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gao_GAO-05-378 | gao_GAO-05-378_0 | The Majority of NPS- Managed Properties Are in the Circles, Squares, and Triangles Category
The majority of the 356 NPS-managed properties in the District are in the circles, squares, and triangles category, representing about 60 percent of the total properties that NPS manages in the District. Of the 356 properties in the District, 242, or about 68 percent, are less than 1 acre in size. To identify what recreational facilities are available on the 356 NPS-managed properties in the District, we asked NPS officials to identify the (1) types of recreational facilities on the properties, such as park benches, outdoor grills, playgrounds, and picnic tables, or shelters and (2) sports-related facilities, such as basketball and tennis courts and baseball and softball fields. NPS officials reported that 202 properties had some type of recreational facility, including 25 properties that had 205 sports facilities. NPS Rated Most Properties or Major Sections of Properties with Sports Facilities in Good or Fair Condition
According to NPS assessments and information reported in its FMSS database, most NPS-managed properties with sports facilities are in good or fair condition. Information on the Condition of Individual Sports Facilities Is Limited
We reviewed the documentation supporting the deferred maintenance associated with each of the 24 properties for which we were provided assessments to ascertain if it provided data that could be used to identify the condition of each sports facility. Some Sports Facilities Posed Potential Safety Hazards
We did not have criteria to judge the condition of the sports facilities. NPS General Management Plans Identify Opportunities for Some Expanded Recreational Uses of NPS-Managed Properties in the District
Current NPS general management plans identify opportunities for some expanded recreational uses, such as improving visitor experience by increasing the number and scope of exhibits; creating a regional sports complex; rehabilitating selected baseball/softball fields and basketball and tennis courts; and creating new hiking trails. NPS has developed four general management plans—two final and two drafts—that encompass 37 of the 356 properties and 4,196 of the 6,735 acres it manages in the District. The following are the new or expanded recreational opportunities identified in the final plans: Fort Circle Parks: The primary new recreational opportunity is the creation of a new walking trail that connects most of the forts encompassing the Fort Circle Parks system. These include Forts Dupont, Totten, Stevens, Stanton, Davis, and Reno. Options Available for NPS Property To Be Used or Managed by the District for Recreational Purposes
There are a number of ways for NPS property to be made available to the District for recreational purposes, including through a transfer of title, transfer of jurisdiction, memoranda of agreement or cooperative agreements, partnerships of public and private entities, and leases. As discussed below, some of these options may be implemented by NPS and the District under existing legislation; others would require enactment of new legislation. In addition, the department said that NPS does not have the authority to enter into a lease that allows erection of a structure on such property. Since FMSS did not provide sufficient information to determine the condition of the sports facilities, we inspected these facilities to identify any deficiencies, such as cracks in the surface of tennis and basketball courts. For the most part, these facilities appeared to be well maintained. GAO Comments
1. 3. | Why GAO Did This Study
In recent years, several challenges have emerged concerning future recreational opportunities in the nation's capital. These challenges include ensuring that an adequate supply of parkland and open space is available to meet the needs of an increasing resident population and the estimated 20 million annual visitors to the District of Columbia's cultural institutions, historic sites, parks, and open spaces. GAO identified (1) the universe of federal property in the District of Columbia (the District) managed by the National Park Service (NPS); (2) what recreational facilities, including those that are sports related, exist on these properties; (3) the condition of the properties with sports facilities and the sports facilities thereon; (4) new or expanded recreational uses discussed in NPS general management plans; and (5) the methods that could be used to convey management responsibility for NPS-managed properties to the District government. Commenting on the draft report, Interior stated that NPS is addressing properties in the greatest need of repair or rehabilitation in priority order. It also said that it did not have authority to enter into a lease that allows the erection of a structure on its property. However, GAO believes that existing authority allows the NPS director to approve such leases under certain circumstances.
What GAO Found
NPS manages 356 federal properties in the District, covering about 6,735 acres of land. Most of the properties are what NPS refers to as circles, squares, and triangles, and are less than 1 acre in size. The second largest total number of properties are parks and parkways, which represent about 93 percent of the total acreage for the 356 properties. NPS officials reported to GAO that 202 properties it manages in the District had various recreational facilities such as park benches, outdoor grills, and picnic tables or shelters. Of the 202 properties, 25 had 205 sports facilities, such as basketball and tennis courts and baseball and softball fields. Most of the properties with sports facilities were in good or fair condition, according to NPS deferred maintenance records, but information on the condition of individual sports facilities is limited. While we did not have criteria to determine the condition of sports facilities, we inspected each of the 205 sports facilities to identify obvious deficiencies, such as cracks in the surface area of tennis and basketball courts. Based on our observations, most of the facilities appeared to be well maintained, but we found some sports facilities had conditions that posed a potential safety risk. NPS has developed four general management plans--two finalized and two in draft. These plans identify some opportunities for new or expanded recreation, such as rehabilitating selected baseball and softball fields and basketball and tennis courts; creating a regional sports complex; and developing new hiking trails. For example, one of the plans calls for the creation of a new trail that connects Forts Dupont, Totten, Stevens, Reno, and others as part of the Fort Circle Parks system. Options available for transferring management responsibilities for NPS properties located in the District to the District city government include transfer of title, transfer of jurisdiction, memoranda of agreement or cooperative agreements, leases, and partnerships with public or private entities. Some of the options would require enacting new legislation while others may be exercised by NPS and the District under existing legislation. |
gao_GAO-05-365 | gao_GAO-05-365_0 | ATSA required that TSA screen 100 percent of checked baggage using explosive detection systems by December 31, 2002. EDS machines use computer-aided tomography X-rays adapted from the medical field to automatically recognize the characteristic signatures of threat explosives. Specifically, TSA’s use of stand-alone EDS and ETD machines required a greater number of screener staff and resulted in screening fewer bags for explosives per hour, as compared with using EDS machines in-line with baggage conveyor systems. TSA’s Initial Deployment of EDS and ETD Machines Resulted in Interim Solutions for Screening with Stand-alone Equipment Located Mainly in Airport Lobbies
Although TSA made significant progress in fielding EDS and ETD equipment to the nation’s airports to screen checked baggage for explosives, as mandated by Congress, TSA primarily used this equipment as part of interim lobby solutions to screen checked baggage for explosives, rather than the permanent integration of EDS machines in-line with airport baggage conveyor systems. Airports and the Federal Government Are Taking Actions to Install In-line Baggage Screening Systems, but Resources Have Not Been Made Available to Fund These Systems on a Large-Scale Basis
Airport operators and TSA are taking actions to install in-line EDS baggage screening systems because of the expected benefits of these systems. In addition, perspectives differ regarding the appropriate role of the federal government, airport operators, and air carriers in funding these capital-intensive systems. Although TSA established criteria to prioritize airport eligibility for receiving LOI funds for in-line EDS baggage screening systems, it has not conducted a systematic, prospective analysis to determine at which airports it could achieve long-term savings and enhanced security by installing in-line systems rather than continue to rely on labor-intensive stand-alone EDS and ETD machines to screen checked baggage for explosives. Further, for airports where in-line systems may not be economically justified because of the high cost of installing the systems, TSA has not conducted an analysis to determine whether it could achieve savings by making greater use of stand-alone EDS systems rather than relying on the use of more labor-intensive ETD machines. TSA officials stated that an in-line screening system at each of these airports would provide enhanced security and efficiencies. TSA estimated that in- line baggage screening systems at these airports would save the federal government $1.3 billion compared with stand-alone EDS systems and that TSA would recover its initial investment in a little over 1 year. Conclusions
TSA has made substantial progress in installing EDS and ETD systems at the nation’s airports—mainly as part of interim lobby screening solutions—to provide the capability to screen all checked baggage for explosives, as mandated by Congress. As part of this assessment, the Administrator should take the following four actions: identify and prioritize the airports where the benefits—in terms of cost savings of baggage screening operations and improved security—of replacing stand-alone baggage screening systems with in-line systems are likely to exceed the costs of the systems, or the systems are needed to address security risks or related factors; consider the projected availability and costs of baggage screening equipment being developed through research and development efforts; estimate total funds needed to install in-line systems where appropriate, including the federal funds needed given different assumptions regarding the federal government and airport cost-shares for funding the in-line systems; and work collaboratively with airport operators, who are expected to share the costs and benefits of in-line systems, to collect data and prepare the analyses needed to develop plans for installing in-line systems. Explosives trace detection works by detecting vapors and residues of explosives. | Why GAO Did This Study
Mandated to screen all checked baggage using explosive detection systems at airports by December 31, 2003, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) deployed two types of screening equipment: explosives detection systems (EDS), which use computer-aided tomography X-rays to recognize the characteristics of explosives, and explosives trace detection (ETD) systems, which use chemical analysis to detect traces of explosive material vapors or residues. This report assesses (1) TSA's use of budgeted funds to install EDS and ETD systems and the impact of initially deploying these systems, (2) TSA and airport actions to install EDS machines in-line with baggage conveyor systems, and the federal resources made available for this purpose, and (3) actions taken by TSA to optimally deploy checked baggage screening systems.
What GAO Found
TSA has made substantial progress in installing EDS and ETD systems at the nation's more than 400 airports to provide the capability to screen all checked baggage using explosive detection systems, as mandated by Congress. However, in initially deploying EDS and ETD equipment, TSA placed stand-alone ETD and the minivan-sized EDS machines--mainly in airport lobbies--that were not integrated in-line with airport baggage conveyor systems. TSA officials stated that the agency's ability to initially install in-line systems was limited because of the high costs and the time required for airport modifications. These interim lobby solutions resulted in operational inefficiencies, including requiring a greater number of screeners, as compared with using EDS machines in-line with baggage conveyor systems. TSA and airport operators are taking actions to install in-line baggage screening systems to streamline airport and TSA operations, reduce screening costs, and enhance security. Eighty-six of the 130 airports we surveyed either have, are planning to have, or are considering installing full or partial in-line systems. However, resources have not been made available to fund these capital-intensive systems on a large-scale basis. Also, the overall costs of installing in-line baggage screening systems at each airport are unknown, the availability of future federal funding is uncertain, and perspectives differ regarding the appropriate role of the federal government, airport operators, and air carriers in funding these systems. Moreover, TSA has not conducted a systematic, prospective analysis to determine at which airports it could achieve long-term savings and enhance efficiencies and security by installing in-line systems or, where in-line systems may not be economically justified, by making greater use of stand-alone EDS systems rather than relying on the labor-intensive and less efficient ETD screening process. However, at nine airports where TSA has agreed to help fund the installation of in-line baggage screening systems, TSA conducted a retrospective cost-benefit analysis which showed that these in-line systems could yield significant savings for the federal government. TSA further estimated that it could recover its initial investment in the in-line systems at these airports in a little over 1 year. |
gao_GAO-01-713T | gao_GAO-01-713T_0 | These benefits typically pay for some or all of the costs not covered by Medicare, such as coinsurance, deductibles, and prescription drugs. In addition, the lack of a cost-sharing limit can leave some beneficiaries with extensive health care needs liable for very large Medicare expenses. The most notable omission in Medicare’s benefit package is coverage for outpatient prescription drugs. Current estimates suggest that the combination of Medicare’s cost-sharing requirements and limited benefits leaves about 45 percent of beneficiaries’ health care costs uncovered. Medigap drug coverage in particular offers only limited protection because of high cost sharing and low coverage caps. Remaining Gaps Leave Beneficiaries at Significant Risk
While Medigap policies cover some costs beneficiaries would otherwise pay out of pocket, Medigap policies have limits and can still leave beneficiaries exposed to significant out-of-pocket costs. First-Dollar Coverage Through Medigap Distorts Medicare's Cost Control Features
Even though Medicare’s original design has been criticized as outmoded, it included various cost-sharing requirements intended to encourage prudent use of services. Unlike Medigap policies, employer-sponsored supplemental insurance policies and Medicare+Choice plans typically reduce beneficiaries’ financial liabilities but do not offer first-dollar coverage. | Why GAO Did This Study
Medicare provides valuable and extensive health care coverage for beneficiaries. Nevertheless, significant gaps leave some beneficiaries vulnerable to sizeable financial burdens from out-of-pocket expenses. Medigap is a widely available source of supplemental coverage. This testimony discusses (1) beneficiaries' potential financial liability under Medicare's current benefit structure and cost-sharing requirements, (2) the cost of Medigap policies and the extent to which they provide additional coverage, and (3) concerns that Medigap's so-called "first dollar" coverage undermines the cost control incentives of Medicare's cost-sharing requirements.
What GAO Found
GAO found that Medicare's benefits package and cost-sharing requirements leave beneficiaries liable for high out-of-pocket costs. Medigap policies pay for some or all Medicare cost-sharing requirements but do not fully protect beneficiaries from potentially significant out-of-pocket costs such as prescription drug coverage. Medigap first-dollar coverage eliminates the ability of Medicare's cost-sharing requirements to promote prudent use of services. |
gao_GAO-08-238T | gao_GAO-08-238T_0 | The Nation’s Long- Term Fiscal Challenge
Long-term fiscal simulations by GAO, Congressional Budget Office (CBO), and others all show that despite a 3-year decline in the federal government’s unified budget deficit, we still face large and growing structural deficits driven primarily by rising health care costs and known demographic trends. The bottom line is that the nation’s longer-term fiscal outlook is daunting under any realistic policy scenario or set of assumptions. Continuing on this unsustainable fiscal path will gradually erode, if not suddenly damage, our economy, our standard of living, and ultimately our national security. Our current path also increasingly will constrain our ability to address emerging and unexpected budgetary needs and they serve to increase the burdens that will be faced by future generations. 2.) As I said at the time, I believe it offers one potential means to achieve an objective we all should share: taking steps to make the tough choices necessary to keep America great and to help make sure that our country’s, children’s and grandchildren’s future is better than our past. I was especially pleased to see that the task force that would be created by your legislation was informed by GAO’s work on the key elements necessary for any task force or commission to be successful. Examples of those factors—and elements your proposal encompasses— are a broad charter—don’t artificially limit what can be discussed and don’t set policy preconditions (like “must support individual accounts”) for membership, involvement of leaders from both the executive and legislative branches—including elected officials, a report with specific proposals and a requirement for supermajority vote to make recommendations to the President and the Congress, and a process to require consideration of the proposals. As you know, members of the Fiscal Wake-Up Tour believe that fiscal responsibility and intergenerational equity must be a top priority for the new President. We all agree that finding solutions will require leadership, bipartisan cooperation, a willingness to discuss all options and courage to make tough choices. Congressional Action on the Proposal
You also asked us to think about the current requirement for a “fast track” up-or-down vote in the House and Senate and the requirement for a supermajority in both houses. Permitting alternative packages to be offered and voted upon may increase the credibility and acceptance of the end result. Its membership is different than your Task Force proposal but it seeks the same goal—improving our fiscal path. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO has for many years warned that our nation is on an imprudent and unsustainable fiscal path. During the past 2 years, the Comptroller General has traveled to 24 states as part of the Fiscal Wake-Up Tour. Members of this diverse group of policy experts agree that finding solutions to the nation's long-term fiscal challenge will require bipartisan cooperation, a willingness to discuss all options, and the courage to make tough choices. Indeed, the members of the Fiscal Wake-Up Tour believe that fiscal responsibility and intergenerational equity must be a top priority for the new President. Several bills have been introduced that would establish a bipartisan group to develop proposals/policy options for addressing the longterm fiscal challenge. At the request of Chairman Conrad and Senator Gregg, the Comptroller General discussed GAO's views on their proposal to create a Bipartisan Task Force for Responsible Fiscal Action (S. 2063).
What GAO Found
Long-term fiscal simulations by GAO, Congressional Budget Office (CBO), and others all show that despite some modest improvement in near-term deficits, we face large and growing structural deficits driven primarily by rising health care costs and known demographic trends. Under any realistic policy scenario or assumptions, the nation's longer-term fiscal outlook is daunting. Continuing on this unsustainable fiscal path will gradually erode, if not suddenly damage, our economy, our standard of living, and ultimately our national security. Our current path also increasingly will constrain our ability to address emerging and unexpected budgetary needs and increase the burdens that will be faced by future generations. As the Comptroller General stated when the bill was introduced, the Bipartisan Task Force for Responsible Fiscal Action offers one potential means to taking steps to make the tough choices necessary to keep America great, and to help make sure that our country's, children's, and grandchildren's future is better than our past. GAO noted that the bill incorporates key elements needed for any task force or commission to be successful: (1) a statutory basis, (2) a broad charter that does not artificially limit what can be discussed and does not set policy preconditions for membership, (3) bipartisan membership, (4) involvement of leaders from both the executive and legislative branches--including elected officials, (5) a report with specific proposals and a requirement for supermajority vote to make recommendations to the President and the Congress, and (6) a process to require consideration of the proposals. GAO also made some suggestions it believes could enhance the likelihood that the bill will achieve its overarching goals. GAO suggested the sponsors consider (1) including a way for the next President to be involved in the process of proposal development, (2) permitting alternative packages to be voted on that would achieve the same fiscal result, and (3) eliminating the requirement for a supermajority in Congress. With the same aim, GAO also expressed some reservations about the current approach to specifying the Task Force Chairman. |
gao_RCED-95-198 | gao_RCED-95-198_0 | Food Stamp Program Administration
The Food Stamp Program is administered by the Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) Food and Consumer Service (FCS) in partnership with state and local governments. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the House Committee on Agriculture asked us to determine (1) why benefit overpayments occur, (2) whether USDA controls and procedures are adequate to prevent food retailer involvement in trafficking, and (3) what can be done to reduce trafficking by food stamp recipients. Caseworkers’ errors, which accounted for 42 percent of the overpayments, occur for a multitude of reasons, but state officials said that the complex Food Stamp Program regulations and the differences between the Food Stamp Program and the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) regulations are the primary contributing factors. FCS is also taking a number of actions to improve payment accuracy. Inadequately trained caseworkers and poor supervision lead to errors. Group Recertifications
Local offices in some states are using group recertifications. This system is called the Income and Eligibility Verification System (IEVS). These initiatives include focusing FCS management attention on error reduction, reducing the differences between the food stamp and AFDC programs, granting states waivers from program requirements, and evaluating new incentives to offer states to reduce their error rates. The primary factor in lowering error rates in these states appears to be the willingness of states to focus on reducing overpayments and making a commitment to do so. Existing FCS controls and procedures have not proven effective in reducing retailer involvement in food stamp trafficking. FCS has various initiatives underway to improve its authorization and monitoring of food stores and is proposing additional actions. However, these initiatives do not include providing additional resources to make site visits. FCS efforts to reduce the number of violating retailers, however, should make it more difficult for recipients to use their benefits for nonfood purchases. Some of the major legislative changes requested include: requiring retailers to provide sales and income tax filing documents when applying for authorization along with permission for FCS to verify such information with other agencies; requiring a 6-month waiting period before reapplication by a store that does not meet initial eligibility criteria; allowing FCS to set time limits for retailer authorization, including shorter authorization periods for questionable retailers; suspending stores charged with trafficking while their cases are pending administrative or judicial review thereby preventing them from continuing to abuse the program during the appeals process; suspending stores charged with trafficking on the basis of electronic benefit transfer transaction data; expanding forfeiture authority to allow the seizure of property used by traffickers in felony food stamp transactions of $5,000 or more, including property gained with the proceeds of illegal transactions; permitting permanent disqualification of retailers who intentionally falsify their applications; increasing the penalties for recipient trafficking; and disqualifying stores from participating in the Food Stamp Program that have been disqualified from participating in the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed fraud, waste, and abuse in the Department of Agriculture's (USDA) food stamp program, focusing on: (1) the causes of benefit overpayments; (2) whether USDA controls and procedures are adequate to prevent retailer involvement in the trafficking of food stamp coupons; and (3) what can be done to reduce trafficking by food stamp recipients.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) state caseworkers' and recipients' errors cause food stamp overpayments; (2) state officials believe that caseworkers' errors stem from the complexity of the program's regulations, the different eligibility criteria for food stamp and Aid to Families with Dependent Children programs, and recipients providing inaccurate income and other information; (3) the states that have reduced their error rates have made a commitment to do so in response to fiscal sanctions and incentives; (4) these states have improved their program administration, caseworker training, accountability, and information analyses and verification; (5) states use group recertifications, recipient contacts to detect household changes, and shorter certification periods for recipients with fluctuating incomes to prevent recipient errors and reduce overpayments; (6) USDA and the states are simplifying program regulations, reducing eligibility criteria differences, and using waivers from certain program requirements to improve payment accuracy; (7) Congress and USDA are considering changing the system of sanctions and incentives for rewarding and penalizing states' error rate performance; (8) insufficient resources for site visits and other monitoring activities hamper USDA controls and procedures for monitoring food stamp trafficking; (9) although USDA has implemented a number of initiatives to improve its retailer monitoring processes, the initiatives do not include additional resources for retailer monitoring; and (10) aggressively reducing the number of retailers who are trafficking in food stamps would make it more difficult for recipients to sell their benefits or use them for nonfood purchases. |
gao_GAO-16-290 | gao_GAO-16-290_0 | Program areas increased by as much as 13.2 percent or decreased by as much as 18.1 percent. Overall Budget Estimates for Modernization Increased Slightly from Those in 2015 Plans but with Some Significant Realignments and Changes within Program Areas
According to the Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan, NNSA’s estimates for the next 25 years total $297.6 billion for modernization activities—an increase of approximately $4.2 billion, or 1.4 percent (in nominal, or current dollar, values), from the $293.4 billion NNSA reported in the 2015 plan. These budget estimates, which are for activities in the Weapons Activities area, are provided in the four areas discussed above: stockpile; infrastructure; research, development, testing, and evaluation; and other weapons activities. The overall increase was moderated by the shift of two counterterrorism programs from the Weapons Activities budget into NNSA’s separate Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation budget. In addition, budget estimates changed significantly for certain program areas and individual programs. Specifically, regarding the weapons refurbishment efforts—which are captured within the stockpile category in the budget— the 2016 budget materials indicate that during the next 25 years, $49.8 billion will be needed to support LEPs and other weapons alteration activities, which is an increase of $8.2 billion, or 19.6 percent, compared with the prior year’s estimate of $41.7 billion. This increase resulted partly from the change in the scope and schedule for some programs, as discussed below. Major Modernization Efforts Beyond the Future- Years Nuclear Security Program May Cost More Than Budget Estimates Reflect
The Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan’s estimates for Weapons Activities are $4.4 billion higher than the out-year projections for funding levels in the President’s budget provided in the DOD-DOE joint report. However, these budget estimates exceed a set of out-year projections for nuclear modernization and sustainment activities over the same time period. NNSA notes this issue in the Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan and states that it will need to be addressed as part of fiscal year 2017 programming. Estimates for Some Major Modernization Efforts in NNSA’s Budget Materials Were Lower Than Its Program-Specific Estimates
On the basis of our analysis of NNSA’s internally developed cost ranges for certain major weapon modernization efforts, we found that the low end of these ranges sometimes exceeded the estimates that NNSA included for those programs in its budget materials. However, in some years, NNSA’s budget estimates for some refurbishment efforts may not align with modernization plans. The budget materials report that the program’s budget estimate that year is $218 million; however, the low point of the cost range is $247 million. NNSA officials also stated that the total estimates for this program are above the total of the midpoint cost estimates for 2016 through 2020 and that funding for 2016 to 2019 is fungible and could be carried over to cover any potential shortfall in 2020. NNSA officials said that by shifting funding projected for 2021 to 2020, the IW-1 budget estimates would still be within the cost ranges. NNSA agreed with our recommendation from that report to provide more transparency with regard to shortfalls in its budget materials. Some Costs Are Not Included in Modernization Budget Estimates, and Dependency on Other Programs Could Lead to Increases in Estimates
We identified instances where certain modernization costs were not included in budget estimates or may be underestimated. In addition to some costs not being included in budget estimates, the estimates for some NNSA modernization efforts could increase in the future because of their dependency on successful execution of other NNSA programs. An NNSA official also stated that the IW-1 LEP budget estimates in the 2016 budget materials are predicated on NNSA successfully modernizing its plutonium pit production capacity. NNSA also provided technical comments separately, which we incorporated as appropriate. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to assess (1) the extent to which the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) budget estimates and plans for modernization activities reflected in its fiscal year 2016 nuclear security budget materials differ, if at all, from those in its fiscal year 2015 budget materials and (2) the extent to which the fiscal year 2016 nuclear security budget materials align with modernization plans as presented in the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan. NNSA’s nuclear security budget materials are composed of two key policy documents that are issued annually: the agency’s budget justification, which contains estimates for the 5-year Future-Years Nuclear Security Program, and the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan, which provides budget estimates over the next 25 years. We also reviewed a third, integrated document on plans for the nuclear deterrent that includes information on the Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of Energy’s (DOE) modernization budget estimates. | Why GAO Did This Study
Nuclear weapons are an integral part of the nation's defense strategy. Since 1992, the United States has shifted from producing new nuclear weapons to maintaining the stockpile through refurbishment. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review —which outlines U.S. nuclear policy, strategy, capabilities, and force posture—identified long-term stockpile modernization goals for NNSA that include sustaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal and investing in a modern infrastructure.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 included a provision for GAO to report annually on NNSA's nuclear security budget materials. These materials are composed of NNSA's budget request justification and its Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan , which describes modernization plans and budget estimates for the next 25 years. This report assesses (1) changes in the estimates in the 2016 budget materials from the prior year's materials and (2) the extent to which NNSA's 2016 budget materials align with plans for major modernization efforts.
GAO analyzed NNSA's fiscal year 2015 and 2016 nuclear security budget materials, which describe modernization plans and budget estimates for the next 25 years. GAO also interviewed NNSA officials.
What GAO Found
In the National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) fiscal year 2016 budget materials, the estimates for efforts related to modernizing the nuclear weapons stockpile total $297.6 billion for the next 25 years—an increase of $4.2 billion (1.4 percent) in nominal dollar values (as opposed to constant dollar values) compared with the prior year's budget materials. However, for certain program areas and individual programs, budget estimates changed more significantly than the overall estimates. NNSA's modernization efforts occur in four areas under the Weapons Activities appropriation account: stockpile; infrastructure; research, development, testing, and evaluation; and other weapons activities. For the stockpile area, budget estimates over 25 years increased by 13.2 percent over the nominal values in the Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan . Within the stockpile area, the estimates for life extension programs (LEP), which refurbish nuclear weapons, increased by 19.6 percent compared with the prior year's estimate, in part because of changes in the scope and schedule for some programs. In contrast, estimates for the other weapon activities area decreased by 18.1 percent, mainly because NNSA shifted two counterterrorism programs out of the Weapons Activities budget and into NNSA's separate Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation budget.
The estimates in NNSA's 2016 nuclear security budget materials may not align with all elements of modernization plans for several reasons. First, the Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan includes estimates for 2021 through 2025 that are $4.4 billion higher than the same time period in a set of out-year projections for funding levels that were included in a joint report by the Department of Defense and Department of Energy. NNSA noted this issue in the 2016 plan and stated that it will need to be addressed as part of fiscal year 2017 programming. In addition, in some years, NNSA's budget estimates for certain weapons refurbishment efforts are below the low point of the programs' internally developed cost ranges. For example, the W88 Alteration 370 budget estimate of $218 million for 2020 was below the low end of the internal program cost range of $247 million. NNSA officials stated that the total estimates for this program are above the total of the midpoint cost estimates for 2016 through 2020 and that funding for 2016 to 2019 is fungible and could be carried over to cover any potential shortfall in 2020. GAO also identified instances where certain modernization costs were not included in the estimates or may be underestimated, or where budget estimates for some efforts could increase due to their dependency on successful execution of other NNSA programs. For example, an NNSA official said that budget estimates for the IW-1 LEP—which is NNSA's first interoperable ballistic missile warhead LEP—are predicated on NNSA successfully modernizing its plutonium pit production capacity. This official stated that if there are delays in modernizing this capacity, the IW-1 LEP could bear greater costs than currently estimated. In August 2015, GAO recommended that NNSA provide more transparency with regard to shortfalls in its budget materials. NNSA agreed and said that it plans to implement this recommendation starting in its 2017 budget supporting documents.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making any new recommendations in this report. In response to GAO's draft report, NNSA provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-15-714 | gao_GAO-15-714_0 | FISMA 2002 required each agency in the executive branch to develop, document, and implement an information security program that includes the following components: periodic assessments of the risk and magnitude of harm that could result from the unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of information or information systems; policies and procedures that (1) are based on risk assessments, (2) cost-effectively reduce information security risks to an acceptable level, (3) ensure that information security is addressed throughout the life cycle of each system, and (4) ensure compliance with applicable requirements; subordinate plans for providing adequate information security for networks, facilities, and systems or a group of information systems, as appropriate; security awareness training to inform personnel of information security risks and of their responsibilities in complying with agency policies and procedures, as well as training personnel with significant security responsibilities for information security; periodic testing and evaluation of the effectiveness of information security policies, procedures, and practices, to be performed with a frequency depending on risk, but no less than annually, and that includes testing of management, operational, and technical controls for every system identified in the agency’s required inventory of major information systems; a process for planning, implementing, evaluating, and documenting remedial action to address any deficiencies in the information security policies, procedures, and practices of the agency; procedures for detecting, reporting, and responding to security incidents; and plans and procedures to ensure continuity of operations for information systems that support the operations and assets of the agency. Expands exemptions from OMB oversight for certain national security- related systems. In addition, FISMA 2014 reiterates the previous requirement for federal agencies to develop, document, and implement an agency-wide information security program. Accordingly, we and agency inspectors general have made hundreds of recommendations to agencies to address these security control deficiencies. In one example, an agency had not fully developed and implemented components of its agency-wide information security risk management program that met FISMA’s requirements. However, many agencies continue to have weaknesses in implementing these controls in part because many of these recommendations remain unimplemented. However, work by the inspectors general revealed weaknesses in risk management. According to OMB, inspectors general at seven agencies reported that their agency did not have a risk management program in place. The agencies generally concurred with our recommendations. Guidance for Reporting Agency Evaluations Was Not always Complete
FISMA 2002 specified that OMB, among its other responsibilities, is to develop policies, principles, standards, and guidelines on information security and report to Congress. Each year, OMB and DHS provide guidance to federal agencies and their inspectors general for preparing their FISMA reports and then summarize the information provided by the agencies and the inspectors general in OMB’s annual report to Congress. Federal agencies’ implementation of FISMA during fiscal years 2013 and 2014 was mixed. Recommendation for Executive Action
We recommend that the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Chief Information Officers Council, and the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency, enhance reporting guidance to the inspectors general for all rating components of agency security programs, such as configuration management and risk management, so that the ratings will be consistent and comparable. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to evaluate (1) the adequacy and effectiveness of federal agencies’ information security policies and procedures and (2) the extent to which federal agencies have implemented the requirements of the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) of 2002. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 1997, GAO has designated federal information security as a government-wide high risk area, and in 2003 expanded this area to include computerized systems supporting the nation's critical infrastructure. In February 2015, in its high risk update, GAO further expanded this area to include protecting the privacy of personal information that is collected, maintained, and shared by both federal and nonfederal entities.
FISMA required federal agencies to develop, document, and implement an agency-wide information security program. The act also assigned OMB with overseeing agencies' implementation of security requirements.
FISMA also included a provision for GAO to periodically report to Congress on (1) the adequacy and effectiveness of agencies' information security policies and practices and (2) agencies' implementation of FISMA requirements. GAO analyzed information security-related reports and data from 24 federal agencies, their inspectors general, and OMB; reviewed prior GAO work; examined documents from OMB and DHS; and spoke to agency officials.
What GAO Found
Persistent weaknesses at 24 federal agencies illustrate the challenges they face in effectively applying information security policies and practices. Most agencies continue to have weaknesses in (1) limiting, preventing, and detecting inappropriate access to computer resources; (2) managing the configuration of software and hardware; (3) segregating duties to ensure that a single individual does not have control over all key aspects of a computer-related operation; (4) planning for continuity of operations in the event of a disaster or disruption; and (5) implementing agency-wide security management programs that are critical to identifying control deficiencies, resolving problems, and managing risks on an ongoing basis (see fig.). These deficiencies place critical information and information systems used to support the operations, assets, and personnel of federal agencies at risk, and can impair agencies' efforts to fully implement effective information security programs. In prior reports, GAO and inspectors general have made hundreds of recommendations to agencies to address deficiencies in their information security controls and weaknesses in their programs, but many of these recommendations remain unimplemented.
Federal agencies' implementation in fiscal years 2013 and 2014 of requirements set by the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 (FISMA) was mixed. For example, most agencies had developed and documented policies and procedures for managing risk, providing security training, and taking remedial actions, among other things. However, each agency's inspector general reported weaknesses in the processes used to implement FISMA requirements. In addition, to comply with FISMA's annual reporting requirements, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) provide guidance to the inspectors general on conducting and reporting agency evaluations. Nevertheless, GAO found that this guidance was not always complete, leading to inconsistent application by the inspectors general. For example, because it did not include criteria for making overall assessments, inspectors general inconsistently reported agency security performance.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is recommending that OMB, in consultation with DHS and others, enhance security program reporting guidance to inspectors general so that the ratings of agency security performance will be consistent and comparable. OMB generally concurred with our recommendation. |
gao_GAO-13-467T | gao_GAO-13-467T_0 | 1). FSOC has established seven standing committees that are generally composed of staff of FSOC members and member agencies to help carry out the council’s business. FSOC and OFR Face Challenges Achieving Their Missions
FSOC and OFR face several challenges as they work to carry out their responsibilities and achieve their missions. Third, OFR faces the challenge of trying to build a world-class research organization from the ground up, including acquiring staff with the needed skills, while meeting its short-term responsibility to support FSOC. Identifying Potential Risks and Emerging Threats to Financial Stability
FSOC has taken steps to meet its statutory responsibilities related to identifying risks and potential emerging threats to U.S. financial stability but has not yet developed comprehensive and systematic mechanisms to realize these goals. positioned to judge which potential threats will benefit from interagency discussions. To improve FSOC’s approaches for monitoring threats to financial stability, we recommended that FSOC develop an approach that included systematic sharing of key financial risk indicators across FSOC members and member agencies to assist in identifying potential threats for further monitoring or analysis. In addition, FSOC does not have sufficient processes for identifying or prioritizing potential emerging threats to U.S. financial stability for its annual reports. FSOC’s 2011 and 2012 annual reports generally addressed the subjects mandated by the Dodd-Frank Act. However, FSOC has not developed a structure that supports having a systematic or comprehensive process for identifying potential emerging threats. We recommended that FSOC develop more systematic approaches for identifying emerging threats to financial stability that are forward-looking and help prioritize such threats in annual reports. Transparency
Although FSOC and OFR have adopted communication methods to provide information on their activities to the public and Congress, some of their methods could be strengthened. We recommended that FSOC keep detailed records of closed door sessions of key meetings. In our September 2012 report, we also recommended that both entities develop a communication strategy to improve communications with the public, which could include more fully developing their websites. OFR issued a strategic framework in March 2012 to cover fiscal years 2012-2014 that lists five strategic goals, including: supporting FSOC through the secure provision of high-quality financial data and conducting the analyses needed to monitor threats to financial stability; developing and promoting data-related standards and best practices; establishing a center of excellence for research on financial stability and promoting best practices for financial risk management; providing the public with key data and analyses while protecting establishing OFR as an efficient organization and world-class workplace. To support the growth of OFR into a viable and sustainable entity, we recommended that OFR build on its strategic framework by further developing its strategic planning and performance management system so that it linked its activities to its goals and used publicly available performance measures to measure its progress. To improve FSOC’s accountability, we recommended in September 2012 that FSOC should make recommendations in the annual report more specific by identifying which FSOC member agency or agencies, as appropriate, were recommended to monitor or implement such actions within specified time frames. In addition, FSOC and OFR have not defined their roles and responsibilities for monitoring risks to the financial system. We recommended that FSOC and OFR clarify responsibility for implementing requirements to monitor threats to financial stability across FSOC and OFR, including among FSOC members and member agencies. We recommended that FSOC work with federal financial regulators to (1) develop formal coordination policies that would clarify issues such as the timing of coordination, the process for soliciting and addressing comments, and FSOC’s role in facilitating coordination and (2) more fully incorporate the key practices for successful collaboration that we have previously identified. Moreover, FSOC can rely on OFR for some data collection and analysis. To strengthen the accountability of FSOC’s decisions, FSOC should establish a collaborative and comprehensive framework for assessing the impact of decisions for designating FMUs and nonbank financial companies on those entities and the wider economy. We made 10 recommendations to FSOC and OFR to strengthen the accountability and transparency of their decisions and activities as well as enhance collaboration among FSOC members and with external stakeholders. In its November 2012 response to our report and recommendations, Treasury noted that FSOC and OFR had considered the recommendations. In March 2013, Treasury officials described steps that each entity was considering or taking to address some of the recommendations, such as reviewing FSOC’s transparency policy and updating the websites. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2010, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act created FSOC to identify and address threats to financial stability and OFR to support FSOC and Congress by providing financial research and data. This testimony primarily discusses findings from a September 2012 GAO report and addresses four topics (1) challenges FSOC and OFR face in carrying out their missions, (2) FSOC's and OFR's efforts to establish management mechanisms, (3) FSOC's and OFR's activities for supporting collaboration among their members and external stakeholders, and (4) FSOC's rules for designating nonbank financial firms that pose threats to financial stability.
For this testimony, GAO updated some information on the entities' response to the recommendations in its September 2012 report.
What GAO Found
The Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) and Office of Financial Research (OFR) face challenges in achieving their missions. For example, collaboration among FSOC members can be challenging, as almost all members represent independent agencies that retain existing authorities. Additionally, OFR faces the challenge of building a world-class research organization while meeting shorter-term responsibilities.
FSOC and OFR have developed some management structures to carry out their missions and taken steps to promote collaboration among their members and stakeholders. For example, FSOC established several standing committees composed of members' and member agencies' staffs to support the council in carrying out its business. FSOC also issued rules on the process for designating nonbank financial firms for additional oversight. However, GAO reported in September 2012 that these efforts could be strengthened to conform to key standards and practices and made 10 recommendations.
