable, contractors are not working towards a chosen solution, and other potential options become more difficult to implement Clearly, timely decisions are needed to allow the program to move forward and for satellite data users to start planning for any data shortfalls they may experience. Over the last few years, it has been troubled by technical problems, cost increases, and schedule delays. Looking forward, technical challenges persist; costs are likely to grow; and schedule delays could lead to gaps in satellite coverage. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) discuss the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) program’s schedule, cost, trends, and risks and (2) describe plans and implications for moving the program forward. | Why GAO Did This Study
Polar-orbiting environmental satellites provide data and imagery that are used by weather forecasters, climatologists, and the military to map and monitor changes in weather, climate, the oceans, and the environment. Our nation's current operational polar-orbiting environmental satellite program is a complex infrastructure that includes two satellite systems, supporting ground stations, and four central data processing centers. In the future, the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) is to combine the two current systems into a single, state-of-the-art environment-monitoring satellite system. This new satellite system is considered critical to the United States' ability to maintain the continuity of data required for weather forecasting and global climate monitoring through the year 2020. GAO was asked to discuss the NPOESS program's schedule, cost, trends, and risks, and to describe plans and implications for moving the program forward.
What GAO Found
The NPOESS program has experienced continued schedule delays, cost increases, and technical challenges over the last several years. The schedule for the launch of the first satellite has been delayed by at least 17 months (until September 2010 at the earliest), and this delay could result in a gap in satellite coverage of at least 3 years if the last satellite in the prior series fails on launch. Program life cycle cost estimates have grown from $6.5 billion in 2002 to $8.1 billion in 2004 and are still growing. While the program is currently reassessing its life cycle cost estimates, our analysis of contractor trends as of September 2005 shows a likely $1.4 billion contract cost overrun--bringing the life cycle cost estimate to about $9.7 billion. Technical risks in developing key sensors continue, and could lead to further cost increases and schedule delays. As a result of expected program cost growth, the Executive Committee responsible for the program is evaluating options for moving the program forward--and new cost estimates for those options. Key options under consideration in August 2005 included removing a key sensor from the first satellite, delaying launches of the first two satellites, and not launching a preliminary risk-reduction satellite. All of these options impact the program's cost, schedules, and the system users who rely on satellite data to develop critical weather products and forecasts--although the full extent of that impact is not clear. Further, last week GAO was informed that there are nine new options now under consideration, and that they are likely to impact costs, schedules, and system users. Until a decision is made, the program remains without a plan for moving forward. Further, there are opportunity costs in not making a decision--some options are lost and others may become more difficult. Given the history of large cost increases and the factors that could further affect NPOESS costs and schedules, continued oversight, strong leadership, and timely decision making are more critical than ever. |
gao_GGD-98-6 | gao_GGD-98-6_0 | Based on discussions with congressional staff, our major objectives were to (1) identify why OFHEO has not finalized risk-based capital standards for the enterprises even though there was a December 1, 1994, deadline for doing so and (2) assess OFHEO’s implementation of its enterprises’ safety and soundness examination responsibility. Based on discussions with congressional staff, we established the following three objectives to assess OFHEO’s overall operations and its capacity to fulfill its safety and soundness mission: (1) identify the reasons that OFHEO did not complete the stress test and risk-based capital standards by December 1, 1994, (2) assess OFHEO’s implementation of its examination responsibilities, and (3) review the status of OFHEO’s implementation of key mission support functions and determine whether OFHEO’s participation in a U.S. government initiative to assist Mexico in developing a secondary mortgage market has had a material impact on OFHEO’s ability to fulfill its mission. OFHEO’s Development of a Stress Test and Risk-Based Capital Standards Has Been Protracted
The act required OFHEO to develop a stress test and risk-based capital standards as essential components of the organization’s mission to help ensure the safety and soundness of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Our review found that the delay in the ongoing development process had been caused primarily by (1) the complex challenges of developing the stress test as required by the act and (2) OFHEO officials’ decision in 1994 that the organization develop its own sophisticated stress test rather than adopting and modifying stress tests that were already under development. Given the importance of the risk-based capital standards, we believe it is essential that OFHEO complete the tasks remaining to develop those standards as expeditiously as possible. In particular, OFHEO officials must coordinate the interagency review process and make key policy decisions about the stress test. The evidence we obtained indicated that, among other factors, limited resources applied to the examination function were largely responsible for OFHEO’s inability to fully implement the 1994 examination plan. In the reassessment of its examination strategy, OFHEO could usefully include consideration of different examination cycles and related coverage that could be accomplished with alternative resource levels. Although OFHEO has completed or initiated examinations covering five of the six core risks, at its current rate it will take OFHEO 3 to 4 years to examine all six core risk areas, which is considerably longer than the 2-year cycle established in the 1994 plan. In particular, OFHEO has too few examiners and specialists to fully cover the six core risks within a 2-year period. According to OFHEO officials, the organization plans to reassess its examination strategy and to make changes as necessary to shorten the examination cycle from 3 to 4 years to 1 year. We are concerned that, without a reassessment of resources, OFHEO may not be able to implement an annual enterprise examination program that adequately covers all risk areas by early 1998. Thus far, OFHEO has not been able to implement a 2-year examination cycle that fully covers all identified risk areas with examination office resources currently assigned. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO assessed the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight's (OFHEO) capacity to fulfill its mission of helping to ensure the safety and soundness of the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), focusing on: (1) identifying the reasons why OFHEO has not issued final risk-based capital standards for the enterprises even though there was a December 1, 1994, deadline for doing so; and (2) OFHEO's implementation of its safety and soundness examination responsibilities.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) to fulfill its statutory safety and soundness mission, OFHEO is to establish risk-based capital standards that are sufficient to withstand the rigors of a complex stress test and implement a comprehensive and timely examination program; (2) to date, OFHEO has not fully completed either of these tasks; (3) OFHEO has not established the risk-based capital standards because it must first develop the stress test; (4) development of a stress test has been protracted primarily due to: (a) the complexity of the development process as specified in the act; and (b) OFHEO's decision in 1994 to develop its own sophisticated stress test rather than adopting and modifying stress tests that were already under development; (5) OFHEO has already missed its December 1994 statutory deadline for completing a stress test and establishing risk-based capital standards by almost 3 years; (6) tasks remaining include making key policy decisions about the stress test and continuing to translate its components into proposed and final rules; (7) GAO believes that it is essential that OFHEO complete the tasks remaining to develop those standards as expeditiously as possible; (8) OFHEO has not fully implemented a timely and comprehensive enterprise safety and soundness examination program; (9) OFHEO established an examination plan in September 1994 that provided for a 2-year cycle for the assessment of six core risks; (10) OFHEO's current 3- to 4-year cycle for assessing the six core risks is considerably longer than the 2-year cycle established in the plan; (11) GAO's analysis found that, among other factors, limited resources allocated to the examination office were largely responsible for OFHEO's inability to comply with the 1994 plan; (12) according to OFHEO officials, the organization plans to reassess its examination strategy and make changes necessary by early 1998 to ensure that its examination staff cover all six core risk areas within a 1-year period; (13) GAO believes that, without a reassessment, and potentially a reallocation of resources, OFHEO may not be able to implement an annual examination cycle by early 1998 that fully covers all risk areas, since the organization has been unable to implement a 2-year cycle with the current assignment of staff to the examination function; and (14) OFHEO could usefully include consideration of different examination cycles and related coverage that could be accomplished with alternative resource levels. |
gao_GAO-05-612 | gao_GAO-05-612_0 | Mercury Controls Have Not Been Permanently Installed at Power Plants but Are Available for Purchase and Have Shown Promising Results in Field Tests
Power plants in the United States do not currently use mercury controls, but some technologies are available for purchase and have shown promising results in full-scale tests in power plants. These tests have shown that mercury controls known as sorbent technologies—which involve injection of a powdered material that binds to mercury in the plant’s exhaust—have shown the greatest effectiveness in removing mercury during tests at power plants. However, long-term test data are limited because most of these tests have lasted less than 3 months. The coal-fired power industry has not used mercury controls because, prior to EPA’s March 2005 rule, federal law had not required mercury emissions reductions at power plants. EPA set the mercury emissions cap for 2010 based on a 50 percent reduction from the 75 tons in coal. Mercury Control Costs Depend on a Variety of Factors, and Current Estimates Vary Widely
The estimated costs to install and operate mercury controls vary greatly and depend on a number of site-specific factors, including the amount of sorbent used (if any), the ability of existing air pollution controls to remove mercury, and the type of coal burned. EPA and DOE have developed the most comprehensive estimates available for mercury controls based on modeling and data from a limited number of field tests, making them both preliminary and uncertain. Regardless of the exact costs of the controls, most of the stakeholders we contacted generally expect the costs to decrease over time. As noted above, EPA based its mercury reduction goals for 2010 to 2018 on the level of control it expects plants will achieve with controls for these other pollutants. Although the DOE and EPA estimates reflect different assumptions as discussed above, we are providing the two agencies’ cost estimates for achieving a 70 percent mercury reduction at a bituminous-fired coal power plant under two scenarios (using an existing electrostatic precipitator and installing a supplemental fabric filter) to provide a perspective on the costs power plants could incur to install sorbent injection technologies. Alternatively, if this plant were to install a supplemental fabric filter, the capital costs would increase to about $28.3 million ($56.53 per kilowatt), and the operating and maintenance costs would decrease to about $2.6 million annually ($0.74 per megawatt-hour). In EPA’s rulemaking documents, the agency said that in light of the more recent tests of chemically enhanced sorbents, their earlier estimates likely overstated the actual costs power plants would incur. For a 500- megawatt plant operating at 80 percent capacity, this would equate to $45 million to $60 million in capital costs and $6.0 million to $8.3 million in annual operating and maintenance costs. According to EPA and DOE officials, the most recent test results of injected sorbent technologies suggest that the cost of using these technologies will be less than these agencies estimated in 2003, stemming from advances in the sorbents. DOE reviewed the report and said that it generally agreed with our findings. EPA’s Office of Air and Radiation and Office of Research and Development provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Congressional requesters asked us to (1) describe the use, availability, and effectiveness of technologies to reduce mercury emissions at power plants; and (2) identify the factors that influence the cost of these technologies and report on available cost estimates. We did not independently test these technologies. We also obtained data on mercury emissions. EPA’s mercury rule requires mercury emissions monitoring and quarterly reporting of mercury emissions data. Environmental Protection Agency. Department of Energy. | Why GAO Did This Study
In March 2005, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issued a rule that will limit emissions of mercury--a toxic element that causes neurological problems--from coal-fired power plants, the nation's largest industrial source of mercury emissions. Under the rule, mercury emissions are to be reduced from a baseline of 48 tons per year to 38 tons in 2010 and to 15 tons in 2018. In the rule, EPA set the emissions target for 2010 based on the level of reductions achievable with technologies for controlling other pollutants--which also capture some mercury--because it believed emerging mercury controls had not been adequately demonstrated. EPA and the Department of Energy (DOE) coordinate research on mercury controls. In this context, GAO was asked to (1) describe the use, availability, and effectiveness of technologies to reduce mercury emissions at power plants; and (2) identify the factors that influence the cost of these technologies and report on available cost estimates. In completing our review, GAO did not independently test mercury controls. GAO provided the draft report to DOE and EPA for comment. DOE said that it generally agreed with our findings. EPA provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
Mercury controls have not been permanently installed at power plants because, prior to the March 2005 mercury rule, federal law had not required this industry to control mercury emissions; however, some technologies are available for purchase and have shown promising results in field tests. Overall, the most extensive tests have been conducted on technologies using sorbents--substances that bind to mercury when injected into a plant's exhaust. Tests of sorbents lasting from several hours to several months have yielded average mercury emission reductions of 30-95 percent, with results varying depending on the type of coal used and other factors, according to DOE and other stakeholders we surveyed. Further, the most recent tests have shown that the effectiveness of sorbents in removing mercury has improved over time. Nonetheless, long-term test data are limited because most tests at power plants during normal operations have lasted less than 3 months. The cost of mercury controls largely depends on several site-specific factors, such as the ability of existing air pollution controls to remove mercury. As a result, the available cost estimates vary widely. Based on modeling and data from a limited number of field tests, EPA and DOE have developed preliminary cost estimates for mercury control technologies, focusing on sorbents. For example, DOE estimated that using sorbent injection to achieve a 70-percent reduction in mercury emissions would cost a medium-sized power plant $984,000 in capital costs and $3.4 million in annual operating and maintenance costs. If this plant did not have an existing fabric filter and chose to install one--an option a plant might pursue to increase the efficiency of mercury removal and reduce related costs--capital costs would increase to about $28.3 million, while annual operating and maintenance costs would decrease to about $2.6 million. Most stakeholders generally expect costs to decrease as a market develops for the control technologies and as plants gain more experience using them. Furthermore, EPA officials said that recent tests of chemically enhanced sorbents lead the agency to believe that its earlier cost estimates likely overstated the actual cost power plants would incur. |
gao_GAO-11-829T | gao_GAO-11-829T_0 | We have also identified technologies that DHS has deployed that have not met key performance requirements. For example, in June 2010, we reported that over half of the 15 DHS programs we reviewed awarded contracts to initiate acquisition activities without component or department approval of documents essential to planning acquisitions, setting operational requirements, and establishing acquisition program baselines. In addition, our past work has found that DHS faces challenges in identifying and meeting program requirements in a number of its programs. DHS Has Encountered Challenges in Conducting and Completing Testing and Evaluation
Our prior work has also identified that failure to resolve problems discovered during testing can sometimes lead to costly redesign and rework at a later date and that addressing such problems during the testing and evaluation phase before moving to the acquisition phase can help agencies avoid future cost overruns. Specifically: In March 2011, we reported that the independent testing and evaluation of SBInet’s Block 1 capability to determine its operational effectiveness and suitability was not complete at the time DHS reached its decision regarding the future of SBInet or requested fiscal year 2012 funding to deploy the new Alternative (Southwest) Border Technology. In September 2010, we reported that S&T’s plans for conducting operational testing of container security technologies did not reflect all of the operational scenarios that CBP was considering for implementation. In October 2009, we reported that TSA deployed explosives trace portals, a technology for detecting traces of explosives on passengers at airport checkpoints, even though TSA officials were aware that tests conducted during 2004 and 2005 on earlier models of the portals suggested the portals did not demonstrate reliable performance in an airport environment. TSA also lacked assurance that the portals would meet functional requirements in airports within estimated costs and the machines were more expensive to install and maintain than expected. In June 2006, TSA halted deployment of the explosives trace portals because of performance problems and high installation costs. DHS Has Not Consistently Incorporated Information on Costs and Benefits in Making Acquisition Decisions
Our prior work has shown that cost-benefit analyses help congressional and agency decision makers assess and prioritize resource investments and consider potentially more cost-effective alternatives and that without this ability, agencies are at risk of experiencing cost overruns, missed deadlines, and performance shortfalls. For example, we have reported that DHS has not consistently included these analyses in its acquisition decision making. Specifically: In March 2011, we reported that the decision by the Secretary of Homeland Security to end the SBInet program was informed by, among other things, an independent analysis of cost-effectiveness. However, it was not clear how DHS used the results to determine the appropriate technology plans and budget decisions, especially since the results of SBInet’s operational effectiveness were not complete at the time of the Secretary’s decision to end the program. Furthermore, the cost analysis was limited in scope and did not consider all technology solutions because of the need to complete the first phase of the analysis in 6 weeks. In October 2009, we reported that TSA had not yet completed a cost- benefit analysis to prioritize and fund its technology investments for screening passengers at airport checkpoints. One reason that TSA had difficulty developing a cost-benefit analysis was that it had not yet developed life-cycle cost estimates for its various screening technologies. In June 2009, we reported that DHS’s cost analysis of the Advanced Spectroscopic Portal (ASP) program did not provide a sound analytical basis for DHS’s decision to deploy the portals. Department of Homeland Security: Assessments of Selected Complex Acquisitions. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses our past work examining the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) progress and challenges in developing and acquiring new technologies to address homeland security needs. DHS acquisition programs represent hundreds of billions of dollars in life-cycle costs and support a wide range of missions and investments including border surveillance and screening equipment, nuclear detection equipment, and technologies used to screen airline passengers and baggage for explosives, among others. Since its creation in 2003, DHS has spent billions of dollars developing and procuring technologies and other countermeasures to address various threats and to conduct its missions. Within DHS, the Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) conducts general research and development and oversees the testing and evaluation efforts of DHS components, which are responsible for developing, testing, and acquiring their own technologies. This testimony focuses on the findings of our prior work related to DHS's efforts to acquire and deploy new technologies to address homeland security needs. Our past work has identified three key challenges: (1) developing technology program requirements, (2) conducting and completing testing and evaluation of technologies and (3) incorporating information on costs and benefits in making technology acquisition decisions. This statement will also discuss recent DHS efforts to strengthen its investment and acquisition processes.
