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gao_GAO-09-985 | gao_GAO-09-985_0 | Part B provides for grants to states and territories and associated jurisdictions to improve quality, availability, and organization of HIV services. CDC and HRSA Have Coordinated on HIV Activities to Assist Health Care Professionals, and Both Agencies Have Taken Steps to Encourage Routine HIV Testing
CDC and HRSA have coordinated on activities to assist health care professionals who provide HIV-related services. CDC also provided HRSA with funding to expand HIV consultation services offered to health care professionals at the National HIV/AIDS Clinicians’ Consultation Center. For example, officials from 3 of these health departments attributed the lack of coordination to differing guidelines CDC and HRSA use for their grantees. HRSA Has Encouraged Routine HIV Testing by Providing for Training for Health Care Providers as Part of CDC-Funded Initiatives
Since the release of CDC’s 2006 routine HIV testing recommendations, HRSA has encouraged routine HIV testing by providing for training for health care providers, as part of CDC-funded initiatives. CDC required health departments to spend all funding on HIV testing and related activities, including the purchase of HIV rapid tests and connecting HIV-positive individuals to care. Over Half of the Selected State and Local Health Departments Reported Implementing Routine HIV Testing in Their Jurisdictions, but Generally Did So in a Limited Number of Sites
Officials from 9 of the 14 state and local health departments we interviewed said that their departments had implemented routine HIV testing, but 7 said that they did so in a limited number of sites. Officials from Selected State and Local Health Departments and Other Sources Have Identified Barriers That Exist to Implementing Routine HIV Testing
Officials from 11 of the 14 state and local health departments we interviewed and other sources knowledgeable about HIV have identified barriers that exist to implementing routine HIV testing. CDC Officials Estimated That About 30 Percent of the Agency’s Annual HIV Prevention Funding Is Spent on HIV Testing
CDC officials estimated that approximately 30 percent of the agency’s annual HIV prevention funding is spent on HIV testing. For example, according to CDC officials, in fiscal year 2008 this would make the total amount spent on HIV testing about $200 million out of the $652.8 million CDC allocated for domestic HIV prevention to its Division of HIV/AIDS Prevention. CDC officials said that, outside of special testing initiatives, they could not provide the exact amount CDC spent on HIV testing. A National Estimate of the Number of Undiagnosed HIV- Positive Individuals Is Available, but an Estimate Is Not Available for the Total Number of Diagnosed Individuals Not Receiving Care Nationally and Neither Estimate Is Available at the State Level
CDC has calculated a national estimate of more than 200,000 undiagnosed HIV-positive individuals—that is, individuals who were unaware they are HIV positive and were therefore not receiving care for HIV. CDC estimated that 232,700 individuals, or 21 percent of the 1.1 million people living with HIV at the end of 2006, were unaware that they were HIV positive. CDC reported that the estimated proportion of individuals with HIV who did not receive care within a year of diagnosis—which CDC measures by the number of HIV-positive individuals who did not have a reported CD4 or viral load test within this time—was 32.4 percent, or 12,285 of the 37,880 individuals who were diagnosed with HIV in 2003. In these examples, the individuals’ change in status as receiving care or not receiving care is not included in CDC’s estimate of the proportion of diagnosed individuals not receiving care. HRSA also collects states’ estimates of the number of diagnosed HIV- positive individuals not receiving care for HIV, but data are not consistently collected or reported by states, and therefore estimates are not available for comparison across all states. Agency Comments
HHS provided technical comments on a draft of the report, which we incorporated as appropriate. We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Health and Human Services. Additionally, we provide information on steps taken by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and states to address this issue. To provide information related to the steps that CDC and HRSA have taken to address the provision of HIV prevention and care for incarcerated persons, we interviewed CDC and HRSA officials. | Why GAO Did This Study
Of the estimated 1.1 million Americans living with HIV, not all are aware of their HIV-positive status. Timely testing of HIV-positive individuals is important to improve health outcomes and to slow the disease's transmission. It is also important that individuals have access to HIV care after being diagnosed, but not all diagnosed individuals are receiving such care. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) provides grants to state and local health departments for HIV prevention and collects data on HIV. In 2006, CDC recommended routine HIV testing for all individuals ages 13-64. The Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) provides grants to states and localities for HIV care and services. GAO was asked to examine issues related to identifying individuals with HIV and connecting them to care. This report examines: 1) CDC and HRSA's coordination on HIV activities and steps they have taken to encourage routine HIV testing; 2) implementation of routine HIV testing by select state and local health departments; 3) available information on CDC funding for HIV testing; and 4) available data on the number of HIV-positive individuals not receiving care for HIV. GAO reviewed reports and agency documents and analyzed CDC, HRSA, and national survey data. GAO interviewed federal officials, officials from nine state and five local health departments chosen by geographic location and number of HIV cases, and others knowledgeable about HIV.
What GAO Found
The Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) is required to ensure that HHS agencies, including CDC and HRSA, coordinate HIV programs to enhance the continuity of prevention and care services. CDC and HRSA have coordinated to assist health care professionals who provide HIV-related services. For example, in 2007 and 2008, CDC provided funding to HRSA to expand consultation services at the National HIV/AIDS Clinicians' Consultation Center. Both CDC and HRSA have taken steps to encourage routine HIV testing--that is, testing all individuals in a health care setting without regard to risk. For example, CDC has funded initiatives on routine HIV testing and HRSA has provided for training as part of these initiatives. Officials from over half of the 14 selected state and local health departments in GAO's review reported implementing routine HIV testing in their jurisdictions. However, according to officials we interviewed, those that implemented it generally did so at a limited number of sites. Officials from most of the selected health departments and other sources knowledgeable about HIV have identified barriers that exist to implementing routine HIV testing, including lack of funding and legal barriers. CDC officials estimated that approximately 30 percent of the agency's annual HIV prevention funding is spent on HIV testing. For example, according to CDC officials, in fiscal 2008, this would make the total amount spent on HIV testing about $200 million out of the $652.8 million CDC allocated for domestic HIV prevention to its Division of HIV/AIDS Prevention. However, CDC officials said that they could not provide the exact amount the Division spends on HIV testing, because they do not routinely aggregate how much all grantees spend on a given activity, including HIV testing. CDC estimated that 232,700 individuals with HIV were undiagnosed--that is, unaware that they were HIV positive--in 2006, and were therefore not receiving care for HIV. CDC has not estimated the total number of diagnosed HIV-positive individuals not receiving care, but has estimated that 32.4 percent, or approximately 12,000, of HIV-positive individuals diagnosed in 2003 did not receive care for HIV within a year of diagnosis. State-level estimates of the number of undiagnosed and diagnosed HIV-positive individuals not receiving care for HIV are not available from CDC. HRSA collects states' estimates of the number of diagnosed individuals not receiving care, but data are not consistently collected or reported by states, and therefore estimates are not available for comparison across all states. HHS provided technical comments on a draft of this report, which GAO incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-11-653 | gao_GAO-11-653_0 | Real estate can be valued using a number of methods, including appraisals, broker price opinions (BPO), and automated valuation models (AVM). The Widespread Use of Appraisals and the Sales Comparison Approach Reflect Their Relative Advantages for Valuations in Mortgage Originations
Available Data Indicate That Appraisals Are the Most Commonly Used Valuation Method for Mortgage Originations
Available data, lenders, and mortgage industry participants we spoke with indicate that appraisals are the most frequently used valuation method for home purchase and refinance mortgages. The enterprises and FHA require that appraisals provide an estimate of market value at a point in time and reflect prevailing economic and housing market conditions. Recent Policy Changes May Affect Consumer Costs for Appraisals, while Other Policy Changes Have Enhanced Disclosures to Consumers
Consumer Costs for Appraisals Vary by Geographic Location, Appraisal Type, and Property Complexity
Lenders generally require consumers to pay for costs associated with obtaining appraisals, which can include fees paid to appraisers and appraisal firms for providing the appraisal and fees charged by AMCs that lenders often use to administer the appraisal process. How the New Requirement That Appraisers Be Paid Customary and Reasonable Fees Will Affect Consumer Costs Is Unknown
A provision in the Act that requires lenders to pay appraisers a “customary and reasonable fee” may affect consumer costs for appraisals, depending on interpretation and implementation of federal rules. If actual costs are higher than this threshold, the lender is responsible for making up the difference, providing lenders with a greater incentive to estimate costs accurately. Conflict-of-Interest Policies Have Changed Appraiser Selection Processes, with Implications for Appraisal Oversight
Recent Policies Address Conflicts of Interest by Enhancing Appraiser Independence Requirements
Recently issued policies reinforce long-standing requirements and guidance addressing conflicts of interest that may arise when parties have an incentive to unduly influence or pressure appraisers to provide biased values. Greater Use of Appraisal Management Companies Highlights Potential Shortcomings in Existing Oversight and Has Raised Questions about Appraisal Quality
Although reliance on AMCs has increased, direct federal oversight of AMCs is limited. Similarly, the enterprises review lenders’ policies and controls but not those of AMCs because lenders are responsible for ensuring that AMCs meet the enterprises’ requirements. Officials from the enterprises said they do not review AMCs directly because they do not have business relationships with AMCs. While views on the impact of AMCs on appraisal quality differ, Congress recognized the importance of additional AMC oversight in enacting the Act by requiring each state to register and regulate AMCs and placing the supervision of AMCs with state appraiser regulatory boards. In addition, the Act requires the federal banking regulators, along with FHFA and the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, to establish minimum standards for states to apply when registering AMCs, including requirements that appraisals coordinated by an AMC comply with USPAP and be conducted independently and free from inappropriate influence and coercion. The Act requires the federal banking regulators and other federal agencies to set minimum state standards for registering AMCs, which provides an opportunity for the regulators to address these areas of concern and promote more consistent oversight of these functions, whether performed by lenders or AMCs. Doing so could help to provide greater assurance to lenders, the enterprises, and federal agencies of the quality of the appraisals provided by AMCs. Recommendation for Executive Action
To help ensure more consistent and effective oversight of the appraisal industry, we recommend that the heads of FDIC, the Federal Reserve, FHFA, NCUA, OCC, and the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection— as part of their joint rulemaking required under the Act—consider including the following areas when developing minimum standards for state registration of AMCs: criteria for selecting appraisers for appraisal orders, review of completed appraisals, and qualifications for appraisal reviewers. We examine (1) the use of different valuation methods and their advantages and disadvantages; (2) factors that affect consumer costs and requirements for disclosing appraisal costs and valuation reports to consumers; and (3) conflict-of- interest and appraiser selection policies, and views on the impact of these policies on industry stakeholders and appraisal quality. We also consider the impact of the Home Valuation Code of Conduct (HVCC) throughout the report. We requested aggregated data on valuations for mortgages originated in these years from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (the enterprises), the five largest lenders (as determined by the dollar volume of total mortgage originations in 2010), six of the largest appraisal management companies (AMC) (as identified by industry trade associations), and three private vendors of mortgage and valuation technology. We interviewed federal banking regulators, lenders, appraisers, AMCs, state regulatory officials, and other mortgage industry participants to discuss changes in policies and their impact on the appraisal process, industry participants, and appraisal quality. | Why GAO Did This Study
Real estate valuations, which encompass appraisals and other estimation methods, have come under increased scrutiny in the wake of the recent mortgage crisis. The Dodd- Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the Act) mandated that GAO study the various valuation methods and the options available for selecting appraisers, as well as the Home Valuation Code of Conduct (HVCC), which established appraiser independence requirements for mortgages sold to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (the enterprises). GAO examined (1) the use of different valuation methods, (2) factors affecting consumer costs for appraisals and appraisal disclosure requirements, and (3) conflict-of-interest and appraiser selection policies and views on their impact. To address these objectives, GAO analyzed government and industry data; reviewed academic and industry literature; examined federal policies and regulations, professional standards, and internal policies and procedures of lenders and appraisal management companies (AMC); and interviewed a broad range of industry participants and observers..
What GAO Found
Data GAO obtained from the enterprises and five of the largest mortgage lenders indicate that appraisals--which provide an estimate of market value at a point in time--are the most commonly used valuation method for first-lien residential mortgage originations, reflecting their perceived advantages relative to other methods. Other methods, such as broker price opinions and automated valuation models, are quicker and less costly but are viewed as less reliable and therefore generally are not used for most purchase and refinance mortgage originations. Although the enterprises and lenders GAO spoke with do not capture data on the prevalence of approaches used to perform appraisals, the sales comparison approach--in which the value is based on recent sales of similar properties--is required by the enterprises and the Federal Housing Administration and is reportedly used in nearly all appraisals. Recent policy changes may affect consumer costs for appraisals, while other policy changes have enhanced disclosures to consumers. Consumer costs for appraisals vary by geographic location, appraisal type, and complexity. However, the impact of recent policy changes on these costs is uncertain. Some appraisers are concerned that the fees they receive from AMCs--firms that manage the appraisal process on behalf of lenders--are too low. A new requirement to pay appraisers a customary and reasonable fee could affect consumer costs and appraisal quality, depending on how new rules are implemented. Other recent policy changes aim to provide lenders with a greater incentive to estimate costs accurately and require lenders to provide consumers with a copy of the valuation report prior to closing. Conflict-of-interest policies, including HVCC, have changed appraiser selection processes and the appraisal industry more broadly, which has raised concerns among some industry participants about the oversight of AMCs. Recently issued policies that reinforce prior requirements and guidance restrict who can select appraisers and prohibit coercing appraisers. In response to market changes and these requirements, some lenders turned to AMCs to select appraisers. Greater use of AMCs has raised questions about oversight of these firms and their impact on appraisal quality. Federal regulators and the enterprises said they hold lenders responsible for ensuring that AMCs' policies and practices meet their requirements for appraiser selection, appraisal review, and reviewer qualifications but that they generally do not directly examine AMCs' operations. Some industry participants said they are concerned that some AMCs may prioritize low costs and speed over quality and competence. The Act places the supervision of AMCs with state appraiser licensing boards and requires the federal banking regulators, the Federal Housing Finance Agency, and the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection to establish minimum standards for states to apply in registering AMCs. A number of states began regulating AMCs in 2009, but the regulatory requirements vary. Setting minimum standards that address key functions AMCs perform on behalf of lenders would enhance oversight of appraisal services and provide greater assurance to lenders, the enterprises, and others of the credibility and quality of the appraisals provided by AMCs.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that federal banking regulators, the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), and the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection consider addressing several key areas, including criteria for selecting appraisers, as part of their joint rulemaking under the Act to set minimum standards for states to apply in registering AMCs. The federal banking regulators and FHFA agreed with or indicated they would consider the recommendation. |
gao_GAO-10-284 | gao_GAO-10-284_0 | DOD Has Implemented Guidance That Generally Addresses Legislative Requirements
To meet the legislative requirements regarding independent management reviews, DOD issued guidance and instructions providing for a peer review process for services acquisitions. DOD’s guidance generally addresses requirements prescribed in the Act to develop a process to evaluate the specified contracting issues, but according to DOD officials, DOD has not yet determined how the department plans to disseminate lessons learned or track recommendations that result from the newly instituted reviews. DOD officials expect to further refine their processes, including developing a more formal means for disseminating lessons learned and tracking recommendations as DOD assesses its initial experiences with peer reviews. Further, as peer review processes evolve, the military departments are considering ways to disseminate lessons learned and track recommendations. 1). Further, the guidance established review criteria for post-award reviews that address each of the contracting issues identified in the Act. Officials said that the teams are generally chaired by a deputy director within DPAP and include participation from senior contracting officials from the military departments and defense agencies as well as legal advisors from the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s General Counsel. The February 2009 guidance indicated that DPAP is to review services acquisitions with an expected value of over $1 billion. As of September 30, 2009, DPAP had conducted 29 peer reviews for 18 services acquisitions. DPAP has not yet determined if it will establish a policy for conducting peer reviews for all individual task orders over this amount in the future. In addition to providing recommendations to address potential issues in proposed acquisitions, the peer review teams have also identified some best practices. Military Departments’ Peer Review Processes Are Evolving
The September 2008 DPAP guidance required the military departments to establish their own procedures for conducting pre- and post-award peer reviews on acquisitions under $1 billion, but provided the flexibility to the services to tailor the process to best meet their needs. 3). As of September 2009, the military departments reported conducting hundreds of peer reviews for services acquisitions, but the departments do not have comprehensive processes for determining the exact number of reviews conducted. DOD indicated that it will continue to refine its peer review process to better disseminate trends, lessons learned, and best practices that are identified during peer reviews. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Section 808 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (the Act) directs GAO to report on the Department of Defense’s (DOD) implementation of its guidance and implementing instructions providing for periodic management reviews of contracts for services. In response to this mandate, we (1) assessed the extent to which DOD’s guidance addressed the Act’s requirements at the department level and how the guidance was implemented and (2) determined the status of actions taken by the military departments pursuant to DOD’s guidance. To do so, we reviewed DOD’s September 2008 and February 2009 guidance issued by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics’ Office of Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy (DPAP). The Navy provided information on the number of reviews it had conducted but could not specify how many had been conducted as of September 30, 2009. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) is the federal government's largest purchaser of contractor-provided services, obligating more than $207 billion on services contracts in fiscal year 2009. DOD contract management has been on GAO's high-risk list since 1992, in part because of continued weaknesses in DOD's management and oversight of contracts for services. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 directed DOD to issue guidance providing for independent management reviews for services acquisitions. The Act required that the guidance provide a means to evaluate specific contracting issues and to address other issues, including identifying procedures for tracking recommendations and disseminating lessons learned. The Act also directed GAO to report on DOD's implementation of its guidance. GAO (1) assessed the extent to which DOD's guidance addressed the Act's requirements and how the guidance was implemented and (2) determined the status of actions taken by the military departments pursuant to DOD's guidance. GAO compared DOD's guidance with the Act's requirements; obtained data on the number of reviews conducted as of September 2009; and analyzed memoranda of 29 acquisitions valued at over $1 billion. In its written comments, DOD noted it planned to refine its processes to better share the lessons learned and best practices identified during peer reviews.
What GAO Found
To meet the legislative requirement regarding independent management reviews, DOD issued guidance in September 2008 and February 2009 providing for a peer review process for services acquisitions. DOD's guidance generally addresses requirements in the Act to issue guidance designed to evaluate specified contracting issues, but according to officials, DOD has not yet determined how it plans to disseminate lessons learned or track recommendations that result from the newly instituted reviews. Under this guidance, the Office of Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy (DPAP) is responsible for conducting pre- and post-award peer reviews for services acquisitions with an estimated value of over $1 billion. Peer review teams include senior contracting officials from the military departments and defense agencies as well as legal advisors. As of September 30, 2009, DPAP had conducted 29 reviews of 18 services acquisitions, including 3 post-award reviews. DOD has also conducted peer reviews on two task orders but has not yet determined if it will do so on individual task orders in the future. The peer review teams made a number of recommendations and identified some best practices. DOD officials expect to refine their processes, including developing a more formal means for disseminating lessons learned and tracking recommendations, as DOD assesses its initial experiences with peer reviews. Each of the military departments has issued guidance establishing peer review processes for services acquisitions valued at less than $1 billion although the guidance is still evolving. The departments' guidance identifies the offices or commands tasked with conducting peer reviews based on various dollar thresholds. The military departments reported conducting hundreds of peer reviews for services acquisitions as of September 30, 2009, but could not provide exact numbers because of the lack of comprehensive reporting processes. Further, as peer review processes evolve, the military departments are considering ways to disseminate lessons learned and track recommendations. |
gao_T-GGD-97-53 | gao_T-GGD-97-53_0 | Postal Service. My testimony will (1) focus on the performance of the Postal Service and the need for improving internal controls and protecting revenue in an organization that takes in and spends billions of dollars each year and (2) highlight some of the key reform and oversight issues that continue to challenge the Postal Service and Congress as they consider how U.S. mail service will be provided in the future. Last year, the Postal Service reported that it had achieved outstanding financial and operational performance. According to the Postal Service’s 1996 annual report, its fiscal year 1996 net income was $1.6 billion. Most recently, the Postmaster General announced that, during 1996, the Postal Service delivered 91 percent of overnight mail on time or better. Additionally, during fiscal year 1996, the Postal Service’s volume exceeded 182 billion pieces of mail and generated more than $56 billion in revenue. While these results are encouraging, other performance data suggest that some areas of concern warrant closer scrutiny. For example, last year’s delivery of 2-day and 3-day mail—at 80 and 83 percent respectively—did not score as high as overnight delivery. Such performance has raised a concern among some customers that the Postal Service’s emphasis on overnight delivery is at the expense of 2-day and 3-day mail. Additionally, although its mail volume continues to grow, the Postal Service is concerned that customers increasingly are turning to its competitors or alternative communications methods. In 1996, mail volume increased by about one-half of anticipated increase in volume. The Postal Service’s continued success in both operational and financial performance will depend heavily on its ability to control operating costs, strengthen internal controls, and ensure the integrity of its services. However, we found several weaknesses in the Postal Service’s internal controls that contributed to unnecessary increased costs. Another key reform issue is the future role of the Postal Service in the constantly changing and increasingly competitive communications market. We also identified several issues surrounding the Postal Service’s role in the international mail arena that remain unresolved. Oversight of the Postal Service Remains Important
despite the initiatives that have been established to address them. The Postal Service has made considerable progress in improving its financial and operational performance. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the challenges that confront the Postal Service and Congress as they consider how to sustain the Postal Service's performance and maintain a competitive role in providing mail service to the American public in the future.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the Postal Service reported that fiscal year (FY) 1996 represented the second year in a row that its financial performance was profitable and operational performance improved; (2) the Postal Service's 1996 net income was $1.6 billion and it delivered 91 percent of overnight mail on time; (3) additionally, for FY 1996, the Postal Service's volume exceeded 182 billion pieces of mail and generated more than $56 billion in revenue; (4) while these results are encouraging, other performance data suggest that some areas warrant closer scrutiny; (5) last year's delivery of 2-day and 3-day mail, at 80 and 83 percent respectively, did not score as high as overnight delivery; (6) the concern among customers is that the Postal Service's emphasis on overnight delivery is at the expense of 2-day and 3-day mail; (7) additionally, although its mail volume continues to grow, the Postal Service is concerned that customers increasingly are turning to its competitors or alternative communications methods; (8) in 1996, mail volume increased by about one-half of anticipated increase in volume; (9) containing costs is another key challenge that GAO has reported on previously; (10) GAO has also found several weaknesses in the Postal Service's internal controls that contributed to increased costs; (11) the Postal Service's continued success in both financial and operational performance will depend heavily on controlling operating costs, strengthening internal controls, and ensuring the integrity of its services; (12) the prospect that pending postal legislation may place the Postal Service in a more competitive arena with its private sector counterparts has prompted congressional consideration of some key reform issues; (13) these issues include how proposed changes to the Private Express Statutes may affect universal mail service, postal revenues, and rates; (14) another reform issue is the future role of the Postal Service in an increasingly competitive, constantly changing communications market; (15) congressional oversight remains a key tool for improving the organizational performance of the Postal Service; (16) one of the most important areas for oversight is labor-management relations; (17) despite the initiatives that have been established to address them, the long-standing labor-management relations problems GAO identified in 1994 remain unresolved; and (18) also, the Postal Service's automation efforts will continue to require the attention of both the Postal Service and Congress to ensure that increased productivity and an adequate return on investments are realized. |
gao_GAO-05-439T | gao_GAO-05-439T_0 | The program is funded through statutorily mandated payments by companies that provide interstate telecommunications services. FCC Established an Unusual Program Structure without Comprehensively Addressing the Applicability of Governmental Standards and Fiscal Controls
FCC established an unusual structure for the E-rate program but has never conducted a comprehensive assessment of which federal requirements, policies, and practices apply to the program, to USAC, or to the Universal Service Fund itself. However, FCC’s conclusions concerning the status of the Universal Service Fund raise further issues relating to the collection, deposit, obligation, and disbursement of those funds—issues that FCC needs to explore and resolve comprehensively rather than in an ad hoc fashion as problems arise. However, USAC is not part of FCC or any other government entity; it is not a government corporation established by Congress; and no contract or memorandum of understanding exists between FCC and USAC for the administration of the E-rate program. FCC Did Not Develop Useful Performance Goals and Measures for Assessing and Managing the E-Rate Program
Although $13 billion in E-rate funding has been committed to beneficiaries during the past 7 years, FCC did not develop useful performance goals and measures to assess the specific impact of these funds on schools’ and libraries’ Internet access and to improve the management of the program, despite a recommendation by us in 1998 to do so. For fiscal years 2000 through 2002, FCC’s goals focused on achieving certain percentage levels of Internet connectivity during a given fiscal year for schools, public school instructional classrooms, and libraries. However, the data that FCC used to report on its progress was limited to public schools (thereby excluding two other major groups of beneficiaries—private schools and libraries) and did not isolate the impact of E-rate funding from other sources of funding, such as state and local government. However, management-oriented goals have not been a feature of FCC’s performance plans, despite long-standing concerns about the program’s effectiveness in key areas. For example, a review of the program by OMB in 2003 concluded that there was no way to tell whether the program has resulted in the cost-effective deployment and use of advanced telecommunications services for schools and libraries. OMB also noted that there was little oversight to ensure that the program beneficiaries were using the funding appropriately and effectively. In response to these concerns, FCC staff have been working on developing new performance goals and measures for the E-rate program and plan to finalize them and seek OMB approval in fiscal year 2005. We found weaknesses with FCC’s implementation of each of these mechanisms, limiting the effectiveness of FCC’s oversight of the program and the enforcement of program procedures to guard against waste, fraud, and abuse of E-rate funding. FCC’s E-rate rulemakings, however, have often been broadly worded and lacking specificity. Beneficiary audits are the most robust mechanism available to the commission in the oversight of the E-rate program, yet FCC generally has been slow to respond to audit findings and has not made full use of the audit findings as a means to understand and resolve problems within the program. FCC Has Been Slow to Act on Some E-Rate Appeals
Under FCC’s rules, program participants can seek review of USAC’s decisions, although FCC’s appeals process for the E-rate program has been slow in some cases. Because appeals decisions are used as precedent, this slowness adds uncertainty to the program and impacts beneficiaries. To address these management and oversight problems identified in our review of the E-rate program, our report recommends that the Chairman of FCC direct commission staff to (1) conduct and document a comprehensive assessment to determine whether all necessary government accountability requirements, policies, and practices have been applied and are fully in place to protect the E-rate program and universal service funding; (2) establish meaningful performance goals and measures for the E-rate program; and (3) develop a strategy for reducing the E-rate program’s appeals backlog, including ensuring that adequate staffing resources are devoted to E-rate appeals. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 1998, the Federal Communications Commission's (FCC) E-rate program has committed more than $13 billion to help schools and libraries acquire Internet and telecommunications services. Recently, allegations of fraud, waste, and abuse by some E-rate program participants have come to light. As steward of the program, FCC must ensure that participants use E-rate funds appropriately and that there is managerial and financial accountability surrounding the funds. This testimony is based on GAO's February 2005 report GAO-05-151 , which reviewed (1) the effect of the current structure of the E-rate program on FCC's management of the program, (2) FCC's development and use of E-rate performance goals and measures, and (3) the effectiveness of FCC's program oversight mechanisms.
What GAO Found
FCC established the E-rate program using an organizational structure unusual to the government without conducting a comprehensive assessment to determine which federal requirements, policies, and practices apply to it. The E-rate program is administered by a private, not-for-profit corporation with no contract or memorandum of understanding with FCC, and program funds are maintained outside of the U.S. Treasury, raising issues related to the collection, deposit, obligation, and disbursement of the funding. While FCC recently concluded that the Universal Service Fund constitutes an appropriation and is subject to the Antideficiency Act, this raises further issues concerning the applicability of other fiscal control and accountability statutes. These issues need to be explored and resolved comprehensively to ensure that appropriate governmental accountability standards are fully in place to help protect the program and the fund from fraud, waste, and abuse. FCC has not developed useful performance goals and measures for assessing and managing the E-rate program. The goals established for fiscal years 2000 through 2002 focused on the percentage of public schools connected to the Internet, but the data used to measure performance did not isolate the impact of E-rate funding from other sources of funding, such as state and local government. A key unanswered question, therefore, is the extent to which increases in connectivity can be attributed to E-rate. In addition, goals for improving E-rate program management have not been a feature of FCC's performance plans. In its 2003 assessment of the program, OMB noted that FCC discontinued E-rate performance measures after fiscal year 2002 and concluded that there was no way to tell whether the program has resulted in the cost-effective deployment and use of advanced telecommunications services for schools and libraries. In response to OMB's concerns, FCC is currently working on developing new E-rate goals. FCC's oversight mechanisms contain weaknesses that limit FCC's management of the program and its ability to understand the scope of any fraud, waste, and abuse within the program. According to FCC officials, oversight of the program is primarily handled through agency rulemaking procedures, beneficiary audits, and appeals decisions. FCC's rulemakings have often lacked specificity and led to a distinction between FCC's rules and the procedures put in place by the program administrator--a distinction that has affected the recovery of funds for program violations. While audits of E-rate beneficiaries have been conducted, FCC has been slow to respond to audit findings and make full use of them to strengthen the program. In addition, the small number of audits completed to date do not provide a basis for accurately assessing the level of fraud, waste, and abuse occurring in the program, although the program administrator is working to address this issue. According to FCC officials, there is also a substantial backlog of E-rate appeals due in part to a shortage of staff and staff turnover. Because appeal decisions establish precedent, this slowness adds uncertainty to the program. |
gao_GGD-99-44 | gao_GGD-99-44_0 | INS’ Border Patrol is responsible for preventing and detecting illegal entry along the border between the nation’s ports of entry. INS Continued to Implement the Attorney General’s Strategy
During fiscal year 1998, INS continued to make progress toward implementing the Attorney General’s strategy. As called for in the strategy, INS allocated its new Border Patrol agent positions according to its four- phased approach and increased the amount of time agents spent on border enforcement activities. Consistent with the strategy, INS allocated 740 (74 percent) of the additional 1,000 Border Patrol agent positions authorized in fiscal year 1998 to phase II sectors in Arizona and Texas. INS Is Testing a Model to Help Identify Appropriate Resource Mix
To identify the appropriate quantity and mix of personnel, equipment, and technology needed to control the border, in January 1999, INS headquarters was testing a Resource and Effectiveness Model designed to measure how changes in resources affect the Border Patrol’s effectiveness in apprehending illegal aliens and seizing narcotics. Consequently, INS did not request any additional southwest land-border inspector positions in its fiscal year 1998 and 1999 budgets. To increase enforcement efforts, southwest border ports continued activities such as using joint enforcement teams to inspect travelers and conducting multiagency cross-training, according to INS reports. Interim Effects of the Strategy
As the strategy along the southwest border is carried out, the Attorney General has anticipated the following interim effects: (1) an initial increase in the number of illegal aliens apprehended in locations receiving an infusion of Border Patrol resources, followed by a decrease in apprehensions; (2) a shift in the flow of illegal alien traffic from sectors that traditionally accounted for most illegal immigration to other sectors; (3) increased attempts by aliens to enter the United States illegally at the ports of entry; (4) increased fees charged by alien smugglers and the use of more sophisticated smuggling tactics; (5) an eventual decrease in attempted reentries by illegal aliens who previously have been apprehended; and (6) reduced violence at the border. Although evaluative data continue to be limited, available data indicated that some of the anticipated effects continued to occur since our last report. Inspectors at southwest border ports of entry apprehended an increased number of persons attempting fraudulent entry and, according to an INS report, smugglers in the Tucson sector were charging higher fees. 7.) 8.) However, the use of IDENT has been uneven at these locations. Thus, in our 1997 report we recommended that the Attorney General develop and implement a plan for a formal, cost-effective, systematic evaluation of the strategy. Pursuant to our recommendation, INS entered into agreements in September 1998 with three independent contractors to provide evaluative studies. The Executive Associate Commissioner for Policy and Planning wrote us that these agreements “will enable INS to develop a southwest border strategy evaluation and to initiate the analysis that fulfills these evaluation plans.”
INS contracted with Advancia Corporation of Lawton, OK, to (1) design an evaluation strategy, (2) identify data needs and analytical approaches, and (3) conduct a study of the southwest border strategy. In April 1999, an official with INS’ Office of Policy and Planning said that the contractor was developing a formal analysis plan intended to assess the effectiveness of the southwest border strategy to date, as well as an evaluation design and analysis plan for continuing evaluation of the strategy. INS could provide us with no other information on the contractors’ progress. A recorded menu will provide information on how to obtain these lists. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO provided information on the Attorney General's strategy for reducing and deterring illegal entry along the southwest border, focusing on: (1) the Immigration and Naturalization Service's (INS) progress in implementing the southwest border strategy during fiscal year (FY) 1998; (2) interim results of the strategy; and (3) actions taken on GAO's recommendation that the Attorney General develop and implement a plan for formal, cost-effective, comprehensive, and systematic evaluation of the strategy.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) INS is continuing to implement its southwest border strategy; (2) although some of the expected interim results continue to occur, available data do not yet answer the fundamental question of how effective the strategy has been in preventing illegal entry; (3) in FY 1998, INS' Border Patrol transitioned into the second phase of its four-phased approach, which called for increasing Border Patrol agents and resources to sectors in Arizona and South Texas; (4) INS allocated 740 of 1,000 new agent positions authorized in FY 1998 to sectors in these locations; (5) INS also added 18 miles of fencing in California and Arizona, increased both the proportion and total amount of time Border Patrol agents at the southwest border spent collectively on border enforcement, and deployed additional technologies such as remote video surveillance cameras; (6) INS was testing a resource and effectiveness model to help it determine the right mix of staffing, equipment, and technology for all of its Border Patrol sectors; (7) to complement the Border Patrol's efforts between ports of entry, INS Inspections added 179 inspectors to southwest land-border ports of entry in FY 1998 and undertook training and enforcement efforts in conjunction with other agencies located at these ports; (8) INS also began testing an inspections program designed to measure how well it conducted inspections of travellers; (9) although evaluative data on the overall impact of the strategy continue to be limited, available data suggested that several anticipated interim effects of the strategy have occurred; (10) the southwest border ports of entry inspectors apprehended an increased number of persons attempting fraudulent entry and there were reports of higher fees being charged by smugglers, which INS said indicated an increased difficulty in illegal border crossing; (11) available information on the interim results of the strategy does not provide answers to the most fundamental questions surrounding the INS' enforcement efforts along the southwest border; (12) pursuant to GAO's 1997 report recommendation to conduct a comprehensive evaluation, INS contracted with private research firms in September 1998 for evaluative studies; (13) as of April 1999, according to INS, one contractor was working on an evaluation design and analysis plan; (14) INS could provide GAO with no other information on the contractor's progress; and (15) consequently, GAO does not know to what extent the contractor's evaluation plan will provide the information needed to determine the extent to which the Attorney General's strategy has been effective. |
gao_GAO-11-834T | gao_GAO-11-834T_0 | However, when the ore was depleted, miners often left behind a legacy of abandoned mines, structures, safety hazards, and contaminated land and water. Four federal agencies—the Department of Agriculture’s Forest Service, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the Department of the Interior’s BLM and Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement (OSM)—fund the cleanup and reclamation of some of these abandoned hardrock mine sites. Accurate Information on the Number of Abandoned Hardrock Mine Sites Was Not Available
In 2008 and 2009, we reported that BLM and the Forest Service have had difficulty determining the number of abandoned hardrock mines on their land and have no definitive estimates on the number of such sites. Moreover, we reported that other estimates that had been developed about the number of abandoned hardrock mine sites on federal, state, and private land in the 12 western states and Alaska (where most of the mining takes place) varied widely and did not provide an accurate assessment of the number of abandoned mines in these states. In 2008, we developed a standard definition of an abandoned hardrock mining site and used this definition to determine how many such sites potentially existed on federal, state and private land in the12 western states and Alaska. Based on our survey of these states, we determined that there were at least 161,000 abandoned hardrock mine sites in these states, and at least 33,000 of these sites had degraded the environment, by, for example, contaminating surface water and groundwater or leaving arsenic-contaminated tailings piles. Federal Agencies Collect Limited Information on Mining Operations on Federal Land
In 2008, we reported that BLM, the Forest Service, and the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) either do not routinely collect or do not consistently maintain data on the amount of hardrock minerals being produced on federal land, the amount of hardrock minerals remaining, and the total acreage of federal land withdrawn from hardrock mining operations. According to officials with BLM and the Forest Service, they do not have the authority to collect information from mine operators on the amount of hardrock minerals produced on federal land, or the amount remaining. In contrast, USGS collects extensive data on hardrock mineral production through its mineral industry surveys and reports these data in monthly, quarterly, and annual reports, but mine operators’ participation in these surveys is voluntary, and USGS does not collect land ownership data that would allow it to determine the amount of hardrock mineral production on federal land. Therefore, information on hardrock mineral production for every mine is not available to the public. Federal Agencies Have Spent Billions of Dollars to Cleanup Abandoned Hardrock Mining Sites
In March 2008, we reported that over a 10 year period, four federal agencies—BLM, the Forest Service, EPA, and OSM— had spent at least a total of $2.6 billion to reclaim abandoned hardrock mines on federal, state, private, and Indian land. Of this amount, EPA had spent the most— $2.2 billion. The amount each agency spent annually varied considerably, and the median amount spent for abandoned hardrock mines on public land by BLM and the Forest Service was about $5 million and about $21 million, respectively. EPA spent substantially more—a median of about $221 million annually—to cleanup abandoned mines that were generally on nonfederal land. Further, OSM provided grants with an annual median value of about $18 million to states and Indian tribes through its program for hardrock mine cleanups. Financial Assurances Provided by Operators of Current Mines on BLM Land May Be Inadequate to Cover Estimated Reclamation Costs
As we have reported, contributing to the costs incurred by the federal government to reclaim land disturbed by mining operations are inadequate financial assurances required by BLM for current hardrock mining operations. Since 2005, we have reported several times that operators of hardrock mines on BLM land have provided inadequate financial assurances to cover estimated reclamation costs in the event that they fail to perform the required reclamation. We made recommendations to strengthen BLM’s management of financial assurances for hardrock operations on its land, which the agency generally implemented. BLM’s report indicated that 52 of the 1,463 hardrock mining operations had inadequate financial assurances—about $28 million less than needed to fully cover estimated reclamation costs. | Why GAO Did This Study
The General Mining Act of 1872 helped foster the development of the West by giving individuals exclusive rights to mine gold, silver, copper, and other hardrock minerals on federal land. However, miners often abandoned mines, leaving behind structures, safety hazards, and contaminated land and water. Four federal agencies--the Department of the Interior's Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement (OSM), the Department of Agriculture's Forest Service, and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)--fund the cleanup of some of these hardrock mine sites. From 2005 through 2009, GAO issued a number of reports and testimonies on various issues related to abandoned and current hardrock mining operations. This testimony summarizes some of the key findings of these reports and testimonies focusing on the (1) number of abandoned hardrock mines, (2) availability of information collected by federal agencies on general mining activities, (3) amount of funding spent by federal agencies on cleanup of abandoned mines, and (4) value of financial assurances for mining operations on federal land managed by BLM. In 2005, GAO recommended that BLM strengthen the management of its financial assurances, which BLM generally implemented. BLM also agreed to take steps to address additional concerns raised by GAO in 2008.
What GAO Found
GAO's past work has shown that there are no definitive estimates of the number of abandoned hardrock mines on federal and other lands. For example, in 2008 and 2009, GAO reported that BLM and the Forest Service had difficulty determining the number of abandoned hardrock mines on their lands and had no definitive estimates. Similarly, estimates of the number of abandoned hardrock mine sites in the 12 western states and Alaska (where most of the mining takes place) varied widely because there was no generally accepted definition of what constitutes an abandoned hardrock mine site. In 2008, GAO developed a standard definition for abandoned hardrock mining sites and used this definition to determine that there were at least 161,000 abandoned hardrock mine sites in the 12 western states and Alaska, and at least 33,000 of these sites had degraded the environment, by contaminating surface water and groundwater or leaving arsenic-contaminated tailings piles. In 2008, GAO reported that BLM, the Forest Service, and the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) either do not routinely collect or do not consistently maintain data on the amount of hardrock minerals being produced on federal land, the amount of hardrock minerals remaining, and the total acreage of federal land withdrawn from hardrock mining operations. According to BLM and Forest Service officials, they do not have the authority to collect information from mine operators on the amount of hardrock minerals produced on federal land or the amount remaining. In contrast, USGS collects extensive data on hardrock mineral production through its mineral industry surveys and reports these data in monthly, quarterly, and annual reports, but the agency does not collect land ownership data that would allow it to determine the amount of hardrock mineral production on federal land. As a result, comprehensive information on hardrock mineral production is generally not available to the public. From 1997 to 2008, four federal agencies--BLM, the Forest Service, EPA, and OSM--had spent at least a total of $2.6 billion to reclaim abandoned hardrock mines on federal, state, private, and Indian lands. Of this amount, EPA had spent the most--$2.2 billion. The amount each agency spent annually varied considerably, and the median amount spent for abandoned hardrock mines on public lands by BLM and the Forest Service was about $5 million and about $21 million, respectively. EPA spent substantially more--a median of about $221 million annually--to clean up abandoned mines that were generally on nonfederal land. OSM provided grants with an annual median value of about $18 million to states and Indian tribes through its program for hardrock mine cleanups. One factor that contributes to costs for reclamation of federal lands disturbed by mining operations is inadequate financial assurances required by BLM. Since 2005, GAO has reported several times that operators of hardrock mines on BLM lands have not provided financial assurances sufficient to cover estimated reclamation costs in the event that operators fail to perform the required reclamation. Most recently, in 2008, GAO reported that the financial assurances that were provided for 52 operations were about $61 million less than needed to fully cover estimated reclamation costs, which could leave the taxpayer with the bill for reclamation, if the operator fails to do so. |
gao_GAO-05-32 | gao_GAO-05-32_0 | When the proposed program is fully implemented, from fiscal years 2009 through 2018, it could result in funding of $1.4 billion annually from nearly 30 agencies, including State. OBO devised a fee-assessment plan that would spread the total embassy construction costs among all agencies with an overseas presence. According to OBO, funds from cost sharing would enable the construction of 150 new embassy and consulate compounds to be completed by 2018, 12 years sooner than OBO’s initial plan, which included a planned completion date of 2030. After fees are phased in during fiscal years 2005 through 2008, non-State agencies would pay $480 million annually for a 10-year period through fiscal year 2018, while State’s annual payment would be $920 million. Proposed Cost Sharing Is Based on a Worldwide Head-Count Formula
In developing the proposed cost-sharing program, OBO, with OMB’s approval, selected a per-capita or head-count formula based on the number of agency staff at all overseas locations and the type of office space. Agencies Have Other Concerns about the Program
Some non-State agencies have other concerns about the proposed program, including how potential disputes would be resolved and how cost-sharing fees would affect their ability to accomplish their overseas missions. Several agencies suggested that it would be useful to establish new interagency mechanisms to discuss and resolve potential disputes. We did not assess the mechanisms to be used to implement the program, if Congress enacts it. Therefore, we have taken no position on whether new interagency mechanisms would be needed. Nevertheless, in our prior work, we have noted the importance of achieving interagency consensus and striving to achieve equity, while minimizing management burden. Decision-makers need to continually focus on these factors in order to give the program every opportunity to succeed. If the proposed program is enacted, it is important that Congress and State monitor the program’s implementation and make changes as needed. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to examine (1) the Department of State’s rationale for and development of the proposed Capital Security Cost-Sharing Program, (2) agency concerns about the program, and (3) the influence of the proposed program on agencies’ decisions on overseas staff levels. To complete our work, we analyzed data, reviewed documents, and discussed the program in Washington, D.C., with officials of State’s Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO), which is responsible for the embassy construction program; the Office of Management and Budget (OMB); and eight other executive branch departments and agencies, including the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, Justice, and the Treasury, and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). The administration proposed the Capital Security Cost-Sharing Program to fund the accelerated construction of secure new embassies and consulates worldwide and to ensure that agencies rightsize the number of staff needed to accomplish their overseas missions. 5. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of State is in the early stages of a proposed multibillion dollar program to build secure new embassies and consulates around the world. Under the proposed Capital Security Cost-Sharing Program, all agencies with staff assigned to overseas diplomatic missions would share in construction costs. This report describes (1) the rationale for and development of the program, (2) agency concerns about the program, and (3) the influence of the program on agencies' overseas staff levels.
What GAO Found
The administration's proposed Capital Security Cost-Sharing Program has been developed to accelerate the building of 150 new secure embassies and consulates around the world and to ensure that all agencies with overseas staff assign only the number of staff needed to accomplish their overseas missions. The Department of State's Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO), which would manage the program, examined several formulas before deciding that all agencies with an overseas presence would share costs, based on a per capita or "head-count" formula. If enacted, nearly 30 U.S. agencies would be assessed a total of $17.5 billion for constructing 150 new embassies by 2018, or 12 years sooner than the projected completion date of 2030. After a gradual phase-in period beginning in fiscal year 2005, the program would generate $1.4 billion annually from fiscal years 2009 through 2018, with State paying $920 million and non-State agencies paying $480 million. Many non-State Department agencies have concerns about the proposed program. They would prefer a formula other than one based on head counts to assess fees, and they are concerned that cost-sharing fees could affect their ability to accomplish their overseas missions. In addition, they stated that it would be useful to establish new interagency mechanisms to discuss and resolve potential implementation issues. We did not assess the mechanisms to be used to implement the program and have taken no position on whether they would be needed. State is concerned that, without accelerated funding, U.S. government employees will remain at risk beyond the 2018 completion date. State is also concerned that, without cost sharing, OBO could overbuild office space due to agencies' imprecise staffing projections. In our prior work, we have noted the importance of achieving interagency consensus and striving to achieve equity while minimizing management burden. Decision-makers need to continually focus on these factors to give the program every opportunity to succeed. If enacted, it is important that Congress and State monitor its implementation and make changes as needed. |
gao_GAO-03-702 | gao_GAO-03-702_0 | Incurred losses are the largest component of medical malpractice insurers’ costs. Comprehensive Data on the Composition and Causes of Increased Losses Were Lacking
A lack of comprehensive data at the national and state levels on insurers’ medical malpractice claims and the associated losses prevented us from fully analyzing both the composition and causes of those losses at the insurer level. This declining profitability has caused some large insurers either to stop selling medical malpractice policies altogether or to reduce the number they sell. Reinsurance Premium Rates Have Increased
A further reason for recent increases in medical malpractice premium rates in our seven sample states was that the cost of reinsurance for these insurers has also increased, increasing the total expenses that premium and other income must cover. So while insurers in other markets that do not have protracted claims resolutions can adjust loss estimates and premium rates more quickly to account for a change in an underlying factor, medical malpractice insurers may not be able to make adjustments for several years. The Medical Malpractice Insurance Market Has Changed since Previous Hard Markets
The medical malpractice insurance market as a whole has changed considerably since the hard markets of the mid-1970s and mid-1980s. For example, insurers have moved from occurrence-based to claims-made policies, physicians have formed mutual nonprofit insurance companies that have come to dominate the market, hospitals and groups of hospitals or physicians have increasingly chosen to self-insure, and states have passed laws designed to slow the increase in medical malpractice premium rates. As a result of this continuing change in the composition of the medical malpractice insurance market, changes in premium rates in the next soft market may be different from previous markets, when commercial carriers dominated the market. And the threshold for excess loss insurance is rising in a number of states. Because many states have made changes to these laws, it is difficult to predict the extent to which premium rates might change in future markets. Conclusions
Multiple factors have combined to increase medical malpractice premium rates over the past several years, but losses on medical malpractice claims appear to be the primary driver of increased premium rates in the long term. At the same time, because of the long lag between collecting premium income and paying on claims, premium rates for the next year must be high enough to cover claims that will be reported that year, the majority of which will be paid over the next 3 to 5 years. However, factors other than losses--such as changes in investment income or the competitive environment--can also affect premium rate decisions in the short run. For example, high expected returns on investment may legitimately permit insurers to price insurance below the expected cost of paying claims. To analyze the factors contributing to the premium rate increases in our sample states and other states, we examined data from state insurance regulators, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), A.M. Best, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the Physician Insurers Association of America on insurers in our sample states as well as the medical malpractice insurance market as a whole. | Why GAO Did This Study
Over the past several years, large increases in medical malpractice insurance premium rates have raised concerns that physicians will no longer be able to afford malpractice insurance and will be forced to curtail or discontinue providing certain services. Additionally, a lack of profitability has led some large insurers to stop selling medical malpractice insurance, furthering concerns that physicians will not be able to obtain coverage. To help Congress better understand the reasons behind the rate increases, GAO undertook a study to (1) describe the extent of the increases in medical malpractice insurance rates, (2) analyze the factors that contributed to those increases, and (3) identify changes in the medical malpractice insurance market that might make this period of rising premium rates different from previous such periods.
What GAO Found
Since 1999, medical malpractice premium rates have increased dramatically for physicians in some specialties in a number of states. However, among larger insurers in the seven states GAO analyzed, both the premium rates and the extent to which these rates have increased varied greatly. Multiple factors, including falling investment income and rising reinsurance costs, have contributed to recent increases in premium rates in our sample states. However, GAO found that losses on medical malpractice claims--which make up the largest part of insurers' costs--appear to be the primary driver of rate increases in the long run. And while losses for the entire industry have shown a persistent upward trend, insurers' loss experiences have varied dramatically across our sample states, resulting in wide variations in premium rates. In addition, factors other than losses can affect premium rates in the short run, exacerbating cycles within the medical malpractice market. For example, high investment income or adjustments to account for lower than expected losses may legitimately permit insurers to price insurance below the expected cost of paying claims. However, because of the long lag between collecting premiums and paying claims, underlying losses may be increasing while insurers are holding premium rates down, requiring large premium rate hikes when the increasing trend in losses is recognized. While these factors may explain some events in the medical malpractice market, GAO could not fully analyze the composition and causes of losses at the insurer level owing to a lack of comprehensive data. GAO's analysis also showed that the medical malpractice market has changed considerably since previous hard markets. Physician-owned and/or operated insurers now cover around 60 percent of the market, self-insurance has become more widespread, and states have passed laws designed to reduce premium rates. As a result, it is not clear how premium rates might behave during future soft or hard markets. |
gao_GAO-17-262T | gao_GAO-17-262T_0 | The Course of the LCS Program Has Changed Significantly over Time
When first conceived, the LCS program represented an innovative approach for conducting naval operations, matched with a unique acquisition strategy that included two nontraditional shipbuilders and two different ships based on commercial designs—Lockheed Martin’s Freedom variant and Austal USA’s Independence variant, respectively. The Navy planned to experiment with these ships to determine its preferred design variant. However, in relatively short order, this experimentation strategy was abandoned in favor of a more traditional acquisition of over 50 ships. While one could argue that a new concept should be expected to evolve over time, the LCS evolution has been complicated by the fact that major commitments have been made to build large numbers of ships before proving their capabilities. LCS Business Case Has Eroded as Cost, Schedule, and Performance Expectations Have Not Been Met
The Navy’s vision for the LCS has evolved significantly over time, with questions remaining today about the program’s underlying business case. In its simplest form, a business case requires a balance between the concept selected to satisfy warfighter needs and the resources— technologies, design knowledge, funding, and time—needed to transform the concept into a product, in this case a ship. The Navy hoped to deliver large numbers of ships to the fleet quickly at a low cost. LCS was designed with reduced requirements as compared to other surface combatants, and over time the Navy has lowered several survivability and lethality requirements further and removed some design features—making the ships less survivable in their expected threat environments and less lethal than initially planned. Despite the uncertainties, the Navy’s acquisition strategy involves effectively demonstrating a commitment to buy all of the planned frigates—12 in total—before establishing realistic cost, schedule, and technical parameters—because the Navy will ask Congress to authorize the contracting approach for the 12 frigates (what the Navy calls a block buy contract) in 2017. However, the Navy will not establish its cost estimate until May 2017— presumably after the Navy requests authorization from Congress in its fiscal year 2018 budget request for the block buy contracting approach for 12 frigates—raising the likelihood that the budget request will not reflect the most current costs for the program moving forward. In addition to the continued cost uncertainty, the schedule and approach for the frigate acquisition have undergone substantial changes in the last year, as shown in table 3. Frigate Does Not Address All Navy Priorities and Will Likely Carry Forward Some of the Limitations of the LCS Designs
As LCS costs grew and capabilities diluted, the Secretary of Defense directed the Navy to explore alternatives to the LCS to address key deficiencies. Ultimately, the department chose a frigate concept based on a minor modified LCS in lieu of more capable small surface combatant options because of LCS’s relatively lower cost and quicker ability to field, as well as the ability to upgrade remaining LCS. Limited Opportunities Remain to Shape LCS and Frigate Programs
The Navy’s plans for fiscal years 2017 and 2018 involve significant decisions for the LCS and the frigate programs, including potential future commitments of approximately $14 billion for seaframes and mission packages. The Navy requested funding for two LCS in its fiscal year 2017 budget request. If these plans hold, Congress will be asked in a few months to consider authorizing a block buy of 12 frigates and funding the lead frigate when the fiscal year 2018 budget is proposed—before detail design has begun and the scope and cost of the design changes needed to turn an LCS into a frigate are well understood. GAO-16-356. Littoral Combat Ship: Knowledge of Survivability and Lethality Capabilities Needed Prior to Making Major Funding Decisions. GAO-13-530. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Navy envisioned a revolutionary approach for the LCS program: dual ship designs with interchangeable mission packages intended to provide mission flexibility at a lower cost. This approach has fallen short, with significant cost increases and reduced expectations about mission flexibility and performance. The Navy has changed acquisition approaches several times. The latest change involves minor upgrades to an LCS design—referred to now as a frigate. Yet, questions persist about both the LCS and the frigate.
GAO has reported on the acquisition struggles facing LCS and now the frigate, particularly in GAO-13-530 and GAO-16-356 . This statement discusses: (1) the evolution of the LCS acquisition strategy and business case; (2) key risks in the Navy's plans for the frigate based on the LCS program; and (3) remaining oversight opportunities for the LCS and small surface combatant programs. This statement is largely based on GAO's prior reports and larger work on shipbuilding and acquisition best practices. It incorporates limited updated audit work where appropriate.
What GAO Found
The Navy's vision for Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program has evolved significantly over the last 15 years, reflecting degradations of the underlying business case. Initial plans to experiment with two different prototype ships adapted from commercial designs were abandoned early in favor of an acquisition approach that committed to numerous ships before proving their capabilities. Ships were not delivered quickly to the fleet at low cost. Rather cost, schedule, and capability expectations degraded over time. In contrast, a sound business case would have balanced needed resources—time, money, and technical knowledge—to transform a concept into the desired product.
Concerned about the LCS's survivability and lethality, in 2014 the Secretary of Defense directed the Navy to evaluate alternatives. After rejecting more capable ships based partly on cost, schedule, and industrial base considerations, the Navy chose the existing LCS designs with minor modifications and re-designated the ship as a frigate. Much of the LCS's capabilities are yet to be demonstrated and the frigate's design, cost, and capabilities are not well-defined. The Navy proposes to commit quickly to the frigate in what it calls a block buy of 12 ships.
Congress has key decisions for fiscal years 2017 and 2018 that have significant funding and oversight implications. First, the Navy has already requested funding to buy two more baseline LCS ships in fiscal year 2017. Second, early next year, the Navy plans to request authorization for a block buy of all 12 frigates and funding in the fiscal year 2018 budget request for the lead frigate. Making these commitments now could make it more difficult to make decisions in the future to reduce or delay the program should that be warranted. A more basic oversight question today is whether a ship that costs twice as much yet delivers less capability than planned warrants an additional investment of nearly $14 billion. GAO has advised Congress to consider not funding the two LCS requested in 2017 given its now obsolete design and existing construction backlogs. Authorizing the block buy strategy for the frigate appears premature. The decisions Congress makes could have implications for what aspiring programs view as acceptable strategies.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making any new recommendations in this statement but has made numerous recommendations to the Department of Defense (DOD) in the past on LCS and frigate acquisition, including strengthening the program's business case before proceeding with acquisition decisions. While DOD has, at times, agreed with GAO's recommendations, it has taken limited action to implement them. |
gao_GAO-03-600 | gao_GAO-03-600_0 | The initial system consisted of space- and ground-based sensors, early warning radars, interceptors, and battle management functions. Former missile defense acquisition programs became elements of a single ballistic missile defense system. The GMD element is intended to protect the United States against long- range ballistic missiles in the midcourse phase of their flight. Other technologies are reaching this level of maturity. If development and testing proceed as planned, MDA will demonstrate the maturity of five additional technologies by the second quarter of fiscal year 2004 and two critical radar technologies during fiscal year 2005. MDA believes that its best opportunity to demonstrate the maturity of the tenth technology, technology critical to GMD’s primary radar, may come through the anticipated flight tests of foreign missiles. In-flight interceptor communications system, which enables the GMD fire control component to communicate with the exoatmospheric kill vehicle while in flight. MDA Has Risked Cost Growth Because It Could Not Fully Rely on Data from Its System for Monitoring Contractor Performance
From the program’s inception in 1997 through 2009, MDA expects to spend about $21.8 billion to develop the GMD element. About $7.8 billion of the estimated cost will be needed between 2002 and 2005 to develop and field the Block 2004 GMD capability and to develop the GMD portion of the test bed. However, MDA has incurred a greater risk of cost increases because for more than a year MDA was not sure that it could rely fully upon data from the prime contractor’s Earned Value Management (EVM) system, which provides program managers and others with early warning of problems that could cause cost and schedule growth. MDA estimates it will need an additional $7.8 billion between 2002 and 2005 to, among other tasks, install interceptors at Fort Greely, Alaska, and at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California; upgrade existing radars and test bed infrastructure; and develop the sea-based X-band radar that will be added in the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2005. MDA’s Insight into Potential Cost Growth Was Limited by the Agency’s Inability to Rely Fully on Data from Earned Value Management System
Because a significant portion of MDA’s Block 2004 GMD cost estimate is the cost of work being performed by the element’s prime contractor, MDA’s ability to closely monitor its contractor’s performance is critical to controlling costs. In February 2002, MDA modified this contract to redirect the contractor’s efforts. If development and testing progress as planned, however, MDA expects to have demonstrated the maturity of 7 of the 10 critical GMD technologies before the element is initially fielded in September 2004 and 2 others during fiscal year 2005. MDA is investing a significant amount of money to achieve an operational capability during the first block of GMD’s development, and the agency expects to continue investing in the element’s improvement over the next several years. To improve MDA’s oversight of the GMD element and to provide the Congress with the best available information for overseeing the program, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Director, Missile Defense Agency, to: ensure that when a contractor is authorized to begin new work before a price is negotiated that DCMA validate the performance measurement baseline to the extent possible by (1) tracking the movement of budget from the authorized, unpriced work account into the baseline, (2) verify that the work packages accurately reflect the new work directed, and (3) report the results of this effort to MDA; and strive to initiate and complete an integrated baseline review (IBR) of any major contract modifications within 6 months. Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine when MDA plans to demonstrate the maturity of technologies critical to the performance of GMD’s Block 2004 capability, we reviewed their critical technologies using technology readiness levels (TRLs) developed by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and used by DOD. Examples include “high fidelity” laboratory integration of components. | Why GAO Did This Study
A number of countries hostile to the United States and its allies have or will soon have missiles capable of delivering nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons. To counter this threat, the Department of Defense's (DOD's) Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is developing a system to defeat ballistic missiles. MDA expects to spend $50 billion over the next 5 years to develop and field this system. A significant portion of these funds will be invested in the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) element. To field elements as soon as practicable, MDA has adopted an acquisition strategy whereby capabilities are upgraded as new technologies become available and is implementing it in 2-year blocks. Given the risks inherent to this strategy, GAO was asked to determine when MDA plans to demonstrate the maturity of technologies critical to the performance of GMD's Block 2004 capability and to identify the estimated costs to develop and field the GMD element and any significant risks with the estimate.
What GAO Found
GMD is a sophisticated weapon system being developed to protect the United States against limited attacks by long-range ballistic missiles. It consists of a collection of radars and a weapon component--a three-stage booster and exoatmospheric kill vehicle--integrated by a centralized control system that formulates battle plans and directs the operation of GMD components. Successful performance of these components is dependent on 10 critical technologies. MDA expects to demonstrate the maturity of most of these technologies before fielding the GMD element, which is scheduled to begin in September 2004. However, the agency has accepted higher cost and schedule risks by beginning integration of the element's components before these technologies have matured. So far, MDA has matured two critical GMD technologies. If development and testing progress as planned, MDA expects to demonstrate the maturity of five other technologies by the second quarter of fiscal year 2004. The radar technologies are the least mature. MDA intends to demonstrate the maturity of an upgraded early warning radar in California in the first quarter of fiscal year 2005 and a sea-based radar in the Pacific Ocean in the fourth quarter of that year. Although MDA does not plan to demonstrate the maturity of the technology of the early warning radar in Alaska, which will serve as the primary fire control radar, through its own integrated flight tests, it may be able to do so through the anticipated launch of foreign test missiles. MDA estimates that it will spend about $21.8 billion between 1997 and 2009 to develop the GMD element. This estimate includes $7.8 billion to develop and field the GMD Block 2004 capability. For example, the funds will be used to install interceptors at two sites, upgrade existing radars and testing infrastructure, and develop the sea-based X-band radar. We found that MDA has incurred a greater risk of cost growth because for more than a year the agency was not able to rely fully on data from its primary tool for monitoring whether the GMD contractor has been performing work within cost and on schedule. In February 2002, MDA modified the prime contract to reflect an increased scope of work for developing GMD. It was not until July 2003 that the agency completed a review to ensure that the data was fully reliable. |
gao_HEHS-96-79 | gao_HEHS-96-79_0 | Recipients Are Increasingly Transferring Resources Worth Millions of Dollars
Since 1989, the number of SSI recipients reporting nonexcludable resource transfers has substantially increased, from fewer than 500 in 1989 to almost 2,800 in 1994. While the number of recipients reporting resource transfers is relatively small compared with the total number of SSI recipients, it represents a growing population receiving millions of dollars in SSI benefits each year. We estimate that between 1990 and 1994 these recipients transferred cars, homes, land, cash, and other resources worth over $74 million. Actual Extent of Resource Transfers Is Unknown, and the Value of Many Transferred Resources Is Unreported or Underreported
Since repeal of the resource transfer restriction in 1988, 9,326 SSI recipients reported transferring resources before applying for or while receiving SSI; however, the actual number of people who did so is unknown. SSI Transfer-of-Resource Restriction Could Also Reduce Medicaid Expenditures
Most of the 3,505 recipients who reported transferring resources were, like most SSI recipients, eligible for Medicaid acute-care benefits. An SSI transfer-of-resource restriction could possibly result in savings in the Medicaid program. SSA incurred little cost to verify the accuracy of reported information. We are sending copies of this report to the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration and other interested parties. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program, focusing on: (1) the number of SSI recipients reporting resource transfers; (2) the kind and worth of resources being transferred; and (3) the possible savings resulting from a reinstatement of the SSI transfer-of-resources restriction.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) while the number of SSI recipients reporting resource transfers has increased, they are only a fraction of the total number of SSI recipients; (2) between 1990 and 1994, 3,505 SSI recipients reported transferring resources worth more than $74 million; (3) the value of reported transferred resources varied and the actual extent of resource transfers is unknown because the Social Security Administration (SSA) does not verify or investigate SSI recipients' self-reported information about resource transfers; and (4) reinstating the SSI transfer-of-resource restriction could reduce program costs, reduce Medicaid costs, and increase SSA administrative costs. |
gao_GAO-03-578 | gao_GAO-03-578_0 | For example, it provides recommendations for the types of workers to be included in the two types of Smallpox Response Teams—the Public Health Smallpox Response Teams and the Healthcare Smallpox Response Teams—but leaves the numbers of workers and exact composition of teams to the jurisdictions to decide on the basis of their particular needs. To enable jurisdictions to implement this program in the safest manner possible, the agency has provided guidance and materials for critical elements of the program, including education and training of health workers who will be administering the education and screening of volunteers to rule out those who may be at greater risk for severe reactions; care of the site of vaccination on the vaccinee’s body to prevent secondary infection or transmission to others; monitoring of adverse events; distribution of the two investigational drugs used in treating certain adverse reactions caused by the vaccine, vaccinia immune globulin (VIG) and cidofovir; and systems for ongoing collection, management, and analysis of program data—including adverse events, transmissions of the vaccinia virus to individuals the vaccinee was in contact with following the vaccination (or “secondary transmission”), requests for VIG or cidofovir, needlestick injuries to vaccinators, and vaccine wastage—to evaluate the program and make adjustments as necessary. Implementation Is Slower Than CDC Planned
Implementation of the smallpox vaccination program has proceeded more slowly than CDC planned. Because of the slow pace, not enough data have been generated to determine whether implementation is proceeding as safely as possible according to the program’s goal. Although CDC reported that a total of 31,297 health workers (about 6 percent of the initial target) had been vaccinated in 54 of the 62 jurisdictions by week 10, about half of those vaccinated were distributed across eight states: Florida, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Carolina, Ohio, Tennessee, and Texas. As of late April, CDC did not have information about the number of complete response teams formed. Major Challenges Are Program Schedule and Hesitancy on Part of the Two Main Groups Involved in Program
Implementation of the smallpox vaccination program is facing two major challenges. One is the program schedule, and the other is hesitancy on the part of the two main groups involved in the program—those needed to implement it and those needed to volunteer to be vaccinated. The program schedule has also placed heavy demands on the jurisdictions. Implementers and Organizations That Represent Them Are Hesitating to Participate Because of Concerns about Adequacy of Resources and Liability Protection
The smallpox vaccination program is to be implemented in the jurisdictions by state and local public health authorities and individual hospitals. They also have concerns about compensation for such injuries. Volunteers are uncertain whether the practices that CDC recommends will be sufficient. Although CDC has said that it expected the first stage to take more than 30 days, it has not set a new target for completion of the first stage. She has indicated that as few as 50,000 would suffice but has not explained how CDC arrived at that number. CDC has not said what the implications of this potential change in targets for the first stage would be for the second stage. In addition, although CDC announced that it would provide guidance for and request plans from the jurisdictions for the second stage, it has not done so. The National Smallpox Vaccination Program is unprecedented and complex. Because many concerns remain unresolved, it may be difficult to achieve the initial targets for the first stage. Answers to these questions are also important for ensuring safe expansion to as many as 10 million additional volunteers in the second stage of the program. Recommendations
To ensure that the National Smallpox Vaccination Program successfully develops adequate response capacity for a potential terrorist attack involving smallpox, we recommend that the Director of CDC provide guidance and specific parameters to the jurisdictions for estimating response capacity needs and work with the jurisdictions to revise local and national targets for the first stage and provide guidance to the jurisdictions for implementing the second stage of the program. Bioterrorism: The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s Role in Public Health Protection. | Why GAO Did This Study
Amid growing concerns about a potential smallpox attack, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) is working with 62 state, local, and territorial jurisdictions to implement the civilian part of the National Smallpox Vaccination Program. The goal is to increase the nation's response capacity by vaccinating health workers for Smallpox Response Teams as quickly as is safely possible. A civilian program using vaccination to bolster bioterrorism preparedness is unprecedented, the health risks are uncertain, and the public health system has had little recent experience with smallpox. Safe implementation of such a program will be complex. GAO was asked to examine implementation and its challenges. GAO reviewed program materials and data and interviewed CDC officials and representatives of organizations involved.