FSOC should develop a systematic approach to help identify potential threats to financial stability that includes collecting and sharing key financial risk indicators. FSOC's Systemic Risk Committee, which is responsible for identifying risks to financial stability, has procedures to facilitate risk analysis but does not have a systematic approach or comprehensive information. FSOC member agencies on their own may not be well positioned to judge which potential threats will benefit from interagency discussions.
FSOC should develop more systematic approaches that are forward looking and help prioritize threats to the financial system in its annual reports. To date, FSOC's annual reports have not reflected a forward-looking process for identifying emerging threats.
To improve transparency, (1) FSOC should keep detailed records of closed-door sessions and (2) both FSOC and OFR should develop a communication strategy to improve communications with the public. Currently, public information on FSOC's and OFR's decision making and activities is limited.
OFR needs to further develop its strategic planning and performance management system to include some leading practices. OFR issued a strategic framework in March 2012 that did not, among other things, link activities to strategic goals and performance measurement systems.
FSOC should identify an agency or agencies to monitor or implement each recommendation from its annual reports within specified time frames. FSOC's annual reports have not consistently identified which entities should monitor or implement the identified recommendations.
FSOC should (1) develop policies to clarify when formal collaboration or coordination should occur, (2) more fully incorporate key practices for successful collaboration, and (3) clarify with OFR responsibility for implementing requirements to monitor risks to the financial system.
FSOC should develop a comprehensive framework for assessing the impact of its designation decisions. For example, FSOC has issued rules on processes for designating nonbank financial entities for additional oversight, but it has not developed plans to comprehensively evaluate whether the designations are having their intended impact.
What GAO Recommends
In its September 2012 report, GAO made 10 recommendations to FSOC and OFR, which among other things, recommends ways to improve the transparency and accountability of their decisions. In response to GAO's report, Treasury said, as Chairperson, that the council and OFR had considered the recommendations. In March 2013 Treasury and OFR officials described steps that each entity was considering or taking to address some of them. |
gao_AIMD-95-203 | gao_AIMD-95-203_0 | Our objectives were to determine whether USDA is (1) managing existing telecommunications resources cost-effectively and consolidating services to maximize savings and (2) effectively planning future communications networks to meet the Department’s information sharing needs. As a result, these agencies waste millions of dollars each year paying for (1) unnecessary telecommunications services and equipment, (2) leased equipment that is not used and services billed for but never provided, and (3) commercial carrier services that are more expensive than those provided under the FTS 2000 contract. However, OIRM has not required USDA’s component agencies to maintain inventories of telecommunications resources and has not provided guidance to the agencies for establishing effective telecommunications management controls. Nevertheless, USDA’s failure to cost-effectively manage its annual $100 million telecommunications investment constitutes a material internal control weakness under the Federal Managers’ Financial Integrity Act of 1982 (31 U.S.C. This is allowed to occur because OIRM continues to approve agencies’ plans for new network systems without (1) determining what information sharing needs USDA agencies have and what opportunities exist to share other agencies’ existing or planned networks and (2) ensuring that the planned networks adequately address the need to share information and resources. Consequently, USDA spends millions of dollars developing networks that do not make efficient use of the Department’s telecommunications resources and cannot support information sharing without costly modifications. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Agriculture's (USDA) management and planning of its telecommunications resources, focusing on whether USDA is: (1) managing its telecommunications resources cost-effectively; and (2) planning telecommunications networks to support its information sharing needs.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) USDA is not cost-effectively managing its annual $100 million telecommunications investment; (2) USDA agencies waste millions of dollars each year paying for unnecessary telecommunications services and equipment, because the Office of Information Resources Management (OIRM) has not fulfilled its responsibility to manage and oversee USDA telecommunications resources; (3) USDA is not effectively planning its telecommunications networks and ensuring that they can support its information sharing needs for the future; and (4) OIRM continues to approve the acquisition and development of costly new agency networks that overlap and do not support interagency information sharing. |
gao_GAO-03-756T | gao_GAO-03-756T_0 | In addition to health care, VA provides disability benefits to those veterans with service-connected conditions. Many Veterans Travel Too Far for Hospital Admissions and Specialty Consultations
The substantial increase in VA health care delivery locations has enhanced access for enrolled veterans in need of primary care, although many still travel long distances for primary care. Shifting the delivery of health care closer to where veterans live may have significant ramifications for other stakeholders, such as medical schools. Specifically, VA’s current projections of acute health care workload indicate a surge in demand for acute health care services over the next 10 years. VA intended to address veterans’ access to nursing home care as part of its larger CARES initiative to project future health care needs and determine how to ensure equitable access. Capital Assets Not Well- Aligned to Meet Veterans’ Needs
VA has a large and aged infrastructure, which is not well aligned to efficiently meet veterans’ needs. VA faces difficult challenges when attempting to improve service delivery efficiencies. VA also faces difficult decisions concerning the need for and sizing of capital investments, especially in locations where future workload may increase over the short term before steadily declining. In fact, we identified federal real property management as a high-risk area in January 2003. Patient Support Services Could Be Provided More Efficiently
As VA continues to transform itself from an inpatient- to an outpatient- based health care system, it must find more efficient, systemwide ways of providing patient care support services, such as consolidation of services and the use of competitive sourcing. Until VA completes these assessments and takes action to reduce costs, it may be paying more for inpatient food services than required and as a result have fewer resources available for the provision of health care to veterans. Fundamental Changes Could Improve Effectiveness of VA’s Disability Programs
Significant program design and management challenges hinder VA’s ability to provide meaningful and timely support to disabled veterans and their families. Moreover, advances in medicine and technology have reduced the severity of some medical conditions and allowed individuals to live with greater independence and function more effectively in work settings. VA’s disability program challenges are not unique. VA Is Trying to Improve the Quality and Timeliness of Claims Processing
Even if VA brought its disability criteria up to date, it would continue to face challenges in ensuring quality and timely decisions, including ensuring that veterans get consistent decisions—that is, comparable decisions on benefit entitlement and rating percentage—regardless of the regional office making the decisions. VA is not alone in facing these challenges; SSA is also challenged to improve its ability to provide accurate, consistent, and timely disability decisions to program applicants. VA proposed such a consolidation in 1995 and in that proposal enumerated several potential benefits, such as allowing VA to assign the most experienced and productive adjudication officers and directors to the consolidated offices; facilitating increased specialization and as-needed expert consultation in deciding complex cases; improving the completeness of claims development, the accuracy and consistency of rating decisions, and the clarity of decision explanations; improving overall adjudication quality by increasing the pool of experience and expertise in critical technical areas; and facilitating consistency in decisionmaking through fewer consolidated claims-processing centers. Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Veterans Affairs. VA Health Care: VA Is Struggling to Address Asset Realignment Challenges. VA Disability Compensation: Disability Ratings May Not Reflect Veterans’ Economic Losses. | Why GAO Did This Study
In previous GAO reports and testimonies on the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), and in its ongoing reviews, GAO identified major management challenges related to enhancing access to health care, improving the efficiency of health care delivery, and improving the effectiveness of disability programs. This testimony underscores the importance of continuing to make progress in addressing these challenges and ultimately overcoming them.
What GAO Found
VA has taken actions to address key challenges in its health care and disability programs. However, growing demand for health care and a potentially larger and more complex disability workload may make VA's challenges in these areas more complex. Enhancing access to health care: VA is challenged to deliver timely, convenient health care to its enrolled veteran population. Too many veterans continue to travel too far and wait too long for care. However, shifting care closer to where veterans live is complicated by stakeholder interests. In addition, VA's efforts to reduce waiting times may be complicated by an anticipated short-term surge in demand for specialty outpatient care. VA also faces difficult challenges in providing equitable access to nursing home care services to a growing elderly veteran population. Improving the efficiency of health care delivery: VA is challenged to find more efficient ways to meet veterans' demand for health care. VA operates a large portfolio of aged buildings that is not well aligned to efficiently meet veterans' needs. As a result, VA faces difficult realignment decisions involving capital investments, consolidations, closures, and contracting with local providers. VA also faces challenges in implementing management changes to improve the efficiency of patient support services, such as food and laundry services. Improving the effectiveness of disability programs: VA is challenged to find more effective ways to compensate veterans with disabilities. VA's outdated disability determination process does not reflect a current view of the relationship between impairments and work capacity. Advances in medicine and technology have allowed some individuals with disabilities to live more independently and work more effectively. VA also faces continuing challenges to improve the timeliness, quality and consistency of claims processing. Major improvements may require fundamental program changes. GAO designated federal real property, including VA health care infrastructure, and federal disability programs, including VA disability benefits, as high-risk areas in January 2003. GAO did this to draw attention to the need for broad-based transformation in these areas, which is critical to improving the government's performance and ensuring accountability within expected resource limits. |
gao_GAO-08-744T | gao_GAO-08-744T_0 | Current Surface Transportation Programs Do Not Effectively Address Identified Transportation Challenges
Current surface transportation programs do not effectively address the transportation challenges the nation faces. Finally, the fiscal sustainability of the numerous highway, transit, and safety programs funded by the Highway Trust Fund is in doubt, as a result of increased spending from the fund without commensurate increases in revenues. Federal Goals and Approaches Have Expanded as State and Local Discretion Has Increased
Since the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956 funded the modern federal highway program, the federal role in surface transportation has expanded to include broader goals, more programs, and a variety of program structures. The Goals and Role of the Federal Government Are Not Clear, and Many Programs Are Not Linked to Performance
We have found that many federal surface transportation programs are not effective at addressing key transportation challenges, such as increasing congestion and growing freight demand, because federal goals and roles are unclear, and many programs lack links to needs or performance. 1). The Fiscal Sustainability of Surface Transportation Programs Is Threatened
The solvency of the federal surface transportation program is at risk because expenditures now exceed revenues for the Highway Trust Fund, and projections indicate that the balance of the Highway Trust Fund will soon be exhausted. Framework to Assess Proposals for Restructuring and Funding Surface Transportation Programs
Through our prior analyses of existing programs, we identified a framework of principles that could help drive an assessment of proposals for restructuring and funding federal surface transportation programs. These principles include (1) creating well-defined goals based on identified areas of national interest, (2) establishing and clearly defining the federal role in achieving each goal, (3) incorporating performance and accountability into funding decisions, (4) employing the best tools and approaches to improve results and emphasize return on investment, and (5) ensuring fiscal sustainability. A range of options—from altering existing or introducing new funding approaches to employing various financing mechanisms—could be used to help meet the demand for additional investments. Each of these options has different merits and challenges, and the selection of any of them will likely involve trade-offs among different policy goals. However, some of the demand for additional investment in transportation infrastructure could be reduced. Another funding source for infrastructure is user fees. However, each financing strategy is, in the final analysis, a form of debt that ultimately must be repaid with interest. A number of available mechanisms can be used to help finance infrastructure projects. Examples of these financing mechanisms follow. Several bills have been introduced in this Congress that would increase investment in the nation’s infrastructure through bonding. Revolving funds. These arrangements show promise as a viable alternative, where appropriate, to help meet growing and costly transportation demands and have the potential to provide numerous benefits to the public sector. The highway public- private partnerships created to date have resulted in advantages from the perspective of state and local governments, such as the construction of new infrastructure without using public funding, and obtaining funds by extracting value from existing facilities for reinvestment in transportation and other public programs. Highway public-private partnerships also entail potential costs and risks. While highway public-private partnerships can be used to obtain financing for highways, these funds are largely a new source of borrowed funds—a form of privately issued debt that must be repaid to private investors seeking a return on their investment by road users over what potentially could be a period of several generations. Ultimately the extent to which public-private partnerships can be used as a tool to help meet the nation’s transportation financing challenges will depend on the ability of states to effectively manage and implement them. The benefits of public-private partnerships are potential benefits—that is, they are not assured and can only be achieved by weighing them against potential costs and trade-offs through careful, comprehensive analysis to determine whether public-private partnerships are appropriate in specific circumstances and, if so, how best to implement them, and how best to protect the public interest. GAO-08-287. GAO-08-93SP. | Why GAO Did This Study
The nation has reached a critical juncture with its current surface transportation policies and programs. Demand has outpaced the capacity of the system, resulting in increased congestion. In addition, without significant changes in funding levels or planned spending, the Highway Trust Fund--the major source of federal highway and transit funding-- is projected to incur significant deficits in the years ahead. Exacerbating concerns about the solvency of the Highway Trust Fund is the federal government's bleak fiscal condition and outlook. As a result, other federal revenue sources may not be available to help solve the nation's current transportation challenges. This statement is based on a body of work that GAO has completed over the past several years for Congress. This testimony discusses (1) GAO's recent findings on the structure and performance of the current surface transportation program (GAO-08-400), (2) a framework to assess proposals for restructuring of the surface transportation program, (3) potential options to fund investments in the surface transportation system, and (4) our recent findings on the benefits, costs, and trade-offs of using public-private partnerships to help fund transportation investments (GAO-08-44).
What GAO Found
Since federal fundingfor the interstate system was established in 1956, the federal role in surface transportation has expanded to include broader goals, more programs, and a variety of program structures. Consequently, the goals of current programs are numerous and sometimes conflicting, and the federal role in these programs is unclear. For example, federal programs do not effectively address key transportation challenges, such as increasing congestion and freight demand. Many surface transportation programs are also not linked to performance of the transportation system or of the grantees, and programs often do not employ the best tools and approaches. Finally, the fiscal sustainability of the numerous highway, transit, and safety programs funded by the Highway Trust Fund is in doubt, because spending from the fund has increased without commensurate increases in revenues. A number of principles can help guide the assessment of proposals to restructure and fund federal surface transportation programs. These principles include (1) ensuring goals are well defined and focused on the national interest, (2) ensuring the federal role in achieving each goal is clearly defined, (3) ensuring accountability for results by entities receiving federal funds, (4) employing the best tools and approaches to improve results and emphasize return on targeted federal investment, and (5) ensuring fiscal sustainability. A range of options could be used to fund the growing demand for additional investment in the surface transportation system. There are two revenue sources for these additional investments: taxes and fees. Financing mechanisms, such as bonding and revolving funds, could also be used to fund transportation infrastructure projects when tax and user fee approaches are not sufficient to meet demands. However, these financing mechanisms are all forms of debt that ultimately must be repaid with interest by the general population through tax increases or reductions in government services. Each of these options has different merits and challenges, and the selection of any of them will likely involve trade-offs among different policy goals. Highway public-private partnerships show promise as a viable alternative, where appropriate, to help meet growing and costly transportation demands. The highway public-private partnerships created to date have resulted in advantages from the perspective of state and local governments, such as the construction of new infrastructure without using public funding. However, highway public-private partnerships also entail potential costs and risks including the reality that funds from public-private partnerships are largely a new source of borrowed funds--a form of privately issued debt that must be repaid to private investors. Ultimately the extent to which public-private partnerships can be used to help meet the nation's transportation funding challenges will depend on the ability of states to weigh potential benefits against potential costs and trade-offs to determine whether public-private partnerships are appropriate in specific circumstances--and if so--how best to implement them and protect the public interest. |
gao_PEMD-95-6 | gao_PEMD-95-6_0 | We interviewed individuals with current and previous program responsibility and analyzed information from the WEEA Program Office, the Department of Education’s Grant and Contract Service Office files, WEEA’s Publishing Center, and independent reviews of the program. Yet one of the three WEEA objectives is to help educational institutions meet the requirements of title IX prohibiting sex discrimination in all educational institutions receiving federal funds. Local and state education agencies received only 15 percent and 2 percent of the awards, respectively. Audiences Addressed
The most frequent level of participants targeted was elementary and secondary students (about 36 percent of projects), followed by parents or other nonschool adults (25 percent). Based on telephone interviews with a random sample of 40 former grantees, we found service activities funded by WEEA often appeared to continue beyond the funding period. However, continuation was contingent upon the availability of other outside funding. Question 2
Did WEEA Promote Gender Equity? In this way, they apparently hoped to provide girls and women with services to compensate for past—and possibly current—educational inequities. Did WEEA Meet Legislative Requirements? The Clinton administration requested and received an increase in the WEEA appropriation from $1.98 million in each of fiscal years 1993 and 1994 to $3.97 million in fiscal year 1995. Some programmatic changes will be required owing to the recent legislation reauthorizing WEEA, but it is not clear whether the Department will make fundamental changes in the design and implementation of the program. Instead, projects typically provided short-term direct services, often career counseling, remedial and other academic instruction, and personal support services, such as psychological counseling, that were not integrated with on-going school-based activities. The absence of evaluation information on past WEEA projects means that the program is left with little evidence of their effectiveness in eliminating sex bias in education. First, the stated purpose of the act was expanded with the following language: “it is also the purpose of this part to provide educational equity for women and girls who suffer multiple discrimination, bias, or stereotyping based on sex and on race, ethnic origin, disability, or age.”
Second, the small grant program was replaced with a challenge provision, which authorized the Secretary to award grants of up to $40,000 to activities “to develop comprehensive plans for the implementation of equity programs; innovative approaches to school community partnerships; new dissemination and replication strategies; and other innovative approaches to achieving the purposes of WEEA.”
Finally, the act required the Secretary to ensure that at least one grant or contract was available during each funding year to support each of six activities authorized in the 1974 amendments. 3. 4. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Education's Women's Educational Equity Act (WEEA) Program, focusing on: (1) what interventions were implemented under WEEA between 1986 and 1991, by whom, for what audiences, and at what costs; (2) whether these activities promoted educational equity for women and reflected legislative requirements; and (3) how changes in program administration affected the ability of the WEEA Program to achieve its legislative purpose.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the WEEA Program funded 205 general and challenge grants between 1986 and 1991 to promote gender equity in all educational institutions receiving federal funds; (2) the WEEA Program addressed gender equity primarily by providing direct services such as career counseling, remedial academic instruction, and personal support services to girls and women to compensate for past and current inequities; (3) elementary and secondary school students were the most frequently targeted participants, followed by parents and other adults from outside the schools; (4) colleges received 36 percent of WEEA grants, nonprofit or community groups received 32 percent of WEEA grants, and local and state education agencies received 15 percent of WEEA grants; (5) WEEA activities often continued beyond the funding period, but continuation of services was contingent upon the availability of other outside funding; (6) the Clinton Administration requested and received an increase in WEEA funding from $1.98 million to $3.97 million in fiscal year 1995; (7) there was limited information on the effectiveness of past WEEA projects in eliminating sex bias in education because WEEA did not require grantees to produce materials on service activities; and (8) it was not clear whether the Department of Education would make fundamental changes in the design and implementation of the WEEA program. |
gao_GAO-08-693 | gao_GAO-08-693_0 | In order to determine how these recommendations fit within IRS’s management and internal control structure, we compared the open recommendations, and the issues that gave rise to them, to the control activities listed in the internal control standards and to the list of major factors and examples outlined in our Internal Control Management and Evaluation Tool. Over the years since we first began auditing IRS’s financial statements in fiscal year 1992, IRS has taken actions enabling us to close over 200 of our financial management-related recommendations. At the same time, however, our audits continue to identify additional internal control issues, resulting in our making further recommendations for corrective action, including 24 new financial management-related recommendations resulting from our fiscal year 2007 financial audit. Status of Recommendations Based on the Year 2007 Financial Statement Audit
In June 2007, we issued a report on the status of IRS’s efforts to implement corrective actions to address financial management recommendations stemming from our fiscal year 2006 and prior year financial audits and other financial management-related work. Consequently, a total of 81 financial management-related recommendations were open at the end of fiscal year 2007 and need to be addressed by IRS. While most of our open recommendations can be addressed in the short term, a few recommendations, particularly those concerning IRS’s automated systems, are complex and will require several more years to fully and effectively address. Open Recommendations Grouped by Control Activity
Linking the open recommendations from our financial audits and other financial management-related work, and the issues that gave rise to them, to internal control activities that are central to IRS’s tax administration responsibilities provides insight regarding their significance. IRS is charged with collecting trillions of dollars in taxes each year, a significant amount of which is collected in the form of checks and cash accompanied by tax returns and related information. In addition, the number of staff increases significantly during the peak of the tax filing season. IRS has made substantial progress in improving its financial management since its first financial audit, as evidenced by consecutive clean audit opinions on its financial statements for the past 8 years, resolution of several material internal control weaknesses, and actions taken resulting in the closure of hundreds of financial management recommendations. This progress has been the result of hard work by many individuals throughout IRS and sustained commitment of IRS leadership. Nonetheless, more needs to be done to fully address the agency’s continuing financial management challenges. Effective implementation of the recommendations we have made and continue to make through our financial audits and related work could greatly assist IRS in improving its internal controls and achieving sound financial management. We will review the effectiveness of further corrective actions IRS has taken or will take and the status of IRS’s progress in addressing all open recommendations as part of our audit of IRS’s fiscal year 2008 financial statements. In its OMB No. | Why GAO Did This Study
In its role as the nation's tax collector, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has a demanding responsibility in annually collecting trillions of dollars in taxes, processing hundreds of millions of tax and information returns, and enforcing the nation's tax laws. Since its first audit of IRS's financial statements in fiscal year 1992, GAO has identified a number of weaknesses in IRS's financial management operations. In related reports, GAO has recommended corrective action to address those weaknesses. Each year, as part of the annual audit of IRS's financial statements, GAO not only makes recommendations to address any new weaknesses identified but also follows up on the status of weaknesses GAO identified in previous years' audits. The purpose of this report is to (1) assist IRS management in tracking the status of audit recommendations and actions needed to fully address them and (2) demonstrate how the recommendations relate to control activities central to IRS's mission and goals.
What GAO Found
IRS has made significant progress in improving its internal controls and financial management since its first financial statement audit in 1992, as evidenced by 8 consecutive years of clean audit opinions on its financial statements, the resolution of several material internal control weaknesses, and actions resulting in the closure of over 200 financial management recommendations. This progress has been the result of hard work throughout the agency and sustained commitment at the top levels of the agency. However, IRS still faces financial management challenges. At the beginning of GAO's audit of IRS's fiscal year 2007 financial statements, 75 financial management-related recommendations from prior audits remained open because IRS had not fully addressed the issues that gave rise to them. During the fiscal year 2007 financial audit, IRS took actions that enabled GAO to close 18 of those recommendations. At the same time, GAO identified additional internal control issues resulting in 24 new recommendations. In total, 81 recommendations remain open at the end of fiscal 2007. To assist IRS in evaluating and improving internal controls, GAO categorized the 81 open recommendations by various internal control activities, which, in turn, were grouped into three broad control categories. The continued existence of internal control weaknesses that gave rise to these recommendations represents a serious obstacle that IRS needs to overcome. Effective implementation of GAO's recommendations can greatly assist IRS in improving its internal controls and achieving sound financial management and can help enable it to more effectively carry out its tax administration responsibilities. Most can be addressed in the short term (the next 2 years). However, a few recommendations, particularly those concerning IRS's automated systems, are complex and will require several more years to fully and effectively address. |
gao_GAO-13-465 | gao_GAO-13-465_0 | ITC decisions can be appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 1). Number of Patent Infringement Lawsuits Increased Significantly in 2011 and the Number of Defendants Increased between 2007 and 2011
From 2000 to 2010, the number of patent infringement lawsuits fluctuated slightly, and from 2010 to 2011, the number increased about 31 percent. This analysis also shows that operating companies brought most of these lawsuits and that lawsuits involving software-related patents accounted for about 89 percent of the increase in defendants during this period. In addition, our analysis of a generalizable sample of data from 2007 through 2011 estimates that the number of overall defendants in patent infringement suits increased by about 129 percent over the 5- year period (see fig. Universities. Our analysis of patent infringement lawsuit data from 2007 to 2011 shows that on average about 46 percent of the lawsuits involved software- related patents. Stakeholders Said That Some Patents Have Unclear Property Rights and Make Overly Broad Claims
Several of the stakeholders we spoke with, including representatives from PMEs, operating companies, and legal commentators, said that many recent patent infringement lawsuits are related to the prevalence of low- quality patents; that is, patents with unclear property rights, overly broad claims, or both. Stakeholders Noted the Recognition of Patents as a Valuable Asset May Have Contributed to Recent Patent Issuance and Litigation
Several stakeholders, including PMEs and legal commentators, we interviewed said that the recognition that patents are a more valuable asset than once assumed may have contributed to recent patent issuance trends and patent infringement lawsuits. For example, representatives from one small software company we spoke with said that they could develop a product in a little as 2 months with only a few programmers. New Initiatives in the Courts May Affect Patent Litigation
The federal court system is implementing some new initiatives to improve the handling of patent cases. Efforts to Improve Courts’ Handling of Patent Cases
In January 2011, Congress established a pilot program in certain U.S. district courts to encourage the enhancement of expertise in patent cases among district court judges. In general, several stakeholders we spoke with agreed that it is too early to tell what impact the patent pilot project will ultimately have on patent litigation. Despite these cases, some stakeholders said that the judicial system has contributed to recent problems in patent infringement litigation and is either unable or unwilling to rectify them. PTO Has Taken Actions to Improve Patent Quality and Implement New AIA Proceedings That May Affect Patent Litigation in the Future
PTO has taken several recent actions that are likely to affect patent quality and patent litigation in the future, including agency initiatives and changes required by AIA. In November 2011, in response to the recommendations from FTC’s 2011 report, PTO acknowledged that more uniform terminology would help to improve the quality of software-related patents and began working to establish a partnership with the software industry to address this issue. In February 2013, PTO officials said that they generally try to adapt to developments in patent law and industry to improve patent quality, as they are doing with their new examination guidelines and their software- related patent partnership. However, the agency does not currently use information on patent litigation in initiating actions like these. However, some staff in PTO’s Office of the Chief Economist have suggested that analyzing relationships between the types of patents involved in infringement litigation and internal patent examination data, including the timeline between the filing and grant of a patent and changes in the wording of claims could potentially benefit patent quality and examination by identifying meaningful patterns in the examination of patents that end up in court. According to some stakeholders, these proceedings are most likely to be used by companies that have been sued for patent infringement. Recommendation for Executive Action
We are recommending that the Secretary of Commerce direct the Director of PTO to consider examining trends in patent infringement litigation, including the types of patents and issues in dispute, and to consider linking this information to internal data on patent examination to improve the quality of issued patents and the patent examination process. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Section 34 of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA) mandated that GAO conduct a study on the consequences of patent litigation by nonpracticing entities (NPE). Our objectives were to determine: (1) what is known about the volume and characteristics of recent patent litigation activity; (2) what is known about the key factors that contribute to recent patent litigation trends; (3) what developments in the judicial system may affect patent litigation; and (4) what actions, if any, has the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) recently taken that may affect patent litigation in the future. We found that these data were sufficiently reliable for purposes of this report. | Why GAO Did This Study
Legal commentators, technology companies, Congress, and others have raised questions about patent infringement lawsuits by entities that own patents but do not make products. Such entities may include universities licensing patents developed by university research, companies focused on licensing patents they developed, or companies that buy patents from others for the purposes of asserting the patents for profit.
Section 34 of AIA mandated that GAO conduct a study on the consequences of patent litigation by NPEs. This report examines (1) the volume and characteristics of recent patent litigation activity; (2) views of stakeholders knowledgeable in patent litigation on key factors that have contributed to recent patent litigation; (3) what developments in the judicial system may affect patent litigation; and (4) what actions, if any, PTO has recently taken that may affect patent litigation in the future. GAO reviewed relevant laws, analyzed patent infringement litigation data from 2000 to 2011, and interviewed officials from PTO and knowledgeable stakeholders, including representatives of companies involved in patent litigation.
What GAO Found
From 2000 to 2010, the number of patent infringement lawsuits in the federal courts fluctuated slightly, and from 2010 to 2011, the number of such lawsuits increased by about a third. Some stakeholders GAO interviewed said that the increase in 2011 was most likely influenced by the anticipation of changes in the 2011 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA), which made several significant changes to the U.S. patent system, including limiting the number of defendants in a lawsuit, causing some plaintiffs that would have previously filed a single lawsuit with multiple defendants to break the lawsuit into multiple lawsuits. In addition, GAO's detailed analysis of a representative sample of 500 lawsuits from 2007 to 2011 shows that the number of overall defendants in patent infringement lawsuits increased by about 129 percent over this period. These data also show that companies that make products brought most of the lawsuits and that nonpracticing entities (NPE) brought about a fifth of all lawsuits. GAO's analysis of these data also found that lawsuits involving software-related patents accounted for about 89 percent of the increase in defendants over this period.
Stakeholders knowledgeable in patent litigation identified three key factors that likely contributed to many recent patent infringement lawsuits. First, several stakeholders GAO interviewed said that many such lawsuits are related to the prevalence of patents with unclear property rights; for example, several of these stakeholders noted that software-related patents often had overly broad or unclear claims or both. Second, some stakeholders said that the potential for large monetary awards from the courts, even for ideas that make only small contributions to a product, can be an incentive for patent owners to file infringement lawsuits. Third, several stakeholders said that the recognition by companies that patents are a more valuable asset than once assumed may have contributed to recent patent infringement lawsuits.
The judicial system is implementing new initiatives to improve the handling of patent cases in the federal courts, including (1) a patent pilot program, to encourage the enhancement of expertise in patent cases among district court judges, and (2) new rules in some federal court districts that are designed to reduce the time and expense of patent infringement litigation. Recent court decisions may also affect how monetary awards are calculated, among other things. Several stakeholders said that it is too early to tell what effect these initiatives will have on patent litigation.
The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) has taken several recent actions that are likely to affect patent quality and litigation in the future, including agency initiatives and changes required by AIA. For example, in November 2011, PTO began working with the software industry to develop more uniform terminology for software-related patents. PTO officials said that they generally try to adapt to developments in patent law and industry to improve patent quality. However, the agency does not currently use information on patent litigation in initiating such actions; some PTO staff said that the types of patents involved in infringement litigation could be linked to PTO's internal data on the patent examination process, and a 2003 National Academies study showed that such analysis could be used to improve patent quality and examination by exposing patterns in the examination of patents that end up in court.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that PTO consider examining trends in patent infringement litigation and consider linking this information to internal patent examination data to improve patent quality and examination. PTO commented on a draft of this report and agreed with key findings and this recommendation. |
gao_GAO-08-110 | gao_GAO-08-110_0 | In accordance with HSPD-6, TSC’s watch list is to contain information about individuals “known or appropriately suspected to be or have been engaged in conduct constituting, in preparation for, in aid of, or related to terrorism.” In implementing this directive, NCTC and the FBI strive to ensure that individuals who are reasonably suspected of having possible links to terrorism—in addition to individuals with known links—are nominated for inclusion on the watch list. 3). Agencies Have Had Approximately 53,000 Encounters with Individuals on the Watch List, and Outcomes Indicate the List Has Helped to Combat Terrorism
For the 42-month period of December 2003 (when TSC began operations) through May 2007, screening and law enforcement agencies encountered individuals who were positively matched to watch list records 53,218 times, according to our analysis of TSC data. Agencies took a range of actions, such as arresting individuals, denying other individuals entry into the United States, and most commonly, releasing the individuals following questioning and information gathering. Our analysis of data on the outcomes of these encounters and interviews with screening agency, law enforcement, and intelligence community officials indicate that the watch list has enhanced the U.S. government’s counterterrorism efforts by (1) helping frontline screening agencies obtain information to determine the level of threat a person poses and the appropriate action to take, if any, and (2) providing the opportunity to collect and share information on known or appropriately suspected terrorists with law enforcement agencies and the intelligence community. The identifying information required depends on the policies and needs of the screening agency and the technical capacity of the respective agency’s computerized name-matching program. As of May 2007, the FBI database contained the third highest percentage of watch list records. Being on the Selectee list does not mean that the person will not be allowed to board an aircraft or enter the United States. Regarding other ameliorative efforts, TSC has ongoing initiatives that could help reduce false negatives, such as improving the quality of watch list data. U.S. Customs and Border Protection Is Studying Cases Where Some Subjects of Watch List Records Were Not Detected by Screening at Ports of Entry
During our field visits in spring 2006 to selected ports of entry, CBP officers informed us of several incidents involving individuals on the watch list who were not detected until after they had been processed and admitted into the United States. The U.S. Government Has Made Progress in Using the Watch List but a Strategy and Plan Supported by a Governance Structure with Clear Lines of Authority Would Enhance Use and Effectiveness
Although the U.S. government has made progress in using watch list records to support terrorism-related screening, there are additional opportunities for using the list. To date, appropriate opportunities have not been systematically identified or evaluated, in part because the federal government lacks an up-to-date strategy and a prioritized investment and implementation plan for optimizing the use and effectiveness of terrorist-related screening. However, many critical infrastructure components are not using watch list records. These plan elements, which were prescribed by HSPD-11, are crucial for coordinated and comprehensive use of terrorist-related screening data, as they provide a platform to establish governmentwide priorities for screening, assess progress toward policy goals and intended outcomes, ensure that any needed changes are implemented, and respond to issues that hinder effectiveness, such as the potential vulnerabilities and interagency coordination challenges discussed in this report. Further, we recommended the following three actions to enhance the use of the consolidated terrorist watch list as a counterterrorism tool and to help ensure its effectiveness: that the Secretary of Homeland Security in consultation with the heads of other appropriate federal departments and agencies and private sector entities, develop guidelines to govern the use of watch list records to support private sector screening processes that have a substantial bearing on homeland security, as called for in HSPD-6; that the Secretary of Homeland Security in consultation with the heads of other appropriate federal departments, develop and submit to the President through the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism an updated strategy for a coordinated and comprehensive approach to terrorist-related screening as called for in HSPD-11, which among other things, (a) identifies all appropriate screening opportunities to use watch list records to detect, identify, track, and interdict individuals who pose a threat to homeland security and (b) safeguards legal rights, including privacy and civil liberties; and that the Secretary of Homeland Security in consultation with the heads of other appropriate federal departments, develop and submit to the President through the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism an updated investment and implementation plan that describes the scope, governance, principles, outcomes, milestones, training objectives, metrics, costs, and schedule of activities necessary for implementing a terrorist-related screening strategy, as called for in HSPD-11. If the entire watch list is not being checked, why not, what potential vulnerabilities exist, and what actions are being planned to address these vulnerabilities? | Why GAO Did This Study
The Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) maintains a consolidated watch list of known or appropriately suspected terrorists and sends records from the list to agencies to support terrorism-related screening. Because the list is an important tool for combating terrorism, GAO examined (1) standards for including individuals on the list, (2) the outcomes of encounters with individuals on the list, (3) potential vulnerabilities and efforts to address them, and (4) actions taken to promote effective terrorism-related screening. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed documentation obtained from and interviewed officials at TSC, the FBI, the National Counterterrorism Center, the Department of Homeland Security, and other agencies that perform terrorism-related screening.
What GAO Found
The FBI and the intelligence community use standards of reasonableness to evaluate individuals for nomination to the consolidated watch list. In general, individuals who are reasonably suspected of having possible links to terrorism--in addition to individuals with known links--are to be nominated. As such, being on the list does not automatically prohibit, for example, the issuance of a visa or entry into the United States. Rather, when an individual on the list is encountered, agency officials are to assess the threat the person poses to determine what action to take, if any. As of May 2007, the consolidated watch list contained approximately 755,000 records. From December 2003 through May 2007, screening and law enforcement agencies encountered individuals who were positively matched to watch list records approximately 53,000 times. Many individuals were matched multiple times. The outcomes of these encounters reflect an array of actions, such as arrests; denials of entry into the United States; and, most often, questioning and release. Within the federal community, there is general agreement that the watch list has helped to combat terrorism by (1) providing screening and law enforcement agencies with information to help them respond appropriately during encounters and (2) helping law enforcement and intelligence agencies track individuals on the watch list and collect information about them for use in conducting investigations and in assessing threats. Regarding potential vulnerabilities, TSC sends records daily from the watch list to screening agencies. However, some records are not sent, partly because screening against them may not be needed to support the respective agency's mission or may not be possible due to the requirements of computer programs used to check individuals against watch list records. Also, some subjects of watch list records have passed undetected through agency screening processes and were not identified, for example, until after they had boarded and flew on an aircraft or were processed at a port of entry and admitted into the United States. TSC and other federal agencies have ongoing initiatives to help reduce these potential vulnerabilities, including efforts to improve computerized name-matching programs and the quality of watch list data. Although the federal government has made progress in promoting effective terrorism-related screening, additional screening opportunities remain untapped--within the federal sector, as well as within critical infrastructure components of the private sector. This situation exists partly because the government lacks an up-to-date strategy and implementation plan for optimizing use of the terrorist watch list. Also lacking are clear lines of authority and responsibility. An up-to-date strategy and implementation plan, supported by a clearly defined leadership or governance structure, would provide a platform to establish governmentwide screening priorities, assess progress toward policy goals and intended outcomes, consider factors related to privacy and civil liberties, ensure that any needed changes are implemented, and respond to issues that hinder effectiveness. |
gao_GAO-12-362 | gao_GAO-12-362_0 | DODIG Is Generally Not Meeting Timeliness Requirements and Improvement Efforts Are Hindered by Unreliable and Incomplete Data
DODIG has taken multiple steps, in collaboration with the service IGs in some instances, to improve DOD’s ability to process military whistleblower reprisal cases in a timely manner. However, DOD has generally not met statutory requirements to provide reports on completed investigations within 180 days of the date the allegation was made or alternatively, to provide notice to the complainant and the Secretary of Defense. DOD Efforts to Improve Case Processing Times Have Been Hindered by Unreliable and Incomplete Data
Although DOD has taken some steps to improve the timeliness of investigations, its efforts are hampered because DODIG does not have key timeliness data that would allow it to identify process areas requiring improvement or evaluate the impact of reforms. In our assessment of its data, we found that DODIG has not consistently or accurately recorded key dates to track how long investigations take to complete. DODIG Is Taking Steps to Address External and Internal Recommended Actions
DODIG has taken steps to improve the whistleblower reprisal process, including acting on prior recommendations. In response, DODIG is instituting changes to quickly assign an investigator to a case, who then makes direct contact with the complainant and initiates an investigation based on the standard that, “the alleged fact, if true, would raise the inference of reprisal.”