What GAO Found
We have identified technologies that DHS has deployed that have not met key performance requirements. For example, in June 2010, we reported that over half of the 15 DHS programs we reviewed awarded contracts to initiate acquisition activities without component or department approval of documents essential to planning acquisitions, setting operational requirements, and establishing acquisition program baselines. Our prior work has also identified that failure to resolve problems discovered during testing can sometimes lead to costly redesign and rework at a later date and that addressing such problems during the testing and evaluation phase before moving to the acquisition phase can help agencies avoid future cost overruns. Specifically: (1) In March 2011, we reported that the independent testing and evaluation of SBInet's Block 1 capability to determine its operational effectiveness and suitability was not complete at the time DHS reached its decision regarding the future of SBInet or requested fiscal year 2012 funding to deploy the new Alternative (Southwest) Border Technology. (2) In September 2010, we reported that S&T's plans for conducting operational testing of container security technologies did not reflect all of the operational scenarios that CBP was considering for implementation. (3) In October 2009, we reported that TSA deployed explosives trace portals, a technology for detecting traces of explosives on passengers at airport checkpoints, even though TSA officials were aware that tests conducted during 2004 and 2005 on earlier models of the portals suggested the portals did not demonstrate reliable performance in an airport environment. TSA also lacked assurance that the portals would meet functional requirements in airports within estimated costs and the machines were more expensive to install and maintain than expected. In June 2006, TSA halted deployment of the explosives trace portals because of performance problems and high installation costs. Our prior work has shown that cost-benefit analyses help congressional and agency decision makers assess and prioritize resource investments and consider potentially more cost-effective alternatives and that without this ability, agencies are at risk of experiencing cost overruns, missed deadlines, and performance shortfalls. For example, we have reported that DHS has not consistently included these analyses in its acquisition decision making. Specifically: (1) In March 2011, we reported that the decision by the Secretary of Homeland Security to end the SBInet program was informed by, among other things, an independent analysis of cost-effectiveness. However, it was not clear how DHS used the results to determine the appropriate technology plans and budget decisions, especially since the results of SBInet's operational effectiveness were not complete at the time of the Secretary's decision to end the program. Furthermore, the cost analysis was limited in scope and did not consider all technology solutions because of the need to complete the first phase of the analysis in 6 weeks. (2) In October 2009, we reported that TSA had not yet completed a cost-benefit analysis to prioritize and fund its technology investments for screening passengers at airport checkpoints. One reason that TSA had difficulty developing a cost-benefit analysis was that it had not yet developed life-cycle cost estimates for its various screening technologies. (3) In June 2009, we reported that DHS's cost analysis of the Advanced Spectroscopic Portal (ASP) program did not provide a sound analytical basis for DHS's decision to deploy the portals. |
gao_HEHS-99-21 | gao_HEHS-99-21_0 | Labor Has Implemented a Program to Verify Wage Data
In response to the House Appropriations Committee’s directive and our recommendation, Labor has implemented a program to verify wage survey data submitted by construction contractors and interested third parties, such as contractor associations and trade unions. To verify these data, Labor established procedures to select samples of wage data forms for telephone verification that differ depending on the entity that submitted the form. In addition, Labor has hired a private accounting firm to conduct on-site verification reviews. In both the telephone and on-site verification process, all data—regardless of which party submitted them—are verified only with the contractors. 4). Verification Will Have Limited Impact on Accuracy of Prevailing Wage Determinations and Will Reduce Timeliness
Verification efforts conducted to date will have a limited impact on the accuracy of prevailing wage rate determinations and will increase the time required to issue them. Errors Identified, but Impact on Accuracy of Wage Determinations Is Limited
Although Labor has identified and corrected numerous errors in the wage data submitted, it has been able to correct only the limited number of wage data forms verified. As a result, even though we found that errors the auditors identified in all nine area surveys averaged 76 cents per hour, Labor officials estimate that the changes to wage determinations will amount to an average of 10 cents per hour. Furthermore, both the Committee directive to use a random sample of wage data forms to select wage data for verification and the procedures Labor uses to implement the directive also limit the extent to which errors found will improve the accuracy of wage determinations. Labor assumes that data from contractors that are unable to provide or refuse access to supporting documentation are correct by including them in the wage rate calculations. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The House Committee on Appropriations in its reports on appropriations for the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education and related agencies for fiscal years 1998 and 1999 asked us to (1) review the Department of Labor’s efforts to verify a random sample of employers’ wage data submissions and select a sample of submissions for on-site data verification and (2) determine the likely effect of these efforts on the accuracy and timeliness of Davis-Bacon wage determinations. These data include the following: all available WHD preliminary analyses (forms WD-22) for all wage surveys sent to the contractor for verification for the 18-month period from the beginning of on-site verification in April 1997 through September 1998; all preliminary and final reports completed by the accounting firm for on-site audits as of September 30, 1998; and electronic records of wage data forms (forms WD-10) maintained by WHD under contract with Computer Data Systems, Inc., concerning the area surveys for which the accounting firm had issued final reports for on-site verification. 2). | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the: (1) Department of Labor's response to the House Appropriations Committee's directive that it verify a random sample of employers' wage data submissions and select a sample of submissions for on-site data verification; and (2) likely effect of these efforts on the accuracy and timeliness of Davis-Bacon Act wage determinations.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) in response to a Committee directive and GAO's recommendation, Labor has implemented a program to verify wage survey data submitted on standardized wage data forms by construction contractors and interested third parties, such as contractor associations and trade unions; (2) to verify these data, Labor has developed procedures to select samples of these forms for telephone verification that differ depending on whether the forms are submitted by contractors or third parties; (3) in addition, Labor has hired a private accounting firm to conduct on-site verification reviews; (4) as of September 30, 1998, the accounting firm had issued final reports for 9 of the 85 geographic area surveys scheduled for audit from April 1997 to June 1998 and had identified errors in wages reported in about 70 percent of the wage data forms reviewed; (5) in both the telephone and on-site verification processes, all data--regardless of the entity that submitted them--are verified only with the contractors; (6) even though Labor has identified and corrected numerous errors in the wage data submitted, its verification efforts will have limited impact on the accuracy of the wage determinations and will increase the time required to issue them; (7) specifically, errors the accounting firm identified and corrected in all nine area surveys averaged 76 cents per hour; (8) but, because Labor was only able to correct the limited number of wage data forms verified, which contain a small portion of the wage rates submitted, on average, changes to these wage determinations will be less than 10 cents per hour, according to Labor officials' estimates; (9) the extent to which correcting the errors found through verification will improve the accuracy of wage determinations is limited by: (a) the Committee directive to use a random sample of wage data forms for verification, given the characteristics of the wage data with respect to the universe being sampled; and (b) the procedures Labor uses to implement this directive; (10) for example, in its procedures, Labor assumes that data from contractors that refuse access to supporting documentation are correct and includes the wages in calculating wage determinations; and (11) while the time needed for verification reduced timeliness of wage determinations, telephone verification added less time to the process than did on-site verification--an estimated average of 2 weeks as compared with an average of 211 days for the 30 area surveys for which the auditor completed preliminary reports. |
gao_GAO-08-729T | gao_GAO-08-729T_0 | In a 1997 interim rule, the former U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) reduced the number of acceptable work eligibility documents from 29 to 27. As of April 2008, more than 61,000 employers have registered to use the program, about 28,000 of whom were active users, according to USCIS. If participation in the E-Verify program were made mandatory, the program would have to accommodate all of the estimated 7.4 million employers in the United States. USCIS has developed cost and staffing estimates for operating a mandatory E-Verify program. Although DHS has not prepared official cost figures, USCIS officials estimated that a mandatory E-Verify program could cost a total of about $765 million for fiscal years 2009 through 2012 if only newly hired employees are queried through the program and about $838 million over the same 4-year period if both newly hired and current employees are queried. Mandatory implementation of E-Verify would also require additional USCIS staff to administer the program, but USCIS was not yet able to provide estimates for its staffing needs. SSA has estimated that implementation of a mandatory E-Verify program would cost a total of about $281 million for fiscal years 2009 through 2013 and require hiring 700 new employees for a total of 2,325 additional workyears over the same 5-year period. USCIS and SSA Are Implementing Plans to Reduce Delays and Improve Efficiency in the E-Verify Process
In prior work, we reported that secondary verifications lengthen the time needed to complete the employment verification process. The majority of E-Verify queries entered by employers—about 92 percent—confirm the employee is authorized to work within seconds. With regard to the SSA tentative nonconfirmations, USCIS officials told us that the majority of erroneous tentative nonconfirmations occur because employees’ citizenship status or other information, such as name changes, is not up to date in the SSA database, generally because individuals have not notified SSA of information changes that occurred. If the employee’s information matched information in DHS’s databases and the databases showed that the person was a naturalized U.S. citizen, E-Verify would confirm the employee as work authorized. In addition USCIS and SSA are exploring options for updating SSA records with naturalization information from DHS records. Although this could help to further reduce the number of SSA tentative nonconfirmations, USCIS and SSA are still in the planning stages, and implementation of this initiative may require significant policy and technical considerations, such as how to link records in SSA and DHS databases that are stored according to different identifiers. These efforts may help improve the efficiency of the verification process. USCIS has Identified Areas where E-Verify is Vulnerable to Fraud, but Proposed Actions Do Not Address All Types of Fraud and Raise Privacy Concerns
In our prior work, we reported that E-Verify enhances the ability of participating employers to reliably verify their employees’ work eligibility. However, the current E-Verify program cannot help employers detect forms of identity fraud, such as cases in which an individual presents genuine documents that are borrowed or stolen because the system will verify an employee when the information entered matches DHS and SSA records, even if the information belongs to another person. The use of the photograph screening tool is currently limited because newly hired employees who are queried through the E-Verify system and present documentation other than green cards or employment authorization documents to verify work eligibility—about 95 percent of E- Verify queries—are not subject to the tool. Expansion of the photograph screening tool would require incorporating other forms of documentation with related databases that store photographic information, such as passports issued by the Department of State and driver’s licenses issued by states. USCIS reported that it is working to address these issues by, for example, conducting education and outreach activities about the E-Verify program. USCIS and ICE are also negotiating an MOU to define roles, responsibilities, and mechanisms for sharing and using E-Verify information. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 1996, the former U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, now within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Social Security Administration (SSA) began operating a voluntary pilot program, recently named the E-Verify program, to provide participating employers with a means for electronically verifying employees' work eligibility. Legislation has been introduced in Congress to require all employers to electronically verify the work authorization status of their employees. In this testimony GAO provides observations on the E-Verify system's capacity and costs, options for reducing delays and improving efficiency in the verification process, ability to detect fraudulent documents and identity theft, and vulnerability to employer fraud and misuse. This testimony is based on GAO's products issued from August 2005 through June 2007 and updated information obtained from DHS and SSA in April 2008. We analyzed data on employer use, E-Verify guidance, and other reports on the employment verification process, as well as legislative proposals and regulations.
What GAO Found
A mandatory E-Verify program would necessitate an increased capacity at both U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and SSA to accommodate the estimated 7.4 million employers in the United States. According to USCIS, as of April 2008, more than 61,000 employers have registered for E-Verify, and about half are active users. Although DHS has not prepared official cost figures, USCIS officials estimated that a mandatory E-Verify program could cost a total of about $765 million for fiscal years 2009 through 2012 if only newly hired employees are queried through the program and about $838 million over the same 4-year period if both newly hired and current employees are queried. USCIS has estimated that it would need additional staff for a mandatory E-Verify program, but was not yet able to provide estimates for its staffing needs. SSA has estimated that implementation of a mandatory E-Verify program would cost a total of about $281 million and require hiring 700 new employees for a total of 2,325 additional workyears for fiscal years 2009 through 2013. USCIS and SSA are exploring options to reduce delays and improve efficiency in the E-Verify process. The majority of E-Verify queries entered by employers--about 92 percent--confirm within seconds that the employee is work-authorized. About 7 percent of the queries cannot be immediately confirmed as work authorized by SSA, and about 1 percent cannot be immediately confirmed as work authorized by USCIS because employees' information queried through the system does not match information in SSA or DHS databases. The majority of SSA erroneous tentative nonconfirmations occur because employees' citizenship or other information, such as name changes, is not up to date in the SSA database, generally because individuals do not request that SSA make these updates. USCIS and SSA are planning to implement initiatives to help address these weaknesses and reduce delays. E-Verify may help employers detect fraudulent documents thereby reducing such fraud, but it cannot yet fully address identity fraud issues, for example when employees present genuine documents that may be stolen. USCIS has added a photograph screening tool to E-Verify through which an employer verifies the authenticity of certain documents, such as an employment authorization document, by matching the photograph on the document with the photograph in DHS databases. USCIS is exploring options to expand this tool to include other forms of documentation, such as passports, with databases that store photographic information, but these efforts are in the planning stages and require decisions about data sharing and privacy issues. E-Verify is vulnerable to acts of employer fraud and misuse, such as employers limiting employees' pay during the E-Verify process. USCIS has established a branch to review employers' use of E-Verify. In addition, information suggesting employers' fraud or misuse can be useful to U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) in targeting worksite enforcement resources. USCIS and ICE are negotiating a memorandum of understanding to define roles and responsibilities for sharing information. |
gao_GAO-14-293 | gao_GAO-14-293_0 | NRC officials said that a new round of security In September 2012, medical facilities we visited, NRC’s requirements did not consistently ensure the security of high-risk radiological sources. Challenges Exist in Reducing Security Risks for Different Types of Industrial Radiological Sources
Challenges exist in reducing the security risks faced by licensees using high-risk industrial radiological sources, even when they follow NRC’s security controls. Specifically, licensees face challenges, in (1) securing mobile and stationary sources and (2) protecting against an insider threat. Mobile Industrial Sources
The portability of some industrial radiological sources makes them susceptible to theft or loss. The most common mobile source, iridium-192, is contained inside a small device called a radiography camera. Licensees Face Challenges Protecting Against an Insider Threat
Licensees of mobile and stationary radiological sources face challenges in determining which of their employees are suitable for trustworthiness and reliability (T&R) certification, as required by NRC’s security controls.Such certification allows for unescorted access to high-risk radiological sources. Federal Agencies Are Taking Steps to Improve Security of Radiological Sources but Are Not Always Effectively Collaborating
Federal agencies are taking steps to better secure industrial radiological sources. NNSA Efforts to Address Security Risks Posed by Industrial Radiological Sources
NNSA has two initiatives under way to address security risks posed by industrial radiological sources: (1) testing and developing tracking technology for mobile sources, and (2) upgrading the physical security of industrial facilities. Our previous work has identified that when responsibilities cut across more than one federal agency—as they do for securing industrial radiological sources—it is important for agencies to work collaboratively. Taking into account the nation’s long-range fiscal challenges, we noted that the federal government must identify ways to deliver results more efficiently and in a way that is consistent with its multiple demands and limited resources. During this review, we found that the agencies involved in securing radiological sources—DHS, NNSA, and NRC—meet quarterly, along with the FBI, for “trilateral” meetings that include, among other things, discussions of radiological security. However, these meetings did not help DHS, NNSA, and NRC collaborate and draw on each agency’s expertise during research, development, and testing of new technology for a mobile source tracking device. It is unclear whether two cases where employees were granted unescorted access, even though each had extensive criminal histories— including, in one of the cases, convictions for terroristic threats— represent isolated incidents or a systemic weakness in the T&R process. Without an assessment by NRC, the agency may not have “reasonable assurance” that the process in place to make access decisions is as robust as it needs to be to prevent the theft or diversion of high-risk radiological sources by a determined insider. However, DHS, NRC, and NNSA have missed the opportunity to leverage resources, including expertise, in developing a new technology to track radiological sources, which could aid in the timely recovery of a lost or stolen radiological source and support the agencies’ common mission. To ensure that the security of radiological sources at industrial facilities is reasonably assured, we recommend that the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission take the following three actions:
Obtain the views of key stakeholders, such as licensees, during the development of the Best Practices Guide to ensure that the guide contains the most relevant and useful information on securing the highest risk radiological sources. Conduct an assessment of the T&R process—by which licensees approve employees for unescorted access—to determine if it provides reasonable assurance against insider threats, including determining why criminal history information concerning convictions for terroristic threats was not provided to a licensee during the T&R process to establish if this represents an isolated case or a systemic weakness in the T&R process; and revising, to the extent permitted by law, the T&R process to provide specific guidance to licensees on how to review a employee’s background. To better leverage resources, including expertise, to address vulnerabilities associated with radiological sources while in transit, we recommend that the Administrator of NNSA, the Chairman of NRC, and the Secretary of DHS review their existing collaboration mechanism for opportunities to enhance collaboration, especially in the development and implementation of new technologies. NRC generally agreed with our four recommendations, and NNSA agreed with the one recommendation directed to it to enhance collaboration with other federal agencies on the development and implementation of new technologies. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2012, GAO identified security weaknesses at U.S. medical facilities that use high-risk radiological sources, such as cesium-137. This report addresses potential security risks with such sources in the industrial sector. Radioactive material is typically sealed in a metal capsule called a sealed source. In the hands of a terrorist, this radioactive material could be used to construct a “dirty bomb.” NRC is responsible for licensing and regulating the commercial use of radiological sources. NNSA provides voluntary security upgrades to facilities with such sources. GAO was asked to review the security of sources at industrial facilities. This report examines (1) the challenges in reducing security risks posed by industrial radiological sources and (2) the steps federal agencies are taking to improve security of the sources. GAO reviewed relevant laws, regulations, and guidance; interviewed federal agency and state officials; and visited 33 of about 1,400 U.S. industrial facilities selected based on, among other things, geographic location and type of device using the radiological source.