What GAO Found
Implementation of the smallpox vaccination program has proceeded more slowly than CDC planned. Vaccinations are to be given to volunteers in two stages. CDC's nationwide target for the first stage was an estimated 500,000 health workers in 30 days. The number of health workers was based on the jurisdictions' combined targets for their Smallpox Response Teams. In the second stage, CDC plans to expand the program to as many as 10 million additional health workers and other emergency response personnel. On the official start date of vaccination, January 24, 2003, only one state began vaccinating. CDC reports that by week 10 (April 4, 2003) about 6 percent of the number of volunteers targeted for the first stage had been vaccinated. Eight states accounted for about half of the vaccinees. Because of the slow pace, not enough data were generated by week 10 to evaluate whether the program is proceeding as safely as possible. Implementation of the program is facing two major challenges. The first is the program schedule, which placed heavy demands on CDC and the jurisdictions. The second is hesitation on the part of the two main groups needed to participate in the program--the state and local public health authorities and hospitals needed to implement it, and the health workers needed to volunteer to be vaccinated. Many implementers are concerned about insufficient resources to support the program and about liability protection. Many potential volunteers are concerned about health risks to themselves and their co-workers, families, and patients and about compensation for adverse events and lost income. Program officials and Congress have been working to address some of the major challenges but it is too soon to evaluate the impact of these efforts on participation in the program. Unless these efforts succeed in overcoming the hesitancy of the participants, it may be difficult to achieve the initial targets for the first stage. CDC has reconsidered the initial targets and said that as few as 50,000 vaccinated health workers nationwide would provide sufficient response capacity. But as of late April, CDC had not set a new nationwide target or requested that the 62 jurisdictions adjust their targets for numbers and types of vaccinated health workers and distribution of response teams. CDC also has not said what the implications of this potential change in targets for the first stage would be for the second stage. In addition, although CDC announced that it would provide guidance for and request plans from the jurisdictions for the second stage, it has not yet done so. |
gao_GAO-17-143 | gao_GAO-17-143_0 | Types of Drug Inspections
FDA conducts several types of inspections of drug manufacturing establishments to protect the drug supply. To accomplish this, the foreign offices focus on the following activities: 1. establishing relationships with U.S. agencies located overseas and foreign stakeholders, including regulatory counterparts and industry, to facilitate collaborations that will streamline and enhance global drug development and regulation; 2. gathering better information locally on product manufacturing and transport to U.S. ports; 3. expanding FDA’s inspectional capacity to include inspections of FDA- regulated commodities, such as drugs, medical devices, and food products, conducted by investigators based in the foreign offices; and 4. providing assistance to strengthen the regulatory systems of FDA’s foreign counterparts to better assure the safety of the products manufactured and exported from their countries to the United States. Currently, FDA has foreign offices in China, Europe, India, and Latin America. FDA Has Increased Its Foreign Drug Inspections and Enhanced Its Ability to Prioritize Drug Establishments for Inspection
Since fiscal year 2009, FDA has increased the number of all foreign drug inspections conducted each year. Beginning in fiscal year 2015, FDA conducted more foreign than domestic inspections. FDA Has Improved Information on Its Catalog of Foreign Drug Establishments, but Lacks Inspection History on One- Third of Them
Since 2010, FDA has taken steps to improve the accuracy and completeness of its catalog of foreign drug establishments. Currently, FDA lacks information on the inspection history of 33 percent of the foreign establishments in its catalog, compared to the 64 percent for which it lacked inspection history in 2010. While the agency has made progress in reducing this knowledge gap, it is important to note that the overall number of foreign establishments with no surveillance inspection history (about 1,000 of the approximately 3,000) remains large. This is also consistent with a recommendation we made to the agency in 2008. FDA Has Not Yet Assessed Its Foreign Offices’ Contributions to Drug Safety, and Their Efforts are Impeded by High Vacancy Rates
FDA has begun to take steps to enhance the agency’s strategic planning for the foreign offices and has developed two performance measures. Specifically, we recommended in 2010 that FDA develop (1) performance goals and measures that can be used to demonstrate the offices’ contributions to long-term outcomes related to imported FDA- regulated products; and (2) a strategic workforce plan for the foreign offices to help ensure that the agency is able to recruit and retain staff with the experience and skills necessary for the foreign offices, and to reintegrate returning staff from overseas into FDA’s domestic offices. FDA reported exceeding its goal of 25 collaborative actions in fiscal year 2015 by 2, for a total of 27 collaborative actions. According to FDA officials, this measure applies to all of OIP’s offices—both foreign and domestic. However, in adopting this approach, the measure does not reflect the unique contributions of the foreign offices as they are not distinguished from those made by OIP as a whole. As of July 2016, OIP’s domestic offices had a vacancy rate of 34 percent, in contrast to the foreign offices’ collective vacancy rate of 46 percent. Appendix I: Types of Foreign Drug Establishment Inspections Conducted, Fiscal Year 2010 through June 30, 2016
Appendix II: Drug Establishments that the Food and Drug Administration May Never Have Inspected
Appendix III: Number of Foreign Drug Inspections in which Temporary Duty Staff Participated
Appendix IV: Efforts by the Food and Drug Administration’s Foreign Offices to Enhance Drug Safety
The Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) foreign offices have helped ensure drug safety by collaborating with foreign counterparts in their host countries. | Why GAO Did This Study
Globalization has complicated FDA's oversight of drugs marketed in the United States. FDA reports that more than 40 percent of finished drugs and 80 percent of active pharmaceutical ingredients are produced overseas. FDA inspects drug manufacturing establishments to ensure that the safety and quality of drugs are not jeopardized by poor manufacturing practices. Beginning in 2008, FDA established foreign offices to obtain better information on products coming from overseas and perform inspections, among other things.
In 2008 and 2010, GAO examined FDA's foreign drug inspection program and recommended it conduct more foreign inspections. In another 2010 report, GAO recommended the agency develop strategic and workforce plans for its foreign offices. GAO was asked to update its work with a focus on FDA's oversight of foreign drug establishments. This study examines (1) enhancements FDA has made to its foreign drug inspection program; and (2) FDA's assessment of its foreign offices, and the challenges they face in ensuring drug safety. GAO analyzed FDA's inspection data from fiscal year 2007 through June 30, 2016; reviewed agency planning documents; and interviewed FDA officials, including former foreign office employees.
What GAO Found
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA), an agency within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), has increased its foreign drug inspections and enhanced its ability to prioritize drug establishments for inspection. The number of foreign inspections has consistently increased each year since fiscal year 2009. Beginning in fiscal year 2015, FDA conducted more foreign than domestic inspections. FDA has also improved the accuracy and completeness of information on its catalog of drug establishments subject to inspection. It has also reduced its catalog of drug establishments with no inspection history to 33 percent of foreign establishments, compared to 64 percent in 2010. However, the number of such establishments remains large, at almost 1,000 of the approximately 3,000 foreign establishments. FDA plans to inspect all of these establishments over the next 3 years.
FDA has not yet assessed its foreign offices' contributions to drug safety. FDA has made progress in its strategic planning for its offices in China, Europe, India, and Latin America, but the lack of an assessment is inconsistent with federal standards for internal controls. Though FDA uses two performance measures to assess the foreign offices—number of medical product inspections and number of collaborative actions—the collaborative action measure does not capture the offices' unique contributions to drug safety. Moreover, the foreign offices face persistently high vacancy rates. As of July 2016, 46 percent of the foreign offices' authorized positions were vacant. Although FDA recently finalized a workforce plan, GAO identified several weaknesses with it. For example, the plan sets a workforce target that applies to both foreign and domestic international program offices, making it difficult to ascertain whether its goal of reducing foreign office staff vacancies is being met.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that FDA assess the contributions of the foreign offices, and set a goal that distinguishes between the vacancy rates of staff in its foreign offices and those in its domestic international program office. HHS agreed with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-08-494T | gao_GAO-08-494T_0 | Major increases in this year’s budget are also attributed to acquisition, construction and improvements for continued enhancement and replacement of aging vessels, aircraft, and infrastructure. Overall Budget Request is 6.9 Percent Higher than Previous Year’s Enacted Budget
The Coast Guard’s budget request in fiscal year 2009 is $9.35 billion, or 6.9 percent more than the enacted fiscal year 2008 budget (see fig. About $6.2 billion, or approximately 66 percent, is for operating expenses. Although the Coast Guard reports summary financial data by homeland security and non-homeland security missions to the Office of Management and Budget, as a multi-mission agency, the Coast Guard can be conducting multiple mission activities simultaneously. In fiscal year 2007, as in fiscal year 2006, the Coast Guard met 5 targets—Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security; Undocumented Migrant Interdiction; Marine Environmental Protection; Other Law Enforcement; and Ice Operations—and agency officials reported that the Coast Guard expects to meet the target for one additional program, Illegal Drug Interdiction, when results become available in August 2008. Coast Guard Continues to Face Challenges in Balancing Its Homeland Security and Non-Homeland Security Missions
After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the Coast Guard’s priorities and focus had to shift suddenly and dramatically toward protecting the nation’s vast and sprawling network of ports and waterways. It is also important to note that assets designed to fulfill homeland security missions can also be used for non-homeland security missions. Meeting security requirements for additional LNG terminals: The Coast Guard is also faced with providing security for vessels arriving at four domestic onshore LNG import facilities. The Coast Guard has not requested any additional funding for the construction of these centers as part of its fiscal year 2009 budget request. Coast Guard Deepwater Program Continues to Experience Challenges and Progress Related to Affordability, Management, and Operations
Over the years, our testimonies on the Coast Guard’s budget and performance have included details on the Deepwater program related to affordability, management, and operations. Given the size of Deepwater funding requirements, the Coast Guard will have a long term challenge in funding the program within its overall and AC&I budgets. In terms of management, the Coast Guard has taken a number of steps to improve program management and implement our previous recommendations. These mitigating measures have resulted in increased costs to maintain the older 110-foot patrol boats and reallocation of operations across the various missions. It has recognized that it needs to increase government management and oversight and has begun to transfer system integration and program management responsibilities back to the Coast Guard. For example, delays in the acquisition of new patrol boats have forced the Coast Guard to incur additional costs to maintain the older patrol boats. The removal of the 123-foot patrol boats from service has also increased operational costs in terms of lost or reallocated missions. Coast Guard: Challenges Affecting Deepwater Asset Deployment and Management and Efforts to Address Them. 7, 2004. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. Coast Guard, a multi-mission maritime military service within the Department of Homeland Security, has requested more than $9 billion for fiscal year 2009 to address its responsibilities for homeland security missions (such as undocumented migrant interdiction) and non-homeland security missions (such as environmental protection). Integral to conducting its missions, is the Deepwater program--a 25-year, $24 billion effort to upgrade or replace vessels and aircraft. This testimony discusses: budget request and trends, and performance statistics, challenges in balancing operations across multiple missions, and Deepwater affordability, management, and its impact on operations. GAO's comments are based on products issued from 1997 to 2008. This testimony also discusses on-going work related to patrol boat operations. To conduct its work, GAO analyzed documentation and interviewed relevant officials.
What GAO Found
The Coast Guard's fiscal year 2009 budget request is approximately 7 percent higher than its fiscal year 2008 enacted budget, generally because of proposed increases in both operating expenses and acquisition, construction, and improvements funding. The Coast Guard expects to meet its performance goals for 6 of its 11 mission areas for fiscal year 2007, similar to the performance it reported for fiscal year 2006. The Coast Guard also continues to develop additional measures to better understand the links between resources expended and results achieved. The Coast Guard continues to face challenges balancing its various missions with its finite resources and has had difficulties funding and executing both its homeland security and non-homeland security missions. GAO's work has shown that the Coast Guard's homeland security requirements continue to increase and that it has been unable to keep up with these rising security demands. For example, the Coast Guard is not meeting its requirements for providing vessel escorts and conducting security patrols. The Coast Guard is also facing additional requirements to conduct more inspections of maritime facilities and provide security at a growing number of facilities that import hazardous cargos. The Deepwater acquisition program continues to be a source of challenges and progress for the Coast Guard. In terms of affordability, the magnitude of Deepwater funding--representing about 11 percent of the agency's proposed fiscal year 2009 budget--presents a long-term challenge. In terms of management, the Coast Guard has made changes to improve program management by moving away from reliance on a system integrator, increasing government monitoring of program outcomes and competitively purchasing selected assets. In terms of operations, delays in the procurement of new patrol boats have increased resource requirements to maintain older legacy patrol boats and keep them operating. |
gao_GAO-05-54 | gao_GAO-05-54_0 | Background
The Workforce Investment Act of 1998 requires states and localities to bring together about 17 federally funded employment and training services into a single system—the one-stop system. Labor, Local Areas, and One-Stops Have Made Various Efforts and Degrees of Progress in Facilitating Access
Labor has awarded grants to facilitate comprehensive access to employment and training programs for persons with disabilities, and local areas and one-stop centers have also made numerous efforts, as well as various degrees of progress, in facilitating comprehensive access to their programs and services. States and local areas have used these grants for a range of efforts, including assessing one-stop architectural accessibility, acquiring assistive technology devices, and increasing staff capacity to provide services to persons with disabilities. Local Areas and One-Stops Have Made Efforts to Facilitate Access to the One-Stops’ Services, but Progress Has Varied
During our site visits, we found that local areas and one-stop centers had made various efforts and degrees of progress in facilitating comprehensive access to the one-stops’ programs and services. However, other sites had assistive technology, and some or all of the staff had already received training in how to use it. One-Stops and Disability Agencies Have Established Various Relationships to Serve Persons with Disabilities
One-stops, VR, and other disability-related agencies in the community have formed various relationships to provide services to persons with disabilities. The one-stops we visited also varied in terms of the extent to which they formed relationships with disability-related service providers other than VR. Labor Has Taken Actions to Ensure That One-Stops Comply with Access Requirements, but These Efforts May Not Be Sufficient
Labor has taken several actions to ensure that persons with disabilities have comprehensive access to one-stops, including training, monitoring, and enforcement activities, but these efforts may not be sufficient. CRC found that the use of the intake form, combined with the requirement that customers provide documentation of their disability, unnecessarily screened out people with disabilities from receiving intensive and training services, even though Labor’s WIA Section 188 regulations require that the one-stops must not deny any qualified person with a disability the opportunity to participate in, or benefit from, a WIA-funded program or activity because of that person’s disability. In addition to the two on-site reviews CRC conducted in 2003, CRC is in the process of conducting two additional reviews in two large metropolitan areas in two other states, which it plans to complete during fiscal year 2005. To date the monitoring and enforcement efforts that have been or are being conducted account for less than 2 percent of the total number of local areas and one-stops nationwide. Moreover, the CRC Director said that she had not yet determined whether CRC would conduct additional on-site reviews. Information on Employment Outcomes Is Limited
Information about the employment outcomes of persons with disabilities is limited by the extent to which disability data are collected and the overall methods used for collecting data for WIA’s performance measures. The information Labor publishes on the employment outcomes of persons with disabilities, however, is limited for several reasons. Labor has issued guidance stating that one-stops must inquire about disability status from job seekers upon registration for services. Further, the collection of information on employment outcomes, including the information on persons with disabilities, is limited to those persons who are registered for WIA services. As such, local areas may be reluctant to provide WIA-funded services to job seekers, including persons with disabilities, who may be less likely than others to find employment or experience an increase in earnings when they are placed in jobs. Although Labor has developed specific regulations requiring that people with disabilities have equal opportunity to participate in and benefit from the programs and services offered in the WIA one-stop system, its efforts to date may not be sufficient to ensure that result. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Workforce Investment Act (WIA) of 1998 includes provisions intended to ensure that people with disabilities have equal opportunity to participate in and benefit from the programs and activities offered through one-stop career centers (one-stops). But little is known, and questions have been raised, about how well this system is working for persons with disabilities. This report examines (1) what the Department of Labor (Labor), states, and the one-stops have done to facilitate comprehensive access to the WIA one-stop system; (2) the various relationships that the one-stops have established with disability-related agencies to provide services to persons with disabilities; (3) what Labor has done to ensure that the one-stops are meeting the comprehensive access requirements, and the factors that have affected efforts to ensure compliance; and (4) what is known about the employment outcomes of persons with disabilities who use the one-stop system.
What GAO Found
Labor has awarded grants to facilitate comprehensive access, which is defined in this report as providing people with disabilities the equal opportunity to participate in and benefit from the programs, activities, and/or employment offered by the WIA one-stop system. States and local areas have used these grants for a range of efforts, including increasing staff capacity to provide services to persons with disabilities. During our site visits to 18 local areas and one-stops, we found that officials at most sites were working to implement architectural access requirements. Moreover, local areas and one-stops varied in the degree to which they had addressed other areas of comprehensive access. For example, a few sites had only begun to acquire assistive technology devices; other sites had assistive technology and had trained some or all of their staff in how to use it. One-stops have established various relationships to provide services to persons with disabilities. The structure of the one-stops' relationships with state vocational rehabilitation (VR) programs varied, as did the extent to which they have formed relationships with disability-related service providers other than VR. A few local areas and one-stops primarily formed relationships with VR, while others had also formed relationships with community-based disability organizations. Although Labor has taken several actions to ensure comprehensive access to one-stops, these efforts may not be sufficient. Labor's Employment and Training Administration (ETA), Civil Rights Center (CRC), and Office of Disability Employment Policy (ODEP) have issued guidance and assistance on the regulatory requirements. CRC also has conducted on-site reviews at local areas and one-stops in two large metropolitan areas in two states. In both areas, CRC identified instances of noncompliance with these requirements. Reviews in two other states will be completed during fiscal year 2005, but Labor has not developed a long-range plan for how it will carry out its oversight and enforcement responsibilities beyond 2005. To date, CRC's monitoring and enforcement efforts account for less than 2 percent of the total number of local areas and one-stops nationwide. The CRC Director stated that she had not yet determined whether CRC would conduct additional on-site reviews. The information that Labor publishes on employment outcomes for people with disabilities is limited for a variety of reasons. Disclosure about disability status is voluntary, thus the information about employment outcomes may be misleading. The collection of information on the employment outcomes of WIA participants is limited to those who are registered for services, and one-stops are not required to register customers who participate in self-service or informational activities. The performance measurement system may result in customers being denied services because local areas may be reluctant to provide WIA-funded services to job seekers who may be less likely to find employment. |
gao_GAO-02-284 | gao_GAO-02-284_0 | The military health system has three missions: (1) maintaining the health of active-duty service personnel, (2) medically supporting military operations, and (3) providing care to the dependents of active-duty personnel, retirees and their families, and survivors. Effective October 1, 2001, retirees age 65 and older enrolled in Medicare part B became eligible for TRICARE coverage— commonly termed TRICARE For Life. This includes copayments required of retirees enrolled in civilian Medicare managed care plans. About 125,000 retirees were eligible for the demonstration. Senior Prime offered enrollees the full range of Medicare-covered services as well as additional TRICARE services, notably prescription drugs. Disenrollment remained low throughout the demonstration, averaging about 2 percent during the last year of the initial demonstration period. Most Nonenrollees Were Satisfied with Their Existing Health Coverage
Most retirees who did not enroll in Senior Prime reported that they were already satisfied with their existing health care coverage, and few cited negative attitudes about military care. Demonstration Underscored Challenges in Managing Care and Costs Within the Military Health System
While the demonstration had positive results for enrollees, it also highlighted several challenges that confront the military health system in managing patient care and costs. Finally, the demonstration illustrated the tensions between the military health system’s commitment to care for active-duty personnel and support military operations and its commitment to provide care to civilian family members and retirees. Although DOD satisfied its new senior enrollees and gave them good access to care, it incurred high costs in doing so. Limitations in Data and Data Systems Posed Problems for DOD Managers
Although DOD was able to establish and operate the demonstration, its efforts were hampered by limitations in its data and data systems. The survey was sent to Senior Prime enrollees and to retirees who were eligible for Senior Prime but did not join. | What GAO Found
The Department of Defense's (DOD) Medicare subvention demonstration tested alternate approaches to health care coverage for military retirees. Retirees could enroll in new DOD-run Medicare managed care plans, known as TRICARE Senior Prime, at six sites. The demonstration plan offered enrollees the full range of Medicare-covered services as well as additional TRICARE services, with minimal copayments. During the demonstration period, the program parameters were changed, allowing military retirees age 65 and older to become eligible for TRICARE coverage as of October 1, 2001, and Senior Prime was extended for one year. The demonstration showed that retirees were interested in enrolling in low-cost military health plans and that DOD was able to satisfy its Senior Prime enrollees. By the close of the initial demonstration period, about 33,000 retirees were enrolled in Senior Prime, and more were on waiting lists. When nonenrollees were asked why they did not join Senior Prime, more than 60 percent said that they were satisfied with their existing health coverage; few said that they disliked military care. Although the demonstration had positive results for enrollees, it also highlighted three challenges confronting the military health system in managing patient care and costs. First, care needs to be managed more efficiently. Although DOD satisfied enrollees and gave them good access to care, it incurred high costs. Second, DOD's efforts were hindered by limitations in its data and data systems. Finally, the demonstration illustrated the tension between the military health system's commitment to support military operations and promote the health of active-duty personnel and its commitment to provide care to dependents of active-duty personnel, retirees and their families, and survivors. |
gao_GAO-03-531T | gao_GAO-03-531T_0 | Student Aid Programs
Ensuring access to postsecondary education while reducing vulnerability of aid programs to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement is one of the key management challenges Education faces. Both Education and Congress have made changes to address management challenges in the student financial aid programs. In 2001, Education established a Management Improvement Team (MIT) of senior managers to formulate strategies to address key management problems throughout the department. These are (1) financial aid system integration issues, (2) fraud and error in student aid application and disbursement processes, (3) defaulted student loans, and (4) human capital management. Significant progress towards this goal was made recently when Education received an unqualified—or “clean”—opinion on its financial statements. While this is an important milestone for the department, significant management weaknesses remain that must be addressed for Education to meet its goal in this area. These weaknesses included (1) the absence of a fully integrated financial management system, (2) deficiencies in financial management practices that require extensive analysis of accounts to resolve errors through manual adjustments, (3) the lack of a rigorous review of interim financial data for timely identification and correction of errors, (4) the inability to accumulate, analyze, and present reliable financial information in the form of financial statements, (5) the dependence on a variety of stopgap measures to prepare financial statements, (6) the insufficiency of compensating controls, such as top-level reviews to address and to seek to compensate for systemic control weaknesses, and (7) the lack of a review to identify and quantify improper payments. Education has taken actions over the last several years to improve its financial management and to address the weaknesses identified. While Education has made progress in addressing many of its weaknesses, in fiscal year 2002, the auditors again reported that significant financial management issues continued to impair the department’s ability to accumulate, analyze, and present reliable financial information. Until these issues are fully resolved, Education’s ability to produce timely, accurate, and useful financial information for its managers and stakeholders will be greatly impeded. Finally, Education will need to continue its actions in addressing weaknesses in its financial management information systems. | Why GAO Did This Study
In its 2003 performance and accountability report on the Department of Education, GAO identified challenges in, among other areas, student financial aid programs and financial management. The information GAO presents in this testimony is intended to assist Congress in assessing Education's progress in addressing and overcoming these challenges.
What GAO Found
Education has taken steps to address its continuing challenges of reducing vulnerabilities in its student aid programs and improving its financial management, such as establishing a senior management team to address management problems, including financial management, throughout the agency. And, while Education has made significant progress, weaknesses remain that will require the continued commitment and vigilance of Education's management to resolve. Reduce vulnerability of student aid programs to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement: Education has made considerable changes to address the ongoing challenges in administering its student aid programs. However, Education needs to continue to address systems integration issues, reduce fraud and error in student aid application and disbursement processes, collect on student loan defaults, and improve its human capital management. Improve financial management: Education has implemented many actions to address its financial management weaknesses. Significant progress was made recently when Education received an unqualified--or "clean"--opinion on its financial statements for fiscal year 2002. While this is an important milestone for the department, internal control and systems weaknesses remain that impede Education's ability to produce timely, accurate, and useful financial information for its managers and stakeholders. |
gao_GAO-13-354 | gao_GAO-13-354_0 | VA and IHS Collaboration through Memorandums of Understanding
In 2003, VA and IHS signed an MOU to facilitate collaborative efforts in serving Native American veterans eligible for health care in both systems. VA and IHS Have Developed Mechanisms to Implement and Monitor the MOU, but Metrics to Monitor Performance Do Not Adequately Measure Progress toward MOU Goals
VA and IHS have documented common goals in their MOU, created 12 workgroups that are tasked with developing strategies to address the goals of the MOU, and created a Joint Implementation Task Force to coordinate tasks, develop implementation policy, and develop performance metrics and timelines—actions that are consistent with those we have found enhance and sustain agency collaboration. VA and IHS Have Defined Common Goals and Created Mechanisms to Implement the MOU
Consistent with our past work on practices that can enhance and sustain collaboration, VA and IHS have defined common goals for implementing the MOU and developed specific strategies the agencies plan to take to achieve them. VA and IHS have created two mechanisms to implement the MOU— workgroups and a Joint Implementation Task Force. VA and IHS Performance Metrics Do Not Adequately Measure Progress on the MOU Goals
The process developed by the Joint Implementation Task Force to monitor the implementation of the MOU includes obtaining data on three performance metrics; however, two of the three metrics do not allow the agencies to measure progress toward the MOU’s goals. The other two metrics are inadequate because their connection to a specific goal is not clear and they lack qualitative measures that would allow the agencies to measure the degree to which desired results are achieved. The weaknesses we found in these performance metrics could limit the ability of VA and IHS managers to gauge progress and make decisions about whether to expand or modify programs or activities, because the agencies will not have information on how well programs are supporting MOU goals. VA and IHS Lack Effective Processes to Overcome the Challenges of Consulting with a Large Number of Diverse, Sovereign Tribes
Mainly because of the large number of diverse tribal communities and tribal sovereignty, VA and IHS face unique challenges associated with coordinating and communicating to implement the MOU. VA and IHS Face Challenges Implementing the MOU Related to the Large Number of Diverse, Sovereign Tribes
VA and IHS officials told us the large number (566) of federally recognized tribes and differing customs and policy-making structures present logistical challenges in widespread implementation of the MOU within tribal communities. Tribal sovereignty includes the inherent right to govern and protect the health, safety, and welfare of tribal members. VA and IHS officials told us that because of tribal sovereignty, tribally operated facilities may choose whether or not to participate in a particular opportunity for collaboration related to the MOU, which makes it challenging to achieve some of the goals of the MOU. VA and IHS Processes in Place to Overcome the Complexities Associated with Consulting with Tribes Do Not Always Ensure Effective Consultation
VA and IHS communicate MOU-related information with the tribes through written correspondence, in-person meetings, and other steps, as is consistent with internal controls calling for effective external communications with groups that can have a serious effect on programs and other activities; however, according to tribal stakeholders we interviewed, these methods for consultation have not always met the needs of the tribal communities, and the agencies have acknowledged that effective consultation has been challenging. Both VA officials and members of tribal communities told us that, because tribal leaders are not always the tribal person designated to make decisions regarding health care, the “Dear Tribal Leader” letters may not always make their way to tribal members designated to take action on health care matters. Another specific concern tribal stakeholders that we spoke with expressed relating to written correspondence was that the agencies sometimes use the letters to simply inform them of steps the agencies have taken without consulting the tribes, as called for by the agencies’ tribal consultation policies. In another example, two tribal stakeholders said they approved of OTGR’s establishment as an office dedicated to Native American veterans’ issues. However, four tribal stakeholders expressed concerns that, despite the creation of OTGR, VA still has not always been effective in its efforts to consult with tribes or be responsive to tribal input provided during consultation. Agency Comments
We provided draft copies of this report to VA and the Department of Health and Human Services for review. | Why GAO Did This Study
Native Americans who have served in the military may be eligible for health care services from both VA and IHS. To enhance health care access and the quality of care provided to Native American veterans, in 2010, these two agencies renewed and revised an MOU designed to improve their coordination and resource sharing related to serving these veterans. GAO was asked to examine how the agencies have implemented the MOU.
This report examines: (1) the extent to which the agencies have established mechanisms through which the MOU can be implemented and monitored; and (2) key challenges the agencies face in implementing the MOU and the progress made in overcoming them. To conduct this work, GAO interviewed VA and IHS officials and reviewed agency documents and reports. GAO also obtained perspectives of tribal communities through attendance at two tribal conferences; interviews with tribal leaders and other tribal members, including veterans; and interviews with other stakeholders, such as health policy experts and consultants.
What GAO Found
The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) and the Indian Health Service (IHS) have developed mechanisms to implement and monitor their memorandum of understanding (MOU); however, the performance metrics developed to assess its implementation do not adequately measure progress made toward its goals. VA and IHS have defined common goals for implementing the MOU and developed strategies to achieve them. They have also created two mechanisms to implement the MOU--12 workgroups with members from both agencies to address the goals of the MOU, and a Joint Implementation Task Force, comprised of VA and IHS officials, to oversee the MOU's implementation. These steps are consistent with practices that GAO has found enhance and sustain agency collaboration. The agencies have also developed three metrics aimed at measuring progress toward the MOU's goals. However, two of the three metrics are inadequate because their connection to any specific MOU goal is not clear and, while they include quantitative measures that tally the number of programs and activities increased or enhanced as a result of the MOU, they lack qualitative measures that would allow the agencies to assess the degree to which the desired results are achieved. The weaknesses in these metrics could limit the ability of VA and IHS managers to gauge progress and make decisions about whether to expand or modify their programs and activities.
VA and IHS face unique challenges associated with consulting with a large number of diverse, sovereign tribes to implement the MOU, and lack fully effective processes to overcome these complexities. VA and IHS officials told us the large number (566 federally recognized tribes) and differing customs and policy-making structures present logistical challenges in widespread implementation of the MOU within tribal communities. They also told us that tribal sovereignty--tribes' inherent right to govern and protect the health, safety, and welfare of tribal members--adds further complexity because tribes may choose whether or not to participate in MOU-related activities. Consistent with internal controls, VA and IHS have processes in place to consult with tribes on MOU-related activities through written correspondence and in-person meetings. However, according to tribal stakeholders GAO spoke with, these processes are often ineffective and have not always met the needs of the tribes, and the agencies have acknowledged that effective consultation has been challenging. For example, one tribal community expressed concern that agency correspondence is not always timely because it is sent to tribal leaders who are sometimes not the tribal members designated to take action on health care matters. Similarly, some tribal stakeholders told GAO that the agencies have not been responsive to tribal input and that sometimes they simply inform tribes of steps they have taken without consulting them. VA and IHS have taken steps to improve consultation with tribes. For example, VA has established an Office of Tribal Government Relations, through which it is developing relationships with tribal leaders and other tribal stakeholders. Additionally, in Alaska, VA has been consulting with a tribal health organization for insight on reaching tribes. However, given the concerns raised by the tribal stakeholders GAO spoke with, further efforts may be needed to enhance tribal consultation to implement and achieve the goals of the MOU.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the agencies take steps to improve the performance metrics used to assess MOU implementation and to develop better processes to consult with tribes. VA and the Department of Health and Human Services agreed with these recommendations. |
gao_GAO-06-554 | gao_GAO-06-554_0 | Tolling Has Promise as an Approach for Enhancing Mobility and for Financing Transportation
As congestion increases and concerns about the sustainability of traditional roadway financing sources grow, tolling has promise as an approach to enhance mobility and to finance transportation. Such tolls can create additional incentives for drivers to avoid driving alone in congested conditions when making their driving decisions. In response, drivers may choose to share rides, use public transportation, travel at less congested (generally off- peak) times, or travel on less congested routes, if available, to reduce their toll payments. Tolling is also consistent with the important user pays principle, can potentially better target spending for new and expanded capacity, and can potentially enhance private-sector participation and investment in major highway projects. Some States Use Tolling to Address Funding Shortfalls, Finance New Capacity, and Manage Congestion; Other States Find Tolling Not Feasible or Have Made Other Choices
Officials in most states planning toll roads indicated that the primary reasons for considering a tolling approach were to address what state officials characterized as transportation funding shortfalls, to finance and build new capacity, and to manage congestion. Both interstates are major freight routes where truck traffic is expected to continue to increase. Applying tolls that vary with the level of congestion—congestion pricing—can reduce congestion and the demand for roads because tolls that vary according to the level of congestion can be used to maintain a predetermined level of service. Many States Find That Tolling Is Not Feasible or Have Made Other Choices
The reason most frequently cited by state transportation officials for not tolling is that tolling is not feasible. In some states, tolling is not considered because toll revenues would not cover the costs of projects. Under this definition, most roads would not generate sufficient revenues from tolls to fund new highway capacity. States That Are Considering and Implementing a Tolling Approach Face Two Broad Types of Challenges
Drawing on our analyses of states’ experience with tolling and on a review of selected published research on tolling, we have identified two broad types of challenges that transportation officials have encountered when attempting to implement tolling: (1) the difficulty of obtaining political and public support in the face of opposition from the public and political leaders and (2) the difficulty of implementing tolling given a lack of, or overly restrictive, enabling toll legislation; concerns about potential traffic diversion resulting from toll projects; and a need to coordinate with other states and regions when toll projects cross jurisdictional boundaries. Some studies have also reported this challenge. Double taxation arguments. States have a number of dedicated sources of revenues that are used to finance highway capital programs. Secure the authority to toll. Building support. This legislation facilitates tolling by realizing two goals—to expand the use of tolling and to leverage tax dollars by allowing state highway funds to be combined with other funds to build toll roads. Providing leadership. Select a Tolling Approach That Provides Tangible Benefits to Users
When proposing a tolling approach, transportation officials should consider promoting one that will produce tangible benefits to users while justifying both the costs of the project and the fees that users will be required to pay for the service. For example, to guarantee free-flowing traffic, toll prices on the Interstate 15 HOT lanes project are set dynamically, changing every 6 minutes to keep traffic flowing freely in the HOT lanes. Regardless of the demand for highway improvements, sustained, long-term, large-scale increases in federal highway grants and state and local spending seem unlikely. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Transportation for review and comment. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to examine (1) the promise of tolling to enhance mobility and finance highway transportation, (2) the extent to which tolling is being used in the United States and the reasons states are using or not using this approach, (3) the challenges states face in implementing tolling, and (4) strategies that can be used to help states address the challenges to tolling. Thus, donor states are statistically more likely to be planning toll roads than donee states—those states that receive more in grants than they collect. | Why GAO Did This Study
Congestion is increasing rapidly across the nation and freight traffic is expected to almost double in 20 years. In many places, decision makers cannot simply build their way out of congestion, and traditional revenue sources may not be sustainable. As the baby boom generation retires and the costs of federal entitlement programs rise, sustained, large-scale increases in federal highway grants seem unlikely. To provide the robust growth that many transportation advocates believe is required to meet the nation's mobility needs, state and local decision makers in virtually all states are seeking alternative funding approaches. Tolling (charging a fee for the use of a highway facility) provides a set of approaches that are increasingly receiving closer attention and consideration. This report examines tolling from a number of perspectives, namely: (1) the promise of tolling to enhance mobility and finance highway transportation, (2) the extent to which tolling is being used and the reasons states are using or not using this approach, (3) the challenges states face in implementing tolling, and (4) strategies that can be used to help states address tolling challenges. GAO is not making any recommendations. GAO provided a draft of this report to U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) officials for comment. DOT officials generally agreed with the information provided.
What GAO Found
Tolling has promise as an approach to enhance mobility and finance transportation. Tolling can potentially enhance mobility by reducing congestion and the demand for roads when tolls vary according to congestion to maintain a predetermined level of service. Such tolls can create incentives for drivers to avoid driving alone in congested conditions when making driving decisions. In response, drivers may choose to share rides, use public transportation, travel at less congested times, or travel on less congested routes, if available. Tolling also has the potential to provide new revenues, promote more effective investment strategies, and better target spending for new and expanded capacity. Tolling can also potentially leverage existing revenue sources by increasing private-sector participation and investment. Over half of the states in the nation have or are planning toll roads to respond to what officials describe as shortfalls in transportation funding, to finance new highway capacity, and to manage road congestion. While the number of states that are tolling or plan to toll has grown since the completion of the Interstate Highway System, and many states currently have major new capacity projects under way, many states report no current plans to introduce tolling because the need for new capacity does not exist, the approach would not generate sufficient revenues, or they have made other choices. According to state transportation officials who were interviewed as part of GAO's nationwide review, substantive challenges exist to implementing tolling. For example, securing public and political support can prove difficult when the public and political leaders argue that tolling is a form of double taxation, is unreasonable because tolls do not usually cover the full costs of projects, and is unfair to certain groups. Other challenges include obtaining sufficient statutory authority to toll, adequately addressing the traffic diversion that might result when motorists seek to avoid toll facilities, and coordinating with other states or jurisdictions on tolling projects. GAO's review of how states implement tolling suggests three strategies that can help facilitate tolling. First, some states have developed policies and laws that facilitate tolling. For example, Texas enacted legislation that enables transportation officials to expand tolling in the state and leverage tax dollars by allowing state highway funds to be combined with other funds. Second, states that have successfully advanced tolling projects have provided strong leadership to advocate and build support for specific projects. In Minnesota, a task force was convened to explore tolling and ultimately supported and recommended a tolling project. Finally, tolling approaches that provided tangible benefits appear to be more likely to be accepted than projects that offer no new tangible benefits or choice to users. For example, in California, toll prices on the Interstate 15 toll facility are set to keep traffic flowing freely in the toll lanes. |
gao_GAO-16-578T | gao_GAO-16-578T_0 | IRS Improved its Telephone Service for the 2016 Filing Season but Still Needs to Develop a Comprehensive Customer Service Strategy
In addition to processing approximately 150 million individual tax returns and issuing more than 100 million refunds during the filing season, IRS provides a range of taxpayer services, including through telephones, written correspondence, and on its website. As a result, the telephone level of service for the entire 2016 fiscal year is expected to be at 47 percent. As we reported in March 2016, IRS’s telephone level of service for the fiscal year has yet to reach the levels it had achieved in earlier years (see figure 1). Implementing Our Prior Recommendations Could Help IRS Improve Customer Service
We have made recommendations to IRS and the Department of the Treasury (Treasury), as well as a matter for congressional consideration, to assist IRS in improving its customer service. Therefore, in December 2015, we suggested that Congress consider requiring that Treasury work with IRS to develop a comprehensive customer service strategy. Billions of Dollars Have Been Lost to IDT Refund Fraud, and IRS Faces Challenges in Combating This Evolving Threat
During the filing season many taxpayers learn that their private information has been stolen and they have been victims of IDT refund fraud. For these taxpayers, IRS has taken action to improve customer service related to IDT refund fraud. IRS develops estimates of the extent of IDT refund fraud to help direct its efforts to identify and prevent the crime. However, IRS also estimated, where data were available, that it paid $3.1 billion in fraudulent IDT refunds. IRS recognized the challenge of IDT refund fraud in its fiscal year 2014-2017 strategic plan and increased resources dedicated to combating IDT and other types of refund fraud. In January 2015, we reported that IRS’s authentication tools have limitations and recommended that IRS assess the costs, benefits and risks of its authentication tools. W-2 Pre-refund Matching. Increasing electronically-filed (e-file) W-2s. Agency officials and third-party stakeholders told us that these changes include lowering the employee threshold requirement for employers to e-file W-2s. Therefore, we have suggested that Congress should consider providing the Secretary of the Treasury with the regulatory authority to lower the threshold for electronic filing of W-2s from 250 returns annually to between 5 to 10 returns, as appropriate. In response to our recommendation, IRS provided us with a report in September 2015 discussing (1) adjustments to IRS systems and work processes needed to use accelerated W-2 information, (2) the potential impacts on internal and external stakeholders, and (3) other changes needed to match W-2 data to tax returns prior to issuing refunds, such as delaying refunds until W-2 data are available. As we reported in March 2016, IRS has implemented numerous controls over key financial and tax processing systems; however, it had not always effectively implemented access and other controls, including elements of its information security program. In our most recent review in March 2016, we found that IRS had improved access controls, but some weaknesses remain. However, key systems we reviewed had not been configured to encrypt sensitive user authentication data. Nevertheless, the control weaknesses we found can be attributed in part to IRS’s inconsistent implementation of elements of its agency-wide information security program. We concluded in our November 2015 report that the collective effect of the deficiencies in information security from prior years that continued to exist in fiscal year 2015, along with the new deficiencies we identified, were serious enough to merit the attention of those charged with governance of IRS and therefore represented a significant deficiency in IRS’s internal control over financial reporting systems as of September 30, 2015. Implementing GAO Recommendations Can Help IRS Better Protect Sensitive Taxpayer and Financial Data
To assist IRS in fully implementing its agency-wide information security program, we made two new recommendations to more effectively implement security-related policies and plans. IRS also needs to strengthen its defenses for addressing IDT refund fraud that is informed by assessing the cost, benefits, and risks of IRS’s various authentication options. | Why GAO Did This Study
IRS provides service to tens of millions of taxpayers and processes most tax returns during the filing season. It is also a time when legitimate taxpayers may learn that they are a victim of IDT refund fraud, which occurs when a thief files a fraudulent return using a legitimate taxpayer's identity and claims a refund. In 2015, GAO added IDT refund fraud to its high-risk area on the enforcement of tax laws and expanded its government-wide high-risk area on federal information security to include the protection of personally identifiable information. With IRS's reliance on computerized systems, recent data breaches at IRS highlight the vulnerability of sensitive taxpayer information.
This statement discusses IRS's efforts to address (1) customer service declines, (2) IDT refund fraud challenges, and (3) information security weaknesses. This statement is based on GAO reports issued between 2012 and 2016 and includes updates of selected data.
What GAO Found
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) improved phone service to taxpayers during the 2016 filing season compared to last year. According to IRS, this is due in part to the additional $290 million in funding Congress provided to improve customer service, identity theft (IDT) refund fraud, and cybersecurity efforts. However, IRS expects its performance for the entire fiscal year will not reach the levels of earlier years. In 2012 and 2014, GAO made recommendations for IRS to improve customer service, which it has yet to implement. Consequently, in December 2015, GAO suggested that Congress require the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) to work with IRS to develop a comprehensive customer service strategy that incorporates elements of these prior recommendations.
IDT refund fraud poses a significant challenge. Although the full extent of this fraud is unknown, IRS estimates it paid $3.1 billion in IDT fraudulent refunds in filing season 2014, while preventing the processing of $22.5 billion in fraudulent refunds (see figure).
IRS has taken steps to combat IDT refund fraud, such as increasing resources dedicated to combating the problem. However, as GAO reported in August 2014 and January 2015, additional actions can further assist the agency, including assessing the costs, benefits, and risks of improving methods for authenticating taxpayers. In addition, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 included a provision to accelerate filings of W-2 information from employers to the IRS that would help IRS with pre-refund matching. GAO suggested that Congress provide Treasury with authority to lower the threshold for e-filing W-2s, which would further enhance pre-refund matching.
In March 2016, GAO reported that IRS had instituted numerous controls over key financial and tax processing systems; however, it had not always effectively implemented other controls intended to properly restrict access to systems and information, among other security measures. While IRS had improved some of its access controls, weaknesses remained in controls over key systems for identifying and authenticating users, authorizing users' level of rights and privileges, and encrypting sensitive data. These weaknesses were due in part to IRS's inconsistent implementation of its agency-wide security program, including not fully implementing 49 prior GAO recommendations. GAO concluded that these weaknesses collectively constituted a significant deficiency for the purposes of financial reporting for fiscal year 2015. As a result, taxpayer and financial data continue to be exposed to increased risk.
What GAO Recommends
GAO previously suggested that Congress consider requiring that Treasury work with IRS to develop a customer service strategy, and providing Treasury with the authority to lower the annual threshold for e-filing W-2s. GAO made prior recommendations to IRS to combat IDT refund fraud, such as assessing the costs, benefits, and risks of taxpayer authentication options, and 45 new recommendations to further improve IRS's information security controls and the implementation of its agency-wide information security program. |
gao_GAO-17-600 | gao_GAO-17-600_0 | Other items are covered under the Medicare DME benefit based on CMS’s interpretation of the statute, which does not elaborate on the meaning of “durable.” By regulation, CMS has defined DME as equipment that (1) can withstand repeated use; (2) has an expected lifetime of at least 3 years; (3) is used primarily to serve a medical purpose; (4) is not generally useful in the absence of an illness or injury; and (5) is appropriate for use in the home. Some Potential Disposable Substitutes for DME Exist, and These Substitutes May Have Benefits in Some Cases Some Potential Examples of Disposable Substitutes for DME Exist, according to Industry Stakeholders
We identified a limited number of disposable medical devices that could potentially substitute for DME, based on our literature review and interviews with industry stakeholders. These devices fall into existing DME categories used by Medicare—infusion pumps, including insulin pumps; blood glucose monitors; sleep apnea devices; and nebulizers. Despite the potential benefits of disposable substitutes, stakeholders also noted limitations to using these devices regarding health outcomes and potential cost-savings. Stakeholders Identified Market Incentives for Developing Potential Disposable DME Substitutes, but Cited Medicare Payment Policy as a Disincentive
Stakeholders we spoke with—including representatives from device manufacturers, Medicare beneficiary advocate groups, providers, and insurers—cited several market incentives for developing potential disposable DME substitutes. Specifically, 13 of the 21 stakeholders cited lack of insurance coverage as a disincentive to developing disposable DME substitutes, including representatives from all of the manufacturer organizations and two-thirds of the manufacturers we interviewed. Five of these stakeholders specifically cited CMS’s definition of DME as a disincentive to technological innovation, such as the development of disposable substitutes. Federal internal control standards state that management should identify, analyze, and respond to change, including anticipating and planning for significant changes using a forward-looking process. Without such consideration for Medicare coverage, CMS and other insurers that follow Medicare payment policy may not be taking advantage of the possible benefits of these devices. CMS Would Need to Consider Issues Related to Benefit Categorization, Including Legal Authority and Potential Payment Methodologies, If Medicare Coverage Were Expanded to Disposable DME Substitutes
If Medicare coverage were expanded to include disposable DME substitutes, CMS would need to consider issues related to benefit category designation. We identified three possible options that CMS could consider as benefit categories for expanding coverage: (1) using the DME benefit, (2) using the home health benefit, or (3) establishing a new benefit. Under each scenario, CMS would need to consider its authority to provide for such expanded coverage. Conclusions
Some disposable medical devices may have the potential to substitute for DME and may offer advantages in some cases, such as cost-savings and better health outcomes. However, Medicare currently does not cover most disposable DME substitutes because they do not meet Medicare’s definition of durability. CMS officials stated that they continue to regard this definition as appropriate and have not considered the possibility of extending DME coverage to these substitutes. According to federal internal control standards, management should anticipate and plan for significant changes using a forward-looking process. Recommendation for Executive Action
We recommend that the Administrator of CMS evaluate the possible costs and savings of using disposable devices that could potentially substitute for DME, including options for benefit categories and payment methodologies that could be used to cover these substitutes, and, if appropriate, seek legislative authority to cover these devices. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2015, Medicare spent $6.7 billion for DME. CMS's definition of DME generally precludes potential disposable DME substitutes from coverage. Congress included a provision in law for GAO to review the potential role of disposable medical devices as substitutes for DME.
This report examines (1) potential disposable DME substitutes and their possible benefits and limitations; (2) the incentives and disincentives stakeholders identified for developing these substitutes, including the possible influence of health insurance coverage; and (3) issues related to benefit category designation—including legal authority and potential payment methodologies—if Medicare coverage were expanded to include disposable DME substitutes. GAO reviewed agency documents and literature on disposable DME substitutes and Medicare payment policy; interviewed CMS officials; and interviewed various stakeholders, including representatives of device manufacturers, beneficiary advocates, health care providers, and insurers, for their perspectives.
What GAO Found
While disposable medical devices are generally not covered by Medicare, GAO identified eight that could potentially substitute for durable medical equipment (DME) items that are covered. These disposable DME substitutes fall into existing Medicare DME categories—infusion pumps, including insulin pumps; blood glucose monitors; sleep apnea devices; and nebulizers. Stakeholders GAO interviewed identified multiple benefits of using disposable substitutes, such as better health outcomes and potential cost-savings. However, they also cited factors that limit their use, including that these substitutes may not lead to cost-savings in all cases.
Stakeholders identified several market incentives, such as a growing demand, as reasons to develop disposable DME substitutes, but mostly cited lack of coverage by Medicare as a disincentive to development. Disposable DME substitutes are generally precluded from Medicare coverage under the DME benefit because they do not meet the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services' (CMS) regulatory definition of “durable”—able to withstand repeated use, with an expected lifetime of at least 3 years. Stakeholders noted this also decreases their chances of obtaining coverage from other insurers, which may follow Medicare payment policy. Some stakeholders noted that CMS's DME definition is a disincentive to technological innovation, and the agency has already faced challenges making coverage decisions with some devices. According to federal internal control standards, management should anticipate and plan for significant changes using a forward-looking process, but CMS officials said the agency has not considered the possibility of reexamining its definition. As a result, the agency may not be taking advantage of the potential benefits of these devices.
If Medicare coverage were expanded to include disposable DME substitutes, CMS would need to consider issues related to benefit category designation. GAO identified three possible options for covering disposable DME substitutes: an expansion of the current DME benefit, an expansion of the current home health benefit, or establishment of a new benefit category. The table lists the options GAO identified, which are not exhaustive. CMS would also need to consider its authority to provide for expanded coverage and evaluate potential reimbursement options.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that CMS, within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), evaluate the possible costs and savings of using disposable devices as substitutes for DME, and, if appropriate, seek legislative authority to cover them. HHS stated that such an evaluation was premature. However, GAO continues to believe an evaluation is needed to help HHS anticipate and plan for significant changes using a forward-looking process. |
gao_RCED-98-28 | gao_RCED-98-28_0 | Negotiated Agreement Provides for Greater Emissions Reductions at Lower Cost Than Initially Proposed
EPA’s final rule to limit emissions from NGS relied on the details of a negotiated agreement, between the power plant owners and environmental groups, which EPA expects to result in greater emissions reductions at a lower cost than EPA’s initial proposal. The agreement increased the level of emissions reductions from EPA’s proposed 70 percent to 90 percent, with estimated annual costs dropping from between $91.9 million and $128.3 million to $89.6 million. According to a project engineer for the Salt River Project, with its compliance determined on an annual basis, the plant can operate its emission control equipment most days at a rate greater than that needed to cut emissions by 90 percent to make up for those days on which emissions are not controlled because the equipment is not operating. Second, the agreement delays the initial installation of emission control equipment by almost 3 years, from January 1995 to November 1997, which allows the plant operators to complete the project in a more cost-effective manner. EPA initially estimated an approximately 14 percent improvement primarily on the basis of a study by the National Park Service, although the agency revised its estimate to approximately 7 percent to reflect the results of other analyses and studies. EPA noted that its revised estimate may be understated because it does not take into account other visibility improvements (1) below the rim of the Grand Canyon, (2) in seasons other than winter at the Grand Canyon, and (3) year round at other nearby national parks. This estimate translates into an increase in the average visual range from about 124 miles to about 133 miles. In addition to improvements during certain winter weather conditions, EPA also estimated visibility improvements on other winter days. EPA and the Owners Used Contingent Valuation to Estimate the Monetary Value of Visibility Benefits
Both EPA and the plant owners estimated, using contingent valuation, the monetary value of visibility improvements from reducing sulfur dioxide emissions from NGS. Although relying on the same methodology, the studies were technically different. The information included numerous analyses of the plant’s effects on visibility at the Grand Canyon and the visibility improvements that might be expected from the addition of emissions controls. EPA initially estimated that reducing the sulfur dioxide emissions by 90 percent would improve the winter seasonal average visibility by approximately 14 percent. EPA Revised Its Estimate to an Approximately 7 Percent Improvement in Visibility
Following a public comment period, EPA revised its estimate that reducing NGS’ sulfur dioxide emissions by 90 percent could improve the winter seasonal average visibility above the rim of the canyon from its initial estimate of approximately 14 percent to approximately 7 percent. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) decision to limit sulfur dioxide emissions from the Navajo Generating Station, focusing on: (1) the effect on emissions reductions and the associated costs that resulted from the negotiated agreement used by EPA in making its decision compared to its initial proposal; (2) the visibility improvements the agency estimated would result from the emissions controls and the means by which these improvements were determined; and (3) how contingent valuation was used to estimate the monetary value of visibility improvements.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the negotiated agreement is expected to result in greater emissions reductions at less cost than EPA had initially proposed; (2) the agency initially proposed limiting sulfur dioxide emissions at the Navajo Generating Station by approximately 70 percent at an annual cost estimated between $91.9 million and $128.3 million; (3) the negotiated agreement is expected to increase emissions reductions to approximately 90 percent at an estimated annual cost of approximately $89.6 million; (4) the lower costs resulted from several factors, according to the plant operators; (5) according to a project engineer for the Salt River Project, with its compliance determined on an annual basis, the plant can operate its emission control equipment most days at a rate greater than that needed to cut emissions by approximately 90 percent to make up for those days on which emissions are not controlled because the equipment is not operating; (6) also, delaying the initial installation of the emission control equipment by almost 3 years, from January 1995 to November 1997, allows the project to be completed in a more cost-effective manner; (7) EPA estimated that reducing the sulfur dioxide emissions at the Navajo Generating Station by approximately 90 percent would improve winter seasonal average visibility at the Grand Canyon approximately 7 percent--from about 124 miles to about 133 miles; (8) most of this improvement was estimated to result from improvements during certain winter weather conditions; (9) EPA initially estimated an approximately 14 percent improvement in the winter seasonal average visibility primarily on the basis of a National Park Service study of visibility in the vicinity of the Grand Canyon; (10) EPA revised this estimate to approximately 7 percent after considering the results of other analyses; (11) however, EPA noted that its revised estimated may be understated because it did not include visibility improvements: (a) below the rim of the Grand Canyon; (b) in seasons other than winter at the Grand Canyon; and (c) year round at other nearby national parks; (12) both EPA and the Navajo Generating Station's owners used contingent valuation to estimate the monetary value of visibility improvements; and (13) although relying on the same methodology, the studies were different and yielded widely different results. |
gao_GAO-15-281 | gao_GAO-15-281_0 | This program, which has no expiration date, provides up to 13 additional weeks of benefits to workers who have exhausted state unemployment insurance benefits during periods of high unemployment. 1). depending on the extent to which their state UI programs comply with federal criteria. More Likely to Have Federal Trust Fund Loans
States that reduced their benefit durations were more likely to have received a federal trust fund loan since 2010 (see app. This requirement made states that directly reduced UI benefit amounts ineligible for federal UI emergency funds, thereby limiting the range of options available to states to reduce benefit costs.suggested that “no other effort to reduce benefits [beyond reducing duration] would be acceptable.”
As one state official said, this rule Also, although the duration reductions will continue regardless of the availability of federal benefits, in 4 of the 7 states where we interviewed UI officials, officials said the availability of federal benefits may have played a role in the decision to reduce the maximum duration of state- funded benefits. Reduction in Maximum Duration of UI Benefits Lowered Total Benefits for Some Individuals
Reduced Durations Decreased Total Benefits for Some Individuals
In the duration reduction states, those UI claimants who would have been eligible to receive benefits beyond the new maximum receive less in total benefits in the absence of federal UI programs. When federal UI benefits were in effect (most recently generally from 2009 until the end of 2013), those individuals who were eligible to receive UI benefits for the maximum total state and federal duration would have received substantially less benefits following reduction, since duration in each federal benefit program depends, in part, on the duration of state benefits. For example, claimants could receive up to 67 weeks of federal benefits when the maximum state benefit duration was 26 weeks. The net cost to the federal government due to the reduction in state benefit durations is difficult to measure because the amount and duration of federal program benefits depend on both a claimant’s state benefits For example, we found that before and how long he or she is eligible.duration reduction, a claimant who received benefits for 75 weeks—26 weeks of state benefits and 49 weeks of federal benefits—would receive fewer total weeks of benefits after reduction in state duration to 20 weeks, but more weeks of federal benefits. Missouri reduced its maximum duration from 26 weeks to 20 weeks effective April 2011. Our analysis of these 2 states shows that there could be a net cost shift to the federal government, perhaps unintended, as a result of state duration reductions. However, DOL has not assessed the extent to which state duration reductions, adopted by states in the wake of the recent recession, affected costs to the federal government. Research Suggests That Reductions in Benefit Duration May Lessen UI’s Positive Effects on the Economy
The relevant economic literature on UI that we reviewed, including analysis by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), considers the benefits to be a source of economic stabilization, by increasing aggregate demand through a “multiplier effect” during downturns. The maximum duration of state benefits has not varied substantially since the 1960s, according to CRS. DOL does not have information about the costs shifted to the federal government and about the changes in total durations resulting from the states’ actions. Recommendation for Executive Action
To inform the design of any future federal UI programs, the Secretary of Labor should examine the implications of state reductions in maximum UI benefit duration on federal UI costs, for example, by modeling the net effect of paying federal benefits earlier to more beneficiaries, albeit for a possibly shorter period of time, and develop recommendations for the program, if appropriate. Specifically, DOL noted that additional study would be useful, and indicated it will begin to assess an approach for determining the implications of reductions in maximum duration on federal costs. Specifically, we reviewed relevant federal laws and regulations and state laws, and confirmed information regarding state laws with relevant state officials; interviewed federal unemployment insurance (UI) program officials and state UI officials in 7 states that reduced duration and 4 states that did not reduce duration, and in 4 of the 7 states that reduced duration, we also interviewed other stakeholders with an interest in UI duration, such as employer groups and advocates; conducted a cluster analysis using data from the Department of Labor’s (DOL) Office of Unemployment Insurance, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), and other sources; analyzed data on a range of variables using data from DOL and BLS; calculated survival rates (the probability that a claimant will continue receiving benefits after a given week) based on data provided to us; conducted an economic literature review on key implications of UI benefits for individuals; and conducted an economic literature review that focused primarily on the stimulative effects of UI, and identified reasonable conclusions about the likely economic effects of duration reduction. This allowed us to identify a group of benefit reduction states (Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Missouri, North Carolina, and South Carolina) that were similar on the characteristics we analyzed, as well as benefit reduction states (Illinois, Kansas, and Michigan) that were not similar to this group. | Why GAO Did This Study
As part of the nation's UI system, overseen by DOL, states provide benefits to eligible unemployed workers, with additional weeks of benefits sometimes provided by the federal government in times of economic stress. Since the 1960s, states have had maximum UI benefit durations of 26 weeks or longer. However, since 2011, nine states have reduced their maximum benefit durations: Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kansas, Michigan, Missouri, North Carolina, and South Carolina. GAO was asked to review the states' reductions.
GAO examined (1) the circumstances in which states reduced the maximum duration of UI benefits, (2) the implications of these reductions for individuals, (3) the effects on federal UI costs, and (4) their broader economic effects. GAO reviewed relevant federal and state laws; visited Georgia and Michigan, which had different approaches to reducing durations; analyzed UI program data from 2006 (before the recession) to 2014; and reviewed relevant economic research.
What GAO Found
The unemployment insurance (UI) system, a federal and state partnership that provides benefits to eligible workers who have lost their jobs, was under financial pressures during the recent recession and recovery. Since 2011, nine states reduced the maximum length of time (duration) individuals could receive state benefits. These states reduced duration from 26 weeks to as few as 12 weeks, with 20 weeks being the most common new maximum. Compared to states that did not reduce duration, those that did generally had higher unemployment rates and weaker UI trust fund balances and were more likely to have federal loans as their UI reserves became depleted. Officials in five of the nine states said that replenishing their trust fund balance was a key rationale for reducing benefit duration. GAO found that most of the nine states, like other states, also increased employer taxes for their UI program and made other benefit reductions such as by changing UI eligibility rules.
Reductions in state benefit durations resulted in some individuals receiving substantially less in total UI benefits. During the period from 2009 through 2013, individuals who exhausted their state benefits could receive additional weeks of benefits from the federal government. The duration of federal benefits was based on the duration of state benefits; shorter maximum state benefit periods resulted in shorter maximum federal benefit periods. As a result, some individuals received substantially less in total UI benefits because the durations of both their state and federal benefits were reduced. For example, in 2013, an individual in a state that had shortened its maximum benefit duration to 20 weeks could have received up to 52.4 additional weeks of federal benefits, for a total of 72.4 weeks. However, had the state maximum duration remained at 26 weeks, that individual could have received up to 67 weeks of federal benefits, for a total of 93 weeks. In contrast, individuals eligible for UI benefits for relatively short periods of time were unaffected by the reduced durations.
The effects of these reductions on federal UI program costs are unclear. Although GAO's prior work on past recessions found it can be useful for federal agencies to assess the unintended consequences of state policy responses, the Department of Labor (DOL) has not assessed the extent of any cost shift to the federal government. The net impact on federal UI costs would depend on how reductions in the duration of state benefits affect the number of people receiving federal benefits and for how long. On the one hand, federal costs are increased to the extent that state duration reductions shift individuals to federal benefits earlier. On the other hand, federal costs are decreased to the extent that fewer weeks of federal UI benefits are available. However, because DOL has not analyzed state data on individuals' weekly benefits, it remains unclear whether the federal government incurred a net cost due to the states' duration reductions.
Relevant research suggests that reductions in benefit duration may reduce the positive effects of UI on the economy. The economic literature that GAO reviewed, including analysis by the Congressional Budget Office, generally indicates positive macroeconomic effects from the UI program, based on the likelihood that benefits are spent, thus providing a stimulus to the economy.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Secretary of Labor examine the implications of state duration reductions for federal UI program costs and develop recommendations, if warranted. DOL agreed with GAO's recommendation and indicated it will begin to assess an approach for studying the implications of reductions in maximum duration on federal costs. |
gao_GAO-02-452 | gao_GAO-02-452_0 | The services acquired spare parts from 70 of the 78 federal stock groups. 1). Defense Logistics Agency officials cited three main reasons for the decline: increased credit card usage, increased contractor maintenance support, and—primarily—military downsizing. The reasons cited for the dollar value increase were (1) Defense Logistics Agency’s shift to a mix of more expensive spare parts and (2) price increases due to inaccurate initial price estimates, long periods between procurements, and/or substantial changes in the quantity of spare parts purchased. Officials stated that the increases were caused in part by the Defense Logistics Agency’s shift to a mix of more expensive spare parts and increases in the price of aviation spare parts. The total number of spare parts purchased fluctuated from a low of 612 in fiscal year 1999 to a high of 1,574 in fiscal year 2000. The officials provided data on the aggregate numbers of spare parts. | What GAO Found
The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) reported that a shortage of spare parts has caused a decline in the military services' readiness, particularly in aviation readiness. In response, Congress provided $1.1 billion in additional funding to purchase spare parts. According to DLA, shortages are a result of aging systems and high operational tempo, which increase the total number of spare parts required. The number of spare parts the military services ordered declined between 1996 and 2000, but the dollar value increased by 18 percent. Further, spare parts purchased were drawn from 70 of 78 stock groups. Defense officials told GAO that military downsizing was the primary reason for the decline and that credit card usage and contractor maintenance support also contributed. The reasons cited for the increase were (1) DLA shifts to a mix of more expensive spare parts and (2) price increases due to inaccurate initial price estimates, long periods between procurements, and substantial changes in the quantity of spare parts purchased. |
gao_GAO-13-268 | gao_GAO-13-268_0 | Between the two reserves, APHIS aims to maintain a total reserve balance equal to 3 to 5 months of AQI program costs. Pending approval from both USDA and DHS, APHIS expects to publish a notice in the Federal Register with a proposed new fee schedule in the fall of 2013. APHIS Currently Does Not Fully Recover Program Costs
In Fiscal Year 2011 There Was a Nearly 40 Percent Gap Between Total Identified AQI Costs and Collections
In fiscal year 2011—the most recent year for which data were available— AQI fee collections covered 62 percent of total identified AQI program costs, leaving a gap of more than $325 million between total AQI costs and total AQI collections. This gap was covered with funds from CBP’s Salaries and Expenses appropriation and by funds from other agencies to cover imputed costs. However, as shown in table 1, APHIS has chosen not to charge some classes of passengers, and the collections of the AQI program as a whole do not equal total identified program costs. In 2005, CBP agreed to report its AQI-related expenses to APHIS quarterly. APHIS agreed with the recommendation and, as we will discuss more fully later on in this report, has included some, but not all, of these costs in its recent analysis of AQI costs. APHIS’s rates for reimbursable agriculture overtime services are similarly misaligned with its costs. The Distribution of Fee Collections among CBP, APHIS, and the AQI Reserve Is Misaligned with AQI Costs
APHIS’s and CBP’s Shares of Fee Revenues Are Misaligned
CBP’s share of AQI fee revenue is significantly lower than its share of program costs. For example, in fiscal year 2011 (the most recent year for which APHIS could provide this data), CBP incurred 81 percent of total AQI program costs, but received only 60 percent of fee revenues; APHIS incurred 19 percent of program costs but retained 36 percent of the revenues, as shown in table 3. Although the 2005 agreement states that AQI funds will be distributed between CBP and APHIS in proportion to each agency’s AQI-related costs, this does not happen in practice. The upper end of the target—5 months—is the amount APHIS officials estimate would be needed to completely shut down the inspection program if it were to cease. However, a maximum target balance aligned with more realistic program risks would also allow for lower reserve levels. APHIS and CBP Do Not Ensure that All AQI Fees Due are Collected
APHIS Does Not Collect AQI Railcar Fees Consistent with Its Regulations
APHIS’s collection practices for the AQI fees assessed on railcars are not consistent with APHIS regulations. CBP Does Not Verify Payment for Commercial Truck, Private Vessel, and Private Aircraft Fees
CBP does not verify that it collects applicable user fees for every commercial truck, private aircraft, and private vessel for which the fees are due, resulting in an unknown amount of lost revenue. As of February 2013, the fees APHIS is considering would not fully remedy these issues (partly because of gaps in AQI’s statutory authority and partly because APHIS chooses not to fully exercise the AQI fee authorities), thus requiring APHIS and CBP to continue to rely on appropriated funds to bridge the historical gap of nearly 40 percent between AQI program costs and collections. Although APHIS is to be commended for its in-depth review of the AQI user fees and program costs, until APHIS includes all imputed costs when setting fee rates and CBP ensures that its CMIS cost data accurately reflect program costs at all ports, APHIS will not be able to set fees to recover the full costs of AQI services. Until APHIS and CBP improve oversight of these collection processes, they will continue to forgo revenue due the government, which will increase reliance on appropriated funds to cover program costs. To help ensure that fee rates are set to recover program costs, as authorized, and to enhance economic efficiency and equity with consideration of the administrative burden, we recommend that the Secretary of Agriculture establish an AQI cruise passenger fee aligned with the costs of inspecting cruise passengers and vessels and collected using the existing processes for collecting cruise passenger customs fees; establish a fee for passenger railcars aligned with the costs of inspecting rail passengers and railcars and collected using the existing processes for collecting passenger railcar customs fees; eliminate caps on the commercial vessel and commercial rail AQI fees; set truck fee rates to recover the costs of AQI services for trucks while maintaining a financial incentive for trucks to use transponders; and recover the costs of AQI services for buses and bus passengers by either establishing a bus passenger fee that is remitted by the bus companies or seeking legislative authority to establish a bus fee that covers the costs of bus passenger inspections. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To analyze the Agricultural Quarantine Inspection (AQI) fees, we assessed (1) the AQI fees currently charged and how, if at all, the proposed revisions would improve efficiency, equity, and revenue adequacy, and reduce administrative burden; (2) how, if at all, changes to the allocation of fee revenues between the Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) could improve efficiency, equity, and revenue adequacy, and reduce administrative burden; and (3) the extent to which Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) fee collection processes provide reasonable assurance that all AQI fees due are collected. In addition, to examine how APHIS and CBP fee collection processes have ensured that all AQI fees are collected, we interviewed APHIS and CBP officials, examined documents related to fee collection procedures, and observed fee collection processes at ports of entry. | Why GAO Did This Study
The AQI program guards against agriculture threats by inspecting international passengers and cargo at U.S. ports of entry, seizing prohibited material, and intercepting foreign agricultural pests. The program, which cost $861 million in 2011, is funded from annual appropriations and user fees. GAO has reported several times on the need to revise the fees to cover program costs as authorized. In 2010, APHIS initiated a review of AQI costs and fee design options. APHIS and CBP are considering options for a new fee structure. Pending departmental approval, APHIS expects to issue a proposed rule in fall 2013. GAO was asked to examine issues related to the AQI fees. This report examines 1) the fees currently charged and proposed revisions; 2) how fee revenues are allocated between the agencies; and 3) the extent to which fee collection processes provide reasonable assurance that all AQI fees due are collected. To do this, GAO reviewed AQI fee and cost data, and relevant laws, regulations, and policies; observed inspections at ports of entry; and interviewed APHIS and CBP officials.