DOD’s Implementation of Oversight Mechanisms Is Not Yet Complete and Faces Challenges
Although DODIG has taken steps to improve its military whistleblower reprisal program, its ability to provide oversight continues to face key challenges due to the lack of performance metrics, outdated and inconsistently followed guidance, and inconsistent monitoring processes and procedures to track all reprisal allegations. The guidance related to certain key provisions of the investigative process is unclear, leading to inconsistent implementation among the service IGs. DODIG also has not been consistently adhering to standards regarding the maintenance of its case files and, as a result, its case files are generally incomplete. DODIG officials acknowledge the importance of standard case monitoring processes and procedures, but currently lack such processes and procedures, which may hinder their ability to consistently assess the status of outstanding reprisal cases. Until it further addresses the weaknesses in its monitoring practices of military whistleblower reprisal cases and the challenges it faces in its other oversight mechanisms, DODIG cannot be sure that it is adequately conducting its oversight responsibilities or implementing the whistleblower reprisal program as intended. DOD Efforts to Ensure Corrective Actions Are Taken in Substantiated Cases Are Hindered by Disconnected Investigative and Corrective Action Processes and Unreliable Data
DOD’s efforts to ensure that appropriate corrective action is taken after investigations are completed—both for whistleblowers and against those who reprise against whistleblowers—are hampered by disconnected investigative and corrective action processes and the limited visibility of corrective actions taken. DODIG and the service BCMRs are also not consistently identifying and tracking data on corrective action taken to undo the damage done to the complainant by the reprisal. Further, unreliable data regarding corrective action taken against the subject are hindering oversight of this key aspect of whistleblower protection. Without addressing these issues, military whistleblowers may not be getting the full protection and resolution they deserve and DOD may not be reaping the full benefits whistleblowers could provide the department. To assist DOD in improving oversight over the whistleblower reprisal investigative process, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense work in coordination with DODIG to: develop and implement performance metrics to ensure the quality and effectiveness of the investigative process, such as ensuring that the case files contain evidence sufficient to support the conclusions; update whistleblower reprisal investigative guidance and ensure that it is consistently followed, including clarifying reporting requirements, responsibilities, and terminology; and consistently monitor the status of whistleblower reprisal investigations. In order to determine the roles and responsibilities of DODIG and the military services in providing corrective action, including the processes and procedures used by the Boards for Correction of Military Records (BCMRs) to provide relief to servicemembers who were reprised against, we reviewed applicable laws and regulations, including the Military Whistleblower Protection Act and DOD Directive 7050.06, and spoke with officials from DODIG, the service IGs, the three service BCMRs, and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness – Enterprise Services. We also obtained information from the service IGs regarding command action for all cases closed between January 1, 2009 and March 31, 2011. 2). | Why GAO Did This Study
Whistleblowers help guard the federal government against waste, fraud, and abuse. The Military Whistleblower Protection Act provides servicemembers with a means to seek relief from reprisals and to hold subjects accountable. GAO was asked to determine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) has (1) satisfied statutory timeliness requirements for processing military whistleblower reprisal cases, (2) established and implemented oversight mechanisms for its process, and (3) taken corrective action in cases where the DOD Inspector General (DODIG) substantiated reprisal claims. GAO also analyzed case characteristics. GAO examined laws, regulations, and guidance documents; interviewed officials from DODIG, service IGs, service Boards for the Correction of Military Records (BCMRs), and the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness; and collected and analyzed case data. GAO also conducted a detailed file review using a representative sample of cases closed between January 1, 2009 and March 31, 2011.
What GAO Found
DODIG has taken multiple steps, in collaboration with the service IGs in some instances, to improve DOD’s ability to process military whistleblower reprisal cases in a timely manner. Timeliness is important to ensure the reliability of evidence and appropriate resolution of reprisal allegations. However, DODIG has generally not met statutory requirements to report on investigations within 180 days, or to provide alternative notification. DODIG has undertaken efforts to improve timeliness by, for example, eliminating a time-consuming phase of its investigative process. However, DOD’s efforts are hampered by unreliable and incomplete data. For instance, GAO found that DODIG has not consistently or accurately recorded key dates to track how long investigations take to complete. Without key timeliness data, DODIG may have difficulty in identifying process areas requiring improvement and evaluating the impact of reforms. Further, the absence of this information limits congressional decision makers’ ability to provide oversight of DOD’s whistleblower reprisal investigative program.
DODIG has begun executing an action plan that includes acting on prior external and internal review recommendations in order to improve its oversight of the department’s whistleblower reprisal process, but implementation of this plan is not yet complete and challenges exist in three areas:
Performance metrics. DODIG has not yet established performance metrics to ensure the quality of reprisal investigations.
Guidance. DOD’s guidance related to the whistleblower program is outdated and does not reflect current investigative processes. Additionally, some of the guidance is unclear, leading to inconsistent implementation among the service IGs. Moreover, DODIG has not been consistently adhering to standards regarding the maintenance of its case files, resulting in generally incomplete files.
Case monitoring processes and procedures. DODIG lacks standard case monitoring processes and procedures, which may hinder its ability to consistently maintain visibility and assess the status of outstanding reprisal investigations including those conducted by service and component IGs.
Until it further addresses the challenges it faces in regard to oversight mechanisms, DODIG cannot be assured that it is effectively conducting its oversight responsibilities or implementing the whistleblower reprisal program as intended.
DOD’s efforts to ensure that appropriate corrective action is taken—both for whistleblowers and against those who reprise against whistleblowers—are hampered by disconnected investigative and corrective action processes and the limited visibility of the corrective actions taken. DODIG and the service BCMRs are not consistently identifying and tracking data on action taken to undo the reprisal damage done to whistleblowers. Further, unreliable data regarding corrective action taken against those found to have reprised against whistleblowers is hindering oversight of this key aspect of whistleblower protections. Without addressing these issues, whistleblowers may not be getting the full protection and resolution they deserve.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD implement procedures to track and report data on its case processing timeliness, take actions to improve oversight of its investigative process, and develop processes to ensure appropriate corrective actions are taken in substantiated cases. DOD concurred with all of GAO’s recommendations. |
gao_GAO-07-585 | gao_GAO-07-585_0 | FMCSA uses enforcement as its primary approach for reducing the number of crashes, fatalities, and injuries involving trucks and buses. In contrast, fewer than 1 percent of the carriers listed in MCMIS have more than 100 vehicles, and nearly 25 percent of them received a SafeStat rating in categories A through G.
A Statistical Approach Would Better Identify Carriers That Pose High Crash Risks Than Does FMCSA’s Current Approach
We found that FMCSA could improve SafeStat’s ability to identify carriers that pose high crash risks if it applied a statistical approach, called a negative binomial regression model, to the four SafeStat safety evaluation areas instead of its current approach. Targeting these high-risk carriers would result in FMCSA giving compliance reviews to carriers that experienced both a higher crash rate and, in conjunction with the higher crash rate, 9,500 more crashes over an 18-month period than those identified by the SafeStat model. Regression Models Identify Carriers That Pose High Crash Risks Better Than Expert Judgment
Although SafeStat is nearly twice as effective as (83 percent better than) random selection in identifying carriers that pose high crash risks and, therefore, has value for improving safety, we found that FMCSA could improve SafeStat’s ability to identify such carriers by about 9 percent if it applied a negative binomial regression model approach to its analysis of motor carrier safety data. FMCSA would choose the number of carriers to review based on the resources available to it, much as it currently does. Selecting carriers for roadside inspections. Despite the problems of late-reported crashes and incomplete and inaccurate data on crashes during the period we studied, we determined that the data were of sufficient quality for our use, which was to assess how the application of regression models might improve the ability to identify high-risk carriers over the current approach—not to determine absolute measures of crash risk. FMCSA has recently undertaken a number of efforts to improve crash data quality. In addition, the percentage of crashes reported by states within 90 days of occurrence has jumped from 32 percent in fiscal year 2000 to 89 percent in fiscal year 2006. 2.) As a result, FMCSA could not match these crashes to motor carriers or use them in SafeStat. To do so would have required us to gather crash records at the state level—an effort that was impractical. Inaccurate Data Potentially Limit SafeStat’s Ability to Identify Carriers That Pose High Crash Risks
Inaccurate data, such as reporting a nonqualifying crash to FMCSA, potentially has a large impact on a motor carrier’s SafeStat score because SafeStat treats crashes as the most important source of information for assessing motor carrier crash risk. The University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute’s reports on crash reporting show that, among the 14 states studied, incorrect reporting of crash data is widespread. While the quality of crash reporting is sufficient for use in identifying motor carriers that pose high crash risks and has started to improve, commercial motor vehicle crash data continue to have some problems with timeliness, completeness, and accuracy. Using a negative binomial regression model would further FMCSA’s mission of reducing crashes through the more effective targeting of compliance reviews to the set of carriers that pose the greatest crash risks. Impact of Data Quality on SafeStat’s Predictive Capability
The 2004 Office of Inspector General report, the 2004 Oak Ridge study, and reports by the University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute on state crash reporting all examined the impact of data quality on SafeStat’s ability to identify carriers that pose high crash risks. We also assessed the extent of late reporting. MCMIS data change over time because crash data are added, deleted, or changed as more information about these crashes is obtained. Since the primary use of SafeStat is to identify and prioritize carriers for FMCSA and state compliance reviews, the empirical Bayes method did not identify carriers with the highest safety risk. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) has the primary federal responsibility for reducing crashes involving large trucks and buses that operate in interstate commerce. FMCSA decides which motor carriers to review for compliance with its safety regulations primarily by using an automated, data-driven analysis model called SafeStat. SafeStat uses data on crashes and other data to assign carriers priorities for compliance reviews. GAO assessed (1) the extent to which changes to the SafeStat model could improve its ability to identify carriers that pose high crash risks and (2) how the quality of the data used affects SafeStat's performance. To carry out its work, GAO analyzed how SafeStat identified high-risk carriers in 2004 and compared these results with crash data through 2005.
What GAO Found
While SafeStat does a better job of identifying motor carriers that pose high crash risks than does a random selection, regression models GAO applied do an even better job. SafeStat works about twice as well as (about 83 percent better than) selecting carriers randomly. SafeStat is built on a number of expert judgments rather than using statistical approaches, such as a regression model. For example, its designers decided to weight more recent motor carrier crashes twice as much as less recent ones on the premise that more recent crashes were stronger indicators of future crashes. GAO estimates that if FMCSA used a negative binomial regression model, FMCSA could increase its ability to identify high-risk carriers by about 9 percent over SafeStat. Carriers identified by the negative binomial regression model as posing a high crash risk experienced 9,500 more crashes than those identified by the SafeStat model over an 18 month follow-up period. The primary use of SafeStat is to identify and prioritize carriers for FMCSA and state compliance reviews. FMCSA measures the ability of SafeStat to perform this role by comparing the crash rate of carriers identified as posing a high crash risk with the crash rate of other carriers. Using a negative binomial regression model would further FMCSA's mission of reducing crashes through the more effective targeting of compliance reviews to the set of carriers that pose the greatest crash risk. Late-reported, incomplete, and inaccurate data reported to FMCSA by states have been a long-standing problem. However, GAO found that late reported data had a small effect on SafeStat's ability to identify carriers that pose high crash risks in 2004. If states had reported all crash data within 90 days after occurrence, as required by FMCSA, a net increase of 299 carriers (or 6 percent) would have been identified as posing high crash risks of the 4,989 that FMCSA identified. Reporting timeliness has improved, from 32 percent of crashes reported on time in fiscal year 2000, to 89 percent in fiscal year 2006. Regarding completeness, GAO found that data for about 21 percent of the crashes (about 39,000 of 184,000) exhibited problems that hampered linking crashes to motor carriers. Having complete information on crashes is important because SafeStat treats crashes as the most important factor for assessing motor carrier crash risk, and crash information is also the crucial factor in the statistical approaches that we employed. Regarding accuracy, a series of studies by the University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute covering 14 states found incorrect reporting of crash data is widespread. GAO was not able to quantify the effect of the incomplete or inaccurate data on SafeStat's ability to identify carriers that pose high crash risks because it would have required gathering crash records at the state level--an effort that was impractical for GAO. FMCSA has acted to improve crash data quality by completing a comprehensive plan for data quality improvement, implementing an approach to correct inaccurate data, and providing grants to states for improving data quality, among other things. |
gao_GAO-15-415 | gao_GAO-15-415_0 | Once the system has been implemented, USCIS expects that
Applicants will be able to establish an account with USCIS to file and track the status of the application, petition, or request online. 2. DHS concurred with our recommendations. Moving forward, USCIS estimates that its Transformation Program will now cost up to $3.1 billion and be fully deployed no later than March 2019. This is an increase of approximately $1 billion and delay of over 4 years from the initial baseline approved in July 2011. Changes to Transformation Program’s Acquisition Strategy Have Contributed to Missed Cost Savings and Deferral of Operational Efficiencies and Other Benefits
The changes in the Transformation Program’s acquisition strategy have significantly impacted the program’s planned schedule targets, which in turn have had negative effects on USCIS’s ability to achieve cost savings, operational efficiencies, and other benefits. According to USCIS, this increased use of IT should help achieve goals such as reducing the immigration benefit backlog through business process change; improving customer service through expanded electronic filing; and enhancing national security by authenticating users and integrating with external agency databases. Table 10 shows the extent to which each of the governance bodies met the leading practices for performing oversight. Finally, the program’s two governance bodies did not implement two leading practices:
Acquisition Review Board: The board did not make decisions based on reliable cost, schedule, and performance information. For example, in March 2013, the committee voted unanimously to migrate to a new architecture for the Transformation Program. This approval was based, in part, on the cost analysis reported by USCIS. However, this analysis included cost savings that did not fully account for the added costs for merging and migrating data from the old architecture. The ability of USCIS, DHS, Congress, and OMB to effectively monitor program performance and make informed program decisions will continue to be limited until department-level governance and oversight bodies more effectively use reliable program information to inform their program evaluations. To improve Transformation Program governance, we further recommend that the Secretary of DHS direct the DHS Under Secretary for Management, in coordination with the Director of US Citizenship and Immigration Services, to ensure that the Executive Steering Committee is effectively monitoring the Transformation Program’s performance and progress toward a predefined cost and schedule and relying on complete and accurate program data to review the performance of the Transformation Program against stated expectations. The department described actions it has taken and plans to take to address this recommendation. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) determine the status of the Transformation Program, including the impact of changes made to the acquisition strategy and (2) assess the extent to which the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the U.S. To determine the extent to which DHS and USCIS are executing effective program oversight and governance, we reviewed DHS acquisition management policy, analyzed roles and responsibilities, and reviewed the execution of these roles and responsibilities against relevant policy, guidance, and leading practices. We determined these assessments were unreliable as discussed in the report. | Why GAO Did This Study
Each year, the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) USCIS processes millions of applications for persons seeking to study, work, visit, or live in the United States. USCIS has been working since 2005 to transform its outdated systems into an account-based system with electronic adjudication and case management tools that will allow applicants to apply and track the progress of their application online. In 2011, USCIS reported that this effort, called the Transformation Program, was to be completed no later than June 2014 at a cost of up to $2.1 billion.
Given the critical importance of the Transformation Program, GAO was asked to review it. This report (1) discusses the program's current status, including the impact of changes made, and (2) assesses the extent to which DHS and USCIS are executing effective program oversight and governance.
To do so, GAO reviewed DHS and USCIS documents, interviewed relevant officials, and compared program documentation and actions to DHS and USCIS policy and guidance and GAO and industry leading information technology practices.
What GAO Found
The U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services' (USCIS) currently expects that its Transformation Program will cost up to $3.1 billion and be fully deployed no later than March 2019, which is an increase of approximately $1 billion and delay of over 4 years from its initial July 2011 baseline. In March 2012, the program began to significantly change its acquisition strategy to address various technical challenges (see table).
Key Changes to the Transformation Program's Acquisition Strategy
Source: GAO analysis of USCIS documentation. | GAO-15-415
These changes have significantly delayed the program's planned schedule, which in turn has had adverse effects on when USCIS expects to achieve cost savings, operational efficiencies, and other benefits. Among other things, USCIS has yet to achieve the goal of enhancing national security by authenticating users and integrating with external agency databases.
While the program's two key governance bodies have taken actions aligned with leading IT management practices, neither has used reliable information to make decisions and inform external reporting (see table). For example, one governing body's vote in March 2013 to migrate to a new architecture was based in part on savings that did not account for the added costs of merging data from the old architecture. The ability of USCIS, DHS, and Congress to effectively monitor program performance may be limited until these bodies more effectively use reliable information to inform their program evaluations.
Extent to Which Program Governance Bodies Met Leading Practices for Oversight
● Implemented ◐ Partially implemented ○ Not implemented
Source: GAO analysis of USCIS documentation. | GAO-15-415
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making recommendations to DHS components and offices to improve governance and oversight of the Transformation Program. DHS agreed with the recommendations, but did not agree with GAO's evaluation of the impact of changes made to the acquisition strategy. GAO maintains its position on the impact of changes, as discussed in the report. |
gao_GAO-07-1111T | gao_GAO-07-1111T_0 | Contractor Performance Is to Be Considered at Multiple Points in the Contracting Process
The government contracting process provides for consideration of various aspects of contractor performance at multiple points: Past performance as source selection factor: Only relatively recently have federal agencies been required to consider past performance in selecting their contractors. Past performance is now required to be an evaluation factor in selecting contractors, along with factors such as price, management capability, and technical approach to the work. Responsibility determinations: Once a contractor is selected for award, the contracting officer must make an affirmative determination that the prospective awardee is capable and ethical. As part of the responsibility determination, the contracting officer also must determine that the prospective awardee has a “satisfactory performance record” on prior contracts. Surveillance of performance under the current contract: Once a contract is awarded, the government should monitor a contractor’s performance throughout the performance period. An agency’s monitoring of a contractor’s performance may serve as a basis for past performance evaluations in future source selections. To protect the government’s interests, agencies can debar contractors from future contracts for various reasons, including serious failure to perform to the terms of a contract. Agencies are required to consider past performance in all negotiated procurements above the simplified acquisition threshold of $100,000 and in all procurements for commercial goods or services. Although past performance must be a significant evaluation factor in the award process, agencies have broad discretion to set the precise weight to be afforded past performance relative to other factors in the evaluation scheme. Whatever they decide about weights, agencies must evaluate proposals in accordance with the evaluation factors set forth in the solicitation, and in a manner consistent with applicable statutes and regulations. In evaluating an offeror’s past performance, the agency must consider the recency and relevance of the information to the current solicitation, the source and context of the information, and the general trends in the offeror’s past performance. Issues in Using Past Performance in Source Selection
Although a seemingly simple concept, using past performance information in source selection can be complicated in practice. Our bid protest decisions, however, illustrate some of the complexities of using past performance information as a predictor of future contractor success. In all of these cases, the key consideration is whether the performance evaluated can reasonably be considered predictive of the offeror’s performance under the contract being considered for award. Who: One issue is whose performance agencies should consider. What: Also at issue is what information agencies are required or permitted to consider in conducting evaluations of past performance. When: Agencies also have to determine the period of time for which they will evaluate the past performance of contractors. These are just some of the many issues that have been the subject of protests involving the use of past performance. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government is the largest single buyer in the world, obligating over $400 billion in fiscal year 2006 for a wide variety of goods and services. Because contracting is so important to how many agencies accomplish their missions, it is critical that agencies focus on buying the right things the right way. This includes ensuring that contracts are awarded only to responsible contractors, and that contractors are held accountable for their performance. Use of contractor performance information is a key factor in doing so. This testimony covers three main areas concerning the use of contractor performance information: (1) the various ways in which a contractor's performance may be considered in the contracting process; (2) how information on past performance is to be used in selecting contractors, as well as the various mechanisms for how that occurs; and (3) some of the key issues that have arisen in considering past performance in source selection, as seen through the prism of GAO's bid protest decisions. GAO has previously made recommendations for improving the use of contractor performance information, but is not making any new recommendations in this testimony.
What GAO Found
The government contracting process provides for consideration of various aspects of contractor performance at multiple points: (1) Source selection: Past performance is required to be an evaluation factor in selecting contractors, along with factors such as price, management capability, and technical approach to the work. (2) Responsibility determinations: Once a contractor is selected for award, the contracting officer must make a responsibility determination that the prospective awardee is capable and ethical. This includes, for example, whether the prospective awardee has a satisfactory performance record on prior contracts. (3) Surveillance under the current contract: Once a contract is awarded, the government monitors a contractor's performance throughout the performance period, which may serve as a basis for performance evaluations in future source selections. (4) Debarment: To protect the government's interests, agencies can debar, that is preclude, contractors from receiving future contracts for various reasons, including serious failure to perform to the terms of a contract. Agencies are required to consider past performance in all negotiated procurements above the simplified acquisition threshold of $100,000 and in all procurements for commercial goods or services. Although past performance must be a significant evaluation factor in the award process, agencies have broad discretion to set the precise weight to be afforded to past performance relative to other factors in the evaluation scheme. Whatever they decide about weights, agencies must evaluate proposals in accordance with the evaluation factors set forth in the solicitation, and in a manner consistent with applicable statutes and regulations. In evaluating an offeror's past performance, the agency must consider the recency and relevance of the information to the current solicitation, the source and context of the information, and general trends in the offeror's past performance. The key consideration is whether the performance evaluated can reasonably be considered predictive of the offeror's performance under the contract being considered for award. Although a seemingly simple concept, using past performance information in source selections can be complicated in practice. GAO bid protest decisions illustrate some of the complexities of using past performance information as a predictor of future contractor success. Some of the questions raised in these cases are: (1) Who: Whose performance should the agencies consider? (2) What: What information are agencies required or permitted to consider in conducting evaluations of past performance? (3) When: What is the period of time for which agencies will evaluate the past performance of contractors? (4) Where: Where do agencies obtain contractor performance information? |
gao_GAO-02-855 | gao_GAO-02-855_0 | Background
The Chugach National Forest was established in 1907 and is the second largest forest in the National Forest System. Agency Regulations Prescribed the Process Used to Revise the Chugach Forest Plan
The National Forest Management Act (NFMA) of 1976 requires the Forest Service to, among other things, (1) develop a plan to manage the lands and resources of each national forest in coordination with the land management planning processes of other federal agencies, states, and localities and (2) revise each plan at least every 15 years. In September 2000, the Supervisor of the Chugach National Forest issued for public comment the agency’s draft preferred alternative together with the detailed comparative analysis of all these alternatives. The Forest Service Took Extensive Actions to Solicit and Respond to Public Concerns
The Forest Service undertook sustained actions to solicit and respond to key public concerns about the revision to the Chugach forest plan. These actions included (1) distributing frequent newsletters on the planning process and its progress, (2) maintaining a Web site on the Internet with links to key planning documents and making available compact discs containing these documents, and (3) holding over 100 meetings in which the public was invited to define key issues and formulate alternatives. Some Decisions Contained in the Agency’s Draft Plan Were Based on Limited Data, but These Limitations Were Addressed in the Final Plan
In developing the draft revised plan, the Forest Service obtained and analyzed a vast amount of data on timber harvesting, mineral mining, commercial fishing, recreation and tourism, forest vegetation, and fish and wildlife habitats. These data and analyses were used to make various decisions on difficult and sometimes controversial trade-offs among competing forest uses. In three areas, we found that the data and analyses used for making some decisions had limitations that were not disclosed in the draft revised plan. | What GAO Found
The Chugach National Forest in Alaska is the second largest of the 155 forests in the National Forest System and stretches across an immensely varied and scenic area. The Forest Service revised the Chugach National Forest Plan in accordance with planning regulations that require the Forest Service to solicit and respond to public concerns in (1) identifying issues to be considered in revising the plans, (2) developing alternative plans for evaluation, (3) selecting a draft preferred alternative plan, and (4) adopting a final revised plan. Forest Service officials actively solicited key public concerns about revising the Chugach forest plan by distributing frequent newsletters; maintaining a Web site to allow the public access to key documents; and holding over 100 public meetings on the plan, including ones to solicit potential alternatives, and later, to discuss its draft preferred alternative plan. In developing its draft revised plan, issued in September 2000, the Forest Service obtained and analyzed a vast amount of data on various potential uses of the lands and resources within the Chugach. These data and analysis provided information for decisions on difficult and sometimes controversial trade-offs among competing forest uses, such as timber harvesting, mineral mining, commercial fishing, recreation and tourism, forest vegetation, and fish and wildlife habitats. GAO's review showed that the data and analysis that the Forest Service used to make some decisions had limitations that were not disclosed in the draft revised plan. |
gao_GAO-09-705T | gao_GAO-09-705T_0 | As shown in the figure, estimated costs for the major space acquisition programs have increased by about $10.9 billion from initial estimates for fiscal years 2008 through 2013. The declining investment in the later years is the result of the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program’s no longer being considered a major acquisition program and the cancellation and proposed cancellation of two development efforts that would have significantly increased DOD’s major space acquisition investment. As figure 2 notes, in several cases, DOD has had to cut back on quantity and capability in the face of escalating costs. The first GEO satellite has been delayed at least 7 years in part because of poor oversight, technical complexities, and rework. There are also concerns about potential gaps in missile warning and weather monitoring capabilities because of delays in SBIRS and NPOESS. Underlying Reasons for Cost and Schedule Growth
Our past work has identified a number of causes behind the cost growth and related problems, but several consistently stand out. First, on a broad scale, DOD starts more weapon programs than it can afford, creating a competition for funding that encourages low cost estimating, optimistic scheduling, overpromising, suppressing bad news, and, for space programs, forsaking the opportunity to identify and assess potentially more executable alternatives. Second, DOD has tended to start its space programs too early, that is, before it has the assurance that the capabilities it is pursuing can be achieved within available resources and time constraints. DOD has taken a number of actions to address the problems on which we have reported. Although these actions are a step in the right direction, additional leadership and support are still needed to ensure that reforms that DOD has begun will take hold. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
In preparing this testimony, we relied on our body of work in space programs, including previously issued GAO reports on assessments of individual space programs, common problems affecting space system acquisitions, and the Department of Defense’s (DOD) acquisition policies. | Why GAO Did This Study
Despite a growing investment in space, the majority of large-scale acquisition programs in the Department of Defense's (DOD) space portfolio have experienced problems during the past two decades that have driven up cost and schedules and increased technical risks. The cost resulting from acquisition problems along with the ambitious nature of space programs has resulted in cancellations of programs that were expected to require investments of tens of billions of dollars. Along with the cost increases, many programs are experiencing significant schedule delays--at least 7 years--resulting in potential capability gaps in areas such as positioning, navigation, and timing; missile warning; and weather monitoring. This testimony focuses on (1) the condition of space acquisitions, (2) causal factors, and (3) recommendations for better positioning programs and industry for success. In preparing this testimony, GAO relied on its body of work in space and other programs, including previously issued GAO reports on assessments of individual space programs, common problems affecting space system acquisitions, and DOD's acquisition policies.
What GAO Found
Estimated costs for major space acquisition programs have increased by about $10.9 billion from initial estimates for fiscal years 2008 through 2013. In several cases, DOD has had to cut back on quantity and capability in the face of escalating costs. Several causes behind the cost growth and related problems consistently stand out. First, DOD starts more weapon programs than it can afford, creating competition for funding that, in part, encourages low cost estimating and optimistic scheduling. Second, DOD has tended to start its space programs before it has the assurance that the capabilities it is pursuing can be achieved within available resources. GAO and others have identified a number of pressures associated with the contractors that develop space systems for the government that have hampered the acquisition process, including ambitious requirements and shortages of technical expertise in the workforce. Although DOD has taken a number of actions to address the problems on which GAO has reported, additional leadership and support are still needed to ensure that reforms that DOD has begun will take hold. |
gao_GAO-01-625 | gao_GAO-01-625_0 | UNAIDS was not expected to fund the efforts of the global community. Intended to be a model of U.N. reform, UNAIDS is the United Nations’ first joint, cosponsored program of its type. Funding by U.N. and bilateral donors has also increased. Many national governments around the world were slow to respond to the HIV/AIDS epidemic, even those in the most affected areas in sub-Saharan Africa. According to the UNAIDS Secretariat, a U.N. system integrated plan on HIV/AIDS is the basis for coordinated U.N. support to the national response and is the single most valuable indicator of the U.N.’s commitment at the country level. UNAIDS Has Made Mixed Progress in Improving Technical Support, Best Practices, and Other Information to Enhance the Response to the Pandemic
UNAIDS is charged with developing and providing information to enhance the U.N. and global response to the HIV/AIDS worldwide epidemic. Various problems, however, have hindered its efforts in this area. U.N. organizations are expected to enhance U.N. coordination and the global response and to provide program and financial support. Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on African Affairs, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, requested that we (1) assess the progress of the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS, especially at the country level, toward increasing the coordination and commitment of the U.N. and global community; (2) assess UNAIDS’ progress in providing technical support and information and in developing a monitoring and evaluation plan to measure results; and (3) identify factors that may have affected UNAIDS’ progress. | Why GAO Did This Study
Despite efforts by the international community to reduce the spread of the human immunodeficiency virus, AIDS is now the fourth leading cause of death in the world and the primary cause of death in sub-Saharan Africa. The Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), funded in part by the United States, is one important international effort against the disease. UNAIDS was established by the United Nations (U.N.) in 1996 to provide coordinated U.N. action and to lead and promote an expanded global response to the worldwide epidemic. This report (1) assesses UNAIDS' progress, especially at the country level, toward increasing the coordination and commitment of the U.N. and global community; (2) assesses UNAIDS' progress in providing technical assistance and information and in developing a monitoring and evaluation plan to measure results; and (3) identifies factors that may have affected UNAIDS' progress.
What GAO Found
GAO found that UNAIDS has made progress in increasing U.N. coordination and enhancing the global response to the worldwide HIV/AIDS epidemic, but its country-level efforts need to be strengthened. UNAIDS has provided financial and technical support to about 50 HIV/AIDS technical networks worldwide, but has not been as successful in tracking the funding and actions host governments and others have taken to address the AIDS problem. UNAIDS has also been unable to follow its intended model of U.N. reform, whereby a single Secretariat together with several U.N. agencies would marshal the U.N. and global community's resources to address the AIDS epidemic. |
gao_GAO-11-721T | gao_GAO-11-721T_0 | Refund Fraud Delays Innocent Taxpayers’ Refunds
Refund fraud can stem from identity theft when an identity thief uses a legitimate taxpayer’s name and Social Security Number (SSN) to file a fraudulent tax return seeking a refund. Employment Fraud Exposes Innocent Taxpayers to Enforcement Actions for Unreported Income
Employment fraud occurs when an identity thief uses a taxpayer’s name and SSN to obtain a job. After the victim files his or her tax return, IRS matches income reported by the victim’s employer and the thief’s employer to the tax return filed by the legitimate taxpayer, as shown in figure 2. IRS agreed with our recommendations to address these and other issues. IRS Has Taken Multiple Steps to Resolve, Detect, and Prevent Employment and Refund Fraud
In 2004, IRS developed a strategy to address the problem of identity theft– related tax administration issues. According to IRS, the strategy has evolved and continues to serve as the foundation for all of IRS’s efforts to provide services to victims of identity theft and to reduce the effects of identity theft on tax administration. Identity theft indicators speed resolution by making a taxpayer’s identity theft problems visible to all IRS personnel with account access. Indicators also alert IRS personnel that a future account problem may be related to identity theft and help speed up the resolution of any such problems. Detection. IRS also uses its identity theft indicators to screen tax returns filed in the names of known refund and employment fraud victims. Prevention. IRS’s Ability to Address Identity Theft Issues Is Constrained by Law, Timing, and Resources
Privacy and Other Laws Limit IRS’s Coordination with Other Agencies and Taxpayers
IRS’s initiatives to address identity theft are limited in part because tax returns and other information submitted to and, in some cases generated by, IRS are confidential and protected from disclosure, except as specifically authorized by statute. Additionally, IRS has limited authorities to share identity theft information with other federal agencies. By the time both the victim and IRS determine that an identity theft incident occurred, well over a year may have passed since the employment fraud. IRS Does Not Pursue Criminal Investigations in Every Case of Potential Refund and Employment Fraud because of Resource Priorities
IRS officials told us that IRS pursues criminal investigations of suspected identity thieves in only a small number of cases. However, more restrictive screening will likely increase the number of legitimate returns that fail the screenings (false positives). IRS provides taxpayers with targeted information to increase their awareness of identity theft, tips and suggestions for safeguarding taxpayers’ personal information, and information to help them better understand tax administration issues related to identity theft. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
Identity theft is a serious and growing problem in the United States. Taxpayers are harmed when identity thieves file fraudulent tax documents using stolen names and Social Security numbers. In 2010 alone, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) identified over 245,000 identity theft incidents that affected the tax system. The hundreds of thousands of taxpayers with tax problems caused by identity theft represent a small percentage of the expected 140 million individual returns filed, but for those affected, the problems can be quite serious. GAO was asked to describe, among other things, (1) when IRS detects identity theft based refund and employment fraud, (2) the steps IRS has taken to resolve, detect, and prevent innocent taxpayers' identity theft related problems, and (3) constraints that hinder IRS's ability to address these issues. GAO's testimony is based on its previous work on identity theft. GAO updated its analysis by examining data on identity theft cases and interviewing IRS officials.
What GAO Found
Identity theft harms innocent taxpayers through employment and refund fraud. In refund fraud, an identity thief uses a taxpayer's name and Social Security Number (SSN) to file for a tax refund, which IRS discovers after the legitimate taxpayer files. In employment fraud, an identity thief uses a taxpayer's name and SSN to obtain a job. When the thief's employer reports income to IRS, the taxpayer appears to have unreported income on his or her return, leading to enforcement action. IRS has taken multiple steps to resolve, detect, and prevent employment and refund fraud: Resolve--IRS marks taxpayer accounts to alert its personnel of a taxpayer's identity theft. The purpose is to expedite resolution of existing problems and alert personnel to potential future account problems. Detect--IRS screens tax returns filed in the names of known refund and employment fraud victims. Prevent--IRS provides taxpayers with information to increase their awareness of identity theft, including tips for safeguarding personal information. IRS has also started providing identity theft victims with a personal identification number to help identify legitimate returns. IRS's ability to address identity theft issues is constrained by (1) privacy laws that limit IRS's ability to share identity theft information with other agencies; (2) the timing of fraud detection--more than a year may have passed since the original fraud occurred; (3) the resources necessary to pursue the large volume of potential criminal refund and employment fraud cases; and (4) the burden that stricter screening would likely cause taxpayers and employers since more legitimate returns would fail such screening.
What GAO Recommends
GAO makes no new recommendations but reports on IRS's efforts to address GAO's earlier recommendation that IRS develop performance measures and collect data suitable for assessing the effectiveness of its identity theft initiatives. IRS agreed with and implemented GAO's earlier recommendation. |
gao_GAO-09-546 | gao_GAO-09-546_0 | Specifically, FISMA requires information security programs to include, among other things: periodic assessments of the risk and magnitude of harm that could result from the unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of information or information systems; risk-based policies and procedures that cost-effectively reduce information security risks to an acceptable level and ensure that information security is addressed throughout the life cycle of each information system; subordinate plans for providing adequate information security for networks, facilities, and systems or groups of information systems, as appropriate; security awareness training for agency personnel, including contractors and other users of information systems that support the operations and assets of the agency; periodic testing and evaluation of the effectiveness of information security policies, procedures, and practices, performed with a frequency depending on risk, but no less than annually, and that includes testing of management, operational, and technical controls for every system identified in the agency’s required inventory of major information systems; a process for planning, implementing, evaluating, and documenting remedial actions to address any deficiencies in the information security policies, procedures, and practices of the agency; procedures for detecting, reporting, and responding to security incidents; plans and procedures to ensure continuity of operations for information systems that support the operations and assets of the agency. Weaknesses in Information Security Place Sensitive Information at Risk
Significant weaknesses in information security policies and practices threaten the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of critical information and information systems used to support the operations, assets, and personnel of most federal agencies. These persistent weaknesses expose sensitive data to significant risk, as illustrated by recent incidents at various agencies. At least 23 major federal agencies had access control weaknesses during fiscal year 2008. Agencies have not fully implemented their risk assessment processes. As a result, agencies have reduced assurance that their systems and the information they contain are sufficiently protected. Opportunities Exist for Bolstering Federal Information Security
In prior reports, we and inspectors general have made hundreds of recommendations to agencies for actions necessary to resolve prior significant control deficiencies and information security program shortfalls. Agencies Continue to Report Progress in Implementing Requirements
Federal agencies reported increased compliance in implementing key information security control activities for fiscal year 2008; however, inspectors general at several agencies noted shortcomings with agencies’ implementation of information security requirements. Consistent with previous years, inspectors general continued to identify weaknesses with the processes and practices agencies have in place to implement FISMA requirements. Although OMB took steps to clarify its reporting instructions to agencies for preparing fiscal year 2008 reports, the instructions did not request inspectors general to report on agencies’ effectiveness of key activities and did not always provide clear guidance to inspectors general. In addition, agencies are required to provide appropriate training on information security to personnel who have significant security responsibilities. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
In accordance with the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 (FISMA) requirement that the Comptroller General report periodically to Congress, our objectives were to evaluate (1) the adequacy and effectiveness of agencies’ information security policies and practices and (2) federal agency implementation of FISMA requirements. | Why GAO Did This Study
For many years, GAO has reported that weaknesses in information security are a widespread problem that can have serious consequences--such as intrusions by malicious users, compromised networks, and the theft of intellectual property and personally identifiable information--and has identified information security as a governmentwide high-risk issue since 1997. Concerned by reports of significant vulnerabilities in federal computer systems, Congress passed the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 (FISMA), which authorized and strengthened information security program, evaluation, and reporting requirements for federal agencies. In accordance with the FISMA requirement that the Comptroller General report periodically to Congress, GAO's objectives were to evaluate (1) the adequacy and effectiveness of agencies' information security policies and practices and (2) federal agencies' implementation of FISMA requirements. To address these objectives, GAO analyzed agency, inspectors general, Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and GAO reports.