What GAO Found
GAO found that challenges exist in reducing the security risks faced by licensees using high-risk industrial radiological sources. Specifically, licensees face challenges in (1) securing mobile and stationary sources and (2) protecting against an insider threat. Regarding mobile sources, their portability makes them susceptible to theft or loss, as the size of some of these sources is small enough for them to be easily concealed. The most common mobile source is contained in a device called a radiography camera. GAO identified four incidents from 2006 to 2012 where such cameras that use high-risk sources to test pipeline welds were stolen. These thefts occurred even though the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has established increased security controls. Licensees also face challenges in determining which employees are suitable for trustworthiness and reliability (T&R) certification to have unescorted access to high-risk radiological sources. GAO found two cases where employees were granted unescorted access, even though each had extensive criminal histories, and one had been convicted for terroristic threats, which include a range of violent threats. In this case, NRC said that the person was convicted not of a threat against the United States, but of making violent verbal threats against two individuals. It is unclear whether these cases represent isolated incidents or a systemic weakness in the T&R process established by NRC. Without an assessment of the process, NRC may not have reasonable assurance that access decisions made by licensees can prevent threats to high-risk radiological sources, particularly by a determined insider.
Federal agencies responsible for securing radiological sources—including NRC, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)—have taken steps to improve the security of industrial radiological sources. For example, NRC is developing a best practices guide that is expected to provide licensees with practical information about how to secure their sources. Also, NNSA is developing new technology that would, if successful, improve tracking of radiological sources while in transit. However, GAO found that although the agencies have been meeting quarterly to discuss, among other things, radiological security, this mechanism did not always help them collaborate and draw on each agency's expertise during research, development, and testing of a new technology for a mobile source tracking device. By not collaborating consistently, the agencies have missed opportunities to leverage resources and expertise in developing this new technology to track radiological sources. This technology could aid in the timely recovery of a lost or stolen radiological source and support the agencies' common mission. As GAO has previously reported, when responsibilities cut across more than one federal agency—as they do for securing industrial radiological sources—it is important for agencies to work collaboratively to deliver results more efficiently and in a way that is consistent with the federal government's multiple demands and limited resources.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends, among other things, that NRC assess the T&R process to determine if it provides reasonable assurance against insider threats. In addition, GAO recommends that NNSA, NRC, and DHS review their collaboration mechanism for opportunities to enhance it, especially in the development of new technologies. NRC generally agreed with GAO's recommendations, and NNSA agreed with the one recommendation directed to it. DHS did not comment on the report. |
gao_GAO-16-450 | gao_GAO-16-450_0 | DLA’s Management of Supply, Storage, and Distribution Functions at DOD’s Industrial Sites
As a result of the 2005 BRAC round and a June 2005 administrative decision by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, the services were required to transfer to DLA all of their supply, storage, and distribution functions at depot-level industrial sites. Specifically, over a five-year period between January 2010 and April 2015, DLA data shows that the ALCs experienced a 20 percent reduction in on-hand inventory while also reducing backorders by 10 percent, and reducing the number of end items awaiting parts by 20 percent. Officials also expressed concern over losing visibility of retail inventory if DLA is allowed to manage retail warehouses. Congress, in the House Report accompanying a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, mandated the Secretary of Defense conduct an assessment of the roles and missions of DLA. DLA and the Services Have Adopted Metrics Assessing Customer Service, but Do Not Have Metrics Needed to More Effectively and Efficiently Manage Operations
DLA and the services have adopted and review customer service metrics that measure the timely availability of spare parts for depot maintenance operations, but do not have metrics that allow them to fully assess the effectiveness and efficiency of supply operations. However, while DLA and the services have some internal efficiency measures, they generally have not adopted metrics that measure the accuracy of planning factors that are necessary to plan efficient and effective support of depot maintenance. Additionally, the services and DLA do not track the potentially significant costs created by a backorder (i.e., disruption costs) to supply and depot maintenance operations, which may prevent DLA and the services from optimizing supply and maintenance operations and may improve the efficiency and effectiveness of depot maintenance. Ultimately, the costs of inaccurate planning factors are both excess inventory and backorders. DOD actions in response to the 2005 BRAC recommendation to transfer supply, storage, and distribution functions at these sites from the services to DLA have had some positive effects at the Air Force ALCs and the Navy FRCs, but the services could take additional steps to ensure they realize the possible benefits of further transfers of retail functions. Without conducting business case analyses that, among other things, draw on lessons learned from the experiences at the ALCs and FRCs—as well as the failed implementation at Norfolk Naval Shipyard—the Army and Marine Corps depots and Navy shipyards are not positioned to know what could be gained by further transferring retail functions to DLA and the department is unable to determine the degree to which the retail supply functions should be transferred to DLA. Recommendations for Executive Action
To increase department-wide supply chain efficiencies and effectiveness in support of maintenance at the Army and Marine Corps depots and Navy shipyards, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness, in conjunction with the Director, Defense Logistics Agency, and the Secretaries of the Army and Navy and the Commandant of the Marine Corps to take the following two actions: assess through a comprehensive business case analysis–drawing on lessons learned from previous efforts–the costs and benefits of DLA managing the retail supply, storage, and distribution functions at the Army and Marine Corps depots and Navy shipyards; and use the analysis to make a decision on the degree to which DLA should manage these functions at the Army and Marine Corps depots and Navy shipyards. In written comments, DOD concurred with our six recommendations. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To assess the extent to which the services transferred retail supply, storage, and distribution functions at Department of Defense (DOD) industrial sites to the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), and whether the results have been used to inform future efforts, we reviewed Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), DLA, and service guidance, and documentation related to retail inventory management at service industrial sites; we conducted interviews with officials from OSD, DLA, service materiel commands, and service industrial sites; and, visited 7 of 17 service industrial sites to observe maintenance operations and retail inventory processes. This could reflect the “growing pains” of transitioning to IMSP, as Air Force Air Logistics Complex (ALC) officials noted that it took them more than 2 years to work through the initial implementation challenges of fully transferring the retail supply function to DLA’s information systems and processes. 2 requires the use of collaboration to improve the accuracy of forecasts. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD manages approximately $97 billion of inventory. To enhance efficiency and effectiveness, the 2005 base realignment and closure round and a June 2005 decision by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics required the military services to transfer to DLA all of their retail inventory supply, storage, and distribution functions at most depot-level industrial sites.
Senate Report 114-49, accompanying a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, included a provision for GAO to examine DLA's supply support to DOD industrial sites.
This report evaluates the extent to which (1) the services have transferred retail supply, storage, and distribution functions at DOD industrial sites to DLA, and whether the results have been used to inform future efforts, and (2) DLA and the services have adopted metrics that allow them to effectively and efficiently manage supply and maintenance operations. GAO reviewed DOD, DLA, and service guidance and documentation; evaluated DLA and service processes; and interviewed officials.
What GAO Found
The military services have, to varying degrees, transferred retail supply, storage, and distribution functions at their depot-level industrial sites to the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) and achieved some efficiencies, but have not fully assessed the costs and benefits of transferring more retail functions to DLA at Army and Marine Corps depots and Navy shipyards. Specifically, Air Force Air Logistics Complexes (ALC) and Navy Fleet Readiness Centers (FRC) transferred all retail supply, storage, and distribution functions to DLA over the course of several years. For example, according to officials and GAO's assessment, these changes have led to a number of benefits, including a 20 percent reduction in on-hand inventory and a 10 percent reduction in backorders at the Air Force ALCs over a 5-year period (see figure for examples of benefits).
By contrast, the Army and Marine Corps have retained most supply functions at their depots and DLA manages inventory at the Navy shipyards while still using Navy systems and processes, rather than those of DLA. The Navy and DLA began to transition to DLA business processes and systems at Norfolk Naval Shipyard in 2012, but the Navy reversed course after 7 months when it resulted in increased waits for inventory and work stoppages. Meanwhile, DLA is pursuing limited steps to improve retail supply, storage, and distribution functions at the industrial sites to improve supply support and overcome service concerns. However, the Department of Defense (DOD), DLA, Army, Navy shipyards, and the Marine Corps have not conducted business case analyses on the benefit of additional transfers of retail functions, though the Army is planning to conduct one. Without such analyses, decision makers will not be positioned to ensure that further transfers of retail functions, if warranted, are efficient and effective.
DOD, DLA and the services have some internal efficiency measures, but they generally do not have metrics that would allow for more effective and efficient management of supply and maintenance operations. Specifically, DOD, the services and DLA have not adopted metrics on the accuracy of planning factors, such as the accuracy of part lists, or the costs created by backorders. Officials noted that accurate planning factors improve demand forecasts needed to minimize backorders and excess inventory. Without relevant metrics on cost and planning factors, DOD, DLA and the services will be unable to optimize supply and maintenance operations and may miss opportunities to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of depot maintenance.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making six recommendations including that DLA, the Army, Navy shipyards, and Marine Corps conduct business case analyses, drawing on lessons learned, to determine if further transfer of retail functions is warranted, and that DOD, DLA, and the services develop metrics to monitor costs and accuracy of demand planning factors. DOD concurs with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-02-29 | gao_GAO-02-29_0 | We also reviewed the auditors’ workpapers for the 24 CFO Act agencies to assess the nature and extent of FFMIA testing. Auditors for 19 of the 24 CFO Act agencies reported that for fiscal year 2000, the agencies’ systems did not comply substantially with one or more FFMIA requirements—federal systems requirements, federal accounting standards, or the SGL. 01-02, these auditors are not saying that the systems are in substantial compliance, but that the results of their tests disclosed no instances in which the agencies’ systems did not substantially comply with FFMIA. Nonintegrated Financial Management Systems
One of the federal financial management systems requirements is that agencies’ financial management systems be integrated. The CFO Act calls for agencies to develop and maintain an integrated accounting and financial management system that complies with federal systems requirements and provides for (1) complete, reliable, consistent, and timely information that responds to the financial information needs of the agency and facilitates the systematic measurement of performance; (2) the development and reporting of cost information; and (3) the integration of accounting, budgeting, and program information. Many of these officials agree that a key to improving financial management and complying with FFMIA is to have an integrated financial system that provides reliable, useful, and timely information that managers can use for day-to-day operations. Of the 21 agencies whose systems were reported to be noncompliant with FFMIA in fiscal year 1999, 16 prepared remediation plans. The plans would be further enhanced by including intermediate target dates. | What GAO Found
Effective management of the government's day-to-day operations has been hampered by a lack of necessary data. The Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act of 1990 calls for the modernization of federal financial management systems, including the systematic measurement of performance; the development of cost information; and the integration of program, budget, and financial information. The Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996 (FFMIA) encourages agencies to have systems that generate timely, accurate, and useful information with which to make informed decisions and to ensure accountability on an ongoing basis. Auditors for 19 of the 24 CFO Act agencies reported that their agencies' financial management systems did not comply substantially with FFMIA requirements, compared to 21 agencies reported as not being substantially compliant for 1999. The auditors for five CFO Act agencies reported no instances in which the agencies' systems did not substantially comply with FFMIA. These auditors, however, did not definitively state whether the agencies' financial management systems substantially complied with FFMIA. FFMIA requires agencies to prepare remediation plans to overcome financial management systems problems. These plans have improved over the fiscal year 1998 plans; however, further enhancements are needed. |
gao_GAO-02-814T | gao_GAO-02-814T_0 | The resulting regulatory framework—dividing spectrum management between the President and an independent regulatory body—is rooted both in the President’s responsibility for national defense and in the fulfillment of federal agencies’ missions, and the encouragement and recognition by the federal government of the investment made by private enterprise in radio and other communications services. Facilitating Spectrum Allocations
The current shared U.S. spectrum management structure has methods for allocating spectrum for new uses and users of wireless services, but these methods have occasionally resulted in lengthy negotiations between FCC and NTIA over how to resolve some allocation issues. However, we heard differences of opinion about the United States’ preparatory process for the conferences. Encouraging Efficient Federal Spectrum Use
NTIA has several activities to encourage efficient spectrum use by the federal government, but does not have assurance that these activities are effective. NTIA is required to promote the efficient and cost-effective use of the federal spectrum that it manages—over 270,000 federal frequency assignments at the end of 2000—“to the maximum extent feasible.” NTIA has directed agencies to use only as much spectrum as they need. NTIA authorizes federal agency use of the spectrum through its frequency assignment process. | What GAO Found
As new technologies that depend on the radio spectrum continue to be developed and used more widely, managing the spectrum can grow increasingly challenging. The current legal framework for domestic spectrum management evolved as a compromise over the questions of who should determine the distribution of the spectrum among competing users and what standard should be applied in making this determination. Although initially, all responsibility for spectrum management was placed in the executive branch, this responsibility has been divided between the executive branch for managing federal use and an independent commission for managing non-federal use since 1927 . The current shared U.S. spectrum management system has processes for allocating spectrum, but these processes have occasionally resulted in lengthy negotiations between the Federal Communications Commission and the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) over allocation issues. The United States also faces challenges in effectively preparing for World Radiocommunication Conferences. NTIA has several activities to encourage efficient spectrum use by federal agencies, but it lacks the assurance that these activities are effective. NTIA is required to promote efficiency in the federal spectrum it manages, which included more than 270,000 federal frequency assignments at the end of 2000. To do this, NTIA directs federal agencies to use only as much of the spectrum as they need. |
gao_HEHS-99-8 | gao_HEHS-99-8_0 | This report describes (1) the extent to which public agencies are using managed care to provide child welfare services, (2) the financial and service delivery arrangements under managed care that are being applied to the child welfare system, and (3) challenges child welfare agencies face as they develop and implement managed care, and the results of such efforts to date. Managed Care Is a New and Growing Strategy in Child Welfare