What GAO Found
GAO's analysis of the Agricultural Quarantine Inspection (AQI) fee and cost data revealed a more than $325 million gap between fee revenues and total program costs in fiscal year 2011, or 38 percent of AQI program costs. The program, which is co-administered by the Department of Agriculture (USDA) Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Customs and Border Patrol (CBP), has a gap for several reasons: 1) APHIS's authority does not permit it to charge all persons seeking entry to the United States (e.g., pedestrians) and does not permit it to charge the costs of those inspections to others; 2) APHIS has chosen not to charge some classes of passengers, citing administrative fee collection difficulties; 3) CBP does not charge a portion of all primary inspections to agriculture functions, as required by CBP guidance; 4) APHIS does not consider all imputed costs (that is, costs incurred by other agencies on behalf of the AQI program) when setting fees; and 5) the allowable rates for overtime services are misaligned with the personnel costs of performing those services. APHIS is considering fees that would better align many, but not all, AQI fees with related inspection activity costs. APHIS and CBP can take additional steps to better align fees with costs; however, additional authority will be needed to fully recover all program costs.
Contrary to APHIS-CBP agreements and APHIS policy, the distribution of fee collections between CBP and APHIS is significantly misaligned with AQI costs. In 2005, CBP and APHIS agreed to divide AQI collections in proportion to each agency's share of AQI costs. However, in fiscal year 2011, for example, CBP incurred over 80 percent of total program costs but received only 60 percent of collections, while APHIS incurred 19 percent of program costs but retained 36 percent of collections. CBP bridges the gap between its AQI costs and its share of the fee revenues with its annual appropriation. In keeping with its authorities and with good practices for fee-funded programs, APHIS carries over a portion of AQI collections from year to year to maintain a shared APHIS-CBP reserve to provide a cushion against unexpected declines in fee collections. APHIS's stated goal is to maintain a 3- to 5-month reserve but the preliminary fee proposal would fund the reserve at a level higher than the 5 month maximum. Further, the 5-month maximum target balance is the amount officials say they would need to completely shut down the program, and therefore does not reflect realistic program risks. Further, this is more than the amount required to cover shortfalls during both the 2009 financial crisis and the events of September 11, 2001, and would increase reliance on appropriated funds to cover current program costs.
APHIS's and CBP's collection processes do not provide reasonable assurance that all AQI fees due are collected. Specifically, APHIS does not collect AQI fees for railcars consistent with its regulations, resulting in a revenue loss of $13.2 million in 2010. Further, CBP does not verify that it collects fees due for every commercial truck, private aircraft, and private vessel, resulting in an unknown amount of revenue loss annually. CBP has tools available to help remedy these issues but does not require their use. Until APHIS and CBP improve oversight of these collection processes, they will continue to forgo revenue due the government, which will increase reliance on appropriated funds to cover program costs.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making a number of recommendations aimed at more fully aligning fees with program costs, aligning the division of fees between APHIS and CBP with their respective costs, and ensuring that fees are collected when due. Further, GAO suggests Congress amend the AQI fee authority to allow the Secretary of Agriculture to set fee rates to recover the full costs of the AQI program. USDA and DHS generally agreed with the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-10-808 | gao_GAO-10-808_0 | FMLOB Migration and Other Financial Management System Guidance
In March 2004, OMB launched the FMLOB initiative, in part, to reduce the cost and improve the quality and performance of federal financial management systems by leveraging shared service solutions and implementing other reforms. Some Agencies Have Used Migration of Core Financial Systems as Part of Modernization Efforts, but Shared Services Use Is Limited
In an effort to capitalize on new technologies to help address financial management weaknesses and help meet their financial management needs, about half of the CFO Act agencies are in the process of or have plans to modernize their core financial systems, which often involve large- scale, multiyear financial system implementation efforts. Overall, 14 of the 23 civilian CFO Act agencies are planning to complete their efforts to deploy 14 planned systems at various times through fiscal year 2018. In connection with these migrations, 5 of the 10 agencies plan to rely on five different commercial providers, while 2 of the 10 rely, or plan to rely, on the same federal SSP to provide these services, and 3 of the 10 have not determined who the provider will be. In contrast, smaller agencies are more frequently relying on external providers to provide core financial system support services to leverage the benefits of using external providers, as discussed in more detail later in this report. Benefits and Challenges of Agency Migrations Raise Important Issues for OMB’s New Financial Systems Modernization Approach
Agencies and external providers reported that migrating support services to external providers offers advantages for helping smaller agencies, in particular, to capitalize on the benefits associated with sharing the services and solutions available through external providers. As shown in table 3, external providers’ experienced staff, the potential for cost savings through shared services, increased economies of scale, and the ability to focus on mission-related responsibilities were cited in the survey responses of CFO Act agencies as some of the benefits and advantages of migrating core financial system support services to external providers. CFO Act agencies also cited various concerns about migrating to external providers, such as the ability of external providers to provide solutions that meet the complex and unique needs associated with large agency migrations. Summary of OMB’s New Approach
To address ongoing challenges with financial management practices, OMB announced a new financial systems modernization approach, which encompasses the following five key areas. What specific criteria will be used to evaluate agency modernization project plans and task orders requiring OMB review and approval? OMB’s June 2010 memorandum states that it plans to issue a revision to OMB Circular No. OMB announced a new strategy and plans for future financial management system modernization efforts, and began issuing a series of guidance on its new approach from March 2010 to June 2010. The experience and challenges related to efforts to implement the FMLOB initiative provide important lessons learned as OMB continues to develop and implement its new approach. Critical next steps will include OMB elaborating on its new approach to address key issues. Articulating key aspects of a strategic plan, such as goals and performance plans clearly linked to strategies for achieving them and expressed in an objective, quantifiable, and measurable form, is also critical for the success of OMB’s new approach. We are not making any new recommendations in this report because of the early implementation stage of OMB’s new approach; however, we will continue to work with OMB to help ensure that it provides agency management and other stakeholders with the guidance needed to bring about meaningful improvements in financial management systems. We continue to believe that the questions and issues raised in the report need to be addressed by OMB in order to reduce risks and help ensure successful outcomes as it moves forward with its new approach and develops additional guidance. We requested comments on a draft of this report from the Acting Director of OMB or his designee. The agencies completed separate questionnaires on each identified core financial system and the status of activities related to migrating information technology (IT) hosting, application management, and transaction processing services supporting these systems to external providers as of September 30, 2009. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2004, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) launched the financial management line of business (FMLOB) initiative, in part, to reduce the cost and improve the quality and performance of federal financial management systems by leveraging shared services available from external providers. In response to a request to study FMLOB-related issues, this report (1) identifies the steps agencies have taken, or planned to take, to modernizing their core financial systems and migrate to an external provider and (2) assesses the reported benefits and significant challenges associated with migrations, including any factors related to OMB's new financial systems modernization approach. GAO's methodology included surveying federal agencies to obtain the status of their financial management systems as of September 30, 2009 (prior to OMB's March 2010 announcement of a new approach), and interviewing officials with selected agencies, external providers, and OMB. In oral comments on a draft of this report, OMB stated its position that it was too early for GAO to draw conclusions on its new approach because it is still a work in progress. For this reason, GAO is not making any new recommendations. However, GAO observes that the experience and challenges related to prior migration and modernization efforts offer important lessons learned as OMB continues to develop and implement its new approach.
What GAO Found
In an effort to capitalize on new technologies to help address serious weaknesses in financial management and help meet their future financial management needs, federal agencies continued to modernize their core financial systems, which often has led to large-scale, multiyear financial system implementation efforts. For the last 6 years, OMB has promoted the use of shared services as a means to more efficiently and effectively meet agency core financial system needs. Overall, 14 of 23 civilian Chief Financial Officer (CFO) Act agencies are planning to complete their efforts to deploy 14 new core financial systems at various times through fiscal year 2018, and in connection with their modernization efforts, 10 of the 14 agencies are migrating, or planning to migrate, hosting and application management support services to external providers. GAO also found that the CFO Act agencies were not using a limited number of external providers, a critical element of OMB's original approach. Five of the 10 agencies planned to rely on five different commercial providers, while 2 of the 10 planned to rely on the same federal provider and 3 had not determined the provider. In contrast, smaller agencies were more frequently relying on the four federal shared service providers to provide core financial system support services to leverage the benefits of using external providers. The most common benefits of migrating cited by CFO Act agencies were external providers' expertise, the potential for cost savings, and the agencies' ability to focus more on mission-related responsibilities. However, CFO Act agencies and external providers cited various challenges affecting modernization and migration efforts, such as reengineering business processes and the ability of external providers to provide specific solutions that meet complex agency needs. In March 2010, OMB announced a new financial systems modernization approach that focuses on the use of common automated solutions for transaction processing, such as invoicing and intergovernmental transactions. OMB issued a memorandum in June 2010 that included guidance for key elements of its new approach, such as agencies splitting financial system modernization projects into smaller segments. This new guidance also requires CFO Act agencies to halt certain modernization projects, pending OMB review and approval of revised project plans. Important aspects of the new approach have not yet been developed or articulated and OMB has stated that it plans to develop additional guidance. In GAO's view, it is critical that OMB's new guidance elaborate on the new approach and address key issues such as goals and performance plans clearly linked to strategies for achieving them, a governance structure, and specific criteria for evaluating projects. GAO believes these issues need to be addressed to reduce risks and help ensure successful outcomes as OMB moves forward with its new approach. GAO will continue to work with OMB to monitor the implementation of its new approach. |
gao_GAO-11-300 | gao_GAO-11-300_0 | In fiscal year 2009, the military services’ TA program expenditures were $517 million, as shown in figure 1. The MIVER contract with ACE expired on December 31, 2010, and DOD elected not to renew the contract because it is expanding the scope of these reviews, but DOD is currently in the process of obtaining a new contract for its reviews. DOD Takes Steps to Enhance Its Oversight of Schools Receiving TA Program Funds, but Areas for Improvement Remain
audit reports and may impose penalties or other sanctions on schools found in violation of Title IV requirements. DOD’s Oversight Policies and Procedures Vary by Schools’ Level of Program Involvement but Could Benefit from a Systematic Risk-Based Approach
DOD policies and procedures to oversee schools receiving TA funds vary based on the school’s level of involvement in the program. While DOD monitors enrollment patterns and schools’ funding levels, and addresses complaints about postsecondary schools on a case-by-case basis, its oversight activities do not include a systematic approach that considers these factors when targeting schools for review. Schools offering classes on an installation are subject to additional oversight measures. DOD’s Education Quality Review Process Was Narrow in Scope and Needed Increased Accountability
The MIVER was limited to institutions that offer face-to-face courses at military installations. While distance learning courses accounted for 71 percent of courses paid for with TA funds in fiscal year 2009, DOD did not have a review process in place to assess the quality of these institutions. In addition, DOD officials said that schools will be selected for the MVER process based on the amount of TA funds they receive. Given that there was no DOD-wide requirement to track the outcomes of MIVER recommendations and some of the military services did not require schools and installations to formally respond to MIVER findings, it is unclear to what extent recommendations that could improve the quality of education services offered at schools and installations were addressed. DOD Has Several Ways to Receive Reports of Problems but Needs a Centralized System to Track Complaints
While DOD has several mechanisms for service members to report problems associated with their TA funding, it lacks a centralized system to track these complaints and how they are resolved. DOD’s Limited Coordination with Accreditors and Education May Hinder Its Efforts
DOD Coordinates with Accrediting Agencies but Does Not Use Information about Schools That Have Been Sanctioned or Have Unapproved Changes
While DOD coordinates with accrediting agencies, it does not use accrediting agencies’ monitoring results or consider schools’ unapproved substantive changes as it carries out its oversight. DOD’s oversight process does not take into account accrediting agencies’ monitoring results of schools that could negatively affect students and service members. Schools can be sanctioned by accrediting agencies when they fail to meet established accrediting standards, such as providing sound institutional governance, providing accurate information to the public, and offering effective educational programs. DOD does not currently require schools to have their substantive changes approved by their accrediting agency in order to receive TA funds. The extent of DOD’s coordination with Education has generally been limited to accreditation status. However, DOD does not utilize information from Education’s monitoring reviews to inform its oversight efforts. Education determines schools’ initial eligibility to participate in federal student aid programs through eligibility reviews and continuing eligibility through program reviews, compliance audits, and financial audits. The results of these oversight measures can provide DOD and its military services with additional insight into a school’s ability to provide a quality education and services to students. DOD may be able to leverage information from Education’s ongoing efforts in this area. Increased oversight is needed to remedy gaps in the accountability of the quality review process and the process to address complaints against schools. DOD could further enhance its oversight efforts by leveraging resources and information that accrediting agencies and Education already collect. To improve the accountability of DOD, its military services, their installations, and participating postsecondary schools in developing its new third-party review process, require all schools, installations, and the military services to formally respond in writing to related recommendations pertaining to them, and develop a process to track and document the status of all recommendations for improvement. 2. 3. In doing so, the Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness should consider the following: developing a more systematic risk-based approach to oversight by utilizing information from accrediting agencies and Education to better target schools, modifying its proposed standard MOU to include an explicit prohibition against school conduct that may adversely affect service members, such as misrepresentation, and reviewing Education’s recently promulgated requirements for state authorization of schools and coordinate with Education to determine the extent to which these requirements are useful for overseeing schools receiving TA funds. 4. 5. | Why GAO Did This Study
In fiscal year 2009, the Department of Defense's (DOD) Military Tuition Assistance (TA) Program provided $517 million in tuition assistance to approximately 377,000 service members. GAO was asked to report on (1) DOD's oversight of schools receiving TA funds, and (2) the extent to which DOD coordinates with accrediting agencies and the U.S. Department of Education (Education) in its oversight activities. GAO conducted site visits to selected military education centers and interviewed officials from DOD, its contractors, Education, accrediting agencies and their association, and postsecondary institutions.
What GAO Found
DOD is taking steps to enhance its oversight of schools receiving TA funds, but areas for improvement remain. Specifically, DOD could benefit from a systematic risk-based oversight approach, increased accountability in its education quality review process, and a centralized system to track complaints. DOD does not systematically target its oversight efforts based on factors that may indicate an increased risk for problems, such as complaints against schools or the number of service members enrolled at a school. Instead, DOD's oversight policies and procedures vary by a school's level of program participation, and schools that operate on base are subject to the highest level of oversight. DOD plans to implement more uniform oversight policies and procedures, but they are not expected to take effect until 2012. In addition, the process DOD used to review the academic courses and services provided by schools and military education centers was narrow in scope and lacked accountability. The review was limited to schools offering traditional classroom instruction at installations and did not include distance education courses, which account for 71 percent of courses taken in fiscal year 2009. The contract for these quality reviews expired on December 31, 2010, and DOD plans to resume its reviews on October 1, 2011, when a new contractor is selected. DOD is developing an expanded quality review process and plans to select schools based, in part, on the amount of TA funds received. With regard to accountability, DOD's review process provided recommendations that could improve educational programming, but there is no DOD-wide process to ensure that these recommendations have been addressed. Furthermore, DOD lacks a system to track complaints about schools and their outcomes. As a result, it may be difficult for DOD and its services to accurately identify and address any servicewide problems and trends. DOD's limited coordination with accreditors and Education may hinder its oversight efforts. DOD verifies whether a school is accredited; however, it does not gather some key information from accreditors when conducting its oversight activities, such as whether schools are in jeopardy of losing their accreditation. Accreditors can place schools on warning or probation status for issues such as providing inaccurate information to the public and poor institutional governance. Schools can experience various problems within the 3- to 10-year accreditation renewal period, and these problems can negatively affect students, including service members. Additionally, DOD does not require schools to have new programs and other changes approved by accrediting agencies in order to receive TA funds. Currently, students enrolled in unapproved programs or locations are ineligible to receive federal student aid from Education, but can receive TA funds. DOD's coordination with Education has generally been limited to accreditation issues and Education's online resources about schools and financial aid. DOD does not utilize information from Education's school-monitoring activities to inform its oversight efforts. Education's findings from program reviews and financial audits of schools provide insights about schools' financial condition, level of compliance, and governance. Collectively, this information could provide DOD with information that can be used to better target schools for review or inform other oversight decisions.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD (1) improve accountability for recommendations made by third-party quality reviews, (2) develop a centralized process to track complaints against schools, (3) conduct a systemic review of its oversight processes, (4) take actions to ensure TA funds are used only for accreditor-approved courses and programs, and (5) require and verify state authorization for all schools. |
gao_NSIAD-96-92 | gao_NSIAD-96-92_0 | NATO’s Enlargement Study
In September 1995, NATO released an internal study of the rationale behind the enlargement and the way it should occur. In fact, NATO members have not yet established a timetable for enlargement or who will be invited to join. U.S. Bilateral Assistance to PFP Member States
In addition to its contribution through NATO common budgets, the United States provided about $53 million in fiscal year 1995 to PFP member countries through five bilateral programs that help to enhance their military equipment and operations. As table 2 shows, the fiscal year 1996 amount for these programs increased to about $125 million. This increase will largely support cooperative activities with PFP member countries. All of these programs, except PFP assistance, predate discussion of NATO enlargement. Partnership for Peace Program
The United States has provided $130 million in bilateral support to the PFP program over 2 years. Seventeen other nations may also receive some U.S. bilateral PFP assistance. The Joint Contact Team Program is executed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the Defense Security Assistance Agency. The International Military Education and Training program is funded through the Foreign Operations appropriation. Potential Costs to NATO and New Members
NATO’s Potential Costs
If NATO increases its membership, it will likely have to provide an undetermined amount of common funding to help the new member nations. The United States provides 23.3 percent of NATO infrastructure project funding, the highest of any member state. However, neither NATO nor the United States know what the total costs of enlargement will be to NATO or individual members, both current and new. New Members’ Potential Costs
Many of the costs resulting from NATO enlargement would be expected to be borne by the new members themselves. The total potential costs that could be incurred by each new NATO member to upgrade its military capabilities cannot be fully determined at this time because NATO has yet to define country-specific military requirements. For example, the Czechs have a 10-year modernization plan to upgrade their equipment and become interoperable with NATO forces. Article 6
For the purposes of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack: on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France, on the territory of Turkey or on the islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer; on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories or any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) future enlargement and plans to include the newly democratic states of the former communist bloc, focusing on: (1) actions NATO plans to take to enlarge itself; (2) U.S. bilateral assistance programs that enhance the military operations and capabilities of aspiring NATO members; and (3) the potential costs of enlargement to NATO and the new members.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) in accordance with its 1991 strategic concept, NATO has initiated two programs designed to reach out to its former adversaries to the east, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and the Partnership for Peace (PFP) program; (2) in September 1995, NATO released an internal study examining the rationale for enlarging NATO and how it might occur; (3) NATO members have not yet established a timetable for enlargement or decided who will be invited to join; (4) the United States has five bilateral assistance programs that help to improve the operational capabilities of potential NATO members and other countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the Newly Independent States, these programs are bilateral PFP assistance (the Warsaw Initiative), Foreign Military Financing, the International Military Education and Training program, the Joint Contact Team Program, and Excess Defense Articles transfers; (5) all but the bilateral PFP assistance predate discussion of NATO's future enlargement; (6) in fiscal year (FY) 1995, the United States provided about $54 million in bilateral assistance to PFP member states through the five bilateral assistance programs and, in FY 1996, the United States will provide about $125 million; (7) this increase in assistance largely supports PFP bilateral assistance for cooperative activities with these nations and, of the total $179 million, about $130 million (or 73 percent) represents support for the PFP program; (8) neither NATO nor the United States knows what the total costs of enlargement will be to NATO or individual members, both current and new; increased membership will place new financial burdens on NATO's commonly funded infrastructure programs and on the new members themselves; (9) many of the costs of enlargement would be expected to be borne by the new members, some of whom may lack the ability to fund the changes necessary for their militaries to become interoperable with NATO forces; (10) the cost that each new member may incur cannot be fully determined because NATO has not yet defined country-specific military requirements; and (11) U.S. officials anticipate that these nations may require bilateral or multilateral financial assistance from the United States and other NATO members. |
gao_GAO-08-71 | gao_GAO-08-71_0 | When EPA began cleaning up contamination in the Libby area in 2000, it also took steps to identify and evaluate sites that may have received shipments of Libby ore for asbestos contamination according to CERCLA. Federal Agencies Have Assessed Sites Thought to Have Received Asbestos- Contaminated Ore but Did So without Critical Information about Safe Exposure Levels
EPA, with assistance from other federal and state agencies, has assessed 271 sites that were thought to have received asbestos-contaminated ore from Libby, Montana, to determine if the sites are contaminated with asbestos and if they need cleanup. As a part of ATSDR’s effort to evaluate public-health risks posed by past and current exposures to asbestos contamination in the Libby area and at some of the sites that received the Libby ore, ATSDR has noted there is an absence of key information on the toxicity of the asbestos found in the Libby ore. ATSDR also noted that the methods EPA used to sample and analyze the air and soil at most of the 28 sites it reviewed have since been improved and now better quantify asbestos levels. In general, a cleanup would be performed if sampling results indicated that asbestos was present in amounts greater than 1 percent (based on the percentage of the area of a microscopic field) in soils or debris or greater than 0.1 asbestos fibers per cubic centimeter of air. In December 2006, EPA’s Office of Inspector General reported that EPA had not completed a toxicity assessment of the type of asbestos found in the Libby ore and that this information was necessary to determine the safe level of exposure for humans. EPA Regions Did Not Consistently Implement Public- Notification Provisions and Adhere to Guidance
At most of the 13 sites for which EPA had public-notification responsibilities, EPA regions did not implement key notification provisions of NCP. Similarly, while community members participating in two of three focus groups were disappointed overall in EPA’s efforts to inform them about cleanups in their neighborhoods, the participants in the third group were very satisfied with EPA’s efforts. At the Denver, Colorado site (Region 8), although officials established an administrative record, they did not notify the public that the record was available for review and did not hold a public-comment period. At two of the three sites, however, most discussion group participants said EPA did not notify them about the cleanups before they began. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
We were asked to (1) describe how the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and other federal agencies assessed and addressed potential risks at the facilities that received asbestos-contaminated vermiculite ore from a mine in Libby, Montana, and the results of these efforts; and (2) determine the extent and effectiveness of the EPA regions’ efforts to notify the public about the cleanup of facilities that received the contaminated ore.
Due to concerns of the Department of Justice and EPA that our work could impact an ongoing federal criminal case against W.R. Grace—the company that owned the vermiculite mine in Libby, Montana, and some of the processing facilities that received ore from Libby—and the need to avoid undue influence in the case, we designed our methodology to minimize direct contact with EPA staff. EPA’s Public-Notification Efforts
To address the second objective, we limited our review to the 13 sites that were being cleaned up and for which EPA had public-notification responsibility. Four focus groups were conducted in Wilder, Kentucky; Dearborn, Michigan; Minot, North Dakota; and Hamilton Township, New Jersey to ensure geographic diversity. The milestone date for completing the baseline risk assessment, including the comprehensive toxicity assessment, is the end of fiscal year 2010.” 19. | Why GAO Did This Study
Between 1923 and the early 1990s, a mine near Libby, Montana, shipped millions of tons of asbestos-contaminated vermiculite ore to sites throughout the United States. In 2000, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) began to clean up asbestos contamination at the Libby mine and evaluate those sites that received the ore to determine if they were contaminated. Under Superfund program regulations and guidance, EPA regional offices took steps to inform affected communities of contamination problems and agency efforts to address them. GAO was asked to (1) describe the status of EPA's and other federal agencies' efforts to assess and address potential risks at the facilities that received contaminated Libby ore and (2) determine the extent and effectiveness of EPA's public notification efforts about cleanups at sites that received Libby ore. GAO, among other steps, convened focus groups in three of the affected communities to address these issues.
What GAO Found
Since 2000, EPA has evaluated 271 sites thought to have received asbestos-contaminated ore from Libby, Montana, but did so without key information on safe exposure levels for asbestos. Based on these evaluations, 19 sites were found to be contaminated with asbestos from the Libby ore and needed to be cleaned up. EPA or the state of jurisdiction generally led or oversaw the cleanups. In general, a cleanup would be performed if sampling results indicated asbestos was present in amounts greater than 1 percent (based on the percentage area in a microscopic field) in soils or debris or greater than 0.1 asbestos fibers per cubic centimeter of air. However, these standards are not health-based and the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry found that the sampling and analysis methods EPA used at most of the sites it examined were limited and have since been improved. The EPA Office of Inspector General reported in December 2006 that EPA had not completed an assessment of the toxicity of the asbestos in the Libby ore. Until it completes this assessment, EPA cannot be assured that the Libby site itself is cleaned to safe levels, nor will it know the extent to which the sites that received Libby ore may need to be reevaluated. EPA has agreed to complete a risk and toxicity assessment by the end of fiscal year 2010. EPA regional offices did not implement key provisions of the agency's public notification regulations at 8 of the 13 sites for which EPA had lead responsibility. At four sites, for example, EPA either did not provide and maintain documentation about the cleanups for public review and comment or provide for a public comment period. Also, although EPA guidance emphasizes that simply complying with the public notification rules is often insufficient to meet communities' needs, at five sites EPA did not go beyond these provisions. Reaction among community members to EPA's public notification measures was mixed. At two of the three sites in which GAO held focus groups with affected community members, participants were critical of EPA's efforts to inform them about the cleanup of the asbestos-contaminated sites in their neighborhood. These included participants in Hamilton Township, New Jersey and Minot, North Dakota who noted that newspaper notices did not identify asbestos as the contaminant in question and contained unclear and bureaucratic language. On the other hand, participants in Dearborn, Michigan praised EPA efforts to, among other things, hold public meetings and hand-deliver written notices. |
gao_GAO-09-540T | gao_GAO-09-540T_0 | In addition to addressing the published recommendations, the SOC assumed responsibility for addressing the policy development and reporting requirements contained in the NDAA 2008. Also, the IPO’s scope of responsibility was broadened to include personnel and benefits data sharing between DOD and VA.
DOD and VA Have Completed the Majority of the Requirements to Jointly Develop Policies on Care and Management, Medical and Disability Evaluation, Return to Active Duty, and the Transition from DOD to VA
As of April 2009, DOD and VA have completed 60 of the 76 requirements we identified for jointly developing policies for recovering servicemembers on (1) care and management, (2) medical and disability evaluation, (3) return to active duty, and (4) servicemember transition from DOD to VA. DOD and VA Have Completed More Than Two-Thirds of the Requirements Regarding the Care and Management of Recovering Servicemembers
We found that more than two-thirds of the requirements for DOD’s and VA’s joint policy development to improve the care and management of recovering servicemembers have been completed while the remaining requirements are in progress. Most of the completed requirements were addressed in DOD’s January 2009 Directive-Type Memorandum (DTM), which was developed in consultation with VA. A VA official told us that VA also plans to issue related policy guidance as part of a VA handbook in June 2009. We identified 18 requirements for this policy area and grouped them into three categories: (1) policy for improved medical evaluations, (2) policy for improved physical disability evaluations, and (3) reporting on the feasibility and advisability of consolidating DOD and VA disability evaluation systems. DOD and VA anticipate issuing a final report on the pilot in August 2009. DOD and VA officials noted that they will be further developing the procedures, processes, and standards for the transition of recovering servicemembers in a subsequent comprehensive policy instruction, which is estimated to be completed by June 2009. DOD and VA Officials Experienced Challenges during Joint Development and Initial Implementation of Required Policies
DOD and VA officials told us that they experienced numerous challenges as they worked to jointly develop policies to improve the care, management, and transition of recovering servicemembers. According to officials, these challenges contributed to the length of time required to issue policy guidance, and in some cases the challenges have not yet been completely resolved. Finally, recent changes to the SOC staff, including DOD’s organizational changes for staff supporting the SOC, could pose challenges to the development of policy affecting recovering servicemembers. In some cases, standardized definitions were critical to policy development. The importance of agreement on key terms is illustrated by an issue encountered by the SOC’s work group responsible for family support policy. DOD also established two new organizational structures—the Office of Transition Policy and Care Coordination and an Executive Secretariat office. In contrast, others are concerned by DOD’s changes, stating that the new organizations disrupt the unity of command that once characterized the SOC’s management because personnel within the SOC organization now report to three different officials within DOD and VA. However, it is too soon to determine how well DOD’s new structure will work in conjunction with the SOC. DOD and VA officials we spoke with told us that the SOC’s work groups continue to carry out their roles and responsibilities. Finally, according to DOD and VA officials, the roles and scope of responsibilities of both the SOC and the DOD and VA Joint Executive Council appear to be in flux and may evolve further still. While the SOC will remain responsible for policy matters directly related to recovering servicemembers, a number of policy issues may now be directed to the Joint Executive Council, including issues that the SOC had previously addressed. Appendix I: Summary of Selected Requirements from the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008
To summarize the status of the Departments’ of Defense (DOD) and Veterans Affairs (VA) efforts to jointly develop policies for each of the four policy areas outlined in sections 1611 through 1614 of the NDAA 2008, we identified 76 requirements in these sections and grouped related requirements into 14 logical categories. | Why GAO Did This Study
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (NDAA 2008) requires the Departments of Defense (DOD) and Veterans Affairs (VA) to jointly develop and implement comprehensive policies on the care, management, and transition of recovering servicemembers. The Senior Oversight Committee (SOC)--jointly chaired by DOD and VA leadership--has assumed responsibility for these policies. The NDAA 2008 also requires GAO to report on the progress DOD and VA make in developing and implementing the policies. This statement provides preliminary information on (1) the progress DOD and VA have made in jointly developing the comprehensive policies required in the NDAA 2008 and (2) the challenges DOD and VA are encountering in the joint development and initial implementation of these policies. GAO determined the current status of policy development by assessing the status reported by SOC officials and analyzing supporting documentation. To identify challenges, GAO interviewed the Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, the Executive Director and Chief of Staff of the SOC, the departmental co-leads for most of the SOC work groups, the Acting Director of DOD's Office of Transition Policy and Care Coordination, and other knowledgeable officials.
What GAO Found
DOD and VA have made substantial progress in jointly developing policies required by sections 1611 through 1614 of the NDAA 2008 in the areas of (1) care and management, (2) medical and disability evaluation, (3) return to active duty, and (4) transition of care and services received from DOD to VA. Overall, GAO's analysis showed that as of March 2009, 60 of the 76 requirements GAO identified have been completed and the remaining 16 requirements are in progress. DOD and VA have completed all of the policy development requirements for medical and disability evaluations, including issuing a report on the feasibility and advisability of consolidating the DOD and VA disability evaluation systems, although the pilot for this approach is still ongoing. DOD has also completed establishing standards for returning recovering servicemembers to active duty. More than two-thirds of the policy development requirements have been completed for the remaining two policy areas--care and management and the transition of recovering servicemembers from DOD to VA. Most of these requirements were addressed in a January 2009 DOD Directive-Type Memorandum that was developed in consultation with VA. DOD officials reported that more information will be provided in a subsequent policy instruction, which will be issued in June 2009. VA also plans to issue related policy guidance in June 2009. DOD and VA officials told GAO that they have experienced numerous challenges as they worked to jointly develop policies to improve the care, management, and transition of recovering servicemembers. According to officials, these challenges contributed to the length of time required to issue policy guidance, and in some cases the challenges have not yet been completely resolved. For example, the SOC must still standardize key terminology relevant to policy issues affecting recovering servicemembers. DOD and VA agreement on key definitions for what constitutes "mental health," for instance, is important for developing policies that define the scope, eligibility, and service levels for recovering servicemembers. Recent changes affecting the SOC may also pose future challenges to policy development. Some officials have expressed concern that DOD's recent changes to staff supporting the SOC have disrupted the unity of command because SOC staff now report to three different officials within DOD and VA. However, it is too soon to determine how DOD's staffing changes will work. Additionally, according to DOD and VA officials, the SOC's scope of responsibilities appears to be in flux. While the SOC will remain responsible for policy matters for recovering servicemembers, a number of policy issues may now be directed to the DOD and VA Joint Executive Council. Despite this uncertainty, DOD and VA officials told GAO that the SOC's work groups continue to carry out their responsibilities. GAO shared the information contained in this statement with DOD and VA officials, and they agreed with the information GAO presented. |
gao_HEHS-00-180 | gao_HEHS-00-180_0 | Large numbers of dying birds and an unusual cluster of human cases were at first viewed as separate events. 2). This finding was significant in implying that, if the virus was St. Louis encephalitis, it was killing birds and possibly could be connected to the human outbreak. The lessons we identified related primarily to addressing possible needs in five areas: local surveillance and response capabilities, communication among public health agencies, coordination between public health and animal health efforts, capabilities of laboratories, and efforts to distinguish between natural and unnatural events. The Local Disease Surveillance and Response System Is Critical
The West Nile outbreak provided a number of lessons about surveillance. Many Aspects of Surveillance and Response Worked Quickly and Well
The human outbreak of West Nile began with a few unusual cases. A 1999 assessment by the Institute found that disease surveillance systems in place at local, state, and federal levels rely on systems of disease reporting from health providers that are notorious for their poor sensitivity, lack of timeliness, and minimal coverage.Because an effective medical response to a bioterrorist event would depend in part on the ability of individual clinicians to identify, accurately diagnose, and effectively treat diseases (including many that may be uncommon), the Institute reported that education about the threat posed by bioterrorism and about the diagnosis and treatment of various agents deserves priority. Better Communication Is Needed Among Public Health Agencies
Experts consider rapid and reliable communication among public health agencies to be essential to bioterrorism preparedness and coordination. While a secure electronic communication network was in place at the time of the initial outbreak, not all involved agencies and officials were using it at the time. Links Between Public and Animal Health Agencies Are Becoming More Important
The West Nile events illustrate the value of communication between public and animal health communities, the latter including those dealing with domestic animals, wildlife, and other animals such as zoo animals. For example,
Some key public health officials, such as the city health department’s Director of the Bureau of Communicable Disease, indicated that they were not aware of the similarities in the clinical symptoms occurring in the birds and humans until many days or weeks after the human outbreak began. The California researcher who conducted some of the diagnostic laboratory work on the West Nile outbreak was brought in by officials at New York State’s Department of Health because they learned of the innovative research his laboratory was developing to quickly and accurately identify the viral causes of unexplained deaths from encephalitis.Some involved officials indicated that the California laboratory’s involvement was fortuitous in allowing a laboratory not consumed with diagnostic testing for the outbreak to focus on performing the types of tests required to eventually identify the virus. Finally, the outbreak and surrounding events support public health officials’ views that bioterrorism preparedness rests in large part on the soundness and preparedness of the public health infrastructure for detecting any disease and the causes of disease outbreaks. With this information, we developed a chronology and compiled a list of lessons learned from the West Nile virus outbreak. Officials and agencies contacted included the following:
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Emergency
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Center for Infectious Diseases, Division of Vector-Borne Infectious Diseases, Division of Viral and Rickettsial Diseases, Division of Bacterial and Mycotic Diseases
Central Intelligence Agency
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection
U.S. Geological Survey, National Wildlife Health Center
U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases
New York State Department of Health
New York State Department of Environmental Conservation
New York City Department of Health
New York City Commissioner’s Office of Emergency Management
Wildlife Conservation Society/Bronx Zoo
Flushing Hospital Medical Center
Connecticut Agricultural Experiment Station
University of California at Irvine
Association of Public Health Laboratories
National Association of County and City Health Officials a ProMED moderator active during the initial outbreak To gather background information and relevant literature on the West Nile outbreak, West Nile virus, and surveillance activities put in place since the outbreak, we searched academic journals and news media and performed an extensive review of publications related to the virus. When the cause of an outbreak is unknown, it is much more difficult to respond quickly and effectively. 1 (Jan. 1, 2000), p. 12. 6, No. 8-17. 5, No. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the West Nile virus outbreak, focusing on: (1) establishing a thorough chronological account of the significant events and communications that occurred, from doctors and others who first saw the symptoms and from the officials mounting a response; and (2) identifying lessons learned for public health and bioterrorism preparedness.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the analysis of the West Nile virus outbreak began as two separate investigations--one of sick people, the other of dying birds; (2) on the human side, the investigation began quickly after a physician at a local hospital reported the first cases, and the original diagnosis, while incorrect, led to prompt mosquito control actions by New York City officials; (3) the ongoing investigation involved the combined efforts of many people in public health agencies and research laboratories at all levels of government; (4) a consensus that the bird and human outbreaks were linked, which was a key to identifying the correct source, took time to develop and was initially dismissed by many involved in the investigation; (5) when the bird and human investigations converged several weeks after initial diagnosis, and after laboratory research was launched independently by several of the participants to explore other possible causes, the link was made and the virus was correctly identified; (6) there are several key lessons that emerged from the investigation and response to this outbreak; (7) the local disease surveillance and response system is critical; (8) in this outbreak, many aspects of the local surveillance system worked well, in that the outbreak was quickly spotted and immediately investigated; (9) assessments of the infrastructure for responding to outbreaks suggest that surveillance networks in many other locations may not be as well prepared; (10) better communication is needed among public health agencies; (11) as the investigation grew, lines of communication and decision-making were often unclear, and efforts to keep everyone informed were awkward; (12) links between public and animal health agencies are becoming more important; (13) the length of time it took to connect the bird and human outbreaks of the West Nile virus signals a need for better coordination among public and animal health agencies; (14) ensuring adequate laboratory capabilities is essential; (15) even though this was a relatively small outbreak, it strained resources for several months; (16) because a bioterrorist event could look like a natural outbreak, bioterrorism preparedness rests in large part on public health preparedness; and (17) the ensuing investigation and post-outbreak assessments illustrate the challenges in identifying the source of an outbreak, supporting public health officials' views that public health preparedness is a key element of bioterrorism preparedness. |
gao_GAO-04-785T | gao_GAO-04-785T_0 | Biometric Technologies for Personal Identification
When used for personal identification, biometric technologies measure and analyze human physiological and behavioral characteristics. The corresponding biometric technologies are fingerprint recognition, hand geometry, and facial, retina, and iris recognition. How Biometric Technologies Work
Biometric technologies vary in complexity, capabilities, and performance, but all share several elements. Depending on the application, biometric systems can be used in one of two modes: verification or identification. Identification is used to establish a person’s identity—that is, to determine who a person is. A high percentage of people are unable to enroll in retina recognition systems because of the precision such systems require. Using Biometrics for Aviation Security
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and subsequently, DHS and TSA, has been examining the use of biometrics for aviation security for several years. FAA has conducted several tests and pilots of biometrics for access control to secure areas of airports. The program was developed in response to ATSA and the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 and will include the use of biometrics to provide a positive match of a credential for up to 6 million transportation workers across the United States. Laws passed since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks require a more extensive use of biometrics for border control. Biometrics can support the protection component of a security program. Weaknesses in the security process or failures by people to operate the technology or implement the security process can diminish the effectiveness of technology. Exception processing that is not as good as biometric-based primary processing could be exploited as a security hole. The use of biometrics does not relieve the credential-issuing authority of the responsibility of ensuring the identity of the person requesting the credential or of conducting a security check, commensurate with the level of access being granted, to assure itself that the person is entitled to receive the credential. In conclusion, biometric technologies are available today that can be used for aviation security. However, it is important to bear in mind that effective security cannot be achieved by relying on technology alone. Technology and people must work together as part of an overall security process. As we have pointed out, weaknesses in any of these areas diminishes the effectiveness of the security process. We have found that three key considerations need to be addressed before a decision is made to design, develop, and implement biometrics into a security system: 1. Decisions must be made on how the technology will be used. A detailed cost-benefit analysis must be conducted to determine that the benefits gained from a system outweigh the costs. 3. A trade-off analysis must be conducted between the increased security, which the use of biometrics would provide, and the effect on areas such as privacy and convenience. Security concerns need to be balanced with practical cost and operational considerations as well as political and economic interests. A risk management approach can help federal agencies identify and address security concerns. To develop security systems with biometrics, the high- level goals of these systems need to be defined, and the concept of operations that will embody the people, process, and technologies required to achieve these goals needs to be developed. With these answers, the proper role of biometric technologies in aviation security can be determined. | Why GAO Did This Study
One of the primary functions of any security system is the control of people moving into or out of protected areas, such as physical buildings, information systems, and our national border. Technologies called biometrics can automate the identification of people by one or more of their distinct physical or behavioral characteristics. The term biometrics covers a wide range of technologies that can be used to verify identity by measuring and analyzing human characteristics--relying on attributes of the individual instead of things the individual may have or know. Since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, laws have been passed that require a more extensive use of biometric technologies in the federal government. In 2002, GAO conducted a technology assessment on the use of biometrics for border security. GAO was asked to testify about the issues that it raised in the report, the current state of the technology, and the application of biometrics to aviation security.
What GAO Found
Biometric technologies are available today that can be used for aviation security. Biometric technologies vary in complexity, capabilities, and performance, and can be used to verify or establish a person's identity. Leading biometric technologies include facial recognition, fingerprint recognition, hand geometry, and iris recognition. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and subsequently, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), has been examining the use of biometrics for aviation security for several years. TSA has three current pilot projects that will study the use of biometrics to enhance aviation security: the Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC), registered traveler, and an access control pilot program designed to secure sensitive areas of an airport. It is important to bear in mind that effective security cannot be achieved by relying on technology alone. Technology and people must work together as part of an overall security process. Weaknesses in any of these areas diminish the effectiveness of the security process. The security process needs to account for limitations in biometric technology. For example, some people cannot enroll in a biometrics system because they lack the appropriate body part. Similarly, errors sometimes occur during matching operations. Exception processing that is not as good as biometric-based primary processing could be exploited as a security hole. Further, non-technological processes for enrollment are critical to the success of a biometrics-based identity management system. Before a person is granted a biometric credential, the issuing authority needs to assure itself that the person is eligible to receive such a credential. We have found that three key considerations need to be addressed before a decision is made to design, develop, and implement biometrics into a security system: (1) decisions must be made on how the technology will be used; (2) a detailed cost-benefit analysis must be conducted to determine that the benefits gained from a system outweigh the costs; and (3) a trade-off analysis must be conducted between the increased security, which the use of biometrics would provide, and the effect on areas such as privacy and convenience. Security concerns need to be balanced with practical cost and operational considerations as well as political and economic interests. A risk management approach can help federal agencies identify and address security concerns. To develop security systems with biometrics, the high-level goals of these systems need to be defined, and the concept of operations that will embody the people, process, and technologies required to achieve these goals needs to be developed. With these answers, the proper role of biometric technologies in aviation security can be determined. |
gao_GAO-11-387 | gao_GAO-11-387_0 | The DOD-NNSA Review of B61 Performance Requirements and Design Options Is Progressing but the Review’s Broad Scope Complicated the Study Efforts, Given the Available Time
Since initiating the joint study for the B61 life extension program at the request of the Nuclear Weapons Council in September 2008, DOD and NNSA have made progress evaluating the military’s performance requirements for the refurbished B61 bomb and have ruled out key design options, but the broad scope of the council’s request has complicated the joint study effort, given the time available to begin producing refurbished weapons. As a result of the broad scope and other factors identified by DOD and NNSA officials, the study is expected to take until September 2011—1 year longer than initially planned. Unless DOD and NNSA clarify their procedures to require that future life extension studies are properly scoped for the available time, they risk setting unrealistic goals and delaying future life extension programs. Our prior work on designing evaluative studies has shown that tailoring a study’s scope to reflect the time constraints for conducting the study is a critical and well-established research practice. Moreover, like the B61 life extension program, future life extension programs also are likely to occur against the approaching end of the existing warhead’s service life. DOD and NNSA Have Not Planned for Maintaining Operational Nuclear Weapons Commitments to NATO if the B61 Life Extension Program Is Delayed
Although DOD and NNSA expect the B61 study to be completed by September 2011, a life extension program delay could affect the U.S. pledge to maintain operational nuclear weapons to support its NATO commitments. However, DOD and NNSA have not yet prepared a long- term risk management plan to help ensure that the United States will be able to maintain these commitments should such delays occur. However, meeting this commitment may prove challenging, as previous nuclear weapons life extension programs have experienced schedule delays for a variety of reasons. Our prior work has shown that developing a risk management plan is a useful program management tool for identifying and measuring risks, developing and implementing risk handling options, and assessing risk reduction measures. Furthermore, without guidance requiring that DOD and NNSA prepare such risk management plans, operational requirements for other weapons could also be at risk as they go through life extension programs, because these weapons are also reaching the end of their operational life. The United States has demonstrated its commitment to preserving this capability in a variety of ways. These steps include just- in-time maintenance actions on the existing bombs because critical components are expected to soon begin reaching the end of their service lives. DOD and NNSA Have Not Established a Long-Term Plan to Avoid Operational Capability Gaps If the B61 Life Extension Program Is Delayed
Although Air Force and NNSA officials told us that DOD’s planned measures should mitigate the risk of a capability gap in the U.S. commitments to NATO during the B61 life extension program, DOD and NNSA have not established a plan to mitigate the long-term operational risks to these commitments, should the program be delayed. To mitigate the risk that U.S. operational commitments will be affected by life extension program schedule delays: Direct the appropriate DOD components, in coordination with NNSA, to prepare an operational risk management plan identifying the measures that would be required to ensure that the United States is able to maintain its commitments to NATO with no gaps in operational capability while the B61 life extension program is being carried out. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
For this review we addressed the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) and the National Nuclear Security Agency (NNSA) have (1) considered the time available to begin producing refurbished bombs when determining the scope of military performance requirements and design options for the B61 life extension program; and (2) taken actions to avoid operational gaps in U.S. nuclear weapons commitments to NATO during the B61 life extension program. To determine the extent to which DOD and NNSA considered the time available to begin producing refurbished B61 bombs when determining the scope of the on-going study of military performance requirements and design options, we examined both the scope of the study and the time frames for performing the B61 life extension program by reviewing documents and interviewing officials from both DOD and NNSA. | Why GAO Did This Study
U.S. nuclear weapons are aging, with key components reaching the end of their service life. In September 2008, the Department of Defense (DOD) and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) began a study of military requirements and design options for extending the B61 bomb's service life. The B61 is used to support the U.S. strategic deterrent and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). GAO was asked to assess the extent to which DOD and NNSA have (1) considered the time available to begin producing refurbished bombs when determining the scope of the study; and (2) taken actions to avoid operational gaps in U.S. nuclear weapons commitments to NATO during the life extension program. To evaluate these objectives, GAO analyzed DOD and NNSA policies, guidance, and reports on life extension programs, and interviewed officials responsible for B61 operations, life extension program planning, management, and oversight. This is the unclassified version of a classified report issued in December 2010.
What GAO Found
DOD and NNSA have made progress in studying and updating the military's performance requirements for the B61 bomb and have ruled out some design options, but the broad scope of the study has complicated the effort, given the time available to begin producing refurbished bombs. Key components of the B61 bombs need to be replaced or they will begin reaching the end of their service life. However, the time and effort required to evaluate the broad scope, and other factors identified by DOD and NNSA officials, have prolonged the study by 1 year. Unlike prior life extension programs, the ongoing B61 study was broadly scoped to accomplish a variety of goals--such as considering previously untried design options and concepts--in addition to replacing the bomb's aging components. GAO's prior work on designing evaluative studies has shown that tailoring a study's scope to reflect relevant time constraints is a critical and well-established practice. However, the guidance for conducting life extension programs does not require DOD and NNSA to consider the available time when setting the scope for a life extension study. Because they have until September 2011 to complete the study, DOD and NNSA officials told GAO that it was premature to assess whether the study's broad scope put the life extension program at risk. However, future life extension programs are also likely to occur against the end of the existing warhead's service life. Unless DOD and NNSA clarify their procedures to require that future studies are properly scoped for the available time, they risk setting unrealistic goals and delaying future life extensions. Although DOD and NNSA believe the B61 study will be completed by September 2011, they have not yet prepared a long-term risk management plan to help avoid operational gaps and ensure that the United States will be able to maintain the capability to support its NATO commitments if the B61 life extension program is delayed or canceled. The United States has pledged to support its nuclear weapons commitments to NATO while the B61 life extension program is under way. In light of this pledge, NNSA and DOD plan to perform just-in-time maintenance on the affected bombs to ensure they remain operational until NNSA can deliver refurbished bombs to DOD. However, avoiding an operational capability gap over the long term may prove challenging, as previous nuclear weapons life extension programs have experienced schedule delays for a variety of reasons. GAO's prior work has shown that a risk management plan is a useful tool for identifying and measuring risks, developing and implementing risk handling options, and assessing risk reduction measures. DOD and NNSA have identified potential steps that could be taken to mitigate operational risks if the B61 life extension program is delayed, but they have not prepared a plan to offer options for managing these risks. Developing such a plan would help ensure that DOD and NNSA are prepared to implement necessary measures to preserve U.S. commitments to NATO. Furthermore, without guidance requiring that DOD and NNSA prepare such risk management plans, operational requirements for other weapons could also be at risk as they go through future life extension programs.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making recommendations that address the need to scope future requirements and design studies to reflect the time available to complete the program and prepare risk management plans to address operational concerns caused by potential life extension program delays. DOD and NNSA agreed with the recommendations. |
gao_NSIAD-98-29 | gao_NSIAD-98-29_0 | The Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC) administers the Air Force supply system and provides suspended inventory management policies and procedures. Reported Value of Suspended Inventory Is Over $3 Billion
DOD reported that about $3.3 billion of secondary items was in a suspended status between April and June 1997. The Warner Robins ALC accounted for about $1.3 billion (53 percent) of the Air Force’s suspended inventory. Appendix III contains additional details on the quantity and value of suspended inventory items. Ineffective Management Can Increase Costs and Reduce Readiness
Significant management weaknesses exist for inventory categorized as suspended. The Air Force is not reviewing the status of these items in a timely manner and has miscategorized a significant amount of inventory. As a result, the Air Force is likely incurring unnecessary logistics costs and missing opportunities to support operational units’ needs in a timely manner. As a result, suspended inventory is not available for use when needed by customers. For the suspended items in our sample, Warner Robins had over 2,000 concurrent backorders, worth about $53 million. If the duration of suspensions had been monitored and usability had been determined within a reasonable amount of time, over 500 of our sample items, worth about $7 million, could have been used to fill some of the backorders, as shown in table 2. The keyboards, valued at $16,000 each, are used on B-52H aircraft. 6) had been suspended in reclaimed inventory for over 2 years. However, waiving the standard exacerbates existing problems with lengthy suspensions. We reviewed internal control assessments by Warner Robins, AFMC, and the Air Force to determine if the Air Force had reported suspended inventory management by ALCs as a material weakness and found that it had not. Air Force and DOD officials have generally stated, and our review confirmed, that ineffective management and delays in determining the usability of suspended inventory can result in increased logistics and support costs and affect readiness. At Warner Robins, (1) item managers generally were not complying with DOD standards for determining the usability of suspended inventory items, (2) about 64 percent of the items we sampled had been in the suspended category for more than 1 year and some longer than 6 years, (3) item managers were following AFMC guidance that does not comply with DOD and Air Force policy, (4) written procedures for controlling suspended inventory were lacking, and (5) management oversight of suspended inventory was limited. Recommendations
To improve the management of suspended items, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Air Force to ensure that, at Warner Robins (1) suspended inventory is properly identified, monitored, inspected, and classified within established DOD timeframes and (2) suspended items receive adequate visibility at all management levels, up to and including the service headquarters, through targeting suspended inventory problems as an issue for review in the Federal Managers’ Financial Integrity Act assessments. Therefore, our report notes that these data are reported values. With the use of the inventory records, we identified the Air Force and Warner Robins Air Logistics Center (ALC) as the DOD component and its inventory control activity with the highest reported dollar value of suspended items. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) secondary inventory management, focusing on the: (1) reported quantity and value of suspended inventory; (2) weaknesses in managing suspended inventory and their potential effect on logistics support costs and readiness; and (3) reasons why suspended inventory is not well managed.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) significant management weaknesses exist in the Air Force's management of inventory that it categorizes as suspended; (2) as a result, the Air Force is vulnerable to incurring unnecessary repair and storage costs and avoidable unit readiness problems; (3) this situation exists largely because management controls are not being implemented effectively or are nonexistent; (4) among DOD components, the Air Force reported the largest amount of suspended inventory--more than 70 percent of the $3.3 billion of all DOD suspended inventory; (5) in April 1997, the Air Force had 403,505 secondary items, valued at $2.4 billion, in a suspended status; (6) the Warner Robins Air Logistics Center (ALC) had the highest reported value of suspended inventory, accounting for about $1.3 billion (53 percent) of the Air Force's suspended inventory; (7) the vast majority of the suspended items reviewed are not being reviewed in a timely manner; (8) of the 1,820 suspended items reviewed with established standards, 97 percent failed to meet these standards; (9) about 64 percent of the inventory reviewed had been in a suspended category for over 1 year, and some had been suspended for over 6 years; (10) delays in determining the usability of suspended inventory can result in increased logistics support costs and readiness problems; (11) Warner Robins had over 2,000 unfilled customer demands (valued at about $53 million) while similar items were in suspension; (12) over 500 of these unfilled demands (valued at about $7 million) could have potentially been filled with these items; (13) two B-52H aircraft had not been fully operational for 175 days and 24 days because two $16,000 data entry keyboards were not available for issue in the Air Force supply system, yet two such keyboards had been maintained in a suspended status for two years; (14) management controls at Warner Robins over items categorized as suspended inventory have broken down and contributed to inventory being in a suspended status beyond established timeframes; (15) Air Force Materiel Command guidance does not comply with DOD policy and safeguard against lengthy suspensions, and Materiel Command and Warner Robins oversight of inventory management has generally been nonexistent; (16) Warner Robins lacks clearly defined suspended inventory management procedures for, and sufficient emphasis on, controlling suspended inventory; and (17) further, management of suspended inventory has not been identified in Air Force assessments of internal controls as a significant weakness, as provided in the Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act of 1982. |
gao_GAO-03-500 | gao_GAO-03-500_0 | Background
RSPA has both legislative and departmental responsibilities for coordinating and evaluating DOT’s research and development programs, which, in fiscal year 2002, amounted to about $1 billion. RSPA Has Met Some, but Not All, Legislative or DOT Requirements for Coordinating DOT Research Efforts
Although RSPA has developed an annual plan and taken other steps to facilitate research coordination, it has not fully met legislative and DOT requirements for coordinating departmental research. RSPA Has Not Reviewed All DOT Research Projects to Identify Unnecessary Duplication
RSPA does not fully meet its legislative requirement to coordinate surface transportation and technology development activities because it does not review all surface transportation research projects to determine whether surface transportation researchers within DOT are unnecessarily duplicating research efforts. The Associate Administrator said that RSPA does not measure the results of federal transportation research activities or provide oversight of the operating administrations’ research program evaluation processes for the following two reasons: (1) the operating administrations have responsibility for performing and measuring their own research programs and (2) the resource constraints that have limited RSPA’s ability to coordinate DOT-wide research also limit the agency’s ability to oversee research program evaluations across the department. Status of RSPA’s Multimodal Research Programs
Since 1999, RSPA has conducted four multimodal research programs, of which two were congressionally mandated. Specifically, TEA-21 required DOT to conduct research on using (1) technology to improve energy efficiency, and reduce emissions and transportation dependence on petroleum, and (2) satellite images to improve transportation safety and disaster planning. According to the Associate Administrator, RSPA’s current multimodal research programs are scheduled for completion by the end of fiscal year 2004. He added that RSPA had not developed and implemented a process for systematically evaluating the results of its multimodal research because of a lack of funding and staffing resources. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We obtained oral comments on a draft of this report from RSPA officials, including the Associate Administrator for Innovation, Research, and Education. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA) within the Department of Transportation (DOT) is responsible for coordinating and ensuring the evaluation of DOT research programs to promote the efficient use of departmental research funds, which in fiscal year 2002 totaled over $1 billion. RSPA is also responsible for conducting multimodal research that cuts across different modes of transportation. The House Committee on Appropriations directed GAO to examine RSPA's coordination and evaluation of research within DOT and the status of its own multimodal research.
What GAO Found
RSPA has met some, but not all, legislative and DOT requirements pertaining to the coordination of departmental research efforts. For example, while RSPA develops an annual plan and meets monthly with other DOT research officials, RSPA does not review the status of all DOT research activities. Thus, it cannot determine whether duplication of research efforts within DOT does or does not occur. Additionally, RSPA has not developed standards against which to measure its performance in coordinating research within DOT. Moreover, RSPA has not fully met all legislative and DOT requirements to measure research results and oversee research evaluations across DOT. RSPA officials cited a lack of ready information on DOT research activities budget constraints and a lack of authority over other DOT agencies as reasons why they served primarily an information-sharing role, rather than as an overseer and manager of the coordination and evaluation processes. Since 1999, RSPA has budgeted $37 million to conduct four major research programs with applicability to more than one mode of transportation--for example, using technology to improve energy efficiency and reduce emissions and transportation dependence on petroleum. According to the Associate Administrator for Innovation, Research, and Education, RSPA's current multimodal research programs are scheduled for completion by the end of fiscal year 2004 and have had a variety of positive results. However, RSPA does not have an evaluation process to systematically evaluate the results of its multimodal research programs. |
gao_GAO-01-783 | gao_GAO-01-783_0 | Conclusions
Shortfalls in DOD’s current strategies and measures for several outcomes have led to difficulties in assessing performance in areas such as combat readiness, support infrastructure reduction, force structure needs, and the matching of resources to program spending plans. DOD’s fiscal year 2002 performance plan, which has yet to be issued, provides DOD with the opportunity to address these shortfalls. On the basis of last year’s analysis of DOD’s fiscal year 1999 performance report and fiscal year 2001 performance plan, we recommended that the Department include more qualitative and quantitative goals and measures in its annual performance plan and report to gauge progress toward achieving mission outcomes. DOD has not as yet fully implemented this recommendation. We continue to believe that the Secretary of Defense should adopt this recommendation as it updates its strategic plan through the Quadrennial Defense Review and prepares its next annual performance plan. By doing so, DOD can ensure that it has strategies that are tied to desired mission outcomes and are well thought-out for resolving ongoing problems, achieving its goals and objectives, and becoming more cost and results oriented. | Why GAO Did This Study
This report reviews the Department of Defense's (DOD) fiscal year 2000 performance report required by the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 and assesses the Department's progress in achieving selected outcomes that were identified as important mission areas for DOD.
What GAO Found
GAO found that shortfalls in DOD's current strategies and measures for several outcomes have led to difficulties in assessing performance in areas such as combat readiness, support infrastructure reduction, force structure needs, and the matching of resources to program spending plans. DOD's fiscal year 2002 performance plan, which has yet to be issued, provides DOD with the opportunity to address these shortfalls. On the basis of last year's analysis of DOD's fiscal year 1999 performance report and fiscal year 2001 performance plan, GAO recommended that the Department include more qualitative and quantitative goals and measures in its annual performance plan and report to gauge progress toward achieving mission outcomes. DOD has not as yet fully implemented this recommendation. GAO continues to believe that the Secretary of Defense should adopt this recommendation as it updates its strategic plan and prepares its next annual performance plan. By doing so, DOD can ensure that its strategies are tied to desired mission outcomes and are well thought-out for resolving ongoing problems, achieving its goals and objectives, and becoming more cost and results oriented. |
gao_GAO-07-22 | gao_GAO-07-22_0 | EBSA Has Made Improvements to Its Enforcement Program, but Challenges Remain
In 2002, we identified several weaknesses in EBSA’s management of its enforcement program, including the lack of a centrally coordinated quality review process, better coordination needed among its investigators, the lack of data to assess the nature and extent of noncompliance, and limited attention to its human capital management, despite the agency’s actions to strengthen the program in prior years. To promote compliance, EBSA has increased its educational outreach to plan participants, sponsors, and service providers, and increased participation in its voluntary correction programs. As part of its workforce efforts, EBSA has recruited investigators with advanced skills in accounting, finance, banking, and law that EBSA believes are required because of the technical aspects of ERISA and the changing nature of benefit plans. At the same time, EBSA has increased its enforcement results since 2002. Although the two agencies periodically share information, we found that EBSA has not yet established a systematic procedure by which its investigators in all its regional offices can regularly confer with their respective SEC regional office. Since our review, we found that EBSA’s overall attrition rate remained high, and in recent years, attrition rates for EBSA’s investigators appear to have risen. While other agencies may face similar attrition problems in such urban areas, EBSA has taken limited steps to evaluate the impact such attrition has on its operations. Unlike Other Agencies, EBSA Does Not Conduct Routine Compliance Examinations or Comprehensive Risk Assessments
Although EBSA regularly targets violations, it does not conduct routine compliance examinations or comprehensive risk assessments to direct its enforcement practices, as do other federal agencies that share similar responsibilities. Rather, the agency relies on various sources for case leads, such as outside complaints and informal targeting of plans, to focus its enforcement efforts. While these leads are important, in addition to undertaking such activities, agencies such as IRS and SEC have developed routine compliance programs to detect violations and identify emerging trends that may warrant further examination by enforcement staff. IRS also uses examinations in an attempt to identify emerging areas of noncompliance and analyze compliance risk levels among specific types of pension plans. Statutory Obstacles May Limit EBSA’s Ability to Oversee Pension Plans Effectively
Certain statutory obstacles may limit EBSA’s effectiveness in overseeing private sector pension plans. In fact, in some cases, investigators were relying on data up to 3 years old to target potential violators. Restrictive Statutory Requirements Can Impede the Restoration of Plan Assets
Restrictive legal requirements have limited EBSA’s ability to assess penalties against fiduciaries or other persons who knowingly participate in a fiduciary breach, and the penalty provision under Section 502(l) of ERISA has delayed and in certain instances prevented the restoration of funds to pension plans. Additionally, even though EBSA has taken steps to address the Form 5500 processing delays, EBSA investigators’ access to timely plan information necessary for targeting new case leads is still limited by ERISA’s filing deadline. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve overall compliance and oversight, we recommend that the Secretary of Labor direct the Assistant Secretary of Labor, EBSA, to evaluate the extent to which EBSA could supplement its current enforcement practices with strategies used by similar enforcement agencies, such as routine compliance examinations and dedicating staff for risk assessment, and conduct a formal review to determine the effect that ERISA’s statutory filing deadlines have on investigators’ access to timely information and the likely impact if these deadlines were shortened. Key contributors are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine the steps that the Employee Benefits Security Administration (EBSA) has taken in recent years to enforce and promote Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) compliance, we collected and documented information on EBSA’s enforcement strategy, operations, and human capital management practices. For more on the reliability of the CPDF, see GAO’s report on the topic. To identify how EBSA practices compare to those of other agencies, we interviewed officials from SEC, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), and the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation. Securities and Exchange Commission Human Capital Survey. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Labor's (DOL) Employee Benefits Security Administration (EBSA) enforces the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), which sets certain minimum standards for private sector pension plans. On the basis of GAO's prior work, the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions asked GAO to review EBSA's enforcement program. Specifically, this report assesses (1) the extent to which EBSA has improved its compliance activities since 2002; (2) how EBSA's enforcement practices compare to those of other agencies; and (3) what obstacles, if any, affect ERISA enforcement. To do this, we reviewed EBSA's enforcement strategy and operations, and interviewed officials at EBSA, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), among others.