What GAO Found
Persistent weaknesses in information security policies and practices continue to threaten the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of critical information and information systems used to support the operations, assets, and personnel of most federal agencies. Recently reported incidents at federal agencies have placed sensitive data at risk, including the theft, loss, or improper disclosure of personally identifiable information of Americans, thereby exposing them to loss of privacy and identity theft. For fiscal year 2008, almost all 24 major federal agencies had weaknesses in information security controls. An underlying reason for these weaknesses is that agencies have not fully implemented their information security programs. As a result, agencies have limited assurance that controls are in place and operating as intended to protect their information resources, thereby leaving them vulnerable to attack or compromise. In prior reports, GAO has made hundreds of recommendations to agencies for actions necessary to resolve prior significant control deficiencies and information security program shortfalls. Federal agencies reported increased compliance in implementing key information security control activities for fiscal year 2008; however, inspectors general at several agencies noted shortcomings with agencies' implementation of information security requirements. Agencies reported increased implementation of control activities, such as providing awareness training for employees and testing system contingency plans. However, agencies reported decreased levels of testing security controls and training for employees who have significant security responsibilities. In addition, inspectors general at several agencies disagreed with performance reported by their agencies and identified weaknesses in the processes used to implement these activities. Further, although OMB took steps to clarify its reporting instructions to agencies for preparing fiscal year 2008 reports, the instructions did not request inspectors general to report on agencies' effectiveness of key activities and did not always provide clear guidance to inspectors general. As a result, the reporting may not adequately reflect agencies' implementation of the required information security policies and procedures. |
gao_GAO-13-499 | gao_GAO-13-499_0 | From fiscal years 2006 through 2012, Industrial Operations’ total actual carryover increased from $2.3 billion to $5 billion, reaching a high of $5.8 billion—12.7 months of work—at the end of fiscal year 2011.1 shows the Army Industrial Operations actual adjusted carryover, allowable carryover, and the amount over (or under) the allowable carryover for fiscal years 2006 through 2012. Budgeted Information on Carryover Underestimated Actual Carryover Information, but the Army Began Taking Action to Align These in Fiscal Year 2012
The Army’s budget estimates for its Industrial Operations carryover were consistently less than the actual carryover amounts each year from fiscal years 2006 through 2012. For the 7-year period, the Industrial Operations actual carryover exceeded budgeted carryover by at least $1.1 billion each year. This was primarily because (1) the Army underestimated its Industrial Operations new orders received from customers for each of the 7 years and (2) for fiscal year 2011, Industrial Operations performed over $1 billion less work than budgeted. During fiscal year 2013, the Army plans to better align the customers’ budgets with the Industrial Operations budgets. However, the Army has not yet developed a timetable for implementing the actions identified by the working group. Army officials stated that the implementation of LMP at the Industrial Operations activities in fiscal years 2009 and 2011 contributed to the fiscal year 2011 actual revenue falling below the prior year and budgeted amounts. Carryover grew in fiscal year 2011 because Industrial Operations received more orders ($7.5 billion) than work it performed ($5.5 billion). In analyzing these workloads, we found three primary causes for the carryover: (1) the scope of work was not well defined, (2) parts needed to perform the work were not available, and (3) revenue recognition business rules were changed as part of the implementation of LMP. As discussed previously, the implementation of LMP changed the revenue recognition business rules and resulted in increased carryover in fiscal years 2011 and 2012. Because of the size of the carryover at the end of fiscal year 2011, the Army recognized that it needed to improve its management of carryover, and in April 2012, the Army formed a working group. Implement the working group’s planned actions to improve the budgeting for new orders to be received by Army Industrial Operations. In its comments, which are reprinted in appendix II, DOD concurred with the three recommendations and cited actions planned or under way to address them. To determine whether, and to what extent, Army Industrial Operations’ budget information on carryover from fiscal years 2006 through 2012 approximated actual information, and if not, whether the Army took actions to align the two, we obtained and analyzed Industrial Operations reports that contained information on budgeted and reported actual new orders, revenue, and actual carryover data for fiscal years 2006 through 2012. To determine whether, and to what extent, Army Industrial Operations’ carryover increased during fiscal years 2011 and 2012, and causes for the carryover for those 2 fiscal years, we met with responsible officials from Army headquarters, AMC, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics and Technology), the Life Cycle Management Commands (LCMC), and four depots that had orders with high dollar amounts of fiscal year 2011 carryover to identify contributing factors that caused the carryover. | Why GAO Did This Study
The 13 Army Industrial Operations activities support combat readiness by providing depot maintenance and ordnance services to keep Army units operating worldwide. To the extent that Industrial Operations does not complete work at year-end, the work and related funding will be carried over into the next fiscal year. Carryover is the reported dollar value of work that has been ordered and funded by customers but not completed by Industrial Operations at the end of the fiscal year. As requested, GAO reviewed issues related to Army Industrial Operations carryover. GAOs objectives were to determine whether, and to what extent, Army Industrial Operations (1) actual carryover exceeded allowable carryover for fiscal years 2006 through 2012; (2) budget information on carryover approximated actual information for fiscal years 2006 through 2012, and if not, whether the Army took actions to align the two; and (3) carryover increased during fiscal years 2011 and 2012 and causes for the carryover. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed relevant carryover guidance, analyzed carryover and related data for Industrial Operations, and interviewed Army officials.
What GAO Found
From fiscal years 2006 through 2012, Army's Industrial Operations' actual carryover was under the allowable amounts in 5 of the 7 fiscal years. However, carryover more than doubled during that period, reaching a high of $5.8 billion in fiscal year 2011. Army officials stated that fiscal year 2011 was an abnormal year because Industrial Operations (1) received more orders than it had ever received--$7.5 billion in new orders--and (2) implemented a system called the Logistics Modernization Program (LMP) that changed the business rules for recognizing revenue and therefore resulted in carryover being higher than it would have been under the prior system. Army officials anticipate carryover decreasing in fiscal year 2013. According to the Army fiscal year 2014 budget, the Army expects carryover to be under $4 billion at the end of fiscal year 2013.
The Army's budget estimates for carryover were less than the actual carryover amounts each year beginning in fiscal year 2006--at least $1.1 billion each year. GAO's analysis showed that the actual amounts of carryover exceeded budgeted amounts primarily because (1) the Army underestimated new orders to be received from customers for all 7 years reviewed, particularly with respect to procurement funded orders, and (2) for fiscal year 2011, Industrial Operations performed over $1 billion less work than budgeted because Army officials were unaware of the impact that LMP would have on revenue when developing the fiscal year 2011 budget. The Army is taking actions intended to better align the customers' budgets with Industrial Operations' budgets.
Industrial Operations' carryover grew significantly in fiscal years 2011 and 2012 to represent about 12.7 and 9.5 months of work, respectively. GAO found three causes for the carryover: (1) the scope of requested work was not well defined, (2) parts were not available to perform the work, and (3) revenue recognition business rules were changed as part of the implementation of LMP. The Army formed a working group in April 2012 that identified actions to help reduce carryover. However, these actions have not been implemented and no timetable for implementation has been set.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making three recommendations to the Department of Defense (DOD) that are aimed at implementing the planned actions identified by the Army's working group to improve the budgeting and management of carryover. DOD concurred with GAO's recommendations and cited related actions planned or under way. |
gao_GAO-07-1107T | gao_GAO-07-1107T_0 | Iraq’s Oil Production Goals Have Not Been Met and Oil Production Figures May Be Overstated
Despite U.S. and Iraqi government efforts to reconstruct Iraq’s key economic sector, oil production has consistently fallen below U.S. program goals. At an average price of $50 per barrel, this is a discrepancy of $5 million to $15 million per day, or $1.8 billion to $5.5 billion per year. An improved metering system has been a U.S. and international donor priority since early 2004, but implementation has been delayed. Security, Corruption, and Funding Challenges Hinder Reconstruction Efforts
The U.S. government and Iraq face several key challenges in improving Iraq’s oil sector. Corruption and Smuggling Reduce Oil Revenues
U.S. and international officials have noted that corruption in Iraq’s oil sector is pervasive. Future Funding Needs Are Significant but Funding Sources Are Uncertain
While billions have been provided to rebuild Iraq’s oil sector, Iraq’s future needs are significant and sources of funding are uncertain. In 2006, Iraq planned to spend more than $3.5 billion for capital projects in the oil sector. Launched in May 2007, the compact was intended to secure additional funding for Iraq’s oil, electricity, and other sectors. Iraq has yet to enact and implement comprehensive hydrocarbon legislation that would define the distribution of future oil revenues and the rights of foreign investors. According to U.S. officials, until such legislation is passed and implemented, it will be difficult for Iraq to attract the billions of dollars in foreign investment it needs to modernize the oil sector. As of July 13, 2007, the Iraqi government was in various stages of drafting and enacting four separate, yet interrelated, pieces of legislation: hydrocarbon framework legislation that establishes the structure, management, and oversight for the sector; revenue-sharing legislation (the draft “Law of Financial Resources”); legislation restructuring the Ministry of Oil; and legislation establishing the Iraq National Oil Company (INOC). Moreover, enacting and implementing hydrocarbon legislation and subsequent regulations and procedures will likely be impeded by some of the same challenges, such as poor security and corruption, that affect achieving program goals and reconstruction of the oil sector. 2. 3. Appendix I: Data on Iraq’s Crude Oil Production and Exports
Table 1 provides the data used in figures 3 and 4 of this testimony. We calculated Iraq’s production for domestic consumption (the amount of oil produced that remains in the country) as the remainder of Iraq’s production of crude oil after exports, based on State Department’s data. | Why GAO Did This Study
Rebuilding Iraq's oil sector is crucial to rebuilding Iraq's economy. For example, oil export revenues account for over half of Iraq's gross domestic product and over 90 percent of government revenues. This testimony addresses (1) the U.S. goals for Iraq's oil sector and progress in achieving these goals, (2) key challenges the U.S. government faces in helping Iraq restore its oil sector, and (3) efforts to enact and implement hydrocarbon legislation. This statement is based on our May 2007 report and updated data, where appropriate.
What GAO Found
Despite 4 years of effort and $2.7 billion in U.S. reconstruction funds, Iraqi oil output has consistently fallen below U.S. program goals. In addition, the State Department's data on Iraq's oil production may be overstated since data from the U.S. Department of Energy show lower production levels--between 100,000 and 300,000 barrels less per day. Inadequate metering, re-injection, corruption, theft, and sabotage account for the discrepancy, which amounts to about $1.8 to $5.5 billion per year. Comprehensive metering of Iraq's oil production has been a long-standing problem and continuing need. Poor security, corruption, and funding constraints continue to impede reconstruction of Iraq's oil sector. The deteriorating security environment places workers and infrastructure at risk while protection efforts have been insufficient. Widespread corruption and smuggling reduce oil revenues. Moreover, Iraq's needs are significant and future funding for the oil sector is uncertain as nearly 80 percent of U.S. funds for the oil sector have been spent. Iraq's contribution has been minimal with the government spending less than 3 percent of the $3.5 billion it approved for oil reconstruction projects in 2006. Iraq has yet to enact and implement hydrocarbon legislation that defines the distribution of oil revenues and the rights of foreign investors. Until this legislation is enacted and implemented, it will be difficult for Iraq to attract the billions of dollars in foreign investment it needs to modernize the sector. As of July 13, 2007, Iraq's cabinet has approved only one of four separate but interrelated pieces of legislation--a framework that establishes the structure, management, and oversight. Another part is in draft and two others are not yet drafted. Poor security, corruption, and the lack of national unity will likely impede the implementation of this legislation. |
gao_GAO-04-151 | gao_GAO-04-151_0 | To its credit, in April 2000, NASA began an effort known as IFMP. As a result, we reported that: NASA has increased its risks of implementing a system that will not optimize mission performance, and will cost more and take longer to implement than necessary; the core financial module is not being designed to integrate the cost and schedule data that program managers need to oversee the work of NASA’s contractors; and costly rework will likely be required to fix requirement defects not identified prior to implementation. When NASA announced in June 2003 that the core financial management module was complete, NASA officials acknowledged that additional work remained, including the need to develop and configure a cost-allocation structure within the system so that it would accumulate the full cost of NASA’s programs and projects for external financial reporting purposes. Consequently, only about one-third of the transaction types that NASA uses in its business processes are currently implemented and fully automated in the core financial module. However, prior to implementation, NASA tested only 120, or 53 percent, of the 225 unique financial events or transaction types identified by NASA as critical for carrying out day-to-day operations and producing external financial reports. Despite these concerns, NASA did not alter its implementation plan for the module. However, NASA did not thoroughly test or implement key requirements prior to implementation and has not used the new system as an opportunity to drive needed changes in its management practices and business processes. NASA Has Not Reengineered Processes to Properly Account for PP&E and Materials
The core financial module, as implemented in June 2003, does not appropriately capture and record PP&E and material in the module’s general ledger at the transaction level. NASA’S Implementation of IFMP Has Created New Reporting Problems
NASA’s implementation of the core financial module has also created new reporting issues. Although NASA knew about these problems prior to implementation, the agency went forward with its implementation plans. Core Financial Module Does Not Substantially Comply With FFMIA
The system limitations discussed previously related to full-cost accounting, property accounting, budgetary accounting, accrued costs, and accounts payable—combined with the findings from our April 2003 report—indicate that NASA’s new core financial module and related systems, as implemented in June 2003, do not substantially comply with the requirements of FFMIA. This act provides agencies a blueprint for building fully integrated financial management systems that routinely provide decision makers with timely, reliable, and useful financial information. Conclusion
If NASA continues on its current track, the core financial module and IFMP will fail to achieve the agency’s stated objective of providing reliable, timely financial information for both internal management decision-making and external reporting purposes. In making that representation, NASA officials acknowledged that, as part of their implementation strategy, they had not yet converted the system to support full-cost accounting. Comments From the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Objective, Scope, and Methodology
The objective of this report was to assess whether the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Integrated Financial Management Program’s (IFMP) core financial module, as implemented on June 2003, would satisfy NASA’s external reporting requirements, such as reliable and auditable financial statements, congressional information needs, and other reporting requirements. We did not assess other aspects of the core financial module’s capabilities. | Why GAO Did This Study
In April 2000, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) began its Integrated Financial Management program (IFMP), its third attempt at modernizing its financial management processes and systems. In April 2003, GAO reported that NASA's acquisition strategy has increased the risk that the agency will implement a system that will cost more and do less than planned. This report is one of a series of reviews of NASA's acquisition and implementation of IFMP, and focuses on the core financial module's ability to provide the information necessary for external financial reporting.
What GAO Found
The core financial module of IFMP provides NASA its first agencywide accounting system--a significant improvement over the 10 disparate systems previously used. However, to meet IFMP's aggressive implementation schedule, NASA deferred testing and implementation of many key requirements of the core financial module. Consequently, when NASA announced, in June 2003, that this module was fully operational at each of its 10 centers, about two-thirds of the financial events or transaction types needed to carry out day-to-day operations and produce external financial reports had not been implemented in the module. NASA officials acknowledged that, as part of their implementation strategy, they had not yet converted the module to support full-cost accounting. In addition, we found that NASA also deferred implementation of other key core financial module capabilities. Because NASA did not use disciplined processes for defining, managing, and testing key system requirements, or substantially reengineer its business processes prior to implementation, the core financial module, as implemented in June 2003, does not address several long-standing external reporting issues and has created some new problems. Long-standing external financial reporting issues have not been addressed. NASA has not used its implementation of the core financial module as an opportunity to drive needed changes in its management practices and business processes. Therefore, the system does little to address NASA's ability to properly account for $37 billion of reported property or certain aspects of the agency's $15 billion annual budget. New financial reporting problems have emerged. NASA went forward with its aggressive implementation plans even though agency managers knew of problems with the module's ability to properly process and record certain transactions. As a result, the module does not appropriately capture critical information on the cost of NASA's operations, such as certain accrued costs, accounts payable, and obligation transactions. In April 2003, GAO reported that the core financial module did not address key internal management information requirements. Now, GAO has found that the module cannot reliably provide key financial data needed for external financial reporting. Although NASA intends to address many of these issues, its implementation approach raises concerns over its ability to do so. These deferred external reporting capabilities, combined with the findings from our April 2003 report, indicate that NASA's June 2003 core financial module and related systems do not substantially comply with the requirements of Federal Financial Management Improvement Act (FFMIA). FFMIA addresses the need for agencies' financial systems to provide value to those who use financial data. NASA must address these issues if the core financial module and IFMP are to achieve the objective of providing reliable, timely financial information for both internal management decision-making and external reporting purposes. |
gao_NSIAD-98-68 | gao_NSIAD-98-68_0 | To address joint readiness, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff established the Joint Monthly Readiness Review (JMRR) in 1994. Specifically, we assessed whether (1) DOD plans to make improvements to SORTS, including adding specific readiness indicators; (2) the JMRR process has improved DOD’s ability to assess readiness; and (3) the quarterly readiness reports to Congress accurately reflect readiness information briefed to senior DOD officials and provide information needed for oversight of military readiness. To understand how DOD assesses and reports readiness at the joint and strategic levels, we met with cognizant officials at OSD, the Joint Staff, and the services to discuss the JMRR and SROC processes and the development of the quarterly readiness reports to Congress. However, we did not evaluate their assessment process. DOD’s Plans to Improve SORTS Will Not Address All Known Limitations
For more than a decade, audit and oversight organizations, including our office, have identified limitations to the SORTS unit readiness system. Additionally, the Joint Staff does not plan to add indicators to SORTS that were identified by a 1994 DOD-funded study as having potential value for monitoring readiness. According to DOD officials, further review of these indicators found that some were not appropriate for inclusion in a unit readiness database because they measure the readiness of forces at an aggregate level. DOD recently issued an implementation plan for responding to the new requirement in 10 U.S.C. 482 to include additional readiness indicators in the quarterly readiness reports to Congress. These upgrades, however, focus on improving the technical aspects of the database. Joint Review Has Expanded DOD’s Readiness Assessment Process
The Joint Monthly Readiness Review represents progress toward a more encompassing readiness measurement process. The review goes beyond the traditional unit perspective that was previously the focus of the readiness assessment system. It also has added a new dimension to DOD’s readiness assessment capability by including wartime scenarios, which are intended to provide insight into whether U.S. forces are ready for their most demanding missions as well as other threats. 3.1). Quarterly Reports Provide Vague Description of Readiness Problems and Remedial Actions
DOD’s quarterly reports to Congress provide only a vague description of readiness issues; consequently, they are not effective as a congressional oversight tool. The reports accurately reflect information from briefings to the Senior Readiness Oversight Council and present a highly summarized view of readiness, focusing on generalized strategic concerns. They are not intended to, and do not, highlight problems at the individual combatant command or unit level. 482 because they lack specific detail on the problems and planned remedial actions. As a result, the aggregated information in DOD’s quarterly report does not include specific deficiencies. To enhance the effectiveness of the quarterly readiness report as a congressional oversight tool, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take steps to better fulfill the legislative reporting requirements under 10 U.S.C. 2. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) efforts to improve its readiness assessment and reporting process, focusing on whether: (1) DOD plans to make improvements to its unit readiness database, including adding specific readiness indicators; (2) a monthly review process instituted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff has improved DOD's ability to assess readiness; and (3) DOD's quarterly readiness reports to Congress accurately reflect readiness information briefed to senior DOD officials and provide information needed for oversight of military readiness.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) over the last few years, DOD has, on the whole, taken action to improve its readiness assessment system; (2) these improvements include technical enhancements to the unit readiness system as well as the establishment of formal DOD-wide forums for evaluating current readiness at the joint and strategic levels; (3) GAO believes these changes represent progress, however, limitations to DOD's unit readiness systems remain and may be reflected in DOD's readiness assessments; (4) additionally, DOD's quarterly reports to Congress provide only a vague description of readiness problems and remedial actions; consequently, they are not effective as a congressional oversight tool; (5) both the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the services have initiated various efforts to improve the technical aspects on the Status of Resources Training System; (6) however, these efforts will not address other known system limitations; (7) further, the Joint Chiefs of Staff currently does not plan to add indicators to the system that were identified by a 1994 DOD-funded study as having potential value for monitoring readiness; (8) the 1994 study did not recommend that the indicators be added to the unit readiness database, and Joint Chiefs of Staff officials said some of the unit indicators were not appropriate for inclusion in this database because they measure the readiness of forces at an aggregate level; (9) DOD recently issued an implementation plan for responding to the new requirements to include additional readiness indicators in the quarterly readiness reports to Congress; (10) the Joint Monthly Readiness Review has added a new dimension to DOD's capability to assess readiness because it goes beyond the traditional unit perspective that was previously the focus of the readiness assessment system; (11) the review also has expanded DOD's readiness assessment capability by following a recurring cycle, adding a joint perspective, incorporating wartime scenarios, and tracking and addressing deficiencies; (12) this review process, however, depends heavily on the judgment of military commanders; (13) DOD's quarterly readiness reports do not fulfill the legislative reporting requirements under 10 U.S.C. 482 because they lack specific detail on deficiencies and remedial actions; (14) as a result, these reports do not provide information needed for effective oversight of military readiness; (15) these reports accurately reflect information from briefings to the Senior Readiness Oversight Council and present a highly aggregated view of readiness; and (16) they are not intended to and do not highlight problems at the individual combatant command or unit level. |
gao_T-RCED-98-35 | gao_T-RCED-98-35_0 | The Need for Employee Housing Is Not Fully Justified
In 1993, we reported that the Park Service had not fully justified the need for all of its employee housing. As a result, and in response to the requirements of the Omnibus Parks and Public Lands Management Act of 1996, the agency is in the process of issuing a contract to provide an assessment of housing needs within the Park Service. Once this contracted assessment is completed, the agency should have a more consistent and objective assessment of its housing needs. In 1993, we reported that the Park Service estimated the backlog to be about $546 million—however, at that time, the agency was not able to provide support for this figure. Today, the agency estimates that its housing backlog is about $300 million. However, a Park Service housing official acknowledged that this estimate is not based on a park-by-park review of the condition of housing facilities but rather a gross estimate based on the total number of houses whose condition has been rated less than good. The contractor is scheduled to complete its work in 2002—9 years after we raised this problem in our 1993 report. However, while the policy has changed, it has not yet been implemented by park managers. The significance of the broad discretion given to individual park managers is that the potential exists for housing decisions to be made that may not be in the best interest of the agency. Also, the Park Service’s housing inventory contains proportionately more houses, multiplex units, and apartments and fewer dormitories and cabins than the other two agencies. Compared with the Forest Service and BLM, the Park Service mission emphasizes providing more in-park visitor services such as law enforcement, search and rescue and other supporting activities. As such, the Park Service believes that it needs to provide a larger number of its employees with in-park housing. In comparison, the Forest Service had 50,877 employees and 4,402 housing units or about one unit for every 11 employees. BLM had 11,861 employees and 206 housing units or about one unit for every 58 employees. For example, in 1993, we reported that the Park Service estimated a backlog of $546 million for repairs, rehabilitation, and replacement of its housing inventory; whereas the Forest Service, having about the same number of units but a different mix, had a backlog of less than a third of the Park Service. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed its past work on National Park Service (NPS) employee housing issues.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) NPS has not clearly justified the need for all of its employee housing units; (2) the agency requires parks to perform needs assessments to justify its housing; (3) however, these assessments may not be in-depth, objective, nor performed consistently from park to park; (4) in response to the Omnibus Parks and Public Lands Management Act of 1996, the agency is beginning to assess the need for its housing units; however, this process is not scheduled to be completed until 2002--9 years after GAO recommended such assessments; (5) NPS has not been able to provide detailed support for its backlog for repairing and replacing its housing inventory; (6) in 1993, GAO reported that the agency estimated its housing backlog at $546 million; however, NPS could not support this figure; (7) today, the agency estimates its housing backlog to be about $300 million; however, NPS acknowledges that this figure is not based on a detailed assessment of its housing repair and maintenance needs but rather a gross estimate based on the total number of houses whose conditions have been rated less than good; (8) individual park managers have broad discretion in implementing park housing policy, resulting in inconsistencies in how the program is managed across the agency and raising questions about whether housing decisions are being made in the best interest of the agency; (9) other federal land management agencies such as the Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) do not provide the same level of housing to their employees; (10) because its mission emphasizes providing more in-park visitor services than the other agencies, NPS believes that it needs to provide a larger number of its employees with in-park housing; (11) for example, in 1994 GAO reported that NPS had one unit for every 5 employees, while the Forest Service had one unit for every 11 employees and the BLM had one unit for every 58 employees; (12) when compared with the other agencies, the NPS mix of housing units has relatively more houses, multiplex units, and apartments and relatively fewer dormitories and cabins, and because of this, the NPS housing inventory is more costly to maintain. |
gao_GAO-17-352 | gao_GAO-17-352_0 | ASD is a complex developmental disorder with characteristics that can range from mild to more pronounced (see fig. Most School Districts Reported Providing Life and Social Skills Services; Other Services Varied Based on Factors Such as Size and Poverty Level
School Districts Reported Providing Life and Social Skills Services; Fewer Provided Services to Prepare for Employment, Housing, and Transportation
Based on the results of our nationally generalizable school district survey, we estimate that in school year 2015-16 most school districts (about 85 percent) provided transition-age students with ASD instruction on life and social skills, as well as behavioral skills (see fig. Fewer, though still a majority of, school districts reported providing certain types of services to support the transition to employment, according to our survey. Specifically, while an estimated 85 percent of districts reported providing career counseling, we estimate that 74 percent provided interview skills, 69 percent provided work experiences, and 63 percent provided job coaching. District-Provided Transition Services Varied by District Size and Poverty Level
While the majority of school districts reported providing some types of transition services to students with ASD, the specific services that districts reported providing varied depending on the size and poverty level of the district, according to our analysis of school districts’ survey responses. Untimely Transition Planning, Complex Adult Systems, and Few Employment Opportunities Are Key Challenges to Transitioning to Adult Life, According to Stakeholders Transition Planning Sometimes Occurs Too Late to Meet Students’ Needs, According to School Districts, Service Providers, and Others
IDEA currently requires schools to include in the IEP transition services needed to assist youth in reaching their appropriate measurable postsecondary goals no later than the first IEP in effect when students reach age 16. Our estimates from school districts’ survey responses indicate that approximately 32 percent of districts—which represents about 4,000 school districts—begin transition planning when students are older than age 14. However, providing discretion in this area may not serve some students well, according to stakeholders we interviewed. Although Education funds research on transition planning for students with disabilities, Education currently does not fund research evaluating the appropriate age to begin transition planning. Lack of service options. Federal Collaborative Efforts Have Missed Opportunities to Enhance Support of Transition-age Youth with Autism
The Interagency Autism Coordinating Committee Has Not Regularly Engaged Key Federal Agencies That Support Youth with Autism
The IACC, managed by HHS, has facilitated collaboration across its member federal agencies on research related to individuals with ASD, including transition-age youth, but it has not regularly engaged several key federal agencies that serve transition-age youth with ASD. Further, during an IACC working group conference call in November 2016, some members of an IACC working group tasked with updating the lifespan and transitions area for the strategic plan suggested that HHS invite representatives of federal agencies who serve transition-age youth and adults to join the IACC to better inform development of the strategic plan. Unless HHS finds ways to regularly engage certain non-member federal agencies that serve or provide financial assistance to populations including individuals with ASD, including transition-age youth, the IACC may miss the opportunity to leverage the knowledge of other agencies as it works to fulfill its expanded responsibilities under the Autism CARES Act. Unless Education examines the outcomes for students who begin transition services at age 16 and the merits and implications of requiring earlier transition planning for all students with disabilities, policymakers may not have critical information when considering changes to IDEA. Recommendations for Executive Action
To determine whether IDEA’s current transition age requirement allows youth with disabilities, including those with ASD, the time needed to plan and prepare for the transition to adult life, the Secretary of Education should examine outcomes for students when transition services begin at age 16 and the merits and implications of amending IDEA to lower the age at which school districts are to begin providing transition services to students with disabilities, such as 14. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of Education, Health and Human Services, Housing and Urban Development, Labor, and the Social Security Administration for review and comment. Interviews with State Officials and Local Service Providers
To examine the types of services and supports provided at the local level to assist youth with ASD in transitioning to adult life and the key challenges for youth with ASD in successfully transitioning to adult life, we conducted interviews with stakeholders in selected states and local areas. We also met with public high school special education teachers and multiple adult service providers in each state. Review of Federal Laws and Regulations, and Interviews with Federal Agency Officials
To examine the extent to which key federal agencies have collaborated in their efforts to assist youth with autism in successfully transitioning to adult life, we reviewed relevant federal laws, including the Autism Collaboration, Accountability, Research, Education, and Support Act of 2014 (Autism CARES Act); the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act; and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended by the Workforce Innovation and Opportunities Act in 2014; regulations; policy and guidance. We evaluated their collaborative efforts against leading federal practices for interagency collaboration, as appropriate. | Why GAO Did This Study
Research suggests that youth with ASD are less likely than youth with other disabilities to be successful in transitioning to work and postsecondary education and therefore, they may face a lifetime of reliance on public assistance. GAO was asked to examine services provided under IDEA to assist youth with ASD in transitioning to adulthood. For this report, GAO examined (1) services and supports provided to assist youth with ASD in transitioning to adulthood, (2) key challenges in successfully transitioning, and (3) the extent to which federal agencies have collaborated to assist in the transition.
GAO reviewed relevant federal laws and regulations and conducted a nationally generalizable survey of 588 school districts to gather information on services provided in school year 2015-16. GAO also interviewed federal officials and state and local stakeholders in three states selected to highlight a mix of localities with and without initiatives serving this population, urbanicity, and geographic dispersion, and GAO evaluated federal collaborative efforts against leading practices.
What GAO Found
According to GAO's nationwide survey of school district special education directors, GAO estimates that about 85 percent of districts in school year 2015-16, provided youth with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) services such as instruction on life, social, and behavioral skills, as they transition from high school to adulthood. ASD is a group of complex developmental disorders characterized by difficulties with social interactions, communication, and repetitive behaviors. Districts provided these services as part of the planning for the transition to adulthood required by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). Fewer, though still a majority of, districts reported providing certain types of employment-related supports. For example, GAO estimates that 69 percent provided work experiences and 63 percent provided job coaching. While the majority of districts reported providing transition services to students with ASD, the services provided varied by factors such as the size and poverty level of the district, according to GAO's analysis of survey responses.
Youth with ASD face key challenges transitioning from high school to adulthood, such as untimely transition planning by school districts, complex adult service systems, and lack of job opportunities, according to stakeholders. IDEA requires districts to begin providing transition services when students with disabilities reach age 16, with the option to start earlier. However, according to GAO's prior work and stakeholders GAO interviewed, providing discretion in this area may not serve some students well. School officials, advocates, and others report that earlier transition planning—with age 14 commonly cited—can have multiple benefits such as allowing more time to obtain important work and academic experiences; however, the Department of Education (Education) is not funding research on the appropriate age to begin transition planning. Unless Education, which administers IDEA, examines the merits of earlier transition planning, policymakers may not have critical information when considering changes to IDEA. Currently, about 32 percent of districts begin transition planning when students are older than age 14, according to GAO's analysis of survey responses.
While the Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) Interagency Autism Coordinating Committee (IACC) has facilitated collaboration across its member agencies, including Education, to support research for transition-age youth with ASD, it has missed opportunities to collaborate with relevant nonmember agencies. Specifically, the Autism Collaboration, Accountability, Research, Education, and Support Act of 2014 calls for the IACC to include in its strategic plan, as practicable, services for individuals with ASD. However, HHS has not regularly engaged certain federal agencies that provide services or financial assistance to transition-age youth with ASD, but are not IACC members, such as the Departments of Labor and Housing and Urban Development. These agencies are not part of working groups tasked with updating the current strategic plan nor has HHS invited them to join the IACC. As a result, IACC may continue to miss opportunities to leverage the knowledge of other agencies—a leading practice for effective federal interagency collaboration—as it works to fulfill its expanded responsibilities under the Act and improve the well-being of individuals with ASD.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making three recommendations to federal agencies, including one to Education to examine the merits and implications of amending IDEA to require earlier transition planning and one to HHS to enhance collaboration with non-IACC member agencies. Education neither agreed nor disagreed with the IDEA recommendation. The agencies generally agreed with or did not comment on other recommendations. |
gao_NSIAD-97-218 | gao_NSIAD-97-218_0 | Because DOD is responsible for reporting on the efforts made by the United States to ensure that CTR assistance is appropriately used, its report also includes some information on the science and technology centersand the nuclear material control, accounting, and physical protection (MCA&PP) projects being implemented by the Departments of State and Energy, respectively. DOD omitted from its report a cash grant made directly to the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense. Department of Energy
Although DOD’s June 1997 report listed the equipment delivered in support of the MCA&PP projects administered by the Department of Energy, it did not include the total value or describe the types of assistance provided. For example, DOD did not report that through 1996, the Department of Energy provided over $43 million worth of assistance to Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakstan. The report, however, did not explain how DOD accounted for a cash grant to Ukraine or thoroughly describe how assistance to the science centers is monitored. Also, the report did not provide details of the Department of Energy’s assurance program. While DOD’s report to Congress states that during 1996 DCAA assessed 17 ISTC projects at 7 locations, it did not provide a description of the audits or the audits’ findings. In approximately half of the 17 audits conducted, DCAA auditors found weaknesses in recording the labor charges of ISTC grantees—they were working more hours than those billed. To date, however, such weaknesses have posed no risk to CTR funding. Future Audit and Examination Activities
According to its report, DOD plans to conduct 17 audit and examination activities during calendar year 1997. Recommendation
To better inform Congress about how CTR-funded assistance has been used, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense, in preparing future reports on such assistance, provide more complete data on CTR-funded projects managed by the Departments of State and Energy, including the values and types of assistance, a detailed description of how the assistance was accounted for, and information on future audit activities for the CTR assistance they provide to the recipient countries. Scope and Methodology
In conducting our work, we reviewed DOD’s latest report to determine whether it (1) contained current and complete data on CTR assistance deliveries, including the current location and condition of the assistance provided; (2) described how CTR-provided assistance was accounted for and used; (3) included an overall determination of whether the assistance was used for its intended purposes; and (4) provided a listing of future audit and examination activities. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) June 1997 report on Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) assistance provided to Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine, focusing on whether it: (1) contained current and complete data on CTR assistance deliveries, including the current location and condition of the assistance provided; (2) described how CTR-provided assistance was accounted for and used; (3) included an overall determination of whether the assistance has been used for its intended purposes; and (4) provided a listing of future audit and examination activities.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) DOD's June 1997 report: (a) listed CTR equipment delivered by DOD and provided information on the location and condition of the equipment, (b) described how such assistance was accounted for and used, and (c) made an overall determination that the assistance provided by DOD was appropriately used, and (d) listed DOD's future audit and examination activities; (2) however, GAO found that DOD's report lacked detailed information; (3) the report did not contain specific data on some CTR-funded projects; (4) for example, information on the CTR-funded cash grant that DOD provided directly to the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense was excluded; (5) also, the report did not describe the types and values of CTR-funded assistance managed by the Departments of State and Energy; (6) through 1996, such assistance amounted to nearly $50 million for over 200 projects at the international science centers, and over $43 million for a variety of material control, accounting, and physical protection projects at 19 sites; (7) the report did not thoroughly describe how DOD accounted for CTR assistance provided through the Departments of State and Energy; (8) for example, audits by the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) help account for CTR-provided assistance to the science centers, yet DOD did not report the results of 17 International Science and Technology Center project audits conducted by DCAA in 1996; (9) approximately half of the 17 audits found weaknesses in reporting labor charges of center grantees, although to date, such weaknesses have posed no risk to CTR funding; (10) also, DOD's report did not describe the nature of the Department of Energy's assurance program used to monitor the assistance provided; and (11) while DOD's report lists planned DOD audit and examination activities, it omitted those activities planned to account for CTR-funded assistance provided through the Departments of State and Energy. |
gao_GAO-08-114T | gao_GAO-08-114T_0 | NRC’s regional offices are responsible for implementing the ROP, along with the inspectors who work directly at each of the nuclear power facilities. NRC Uses Various Tools and Takes a Risk-Informed and Graded Approach to Ensuring the Safety of Nuclear Power Facilities
In implementing its ROP, NRC oversees the safe operation of nuclear power facilities through physical inspections of the various complex plant equipment and operations, reviews of reactor operator records, and quantitative measures or indicators of each reactor’s performance. Ninety-seven percent of these findings were designated green—very low risk to safe facility operations, but important to correct. For varying periods from 2001 through 2005, on the combined basis of inspection findings and performance indicators, NRC has subjected more than 75 percent of the reactor units to oversight beyond the baseline inspections. While most reactors received the lowest level of increased oversight through a supplemental inspection, five reactors were subjected to NRC’s highest level of oversight. Reactor units in this category were generally subjected to this higher oversight for long periods due to the more systemic nature of their performance problems. NRC Continues to Make Improvements to Its ROP in Key Areas
Our 2006 report found that NRC has generally taken a proactive approach to continuously improving its oversight process, in response to recommendations that grew out of the Davis-Besse incident; independent reviews; and feedback that is usually obtained during NRC’s annual self- assessment of its oversight process from stakeholders, including its regional and on-site inspectors. Continued efforts will be needed to address other shortcomings or opportunities for improvement, however, particularly in improving its ability to identify and address early indications of declining safety performance at nuclear power facilities. Although NRC and others have long recognized the effects of a facility’s safety culture on performance, NRC did not undertake efforts to better incorporate safety culture into the ROP until 2005, when it formed a working group to lead the agency’s efforts. While NRC has largely implemented initial safety culture enhancements to the ROP that primarily address cross-cutting issues, it does not plan to take any additional actions to further implement either recommendation before it completes its assessment of an 18-month implementation phase at the end of this year. NRC Has Implemented Many Actions to Prepare Its Workforce for New Reactor Licensing Reviews and Manage Its Workload, but Several Key Elements Are Still Under Way
NRC has prepared its workforce for new reactor licensing reviews by increasing funding for new reactor activities, reorganizing several offices, creating and partly staffing the Office of New Reactors (NRO), and hiring a significant number of entry-level and midlevel professionals. NRC is using a project management approach to better schedule, manage, and coordinate COL application and design certification reviews. However, NRC has not yet developed specific criteria to set priorities for reviewing these applications if it needs to decide which applications take precedence. However, it has not clearly defined the board’s role, if any, in setting priorities or directing resource allocation. NRC Has Significantly Revised Its Overall Regulatory Framework and Review Process, but Several Activities Are Still in Progress
NRC has significantly revised most of its primary regulatory framework and review process to prepare for licensing new reactors. Specifically, NRC has revised and augmented its rules, guidance, and oversight criteria for licensing and constructing new reactors primarily to provide for early resolution of issues, standardization, and predictability in the licensing process. While NRC has made progress in these areas, it has not yet completed some ancillary rules and regulatory guidance, or actions to implement certain review process components. We recommended that NRC enhance the process for requesting additional information by (1) providing more specific guidance to staff on the development and resolution of requests for additional information within and across design centers and (2) explaining forthcoming workflow and electronic process revisions to COL applicants in a timely manner. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is responsible for overseeing the nation's 104 commercial nuclear power reactors to ensure they are operated safely. Since 2000, NRC has used a formal Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) to oversee safety. NRC is also responsible for licensing the construction and operation of new reactors. Electric power companies have announced plans to submit 20 applications in the next 18 months. This testimony is based on GAO reports that reviewed (1) how NRC implements the ROP, (2) the results of the ROP over several years, (3) the status of NRC's efforts to improve the ROP, (4) NRC's efforts to prepare its workforce and manage its workload for new reactor licensing, and (5) NRC's efforts to develop its regulatory framework and review processes for new reactor activities. In conducting this work, GAO analyzed programwide information and interviewed cognizant NRC managers and industry representatives.