Nationwide, public child welfare agencies are implementing, planning, or considering managed care initiatives in 35 states. Most ongoing initiatives are serving foster care children with the most complex and costly service needs. Finally, for-profit managed care companies have not had a major role in implementing managed care in child welfare, with only a few locations using these organizations to manage the delivery of child welfare services. For example, public agencies can incorporate fixed payments into existing contracts with community-based service providers. Managed Care Initiatives Use Capitated Payments and Rely on Private Entities to Assume Case Management Responsibilites
Child welfare agencies have implemented capitated payment systems and new service-delivery strategies in their managed care initiatives. In addition, service providers in eight ongoing initiatives are being held accountable for their performance for the first time. Another method public child welfare agencies use to help ensure that managed care entities do not inappropriately limit the amount or types of necessary service to children and families is to restrict profit levels or require that cost savings be reinvested in services. Third, managed care requires both public and private agencies to assume new roles and responsibilities. Despite these challenges, public officials are encouraged by early—though limited—positive results. Public Agencies Face Initial Start-Up Tasks
Before managed care arrangements can be implemented, both public and private agencies have found they need to accomplish a number of start-up tasks. Management Information Systems Are a Continuing Challenge
Program officials responsible for the initiatives we surveyed view the development of a management information system as the most difficult task they face in their move to managed care. Roles and Responsibilities Change Dramatically
Under managed care, public agencies are adjusting to new responsibilities while shifting some traditional functions to the private sector. New Responsibilities Demand a Culture Change and Staff Adjustment
Many of the public agencies implementing managed care initiatives have shifted most of the day-to-day casework responsibilities to private contractors, while developing the capacity and expertise to perform system oversight and monitoring activities. Some contracts require the service provider to provide the information the public child welfare agency needs to file claims for federal title IV-E reimbursement of the costs associated with feeding and housing an eligible child in out-of-home care, as well as certain administrative costs related to that child’s placement, such as case management and licensing of foster homes. While there is no single managed care approach, in general, states and localities are (1) experimenting with capitated payments to transfer financial risk to providers and (2) managing children’s care through a single point of entry to a full array of services. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the states' efforts to implement managed care into their child welfare systems, focusing on determining the: (1) extent to which public agencies are using managed care to provide child welfare services; (2) financial and service delivery arrangements being used under a managed care approach; and (3) challenges child welfare agencies face as they develop and implement managed care, and the results of such efforts to date.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) nationwide, public child welfare agencies have implemented managed care projects or initiatives in 13 states, with new initiatives being planned or considered in more than 20 other states; (2) most of the ongoing initiatives involve foster children with the most complex and costly service needs; (3) currently, only about 4 percent of the nation's child welfare population is being served under managed care arrangements; (4) public agencies have contracted with experienced nonprofit, community-based providers in their service systems to implement managed care initiatives; (5) for-profit managed care companies have not had a major role in implementing managed care in child welfare; only a few jurisdictions are using for-profit companies to administer and provide child welfare services; (6) the majority of the ongoing child welfare managed care initiatives have established a capitated payment system; (7) lacking experience and uncertain about the feasibility of new fixed payments, some initiatives also use mechanisms to limit the financial risk that has been shifted to providers; (8) managed care initiatives require service providers to organize and coordinate a full array of services to ensure that appropriate and necessary services are available to children and their families; (9) most of the public agencies responsible for the initiatives have transferred case management functions to private entities; (10) the public sector, however, continues to play an active role at strategic points throughout the service-delivery process; (11) to ensure that providers' cost-controlling strategies do not jeopardize service quality or access to care, public agencies use various quality assurance techniques to hold service providers accountable for outcomes; (12) as more public child welfare agencies move toward managed care, public officials and their private contractors face several challenges; (13) as they develop and implement a capitated payment method, agencies need to find ways to maintain adequate cash flow; (14) agencies face the difficult tasks of developing sound management information systems; (15) both public and private agencies face new responsibilities as some traditionally public functions shift to the private sector and new roles emerge; (16) these changes may require these agencies to develop new procedures for case management and program administration and to provide additional training for both public and private employees; and (17) despite these challenges, public officials are encouraged by some positive, though limited, early results from managed care initiatives. |
gao_RCED-96-6 | gao_RCED-96-6_0 | Section 1098 of the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA) tasked GAO with reviewing the process for distributing highway funds to the states. In discussion with the congressional committees identified in section 1098, we agreed to address (1) the way the formula works and the relevancy of the data used for the formula and (2) the major funding objectives implicit in the formula and the implications of alternative formula factors for achieving these objectives. Funding for these demonstration projects is not distributed by formula. Funding for the other program categories is also based on separate calculations. 3.) First, a state’s total funding share for the four largest programs is fixed over the life of ISTEA. For major highway programs, the data underlying the distribution of highway funds to the states are generally outdated, unresponsive to changing conditions, and often not reflective of the nation’s highway system or its usage. Alternatives for Distributing Federal Highway Funds
On the basis of our analysis and discussions with federal and state transportation officials, ISTEA’s myriad objectives for highways can be placed into four overarching categories: (1) maintaining and improving the highway infrastructure, (2) returning the majority of funds to the state where the revenue was generated, (3) fostering social benefits, and (4) safeguarding the states’ historical funding shares. However, a formula based on direct measures of need could prove problematic. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the formula for distributing federal highway funds, focusing on the: (1) relevancy of the data used for the formula; (2) major funding objectives implicit in the formula; and (3) implications of alternative formula factors for achieving these objectives.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the federal highway funding formula is complex and cumbersome; (2) the underlying data and factors used in the formula are to a large extent irrelevant, since funding outcomes are essentially predetermined; (3) annual combined funding for the four largest highway programs is fixed throughout the 6-year life of the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA); (4) some of the factors used in formula calculations are based on outdated information, are unresponsive to changing conditions, and often do not reflect the highway system's utilization; (5) equity adjustments increase many states' final funding levels; (6) funding for demonstration projects is not determined by formula; (7) ISTEA objectives include maintaining and improving the highway infrastructure, returning Highway Trust funds to the states where the revenue was generated, advancing selected goals, and safeguarding the states' historical funding shares; and (8) a combination of objectives based on states' needs and resources could form the basis for a new formula, but any new formula is likely to change the states' highway funding levels. |
gao_AIMD-99-15 | gao_AIMD-99-15_0 | The increased number of seasonal staff IRS employs to handle and process this large volume of receipts and returns increases IRS’ vulnerability to theft. In addition to adequately safeguarding taxpayer receipts, it is equally important for IRS to protect sensitive taxpayer data. We recognize that due to the high volume and sensitive nature of IRS’ activities, particularly during the peak filing season, no system of internal control can eliminate the vulnerability of receipts and sensitive taxpayer information to theft. As a result, the vulnerability of this data to theft or misuse is heightened. Because of the length of time it takes, IRS only requires a background investigation for employees hired for periods of 90 days or more. These seasonal and temporary employees work an average of 8 to 10 weeks during the peak filing season, and may have already finished their term of employment before IRS receives the results of these fingerprint checks. If the results of fingerprint checks are not received promptly by IRS, these individuals can be placed in positions to steal receipts and taxpayer data. According to the internal audit review, of the 80 thefts of receipts at service centers reported between January 1995 and July 1997, 12 were committed by employees with previous arrest records for theft, assault, or drug charges that were not identified prior to employment. Physical Safeguards Are Inadequate to Protect Cash Receipts
The Comptroller General’s Standards for Internal Controls in the Federal Government requires that access to resources and records, such as IRS receipts and taxpayer data, be limited to authorized individuals in order to reduce the risk of unauthorized use or loss to the government. Because IRS service centers and district offices directly collected over $100 billion in fiscal year 1997 and are responsible for processing all taxpayer data submitted by taxpayers, such weaknesses increase the vulnerability of receipts and taxpayer data to theft or misuse. These receipts were stored overnight in a locked cabinet. Courier Security Does Not Adequately Protect Deposits and Sensitive Taxpayer Data From Theft or Loss
Proper safeguarding of assets requires that IRS ensure adequate security over receipts from the time they are received at the service center until the time they are deposited at financial depository institutions. During the peak filing season, one service center deposit typically has tens of thousands of checks. These actions include conducting an analysis of risk classifications of positions in the Receipt and Control Branch to ensure background checks are commensurate with the level of risk associated with the position; ensuring IRS has the necessary equipment to participate in the FBI’s Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System program by August 1999; working with each service center to determine appropriate methods for securing overflow areas and ensuring all final candling areas are located in restricted access areas; exploring various options for security containers for unmatched checks and implementing a process for such storage by August 1999; revising procedures to require stamping all returned refund checks “non-negotiable” as soon as they are extracted from envelopes; revising procedures for safeguarding receipts received in walk-in facilities and for maintaining a control log of receipts received and deposited or transferred to another unit by January 1999; and studying alternative methods for transporting deposits to depositories and service center practices for limiting courier access to service centers. GAO Comment
1. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) physical controls over receipts and taxpayer data.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) IRS' controls over receipts and taxpayer data do not adequately reduce the vulnerability of the federal government and taxpayers to loss from theft; (2) this condition existed because of the length of time required to conduct background investigations, delays in receiving results of fingerprint checks, and processing demands which required the hiring of thousands of employees during the peak filing season; (3) placing new hires in sensitive positions prior to, at a minimum, receiving the results of fingerprint check increases the vulnerability of receipts and taxpayer data to theft; (4) in fact, of the 80 thefts IRS investigated at service centers from January 1995 to July 1997, 12 were committed by individuals who had previous arrest records that were not identified prior to their employment; (5) GAO also noted weaknesses in the physical controls over service center and district office receipts; (6) while service center receipts are required to be processed only by authorized individuals in the Receipt and Control Branch, which is a restricted access area, numerous receipts were found in unrestricted areas accessible to other IRS employees and to non-employees not authorized to handle receipts; (7) receipts particularly vulnerable to theft also were not adequately secured; (8) while it is important to adequately protect cash and checks received at IRS facilities, it is similarly essential to ensure that these receipts are properly protected during transport to depository institutions; (9) GAO found that single, unarmed couriers in ordinary civilian vehicles were used to transport IRS deposits totalling hundreds of millions of dollars to the depository institutions during the peak filing season; (10) the theft of one peak season deposit could place a significant administrative burden on IRS to contact taxpayers and initiate stop payment orders on tens of thousands of checks; (11) although receipts and taxpayer information will always be vulnerable to theft, IRS has a responsibility to protect the government and taxpayers from such losses; (12) many of the actions GAO is recommending to minimize these vulnerabilities and thus better protect taxpayer receipts and data would not result in significant costs, and several other actions GAO is recommending are already required by IRS policy or are currently under consideration by IRS management; and (13) IRS has prepared two corrective action plans to reduce its vulnerability to theft or loss of receipts and taxpayer data. |
gao_GAO-04-424 | gao_GAO-04-424_0 | RHS’s Current Methods Have Overestimated the Agency’s Budget Needs by as Much as 7 Percent, or $51 Million Per Year
Using its current methodology, RHS has overestimated its budget needs for 5-year rental assistance contracts in three ways. Second, RHS compounds the inflation rate to reflect the price level in the fifth year and applies that rate to each contract year, rather than using an appropriate rate for each year. Certain aspects of the model promise improvements over the current estimating methods. Furthermore, RHS is incorrectly calculating its historical rates of change in a way that could cause the agency to underestimate its budget needs. Contracts issued from 1983 through 1997 accounted for the remaining $95 million. In 2002, approximately $179 million in rental assistance funds was paid to project owners from contracts issued from 1978 through 1997, $53 million of it from contracts issued from 1978 through 1982, and $126 million from contracts issued from 1983 through 1997. The 1978 to 1982 contracts, which were funded based on inflation projections of 10 to 20 percent, will not expend their $510 million in unexpended balances until 2011 on average—8 years after the last of the 20-year contracts should have expired. Using RHS rental assistance payment data, we calculated that RHS overestimated its funding needs for these contracts by an average of about 8 percent each year. RHS Has Overestimated Its Spending Needs in Most Years Since 1990
Our analysis of rental assistance payment data showed that the agency has been overestimating its budget needs since at least 1990, the earliest year for which we gathered data. Importantly, where we had sufficient data from the agency, our analysis also shows that if RHS had used and correctly applied OMB inflation rates to its base per-unit rates, its estimates would have been closer to actual expenditures. The rental assistance program, with an annual budget of over $700 million, provides further subsidies to about half this number. RHS is updating and automating its budget estimation process, and its new forecasting model shows some improvements over past and current processes. A simple modification to the agency’s planned budget estimation process would help the agency more accurately estimate its rental assistance needs and curtail future unexpended balances—or budget shortfalls as the case may be. As stated in this report, we believe RHS overestimates its budget needs by using inflation factors that are higher than those projected by OMB for use in the budget process, improperly compounding the inflation rates, and using expenditure rates that may overstate the need for rental assistance. To assess the activity level of rental assistance contracts issued from 1998 through 2002 and the accuracy of RHS’s estimates of the rates at which these funds would be used, we reviewed rental assistance data from AMAS from January 1998 through October 2003 to determine the activity level of the unexpended balances. We assessed the accuracy of RHS’s estimates of the rate at which the funds would be used by comparing RHS’s estimated rental assistance expenditures to actual program expenditures. However, the resulting figure (fig. 5. 6. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Rural Housing Service's (RHS) Section 521 Rental Assistance Program provides rental subsidies to about 250,000 rural tenants. With an annual budget of over $700 million, the program is RHS's largest line-item appropriation, accounting for approximately 70 percent of the agency's budget. In early 2003, RHS reported hundreds of millions of dollars in unexpended balances, primarily tied to 5- and 20-year contracts issued from 1978 through 1982. Concern has arisen that these unexpended balances may be the result of the agency's budget practices, especially its procedures for estimating funding needs. GAO was asked to assess the accuracy of RHS's budget estimates for the rental assistance program, the activity level of rental assistance contracts issued from 1978 through 1997, and the activity level of rental assistance contracts issued from 1998 through 2002 and the accuracy of RHS's estimates of the rate at which these funds would be used.