What GAO Found
In March 2002, we identified weaknesses in EBSA's enforcement program, despite the agency's actions to strengthen it. Since that time, EBSA has, among other things, promoted coordination among regional investigators and increased participation in its voluntary correction programs, as we recommended. EBSA also has recruited investigators with advanced skills in accounting, finance, banking, and law that officials believe are necessary due to ERISA's technicalities. Yet some weaknesses identified in 2002 remain. Specifically, EBSA still has not adequately assessed the nature and extent of ERISA noncompliance, even though it has taken steps to do so. Without these data, EBSA is not positioned to focus its resources on key areas of noncompliance nor have adequate measurable performance goals to evaluate its impact on improving industry compliance. We also found that while some regional offices did routinely attempt to confer with their respective regional office of the SEC--the agency that oversees many of the same pension service providers under the securities laws--for case leads or to consider trends in potential pension violations, others did not. Lastly, EBSA's overall attrition rates remain high, with many investigators leaving for employment outside the federal government, yet EBSA has taken limited steps to evaluate the effect such attrition has on its operations. EBSA does not conduct routine compliance examinations and broad, ongoing risk assessments to focus its enforcement efforts like other agencies. Rather, investigators rely on various sources for case leads, such as participant complaints, agency referrals, and computer targeting. While such sources are important, this approach generally limits EBSA to leads discerned by participants and other government agencies or those disclosed by plan sponsors, and not those more complex or hidden. Further, EBSA also has not established a comprehensive risk assessment function. Instead of broad risk assessments, EBSA's annual risk evaluations are generally limited to a risk analysis of frontline investigators' case loads. In contrast, in addition to such activities, IRS and SEC incorporate routine compliance programs in an attempt to detect violations and identify emerging trends that may warrant enforcement action. Also, the SEC and Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation have dedicated staff to regularly analyze information from various sources, such as investigations and academic research. Certain statutory obstacles also limit EBSA's oversight of private sector pension plans. First, restrictive legal requirements have limited EBSA's ability to assess penalties against fiduciaries and can impede the restoration of plan assets. DOL officials said that the 502(l) penalty under ERISA discourages quick settlement and can reduce the amount of funds returned to pension plans. Second, EBSA investigators' access to timely information necessary for identifying potential violations is limited by ERISA's filing requirements. Even though EBSA is taking steps to address processing delays, in 2006, investigators were relying on information up to 3 years old to target new case leads in some cases. |
gao_GAO-11-112 | gao_GAO-11-112_0 | Since operational testing began in 2001, the reliability of the JASSM missile has been inconsistent. In June 2010, the Secretary of Defense announced an initiative to restore affordability and productivity in defense spending. That guidance included 23 principle actions to improve efficiency, including “Mandate affordability as a requirement” and “Drive productivity growth through Will Cost/Should Cost management.”
Corrective Actions Have Led to Improved JASSM Test Results but Operational Effectiveness Is Still to Be Demonstrated
Since 2007, the Air Force has enhanced its oversight of the JASSM program and made significant investments to improve its reliability as directed by USD/ATL. As a result of increased reliability testing and investments in reliability initiatives, the Air Force has identified many of the root causes for flight test failures. Since then, design changes and other corrective actions have improved JASSM baseline’s test results significantly—now demonstrating 85 percent success. The JASSM-ER variant has done well thus far, with no scored failures during the first seven flight tests. However, while JASSM baseline missile reliability has improved, it is not expected to achieve the USD/ATL-required level of 90 percent until 2013, and its operational effectiveness has not yet been demonstrated either through operational testing or use in a combat operation. In addition, while it has initiated several cost control measures, the Air Force appears to have limited options to reduce JASSM costs. First, the Air Force has not been able to provide enough annual funding to support the annual procurement levels used as the basis for its 2008 program cost estimate. That has led to a less efficient production process and a longer production period (most recently extended 5 years to 2025). If retrofitted missiles are found to be effective, the Air Force may still have to find additional funding to complete the retrofit process. Third, the Air Force plans to conduct many more flight tests to improve JASSM reliability from 85 to 90 percent. Finally, in comparing the capabilities and cost of JASSM to several domestic and international missile systems in 2008, the Air Force assumed that JASSM would cost about $1 million per unit, which is about 40 percent less than currently expected. Further, the unit cost differential between JASSM-ER and the lower-priced alternatives may now be large enough to make those alternatives more competitive in terms of cost or capabilities. A $2.2 billion, 11-year program to produce 2,400 missiles has become a $7.1 billion, 28-year program to produce 4,900 missiles. At this point, about 70 percent of the projected JASSM costs have not yet been incurred. With the JASSM program now expected to extend through 2025 and about $5 billion yet to be spent, a reevaluation of its cost-effectiveness is warranted before such a commitment is made. Recommendation for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense defer the production decision for JASSM-ER until (1) the program’s likely costs and affordability are reassessed to take into account the feasibility and cost of retrofitting JASSM baseline missiles or replacing them, the cost of additional reliability testing against the likely improvement, and the effect of sustained low production rates; and (2) the results of the previous analysis of alternatives are reassessed in light of the likely costs of the JASSM program. DOD stated that JASSM-ER is on track for a Milestone C low-rate initial production decision in November 2010. Beyond these steps, it is incumbent upon the department to reexamine JASSM before making the production decision to ensure that the program is structured as efficiently as possible and is still a good investment given the other demands DOD faces. If DOD needs more time, then we believe the decision could be delayed. We interviewed officials with the JASSM joint program office; Lockheed Martin; Office of Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; Office of Secretary of Defense Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation; Director of Operational Test and Evaluation; Air Combat Command; Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition; Joint Staff; and a former program official to the determine acquisition planning leading up to JASSM-ER’s production decision and what initiatives have been taken to control costs. Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
Appendix III: JASSM Baseline and JASSM-ER Cost Estimates Met Most Best Practices, but the Risk Analyses Did Not Consider Reliability or Extending the Production Schedule
After reviewing documentation submitted by the JASSM program office, conducting interviews, and reviewing relevant sources, we determined the CAIG’s life-cycle cost estimate’s totaling $7.1 billion for both programs— the JASSM baseline cost estimate was $3.4 million while the JASSM-ER variant cost estimate of $3.7 million—Fully Met one and Substantially Met the other three characteristics of a reliable cost estimate, as shown in Table 3 below. | Why GAO Did This Study
Over the past two and a half decades, the Department of Defense (DOD) has invested heavily to acquire a cruise missile capable of attacking ground targets stealthily, reliably, and affordably. After abandoning an earlier, more expensive missile and a joint service effort, the Air Force began producing the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM) in 2001. After that, the program (1) encountered many flight test failures, (2) decided to develop an extended range version, and (3) recognized significant cost growth. The production decision for the JASSM-ER is planned for November 2010. Also, the Secretary of Defense has recently announced a major initiative to restore affordability and productivity in defense spending. This initiative is expected to, among other things, identify savings by conducting needed programs more efficiently. As DOD faces the initial production decision on JASSM-ER, GAO was asked to assess (1) most recent test results, correction of causes of previous flight test failures, and efforts to improve JASSM's reliability; and (2) JASSM cost changes, efforts to control costs, and additional cost risks for the program.
What GAO Found
Since 2007, design changes and other corrective actions by the Air Force have improved the baseline JASSM's test results significantly--the missile has now demonstrated 85 percent success versus 58 percent achieved previously and before the corrections. The JASSM-ER variant has done well thus far, with no failures during the first seven flight tests. These results reflect the Air Force's enhanced oversight of the program and significant investments made to improve reliability. These efforts also identified many of the root causes for flight test failures. While baseline JASSM missile reliability has improved, it is not expected to achieve the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics' required level of 90 percent until 2013. Tests conducted thus far of the improved baseline JASSM and the JASSM-ER variants have been developmental--or controlled--in nature. Neither the improved JASSM baseline missile nor the JASSM-ER has been demonstrated in operationally realistic testing or in a combat operation. JASSM costs have increased by over seven percent since the program was restructured in 2008. As the table shows, since 1998, JASSM quantities have more than doubled and estimated program costs have grown from $2.2 billion to a $7.1 billion. The Air Force has taken several steps to control JASSM costs, but options to reduce costs at this point appear limited. In fact, several factors suggest additional cost growth is likely. First, the Air Force has not been able to provide enough funding to produce the missiles at planned rates. That has led to a less efficient production process, a longer production period, and higher costs that have not yet been reflected in the $7.1 billion estimate. Second, the Air Force's potential plans to retrofit existing missiles with the reliability improvements may not be feasible, given the missile's sensitivity to being reopened. If retrofits prove infeasible, new replacements may have to be purchased; if they are feasible, the Air Force may have to provide additional funding to retrofit all existing missiles. Finally, since the Air Force last compared JASSM to possible alternatives, the unit cost was assumed to be about 40 percent less than currently expected and that now could make alternatives more competitive in terms of cost and/or capabilities. A reevaluation of the JASSM program, given that most of its costs have yet to be incurred, is warranted before the decision to produce the JASSM-ER is made.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense reevaluate the JASSM program's affordability and cost-effectiveness before making the decision to produce the JASSM-ER. DOD partially concurred with GAO's assessment, but believes the JASSM-ER should begin production in November 2010. GAO believes that it is incumbent upon the department to reexamine JASSM before making the production decision to ensure that the program is structured as efficiently as possible and is still a good investment given the other demands DOD faces. |
gao_GAO-17-25 | gao_GAO-17-25_0 | Background
The Capitol Visitor Center (CVC) was the largest construction project on the Capitol Grounds in over 140 years. AOC Jurisdictions, Offices, and Major Contracts Subject to OIG Oversight
AOC is responsible for the maintenance, renovation, and construction of the Capitol Hill buildings and grounds covering 17.4 million square feet of facilities and more than 587 acres, and the AOC OIG is responsible for the audit and investigative oversight of AOC. In interviews with the IG, he explained that instead of formal plans with an assessment of risk and an assignment of priorities, the OIG relied on a process of “continuous review” defined by the IG as an effort to alert AOC and the Congress to cost overruns, delays, and other contract management issues as they occurred. OIG Provided No Audit Reports of AOC’s Mega Projects and Most Jurisdictions and Offices during Fiscal Years 2012 through 2015
In large part because of the OIG’s insufficient audit planning, the OIG provided no audit reports of AOC’s mega projects with an estimated combined cost of over $1.1 billion, and the OIG provided limited audit oversight of AOC’s jurisdictions and offices during the 4-year period we reviewed. (See table 2.) Investigative Changes Contributed to a Decline of Reports and Accomplishments
Although the OIG continues to perform investigations, the IG’s changes in investigative operations have contributed in part to a significant decline in the number of investigative reports and monetary accomplishments reported by the OIG. During the same 4-year period, the OIG provided only one audit report that addressed a single program among all the programs provided by AOC’s 10 jurisdictions, and reported a declining number of other audit reports accompanied by a corresponding decline in the reported amount of monetary accomplishments. The OIG’s efforts during the 4-year period, including its continuous review of mega projects, did not have audit plans that were based on an assessment of risk or assignment of priorities. In addition, the current IG rescinded the OIG’s law enforcement authority and removed its investigators’ responsibility to complete investigations of potential criminal allegations, resulting in these allegations being referred to USCP for investigation. USCP and AOC program offices are not subject to CIGIE’s Quality Standards for Investigations. To provide increased oversight of AOC and to keep the Architect and the Congress fully and currently informed, we recommend that the AOC OIG revise and implement policies and procedures to provide audit reports that are based on planning that includes an assessment of risk and the assignment of priorities, consistent with requirements in CIGIE’s Quality Standards for Federal Offices of Inspector General. To reduce the risk that fraud, waste, and abuse and criminal activities are not detected or fully addressed, we recommend that (1) the AOC OIG work with CIGIE to obtain a peer review from another federal OIG of the AOC OIG’s overall investigative operations, including consideration of the OIG’s reliance on investigations performed by other entities, and (2) make any needed changes in its operating procedures based on the results of the review to help ensure that investigations of AOC are conducted in accordance with CIGIE standards for investigations and AOC IG Act requirements. The OIG agreed with our recommendation to work with CIGIE to obtain a peer review of the AOC OIG’s investigative operations, including consideration of the OIG’s reliance on investigations performed by other entities. We did not assess this determination. AOC OIG has responsibility for ensuring that its investigations comply with applicable standards. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our audit objectives were to (1) identify the Architect of the Capitol’s (AOC) jurisdictions, offices, and major contracts subject to AOC Office of Inspector General (OIG) oversight during fiscal years 2012 through 2015; (2) determine the statutory requirements, policies, and budgetary and staffing resources of the AOC OIG during fiscal years 2012 through 2015; and (3) examine the extent to which the AOC OIG developed plans and policies for oversight of AOC’s jurisdictions, offices, and major contracts during fiscal years 2012 through fiscal year 2015, and the extent to which oversight was provided. We also obtained the OIG policies and procedures specific to OIG planning and compared these requirements with the OIG’s plans. | Why GAO Did This Study
The AOC OIG was established by statute in 2007, in part because of congressional concerns about time delays and cost overruns during construction of the Capitol Visitor Center. GAO was asked to assess the AOC OIG's oversight of AOC. This report describes AOC areas subject to OIG oversight and examines the extent to which the OIG developed plans and policies for AOC oversight for fiscal years 2012 through 2015 and the extent to which oversight was provided. GAO reviewed AOC's annual performance and accountability reports, the OIG's statutory requirements, the OIG's policies and procedures, and applicable CIGIE standards. GAO also interviewed AOC OIG officials, analyzed the OIG's plans and reports for the 4-year period, and compared these efforts with the AOC areas subject to oversight.
What GAO Found
During fiscal years 2012 through 2015—the 4-year period GAO reviewed—the Architect of the Capitol (AOC) Office of Inspector General (OIG) had responsibilities for independent audits and investigations of AOC's
10 jurisdictions with specific program responsibilities for the maintenance, operations, and preservation of the buildings and grounds across Capitol Hill;
Capitol Construction and Operations with central support offices; and
construction and restoration projects, including its four largest ongoing “mega projects,” with an estimated combined cost of over $1 billion.
The AOC OIG's audit planning during this period did not include either risk assessments or assigned priorities for conducting audits consistent with standards of the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE). In addition, the OIG did not adopt these CIGIE standards in its policies and procedures. Instead, the current IG emphasized “continuous review” of mega projects, which he defined as an effort to alert AOC and the Congress of contract management issues as they occurred. This approach and the prior IG's efforts did not result in any audit reports of AOC's mega projects during fiscal years 2012 through 2015. The OIG also reported a decline in total audit reports and monetary accomplishments of potential dollar savings during fiscal years 2014 and 2015 (see table). Further, the OIG provided only one audit report of an AOC jurisdiction program during the 4-year period. Because of incomplete plans, a limited number of audit reports, and the lack of audit reports of AOC's mega projects, AOC and the Congress did not have the full benefit of OIG findings and recommendations and were not kept fully and currently informed of possible AOC problems and deficiencies during the 4-year period.
In fiscal year 2014, the IG rescinded the OIG's law enforcement authority and removed the OIG investigators' responsibility to complete criminal investigations. Instead, the OIG's investigators have responsibility for administrative investigations and rely primarily on the U.S. Capitol Police (USCP) to perform criminal investigations, and on occasion other AOC program offices perform their own investigations. USCP and AOC program offices are not subject to CIGIE standards. The OIG is required to follow CIGIE standards for investigations. These OIG changes contributed in part to a decline in investigative reports and monetary accomplishments. The OIG has volunteered to receive a peer review of its investigations that could be expanded to include consideration of investigations by these other entities.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making two recommendations to the AOC OIG to (1) revise and implement policies and procedures to provide audit reports based on planning that includes risk assessment and assignment of priorities consistent with CIGIE standards and (2) obtain a peer review from another federal OIG of overall investigative operations, including consideration of the OIG's reliance on investigations performed by other entities, and to make any needed changes based on the results of such review. In comments on a draft of this report, the AOC OIG agreed with the two recommendations but raised concerns with some of GAO's findings. GAO continues to believe that its findings are valid, as discussed in the report. |
gao_GGD-99-97 | gao_GGD-99-97_0 | This is a program to acquire 166 Doppler radars. NWS reports that five of the six mission-critical systems that interface with AWIPS are already Year 2000 compliant, on the basis of individual systems tests. Pursuing the Most Cost-Effective Alternatives for Acquiring NOAA’s Marine Data
NOAA has an aging in-house fleet of 15 ships that are used to support its programs in fisheries research, oceanographic research, and hydrographic charting and mapping. Although NOAA apparently has made progress in reducing the costs of its fleet and outsourcing for more of its research and data needs, NOAA continues to rely heavily on its in-house fleet and still plans to replace or upgrade some of these ships. In summary, NWS faces significant challenges this year—both in deploying the initial version of AWIPS and in addressing the Year 2000 problem. In the NOAA fleet area, continuing congressional oversight of NOAA’s budget requests for replacement or upgraded ships is needed to ensure that NOAA is pursuing the most cost-effective alternatives for acquiring marine data. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the: (1) status of the National Weather Service (NWS) systems modernization; and (2) most cost-effective alternatives for acquiring the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's (NOAA) marine data.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) although NWS is nearing completion of its systems modernization effort, two significant challenges face it this year: (a) deploying the final system of modernization; and (b) ensuring that all of its mission-critical systems are year 2000 compliant; (2) NWS has made progress on both fronts; (3) in the NOAA fleet area, NOAA now outsources for more of its research and data needs but plans to spend $185 million over the next five years to acquire four new replacement NOAA fisheries research ships; and (4) thus, GAO believes that continued congressional oversight of this area, as well as NOAA's budget requests for replacement or upgraded ships, is needed to ensure that NOAA is pursuing the most cost-effective alternatives for acquiring marine data. |
gao_GAO-10-614T | gao_GAO-10-614T_0 | FPS Faces Challenges Managing Its Guard Contractors That Hamper Its Ability to Protect Federal Facilities
Some FPS Guard Contractors Did Not Always Comply with the Terms of Contracts and FPS Has Not Taken Actions against Them
FPS has not taken actions against some guard contractors that did not comply with the terms of the contracts. We reviewed the official contract files for the 7 contractors who, as we testified in July 2009, had guards performing on contracts with expired certification and training requirements to determine what action, if any, FPS had taken against these contractors for contract noncompliance. The 7 contractors we reviewed had been awarded several multiyear contracts totaling $406 million to provide guards at federal facilities in 13 states and Washington, D.C. In fact, FPS exercised the option to extend the contracts of these 7 contractors. FPS Did Not Always Comply with Its Procedures for Completing Annual Performance Evaluations of Its Guard Contractors
FPS requires an annual performance evaluation of each contractor and at the conclusion of contracts exceeding $100,000, and requires that these evaluations and other performance-related documentation be included in the contract file. FPS Continues to Face Challenges with Overseeing Guards That Raise Concern about Protection of Federal Facilities
FPS Is Not Providing All Guards with X-ray and Magnetometer Training in Some Regions
As of February 2010, FPS had yet to provide some of its guards with all of the required X-ray or magnetometer training. As of February 2010, these 1,500 guards had not received the 16 hours of training but continued to work at federal facilities in this region. X-ray and magnetometer training is important because the majority of the guards are primarily responsible for using this equipment to monitor and control access points at federal facilities. FPS Lacks Assurance That Its Guards Have Required Certifications and Training
FPS currently does not have a fully reliable system for monitoring and verifying whether its 15,000 guards have the certifications and training to stand post at federal facilities. FPS Continues to Have Limited Assurance That Guards Are Complying with Post Orders once They Are Deployed to Federal Facilities
Once guards are deployed to a federal facility, guards are not always complying with assigned responsibilities (post orders). Since July 2009, FPS conducted 53 similar penetration tests at federal facilities in the 6 regions we visited, and in over 66 percent of these tests, guards allowed prohibited items into federal facilities. Recent Actions Taken by FPS May Help Improve Oversight of the Contract Guard Program
In response to our July 2009 testimony, FPS has taken a number of actions that, once fully implemented, could help address the challenges the agency faces in managing its contract guard program. FPS has increased the number of guard inspections to two a week at federal facilities in some metropolitan areas. Implementing a new system to monitor guard training and certifications. Despite FPS’s recent actions, it continues to face challenges in ensuring that its $659 million guard program is effective in protecting federal facilities. For example, many of the 15,000 guards will not be fully trained until the end of 2010. Thus, in our report we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Under Secretary of NPPD and the Director of FPS to take the following eight actions: identify other approaches and options that would be most beneficial and financially feasible for protecting federal buildings; rigorously and consistently monitor guard contractors’ and guards’ performance and step up enforcement against contractors that are not complying with the terms of the contract; complete all contract performance evaluations in accordance with FPS and Federal Acquisition Regulation requirements; issue a standardized record-keeping format to ensure that contract files have required documentation; develop a mechanism to routinely monitor guards at federal facilities provide building-specific and scenario-based training and guidance to its develop and implement a management tool for ensuring that reliable, comprehensive data on the contract guard program are available on a real- time basis; and verify the accuracy of all guard certification and training data before entering them into RAMP, and periodically test the accuracy and reliability of RAMP data to ensure that FPS management has the information needed to effectively oversee its guard program. | Why GAO Did This Study
To accomplish its mission of protecting about 9,000 federal facilities, the Federal Protective Service (FPS) currently has a budget of about $1 billion, about 1,225 full-time employees, and about 15,000 contract security guards. FPS obligated $659 million for guard services in fiscal year 2009. This testimony is based on our report issued on April 13, 2010, and discusses challenges FPS continues to face in (1) managing its guard contractors and (2) overseeing guards deployed at federal facilities, and (3) the actions FPS has taken to address these challenges. To address these objectives, GAO conducted site visits at 6 of FPS's 11 regions; interviewed FPS officials, guards, and contractors, and analyzed FPS's contract files. GAO also reviewed new contract guard program guidance issued since our July 2009 report and observed guard inspections and penetration testing done by FPS.
What GAO Found
FPS faces a number of challenges in managing its guard contractors that hamper its ability to protect federal facilities. FPS requires contractors to provide guards who have met training and certification requirements. FPS's guard contract also states that a contractor who does not comply with the contract is subject to enforcement action. GAO reviewed the official contract files for the seven contractors who, as GAO testified in July 2009, had guards performing on contracts with expired certification and training requirements to determine what action, if any, FPS had taken against these contractors for contract noncompliance. These contractors had been awarded several multiyear contracts totaling $406 million to provide guards at federal facilities in 13 states and Washington, D.C. FPS did not take any enforcement actions against these seven contractors for noncompliance. In fact, FPS exercised the option to extend their contracts. FPS also did not comply with its requirement that a performance evaluation of each contractor be completed annually and that these evaluations and other performance-related data be included in the contract file. FPS plans to provide additional training and hold staff responsible for completing these evaluations more accountable. FPS also faces challenges in ensuring that many of the 15,000 guards have the required training and certification to be deployed at a federal facility. In July 2009, GAO reported that since 2004, FPS had not provided X-ray and magnetometer training to about 1,500 guards in 1 region. As of January 2010, these guards had not received this training and continued to work at federal facilities in this region. X-ray and magnetometer training is important because guards control access points at federal facilities. FPS currently does not have a fully reliable system for monitoring and verifying whether its 15,000 guards have the certifications and training to stand post at federal facilities. FPS developed a new Risk Assessment and Program Management system to help monitor and track guard certifications and training. However, FPS is experiencing difficulties with this system and has suspended its use. In addition, once guards are deployed to a federal facility, they are not always complying with assigned responsibilities (post orders). Since July 2009, FPS has conducted 53 penetration tests in the 6 regions we visited, and in over half of these tests some guards did not identify prohibited items, such as guns and knives. In response to GAO's July 2009 testimony, FPS has taken a number of actions that, once fully implemented, could help address challenges it faces in managing its contract guard program. For example, FPS has increased the number of guard inspections at federal facilities in some metropolitan areas. FPS also revised its X-ray and magnetometer training; however, all guards will not be fully trained until the end of 2010, although they are deployed at federal facilities. Despite FPS's recent actions, it continues to face challenges in ensuring that its $659 million guard program is effective in protecting federal facilities. Thus, among other things, FPS needs to reassess how it protects federal facilities and rigorously enforce the terms of the contracts. |
gao_HEHS-00-175 | gao_HEHS-00-175_0 | In doing so, EPA is required to (1) apply an additional 10-fold safety factor in setting tolerances to ensure the safety of foods for children, unless reliable data support a different factor; (2) ensure that there is reasonable certainty that no harm will result to children from aggregate exposure to a pesticide from food, drinking water, and residential sources; and (3) consider available information concerning the cumulative effects on children of pesticides that act in a similar harmful way (known as a common mechanism of toxicity). Approach for Considering Additional Safety Factor Has Evolved Since 1996
EPA began to consider the additional safety factor in its pesticide reviews and tolerance reassessments soon after FQPA was passed. No Additional Safety Factor Has Been Applied in Half of Decisions
OPP senior managers make the final decisions about whether to apply the additional safety factor for children, based on the Safety Factor Committee’s recommendations and other considerations. OPP determined that a safety factor to protect children, in addition to the routinely applied 100-fold safety factor, was necessary in 49 cases and that available evidence was sufficient to show that an additional safety factor was not required in 56 cases (see table 3). In the case of the organophosphates—and chlorpyrifos in particular—the potential effects of aggregate exposure and cumulative assessments, in terms of needed mitigation steps, are beginning to emerge. Interim Procedures for Aggregate Exposure Assessments Are in Place
Although formal policy guidance for performing aggregate exposure assessments has not yet been issued in final form, EPA has interim procedures in place for considering aggregate exposure using available data and methods.Traditionally, EPA has assessed the risk of food use pesticides on the basis of estimated exposure from all foods containing residues of the pesticide. Because of its traditional focus on pesticide exposures from foods, EPA’s data and methods for estimating food exposures are relatively highly developed, but for most pesticides the agency has lacked the data and methods to estimate nonfood exposures from drinking water and residential uses. EPA Has Made Some Progress in Reassessing Tolerances to Date
EPA has made some progress in reassessing existing tolerances, as required by FQPA, but relatively few of these allowable limits for pesticide residues have changed as a result of considering the law’s new requirements. As of April 2000, EPA reported that it had reassessed nearly 3,500 tolerances for about 300 pesticides.However, nearly half of these tolerance reassessments did not require consideration of the additional safety factor for children or aggregate exposure, because the manufacturer agreed with EPA to voluntarily eliminate the tolerances and withdraw the pesticides from those uses. Although EPA has given priority to reassessing tolerances for high-risk pesticides, reassessments for the high-risk organophosphate pesticides cannot be completed until a cumulative assessment has been done for the group. Most of these tolerance reassessments—1,421 tolerances, or 77.5 percent—resulted in no change (see table 4). This group accounts for the largest proportion, about 57 percent, of all tolerances that need to be reassessed. Did the committee adequately justify its decisions on (1) data completeness and reliability (data gaps) and (2) evidence of increased susceptibility in children? EPA was not prepared to consider cumulative effects at that time. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) efforts to reduce children's exposure to pesticides by implementing the requirements of the Food Quality Protection Act (FQPA), focusing on the: (1) approach EPA has developed for making decisions about applying the new safety factor; (2) progress that has been made in considering aggregate exposure and cumulative effects; and (3) progress that has been made in reassessing tolerances for pesticide residues.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) when FQPA became law in 1996, EPA immediately began efforts to consider the additional safety factors for children, using available methods and data in an interim approach that has evolved over time; (2) an internal committee now recommends whether to apply the additional safety factor in pesticide reviews, based on data completeness and evidence of increased susceptibility in children; (3) using this approach, EPA has made decisions about applying the additional safety factor for 105 of the more than 450 pesticides to be reassessed; (4) it determined that an additional safety factor was necessary in 49 cases and not necessary in the remaining 56 cases; (5) EPA also had interim procedures in place for considering aggregate exposure, which incorporate available data on exposures from food, drinking water, and residential uses; (6) data on nonfood exposures have been lacking for most pesticides, however, and methods for estimating and combining such exposures are still being developed; (7) EPA has not yet begun to consider cumulative effects in the regulatory process; (8) it has determined that one group of pesticides that is considered to be high-risk, called the organophosphates, will need to be assessed for cumulative effect, but methods for doing so are still under development; (9) potential effects of considering aggregate exposure and cumulative effects are beginning to emerge; (10) on June 8, 2000, after applying the additional safety factor and conducting an aggregate exposure assessment for chlorpyrifos, EPA announced a need to substantially reduce children's exposure to this pesticide by reducing its use on foods frequently eaten by children and by eliminating nearly all household uses; (11) EPA has reported progress in reassessing existing tolerances for pesticide residues on foods, but relatively few of these allowable limits have changed as a result of considering FQPA's new requirements; (12) FQPA called for reassessing one-third of all existing tolerances by August 1999--a goal EPA met; (13) GAO analyzed a larger group, those counted as reassessed through April 2000; (14) for about 47 percent of these tolerances, the manufacturer agreed with EPA to eliminate the tolerances and withdraw the pesticides from those uses, before the additional safety factor or aggregate exposures were considered; (15) in most of these cases the pesticide was no longer being used on a particular food crop or the manufacturer decided not to maintain the ability to use it on a particular food crop; (16) most of the remaining reassessments in the group GAO analyzed resulted in no change; and (17) in reassessing tolerances, EPA has given priority to high-risk chemicals. |
gao_GAO-02-717 | gao_GAO-02-717_0 | As the use of these electronic technologies has increased in the workplace, so have employers’ concerns about their employees’ use of company-owned computing systems—e-mail, the Internet, and computer files—for activities other than company business. This act expands the federal government’s authority to monitor electronic communications and Internet activities, including e-mail. Such decisions, however, have generally given employers substantial leeway in monitoring computer use of their employees. Private Sector Companies Gathered Information on Employees’ Computer Use and Some Read and Reviewed Contents
All 14 companies we contacted routinely collected and stored employee e-mail messages, information on Internet sites visited, and computer file activity. In general, we found that the companies we studied initiated few investigations of employee computer conduct. Companies Developed Computer-Use Policies and Informed Their Employees
The 14 companies we reviewed all have written policies that included most of the elements recommended in the literature and by experts as critical to a company computer-use policy. For example, one company’s policy statement regarding “Monitoring Use of Proprietary Assets” stated, “ reserves the right to access and monitor the contents of any system resource utilized at its facilities.” Another company’s policy stated, “the information and communications processed through your account are subject to review, monitoring, and recording at any time without notice or permission.” An official from another company, which only collected and stored employee computer use information and did not routinely review electronic transmissions, told us his company informed employees of its capacity to monitor its property with the more general statement that “data is collected and the company reserves the right to review this data.” Only one company reported that its policy did not include language specifically informing employees that their computer use was subject to review by other people in the company. Companies Have Not Changed Their Computer-Use Policies or Monitoring Practices as a Result of the September 11 Terrorist Attacks
None of the companies’ representatives we interviewed said that they had changed any of their computer-use polices or practices as a result of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. However, representatives from 10 companies did report increased concern for the security of their computer systems from outside trespassers or viruses entering their systems through e-mail or from imported computer files. | What GAO Found
Over the past decade, there has been a technological revolution in the workplace as businesses have increasingly turned to computer technology the primary tool to communicate, conduct research, and store information. Also during this time, concern has grown among private sector employers that their computer resources may be abused by employees--either by accessing offensive material or jeopardizing the security of proprietary information--and may provide an easy entry point into a company's electronic systems by computer trespassers. As a result, companies have developed "computer conduct" policies and implement strategies to monitor their employees' use of e-mail, the Internet, and computer files. Federal and state laws and judicial decisions have generally given private sector companies wide discretion in their monitoring and review of employee computer transmissions. However, some legal experts believe that these laws should be more protective of employee privacy by limiting what aspects of employee computer use employers may monitor and how they may do so. Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States, policymakers re-examined many privacy issues as they debated the USA PATRIOT Act, which expands the federal government's authority to monitor electronic communications and Internet activities. GAO reviewed 14 private sector companies' monitoring policies and found that all companies reviewed store their employees' electronic transactions: e-mail messages, information on Internet sites visited, and computer file activity. They collect this information to create duplicate or back-up files in case of system disruption; to manage computer resources such as system capacity to handle routine e-mail and Internet traffic; and to hold employees accountable for company policies. Representatives from all of the companies had policies that contained most of the elements experts agreed should be included in company computer-use polices. None of the companies GAO studied had changed any of their employee computer-use policies or monitoring practices after the September 11 attacks. Most companies did, however, report a growing concern about electronic intrusion into their computer systems from outside trespassers or viruses and had increased their vigilance by strengthening their surveillance of incoming electronic transmissions. |
gao_GAO-16-718 | gao_GAO-16-718_0 | For example, direct care workers as a group are also referred to as paraprofessional workers, direct support professionals, or direct service workers. Federal Data Provide Broad Picture of the Direct Care Workforce but Contain Limitations and Gaps; Some States Have Collected Data in These Areas
Federal Data on the Number, Characteristics, and Compensation of Direct Care Workers Exist but Have Limitations, and Data about Workforce Stability Are Unavailable
Federal data from the Census Bureau’s ACS show that in 2014, the direct care workforce that provided LTSS totaled an estimated 3.27 million workers, about 20 percent of the total U.S. health workforce that year. We were unable to identify federal data sources on workforce stability measures, which are often used for workforce planning. Some States Have Collected Detailed Data in Areas Where Federal Data Are Lacking
The four states we reviewed (Arkansas, Maine, Minnesota, and Oregon) each conducted one-time studies to obtain more detailed information about direct care workers who provide LTSS in those states. We obtained summary results from independent provider surveys for Maine and Minnesota, which showed that most responding independent providers worked for a family member, a neighbor, a friend, or someone else they knew. HRSA Has Developed Some Information on the Direct Care Workforce but Has Not Projected Supply and Demand or Overcome Data Limitations
HRSA Has Developed Some Information about the Direct Care Workforce
We identified two reports that HRSA issued in the last 12 years that have provided information about the direct care workforce. Personal care aides and the occupational grouping titled nursing, psychiatric, and home health aides were among the 35 occupations included in this report. HRSA Has Not Produced Projections of Supply and Demand for the Direct Care Workforce or Developed Methods to Address Data Limitations
HRSA’s strategic plan includes a goal to enhance focus on workforce assessment and policy analysis through developing and employing approaches to monitoring, forecasting, and meeting long-term health workforce needs. According to HRSA’s website, the National Center for Health Workforce Analysis conducts projections of the supply of and demand for the U.S. health workforce and works to overcome inherent data challenges in making these projections by improving available data; HRSA has not yet done this for direct care workers. Conclusions
Direct care workers are responsible for providing the majority of paid hands-on care to millions of elderly and individuals with disabilities needing LTSS. However, reported high attrition rates and problems recruiting and retaining these workers, along with the anticipated rise in the elderly population, have fueled concerns about shortages. Unless HRSA takes actions to overcome data limitations in order to make projections of supply and demand, the ability of policymakers and other stakeholders to develop appropriate workforce strategies to ensure a sufficient number of qualified direct care workers will continue to be hampered. Recommendation for Executive Action
To improve available data about the direct care workforce, we recommend that the Acting Administrator of the Health Resources and Services Administration take steps to produce projections of direct care workforce supply and demand and develop methods to address data limitations in order to do so. In its comments, HHS concurred with our recommendation that HRSA take steps to develop projections of direct care workforce supply and demand, stating that developing such projections is timely and important. Congruent with the message of our report, HHS stated that given the growth in the aging population and the challenges in recruiting and retaining direct care workers, having clear information on this workforce is critical for workforce planning. One limitation of the BLS surveys we reviewed is that the extent to which they include direct care workers working as independent providers is unclear. The data include information on the percentage of direct care workers out of all health workers, and direct care workers’ demographics, wages, hours, and benefits. | Why GAO Did This Study
Millions of elderly individuals and persons with disabling conditions rely on LTSS to help them perform routine daily activities, such as eating and bathing. Direct care workers are among the primary providers of LTSS. Reported difficulties recruiting and retaining direct care workers and the anticipated growth in the elderly population have fueled concerns about the capacity of the paid direct care workforce to meet the demand for LTSS. Despite these concerns, policymakers lack data to help assess the size of the problem.
GAO was asked to provide information on direct care workers who deliver LTSS. This report examines (1) federal and state data available on the paid direct care workforce and (2) actions HRSA has taken to develop information and projections on this workforce. GAO analyzed the most recent data available from the Census Bureau and Bureau of Labor Statistics on paid direct care workers' demographics, compensation, and benefits and reviewed efforts to collect data on direct care workers in four states, selected in part for geographic variation. GAO also reviewed HRSA documents and interviewed agency officials about HRSA's previous, ongoing, and planned efforts to improve data.
What GAO Found
Federal data sources provide a broad picture of direct care workers—nursing assistants and home health, psychiatric, and personal care aides—who provide long-term services and supports (LTSS), but limitations and gaps affect the data's usefulness for workforce planning. Some states have collected data in areas where federal data are limited, but these have been one-time studies. Federal data show that direct care workers who provide LTSS numbered an estimated 3.27 million in 2014, or 20.8 percent of the nation's health workforce. Federal data show that wages for direct care workers, while differing by occupation, are generally low, averaging between approximately $10 and $13 per hour in 2015. However it is unclear to what extent these wage data include direct care workers employed directly by the individuals for whom they care. The number of these workers, often referred to as independent providers, is believed to be significant and growing. Some states, in coordination with the federal government or on their own, have conducted studies about direct care workers and collected detailed information. These studies showed that a majority of independent providers worked for a family member or someone else they knew.
The Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA), which is responsible for monitoring the supply of and demand for health professionals, has developed some information on direct care workers. However, HRSA has not produced projections of this workforce or developed methods to address data limitations, which is in line with one of the goals in its strategic plan. HRSA's actions include sponsoring research and issuing a 2013 report that summarized federal data on different occupations, including direct care workers. While HRSA has recognized the limitations of existing data and cites these as reasons it has not developed projections for this workforce, the agency has not developed methods to address data challenges. Unless HRSA takes steps to overcome data limitations in order to make projections of supply and demand for direct care workers, policymakers will continue to be hampered in their ability to identify workforce trends and develop appropriate strategies to help ensure a sufficient number of qualified direct care workers.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that HRSA take steps to produce projections of direct care workforce supply and demand and develop methods to address data limitations in order to do so. HHS concurred with GAO's recommendation, stating that developing projections for the direct care workforce is timely and important. |
gao_GAO-10-888T | gao_GAO-10-888T_0 | Interior’s Policies and Practices for Offshore and Onshore Oil and Gas Leases Differ in Key Ways
In October 2008, we reported that Interior’s policies and practices for identifying and evaluating lease parcels and bids differ in key ways depending on whether the lease is located offshore—and therefore overseen by OEMM—or onshore—and therefore overseen by BLM. Specifically: For offshore leases, OEMM—pursuant to the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act—lays out 5-year strategic plans for the areas it plans to lease and establishes a schedule for offering leases. Interior’s Oversight of Federal Oil and Gas Production Has Not Kept Pace with Increased Activity
Oil and gas activity has generally increased over the past 20 years, and our reviews have found that Interior has—at times—been unable to adequately oversee these activities: (1) completing environmental inspections; (2) verifying oil and gas production; (3) hiring, training, and retaining staff; (4) using categorical exclusions to streamline environmental analyses required for certain oil and gas activities; (5) performing environmental monitoring in accordance with land use plans; (6) conducting environmental analyses; and (7) responding to onshore lease protests. Verifying oil and gas production. For onshore leases, BLM only completed a portion of its production verification inspections because its workload had substantially grown in response to increases in onshore drilling. Additionally, in March 2010, we found that Interior had not consistently updated its oil and gas measurement regulations. Although Interior policy directed its agencies to prepare handbooks providing guidance on how to implement NEPA, we found that MMS lacked such a handbook. Interior May be Missing Opportunities to Fundamentally Shift the Terms of Federal Oil and Gas Leases to Increase Revenues
In our past work, we have identified several areas where Interior may be missing opportunities to increase revenue by fundamentally shifting the terms of federal oil and gas leases. As we reported in September 2008, (1) federal oil and gas leasing terms currently result in the U.S. government receiving one of the smallest shares of oil and gas revenue when compared to other countries and (2) Interior’s inflexible royalty rate structure has put pressure on Interior and Congress to periodically change royalty rates. For example, we reported the results of a private study in 2007 showing that the revenue share the U.S. government collects on oil and gas produced in the Gulf of Mexico ranked 93rd lowest of the 104 revenue collection regimes around the world covered by the study. To address weaknesses in Interior’s royalty program, we suggested that Congress may wish to consider directing the Secretary of the Interior to convene an independent panel to perform a comprehensive review of the federal oil and gas fiscal system and direct MMS and other relevant agencies within Interior to establish procedures for periodically collecting data and information and conducting analyses to determine how the federal government take and the attractiveness for oil and gas investors in each federal oil and gas region compare to those of other resource owners and report this information to Congress. To address what we believe are key weaknesses in Interior’s royalty program while acknowledging potential differences between federal, state, and private leases, we recommended that the Secretary of the Interior develop a strategy to evaluate options to encourage faster development of oil and gas leases on federal lands, including determining whether methods to differentiate between leases according to the likelihood of finding economic quantities of oil or gas and whether some of the other methods states use could effectively be employed, either across all federal leases or in a targeted fashion. In September 2008, we reported that Interior’s oil and gas IT systems did not include several key functionalities, including (1) limiting a company’s ability to make adjustments to self-reported data after an audit had occurred and (2) identifying missing royalty reports. MMS’s ability to maintain the accuracy of production and royalty data has been hampered because companies can make adjustments to their previously entered data without prior MMS approval. This created an unnecessary risk that MMS was not collecting accurate royalties in a timely manner. Since September 2008, MMS has made improvements in its IT systems for identifying missing royalty reports, but it is too early to assess their effectiveness. Moreover, in our March 2010 report, we found that Interior’s longstanding efforts to implement two key IT systems for facilitating verification of produced volumes of oil and gas from federal leases were behind schedule and years from widespread adoption. | Why GAO Did This Study
The catastrophic oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico has drawn attention to the exploration and production of oil and gas from leases on federal lands and waters. The Department of the Interior oversees oil and gas activities on federal lands and waters. Onshore, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) has oversight responsibilities. Offshore, the newly created Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation, and Enforcement (BOEMRE), has oversight responsibilities. Prior to BOEMRE, the Minerals Management Service's (MMS) Offshore Energy and Minerals Management oversaw offshore oil and gas activities, while MMS's Minerals Revenue Management collected revenues from oil and gas produced. For the purposes of our testimony today, we present our findings in accordance with Interior's organizational structure prior to establishing BOEMRE. Over the past 5 years, GAO has issued numerous recommendations to the Secretary of the Interior to improve the agency's management of oil and gas resources--most recently in two reports issued in March 2010. Overall, GAO's work in this area can be useful in evaluating potential strategies for reorganizing and improving oil and gas management at Interior. Specifically, GAO's work can assist the Secretary and Congress as they are considering restructuring Interior's oversight of oil and gas development and production, revenue collection, and information technology (IT) systems.
What GAO Found
GAO's recent evaluations of federal oil and gas management have identified key areas where Interior could provide more effective oversight. In October 2008, GAO reported that Interior policies and practices for leasing offshore and onshore oil and gas differed in key ways. Considering the ways that areas are selected for leasing, GAO found that MMS sets out a 5-year strategic plan identifying both a leasing schedule and the offshore areas it will lease. In contrast, BLM relies on industry and others to nominate onshore areas for leasing, then selects lands to lease from these nominations and from areas it has identified. Oil and gas activity has generally increased in recent years, and Interior has at times been unable to meet its legal and agency mandated oversight obligations in key areas. For example, in a June 2005 report, GAO found that Interior was unable to complete its environmental inspections because of increased onshore drilling activity. GAO also found in a September 2008 review that Interior was not consistently completing inspections to verify oil and gas volumes produced from federal leases. GAO found in a March 2010 report that MMS faces challenges conducting required environmental reviews in Alaska. In particular, MMS has no handbook providing guidance on how to conduct these reviews, although Interior policy directs it to prepare one. Interior may be missing opportunities to fundamentally shift the terms of federal oil and gas leases and increase revenues. In a September 2008 report, GAO reported that, compared to other countries, the United States receives one of the lowest shares of revenue for oil and gas. In addition, Interior's royalty rate, which does not change to reflect changing prices and market conditions, has at times led to pressure on Interior and Congress to periodically change royalty rates in response to market conditions. Interior also has done less than some states and private landowners to encourage lease development and may be missing opportunities to increase production revenues. Interior began studying ways to improve revenue collection and leasing practices earlier this year. Interior's oil and gas IT systems lack key functionalities. A September 2008 GAO review found that MMS's ability to maintain the accuracy of oil and gas production and royalty data was hampered by two key limitations in its IT system: (1) it did not limit companies' ability to adjust self-reported data after MMS had audited them and (2) it did not identify missing royalty reports. More recently, a March 2010 report found that Interior's long-standing efforts to implement two key technologies for verifying oil and gas production are behind schedule and years from widespread adoption. |
gao_GAO-10-1028 | gao_GAO-10-1028_0 | The United States Was Generally Underrepresented at All Five UN Organizations
Based on UN organizations’ formal and informal targets for equitable geographic representation in 2009, the United States was underrepresented at all five of the UN organizations we reviewed—the Secretariat, WHO, FAO, IAEA, and UNHCR. For example, from 2006 to 2009, the annual growth rate of nongeographic positions at the Secretariat was 13 percent, leading to an increase in nongeographic positions as a percentage of all professional positions from about 64 percent in 2006 to 70.5 percent in 2009. Representation in Policymaking and Senior- Level Positions Generally Decreased at UN Organizations
With regard to Americans in geographic policymaking and senior-level positions, we found that, from 2006 to 2009, U.S. representation in these positions decreased at three of the four organizations that distinguish between geographic and nongeographic positions—the Secretariat, WHO, and IAEA. UN Organizations Face Challenges to Recruiting, Hiring, and Retaining Professional Staff, Including Americans
Based on our interviews with 63 Americans employed at the UN organizations, UN human resources officials, and U.S. officials, we identified eight issues that present challenges to recruiting, hiring, and retaining American professional staff at the five UN organizations we reviewed. Difficulty obtaining spousal employment. Lengthy hiring process. UN organizations’ lengthy hiring processes can deter candidates from accepting employment. Limited opportunity for promotion and professional growth. State Has Made Efforts to Increase U.S. Representation but Has Not Evaluated the Effectiveness of Most of These Efforts and Allocates JPOs at Only a Few UN Organizations
State has taken steps to increase U.S. representation in UN organizations, including the implementation of some of our 2006 report recommendations. In 2006, we reported that State’s recruitment and outreach efforts did not reach some potential applicants. In addition, the U.S. However, State has not assessed the effectiveness of most of its efforts to increase U.S. representation. Instead, many Americans we spoke with learned about UN job opportunities through their own personal or professional networks. JPOs are considered staff members of the UN organizations but are funded by member states. (1) To provide more complete information on the level of U.S. representation at UN organizations, we recommend that the Secretary of State include data on U.S. representation in all professional positions, similar to the information it currently provides on staff in geographic positions, in State’s annual report to Congress on U.S. representation in UN organizations. The evaluation should include an assessment of State’s ongoing efforts such as its Web-based database for sending UN vacancy announcements to interested job candidates. (3) Consider implementing a pilot program to fund JPOs at UN organizations where the United States currently does not have JPOs such as the Secretariat. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to examine (1) U.S. representation at five United Nations (UN) organizations; (2) issues affecting the recruitment, hiring, and retention of professional staff, including Americans at these five UN organizations; and (3) efforts the State Department (State) has undertaken to improve U.S. representation at UN organizations, including its implementation of our 2006 recommendations. Our scope included five UN organizations: the UN Secretariat (the Secretariat), International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), and World Health Organization (WHO). Together they comprised over 50 percent of total UN organizations’ professional staff as of December 2008. Methodology for Reviewing U.S. State Department’s Efforts to Increase U.S. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. Congress has continuing concerns about U.S. underrepresentation in United Nations (UN) organizations. Some UN organizations establish targets for member state representation, and such positions are classified as geographic positions. GAO's 2006 report found that the State Department (State) could take additional steps to increase U.S. representation. This report examines (1) U.S. representation at five UN organizations; (2) issues affecting the employment of professional staff, including Americans at these organizations; and (3) efforts State has undertaken to increase U.S. representation. GAO analyzed employment data from five UN organizations that comprise over 50 percent of total UN professional staff and interviewed U.S. and UN officials, including 63 Americans employed at the five organizations.
What GAO Found
In 2009, the United States was underrepresented, based on formal and informal targets, at all five of the UN organizations GAO reviewed--the Secretariat, World Health Organization (WHO), Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). This follows general U.S. underrepresentation at most of these organizations from 2006 to 2009. At the four UN organizations that distinguish geographic and nongeographic positions, there was an increase in the percentage of nongeographic professional positions during 2006 to 2009. The United States is not as well represented in nongeographic as geographic positions at FAO and the Secretariat, which could affect future overall U.S. representation. In addition, U.S. representation in policymaking and senior-level positions generally decreased at these UN organizations from 2006 to 2009. The five UN organizations GAO reviewed have challenges that affect the recruitment, hiring, and retention of professional staff, including Americans. Challenges include Americans' lack of proficiency in UN languages, difficulty for spouses to obtain employment in some locations, lengthy hiring processes, and limited opportunities for promotion and professional growth. For example, 45 out of 63 Americans we interviewed identified the lengthy hiring process as a challenge to recruiting and hiring. While these UN organizations have initiated human resource reforms that may address some of the issues, such as efforts to decrease hiring time, it is too early to determine their impact. Since 2006, State has made efforts to increase U.S. representation in the UN, including implementing some of GAO's 2006 recommendations. State has improved its Web site; increased outreach initiatives; begun developing a Web-based database, so interested UN job applicants can receive automatic vacancy announcements; and conducted an informal review of funding JPOs, but it continues to allocate JPOs at only a few UN organizations. State has not assessed the effectiveness of most of its current efforts to increase U.S. representation. Despite State's efforts, many Americans employed at the five organizations learned about UN job opportunities through their own networks, not through State.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Secretary of State (1) include data on U.S. representation in all professional positions in its annual report to Congress, (2) evaluate its ongoing activities to increase U.S. representation, and (3) consider a pilot program to fund Junior Professional Officers (JPO), who are entry-level employees funded by member states, at UN organizations where the United States currently does not have any JPOs. In commenting on a draft of this report, State concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-04-748 | gao_GAO-04-748_0 | Last year, we reported that FTA implemented two changes to the New Starts process for the fiscal year 2004 cycle. FTA proposed 7 projects for funding for the fiscal year 2005 cycle, including 5 projects for FFGAs. The remaining 2 projects were considered to be “meritorious and worthy of funding” and FTA proposed a total of $50 million for these projects—substantially more than amounts proposed for similar projects in prior years. FTA proposed 7 projects for funding for the fiscal year 2005 cycle. Most Project Sponsors Proposed a Federal New Starts Share of Less Than 60 Percent, but Some Raised Concerns about FTA’s Push for Lower Federal New Starts Share
FTA instituted a policy favoring projects that seek a federal New Starts share of no more than 60 percent of the total project cost in fiscal year 2004. FTA’s description of the preference policy in its fiscal year 2005 New Starts report suggests that this policy is absolute in that projects proposing more than a 60 percent federal New Starts share will not be recommended for an FFGA. FTA has agreed to clarify in its upcoming reporting instructions that this is a general preference policy, thus allowing for the possibility of exceptions. Administration’s Proposed Fiscal Year 2005 Budget Requests a 15 Percent Increase in New Starts Funding
In its budget proposal for fiscal year 2005, the administration requests $1.5 billion for the construction of new transit systems and the expansion of existing systems through the New Starts program—an increase of $225 million, or 15 percent, over the amount appropriated for fiscal year 2004. Both the Senate and House bills contain a number of provisions and initiatives for the New Starts program. Some of the key provisions of these bills would (1) streamline the evaluation process for projects under $75 million, (2) expand the definition of eligible projects, (3) change the ratings categories, and (4) maintain the maximum federal New Starts share at 80 percent. The project sponsors we interviewed had mixed reactions to these provisions. In addition, most of the sponsors called for clear definitions to any changes to the New Starts process. Currently, TEA-21 limits New Starts funding to fixed-guideway projects. Change the rating categories. Project Sponsors Have Taken Steps to Address Variances in Funding
All 26 projects with existing FFGAs have not received funds as scheduled— that is, the amount of funding appropriated was less than the amount scheduled in the FFGA. According to FTA, all completed New Starts projects received the total FFGA amount but not necessarily according to the original FFGA schedule. As of March 2004, the 26 projects have received a total of $294 million, or 5 percent, less than the amount authorized by the projects’ FFGAs. The amount and timing of the differences in funding varied for each project, but all 26 projects with FFGAs received less than the scheduled amount at some point. Faced with these variances in funding, project officials we interviewed have developed methods to mitigate the impact of receiving less than the scheduled annual amount for their project. According to FTA, its policy is in response to language contained in appropriations committee reports and will result in more projects receiving funding by spreading limited resources among them and ensuring that local governments whose regions would benefit from the project play a major role in funding such projects. Recommendations for Executive Action
To ensure that FTA’s New Starts evaluation process and policies are objective, transparent, and comply with federal statute, we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation direct the Administrator, FTA, to take the following two actions: Clearly explain the basis on which it decides which projects will be recommended for funding outside of FFGAs, such as projects considered to be meritorious, and what projects must do to qualify for such a recommendation. Scope and Methodology
To address our objectives, we reviewed the administration’s fiscal year 2005 budget request and legislative reauthorization proposals, the Federal Transit Administration’s (FTA) annual New Starts reports, records on funding authorized and appropriated to projects with existing full funding grant agreements (FFGAs), and federal statutes pertaining to the New Starts program. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21) and subsequent legislation authorized about $8.3 billion in guaranteed funding for the Federal Transit Administration's (FTA) New Starts program, which funds fixed guideway transit projects, such as rail and trolley projects, through FFGAs. GAO assessed the New Starts process for the fiscal year 2005 cycle. GAO identified (1) the number of projects that were evaluated, rated, and proposed for new FFGAs and how recent changes to the process were reflected in ratings; (2) the proposed funding commitments in the administration's budget request and legislative reauthorization proposals; and (3) the extent to which amounts appropriated since 1998 fulfilled FFGAs.
What GAO Found
For the fiscal year 2005 cycle, FTA evaluated 38 projects, rated 29 projects, and proposed 7 projects for funding. FTA recommended 5 of the 7 projects for full funding grant agreements (FFGAs). FTA considered the remaining 2 projects to be meritorious and recommended a total of $50 million for these projects in fiscal year 2005. However, FTA does not clearly explain how it decides which projects will be recommended for funding outside of FFGAs or what project sponsors must do to qualify for such a recommendation. Last year, in response to language contained in appropriations committee reports, FTA instituted a policy favoring projects that seek a federal New Starts share of no more than 60 percent of the total project cost--even though the law allows projects to seek up to 80 percent--in its recommendation for FFGAs. According to FTA officials, this policy allows more projects to receive funding and ensures that local governments play a major role in funding such projects. FTA describes the 60 percent policy as a general preference; however, FTA's fiscal year 2005 New Starts report suggests that this policy is absolute in that projects proposing more than a 60 percent federal New Starts share will not be recommended for an FFGA. Therefore, FTA agreed to describe the policy as a general preference in future reporting instructions, thus allowing for the possibility of exceptions. Although most of the projects evaluated during the current cycle proposed a federal New Starts share of less than 60 percent of total project costs, some project sponsors GAO interviewed raised concerns about the difficulties of securing the local funding share. However, the overall impact of this policy on projects is unknown. The administration's fiscal year 2005 budget proposal requests $1.5 billion for the New Starts program, a $225 million increase over the amount appropriated for the fiscal year 2004 cycle. Congress is currently considering legislative reauthorization proposals, which contain a number of provisions and initiatives for the New Starts program including streamlining the New Starts evaluation process for projects requesting less than $75 million in New Starts funds, expanding the definition of eligible projects, changing the ratings categories, and maintaining the maximum federal New Starts share at 80 percent of total project cost. Project sponsors GAO interviewed had varying views on these provisions, but most said that clear definitions would be needed for any proposed changes to the New Starts process. All 26 projects with existing FFGAs have not received funds as scheduled--the amount of funding appropriated was less than the amount authorized and scheduled by the FFGA. According to FTA, all completed projects have received the total amount authorized in the FFGAs, but not necessarily according to the original FFGA schedule. As of March 2004, the 26 projects have received a total of $294 million, or 5 percent, less than the amount scheduled by the projects' FFGAs. The amount and timing of differences varied for each project. Project sponsors GAO interviewed have developed methods to mitigate the impact of receiving less than the scheduled annual amount for their project, but these methods can generate additional costs. |
gao_RCED-97-118 | gao_RCED-97-118_0 | These 1.1 million affected households, which represent about 10 percent of all food stamp households, would have received more in food stamp benefits in the absence of the cap because they (1) had excess shelter expenses they could not deduct from their income and (2) were not receiving the maximum allowable food stamp benefit. Characteristics of Households and Participants Affected by the Cap on Excess Shelter Expense Deduction
In fiscal year 1995, the 1.1 million households affected by the cap on the deduction for excess shelter expenses differed in several aspects from households not affected by the cap. Household Composition
In fiscal year 1995, households affected by the excess shelter cap were more likely than households not affected to (1) contain children, (2) be headed by a single female, (3) have more members, and (4) have more noncitizen members. 6.) Affected households tended to be concentrated in the Northeast, 37.5 percent, and West, 27.9 percent, while not affected households tended to be located in the South, 41.5 percent. Food Stamp Benefit Increases in Absence of a Cap
Food stamp benefits for the 1.1 million households affected by the cap would have increased by about 12 percent, on average, or about $31 per month, in absence of the cap in fiscal year 1995. Households in urban areas would have received larger average monthly increases, $32, than in rural areas, $25. In the absence of the cap, total federal food stamp expenditures would have increased by approximately 1.9 percent, or $34.7 million monthly, for a total of $417 million, in fiscal year 1995. Of these 10 states, California and New York would have received almost half of these additional benefits. For our analyses, we compared the characteristics of households whose benefits were limited by the cap with those households whose benefits were not affected by the cap. To determine the extent to which food stamp benefits would have been higher in the absence of the cap, we recalculated the benefits that affected food stamp households would have received with no cap in place. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the legislative changes to the Food Stamp Program mandated by the 1996 welfare reform act; focusing on, for fiscal year (FY) 1995, the: (1) characteristics of households whose food stamp benefits were limited because of the cap on their deduction for excess shelter expenses; and (2) extent to which food stamp benefits would have been higher for these households if there had not been a cap.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) in FY 1995, households whose food stamp benefits were limited because of the cap on the deduction for excess shelter expenses differed in several key respects from households not affected by this cap; (2) nearly all households affected by the cap had children, while only slightly more than half of households not affected by the cap had children; (3) moreover, households affected by the cap were more likely to: (a) be headed by asingle female; (b) have noncitizen members; (c) have earned income; and (d) live in urban areas; (4) affected households also typically had more household members and received more in food stamp benefits than those not affected by the cap; (5) households affected by the cap tended to be located in the Northeast and West, while households not affected by the cap tended to be located in the South; (6) in the absence of the cap on the excess shelter expenses deduction in FY 1995, the average monthly food stamp benefit for affected households would have been about 12 percent, or $31, higher; (7) total federal food stamp expenditures would have increased by 1.9 percent, for a total of $417 million in FY 1995; (8) the largest increase would have been for households in the Northeast, where average shelter costs are the highest; (9) nationwide, households in urban areas would have received larger increases than those in rural areas; and (10) households in New York and California would have received almost half of these additional benefits. |
gao_GAO-08-582 | gao_GAO-08-582_0 | 1.) HCAAF is intended to assist federal agencies with their human capital planning process, including developing strategies that support each agency’s mission and goals. The CDC Plan Includes Strategies to Address Key Human Capital Challenges, Except for Managing a Workforce with a Large and Growing Number of Contractors
The CDC Plan includes strategies that could help the agency address five of the six key human capital challenges we identified that it faces in its efforts to sustain a skilled workforce. These six key challenges are (1) changing workforce demographics, highlighted by the potential loss of essential personnel due to retirement; (2) the limited supply of skilled public health professionals; (3) CDC’s acknowledged need to increase the diversity of its workforce; (4) changing workforce needs resulting from the agency’s expanding scope of work and responsibilities; (5) logistical difficulties involved in acquiring and retaining a skilled workforce; and (6) difficulties presented by managing a workforce with a large and growing number of contractors. CDC officials told us they intended to update the CDC Plan annually and to integrate the plan with these documents as the plan is updated. 2.) The CDC Plan only partially meets the criteria for strategic alignment as defined by GAO and OPM because the strategies in the CDC Plan are not integrated with the documents that serve as the agency’s strategic plan, its performance plan, or its budget. CDC Incorporated Aspects of Our Principles for Strategic Human Capital Planning into the CDC Plan and Has Outlined Further Actions
CDC incorporated aspects of our five principles for strategic human capital planning into the CDC Plan and has outlined further actions it intends to take. CDC has also taken steps to incorporate the fourth principle, which stresses building the capabilities needed to support the strategies. CDC Involved Top Management and a Stakeholder in Developing Its Plan and Intends to Include Nonsupervisory Employees in Future Implementation and Updates
In development of the CDC Plan, the agency incorporated aspects of our first principle, which is to involve top management, managers, other employees, and stakeholders in developing, communicating, and implementing the human capital plan, but it did not formally involve nonsupervisory employees. CDC Conducted a Preliminary Workforce Analysis and Is Completing Efforts to Identify Gaps in Skills and Competencies
CDC has begun to incorporate the second principle—determining the skills and competencies needed to achieve the mission and goals, including identifying gaps in these skills and competencies—by conducting a preliminary workforce analysis and is working to complete analyses to identify gaps in skills and competencies. The CDC Plan thus incorporates an aspect of our third principle, which is to develop strategies to acquire, retain, and develop a skilled workforce and to address skill and competency gaps. Without addressing this challenge as part of its strategies, the CDC Plan may not be as useful as it could be in providing the agency with a strategic view of its governmental and contractor workforce. The strategies in the CDC Plan are linked with the agency’s mission and goals; however, they are not integrated into a strategic plan, performance plan, or budget. At CDC, contractors represent more than one-third of the agency’s workforce and thus are clearly a critical part of the agency’s human capital. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine whether the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 2007 Strategic Human Capital Management Plan (CDC Plan) was designed to address the challenges CDC faces in sustaining a skilled workforce, we analyzed interviews we conducted with multiple entities from CDC, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), and three policy research and professional associations. For the fifth principle—monitoring and evaluating the contribution that strategies have made toward achieving the agency’s mission and goals— we reviewed the CDC Plan and related documents and interviewed OWCD officials in order to determine CDC’s current monitoring efforts and how CDC planned to monitor and evaluate the agency’s progress toward its human capital goals. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)--an agency in the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)--has experienced an expanding workload due to emerging health threats, such as bioterrorism. Strategic planning helps agencies like CDC sustain a workforce with the necessary education, skills, and competencies--human capital--to fulfill their missions. In September 2007, CDC released its Strategic Human Capital Management Plan (CDC Plan). GAO was asked to review CDC's human capital planning. GAO determined (1) whether the CDC Plan was designed to address the human capital challenges CDC faces; (2) the extent to which the CDC Plan is strategically aligned with agency goals, plans, and budget; and (3) the extent to which CDC incorporated GAO's principles for strategic human capital planning. To do so, GAO interviewed officials and analyzed data and documents.
What GAO Found
GAO identified six key challenges CDC faces in its efforts to sustain a skilled workforce to fulfill its mission and goals, and the CDC Plan includes strategies that could help the agency address five of them. These challenges are (1) changing workforce demographics, highlighted by the potential loss of essential personnel due to retirement; (2) the limited supply of skilled public health professionals; (3) CDC's acknowledged need to increase the diversity of its workforce; (4) changing workforce needs resulting from the agency's expanding scope of work and responsibilities; (5) logistical difficulties involved in acquiring and retaining a skilled workforce; and (6) difficulties presented by managing a workforce with a large and growing number of contractors. While the CDC Plan includes strategies designed to address the first five challenges, it does not address the challenge involving contractors, which represent more than one-third of its workforce. Thus, the CDC Plan may not be as useful as it could be to provide a strategic view of its contractor workforce and to assist the agency with managing all of its human capital. The CDC Plan only partially meets the criteria for strategic alignment: the strategies in it are linked with the agency's mission and goals, but they are not integrated with the documents that serve as the strategic plan, performance plan, or budget. According to CDC officials, the agency will update the CDC Plan annually and will integrate it with these documents as it is updated. CDC incorporated aspects of all of GAO's principles of strategic human capital planning into the CDC Plan and has outlined intended actions that could further incorporate the principles in subsequent updates. CDC partially incorporated the first principle--to involve managers, other employees, and stakeholders in developing, communicating, and implementing the human capital plan--by formally involving management and stakeholders in plan development. CDC intends to involve other employees in implementation and future updates. CDC partially incorporated the second principle--to determine the skills and competencies needed to achieve agency mission and goals, including identifying skill and competency gaps--by conducting a preliminary workforce analysis. The agency had not completed its analyses of skill and competency gaps for the occupations it deemed most critical when the plan was developed, but has now completed an analysis for one critical occupation and is conducting others. The plan partially follows the third principle--to develop strategies to acquire, retain, and develop a skilled workforce and to address gaps. CDC developed strategies for its plan and intends to target gaps once they are identified. CDC has incorporated the fourth principle--to build capabilities to support the strategies--through such activities as ongoing efforts to streamline hiring. The fifth principle is to monitor and evaluate the contribution that strategies have made toward achieving mission and goals. The agency indicated in the CDC Plan that it intends to monitor and evaluate its strategies as part of its implementation activities. Further incorporation of GAO's principles into plan updates could help the agency strengthen its human capital efforts. |
gao_GAO-05-72 | gao_GAO-05-72_0 | Currently, Medicare pays a dispensing fee of $5 monthly per patient for inhalation therapy drugs. Suppliers’ Acquisition Costs Of Inhalation Therapy Drugs Varied Widely
We found that 2003 per unit acquisition costs for the three inhalation therapy drugs most frequently billed to Medicare varied widely among the 12 suppliers in our sample (see table 1). Although costs varied, they were not always lower for large suppliers. For example, the lowest acquisition cost for ipratropium bromide was obtained by one of the small suppliers, and the highest acquisition cost was obtained by one of the large suppliers. Using the lowest and highest per unit acquisition costs reported by our suppliers for 2003, we estimated a difference of $119 to $129 per patient, per month between what suppliers received in payment from Medicare at a rate of 95 percent of AWP and the acquisition costs they incurred for a typical monthly supply of albuterol sulfate. For ipratropium bromide, we estimated that the difference between the 2003 payment rate and lowest and highest acquisition costs was $162 to $187 per patient per month for a typical monthly supply. We also found that larger suppliers did not necessarily have lower dispensing costs. Using 2003 data obtained from 12 inhalation therapy suppliers, we estimated that the cost of dispensing inhalation therapy drugs ranged from $7 to $204 per patient per month. Because of the difference between the acquisition prices of the drugs and Medicare’s payment for them, suppliers indicated that they were able to incur the costs associated with providing services that benefited both beneficiaries and their physicians. All suppliers in our sample made phone calls to beneficiaries to ask them if they needed medication refills, to coordinate a refill delivery, and to check on the beneficiaries’ compliance with their prescribed drug regimens. Most suppliers made these calls on a monthly basis, but one reported that it did so twice a month. Several suppliers reported that they incurred substantial costs to ship drugs overnight to beneficiaries; most did so on an as-needed basis, although one supplier did so routinely. Some costs incurred by suppliers are necessary to dispense inhalation therapy drugs to Medicare beneficiaries, for example, maintaining a licensed pharmacy and billing Medicare. These necessary costs may no longer be covered when Medicare drug payments are closer to acquisition costs with the implementation of the ASP-based payment system. These 12 suppliers accounted for more than 42 percent of 2003 Medicare inhalation therapy payments. For each supplier, we divided inhalation therapy drug dispensing costs by the number of reported inhalation therapy patient-months to determine per patient monthly drug dispensing costs. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA) revised the payment formula for most of the outpatient drugs, including inhalation therapy drugs, covered under Medicare part B. Under the revised formula, effective 2005, Medicare's payment is intended to be closer to acquisition costs. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), the agency that administers Medicare, also pays suppliers of inhalation therapy drugs a $5 per patient per month dispensing fee. Suppliers have raised concerns that once drug payments are closer to acquisition costs, they will no longer be able to use overpayments on drugs to subsidize dispensing costs, which they state are higher than $5. As directed by MMA, GAO (1) examined suppliers' acquisition costs of inhalation therapy drugs and (2) identified costs to suppliers of dispensing inhalation therapy drugs to Medicare beneficiaries.