What GAO Found
In implementing its ROP, NRC uses various tools and takes a risk-informed and graded approach to ensure the safety of nuclear power facilities. The ROP primarily relies on physical inspections of equipment and operations and quantitative measures or indicators of performance at each facility to assess the status of safety and determine appropriate levels of oversight. Since 2001, NRC has made more than 4,000 inspection findings that reactor unit operators had not fully complied with safety procedures. Almost all of these findings were for actions NRC considered important to correct but of low significance to safe operations. As a result of NRC inspections, more than 75 percent of the nation's reactor units received some level of increased oversight while five units were subjected to NRC's highest level of oversight for long periods because their performance problems were more systemic. In 2006, GAO reported that NRC has generally taken a proactive approach to improving its ROP. However, concerted efforts will be needed to address shortcomings, particularly in identifying and addressing early indications of declining reactor safety performance. For example, NRC is implementing several enhancements to the ROP to better assess a facility's safety culture--organizational characteristics that ensure safety issues receive the attention their significance warrants. GAO made recommendations to further improve this effort, and NRC has taken initial steps to implement them. NRC has taken important steps to prepare its workforce for new licensing reviews, but several key activities are still underway and uncertainties remain about its management of the expected surge of applications. For example, NRC has increased funding, hired hundreds of new employees, and created and partly staffed a new office. However, NRC has not completed its development of some computer-based tools for enhancing the consistency and coordination of application reviews and has not fully developed criteria for setting priorities if the workload exceeds available resources. Also, while NRC's Office of New Reactors established a resource management board for coordinating certain office review activities, it has not clearly defined the extent of the board's responsibilities. NRC agreed with recommendations GAO made to further improve its workload management. NRC has revised most of its primary regulatory framework and review processes, including its rules, guidance, and oversight criteria to provide for early resolution of issues, standardization, and enhanced predictability. However, NRC has not yet completed some associated rules, guidance, and review process components, including revisions to its environmental guidance, its hearing process, and its process for requesting additional information from applicants. Without these components, expected efficiencies and predictability may be limited regarding the total time an applicant needs to obtain a license. NRC agreed with a recommendation GAO made to further improve its application review process. |
gao_HEHS-95-156 | gao_HEHS-95-156_0 | In addition, the MHSS provides health care to dependents of active duty members, retirees and their dependents, and survivors of service members. Beneficiaries Have Access to Primary Care but Specialty and Dental Care Are Limited
Beneficiaries have access to primary care at military facilities, including outlying clinics. Beneficiaries in all categories expressed general satisfaction with their access to primary care in military facilities. However, the military medical leadership, military physicians, and beneficiaries all commented that there has been a significant reduction in the amount and location of U.S. military specialty care available in Europe since the downsizing began. These actions often resulted in immediate personnel shortages for the medical units in Europe and further hindered the delivery of health care to beneficiaries there. Health care providers at one clinic estimated that it took between 2 and 4 weeks to obtain the results for such tests. When admitted, beneficiaries explained that they must contend with language barriers, cultural differences, and quality of care concerns such as differences in treatment. To address beneficiaries’ overall concern, DOD is developing an interservice health care plan for all beneficiaries in Europe that seeks to maximize the use of military medical facilities. To better inform beneficiaries and thereby reduce their anxieties about health care—military and host nation—available in their communities in Europe, DOD is creating an education program. For example, it has (1) prepared a new detailed handbook to inform patients about host nation obstetrical services; (2) developed a questionnaire to obtain beneficiary feedback about host nation medical care; (3) held meetings with beneficiaries to educate them on the changes; (4) hired a host nation physician to perform oversight and liaison services among the host nation facility, the patient, and the military medical providers; and (5) made arrangements for translators to assist when Italian ambulance service is needed. A recorded menu will provide information on how to obtain these lists. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed beneficiary access to military health care in Europe, focusing on the: (1) availability of health care in military facilities; (2) obstacles in providing military health care; (3) experiences of beneficiaries that have used host nation providers instead of military health care providers; and (4) Department of Defense's (DOD) handling of service delivery problems and beneficiary concerns.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) since the downsizing of U.S. military personnel in Europe, beneficiaries have found it difficult to obtain health services at overseas military facilities; (2) although beneficiaries have access to primary health care services, their access to specialty and dental care services is limited; (3) the reduced military health care system has resulted in DOD relying on the German and Italian medical systems to provide health services to beneficiaries; and (4) beneficiaries must contend with language barriers, cultural differences, unfamiliar doctors, and the general lack of information about how to obtain host nation health care. In addition, GAO found that DOD: (1) is developing an interservice health care plan for all beneficiaries in Europe; (2) has hired liason personnel to help beneficiaries obtain health care from German and Italian health care providers; and (3) plans to contract for services to monitor the care that beneficiaries receive from host nation providers, an education program that explains beneficiary health care options in Europe, and the translation of host nation medical records. |
gao_NSIAD-97-82 | gao_NSIAD-97-82_0 | The Army Operates a Slow, Inefficient, and Costly Logistics System
The Army’s current depot repair pipeline, characterized by a $2.6 billion inventory investment, is slow, unreliable, and inefficient. The benefits for the Army would be greater weapon system availability, more regular and predictable supply of serviceable components, savings from reduced pipeline inventory requirements, and a repair system more flexible and responsive in serving the needs of the combat commander.”
To calculate the amount of time the Army’s system takes to repair and distribute parts using the current depot repair process, we judgmentally selected 24 types of Army aviation parts and computed the time the parts spent in four key segments of the repair process. Several Factors Contribute to This Slow System
Several factors contribute to the Army’s slow logistics pipeline. Functions such as testing, cleaning, and machining are sometimes done at separate shops that are hundreds of yards apart. In early 1995, the Army’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics directed the Army logistics community to implement a program called “Velocity Management” to speed up key aspects of the logistics system and reduce the Army’s need for large inventory levels. Under this program, the Army has established Army-wide process improvement teams for the following four areas: (1) ordering and shipping of parts, (2) the repair cycle, (3) inventory levels and locations, and (4) financial management. As of September 1996, however, Velocity Management has had no impact on CCAD operations and has had only limited success in improving overall logistics operations. Industry Best Practices Can Be Used to Build on Army Initiatives
The airline industry has developed leading-edge practices that focus on reducing the time and complexity of the logistics pipeline. Minimizing idle time helps reduce inventories because it lessens the need for extra “cushions” of inventory to cover operations while parts are out of service. Reorganizing the Repair Process
One approach to simplify the repair process is the “cellular” concept, which brings all the resources, such as tooling and support equipment, personnel, and inventory that are needed to repair a broken part into one location, or one “cell.” This approach simplifies the flow of parts through the process by eliminating the time-consuming exercise of routing parts to workshops in different locations. Recommendations
As part of the Army’s current efforts to improve the logistics system’s responsiveness and reduce its complexity, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army, working with DLA, to develop a demonstration project to determine the extent to which the Army can apply best practices to its logistics operations. The specific practices that should be considered, where feasible, are eliminating excess inventory and inducting parts at repair depots soon after they break, consistent with repair requirements, to prevent parts from sitting idle; using the cellular concept to reduce the time it takes to repair parts; establishing innovative supplier partnerships to increase the availability of parts needed to complete repairs at the depot, such as local distribution centers and integrated supplier programs; and using third-party logistics providers to store and distribute spare parts between the depot and end users to improve delivery times. Scope and Methodology
We reviewed documents and interviewed officials on the Army’s inventory policies, practices, and efforts to improve its logistics operations. We did not test or otherwise validate the Army’s data. We did not independently verify the accuracy of logistics costs and performance measures provided by private sector organizations. Additional copies are $2 each. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Army's logistics system for aviation parts, focusing on: (1) the current performance of the Army's logistics system; (2) the Army's efforts to improve the logistics system and reduce costs; and (3) opportunities where best practices could be incorporated into the Army's logistics operations. GAO did not test or otherwise validate the Army's data.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the Army's efforts to improve its logistics pipeline for aviation parts and reduce logistics costs could be enhanced by incorporating best practices GAO has identified in the private sector; (2) the Army's current repair pipeline, characterized by a $2.6-billion investment in aviation parts, is slow and inefficient; and (3) several factors contribute to the long pipeline time, including: (a) broken reparable parts move slowly between field units and a repair depot; (b) reparable parts are stored in warehouses for several months before and after they are repaired; (c) repair depots are inefficiently organized; and (d) consumable parts are not available to mechanics when needed; (4) the Army has recognized that it must improve its logistics systems; (5) under a recently established program called "Velocity Management," the Army plans to focus on and improve repair of components, order and shipment of parts, inventory levels, and financial management; (6) the program is in the initial stages of development and has had limited success in actual Army-wide process improvements to date; (7) best practices used in the airline industry provide opportunities to build on the Army's efforts to improve its logistics pipeline; (8) GAO identified key best practices to address each of the four factors contributing to the Army's long pipeline time: (a) third-party logistics services can assume warehousing and distribution functions, and provide rapid delivery of parts and state-of-the-art information systems that would speed the shipment of parts between depots and field locations; (b) eliminating excess inventory and quickly initiating repair actions can reduce the amount of time parts are stored, improve the visibility of production backlogs, and reduce the need for large inventory to cover operations while parts are out of service; (c) cellular manufacturing techniques can improve repair shop efficiency by bringing all the resources needed to complete repairs to one location, thereby minimizing the current time-consuming exercise of routing parts to different workshops located hundreds of yards apart; and (d) innovative supplier partnerships can increase the availability of consumable parts, minimize the time it takes to deliver parts to mechanics, and delay the purchase of parts until they are needed to complete repairs; and (9) although GAO cannot say that these practices can be successfully integrated into the Army's system, GAO believes they are compatible with many aspects of the Army's operations and the Velocity Management Program. |
gao_GAO-02-852T | gao_GAO-02-852T_0 | DOE has reported completing its cleanup work at 74 of the 114 sites in the complex, but those were small and the least difficult to deal with. Compliance Agreements Are of Three Main Types
Compliance agreements in effect at DOE sites can be grouped into three main types (see table 1). These agreements are typically between DOE and states. Of the 4,558 milestones completed, about 80 percent were finished by the original due date for the milestone. However, DOE headquarters officials evaluate individual site estimates and combine them into an overall DOE-wide budget, taking into account broader considerations and other priorities that it must address as part of the give-and-take of the budget process. DOE is not required to develop or present this information to the Congress. Sites develop these estimates because many of the compliance agreements require DOE to request sufficient funding each year to meet all of the requirements in the agreements. Compliance Agreements Are Site Specific and Do Not Allow for Managing Risks Across DOE Sites
DOE’s compliance agreements focus on environmental issues at specific sites and do not include information on the risks being addressed. Compliance Agreements Were Not a Barrier to Past Management Improvements, but Impact on February 2002 Initiative Is Unclear
Compliance agreements have not been a barrier to previous DOE management improvements, but it is not clear if the agreements will be used to oppose proposed changes stemming from the February 2002 initiative. Addressing both of these challenges will be important to better ensure that DOE’s latest management initiative will achieve the desired results of accelerating risk reduction and reducing cleanup costs. | What GAO Found
Compliance agreements between the Department of Energy (DOE) and its regulators specify cleanup activities and milestones that DOE has agreed to achieve. The 70 compliance agreements at DOE sites vary, but can be divided into three main types. These are: (1) agreements specifically required by the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 to address cleanup of federal sites on EPA's national priorities list or by the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 to address the management of mixed radioactive and hazardous waste at DOE facilities; (2) court-ordered agreements resulting from lawsuits initiated primarily by states; and (3) other agreements, including state administrative orders enforcing state hazardous waste management laws. DOE reported completing about 80 percent of its milestones by the time originally scheduled in the agreements. The cost of complying with these agreements is not specifically identified in the DOE budget submitted to Congress. Individual DOE sites develop annual compliance cost estimates as part of their budget requests. However, DOE headquarters officials adjust those individual site estimates to reflect national priorities and to reconcile various competing demands. Compliance agreements are site-specific and are not intended to provide a mechanism for DOE to use in prioritizing risks among the various sites. Compliance agreements have not been a barrier to previous DOE management initiatives, but it is not clear if the compliance agreements will be used to oppose DOE's latest initiative to focus on accelerating risk reduction at sites. |
gao_GAO-12-270T | gao_GAO-12-270T_0 | Removal from the home can occur because of physical abuse or neglect. As we have previously reported, children in foster care exhibit more numerous and serious medical conditions, including mental health conditions, than do other children. Further, additional risks these drugs pose specifically to children are not well understood. Foster children in each of the five selected states were prescribed psychotropic drugs at higher rates than were nonfoster children in Medicaid during 2008. These states spent over $375 million for prescriptions provided through fee-for-service programs to foster and nonfoster children. The higher rates do not necessarily indicate inappropriate prescribing practices, as they could be due to foster children’s greater exposure to traumatic experiences and the unique challenges of coordinating their medical care. However, psychotropic drug claims for foster children were also more likely to show the indicators of potential health risks that we established with our experts. According to our experts, no evidence supports the concomitant use of five or more psychotropic drugs in adults or children, yet hundreds of both foster and nonfoster children were prescribed such a medication regimen. Similarly, thousands of foster and nonfoster children were prescribed doses exceeding maximum levels cited in guidelines based on FDA-approved drug labels, which our experts said increases the potential for adverse side effects, and does not typically increase the efficacy of the drugs to any significant extent. Further, foster and nonfoster children under 1 year old were prescribed psychotropic drugs, which our experts said have no established use for mental health conditions in infants and could result in serious adverse effects. Selected States’ Psychotropic Drug Monitoring Programs Fall Short of AACAP- Best Principles Guidelines
Comparing the selected states’ monitoring programs for psychotropic drugs provided to foster children with AACAP’s guidelines indicates that, as of October 2011, each of the state programs falls short of providing comprehensive oversight as defined by AACAP. Such variation is not surprising given that states set their own oversight guidelines and have only recently been required, as a condition of receiving certain federal child welfare grants, to establish protocols for the appropriate use and monitoring of psychotropic drugs prescribed to foster children. Oversight procedures: Each of the six states has developed some procedures similar to AACAP’s guidelines for overseeing psychotropic drug prescriptions for foster children, as evidenced by interviews and documentation provided by state Medicaid and foster care officials. In addition, as stated earlier, Maryland’s 2008 foster care data were found unreliable. Consultation program: According to interviews and documentation provided by state Medicaid and foster care officials, five of the six states have implemented some of AACAP’s guidelines for consultation, but only one of the six selected states has implemented a consultation program that ensures all consent givers and prescribers are able to seek advice from child and adolescent psychiatrists before making consent decisions for foster children. Information sharing: Four of the six selected states have created websites with information on psychotropic drugs for clinicians, foster parents, and other caregivers. Conclusions
The higher rates of psychotropic drug prescriptions among foster children may be explained by their greater mental health needs and the challenges inherent to the foster care system. However, thousands of foster and nonfoster children in the five states we analyzed were found to have prescriptions that carry potential health risks. Recommendation for Executive Action
In our draft report, we recommended that the Secretary of HHS evaluate our findings and consider endorsing guidance to state Medicaid and child welfare agencies on best practices for monitoring psychotropic drug prescriptions for foster children, including guidance that addresses, at minimum, informed consent, oversight, consultation, and information sharing. Agency comments will be incorporated and addressed in a written report that will be issued in December 2011. | Why GAO Did This Study
Foster children have often been removed from abusive or neglectful homes and tend to have more mental health conditions than other children. Treatment may include psychotropic drugs but their risks to children are not well understood. Medicaid, administered by states and overseen by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), provides prescription drug coverage to foster children. This testimony examines (1) rates of psychotropic prescriptions for foster and nonfoster children in 2008 and (2) state oversight of psychotropic prescriptions for foster children through October 2011. GAO selected Florida, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Oregon, and Texas primarily based on their geographic diversity and size of the foster care population. Results cannot be generalized to other states. In addition, GAO analyzed Medicaid fee-for-service and foster care data from selected states for 2008, the most recent year of prescription data available at the start of the audit. Maryland's 2008 foster care data was unreliable. GAO also used expert child psychiatrists to provide a clinical perspective on its methodology and analysis, reviewed regulations and state policies, and interviewed federal and state officials.
What GAO Found
Foster children in the five states GAO analyzed were prescribed psychotropic drugs at higher rates than nonfoster children in Medicaid during 2008, which according to research, experts consulted, and certain federal and state officials, could be due in part to foster children's greater mental health needs, greater exposure to traumatic experiences and the challenges of coordinating their medical care. However, prescriptions to foster children in these states were also more likely to have indicators of potential health risks. According to GAO's experts, no evidence supports the concomitant use of five or more psychotropic drugs in adults or children, yet hundreds of both foster and nonfoster children in the five states had such a drug regimen. Similarly, thousands of foster and nonfoster children were prescribed doses higher than the maximum levels cited in guidelines developed by Texas based on FDA-approved labels, which GAO's experts said increases the risk of adverse side effects and does not typically increase the efficacy of the drugs to any significant extent. Further, foster and nonfoster children under 1 year old were prescribed psychotropic drugs, which GAO's experts said have no established use for mental health conditions in infants; providing them these drugs could result in serious adverse effects. Selected states' monitoring programs for psychotropic drugs provided to foster children fall short of best principle guidelines published by the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry (AACAP). The guidelines, which states are not required to follow, cover four categories. (1) Consent: Each state has some practices consistent with AACAP consent guidelines, such as identifying caregivers empowered to give consent. (2) Oversight: Each state has procedures consistent with some but not all oversight guidelines, which include monitoring rates of prescriptions. (3) Consultation: Five states have implemented some but not all guidelines, which include providing consultations by child psychiatrists by request. (4) Information: Four states have created websites about psychotropic drugs for clinicians, foster parents, and other caregivers. This variation is expected because states set their own guidelines. HHS has not endorsed specific measures for state oversight of psychotropic prescriptions for foster children. HHS-endorsed guidance could help close gaps in oversight of psychotropic prescriptions and increase protections for these vulnerable children. In our draft report, GAO recommended that HHS consider endorsing guidance for states on best practices for overseeing psychotropic prescriptions for foster children. HHS agreed with our recommendation. Agency comments will be incorporated and addressed in a written report that will be issued in December 2011. |
gao_GAO-04-626T | gao_GAO-04-626T_0 | Underlying Causes of Financial and Related Business Process Transformation Challenges
Since May 1997, we have highlighted in various testimonies and reports what we believe are the underlying causes of the department’s inability to resolve its long-standing financial management and related business management weaknesses and fundamentally reform its business operations. Over the years, the department has undertaken many initiatives intended to transform its business operations departmentwide and improve the reliability of information for decision making and reporting but has not had much success because it has not addressed the following four underlying causes: a lack of sustained top-level leadership and management accountability for deeply embedded cultural resistance to change, including military service parochialism and stovepiped operations; a lack of results-oriented goals and performance measures and monitoring; and inadequate incentives and accountability mechanisms relating to business transformation efforts. Given the importance of DOD’s business transformation effort, it is imperative that it receive the sustained leadership needed to improve the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of DOD’s business operations. In addition, in September 2003, we reported that DOD continued to use a stovepiped approach to develop and fund its business system investments. These elements are addressing the department’s financial management and related business operational challenges as part of a comprehensive, integrated, DOD-wide strategic plan for business reform; providing for sustained and committed leadership by top management, including but not limited to the Secretary of Defense; establishing resource control over business systems investments; establishing clear lines of responsibility, authority, and accountability; incorporating results-oriented performance measures and monitoring progress tied to key financial and business transformation objectives; providing appropriate incentives or consequences for action or inaction; establishing an enterprise architecture to guide and direct business systems modernization investments; and ensuring effective oversight and monitoring. Later, we will offer a suggestion for improving the management and oversight of the billions of dollars DOD invests annually in business systems. Specifically, we found that DOD and the military services had done the following. Suggestions for Legislative Consideration
We would like to offer two suggestions for legislative consideration that we believe could contribute significantly to the department’s ability to not only address the impediments to DOD success but also to incorporate needed key elements to successful reform. Further, the lack of adequate transparency and appropriate accountability across all business areas has resulted in certain fraud, waste, and abuse and hinders DOD’s attempts to develop world-class operations and activities to support its forces. DOD’s senior leaders have demonstrated a commitment to transforming the department and improving its business operations and have taken positive steps to begin this effort. We believe that implementation of our open recommendations and our suggested legislative initiatives would greatly improve the likelihood of meaningful, broad-based reform at DOD. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO has issued several reports pertaining to the Department of Defense's (DOD) architecture and systems modernization efforts which revealed that many of the underlying conditions that contributed to the failure of prior DOD efforts to improve its business systems remain fundamentally unchanged. The Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities, House Committee on Armed Services, asked GAO to provide its perspectives on (1) the impact long-standing financial and related business weaknesses continue to have on DOD, (2) the underlying causes of DOD business transformation challenges, and (3) DOD business transformation efforts. In addition, GAO reiterates the key elements to successful reform: (1) an integrated business transformation strategy, (2) sustained leadership and resource control, (3) clear lines of responsibility and accountability, (4) results-oriented performance, (5) appropriate incentives and consequences, (6) an enterprise architecture to guide reform efforts, and (7) effective monitoring and oversight. GAO also offers two suggestions for legislative consideration that are intended to improve the likelihood of meaningful, broad-based financial management and related business reform at DOD.
What GAO Found
DOD's senior civilian and military leaders are committed to transforming the department and improving its business operations and have taken positive steps to begin this effort. However, overhauling the financial management and related business operations of one of the largest and most complex organizations in the world represents a huge management challenge. Six DOD program areas are on GAO's "high risk" list, and the department shares responsibility for three other governmentwide high-risk areas. DOD's substantial financial and business management weaknesses adversely affect not only its ability to produce auditable financial information, but also to provide timely, reliable information for management and Congress to use in making informed decisions. Further, the lack of adequate transparency and appropriate accountability across all of DOD's major business areas results in billions of dollars in annual wasted resources in a time of increasing fiscal constraint. Four underlying causes impede reform: (1) lack of sustained leadership, (2) cultural resistance to change, (3) lack of meaningful metrics and ongoing monitoring, and (4) inadequate incentives and accountability mechanisms. To address these issues, GAO reiterates the keys to successful business transformation and offers two suggestions for legislative action. First GAO suggests that a senior management position be established to spearhead DOD-wide business transformation efforts. Second, GAO proposes that the leaders of DOD's functional areas, referred to as departmentwide domains, receive and control the funding for system investments, as opposed to the military services. Domain leaders would be responsible for managing business system and process reform efforts within their business areas and would be accountable to the new senior management official for ensuring their efforts comply with DOD's business enterprise architecture. |
gao_GAO-01-181 | gao_GAO-01-181_0 | As administered in subsequent years (when it became known as Aid to Families With Dependent Children or AFDC), the welfare program evolved into an open-ended entitlement program, providing cash assistance to people with children, usually single parents, who earned little income. The legislation put a maximum 5-year limit on the availability of federal cash assistance under TANFand required adults to work or participate in work-related activities after receiving assistance for 24 months as a condition for continuing to receive benefits. Certain Economic and Policy Factors Parallel Long-Term UI Decline
Although there is no agreement about the causes of the general decline in the rate of UI filing,certain factors are commonly considered significant, including (1) the decrease in the number of workers employed in manufacturing jobs; (2) the decline of union membership in the workforce; (3) increasingly tighter state requirements for UI eligibility; (4) federal taxation of UI benefits beginning in 1979; (5) population shifts, starting in the 1970s, of workers from northeastern states to southern states, where unemployed workers are less likely to apply for UI benefits; and (6) changes in the survey methodology of the CPS during the 1980s that increased the number of unemployed who were counted (changing the denominator used in calculating the recipiency rate).Of these factors, the first three affect the entire period of decline. Unemployed Low- Wage Workers Were Less Likely to Receive UI Than Other Unemployed Workers in the 1990s
Unemployed low-wage workers were less likely to collect UI benefits than other unemployed workers in the early 1990s, and the most recent evidence suggests that this trend continued throughout the decade. Little Change to UI Since Welfare Reform
Since welfare reform in 1996, the welfare rolls have dropped and large numbers of people have joined the labor force, many in low-wage jobs. Since then, the U.S. economy and the composition of its labor force have changed, while the UI program has been slow to adapt to these changes. Both the advisory council and the stakeholder workgroup proposed that states should not reject claimants simply because they are looking for part-time, rather than full-time, work. Scope and Methodology
We used a variety of data sources to examine the role of unemployment insurance (UI) as part of the safety net for low-wage workers. | Why GAO Did This Study
The welfare and unemployment insurance (UI) programs have been part of the nation's social safety net since 1935. The welfare program provides cash assistance to needy families without means of support, while UI provides cash assistance to people temporarily unemployed. In 1996, welfare reform put time limits on how long most people can receive cash assistance and generally required recipients to engage in work activities to qualify for income support. Since then, the welfare rolls have dropped dramatically as large numbers of welfare recipients have started working, many in low-income jobs. With this shift, the UI program has become a more significant part of the social security net. GAO examined the use of the UI program by low-wage and unemployed workers.
What GAO Found
GAO found that low-wage workers are less likely to receive UI benefits than are other unemployed workers even though they are twice as likely to be unemployed. Low-wage workers are less likely to receive UI benefits because of (1) their tendency to quit work voluntarily, (2) restrictive state eligibility requirements, and (3) their lack of union memberships. Several UI reform proposals to expand the availability of UI benefits to these workers are being discussed by the Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation. |
gao_GAO-05-71 | gao_GAO-05-71_0 | To carry out the 2000 Census’s Accuracy and Coverage Evaluation program (A.C.E. While the A.C.E. In the end, the Bureau decided not to use A.C.E.’s matching process results to adjust the 2000 Census. To identify the extent of the census errors not accounted for by A.C.E., we reviewed the descriptive coverage error estimates and the limitations and context of these data as described in the Bureau reports published by the Bureau in March 2001, October 2001, and March 2003. However, the Bureau has not accounted for how these design decisions have affected coverage error estimates, which has prevented it from pinpointing what went wrong with A.C.E., and this in turn could hamper its efforts to craft a more successful coverage measurement program for the next national head count. According to senior Bureau officials, increasingly complicated social factors, such as extended families and population mobility, presented challenges for A.C.E., making it difficult to determine exactly where certain individuals should have been counted. These revisions suggest that the original A.C.E. estimates were unreliable. estimates. Unexpected Differences in Patterns of Coverage Error between the Housing and the Population Count Further Call into Question Reliability of Revised Estimates
According to Bureau reporting, when it examined the validity of the revised coverage error estimates the Bureau expected to see across demographic groups similar patterns between the coverage error for the count of the population and the count of housing. estimates has provided lessons, it remains unclear how the Bureau will use its published coverage error estimates to make decisions leading to a more reliable measure of coverage error in 2010, or how the unreliable estimates can be of value to policymakers or the public. Recommendations for Executive Action
As the Bureau plans for its coverage evaluation of the next national head count in 2010, we recommend that the Secretary of Commerce direct that the Bureau take the following three actions to ensure that coverage evaluation results the Bureau disseminates are as useful as possible to Congress and other census stakeholders: To avoid creating any unnecessary blind spots in the 2010 coverage evaluation, as the Bureau plans for its coverage evaluation in 2010, it should take into account how any significant future design decisions relating to census (for example, residence rules, efforts to detect and reduce duplicates, or other procedures) or A.C.E. might have affected the accuracy of the coverage error estimates. 2. Regarding our finding that the Bureau has not produced reliable revised estimates of coverage error for the 2000 Census, and, specifically, that the full impact of the Bureau’s methodological limitations on the revised estimates has not been made clear, the Department wrote that the Census Bureau feels that further evaluations would not be a wise use of resources. Residence Rules
The rules the Bureau uses to determine where people should be counted. | Why GAO Did This Study
Evaluations of past censuses show that certain groups were undercounted compared to other groups, a problem known as "coverage error." To address this, the Census Bureau included in its 2000 Census design the Accuracy and Coverage Evaluation Program (A.C.E.) to (1) measure coverage error and (2) use the results to adjust the census, if warranted. However, the Bureau found the A.C.E. results inaccurate and decided not to adjust or plan for adjustment in 2010. Congress asked GAO to determine (1) factors contributing to A.C.E.'s reported failure to accurately estimate census coverage error, and (2) the reliability of the revised coverage error estimates the Bureau subsequently produced. To do this, GAO examined three sets of Bureau research published in March 2001, October 2001, and March 2003 and interviewed Bureau officials.
What GAO Found
According to senior Bureau officials, increasingly complicated social factors, such as extended families and population mobility, presented challenges for A.C.E., making it difficult to determine exactly where certain individuals should have been counted thus contributing to the inaccuracy of the coverage error estimates. For example, parents in custody disputes both may have an incentive to claim their child as a resident, but the Bureau used rules for determining where people should be countedresidence rules--that did not account for many of these kinds of circumstances. Other design decisions concerning both A.C.E. and the census also may have created "blind spots" that contributed to the inaccuracy of the estimates. The Bureau has not accounted for the effects of these or other key design decisions on the coverage error estimates, which could hamper the Bureau's efforts to craft a program that better measures coverage error for the next national census. Despite having twice revised A.C.E.'s original coverage error estimates, the Bureau has no reliable estimates of the extent of coverage error for the 2000 census. While both revisions suggested that the original estimates were inaccurate, in the course of thoroughly reviewing the revisions, the Bureau documented (1) extensive limitations in the revision methodology and (2) an unexpected pattern between the revised estimates and other A.C.E. data, both of which indicated that the revised coverage error estimates may be questionable themselves. Furthermore, when the Bureau published the revised estimates, it did not clearly quantify the impact of these limitations for readers, thus preventing readers from accurately judging the overall reliability of the estimates. It is therefore unclear how A.C.E. information will be useful to the public or policymakers, or how the Bureau can use it to make better decisions in the future. |
gao_NSIAD-95-33 | gao_NSIAD-95-33_0 | Not all aspects of life and microgravity sciences research require a space-based environment. Developing a Larger Research Community Will Require Adjusting Funding Priorities
NASA intends to build a space station-era research community from the ground up. A NASA official estimates that the number of ground-based microgravity researchers needs to increase from 73 to 240 between fiscal years 1992 and 1998. Although this approach appears reasonable, the planned funding levels do not match the program’s objective, and funding priorities may need to be reassessed if the number of life and microgravity ground-based investigators is to be significantly increased. Selecting IML-2 Investigators Illustrated Two Basic Approaches for Developing Research Community
In recent years, NASA has used two approaches for developing life and microgravity science research communities—“select for flight” or “select for science.” In the select-for-flight approach, all of the U.S. life science and most of the U.S. microgravity investigators on IML-2 were selected from proposals submitted in response to flight-related announcements. A NASA microgravity research official estimates that NASA will need to fund about 240 ground-based investigators to support a station-based microgravity sciences research program. Ground-based research is funded from NASA’s research and analysis budget. However, NASA does not anticipate that this budget will increase for fiscal years 1995 through 1999. Based on the Committee’s direction, NASA requires that all research proposals be reviewed by peers for scientific merit and relevance (previously, some life science research conducted by NASA scientists was not subject to peer review); all research be reviewed by peers at least every 3 years; all research be reviewed for progress annually and for the performance of its objectives at least every 3 years; peer review be performed by the best-qualified individuals available in the peer review scores provided by external peer review groups be critical factors determining the priority for initial and continued funding of research projects and programs. Assessing the Impact of Canceled Spacelab Flight on the Research Community
NASA’s efforts to develop a research community are not likely to be adversely affected by the February 1994 cancellation of SLS-3. The U.S. principal investigators on the Spacelab flight stated that they will be able to meet their experiment objectives on other missions, including multiple Shuttle flights to Mir. Experiment Quality Assurance Procedures
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA) guiding principle for quality assurance is periodic review over the lifetime of an experiment. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) efforts to develop a robust life and microgravity sciences research community for the space station, focusing on: (1) what NASA is doing to assess the required size of the research community needed for the space station and to ensure that such a community will be available; (2) how NASA will ensure that the research selected for the space station will be the best possible; and (3) whether the recently cancelled shuttle research flight adversely affected NASA efforts to develop a research community for the space station.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) NASA is focusing on developing a comprehensive research program that emphasizes more ground-based research and uses space flight only for research efforts that require a microgravity environment in space; (2) NASA wants to greatly increase the number of ground-based investigators to accomplish this program; (3) the science-oriented approach is reasonable, but funding levels could jeopardize it unless NASA adjusts its funding priorities so, to achieve its goal, NASA will need to increase funding for life and microgravity sciences research and analysis from fiscal years 1995 through 1999; (4) if NASA funding remains at expected levels, a smaller than desired number of ground investigators in the ground-based research program will be selected; (4) although peer review panels and NASA sometimes disagree on the scientific merit and relevance of NASA funding proposals, NASA funding decisions were generally consistent with the recommendations of the peer review panels; and (5) NASA efforts to increase the size of its life and microgravity sciences research community are not likely to be adversely affected by the cancellation of the third Spacelab Life Sciences flight, since most of the principal investigators have been accommodated on other space flights and generally will be able to meet their experiment objectives. |
gao_GAO-03-821 | gao_GAO-03-821_0 | Education Could Benefit from Access to Taxpayer Information to Verify Student Eligibility for Financial Aid Programs
Education uses taxpayer information for some eligibility determinations and other purposes, but is not authorized to directly receive taxpayer information from IRS to verify student financial aid eligibility or determine payment amounts for its federal student aid programs—due to IRC Section 6103 restrictions. Using aggregate IRS income information, Education estimates that $602 million in grant overpayments occurred during this time. Education also uses these data in researching and computing statistical data on overall borrower debt, such as determining the average and median debt burden ratios for any given year. Approximately 11.4 million individuals applied for over $50 billion in federal student financial aid in academic year 2001-02. According to Education officials, a 1998 amendment to HEA was intended to authorize the matching of student aid applicant information with several elements of federal income tax return information. However, that provision could not be used as intended because IRC Section 6103 was not specifically amended so that Education and its contractors, which assist Education in administering the various financial aid programs, could have access to taxpayer information. IRS Does Not Use Education’s Student Aid Data and the Potential Benefit of Doing So Appears to Be Limited
IRS does not use personal information from applicants that Education collects and maintains to ensure that taxpayers meet their tax obligations because IRS officials believe the taxpayer information IRS receives is more accurate. In general, IRS officials’ views are supported by its past estimates of taxpayers’ levels of compliance and by the results of Education studies and investigations. For example, in the mid-1990s, IRS estimated that taxpayers with only wage income had a 99 percent voluntary reporting compliance rate, and taxpayers with interest and dividend income were 95 percent compliant in reporting this income. The student aid applications ask students and/or their parents to report income information directly from their tax returns and generally do not ask for other corroboration of income. To determine whether Education uses IRS taxpayer information to verify information provided by applicants for federal student aid and the benefits of increasing verification activities, we analyzed the student financial aid application and determined what personal information Education collects from applicants. To determine whether IRS uses personal information maintained by Education to ensure that taxpayers meet their tax obligations and the benefits of increasing such activities, we collected data to determine what personal information IRS obtains from Education. | Why GAO Did This Study
Data sharing can be a valuable tool for federal agencies in determining applicants' eligibility for benefit and loan programs. Congress has authorized the Department of Education, among others, to have limited access to federal taxpayer information collected by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). Likewise, IRS is able to use personal information collected by outside sources to better ensure that taxpayers are meeting their tax obligations. GAO was asked to determine whether Education uses taxpayer information to verify information provided by student aid applicants, and the benefits of increasing data verification activities, and whether IRS uses personal information maintained by Education to ensure that taxpayers meet their tax obligations, and the benefits of increasing these activities.