What GAO Found
RHS is overestimating its budget needs for 5-year rental assistance contracts in three ways. First, the agency uses inflation factors that are higher than those OMB recommends for use in the budget process. Second, RHS does not apply its inflation rate separately to each year of a 5-year contract, but instead compounds the rate to reflect the price level in the fifth year and applies that rate to each contract year. Using these first two methods, RHS overestimated its 2003 budget needs by $51 million (6.5 percent). Third, RHS bases its estimates of future expenditure rates on recent maximum expenditures, rather than on the average rates at which rental assistance funds are expended. RHS has begun the process of automating its budget processes and certain aspects of its new model promise improvements over the current estimating methods. However, the agency continues to use its own inflation rates and incorrectly calculates those rates in such a way that would cause the agency to actually underestimate its budget needs. At current spending rates, it will take another 7 years for all the active contracts that were issued from 1978 through 1982 to expend their funds, 8 years after the last of the 20-year contracts were expected to expire. Contracts issued from 1983 through 1997 should expend their remaining funds in 2004. GAO calculated that RHS overestimated its funding needs for contracts issued from 1998 through 2002 by an average of about 8 percent each year. GAO analysis of rental assistance payment data showed that the agency has overestimated its budget needs almost every year since 1990, the earliest year for which GAO gathered data. Where GAO had sufficient data from the agency, the analysis also shows that if RHS had used and correctly applied OMB inflation rates to its base perunit rates, its estimates would have been closer to actual expenditures. Standardizing the agency's budget estimation processes would help the agency more accurately estimate its rental assistance needs and curtail future unexpended balances or budget shortfalls. |
gao_GAO-03-382 | gao_GAO-03-382_0 | Since that time, the Corps has gradually reduced its hopper dredging fleet from 14 to 4 vessels, while a private hopper dredging industry of five firms and 16 vessels has emerged. Corps’ Hopper Dredge Fleet Addresses Several Needs
Corps officials and representatives from the dredging industry, selected ports, and the maritime industry generally agreed that the Corps’ hopper dredge fleet currently (1) provides additional dredging capacity during peak demand years, (2) meets emergency dredging and national defense needs identified in the 1978 legislation, and (3) provides an alternative work option when industry provides no bids or when its bids exceed the government cost estimate by more than 25 percent. Restrictions on the Corps’ Hopper Dredge Fleet Have Imposed Costs, but Benefits Are Unproven
Restrictions on the Corps’ hopper dredge fleet, which began in fiscal year 1993, have imposed costs on the Corps’ dredging program, but have thus far not resulted in proven benefits. A possible benefit of the restrictions is that they could eventually encourage more firms to enter the market or existing firms to add capacity, which, in turn, may promote competition, improve dredging efficiency, and thus reduce prices. Although there has been an increase in the number of private industry hopper dredges since the restrictions were first imposed, the number of private firms in the hopper dredging market has decreased. In addition, during the same time period, the number of contractor bids per Corps solicitation has decreased, while the number of winning bids exceeding the Corps’ cost estimate has increased. Corps Has Not Justified the Existing and Proposed Restrictions on Its Hopper Dredge Fleet
In a June 2000 report to the Congress, the Corps stated that the placement of the Wheeler in ready reserve had been a success and recommended that the vessel remain in ready reserve. However, the report contained a number of analytical and evidentiary shortcomings, and, when asked, the Corps could not provide any supporting documentation for its recommendation. In addition, the report also proposed that the McFarland be placed in ready reserve, but the Corps did not conduct an analysis to support this proposal. Furthermore, according to the Corps, the McFarland will require at least a $25 million capital investment to ensure its safety, operational reliability, and effectiveness for future service. It is questionable whether such an investment in a vessel that would be placed in ready reserve and receive only minimal use is in the best interest of the government. The Corps estimates that if the McFarland were placed in ready reserve, it would require an annual subsidy of about $8 million to remain idle. Recommendations for Executive Action
In an effort to discern the most economical and advantageous manner in which to operate its hopper dredge fleet, and because the Corps has been unable to support, through analysis and documentation, the costs and benefits of placing its hopper dredges in ready reserve, we recommend that the Secretary of the Army direct the Corps of Engineers to obtain and analyze the baseline data needed to determine the appropriate use of the Corps’ hopper dredge fleet including, among other things, data on the frequency, type, and cost of emergency work performed by the Corps and the private hopper dredging industry; contract type; and solicitations that receive no bids or where all the bids received exceeded the Corps’ estimate by more than 25 percent; prepare a comprehensive analysis of the costs and benefits of existing and proposed restrictions on the use of the Corps’ hopper dredge fleet—including limiting the Corps’ dredges to 180 days of work per year, placing the Wheeler into ready reserve, limiting the McFarland to its historic work in the Delaware River, and placing the McFarland into ready reserve status; and assess the data and procedures used to perform the government cost estimate when contracting dredging work to the private hopper dredging industry, including, among other things, (1) updating the cost information for private industry hopper dredges and (2) examining the policies related to calculating transit costs. 4. 5. | Why GAO Did This Study
The fiscal year 2002 Conference Report for the Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act directed GAO to study the benefits and effects of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' (Corps) dredge fleet. GAO examined the characteristics and changing roles of the Corps and industry in hopper dredging; the effect of current restrictions on the Corps' hopper dredge fleet; and whether existing and proposed restrictions on the fleet, including the proposal to place the McFarland in ready reserve, are justified. In addition, GAO identified concerns related to the government cost estimates the Corps prepares to determine the reasonableness of industry bids.
What GAO Found
In response to 1978 legislation that encouraged private industry participation in dredging, the Corps gradually reduced its hopper dredge fleet from 14 to 4 vessels (the Wheeler, the McFarland, the Essayons, and the Yaquina) while a private hopper dredging industry of five firms and 16 vessels has emerged. Dredging stakeholders generally agreed that the Corps needs to retain at least a small hopper dredge fleet to (1) provide additional dredging capacity during peak demand years, (2) meet emergency dredging needs, and (3) provide an alternative work option when industry provides no bids or when its bids exceed the government cost estimate by more than 25 percent. In reviewing the cost estimation process, GAO found that the Corps' estimates are based on some outdated contractor cost information and an expired policy for calculating transit costs. The restrictions on the use of the Corps' hopper dredge fleet that began in fiscal year 1993 have imposed costs on the Corps' dredging program, but have thus far not resulted in proven benefits. The Corps estimates that it spends $12.5 million annually to maintain the Wheeler in ready reserve, defined as 55 workdays plus emergencies, of which about $8.4 million is needed to cover the costs incurred when the vessel is idle. A possible benefit of restrictions on the Corps' vessels is that they could eventually encourage existing firms to add dredging capacity or more firms to enter the market, which, in turn, may promote competition, improve dredging efficiency, and lower prices. Although there has been an increase in the number of private industry hopper dredges since the restrictions were first imposed, the number of private firms in the hopper dredging market has decreased. In addition, during the same time period, the number of contractor bids per Corps solicitation has decreased, while the number of winning bids exceeding the Corps' cost estimates has increased. Although the Corps proposed that the McFarland be placed in ready reserve, it has not conducted an analysis to establish that this action would be in the government's best interest. Specifically, in a June 2000 report to the Congress, the Corps stated that the placement of the Wheeler in ready reserve had been a success and proposed that the McFarland also be placed in ready reserve. However, when asked, the Corps could not provide any supporting documentation for its report. Furthermore, according to the Corps, future use of the McFarland will require at least a $25 million capital investment to ensure its safety, operational reliability, and effectiveness. Such an investment in a vessel that would be placed in ready reserve and receive only minimal use is questionable. |
gao_GAO-04-460 | gao_GAO-04-460_0 | Quality Assurance Problems Persist at the Yucca Mountain Project
DOE reports that it has implemented almost all of the actions identified in its 2002 corrective action plan; however, recent audits and assessments indicate that recurring quality assurance problems have not been corrected. Collectively, these assessments found continuing management weaknesses that DOE had identified as root causes of the recurring problems. In a June 2003 audit, DOE found quality problems in developing and validating software. In September 2003, DOE quality assurance auditors found that some data sets were still not qualified or traceable to their sources. Collectively, these assessments identified continuing weaknesses in the areas of roles and responsibilities, quality assurance procedures, and a work environment that did not foster employee confidence in raising concerns without fear of reprisal. This could result in a large volume of requests for additional information in some areas which could extend the review process, and could prevent NRC from making a decision regarding issuing a construction authorization to DOE within the time required by law.”
Corrective Action Plan Lacks Measurable Goals
DOE cannot formally assess the overall effectiveness of its 2002 corrective action plan because the performance goals to assess management weaknesses in the plan lack objective measurements and time frames for determining success. For example, the goals do not specify the amount of improvement expected, how quickly the improvement should be achieved, or how long the improvement should be sustained before the problems can be considered corrected. However, the review also noted the effectiveness of corrective actions under the plan could not be evaluated because many of the goals in the performance measurement tool that are linked to the 2002 plan lacked the level of objectivity and testing needed to measure effectiveness. As NRC has noted, quality assurance problems could delay the licensing process. We disagree with most of DOE’s comments. Despite the many actions taken to improve the quality assurance program, the management weaknesses and quality problems with data, models, and software have continued, indicating that the corrective actions have not been fully effective. To determine the adequacy of DOE’s plan to measure the effectiveness of the actions it has taken, we examined the July 2002 corrective action plan and subsequent project performance measurement documents to determine how DOE intended to use goals and performance measures to evaluate the plan’s effectiveness. Role of Quality Assurance in the Licensing Process
After the Department of Energy (DOE) submits its license application to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), NRC will review it to determine whether all NRC requirements have been met and whether the repository is likely to operate safely as designed. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Energy (DOE) must obtain a license from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to construct a nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. In licensing, a quality assurance program helps ensure that the information used to demonstrate the safety of the repository is defensible and well documented. DOE developed a corrective action plan in 2002 to fix recurring problems with the accuracy of such information. This report assesses the status of corrective actions and the adequacy of DOE's plan to measure the effectiveness of actions taken.
What GAO Found
DOE has reportedly implemented most of the actions in its 2002 corrective action plan, but recent audits and assessments have identified lingering quality problems with data, models, and software and continuing management weaknesses. Audits revealed that some data sets could not be traced back to their sources, model development and validation procedures were not followed, and some processes for software development and validation were inadequate or not followed. DOE believes these problems have not affected the technical basis of the project; however, they could adversely affect the licensing process. Recent assessments identified continuing management weaknesses in the areas of roles and responsibilities, quality assurance policies and procedures, and a work environment that did not foster employee confidence in raising concerns without fear of reprisal. NRC has acknowledged DOE's effectiveness in identifying quality problems, but recently concluded that quality problems could delay the licensing process. DOE cannot assess the effectiveness of its 2002 plan because the performance goals to assess management weaknesses lack objective measurements and time frames for determining success. The goals do not specify the amount of improvement expected, how quickly the improvement should be achieved, or how long the improvement should be sustained before the problems can be considered corrected. DOE recently developed a measurement tool that incorporates and revises some of the goals from the action plan, but most of the revised goals continue to lack the necessary time frames needed to determine whether the actions have corrected the recurring problems. A recently completed DOE review of the 2002 plan found that the corrective actions have been fully implemented. However, the review also noted the effectiveness of the actions could not be evaluated because many of the plan's goals lacked the level of objectivity and testing needed to measure effectiveness. |
gao_GAO-10-96 | gao_GAO-10-96_0 | In 2005, State began issuing e-passports, which introduced an enhanced design and physical security features. These covers include the computer chip embedded in the back cover that can communicate using contactless ID technology. Two separate companies were awarded contracts to supply chips for the U.S. e-passports. 2). In agreement with ICAO standards for e-passports, State generates and writes a digital signature on the chip of each e-passport during the personalization process. State has developed a comprehensive set of controls to govern the operation and management of the PKI that generates the digital signatures used to help assure the integrity of the passport data written to the chip. At that time, DHS had not fully deployed e-passport readers to all primary inspection lanes at all ports of entry and did not have a schedule to do so. Malicious Code Does Not Pose a Significant Risk to U.S. E-passport Computer Chips or Federal Computer Systems That Read Them
Protections designed into the U.S. e-passport computer chip limit the risks of malicious code being resident on the chip, a necessary precondition for a malicious code attack to occur from the chip against computer systems that read them. GPO and State have taken additional actions to decrease the likelihood that malicious code could be introduced onto the chip. Finally, given that no protection can be considered foolproof, DHS still needs to address deficiencies noted in our previous work on the US-VISIT computer systems to mitigate the impact of malicious code, should it infect those systems. While these steps do not provide complete assurance that the chips are free from malicious code, the limited communications between the e-passport chip and agency computers significantly lowers the risk that malicious code that could be resident on an e-passport chip could pose to agency computers. Without these capabilities, the additional security against forgery and counterfeiting that could be provided by the inclusion of computer chips on e-passports issued by the United States and foreign countries, including those participating in the visa waiver program, is not fully realized. GPO and State have also taken steps to assure the security of the embedded computer chips in U.S. e-passports. Recommendations for Executive Action
To ensure that border officers can more fully utilize the security features of electronic passports, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security take the following two actions to provide greater assurance that electronic passport data were written by the issuing nation and have not been altered or forged: Design and implement the systems functionality and databases needed to fully verify electronic passport digital signatures at U.S. ports of entry. To determine whether malicious code on the e-passport chips poses a risk to national security, we determined how U.S. e-passport computer chips are manufactured and incorporated into the production of blank U.S. e-passport booklets based on interviews with the Government Printing Office (GPO) and manufacturer officials and our reviews of GPO documentation. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2005, the Department of State (State) began issuing electronic passports (e-passports) with embedded computer chips that store information identical to that printed in the passport. By agreement with State, the U.S. Government Printing Office (GPO) produces blank e-passport books. Two foreign companies are used by GPO to produce e-passport covers, including the computer chips embedded in them. At U.S. ports of entry, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) inspects passports. GAO was asked to examine potential risks to national security posed by using foreign suppliers for U.S. e-passport computer chips. This report specifically examines the following two risks: (1) Can the computer chips used in U.S. e-passports be altered or forged to fraudulently enter the United States? (2) What risk could malicious code on the U.S. e-passport computer chip pose to national security? To conduct this work, GAO reviewed documents and interviewed officials at State, GPO, and DHS relating to the U.S. e-passport design and manufacturing and e-passport inspection systems and procedures.
What GAO Found
State has developed a comprehensive set of controls to govern the operation and management of a system to generate and write a security feature called a digital signature on the chip of each e-passport it issues. When verified, digital signatures can help provide reasonable assurance that data placed on the chip by State have not been altered or forged. However, DHS does not have the capability to fully verify the digital signatures because it has not deployed e-passport readers to all of its ports of entry and it has not implemented the system functionality necessary to perform the verification. Because the value of security features depends not only on their solid design, but also on an inspection process that uses them, the additional security against forgery and counterfeiting that could be provided by the inclusion of computer chips on e-passports issued by the United States and foreign countries, including those participating in the visa waiver program, is not fully realized. Protections designed into the U.S. e-passport computer chip limit the risks of malicious code being resident on the chip, a necessary precondition for a malicious code attack to occur from the chip against computer systems that read them. GPO and State have taken additional actions to decrease the likelihood that malicious code could be introduced onto the chip. While these steps do not provide complete assurance that the chips are free from malicious code, the limited communications between the e-passport chip and agency computers significantly lowers the risk that malicious code--if resident on an e-passport chip--could pose to agency computers. Finally, given that no protection can be considered foolproof, DHS still needs to address deficiencies noted in our previous work on its computer systems to mitigate the impact of any malicious code that may be read from e-passport computer chips and infect those systems. |
gao_GAO-02-754 | gao_GAO-02-754_0 | Health care facilities transfuse the resulting 26.5 million components into about 4.5 million patients per year. Blood Suppliers’ Response to September 11 Attacks Has Focused Emergency Planning on Maintaining Adequate Inventory
The high volume of blood donations made immediately after September 11, and the very small amount of blood needed to treat survivors, resulted in a national surplus—supply was substantially greater than needed for transfusions. Nationwide Blood Supply Can Likely Compensate for Donor Losses Resulting from New Policies
The overall growth in the U.S. blood supply in recent years and the demonstrated ability of particular blood suppliers to increase collections indicate that the blood industry as a whole can compensate for donor losses from the new vCJD donor deferrals. Recent Blood Price Increases are Partly the Result of New Measures to Improve Blood Safety
Although blood is collected primarily from unpaid volunteers, blood banks incur costs from collecting, processing, and testing donated blood. Furthermore, the average price of blood has risen sharply since 1998. | What GAO Found
According to the American Association of Blood Banks, every year about 8 million individuals donate 14 million pints of blood, and 4.5 million patients receive life saving blood transfusions. The available data indicate that the blood supply has increased in the last 5 years and that growth has kept pace with the rise in demand. Blood suppliers received a high volume of blood donations immediately after the September 11 attacks. However, the small amount of blood needed to treat survivors of the attacks resulted in a nationwide surplus. The nation's blood supply can compensate for donors lost because of new donor restrictions designed to further reduce the risk of variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease transmission. The average price of blood has risen over 50 percent since 1998. Although blood is primarily collected from volunteers, blood suppliers incur costs by collecting, processing, and testing donated blood. |
gao_GAO-04-531 | gao_GAO-04-531_0 | Both sovereign and private borrowers present some risk of failing to meet payment obligations (i.e., defaulting), potentially causing a financial loss for Ex-Im Bank and the U.S. government.In 1990, to more accurately measure the cost of federal credit programs, the government enacted credit reform, which required agencies that provide domestic or international credit, including Ex-Im Bank, to estimate and request appropriations for the long-term net losses, or subsidy costs, of their credit activities.According to credit reform, Ex-Im Bank incurs subsidy costs when estimated payments by the government (such as loan disbursements) exceed estimated payments to the government (such as principal repayments, fees, interest payments, and recovered assets), on a present value basis over the life of the loan. OMB Developed New Method That Lowered Expected Loss Rates
OMB developed its current methodology for determining expected loss rates for ICRAS agencies, which lowered these rates, based in part on evidence that its former approach overstated likely defaults and losses. OMB’s current approach uses historical corporate bond default data, adjusted for trends in interest rate spreads, to predict defaults and applies an assumption regarding recovery rates to estimate expected loss rates. Under the current approach, loss rates across most risk categories dropped significantly. Assessing the risk of such credit activity, particularly in developing countries, is inherently difficult. In addition, while OMB has assumed increasingly lower recovery rates since implementing its method, its basis for the recovery rates and changes in them has not been transparent. Finally, despite its complexity and the changes it implied, OMB developed the current methodology independently and provided ICRAS agencies with limited information about the methodology. In addition, corporate default data now show higher defaults in certain higher-risk categories than the data OMB used. OMB’s shift to using historical corporate default data in its methodology for estimating loss rates of ICRAS agency activities has some basis, given the practices of other financial institutions and limitations in available historical data. However, the predictive value of those corporate default data for the financing undertaken by Ex-Im Bank or other ICRAS agencies has not yet been established. In response to the mandate, we agreed to (1) describe OMB’s current and former methodologies for estimating expected loss rates for international credits and the rationale for the recent revisions, (2) determine the impacts of the current OMB methodology on Ex-Im Bank, and (3) assess the current methodology and the process by which it was developed. expected losses. Comparison of OMB Default Probabilities for Fiscal Years 2004 and 2005 with Corporate Default Rates Used in OMB Model
In fiscal year 2003, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) introduced its current methodology for estimating the expected loss rates of international financing provided by U.S. credit agencies. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Export-Import Bank (Ex-Im Bank) facilitates U.S. exports by extending credit to foreign governments and corporations, mostly in developing countries. The Federal Credit Reform Act requires Ex-Im Bank to estimate its net future losses, called "subsidy costs," for budget purposes. Beginning with fiscal year 2003, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) significantly changed its methodology for estimating a key subsidy cost component: the expected loss rates across a range of risk ratings of U.S.-provided international credits. In response to a congressional mandate, GAO agreed to (1) describe OMB's current and former methodologies and the rationale for the recent revisions, (2) determine the current methodology's impact on Ex-Im Bank, and (3) assess the methodology and how it was developed.