What GAO Found
Using cost data obtained from 12 inhalation therapy suppliers that accounted for more than 42 percent of 2003 Medicare inhalation therapy payments, GAO found that 2003 acquisition costs for the three inhalation therapy drugs representing approximately 98 percent of Medicare inhalation therapy drug expenditures varied widely. For example, per unit acquisition costs for ipratropium bromide, the inhalation therapy drug with the highest Medicare expenditures, ranged from $0.23 to $0.64. Although costs varied, they were not always lower for the 4 largest suppliers. The lowest acquisition cost for ipratropium bromide was obtained by one of the small suppliers, and the highest by one of the large suppliers. GAO estimated that the 2003 Medicare payment rate per patient, per month was between $119 to $129 higher than suppliers' acquisition costs for a typical monthly supply of albuterol sulfate and between $162 to $187 higher for a typical monthly supply of ipratropium bromide. GAO estimated 2003 per patient monthly dispensing costs of $7 to $204 for the 12 inhalation therapy suppliers, which included patient care costs, such as pharmacy and shipping, and administrative and overhead costs, such as billing. Large suppliers did not necessarily have lower dispensing costs. Because Medicare payments for drugs have been much higher than suppliers' acquisition costs, suppliers indicated they were able to provide services that benefited both beneficiaries and their physicians, a fact that raises questions about the services necessary to dispense inhalation therapy drugs. For example, several suppliers reported that they incur substantial costs to ship drugs overnight to beneficiaries; most did so on an as-needed basis, although one did so routinely. All suppliers in GAO's sample made phone calls to beneficiaries to ask them if they needed medication refills, to coordinate a refill delivery, and to check on the beneficiaries' compliance with their prescribed drug regimens. Most suppliers made these calls on a monthly basis, but one reported that it did so twice a month. |
gao_GAO-16-764 | gao_GAO-16-764_0 | TSA Assesses Air Marshals’ Training Needs by Considering Several Information Sources, but Opportunities Exist to Obtain More Feedback from Air Marshals
TSA Assesses Its Federal Air Marshal Training Program Using Multiple Information Sources
TSA’s primary method for assessing air marshals’ training needs is by holding Curriculum Development Conferences (CDC) and Curriculum Review Conferences (CRC). OTD Could Improve its Collection of Feedback from Air Marshals to Fully Identify and Address Training Needs
OTD Does Not Systematically Collect Training Feedback from Incumbent Air Marshals on Field-Based Training
OTD conducts surveys to obtain feedback from air marshal candidates and newly graduated air marshals on the effectiveness of FAMTP courses they complete at TSATC and the quality of TSATC trainers and facilities, consistent with Kirkpatrick levels 1 and 3. TSA Has Established Recurrent Training Requirements to Ensure Mission Readiness, but Opportunities for Improvement Exist
FAMS relies on its recurrent training program to help ensure incumbent air marshals’ mission readiness, but additional actions could strengthen FAMS’s ability to do so. First, FAMS does not have complete and timely data on the extent to which air marshals have fulfilled their recurrent training requirements. In addition, FAMS has established a new health, fitness, and wellness program as part of its recurrent training program—in part to address recent concerns with air marshals’ fitness and injury rates—but it is too early to gauge the program’s effectiveness. Given the number of training records that we found were incomplete or not entered into FAMIS in a timely manner, as well as the ongoing challenges that FAMS has faced in ensuring accurate and timely input of training and exemptions data as described in the OOI findings, policies that specify who is responsible at the headquarters level for overseeing these activities could help FAMS ensure its data on air marshals’ recurrent training are consistently accurate and up to date. FAMS Requires Air Marshals to Demonstrate Their Proficiency in Marksmanship, but Does Not Require That They Do So for Other Key Skills
Air marshals must demonstrate their proficiency in marksmanship by taking the practical pistol course on a quarterly basis and achieving a minimum score of 255 out of 300—the highest qualification standard for any federal law enforcement agency, according to FAMS officials. However, for the remainder of air marshals’ required recurrent training courses, FAMS does not assess air marshals against a similarly identified level of proficiency, such as by requiring examinations to evaluate air marshals’ knowledge in classroom-based courses or by using checklists or other objective tools to evaluate air marshals’ performance during simulation-based courses, such as mission tactics. Objective and standardized methods of evaluating incumbent air marshals performance would better enable FAMS to assess air marshals’ proficiency in key skills and also more effectively target areas for improvement. Also, by taking additional steps to improve the response rates for the training surveys it administers to air marshal candidates, incumbent air marshals, and their supervisors, OTD could be more reasonably assured that the feedback it receives represents the full spectrum of views held by its air marshal workforce. Recommendations for Executive Action
To ensure effective evaluation of air marshal training, we recommend that the TSA Administrator direct OTD to take the following two actions: implement a mechanism for regularly collecting and incorporating incumbent air marshals’ feedback on the training they receive from field office programs, and take additional steps to improve the response rates of the training surveys it conducts. To provide reasonable assurance that air marshals are complying with recurrent training requirements and have the capability to carry out FAMS’s mission, we recommend the TSA Administrator direct FAMS to take the following three actions: specify in policy who at the headquarters level has oversight responsibility for ensuring that field office SACs or their designees meet their responsibilities for ensuring that training completion records are entered in a timely manner, specify in policy who at the headquarters level is responsible for ensuring that headquarters personnel enter approved air marshals’ training exemptions into FAMIS, and define the timeframe for doing so, and develop and implement standardized methods, such as examinations and checklists, for determining whether incumbent air marshals continue to be mission ready in key skills. To what extent does the Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS) ensure that incumbent air marshals are mission ready? This report is a public version of the prior sensitive report that we provided to you. We interviewed senior officials responsible for these efforts in TSA’s Office of Training and Development (OTD). Additionally, we obtained the available response rates for surveys OTD conducted of FAMTP graduates and their supervisor’s on the effectiveness of FAMTP courses for calendar years 2009 through 2011—the last three full years that FAMS hired air marshals. To address the second objective, we assessed FAMS directives that set forth training requirements for incumbent air marshals, and analyzed air marshals training data for calendar year 2014, which is the most recent year for which training data were available, to determine the extent to which air marshals met these requirements. | Why GAO Did This Study
FAMS, within TSA, is the federal entity responsible for promoting confidence in the nation's aviation system through deploying air marshals to protect U.S. air carriers, airports, passengers, and crews.
GAO was asked to assess FAMS's training program for federal air marshals. This report examines (1) how TSA assesses the training needs of air marshal candidates and incumbent air marshals, and any opportunities that exist to improve this assessment, and (2) the extent to which FAMS ensures that incumbent air marshals are mission ready.
GAO analyzed FAMS training data for calendar year 2014, the last year of available data, reviewed TSA, OTD and DHS guidance and policies on FAMS's air marshal training program, interviewed TSA and FAMS headquarters officials, and visited the TSA Training Center and 7 of FAMS 22 field offices selected based on size and geographic dispersion.
What GAO Found
The Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) Office of Training and Development (OTD) assesses air marshals' training needs using several information sources, but opportunities exist to obtain more feedback from air marshals on whether the training courses they must take met their needs. OTD primarily assesses air marshals' training needs by holding curriculum development and review conferences composed of OTD officials, training instructors, and other subject matter experts. In assessing courses, conference participants use, among other things, the results of surveys that some air marshals complete on the effectiveness of their training. However, while OTD administers these surveys for air marshal candidates and newly graduated air marshals, it does not use them to obtain feedback from incumbent air marshals on the effectiveness of their annual recurrent training courses. Systematically gathering feedback from incumbent air marshals would better position OTD to fully assess whether the training program is meeting air marshals' needs. Additionally, among the training surveys that OTD does currently administer to air marshals, the response rates have been low. For example, among newly hired air marshals and their supervisors from 2009 through 2011—the last three full years in which the Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS) hired air marshals—the survey response rates ranged from 16 to 38 percent. Until OTD takes steps to achieve sufficient response rates, OTD cannot be reasonably assured that the feedback it receives represents the full spectrum of views held by air marshals.
FAMS relies on its annual recurrent training program to ensure incumbent air marshals' mission readiness, but additional actions could strengthen FAMS's ability to do so. First, FAMS does not have complete and timely data on the extent to which air marshals have completed their recurrent training. For example, nearly one-quarter of all training records for calendar year 2014 had not been entered into FAMS's training database within the required time period. Policies that specify who is responsible at the headquarters level for overseeing these activities could help FAMS ensure its data on air marshals' recurrent training are accurate and up to date. Second, FAMS requires air marshals to demonstrate proficiency in marksmanship by achieving a minimum score of 255 out of 300 on the practical pistol course every quarter. However, for the remaining recurrent training courses FAMS does not assess air marshals' knowledge or performance in these courses against a similarly identified level of proficiency, such as by requiring examinations or by using checklists or other objective tools. More objective and standardized methods of determining incumbent air marshals' mission readiness, as called for by the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Learning Evaluation Guide, could help FAMS better and more consistently assess air marshals' skills and target areas for improvement. Additionally, in 2015 FAMS developed a health, fitness, and wellness program to improve air marshals' overall health and wellness, but it is too early to gauge the program's effectiveness. This is a public version of a sensitive report that GAO issued in June 2016. Information that TSA deems “Sensitive Security Information” has been removed.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that OTD implement a mechanism for regularly collecting incumbent air marshals' feedback on their recurrent training, and take steps to improve the response rates of training surveys it conducts. GAO also recommends that FAMS specify in policy who at the headquarters level has oversight responsibility for ensuring that recurrent training records are entered in a timely manner, and develop and implement standardized methods to determine whether incumbent air marshals continue to be mission ready in key skills. DHS concurred with all of the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-15-93 | gao_GAO-15-93_0 | 1). ETA Considered Overarching Goals and Various Factors in Selecting Measures to Address Job Corps’ Financial Challenges
ETA Used Funding Transfers and Spending Cuts to Address Job Corps’ Financial Challenges in Program Years 2011 and 2012
ETA addressed Job Corps’ financial challenges in program years 2011 and 2012 through a combination of funding transfers and spending cuts. Over both program years, ETA used $38.4 million in funding transfers and implemented $75.3 million in spending cuts (see table 2). Temporary cuts to training. Permanent cuts to student benefits and services. Job Corps Contractors and Some Members of Congress Said That Communications Were Sometimes Not Timely and Complete
Job Corps center contractors’ corporate and center staff, and outreach and admissions contractors, told us that the timing of ETA’s internal notices regarding spending cuts in program years 2011 and 2012 in some cases created challenges for staff. For example, in two cases, ETA issued a notice on a Friday that required all contractors to submit a response by the following Monday or Tuesday. Staff at three of eight centers we visited said they or corporate staff worked over the weekend to prepare responses, such as revised spending plans. Our review of ETA’s internal notices regarding spending cuts found that 11 of 19—8 of which were issued in program year 2012—provided all contractors, including center staff, with short notice of program changes or a short time frame in which to respond, or both. In addition, Job Corps center contractors’ corporate and center staff, and outreach and admissions contractors, told us that ETA’s internal notices sometimes lacked information they needed to effectively implement changes and communicate them to students and community partners. Given the challenges contractors identified, ETA’s internal guidance may not ensure that contractors receive sufficiently detailed information at the appropriate time to effectively communicate and implement program changes. Similarly, while DOL met legal requirements for notifying the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations of funding transfers within certain time frames, some members of Congress expressed dissatisfaction with the timing and completeness of DOL’s communications. The Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act, which was enacted in 2014, requires DOL to provide more frequent and detailed reports to several congressional committees and subcommittees on Job Corps’ financial position. ETA’s Spending Cuts Adversely Affected Applicants and Students, and Had Other Wide-Ranging Effects
Enrollment Suspensions Reduced the Number of Applicants and New Enrollees, and Had Other Effects
The three enrollment suspensions ETA implemented in program years 2011 and 2012 restricted access to Job Corps for all but a few types of applicants, which reduced the number of students who applied to and entered the program (new enrollees) in those program years. The 2013 enrollment suspension also had subsequent effects on student recruitment and enrollment. In response to the DOL inspector general’s recommendations, ETA has implemented several initiatives to improve the tracking and reporting of Job Corps’ financial information. Beyond these steps to address the DOL inspector general’s recommendations, ETA has initiatives underway to better align Job Corps’ costs with its appropriations. Furthermore, ETA officials told us that they are assessing the financial implications associated with current and future program changes. While ETA is working to close the inspector general’s recommendations, it is too early to determine the extent to which the steps ETA has taken will help improve its financial management of the program in the future. Recommendation for Executive Action
To enhance communication with contractors about Job Corps program changes, we recommend that the Secretary of Labor direct the Assistant Secretary for Employment and Training to review the sufficiency of ETA’s guidance for internal notices—including Program Instruction Notices, Policy and Requirements Handbook Change Notices, and Information Notices—to ensure that contractors are provided with adequate notification of program changes before they are expected to be implemented, and an adequate level of information to assist them in carrying out their responsibilities. DOL concurred with our recommendation for ETA to review the sufficiency of its guidance for internal notices provided to contractors. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to examine (1) how ETA selected the measures it implemented to address Job Corps’ financial challenges in program years 2011 and 2012, (2) the timeliness and completeness of ETA’s communications to contractors, including center staff, and Congress, (3) the effects ETA’s spending cuts had on applicants and students, and (4) the steps ETA has taken since to improve Job Corps’ financial management. We also assessed ETA’s internal communications guidance using GAO’s standards for internal control in the federal government. We also interviewed DOL’s inspector general to identify ETA’s progress in implementing its May 2013 recommendations. | Why GAO Did This Study
Job Corps—funded at about $1.6 billion in program year 2013—is the nation's largest residential, educational, and career training program for economically disadvantaged youth. In program years 2011 and 2012, ETA projected that Job Corps' costs would exceed its appropriations, and took action to resolve these gaps. In May 2013, DOL's inspector general reported internal control weaknesses and recommended improvements; however, questions remained about the funding transfers and spending cuts ETA implemented. GAO was asked to review these measures.
This report examines (1) how ETA selected the measures it implemented to address Job Corps' financial challenges, (2) the timeliness and completeness of ETA's communications to contractors, including center staff, and Congress, (3) how spending cuts affected applicants and students, and (4) steps ETA has taken since to improve Job Corps' financial management. GAO visited 8 of the 125 centers—selected based on their geographic diversity and other factors—and interviewed staff and students; reviewed ETA's internal notices to contractors and DOL's communications with Congress, and assessed ETA's guidance for internal notices using federal internal control standards; and analyzed ETA's enrollment data from program years 2010 through 2013.
What GAO Found
In selecting funding transfers and spending cuts to address Job Corps' projected funding gaps in program years 2011 and 2012, the Department of Labor's (DOL) Employment and Training Administration (ETA) considered various factors, including the potential effects on students and recommendations from stakeholders. After considering these factors, ETA used $38 million in funding transfers and implemented $75 million in spending cuts, which included several temporary suspensions of new enrollments, temporary cuts to training, and permanent cuts to student benefits and services, and administrative costs.
Job Corps' contractors, including center staff, said ETA's internal notices to implement spending cuts in program years 2011 and 2012 were sometimes not timely and complete. For example, in some cases, ETA issued a notice on a Friday that required a response by Monday or Tuesday. Staff at three of the eight centers GAO visited said they or other staff worked over the weekend to prepare responses, such as revised spending plans. GAO's review of ETA's internal notices found that 11 of 19 gave contractors 3 business days or fewer to implement a program change, respond, or both. Contractors also said ETA's notices sometimes lacked information they needed to effectively implement changes and communicate them to students and community partners, such as how long cuts would last. ETA officials said their communications were appropriate, given their oversight role and time constraints. Although ETA has guidance on the content of internal notices to contractors, it does not specify time frames for providing notice of program changes. Given challenges contractors identified, ETA's guidance may not ensure that, in accordance with federal internal control standards, contractors receive sufficiently detailed information at the appropriate time to effectively communicate and implement changes. With regard to Congress, while DOL met requirements for notification of funding transfers, some members sent letters to DOL expressing dissatisfaction with the timing and completeness of DOL's communications. The Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act, subsequently enacted in 2014, requires DOL to provide more frequent and detailed reports to Congress on Job Corps' financial position.
ETA's spending cuts reduced the number of applicants and new enrollees, limited some training opportunities for students, and had other adverse effects. According to ETA data, Job Corps applicants decreased by about a third, from 79,567 in program year 2010 to 53,725 in program year 2012, and new student enrollments decreased by about a quarter, from 56,171 to 40,792 over the same time period. The final enrollment suspension, along with other factors, such as a reduction in outreach and admissions staff, also had subsequent effects on student recruitment. For example, after the enrollment suspension ended, it took Job Corps 8 months to reach over 90 percent of its planned enrollment goal.
In response to recommendations by DOL's inspector general for internal control improvements, ETA has implemented several initiatives to improve the tracking and reporting of Job Corps' financial information. ETA also has initiatives underway to help ensure that Job Corps' costs and appropriations are aligned and to assess the financial implications associated with program changes. While these are all important steps, it is too early to determine the extent to which they will help ETA improve its financial management of the program in the future.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that ETA review the sufficiency of its guidance for internal notices about program changes. ETA concurred with this recommendation. |
gao_RCED-98-228 | gao_RCED-98-228_0 | Duplicate Participation May Cost Millions in Overpayments
In the four states we examined, about $3.9 million in food stamp benefits were provided during calendar year 1996 to households in different states that may have simultaneously included the same individuals as members. The possibility of duplicate participation in multiple benefit programs is consistent with a September 1997 analysis by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). Lack of Comprehensive Information Allows Duplicate Participation
Individuals included in food stamp households in more than one state escape detection because there is no comprehensive national system to identify food stamp participation in more than one state. The Congress, recognizing that the 1996 welfare reform legislation, which contains work requirements for the Food Stamp Program and time limits for TANF, would necessitate tracking participation across states, asked HHS to study how these requirements would be implemented. In the absence of such a system, states must rely primarily on applicants to truthfully report the individuals who are members of their households, not include individuals physically residing in another state or household, and notify them of any subsequent changes. Although certain provisions of the welfare reform legislation of 1996 cannot be fully enforced without interstate tracking of participation in public assistance programs, most states have not begun planning how to track and thus prevent duplicate participation, and no federal agency has overall responsibility for creating a national database or information system to facilitate such tracking. While HHS’ report identified five potential systems that could be developed for interstate tracking, the report did not recommend developing any specific system. In addition, they recertify the household at least annually. Until a national system to track all participation in public assistance programs is established to assist states in enforcing welfare reform provisions, a national database of food stamp participation information could be used to detect and prevent duplicate participation at the time of application, thereby obviating the process of recouping overpayments. Given our findings of potential duplicate participation in four widely separated states, as well as similar findings by HHS, we believe that creating a national system to collect, analyze, and disseminate information on participation in the Food Stamp Program would be an effective way to provide the states with the information they need to help prevent duplicate participation. Recommendation to the Secretary of Agriculture
In the absence of a comprehensive national information system on participants in all public assistance programs, we recommend that the Secretary of Agriculture direct the Administrator of FNS to consider establishing a central system to help ensure that individuals participating in the Food Stamp Program are not being improperly included as household members in more than one state concurrently. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To determine how many individuals were included as members of more than one household that received food stamp benefits during the same time period and the estimated value of the benefits that were issued to those households, we matched the food stamp records of each of the four states with the largest benefit issuance in the Food Stamp Program against each other. To identify the options for detecting or preventing future food stamp overpayments caused by duplicate participation, we discussed with agency officials in each of the states we visited their opinions regarding the value of computer matching. GAO Comments
1. 2. 3. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on ineligible individuals who are improperly participating in the Department of Agriculture's (USDA) Food Stamp Program, focusing on: (1) determining how many individuals were included as members of food stamp households in more than one state during 1996 and the estimated value of the benefits that were improperly issued to those households; (2) determining how these individuals could be improperly included without being detected; and (3) identifying an option for detecting or preventing future food stamp overpayments caused by such duplicate participation.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) among the four widely separated states GAO reviewed, GAO identified over 20,000 individuals who were potentially improperly included in food stamp households in at least two of those four states at the same time during calendar year 1996; (2) while GAO cannot estimate the potential amount of overpayments nationwide due to this duplicate participation, the households in those four states improperly collected an estimated $3.9 million in food stamp benefits; (3) additional evidence of the scope of this problem is indicated by a September 1997 Department of Health and Human Services computer match of 15 states and the District of Columbia, which found 18,000 potential cases of duplicate participation in the public assistance programs, including food stamps; (4) interstate duplicate participation goes undetected because there is no national system to identify food stamp participation in more than one state; (5) welfare reform legislation of 1996 contains work requirements for the Food Stamp Program and time limits for Temporary Assistance for Needy Families that can be fully enforced only by interstate tracking of participation in public assistance programs; (6) however, the law does not require a national tracking system to be established, and no federal agency is responsible for creating a national system to facilitate such tracking; (7) although the states have been working individually to modify their systems to meet welfare reform requirements, few states have made progress in developing automated systems to track participation outside their borders; (8) while states may currently learn of some duplicate participation from the Social Security Administration or through their own matching efforts with neighboring states, they rely primarily on applicants and clients to truthfully identify who resides in their households; (9) in the absence of a comprehensive national database or information system to track participants receiving public assistance, creating a USDA-managed system to collect and disseminate information on national participation in the Food Stamp Program could provide an efficient and effective means to identify duplicate participation and help prevent food stamp overpayments; (10) rather than relying on states to individually develop programs to identify and prevent duplicate participation, it would be more efficient for USDA to develop a single nationwide system; and (11) once established, such a system could be expanded to track additional information that would help states enforce welfare reform provisions relating to food stamps. |
gao_GAO-12-953 | gao_GAO-12-953_0 | 2009 Changes to the TAA Program
The 2009 legislation made substantial changes to the TAA program, including extending eligibility to workers in a greater variety of circumstances. Training. The 2009 legislation also affected Labor’s operations by, for example, establishing a new Office of Trade Adjustment Assistance and requiring Labor to collect additional information on workers who receive TAA benefits and services, as well as data on service sector workers, including the service workers’ state, industry, and reason for certification. The agencies assist workers and employers in filing petitions and can also file petitions on behalf of workers. Multiple factors contributed to this increase. Labor’s Processing Timeliness Adversely Affected by Increased Petition Volume and Initial Staff Shortage
Labor initially had insufficient capacity to handle its increased workload, and thus, lagged in processing petitions. The quarter after the 2009 legislation took effect, on average, Labor took 153 days to process a petition—nearly four times as long as the statutory limit (see fig. Moreover, in June 2012, we reviewed Labor’s petition investigation process and found that it generally conformed to best practices for internal controls. Nearly All of the Changes Benefited Participants and Some Helped Administrators As Well
Participants benefited from nearly all of the 2009 legislative changes, some of which also helped administrators better serve the participants, according to the state officials we interviewed. Both participants and administrators benefited from a simplified and extended training enrollment deadline—which must be met to qualify for TAA-based income support—according to officials from all six states. Some state officials noted that the extension provided case managers with more time to assess participants’ skills and abilities and advise them on employment and training options. Several state officials said that dedication of these funds allowed case managers to better serve participants. the possibility of receiving income support for longer than previously available; the option to start training while threatened with job loss (prior to actually losing their jobs); the flexibility to attend training on a part-time basis; and According to several officials, the additional 26 weeks of potential income support while in training allowed program participants to consider longer- term training options, such as health care, a high-demand profession. Over 107,000 Workers Received Benefits and Services, but Little Is Known About Their Outcomes
About Half of the Participants in the 2009 Program Enrolled in Training, but Other Benefits Were Less Utilized
TAA provides participants with a variety of benefits and services—some were used more than others. Limited Outcome Data are Available
Little is yet known about the outcomes achieved by participants in the 2009 program largely because nearly two-thirds of the participants were still enrolled in the program as of September 30, 2011. The study will address the operation and impacts of the program after the passage of the Trade Adjustment Assistance Reform Act of 2002 and will include an impact study on participants’ employment-related outcomes, overall and for key worker subgroups, and a benefit-cost analysis. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We provided officials from the Department of Labor a draft of this report for review and comment. In its written comments, Labor generally agreed with our findings. Other contacts and staff acknowledgments are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine: (1) what challenges Labor faced in implementing the 2009 legislation, (2) the effect selected state government officials say the 2009 legislative changes had on participants and on state and local administrators, and (3) the extent participants received TAA benefits and services as established by the 2009 legislation and what is known about employment outcomes. We also assessed what internal controls were present in Labor’s petition investigation process as of June 2012. Specifically, we found that the employment status and earnings information for many participants who had exited the program was not identified. Enrollment date is not 3. | Why GAO Did This Study
While international trade has benefited Americans in a number of ways, it has also contributed to layoffs in a range of industries. To assist trade-displaced workers, Labor administers the TAA for Workers program, which provides income support, job training, and other benefits. The Trade Globalization and Adjustment Assistance Act of 2009, enacted as part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, made substantial changes to the TAA program, such as extending eligibility to workers in the service sector and increasing benefits levels. The Act also required GAO to report on the operation and effectiveness of those changes. Specifically, GAO examined (1) the challenges Labor faced in implementing the 2009 legislation, (2) selected state officials' assessment of the 2009 legislation's effect on participants and state and local administrators, and (3) the extent to which participants received program benefits and services established by the 2009 legislation and achieved employment outcomes. GAO interviewed officials at Labor and in six states, selected for having a high level of TAA activity and geographic diversity. GAO also reviewed Labor's internal controls for investigating petitions, which are filed on behalf of workers and are the starting point for determining their TAA eligibility. GAO analyzed participant data on specific benefits and services received and employment outcomes, as available.
What GAO Found
The Department of Labor (Labor) was challenged to process the substantial increase in petitions filed for the Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) for Workers program after related legislation was enacted in 2009. Labor initially had insufficient capacity to handle this increased workload, leading to processing delays and data recording errors. For example, in the quarter after the 2009 legislation took effect, Labor took an average of 153 days to process a petition—nearly four times the statutory limit. Labor responded with corrective action, including hiring new staff and adding additional quality control steps for processing petitions. Partly as a result of these efforts, processing times fell substantially. Moreover, GAO found that Labor's petition investigation process, as of June 2012, generally conformed to best practices for internal controls.
According to selected state officials, virtually all of the 2009 changes benefited participants, and some also helped administrators serve participants. Officials in all six states GAO interviewed expressed the view that both participants and administrators benefited from the simplified and extended training enrollment deadline. Some officials said the new deadline was easier for eligible workers to understand and provided administrators with more time to advise participants on their training and employment options. Moreover, officials said participants who enrolled in training benefited from other program changes, including increased training funds, the option to attend training part-time, and a longer period for income support. Some state officials said that the additional weeks of income support allowed participants to consider longer-term training options, such as health care programs.
Over 107,000 participants received benefits and services as established by the 2009 law, but little is yet known about their employment outcomes. Nationally, all the participants received case management and reemployment services and about half enrolled in training, most commonly occupational skills training. Less than 8 percent of participants used other benefits. Little is known about employment outcomes because nearly two-thirds of the participants were still enrolled as of September 30, 2011, and employment and earnings information was often not available for those who had exited the program. While this information will eventually be available, other factors, including the overall state of the economy, affect these outcomes so isolating the effects of the 2009 legislative changes would be difficult.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making recommendations in this report. Labor generally agreed with the report's findings. |
gao_GAO-14-67 | gao_GAO-14-67_0 | 7 U.S.C. Agencies Conducted Required Regulatory Analyses but May Not Be Identifying All Major Rules
In the Federal Register releases of the 59 Dodd-Frank rules that we identified and reviewed, the issuing federal agencies stated that they conducted the regulatory analyses required by various federal statutes.As independent regulatory agencies, the federal financial regulators— CFPB, CFTC, FDIC, the Federal Reserve, OCC, NCUA, and SEC—are not subject to executive orders that require comprehensive benefit-cost analysis in accordance with guidance issued by OMB. Under CRA, OMB is responsible for determining which rules are major but relies on agency analyses to help make the determination. Regulators Continue to Coordinate on Rulemakings
Federal agencies coordinated on 49 of the 70 Dodd-Frank regulations that we reviewed, as required by the act or voluntarily. CFPB Has a Framework to Coordinate with Prudential Regulators and Is Establishing One with State Regulators
Under the Dodd-Frank Act, CFPB is authorized to supervise insured depository institutions and credit unions with more than $10 billion in assets (large banks) and their affiliates, and nonbank financial service providers (nonbanks). CFPB has established a framework to comply with Dodd-Frank’s requirements to coordinate supervision with prudential regulators and is establishing a similar framework to comply with the act’s coordination requirements with state regulators. Impacts of the Dodd- Frank Act Are Uncertain, and Regulators Are Developing Plans to Review Rules Retrospectively
Federal financial regulators are continuing to implement reforms pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act, but the full impact of the act remains uncertain. Third, we developed indicators to monitor the extent to which certain of the Dodd-Frank Act’s swap reforms are consistent with the act’s goals of reducing risk. Finally, we assessed agencies’ plans to conduct retrospective reviews of their existing rules. Importantly, these indicators have several key limitations. Regulators Vary in Their Approaches and Progress in Developing Retrospective Review Plans
Federal financial regulators vary in their approaches and progress in developing and implementing plans to conduct retrospective reviews of their existing Dodd-Frank and other rules in recognition of Executive Order 13,579 (E.O. In that regard, we recommended in our prior report that the federal financial regulators develop plans that determine how they will measure the impact of Dodd- Frank regulations—for example, determining how and when to collect, analyze, and report needed data. To date, regulators have not implemented our recommendation. We maintain that doing so would position them to make their future retrospective reviews as robust as possible. OMB provided guidance on implementing CRA in 1999, but such guidance does not establish standardized processes for submitting rules to OMB for its review or applying CRA’s criteria. These inconsistent processes could lead to the inconsistent classification of some rules. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help ensure that OMB, in consultation with federal financial regulators, consistently classifies Dodd-Frank rules as major under CRA, we recommend that the Director of OMB, through the Administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, issue additional guidance to help standardize processes for identifying major rules under CRA, including on (1) the extent to which agencies should submit rules to OMB for review, such as whether agencies should submit only those rules their analyses indicate are major or all rules, and (2) how agencies should apply CRA’s major rule criteria in their analyses, such as whether agencies should include indirect benefits or costs, combine benefits or costs of separate but related rules, or aggregate benefits or costs for jointly issued rules. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report examines rulemaking under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank Act). More specifically, we examined (1) the regulatory analysis conducted by federal agencies in their Dodd-Frank rulemakings, including their assessments of which rules they considered to be major rules under the Congressional Review Act (CRA); (2) interagency coordination by the agencies in their Dodd-Frank rulemakings and by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) with other agencies in connection to its supervision of large banks and certain nonbank financial service providers; and (3) possible impact of selected Dodd-Frank provisions and their implementing regulations and agency plans to assess such regulations retrospectively. To examine the regulatory analyses and coordination conducted by the regulators, we focused our analysis on final rules issued pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act that became effective from July 24, 2012, through July 22, 2013, a total of 70 rules (see app. Using GAO’s Federal Rules database we found that 10 of the 59 rules were classified by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), in consultation with the rulemaking agencies, as major rules under CRA (that is, have resulted in or are likely to result in an annual impact on the economy of $100 million or more, a major increase in costs or prices, or significant adverse effects on competition, employment, investment, productivity, innovation, or on the ability of U.S.-based enterprises to compete with foreign-based enterprises in domestic and export markets). Although changes in our indicators may be suggestive of the act’s impact on the swaps market, the indicators have a number of limitations, including that they do not identify causal linkages between the act and changes in the indicators. Funding cost. Our baseline estimates also suggest that the Dodd-Frank Act is associated with improvements in most measures of U.S. bank SIFIs’ safety and soundness. | Why GAO Did This Study
The 2010 Dodd-Frank Act requires or authorizes various federal agencies to issue hundreds of rules to implement reforms intended to strengthen the financial services industry. As amended by Public Law No. 112-10, the act also mandates that GAO annually study financial services regulations. This report examines (1) the regulatory analyses agencies conducted in their Dodd-Frank rulemakings; (2) interagency coordination on such rulemakings and by CFPB in its supervision activities; and (3) the possible impact of selected Dodd-Frank provisions and related rules and agency plans to assess Dodd-Frank Act rules retrospectively. GAO identified and reviewed 70 Dodd-Frank rules that became effective from July 24, 2012, through July 22, 2013, to determine whether the required regulatory analyses and coordination were conducted; examined CFPB's policies, procedures, and other materials; developed indicators on the impact of the act's systemic risk-related provisions and rules; conducted a regression analysis to assess the act's impact on large bank holding companies; and interviewed federal financial regulators and officials from the U.S. Department of the Treasury, the Financial Stability Oversight Council, and OMB.
What GAO Found
Federal agencies conducted the required regulatory analyses for all rules issued pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) that GAO identified and reviewed. However, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), in coordination with the agencies, may not be consistently determining which rules are considered major rules under the Congressional Review Act (CRA). Under the act, Congress is allowed to review major rules before they become effective. The act outlines criteria for determining whether a rule is major, such as whether it will result in an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more. OMB is responsible for determining which rules are major under CRA but relies on agency analyses to help make the determination. OMB guidance does not address whether independent agencies should submit all rules for review or how they should apply major rule criteria. GAO found that some independent agencies submitted all their rules to OMB, but others did not. GAO also found inconsistencies in how these agencies applied the CRA criteria. For example, GAO found rules issued by different agencies that had similar economic impacts but were not similarly classified as major. These issues raise the risk of some rules not being properly classified as major, limiting Congress's ability to review these rules before they become effective.
Federal regulators coordinated on 49 rulemakings pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act or voluntarily. As required by the act, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) established a framework to coordinate its supervision activities with prudential regulators and is establishing a similar framework to coordinate with state regulators. In May 2012, CFPB and prudential regulators entered into an agreement that specifies how they plan to meet the act's coordination requirements for the supervision of large banks (i.e., more than $10 billion in assets). CFPB has entered into similar agreements with state regulators to coordinate examinations of banks and nonbank financial entities.
The Dodd-Frank Act has not been fully implemented and its full impact remains uncertain. Using recently released data, GAO updated its prior report's indicators monitoring certain risk characteristics of large U.S. bank holding companies. Although changes in the indicators are not evidence of causal links to the act's provisions, some indicators suggest these companies, on average, have decreased their leverage and enhanced their liquidity since the act's passage. Moreover, GAO's updated regression analysis suggests that the act continued to have little effect on the funding costs of large U.S. bank holding companies but may have helped improve their safety and soundness. Based on its analysis of the act and market data, GAO also developed new indicators for this report to monitor the extent to which certain of the act's swap reforms are associated with their intended outcomes. These indicators establish baselines for measuring future changes. Finally, GAO examined federal financial regulators' plans to conduct retrospective reviews of their Dodd-Frank rules. Executive Order 13,579 asks independent agencies, including federal financial regulators, to develop plans to conduct retrospective reviews of existing rules that may be excessively burdensome or costly. Regulators have varied in their approaches and progress in developing and implementing such plans. Given the importance of such reviews, GAO recommended in 2011 that the regulators determine how they will measure the impact of Dodd-Frank regulations in their plans, but they have not done so to date. GAO maintains that doing so would position the regulators to make their future retrospective reviews as robust as possible.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that OMB issue guidance to help standardize CRA processes. OMB disagreed such guidance is needed, in part because GAO did not identify inconsistencies in major rule designations. GAO maintains that the identified process inconsistencies could lead to differing designations under CRA, and its recommendation helps ensure consistency in designating major rules. |
gao_GAO-15-390 | gao_GAO-15-390_0 | All four of the states included in our review— Arizona, Florida, Michigan, and New Jersey—had MCO arrangements in place. About 700 of the 5.4 million beneficiaries we reviewed received more than a 1-year supply (a 480-day supply) of the same drug in 2011 at a cost to About 50 of these beneficiaries Medicaid of at least $1.6 million.received more than 2 years’ worth (a 730-day supply) of the same drug. According to CMS data, more than 16,000 beneficiaries out of the 5.4 million we reviewed visited five or more prescribers to receive prescriptions for antipsychotics or respiratory medications valued at about $33 million.15 prescribers and 10 pharmacies to obtain various antipsychotics at a cost to Medicaid of about $23,000 in 1 year. Drug Utilization Reviews Help States Detect and Prevent Unnecessary Prescriptions, and Additional Reporting Would Help CMS Determine Whether More Guidance on Controls Is Needed
CMS monitors state Medicaid programs’ efforts to prevent and detect instances of prescription-drug fraud in Medicaid, but we identified areas that may require additional guidance for oversight. Required by federal law, the Medicaid Drug Utilization Review (DUR) program is one process states use to promote patient safety and monitor prescription-drug activity for fraud, waste, and abuse. In the first phase (prospective DUR) the states use tools such as point-of-sale edits, preferred-drug lists, and eligibility screening to promote patient safety and avoid abuse. The second phase (retrospective DUR) involves ongoing and periodic examination of claims data to identify patterns of fraud, abuse, gross overuse, or medically unnecessary care and implements corrective action when needed. CMS does not collect information about lock-in programs for noncontrolled substances or automatic refill prohibitions, despite the concerns detailed below. Lock-In Programs (also known as Restricted Recipient Programs). Pharmacies may automatically refill prescriptions for certain medications without any customer action. Concerns with pharmacy automatic refill include the potential for stockpiling, continued fill of discontinued medications, and an increase in the cost and waste of prescription medications. Currently, Florida and Arizona are the states in our review that do not allow automatic refills. Lock-in programs are an important tool that can be used to address doctor shopping by locking beneficiaries who have abused the Medicaid program in to one prescriber, one pharmacy, or both for receiving prescriptions. Recommendation for Executive Action
To enhance monitoring of potentially wasteful or abusive practices in the Medicaid program, we recommend that the Acting Administrator of CMS require states to report to CMS whether their state has lock-in programs for abusers of noncontrolled substances and prohibitions on pharmacy automatic refills, and examine the results to determine whether additional guidance is appropriate. In its written comments, HHS concurred with our recommendation and stated that it will consider requiring states to report on lock-in programs for abusers of noncontrolled substances and pharmacy automatic refill policies. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
In this report, we (1) evaluated the reliability of Medicaid data from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid (CMS) and selected states for the purpose of identifying indicators of potential fraud or abuse; (2) identified and analyzed indicators, if any, of potentially fraudulent or abusive activities related to prescription drugs in Medicaid; and (3) examined the extent to which federal and selected state oversight policies, controls, and processes are designed to prevent and detect indicators of prescription- drug fraud in Medicaid. On the basis of our discussions with agency officials and our own To identify indicators of potentially fraudulent or abusive activities related to prescription drugs in Medicaid, we obtained and analyzed Medicaid claims paid in fiscal year 2011, the most-recent period from which we could draw reliable data, for four states: Arizona, Florida, Michigan and New Jersey. These states accounted for about 13 percent of the federal share of fiscal year 2011 Medicaid expenditures. These states were selected primarily because they had consistently comparable and reliable data and were among the states with the highest Medicaid expenditures. The results of our analysis of these states are not generalizable to other states. | Why GAO Did This Study
Medicaid is a significant expenditure for the federal government and the states, with total federal outlays of $310 billion in fiscal year 2014. CMS reported an estimated $17.5 billion in potentially improper payments for the Medicaid program in 2014.
GAO was asked to review pharmacy-related program-integrity efforts at selected states. Among other reporting objectives, this report (1) identifies and analyzes indicators of potentially fraudulent or abusive prescribing activities in fiscal year 2011, and (2) examines the extent to which federal and state oversight policies, controls, and processes are in place to prevent and detect instances of prescription-drug fraud and abuse.
GAO analyzed Medicaid claims paid in fiscal year 2011, the most-recent reliable data available, for four states: Arizona, Florida, Michigan, and New Jersey. These states were chosen, in part, because they were among those with the highest Medicaid expenditures; the results are not generalizable to all states. GAO performed data matching with various databases to identify indicators of potential fraud, reviewed CMS and state Medicaid program-integrity policies, and interviewed CMS and state officials performing oversight functions.
What GAO Found
GAO found indicators of potential prescription-medication fraud and abuse among thousands of Medicaid beneficiaries and hundreds of prescribers during fiscal year 2011—the most-recent year for which reliable data were available in four selected states: Arizona, Florida, Michigan, and New Jersey. These states accounted for about 13 percent of all fiscal year 2011 Medicaid payments. Specifically, in these four states, GAO found the following:
More than 16,000 of the 5.4 million beneficiaries potentially engaged in “doctor shopping,” by visiting five or more doctors to receive prescriptions for antipsychotics or respiratory medications valued at about $33 million.
About 700 beneficiaries received more than a 1-year supply of the same drug in 2011 at a cost to Medicaid of at least $1.6 million. This is an indicator of diversion, which is the redirection of prescription drugs for illegitimate purposes.
As required by federal law, the Medicaid Drug Utilization Review program is a two-phase review process states use to promote safety while also monitoring prescription-drug activity for fraud. Federal law requires each state to report on the operation of its review program, a key monitoring tool that the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) uses to oversee the review process in states, but GAO identified additional actions that could improve oversight. In the first phase, states use tools and eligibility screening to promote patient safety and avoid abuse before the drugs are dispensed. The second phase involves ongoing and periodic examination of claims data to identify patterns of fraud, abuse, gross overuse, or medically unnecessary care, and implement corrective action when needed.
However, GAO identified two potential controls that are not included in CMS's current reporting requirements:
Lock-in programs for noncontrolled substances. Lock-in programs address doctor shopping by restricting beneficiaries who have abused the Medicaid program to one health-care provider, one pharmacy, or both, for receiving prescriptions. Lock-in programs have typically been used on controlled substances. Expanding lock-in programs that currently focus on controlled substances to restrict abusers of noncontrolled substances, such as the human immunodeficiency virus medications Atripla and Truvada, to a single prescriber or pharmacy may help address potential fraud and abuse.
Prohibition of automatic refills. Pharmacies permitting automatic refills automatically refill prescriptions for certain medications without any customer action. Concerns with pharmacy automatic refill include the potential for stockpiling, continued fill of discontinued medications, and increased cost and waste of prescription medications. Two states GAO reviewed—Florida and Arizona—have prohibited the practice.
CMS does not collect information about lock-in programs for noncontrolled substances or automatic refill prohibitions, but doing so would help the agency determine whether additional guidance is needed.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that CMS require states to report information about specific drug-utilization review controls to determine whether additional guidance is needed. The agency concurred with the recommendation and stated that it will consider requiring states to report on these areas. |
gao_GGD-95-12 | gao_GGD-95-12_0 | France, Germany, and the United Kingdom each rely primarily on a centralized marketing organization to promote their agricultural exports. They conduct a number of different types of promotions, provide an array of services to exporters, and promote nearly all high-value products and commodities. Because so many factors influence a country’s export levels, these figures alone are not sufficient to make judgments about the effectiveness of the countries’ foreign market development programs. The activities conducted generally included market research, consulting services, trade servicing, consumer promotions, advertising, and sponsorship at trade shows. Foreign Market Development by the United States
Most foreign market development of U.S. high-value products is carried out by not-for-profit trade associations. USDA’s Foreign Agricultural Service has the primary government role in market development and promotion of HVPs. Information on Five Countries’ Marketing Organizations, 1993
Government division that supports promotional activities at overseas posts (Table notes on next page)
Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to obtain information on (1) the organizations in France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands that help develop foreign markets for high-value agricultural products; (2) the programs of the U.S. Department of Agriculture for HVP foreign market development; and (3) the ways in which these five countries’ programs are evaluated to determine their effectiveness in increasing exports. To obtain information on the foreign market development efforts of France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands, we conducted telephone interviews and met in the United States with officials of foreign marketing organizations and the embassies of the four countries. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the structure, funding, and promotional activities of the organizations that develop foreign markets for high-value agricultural products (HVP), focusing on the: (1) organizations in France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands that help develop foreign markets for HVP; (2) Department of Agriculture's (USDA) foreign market development programs; and (3) ways in which these countries' programs are evaluated to determine their effectiveness in increasing exports.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) France, Germany, and the United Kingdom each have an integrated market development organization that provides an array of services and promotes most agricultural products; (2) the Netherlands relies primarily on independent commodity associations to promote its agricultural products; (3) all of the countries spent less on foreign market development than the United States in 1993; (4) because so many factors influence a country's export levels, information on promotion expenditures alone is not sufficient to determine the effectiveness of a country's foreign market development efforts; (5) the countries' foreign market development programs are financed mostly by the private sector, while U.S. foreign market development programs are coordinated by the USDA Foreign Agricultural Service; and (6) the market development organizations reviewed and the United States generally engage in the same kinds of promotional activities, including market research, trade shows, consumer promotions, and trade servicing. |
gao_GAO-03-164 | gao_GAO-03-164_0 | Some Airports Have Spent Many Years Building Runways and Have Faced a Variety of Challenges
The amount of time that airports spend planning and building their runways can vary because of a number of factors. Figure 3 shows that the median time spent on completed runway projects was about 10 years, while the median time airports estimated they would spend on runway projects not yet completed was about 14 years. According to FAA, there can be a considerable lag from the inception of the runway process until the runway is completed and in operation. Some of the specific challenges identified by airports and other stakeholders we visited include the following: Reaching stakeholder agreement. Mitigating the impact of noise and other issues. Design and construction of the runway. A Number of Initiatives Are Underway to Address Challenges Related to Building Runways
While there may be no single solution to all the challenges associated with planning and building runways, the federal government and airports have undertaken a number of initiatives to address the challenges related to such issues as duplicative environmental requirements, stakeholder differences, and noise mitigation. FAA Initiatives Focus on Streamlining the Planning and Environmental Review Processes
FAA has identified and undertaken several initiatives directed at streamlining the planning and environmental review processes and improving cooperation, communication, and coordination among major stakeholders. While the Executive Order and the proposed legislation were designed to address challenges some of the airports experienced, it is too early to assess their impact; the Executive Order was only recently signed, and the legislation did not pass in the 107th session of Congress. However, they did express some concerns related to our analysis of the amount of time airports spent or estimated spending in developing their runways, as compared with the results of FAA’s 2001 study. They also suggested that GAO include more acknowledgment of their efforts in trying to improve the runway development process. Regarding FAA’s concerns, we believe our approach was a reasonable assessment of the amount of time it takes airports to build runways. However, we clarified our discussion on the length of time by focusing on the median time rather than the average time because this approach minimizes the impact of outlying airports that may have taken a very long or a very short time to build their runways. Scope and Methodology
Our primary methods for addressing our two research questions—first, how much time do airports spend building their runway projects and what challenges do airports and other stakeholders experience during this process, and second, what have airports and other stakeholders done or proposed to do to address the challenges they experienced in building runways—-were to conduct a nationwide survey of airports that built new runways between 1991 and 2000 or planned to build new runways by 2010, and to perform site visits at five airports. The survey, conducted in February 2002, provided data on the amount of time that 30 airports spent in planning and building 32 runway projects; on key factors that accelerated or delayed the projects; and on initiatives that airports have taken to address the challenges they faced during the process. We also included airports that were in various stages of completing their runway projects, and in various parts of the country. Stakeholders said this is partly attributable to community opposition and to the effect of this opposition on the process. Status of the Runway Project
FAA commissioned the runway in 1997. | Why GAO Did This Study
Aviation experts believe that building runways is one key way to address airport capacity issues and prevent delays that can affect the entire U.S. economy, but runway projects are often controversial and time-consuming. GAO was asked to examine how much time airports spend completing runways, what challenges airports and other stakeholders experience during this process, and what airports and other stakeholders have done to address challenges related to runway projects. GAO analyzed the results of surveys from 30 airports on 32 runway projects and visited 5 airports in order to interview numerous runway project stakeholders. The Department of Transportation agreed with GAO's characterization of the challenges associated with building runways and some of the initiatives taken to address these challenges. They did express some concerns related to GAO's analysis of the time airports spent or estimated spending in developing runways, and suggested that GAO acknowledge additional FAA efforts to improve the runway process. We believe that our approach was a reasonable assessment of the amount of time taken to build runways; however, we clarified our discussion about the length of time. We also added information regarding initiatives undertaken by FAA.
What GAO Found
The amount of time airports spend planning and building their runways can vary because of numerous factors. In light of this variation, for the 32 runway projects we analyzed, we used median rather than average time. The median time was about 10 years for runways that had been completed and was estimated to be about 14 years for those not completed. Most airports and stakeholders we visited and surveyed said they faced a variety of challenges that had delayed their runway projects. While the level of challenges that airports faced varied in part depending on the proximity of the airport to a major city and the amount of community opposition to the runway, some common themes emerged, including challenges related to the following: reaching stakeholder agreement on purpose and need for the runway; completing the environmental review process; reaching agreement on noise mitigation and other issues; and designing and constructing the runway. Although there may be no single solution to the challenges involved in developing runways, the federal government and airport authorities have undertaken a number of initiatives in this area. Recently, the President issued an Executive Order that is directed at streamlining the environmental review of transportation infrastructure projects, including runways. In addition, two federal legislative initiatives designed to streamline the runway process were considered in the 107th Congress. In addition, FAA has undertaken a number of initiatives directed at streamlining parts of the process. Airports have also undertaken initiatives in this area, including involving stakeholders such as community groups early in the process, and reaching early agreement on how best to mitigate noise and other runway impacts. These initiatives may be a step in the right direction, but it is too early to assess their impact on the runway process. |
gao_GAO-01-372 | gao_GAO-01-372_0 | The Chairman also requested that DOD look to the private sector for environmentally friendly processes that could be used to help demilitarize excess ammunition. Despite these efforts, the reported stockpile grew from 354,000 tons in 1993 to 493,000 tons at the end of 2000 and is projected to be at 403,000 tons in 2004 (see fig. In addition, the Operations Support Command’s reported stockpile does not include all excess ammunition needing demilitarization. The Army Increased Its Reliance on Contracted Demilitarization Without Assessing Impact on Government Facilities
In recent years, the Operations Support Command has worked to allocate 50 percent of its excess ammunition demilitarization budget to contractors that used environmentally friendly demilitarization processes. However, at the same time the Command retained and underutilized environmentally friendly demilitarization capabilities at government facilities. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve the financial reporting, economy, and efficiency of demilitarizing excess ammunition, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense require the Secretary of the Army to 1. identify and include the total liability (domestic and overseas) associated with demilitarizing excess ammunition in the Department’s annual consolidated balance sheet; 2. develop a plan in consultation with Congress that includes procedures for assessing the appropriate mix of public/private sector capacity needed to demilitarize excess ammunition and the cost-effectiveness of using contractors versus government facilities to demilitarize excess ammunition, with specific actions identified for addressing the capacity issue; and 3. comply with DOD’s policy to routinely compare planned purchases of ammunition for training with usable ammunition in the stockpile and require the single manager for conventional ammunition to prepare periodic reports to the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, documenting such comparisons and showing the quantities and types of ammunition reclaimed from the stockpile. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine the extent to which the excess ammunition stockpile has been reduced and whether the liability associated with excess ammunition has been fully identified, we reviewed the composition of the Army’s reported stockpile of excess ammunition and obtained inventory records showing the condition and location of the services’ ammunition. | Why GAO Did This Study
This report reviews the Department of Defense's (DOD) management practices for demilitarizing excess ammunition. Specifically, GAO evaluates (1) the extent to which the excess ammunition stockpile has been reduced and whether the liability associated with excess ammunition has been fully identified, (2) the Army's reliance on contracted demilitarization and the impact of doing so on government facilities that use similar environmentally friendly processes, and (3) the feasibility of using excess ammunition for U.S. training needs.
What GAO Found
GAO found that DOD's reported stockpile of excess ammunition has grown rather than decreased, rising from 354,000 tons in 1993 to 493,000 tons at the end of 2000. In addition, the reported stockpile does not include all excess ammunition, which understates DOD's ultimate liability for demilitarizing ammunition. In recent years, the Army has devoted 50 percent of its excess ammunition demilitarization budget to contractors that use environmentally friendly demilitarization processes. Although a congressional directive resulted in greater emphasis on contractor demilitarization, the Army began and later expanded this effort without considering the effect it would have on government facilities. With increased contractor demilitarization, the Army has retained and underutilized environmentally friendly demilitarization capabilities in government facilities. Finally, some excess ammunition potentially could be used to meet training needs, but further analysis by the Army is needed to fully evaluate the potential. |
gao_GAO-06-1127T | gao_GAO-06-1127T_0 | The high cost of these unsuccessful efforts and the potential costs of implementing the Vision make it important that NASA achieve success in its new exploration program beginning with the CEV project. The absence of firm cost estimates is mainly due to the fact that the program is in the early stages of its life cycle. While changes to the program are appropriate at this stage when concepts are still being developed, they leave the agency in the position of being unable to firmly identify program requirements and needed resources. NASA plans to commit to a firm cost estimate for the Constellation program at the preliminary design review in 2008, when requirements, design, and schedule will all be baselined. As we reported in July 2006, there are years when NASA has projected insufficient funding to implement the architecture with some yearly shortfalls exceeding $1 billion; while in other years the funding available exceeds needed resources. However, despite initial surpluses, the long-term sustainability of the program is questionable given the long-term funding outlook for the program. NASA’s preliminary projections show multibillion-dollar shortfalls for its Exploration Systems Mission Directorate in all fiscal years from 2014 to 2020, with an overall deficit through 2025 in excess of $18 billion. NASA must also contend with competing budgetary demands within the agency as implementation of the exploration program continues. Lack of Sound Business Case Puts CEV Acquisition at Risk
In July 2006, we reported that NASA’s acquisition strategy for the CEV placed the project at risk of significant cost overruns, schedule delays, and performance shortfalls because it committed the government to a long- term contract before establishing a sound business case. Our report highlighted that NASA had yet to develop key elements of a sound business case, including well-defined requirements, mature technology, a preliminary design, and firm cost estimates that would support such a long-term commitment. These changes to the acquisition strategy lessen the government’s financial obligation at this early stage. However, in our 2005 report that assessed NASA’s acquisition policies, we found that NASA’s policies lacked major decision reviews beyond the initial project approval gate and a standard set of criteria with which to measure projects at crucial phases in the development life cycle—key markers for monitoring such progress. In the revised policy, NASA indicated that it would require the results of the critical design review and, for projects that enter a large-scale production phase, the results of the production readiness review to be reported to the appropriate decision authority in a timely manner so that a decision about whether to proceed with the project can be made. The realistic identification of the resources needed to achieve the agency’s short-term goals would provide support for such a sustained commitment over the long term. As NASA proceeds with its acquisition strategy for the CEV project and other key projects, it will be essential that the agency ensure that the investment decisions it is making are sound and based upon high levels of knowledge. | Why GAO Did This Study
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) plans to spend nearly $230 billion over the next two decades implementing the President's Vision for Space Exploration (Vision) plans. In July 2006, GAO issued a report that questioned the program's affordability, and particularly, NASA's acquisition approach for one of the program's major projects--the Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV). This testimony, which is based upon that report and another recent GAO report evaluating NASA's acquisition policies, highlights GAO's continuing concerns with (1) the affordability of the exploration program; (2) the acquisition approach for the CEV, and; (3) NASA's acquisition policies that lack requirements for projects to proceed with adequate knowledge.
What GAO Found
NASA's proposals for implementing the space exploration Vision raise a number of concerns. NASA cannot develop a firm cost estimate for the exploration program at this time because the program is in its early stages. The changes that have occurred to the program over the past year and the resulting refinement of its cost estimates are indicative of the evolving nature of the program. While changes are appropriate at this stage of the program, they leave the agency unable to firmly identify program requirements and needed resources and, therefore, not in the position to make a long term commitment to the program. NASA will likely be challenged to implement the program, as laid out in its Exploration Systems Architecture study (ESAS), due to the high costs associated with the program in some years and its long-term sustainability relative to anticipated funding. As we reported in July 2006, there are years when NASA, with some yearly shortfalls exceeding $1 billion, does not have sufficient funding to implement the architecture; while in other years the funding available exceeds needed resources. Despite initial surpluses, the long-term sustainability of the program is questionable, given its long-term funding outlook. NASA's preliminary projections show multibillion-dollar shortfalls for its exploration directorate in all fiscal years from 2014 to 2020, with an overall deficit through 2025 in excess of $18 billion. NASA's acquisition strategy for the CEV was not based upon obtaining an adequate level of knowledge when making key resources decisions, placing the program at risk for cost overruns, schedule delays, and performance shortfalls. These risks were evident in NASA's plan to commit to a long-term product development effort before establishing a sound business case for the project that includes well-defined requirements, mature technology, a preliminary design, and firm cost estimates. NASA adjusted its acquisition approach and the agency included the production and sustainment portions of the contract as options--a move that is consistent with the recommendation in our report because it lessens the government's financial obligation at this early stage. However, risks persist with NASA's approach. As we reported in 2005, NASA's acquisition policies lacked major decision reviews beyond the initial project approval gate and lacked a standard set of criteria with which to measure projects at crucial phases in the development life cycle. These decision reviews and development measures are key markers needed to ensure that projects are proceeding with and decisions are being based upon the appropriate level of knowledge and can help to lessen identified project risks. The CEV project would benefit from the application of such markers. |
gao_GAO-14-327 | gao_GAO-14-327_0 | The Department of the Army currently has 34 MHPI projects at 44 installations in the United States. Since these projects began, the Army has invested $1.97 billion and the private sector has invested $12.6 billion in the initial development of the military housing projects. Army MHPI Project- Litigation Costs Involving Pinnacle Were Not Accounted for during MHPI Annual Budget Process
According to Army officials, the only litigation that has caused the expenditure of funds not accounted for during the MHPI’s annual budget process for operating costs to-date is litigation involving Clark Realty Capital (Clark) and Pinnacle Property Management (Pinnacle). The Army Followed a Process to Manage MHPI Litigation Funds Not Accounted for in the Budget That Limits Access to Litigation Information
The Army has a standard process to manage MHPI projects’ funds for the costs of litigation not accounted for in the MHPI projects’ annual budget process, but instead used an alternative process designed to limit access to information about the Pinnacle litigation. The alternative process is consistent with the relevant MHPI projects’ operating agreements. However, according to Army officials, the standard process has not yet been used to approve any major decisions regarding litigation expenses, because the Pinnacle cases are the only cases that met the major-decision threshold criteria whose litigation expenses have been approved and would have gone through this process had decisions not been made to restrict access to information pertaining to this litigation. This process is consistent with the MHPI projects’ operating agreements for managing these projects and allows for Clark and only one Army office to review associated cost information. As a result, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations, Housing & Partnerships), acting on behalf of the Army, can directly approve specific actions proposed by Clark senior leadership on behalf of the MHPI project, such as approving the litigation and audit budget and expenses. According to Army officials, throughout the litigation process, Army and Clark officials have regularly shared litigation documents and met to discuss the Pinnacle litigation. Army MHPI Project Costs for the Pinnacle Litigation Have Not Prevented Housing Projects from Meeting Normal Operating Requirements
According to Army officials and our analysis of the project-management accounts for the four locations involved in the Pinnacle litigation, the expenditure of funds to pay litigation and audit expenses have not prevented the projects from meeting normal operating requirements, such as conducting maintenance or paying for utilities, from the time the litigation began in 2010. According to Army officials, Pinnacle litigation and audit expenses were also paid from revenues that flowed into the MHPI projects. Nevertheless, Army officials said that the Pinnacle litigation and audit costs have had no effects on the projects’ ability to move forward with construction as planned because these projects were developed within anticipated funding levels. The MHPI projects’ property-management agreements provide that the party that substantially prevails in a legal action may recoup their legal expenses. Army officials stated that they expect the MHPI projects to prevail in the litigation and recoup most, or even all, the costs of conducting the litigation. However, DOD did not provide written comments and provided technical comments, which we incorporated in our report as appropriate. We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of the Army; and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 1996, Congress enacted the MHPI, which provided the Department of Defense with a variety of authorities that may be used to obtain private-sector financing and management to repair, renovate, construct, and operate military family housing. The Army has invested $1.97 billion and the private sector has invested $12.6 billion in the initial development of MHPI projects at 44 installations.
The Senate report accompanying a proposed version of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 mandated GAO to examine the Army’s litigation costs related to MHPI, specifically any litigation costs not accounted for during the MHPI’s annual budget process. This report examines the extent to which the Army has implemented its process to manage funds for litigation not accounted for in the budget and identifies any effects that the litigation and audit costs have had on managing the MHPI projects.
To conduct its work, GAO examined the Army’s process for managing litigation, interviewed Army officials, and analyzed documents to determine whether litigation and audit costs have had any effects on managing the MHPI projects.
GAO is not making recommendations in this report. DOD provided technical comments on a draft of this report, which were incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
The Army has a standard process to manage litigation costs of its Military Housing Privatization Initiative (MHPI) projects that are not accounted for in the annual budget process. Army officials indicated that there is one case between four Army MHPI projects and Pinnacle Property Management (Pinnacle) that met the dollar threshold criteria and that would have been approved through this process. However, Army officials did not use the standard process because the Army determined that it needed to limit access to Pinnacle litigation information to avoid disclosing any information material to the litigation strategy. As a result, the Army used an alternative process to review and approve litigation costs for Pinnacle that is consistent with MHPI operating agreements. Had the standard process been followed, litigation and litigation cost information would have been shared with the MHPI projects construction company, Clark Realty Capital (Clark), and four different offices within the Army. Army and Clark officials decided to use the alternative process allowed by the MHPI’s operating agreements so that fewer personnel would be aware of ongoing litigation information involving Pinnacle. The alternative process allows the Army and Clark to directly approve specific actions on behalf of the MHPI project, such as approving litigation and audit expenses, and allows sharing information with only Clark and one Army office.
According to Army officials and our analysis of these four MHPI projects’ accounts, Pinnacle litigation expenses have not prevented the projects from meeting their normal operating requirements, such as conducting maintenance or paying for utilities. Rents collected from these four MHPI projects funded the normal operating requirements for these projects as well as the Pinnacle litigation and audit expenses. Rents collected in excess of operating expenses normally are available for other purposes such as construction; capital, repair, and replacement of buildings; and future reinvestment. However, because litigation expenses were also paid from the rents collected at the four MHPI projects involved in the litigation, some funds have not been available for these purposes. Nevertheless, Army officials said that the Pinnacle litigation and audit costs have had no effects on the four projects’ ability to move forward with construction as planned so far or to meet any scheduled capital repair projects because these projects were developed within anticipated funding levels.
The Army property-management agreements provide that the party that substantially prevails in a legal action may recoup their legal expenses. Army officials stated that they expect the MHPI projects to prevail in the litigation and recoup most, or even all, the costs of conducting the litigation. |
gao_GAO-03-688 | gao_GAO-03-688_0 | However, agencies could strengthen controls in key areas consistently identified as important for effective inventory management. In addition, only 11 of the 18 agencies required that supervisors oversee periodic firearms inventories. Investigations and Discipline—Agencies Required Investigations of Missing Firearms and Discipline When Deemed Appropriate
We surveyed agencies to determine whether they established written policies and procedures, in accordance with federal internal controls standards and related criteria, to ensure that instances of missing firearms are investigated, and employees are appropriately disciplined for not safeguarding firearms or reporting missing firearms. Audits Found Weaknesses in Firearms Controls at Justice and Treasury Agencies, but Improvements Are Being Made
Audits conducted by the Departments of Justice and Treasury OIGs and TIGTA found that agencies did not always comply with agency policies and procedures for maintaining and controlling firearms inventories or establish needed controls. Although these weaknesses were found, agencies have taken, or are in the process of taking, actions to improve their controls over firearms inventories. Audits conducted by Justice’s and Treasury’s OIGs found that some missing firearms were recovered during the commission of a crime, or in connection with a criminal investigation. As of July 2002, 188 of these firearms had been subsequently recovered, leaving 824 still missing. While we could not determine the exact percentage of agency firearms that were reported lost, stolen, or missing, it appears that these firearms generally accounted for less than one percent of agencies’ total firearms inventories. Of the 1,012 firearms that agencies reported lost, stolen, or otherwise not in their possession, most missing firearms were pistols (541). The need for an assessment of firearms controls, and documentation of controls in policies and procedures, is demonstrated by the majority of agencies reviewed reporting missing firearms. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
We reviewed federal law enforcement agencies’ control over firearms to determine (1) the extent to which these agencies’ policies, procedures, and practices for controlling and safeguarding firearms were consistent with federal internal control standards and related criteria issued by law enforcement and management organizations; (2) whether reviews conducted by the Department of Justice and Department of Treasury identified instances of noncompliance with firearms policies and procedures, and whether agencies have taken actions to correct identified weaknesses, particularly regarding (a) conducting inventories, (b) investigating missing firearms, and (c) disciplining employees; and (3) the number of firearms that selected federal law enforcement agencies identified as lost, stolen, or otherwise not in their possession between September 30, 1998 and July 2002. | Why GAO Did This Study
In March 2001, the Department of Justice Office of Inspector General reported that the Immigration and Naturalization Service could not account for over 500 of its firearms. Furthermore, in July 2001, the Federal Bureau of Investigation disclosed that 449 of its firearms were lost or stolen. Given the possible threat that lost, stolen, or missing firearms poses to the public, GAO assessed (1) the consistency of federal agencies' firearms controls with federal internal control standards and related criteria; and (2) compliance by Justice and Treasury agencies with established firearms controls and improvements made to strengthen and enforce controls.