What GAO Found
Education uses taxpayer information for several purposes, such as locating loan defaulters; researching and computing statistical data on overall borrower debt; and, upon taxpayers' consent, determining loan repayment amounts. However, Education is not authorized to directly receive taxpayer information from IRS to verify eligibility for student financial aid provided under Title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (HEA). In academic year 2001-02, 11.4 million students applied for $54 billion in aid. A 1998 amendment to HEA was intended to authorize the matching of student aid applicant information with several elements of federal income tax return information. However, HEA could not be used as intended because Internal Revenue Code Section 6103 was not specifically amended so that Education and its contractors, which assist Education in administering the various financial aid programs, could have access to taxpayer information. Based on a study that matched Education data and IRS income information, Education estimates that it made approximately $602 million in grant overpayments during fiscal years 2001 and 2002. IRS does not use personal information collected from applicants and maintained by Education to ensure that taxpayers meet their tax obligations because IRS officials believe the taxpayer information IRS receives is more accurate. In general, IRS officials' views are supported by IRS's past estimates of taxpayers' levels of compliance and by the results of Education's studies and investigations. For example, in the mid-1990s, IRS estimated that taxpayers with only wage income had a 99 percent voluntary compliance rate and taxpayers with interest and dividend income were 95 percent compliant in reporting this income. However, Education's student aid application data are not suited to IRS's tax administration purposes because the applications ask students and/or their parents to report data that come directly from their tax returns. |
gao_GAO-01-232 | gao_GAO-01-232_0 | Each advisor imitates the interaction that an individual might have with a DOL employment law expert, asking questions and providing answers that are based on the responses provided. Several of the state innovations were interactive systems that allowed regulated entities to identify their regulatory responsibilities and sometimes to complete the related transactions. For example, Florida’s Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) has a “One-Stop Permit Registry” (OSPREY) allowing users to obtain information about all environmental permits administered by the department. Specifically, they suggested that agencies improve both the content and access to on-line information, more broadly and consistently use some existing applications, and adopt some new applications. Factors Facilitating the Development and Diffusion of Innovative IT-based Regulatory Management Approaches
Federal and state agency officials and representatives of nongovernmental organizations identified a number of factors that they believed affect the adoption and diffusion of IT-based approaches in regulatory management: (1) top-level leadership commitment/support, (2) adequate financial resources and human capital, (3) legislative and executive branch initiatives, (4) internal and external partnerships with critical stakeholders, (5) reengineering of existing business processes, and (6) the development of a communication infrastructure. Conclusions
Federal and state regulatory agencies are already making extensive use of IT to address traditional regulatory problems and improve regulatory management. | What GAO Found
Federal and state agencies are making extensive use of information technology (IT) to address traditional regulatory management. For example, the Department of Labor has a system of electronic "advisors" imitating the interaction that an individual might have with an employment law expert, and the Environmental Protection Agency is working with partners in state government to develop a national environmental information exchange network. Several of the state innovations include interactive systems that allow regulated entities to identify their regulatory responsibilities and complete related transactions. For example, the Texas Railroad Commission has an electronic process that allows users to obtain oil or gas well permits on-line, complete the required forms, and pay any associated fees. Representatives from nongovernmental organizations suggest that federal agencies improve both the content and access to on-line information, more broadly and consistently use some existing applications, and adopt some new applications. Several key factors that facilitate or hinder the adoption and diffusion of innovative IT applications are (1) top-level leadership commitment/support, (2) adequate financial resources and human capital, (3) legislative and executive branch IT initiatives, (4) internal and external partnerships with critical stakeholders, (5) reengineering of existing business processes, and (6) development of a communication infrastructure. |
gao_GAO-17-467 | gao_GAO-17-467_0 | IRS Responsibilities Related to PTC
IRS is responsible for determining the final amounts of PTC that taxpayers are entitled to receive based on household incomes and family sizes reported on their tax returns. OMB guidance requires that agencies take into account the following nine risk factors that are likely to contribute to significant improper payments: 1. whether the program or activity reviewed is new to the agency; 2. the complexity of the program or activity reviewed, particularly with respect to determining correct payment amounts; 3. the volume of payments made annually; 4. whether payments or payment eligibility decisions are made outside of the agency, for example, by a state or local government or a regional federal office; 5. recent major changes in program funding, authorities, practices, or 6. the level, experience, and quality of training for personnel responsible for making program eligibility determinations or certifying that payments are accurate; 7. inherent risks of improper payments because of the nature of agency 8. significant deficiencies in the agency’s audit reports, including but not limited to the agency inspector general or GAO audit findings or other relevant management findings that might hinder accurate payment certification; and 9. results from prior improper payment work. CMS Assessed Its PTC Program as Susceptible to Significant Improper Payments but Has Not Estimated or Reported Amounts as Required
In fiscal year 2016, CMS concluded that its advance PTC program was susceptible to significant improper payments. We determined that CMS instituted a systematic, qualitative method for assessing risk that was consistent with IPIA requirements and OMB guidance. IRS Did Not Determine Whether Its PTC Program Is Susceptible to Significant Improper Payments
In its fiscal year 2016 improper payments susceptibility assessment, IRS did not assess the PTC program’s susceptibility to significant improper payments in a manner consistent with IPIA requirements. Until IRS conducts an appropriate assessment, it will continue to be uncertain whether IRS should estimate the amount of improper PTC payments. CMS Control Activities Related to Preventing and Detecting Improper Payments of Advance PTC Were Not Properly Designed
CMS control activities were not properly designed and implemented to help achieve management objectives related to preventing and detecting improper payments of advance PTC. Without establishing proper procedures to periodically check for changes in circumstances, such as individuals’ eligibility for government-sponsored coverage or their deaths, CMS is at increased risk of providing advance PTC on behalf of individuals who are not eligible for it. CMS Properly Designed and Implemented Control Activities Related to the Accuracy of Advance PTC Payments Made to Certified Issuers and Qualified Health Plans
Based on our audit work, CMS has properly designed and implemented procedures related to the accuracy of advance PTC to reasonably assure that payments made to issuers and qualified health plans comply with applicable requirements, including procedures to generate accurate policy-based payments to issuers based on properly review and approve of issuer payment calculations and perform compliance reviews to help ensure that issuers and qualified health plans meet applicable requirements of the marketplace; and notify issuers of noncompliance and decertify those that do not meet key requirements. Specifically, we found deficiencies in the design of IRS control activities related to determining whether individuals met the citizenship or lawful presence requirement for PTC eligibility; had access to or enrollment in health care coverage that met minimum essential coverage, which would allow individuals to obtain PTC for the months that were not covered; properly assessed individual shared responsibility payments (SRP) on their tax returns; and were properly notified of the requirement to file if they did not file their tax returns. IRS faces several challenges that affect its ability to design and implement control activities related to PTC. In 2015, we suggested that IRS seek legislative authority to correct tax returns at filing based on the marketplace data. Under the proposals, Treasury would be granted regulatory authority to permit IRS to correct errors in cases where information provided by individuals does not match corresponding information in government databases. As of the completion of our audit, Congress has not yet granted this broad authority. The effect of IRS’s lack of authority to correct PTC-related errors on tax returns at filing was illustrated in our review of a statistical sample of 93 tax returns with PTC-related amounts during the first 9 months of fiscal year 2016. Thus, without the ability to automatically correct the tax returns, IRS is not able to fully collect excess advance PTC overpayments and reimburse PTC underpayments. As a result, HHS’s overall improper payment estimate will continue to be understated. In addition, Congress and other stakeholders will continue to lack key payment integrity information for monitoring HHS’s improper payments. IRS did not properly design and implement certain key control activities related to preventing and detecting PTC improper payments, including recovering excess advance PTC overpayments. Finally, although IRS used an ad hoc process for notifying nonfilers of the requirement to file tax returns, IRS did not establish procedures for sending these notices regularly during each filing season to facilitate compliance. Without addressing these key deficiencies in control activities, IRS is at increased risk of making improper payments to individuals and may not be fully collecting excess advance PTC or reimbursing PTC underpayments. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve annual reporting on PTC improper payments, control activities related to eligibility determinations, and calculations of advance PTC, we recommend that the Secretary of Health and Human Services direct the Administrator of CMS to take the following 10 actions: 1. In its comments, reproduced in appendix III, HHS concurred with seven of our recommendations and neither agreed nor disagreed with the remaining three recommendations. In its comments, reproduced in appendix IV, IRS agreed with two recommendations, partially agreed with two other recommendations, and disagreed with the remaining recommendation. These actions, if implemented effectively, would address our recommendations. IRS partially agreed with our first recommendation related to an improper payment assessment for the PTC program. IRS disagreed with our fourth recommendation related to reviewing tax returns to those who are not reporting SRP. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report are to determine the extent to which (1) the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) assessed the susceptibility of their premium tax credit (PTC) programs to significant improper payments and, if the programs were deemed susceptible, whether CMS and IRS took actions required by the Improper Payments Information Act, as amended (IPIA), and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance; (2) CMS properly designed and implemented key internal control activities related to preventing and detecting improper payments of advance PTC; and (3) IRS properly designed and implemented key control activities related to preventing improper payments of PTC in processing federal income tax returns, detecting and recovering advance PTC overpayments made to issuers on behalf of policyholders, and reimbursing underpayments made to policyholders. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) aims to expand health insurance coverage and affordability. PPACA provides eligible individuals with PTC to help cover the cost of premiums for health plans purchased through a marketplace. CMS maintains the federally facilitated marketplace known as HealthCare.gov. IRS is responsible for processing PTC-related amounts on tax returns. The estimated fiscal year 2016 net outlay for PTC that was refunded to taxpayers was about $24 billion, while the estimated revenue effect from PTC that taxpayers used to reduce their tax liabilities was about $2 billion.
GAO was asked to examine improper payments related to PTC. This report assesses the extent to which (1) CMS and IRS assessed the susceptibility of their PTC programs to significant improper payments; (2) CMS properly designed and implemented key control activities related to preventing and detecting improper payments of advance PTC; and (3) IRS properly designed and implemented key control activities related to preventing and detecting improper payments of PTC, including recovering overpayments and reimbursing underpayments of PTC.
GAO reviewed the improper payment susceptibility assessments completed by CMS and IRS; interviewed agency officials; reviewed policies and procedures; and tested statistical samples of (1) CMS applications with advance PTC transactions during the 2016 open enrollment period and (2) income tax returns with PTC transactions processed during the first 9 months of fiscal year 2016.
What GAO Found
In fiscal year 2016, the Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) assessed its advance premium tax credit (PTC) program as susceptible to significant improper payments. CMS instituted a qualitative method for assessing the susceptibility of its program that was consistent with requirements, including assessing each of the nine required qualitative risk factors. However, CMS stated that it may not report improper payment estimates for the PTC program as required until at least fiscal year 2022 because of the complexity and timing of the process for developing such estimates. As a result, HHS's overall improper payments estimate will continue to be understated, and Congress and others will continue to lack key payment integrity information for monitoring HHS's improper payments. The fiscal year 2016 Internal Revenue Service (IRS) assessment for its PTC program was not consistent with requirements nor did it demonstrate whether the program met applicable thresholds for susceptibility to significant improper payments. Until IRS conducts an appropriate assessment, it will remain uncertain whether IRS should estimate the amount of improper payments for its PTC program.
Although CMS properly designed and implemented control activities related to the accuracy of advance PTC payments, it did not properly design control activities related to preventing and detecting improper payments of advance PTC, such as verifying individuals' eligibility. As a result, CMS is at increased risk of making improper payments of advance PTC to issuers on behalf of individuals.
IRS did not design and implement certain key control activities related to preventing and detecting PTC improper payments, including recovering excess advance PTC overpayments. For example, IRS did not properly design procedures to routinely check for duplicate employer- or government-sponsored coverage. In addition, in 2015 and 2016, IRS used an ad hoc process for notifying nonfilers of the requirement to file tax returns; however, IRS did not establish procedures for sending these notices regularly during each filing season to facilitate compliance. Without properly designed control activities related to PTC, IRS is at increased risk of making improper payments to individuals.
IRS faces challenges that affect its ability to design and implement procedures related to preventing and detecting PTC improper payments, including recovering advance PTC overpayments and reimbursing advance PTC underpayments. For example, IRS maintains that reduced resources have impaired its ability to implement needed controls. Further, statutory limitations contributed to IRS's inability to fully collect excess advance PTC overpayments and reimburse PTC underpayments and to automatically correct errors in tax returns. GAO previously suggested that IRS seek legislative authority to correct tax returns at filing based on marketplace data. The Department of the Treasury, on behalf of IRS, has submitted proposals for congressional consideration to permit IRS to correct such errors where individuals' information on tax returns does not match corresponding information provided in government databases. Congress has not yet granted this broad authority.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making 10 recommendations to HHS. Of these, 2 recommendations are related to complying with annual reporting of advance PTC improper payments estimates, including assuring that CMS expedites the process for reporting such estimates. The 8 remaining recommendations address improving control activities related to eligibility determinations and calculations of advance PTC based on incomes and family sizes. HHS concurred with 7 of the recommendations and neither agreed nor disagreed with the remaining 3 recommendations, which related to improving control activities for verifying identities of individuals, preventing duplicate coverage of individuals receiving minimum essential coverage through their employers, and verifying household incomes and family sizes. GAO continues to believe that actions to implement these 3 recommendations are needed as discussed in the report.
GAO is also making 5 recommendations to IRS. Of these, 1 recommendation focuses on properly assessing the susceptibility of the PTC program to significant improper payments. The remaining 4 recommendations address improving control activities related to processing PTC information on tax returns, such as recovering advance PTC made for individuals who do not meet the eligibility requirements for citizenship or lawful presence. IRS agreed with 2 recommendations, partially agreed with 2 other recommendations, and disagreed with the remaining recommendation. For the 2 partial concurrences, GAO continues to believe that actions to fully implement these recommendations are needed as discussed in the report. Although IRS disagreed with the 1 recommendation related to reviewing tax returns to those who are not reporting shared responsibility payments, the actions IRS described in its comments, if implemented effectively, would address the recommendation. |
gao_GAO-14-316 | gao_GAO-14-316_0 | The Air Force Has Made Efforts to Manage RPA Pilots but Faces Challenges to Recruit, Develop, and Retain Pilots and Build Their Morale
The Air Force has taken some steps toward managing RPA pilots using a strategic human-capital approach but faces several challenges including accurately identifying personnel requirements, limited training time for pilots, recruiting and retention difficulties, and incorporating feedback from RPA pilots into its operations. Air Force Has Not Accurately Identified Optimum Personnel Requirements and Has Not Established a Minimum Personnel Requirement
The Air Force has not accurately identified optimum personnel requirements, or crew ratio, for the number of RPA pilots it requires. In the 2008 study that the Air Force Manpower Agency conducted to determine the appropriate crew ratios for MQ-1 Predator squadrons, the Air Force did not account for all of the flying and administrative tasks that are required in these squadrons. Headquarters Air Force officials stated that updating the crew ratio has not been a top priority. Such risks can arise when crew-ratio requirements are set too low, as well as when units operate at crew ratios that are too far below optimum crew ratios. The Air Force Faces Challenges Recruiting RPA Pilots and May Face Challenges Retaining Them in the Future
The Air Force has used a dual strategy to meet its increasing need for RPA pilots: using manned-aircraft pilots and recruiting RPA pilots, the career field established in 2010 for officers trained to only fly RPAs. High-performing organizations tailor their recruitment and retention strategies to meet their specific mission needs. The Air Force Has Mechanisms to Collect Feedback from RPA Pilots but Has Not Used That Feedback to Manage Its Human-Capital Strategy for RPA Pilots
While the Air Force has mechanisms in place to collect feedback from RPA pilots, it has not used this feedback to develop its strategic human- capital approach to managing RPA pilots, such as by incorporating their feedback into tailoring a recruiting and retention strategy or by taking actions related to training and development. Air Force Has Taken Some Actions to Address the Potentially Challenging Working Conditions RPA Pilots Face but Has Not Fully Analyzed Being Deployed-on-Station
Air Force RPA Pilots Find Their Work Rewarding but Report Multiple Challenging Working Conditions, Some of Which the Air Force Has Taken Actions to Address
RPA pilots find their mission rewarding, but they reported that they face multiple, challenging working conditions. Air Force Has Not Fully Analyzed Challenges That RPA Pilots Face Related to Being Deployed-on- Station
RPA pilots also face challenges related to being deployed-on-station as they balance their warfighting responsibilities with their personal lives. Because pilots are able to operate RPAs from Air Force bases in the United States and are thus able to live at home—what is known as being deployed-on-station—their dual role juxtaposes stress related to supporting combat operations with the strains that can occur in their personal lives. The Air Force Monitors RPA Pilot Promotion Rates but Has Not Analyzed Factors Related to Those Rates
The Air Force Monitors RPA Pilot Promotion Rates and Has Found That They Are Lower Than in Other Career Fields
AFPC monitors the promotion rates of RPA pilots and has found that they were promoted below the average rate for active-duty line officers on 20 of 24 officer promotion boards since 2006. Finally, without evaluating the viability of using alternative personnel populations, such as enlisted or civilian personnel, the Air Force may not meet and sustain required RPA pilot staffing levels. However, without analyzing whether being deployed-on-station has long-term negative effects, the Air Force does not have the information it needs to determine whether it should take any action in response. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Air Force to take the following seven actions: update crew ratios for RPA units to help ensure that the Air Force establishes a more-accurate understanding of the required number of RPA pilots needed in its units, establish a minimum crew ratio in Air Force policy below which RPA units cannot operate without running unacceptable levels of risk to accomplishing the mission and ensuring safety, develop a recruiting and retention strategy that is a tailored to the specific needs and challenges of RPA pilots to help ensure that the Air Force can meet and retain required staffing levels to meet its mission, evaluate the viability of using alternative personnel populations including enlisted or civilian personnel as RPA pilots to identify whether such populations could help the Air Force meet and sustain required RPA pilot staffing levels, incorporate feedback from RPA pilots by using existing mechanisms or by collecting direct feedback from RPA pilots, analyze the effects of being deployed-on-station to determine whether there are resulting negative effects on the quality of life of RPA pilots and take responsive actions as appropriate, and include the career field effect of being an RPA pilot into AFPC’s analysis to determine whether and how being an RPA pilot is related to promotions and determine whether the factors AFPC identified in its analysis of Line of the Air Force officers are also related to RPA pilot promotions. In its written comments, the Air Force concurred with four of our seven recommendations and partially concurred with the remaining three recommendations. Finally, it is unclear whether the Air Force is targeting actions to increase RPA promotion rates at the right factors and thus its actions may have limited effect. To evaluate the extent to which the Air Force has addressed concerns, if any, about the working conditions of RPA pilots that may affect their quality of life, we identified and analyzed criteria included in DOD’s 2009 and 2004 Quadrennial Quality of Life Reviews in which DOD expresses its commitment to provide servicemembers with the best quality of life possible through support and development of responses to emerging servicemember needs. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 2008, the Air Force has more than tripled the number of its active-duty pilots flying RPAs, which is the term the Air Force uses to refer to unmanned aerial systems such as the MQ-1 Predator. Due to increases in demand, RPA pilots have had a significant increase in workload since 2007. GAO was asked to evaluate the Air Force's approach to managing its RPA pilots as well as their quality of life and promotion rates. For this review, GAO evaluated the extent to which the Air Force (1) has used a strategic human-capital approach to manage RPA pilots; (2) has addressed concerns, if any, about the working conditions of RPA pilots that may affect their quality of life; and (3) analyzes the promotion rates of RPA pilots.
GAO analyzed personnel planning documents, Air Force studies, and officer promotion data. GAO also interviewed unit commanders at selected Air Force bases and Headquarters Air Force officials and conducted focus groups with RPA pilots. While the results of these focus groups are not generalizable, they provide valuable insights.
What GAO Found
The Air Force has managed its remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) pilots using some strategic human-capital approaches, such as planning for the different levels of experience that it needs in these pilots. However, it continues to face challenges. High-performing organizations manage human capital to identify the right number of personnel and to target the right sources to fill personnel needs. In 2008, the Air Force determined the optimum number of RPA pilots—the crew ratio—for some units, but it did not account for all tasks these units complete. Air Force officials stated that, as a result, the crew ratio is too low, but the Air Force has not updated it. Air Force guidance states that low crew ratios diminish combat capability and cause flight safety to suffer, but the Air Force has operated below its optimum crew ratio and it has not established a minimum crew ratio. Further, high work demands on RPA pilots limit the time they have available for training and development and negatively affects their work-life balance. In addition, the Air Force faces challenges recruiting officers into the RPA pilot career and may face challenges retaining them in the future. High-performing organizations tailor their recruiting and retention strategies to meet their specific mission needs, but the Air Force has not tailored its approach to recruiting and retaining RPA pilots nor considered the viability of using alternative personnel such as enlisted personnel or civilians. Without developing an approach to recruiting and retaining RPA pilots and evaluating the viability of using alternative personnel populations for the RPA pilot career, the Air Force may continue to face challenges, further exacerbating existing shortfalls of RPA pilots. Moreover, the Air Force has not used direct feedback from RPA pilots via existing mechanisms, or otherwise, to develop its approach to managing challenges related to recruiting, retention, training, and development of RPA pilots.
The Air Force has taken some actions to address potentially difficult working conditions RPA pilots face, but it has not fully analyzed the challenge pilots face to balance their warfighting roles with their personal lives. RPA pilots operate RPAs from bases in the United States and live at home; thus they experience combat alongside their personal lives—known as being deployed-on-station—which RPA pilots stated negatively affects their morale. While the Department of Defense has committed to maintaining high morale for servicemembers, the Air Force has not fully analyzed the effects on morale related to being deployed-on-station, and thus it does not know whether it needs to take actions in response.
The Air Force monitors RPA pilot promotion rates, but has not analyzed factors that may relate to their low promotion rates. Statistical principles call for researchers to account for potential key factors in analysis because when they omit key factors, the relationships between other factors may not be accurately estimated. The Air Force analyzed promotions across a group of officers, including RPA pilots, and found factors that related to promotions in general. However, the Air Force has not analyzed the factors related to RPA pilots' promotions specifically and, as a result, it does not have the information to determine what factors may affect their promotions. Consequently, the Air Force may not be targeting actions it is taking to raise RPA pilot promotion rates at the appropriate factors, and information it has reported to Congress may not be accurate.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Air Force update optimum crew ratios; establish a minimum crew ratio; develop a recruiting and retention strategy; evaluate using alternative personnel populations to be pilots; use feedback from RPA pilots; analyze the effects of being deployed-on-station; and analyze the effect that being an RPA pilot has on promotions. The Air Force concurred with four recommendations and partially concurred with the remaining three recommendations. |
gao_GAO-04-810 | gao_GAO-04-810_0 | Each state department of education provides guidance and regulations on state education laws to each school district. Since 2000, Most States Have Enacted Laws and Proposed Legislation That Affect Commercial Activities in Schools
Since 2000, 13 states have established statutes, regulations, or both that address one or several categories of commercial activities in schools. Six of these states established provisions addressing market research by restricting the use of student data for commercial activities and for surveys. In addition, as of February 2004, at least 25 states are considering proposed legislation that would affect commercial activities. Most of these proposals would affect product sales, particularly the sale of food and beverages. Prior to 2000, 28 states had passed provisions addressing commercial activities. Six states passed legislation affecting marketing research. Only 1 state established a measure that addressed market research. As we found earlier, most commercial activities, particularly product sales and advertising, occurred in high schools. Districts Are Beginning to Implement Provisions on Student Data, and Few Use Student Data for Commercial Purposes
We estimate that about two-thirds of the districts in the nation were either developing or had developed policies addressing the new provisions on the use of student data for commercial purposes. However, only 19 of the 61 districts that provided us copies of their policies specifically addressed these provisions. Of the 17 districts that released data for commercial purposes, all reported that they released data only for school-related purposes. Education Developed and Disseminated Guidance, but Many Districts’ Policies Did Not Address Requirements
As required by NCLBA, Education has developed guidance and notified every school district superintendent and chief state school officer in the country of the new required student information protections and policies, and has charged the Family Policy Compliance Office to hear complaints on PPRA. Although Education is not required to issue its guidance to state school boards associations, four districts in two states in our survey offered unsolicited information that they relied on state school boards associations to develop policies for their consideration and adoption. Two districts in a third state that sent us policies used policies developed by their state school boards association to address commercial activities in schools. Recommendation for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of Education take additional action to assist districts in understanding that they are required to have specific policies in place for the collection, disclosure, and use of student information for marketing and selling purposes by disseminating its guidance to state school boards associations. Follow-up Telephone Interviews with the Seven Districts We Visited in 2000
We conducted telephone interviews with district and school officials in the seven districts we visited to collect information for Public Education: Commercial Activities in Schools (GAO-00-156), a report we issued in 2000, to discern changes in commercial activities in these districts. | Why GAO Did This Study
Congress has continuing interest in commercial activities in U.S. public schools. These include product sales, advertising, market research, and the commercial use of personal data about students (such as names, addresses, and telephone numbers) by schools. To update information about commercial activities in schools, Congress asked us to answer the following questions: (1) Since 2000, what statutes and regulations have states enacted and proposed to govern commercial activities in schools? (2) To what extent have districts developed policies implementing amended provisions of the Protection of Pupil Rights Amendment (PPRA) in the No Child Left Behind Act on the use of student data for commercial purposes? (3) What guidance has the Department of Education (Education) disseminated? To answer these questions, we researched state laws, surveyed a national sample of school districts, analyzed policies provided by districts, interviewed officials at Education, and examined its guidance. In addition, we updated findings from the districts we visited in 2000.
What GAO Found
Since we reported on commercial activities in 2000, 13 states have established laws addressing commercial activities in public schools, and at least 25 states are considering such legislation. Of the states establishing new laws, 6 established laws affecting market research by addressing the use of student data for commercial activities. Almost all of the proposed bills target the sale of food and beverages. Prior to 2000, 28 states established laws addressing commercial activities, particularly product sales and advertising. At that time, only 1 state passed a provision affecting market research. PPRA provisions required districts to implement policies on the collection, disclosure, or use of student data for marketing and selling purposes, and we estimate that about two-thirds of the districts in the nation believe they are developing or have developed such policies. However, of the 61 districts that sent us policies, only 19 policies addressed these issues. No district reported having collected student data for commercial purposes. Only a few reported disclosing student information for these purposes, and all had done so for school-related purposes such as graduation pictures. Education has undertaken several activities, such as sending guidance to state education agencies and school district superintendents and posting information on its Web page, to inform districts about the student information provisions of PPRA, but many districts appear not to understand the new requirements. Some districts told us that they relied on their state school boards association to develop policies for them because state school boards associations address federal and state laws. School districts in one state sent us policies that addressed commercial activities that had been developed by their state school boards association. Education was not required to disseminate guidance to associations of local school boards in each state and has not done so. |
gao_GAO-13-622 | gao_GAO-13-622_0 | Current Safe-Harbor Treatment for Financial Contracts under the Code
Although the automatic stay generally preserves assets and prevents creditors from taking company assets in payment of debts before a case is resolved and assets are distributed in a systematic way, it is subject to exceptions, one of which can be particularly important in a financial institution bankruptcy. Although experts broadly supported regulatory involvement in financial company bankruptcies, they said the proposed changes raise several implementation issues, such as determining the number of days prior to a bankruptcy that a company would be required to notify regulators and which regulator(s) to notify. One expert noted that because large financial companies have many regulators, before a firm could file for bankruptcy it would be important to identify in advance which regulators to notify. Experts Considered Fully Secured Federal or Industry Funding Mechanisms Essential for Orderly and Efficient Bankruptcies
Experts at our roundtables emphasized that many of the proposals to make the bankruptcy process more orderly and effective depend on having an adequate funding mechanism. As a result, experts at the first roundtable generally agreed that changing the Code to prevent any federal funding of these bankruptcies would not be consistent with orderly and effective resolutions. The industry could create a fund or mechanism for providing liquidity to firms that needed it. A few of the experts noted that some government guarantees might facilitate private-sector financing. Experts Had Varying Views on Advantages and Disadvantages of QFC Proposals
Experts at our roundtables evaluated proposals to change the treatment of certain QFCs relative to criteria for orderly and effective financial company bankruptcies. For example, with regard to the safe-harbor exemptions from avoidance actions—trustees’ ability to “avoid” transfers entered into in the 90 days prior to a bankruptcy if they are determined to be preferential or up to 2 years prior to a bankruptcy if they are determined to be fraudulent—some legal experts at the second roundtable said that the courts were giving preferential treatment to contracts that in principle should not be receiving it. The expert and others said that it might be useful to allow a judge to make decisions relative to some contracts. When explicitly asked, some experts responded that limiting the safe harbors would increase systemic risk, while others responded that limiting them would reduce it. One expert at the second roundtable noted that during the early days of the Lehman Bankruptcy, he thought that the QFC terminations would lead to a systemic event in derivatives markets, but that did not happen. Roundtable participants also discussed whether a temporary stay for QFCs would enhance the value of a financial company; however, as noted earlier, they were split on whether this would contribute or detract from the overall orderliness and effectiveness of financial company bankruptcies. FSOC—which was established under the Dodd-Frank Act to identify and respond to threats to financial stability—has not specifically considered changes to the role of regulators in bankruptcy or the treatment of QFCs. Recommendations for Executive Action
To fulfill FSOC’s role under the Dodd-Frank Act to identify and respond to threats to financial stability, we recommend that the Secretary of the Treasury, as Chairperson of FSOC, in consultation with other FSOC members, consider the implications for U.S. financial stability of changing the role of regulators and narrowing the safe harbor treatment of qualified financial contracts in financial company bankruptcies. In commenting on our draft report, FSOC said that it shares our concern that a disorderly financial company bankruptcy could pose risks to financial stability. Given that preference and FSOC’s charge to identify and respond to risks to U.S. financial stability, our recommendation—that FSOC consider the implications for U.S. financial stability of changing the role of regulators and narrowing safe harbor treatment of QFCs in financial company bankruptcies—is consistent with its statutory role and responsibilities. This report, the third in the series, examines the advantages and disadvantages of certain proposals to modify the Bankruptcy Code (Code) for financial company bankruptcies. Specifically this report examines the advantages and disadvantages of proposals (1) to change the role of financial regulators in the bankruptcy process; (2) affecting the funding of financial company bankruptcies; and (3) to change the safe- harbor treatment of qualified financial contracts (QFC), including derivatives and repurchase agreements. These criteria are minimizing systemic risk, avoiding fire sales, maximizing value; preserving due process, and minimizing taxpayer liability. QFCs are generally also exempt from avoidance or claw back provisions under the Code. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) mandates that GAO report on an ongoing basis on ways to make the Code more effective in resolving certain failed financial companies. This report examines advantages and disadvantages of certain proposals, based on those identified in GAO's first report, to revise the Code for financial company bankruptcies--specifically, proposals (1) to change the role of financial regulators in the bankruptcy process; (2) affecting funding of financial company bankruptcies; and (3) to change the safe-harbor treatment of QFCs. For this report, GAO held two expert roundtables in which participants evaluated the proposals using criteria for orderly and effective bankruptcies that GAO developed in earlier reports. The criteria are minimizing systemic risk, avoiding asset fire sales, ensuring due process, maximizing value, and limiting taxpayer liability. GAO identified these criteria by reviewing literature and interviewing government officials, industry representatives, and legal and academic experts.
What GAO Found
Because the Bankruptcy Code (Code) does not specifically address issues of systemic risk, experts have proposed giving financial regulators a greater role in financial company bankruptcies. However, according to experts at a GAO roundtable, such proposals may have limited impact and raise certain implementation issues. For example, a proposal to require notification before bankruptcy depends on when (number of days) notification would be required and with whom (which regulators). Experts noted financial companies may not know that they will declare bankruptcy even a few days before the event and could have many regulators to notify. Experts also noted ways regulators already can compel financial companies to declare bankruptcy, and that changing the Code to allow regulators to place firms in bankruptcy involuntarily could temporarily place a firm in an uncertain legal status, eroding firms' values and endangering market stability. Other options, such as having regulatory standards forcing the firm into bankruptcy, could improve the likelihood of an orderly resolution, according to these experts. Although the proposals reflect the need to minimize systemic effects of financial company bankruptcies, the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC)--charged with responding to threats to financial stability--has not considered changes to the Code. Consideration could improve FSOC's ability to address such threats in a timely and effective manner.
Experts emphasized that funding is needed to facilitate orderly and effective financial company bankruptcies. They generally agreed that prohibiting all federal funding or guarantees of private funding likely would lead to fire sales of assets. They agreed that fully secured funding should be used only to provide short-run liquidity and not for bailouts of insolvent firms' creditors. Experts suggested a private-sector fund could be created for this purpose. Such funds could be collected voluntarily, through routine assessments (before a bankruptcy), or through a facility similar to the one created for the Orderly Liquidation Authority, which allows federal funding at the time of a bankruptcy and later recovery of funds through an industry assessment. Experts noted some difficulties associated with these proposals, including determining whether a firm was insolvent or needed liquidity, and identifying permissible types of collateral.
Generally, experts did not agree on advantages or disadvantages of proposals to change the safe-harbor treatment of qualified financial contracts (QFC). The Code exempts QFCs, such as derivatives, from the automatic stay that generally prevents creditors from taking company assets in payment of debts before a case is resolved. It also exempts QFCs from provisions that allow bankruptcy judges to "avoid" contracts entered into within specified times before a filing. Proposals to change QFC treatment--subjecting all or some contracts to the automatic stay on a permanent or temporary basis and removing the avoidance exemptions--might address issues raised by extensive contract terminations in the early days of financial company bankruptcies. Experts said it was unclear what lessons should be learned from those experiences. Many noted that narrowing the exemptions would reduce the size of derivative markets, but views varied about whether such narrowing would increase or decrease systemic risk. Some experts said that the current safe harbors decrease systemic risk, while others said they increase it by making firms more dependent on less-reliable short-term financing.
What GAO Recommends
FSOC should consider the implications for U.S. financial stability of changing the role of regulators and the treatment of QFCs in financial company bankruptcies. FSOC agreed that a disorderly financial company bankruptcy could pose risks to financial stability, but stated that it would be premature for FSOC to consider proposals to change the Code. GAO reiterated that its recommendation was consistent with FSOCs statutory role and responsibilities. |
gao_GAO-06-1025 | gao_GAO-06-1025_0 | The Kennedy Center Has Taken Steps to Implement Our Oversight, Fire Safety, and Capital Project Recommendations, but More Work Remains
Recently, we recommended that the Kennedy Center increase oversight of its management of federal funds, ensure the fire safety of the center, and better align its management of capital projects with best practices. 3). To increase oversight of the Kennedy Center’s management of federal funds, we recommended in April 2005 that the Kennedy Center work with an independent federal government oversight organization, such as the Smithsonian Institution OIG, for audits of the center’s use of federal funds. Peer review of modeling studies is a common industry practice outlined in fire code. The Kennedy Center has implemented our recommendation to obtain a peer review of its fire-modeling study. The Kennedy Center has implemented our recommendation to manage the storage of combustible materials. We found that the Family Theater was completed on schedule and with limited cost growth. The Kennedy Center Will Not Complete All Planned Capital Renovations within CBP Budgets and Time Frames
The Kennedy Center’s 2005 CBP indicates that the center will need additional budget resources to complete the federally funded projects remaining in its CBP and that the terrace-level renovations will be deferred until after the CBP ends in 2008. Specifically, the Kennedy Center did not obtain a required deviation from the FAR, and it authorized contractor work to begin on the Family Theater before establishing the guaranteed maximum price of the project. However, the 2005 CBP shows that the center now plans to defer most terrace-level renovations beyond the end of the CBP. Three factors limit the board’s oversight of federally funded capital projects. However, several factors limit the Kennedy Center Board of Trustees’ oversight for federally funded capital projects. The Operations Committee has also met infrequently, and attendance at its meetings has been low. 2. To strengthen the Kennedy Center Board of Trustees’ role in overseeing federally funded capital projects and to improve the board’s ability to carry out its responsibilities under the Kennedy Center Act, we recommend that the Chairman and Trustees of the Board take the following two actions: Develop and implement procedures on how the board and its Operations Committee are to carry out their duties under the Kennedy Center Act and their responsibilities for overseeing federal funds, including a clarification of the roles and responsibilities of the Operations Committee; Ensure that the board receives detailed, transparent, and timely information on how federal funds for capital projects have been budgeted and spent on capital projects, such as information on original versus actual project budgets and schedules. Our objectives were to determine (1) the progress the Kennedy Center has made in implementing the recommendations in our April 2005 report, (2) the status of capital projects and the planned spending of federal funds for capital projects as indicated by the Kennedy Center’s most recent comprehensive building plan, and (3) the Kennedy Center Board of Trustees’ responsibilities for federally funded capital projects and the extent to which the board fulfills these responsibilities. In addition, we discussed with Kennedy Center management officials the time frame for implementation and the federal guidance used for the development of its contract, financial, and project management policies and procedures. GAO Comments
1. | Why GAO Did This Study
In April 2005, GAO recommended that the John F. Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts (Kennedy Center) increase oversight of its management of federal funds, better comply with fire code, and conform to project management best practices. GAO was asked to evaluate (1) the progress the Kennedy Center has made in implementing GAO's April 2005 recommendations, (2) the status of federally funded capital projects and the planned spending of federal funds for capital projects as indicated by the Kennedy Center's most recent comprehensive building plan, and (3) the Kennedy Center Board of Trustees' responsibilities for federally funded capital projects and the extent to which the board fulfills these responsibilities. To fulfill these objectives, GAO examined Kennedy Center documents, visited other arts organizations, and interviewed affected parties.