What GAO Found
OMB changed its method for determining expected loss rates for U.S. international credits, with one basis being that emerging finance literature indicated the former approach might overstate losses to the government. While it formerly used only interest rate differences across bonds to derive expected loss rates, it now uses corporate bond default data, adjusted for trends in interest rates, to predict defaults and makes assumptions regarding recoveries to estimate expected loss rates. As the figure shows, expected loss rates fell under the new approach: they were higher across risk rating categories in fiscal year 2002 (the last year that the former method was used) than in fiscal year 2005. This drop has contributed to lower Ex-Im Bank projections of subsidy costs and budget needs. OMB's current method for estimating expected loss rates involves challenges and lacks transparency. Estimating such losses on developing country financing is inherently difficult, and OMB's shift to using corporate default data has some basis, given the practices of some other financial institutions and limitations in other data sources. However, the corporate default data's coverage of developing countries has historically been limited, and their predictive value for Ex-Im Bank losses is not yet established. OMB's method generally predicts lower defaults than the corporate default data it used, whereas more recent corporate data show higher default rates. At the same time, OMB has assumed increasingly lower recovery rates, which serve to somewhat offset the lower default expectations, but the basis for the recovery rates and the changes over time has not been transparent. In addition, despite the method's complexity, OMB developed it independently and provided affected agencies with limited information about its basis or structure. |
gao_GAO-06-588T | gao_GAO-06-588T_0 | Background
On average, about 3 people have died and about 8 people have been injured annually over the last 10 years in natural gas transmission pipeline incidents. As a means of enhancing the security and safety of gas pipelines, the 2002 act included an integrity management structure that, in part, requires operators of gas transmission pipelines to systematically assess for safety risks the portions of their pipelines located in highly populated or frequently used areas, such as parks. The act requires that operators perform these assessments (called baseline assessments) on half of the pipeline mileage in highly populated or frequented areas by December 2007 and the remainder by December 2012. Operators must then repair or replace any defective pipelines. The act further provides that pipeline segments in highly populated or frequented areas must be reassessed for safety risks at least every 7 years. Under these regulations, and mostly consistent with industry national consensus standards, operators must also reassess their pipeline segments for safety risks at least every 10, 15, or 20 years, depending on the pressure under which the pipeline segments are operated and the condition of the pipeline. Early Indications Suggest that Gas Integrity Management Enhances Public Safety, but Operators and States Raise Some Concerns About Implementation
While the gas integrity management program is still being implemented, early indications suggest that it enhances public safety by supplementing existing safety standards with risk-based management principles. The primary benefit identified was the comprehensive knowledge the program requires all operators to have of their pipeline systems. Another concern raised by most of the operators is the requirement to reassess their pipelines at least every 7 years. I am pleased to report that in response to our 2002 recommendation, PHMSA has been working to improve its communication with states about their role in overseeing integrity management programs. Operators Favor a Risk- based, Rather than a One- Size-Fits-All, Reassessment Standard
As discussed earlier, as of December 2005, operators nationwide have notified PHMSA of 338 problems that required immediate repair in the 6,700 miles in highly populated or frequented areas that they have assessed—about one immediate repair required for every 20 miles of pipeline assessed in highly populated or frequented areas. 1.) (The industry standard requires that pipelines be reassessed at least every 5 years if all repairs are not made. Some operators told us that the 7-year reassessment requirement is conservative for pipelines that operate under lower stress. An industry concern about the 7-year reassessment requirement is that operators will be required to conduct reassessments starting in 2010 while they are still in the 10-year period (2003-2012) for conducting baseline assessments. 2.) PHMSA Has Developed a Reasonable Framework for Its Enforcement Program
In 2004, we concluded that we could not assess the effectiveness of PHMSA’s enforcement strategy because it had not incorporated key features of effective program management—clear program goals, a well- defined strategy for achieving those goals, and performance measures that link to the program goals. The strategy also links these efforts to goals to reduce and prevent pipeline incidents and damage, in addition to providing for periodic assessment of results. To meet these goals, PHMSA has developed a multi-pronged strategy that is directed at the pipeline industry and stakeholders (such as state regulators), ensures that its processes make effective use of its resources. For example, PHMSA’s strategy calls for using risk-based enforcement to, among other things, take enforcement actions that clearly reflect potential risk and seriousness and deal severely with significant operator noncompliance and repeat offenses. Third, the strategy, among other things, calls for improving PHMSA’s own enforcement activities by developing comprehensive guidance tools, training inspectors on their use, and effectively using state inspection capabilities. We expect to provide additional insights into issues involving state pipeline agency staffing and training and the 7-year reassessment requirement when we report to this Subcommittee and others this fall. | Why GAO Did This Study
About a dozen people are killed or injured in natural gas transmission pipeline incidents each year. In an effort to improve upon this safety record, the Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002 requires that operators assess pipeline segments in about 20,000 miles of highly populated or frequented areas for safety risks, such as corrosion, welding defects, or incorrect operation. Half of these baseline assessments must be done by December 2007, and the remainder by December 2012. Operators must then repair or replace any defective pipelines, and reassess these pipeline segments for corrosion damage at least every 7 years. The Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) administers this program, called gas integrity management. This testimony is based on ongoing work for this Subcommittee and for other committees, as required by the 2002 act. The testimony provides preliminary results on the safety effects of (1) PHMSA's gas integrity management program and (2) the requirement that operators reassess their natural gas pipelines at least every 7 years. It also discusses how PHMSA has acted to strengthen its enforcement program in response to recommendations GAO made in 2004. GAO expects to issue two reports this fall that will address these and other topics. This testimony also discusses how PHMSA has strengthened its enforcement program in response to recommendations GAO made in 2004.
What GAO Found
Early indications suggest that the gas transmission pipeline integrity management program enhances public safety by supplementing existing safety standards with risk-based management principles. Operators have reported that they have assessed about 6,700 miles as of December 2005 and completed 338 repairs for problems they are required to address immediately. Operators told GAO that the primary benefit of the program is the comprehensive knowledge they must acquire about the condition of their pipelines. For some operators, the integrity management program has prompted such assessments for the first time. Operators raised concerns about (1) their uncertainty over the level of documentation that PHMSA requires and (2) whether their pipelines need to be reassessed at least every 7 years. The 7-year reassessment requirement is generally consistent with the industry consensus standard of at least every 10 years (higher operating pressure in relation to wall strength). The majority of transmission pipelines in the U.S. are estimated to be higher stress pipelines. However, most lower stress pipelines operators told GAO that the 7-year requirement is conservative for their pipelines because they found few problems requiring reassessments earlier than the 15 to 20 years under the industry standard. Operators GAO contacted said that periodic reassessments are beneficial for finding and preventing problems; but they favored reassessments on severity of risk rather than a one-size-fits-all standard. Operators did not expect that the existence of an "overlap period" from 2010 through 2012, when operators will be conducting baseline assessments and reassessments at the same time, would create problems in finding resources to conduct reassessments. PHMSA has developed a reasonable enforcement strategy framework that is responsive to GAO's earlier recommendations. PHMSA's strategy is aimed at reducing pipeline incidents and damage through direct enforcement and through prevention involving the pipeline industry and stakeholders (such as state regulators). Among other things, the strategy entails (1) using risk-based enforcement and dealing severely with significant noncompliance and repeat offenses, (2) increasing knowledge and accountability for results by clearly communicating expectations for operators' compliance, (3) developing comprehensive guidance tools and training inspectors on their use, and (4) effectively using state inspection capabilities. |
gao_GAO-02-296 | gao_GAO-02-296_0 | The hearings confirmed that federal agencies were retaining employees in an ongoing series of temporary appointments for long periods (8 to 10 years) without benefits or tenure. Over the 10-year period, these 10 agencies accounted for slightly over 90 percent of all temporary limited employees hired governmentwide. The number of temporary limited employees hired governmentwide declined by about 47 percent from fiscal year 1991 to fiscal year 2000. These employees received some benefits, including annual pay adjustments, overtime pay, and premium pay. From fiscal years 1991 through 2000, the majority of temporary limited employees were full-time hires. Agency officials’ responses indicate that 37 percent of the temporary limited employees hired in fiscal year 2000 in their agencies were for seasonal work. The most often reported occupational series for fiscal year 2000 was the office automation clerical and assistance series. OPM stated that its intention in revising the regulations was to ensure that temporary limited employees were used to meet truly short-term needs and were not serving for years under a series of temporary appointments without many of the benefits afforded other long-term employees. An OPM official said that OMSOE routinely includes some individual temporary appointments in its periodic oversight reviews but generally does not look at the work history of temporary limited employees serving in those appointments. In 1994, OPM revised its regulations governing temporary limited employees, generally creating a 2-year limit for each temporary appointment. Our objectives were to (1) identify the federal agencies that are the predominant users of temporary limited employees and the job characteristics of such employees (including work schedules, occupations, grade levels, and benefits); (2) discuss the primary reasons agencies give for using temporary limited employees; and (3) compare the federal government’s use of temporary limited employees with that of the private sector. | What GAO Found
In the early 1990s, concerns arose that federal agencies were retaining employees in an ongoing series of temporary appointments without benefits or tenure. For fiscal years 1991 through 2000, 10 agencies accounted for 90 percent of all temporary limited employees hired governmentwide. During this period, the number of temporary limited employees hired governmentwide declined by 47 percent--from 282,135 in fiscal year 1991 to 150,395 in fiscal year 2000. Most temporary limited employees were full-time hires in white-collar jobs who received some benefits, including annual pay adjustments and premium pay. A survey done at the 10 agencies indicated that seasonal work was the primary reason for using such employees, followed by peak workloads. The office automation clerical and assistance series was the most often reported occupational series for fiscal year 2000. Recent studies suggest that federal agencies and private sector firms use temporary employees for similar reasons--often staffing flexibility. Because temporary limited employees were serving for years under temporary appointments without the benefits afforded other long-term employees, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) revised its regulations in 1994 to ensure that temporary employees were "used to meet truly short-term needs." The revised regulations created a two-year limit for individual temporary appointments in both the competitive and excepted service. OPM officials said that the Office of Merit Systems Oversight and Effectiveness, when assessing agencies' compliance with personnel laws and regulations, routinely included some individual temporary appointments in its periodic oversight reviews, but generally did not look at the work history of temporary limited employees in those appointments. OPM data show that many temporary limited employees hired in fiscal year 2000 had worked for the federal government for at least five years. |
gao_GAO-01-298 | gao_GAO-01-298_0 | Finally, a body of welfare reform research examines the implementation of TANF at the state and local levels. The national data provide extensive information related to TANF’s goals of providing assistance to needy families and ending dependency on government benefits through job preparation, work, and marriage. State and local data not only address the same goals as the national data but in some cases also provide information related to the goals of preventing out- of-wedlock pregnancies and promoting family formation. National Data Address Two TANF Goals but Provide Limited Information on Out- of-Wedlock Pregnancy Prevention and Family Formation Strategies
National data provide detailed descriptive information related to two of TANF’s goals, but limited information related to TANF’s goals of preventing out-of-wedlock pregnancies and promoting family formation. HHS administrative records and national surveys provide descriptive information about TANF recipients’ participation in work activities, employment status, earnings, and other family well-being measures. Waiver data come from evaluations that tested the effects of programs implemented by states under waivers approved by HHS prior to TANF. These data sets represented 15 states. National data are collected from random samples that contain low-income families and TANF recipients. Policymakers, federal and state officials, and the welfare reform research community will need to seek ways to balance the need for information about TANF’s effects with the resource demands of rigorous studies. Scope and Type of Analyses for Which Waiver and Demonstration Data Can Be Used
Jobs First: Implementation and Early Impacts of Connecticut’s Welfare Reform Initiative Administrative Survey
The Family Transition Program: Implementation and Three-Year Impact of Florida’s Initial Time-Limited Welfare Program Administrative Survey Iowa’s Family Investment Program: Impacts During the First 3-½ Years of Welfare Reform Administrative Reforming Welfare and Rewarding Work: Final Report on the Minnesota Family Investment Program Administrative Surveys (2)
Comments From the Department of Health and Human Services
GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
GAO Contacts
Staff Acknowledgments
In addition to those named above, the following individuals made important contributions to this report: Patrick DiBattista designed the data collection instrument used to assess the 187 data sets reviewed, oversaw data collection, and designed and conducted the analysis of the data's strengths and weaknesses; Andrea Sykes played a major role in data collection and developed the analysis of the data's availability to address TANF's goals; Stephen Langley III also played a major role in data collection, provided consultation on multivariate analysis issues, and prepared the report's methodology appendix; James Wright provided guidance on study design and measurement; and Gale Harris, Kathryn Larin, and Heather McCallum provided consultation on TANF policy and implementation issues. | What GAO Found
GAO commented on the federal government's ability to assess the goals of the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program using national, state, and local data. These data address the goals to differing degrees. National data, which includes data collected in national surveys and information that all states report to the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), include extensive information on TANF's two goals of providing assistance to needy families and ending dependency on government benefits but have limited information on promoting family formation. The data pertain to such issues as changes in TANF workloads, recipients' participation in work activities, employment status and earnings, and family well-being. Although there are national data on the incidence of out-of-wedlock births and marriage among TANF recipients and other low-income families, these data include only very recently available information on states' strategies to prevent out-of-wedlock pregnancies or promote family formation. Studies of welfare reform at the state and local levels contain the same kind of information as national data, but they also include information about areas very recently covered by national data. Much of these data come from waiver evaluations--evaluations conducted in states that experimented with their welfare program, under a waiver from HHS, prior to TANF. The usefulness of existing data for assessing TANF's progress varies. In general, the need for information about TANF's progress will have to be balanced against the challenges of rigorous data collection from the low- income population. |
gao_GAO-16-192 | gao_GAO-16-192_0 | Background
FDA’s four expedited programs—accelerated approval, breakthrough therapy designation, fast track designation, and priority review—are intended to facilitate and expedite development and review of new drugs to address unmet medical needs in the treatment of a serious condition. There are two different ways that drug applications are selected for review using an expedited program. For accelerated approval and priority review, sponsors do not submit formal requests. After FDA approves a drug for marketing, the agency continues to monitor the drug’s safety and is required by law to publicly report on certain aspects of its postmarket safety efforts. FDA Granted More than Half of Requests for Fast Track Designation and Denied Most Requests for Breakthrough Therapy Designation
FDA Granted Two-Thirds of Requests for Fast Track Designation and Denied Most Requests for Breakthrough Therapy Designation
Of the 772 requests for fast track designation FDA received from October 1, 2006, through December 31, 2014, FDA granted about two-thirds (or 525) of them. 1.) In contrast to granting most of the requests for fast track designation, FDA denied more than half (or 120) of the 225 requests for breakthrough therapy designation that the agency received since that expedited program was established in July 2012 through the end of December 2014. FDA granted 71 requests for breakthrough therapy designation since the program was established, including 31 requests granted in each of fiscal years 2013 and 2014. One in Four Drug Applications Approved by FDA Used at Least One Expedited Program, and the Most Frequent Category Was Oncology Drugs
About a quarter of the 1,717 drug applications that FDA approved from October 1, 2006, through December 31, 2014, used at least one expedited program. Drug applications may use multiple expedited programs, although most used one program. Of 444 approved drug applications that used one or more expedited programs, 344 (77 percent) used one expedited program, 78 used 2 programs, 20 used 3 programs, and 2 used all four programs. FDA Lacks Reliable Information for Postmarket Safety Reporting and Oversight
FDA lacks reliable, readily accessible data on tracked safety issues and postmarket studies needed to meet certain postmarket safety reporting responsibilities and to conduct systematic oversight. CDER’s internal evaluations of data in its DARRTS database revealed problems with the completeness, timeliness, and accuracy of the data. These problems, as well as problems with the way data are recorded that impair their accessibility, have prevented FDA from publishing some required postmarket safety reports in a timely manner, and have restricted its ability to perform systematic oversight. Although FDA has taken some steps to address the problems with its data, it lacks comprehensive plans for doing so. Additionally, FDA officials said they do not have plans to analyze tracked safety issue and postmarket study data to inform the agency’s oversight of its expedited programs, such as determining if drugs that used an expedited program were subsequently associated with tracked safety issues at rates or of types that differed from drugs that used FDA’s standard process. FDA officials said that they do not subject applications that used an expedited program to greater postmarket safety monitoring and they do not have plans to do so because, to obtain approval for marketing, these applications are required to meet the same standard of evidence for safety and effectiveness as are applications that used FDA’s standard process. However, we found problems with the agency’s efforts to oversee and track potential safety issues and postmarket studies once those drugs are on the market. While internal control standards for the federal government specify that information should be recorded in a form and within a time frame that enables staff to carry out their responsibilities and that relevant, reliable, and timely information should be available for external reporting purposes, FDA’s data on postmarket safety issues and studies were found to be incomplete, outdated, to contain inaccuracies, and to be stored in a manner that made routine, systematic analysis difficult. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve the data on tracked safety issues and postmarket studies that are needed for required reporting and for systematic oversight of postmarket drug safety, we recommend that the Secretary of HHS direct the Commissioner of FDA to take the following two actions: develop comprehensive plans, with goals and time frames, to help ensure that identified problems with the completeness, timeliness, and accuracy of information in its database on tracked safety issues and postmarket studies are corrected, and work with stakeholders within FDA to identify additional improvements that could be made to FDA’s current database or future information technology investments to capture information in a form that can be easily and systematically used by staff for oversight purposes. HHS also pointed out the differences between the standards for granting breakthrough therapy designation or fast track designation—that is, the ability for a drug sponsor to use one of these two expedited programs—and FDA approval of the drugs for marketing; these distinctions are also noted in our report. | Why GAO Did This Study
FDA oversees the safety and effectiveness of drugs sold on the U.S. market. When there is an unmet need for the treatment of a serious condition, FDA may use one or more of its expedited programs, such as fast track and breakthrough therapy designation, which are intended to bring drugs to market more quickly. FDA is also responsible for monitoring the safety of drugs and reporting on those efforts.