What GAO Found
GAO found that all 18 federal agencies reviewed, which accounted for over 95 percent of federal officers and agents authorized to carry firearms, had policies and procedures for controlling and safeguarding firearms that were consistent with federal internal control standards and related criteria. However, agencies could strengthen their controls in key areas that have been consistently recognized as important for effective inventory management. These areas include recording and tracking firearms inventory data; maintaining, controlling, and accounting for firearms inventories; ensuring personal and supervisory accountability for firearms; and requiring investigations, and discipline when deemed appropriate, for individuals determined not to have followed firearms accountability procedures. Although agencies established policies and procedures to control firearms, audits conducted by the Departments of Justice and the Treasury found that agencies did not always follow established procedures, or implement procedures, for conducting periodic inventories, reporting and investigating missing firearms, and securing firearms inventories. Since these weaknesses were identified, we found that agencies have implemented, or are in the process of implementing, actions to strengthen their firearms controls. In addition, 15 of the 18 federal agencies GAO reviewed reported a total of 1,012 firearms as lost, stolen, or otherwise not in their possession between September 30, 1998 and July 2002, further indicating the need for stronger controls. Of these firearms, 188 were recovered, leaving 824 firearms still missing. While we could not determine the exact percentage of agency firearms that were reported lost, stolen, or missing, it appears that these firearms generally accounted for less than 1 percent of agencies' total firearms inventories. In independent reviews of selected missing firearms cases, the Departments of Justice and the Treasury identified instances of firearms recovered in connection with criminal activity or during the course of criminal investigations. |
gao_GAO-09-877 | gao_GAO-09-877_0 | Agencies’ Efforts to Implement a New Approach to Managing Wildland Fire Have Better Positioned Them to Respond to Fire Effectively
As the Forest Service and the Interior agencies have improved their understanding of wildland fire’s role on the landscape, their approach to managing fire has evolved. Under the policy, the agencies abandoned their attempt to put out every wildland fire, seeking instead to (1) make communities and resources less susceptible to being damaged by wildland fire and (2) respond to fires so as to protect communities and important resources at risk but also to consider both the cost and long- term effects of that response. They have also improved their ability to respond efficiently and effectively to wildland fires that occur, including taking steps to (1) implement the federal wildland fire management policy, (2) improve decisions regarding fire management strategies, and (3) improve how they acquire and use firefighting assets. Reducing hazardous fuels—to keep wildland fires from spreading into the wildland-urban interface and to help protect important resources by lessening a fire’s intensity—is one of the primary objectives of the National Fire Plan. Although the agencies have made progress in other areas, they still lack such a measure. FPA was intended to help the agencies develop their wildland fire budget requests and allocate funds by, among other objectives, (1) providing a common budget framework to analyze firefighting assets without regard for agency jurisdictions; (2) examining the full scope of fire management activities, including preparing for fires by acquiring and positioning firefighting assets for the fire season, mobilizing assets to suppress fires, and reducing potentially hazardous fuels; (3) modeling the effects over time of differing strategies for responding to wildland fires and treating lands to reduce hazardous fuels; and (4) using this information to identify the most cost-effective mix and location of federal wildland fire management assets. Agencies Have Yet to Take Certain Key Actions That Would Substantially Improve Their Management of Wildland Fire
Despite the important steps the agencies have taken, much work remains. We have previously recommended several key actions—including development of an overarching investment strategy for addressing the wildland fire problem—that, if completed, would improve the agencies’ management of wildland fire. In addition to completing the overarching strategy (which we have termed a cohesive strategy), we have recommended that the agencies clarify the importance of containing costs relative to other, often-competing objectives and clarify financial responsibilities for fires that cross federal, state, and local jurisdictions. By laying out various potential approaches for addressing the growing wildland fire threat, the estimated costs associated with each approach, and the trade-offs involved, a cohesive strategy would help Congress and the agencies make informed decisions about how to invest scarce funds. As a result, despite improvements the agencies continue to make to policy, decision-support tools, and oversight, we believe that managers in the field lack a clear understanding of the relative importance that the agencies’ leadership places on containing costs and—as we concluded in our 2007 report—are therefore likely to continue to select firefighting strategies without due consideration of the costs of suppression. Unless the financial responsibilities for multijurisdictional fires are clarified, the concerns that the existing framework insulates nonfederal entities from the cost of protecting the wildland-urban interface from fire—and that the federal government therefore continues to bear more than its share of that cost—are unlikely to be addressed. Mitigate Effects of Rising Fire Costs on Other Agency Programs
Rising wildland fire costs have led the Forest Service and the Interior agencies to transfer funds from other programs to help pay for fire suppression. | Why GAO Did This Study
The nation's wildland fire problems have worsened dramatically over the past decade, with more than a doubling of average annual acreage burned and federal appropriations for wildland fire management. The deteriorating fire situation has led the agencies responsible for managing wildland fires on federal lands--the Forest Service in the Department of Agriculture and four agencies in the Department of the Interior--to reassess how they respond to wildland fire and to take steps to improve their fire management programs. GAO reviewed (1) progress the agencies have made in managing wildland fire and (2) key actions GAO previously recommended and believes are still necessary to improve wildland fire management. GAO reviewed previous GAO reports and agency documents and interviewed agency officials. GAO prepared this report under the Comptroller General's authority to conduct evaluations on his own initiative.
What GAO Found
The Forest Service and the Interior agencies have improved their understanding of wildland fire's ecological role on the landscape and have taken important steps toward enhancing their ability to cost-effectively protect communities and resources by seeking to (1) make communities and resources less susceptible to being damaged by wildland fire and (2) respond to fire so as to protect communities and important resources at risk but to also consider both the cost and long-term effects of that response. To help them do so, the agencies in recent years have reduced hazardous fuels, in an effort to keep wildland fires from spreading into the wildland-urban interface and to help protect important resources by lessening a fire's intensity; sponsored efforts to educate homeowners about steps they can take to protect their homes from wildland fire; and provided grants to help homeowners carry out these steps. The agencies have also made improvements that lay important groundwork for enhancing their response to wildland fire, including adopting new guidance on how managers in the field are to select firefighting strategies, improving the analytical tools that assist managers in selecting a strategy, and improving how they acquire and use expensive firefighting assets. Despite the agencies' efforts, much work remains. GAO has recommended several key actions--including development of an overarching fire management strategy--that, if completed, would substantially improve the agencies' management of wildland fire. Nonetheless, the agencies have yet to: (1) Develop a cohesive strategy laying out various potential approaches for addressing the growing wildland fire threat, estimated costs associated with each approach, and the trade-offs involved. Such information would help the agencies and Congress make fundamental decisions about an effective and affordable approach to responding to fires. (2) Establish a cost-containment strategy that clarifies the importance of containing costs relative to other, often-competing objectives. Without such clarification, GAO believes managers in the field lack a clear understanding of the relative importance that the agencies' leadership places on containing costs and are therefore likely to continue to select firefighting strategies without duly considering the costs of suppression. (3) Clarify financial responsibilities for fires that cross federal, state, and local jurisdictions. Unless the financial responsibilities for multijurisdictional fires are clarified, concerns that the existing framework insulates nonfederal entities from the cost of protecting the wildland-urban interface--and that the federal government would therefore continue to bear more than its share of the cost--are unlikely to be addressed. (4) Take action to mitigate the effects of rising fire costs on other agency programs. The sharply rising costs of managing wildland fires have led the agencies to transfer funds from other programs to help pay for fire suppression, disrupting or delaying activities in these other programs. Better methods of predicting needed suppression funding could reduce the need to transfer funds from other programs. |
gao_GAO-07-140 | gao_GAO-07-140_0 | In addition to federal funding, state and local agencies provide significant funding to support the education of these students. In particular, Title III provides for formula-based grants whereas Title VII provided funds primarily through discretionary grants. Education Used Census’ ACS Data to Distribute Title III Funds Because State Data Were Incomplete and Data Measurement Issues Could Result in Funding Differences across States
Education used ACS data to distribute Title III funds across states although measurement issues with ACS and state-reported data could affect the amount of funding that each state receives. Education officials told us that they expect this review along with feedback to the states to result in improved data for school year 2005-06 and beyond. While Education officials expected that their efforts would improve the quality of the data, they told us that they had not established criteria or a methodology to determine the relative accuracy of the two data sources. The Allowable State Data and the ACS Data Differ in What They Measure and How That Measurement Occurs
The two allowable sources of data measure fundamentally different populations. We simulated the distribution of funds across our 12 study states, using ACS data and data representing the number of students with limited English proficiency reported to us by state officials. Under NCLBA, Federal Funding for Students with Limited English Proficiency and Immigrant Children and Youth Has Increased, and More School Districts Are Receiving Funds
Federal funds for students with limited English proficiency and immigrant children and youth increased significantly from fiscal year 2001—the year prior to the enactment of the NCLBA— to fiscal year 2006. Congress appropriated over $650 million for this purpose in fiscal year 2002. 6). In fiscal year 2001, Education distributed 41.2 percent of the $432 million of Title VII funds provided to states in the form of discretionary grants to schools, school districts, and state education agencies to support the education of students with limited English proficiency, and 22.5 percent for professional development of teachers and others associated with the education of these students. States and School Districts Used Title III Funds to Support Programs for Students with Limited English Proficiency, but Some Cited Challenges Recruiting Highly Qualified Staff
States and school districts reported using Title III funds to support a variety of programs and activities for students with limited English proficiency, ranging from various types of language instruction programs to professional development. In addition, officials in 5 of the 12 study states thought more guidance was needed to develop English language proficiency assessments that meet NCLBA’s requirements. In addition, ACS data have shown volatility—large increases and decreases—in the numbers of students with limited English proficiency from 2003 to 2004. To strengthen the basis for Education’s distribution of Title III funds, we recommend that the Secretary of Education develop and implement a transparent methodology for determining the relative accuracy of the two allowable sources of data, ACS or state data on the number of students with limited English proficiency assessed annually, for Title III allocations to states. | Why GAO Did This Study
Title III of the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLBA) designates federal funds to support the education of students with limited English proficiency and provides for formula-based grants to states. This report describes the data the Education Department used to distribute Title III funds and the implications of data measurement issues for the two allowable sources of data-- American Community Survey (ACS) and state assessment data--for allocating funds across states. In addition, the report describes changes in federal funding to support these students under NCLBA and how states and school districts used these funds as well as Education's Title III oversight and support to states. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed documentation on ACS and state data, interviewed federal and state officials, and collected data from 12 states, 11 districts, and 6 schools.
What GAO Found
Education used ACS data to distribute Title III funds, but measurement issues with both ACS and state data could result in funding differences. Education used ACS data primarily because state data were incomplete. In September, Education officials told us they were developing plans to clarify instructions for state data submissions to address identified inconsistencies. While Education officials expected their efforts to improve the quality of the data, they told us that they had not established criteria or a methodology to determine the relative accuracy of the two data sources. State data represent the number of students with limited English proficiency assessed annually for English proficiency, and ACS data are based in part on responses to subjective English ability questions from a sample of the population. ACS data showed large increases and decreases in numbers of these students from 2003 to 2004 in part due to sample size. ACS data and state counts of students with limited English proficiency for the 12 study states differed. GAO's simulation of the distribution of Title III funds for fiscal years 2005 and 2006 based on these numbers showed that there would be differences in how much funding states would receive. In fiscal year 2006, Congress authorized over $650 million in Title III funding for students with limited English proficiency--an increase of over $200 million since fiscal year 2001 under NCLBA. This increase in funding as well as the change in how funds are distributed--from a primarily discretionary grant program to a formula grant program--contributed to more districts receiving federal funding to support students with limited English proficiency since the enactment of NCLBA. States and school districts used Title III funds to support programs and activities including language instruction and professional development. Education provided oversight and support to states. Officials from 5 of the 12 study states reported overall satisfaction with the support from Education. However, some officials indicated that they needed more guidance in certain areas, such as developing English language proficiency assessments that meet NCLBA's requirements. Education is taking steps to address issues states identified. |
gao_HEHS-99-15 | gao_HEHS-99-15_0 | About a third of the vocational training expenditure is provided by national labor unions and business organizations under sole source contracts with Labor. Job Corps also reported that 48 percent of those who left the program completed vocational training. Labor’s Initiatives Enhance the Appropriateness and Relevancy of Vocational Training
Labor has several activities to improve Job Corps’ employer and community linkages to ensure that vocational training is appropriate for local labor markets and relevant to employers’ needs. National Initiatives Recognize Need for Employer Involvement
Since 1984, Labor has used industry advisory groups to review vocational course curricula to ensure that course content is relevant to the job market. The Industry Advisory Group recommends to Labor changes to Job Corps’ vocational training curricula, materials, and equipment. In program year 1995, Labor introduced a school-to-work initiative at three Job Corps centers combining center-based training with actual worksite experience related to it. Regional Job Corps Initiatives Expand Employer Relations
In addition to national efforts, three of Labor’s regional offices have developed their own initiatives to improve linkages between Job Corps centers and employers. Speakers discuss local employment opportunities and donate funds to benefit Job Corps participants. Two Job Corps Program Measures Are Misleading and Overstate Program Success
Two performance indicators that Labor uses to evaluate Job Corps’ success are misleading, overstating the extent to which vocational training is completed and job placements are training-related. Labor reports that nationwide about 48 percent of all program participants complete their vocational training and that about 62 percent of the jobs obtained by program participants are related to the training they received. However, we found that nationally only about 14 percent of the program participants satisfied all their vocational training requirements and that about 41 percent of the reported training-related job placements at the five centers we visited were questionable. We found that only about 14 percent of the program year 1996 participants actually completed all the required tasks of their vocational training programs. At these centers, about 51 percent of the 3,500 participants were considered to be vocational completers. In addition, Labor officials stated that a main reason it contracts on a sole source basis is that the contractors maintain an extensive nationwide placement network. Therefore, we recommend that the Secretary of Labor more accurately define and report information on the extent to which program participants complete vocational training and develop a more accurate system of reporting training-related jobs and effectively monitor its implementation. In addition, because Labor has not presented adequate justification for its long-standing practice of contracting on a sole source basis with nine national labor and business organizations for vocational training, we recommend that the Secretary of Labor properly justify its use of noncompetitive procedures if it is to continue to award contracts for vocational training services. Labor has been unable to determine the extent to which national training contractors are responsible for placing participants and thus for their reported better performance. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed Job Corps' vocational training component to describe the program's contracting policies and to assess contractor performance, focusing on: (1) how Job Corps ensures that vocational training is appropriate and relevant to employers' needs and the extent to which participants are completing vocational training and obtaining training-related jobs; and (2) Job Corps' process for contracting with vocational training providers.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the Department of Labor has several activities to foster Job Corps' employer and community linkages to ensure the appropriateness of its vocational training to local labor markets and its relevance to employers' needs; (2) Labor has industry advisory groups that regularly review vocational course curricula to ensure their relevance to today's job market; (3) Labor has also introduced a school-to-work initiative designed to link Job Corps with local employers combining center-based training with actual worksite experience at more than half the Job Corps centers; (4) complementing these national efforts, three of Labor's regional offices have developed their own initiatives to improve linkages between Job Corps and local labor markets; (5) despite Labor's efforts to increase the effectiveness of its vocational training through employer and community linkages, Job Corps data on the extent to which participants complete vocational training and obtain training-related jobs are misleading and overstate the program's results; (6) although Job Corps reported that 48 percent of its program year 1996 participants completed their vocational training, GAO found that only 14 percent of the program participants actually completed all the requirements of their vocational training curricula; (7) the rest of the participants whom Job Corps considered to be vocational completers had performed only some of the duties and tasks of a specific vocational training program; (8) Labor also reported that 62 percent of the participants nationwide who obtained employment found jobs that matched the vocational training received in Job Corps; (9) at the five centers GAO visited, however, the validity of about 41 percent of the job placements reported by Labor to be training-related was questionable; (10) in looking at how training providers are selected, GAO found that about a third of Job Corps' vocational training has been provided under sole source contracts awarded to national labor and business organizations for more than 30 years, but in GAO's opinion, Labor has not adequately justified procuring these training services noncompetitively; (11) a principal reason Labor has cited for awarding these contracts on a sole source basis is that these organizations maintain an extensive nationwide placement network and are better able than nonnational organizations to place Job Corps participants who complete their training; and (12) Labor has provided no data, however, to show the extent to which these sole source contractors actually place Job Corps participants nationwide. |
gao_GAO-10-403 | gao_GAO-10-403_0 | MAOs are allowed flexibility in designing their plan benefit packages and cost sharing for certain services can vary widely by MA plan. The Good Health Group of Plans Generally Charged Lower Premiums and Higher Cost Sharing for Certain Benefits, and Offered Fewer Additional Benefits
The good health group of plans—MA plans in which the average beneficiary had projected health care costs at least 10 percent below those for an average Medicare beneficiary within the plan’s service area— generally charged lower premiums and had higher cost sharing for certain services compared with the poor health group of plans. 1.) For example, in 2008, almost half of the good health group of plans—46 percent—did not have a premium for Part C (medical) or Part D (prescription drug) coverage, while about one-fifth of the poor health group of plans had no premium. The Good Health Group of Plans Generally Had Higher Cost Sharing for Certain Services
The good health group of plans tended to have higher cost sharing for the services we reviewed—which included inpatient hospital acute stays, inpatient mental health stays, skilled nursing facility (SNF) stays, and renal dialysis—than the poor health group of plans. The Good Health Group of Plans Generally Had Fewer Additional Benefits
Plans in the good health group were less likely to include certain additional benefits in their benefit packages, such as vision and dental care coverage, but were more likely to include a fitness benefit than plans in the poor health group. 3.) twenty-three percent of plans in the good health group included coverage for comprehensive dental benefits compared with 33 percent of plans in the poor health group. More MA Plans and Beneficiaries Were in the Good Health Group than in the Poor Health Group of Plans
In 2008, the plans in the good health group differed with those in the poor health group by plan type, plan size, and, for HMOs, by the difference between MA payment benchmarks and estimated FFS spending. Our analysis of the percentage of beneficiaries, including those enrolled in SNPs, by health group showed that 29 percent were in the good health group of plans, 55 percent in the average health group of plans, and 16 percent in the poor health group of plans. 5.) The five MAOs varied in the extent to which their plans fell into the good, average, and poor beneficiary health status groups. For example, one MAO had 17 percent of its beneficiaries in plans in the good health group and 17 percent in plans in the poor health group, while another had 49 percent of its beneficiaries in plans in the good health group and less than 1 percent in plans in the poor health group. 7.) Excluding SNPs, MA plans with lower enrollment were more likely to be in the good health group than plans with higher enrollment. CMS Recently Revised Its Process for Ensuring That MA Plan Benefit Packages Do Not Discriminate against Beneficiaries in Poor Health
For contract year 2010, CMS modified the process it used to ensure MA plan benefit packages do not discriminate against beneficiaries in poor health. CMS Revised the Way It Identifies Benefit Packages Likely to be Discriminatory, and Some New Review Thresholds Allowed Higher Cost Sharing
For contract year 2010, CMS modified the benefit package review process used in previous years. Under the new process for reviewing MA plans for the likelihood of discrimination, CMS examined plans’ 2010 OOP maximums and identified MA plans with comparatively high cost-sharing amounts. For example, among plans without an OOP maximum or one above the amount specified in the 2010 Call Letter, the copayment allowed for a typical inpatient mental health stay doubled from $61 to $130 per day and the copayment allowed for a typical SNF stay increased from $53 to $70 per day. In addition, all plans contacted subsequently reduced cost-sharing amounts to at or below agency thresholds. Our analysis indicated that the percentage of plans initially exceeding and remaining above one or more cost-sharing thresholds in those 2 years varied by plans’ average beneficiary health status, as follows: Among the good health group of plans reviewed for contract year 2008, 39 percent were initially identified as having cost sharing that exceeded CMS’s cost-sharing thresholds and 33 percent were approved with cost sharing that exceeded CMS’s cost-sharing thresholds, a decrease of 6 percentage points. CMS Comments
CMS stated that the agency’s general experience with beneficiaries—that beneficiaries select MA plans based on their individual health status—is consistent with the report’s findings. 2. | Why GAO Did This Study
Nearly 11 million Medicare beneficiaries are enrolled in Medicare Advantage (MA), Medicare's private health insurance option. Benefits vary by MA plan and may include coverage for services not available in traditional Medicare. To ensure MA plan benefit package designs do not discriminate against beneficiaries in poor health with high expected health care costs, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) reviews and approves all benefit packages yearly. GAO examined (1) MA plan benefit packages by average health status of plans' enrolled beneficiaries, (2) distribution and characteristics of MA plans by average beneficiary health status, and (3) CMS's process for ensuring that benefit packages do not discriminate with respect to health status. Using 2008 data on beneficiaries' expected health care costs, the most recent data available, GAO sorted 2,899 plans enrolling 7.5 million beneficiaries into three groups: good health (below-average expected costs), average health, and poor health (above-average expected costs). GAO then analyzed MA plan benefit packages by health group and reviewed CMS documentation and interviewed agency officials on CMS's benefit package review process. GAO did not determine whether plans structured benefit packages in response to enrolled beneficiaries' health status or beneficiaries in particular health groups chose plans because of the benefits.
What GAO Found
In 2008, plans in the good health group generally had lower premiums, higher cost sharing for certain services, and fewer additional benefits than plans in the poor health group. Almost half of the plans in the good health group did not have an MA premium for medical or drug coverage, while about one-fifth of plans in the poor health group had no MA premium. Plans in the good health group had higher cost sharing, weighted by enrollment, for inpatient hospital care, skilled nursing facility stays, and renal dialysis than plans in the poor health group. Plans in the good health group were more likely to have an out-of-pocket (OOP) maximum, but the average OOP maximum for plans in that group, weighted by enrollment, was 55 percent higher than that for plans in the poor health group. Comprehensive dental and hearing aid benefits were more likely to be included in the benefit packages for beneficiaries in the poor health group of plans whereas fitness benefits were more likely to be included in the benefit packages for beneficiaries in the good health group of plans. Forty-three percent of plans were in the good health group, 37 percent in the average health group, and 20 percent in the poor health group. Twenty-nine percent of MA beneficiaries were in plans in the good health group, 55 percent in plans in the average health group, and 16 percent in plans in the poor health group. Among the five largest companies sponsoring MA plans, beneficiary health varied: one sponsor had 17 percent of its beneficiaries in plans in the good health group and 17 percent in plans in the poor health group; another sponsor had 49 percent of beneficiaries in plans in the good health group and less than 1 percent in plans in the poor health group. Average beneficiary health status also varied by other factors, such as plan type and plan size. CMS has revised its process for reviewing MA plans for the likelihood of discrimination. It developed a new methodology for setting cost-sharing thresholds--criteria used to identify benefit packages likely to discriminate against certain beneficiaries. For contract year 2010, CMS contacted all MA plans with benefit packages identified as likely to discriminate, and all plans subsequently met cost-sharing thresholds. The new methodology for setting cost-sharing thresholds allowed higher cost sharing for some services relative to 2009. For example, among plans without an OOP maximum or one above $3,400 for 2010, allowed cost sharing for a typical inpatient mental health stay doubled, from $61 per day to $130 per day, and allowed cost sharing for a typical skilled nursing facility stay increased from $53 to $70 per day, compared to 2009. In comments on a draft of this report, CMS noted that GAO's findings are consistent with the agency's experience. CMS also stated that, prior to contract year 2010, it targeted for cost-sharing reductions plans with the most egregious cost sharing and often reduced cost-sharing amounts, but to amounts that were still above the thresholds. |
gao_T-RCED-99-81 | gao_T-RCED-99-81_0 | Moreover, increasingly, legislative and administrative decisions and judicial interpretations have required the Forest Service to give priority to non-revenue-generating uses over uses that can and have produced revenue. When the Forest Service can generate revenue, it is sometimes required to provide goods and services at less than their fair market value. The costs to prepare and administer the sales are funded primarily from annual appropriations rather than from the revenue generated by the sales. When the Congress has given the Forest Service the authority to obtain fair market value for goods or to recover costs for services, the agency often has not done so. Given a Financial Incentive, the Forest Service Can and Will Increase Revenue
The Forest Service’s failure to obtain fair market value for goods or recover costs for services when authorized by the Congress results, in part, because the agency lacks a financial incentive to do so. The demonstration program legislation allows these agencies to experiment with new or increased fees at up to 100 sites per agency. By allowing the agency to retain the fees collected, the Congress created a powerful incentive for forest managers to emphasize fee collections. Gross revenue from recreational fees on the national forests increased from $10.0 million in fiscal year 1996 to $18.3 million in fiscal year 1997, or by 83 percent, and to $26.3 million in fiscal year 1998, or by 163 percent compared with fiscal year 1996. These practices can help address visitors’ and resource management needs and can lower operating costs. The administration also plans to forward legislative proposals to the Congress in the near future that would allow the agency to retain and spend all of the revenue generated by fees for commercial filming and photography on the national forests. Other legislative changes being considered by the agency would allow it to retain and spend all or a portion of the (1) revenue generated by fees charged to recover the costs to review and process special-use permit applications and (2) fees collected for resort lodges, marinas, guide services, private recreational cabins, special group events, and other commercial and noncommercial activities on the national forests. As a result, the agency estimates that it forgoes $5 million to $7 million annually. However, providing the agency with this authority at this time would involve risks and difficult trade-offs. In particular, the Forest Service would not be able to accurately account for how it spent the money and what it accomplished with it. However, allowing the Forest Service to collect, retain, and spend more of the revenue generated by goods and services on the national forests would require difficult policy choices and trade-offs. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the barriers and opportunities for generating revenue on lands managed by the Forest Service.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) legislative and administrative decisions and judicial interpretations of statutory requirements have required the agency to shift its emphasis from uses that generate revenue, such as producing timber, to those that do not, such as protecting species and their habitats; (2) the Forest Service is required by law to continue providing certain goods and services at less than fair market value; (3) certain legislative provisions also serve as disincentives to either increasing revenue or decreasing costs; (4) because the costs are funded from annual appropriations rather than from the revenue generated, the agency does not have an incentive to control costs; (5) when Congress has provided the Forest Service with the authority to obtain fair market value for certain uses, or to recover costs for services, the agency often has not done so; (6) as a result, the Forest Service forgoes at least $50 million in revenue annually; (7) given a financial incentive and flexibility, the Forest Service can and will increase revenue; (8) for example, the recreational fee demonstration program, first authorized by Congress in fiscal year (FY) 1996, allows the agency to: (a) test new or increased fees at up to 100 sites; and (b) retain the revenue to help address unmet needs for visitor services, repairs and maintenance, and resource management; (9) by allowing the agency to retain the fees collected, Congress created an incentive for forest managers to emphasize fee collections; (10) gross revenue from recreational fees on the national forests increased from $10.0 million in FY 1996 to $26.3 million in FY 1998; (11) the administration plans to forward legislative proposals to Congress, and the Forest Service is considering other legislative changes that would allow the agency to collect, retain, and spend more fee revenue; (12) however, allowing forest managers to retain and spend all or a portion of the revenue they collect would involve risks and difficult trade-offs; (13) in particular, the Forest Service is still far from achieving financial and performance accountability and thus cannot accurately account for how it spends money and what it accomplishes with it; and (14) allowing the agency to collect, retain, and spend more of the revenue generated by goods and services on the national forests would also require difficult trade-offs or policy choices between increasing revenue and other values and concerns. |
gao_GAO-05-544 | gao_GAO-05-544_0 | The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 mandated that GAO report on TAP for service members separating or retiring from the military and members of the Reserves and National Guard who are released from active duty in a process referred to as demobilization. The use of the Reserves and National Guard has increased dramatically in recent years, with more called to active duty than at any other time since the Korean War. These federal agencies facilitate interagency coordination through regular meetings and formal agreements. Reserve and National Guard members returning from overseas may get similar information but generally do not have time to attend formal TAP components during demobilization. All separating service members with at least 180 days of active duty must receive preseparation counseling. 2.) Because of the demobilization timetables, many Reserve and National Guard members cannot take advantage of TAP components offered to full- time active duty military personnel and instead receive much shorter presentations as part of large groups at demobilization briefings. As expected, estimated participation rates have been the highest for preseparation counseling where attendance is mandated in law. Many Actions are Under Way to Improve TAP, but Challenges Remain in Meeting the Needs of Reserves and National Guard
The agencies administering the program have taken several actions to improve TAP program materials for all eligible personnel separating from the military, including Reserve and National Guard members. DOL plans to use focus groups and survey data to assess the strengths and weaknesses of its employment workshop curriculum in serving the needs of all service members. Actions Are Planned or Under Way to Increase Participation in TAP
DOD and its partner agencies are considering or have undertaken several actions designed to increase participation in TAP, including making attendance mandatory or mandating that service members receive permission to attend TAP, so that individuals have the opportunity to participate with the support of their commanders or other leaders; emphasizing the importance and relevance of veterans’ benefits by offering this information before the employment workshop as a stand- alone briefing by VA; sending DOL contractors and VA staff overseas to present their TAP components to service members located at bases around the world; and developing a centralized database to automate and manage information on participation. Meanwhile, DOL is currently involved in three state pilot programs of employment workshops designed for returning Reserve and National Guard members. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To assess how the transition assistance program (TAP) is administered, we reviewed the legislative and regulatory history of TAP, including records of congressional hearings, and interviewed responsible officials, including TAP managers and other officials from the Departments of Defense (DOD), Labor (DOL), and Veterans Affairs (VA); the armed forces; Reserve Affairs; and the National Guard Bureau. Military and Veterans’ Benefits: Observations on the Transition Assistance Program. | Why GAO Did This Study
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 mandated that GAO review whether the transition assistance program (TAP) is meeting the needs of service members leaving the military. GAO (1) assessed TAP administration, including program participation, and (2) identified actions agencies are taking to improve TAP and challenges that remain. TAP serves military personnel with at least 180 days of active duty who separate or retire and members of the Reserves and National Guard who are released from active duty, a process termed demobilization. Recently, the Reserves and National Guard have been called to active duty in greater numbers than at any other time since the Korean War.
What GAO Found
Transition assistance is intended to help service members successfully adjust to civilian life after serving in the military. Jointly administered by the Departments of Defense (DOD), Labor (DOL) and Veterans Affairs (VA), the four components of TAP are coordinated through meetings of agency TAP managers and interagency agreements. Both the method of delivery and the level of participation may vary, with participation rates highest for the mandatory preseparation counseling. Because they demobilize within days after they return from overseas, generally members of the Reserves and National Guard may get similar information but not the time to participate fully in TAP. At demobilization they may complete their preseparation counseling forms as a group without individual attention; get 45 minutes of briefing on veterans' benefits rather than a half-day; and receive no employment preparation. Participation of service members in the Disabled TAP component is not known, because VA does not track this information. The federal agencies have taken actions to improve TAP's content and increase participation among full-time active duty military personnel but face challenges serving Reserve and National Guard members because of their rapid demobilization. To improve content, the agencies have updated, or plan to update, their manuals, forms, and other materials, and DOL is assessing its employment workshop curriculum using focus groups and survey data. To increase participation, DOL and VA provide some employment workshops and veterans' benefits briefings overseas, and DOD is considering mandating participation in all components. While the agencies have not assessed when and where to offer TAP for members of the Reserves and National Guard, DOL has pilot programs in three states that will offer employment workshops after the members return home. |
gao_HEHS-97-24 | gao_HEHS-97-24_0 | Program Is Not Targeting Underserved Medicare and Medicaid Populations
The RHC program has grown rapidly since 1990, but not in those locations where Medicare and Medicaid populations are having difficulty obtaining primary care. Our analysis indicates that many of the areas in which RHCs are being certified are not only well-populated but also have existing—and extensive—primary health care systems. We found four problem areas that may result in unneeded expenditure of a portion of these Medicare and Medicaid funds: (1) no limit on payments made to facility-based RHCs, (2) no screening to determine if claimed costs are reasonable, (3) an inability to target cost-based reimbursement where needed for financial viability, and (4) no mechanism to discontinue cost- based reimbursement if the RHC’s location is no longer rural or underserved. Controls Are Lacking on Payments to Facility-Based RHCs
Nationwide data on ownership patterns show that nearly half of all RHCs are operated by a facility such as a hospital, skilled nursing facility, or home health agency. Merced’s 1990 population was more than 56,000—above the maximum of 50,000 under the program’s eligibility criteria. Recommendations to the Congress
To refocus the RHC program to meet its original purpose, the Congress should amend the law to restrict the cost-based reimbursement benefit of the program to (1) RHCs in areas with no other Medicare or Medicaid providers or (2) RHCs that can demonstrate that existing providers will not accept new Medicare or Medicaid patients and that the funding will be used to expand access to them and require periodic recertification to ensure that clinics continue to meet eligibility requirements for cost reimbursement. Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.
Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Improving Access to Care
Our first objective was to determine whether the RHC program was serving a Medicare and Medicaid population that would otherwise have difficulty obtaining primary care. The purpose of the program is to assist small rural areas relying on nonphysicians or overworked sole physicians for care. Controlling Program Costs
Our second objective was to identify whether controls were in place to ensure that costs claimed for reimbursement are reasonable and to target the cost-reimbursement benefit of the program effectively. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Rural Health Clinic (RHC) Program, focusing on: (1) whether the RHC program is serving a Medicare and Medicaid population that would otherwise have difficulty obtaining primary care; and (2) whether there are controls in place to ensure that costs claimed for reimbursement are reasonable and to target the cost-reimbursement benefit of the program to clinics needing it for financial viability.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the RHC program is generally not focused on serving Medicare and Medicaid populations having difficulty obtaining primary care in isolated rural areas; (2) the additional Medicare and Medicaid payments provided to RHCs increasingly benefit well-staffed, financially viable clinics in suburban areas that already have extensive health care delivery systems in place; (3) most RHCs are conversions of existing physician practices that generally do not need or use the benefits under the program to enlarge the size of the practice or take other actions to expand care provided to underserved portions of the area's population; (4) contributing to this problem are the extraordinarily high reimbursements that RHC providers receive for each patient visit for Medicare and Medicaid services at many clinics, the program's broad eligibility criteria, and the requirement that the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) reimburse all RHCs at cost, even if they are already financially viable; (5) HCFA is not using its authority to set maximum payment limits for nearly half of the RHCs that are operated as a part of a hospital or other facility or implementing screens necessary to determine whether claimed costs at independent or facility-based RHCs are reasonable; and (6) once certified, RHCs remain eligible for cost reimbursement indefinitely, even if the area they serve no longer qualifies as rural or underserved. |
gao_GAO-15-440T | gao_GAO-15-440T_0 | Sustained Attention Is Critical for Addressing Fragmentation, Overlap, and Duplication and Achieving Other Financial Benefits
In our four annual reports issued from 2011 through 2014, we identified over 180 areas with approximately 440 actions that the executive branch and Congress could take to address fragmentation, overlap, and duplication; achieve other cost savings; or enhance revenue. Executive Branch and Congress Continued to Make Progress in Addressing Previously Identified Issues
We found that the executive branch agencies and Congress have made progress in addressing the actions identified in our 2011–2014 annual reports. As shown in table 1, of the approximately 440 actions needed in these areas, 135 (29 percent) were addressed, 202 (44 percent) were partially addressed, and 103 (22 percent) were not addressed as of November 2014. In addition, progress has been made in addressing the proliferation of certain programs. As illustrated below, our work identified areas of fragmentation, overlap, or duplication that spanned the range of government activities, along with opportunities to address these issues. Table 4 highlights these and other opportunities that could result in tens of billions of dollars in cost savings or enhanced revenue. Addressing Improper Payments Could Help Achieve Cost Savings
Reducing improper payments could result in significant cost savings. The Improper Payments Information Act of 2002 (IPIA)—as amended by the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010 (IPERA) and the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Improvement Act of 2012 (IPERIA)—requires executive branch agencies to (1) review all programs and activities, (2) identify those that may be susceptible to significant improper payments, (3) estimate the annual amount of improper payments for those programs and activities, (4) implement actions to reduce improper payments and set reduction targets, and (5) report on the results of addressing the foregoing requirements. For the first time in recent years, the government-wide improper payment estimate increased in fiscal year 2014, primarily due to significant increases in the improper payment estimates for Medicare, Medicaid, and the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). These programs combined account for over 76 percent of the government-wide estimate. While recent laws and guidance have focused attention on the issue, agencies continue to face challenges in reducing improper payments, such as statutory limitations and compliance issues. Improper Payments Remain a Government- Wide Issue
Agency improper payment estimates totaled $124.7 billion in fiscal year 2014, a significant increase ($19 billion) from the prior year’s estimate of $105.8 billion. Additional Efforts Are Needed to Reduce Medicare, Medicaid, and Earned Income Tax Credit Improper Payments
Improper payment estimates for Medicare, Medicaid, and the EITC are among the highest estimates government-wide, and federal spending in Medicare and Medicaid is expected to significantly increase.Consequently, it is critical that actions are taken to reduce improper payments in these programs. Over the past several years, we made numerous recommendations that, if effectively implemented, could improve program management, help reduce improper payments in these programs, and achieve cost savings. Improving use of automated edits. To help improve the efficiency and effectiveness of program integrity efforts, we recommended that CMS require states to conduct audits of payments to and by managed care organizations, update managed care guidance on program integrity practices, and provide states with additional support in overseeing managed care program integrity. The Do Not Pay initiative is a web-based, centralized data-matching service that allows agencies to review multiple databases to determine a recipient’s award or payment eligibility prior to making payments. | Why GAO Did This Study
As the fiscal pressures facing the government continue, so too does the need for executive branch agencies and Congress to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of government programs and activities. Such opportunities exist throughout the government. GAO reports annually to Congress on federal programs, agencies, offices, and initiatives (both within departments and government-wide) that are fragmented, overlapping, or duplicative as well as opportunities for cost savings or enhanced revenues. One area that GAO has highlighted as offering the potential for significant cost savings is improper payments, which are payments that should not have been made or were made in the incorrect amount.
This statement discusses the status of (1) actions taken and remaining opportunities to address fragmentation, overlap, and duplication issues, and achieve other financial benefits as identified in GAO's 2011-2014 annual reports; and (2) efforts to address government-wide improper payment issues. GAO reviewed and updated prior work and recommendations on issues of fragmentation, overlap, duplication, cost savings, and improper payments. GAO also reviewed reports of inspectors general and agency financial reports.
What GAO Found
The executive branch and Congress have made progress in addressing the approximately 440 actions across 180 areas that GAO identified in its past annual reports. These issues span the range of government services and programs, from the Medicare and Medicaid programs to transportation programs to weapon systems acquisitions. As of November 19, 2014, 29 percent of these actions were addressed, 44 percent were partially addressed, and 22 percent were not addressed. Executive branch and congressional efforts to address these actions over the past 4 years resulted in over $20 billion in financial benefits, with about $80 billion more in financial benefits anticipated in future years. Although progress has been made, fully addressing all the remaining actions identified in GAO's annual reports could lead to tens of billions of dollars of additional savings, with significant opportunities for improved efficiencies, cost savings, or revenue enhancements in the areas of defense, information technology, education and training, health care, energy, and tax enforcement. Sustained leadership by Congress and the executive branch is necessary to achieve this goal.
Efforts to reduce improper payments could result in significant cost savings. For the first time in recent years, the government-wide improper payment estimate significantly increased—to $124.7 billion in fiscal year 2014, up from $105.8 billion in fiscal year 2013. This increase of almost $19 billion was primarily due to estimates for Medicare, Medicaid, and the Earned Income Tax Credit, which account for over 76 percent of the government-wide estimate.
What GAO Recommends
GAO has made numerous recommendations that, if effectively implemented, could improve program management and help reduce improper payments in these programs. Examples include improving the use of prepayment edits in Medicare and requiring states to audit Medicaid payments to and by managed care organizations. Recent laws and guidance have focused attention on the issue of improper payments. For example, the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Improvement Act of 2012 enacted into law elements of the Do Not Pay initiative, which is a web-based, centralized data matching service that could help prevent improper payments. However, agencies continue to face challenges, such as statutory limitations and compliance issues, in reducing improper payments. |
gao_GAO-07-1153 | gao_GAO-07-1153_0 | State’s Amount of International Development and Humanitarian Assistance Has Increased Significantly in Recent Years
State’s funding available for international development and humanitarian assistance, such as democracy promotion, drug interdiction, and refugee assistance, nearly doubled between fiscal years 2000 and 2006. State primarily uses grants and cooperative agreements to fund development and humanitarian assistance activities. State Uses a Variety of Approaches to Manage and Monitor Development and Humanitarian Assistance Programs
State primarily manages its development assistance and humanitarian programs centrally, obligating the majority of the funds and making the assistance awards from State headquarters in Washington, D.C. Grants officers and grants officer representatives have formal oversight responsibilities, though other staff also carry out such functions informally. A mix of headquarters and overseas staff monitor the implementation of program activities, and only a few bureaus have staff overseas specifically assigned to their programs. State Does Not Use Strategic Workforce Planning to Support Its Foreign Assistance Efforts
A key principle of strategic workforce planning is to define the critical skills and competencies that will be needed to achieve current and future programmatic goals. For example, grants officers—who are responsible for the legal aspects of entering into, amending, and terminating awards—must meet educational and training requirements, while grants officer representatives in some State Bureaus—who are delegated some of these monitoring responsibilities—do not have to meet such requirements. Finally, State has not used strategic workforce planning to align the efforts of its recently established Office of the Director of Foreign Assistance to reform the foreign assistance budget with staffing and skill requirements. State has not taken such action for staff with foreign assistance management responsibilities. State Has Not Collected Critical Information on Current Staff with Foreign Assistance Management Responsibilities
The collection of information on critical skills and competencies needed to perform an agency’s mission is one step in determining current and future human capital needs. We found that State has inconsistent training and skills requirements for its staff involved in foreign assistance oversight. Moreover, an FSI survey in response to employee requests for grants management training suggests that Foreign Service officers overseas recognize that there is a gap in their foreign assistance management skills. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine the size and scope of the Department of State’s (State) development and humanitarian assistance, we first reviewed U.S. budget documents to identify funding supporting U.S. foreign assistance, as well as State’s part in supporting these overall efforts. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Secretary of State has made foreign assistance a pillar of the department's Transformational Diplomacy Initiative and has sought better policy coordination, planning, and oversight by establishing a Director of Foreign Assistance (F Bureau). Even though the U.S. Agency for International Development has been the principal agency for development and humanitarian aid, the Department of State (State) has had a significant role delivering this type of assistance. Thus, it is essential that State have the right staff, with the right skills, in the right places to carry out its foreign assistance management responsibilities and ensure that U.S. funds are well spent. As requested, this report (1) describes the size and scope of development and humanitarian foreign assistance programs managed by State, (2) describes State's approaches to managing and monitoring such programs, and (3) evaluates State's processes for determining its human capital requirements for managing these programs.
What GAO Found
In fiscal year 2006, State had about $4.7 billion available for development and humanitarian assistance activities, nearly double the amount it was responsible for managing in 2000. This funding supported, for example, programs aimed at alleviating poverty and the suffering of refugees, as well as funding international drug interdiction efforts. State primarily uses grants and cooperative agreements to deliver this type of assistance. State manages its development and humanitarian assistance programs centrally, obligating about 80 percent of the funds and making awards from headquarters. State uses a variety of oversight approaches. Grants officers and grants officer representatives have formal oversight responsibilities, but other staff also carry out functions informally. A mix of headquarters and overseas staff monitor program implementation. State's strategic workforce planning does not reflect its foreign assistance activities. A key principle of strategic workforce planning is to define the critical skills and competencies that will be needed to achieve current and future programmatic goals. State has not defined its staff needs to manage and monitor its foreign assistance programs and has not collected critical information on current staff with these responsibilities. Moreover, GAO found inconsistent training and skills requirements for staff involved in foreign assistance oversight. For example, grants officers--who are responsible for the legal aspects of entering into, amending, and terminating awards--must meet educational and training requirements, while grants officer representatives--who are delegated some monitoring responsibilities--do not. Further, a recent State survey suggests that Foreign Service officers overseas recognize that there is a gap in their foreign assistance management skills. Various State officials have concerns about the department's ability to effectively manage its development and humanitarian assistance. Finally, State has not used strategic workforce planning to align F Bureau budget reforms with staffing and skill requirements. |
gao_GAO-15-74 | gao_GAO-15-74_0 | The administration of ERISA is divided among three federal agencies: the Department of Labor (DOL), the Department of the Treasury (specifically the Internal Revenue Service ), and the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC). Little Is Known about the Extent of Lump Sum Windows, though Cost-Saving Incentives May Be Encouraging Sponsor Use
Data are lacking about the prevalence of lump sum windows, as there are no requirements that sponsors report when they use this practice. The offers we identified included offers made to separated vested participants not yet receiving benefits, as well as offers targeted to retirees who were already receiving benefit payments. These include changing federal laws and regulations governing the interest rates and mortality tables used to calculate lump sums, and those affecting PBGC premium rates. Nevertheless, pension experts generally agree that sponsors’ use of lump sum windows has become more frequent in recent years. time, these 22 cases alone involved offers to approximately 498,000 participants. Ability to Choose a “Lookback” Rate One longstanding IRS rule that can sometimes provide a significant financial incentive for offering a lump sum window is the provision that permits plan sponsors to select the interest rate used for lump sum calculations from up to 17 months prior to the month of the lump sum offer. Differences between Retail and Plan Annuities
Using the lump sum to purchase a retail annuity could result in significantly less annuity income than what would have been provided by the plan because different factors are at play for sponsors converting pension annuities to lump sums than for insurance companies selling Insurers in the retail market use lifetime annuities on the retail market.different interest rate assumptions and mortality tables than those used by plan sponsors to calculate minimum required lump sums, and also include other factors such as profit margins in their pricing. Using Lump Sums for Immediate Expenditures May Have Benefits but also Consequences for Retirement
One of the most critical decisions that participants must make with their lump sums is whether they will continue to manage their lump sum payments as part of their retirement planning goals. Participants Need Information in Eight Key Areas to Make an Informed Decision
Based on a review of publications by federal agencies, the ERISA Advisory Council, financial advisors, investment firms, financial services firms, and participant advocacy groups, as well as relevant federal laws and regulations, we identified eight key areas of information that participants need to weigh their options and determine what is in their best interest when faced with a lump sum window offer (see table 1). Materials Provided by Sponsors Lacked Key Information That Could Have Helped Participants
In our review and analysis of 11 packets of information that sponsors— representing about 248,000 participant offers—provided to participants regarding a lump sum window offer, we found that all of the packets lacked important information that could have helped participants. Key Factor #2: Lump Sum Calculation
With respect to the lump sum calculation, we found that the information in only 2 of the 11 packets fully explained how the lump sum had been generated, providing sufficient information to facilitate an understanding of the interest rate, mortality table, and benefit used by the sponsor. The remaining 9 packets lacked some key information used in calculating the lump sum amount, such as the interest rates or mortality assumptions. GAO did not consider the inclusion of these interest rates sufficient for participants’ purposes in assessing the lump sum offer. In addition, in many (5 of 11) of the packets, the relative value statements compared the lump sum payment amount to the value of an immediate annuity starting at the same time as the lump sum payment would occur, but not the value of the deferred annuity available when the participant reached full retirement age, often at age 65. could lose some or all of their benefits. Specifically, most participants accepting the lump sum offer were motivated by fear that retaining their annuity would hurt their prospects for a secure retirement (10 of 15), either because the pension plan would default on its promise (10 of 15) or because the plan sponsor would not In contrast, many manage the pension benefits responsibly (6 of 15).participants who chose to reject the lump sum offer indicated that their retirement might be more secure if they retained their annuity. DOL agreed with the second recommendation on coordinating with Treasury (including IRS) and PBGC to clarify guidance regarding information sponsors should provide to participants when extending a lump sum window offer. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to examine 1) the extent to which sponsors of defined benefit plans are transferring risk through the use of lump sum windows, and the incentives for sponsors to take such actions, 2) the implications for participants who accept a lump sum payment, and 3) the extent to which sponsors’ lump sum window informational materials enable participants to make an informed decision. Prior to identifying these actions, we asked relevant federal agency officials and pension experts what sources of information were available and we were told such sources were limited. As noted earlier, this review was an information review and did not constitute a compliance or legal review. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 2012, a number of large pension plan sponsors have given selected participants a limited-time option of receiving their retirement benefits in the form of a lump sum. Although sponsors' decisions to make certain lump sum “window” offers may be permissible by law, questions have been raised about participants' understanding of the financial tradeoffs associated with their choice. GAO was asked to review critical issues associated with these types of offers.
This report focuses on 1) the prevalence of lump sum offers and sponsors' incentives to use them, 2) the implications for participants, and 3) the extent to which selected lump sum materials provided to participants include key information. To conduct this work, GAO identified sponsors offering lump sum windows and used social media to identify participants given offers. GAO reviewed 11 informational packets acquired through interviews with selected plan sponsors and participants. GAO also analyzed lump sum calculations and interviewed federal officials and pension experts.
What GAO Found
Little public data are available to assess the extent to which sponsors of defined benefit plans are offering participants immediate lump sums to replace their lifetime annuities, but certain laws and regulations provide incentives for use of this practice. Although the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) has primary responsibility for overseeing pension sponsors' reporting requirements, it does not require sponsors to report such lump sum offers, making oversight difficult. Pension experts generally agree that there has been a recent increase in these types of offers. By reviewing the limited public information that is available, GAO identified 22 plan sponsors who had offered lump sum windows in 2012, involving approximately 498,000 participants and resulting in lump sum payouts totaling more than $9.25 billion. Most of these payouts went to participants who had separated from employment and were not yet retired, but some went to retirees already receiving pension benefits. Sponsors are currently afforded enhanced financial incentives to make these offers by certain laws and regulations issued by the U.S. Department of the Treasury (specifically the Internal Revenue Service) governing the interest rates and mortality tables used to calculate lump sums.
Participants potentially face a reduction in their retirement assets when they accept a lump sum offer. The amount of the lump sum payment may be less than what it would cost in the retail market to replace the plan's benefit because the mortality and interest rates used by retail market insurers are different from the rates used by sponsors, particularly when calculating lump sums for younger participants and women. Participants who assume management of their lump sum payment gain control of their assets but also face potential investment challenges. In addition, some participants may not continue to save their lump sum payment for retirement but instead may spend some or all of it.
GAO reviewed 11 packets of informational materials provided by sponsors offering lump sums to as many as 248,000 participants and found that the packets consistently lacked key information needed to make an informed decision or were otherwise unclear. Using various sources, including financial advisors, federal agency publications, laws, and regulations, GAO identified eight key types of information that participants need to have a sound understanding of a lump sum offer. While GAO did not review the packets for compliance or legal adequacy, most packets provided a substantial amount of this key information. However, all of the packets GAO reviewed lacked at least some key information. For example, the relative value notices were often unclear about how the value of the lump sum compared to the value of the lifetime monthly benefit provided by the plan. Similarly, many packets did not clearly indicate the interest rate or mortality assumptions used, limiting participants' ability to assess how the lump sum payment was calculated. Further, few of the packets informed participants about the benefit protections they would keep by staying in their employer's plan—full or partial protections provided by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, the agency that insures defined benefit pensions when a sponsor defaults. This omission is notable because many participants GAO interviewed cited fear of sponsor default as an important factor in choosing the lump sum.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOL improve oversight by requiring plan sponsors to notify the agency when they implement lump sum windows, and coordinate with Treasury to clarify guidance on the information sponsors provide to participants. Further, Treasury should reassess regulations governing relative value statements, as well as the interest rates and mortality tables used in calculating lump sums. Agencies generally agreed with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-14-760 | gao_GAO-14-760_0 | The Small Business Act authorizes SBA to make available several types of disaster loans, including two types of direct loans: physical disaster loans and economic injury disaster loans. Economic injury disaster loans (EIDL): These loans provide small businesses that are not able to obtain credit elsewhere with necessary working capital until normal operations resume after a disaster declaration. Application processing stage. Immediate Disaster Assistance Program (IDAP). IDAP would provide small businesses with interim guaranteed loans of up to $25,000 with a loan decision within 36 hours. SBA Did Not Meet Its Timeliness Goal for Application Processing and a Backlog of Applications Grew Rapidly
Following Hurricane Sandy, SBA did not meet its goal to process business loan applications within 21 days from application receipt to loan decision. As shown in figure 3, SBA took an average of 45 days for physical disaster business loan applications and 38 days for EIDL applications. SBA Did Not Anticipate Receiving a High Volume of Loan Applications Early in Its Response to Hurricane Sandy
SBA said that in the aftermath of Hurricane Sandy, it was challenged by a high volume of loan applications submitted at a faster rate than it had experienced in previous disasters. According to the application intake curve for Hurricane Sandy, SBA estimated that application submission would peak about 7 to 9 weeks after Hurricane Sandy. Approval Rates, Reasons for Decline, Withdrawals, and Cancellations for Hurricane Sandy and Previous Disasters
SBA’s overall approval rate for Hurricane Sandy business loan applications was 42 percent, which was lower than those for Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma, higher than that for Hurricane Ike, and comparable to the approval rate for Hurricane Irene. Second, SBA told us that they received feedback from lenders indicating challenges that may discourage lenders from participating in the program, although SBA’s documentation of this feedback is limited. Without an appropriately documented evaluation of its outreach to lenders, SBA may not have complete and reliable information on which to base its reporting to Congress about its challenges with implementing the programs required by the act. While SBA officials told us the agency has taken steps to respond to these challenges, it has not revised its disaster planning documents— including the Disaster Preparedness and Recovery Plan and ODA Playbook—to reflect the unexpected volume of early applications and its potential impact on staffing, resources, and forecasting models. Federal internal control standards state that management should identify risks and take action to manage them. Without taking the large volume of applications it received shortly after Hurricane Sandy into account in its disaster planning documents and analyzing the risk that trend may pose for timely disaster response, SBA risks being unprepared for a similar experience following future disasters, which may result in delays in providing loan funds to disaster victims. However SBA has not conducted a formal documented evaluation of lenders’ feedback that would establish the basis for proposed changes to requirements for Congress to consider. Recommendations for Executive Action
In order to address potential risk to SBA’s ability to provide timely disaster assistance in the future, based on the agency’s experience from Hurricane Sandy, we recommend that the Administrator of SBA direct the Office of Disaster Assistance to take the following action:
Revise SBA’s disaster planning documents to anticipate the potential impact of early application submissions on staffing and resources for future disasters, as well as the risk this impact may pose for SBA’s timely disaster response. In response to our recommendations that SBA conduct a formal documented evaluation of lenders’ feedback on IDAP, and report to Congress on challenges to implementing the program, SBA agreed that its Office of Capital Access (OCA) has not performed a formal documented evaluation of IDAP. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to examine (1) the timeliness of the Small Business Administration’s (SBA) disaster assistance to small businesses following Hurricane Sandy and the factors that affected SBA’s timeliness, (2) the loan approval rates for small businesses and reasons for decline following Hurricane Sandy, in comparison with those of previous disasters, and (3) the extent to which SBA has implemented loan programs mandated by the Small Business Disaster Response and Loan Improvements Act of 2008. | Why GAO Did This Study
On October 29, 2012, Hurricane Sandy made landfall, causing an estimated $65 billion in damage. SBA administers the Disaster Loan Program, which provides physical disaster loans (used to rebuild or replace damaged property) and economic injury disaster loans (used for working capital until normal operations resume) to help businesses and individual homeowners recover from disasters. In the aftermath of Hurricane Sandy, Congress passed the Disaster Relief Appropriations Act of 2013, which appropriated $779 million to SBA for disaster loans and administrative expenses.
GAO was asked to review SBA's assistance to small businesses following Hurricane Sandy. This report examines (1) the timeliness of SBA's disaster assistance to small businesses; (2) the loan approval rates for small businesses and reasons for decline for Hurricane Sandy and previous disasters; and (3) the extent to which SBA has implemented programs mandated by the Small Business Disaster Response and Loan Improvements Act of 2008. GAO analyzed SBA data on application processing; reviewed documentation related to SBA's planning, relevant legislation, and regulations; and interviewed SBA officials.
What GAO Found
Following Hurricane Sandy, the Small Business Administration (SBA) did not meet its timeliness goal for processing business loan applications. From application receipt to loan decision, SBA took an average of 45 days to process physical business disaster loans and 38 days for economic injury loans, both of which exceed SBA's 21-day application processing goal. SBA said it was challenged by an unexpectedly high volume of loan applications that it received early in its response to the disaster, in addition to other challenges, such as technological issues. SBA estimated that application submissions would peak about 7 to 9 weeks after Hurricane Sandy, but it received a larger volume of applications than were expected prior to that period. While SBA officials told GAO that the agency has taken steps to respond to some challenges, it has not revised its disaster planning documents—including the Disaster Preparedness and Recovery Plan—to reflect the early volume of application submissions received after Hurricane Sandy and the potential impact a similar experience could have on staffing, resources, and forecasting models for future disasters. Federal internal control standards state that management should identify risks and take action to manage them. Without taking its experience with early application submissions after Hurricane Sandy into account in its disaster planning documents and analyzing the potential risk early submissions may pose for timely disaster response, SBA may be unprepared for a large volume of applications to be submitted quickly following future disasters, which may result in delays in loan funds for disaster victims.
SBA approved 42 percent of business loan applications following Hurricane Sandy. This rate was lower than those of Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma, higher than that of Ike, and comparable to that of Irene (the five disasters that generated the most SBA disaster loan applications since 2005). For Hurricane Sandy and for previous disasters, SBA declined business loan applications primarily because of applicants' lack of repayment ability and credit history.
SBA has not implemented the guaranteed disaster loan programs Congress mandated in 2008, including the Immediate Disaster Assistance Program (IDAP)—a bridge loan program through private sector lenders providing disaster victims with up to $25,000 with a 36-hour application approval period. SBA officials told GAO they are trying to implement IDAP but have received feedback from lenders that some program requirements—such as a statutory minimum 10-year time frame for servicing the loan under certain circumstances—may discourage lenders from participating. However, SBA has not conducted a formal documented evaluation of lenders' feedback that would establish the basis for proposed changes to requirements for Congress to consider. Without an appropriately documented evaluation of its outreach to lenders, SBA may not have complete and reliable information on which to base its reporting to Congress about its challenges with implementing the programs required by the act.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that SBA revise its disaster planning documents, conduct a formal documented evaluation of lenders' feedback on IDAP, and report to Congress on challenges to implementing the program. SBA generally agreed with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GGD-99-109 | gao_GGD-99-109_0 | This environment of reform has affected FSS and FTS. However, SOS had a role in the IT area that went beyond what FSS offers through its IT schedules and more closely resembled what FTS offers in assisting agencies with the acquisition of IT systems and related services. Agency Accountability Without Centralized Procurement
Over the last decade, reform in the central government of New Zealand has centered on shifting accountability for results to departments and relying more on the private sector to perform activities of a business nature. Conclusions
Information on the various approaches used by these four countries provides insight into how they performed activities similar to those of FSS and FTS. None of the countries had government organizations that completely mirrored FSS and FTS. For example, in the UK, the government organizations that performed activities similar to FSS and FTS were different in that they had more flexibility to manage personnel and financial matters than traditional government departments. New Zealand sold its central procurement agency to the private sector, and agencies now could use the private sector business that was created to help meet their procurement needs. Also, there were similarities and differences in the programs and policies these countries used in the procurement of supplies, vehicles, telecommunications, and IT. These reforms and streamlining efforts in the United States, as well as those in the four countries, were designed to make government operate more efficiently, improve service delivery, and focus on government’s core mission. In considering the merits of the approaches used by the countries and their applicability to FSS and FTS, it is important to recognize that such factors as differences in political and economic environments, the role of social objectives in the procurement process, and the volume of contracting activity would have to be considered. Furthermore, although the officials we interviewed in the four countries were generally satisfied with the reforms and believed their governments were better off with them in place, performance data on the effectiveness of the various reforms were generally unavailable or were in the early stages of development. Organizations With Activities Related to Supply, Vehicle, Telecommunications, and IT Procurement
United States General Services Administration’s
Federal Supply Service (FSS) and Federal Technology Service (FTS)
Office of Management and Budget’s Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP); GSA’s Office of Governmentwide Policy (OGP)
FSS has nonmandatory, prenegotiated contract arrangements under which agencies deal directly with vendors to acquire a range of supplies, including IT goods and services; FSS also stocks supplies for resale to agencies from its distribution centers and government stores. Objective, Scope, and Methodology
Our objective was to identify the organizations, policies, and programs that Canada, the United Kingdom (UK), Australia, and New Zealand had in place to assist agencies with the procurement of supplies, vehicles, telecommunications, and IT. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on how foreign governments perform procurement activities that in the United States fall under the responsibility of the General Services Administration's Federal Supply Service (FSS) and Federal Technology Service (FTS).
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) none of the countries had organizations that completely mirrored FSS and FTS; (2) Canada and the United Kingdom (UK) had the closest models in that they had organizations available to assist agencies in the procurement of supplies, vehicles, telecommunications, and information technology (IT); (3) however, these organizations had different features from those of FSS and FTS; (4) the two organizations in the UK differed from FSS and FTS because they were given more flexibility than traditional government departments in the personnel and financial areas; (5) Australia and New Zealand had very different models from the United States; (6) Australia had only an organization that performed activities similar to those of FTS, and its role in assisting agencies with the acquisition of IT systems and related services was minor; (7) New Zealand had no government organizations that performed activities similar to those of FSS and FTS because it sold its central procurement agency to the private sector several years ago; (8) this private sector business assisted government agencies with the procurement of supplies and did business only with the government; (9) GAO's analysis also showed that there were similarities and differences in the programs and policies these countries used in the procurement of supplies compared to those of FSS and FTS; (10) according to officials in these countries, procurement reform evolved over a number of years and was primarily influenced by a desire to rely more on the private sector to perform activities of a business nature so that government could operate more efficiently, improve its services, and focus on its core mission; (11) it is important to recognize that such factors as differences in political and economic environments, the role of social objectives in the procurement process, and the volume of contracting activity would have to be considered in a discussion of whether these approaches had applicability to FSS and FTS operations in the United States; (12) furthermore, some reforms were very recent, and performance data on the effectiveness of the various reforms were generally unavailable or were in the early stages of development; (13) consequently, GAO could not, from an overall perspective, gauge how well these reforms were working; and (14) nonetheless, officials GAO interviewed who were end-users of the procurement organizations and policies GAO observed said they were generally satisfied with the reforms and believed their governments were operating more efficiently than under old policies. |
gao_GAO-12-580T | gao_GAO-12-580T_0 | Accordingly, the department has increased its reliance on IT. HUD’s IT Environment
Despite its growing mission, HUD’s IT environment has not effectively supported its business operations. Progress Has Been Made in Implementing Recommendations on HUD’s IT Modernization, but More Work Remains
While HUD has been working to modernize its IT systems, we reported in 2009 that the department lacked sound management controls that are essential to achieving successful outcomes. Strategic planning and performance management: Effective IT strategic planning and performance management are intended to ensure that an organization’s IT strategic goals are aligned with its overall mission goals and outcomes and that these goals are supported by clearly defined (1) activities aimed at accomplishing the goals and (2) measures for determining performance in accomplishing the activities and goals. In 2009, we found that although HUD had established an IT strategic plan that outlined goals and performance measures, it had not assessed its IT performance against established goals since fiscal year 2007. By not regularly assessing and reporting progress against its strategic IT performance measures and activities, HUD did not know how well it was achieving its strategic goals and where it needed to improve. In September 2011, we reported that HUD had fully implemented this recommendation by issuing a new department-wide strategic plan with associated goals that aligned with new IT strategic goals that the OCIO developed. In 2009, we reported that while HUD had established a range of policies and procedures for developing a complete investment portfolio, it had not established policies and procedures for evaluating the portfolio.evaluating the performance of its portfolios, HUD was limited in its ability to control the risks and achieve the benefits associated with the mix of legacy system and modernization investments selected. Human capital management involves assessing IT workforce needs, inventorying existing staff’s knowledge and skills and identifying any gaps between needs and existing capabilities, and developing strategies and plans to fill any gaps. Enterprise architecture: EA development and use is aimed at establishing a corporate blueprint for investing that connects strategic plans with individual programs and system solutions. As a result, HUD’s segment architectures did not provide a sufficient basis for guiding and directing segment projects in a manner to ensure that both, system enhancements and new development efforts were properly sequenced, well integrated, and not duplicative. As of this month, the department had not yet finalized its EA policy. HUD’s Implementation of Recommendations to Improve Expenditure Plans Enables More Oversight
Out of concern about HUD’s capacity to manage its IT modernization efforts, Congress established limitations on the funding provided to the department for this purpose. To address the first set of statutory conditions, for each modernization project, HUD was required to identify in the plan (1) functional and performance capabilities to be delivered, (2) expected mission benefits, (3) estimated lifecycle costs, and (4) planned key milestones. To address the second set of statutory conditions, the plan had to demonstrate that each project (1) was supported by an adequately staffed project office, (2) conformed to capital planning and investment control requirements, (3) complied with the department’s enterprise architecture, and (4) was being managed in accordance with applicable lifecycle management policies and guidance. Our assessment found that the department’s first expenditure plan, submitted in April 2010, did not adequately satisfy the two sets of statutory conditions. In the absence of this information, the plan was limited as a congressional oversight and decision-making mechanism. As a result, we recommended that HUD ensure that future expenditure plans satisfied each element of both sets of statutory conditions and describe the status of HUD’s efforts to establish and implement modernization management controls. For example, the plan described specific and measureable mission benefits for each of the identified IT modernization projects. In summary, HUD has made progress in addressing certain weaknesses that we identified in its IT management capabilities. However, it is important to note that more actions are still needed. HUD has demonstrated progress in improving the content of its IT expenditure plans. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) performs a range of significant home ownership and community development missions that are integral to the U.S. economy. In doing so, HUD relies extensively on information technology (IT). However, HUDs IT environment has not effectively supported its business operations, and as a result, the department has been working to modernize its IT infrastructure. To provide oversight and inform decision-making, Congress required that HUD develop and submit plans describing how it intends to use its expenditures to support its modernization efforts. In addition, Congress required GAO to review these expenditure plans to determine if they meet statutory conditions.