What GAO Found
The Kennedy Center has taken steps to implement GAO's oversight, fire safety, and capital project recommendations but more work remains. For example, to increase oversight of its management of federal funds, the Kennedy Center contracted with the Smithsonian Institution Office of the Inspector General for audits of federal funds used for capital projects. In addition, to better comply with fire safety code, the Kennedy Center has implemented GAO's recommendations to obtain a peer review of its fire-modeling study and manage the storage of combustible materials. As a result of the peer review, the center made changes to its fire-modeling study. Finally, to better align with project management best practices, the Kennedy Center has implemented GAO's recommendations to design and implement contract, financial, and project management policies and procedures and control cost and schedule changes in future projects. The Kennedy Center's 2005 comprehensive building plan (CBP)--or longterm renovation effort--shows that the center will not complete its capital renovations within the planned 2008 time frame and budgets. The estimated costs for the remaining CBP projects have increased from $48 million to $58 million since the 2004 CBP, and the center plans to defer most terrace-level renovations beyond 2008, the original completion date. The 2005 CBP shows that the Family Theater was completed on schedule in 2005 with limited cost growth. However, despite improved contracting practices, GAO found that the Kennedy Center did not fully comply with the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) when it used an alternative contracting method. In addition, it increased the risk of cost overruns by authorizing Family Theater work to begin before establishing the contract's guaranteed maximum price. The Kennedy Center Board of Trustees has delegated to management most of its responsibilities for federally funded capital projects, which is a typical board action. However, GAO found that several factors limit the board's oversight of federally funded capital projects. The Kennedy Center Board of Trustees and its Operations Committee (1) lack procedures on how to carry out the board's responsibilities for federally funded projects (2) have experienced low attendance at meetings, and (3) lack information needed to evaluate the implementation of capital projects. In addition, the Operations Committee has met infrequently, which further limits oversight. |
gao_GAO-13-748T | gao_GAO-13-748T_0 | Small Employers Face Challenges Helping Their Workers Save for Retirement
Complex Rules, Resource Constraints, and Financial Instability Contribute to Low Rates of Plan Sponsorship by Small Employers
As we reported in March 2012, retirement plan sponsorship is low among small employers, which may reflect the challenges employers face in establishing and maintaining a plan. Our analysis of available Labor and IRS data found that about 14 percent of small employers sponsored some type of plan in 2009. For example, some small employers and retirement experts said that the broad range of plan types and features made it difficult for small employers to compare and choose plans. Specifically, some small employer sponsors found the fiduciary responsibility of selecting investment fund choices for their plans particularly challenging. In addition to these challenges, smaller or newer firms may be unwilling or unable to sponsor plans because they lack sufficient financial resources, time, and personnel. Additionally, some small employers, such as those who described having a younger workforce, stated that their employees were less concerned about saving for retirement and, as a result, were not demanding retirement benefits. In March 2012, we made a recommendation to Labor to convene an interagency task force with the Department of the Treasury, IRS, SBA, and other appropriate agencies to review, analyze, and address the challenges small employers face in helping ensure retirement security. The agencies generally agreed with this recommendation, however, Labor disagreed with one aspect of our recommendation, which was for the task force to create a single webportal for federal guidance. We believe consolidating plan information onto one webportal could benefit small employers, mainly because federal resources are scattered across different sites. Participants of Small Employer 401(k) Plans are Likely to Pay Higher Fees
Small employers are more likely to sponsor 401(k) plans and participants of these plans tend to pay higher fees than larger plans. According to our analysis of Labor and IRS data, out of slightly more than 712,000 small employers that sponsored a single type of plan in 2009, about 46 percent sponsored a 401(k) plan, 40 percent a SIMPLE IRA, and the remaining employers sponsored other types of plans, including DB and non-401(k) Experts have identified low contribution rates as a profit sharing plans.key problem facing workers seeking to secure an adequate retirement income. Regarding fees, plans with fewer than 100 participants account for the majority of 401(k) plans, and these plans usually pay higher fees. In April 2012, we reported that participants in smaller plans typically pay higher fees than participants in larger plans. Little Information Available About Current MEPs and Their Potential to Increase Small Business Sponsorship
As we reported in September 2012, little is known about the employers that participate in MEPs, or even the number of MEPs by type, in part because the federal government no longer collects these data. MEPs have been suggested by PEO and open MEP representatives as a viable way for small employers to reduce their administrative responsibility for their pension plans. A small employer sponsoring a single employer plan can also contract with a service provider to perform administrative functions, but a couple of interviewees said employers not already offering plans might find it easier and faster to join a MEP than to create their own single employer plan. However, it is not clear how much relief from fiduciary liability a MEP can provide to participating employers, and it is not clear that such relief is unique to MEPs. Overall, no consensus existed among MEP representatives and pension experts on the potential for MEPs to substantially expand coverage. To ensure Labor has information needed to oversee MEPs, in September 2012, we recommended that Labor gather additional information about the employers participating in MEPs, potentially through the Form 5500, which is the primary source of pension plan information for government oversight activities. | Why GAO Did This Study
About 42 million workers, or about onethird of all private-sector employees, work for employers with fewer than 100 employees, and recent federal data suggest many of these workers lack access to work-based retirement benefits. Despite efforts by the federal government to develop new plan designs and to increase tax incentives, plan sponsorship remains low among small employers. MEPs, a type of arrangement involving more than one employer, have been suggested as a potential way to increase coverage.
This testimony describes (1) the challenges small employers face in helping ensure that their workers secure retirement income, and (2) types of MEPs and their potential to address these challenges. GAO drew from its previous reports related to small employer challenges in establishing and maintaining a retirement plan and recent work on MEPs issued from March 2012 through September 2012.
What GAO Found
About 14 percent of small employers sponsor some type of plan for their employees to save for retirement and these employers in general can face numerous challenges establishing and maintaining a plan. GAO's March 2012 report found that many of the small employers who were contacted said they felt overwhelmed by the number of plan options, plan administration requirements, and fiduciary responsibilities. For example, some small employers found it challenging to select investment funds for their plans. Small employers also cited other challenges in sponsoring a plan, including a lack of financial resources, time, and personnel. GAO's April 2012 review of select 401(k) plans--the most common type of plan sponsored by small employers--found that some smaller plan sponsors did not know about or fully understand fees they and their participants were charged, such as fees associated with group annuity contracts. In addition to these fees, participants in small plans often pay higher recordkeeping and investment management fees than participants in larger plans. GAO's work demonstrates the need for plan sponsors, particularly small sponsors, to understand fees in order to help participants secure adequate retirement savings. Any fees paid by participants, even a seemingly small amount, can significantly reduce retirement savings over time.
Little is known about the types of employers that participate in multiple employer plans (MEP), particularly because, since 2004, no publically available information has been collected on such employers. MEP representatives have suggested MEPs as a viable way for small employers to reduce the administrative and fiduciary responsibilities that come with sponsoring a pension plan, and for reducing costs, in part through asset pooling. However, GAO found that these advantages are not always unique to MEPs. There was also no consensus on the potential for MEPs to increase plan coverage. During GAO's September 2012 study the Department of Labor (Labor) ruled that some MEPs made up of otherwise unrelated employers did not constitute a single pension plan but an arrangement under which each employer sponsored a separate plan for its own employees. Because this raises significant policy and compliance questions and data are limited, it is important that Labor gather information on participating employers to inform policy and oversight activities on retirement security for employees of small businesses.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making any new recommendations. GAO made several recommendations in prior reports to Labor and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to address challenges facing small employers and to improve oversight and coordination for MEPs. The agencies generally agreed with GAO's recommendations. However, Labor disagreed with a recommendation to create a single webportal for federal guidance. GAO believes consolidating information could benefit small employers, mainly because resources are scattered. |
gao_GAO-16-31 | gao_GAO-16-31_0 | Background
Characteristics of Dual- Eligible Beneficiaries
Dual-eligible beneficiaries are a particularly vulnerable group. 1.) Financial Alignment Demonstration: Design and Implementation, Care Coordination, and Sources of Potential Savings
Design and Implementation of the Demonstration
CMS’s goal for the Financial Alignment Demonstration is to integrate Medicare and Medicaid services and financing and improve care coordination for beneficiaries, therefore resulting in improved care and savings to Medicare and Medicaid. Then, the state, CMS, and an integrated care organization enter into a three-way contract, and the integrated care organization receives a prospective blended capitated payment, which includes both Medicare and Medicaid payments, to provide coordinated care across both programs. One state, Washington, is using Medicaid health home agencies to coordinate Medicare and Medicaid services among existing fee-for-service providers for dual-eligible beneficiaries. Due to the flexibility states have in designing these elements in their demonstrations, implementation varied among the organizations in these five states. Care Coordinator
Staff from organizations in our review reported different ways that they assigned care coordinators to beneficiaries. Some organizations assigned care coordinators on the basis of geographic proximity to the beneficiary or the beneficiary’s primary care provider. Care coordinators we spoke with reported interacting with beneficiaries by mail, e-mail, telephone, and in person, but most care coordinators said they interacted with beneficiaries by telephone or in person. Organizations Described Challenges in Coordinating Care, and the Extent to Which Care Coordination Occurs in the Demonstration Is Not Fully Known
Organization staff in the five states in our review described challenges that affected their ability to coordinate care for beneficiaries. When organizations are unable to locate beneficiaries, it can be challenging for the organizations to coordinate their care, which is one of the key goals of the demonstration and one that CMS views as essential to the successful integration of care between Medicare and Medicaid. CMS Has Established a Framework of Monitoring Activities to Oversee the Demonstration
To oversee the coordination of care provided in the demonstration, CMS has established a framework of monitoring activities. One key component of CMS’s oversight is monitoring of core and state- specific measures that the organizations, for the capitated model, and states, for the MFFS model, are contractually required to report. CMS Collects Information that Assesses the Extent to which Care Coordination Is Occurring in the Demonstration, but Not All of This Information is Comparable
CMS collects different sets of core measures for the capitated and MFFS model states. Two out of 10 core measures in the capitated model provide information on the extent to which care coordination is occurring, while no core measures in the MFFS model examine this area. While the results of the capitated and MFFS surveys are still forthcoming, these questions may be able to provide CMS with important information about whether beneficiaries are meeting with their care coordinators. Moreover, while CMS collects some state-specific measures that examine this area, they are not comparable across the states. Internal control standards for the federal government specify that monitoring should be designed to help an agency accomplish its goals. Because not all of the information that CMS collects to examine the extent to which care coordination is occurring is comparable across the demonstration, the agency does not fully know whether it has achieved its goal of improving care coordination for dual-eligible beneficiaries. However, we believe that establishing additional measures that would allow CMS to obtain these data from all states and organizations participating in the demonstration could help it better understand the reasons why care coordination is or is not occurring and thus help the agency to strengthen the demonstration. Recommendations for Executive Action
To strengthen oversight of the provision of care coordination services in the Financial Alignment Demonstration, we recommend that the Secretary of Health and Human Services direct the Administrator of CMS to take the following two actions:
Expediently develop and require organizations in the capitated model, and the states in the MFFS model, to report comparable core data measures across the demonstration that measure the following: the extent to which ICT meetings are occurring, and for MFFS states, the extent to which health risk assessments are completed. For example, HHS noted that it is developing a set of care coordination measures to supplement data obtained from the CAHPS surveys. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Medicare and Medicaid programs spent an estimated $300 billion on dual-eligible beneficiaries—those individuals who qualify for both programs—in 2010. These beneficiaries often have complex health needs, increasing the need for care coordination across the two programs. In 2013, CMS began the Financial Alignment Demonstration, with the goal of integrating Medicare and Medicaid services and financing and improving care coordination. Thirteen states are participating.
GAO was asked to examine care coordination under the demonstration. GAO examined (1) how integrated care organizations—which are health plans or other entities—are implementing care coordination and (2) what, if any, challenges organizations have encountered in implementing care coordination and the extent to which CMS oversees these care coordination activities. GAO interviewed officials from CMS and, during site visits to a nongeneralizable sample of the first five states to implement the demonstration, interviewed state officials, organizations, advocacy groups, and providers. GAO also reviewed CMS guidance outlining CMS's oversight role and the measures it uses to monitor the demonstration.
What GAO Found
Due to the flexibility that states have in designing their Financial Alignment Demonstrations, the integrated care organizations that GAO interviewed in California, Illinois, Massachusetts, Virginia, and Washington implemented care coordination for dual-eligible Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries in a variety of ways. For example, these organizations assigned care coordinators to beneficiaries using different approaches, such as assigning them by geographic proximity to the beneficiary or to the beneficiary's primary care provider. Care coordinators also used a range of interactions with beneficiaries in order to coordinate care, including by mail, e-mail, telephone, or in person.
The organizations GAO interviewed described facing challenges that affected their ability to coordinate care, such as difficulties in locating beneficiaries. Specifically, organizations noted that certain characteristics of dual-eligible beneficiaries, such as high levels of transience, can make it challenging to coordinate their care—one of the key goals of the demonstration. GAO's interviews with beneficiary advocacy groups and providers raised questions about the extent to which care coordination is actually occurring.
The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), an agency within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), collects information that assesses the extent to which care coordination is occurring, but not all of this information is comparable across the states. To inform its oversight, CMS has established a framework of monitoring activities, and one key component of this oversight is the monitoring of core and state-specific measures for each of the two demonstration models that states can implement: (1) the capitated model, where organizations receive a capitated payment to provide integrated care, and (2) the managed fee-for-service (MFFS) model, where states are eligible for retroactive savings resulting from initiatives to integrate care with existing fee-for-service providers. CMS collects different sets of core measures from the capitated and MFFS model states. Two out of 10 core measures in the capitated model provide information on the extent to which care coordination is occurring, while no core measures in the MFFS model examine this area. The states in our review had state-specific measures that explored aspects of care coordination, but they were not comparable across the states or both demonstration models. In addition, CMS added comparable, demonstration-specific questions to the Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems, a survey that CMS requires all organizations for the capitated model, and states for the MFFS model, to complete annually. While the results of the surveys are still forthcoming, information from these questions may be able to provide CMS with important information about whether beneficiaries are meeting with their care coordinators across both models. Federal internal control standards state that monitoring should be designed to help an agency accomplish its goals. Because not all of the information that CMS collects to examine the extent to which care coordination is occurring is comparable, CMS does not fully know whether it has achieved its goal of providing coordinated care to dual-eligible beneficiaries. Establishing additional measures that would allow CMS to obtain these data could help it better understand the reasons why care coordination is or is not occurring and thus help the agency to strengthen the demonstration.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that CMS develop new comparable measures and align existing measures to strengthen oversight of care coordination. HHS proposed actions that it plans to take in response to GAO's recommendations, as discussed in the report. |
gao_GAO-17-154 | gao_GAO-17-154_0 | If a federal agency is involved in authorizing, funding, or carrying out a proposed project, FWS’s discussions with project proponents about options to avoid and minimize potential adverse impacts on the ABB can occur within the context of consultations under section 7 of the ESA. In these cases, FWS has other options—compensatory mitigation strategies—that project proponents may choose to use to compensate for the impact of their projects. FWS Has Used In- Lieu Fee Programs and Conservation Banks to Conserve the ABB but Does Not Track the Use of In- Lieu Fee Programs Across Regions
FWS uses several compensatory mitigation strategies, such as in-lieu fee programs and conservation banks operated by third parties, to provide project proponents the option to compensate for remaining unavoidable impacts to endangered or threatened species after project proponents have implemented all appropriate and practicable avoidance and minimization measures, and FWS has used these strategies to conserve the ABB. FWS Uses Several Types of Compensatory Mitigation Strategies and in September 2016 Issued a Draft ESA Compensatory Mitigation Policy
In addition to discussing and, in some cases, requiring measures to avoid and minimize potential adverse impacts to listed species, FWS may also discuss compensatory mitigation strategies with the project proponents so that they can compensate for any remaining unavoidable impacts on listed species from their projects after implementing all appropriate and practicable avoidance and minimization measures. FWS Tracks Key Information about Conservation Banks, but Its Plan to Track In-Lieu Fee Programs Has Not Been Fully Implemented
FWS tracks key information about the conservation banks it approves, such as the location and credits available, but it does not track in-lieu fee programs. Federal government standards for internal control provide that management should design control activities to achieve objectives and respond to risks. To accomplish this, according to federal internal control standards, management should define the time frames for achieving the objectives. Until FWS establishes a timetable with milestones for modifying the RIBITS database to incorporate in-lieu fee program information, the agency will not have reasonable assurance that it will obtain relevant and reliable data on its in-lieu fee programs, which will impact its ability to effectively evaluate its in-lieu fee programs and determine the most effective strategy for conservation. Since 2014, FWS Has Used Two Conservation Banks to Allow Project Proponents to Compensate for Potential Impacts on the ABB in Oklahoma
The Oklahoma Ecological Services Field Office approved two conservation banks for the ABB in an effort to allow project proponents to compensate for the potential adverse impacts of their projects on the ABB and to provide long-term conservation for the species, according to agency officials. Recommendation for Executive Action
To help improve FWS’s ability to evaluate the effectiveness of its compensatory mitigation strategies and ensure that the agency appropriately plans the obligations necessary for this purpose, we recommend that the Director of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) has sought to avoid and minimize potential adverse impacts on the American burying beetle (ABB) from construction and other projects and (2) what is known about FWS’s compensatory mitigation strategies and how FWS has used two of these strategies, in-lieu fee programs and conservation banks, for the ABB. To conduct our work, we reviewed and analyzed relevant laws, agency policies, guidance, and other documentation related to the Endangered Species Act (ESA), compensatory mitigation strategies, and conservation efforts for the ABB. We also analyzed FWS data on the use of conservation banks for all species listed under the ESA, which is reported in the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ Regulatory In-lieu fee and Bank Information Tracking System (RIBITS). | Why GAO Did This Study
The ABB is a large scavenger insect that FWS listed as endangered in 1989 under the Endangered Species Act (ESA). FWS uses various strategies to address potential adverse impacts on protected species from construction and other projects. In some cases, FWS has required project proponents to take specific steps to avoid, minimize, or compensate for a project's potential impacts on the ABB or its habitat. When these proponents make financial contributions to compensate for the impacts of these projects, FWS generally refers to it as compensatory mitigation. GAO was asked to provide information on how FWS uses different compensatory mitigation strategies.
This report examines: (1) how FWS has sought to avoid and minimize potential adverse impacts on the ABB from projects and (2) what is known about FWS's compensatory mitigation strategies and how FW has used two of them, in-lieu fee programs and conservation banks, for the ABB. GAO reviewed relevant laws, policies, guidance, and conservation efforts for the ABB; analyzed FWS data on ESA consultations and the use of conservation banks; and interviewed officials from FWS, project proponents, and organizations involved in ABB conservation.
What GAO Found
To address the potential adverse impacts of construction and other projects on the American burying beetle (ABB) and its habitat, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), within the Department of the Interior, first focuses on avoidance and minimization approaches. For example, to avoid impacts on ABB habitat, FWS may suggest that project proponents—public and private entities—relocate the project or part of the project to another location. If complete avoidance is not possible, FWS may suggest ways to minimize the potential impacts, such as reducing soil disturbance during construction or limiting the use of pesticides. If avoidance and minimization actions are impractical or inadequate, then FWS may suggest compensatory mitigation strategies, which allow project proponents to choose to compensate for the potential adverse impacts of their projects.
FWS uses several types of compensatory mitigation strategies, including (1) conservation banks, in which third parties invest up front in protected lands that are conserved and managed for a species, and then sell mitigation credits to project proponents, and (2) in-lieu fee programs, in which third parties generally collect money from several project proponents and conduct conservation activities for the species in a location away from the project site after the project's potential impacts have occurred. FWS has used two conservation banks in Oklahoma and three in-lieu fee programs in several states specifically to conserve the ABB. FWS tracks key information about its conservation banks, such as the location and mitigation credits available, and uses this information to help manage activities. However, FWS has not fully implemented its plan to track in-lieu fee programs. FWS signed an interagency agreement with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in February 2016 to modify its Regulatory In-lieu fee and Bank Information Tracking System (RIBITS) to enable FWS to track its in-lieu fee programs. However, FWS has not obligated funds for the necessary modifications or developed a timetable for doing so. Federal internal control standards provide that management should design control activities to achieve objectives and respond to risks. To accomplish this, federal internal control standards recommend that management define the time frames for how objectives will be achieved. Until FWS collects relevant and reliable data on its in-lieu fee programs, the agency will not be able to evaluate the effectiveness of its programs and determine the most effective strategy for conservation.
What GAO Recommends
To ensure that appropriate plans are made to obligate funds, GAO recommends that FWS establish a timetable with milestones for modifying RIBITS to incorporate FWS's in-lieu fee program information.
FWS concurred with this recommendation. |
gao_RCED-98-148 | gao_RCED-98-148_0 | Report 105-175), we identified (1) the impact of welfare reform on the revenue sources, employment status of tenants, and roles of selected housing agencies and (2) HUD’s role in assisting housing agencies and their clients as they adapt to welfare reform. Impact of Welfare Reform on the Revenue, Employment Status of Tenants, and Roles of Selected Housing Agencies Is Uncertain
It is too early to be certain what impact welfare reform will have on the revenue of the housing agencies we visited, the employment status of their tenants, and the roles of the housing agencies. Although these agencies serve many tenants who depend on cash assistance for some or all of their income, most of their executive directors and other officials had not developed financial estimates of welfare reform’s impact. However, the housing agencies’ supportive service activities were generally operated separately from the states’ welfare reform efforts. Officials generally lack the resources needed to undertake detailed analyses of the impact of their state’s welfare reform plan on their revenue. In addition, the state and local government offices with welfare reform responsibilities that we visited rarely targeted funds and programs to public housing developments. In addition, officials at state welfare offices and housing agencies said the states had not targeted funds for employment, training, and support services to housing agencies with large TANF populations; however, TANF recipients with housing assistance are eligible for the same services as other TANF recipients. Researchers with the Institute for Policy Studies at the Johns Hopkins University have shown that welfare recipients with housing assistance have longer spells on welfare than those without housing assistance. Under Welfare Reform, Housing Agencies Need More Guidance From HUD and Involvement With the States
HUD has a smaller role in welfare reform than the states or some other federal agencies, such as the departments of Health and Human Services and Labor, yet HUD has stated that it is committed to making welfare reform work. HUD’s commitment rests, in part, on the large numbers of tenants who currently receive, but may lose, welfare benefits if they do not find work. While HUD’s strategic plan and other management documents stress the importance of making welfare reform work and explain how HUD’s own programs can facilitate welfare reform, they do not recognize a role for HUD at the state level and do not include a formal strategy for increasing the states’ awareness of the assisted housing population and for improving coordination among HUD, the states, and the public housing agencies. Recommendations
To assist public housing agencies in their efforts to help residents move from welfare to work, GAO recommends that the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development increase communications with field offices and housing agencies to clarify HUD’s role in welfare reform, explain how current programs can be used to complement welfare reform efforts, and identify sources of information about other federal welfare reform efforts; provide additional technical assistance and data on tenants’ characteristics along with guidance that would help housing agencies use the data to assist in managing the units and in determining what impact welfare reform might have on the agencies; and develop a comprehensive strategy that relies on each field office to promote the benefits of using assisted housing developments as places to deliver services related to welfare reform and to help link other field office and housing agency staff with federal, state and local welfare reform efforts. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the implications of welfare reform on public housing agencies and their tenants, focusing on the: (1) impact of welfare reform on the revenue, employment status of tenants, and roles of selected housing agencies; and (2) Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) role in assisting housing agencies and their clients as they adapt to welfare reform.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) it is too early to be certain what impact welfare reform will have on the revenue of the housing agencies that GAO selected, the employment status of their tenants, and the roles of these housing agencies; (2) most of the agencies had not attempted to estimate welfare reform's impact on their revenue for multiple reasons, including a lack of resources to undertake detailed analyses of the impact of their state's welfare reform plan; (3) welfare rolls had declined in the states that GAO visited, and state officials described services being provided to help Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) recipients overcome obstacles to employment; (4) housing agency officials, residents, and others believed that tenants would face significant challenges in moving from welfare to work; (5) their concerns are supported by research, based on past behavior, which shows that welfare recipients with housing assistance tend to have longer stays on welfare than those without housing assistance; (6) executive directors recognized that the role of housing agencies increasingly includes providing social services as well as housing; (7) however, agencies' social service activities were generally operated separately from states' welfare reform efforts; (8) the agencies that GAO visited had limited involvement in their state's welfare reform efforts; (9) state and local government offices with welfare reform responsibilities rarely targeted funds and programs to public housing developments; however, TANF recipients with housing assistance are eligible for the same services as other TANF recipients; (10) HUD has a smaller role in welfare reform than the states or some other federal agencies; however, HUD said that it is committed to making welfare reform work; (11) HUD's role is driven, in part, by the large numbers of tenants who currently receive welfare benefits whose incomes will decline if they do not find jobs or other sources of income within the time limits; (12) HUD's own financial status depends, to some extent, on these tenants' success in replacing welfare benefits with earnings; (13) to date, HUD has emphasized the importance of welfare reform in at least two strategic planning documents, issued guidance on welfare reform, redirected some programs to focus on welfare reform, and begun to coordinate its welfare reform activities internally and externally; and (14) HUD's strategic plans do not include a comprehensive strategy for bringing together HUD's resources for welfare reform and the funds and programs available from the states and other federal agencies. |
gao_GAO-01-434 | gao_GAO-01-434_0 | Conclusion
The west campus of St. Elizabeths is a unique property that according to HHS, GSA, and District officials, is in a badly deteriorated condition. Our evidence suggests that a significant amount of money and much work would be needed to prepare it for reuse. This work includes stabilizing and mothballing the buildings for the period of time when the excess and disposal process will take place, developing plans for protection and maintenance, addressing environmental and historic preservation issues, studying potential uses for the property, and identifying user(s). The historic significance of the property, as well as the economic implications of its reuse for the District, will be key factors to be considered in determining the future use of the property. Attaining a successful outcome that is agreeable to all the interested stakeholders and is in the best interest of the government will be a challenging and complex task. | What GAO Found
The west campus of St. Elizabeths hospital is a unique property that is generally acknowledged to be in poor condition. GAO concludes that a significant sum of money and much work would be needed to prepare the west campus for reuse. This work would include stabilizing and mothballing the buildings for the period of time when the excess and disposal process will take place, developing plans for protection and maintenance, addressing environmental and historic preservation issues, studying potential uses for the property, and identifying user(s). The historic significance of the property, as well as the economic implications of its reuse for the District of Columbia will be key factors to be considered in determining the property's future. A successful outcome that is agreeable to all the interested stakeholders and is in the government's best interest will be a challenging and complex task. |
gao_GAO-05-662T | gao_GAO-05-662T_0 | The Office of the Assistant Secretary for VETS administers the agency’s activities through regional administrators and a VETS director in each state. For example, JVA clarified the roles of DVOP and LVER staff, and gave states greater flexibility in determining how the staff are used. Although VETS has issued guidance on the performance incentive program to recognize exemplary staff as required by JVA, states have implemented this program differently, and 11 states do not plan to implement the incentive program because sometimes it conflicts with the state’s policy if awards are given to individuals. In addition, integrating DVOP and LVER staff into one-stop centers continues to be challenging. VETS Has Provided Guidance and Training to Distinguish DVOP from LVER Staff Duties and Many States Plan to Use Part-Time DVOP Staff
Through its policy guidance letters, VETS has clarified the DVOP and LVER staff’s new functions, along with new staffing and reporting requirements, including the use of part-time positions for DVOPs. New Performance System Implemented for DVOPs and LVERs, but Too Early to Link Changes to Veterans’ Employment Outcomes
VETS has implemented some JVA changes to the accountability system related to the measures used for assessing DVOP and LVER performance, but it estimates that it will be at least 2007 before it can implement a minimum standard for veterans entering employment that all states will be expected to meet. In addition, Labor has established an entered-employment goal of 58 percent for veterans served through the DVOP and LVER programs. While VETS reported that the DVOP and LVER programs met Labor’s program year 2003 goals for some measures, concerns about data reliability remain, preventing an accurate assessment of how well DVOP and LVER staff are performing. Three measures are based on WIA: (1) veterans that entered employment; (2) retention in employment at 6 months; and (3) job seeker satisfaction. VETS Reports Meeting Goals, but Data Reliability Concerns Remain
Nationwide, VETS reported that the DVOP and LVER programs met Labor’s goals for the entered employment rate (58 percent) for all eligible veterans in program year 2003, while they fell short of their 60-percent target entered employment rate for disabled veterans (see table 2). Monitoring Systems Evolving to Strengthen Program Accountability
In response to JVA’s requirement to monitor the DVOP and LVER programs, VETS has shifted greater responsibility for monitoring program performance to the state level, and VETS’ monitoring role continues to evolve from enforcer to partner in achieving state goals. Veterans’ Employment and Training Service: Flexibility and Accountability Needed to Improve Service to Veterans. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Labor's Veterans' Employment and Training Service (VETS) administers two programs designed to assist the roughly 700,000 veterans who are unemployed in any given month. These two programs, the Disabled Veterans' Outreach Program (DVOP) and the Local Veterans' Employment Representative (LVER) program, fund employment, training, and job placement services to veterans. In 2002, Congress passed the Jobs for Veterans Act (JVA), which redefined the roles of DVOP and LVER staff and required that VETS establish a new performance accountability system. This testimony is based on GAO's ongoing work in this area and focuses on three aspects: (1) the separation of DVOP's and LVER's roles and responsibilities; (2) VETS' performance accountability system for DVOP and LVER staff; and (3) VETS' system for monitoring DVOP and LVER performance.
What GAO Found
VETS has established separate roles for DVOP and LVER staff and has provided policy guidance and training to states explaining these changes. Under JVA, states now determine how many DVOP and LVER staff they hire, where to place them within the local workforce areas, and 23 states are planning to use some part-time DVOP staff. There are indications that integrating DVOP and LVER staff into the local workforce offices remains challenging. While VETS has issued guidance on an incentive program to encourage improved performance, state implementation of the program has varied, and 11 states do not plan to participate. VETS has implemented employment measures for DVOP and LVER staff, but a minimum standard that all states must meet for veterans entering employment will not be available before 2007. VETS reported meeting Labor's goal of achieving a 58-percent employment rate for all veteran job seekers during program year 2003, but fell somewhat short of reaching a 60-percent employment goal for disabled veterans. Assessing how well DVOP and LVER programs are serving veterans may continue to be difficult due to ongoing concerns about data reliability. VETS implemented a monitoring system in program year 2004 that relies primarily on state self-assessments of performance in conjunction with onsite reviews. It is unclear, however, how VETS staff at the state, regional, and national levels will use this information consistently to guide or improve the DVOP and LVER programs. VETS is working with other Labor agencies to coordinate monitoring and enforcement efforts. |
gao_GGD-00-14 | gao_GGD-00-14_0 | Grants or Other Direct Federal Funding
In response to our inquiries, officials at each of the DOD components we contacted told us that they did not provide grants for any purposes, including crime technology-related assistance, to state and local law enforcement agencies during fiscal years 1996 through 1998. Support Services and Systems
Regarding support services and systems, DOD’s crime technology assistance to state and local law enforcement totaled an estimated $30 million for fiscal years 1996 through 1998. However, we determined that these activities did not meet our definition of crime technology assistance. In-Kind Transfer Programs
During fiscal years 1996 through 1998, DOD’s in-kind assistance to state and local law enforcement totaled about $95.9 million. Other Transfers Indirect Assistance May Result From DOD Research and Development Efforts
In its counterterrorism and counterdrug efforts, the federal government has invested considerable funds in recent years to develop technologies for detecting explosives and narcotics. Although not directly intended for state and local law enforcement agencies, some of DOD’s research and development efforts have had spin-off benefits for these agencies. That is, proven technologies have resulted in crime-fighting products’ becoming commercially available for purchase by all levels of law enforcement. We did not attempt to identify all relevant examples nor to quantify the costs associated with specific products because DOD’s research and development efforts primarily and directly support federal agency needs rather than those of state and local law enforcement. Also, (1) any spin-off benefits to state and local law enforcement may not occur until years after federal research and development funds are expended and (2) the acquisition of commercially available products generally is dependent on these agencies’ own budgets. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the crime technology assistance provided by the Department of Defense (DOD) to state and local law enforcement agencies during fiscal years (FY) 1996 through 1998, focusing on: (1) grants or other types of direct federal funding; (2) access to support services and systems, such as counterdrug or other intelligence centers; and (3) in-kind transfers of equipment or other assets.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) DOD said it provided no crime technology-related grants to state and local law enforcement agencies during FY 1996 through FY 1998; (2) although each state's National Guard received funds for its counterdrug program, these funds did not meet GAO's definition of crime technology assistance, with one exception; (3) GAO also did not find any other type of direct funding; (4) identifiable crime technology assistance provided by DOD to state and local law enforcement agencies during FY 1996 through FY 1998 totalled an estimated $125.9 million; (5) of this amount, about $95.9 million involved in-kind transfers, representing about 76 percent of the total; (6) although not directly intended for state and local law enforcement agencies, some of DOD's research and development efforts in recent years have had spin-off benefits for these agencies--particularly DOD's efforts to develop technologies for federal use in detecting explosives and narcotics; (7) for example, proven technologies have resulted in crime-fighting products--such as bomb detection equipment--becoming commercially available for purchase by all levels of law enforcement; and (8) GAO did not attempt to identify all relevant examples nor to quantify the costs associated with specific products because: (a) DOD's research and development efforts primarily and directly support federal agency needs; and (b) the acquisition of any resulting commercially available products generally is dependent on state and local law enforcement agencies' own budgets. |
gao_GAO-08-366 | gao_GAO-08-366_0 | DOD’s Decision to Stop Actively Searching for Project 112 Individuals Was Not Based on a Sound and Documented Cost-Benefit Analysis
In June 2003, after having identified several thousand servicemembers and hundreds of civilians as having been potentially exposed to chemical or biological substances during Project 112, DOD stopped actively searching for additional individuals. However, we found that DOD had not exhausted all possibilities for identifying additional servicemembers and civilian personnel who had been potentially exposed. Therefore, we recommended that DOD determine the feasibility of addressing these unresolved issues. In response to our recommendation, DOD determined continuing an active search for individuals had reached the point of diminishing returns, and reaffirmed its decision to cease active searches. This decision was not supported by any objective analysis of the potential costs and benefits of continuing the effort. DOD’s Effort to Identify Individuals Potentially Exposed during Non-Project 112 Tests Has Several Shortcomings
Although DOD has taken action to identify individuals who were potentially exposed during chemical or biological tests outside of Project 112, we identified several shortcomings in the current effort. Second, the scope of DOD’s current effort is unclear. DOD’s Current Effort Lacks Transparency
DOD’s current effort lacks transparency since it has not worked with veterans, and it has not kept Congress and veterans service organizations fully informed about the status of its efforts. DOD and VA Have Had Limited Success in Notifying Potentially Exposed Individuals
DOD and VA have had limited success in notifying individuals who were potentially exposed to chemical and biological substances during Project 112 tests or testing that occurred outside of Project 112 due to several factors. First, DOD has inconsistently transmitted information about identified servicemembers to VA. Second, VA has not used all available resources to obtain contact information for servicemembers who were identified as having been potentially exposed. DOD Has Not Notified Civilians Due in Part to a Lack of Specific Guidance
DOD has not taken any actions to notify civilians who have been identified as having been potentially exposed during Project 112 tests and other chemical and biological tests, due in part to a lack of specific guidance defining the requirements to notify civilians. During our review, DOD and Department of Labor officials stated that they were unaware of a requirement for them to notify civilians of their potential exposure. Conclusions
Since World War II, potentially tens of thousands of military personnel and civilians have been exposed to chemical or biological substances during previously classified DOD tests. While DOD has concluded that continuing an active search for individuals potentially exposed during Project 112 has reached a point of diminishing returns, it has not conducted an informed cost- benefit analysis, which could guide DOD in identifying the extent to which it might need to take additional actions. Furthermore, until DOD conducts such an analysis, Congress, veterans, and the public may continue to question the completeness and accuracy of DOD’s efforts. To ensure that DOD’s current effort to identify individuals who were potentially exposed during chemical and biological tests outside of Project 112 are more efficient, effective, and transparent, and to ensure that its databases contain accurate information, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Office of Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics to take the following four actions: in coordination with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, modify the guidance about the scope of work for its current effort, such as the statement of work and concept of operations plan, to clearly define consistent, reasonable, and acceptable goals and objectives, and the type and amount of information that will need to be collected to meet these goals and objectives; implement effective internal controls and oversight practices, such as periodic site visits, regular assessments of the contactor’s efforts, and quality assurance reviews of the information provided by the contractor; coordinate and communicate with other entities that previously identified exposed individuals to leverage existing information, including institutional knowledge and documents; and make its efforts transparent with regular updates to Congress, the public, and veterans service organizations. The Department of Labor did not provide us any comments. In light of the increasing number of individuals who have been identified since DOD provided its report to Congress in 2003 and ceased its active search for additional individuals, until the department provides a more substantive analysis that supports its decision to cease active searches for additional individuals potentially exposed during Project 112 tests, Congress and veterans may continue to question the completeness and level of commitment to this effort. | Why GAO Did This Study
Tens of thousands of military personnel and civilians were potentially exposed to chemical or biological substances through Department of Defense (DOD) tests since World War II. DOD conducted some of these tests as part of its Project 112 test program, while others were conducted as separate efforts. GAO was asked to (1) assess DOD's efforts to identify individuals who were potentially exposed during Project 112 tests, (2) evaluate DOD's current effort to identify individuals who were potentially exposed during tests conducted outside of Project 112, and (3) determine the extent to which DOD and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) have taken action to notify individuals who might have been exposed during chemical and biological tests. GAO analyzed documents and interviewed officials from DOD, VA, the Department of Labor, and a veterans service organization.