GAO was asked to provide information about FDA's expedited programs and its postmarket monitoring of expedited and nonexpedited drugs. This report examines (1) the number and types of requests for fast track or breakthrough therapy designation, (2) the number and types of FDA-approved drug applications that used an expedited program, and (3) the extent to which FDA's data on tracked safety issues and postmarket studies allowed the agency to meet its reporting and oversight responsibilities. GAO analyzed FDA data on requests for fast track or breakthrough therapy designation and approved drug applications that used an expedited program from October 1, 2006, to December 31, 2014 (the most recent available). GAO reviewed FDA information on tracked safety issues and postmarket studies, including FDA internal evaluations and guidance, and interviewed FDA officials.
What GAO Found
From October 1, 2006, to December 31, 2014, the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER) received about 1,000 requests for fast track designation and breakthrough therapy designation—two of the agency's four expedited programs to facilitate and expedite the development and review of new drugs. Drug sponsors are required to submit formal requests to use these two programs; for the other two expedited programs (accelerated approval and priority review) sponsors are not required to submit formal requests. Regardless of whether sponsors submit a request for an expedited program, they are required to submit a marketing application prior to offering a drug for sale in the United States; using an expedited program does not ensure FDA approval of the marketing application. Sponsors submitted more than 770 requests for fast track designation since fiscal year 2007, and FDA granted about two-thirds of these requests. Sponsors submitted more than 220 requests for breakthrough therapy designation since it was established in July 2012, and the agency denied more than half of these requests.
About a quarter of the drug applications CDER approved for the U.S. market from October 1, 2006, to December 31, 2014, used at least one expedited program, according to FDA data. Included among these applications were new drug applications, biologic license applications, and efficacy supplements, which allow for revisions to the original application, such as changes in the drug's indicated use. Although most of these applications used one program, some applications used two or more, including two oncology drug applications that used all four expedited programs (accelerated approval, breakthrough therapy designation, fast track designation, and priority review). The most common product area among these applications was oncology (19 percent).
FDA lacks reliable, readily accessible data on tracked safety issues and postmarket studies needed to meet certain postmarket safety reporting responsibilities and to conduct systematic oversight. Tracked safety issues are potential safety issues that FDA determines are significant and that it tracks using an internal database. Internal control standards for federal agencies specify that information should be recorded in a form and within a time frame that enables staff to carry out their responsibilities and that relevant, reliable, and timely information should be available for external reporting purposes. However, evaluations conducted by CDER of data in its database revealed problems with the completeness, timeliness, and accuracy of the data. These problems, as well as problems with the way data are recorded that impair their accessibility, have prevented FDA from publishing statutorily required reports on certain potential safety issues and postmarket studies in a timely manner, and have restricted the agency's ability to perform systematic oversight of postmarket drug safety. Although FDA has taken some steps to address the problems with its data, the agency lacks plans that comprehensively outline its efforts and establish related goals and time frames. Additionally, FDA does not have plans to use these data to inform its oversight of its expedited programs, such as determining if drugs that used an expedited program were subsequently associated with tracked safety issues at rates or of types that differed from drugs that used FDA's standard process.
What GAO Recommends
FDA should develop plans to correct problems with its postmarket safety data and ensure that these data can be easily used for oversight. HHS agreed with GAO's recommendations and provided additional information on FDA's postmarket safety efforts. |
gao_T-AIMD-98-215 | gao_T-AIMD-98-215_0 | Progress Is Being Made
Since the CFO Act’s passage, steady progress has been made in improving federal financial management. For fiscal year 1996, when agencywide financial statements were required across government for the first time, 6 of the 24 CFO Act agencies received unqualified audit opinions. Many people are actively working to resolve federal financial management problems. Our testimony framed the most serious financial management improvement challenges facing the federal government. Our audit of the federal government’s consolidated financial statements and the Inspectors General audits of agencies’ financial statements have resulted in an identification and analysis of deficiencies in the government’s recordkeeping and control system and recommendations to correct them. Ultimately, agency heads and their senior management team have to be accountable for results. Congressional Oversight Is Key
Congressional attention is essential to help sustain the current momentum to implement financial management reform legislation. There are clear indications that the results of financial audits are beginning to attract increasing attention from various congressional committees. This legislation also requires (1) auditors performing financial audits under the CFO Act to report whether agencies comply with these requirements and (2) if agencies do not comply, agency heads are to prepare remediation plans to bring financial management systems into substantial compliance within 3 years. The Congress can build further upon this structure by conducting annual hearings on each agency as part of the regular appropriation, authorization, and oversight process. Based on the circumstances of individual agencies on a case-by-case basis, the Congress could, for example, consider whether (1) in areas of special concern, to require attainment of specified improvements within established milestones before certain funds supporting administrative operations or systems would be available for obligation, (2) to expand, continue, or limit transfer or reprogramming authority depending on the quality of an agency’s financial management, (3) to target, or set aside, needed funding for financial management improvement efforts that are deemed necessary to achieve progress and require periodic status reports on the return for this investment, or (4) to scrutinize funding requests, and perhaps consider limiting funds, in areas where agencies cannot provide satisfactory answers to questions raised about the quality of the data underpinning the request or their ability to properly account for the expenditures. These mechanisms—sustained congressional attention as part of the normal oversight process and agency head accountability—are essential to continue to effectively implement the financial management reform legislative foundation the Congress has established. They are key elements of ensuring that agencies make the investment of time, talent, and resources necessary to achieve needed financial management improvements. With a concerted effort, the federal government, as a whole, can continue to make progress toward ensuring full accountability and generating reliable information on a regular basis. They are also central to assuring taxpayers that their money is being used as intended and helping the government implement broad management reforms called for by the Government Performance and Results Act. U.S. General Accounting Office P.O. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO discussed ways Congress can help to ensure that agencies effectively implement federal financial management reform legislation.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) an essential foundation to help achieve the goals of implementing financial management reforms is the requirement that the 24 Chief Financial Officers Act agencies annually prepare financial statements and subject them to an independent audit, beginning with those for fiscal year (FY) 1996; (2) additionally, audited consolidated financial statements for the U.S. government are now required annually, starting with those for FY 1997; (3) to further promote needed reforms, the Federal Financial Management Improvement Act calls for agencies to meet various financial management standards and requirements and, if they do not, to prepare remediation plans; (4) these reforms begin to subject the federal government to the same fiscal discipline imposed for years on the private sector and state and local governments; (5) this discipline is needed to correct long-standing serious weaknesses in federal financial management systems, controls, and reporting practices; (6) considerable effort is under way across government to make needed improvements and progress is being made, but a great deal of perseverance will be required to fully attain the legislative goals set by federal financial management statutes; (7) the federal government can continue to make progress in implementing financial management reforms, but the pace and extent of improvement will depend upon the dedication of agency heads and their senior management teams, especially chief financial officers, and the ability to deal with a range of financial management systems issues, as well as continuing emphasis by Congress on financial management reform; (8) broad oversight by Congress will be very important to hold agency heads accountable for needed financial management improvements; and (9) Congress would make a significant contribution to ensuring satisfactory results in this area if the results of financial audits and needed improvements became a routine part of its normal annual appropriation, authorization, and oversight deliberations. |
gao_GAO-05-346T | gao_GAO-05-346T_0 | Background
In 1996, the United Nations and Iraq established the Oil for Food program to address growing concerns about the humanitarian situation in Iraq after international sanctions were imposed in 1990. The program’s intent was to allow the Iraqi government to use the proceeds of its oil sales to pay for food, medicine, and infrastructure maintenance, and at the same time prevent the regime from obtaining goods for military purposes. OIOS History, Organization, and Resources
Prior to the creation of OIOS, the United States and other member states had expressed concern about the ability of the United Nations to conduct internal oversight. In 1994, the General Assembly established OIOS to conduct audits, evaluations, inspections, and investigations of U.N. programs and funds. However, in December 2004, the General Assembly passed a resolution requiring OIOS to publish the titles and summaries of all audit reports and provide member states with access to these reports on request. Events Leading to the Creation of OIOS
Before the OIOS was created in July 1994, the United States and other U.N. member states, the U.S. Congress, and the Government Accountability Office (GAO) had expressed concern about the United Nations’ management of its resources and had criticized the inadequacies of its internal oversight mechanisms. Permanent Representative to the United Nations proposed the establishment of an “office of inspector general” to the General Assembly. Since its inception, OIOS has generally submitted its reports to the head of the unit audited. It also provided certain reports of interest to the General Assembly. In 2000, OIOS established the Iraq Program Audit Section within the Internal Audit Division. OIOS’ audit responsibilities extended to the following entities involved in Iraq operations: Office of the Iraq Program (OIP) in New York; U.N. Office of the Humanitarian Coordinator in Iraq; U.N. Compensation Commission (UNCC); U.N. Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission; U.N. Human Settlement Program (U.N.-Habitat) Settlement Rehabilitation Program in northern Iraq; U.N. Audits Show Recurring Management Weaknesses
The OIOS audits revealed a number of deficiencies in the management of the Oil for Food program and its assets and made numerous recommendations to correct these deficiencies. We also highlight findings from the audits of the inspections contracts. U.N. Oil for Food Program in Northern Iraq
The OIOS audits that reviewed U.N. activities in northern Iraq found problems with planning and coordination, procurement, and asset and cash management. For example, six diesel generators were procured in an area where diesel fuel was not readily available. In one case, $1.6 million in excess construction material remained after most projects were complete. U.N. Compensation Commission
The U.N. Various Factors Affected Audit Coverage and Effectiveness
OIOS’ audits and summary reports revealed a number of deficiencies in the management and internal controls of the Oil for Food program, particularly in northern Iraq. Limitations on OIOS’ resources and reporting hampered its coverage of the Oil for Food program and its effectiveness as an oversight tool. OIOS did not examine certain headquarters functions—particularly OIP’s oversight of the contracts for central and southern Iraq that accounted for 59 percent or almost $40 billion in Oil for Food proceeds. OIOS did not assess the humanitarian contracts or OIP’s roles and responsibilities and its relationship with the sanctions committee. Conclusion
The internal audits provide important information on the management of the Oil for Food program, particularly in the north, and on the management of the commission that compensates claims for war damages with proceeds from Iraq’s oil sales—two areas that have received little public attention. Appendix I: Summary of OIOS Audit Findings and Recommendations
We reviewed the 58 reports released by the Independent Inquiry Committee to determine the scope of the audits and the issues addressed in the reports’ findings and recommendations. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Oil for Food program was established by the United Nations and Iraq in 1996 to address concerns about the humanitarian situation after international sanctions were imposed in 1990. The program allowed the Iraqi government to use the proceeds of its oil sales to pay for food, medicine, and infrastructure maintenance. Allegations of fraud and corruption have plagued the Oil for Food program. As we have testified and others have reported, the former regime gained illicit revenues through smuggling and through illegal surcharges and commissions on Oil for Food contracts. The United Nations' Independent Inquiry Committee was established in April 2004 to investigate allegations of corruption and misconduct within the Oil for Food program and its overall management of the humanitarian program. In January 2005, the Committee publicly released 58 internal audit reports conducted by the United Nations' Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS). GAO (1) provides information on OIOS' background, structure, and resources; (2) highlights the findings of the internal audit reports; and (3) discusses limitations on the audits' coverage.