GAO was asked to testify on HUDs progress in implementing its prior recommendations on (1) modernizing its IT systems and (2) improving its expenditure plans. In preparing this statement, GAO relied on previous work at HUD.
What GAO Found
HUD has made progress in implementing prior GAO recommendations on modernizing its IT environment; however more actions are needed. In 2009, GAO reported that HUD lacked key IT management controls; which are essential to achieving successful outcomes. Specifically,
Although the department had established an IT strategic plan that outlined goals and performance measures, it had not assessed its performance against established goals. As a result, HUD did not know how well it was achieving its goals and where it needed to improve.
While the department had established policies and procedures for developing a complete portfolio of its investments, it had not established policies and procedures for evaluating that portfolio. This meant that it was limited in its ability to control risks and achieve benefits associated with the mix of legacy systems and modernization investments it selected.
HUDs Office of the Chief Information Officer had not adequately assessed its IT workforce needs, inventoried existing staff knowledge and skills, and identified gaps between needs and existing capabilities. As a result, the department was not well positioned to acquire the skill sets it needed.
The department had not fully developed its enterprise architecture (EA)which provides a blueprint for investing that connects strategic plans with individual programs and system solutions. This meant that HUD lacked a sufficient basis for guiding and directing its modernization projects.
GAO made a number of recommendations to HUD aimed at strengthening its management capabilities, and while progress has been made in addressing them, work remains. For example, HUD issued a department-wide strategic plan with associated goals that aligned with new IT strategic goals. However, the department had not developed criteria for assessing the performance of its portfolios, finalized its plan to address its IT workforce needs, or established an approved policy for its enterprise architecture.
HUDs modernization expenditure plans, which are to describe how the agency plans to spend IT modernization funding, have improved in response to GAOs recommendations. These plans are to meet statutory conditions that include identifying, for each modernization project, capabilities to be delivered, expected benefits, estimated costs, and key milestones; and showing that each project is supported by adequate staff, conforms to capital planning and investment control requirements, complies with the departments EA, and is being managed in accordance with department lifecycle management policies. GAO found that HUDs 2010 expenditure plan contained weaknesses and thus was limited as a congressional oversight and decision-making mechanism. Accordingly, GAO recommended, among other things, that the department ensure future plans satisfied each element of the statutory conditions. In response, subsequent expenditure plans submitted in 2011 and 2012 satisfied the conditions. As a result, these more recent plans have provided key information needed for continued oversight of the modernization projects.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making new recommendations. As noted, GAO has previously made recommendations aimed at assisting HUD in fully implementing key IT management controls. |
gao_GAO-06-792 | gao_GAO-06-792_0 | In the 1980s and 1990s, NWS undertook a nationwide modernization program to develop new systems and technologies and to consolidate its field office structure. NWS Is Positioning Itself to Provide Better Service through Upgrades to Its Systems and Technologies
NWS is positioning itself to provide better service through system and technology upgrades. Over the next few years, the agency plans to upgrade and improve its systems, predictive weather models, and computational abilities, and it appropriately links these upgrades to its performance goals. Further, in its annual performance plans, NOAA reports on expected NWS service improvements and identifies the technologies and systems that are expected to help improve them. For example, NWS expects to reduce its average error in forecasting a hurricane’s path by approximately 20 nautical miles between 2005 and 2011 through a combination of upgrades to observation systems, better hurricane forecast models, enhancements to the computer infrastructure, and research that will be transferred to NWS forecast operations. Also, NWS expects tornado warning lead times to increase from 13 to 15 minutes by the end of fiscal year 2008 after NWS completes retrofits to the NEXRAD systems, realizes the benefits of AWIPS software enhancements, and implements new training techniques. NWS’s Training Is Expected to Result in Forecast Service Improvements, but the Training Selection Process Lacks Sufficient Oversight
NWS provides employee training courses that are expected to help improve forecast service performance, but the agency’s process for selecting this training lacks sufficient oversight. In justifying training courses, program officials routinely link proposed courses to NWS forecast performance measures. Specifically, in 2006, 131 of the 134 original training needs were linked to expectations for improved forecasting performance—including training on cardiopulmonary resuscitation, spill prevention, leadership, systems security, and equal employment opportunity/diversity. The training selection process did not validate or question that these courses would improve tornado warning lead times or hurricane warning accuracy. Although these courses are important and likely justifiable on other bases, the overuse of this justification undermines the distinctions among training courses and the credibility of the course selection process. Additionally, because the training selection process does not clearly distinguish among courses, it is difficult to determine whether sufficient funds are dedicated to the courses that are expected improve performance. Changing Concept of Operations Could Affect Nationwide Office Configuration, but Impact on Forecast Services, Staffing, and Budget Is Not Yet Known
NWS plans to develop a prototype of a new concept of operations—an effort that could affect its national office configuration, including the location and functions of its offices nationwide. However, NWS has yet to determine many details about the impact of any proposed changes on NWS forecast services, staffing, and budget. Further, NWS has not yet identified key activities, timelines, or measures for evaluating the concept of operations prototype. As a result, it is not evident that NWS will collect the information it needs on the impact and benefits of any office restructuring in order to make sound and cost-effective decisions. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were (1) to evaluate the National Weather Service’s (NWS) efforts to achieve improvements in the delivery of its services through upgrades to its systems, models, and computational abilities; (2) to assess the agency’s plans to achieve improvements in the delivery of its services through the training and professional development of its employees; and (3) to evaluate the agency’s plans for revising its nationwide office configuration and the implications of these plans on local forecasting services, staffing, and budgets. | Why GAO Did This Study
To provide accurate and timely weather forecasts, the National Weather Service (NWS) uses systems, technologies, and manual processes to collect, process, and disseminate weather data to its nationwide network of field offices and centers. After completing a major modernization program in the 1990s, NWS is seeking to upgrade its systems with the goal of improving its forecasting abilities, and it is considering changing how its nationwide office structure operates in order to enhance efficiency. GAO was asked to (1) evaluate NWS's efforts to achieve improvements in the delivery of its services through system and technology upgrades, (2) assess agency plans to achieve service improvements through training its employees, and (3) evaluate agency plans to revise its nationwide office configuration and the implications of these plans on local forecasting services, staffing, and budgets.
What GAO Found
NWS is positioning itself to provide better service through over $315 million in planned upgrades to its systems and technologies. In annual plans, the agency links expected improvements in its service performance measures with the technologies and systems expected to improve them. For example, NWS expects to reduce the average error in its forecasts of hurricane paths by approximately 20 nautical miles between 2005 and 2011 through a combination of upgrades to observation systems, better hurricane forecast models, enhancements to the computer infrastructure, and research that will be transferred to forecast operations. Also, NWS expects to increase tornado warning lead times from 13 to 15 minutes by the end of fiscal year 2008 after the agency completes an upgrade to its radar system and realizes benefits from software improvements to its forecaster workstations. NWS also provides training courses for its employees to help improve its forecasting services, but the agency's process for selecting training lacks sufficient oversight. Program officials propose and justify training needs on the basis of up to eight different criteria--including whether a course is expected to improve NWS forecasting performance measures, support customer outreach, or increase scientific awareness. Many of these course justifications appropriately demonstrate support for improved forecasting performance. For example, training on how to more effectively use forecaster workstations is expected to help improve tornado and hurricane warnings. However, in justifying training courses, program officials routinely link courses to NWS forecasting performance measures. For example, in 2006, almost all training needs were linked to expectations for improved performance--including training on cardiopulmonary resuscitation, spill prevention, and systems security. The training selection process did not validate or question how these courses could help improve weather forecasts. Overuse of this justification undermines the distinctions among different training courses and the credibility of the course selection process. Additionally, because the training selection process does not clearly distinguish among courses, it is difficult to determine whether sufficient funds are dedicated to the courses that are expected to improve performance. To improve its efficiency, NWS plans to develop a prototype of a new concept of operations, an effort that could affect its national office configuration, including the location and functions of its offices nationwide. However, many details about the impact of any proposed changes on NWS forecast services, staffing, and budget have yet to be determined. Further, the agency has not yet determined key activities, timelines, or measures for evaluating the prototype of the new office operational structure. As a result, it is not evident that NWS will collect the information it needs on the impact and benefits of any office restructuring in order to make sound and cost-effective decisions. |
gao_GAO-07-1100T | gao_GAO-07-1100T_0 | Inadequate IT Inventory Control and Accountability Pose Risk of Loss, Theft, and Misappropriation
Our tests of IT equipment inventory controls at four case study locations, including three VA medical centers and VA headquarters, identified a weak overall control environment and a pervasive lack of accountability for IT equipment items across the locations we tested. Our statistical tests identified a total of 123 lost and missing IT equipment items across the four case locations, including 53 IT equipment items that could have stored sensitive personal information. Under this lax control environment, missing IT equipment items were often not reported for several months and, in some cases several years, until the problem was identified during a physical inventory. Our statistical tests of missing equipment found that none of the four test locations had effective controls. Although our Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government requires timely recording of transactions as part of an effective internal control structure and safeguarding of sensitive assets, we found that VA’s property management policy neither specified what transactions were to be recorded for various changes in inventory status nor provided criteria for timely recording. Physical Inventories by Case Study Locations Identified Thousands of Missing IT Equipment Items Valued at Millions of Dollars
To assess the effect of the lax control environment for IT equipment, we asked VA officials at the case study locations covered in both our current and previous audits to provide us with information on the results of their physical inventories performed after issuance of recommendations in our July 2004 report, including Reports of Survey information on identified losses of IT equipment. As of February 28, 2007, the four case study locations covered in our current audit reported over 2,400 missing IT equipment items with a combined original acquisition value of about $6.4 million as a result of inventories they performed during fiscal years 2005 and 2006. Because inventory records were not consistently updated as changes in user organization or location occurred and none of the locations we audited required accountability at the user level, it is not possible to determine whether the missing IT equipment items represent recordkeeping errors or the loss, theft, or misappropriation of IT equipment. Physical Security Weaknesses Increase Risk of Loss, Theft, and Misappropriation of IT Equipment and Sensitive Data
Our investigator’s inspection of physical security at officially designated IT warehouses and storerooms at our four case study locations that held new and used IT equipment found that most of these storage facilities met the requirements in VA Handbook 0730/1, Security and Law Enforcement. We also found numerous instances of informal IT storage areas at VA headquarters that did not meet VA physical security requirements. In addition, although VA requires that hard drives of IT equipment and medical equipment be sanitized prior to disposal to prevent unauthorized release of sensitive personal and medical information, we found weaknesses in the disposal process that pose a risk of data breach related to sensitive personal information residing on hard drives in the property disposal process that have not yet been sanitized. The failure to provide adequate security leaves the information stored on these computers vulnerable to data breach. Although VA management has taken some actions to improve inventory controls, strengthening the overall control environment and establishing and implementing specific IT equipment controls will require a renewed focus, oversight, and continuing commitment throughout the organization. | Why GAO Did This Study
In July 2004, GAO reported that the six Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) medical centers it audited lacked a reliable property control database and had problems with implementation of VA inventory policies and procedures. Fewer than half the items GAO selected for testing could be located. Most of the missing items were information technology (IT) equipment. In light of these concerns and recent thefts of laptops and data breaches at VA, this testimony focuses on (1) the risk of theft, loss, or misappropriation of IT equipment at selected locations; (2) whether selected locations have adequate procedures in place to assure accountability and physical security of IT equipment in the excess property disposal process; and (3) what actions VA management has taken to address identified IT inventory control weaknesses. GAO statistically tested inventory controls at four case study locations.
What GAO Found
A weak overall control environment for VA IT equipment at the four locations GAO audited poses a significant security vulnerability to the nation's veterans with regard to sensitive data maintained on this equipment. GAO's Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government requires agencies to establish physical controls to safeguard vulnerable assets, such as IT equipment, which might be vulnerable to risk of loss, and federal records management law requires federal agencies to record essential transactions. However, GAO found that current VA property management policy does not provide guidance for creating records of inventory transactions as changes occur. GAO also found that policies requiring annual inventories of sensitive items, such as IT equipment; adequate physical security; and immediate reporting of lost and missing items have not been enforced. GAO's statistical tests of physical inventory controls at four VA locations identified a total of 123 missing IT equipment items, including 53 computers that could have stored sensitive data. The lack of user-level accountability and inaccurate records on status, location, and item descriptions make it difficult to determine the extent to which actual theft, loss, or misappropriation may have occurred without detection. GAO also found that the four VA locations reported over 2,400 missing IT equipment items, valued at about $6.4 million, identified during physical inventories performed during fiscal years 2005 and 2006. Missing items were often not reported for several months and, in some cases, several years. It is very difficult to investigate these losses because information on specific events and circumstances at the time of the losses is not known. GAO's limited tests of computer hard drives in the excess property disposal process found hard drives at two of the four case study locations that contained personal information, including veterans' names and Social Security numbers. GAO's tests did not find any remaining data after sanitization procedures were performed. However, weaknesses in physical security at IT storage locations and delays in completing the data sanitization process heighten the risk of data breach. Although VA management has taken some actions to improve controls over IT equipment, including strengthening policies and procedures, improving the overall control environment for sensitive IT equipment will require a renewed focus, oversight, and continued commitment throughout the organization. |
gao_GAO-02-880 | gao_GAO-02-880_0 | The provisions also prohibit 14- and 15-year-olds from working during school hours and limit the number of hours and times of day they can work. Many Children Are Illegally Employed; Illegal Employment Varies by Age and Gender
As in 1990, we estimated that as many as 4 percent of all 15- to 17-year-olds who worked in 2001 worked illegally, either because they worked more hours than allowed under the law or because they worked in prohibited hazardous occupations. 3). Fatalities Have Changed Little; Extent of Change in Other Work-Related Injuries to Children Is Unclear
The number and characteristics of children who die each year as a result of a work-related injury have changed little over the past decade. It is difficult, however, to determine whether the number of work-related injuries to children has changed, because the two primary sources of data on nonfatal injuries to working children—BLS and NIOSH—provide significantly different estimates of the number of children injured over the decade. 7.) Conclusions
By allowing and encouraging children to work, the nation acknowledges that children can derive many benefits from working, such as independence, confidence, and responsibility. Estimating the Number of Children Employed Illegally in the United States
To estimate the number of children who are employed illegally in the United States—children employed in violation of the child labor provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)—we compared data obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics’s (BLS) Current Population Survey (CPS) on children in the United States who work to the child labor provisions of FLSA. Appendix IV: Comments from The Department of Labor
GAO Comments
1. 16. 17. | What GAO Found
In 2001, almost 40 percent of all 16- and 17-year-olds in the United States and many 14- and 15-year-olds worked at some time in the year. Children in the United States are often encouraged to work, and many people believe that children benefit from early work experiences by developing independence, confidence, and responsibility. However, the public also wants to ensure that the work experiences of young people enhance, rather than harm, their future opportunities. The number and characteristics of working children have changed little over the past decade. According to Bureau of Labor Statistics data, as in 1990, as many as 3.7 million children aged 15 to 17 worked in 2001. The number of children who die each year from work-related injuries has changed little since 1992, but the number of children who incurred nonfatal injuries while working is more difficult to determine because data from different sources provide different estimates of the number of injuries and trends over time. The Department of Labor devotes many resources to ensuring compliance with the child labor provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, including conducting nationwide campaigns designed to increase public awareness of the provisions, but its compliance efforts suffer from limitations that may prevent adequate enforcement of the law. |
gao_GAO-08-466 | gao_GAO-08-466_0 | However, under the terms of the covenant, the federal government has the right to apply federal law in these exempted areas without the consent of the CNMI government. Tourists. Tourists. Legislation
The pending legislation applies provisions of federal immigration law to the CNMI one year after the legislation’s enactment, subject to a transition period that begins 1 year after enactment and ends on December 31, 2013, under H.R. Second, during the transition period, employers of workers not otherwise eligible for admission under federal law can apply for temporary CNMI-only nonimmigrant work permits, and this program may be extended indefinitely by the U.S. Secretary of Labor for up to 5 years at a time. Third, during the transition period, existing CNMI-government-approved foreign workers lacking U.S. immigration status can continue to live and work in the CNMI for a limited time. The CNMI’s exemption from the visa caps expires at the end of the transition period in 2013 or 2014, and the demand for U.S. nonimmigrant worker visas has exceeded the capped supply in recent years. Furthermore, there are no nonimmigrant visas available for workers in continuous low-skill positions. Fees for the CNMI-only work permit will be determined by federal regulations and are not currently available. In deciding whether to extend the period in which CNMI-only nonimmigrant work permits may be issued, the Secretary of Labor may consider workforce studies on the need for foreign workers in the CNMI; the unemployment rate of U.S. citizen workers residing in the CNMI; the number of unemployed foreign workers in the CNMI; and any other available evidence regarding U.S., CNMI, and foreign worker trends in the CNMI. Access to Permanent Employment-Based Immigrant Visas for Foreign Workers
Under the pending legislation, when federal immigration law becomes applicable to the CNMI on the transition program effective date, CNMI employers will be able to petition to bring workers to the CNMI as employment-based permanent immigrants under the same procedures as other U.S. employers. Access to Foreign Workers after the End of the Transition Period and after Any Extensions
After the end of the transition period and after any extensions of the CNMI-only work permit program, the pending legislation limits CNMI employers’ access to foreign workers, particularly low-skill workers in continuous, nontemporary jobs. Citizens of countries who do not qualify for entry under the joint CNMI and Guam visa waiver program or other U.S. visa waiver programs may apply for U.S. visitor visas valid for entry to any part of the United States, which generally require in-person applications and higher fees than the CNMI currently assesses. Changes in tourists’ access to the CNMI will depend on the countries that are included in the CNMI-Guam visa waiver program. Until the regulations implementing the joint visa waiver program are established, we cannot determine whether the new visa waiver program will be more or less restrictive than the current CNMI or Guam waiver programs. Pending Legislation Provisions for Foreign Investors
After federal immigration law applies, new CNMI foreign investors must meet more stringent investment requirements in order to obtain immigrant investor status, which allows investors to petition for U.S. permanent immigration status that is currently unavailable in the CNMI. New foreign investors also could apply for nonimmigrant treaty investor status. Grandfathered Status for Foreign Investors during the Transition Period
The pending legislation allows current CNMI foreign investors to remain in the CNMI as investors after the start of the transition period by authorizing DHS to provide CNMI-only nonimmigrant E-2 treaty investor status to those who have been admitted to the CNMI in long-term investor status under CNMI immigration laws before the start of the transition program. The Department of Labor had no comments. The CNMI government disagreed with some key findings related to the pending legislation. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To complete our work, we reviewed current immigration laws of the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI), U.S. immigration law, and pending legislation that would apply U.S. immigration law to the CNMI. 3079, passed by the House of Representatives, and S. 2739, pending in the Senate. Appendix II: U.S. Nonimmigrant Classes of Admission
Aliens in continuous and immediate transit through the United States Aliens in transit to the United Nations Headquarters District Foreign government officials, attendants, servants, and personal employees, and spouses and children in transit Visa Waiver Program—temporary visitors for business to Guam Visa Waiver Program—temporary visitors for business Visa Waiver Program—temporary visitors for pleasure to Guam Visa Waiver Program—temporary visitors for pleasure Temporary workers with “specialty occupation”
Appendix III: U.S. and CNMI Fees for Foreign Workers, Tourists, and Foreign Investors
Specialty workers (H-1B): $320 to $2,320 for petition (range includes supplemental fees of $750 or $1,500 and fraud prevention fee of $500 required for some petitions); associated visa typically valid for up to 3 years
Appendix IV: Country Participation in Current Waiver Programs in the United States, the CNMI, and Guam
CNMI entry permit waiver programNo (limited for shipping)
No (police clearance)
Appendix V: Northern Mariana Islands Immigration, Security, and Labor Act (H.R. The Department of the Interior generally agreed with our findings. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) is subject to most U.S. laws but, under the terms of its 1976 covenant with the United States, administers its own immigration system. It has applied this flexibility to admit substantial numbers of foreign workers, in addition to admitting tourists and foreign investors. The covenant grants Congress the right to apply federal immigration law to the CNMI. On December 11, 2007, the House of Representatives passed legislation applying U.S. immigration law to the CNMI; as of report issuance, this legislation was pending in the Senate. If passed, it will amend the covenant and will apply federal immigration law to the CNMI 1 year after the legislation's enactment, subject to a transition period that begins 1 year after enactment but may be delayed 180 days. GAO was asked to review key provisions of the pending legislation, current U.S. immigration law, and current CNMI immigration law, particularly regarding (1) foreign workers, (2) tourists, and (3) foreign investors. The Departments of Homeland Security and the Interior generally agreed with the findings in this report, and the Department of Labor provided no comments. The CNMI government disagreed with some key findings related to GAO's interpretation of the legislation. GAO continues to interpret the legislation as stated in this report.
What GAO Found
The pending legislation applies U.S. immigration law to the CNMI and provides federal agencies some flexibility in preserving the CNMI's access to workers, tourists, and foreign investors as it transitions to a federal system. However, without implementing regulations, key details remain unknown. During the transition period, foreign workers may be admitted to the CNMI through exemptions from caps that restrict the number of U.S. visas for nonimmigrant workers. Workers not otherwise eligible under federal law may be admitted through a CNMI-only permit program, which may be extended indefinitely for up to 5 years at a time. Current workers who do not obtain U.S. immigration status may continue to live and work in the CNMI for a limited time. During and after the transition period, CNMI employers also can petition for nonimmigrant and employment-based permanent immigration status for workers under the same procedures as other U.S. employers. However, access to foreign workers in low-skill jobs will be limited after the end of the transition period in 2013 or 2014 and after any extensions of the CNMI-only permit program, because the demand for certain U.S. nonimmigrant worker visas recently has exceeded the supply and because no nonimmigrant visas are available for workers in continuous low-skill positions. While fees for the CNMI-only work permit will be determined by federal regulations and are unknown, the current fees for U.S. foreign worker permits that would apply after the end of the transition period and any extensions range higher than the CNMI's current foreign worker permit fees. The pending legislation establishes a joint visa waiver program by adding the CNMI to an existing Guam visa waiver program. The program exempts tourism and business visitors from certain countries to the CNMI and Guam from the standard U.S. visa documentation requirements. Citizens of countries not included in the CNMI-Guam or other U.S. visa waiver programs may apply for U.S. visitor visas, which require in-person applications and higher fees than the CNMI currently assesses. Changes in tourists' access to the CNMI will depend on the countries included in the CNMI-Guam visa waiver program. Until the joint program's implementing regulations are established, GAO cannot determine whether the program will be more or less restrictive than the current CNMI and Guam waiver programs. After federal immigration law applies, new CNMI foreign investors must meet federal law's more stringent investment requirements to obtain immigrant investor status, which allows investors to petition for U.S. permanent resident status that is currently unavailable in the CNMI. New investors also could apply for nonimmigrant treaty investor status. In addition, the pending legislation allows current CNMI foreign investors to convert to CNMI-only nonimmigrant treaty investors during the transition period. |
gao_GAO-12-7 | gao_GAO-12-7_0 | As we have described in numerous reports and testimonies, although a variety of best practice documentation exists to guide their successful acquisition, federal IT projects too frequently incur cost overruns and schedule slippages while contributing little to mission-related outcomes. Seven IT Investments Were Reported as Being Successfully Acquired
According to federal department officials, the following seven investments best achieved their respective cost, schedule, scope, and performance goals. The Decennial Response Integration System (DRIS) provided a system for collecting and integrating census responses from forms and telephone interviews. The MOMentum Project has two phases. The factors most commonly identified include active engagement of stakeholders, program staff with the necessary knowledge and skills, and senior department and agency executive support for the program. Officials from all seven selected investments cited active engagement with program stakeholders—individuals or groups (including, in some cases, end users) with an interest in the success of the acquisition—as a critical factor to the success of those investments. Agency officials stated that stakeholders, among other things, reviewed contractor proposals during the procurement process, regularly attended program management office sponsored meetings, were working members of integrated project teams, and were notified of problems and concerns as soon as possible. End Users Participated in Testing of System Functionality Prior to Formal End User Acceptance Testing
Officials from five of the seven selected investments identified having the end users test and validate the system components prior to formal end user acceptance testing for deployment as critical to the success of their program. Program Officials Maintained Regular Communication with the Prime Contractor
Officials from four of the seven selected investments indicated that regular communication between the program management office and the prime contractor was critical to the success of the program. Concluding Observations
Although the critical success factors identified by the seven agencies were cited as practices that contributed to the success of their acquisitions, implementation of these factors will not necessarily ensure that federal agencies will successfully acquire IT systems because many different factors contribute to successful acquisitions. Moreover, the critical success factors in this report also support OMB’s objective of improving the management of large- scale IT acquisitions across the federal government, and wide dissemination of these factors and how agencies implemented them could complement these efforts. The Director of the NNSA’s Office of Internal Controls, responding on behalf of the Department of Energy, provided an e-mail stating that they agreed with the report and had no further comments. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) identify federal information technology (IT) investments that were or are being successfully acquired and (2) identify the critical factors that led to the successful acquisition of these investments. Seven departments—the Departments of Defense, Commerce, Energy, Homeland Security, Transportation, the Treasury, and Veterans Affairs—identified successful IT investments. Collectively, these departments accounted for 73 percent of the planned IT spending for fiscal year 2011. | Why GAO Did This Study
Planned federal information technology (IT) spending has now risen to at least $81 billion for fiscal year 2012. As GAO has previously reported, although a variety of best practices exists to guide their successful acquisition, federal IT projects too frequently incur cost overruns and schedule slippages while contributing little to mission-related outcomes. Recognizing these problems, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has launched several initiatives to improve the oversight and management of IT investments. GAO was asked to identify (1) federal IT investments that were or are being successfully acquired and (2) the critical factors that led to the successful acquisition of these investments. To do this, GAO interviewed agency officials from selected federal departments responsible for each investment. In commenting on a draft of GAO's report, three departments generally agreed with the report. OMB and the other departments either provided minor technical comments, or stated that they had no comments at all.
What GAO Found
According to federal department officials, the following seven investments were successfully acquired in that they best achieved their respective cost, schedule, scope, and performance goals: (1) Department of Commerce's Decennial Response Integration System; (2) Department of Defense's Global Combat Support System-Joint, Increment 7; (3) Department of Energy's Manufacturing Operations Management (MOMentum) Project; (4) Department of Homeland Security's Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative; (5) Department of Transportation's Integrated Terminal Weather System; (6) Department of the Treasury's Customer Account Data Engine 2 (CADE 2); and (7) Department of Veterans Affairs' Occupational Health Record-keeping System. Department officials identified nine common factors that were critical to the success of three or more of the seven investments: (1) Program officials were actively engaged with stakeholders; (2) Program staff had the necessary knowledge and skills; (3) Senior department and agency executives supported the programs; (4) End users and stakeholders were involved in the development of requirements; (5) End users participated in testing of system functionality prior to formal end user acceptance testing; (6) Government and contractor staff were stable and consistent; (7) Program staff prioritized requirements; (8) Program officials maintained regular communication with the prime contractor; and (9) Programs received sufficient funding. Officials from all seven investments cited active engagement with program stakeholders as a critical factor to the success of those investments. Agency officials stated that stakeholders regularly attended program management office sponsored meetings; were working members of integrated project teams; and were notified of problems and concerns as soon as possible. Implementation of these critical factors will not necessarily ensure that federal agencies will successfully acquire IT systems because many different factors contribute to successful acquisitions. Nonetheless, these critical factors support OMB's objective of improving the management of large-scale IT acquisitions across the federal government, and wide dissemination of these factors could complement OMB's efforts. |
gao_GAO-14-864T | gao_GAO-14-864T_0 | However, from fiscal year 2009—when construction began—through the time of the fiscal year 2014 appropriation, the gap between requested and received funding was over $1.6 billion. According to DHS and GSA officials, this gap created cost escalations of over $1 billion and schedule delays of over 10 years. DHS and GSA Consolidation Plans Did Not Fully Conform with Leading Capital Decision- Making Practices
In our September 2014 report, we found that DHS and GSA planning for the DHS headquarters consolidation did not fully conform with leading capital decision-making practices intended to help agencies effectively plan and procure assets. Specifically, we found that DHS and GSA had not conducted a comprehensive assessment of current needs, identified capability gaps, or evaluated and prioritized alternatives that would help officials adapt consolidation plans to changing conditions and address funding issues as reflected in leading practices. DHS and GSA officials reported that they had taken some initial actions that may facilitate consolidation planning in a manner consistent with leading practices. For example, DHS has an overall goal of reducing the square footage allotted per employee across the department in accordance with current workplace standards, such as standards for telework and hoteling.and GSA officials acknowledged that new workplace standards could create a number of new development options to consider, as the new standards would allow for more staff to occupy the current space at St. Elizabeths than previously anticipated. DHS and GSA officials also reported analyzing different leasing options that could affect consolidation efforts. However, we found that the consolidation plans, which were finalized between 2006 and 2009, had not been updated to reflect these actions. For example, we found that the 2013 cost estimate—the most recent available—did not include (1) a life- cycle cost analysis of the project, including the cost of repair, operations, and maintenance; (2) was not regularly updated to reflect significant changes to the program including actual costs; and (3) did not include an independent estimate to assist in tracking the budget. In addition, a sensitivity analysis had not been performed to assess the reasonableness of the cost estimate. Schedule Estimates
In addition, we found that the 2008 and 2013 schedule estimates did not include all activities for both the government and its contractors necessary to accomplish the project’s objectives and did not include schedule baseline documents to help measure performance as reflected in leading practices and GSA guidance. For the 2008 schedule estimate, we also found that resources (such as labor, materials, and equipment) were not accounted for and a risk assessment had not been conducted to predict a level of confidence in the project’s completion date. As a result, in our September 2014 report, we recommended that, after revising the DHS headquarters consolidation plans, DHS and GSA develop revised cost and schedule estimates for the remaining portions of the consolidation project that conform to GSA guidance and leading practices for cost and schedule estimation, including an independent evaluation of the estimates. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony summarizes the information contained in GAO's September 2014 report, entitled: Federal Real Property: DHS and GSA Need to Strengthen the Management of DHS Headquarters Consolidation ( GAO-14-648 ).
What GAO Found
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and General Services Administration (GSA) planning for the DHS headquarters consolidation does not fully conform with leading capital decision-making practices intended to help agencies effectively plan and procure assets. DHS and GSA officials reported that they have taken some initial actions that may facilitate consolidation planning in a manner consistent with leading practices, such as adopting recent workplace standards at the department level and assessing DHS's leasing portfolio. For example, DHS has an overall goal of reducing the square footage allotted per employee across DHS in accordance with current workplace standards. Officials acknowledged that this could allow more staff to occupy less space than when the campus was initially planned in 2009. DHS and GSA officials also reported analyzing different leasing options that could affect consolidation efforts. However, consolidation plans, which were finalized between 2006 and 2009, have not been updated to reflect these changes. According to DHS and GSA officials, the funding gap between what was requested and what was received from fiscal years 2009 through 2014, was over $1.6 billion. According to these officials, this gap has escalated estimated costs by over $1 billion--from $3.3 billion to the current $4.5 billion--and delayed scheduled completion by over 10 years, from an original completion date of 2015 to the current estimate of 2026. However, DHS and GSA have not conducted a comprehensive assessment of current needs, identified capability gaps, or evaluated and prioritized alternatives to help them adapt consolidation plans to changing conditions and address funding issues as reflected in leading practices. DHS and GSA reported that they have begun to work together to consider changes to their plans, but as of August 2014, they had not announced when new plans will be issued and whether they would fully conform to leading capital decision-making practices to help plan project implementation.
DHS and GSA did not follow relevant GSA guidance and GAO's leading practices when developing the cost and schedule estimates for the St. Elizabeths project, and the estimates are unreliable. For example, GAO found that the 2013 cost estimate--the most recent available--does not include a life-cycle cost analysis of the project, including the cost of operations and maintenance; was not regularly updated to reflect significant program changes, including actual costs; and does not include an independent estimate to help track the budget, as required by GSA guidance. Also, the 2008 and 2013 schedule estimates do not include all activities for the government and its contractors needed to accomplish project objectives. GAO's comparison of the cost and schedule estimates with leading practices identified the same concerns, as well as others. For example, a sensitivity analysis has not been performed to assess the reasonableness of the cost estimate. For the 2008 and 2013 schedule estimates, resources (such as labor and materials) are not accounted for and a risk assessment has not been conducted to predict a level of confidence in the project's completion date. Because DHS and GSA project cost and schedule estimates inform Congress's funding decisions and affect the agencies' abilities to effectively allocate resources, there is a risk that funding decisions and resource allocations could be made based on information that is not reliable or is out of date. |
gao_RCED-99-99 | gao_RCED-99-99_0 | Definition of Peer Review
There is no written definition of peer review that applies across the federal government. Peers generally are considered to be scientists or engineers who have qualifications and expertise equivalent to those of the researcher whose work they review. However, the office advocates the use of peer review and provides guidance to agencies on the use of peer review to assess the quality of research. Officials at the Office of Science and Technology Policy said that agencies’ peer review practices should be flexible and tailored to agency missions and type of research, and that specific uniform practices should not be dictated for every agency or all federally funded research. “Science agencies must devise assessment strategies that are appropriate to the nature of scientific processes and to the enabling role of fundamental science in support of over-arching national goals... should be designed to...respond to surprises, pursue detours, and revise program agendas in response to new scientific information and technical opportunities essential to the future well-being of all our people.”
All the agencies that we contacted identified policies, orders, or other internal guidance regarding the conduct of peer review. Reviews of Research Proposals
All the agencies conduct peer reviews to help determine which competitive research proposals to fund. In some circumstances, agencies use these same types of peer review processes to assess the merit of research that is not funded through competitive selection, generally this research is internal to the agencies. These reviews are generally conducted by supervisors or managers and are, therefore, not independent reviews of the research. These reviews occur at both the project and program level. Research Not Subject to Review
While the agencies said that they conduct either peer reviews or other quality reviews for almost all of their research, there are small amounts of research that may not be reviewed. Scope and Methodology
To define what is meant by peer review and to describe the federal government’s peer review policy, we reviewed studies of government peer review, previous GAO reports, and documentation provided by the 12 agencies included in our review. To describe the peer review practices of 12 agencies, we obtained and compared descriptive information on peer review at each agency to identify what the various practices were and to determine whether the practices were uniform among and within the agencies. Peer Review Practices
ARS has a multilayered system of complimentary peer reviews that includes reviews of the technical merit of planned research projects prior to funding, reviews of research results prior to the publication of the results, and reviews of ongoing research programs. Peer review will probably be defined as a method for conducting merit review that uses people with qualifications and expertise to conduct research similar to that being reviewed. Reviews of Publications
According to FS officials, publications play a key role in the quality assurance and quality control process for research and development. Other Agency Quality Assurance Reviews
Since all NOAA research is evaluated by some type of peer review process, agency officials provided no examples of other quality assurance reviews. Peer Review is also used to evaluate unsolicited proposals. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO studied the peer review and other quality assurance processes that federal agencies use in conducting scientific research and development, focusing on: (1) defining what is meant by peer review; (2) describing the federal government's peer review policy; (3) describing the peer review practices of 12 federal agencies that conduct scientific research; (4) describing other agencies' quality assurance reviews; and (5) identifying which research is not subject to review.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) there is no written governmentwide definition of peer review; (2) officials at the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) and at the agencies GAO contacted generally concur that peer review is defined as a process that includes an independent assessment of the technical, or scientific merit of research by peers who are scientists with knowledge and expertise equal to that of the researchers whose work they review; (3) there is no uniform federal policy for conducting peer reviews; (4) through annual budget guidance to federal agencies, OSTP and the Office of Management and Budget encourage funding of research projects that are peer reviewed over those that are not reviewed; (5) officials at OSTP said that peer review practices should not be dictated uniformly for every agency or for all types of federally funded research; (6) rather, the practices should be tailored to agency missions and type of research; (7) each of the 12 agencies that GAO contacted had a variety of policies, orders, or other internal guidance regarding the conduct of peer review; (8) to varying degrees, the 12 agencies use peer review to: (a) assess the merit of competitive and noncompetitive research proposals; (b) determine whether to continue or renew research projects; (c) evaluate the results of the research prior to the publication of those results; (d) establish annual budget priorities for research programs; and (e) evaluate program and scientist performance; (9) all of the agencies use peer review to assess competitive research proposals; (10) the methods for conducting peer reviews vary among and within the agencies; (11) most of the agencies that GAO reviewed also use reviews by agency supervisors or program managers to assess the quality of research proposals, to check the quality of in-progress research, and to evaluate program performance; (12) generally, these quality assurance reviews are not considered independent assessments--a key criterion in the peer review process; (13) these quality assurance reviews occur at both the project and program levels; (14) while agencies reported that almost all research is reviewed either through peer reviews or other quality assurance reviews, a small amount of research may not be reviewed by the agencies in certain circumstances; and (15) examples of research that may be funded without being reviewed include projects that are congressionally mandated or projects that use widely accepted methodologies. |
gao_GAO-12-405T | gao_GAO-12-405T_0 | Background
Fiscal year 2011 marked the eighth year of implementation of the Improper Payments Information Act of 2002 (IPIA), as well as the first year of implementation for the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010 (IPERA). IPIA requires executive branch agencies to annually review all programs and activities to identify those that are susceptible to significant improper payments, estimate the annual amount of improper payments for such programs and activities, and report these estimates along with actions taken to reduce improper payments for programs with estimates that exceed $10 million. IPERA, enacted July 22, 2010, amended IPIA by expanding on the previous requirements for identifying, estimating, and reporting on programs and activities susceptible to significant improper payments and expanding requirements for recovering overpayments across a broad range of federal programs. OMB and Agencies Reported Progress in Estimating and Reducing Improper Payments
Federal agencies reported improper payment estimates totaling $115.3 billion in fiscal year 2011, a decrease of $5.3 billion from the revised prior year reported estimate of $120.6 billion. The decrease in the fiscal year 2011 estimate is attributed primarily to decreases in program outlays for the Department of Labor’s Unemployment Insurance program, and decreases in reported error rates for fiscal year 2011 (compared to fiscal year 2010) for the Department of the Treasury’s (Treasury) Earned Income Tax Credit program and the Department of Health and Human Services’ (HHS) Medicare Advantage program. The $115.3 billion in estimated federal improper payments reported for fiscal year 2011 was attributable to 79 programs spread among 17 agencies. Specifically, as shown in table 1, these 10 programs accounted for about $107 billion or 93 percent of the total estimated improper payments agencies reported for fiscal year 2011. However, three additional programs providing estimates in fiscal year 2011 were not included in the governmentwide totals because their estimation methodologies were still under development. Over half of this amount, $797 million, can be attributed to the Medicare recovery audit contractor program which identifies improper Medicare payments—both overpayments and underpayments—in all 50 states. Remaining Challenges in Complete and Accurate Reporting of Improper Payments
Despite reported progress in reducing estimated improper payment amounts and error rates for some programs and activities during fiscal year 2011, the federal government continues to face challenges in determining the full extent of improper payments. Specifically, some agencies have not yet reported estimates for all risk-susceptible programs and some agencies’ estimating methodologies need to be refined. We have also found that internal control weaknesses exist, heightening the risk of improper payments occurring. Current and Future Actions to Move Forward with Improper Payment Reduction Strategies
A number of actions are under way across the federal government to help advance improper payment reduction goals. These initiatives, as well as additional actions in the future, will be needed to advance the federal government efforts to reduce improper payments. Identifying and analyzing the root causes of improper payments is key to developing effective corrective actions and implementing the controls needed to advance the federal government’s efforts to reduce and prevent improper payments. In this regard, implementing strong preventive controls can serve as the front-line defense against improper payments. Proactively preventing improper payments increases public confidence in the administration of benefit programs and avoids the difficulties associated with the “pay and chase”example, addressing program design issues that are a factor in causing improper payments may be an effective preventive strategy to be aspects of recovering overpayments. In addition, agencies can also enhance detective controls to identify and recover overpayments. Of the 79 programs with improper payment estimates in fiscal year 2011, we found that agencies reported the root causes information using the required categories for 42 programs in their fiscal year 2011 PARs and AFRs. Preventive controls may involve a variety of activities such as upfront validation of eligibility, predictive analytic tests, training programs, and timely resolution of audit findings. Data mining. Recovery auditing. Another area for further exploration is the broader use of incentives for states to implement effective preventive and detective controls. 2011 Financial Report of the United States Government. | Why GAO Did This Study
Over the past decade, GAO has issued numerous reports and testimonies highlighting improper payment issues across the federal government as well as at specific agencies. Fiscal year 2011 marked the eighth year of implementation of the Improper Payments Information Act of 2002 (IPIA), as well as the first year of implementation for the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010 (IPERA). IPIA requires executive branch agencies to annually identify programs and activities susceptible to significant improper payments, estimate the amount of improper payments for such programs and activities, and report these estimates along with actions taken to reduce them. IPERA, enacted July 22, 2010, amended IPIA and expanded requirements for recovering overpayments across a broad range of federal programs.
This testimony addresses (1) federal agencies reported progress in estimating and reducing improper payments, (2) remaining challenges in meeting current requirements to estimate and report improper payments and (3) actions that can be taken to move forward with improper payment reduction strategies. This testimony is primarily based on prior GAO reports, including GAOs fiscal year 2011 audit of the Financial Report of the United States Government. The testimony also includes improper payment information recently presented in federal entities fiscal year 2011 financial reports.
What GAO Found
Federal agencies reported an estimated $115.3 billion in improper payments in fiscal year 2011, a decrease of $5.3 billion from the prior year reported estimate of $120.6 billion. The $115.3 billion estimate was attributable to 79 programs spread among 17 agencies. Ten programs accounted for about $107 billion or 93 percent of the total estimated improper payments agencies reported for fiscal year 2011. The reported decrease in fiscal year 2011 was primarily related to three programsdecreases in program outlays for the Department of Labors Unemployment Insurance program, and decreases in reported error rates for the Earned Income Tax Credit program and the Medicare Advantage program. Further, the Office of Management and Budget reported that agencies recaptured $1.25 billion in improper payments to contractors, vendors, and healthcare providers in fiscal year 2011. Over half of this amount, $797 million, can be attributed to the Medicare Recovery Audit Contractor program which identifies Medicare overpayments and underpayments.
The federal government continues to face challenges in determining the full extent of improper payments. Some agencies have not yet reported estimates for all risk-susceptible programs, such as the Department of Health and Human Services Temporary Assistance for Needy Families program. Internal control weaknesses continue to exist, heightening the risk of improper payments. Some agencies estimating methodologies need to be refined. For example, two Department of Defense commercial payment programs were not included in the total governmentwide error rate because the estimation methodologies for these programs were still under development.
A number of actions are under way across government to help advance improper payment reduction goals. These actions and future initiatives will be needed to enhance federal government efforts to reduce improper payments. For example,
Additional information and analysis on the root causes of improper payment estimates would help agencies target effective corrective actions and implement preventive measures. Although agencies were required to report the root causes of improper payments in three categories beginning in fiscal year 2011, of the 79 programs with improper payment estimates for fiscal year 2011, 42 programs reported the root cause information using the required categories. In addition, because the three categories are general, additional analysis is critical to understanding the root causes.
Implementing strong preventive controls can help defend against improper payments, increasing public confidence and avoiding the difficult pay and chase aspects of recovering improper payments. Preventive controls involve activities such as upfront validation of eligibility using electronic data matching, predictive analytic tests, and training programs. Further, addressing program design issues, such as complex eligibility requirements, may also warrant further consideration.
Effective detection techniques to quickly identify and recover improper payments are also important to a successful reduction strategy. Detection activities include data mining and recovery audits. Another area for further exploration is the broader use of incentives to encourage and support states in efforts to implement effective preventive and detective controls. |
gao_GAO-02-691T | gao_GAO-02-691T_0 | In 1936, the Social Security Administration (SSA) created a numbering system designed to provide a unique identifier, the SSN, to each individual. The agency uses SSNs to track workers’ earnings and eligibility for Social Security benefits, and as of December 1998, SSA had issued 391 million SSNs. Government entities are beginning to make their records electronically available over the Internet. This is particularly true at the state and county level. SSNs Are Widely Used by Program Agencies at All Levels of Government, but Could Be Better Protected by Them
When federal, state, and county government agencies administer programs that deliver services and benefits to the public, they rely extensively on the SSNs of those receiving the benefits and services. In addition, they are particularly useful when agencies share information with others to verify the eligibility of benefit applicants or to collect outstanding debts. However, we found examples of some government entities that are trying innovative approaches to protect the SSNs in such records from public display. This would create new opportunities for gathering SSNs on a broader scale. Traditional Access to Public Records Has Practical Limitations That Would Not Exist if the Records Were Placed on the Internet
Traditionally, the public has been able to gain access to SSNs contained in public records by visiting the recorder’s office, state office, or court house; however, the requirement to visit a physical location and request or search for information on a case-by-case basis offers some measure of protection against the widespread collection and use of others’ SSNs from public records. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Social Security numbers (SSN), originally created in 1936 to track workers' earnings and eligibility for Social Security benefits is now used for many other purposes by both government and private sectors. The growth in electronic record keeping and the availability of information over the Internet, combined with the rise in identity theft, have heightened public concern about how their SSNs are being used. Federal agencies use SSNs to manage records, verify the eligibility of benefit applicants, collect outstanding debts, and do research and program evaluation.
What GAO Found
GAO found that federal laws designed to protect SSNs are not being followed consistently, Moreover, courts at all levels of government and offices at the state and county level maintain records that contain SSNs for the purpose of making these records available to the public. Recognizing that these SSNs may be misused, some government entities have taken steps to protect the SSNs from public display. At the same time, however, some government entities are considering making more public records available on the Intranet. Ease of access to electronically available files could encourage more information gathering from public records on a broader scale than possible previously. |
gao_GAO-09-478T | gao_GAO-09-478T_0 | The type and extent of individual taxpayers’ illegal offshore activity varies. Several Factors May Facilitate the Use of Offshore Jurisdictions to Avoid Paying Taxes
Limited transparency regarding U.S. persons’ financial activities in foreign jurisdictions contributes to the risk that some persons may use offshore entities to hide illegal activity from U.S. regulators and enforcement officials. Finally, financial advisors often facilitate abusive transactions by enabling taxpayers’ offshore schemes. IRS Faces Significant Challenges in Identifying the Nature and Extent of Offshore Noncompliance
IRS has several initiatives that target offshore tax evasion, but tax evasion and crimes involving offshore entities are difficult to detect and to prosecute. As noted earlier, individual U.S. taxpayers and corporations generally are required to self-report their foreign taxable income to IRS. In addition, when self-reporting does occur, the completeness and accuracy of reported information is not easily verified. Given the characteristics of offshore evasion, IRS examinations that include offshore tax issues for an individual can take much longer than other examinations. Specifically, our past work has shown that from 2002 through 2005, IRS examinations involving offshore tax evasion took a median of 500 more calendar days to develop and examine than other examinations. The amount of time required to complete offshore examinations is lengthy for several reasons, such as technical complexity and the difficulty of obtaining information from foreign sources. Because of the 3-year statute of limitations on assessments, the additional time needed to complete an offshore examination means that IRS sometimes has to prematurely end offshore examinations and sometimes chooses not to open them at all, despite evidence of likely noncompliance. In testimony before Congress, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue has said that in cases involving offshore bank and investment accounts in bank secrecy jurisdictions, it would be helpful for Congress to extend the time for assessing a tax liability with respect to offshore issues from 3 to 6 years. At a more fundamental level, jurisdictional limitations also make it difficult for IRS to identify potential noncompliance associated with offshore activity. Under the QI program, foreign financial institutions voluntarily report to IRS income earned and taxes withheld on U.S. source income, providing some assurance that taxes on U.S. source income sent offshore are properly withheld and income is properly reported. The previously discussed case of Swiss bank UBS provides a stark example of the QI program’s vulnerabilities. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
Much offshore financial activity by individual U.S. taxpayers is not illegal, but numerous schemes have been devised to hide the true ownership of funds held offshore and income moving between the United States and offshore jurisdictions. In recent years, GAO has reported on several aspects of offshore financial activity and the tax compliance and tax administration challenges such activity raises for the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). To assist the Congress in understanding these issues and to support Congress's consideration of possible legislative changes, GAO was asked to summarize its recent work describing individual offshore tax noncompliance, factors that enable offshore noncompliance, and the challenges that U.S. taxpayers' financial activity in offshore jurisdictions pose for IRS. This statement was primarily drawn from previously issued GAO products.
What GAO Found
Individual U.S. taxpayers engage in financial activity involving offshore jurisdictions for a variety of reasons. When they do, they are obligated to report any income earned in the course of those activities. They are also required to report when they control more than $10,000 in assets outside of the country. However, much of this required reporting depends on taxpayers knowing their reporting obligations and voluntarily complying. Some taxpayers do not comply with their income and asset reporting obligations. Limited transparency, the relative ease and low cost of establishing offshore entities, and an array of financial advisors can facilitate tax evasion. IRS's Qualified Intermediary program has helped IRS obtain information about U.S. taxpayers' offshore financial activity, but as the recent case against the large Swiss bank UBS AG underscores, the program alone is insufficient to address all offshore tax evasion. Earlier, GAO had recommended changes to improve QI reporting, make better use of reports, and enhance assurance that any fraudulent QI activity is detected. IRS examinations that include offshore tax issues can take much longer than other examinations. GAO's past work has shown that from 2002 through 2005, IRS examinations involving offshore tax evasion took a median of 500 more calendar days to develop and examine than other examinations. The amount of time required to complete offshore examinations is lengthy for several reasons, such as technical complexity and the difficulty of obtaining information from foreign sources. However, the same statute of limitations preventing IRS from assessing taxes or penalties more than 3 years after a return is filed applies to both domestic and offshore financial activity. The additional time needed to complete an offshore examination means that IRS sometimes has to prematurely end offshore examinations and sometimes chooses not to open them at all, despite evidence of likely noncompliance. In testimony before Congress, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue has said that in cases involving offshore bank and investment accounts in bank secrecy jurisdictions, it would be helpful for Congress to extend the time to assess a tax liability with respect to offshore issues from 3 to 6 years. |
gao_GAO-11-338T | gao_GAO-11-338T_0 | The goal of the first-lien mortgage modification program is to reduce struggling homeowners’ mortgage payments to more affordable levels— specifically to 31 percent of the borrower’s income. Most of the disbursements to date have been made for the first-lien modification program. In addition to first-lien modifications, Treasury has announced a number of TARP-funded housing programs, including those for modifying second liens held by borrowers with first-lien modifications under HAMP, reducing principal, offering temporary forbearance for unemployed borrowers, and providing alternatives to foreclosure (see table 1). Servicers Have Been Inconsistent in Soliciting and Evaluating HAMP Borrowers and More Treasury Action Is Needed to Ensure Equitable Treatment of Borrowers with Similar Circumstances
Although one of Treasury’s stated goals for HAMP is to standardize the loan modification process across the servicing industry, in our June 2010 report, we identified several inconsistencies in the way servicers treated borrowers under HAMP that could lead to inequitable treatment of similarly situated borrowers. We also noted that many borrowers had complained they did not receive timely responses to their HAMP applications and had difficulty obtaining information about the program. In addition, Treasury has not clearly informed borrowers that they can use the HOPE Hotline to raise concerns about servicers’ handling of HAMP loan modifications and to challenge potentially incorrect denials, likely limiting the number of borrowers who have used the hotline for these purposes. In our June 2010 report, we recommended that Treasury finalize and expeditiously issue consequences for servicers who do not comply with HAMP requirements. We made eight recommendations to improve the transparency and accountability of HAMP in June 2010. Treasury stated that it intended to implement some of the recommendations, but little action has been taken to date. Implementation Challenges Have Affected the Progress of Treasury’s Newer Housing Programs
The implementation of Treasury’s 2MP, HAFA, and PRA programs has been slow, and limited activity has been reported to date. All six of the large MHA servicers we spoke with identified extensive program requirements as reasons for the slow implementation of HAFA, including the initial requirement that applicants first be evaluated for a HAMP first-lien modification. We recommended in June 2010 that Treasury report activity under PRA, including the extent to which servicers determined that principal reduction was beneficial to mortgage investors but did not offer it, to ensure transparency in the implementation of this program. In addition, we found that Treasury could do more to build on the lessons learned from its first-lien modification program. As a result, servicers’ ability to effectively offer troubled homeowners second-lien modifications, foreclosure alternatives, and principal reductions is unclear. HAMP Borrowers Shared Several Characteristics, Including Reduced Income; Early Data Indicate that Borrowers Who Redefaulted from Permanent Modifications Were Further Into Delinquency
Our analysis of HAMP data for borrowers in trial and permanent modifications indicated that over half of borrowers cited curtailed income, such as reduced pay, as the primary reason for needing to lower their mortgage payments (56 percent of borrowers in active modifications and 53 percent in trial modifications). Borrowers who were either canceled from a trial modification or redefaulted from a permanent one shared several of these characteristics, including having high debt levels and being “underwater” on their mortgages. In addition, borrowers who were 60 or 90 days or more delinquent at the time of their trial modifications were 6 and 9 percent more likely to have trial modifications canceled, respectively, compared with borrowers who were not yet delinquent at the time of their trial modifications. Most Borrowers Denied or Canceled from Trial Modifications Have Avoided Foreclosure to Date, but Limits to Treasury’s Data Make Understanding Their Outcomes Difficult
We requested data from six servicers on the outcomes of borrowers who (1) were denied a HAMP trial modification, (2) had their trial modification canceled, or (3) redefaulted from a HAMP permanent modification. We also looked at data that Treasury had begun reporting on the disposition paths of borrowers who were denied or canceled from HAMP trial modifications. However, weaknesses in how Treasury requires servicers to report data make it difficult to understand the current status of these borrowers. Without accurate reporting of borrower outcomes, Treasury cannot know the actual extent to which borrowers who are denied, canceled, or redefaulted from HAMP are helped by other programs or evaluate the need for further action to assist this group of homeowners. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses our work on the Making Home Affordable (MHA) program, including the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP). Since the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) first announced the framework for its MHA program over 2 years ago, the number of homeowners facing potential foreclosure has remained at historically high levels. HAMP, the key component of MHA, provides financial incentives to servicers and mortgage holders/investors to offer modifications on first-lien mortgages. The modifications are intended to reduce borrowers' monthly mortgage payments to affordable levels to help these homeowners avoid foreclosure and keep their homes. Since HAMP's inception, concerns have been raised that the program is not reaching the expected number of homeowners. In two prior reports, we looked at the implementation of the HAMP first-lien modification program, noted that Treasury faced challenges in implementing it, and made several recommendations intended to address these challenges. In addition, our ongoing work examines the extent to which additional MHA programs have been successful at reaching struggling homeowners, the characteristics of homeowners who have been assisted by the HAMP first-lien modification program, and the outcomes for borrowers who do not complete HAMP trial or permanent modifications. These programs include the Second-Lien Modification Program (2MP) for those whose first liens have been modified under HAMP, the Home Affordable Foreclosure Alternatives (HAFA) program for those who are not successful in HAMP modifications, and the Principal Reduction Alternatives (PRA) program for borrowers who owe more on their mortgages than the value of their homes. This testimony is based on the report on HAMP that we issued in June 2010, as well as on preliminary observations from our ongoing work. Specifically, this statement focuses on (1) the extent to which HAMP servicers have treated borrowers consistently and the actions that Treasury and its financial agents have taken to ensure consistent treatment; (2) the status of Treasury's second-lien modification, foreclosure alternatives, and principal reduction programs; (3) the characteristics of borrowers who received HAMP modifications; and (4) outcomes for borrowers who are denied or fall out of HAMP trial or permanent first-lien modifications.
What GAO Found
In June 2010, we reported on several inconsistencies in the way servicers treated borrowers under HAMP that could lead to inequitable treatment of similarly situated borrowers. These inconsistencies involved how servicers solicited borrowers for the program, how they evaluated borrowers who were not yet 60 days delinquent on their mortgage payments, and how they handled borrower complaints. In addition, we noted that while Treasury had taken some steps to ensure servicer compliance with program guidance, it had not yet finalized consequences for servicer noncompliance. We made eight recommendations to improve the transparency and accountability of HAMP in June 2010. Treasury stated that it intended to implement some of the recommendations, but little action has been taken to date. Further, as part of our ongoing work, we identified several implementation challenges that had slowed implementation of newer MHA programs, specifically 2MP, HAFA, and the Principal Reduction Alternative (PRA). For example, we found that servicers experienced difficulties in using a required database to identify borrowers who might be eligible for 2MP, contributing to a slow start for this program. We found that borrowers who were in HAMP trial or permanent modifications tended to share certain characteristics, such as reduced income and having high debt levels, and that those who were canceled from trial modifications or redefaulted from permanent modifications tended to be further into delinquency at the time of their modifications. Lastly, we found that many borrowers who were denied or fell out of HAMP modifications had been able to avoid foreclosure to date. But weaknesses in how Treasury reports the disposition paths, or outcomes, for these borrowers make it difficult to understand exactly what has happened to these homeowners. |
gao_GAO-13-568 | gao_GAO-13-568_0 | But in years of catastrophic flooding, such as 2005, it has not done so and has exercised its authority to borrow from Treasury to pay claims. As of September 2012, about 85 WYO insurance companies accounted for about 85 percent of the more than 5.5 million policies in force. Less Than Half of Policyholders Purchase Maximum Coverage from NFIP for Buildings and Contents
Our analysis of NFIP’s database of policies showed that fewer than half of all residential and commercial policyholders had maximum flood coverage for buildings, a possible indicator of how many policyholders might purchase additional coverage if the limits were increased. In comparing maximum coverage rates in individual states, we found that, in general, states with higher median home values also had a higher percentage of policyholders purchasing coverage at the maximum limit. In addition to high costs, staff at consumer advocacy organizations and insurance industry organizations described a number of other reasons that a consumer might decide not to purchase flood insurance in general. Opinions also vary regarding the potential effects of lowering coverage limits. As with the baseline scenario, the results from these additional scenarios all suggest that higher coverage limits would have been associated with increased net revenue in most of the years analyzed, except for the years with catastrophic losses. Overall, the financial impact on the program of raising coverage limits would depend on the adequacy of the rates that would be charged for the additional coverage. This would lessen the premiums collected and overall risk exposure of the private flood insurance market. As we noted earlier, the percentage of residential and commercial policies at the maximum coverage amounts increased from 2002 through 2012, suggesting possible additional demand for increased coverage limits. Some brokers we interviewed also said that adding business interruption coverage to NFIP could result in less uninsured risk in the market. Under the assumption that FEMA’s rates would be lower than private market industry rates, industry stakeholders told us that more small- and medium-sized companies might be able to purchase this coverage because it would be more affordable to them. NFIP officials stated that they would need to hire In addition to these challenges, if the rates NFIP charged for business interruption coverage were not adequately risk-based, adding such coverage could negatively impact the program’s financial stability and thus further increase taxpayer exposure. Business interruption coverage is expensive through the private market and is generally only purchased by large companies. However, FEMA does not have historical data on additional living expense losses for flood, and the usefulness of any data from private insurers that offer this coverage is limited because these policies typically cover only a specific subset of the market and may not account for the larger number of policyholders that NFIP would cover in a disaster-stricken area. First, WYOs would need to adjust for changes in claims processing. For example, according to the FEMA study, this coverage can be added to some excess flood insurance policies, with limits from $7,500 up to $107,500. Because the excess market is generally selective, NFIP coverage for additional living expenses could allow additional consumers the ability to purchase this type of coverage, although FEMA officials noted that depending on how the coverage was structured, it could be fairly expensive. The Department noted that it concurred with our prior recommendation directing FEMA to take steps to ensure that methods and data used to set NFIP rates result in premiums that accurately reflect the risk of losses from flooding. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to examine (1) existing flood insurance coverage; (2) the potential effects on the National Flood Insurance Program’s (NFIP) financial condition, the private insurance market, and consumers of raising or lowering NFIP coverage limits; and (3) the potential effects on NFIP’s financial condition, the private insurance market, and consumers of allowing NFIP to offer optional coverage for business interruption and additional living expenses. To further address the effects on the private insurance market, NFIP, and consumers if NFIP were to change its coverage limits, or if NFIP were to offer optional coverage for business interruption and additional living expenses, we obtained some data in an industry survey last updated in 2010 pertaining to flood insurance programs outside NFIP that offered private flood insurance, catastrophe insurance that included coverage for flood, and other non-lender-placed and lender-placed flood coverage. | Why GAO Did This Study
NFIP was created in 1968 and is the only federal flood insurance available. It may be the sole source of insurance to some residents of flood-prone areas. Mainly due to catastrophic losses in 2005, the program became indebted to the U.S. Treasury and has been unable to repay this debt. Because of NFIPs financial instability and management challenges, GAO placed the program on its High-Risk List in 2006. The Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012 introduced many changes to the program and mandates GAO to study the effects of increasing the maximum coverage limits ($250,000 for residential buildings and $500,000 for commercial buildings) and providing optional coverage for business interruption and additional living expenses. This report discusses (1) existing flood insurance coverage, (2) the potential effects of changing NFIP coverage limits, and (3) the potential effects of allowing NFIP to offer optional coverage for business interruption and additional living expenses. To address these objectives, GAO analyzed data from NFIPs databases of policies and claims, reviewed prior reports, and interviewed brokers, insurers, and representatives from consumer advocacy and industry organizations.
What GAO Found
The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) currently has more than 5.5 million policyholders insured for about $1.3 trillion who pay about $3.5 billion in annual premiums, but less than half purchase maximum coverage--a possible indicator of how many might purchase additional coverage were it offered. However, from 2002 through 2012, the proportion of residential and commercial policies at maximum building coverage rose substantially--from 11 to 42 percent and from 21 to 36 percent, respectively. States along the Gulf and East Coasts have the most residential policyholders with maximum coverage. In addition, states with higher median home values generally have a higher percentage of policyholders purchasing coverage up to the limit. Industry stakeholders said that an unknown number of policyholders with higher-value properties choose to purchase additional, or excess, coverage above the NFIP limit through the private flood insurance market--a small and selective group of insurers.
Increasing coverage limits could increase the net revenue of the program and have varying effects on NFIP, the private insurance market, and consumers. Assuming that higher coverage limits had been in effect from 2002 through 2011, GAO's analysis suggests that NFIP still would have suffered losses during years with catastrophic floods, such as 2004 and 2005, but would have experienced net increases in revenue in other years. Such increases could have offset future losses or helped avoid additional debt, but the overall financial impact and risk to the program would depend on the adequacy of the rates charged, which GAO has questioned in the past, and the number of policyholders opting for additional coverage. Regarding the private flood insurance market and consumers, higher NFIP coverage limits could decrease participating insurers' overall risk exposure and provide more options to consumers, but might lessen participation of private insurers, as consumers might need to purchase less private insurance.
Adding optional coverage to NFIP for business interruption and additional living expenses could result in less uninsured risk in the market, but further negatively impact the financial stability of the program. Industry stakeholders told GAO that business interruption coverage is generally purchased by only larger companies, as its high cost prohibits small- and medium-sized companies from being able to afford it. In addition, adding business interruption coverage to NFIP could be particularly challenging. For example, properly pricing risk, underwriting, and claim processing can be complex. NFIP officials have stated that they would have to hire additional expertise in-house to offer this coverage. Similarly, offering optional coverage for additional living expenses has many of the same potential effects on NFIP, the private market, and consumers, although this coverage is generally less complex to administer.
What GAO Recommends
GAO continues to support previous recommendations to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) that address the need to ensure that the methods and data used to set NFIP rates accurately reflect the risk of losses from flooding. FEMA agreed and has taken some steps to begin to implement them. |
gao_GAO-12-490 | gao_GAO-12-490_0 | HUD Has Not Identified Standard Performance Data and Indicators Needed to Evaluate the Program
MTW agencies provide descriptions of their activities and performance information in their annual reports to HUD. HUD Lacks a Systematic Process for Identifying Lessons Learned
While HUD has identified some lessons learned on an ad hoc basis, it does not have a systematic process in place for identifying such lessons. HUD Generally Follows Its Monitoring Policies and Procedures, but Could Strengthen Them
HUD has policies and procedures in place to monitor MTW agencies. HUD’s Monitoring Policies and Procedures Have Several Key Weaknesses
Although HUD follows the policies and procedures that it has in place, it could do more to ensure that MTW agencies are demonstrating compliance with statutory requirements and to identify possible risks relating to activities implemented by each agency, among other things. Without a process for systematically assessing compliance with statutory requirements, HUD lacks assurance that agencies are complying with them. Third, HUD has not performed an annual assessment of program risks. As we noted previously, conclusive information about the effectiveness of the MTW program is limited in part because HUD does not have a plan for identifying and analyzing standard performance data, has not established performance indicators for the program as whole, and does not have a systematic process for identifying lessons learned. The report concluded that, given these limitations, expansion should occur only if newly admitted PHAs structure their programs for high-quality evaluations that permit lessons learned to be generalized beyond a single PHA experience. In addition, our own work, some research organizations, and affordable housing advocates question HUD’s ability to effectively manage an expanded MTW program. While this flexibility has allowed participating agencies to implement hundreds of activities, HUD has not done all that it can to evaluate the program’s effectiveness, identify successful approaches that could be applied to public housing agencies more broadly, or ensure that MTW agencies comply with program requirements. Without more complete knowledge of the program’s effectiveness and the extent to which agencies are adhering to program requirements, it is difficult for Congress to know whether an expanded MTW will benefit additional agencies and the residents they serve. Without more specific guidance on reporting performance information, HUD cannot be assured of collecting data that reflects the outcomes of activities. Additionally, HUD has not established performance indicators specific to MTW. Indicators linked to the statutory purposes of reducing costs, encouraging self-sufficiency, and increasing housing choices would help HUD demonstrate that the program has produced desired results. At the same time, HUD’s monitoring efforts are not as strong as they could be. Finally, just as HUD does not assess compliance with all three self-certified requirements, it does not verify the accuracy of key information that agencies self-report, including information on the impact of MTW activities. Annual site visits have been used primarily to provide technical assistance rather than to assess self-reported information. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve what is known about the effectiveness of the MTW program, we recommend that the Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development improve HUD’s guidance to MTW agencies on providing performance information in their annual reports by requiring that such information be quantifiable and outcome-oriented to the extent possible; develop and implement a plan for quantitatively assessing the effectiveness of similar activities and the program as a whole including the identification of standard performance data needed; and establish performance indicators for the MTW program as a whole. To improve HUD’s oversight of the MTW program, we recommend that the Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development issue guidance that clarifies key program terms, such as the three statutory purposes of the program and the five statutory requirements that MTW agencies must meet; develop and implement a systematic process for assessing compliance with statutory requirements; conduct an annual risk assessment for the MTW program and implement risk-based monitoring policies and procedures such as those currently being considered for site visits; and implement control activities designed to verify the accuracy of a sample of the performance information that MTW agencies self-report. HUD generally agreed with the three remaining recommendations. For example, HUD agreed that it should proactively identify lessons learned and described some of its recent efforts to do so. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Our objectives were to examine (1) what is known about the extent to which the Moving to Work (MTW) demonstration program is addressing the program’s statutory purposes, (2) the Department of Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD) monitoring of MTW agencies’ efforts to address these purposes and meet statutory requirements, and (3) potential benefits of and concerns about expanding the number of public housing agencies (PHA) that can participate in the demonstration program. | Why GAO Did This Study
HUDs MTW demonstration program gives participating PHAs the flexibility to create innovative housing strategies through their fiscal year 2018. MTW agencies must create activities linked to three statutory purposesreducing costs, providing incentives for self-sufficiency, and increasing housing choicesand meet five statutory requirements. Congress is considering expanding MTW and has asked GAO to examine what is known about (1) the programs success in addressing the three purposes, (2) HUDs monitoring efforts, and (3) the potential benefits of and concerns about expansion. GAO analyzed the most current annual reports for 30 MTW agencies; compared HUDs monitoring efforts with internal control standards; and interviewed agency officials, researchers, and industry officials.
What GAO Found
Public housing agencies (PHA) that participate in the Moving to Work (MTW) program report annually on the performance of their activities, which include efforts to reduce administrative costs and encourage residents to work. But this performance information varies, and the Department of Housing and Urban Developments (HUD) guidance does not specify that it be quantifiable and outcome oriented. Further, HUD has not identified the performance data that would be needed to assess the results of similar MTW activities or the program as a whole and has not established performance indicators for the program. The shortage of such analyses and indicators has hindered comprehensive evaluation efforts, although such evaluations are key to determining the success of any demonstration program. Further, while HUD has identified some lessons learned from the program, it has no systematic process to identify them and thus has relied primarily on ad hoc information. The absence of a systematic process for identifying lessons learned limits HUDs ability to promote useful practices that could be more broadly implemented to address the purposes of the program.
HUD generally follows its MTW monitoring policies and procedures, but they could be strengthened. HUD staff review and approve each MTW agencys annual plan to ensure that planned activities are linked to program purposes and visit each MTW agency annually to provide technical assistance. But HUD has not taken key monitoring steps set out in internal control standards, such as issuing guidance that defines program terms or assessing compliance with all of the requirements. Without clarifying key terms and establishing a process for assessing compliance with statutory requirements, HUD lacks assurance that agencies are actually complying with the statute. Additionally, HUD has not done an annual assessment of program risks despite its own requirement to do so and has not developed risk-based monitoring procedures. Without taking these steps, HUD lacks assurance that it has identified all risks to the program. Finally, HUD does not have policies or procedures in place to verify the accuracy of key information that agencies self-report. For example, HUD staff do not verify self-reported performance information during their reviews of annual reports or annual site visits. Without verifying at least some information, HUD cannot be sure that self-reported information is accurate.
Expanding the MTW program may offer benefits but also raises questions. According to HUD, affordable housing advocates, and MTW agencies, expanding MTW to additional PHAs would allow agencies to develop more activities tailored to local conditions and result in more lessons learned. However, data limitations and monitoring weaknesses raise questions about expansion. HUD recently reported that expansion should occur only if newly admitted PHAs structured their programs to permit high-quality evaluations and ensure that lessons learned could be generalized. Until more complete information on the programs effectiveness and the extent to which agencies are adhering to program requirements is available, it will be difficult for Congress to know whether an expanded MTW would benefit additional agencies and the residents they serve. Some researchers and MTW agencies suggested alternatives to expansion, including implementing a program that was more limited in scope.
What GAO Recommends
GAO makes eight recommendations to HUD: that HUD improve its guidance on reporting performance information, develop a plan for identifying and analyzing standard performance data, establish performance indicators, systematically identify lessons learned, clarify key terms, implement a process for assessing compliance with statutory requirements, do annual assessments of program risks, and verify the accuracy of self-reported data. HUD generally or in part agreed with seven of them. HUD disagreed with our recommendation that it create overall performance indicators. GAO believes, however, that they are critical to demonstrating program results and thus maintains its recommendation. |
gao_GAO-09-67 | gao_GAO-09-67_0 | USDA Made Millions of Dollars in Farm Payments to Potentially Ineligible Individuals from 2003 through 2006
We identified 2,702 individuals—out of the 1.8 million individuals receiving farm payments from 2003 through 2006—who were potentially ineligible for farm payments because they had a 3-year average AGI that exceeded $2.5 million and derived less than 75 percent of their income from farming, ranching, or forestry operations. Nevertheless, USDA paid over $49 million to these individuals. USDA Does Not Have Adequate Management Controls to Identify Potentially Ineligible High- Income Individuals
Payments to potentially ineligible high-income individuals have occurred because USDA does not have management controls, such as reviewing an appropriate sample of recipients’ tax returns, to verify that payments are going only to individuals who do not exceed the income eligibility caps. Because USDA has drawn a sample of individuals receiving farm payments that has not routinely tested for income eligibility, it could not ensure that only individuals who have not exceeded the income eligibility caps were receiving farm payments. According to these and other USDA officials, resource constraints that hamper USDA’s ability to examine complex tax and financial information contribute to USDA’s inability to verify that each individual who receives farm program payments were eligible under the AGI provision. 2008 Farm Bill Increases the Number of Individuals Likely Affected by the AGI Cap
Because of lower income eligibility caps under the 2008 Farm Bill, the number of individuals whose AGI exceeds the caps will likely rise, increasing the risk that USDA could make improper payments to more individuals. Individuals Who Receive Farm Program Payments Generally Report Higher Incomes Than All Tax Filers
Individuals participating in farm programs are three times more likely to have an AGI exceeding $500,000 than all individuals who file taxes. Furthermore, as figure 2 shows, 12 of every 1,000 individuals receiving farm program payments reported AGI between $500,000 and $1 million compared with about 4 of all tax filers who reported income at this level. The 2008 Farm Bill directs USDA to establish statistically valid procedures to conduct targeted audits of persons and legal entities that are most likely to exceed the income eligibility caps. In this context, we were asked to evaluate (1) how effectively the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) implemented provisions under the 2002 Farm Bill that prohibited payments to individuals whose 3-year average AGI exceeded $2.5 million and who derived less than 75 percent of that income from farming, ranching, or forestry operations; (2) the potential impact of the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008’s (2008 Farm Bill) AGI provisions on individuals who receive farm program payments; and (3) the distribution of income for individuals receiving farm program payments compared with all tax filers. | Why GAO Did This Study
Farmers receive about $16 billion annually in federal farm program payments. These payments go to about 2 million recipients, both individuals and entities. GAO previously has reported that the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) did not consistently ensure that these payments went only to those who meet eligibility requirements. GAO was asked to evaluate (1) how effectively USDA implemented 2002 Farm Bill provisions prohibiting payments to individuals or entities whose income exceeded $2.5 million and who derived less than 75 percent of that income from farming, ranching, or forestry operations, (2) the potential impact of the 2008 Farm Bill's income eligibility provisions on individuals who receive farm payments, and (3) the distribution of income of these individuals compared with all 2006 tax filers. GAO compared USDA data on individuals receiving payments with the latest available Internal Revenue Service (IRS) data on these individuals.
What GAO Found
USDA does not have management controls, such as reviewing an appropriate sample of recipients' tax returns, to verify that payments are made only to individuals who do not exceed income eligibility caps and therefore cannot be assured that millions of dollars in farm program payments it made are proper. GAO found that of the 1.8 million individuals receiving farm payments from 2003 through 2006, 2,702 had an average adjusted gross income (AGI) that exceeded $2.5 million and derived less than 75 percent of their income from farming, ranching, or forestry operations, thereby making them potentially ineligible for farm payments. Nevertheless, USDA paid over $49 million to these individuals. According to USDA officials, a number of factors--such as resource constraints that hamper its ability to examine complex tax and financial information as well as a lack of authority to obtain and use IRS tax filer data for such purposes--contribute to the department's inability to verify that each individual who receives farm program payments complies with income eligibility provisions. However, USDA does not routinely sample individuals receiving farm payments to test for income eligibility; instead, its annual sample selected for review is based primarily on compliance with eligibility requirements other than income. The 2008 Farm Bill directs USDA to use statistical methods to target those individuals most likely to exceed income eligibility caps. The 2008 Farm Bill will increase the number of individuals likely to exceed the income eligibility caps. That is, with lower income eligibility caps under the 2008 Farm Bill, the number of individuals whose AGI exceeds the caps will rise, increasing the risk that USDA will make improper payments to more individuals. For example, had the new Farm Bill been in effect in 2006, as many as 23,506 individuals who received farm program payments would likely have been ineligible for crop subsidy and disaster assistance payments totaling as much as $90 million. Compared with all tax filers, individuals who participated in farm programs in 2006 are more likely to have higher incomes. For example, 12 of every 1,000 individuals receiving farm program payments reported AGI between $500,000 and $1 million compared with about 4 of all tax filers who reported income at this level. |
gao_GAO-16-337 | gao_GAO-16-337_0 | Federal Data Show a Decline in Injuries and Illnesses, Yet Meat and Poultry Workers Continue to Face Hazardous Conditions
Federal Data Show a Decline in Injury and Illness Rates for Meat and Poultry Workers
Injury and illness rates of total recordable cases in the meat and poultry industry declined from an estimated 9.8 cases per 100 full-time workers in calendar year 2004 to 5.7 cases in 2013, according to BLS data (see fig. However, the rates in the meat and poultry industry remained higher than those of manufacturing from 2004 through 2013. While injury and illness rates have declined in the meat and poultry industry, meat workers sustained a higher estimated rate of injuries and illnesses than poultry workers from calendar years 2004 through 2013, according to BLS data (see fig. USDA data show that its inspectors experience injuries and illnesses similar to those experienced by other meat and poultry workers. Evaluations, Studies, and Stakeholder Views Indicate that Hazardous Work Conditions Persist
Since our findings in 2005 on meat and poultry workers facing hazardous work conditions, NIOSH health hazard evaluations and academic studies have found that meat and poultry workers continue to face the types of hazards we cited, including hazards associated with musculoskeletal disorders, chemical hazards, biological hazards from pathogens and animals, and traumatic injury hazards from machines and tools. DOL Faces Challenges Gathering Data on Injury and Illness Rates Because of Industry Characteristics and Inadequate Data Collection
Meat and Poultry Worker Vulnerability and Employer Practices May Contribute to Underreporting of Injuries and Illnesses
Workers and employers may underreport injuries and illnesses in the meat and poultry industry because of worker concerns over potential loss of employment, and employer concerns over potential costs associated with injuries and illnesses, according to federal officials, worker advocacy groups, and studies. Specifically, BLS’s annual SOII only collects injury and illness details—such as the type of injury or illness—on cases that result in workers having to take days off from work. For example, the survey does not collect detailed information on MSDs that resulted in a worker being placed on work restriction, transferred to a different job, or continuing in the same job after medical treatment, making it more difficult to identify and track these MSDs. Federal internal control standards call for agencies to track data to help them make decisions and meet their goals. Our findings raise questions about whether the federal government is doing all it can to ensure it collects the data it needs to support worker protection and workplace safety. Strengthening DOL’s data collection on worker injuries and illnesses is the first step towards achieving that goal. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
This report (1) describes what is known about injuries, illnesses, and hazards in the meat and poultry industry since we last reported, and (2) examines what, if any, challenges the Department of Labor (DOL) faces in gathering data on injury and illness rates in this industry. A limitation of this data source is that workers’ compensation data likely undercounts injuries and illnesses. The information gathered in these interviews is not generalizable to all plants or workers. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOL is responsible for gathering data on workplace injuries and illnesses, including those in the meat and poultry industry, where workers may experience injuries and illnesses such as sprains, cuts, burns, amputations, repetitive motion injuries, and skin disorders. GAO was asked to examine developments since its 2005 report, which found this industry was one of the most hazardous in the United States and that DOL data on worker injuries and illnesses may not be accurate, and recommended that DOL improve its data collection.
This report (1) describes what is known about injuries, illnesses, and hazards in the meat and poultry industry since GAO last reported, and (2) examines DOL's challenges gathering injury and illness data in this industry. GAO analyzed DOL data from 2004 through 2015, including injury and illness data through 2013, the most recent data available, and examined academic and government studies and evaluations on injuries and illnesses. GAO interviewed DOL and other federal officials, worker advocates, industry officials, and workers, and visited six meat and poultry plants selected for a mix of species and states. The information gathered in these visits is not generalizable to all plants or workers.
What GAO Found
Injury and illness rates in the meat and poultry slaughtering and processing industry declined from 2004 through 2013, similar to rates in all U.S. manufacturing, according to Department of Labor (DOL) data (see figure), yet hazardous conditions remain. The rates declined from an estimated 9.8 cases per 100 full-time workers in 2004 to 5.7 in 2013. However, these rates continued to be higher than rates for manufacturing overall. Meat workers sustained a higher estimated rate of injuries and illnesses than poultry workers, according to DOL data. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) evaluations and academic studies have found that workers continue to face the hazardous conditions GAO cited in 2005, including tasks associated with musculoskeletal disorders, exposure to chemicals and pathogens, and traumatic injuries from machines and tools.
DOL faces challenges gathering data on injury and illness rates for meat and poultry workers because of underreporting and inadequate data collection. For example, workers may underreport injuries and illnesses because they fear losing their jobs, and employers may underreport because of concerns about potential costs. Another data gathering challenge is that DOL only collects detailed data for those injuries and illnesses that result in a worker having to take days away from work. These detailed data do not include injuries and illnesses such as musculoskeletal disorders that result in a worker being placed on work restriction or transferred to another job. Further, DOL does not have complete injury and illness data on meat and poultry sanitation workers because they may not be classified in the meat and poultry industry if they work for contractors. Federal internal control standards require agencies to track data to help them make decisions and meet their goals. These limitations in DOL's data collection raise questions about whether the federal government is doing all it can to collect the data it needs to support worker protection and workplace safety.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making three recommendations, including that DOL improve its data on musculoskeletal disorders and sanitation workers in the meat and poultry industry. DOL, USDA, and CDC concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-09-927T | gao_GAO-09-927T_0 | Background
DOD plays a support role in CBRNE consequence management, including providing those capabilities needed to save lives, alleviate hardship or suffering, and minimize property damage caused by the incident. The federal government provides assistance to states if they require additional capabilities and request assistance. DOD CBRNE Consequence Management Plans and Integration with Other Federal Plans
DOD has operational plans for CBRNE consequence management. However, DOD has not integrated its plans with other federal government plans, because the concept and strategic plans associated with the Integrated Planning System mandated by Presidential directive in December 2007 have not been completed. DOD Has Developed Plans for CBRNE Consequence Management
Unlike most federal agencies, DOD has had CBRNE consequence management operational plans for over 10 years. DOD’s plans and those of other federal and state entities cannot be fully integrated until the supporting strategic and concept plans are completed. However, its ability to respond effectively may be compromised because (1) its planned response times may not meet the requirements of a particular incident, (2) it may lack sufficient capacity in some key capabilities, and (3) it faces challenges in adhering to its strategy for sourcing the CCMRFs with available units. These challenges to sourcing the CCMRF increase the risk that DOD’s ability to effectively respond to one or more major domestic CBRNE incidents will be compromised. That risk can be mitigated by plans that integrate the active and reserve component portions of the CCMRF and agreements between DOD and the states on the availability of National Guard units and the duty status under which they would respond to a major incident requiring federal forces. DOD Actions on CCMRF Readiness and Training and the Impact of Current Deployments
DOD has taken a number of actions in the past year to improve the readiness of its CCMRF units. However, our ongoing work shows that the CCMRF may be limited in its ability to successfully conduct consequence management operations because (1) it does not conduct realistic full force field training to confirm units’ readiness to assume the mission or to deploy rapidly, and (2) conflicting priorities between the CCMRF mission and overseas deployments impact some units’ mission preparation and unit cohesion. Therefore, for the first time, identified units are conducting individual and collective training focused on the CCMRF mission. While DOD has identified CCMRF as a high priority mission, competing demands associated with follow-on missions may distract from a unit’s focus on the domestic mission. These training and force rotation issues have prevented DOD from providing the kind of stability to the force that would allow units to build cohesiveness. CCMRF Requirements Development, Funding, and Oversight
DOD is making progress in identifying and providing funding and equipment to meet CCMRF mission requirements; however, its efforts to identify total program requirements have not been completed, and its approach to providing program funding has been fragmented, because funding responsibilities for CCMRF-related costs are dispersed throughout DOD and are not subject to central oversight. Extent of Dedicated Funds for Some CCMRF Training Impacts Mission
In the spring of 2008, sourcing priority for the CCMRF mission increased substantially within the department, and funding was provided for specific aspects of the mission. This, in turn, puts units at risk of not being fully prepared if they are needed to respond to an incident. Because DOD has assigned funding responsibilities across the department and because much of the funding for the CCMRF is coming from existing operations and maintenance accounts, DOD lacks visibility across the department over the total funding requirements for this mission. Without an overarching approach to developing requirements and providing funding, and a centralized focal point to ensure that all requirements have been identified and fully funded, DOD’s ability to carry out this high-priority homeland security mission in an efficient and effective manner is at risk. We plan to provide this subcommittee and our other congressional requesters with our final report on DOD’s CBRNE consequence management efforts in September 2009. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD plays a support role in managing Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives (CBRNE) incidents, including providing capabilities needed to save lives, alleviate hardship or suffering, and minimize property damage. This testimony addresses GAO's preliminary observations on DOD's role in CBRNE consequence management efforts and addresses the extent to which (1) DOD's plans and capabilities are integrated with other federal government plans, (2) DOD has planned for and structured its force to provide CBRNE consequence management assistance, (3) DOD's CBRNE Consequence Management Response Forces (CCMRF) are prepared to perform their mission; and (4) DOD has funding plans for the CCMRF that are linked to requirements for specialized CBRNE capabilities. GAO reviewed DOD's plans for CBRNE consequence management and documents from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency. GAO also met with officials from the Undersecretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, U.S Northern Command, U.S. Army Forces Command, U.S. Army North, the National Guard Bureau, and some CCMRF units.
What GAO Found
DOD has its own CBRNE consequence management plans but has not integrated them with other federal government plans because all elements of the Integrated Planning System mandated by Presidential directive in December 2007 have not been completed. The system is to develop and link planning documents at the federal, state, and local levels. While the system's framework is established, the CBRNE concept and strategic plans that provide further guidance are incomplete. DOD has had operational plans in place and revises these plans regularly. However, until the Integrated Planning System and its associated plans are complete, DOD's plans and those of other federal and state entities will not be integrated, and it will remain unclear whether DOD's CCMRF will address potential gaps in capabilities. With a goal to respond to multiple, near-simultaneous, catastrophic CBRNE incidents, DOD has plans to provide the needed capabilities, but its planned response times may not meet incident requirements, it may lack sufficient capacity in some capabilities, and it faces challenges to its strategy for sourcing all three CCMRFs with available units. Without assigned units and plans that integrate the active and reserve portions of the CCMRF, and agreements between DOD and the states on the availability of National Guard units and the duty status in which they would respond to an incident requiring federal forces, DOD's ability to train and deploy forces in a timely manner to assist civil authorities to respond to multiple CBRNE incidents is at risk. DOD has taken a number of actions in the past year to improve the readiness of units assigned to the CCMRF, increasing both individual and collective training focused on the mission and identifying the mission as high priority. However, the CCMRF has not conducted realistic full force field training to confirm units' readiness to assume the mission or to deploy rapidly. Competing demands of overseas missions may distract from a unit's focus on the domestic mission, and some CCMRF units rotate more frequently than stated goals. These training and force rotation problems have prevented DOD from providing the kind of stability to the force that would allow units to build cohesiveness. DOD is making progress in identifying and providing funding and equipment to meet CCMRF mission requirements; however, its efforts to identify total program requirements have not been completed, and funding responsibilities have been assigned across the department and are not subject to central oversight. When the CCMRF mission priority increased in the spring of 2008, more funding was provided. However, units did not have dedicated funding and thus purchased equipment with existing funding which is also used for other missions. DOD lacks visibility over the mission's total funding requirements. Without an overarching approach to developing requirements and providing funding and a centralized focal point to ensure that all requirements have been identified and funded, DOD's ability to ensure that its forces are prepared to carry out this high priority mission remains challenged. |
gao_GAO-04-73 | gao_GAO-04-73_0 | Of U.S. charities with revenues of $100,000 or more, we estimate that 2.7 percent, or about 4,300 charities nationwide, have vehicle donation programs. Small Percentage of Taxpayers Claimed Deductions for Vehicle Donations
Our analysis of IRS tax return data for tax year 2000 showed that a small percentage of taxpayers claimed deductions for vehicle donations. The 733,000 returns represented about 17 percent of the 4.4 million returns filed with noncash contribution deductions over $500. We estimate that vehicle donation deductions lowered taxpayers’ income tax liability by an estimated $654 million. Other important reasons cited in the surveys for donating vehicles were to help a charitable cause and to easily dispose of an unwanted vehicle. Charities Receive Less than Donors Claimed as the Value of the Vehicle for the 54 Donations We Reviewed
Although proceeds from vehicle donations are a welcomed source of revenue, it was not a crucial source of income for the majority of the charities we reviewed. Based on information from charities we spoke with, this difference is due in part to donated vehicles being often sold at auto auctions at wholesale prices, and processing expenses and third-party fees reducing the amount of proceeds charities receive. Revenue to Charities from Vehicle Donations Varied
The annual net proceeds from vehicle donations for 2002 reported by the charities we interviewed ranged from as little as $1,000 for 2 vehicles donated to a senior center, to over $8.8 million for 1 national charity that received over 70,000 vehicles. California is the only state that collects data on the proceeds received by charities from vehicle donation programs. However, since we did not have additional information, such as the vehicle’s condition and mileage, we could not determine whether the reported valuations claimed by donors accurately reflected fair market value. Results of National Research Program and Donated Property Task Force May Lead to More Noncash Contribution Compliance Activities
While more compliance resources are being devoted to higher priority audit issues such as abusive tax shelters and high-income nonfilers, IRS’s National Research Program is to provide data on compliance problems associated with noncash contributions, including deductions for donated vehicles. In July 2002, the task force developed several draft recommendations for improving IRS’s oversight of donated property programs and deductions. In addition, a number of nongovernmental sources offer charities similar advice. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine: (1) the number of charities with vehicle donation programs, and the number of taxpayers claiming deductions for vehicle donations; (2) the vehicle donation process; (3) proceeds received by charities from vehicle donations to what donors claim for vehicle donation deductions; (4) the Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS) and state compliance activities directed at vehicle donations and incidents of noncompliance; and (5) guidance available to taxpayers and charities to help them make informed decisions regarding vehicle donations. | Why GAO Did This Study
Donating a vehicle to charity enables a donor to support a charitable cause, dispose of an unwanted vehicle, and receive a tax benefit. More charities are turning to vehicle donation programs as a means for raising funds. As a result, our objectives were to: (1) determine the number of charities with vehicle donation programs, and the number of taxpayers claiming deductions for vehicle donations; (2) compare the proceeds received by charities from vehicle donations to what donors claimed for those deductions; and (3) describe related Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and state compliance activities.
What GAO Found
An estimated 4,300 charities have vehicle donation programs, based on a GAO survey of 157,500 charities with revenue of $100,000 or more. Taxpayers claimed deductions for donated vehicles on about 733,000 of the 4.4 million tax year 2000 returns filed with noncash deductions over $500, lowering taxpayer liability by an estimated $654 million. For the charities surveyed, proceeds from vehicle donations ranged from $1,000 for one charity, to $8.8 million for another. However, proceeds generally constituted a small share of total charity revenue for the majority of charities GAO reviewed. In addition, for two-thirds of the 54 specific vehicle donations GAO examined, charities received 5 percent or less of the value donors claimed as deductions on their tax return. Differences in proceeds received by the charity and value claimed by a taxpayer were due in part, to vehicles being sold at auctions at wholesale prices, and proceeds being reduced by vehicle processing and fundraising costs. Due to a lack of available data on the condition of donated vehicles, GAO could not determine whether taxpayers appropriately valued their vehicles when claiming associated tax deductions. The IRS has some activities designed to detect noncompliant claims for noncash deductions, including vehicle donations. However, the IRS has not pursued potential leads from these activities because tax revenue yields are less than other potential noncompliance cases, such as abusive tax shelters. IRS's ongoing National Research Program study may provide information on how to deal with donated vehicle compliance issues. Also, an IRS task force drafted recommendations for improving IRS's oversight of charities' donated property programs. State officials have filed legal actions in a number of cases involving problems with vehicle donation programs, such as an individual soliciting vehicle donations for fictitious charities. |
gao_NSIAD-98-73 | gao_NSIAD-98-73_0 | DISA’s Joint Interoperability Test Command is the sole certifier of C4I systems. DOD guidance requires that a system be tested and certified before approval to produce and field it. Compliance With Certification Requirement Is Inadequate
Commanders in chief, services, and DOD agencies are generally not complying with the certification requirement. Test Command officials said they did not know precisely how many of these systems require certification. According to Test Command officials, previously certified systems that were later modified are not consistently submitted for recertification as required. In fiscal year 1997, the number of intelligence systems tested and certified increased to 14. Nevertheless, systems receive approval for production and fielding even though they may not have been certified or obtained waivers. Weaknesses Exist in DOD’s Certification Process
Noncompliance with interoperability testing and certification stems from weaknesses in the certification process itself. For example, DOD lacks a complete and accurate listing of C4I systems requiring certification and a plan to prioritize systems for testing. As a result, the Test Command may not be focusing its limited resources on certifying the most critical systems first. The process also does not include a mechanism to notify the services about interoperability problems identified in joint exercises, and the Test Command has only recently begun to contact the services regarding the noted problems. Test Panel Does Not Have a Formal Process for Informing DOD Organizations About Expired Waivers
According to a Test Panel official, the Panel does not have a formal process to ensure that fielded systems with expired waivers are tested. Improvements to the certification process are needed to provide better assurance that C4I systems most critical to joint operations are certified for interoperability. Recommendations
To ensure that systems critical to effective joint operations do not proceed to production without due consideration given to the need for interoperability certification, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense require the acquisition authorities to adhere to the requirement that C4I systems be tested and certified for interoperability prior to the production and fielding decision unless an official waiver has been granted. To improve the process for certifying C4I systems for interoperability, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, direct the service secretaries, in collaboration with the Director of DISA to verify and validate all C4 data in the Defense Integration Support Tool and develop a complete and accurate list of C4I systems requiring certification and
Director of DISA to ensure that the status of system’s certification is added to the Defense Integration Support Tool and that this database be properly maintained to better monitor C4 systems for interoperability compliance. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed: (1) whether Department of Defense (DOD) organizations are complying with interoperability testing and certification requirements for command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) systems; and (2) what actions, if any, are needed to improve the current certification process.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) DOD does not have an effective process for certifying existing, newly developed, and modified C4I systems for interoperability; (2) many C4I systems have not been certified for interoperability and, in fact, DOD does not know how many require certification; (3) improvements to the certification process are needed to provide DOD better assurance that C4I systems critical to effective joint operations are tested and certified for interoperability; (4) DOD organizations are not complying with the current interoperability testing and certification process for existing, newly developed, and modified C4I systems; (5) according to Test Command officials, many C4I systems that require interoperability testing have not been certified or have not received a waiver from the requirement; (6) the extent of this noncompliance could have far-reaching effects on the use of such systems in joint operations; (7) noncompliance with interoperability testing and certification stems from weaknesses in the certification process itself; (8) while DOD guidance requires that all new systems be certified or obtain a waiver from certification testing before they enter production and fielding, systems proceed to these latter acquisition stages without being certified; (9) this occurs, in part, because Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) Joint Interoperability Test Command officials lack the authority to compel DOD organizations to submit their C4I systems for testing; (10) although DOD guidance spells out a specific interoperability certification requirement, many DOD organizations are unaware of it; (11) others simply ignore the requirement because it is not strictly enforced or because they do not adequately budget for such testing; (12) another fundamental weakness in the process is the lack of a complete and accurate listing of C4I systems requiring certification and a plan to prioritize systems for testing; (13) as a result, the Test Command may not be focusing its limited resources on certifying the most critical systems first; (14) prioritization is important since the Command has reviewed only about 100 systems per year, and a requirement for recertification of modified systems continually adds to the number of systems requiring certification; and (15) the process does not include notifying the services about interoperability problems, and the Test Command has only recently begun to contact the services regarding the noted problems. |
gao_GAO-10-441T | gao_GAO-10-441T_0 | Although Large Commercial Airplanes Have Experienced Few Icing-Related Accidents since 1998, the Many Reported Icing Incidents Suggest that Icing Is an Ongoing Risk to Aviation Safety
According to NTSB’s aviation accident database, from 1998 to 2009 one large commercial airplane was involved in a nonfatal accident after encountering icing conditions during flight and five large commercial airplanes were involved in nonfatal accidents related to snow or ice on runways. Although there have been few accidents, FAA and others recognize that incidents are potential precursors to accidents. During this same time period, NASA’s Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) received over 600 icing and winter weather-related incident involving large commercial airplanes. FAA and Other Aviation Stakeholders Have Undertaken a Variety of Efforts Aimed at Improving Safety in Icing/Winter Weather Conditions
FAA Adopted a Plan to Increase Safety in Icing Conditions and Has Taken Other Actions to Improve Safety in Winter Weather
Following the 1994 fatal crash of American Eagle Flight 4184 in Roselawn, Indiana, FAA issued a multiyear plan in 1997for improving the safety of aircraft operating in icing conditions and created a steering committee to monitor the progress of the planned activities. Over the last decade, FAA made progress on the implementation of the objectives specified in its multiyear plan by issuing or amending regulations, airworthiness directives (ADs), and voluntary guidance to provide icing-related safety oversight. For example, FAA has supported NASA research related to severe icing conditions and the National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR) research related to weather and aircraft icing. For example, NTSB investigates and reports on civil aviation accidents and issues safety recommendations to FAA and others, some of which it deems most critical and places on a list of “Most Wanted” recommendations. The private sector has also contributed to efforts to prevent accidents and incidents related to icing and winter weather conditions. For example, as shown in figure 2, aircraft manufacturers have deployed various technologies such as wing deicers, anti-icing systems, and heated wings. In addition, airports operate ground deicing and runway clearing programs that help ensure clean wings (see fig. 3) and runways. Continued Attention to Regulation, Training, and Coordination Issues Could Further Mitigate the Risks of Winter Weather Operations
While FAA and others are undertaking efforts to mitigate the risks of aircraft icing and winter weather operations, through our interviews and discussions with government and industry stakeholders, we have identified challenges related to these risks that, if addressed by ongoing or planned efforts, could improve aviation safety. These challenges include (1) improving the timeliness of FAA’s winter weather rulemaking efforts, (2) ensuring the availability of adequate resources for icing-related research and development (R&D), (3) ensuring that pilot training is thorough, relevant, and realistic, (4) ensuring the collection and distribution of timely and accurate weather information, and (5) developing a more integrated approach to effectively manage winter operations. | Why GAO Did This Study
Ice formation on aircraft can disrupt the smooth flow of air over the wings and prevent the aircraft from taking off or decrease the pilot's ability to maintain control of the aircraft. Taxi and landing operations can also be risky in winter weather. Despite a variety of technologies designed to prevent ice from forming on planes, as well as persistent efforts by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and other stakeholders to mitigate icing risks, icing remains a serious concern. As part of an ongoing review, this statement provides preliminary information on (1) the extent to which large commercial airplanes have experienced accidents and incidents related to icing and contaminated runways, (2) the efforts of FAA and aviation stakeholders to improve safety in icing and winter weather operating conditions, and (3) the challenges that continue to affect aviation safety in icing and winter weather operating conditions. GAO analyzed data obtained from FAA, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and others. GAO conducted data reliability testing and determined that the data used in this report were sufficiently reliable for our purposes. Further, GAO obtained information from senior FAA and NTSB officials, representatives of the Flight Safety Foundation, and representatives of some key aviation industry stakeholder organizations. GAO provided a draft of this statement to FAA, NTSB, and NASA and incorporated their comments where appropriate.
What GAO Found
According to NTSB's aviation accident database, from 1998 to 2009 one large commercial airplane was involved in a nonfatal accident after encountering icing conditions during flight and five large commercial airplanes were involved in nonfatal accidents due to snow or ice on runways. However, FAA and others recognize that incidents are potential precursors to accidents and the many reported icing incidents suggest that these airplanes face ongoing risks from icing. For example, FAA and NASA databases contain information on over 600 icing-related incidents involving large commercial airplanes. FAA and other aviation stakeholders have undertaken many efforts to improve safety in icing conditions. For example, in 1997, FAA issued a multiyear plan for improving the safety of aircraft operating in icing conditions and has since made progress on the objectives specified in its plan by issuing regulations, airworthiness directives, and voluntary guidance, among other initiatives. Other government entities that have taken steps to increase aviation safety in icing conditions include NTSB, which has issued numerous recommendations as a result of its aviation accident investigations, and NASA, which has contributed to icing-related research. The private sector has deployed various technologies on aircraft, such as wing deicers, and operated ground deicing and runway clearing programs at airports. GAO identified challenges related to winter weather aviation operations that, if addressed by ongoing or planned efforts, could improve safety. These challenges include (1) improving the timeliness of FAA's winter weather rulemaking efforts; (2) ensuring the availability of adequate resources for icing-related research and development; (3) ensuring that pilot training is thorough and realistic; (4) ensuring the collection and distribution of accurate weather information; and (5) developing a more integrated approach to effectively manage winter operations. |
gao_GAO-06-180T | gao_GAO-06-180T_0 | For example, wall stone installation work has continued in the great hall, the orientation theaters, and the auditorium, and the number of stone masons working in the interior of the CVC has increased since mid August. On the other hand, between the Subcommittee’s September 15 hearing and October 12, the sequence 2 contractor completed work on only 3 of the 11 activities we and AOC have been tracking for the Subcommittee. Furthermore, additional delays have occurred on interior and exterior stonework installation, the East Front, the utility tunnel, and the House connector tunnel. However, these changes have not yet been fully evaluated. AOC and its construction management contractor are reviewing the changes, as is AOC’s Chief Fire Marshal. AOC and its construction management contractor believe it will take about 30 to 60 days to complete their assessments, and AOC’s Chief Fire Marshal believes that he may have his evaluation done before the end of October. According to AOC, it has not yet completed this evaluation. Our reasons for concern include the uncertainty associated with the September changes in the HVAC commissioning and fire protection system schedules that have not yet been fully reviewed, the schedule slippages to date, optimistic durations for a number of activities based on the views of CVC team members, the large number of activity paths that are critical, and risks and uncertainties that continue to face the project. AOC agreed that these issues are important and said it would discuss them with its construction management contractor. 1. Evolving design: The CVC’s fire protection system has undergone a number of design changes and has been the subject of debate among relevant stakeholders for a number of reasons, largely due to conflicts between security and life and fire safety requirements. On October 5, we attended meetings of representatives from the CVC project team, AOC’s Fire Marshal Division, and USCP where issues surrounding the CVC’s fire protection system were discussed. Based on those discussions and information subsequently provided by AOC and USCP, it appears to us that the design of the CVC’s fire protection system is now essentially complete and agreed to by all of the relevant stakeholders. 2. Increased cost: As of September 30, executed contract modifications and anticipated changes related to CVC’s fire protection system totaled about $5.3 million, with most of this amount, about $4.4 million, being estimated costs for anticipated changes that have not been fully evaluated or approved. Changes to the system’s design and scope already made have resulted in about $900,000 in cost increases. Costs for changes that have been made or that are anticipated have increased or are expected to increase for several reasons, but the bulk of the increases stems largely from two factors—changes requested by AOC’s Chief Fire Marshal aimed at ensuring that the system meets fire safety standards based on his interpretation of code requirements (an area where conflict existed between fire safety and security requirements) and a disagreement between AOC and a contractor on contract requirements regarding certain detection devices. Differences of opinion among CVC team members exist on the magnitude of the estimated costs for this change. We have discussed this issue with AOC, and it has agreed to fully evaluate the cost before it executes additional contract modifications relating to stair pressurization. Coordination problems: The CVC project team and AOC’ s Fire Marshal Division have been experiencing difficulties arranging for timely inspections of completed work due to coordination problems involving the amount of notice and documentation needed before inspections can occur. Our Project Cost Estimate Update Awaits Assessment of Consultant Estimate and Schedule Stabilization; Funding Provided Has Not Changed Since September 2005
AOC’s consultant—MBP—finished its work last week to update the estimated cost to complete the project. We have not yet had time to evaluate MBP’s report. Also, as we said during the Subcommittee’s September 15 CVC hearing, we are waiting for the project schedule to stabilize before we begin our work to comprehensively update our November 2004 estimate of the cost to complete the project. Thus, we are not revising our interim updated estimated cost to complete the project of between $525.6 million and about $559 million that we discussed at the Subcommittee’s September 15 CVC hearing. As soon as we evaluate MBP’s report and the project schedule stabilizes, we will begin our work to assess the reasonableness of the scheduled completion dates for the CVC and the House and Senate expansion spaces and comprehensively update our estimate of the cost to complete the project. No additional funding beyond the $527.9 million for construction and the $7.8 million that was available for CVC construction or operations has been provided for the project since the Subcommittee’s September 15 hearing. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO testified before Congress on the progress on the Capitol Visitor Center (CVC) project. Our remarks will focus on (1) the Architect of the Capitol's (AOC) progress in managing the project's schedule since Congress's September 15 hearing on the project, (2) issues associated with the CVC's fire protection system, and (3) the project's costs and funding. Our ability to fully address these issues is limited by two important factors. First, AOC's sequence 2 construction contractor's--Manhattan Construction Company--September 2005 schedule reflects a number of significant changes, and AOC has not yet had the opportunity to fully evaluate these changes. Second, neither AOC nor its construction management contractor--Gilbane Building Company--has completed the evaluation of elements of the project schedule that we recommended during Congress's September 15 hearing. Thus, while we will discuss the schedule's status, we will not be able to provide specific estimated completion dates until AOC and its construction management contractor complete their assessments and we have the opportunity to evaluate them. Similarly, while we will discuss the status of the project's costs and funding, we will wait until the project schedule is fully reviewed and stabilized and we have had an opportunity to evaluate AOC's consultant's, McDonough Bolyard Peck (MBP), cost-estimation work before we comprehensively update our November 2004 estimate of the cost to complete the project.
What GAO Found
AOC and its construction contractors have made progress in managing the schedule and accomplishing work since Congress's September 15 CVC hearing, but additional delays have been encountered. Work on all interior levels of the CVC, various sections of the House and Senate expansion spaces, the plaza, and the utility tunnel has continued. However, additional delays have occurred in a number of areas. For example, despite an increase in the number of stone masons working on the project in September, the project lost about 2 weeks on interior stone work installation and a similar amount of time on the utility tunnel. The design of the CVC's fire protection system has undergone a number of changes--largely to reconcile conflicts between security and life and fire safety requirements--and in a number of instances has been the focus of considerable debate among stakeholders (e.g. CVC project team members, AOC's Chief Fire Marshal and AOC fire protection engineers, and USCP representatives). Changes to the system's design and scope have resulted in about $900,000 in cost increases so far and could result in additional increased costs of about $4.4 million based on anticipated changes as of September 30, 2005. The bulk of the potential $5.3 million cost increase stems from two factors--a change in the manner smoke will be kept from egress stairwells that was requested by AOC's Chief Fire Marshal and agreed to by the stakeholders and which resolves a conflict between security and life and fire safety requirements, and a disagreement between AOC and a contractor over contract requirements for certain detection devices. The increased cost figure could change significantly, however, because some CVC project team members believe that the estimated costs for these changes are too high, costs for all proposed or anticipated changes have not yet been fully evaluated, and negotiations relative to the estimated $4.4 million in anticipated changes have not been completed. We have discussed the costs associated with the stairwell change with AOC, and it has agreed to fully evaluate the situation before it executes any additional contract modifications for this change. Based on our discussions with the CVC project team, AOC's Chief Fire Marshal, and USCP representatives, it appears that the fire protection system design is now essentially complete and agreed to by all the stakeholders. Finally, coordination problems have existed between the CVC project team and AOC's Chief Fire Marshall in arranging for inspections of completed work, but steps are being taken to resolve the problems. We have not updated our interim estimate of a cost of between $525.6 million and about $559 million to complete the project, which we reported at Congress's September 15 CVC hearing, because AOC's consultant just completed its updated cost estimate and we have not yet had the opportunity to evaluate it, and because the project schedule has not yet stabilized. As soon as we evaluate MBP's report and the project schedule stabilizes, we will begin our work to reassess the reasonableness of project completion dates and comprehensively update our cost-tocomplete estimate. No additional funding beyond the $527.9 million for CVC construction and the $7.8 million that remained available for CVC operations or construction that we reported at Congerss's last CVC hearing has been provided for the CVC. |
gao_GAO-17-529 | gao_GAO-17-529_0 | West Virginia did not have Medicaid coverage for low-income, childless adults prior to its Medicaid expansion in 2014. From 17 to 25 Percent of Expansion Enrollees in Selected States Had a Behavioral Health Diagnosis; Enrollees’ Gender and Age Were Similar across the States From 17 to 25 Percent of Expansion Enrollees had a Behavioral Health Diagnosis in Selected States, Most Commonly a Mental Health Condition
Across our four selected states in 2014, from 17 to 25 percent of expansion enrollees were diagnosed with a behavioral health condition. Diagnoses of mental health conditions were more common than diagnoses of substance use conditions. From 11 to 20 percent of expansion enrollees were diagnosed with a mental health condition, compared with 6 to 8 percent diagnosed with a substance use condition. The most common mental health condition categories were mood disorders, such as depression, and anxiety disorders, such as panic disorder. From 20 to 34 Percent of Expansion Enrollees in Selected States Received Behavioral Health Treatment; Psychotherapy and Antidepressant Medications Were Most Common
Use of behavioral health treatment—services and drugs to address mental health and substance use conditions—ranged from 20 to 34 percent in selected states in 2014. These rates exceeded the rates of diagnosed conditions presented above, in part, because prescription drugs are not recorded with diagnosis codes. Thus, enrollees who only used behavioral health prescription drugs—and no outpatient services—were not counted in the diagnosis totals. Officials we spoke with from three of the selected states told us that expansion enrollees likely had greater access to behavioral health treatment after enrolling in Medicaid. West Virginia officials said that access to behavioral health prescription drugs, particularly MAT for substance use conditions, increased for Medicaid expansion enrollees. By contrast, there was less of a change for expansion enrollees in New York. The Most Commonly Used Behavioral Health Service Categories were Psychotherapy and Diagnostic Services
Among the 9 to 16 percent of expansion enrollees who used a behavioral health service in the four selected states, the two most commonly used service categories were psychotherapy—regular visits with a provider to help a patient understand, reduce, and manage symptoms—and diagnostic services. From 67 to 78 percent of expansion enrollees who used a behavioral health drug took an antidepressant. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) for review. HHS provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. Step 1: State Selection
We selected four states: Iowa, New York, Washington, and West Virginia. The four selected states 1. were among the 25 states that expanded Medicaid as allowed under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) as of January 1, 2014; 2. had enrollment and utilization data for expansion enrollees in MSIS for all of calendar year 2014 that were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our reporting objectives; and 3. had available information and documentation on Medicaid behavioral health benefits, and on how enrollment, service utilization, and prescription drug data were recorded for expansion enrollees. Step 3: Utilization Analyses
We conducted interviews with officials from our four selected states to discuss behavioral health benefits for Medicaid expansion enrollees; how enrollment, service utilization, and prescription drug data were recorded in MSIS; officials’ perspectives on the results of our analysis; and whether Medicaid expansion affected the availability of behavioral health treatment for expansion enrollees, relative to what was available for low- income, uninsured adults prior to the first year of expansion in 2014. | Why GAO Did This Study
Behavioral health conditions disproportionately affect low-income populations. Treatment can improve individuals' symptoms and help avoid negative outcomes. The expansion of Medicaid to cover low-income adults in some states—authorized by PPACA—may have increased the demand for such treatment. However, little is known about the extent to which Medicaid expansion enrollees experienced behavioral health conditions or utilized treatment during the first year of expansion in 2014.
GAO was asked to provide information about the utilization of behavioral health treatment among Medicaid expansion enrollees during the first year of expansion in 2014. For selected states in 2014, this report describes (1) the population of Medicaid expansion enrollees with behavioral health diagnoses, and (2) the use of behavioral health treatment among Medicaid expansion enrollees.
GAO selected four expansion states—Iowa, New York, Washington, and West Virginia—based on, among other criteria, availability and reliability of Medicaid enrollment and utilization data. GAO analyzed Medicaid data on behavioral health diagnoses and treatment use for expansion enrollees for 2014, the most recent year available. GAO also reviewed documents and interviewed Medicaid officials from all selected states to understand how data were recorded, and how treatment for expansion enrollees compared with what was available prior to expansion. The Department of Health and Human Services provided technical comments on a draft of this report, which GAO incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
In four selected states, from 17 to 25 percent of enrollees who were covered by state expansions of Medicaid—authorized by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA)—had diagnosed behavioral health conditions (mental health and substance use conditions) in 2014. Mental health conditions were more common than substance use conditions; from 11 to 20 percent of expansion enrollees were diagnosed with a mental health condition, compared with 6 to 8 percent diagnosed with a substance use condition. The most common mental health condition category was mood disorders, such as depression. For substance use, substance-related conditions (e.g., addiction to drugs like opioids) were more prevalent than alcohol-related conditions.
From 20 to 34 percent of expansion enrollees in the four selected states received behavioral health treatment in 2014, which includes outpatient services such as psychotherapy or prescription drugs. Treatment rates exceeded rates of diagnosed conditions, in part, because prescription drugs are not recorded with diagnosis codes. Thus, enrollees who only used behavioral health prescription drugs—and no outpatient services—were not counted in the diagnosis totals.
The two most commonly used behavioral health service categories were psychotherapy services (visits with a provider aimed at reducing and managing symptoms) and diagnostic services, such as diagnostic evaluations.
Antidepressants were the most commonly used behavioral health prescription drug category; over two-thirds of expansion enrollees who used a behavioral health drug took an antidepressant.
Officials in three of the four selected states said that expansion enrollees likely had greater access to behavioral health treatment after enrolling in Medicaid. Officials from Iowa, Washington, and West Virginia reported that, compared to being uninsured, expansion enrollees could more easily access treatment, such as community-based mental health services and behavioral health prescription drugs. Officials in New York said expansion enrollees experienced less of a change, because most of its enrollees were previously eligible for Medicaid. |
gao_GGD-98-124 | gao_GGD-98-124_0 | To fulfill its responsibilities, GSA has developed regulations and other guidance to assist agencies in implementing FACA, has provided training to agency officials, and was instrumental in creating and has collaborated with the Interagency Committee on Federal Advisory Committee Management. We found that GSA had not appropriately ensured that (1) advisory committees were properly established, (2) committees were reviewed annually, (3) annual reports were submitted to the President before they were due to Congress, and (4) follow-up reports on presidential advisory committees’ recommendations were prepared for Congress. The Secretariat is under the GSA Associate Administrator for Governmentwide Policy. To determine whether GSA had submitted annual reports on advisory committees to the President in a timely manner, we examined documentation regarding when GSA had submitted annual reports to the President for fiscal years 1988 through 1996. GSA Did Not Ensure That Advisory Committees Were Established With Complete Charters and Justification Letters
FACA and GSA regulations require that agencies consult with GSA before establishing advisory committees. In our review of the 203 charters and 107 justification letters submitted to GSA from October 1, 1996, through July 21, 1997, we found that 36 percent of the charters and 38 percent of the letters were missing at least one item that was required by FACA or GSA regulations. Secretariat officials told us that, while they concurred with the need for the 203 committees, the agencies were responsible for ensuring that the charters and justification letters were properly done. Advisory Committees Were Not Comprehensively Reviewed Annually
FACA requires GSA to make an annual comprehensive review of each advisory committee to determine whether it is carrying out its purpose, whether its responsibilities should be revised, and whether it should be abolished or merged with another committee. GSA regulations require that agencies prepare an annual report for each committee, including the agencies’ recommendations for continuing, merging, or terminating committees. GSA did not submit most of its annual reports to the President in time for him to meet the December 31 reporting date to Congress. The Secretariat’s view and proposed action do not relieve it of its responsibilities under FACA, and the Secretariat has not fulfilled those responsibilities. In particular, the Secretariat should (1) consult with the agencies to ensure that the charters and justification letters for federal advisory committees contain the information required by law or regulation, (2) follow up with agencies when their annual reports contain information that raises questions about whether committees should be continued, and (3) ensure that agencies file the required follow-up reports to Congress on presidential advisory committee recommendations. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed whether the General Services Administration (GSA), through its Committee Management Secretariat, was carrying out its oversight responsibilities under the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), focusing on whether GSA had: (1) ensured that federal advisory committees were established with complete charters and justification letters; (2) comprehensively reviewed each advisory committee annually; (3) submitted annual reports on advisory committees to the President in a timely manner; and (4) ensured that agencies prepared follow-up reports to Congress on recommendations by presidential advisory committees.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) compared to when GAO last reported in 1988, little had changed during the period it studied on how the Secretariat carried out its FACA responsibilities; (2) with 963 federal advisory committees, 57 sponsoring agencies, and submissions for each committee during fiscal year (FY) 1997, GSA's Committee Management Secretariat reviewed a large amount of paperwork for the purpose of ensuring that sponsoring agencies were: (a) following the requirements placed upon them by FACA; and (b) implementing GSA regulations; (3) the Secretariat conducted these reviews while performing other duties, such as providing formal training to federal employees who were directly involved with the operations of advisory committees and collaborating with an interagency committee on advisory committee management; (4) nevertheless, the Secretariat was responsible under FACA and GSA regulations for ensuring that those requirements were all fulfilled; (5) GSA, in consultation with the agencies, did not ensure that advisory committees were established with complete charters and justification letters as required by FACA or GSA regulations; (6) 36 percent of the charters and 38 percent of the letters GAO reviewed did not contain one or more items required by FACA or GSA regulations; (7) GSA did not independently assess, as it conducted the annual comprehensive reviews required by FACA, whether committees should be continued, merged, or terminated; (8) although GSA collected the FY 1996 annual reports, GSA officials said they accepted the data in them without further review; (9) GAO found this acceptance to be the norm even when information in a FY 1996 annual report should reasonably lead to further inquiries; (10) GSA did not submit most of its FACA annual reports to the President in time for him to meet the statutory reporting date to Congress nor did it ensure that FACA-required follow-up reports on presidential advisory committee recommendations were prepared for Congress; (11) Secretariat officials told GAO that agencies must take greater responsibility for preparing complete charters and justification letters and committee annual reports for sending follow-up reports to Congress; and (12) FACA has given the Secretariat responsibilities for ensuring that agencies satisfy the requirements for forming and operating advisory committees, and the Secretariat is not carrying out these responsibilities. |
gao_GAO-09-813T | gao_GAO-09-813T_0 | However, we have found that CBP’s efforts continue to face challenges which inhibit its ability to fully address the risk of textile transshipment. Our prior reports identified three key challenges to effectively addressing textile transshipment. First, in 2004 we found that CBP’s Textile Production Verification Team reports were not always finalized and provided to CBP ports, other agencies, or foreign governments for follow- up in a timely manner. CBP adopted our recommendation to improve the timeliness of this follow-up. We also found that information from overseas Customs Attaché offices and cooperative efforts by foreign governments can provide important information for port inspections. Since the time of our report, CBP has increased the number of attaches in foreign ports to 20 in 2009. In addition, ICE has also increased its overseas personnel to over 50 in 2009. Second, the in-bond program creates the risk that importers can circumvent trade rules, including those applying to textile imports. To facilitate trade, the U.S. customs system allows imported cargo intended for either U.S. or foreign markets to move from one U.S. port to another without being assessed duties or quotas and without officially entering U.S. commerce. This cargo—referred to as an in-bond shipment, requires a responsible party to be covered by a CBP-approved bond and to agree to comply with applicable regulations. Some CBP port officials have estimated that in-bond shipments represent from 30 percent to 60 percent of goods received at their ports. In our original report on textile transshipment and in a later review, we found that CBP’s ability to assess and manage the risks of the in-bond cargo system was impaired by both (1) the limited information it collected on in-bond cargo and (2) the limited analysis it performed on available information. Third, in reviewing the in-bond system, we also found that CBP had failed to perform basic analyses of available information. CBP was not able to tell us, for example, the extent of the system’s use, what products are shipped in-bond, or what shipments are expected for entry (and thus expected revenue collection from applicable trade duties) at inland ports. Despite prior audit recommendations, important management weaknesses persisted in CBP’s tracking of in-bond cargo, with the result that CBP still does not know whether in-bond cargo shipments of greatest security or revenue interest are in fact entered into U.S. commerce or exported as required. In particular, CBP continued to have high numbers of open in- bond transactions with uncertain disposition. To the extent that these changes address problems with the in-bond system, they will also address one of the ways in which textiles and other goods might illegally enter the United States or enter without paying the appropriate duties. CBP Needs to Renew Its Focus on Revenue Functions
In addition to needed improvements on specific programs, we also found that CBP had to find a way to better balance security and important trade functions such as revenue collection. Although CBP’s priority mission relates to homeland security, it collected more than $34 billion in fiscal year 2008, making it the second largest revenue generator for the federal government. Because of the high concentration of duties collected on textiles and apparel—four percent of U.S. imports generate approximately 40 percent of U.S. duties collected—any efforts to focus on revenue functions would likely generate improved oversight of textile and apparel imports. Our previous findings suggest that Congress’ concerns about the potential effects of moving customs revenue functions into DHS, whose priority mission is homeland security, were warranted. We found that this shift in mission contributed to reduced focus and resources devoted to customs revenue functions. Specifically, the number of staff in most customs revenue positions declined since the creation of DHS, despite a legislative mandate that they should not. In addition, the number of Auditors in the Office of Inspector General dedicated to customs issues has declined as the office’s resources were focused in other areas. Conclusion
Mr. Chairman, we appreciate the opportunity to summarize our work related to CBP’s efforts to enforce U.S. laws regarding illegal shipments of textiles and other products. As I have noted in my statement, we have performed a number of studies for the U.S. Congress both on textile issues specifically as well as on a number of closely related issues such as the in- bond program, revenue collection, and intellectual property enforcement at the U.S. border. Over time, we have found that CBP has made improvements in its efforts to enforce trade laws, including those related to textiles, but trade enforcement issues continue to present long-term challenges with significant revenue implications for the U.S. government. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony provides GAO's perspective on the issues associated with textile transshipment. It is particularly important in the current economic environment that the United States does everything it can to ensure that U.S. laws regarding the entry of illegal goods are fully enforced at the U.S. borders. Effective monitoring of textile and apparel imports are also important because duties on textile and apparel products account for a significant share of U.S. duty collections. However, this enforcement takes place in the challenging and busy environment of U.S. ports of entry - - in fiscal year 2008, there were nearly 29 million trade entries processed at more than 300 ports of entry throughout the United States. This testimony will summarize key findings from our prior reports on (1) U.S. government efforts to enforce laws related to imports of textiles and other goods, including transshipment, and (2) the revenue implications of these efforts, as well as discuss the recommendations we made to improve those efforts. GAO's last report on the subject of textile transshipment was published in 2004 and there have been many changes in world trade and in customs enforcement since that time. However, we have consulted with Customs and Border Protection (CBP) since that report was issued on the status of their response to the GAO recommendations to improve that system. In addition, we have completed additional studies on customs enforcement issues, which provide important insights into the challenges CBP faces as it addresses textile transshipment. One of those reports covered the in-bond system, which was a key subject in the 2004 report on textiles, and a second is on CBP's ability to maintain an emphasis on revenue such as duties collected from textile and apparel imports. In addition, we have also completed numerous studies on intellectual property enforcement by CBP and other U.S. agencies, and there is considerable overlap between those efforts and textile enforcement efforts.
What GAO Found
Our prior reports identified three key challenges to effectively addressing textile transshipment. First, in 2004 we found that CBP's Textile Production Verification Team reports were not always finalized and provided to CBP ports, other agencies, or foreign governments for follow-up in a timely manner. CBP adopted our recommendation to improve the timeliness of this follow-up. We also found that information from overseas Customs Attache' offices and cooperative efforts by foreign governments can provide important information for port inspections. Since the time of our report, CBP has increased the number of attaches in foreign ports to 20 in 2009. In addition, ICE has also increased its overseas personnel to over 50 in 2009. The in-bond program creates the risk that importers can circumvent trade rules, including those applying to textile imports. To facilitate trade, the U.S. customs system allows imported cargo intended for either U.S. or foreign markets to move from one U.S. port to another without being assessed duties or quotas and without officially entering U.S. commerce. This cargo--referred to as an in-bond shipment, requires a responsible party to be covered by a CBP-approved bond and to agree to comply with applicable regulations. Some CBP port officials have estimated that in-bond shipments represent from 30 percent to 60 percent of goods received at their ports. In our original report on textile transshipment and in a later review, we found that CBP's ability to assess and manage the risks of the in-bond cargo system was impaired by both (1) the limited information it collected on in-bond cargo and (2) the limited analysis it performed on available information. CBP was not able to tell us, for example, the extent of the system's use, what products are shipped in-bond, or what shipments are expected for entry (and thus expected revenue collection from applicable trade duties) at inland ports. In reviewing the in-bond system, we also found that CBP had failed to perform basic analyses of available information. CBP was not able to tell us, for example, the extent of the system's use, what products are shipped in-bond, or what shipments are expected for entry (and thus expected revenue collection from applicable trade duties) at inland ports. Despite prior audit recommendations, important management weaknesses persisted in CBP's tracking of in-bond cargo, with the result that CBP still does not know whether in-bond cargo shipments of greatest security or revenue interest are in fact entered into U.S. commerce or exported as required. In particular, CBP continued to have high numbers of open in-bond transactions with uncertain disposition. In addition to needed improvements on specific programs, we also found that CBP had to find a way to better balance security and important trade functions such as revenue collection. Although CBP's priority mission relates to homeland security, it collected more than $34 billion in fiscal year 2008, making it the second largest revenue generator for the federal government. Because of the high concentration of duties collected on textiles and apparel--four percent of U.S. imports generate approximately 40 percent of U.S. duties collected--any efforts to focus on revenue functions would likely generate improved oversight of textile and apparel imports. Our previous findings suggest that Congress' concerns about the potential effects of moving customs revenue functions into DHS, whose priority mission is homeland security, were warranted. We found that this shift in mission contributed to reduced focus and resources devoted to customs revenue functions. Specifically, the number of staff in most customs revenue positions declined since the creation of DHS, despite a legislative mandate that they should not. In addition, the number of Auditors in the Office of Inspector General dedicated to customs issues has declined as the office's resources were focused in other areas. |
gao_GAO-15-108 | gao_GAO-15-108_0 | 1). 2). Mobile Providers Employ Usage-Based Pricing More Widely Than Fixed Providers and Agree to a Code of Conduct
UBP More Commonly Used by Mobile Than Fixed Providers
Mobile: Based on our analysis of data plans, all four mobile providers we reviewed now offer some form of UBP Internet plans. Mobile and Fixed Providers Moving Away from Unlimited Data to UBP Plans
Both mobile and fixed Internet providers have increasingly been moving from unlimited data plans to usage-based plans. In particular, consumers report low levels of satisfaction with “ease of understanding their bill” and “variety of plans.”
Internet Consumers in Focus Groups Accepted Mobile Usage-Based Pricing, but Had Concerns over Fixed
Focus Group Participants Said They Are Not Used to Thinking about Fixed Data Usage and Exhibited Confusion over Data Usage
A common sentiment expressed by focus group participants was that they had no idea how much data they use at home—likely in large part because they have never been subject to data allowances and, therefore, have not needed to consider their data usage at home. In addition, focus group participants exhibited many instances of confusion and a lack of understanding of their fixed-Internet data usage. However, participants in all eight groups expressed strong negative reactions to the concept of fixed Internet UBP, and these discussions overshadowed discussions about the potential benefits of UBP. Participants cited the importance of the Internet for commerce, education, and employment and expressed concern that UBP could limit their access to the Internet. Fixed internet UBP negatively affecting certain populations, such as students and telecommuters who may use a lot of data at home and those with lower-socio-economic status who may have difficulty affording data plans with sufficient data allowance. The Potential Effects of Usage-Based Pricing on Consumers Are Unclear and Could Depend on Competition
Usage-Based Pricing Could Increase Costs on Heaviest Users, but May Not Be Warranted
One economic rationale for UBP is to address situations where users take into account their own costs and benefits from Internet access, but ignore other costs—such as congestion—that they impose on other users— referred to as “externalities.” In the presence of such externalities, economists often propose that consumers should be charged prices that reflect both of these types of costs in order to ensure that the consumers use the resource efficiently. However, some industry stakeholders we interviewed said that UBP may not be warranted to address the data usage of the heaviest users. According to economics literature, UBP can be interpreted as a form of price discrimination, where sellers offer the same or similar goods at different prices and consumers choose among these versions. FCC does not track providers’ use of UBP as FCC only recently started collecting data for the specific purpose mentioned above. Some Internet users, such as heavy data users, may pay more for access under UBP. Providers could implement UBP in a way that benefits consumers—for example, by offering low-data, low- cost plans for customers who do not want to pay for an unlimited data plan they do not need. However, providers—especially those facing limited competition—could use UBP as a means to increase their profits which could result in UBP having negative effects, including increased prices paid by consumers, reductions in content and applications accessed by consumers, and increased threats to network security. While FCC has been collecting relevant data on the use of UBP, including information on data allowances, FCC is not using the data to gain an understanding of how UBP is being used and what its potential effects are on consumers. In response to our recommendation that FCC collaborate with fixed Internet providers to develop a voluntary code of conduct for consumer communication, FCC said that because the number of consumer complaints regarding UBP by fixed providers appears to be small and that UBP plans are less common for fixed Internet customers than mobile customers, it is unclear that any action is needed at this time. Given the trend toward greater use of UBP by fixed providers, increased data usage, confusion by consumers regarding data usage, our previous findings that consumers may not know to file complaints with FCC, and the potential that limited competition among fixed providers could result in their using UBP in ways that harm consumers, we continue to believe that it is important for FCC to be more proactive. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To review what information is available about the application of usage- based pricing by Internet service providers, we reviewed information on the current consumer Internet data plans of the largest 13 fixed and 4 mobile providers in order to cover 98 percent of each market. To review issues related to usage-based pricing that selected consumers report are important to them, we contracted with a private market research firm to assist with screening, recruiting, and holding focus groups with Internet consumers. We interviewed the 4 mobile and 13 fixed providers mentioned above regarding the potential effects of UBP on consumers. | Why GAO Did This Study
Access to broadband Internet is seen as being crucial to improving access to information, quality of life, and economic growth. In recent years, some Internet providers have moved away from unlimited data plans to UBP with uncertain effects on consumers.
GAO was asked to review the use of UBP by Internet providers. This report examines: (1) information available about the application of UBP by Internet service providers; (2) issues related to UBP selected consumers report are important to them; and (3) the potential effects of UBP on consumers.
GAO collected data on Internet plans from the country's 13 top fixed and 4 top mobile providers; contracted with a market research firm to assist with conducting eight focus groups held with consumers in four cities selected to reflect geographic diversity; reviewed relevant studies; and interviewed officials from the top Internet providers, FCC and industry stakeholders, including researchers, policy, and industry organizations.
What GAO Found
Based on an analysis of consumer data plans of the top 13 fixed—in home—and 4 mobile Internet providers, GAO found that mobile providers employ usage-based pricing (UBP) more commonly than fixed. Under UBP, providers can charge varying prices, change connection speeds, or take other actions based on Internet data consumed. The 4 largest mobile providers in the country all use UBP to some extent; 7 of the 13 largest fixed providers now use UBP to some extent. Because prices can vary based on usage, it may be important that consumers be informed about data. GAO found that some tools offered by fixed providers to educate consumers regarding data can be confusing. For example, some provider estimates vary on data consumed for the same type of content. While mobile providers follow a voluntary code of conduct, developed with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), to encourage useful, consistent consumer education, no similar code exists among fixed providers potentially resulting in confusion and a lack of consumer awareness regarding data needs.
Participants in all eight of GAO's focus groups reported being subject to mobile UBP and expressed some concerns about it, such as difficulty tracking data usage among many devices. Yet participants accepted mobile UBP and adapted by, for example, limiting use of high-data content and by connecting to Wi-Fi. By contrast, only a few participants in three focus groups reported being subject to fixed Internet UBP. Participants expressed concerns about possible increases in prices for access caused by fixed-Internet UBP and the potential effect of limits on their fixed Internet, where they have not considered data usage. Participants exhibited confusion over data consumption—for example thinking that low-data activities like online shopping consumed large amounts of data. Participants also expressed concern about difficulty tracking the wide range of devices accessing their fixed data allowance and that fixed UBP may negatively affect students, people working from home, and those with lower socio-economic status.
The potential effects of UBP are uncertain and could depend on competition among providers. Based on economics literature, UBP can address the usage of the heaviest data users and can benefit consumers by providing more options as opposed to a one-size-fits-all unlimited data plan. The literature also suggests that providers could implement UBP to benefit consumers—for example, by offering low-data, low-cost plans for those who do not want an unlimited data plan. While mobile providers GAO reviewed offer such plans, fixed providers—generally facing less competition—do so to a lesser extent. According to the literature, providers facing limited competition could use UBP to increase profits, potentially resulting in negative effects, including increased prices, reductions in content accessed, and increased threats to network security. Several researchers and stakeholders GAO interviewed said that UBP could reduce innovation for applications and content if consumers ration their data. While FCC is collecting data regarding fixed UBP, it is not using this data to track UBP use because it only recently started collecting the data specifically to analyze prices. As a result, although FCC is charged with promoting the public interest, it may not know if UBP is being used in a way that is contrary to the public interest and, if so, take appropriate actions. |
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