What GAO Found
Before the United Nations established OIOS, the United States and other member states had criticized its lack of internal oversight mechanisms. In 1993, the United States proposed the establishment of an inspector general position within the United Nations and withheld U.S. funds until such an office was established. In 1994, the General Assembly created OIOS and tasked it with conducting audits, investigations, inspections, and evaluations of U.N. programs and funds. OIOS has generally provided audit reports to the head of the U.N. agency or program subject to the audit but also provided certain reports of interest to the General Assembly. However, this limited distribution hampered member states' efforts to oversee important U.N. programs. In December 2004, the General Assembly directed OIOS to publish the titles and summaries of all audit reports and provide member states with access to these reports on request. The audit reports released in January 2005 found deficiencies in the management of the Oil for Food program and made numerous recommendations. We identified 702 findings in these reports. Most reports focused on U.N. activities in northern Iraq, the operations of the U.N. Compensation Commission, and the implementation of U.N. inspection contracts. In the north, OIOS audits found problems with coordination, planning, procurement, asset management, and cash management. For example, U.N. agencies had purchased diesel generators in an area where diesel fuel was not readily available and constructed a health facility subject to frequent flooding. An audit of U.N.-Habitat found $1.6 million in excess construction material on hand after most projects were complete. OIOS audits of the U.N. Compensation Commission found poor internal controls and recommended downward adjustments totaling more than $500 million. The United Nations asserted that OIOS had limited audit authority over the Commission. Finally, OIOS audits of the contractors inspecting Iraq's oil exports and commodity imports found procurement irregularities and limited U.N. oversight. OIOS' audits and summary reports revealed deficiencies in the management and internal controls of the Oil for Food program. However, OIOS did not examine certain headquarters functions--particularly OIP's oversight of the contracts for central and southern Iraq that accounted for 59 percent or almost $40 billion in Oil for Food proceeds. The Independent Inquiry Committee noted several factors that limited OIOS' scope and authority. First, OIOS did not believe it had purview over the humanitarian contracts because the sanctions committee approved the contracts. Second, the U.N. Office of the Iraq Program steered OIOS toward programs in the field rather than at headquarters. Third, the Office of the Iraq Program refused to fund an OIOS risk assessment of its program management division. Finally, U.N. management and the Office of the Iraq Program prevented OIOS from reporting its audit results directly to the Security Council. |
gao_GAO-14-640 | gao_GAO-14-640_0 | DHS and DOD Data Systems Do Not Track Complete Revocation Information
DHS’s and DOD’s data systems track varying levels of detail related to personnel security clearance revocations. DHS’s and DOD’s data systems could provide data on the number of and reasons for revocations, but they could not provide some data, such as the number of individuals who received a proposal to revoke their eligibility for access to classified information, which means that the total number of employees affected by the revocation process is unknown. Because of potential inaccuracies in DOD eligibility data, which are discussed below, we were unable to determine the percentage of DOD clearance holders whose clearances were revoked. Inconsistent Implementation of Revocation Requirements across DHS and DOD Is Due in Part to Limited Oversight of the Security Clearance Revocation Process
Inconsistent implementation of the requirements in the governing executive orders by DHS, DOD, and some of their components, and limited oversight over the revocation process, have resulted in employees in some agency components and workforces experiencing different protections and processes than employees in other agency components and workforces. DHS and DOD have implemented the requirements in Executive Orders 12968 and 10865 in different ways for different groups of personnel, but these differences are required or permitted by the executive orders. However, some components’ implementation of the clearance revocation process could potentially be inconsistent with the executive orders in two areas: having an opportunity to be provided with certain information upon which a revocation appeal determination is based, and communicating the right to counsel. Although DHS and DOD have performed some oversight over the revocation process at the component level, they have not evaluated the quality of the process or developed performance measures to measure quality department-wide. Army PSAB officials said that the PSAB is not responsible for providing employees with this information. ODNI Has Exercised Some Oversight over Security Clearance Revocations, but Has Not Reviewed the Extent That Clearance Revocation Process Should Be Uniform across the Federal Government
ODNI has exercised some oversight of security clearance revocations by reviewing policies and procedures within some agencies; however, it has not established any metrics to measure the quality of the process government-wide and has not reviewed security clearance revocation processes across the federal government to determine the extent to which policies and procedures should be uniform. was added to address an agency’s process to deny or revoke a clearance. Employment Outcomes after Clearance Revocation Are Determined Based on Several Factors, and Identification of these Outcomes Is Hindered by Lack of Data
DHS and DOD employees whose eligibility to access classified information has been revoked may not have consistent employment outcomes, such as reassignment or termination, because these outcomes are generally dependent on several factors, including the agency’s mission and needs and the manager’s discretion. Communication between personnel security and human capital offices at DHS and DOD varies, because human capital and personnel security processes are intentionally managed separately, and most components could not readily ascertain the employment outcomes of individuals whose clearances had been revoked. Officials from five DHS components—U.S. Without accurate data, DOD’s ability to reduce the total population of clearance holders and minimize risk and reduce costs to the government will be hampered. Further, DHS, DOD, and some of their components have implemented the requirements from the executive orders in different ways. Finally, regarding our recommendation to review and analyze the discrepancies in the total number of employees and the number of employees eligible to access classified information, DOD concurred, commenting that within 30 days of the release of the final report, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence will convene a meeting of action officers and analysts to identify strategies for reviewing, analyzing, and resolving the discrepancies in the total number of employees and the number of employees eligible to access classified information. To assess whether DOD’s personnel security management system accurately reports the total number of DOD employees eligible for access to classified information, we compared the total number of DOD employees eligible for access to classified information reported by DOD’s personnel security management system to the total number of DOD employees in each component. | Why GAO Did This Study
Personnel security clearances allow people access to classified information that, through unauthorized disclosure, can cause exceptionally grave damage to U.S. national security. In light of recent events, having a high-quality process to determine whether an individual's eligibility to access classified information should be revoked has become increasingly important. DOD and DHS grant the most clearances in the executive branch, and the Director of National Intelligence is responsible for, among other things, oversight of clearance eligibility determinations.
GAO was asked to evaluate revocation processes at DHS and DOD. GAO evaluated the extent to which the agencies (1) track data on these processes; (2) consistently implement government-wide requirements and exercise oversight over these processes; and (3) determine outcomes for employees whose clearances were revoked. During this review, GAO identified possible inaccuracies in DOD's data on eligible personnel with access to classified information and is also reporting on that issue. GAO analyzed agency revocation data, reviewed executive orders, agency guidance, and documents, and interviewed officials from ODNI, DHS, DOD, and their components.
What GAO Found
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of Defense (DOD) both have systems that track varying levels of detail related to revocations of employees' security clearances. DHS's and DOD's data systems could provide data on the number of and reasons for revocations, but they could not provide some data, such as the number of individuals who received a proposal to revoke their eligibility for access to classified information, which means that the total number of employees affected by the revocation process is unknown.
Inconsistent implementation of the requirements in the governing executive orders by DHS, DOD, and some of their components, and limited oversight over the revocation process, have resulted in some employees experiencing different protections and processes than other employees. Specifically, DHS and DOD have implemented the requirements for the revocation process contained in Executive Orders 12968 and 10865 in different ways for different groups of personnel. Although certain differences are permitted or required by the executive orders, GAO found that implementation by some components could potentially be inconsistent with the executive orders in two areas. As a result, some employees may not be provided with certain information upon which a revocation appeal determination is based, and may not be told that they have a right to counsel. These inconsistencies in implementation may be in part because neither DHS nor DOD have evaluated the quality of their processes or developed performance measures to measure quality department-wide. Similarly, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) has only exercised limited oversight by reviewing policies and procedures within some agencies. ODNI has not established any metrics to measure the quality of the process government-wide and has not reviewed revocation processes across the federal government to determine the extent to which policies and procedures should be uniform.
DHS and DOD employees whose clearances were revoked may not have consistent employment outcomes, such as reassignment or termination, because these outcomes are determined by several factors, such as the agency's mission and needs and the manager's discretion. Further, most components could not readily ascertain employment outcomes of individuals with revoked clearances, because these data are not readily available, and communication between personnel security and human capital offices at the departments varies.
GAO's comparison of the total number of DOD employees eligible to access classified information to the total number of DOD employees in fiscal year 2013 suggests that DOD's clearance eligibility totals may be inaccurate. Specifically, GAO found that the number of eligible employees exceeded the total number of employees in five DOD components. DOD officials said this discrepancy could be because DOD's eligibility database is not consistently updated when an employee separates. As a result, the total number of government employees eligible to access classified information that ODNI reports to Congress likely overstates the number of eligible DOD employees. Inaccurate eligibility data hampers DOD's ability to reduce its number of clearance holders to minimize risk and reduce costs to the government.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DHS, DOD, and the DNI take several actions to improve data quality and oversight related to the personnel security revocation process. DHS, DOD, and ODNI generally agreed with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-10-834T | gao_GAO-10-834T_0 | Federal Systems and Infrastructures Face Increasing Cyber Threats
Threats to federal information systems and cyber-based critical infrastructures are evolving and growing. Federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies have identified multiple sources of threats to our nation’s critical information systems, including foreign nations engaged in espionage and information warfare, criminals, hackers, virus writers, and disgruntled employees and contractors. These groups and individuals have a variety of attack techniques at their disposal. Furthermore, as we have previously reported, the techniques have characteristics that can vastly enhance the reach and impact of their actions, such as the following: Attackers do not need to be physically close to their targets to perpetrate a cyber attack. Technology allows actions to easily cross multiple state and national borders. Attackers can easily remain anonymous. The connectivity between information systems, the Internet, and other infrastructures creates opportunities for attackers to disrupt telecommunications, electrical power, and other critical services. Reported Security Incidents Are on the Rise
Consistent with the evolving and growing nature of the threats to federal systems, agencies are reporting an increasing number of security incidents. However, serious and widespread information security control deficiencies continue to place federal assets at risk of inadvertent o deliberate misuse, financial information at risk of unauthorized modification or destruction, sensitive information at risk of inappropr disclosure, and critical operations at risk of disruption. In their fiscal year 2009 performance and accountability reports, 21 of 24 major federal agencies noted that inadequate information system controls over their financial systems and information were either a material weakness or a significant deficiency. Similarly, our audits have identified control deficiencies in both financial and nonfinancial systems, including vulnerabilities in critical federal systems. Opportunities Exist for Enhancing Federal Cybersecurity
Over the past several years, we and agency inspectors general have made hundreds of recommendations to agencies for actions necessary to resolve prior significant control deficiencies and information security program shortfalls. In addition, the White House, OMB, and certain federal agencies have undertaken several governmentwide initiatives that are intended to enhance information security at federal agencies. However, these initiatives face challenges that require sustained attention: Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI): In January 2008, President Bush initiated a series of 12 projects aimed primarily at improving the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) and other federal agencies’ efforts to protect against intrusion attempts and anticipate future threats. Similarly, in September 2008, we reported that since conducting a major cyber attack exercise, called Cyber Storm, DHS had demonstrated progress in addressing eight lessons it had learned from these efforts. We also testified in March 2009 on needed improvements to the nation’s cybersecurity strategy. In preparation for that testimony, we obtained the views of experts (by means of panel discussions) on critical aspects of the strategy, including areas for improvement. To help in meeting these threats, opportunities exist to improve information security throughout the federal government. The prompt and effective implementation of the hundreds of recommendations by us and by agency inspectors general to mitigate information security control deficiencies and fully implement agencywide security programs would strengthen the protection of federal information systems, as would efforts by DHS to develop better capabilities to meets its responsibilities, and the implementation of recommended improvements to the national cybersecurity strategy. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pervasive and sustained cyber attacks continue to pose a potentially devastating threat to the systems and operations of the federal government. In recent testimony, the Director of National Intelligence highlighted that many nation states, terrorist networks, and organized criminal groups have the capability to target elements of the United States information infrastructure for intelligence collection, intellectual property theft, or disruption. In July 2009, press accounts reported attacks on Web sites operated by major government agencies. The ever-increasing dependence of federal agencies on information systems to carry out essential, everyday operations can make them vulnerable to an array of cyber-based risks. Thus it is increasingly important that the federal government carry out a concerted effort to safeguard its systems and the information they contain. GAO is providing a statement describing (1) cyber threats to federal information systems and cyber-based critical infrastructures, (2) control deficiencies that make federal systems vulnerable to those threats, and (3) opportunities that exist for improving federal cybersecurity. In preparing this statement, GAO relied on its previously published work in this area.
What GAO Found
Cyber-based threats to federal systems and critical infrastructure are evolving and growing. These threats can come from a variety of sources, including criminals and foreign nations, as well as hackers and disgruntled employees. These potential attackers have a variety of techniques at their disposal, which can vastly enhance the reach and impact of their actions. For example, cyber attackers do not need to be physically close to their targets, their attacks can easily cross state and national borders, and cyber attackers can easily preserve their anonymity. Further, the interconnectivity between information systems, the Internet, and other infrastructure presents increasing opportunities for such attacks. Consistent with this, reports of security incidents from federal agencies are on the rise, increasing by over 400 percent from fiscal year 2006 to fiscal year 2009. Compounding the growing number and kinds of threats, GAO--along with agencies' internal assessments--has identified significant deficiencies in the security controls on federal information systems, which have resulted in pervasive vulnerabilities. These include weaknesses in the security of both financial and non-financial systems and information, including vulnerabilities in critical federal systems. These deficiencies continue to place federal assets at risk of inadvertent or deliberate misuse, financial information at risk of unauthorized modification or destruction, and critical operations at risk of disruption. Multiple opportunities exist to improve federal cybersecurity. To address identified deficiencies in agencies' security controls and shortfalls in their information security programs, GAO and agency inspectors general have made hundreds of recommendations over the past several years, many of which agencies are implementing. In addition, the White House, the Office of Management and Budget, and certain federal agencies have undertaken several governmentwide initiatives intended to enhance information security at federal agencies. While progress has been made on these initiatives, they all face challenges that require sustained attention, and GAO has made several recommendations for improving the implementation and effectiveness of these initiatives. Further, the Department of Homeland Security also needs to fulfill its key cybersecurity responsibilities, such as developing capabilities for ensuring the protection of cyber-based critical infrastructures and implementing lessons learned from a major cyber simulation exercise. Finally, a GAO-convened panel of experts has made several recommendations for improving the nation's cybersecurity strategy. Realizing these opportunities for improvement can help ensure that the federal government's systems, information, and critical cyber-based infrastructures are effectively protected. |
gao_AIMD-97-133 | gao_AIMD-97-133_0 | NWS operations also support other agencies’ missions and the nation’s commercial interests. Scope and Methodology
To assess the degree of NWS analysis in support of the planned closure of the southern regional headquarters office, we reviewed NWS documents, including a transition report on the closure, cost comparisons of maintaining a four mainland regional structure versus a three mainland regional structure, alternative plans for keeping the four mainland regional structures intact, and the estimated cost savings associated with the closure of the southern region. Further, NWS officials did not fill 118 vacant positions in fiscal year 1997. The director of the eastern regional headquarters office was very concerned that his office would be taking on far greater responsibilities than could be managed. No Viable, Documented Alternative Developed for Maintaining Current Regional Structure
NWS headquarters did not, according to its deputy for operations, develop any documented alternative plans that would enable it to keep intact the current regional structure of four mainland offices and to meet the budget shortfall and minimize adverse impact to weather service users. This proposal was similarly rejected for exceeding the regional staffing target of 189. By not completing and documenting a risk analysis to support its decision to close the southern regional headquarters office, NWS does not have an adequate basis on which to assure weather service users in that area that they will not be exposed to unnecessary risk. Recommendation
To ensure that weather service users are not adversely affected by a decision to restructure NWS offices, we recommend that, prior to making any decision to close the southern regional headquarters office, the Secretary of Commerce direct that the Administrator, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, complete a documented analysis of the risks associated with a range of alternative actions to address NWS budget shortfalls. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed proposed staffing cuts at the National Weather Service (NWS), focusing on the NWS analysis: (1) supporting the planned closure of its southern regional headquarters office; and (2) of alternative plans for maintaining its current regional structure of four mainland offices.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) NWS did not perform any documented risk analysis to support its decision to close its southern regional headquarters office; (2) accelerating the planned closure of this office was one of several actions taken in response to a budget shortfall estimated by both the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and NWS to be about $47 million for fiscal year 1997; (3) while acknowledging that no risk analysis was conducted, NWS officials stated that, on the basis of their professional judgment, no degradation of service would occur from the closure because the southern region's responsibilities would be transferred to other regional offices; (4) weather service users have raised concerns, however, including whether the closure would adversely affect weather services and jeopardize public safety and the protection of property; (5) several alternative strategies for maintaining the current regional structure were proposed by NWS regional offices; (6) headquarters officials rejected these strategies primarily because they did not meet the agency's overall staffing targets for the regions; and (7) because of uncertainties surrounding NWS funding, the Secretary of Commerce announced on June 25, 1997, that a decision to close the southern regional office would be delayed for 60 days, to give outside experts an opportunity to complete a review of NWS' budget and operations. |
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