What GAO Found
Since 2003, DOD has stopped actively searching for individuals who were potentially exposed to chemical or biological substances during Project 112 tests, but did not provide a sound and documented basis for that decision. In 2003, DOD reported it had identified 5,842 servicemembers and estimated 350 civilians as having been potentially exposed during Project 112, and indicated that DOD would cease actively searching for additional individuals. However, in 2004, GAO reported that DOD did not exhaust all possible sources of information and recommended that DOD determine the feasibility of identifying additional individuals. In response to GAO's recommendation, DOD determined continuing an active search for individuals had reached the point of diminishing returns, and reaffirmed its decision to cease active searches. This decision was not supported by an objective analysis of the potential costs and benefits of continuing the effort, nor could DOD provide any documented criteria from which it made its determination. Since June 2003, however, non-DOD sources--including the Institute of Medicine--have identified approximately 600 additional names of individuals who were potentially exposed during Project 112. Until DOD provides a more objective analysis of the costs and benefits of actively searching for Project 112 participants, DOD's efforts may continue to be questioned. DOD has taken action to identify individuals who were potentially exposed during tests outside of Project 112, but GAO identified four shortcomings in DOD's current effort. First, DOD's effort lacks clear and consistent objectives, scope of work, and information needs that would set the parameters for its efforts. Second, DOD has not provided adequate oversight to guide this effort. Third, DOD has not fully leveraged information obtained from previous research efforts that identified exposed individuals. Fourth, DOD's effort lacks transparency since it has not kept Congress and veterans service organizations fully informed of the progress and results of its efforts. Until DOD addresses these limitations, Congress, veterans, and the American public can not be assured that DOD's current effort is reasonable and effective. DOD and VA have had limited success in notifying individuals potentially exposed during tests both within and outside Project 112. DOD has a process to share the names of identified servicemembers with VA; however, DOD has delayed regular updates to VA because of a number of factors, such as competing priorities. Furthermore, although VA has a process for notifying potentially exposed veterans, it was not using certain available resources to obtain contact information to notify veterans or to help determine whether they were deceased. Moreover, DOD had not taken any action with the civilian names, focusing instead on veterans since the primary impetus for the research has been requests from VA. DOD has refrained from taking action on civilians in part because it lacks specific guidance that defines the requirements to notify civilians. Until these issues are addressed, some identified veterans and civilians will remain unaware of their potential exposure. |
gao_T-NSIAD-98-109 | gao_T-NSIAD-98-109_0 | High Rate of Attrition Continues Despite Increases in Recruit Quality
By 1986, recruit quality was at historically high levels. Attrition Is Costly
On the basis of DOD-provided cost data, we estimated that in fiscal year 1996, DOD and the services spent about $390 million to enlist personnel who never made it to their first duty stations. Currently, available data on attrition does not permit DOD to pinpoint the precise reasons that enlistees are departing before completing their training. Reducing Attrition Will Not Be Simple
In the absence of complete data on why first-term attrition is occurring, we examined the various pre-enlistment screening processes that correspond to the types of separations that were occurring frequently. For example, because a significant number of enlistees were being separated for medical problems and for fraudulent entry, we focused our work on recruiting and medical examining processes that were intended to detect problems before applicants are enlisted. These processes involve many different military personnel. We also believe that the services’ mechanisms for medically screening military applicants could be improved. To improve the selection of recruiters and enhance the retention of recruits, we recommended that the services (1) use experienced field recruiters to personally interview all potential recruiters, use communication skills as a key recruiter selection criterion, and develop or procure personality screening tests that can aid in the selection of recruiters; (2) emphasize the recruiter’s role in reducing attrition by providing opportunities for recruiter trainees to interact with drill instructors and separating recruits; (3) encourage the services to incorporate more structured physical fitness training for recruits into their Delayed Entry Programs; (4) conduct physical fitness tests before recruits report to basic training; (5) link recruiter rewards more closely to recruits’ successful completion of basic training; and (6) encourage the use of quarterly floating recruitment goals as an alternative to the services’ current systems of monthly goals. Inclusion of GAO’s Recommendations in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998
In its National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 (P.L. DOD and Service Actions in Response to GAO’s Recommendations and the Fiscal Year 1998 Defense Authorization Act
DOD and the services have taken many actions in response to our recommendations and the requirements in the Fiscal Year 1998 Defense Authorization Act. As of January 1998, DOD reported that the following changes have been made in response to the recommendations in our 1997 report: (1) the Military Entrance Processing Command is formulating procedures to comply with the new requirement to obtain from military applicants the names of their medical insurers and health care providers; (2) the Accession Medical Standards Working Group has created a team to evaluate the Applicant Medical Prescreening Form (DD Form 2246); (3) DOD has adopted the policy of using codes from the International Classification of Diseases on all medical waivers and separations and plans to collect this information in a database that will permit a review of medical screening policies; (4) DOD plans to form a team made up of officials from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) and the Office of Accession Policy to conduct semiannual reviews of medical separations; and (5) all services are now testing applicants for drugs at the Military Entrance Processing Stations. Until DOD has uniform and complete information on why recruits are being separated early, it will have no basis for determining how much it can reduce attrition. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed its work on the attrition and recruiting of the military services' enlisted personnel, focusing on: (1) the historical problem of attrition and its costs; (2) the Department of Defense's (DOD) lack of complete data on why enlistees are being separated early; (3) GAO's recommendations on ways to improve the screening of recruiters and recruits; and (4) DOD's actions thus far to respond to GAO's recommendations.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) despite increases in the quality of DOD's enlistees, about one-third of all new recruits continue to leave the military service before they fulfill their first term of enlistment; (2) this attrition rate is costly in that the services must maintain infrastructure to recruit and train around 200,000 persons per year; (3) solving the problem of attrition will not be simple in large part because DOD does not have complete data on why enlisted personnel are being separated; (4) in GAO's work, it has concentrated on what it has found to be major categories of separation, such as medical problems and fraudulent enlistments; (5) because these types of separations involve services' entire screening processes, GAO has reexamined these processes from the time recruiters are selected, through the time that applicants are prescreened by recruiters, through the medical examinations applicants undergo, and through physical preparation of recruits for basic training; (6) the process of attracting quality recruits and retaining them involves many service entities and many processes; (7) GAO has recommended ways to improve the: (a) data DOD collects to analyze reasons for attrition; (b) services' criteria for selecting recruiters; (c) incentive systems for recruiters to enlist persons who will complete basic training; and (d) services' mechanisms for identifying medical problems before recruits are enlisted; (8) many of these recommendations have been incorporated into the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998; (9) DOD and the services have already taken some positive steps in response to GAO's recommendations and the National Defense Authorization Act; and (10) however, GAO believes that DOD needs to take further action to change the criteria by which recruiters are selected, provide recruiters with more opportunities to interact with drill instructors, and revise recruiters' incentive systems to improve their quality of life. |
gao_GAO-13-780 | gao_GAO-13-780_0 | States contract with managed care organizations to provide a comprehensive set Also, states may of services to Medicaid beneficiaries; states may also contract with limited benefit plans to provide a defined set of services, such as mental health services. Care coordination is particularly important for Medicaid beneficiaries with mental illnesses because they are more likely to have other medical conditions requiring ongoing physical health care services than beneficiaries without mental illnesses. Enrollment, Payment, and Scope of Services Varied Across All 13 States Using Limited Benefit Plans for Mental Health Services
Across the 13 states that contracted with limited benefit plans to provide mental health services to adult Medicaid beneficiaries, the enrollment levels, total payments, and services provided varied. States can enroll different adult populations—such as individuals who are blind, disabled, or have developmental disabilities—in limited benefit plans, which could contribute to variation in the number of adults enrolled, as well as the level of capitated payments states made to these plans.reported that about 4.4 million adult Medicaid beneficiaries were enrolled in limited benefit plans, about 48.6 percent of all adult Medicaid beneficiaries in the 13 states. 1.) Capitated payments to limited benefit plans providing mental health services to adult Medicaid beneficiaries also varied across the 13 states in fiscal year 2012. 2). Four Selected States Took Steps to Facilitate the Coordination of Mental and Physical Health Care Services
The steps that selected states—Florida, Kansas, Michigan, and Washington—generally took to facilitate the coordination of mental and physical health care included (1) incorporating care coordination requirements in the contracts with limited benefit plans; (2) implementing additional steps to coordinate care; and (3) monitoring limited benefit plans’ implementation of care coordination. Focused care coordination studies examine a state’s coordination of mental health and physical health care services. CMS Reviewed State Waiver Applications and Contracts with Limited Benefit Plans
GAO found that CMS did not take direct steps to facilitate the coordination of mental and physical health care services for adult Medicaid beneficiaries enrolled in limited benefit plans because its role is to provide oversight of, and technical assistance to, the states in carrying out their Medicaid programs. In its oversight role, the agency reviewed and approved state-submitted managed care waiver applications and contracts with limited benefit plans providing mental health services, some of which contain care coordination provisions. Agency Comments
The Department of Health and Human Services reviewed a draft of this report and provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. | Why GAO Did This Study
Medicaid is the largest payer of mental health services in the United States and Medicaid spending on such services is likely to grow. Some states provide mental health services to Medicaid beneficiaries separately from physical health care services through contracts with limited benefit plans, which are paid on a per person basis to provide a defined set of services. While using these plans to provide mental health services may control costs, it can also increase the risk that these services will not be coordinated with physical health care services. Coordinated care is important for Medicaid beneficiaries with mental illnesses because they are more likely than others to have ongoing health conditions. GAO was asked for information on states' use of Medicaid managed care. In this report, GAO examined the (1) extent that states provide mental health services through limited benefit plans, and (2) steps states and CMS have taken to facilitate the coordination of mental and physical health care services for adult beneficiaries enrolled in these plans.
GAO collected information on enrollment, payments, and services from the 13 states that contracted with limited benefit plans to provide mental health services to adult beneficiaries. GAO also selected 4 states based on, among other criteria, the number of beneficiaries enrolled in limited benefit plans. GAO reviewed documents from the 4 states and CMS, and interviewed officials to identify steps taken to coordinate care.
The Department of Health and Human Services provided technical comments, which GAO incorporated, as appropriate.
What GAO Found
Thirteen states reported that in fiscal year 2012 they paid a total of about $5.6 billion to limited benefit plans to provide mental health services to about 4.4 million adult Medicaid beneficiaries. States can enroll different populations--such as adults who are blind, disabled, or have developmental disabilities--in limited benefit plans, which could contribute to the variation in the number of adults enrolled and level of capitated payments made across the 13 states.
Four selected states--Florida, Kansas, Michigan, and Washington--took three steps to facilitate the coordination of mental and physical health care services:
1. incorporating care coordination requirements in limited benefit plan contracts;
2. implementing additional steps to coordinate care, such as policies that included incentives to coordinate care; and
3. monitoring limited benefit plans' implementation of care coordination.
GAO found that the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services' (CMS) did not take direct steps to facilitate care coordination, because its role is to oversee and provide technical assistance. In its oversight role, CMS reviewed and approved state submitted documents, such as contracts with mental health limited benefit plans, some of which contained care coordination requirements. |
gao_GAO-09-425T | gao_GAO-09-425T_0 | But concerns remain. Interior also faces challenges in managing oil and gas operations on federal lands, adapting to climate change, and resolving natural resource conflicts through collaborative management. Wildland Fire Management Challenges Persist
The wildland fire problems facing our nation continue to grow. Strengthening the Accountability of Indian and Island Community Programs
We have reported on management weaknesses in Indian and island community programs for a number of years—most recently on serious delays in BIA’s program for determining whether the department will accept land in trust and the need to assist seven island communities— four U.S. territories and three sovereign island nations—with long-standing financial and program management deficiencies. Improving Federal Land Acquisition and Management
As the steward of more than 500 million acres of federal land, land consolidation through sales and acquisitions and land management are important functions for the Department of the Interior. However, the Federal Land Transaction Facilitation Act of 2000 which, in part, was intended to facilitate land consolidation, has had limited success. In addition, Interior’s Fish and Wildlife Service is unlikely to achieve its goals to protect certain migratory bird habitat, and it is generally not managing a majority of its farmlands. Reducing Interior’s Deferred Maintenance Backlog
Interior also faces a challenge in adequately maintaining its facilities and infrastructure. In November 2008, the department estimated that the deferred maintenance backlog for fiscal year 2008 was between $13.2 billion and $19.4 billion (see table 1). Although Interior has made a concentrated effort to address its deferred maintenance backlog, the dollar estimate of the backlog has continued to escalate. The 2008 backlog estimate is more than 60 percent higher than the 2003 estimate of between $8.1 billion and $11.4 billion. The funds included in the recently enacted stimulus package for Interior may reverse this trend. Ensuring the Accurate Collection of Royalties
Interior collects, on average, over $10 billion annually in mineral lease revenues, but many material weaknesses in federal oil and gas management and revenue collection processes and practices place an unknown but significant proportion of royalties and other oil and gas revenues at risk. These weaknesses also raise questions about whether Interior is collecting an appropriate amount of revenue for the rights to explore for, develop, and produce oil and gas on federal lands and waters. Enhancing Other Revenue Collections and Financial Assurances
Additional revenues or financial assurances could be generated through hardrock mining operations by amending the General Mining Act of 1872 so that the federal government could collect federal royalties on minerals extracted from U.S. mineral rights and by requiring adequate financial assurances from hardrock mining operations to fully cover estimated reclamation costs. Additional revenues could also be generated by increasing the grazing fee for public lands managed by Interior’s Bureau of Land Management. Posthearing Questions: Major Management Challenges at the Department of the Interior. Department of the Interior: Major Management Challenges. Other Resource Protection Products
Endangered Species Act: Many GAO Recommendations Have Been Implemented, but Some Issues Remain Unresolved. Oil and Gas Development: Challenges to Agency Decisions and Opportunities for BLM to Standardize Data Collection. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of the Interior is responsible for managing much of the nation's vast natural resources. Its agencies implement an array of programs intended to protect these precious resources for future generations while also allowing certain uses of them, such as oil and gas development and recreation. In some cases, Interior is authorized to collect royalties and fees for these uses. Over the years, GAO has reported on challenges facing Interior as it implements its programs. In addition to basic program management issues, Interior faces difficult choices in balancing its many responsibilities, and in improving the condition of the nation's natural resources and the department's infrastructure, in light of the federal deficit and long-term fiscal challenges facing the nation. This testimony highlights some of the major management challenges facing Interior today. It is based on prior GAO reports.
What GAO Found
As GAO's previous work has shown, the Department of the Interior faces major management challenges in the following six areas: (1) Strengthening resource protection; (2) Strengthening the accountability of Indian and island community programs; (3) Improving federal land acquisition and management; (4) Reducing Interior's deferred maintenance backlog; (5) Ensuring the accurate collection of royalties; and (6) Enhancing other revenue collections and financial assurances. Interior has not yet developed a cohesive strategy to address wildland fire issues, as GAO recommended in 1999 and 2005. In addition, Interior faces challenges in managing oil and gas operations on federal lands, adapting to climate change, and resolving natural resource conflicts through collaborative management. Having a land base is important to Indian tribes. Concerns remain about delays in decisions about land that Interior will take into trust status. In addition, programs for seven island communities--four U.S. territories and three sovereign island nations--continue to have financial and program management deficiencies. As the steward of more than 500 million acres of federal land, land consolidation through sales and acquisitions and land management are important functions for the department. The Federal Land Transaction Facilitation Act has had limited success and Interior's U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service is unlikely to achieve its goals to protect certain migratory bird habitat and it is generally not managing a majority of its farmlands. While Interior has improved inventory and asset management systems, the dollar estimate of the deferred maintenance backlog has continued to grow. The 2008 estimate of between $13.2 billion and $19.4 billion is more than 60 percent higher than the 2003 estimate. The funds for Interior in the recently enacted stimulus package may reverse this trend. GAO and others have found many material weaknesses in their numerous evaluations of federal oil and gas management and revenue collection processes. These weaknesses place an unknown but significant proportion of royalties and other oil and gas revenues at risk and raise questions about whether Interior is collecting an appropriate amount of revenue for the rights to explore for, develop, and produce oil and gas from federal lands and waters. Additional revenues or financial assurances could be generated by (1) amending the General Mining Act of 1872 to collect federal royalties on gold, silver, copper, and other valuable minerals belonging to the United States, (2) requiring adequate financial assurances from hardrock mining operations to fully cover estimated reclamation costs, and (3) increasing the grazing fee for public lands managed by Interior's Bureau of Land |
gao_T-NSIAD-96-154 | gao_T-NSIAD-96-154_0 | DOD has acted. During 1994 and 1995, it established the Joint Service Integration Group to prioritize chemical and biological defense research efforts and develop a modernization plan; and the Joint Service Materiel Group to develop research, development, acquisition, and logistics support plans. However, DOD has not succeeded in fielding other needed equipment and systems designed to address critical battlefield deficiencies identified during the Persian Gulf Conflict and earlier. For example, in 1986, DOD studies found that its forces were inadequately trained to conduct critical tasks. Army studies conducted from 1991 to 1995 showed serious weaknesses at all levels in chemical and biological defense skills. There are two fundamental reasons for this. Medical Units Lack Equipment and Training
We examined the ability of U.S. Army medical units that support early-deploying Army divisions to treat casualties in a chemically and biologically contaminated environment. We found that these units often lacked needed equipment and training. Vaccine Stocks and Immunization Plans
Today, DOD still has inadequate stocks of vaccines for known threat agents, and so far has chosen not to implement existing immunization policy and procedures. Problems Stem From Lack of Emphasis on Preparation for Chemical/ Biological Warfare
The primary cause for the deficiencies in chemical and biological defense preparedness is a lack of emphasis up and down the line of command in DOD. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the capability of U.S. forces to fight and survive chemical and biological warfare.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) none of the Army's crisis-response or early-deployment units have complied with requirements for stocking equipment critical for fighting under chemical or biological warfare; (2) the Department of Defense (DOD) has established two joint service groups to prioritize chemical and biological defense research efforts, develop a modernization plan, and develop support plans; (3) although DOD has begun to field a biological agent detection system, it has not successfully fielded other needed equipment and systems to address critical battlefield deficiencies; (4) ground forces are inadequately trained to conduct critical tasks related to biological and chemical warfare, and there are serious weaknesses at all levels in chemical and biological defense skills; (5) medical units often lack the equipment and training needed to treat casualties resulting from chemical or biological contamination; (6) DOD has inadequate stocks of vaccines for known threat agents and not implemented the immunization policy established in 1993; and (7) the primary cause of these deficiencies is a lack of emphasis along the DOD command chain, with DOD focusing its efforts and resources on other priorities. |
gao_GAO-14-474 | gao_GAO-14-474_0 | The CERT contractor conducts postpayment claims reviews on a nationwide random sample of claims, which are used to annually estimate the national Medicare FFS improper payment rate. CMS Lacks Reliable Data to Estimate the Number of Duplicative Claims Reviews and Has Not Taken Sufficient Steps to Prevent Inappropriate Duplication
CMS lacks reliable data to estimate the number of duplicative claims reviews that are conducted. CMS also has not issued complete guidance for MACs and ZPICs on whether it is appropriate for them to conduct duplicative reviews. The RAs performed more than 80 percent of the claims reviews in 2012 and the Recovery Audit Data Warehouse was designed to track RA claims review activities and to prevent RAs from duplicating other contractors’ claims reviews; it was not designed to track and prevent duplicate claims reviews by the other three contractor types. Efficiency and Effectiveness of Communications to Providers May Be Reduced by Differences and Lack of Clarity in CMS’s Requirements, Contractor Compliance, and Extent of CMS’s Oversight
Several factors may reduce the efficiency and effectiveness of contractors’ correspondence with providers. CMS’s Requirements for Correspondence Content Vary across Contractor Types and Are Not Always Clear
CMS requires contractors to include certain content in the correspondence they send to providers, but the requirements sometimes differ. Contractors Did Not Consistently Comply with Requirements for Correspondence Content
Compliance with CMS requirements was not consistent across contractor types for the correspondence we reviewed. 1). Our findings that contractors did not comply consistently with CMS’s requirements for the correspondence we reviewed indicate that CMS’s monitoring efforts in this area are not adequate to meet federal internal control standards to monitor contractors’ activities. CMS Has Some External Validation Reviews for Three of Four Contractor Types
CMS has implemented additional quality assurance processes in which the MACs, ZPICs, and RAs have a sample of their claims reviews undergo external validation by CMS or an independent contractor, using clinical staff or coders, to assess the appropriateness of the contractors’ claims review decisions about whether the claim was paid properly according to Medicare coverage and billing rules. CMS Has Multiple Strategies for Coordinating Postpayment Claims Reviews, but Differences in Requirements and Contractor Coordination Remain That May Hamper Effectiveness and Efficiency of Claims Reviews
CMS has strategies to coordinate internally among relevant CMS offices in developing the requirements for postpayment claims review contractors’ activities and has strategies to facilitate coordination among the contractor types. 3.) However, CMS’s internal coordination strategies have not resolved long- standing differences in requirements across contractor types. It is important that providers understand the postpayment claims review process, including what documentation they need to send to contractors, the steps in the review process, and their rights. The comparatively limited amount of required communication between ZPICs and other contractors addressing improper payment issues reduces CMS’s assurance that the four types of postpayment contractors that we reviewed are coordinating as effectively as possible to reduce improper payments and fraud. Recommendations for Executive Action
In order to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of Medicare postpayment claims review efforts and simplify compliance for providers, we recommend that the Administrator of CMS take the following four actions: monitor the Recovery Audit Data Warehouse to ensure that all postpayment review contractors are submitting required data and that the data the database contains are accurate and complete; develop complete guidance to define contractors’ responsibilities regarding duplicative claims reviews, including specifying whether and when MACs and ZPICs can duplicate other contractors’ reviews; clarify the current requirements for the content of contractors’ ADRs and results letters and standardize the requirements and contents as much as possible to ensure greater consistency among postpayment claims review contractors’ correspondence; and assess regularly whether contractors are complying with CMS requirements for the content of correspondence sent to providers regarding claims reviews. In its comments, HHS agreed with our findings and concurred with all four recommendations. We selected all four Recovery Auditors (RA) because they conduct substantially more postpayment claims reviews than all the other contractors combined, and the Comprehensive Error Rate Testing (CERT) contractor, which reviews a nationwide random sample of claims. To assess the extent to which CMS requirements for the content of contractors’ correspondence with providers help ensure effective communication, we focused our review on ADRs and results letters. Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Health and Human Services
Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
GAO Contact
Staff Acknowledgments
In addition to the contact named above, Sheila. Related GAO Products
Medicare Program Integrity: Contractors Reported Generating Savings, but CMS Could Improve Its Oversight. GAO’s 2013 High-Risk Update: Medicare and Medicaid. | Why GAO Did This Study
Several types of Medicare contractors conduct postpayment claims reviews to help reduce improper payments. Questions have been raised about their effectiveness and efficiency, and the burden on providers. GAO was asked to assess aspects of the claims review process.
Building on GAO's July 2013 report on postpayment claims review requirements, this report examines, among other things, the extent to which CMS has (1) data to assess whether contractors conduct duplicative postpayment claims reviews, (2) requirements for contractor correspondence with providers to help ensure effective communication, and (3) strategies for coordination of claims review activities. GAO reviewed CMS's requirements for claims reviews; interviewed CMS officials, selected contractors, and provider associations; analyzed CMS data; assessed a nongeneralizable sample of 114 pieces of contractor correspondence for compliance with requirements; and assessed CMS's requirements and oversight against federal internal control standards and other guidance.
What GAO Found
The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has taken steps to prevent its contractors from conducting certain duplicative postpayment claims reviews—reviews of the same claims that are not permitted by the agency—but CMS neither has reliable data nor provides sufficient oversight and guidance to measure and fully prevent duplication. The four types of contractors GAO reviewed that examine providers' documentation to determine whether Medicare's payment was proper included
Medicare Administrative Contractors (MAC), which process and pay claims;
Zone Program Integrity Contractors (ZPIC), which investigate potential fraud;
Recovery Auditors (RA), tasked with identifying on a postpayment basis improper payments not previously reviewed by other contractors; and
the Comprehensive Error Rate Testing (CERT) contractor, which reviews claims used to annually estimate Medicare's improper payment rate.
CMS implemented a database to track RA activities, designed in part to prevent RAs, which conducted most of the postpayment reviews, from duplicating other contractors' reviews. However, the database was not designed to provide information on all possible duplication, and its data are not reliable because other postpayment contractors did not consistently enter information about their reviews. CMS has not provided sufficient oversight of these data or issued complete guidance to contractors on avoiding duplicative claims reviews.
CMS requires its contractors to include certain content in postpayment review correspondence with providers, but some requirements vary across contractor types and are not always clear, and contractors vary in their compliance with their requirements. These factors can lead to providers receiving less information about the reviews and thus decrease effective communication with them. In addition, the extent of CMS's oversight of correspondence varies across contractors, which decreases assurance that contractors comply consistently with requirements. In the correspondence reviewed, GAO found high compliance rates for some requirements, such as citing the issues leading to an overpayment, but low compliance rates for requirements about communicating providers' rights, which could affect providers' ability to exercise their rights.
CMS has strategies to coordinate internally among relevant offices regarding requirements for contractors' claims review activities. The agency also has strategies to facilitate coordination among contractors, such as requiring joint operating agreements between contractors operating in the same geographic area. However, these strategies have not led to consistent requirements across contractor types or full coordination between ZPICs and RAs. GAO previously recommended that CMS increase the consistency of its requirements, where appropriate, and the HHS Office of Inspector General has recommended steps to improve coordination between ZPICs and RAs.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that CMS take actions to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of contractors' postpayment review efforts, which include providing additional oversight and guidance regarding data, duplicative reviews, and contractor correspondence. In its comments, the Department of Health and Human Services concurred with the recommendations and noted plans to improve CMS oversight and guidance. |
gao_HEHS-95-208 | gao_HEHS-95-208_0 | Recent Trends Have Led to a Foster Care Crisis
Current trends in the number and needs of foster children have led to a crisis in the child welfare system. 6.) Resources Have Not Kept Pace With Service Needs
The child welfare system has been under great pressure to meet increased demands. States and localities provide the majority of funding for foster care and child welfare services. Federal foster care funds cannot be used to pay for most child welfare services, and available state funds are increasingly required for investigations of abuse and neglect reports. Other resource constraints have included problems recruiting and retaining caseworkers, shortages of available foster parents, and difficulties obtaining needed services from systems outside the control of child welfare. States Struggle to Meet Caseload and Resource Challenges
In response to the escalating pressure on the foster care system, states have adopted various measures to meet changing foster care needs. In 1993, 48 states offered some family preservation services. Kinship care is less costly than traditional foster homes in those states where relatives are ineligible for state foster care payments. First, officials agreed that capping the block grant would control federal foster care expenditures and might result in savings at that level. 4
Recent GAO Reports and Testimonies on Child Protection, Foster Care, Adoption, and Related Topics
Child Abuse and Neglect Prevention
Child Abuse: Prevention Programs Need Greater Emphasis (GAO/HRD-92-99, Aug. 3, 1992)
Child abuse prevention programs have been shown to be effective and may pay for themselves by lowering the social costs resulting from child abuse. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the foster care system and related child welfare services, focusing on: (1) recent trends in the characteristics of the foster care population; (2) whether resources for foster care and child welfare services have kept pace with changing needs; and (3) how states are responding to current foster care and other service needs.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the sharp increase in the number of child abuse and neglect reports and foster care caseloads have increased the demand for child welfare services and have greatly restricted resources for those services; (2) resource constraints have resulted in restrictions on the use of federal foster care funds, diversion of funds to child abuse and neglect investigations, caseworker recruiting and retention problems, shortages of foster parents, and difficulties in obtaining outside services; (3) states have adopted various cost saving methods to meet their service needs while protecting children; (4) family preservation services and kinship care reduce costs while maintaining family ties; (5) specialized foster care for emotionally disturbed and medically fragile children is less costly than institutionalization; and (6) while proposed legislation creating a block grant for child welfare services and foster care would give states greater flexibility in allocating funds to match needs and reduce administrative costs, Congress must consider provisions that reflect lessons learned from earlier attempts to provide block grants for child welfare services. |
gao_GAO-17-259 | gao_GAO-17-259_0 | Regulatory and Other Assessments Indicate ASI Has Had Adequate Reserves and Strong Claims- Paying Ability
Regulators Have Not Cited Concerns about ASI
The Ohio Department of Insurance’s most recent examination of ASI, which covered 2008–2012, did not identify any deficiencies in ASI’s financial condition and determined that ASI’s reserves for losses were consistent with Ohio’s legal requirements and were adequate and appropriate. However, in the event of potential impairment of ASI’s funding, Ohio law allows ASI to charge a special assessment, with regulator approval, against the credit unions it insures. The actuarial firm conducts a study of the adequacy of ASI’s capital every 3 years, which looks at the company as a whole and its ability to pay present and future claims for losses experienced by the credit unions it insures, under different economic scenarios; and an annual study of ASI’s loss experience to help estimate loss reserves and render an annual statement of actuarial opinion on the adequacy of its loss reserves. Credit Unions We Reviewed Largely Complied with Disclosure Requirements, but Some Disclosure Provisions Lack Specificity
Privately insured credit unions we reviewed largely complied with requirements to disclose that they are not federally insured. For example, 45 of the 47 credit unions displayed a disclosure at teller windows. However, 7 of the 17 credit unions we visited that had drive-through windows did not have disclosures at the window (see fig. We also observed that the dimensions and font sizes of the disclosure signage varied among credit unions, with some having signage too small to be easily read, or not placed conspicuously. CFPB does not provide official signage to privately insured credit unions and Regulation I does not specify signage dimensions or font size requirements. Disclosures on websites. We also reviewed 102 privately insured credit union websites and found that almost all of these websites complied with CFPB’s requirement to disclose on their main Internet page that the institution is not federally insured. On our visits to privately insured credit unions we obtained printed materials (such as brochures, promotional flyers, and newsletters which could be considered advertisements), and 8 of the 36 credit unions from which we obtained samples of printed materials had at least one item that did not contain a disclosure. Further, there may continue to be confusion about what constitutes “advertising” and whether certain printed materials are required to include disclosures. By clarifying Regulation I, CFPB would facilitate state credit union supervisor monitoring and credit union compliance and would better ensure that consumers were informed that their deposits are not federally insured. CFPB should issue guidance to (1) clarify whether drive-through windows require disclosures; (2) describe what constitutes clear and conspicuous disclosure, including minimum signage dimensions and font size for disclosures; and (3) explain and provide examples of which communications are advertising. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report (1) discusses regulatory and other assessments of American Share Insurance (ASI), the sole private deposit insurer, and (2) examines the level of compliance with disclosure requirements by credit unions that do not have federal deposit insurance. The Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act (FAST Act) includes a provision for us to review private deposit insurers and privately insured credit unions’ disclosure compliance in the United States. To review information about the credit unions that ASI insures, we reviewed CAMEL ratings for privately and federally insured credit unions for 2006–2015. We also used financial data from SNL Financial (2011–2015) to analyze selected financial indicators for privately and federally insured credit unions. To determine compliance with disclosure requirements, we identified disclosure requirements for credit unions that do not have federal deposit insurance by reviewing the Federal Deposit Insurance Act disclosure provisions and the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection’s (CFPB) corresponding Regulation I. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Federal Deposit Insurance Act requires privately insured credit unions to disclose to consumers that they do not have federal deposit insurance and CFPB has implemented regulations on these requirements. The Fixing America's Surface Transportation Act includes a provision for GAO to review private deposit insurers and privately insured credit unions' compliance with disclosures. This report (1) discusses regulatory and other assessments of ASI, the sole private insurer, and (2) examines the level of compliance with disclosure requirements for privately insured credit unions. GAO reviewed documentation from and interviewed federal and state regulators, ASI management, and ASI's third-party actuarial firm. GAO reviewed certain key methods and assumptions used by the actuarial firm. GAO also analyzed regulatory ratings (2006–2015) and selected financial data (2011–2015) on privately and federally insured credit unions. In addition, GAO reviewed 102 websites for all privately insured credit unions that had websites, conducted unannounced site visits at 47 credit unions (selected based largely on asset size and geography), and reviewed printed materials from 36 of the credit unions it visited that had materials readily available.
What GAO Found
About 2 percent of credit unions (125) have private deposit insurance, which is provided by one company—American Share Insurance (ASI). Regulatory and other assessments have suggested that ASI's reserves have been adequate and that the company has had a strong ability to cover present and future losses for the credit unions it insures. The most recent examination of ASI by its primary regulator (Ohio Department of Insurance) determined that ASI's reserves for losses were adequate and appropriate and consistent with legal requirements. An independent actuarial firm hired by ASI reported that it had a strong ability to cover losses under different economic scenarios. The Ohio regulator and the actuarial firm both noted risk factors that could affect ASI's financial condition, including changes in macroeconomic conditions or major losses by the largest credit unions it insures. In the event of financial difficulties, Ohio law allows ASI to tap into additional sources of funding, including lines of credit and special assessments from its insured credit unions.
Privately insured credit unions largely complied with the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (CFPB) requirements to disclose that they do not have federal deposit insurance. For instance, 45 of 47 credit unions GAO visited displayed required disclosures at teller windows (see fig.), and 99 of 102 websites GAO reviewed included the disclosure on their main Internet page, as required. However, 7 of 17 credit unions with drive-through windows that GAO visited did not have disclosure signs at these windows. Additionally, printed materials (such as brochures and flyers) GAO reviewed from 8 of 36 credit unions did not include disclosures. The regulations require all advertising to include a disclosure, but do not define what constitutes advertising. In some cases, disclosure signs or text size were too small to be easily read, or were not placed conspicuously. CFPB's regulations on disclosures for privately insured credit unions do not specify signage dimensions or font size. Without clear disclosure requirements, state credit union supervisors and credit unions may not be consistent in how they interpret disclosure requirements and some consumers may not be informed that their deposits are not federally insured.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that CFPB issue guidance for privately insured credit unions to clarify whether drive-through windows require disclosure, describe what constitutes clear and conspicuous disclosure, including minimum signage dimensions and font size, and explain and provide examples of which communications are advertising. CFPB agreed with these recommendations. |
gao_GAO-05-870 | gao_GAO-05-870_0 | section 404, which prohibits the discharge of dredged or fill material into “waters of the United States” without a permit from the Corps. While the SWANCC ruling specifically addressed the use of migratory birds as a basis for asserting jurisdiction over these waters, it did not address other bases cited in Corps regulations as examples for asserting jurisdiction. Because of this uncertainty, the memorandum instructed the field staff to seek formal project-specific headquarters approval prior to asserting jurisdiction over such waters based solely on links to interstate commerce. Corps Districts Generally Use Similar Processes and Data Sources When Making Jurisdictional Determinations
Each of the five Corps districts we visited generally used a similar process and similar data sources for making jurisdictional determinations. The districts use a four-step process that consists of (1) receiving a request for a jurisdictional determination or a permit application; (2) reviewing the submitted information for completeness; (3) requesting additional data from the project proponent, as necessary; and (4) analyzing the data to determine if the waters or wetlands are regulated under the Clean Water Act. Corps districts also used similar data to make these determinations, which frequently included topographic, soil, and wetland inventory maps as well as photographs. Photographs. Other factors that influence whether a site visit is conducted, according to Corps project managers, include the proximity of the project site to the Corps’ office and resources available to travel to the site, the nature of the topography and the number of waters or wetlands that appear to be on the project site, a project manager’s familiarity with the geographic area where the project is being undertaken, the potential for public concern over the proposed project, the size of the waters or wetlands on the project site and their value, the extent to which the data from all of the different data sources independently confirm the existence and nature of waters or wetlands on a project site as well as whether they are connected to “waters of the United States,” and the existence of any other federal, state, or local agency that may have oversight responsibility for waters or wetlands at the project site and whether officials from those agencies visited the site. Corps Districts Generally Do Not Document Their Rationales for Nonjurisdictional Determinations
Corps records provide limited information on the rationale that the project managers used when deciding not to assert jurisdiction over certain waters and wetlands. However, we found that not all project managers are including a detailed rationale in the project files. The percentage of files that contained no rationale also varied by district and ranged from a low of 12 percent of the Jacksonville District’s files (17 of 140) to a high of 49 percent of the Chicago District’s files (74 of 150). § 328.3(a)(3) to Assert Jurisdiction
The Corps is generally not using 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3) as the sole basis to assert jurisdiction over isolated, intrastate, nonnavigable waters. However, the data being collected by the Corps and EPA is inadequate to fully assess the impact of SWANCC on isolated, intrastate, nonnavigable waters. Because of limited resources, according to a senior regulatory program manager and EPA officials, neither agency is planning to conduct a more in-depth analysis of data already collected. These include the lack of (1) a consistent definition of an isolated wetland; (2) knowledge of the number and area of isolated wetlands in the United States; (3) information on the diversity of isolated wetlands relative to each other and to other ecosystems; (4) knowledge about other federal, state, tribal, and local programs that may protect isolated wetlands; and (5) information on how isolated wetlands, wetland complexes, and other at-risk waters contribute, hydrologically, chemically, and biologically to “waters of the United States.”
Neither agency believes that it is possible to easily develop and readily implement a realistic approach that would allow them to fully assess the impact of the ruling on federal jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act, given the lack of some data, the vast amount of data that would be needed to assess the impact of SWANCC, and current resource constraints. This time period was selected because data on the Corps’ nonjurisdictional determinations were not readily available before April 2004. To determine the extent to which the Corps documents its decisions when it concludes that it does not have jurisdiction over certain waters and wetlands, we reviewed 770 project files in the five selected districts where the agency determined, between April and December 2004, that it did not have jurisdiction over some or all of the waters on those project sites. Further, the Corps has no guidance on what a rationale should include. To determine the extent to which the Corps is asserting jurisdiction over isolated, intrastate, nonnavigable waters using its remaining authority in 33 C.F.R. To determine the extent to which the Corps and EPA are collecting data to assess the impact of Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (SWANCC), we interviewed Corps and EPA officials at their respective headquarters to identify what actions have been taken or are planned to assess the impact. | Why GAO Did This Study
Section 404 of the Clean Water Act prohibits the discharge of dredged or fill material into federally regulated waters without first obtaining a U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) permit. Before 2001, the Corps asserted jurisdiction over most waters, including isolated, intrastate, nonnavigable waters, if migratory birds could use them. However, in January 2001, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that the Corps exceeded its authority in asserting jurisdiction over such waters based solely on their use by birds. GAO was asked to examine, among other things, the (1) processes and data the Corps uses for making jurisdictional determinations; (2) extent to which the Corps documents decisions that it does not have jurisdiction; (3) extent to which the Corps is using its remaining authority to assert jurisdiction over isolated, intrastate, nonnavigable waters; and (4) extent to which the Corps and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) are collecting data to assess the impact of the court's January 2001 ruling.
What GAO Found
The five Corps districts included in GAO's review generally used similar processes and data sources for making jurisdictional determinations. After the districts receive a request for a determination, a project manager will review the submitted data for completeness, request additional data from the applicant, as necessary, and analyze the data to decide whether any waters are jurisdictional under the act. Data reviewed by project managers include photographs and topographic, soils, and wetland inventory maps that show, among other things, where the proposed project is located, whether other agencies have identified waters on the property, and whether there appears to be a basis for waters to be considered federally regulated under the act. Site visits are generally conducted when maps and photographs are not sufficiently detailed to make determinations. While GAO found that the Corps generally documents its rationale for asserting jurisdiction over waters or wetlands, it does not prepare similar documentation for nonjurisdictional determinations. Such rationales are important because determinations can be challenged by property owners and the public. GAO found that only 5 percent or less of the files in four of the five districts contained a detailed rationale, while 31 percent of the files in the fifth district contained such a rationale. The percentage of files that contained no rationale whatsoever as to why the Corps did not assert jurisdiction ranged from a low of 12 percent to a high of 49 percent in the five districts. The remaining files contained partial rationales. Following the Supreme Court's January 2001 ruling, the Corps is generally not asserting jurisdiction over isolated, intrastate, nonnavigable waters using its remaining authority. Since January 2003, EPA and the Corps have required field staff to obtain headquarters approval to assert jurisdiction over waters based solely on links to interstate commerce. Only eight cases have been submitted, and none of these cases have resulted in a decision to assert jurisdiction. According to project managers, they are reluctant to assert jurisdiction over these kinds of waters because of the lack of guidance from headquarters and perceptions that they should not be doing so. Although the Corps has drafted a memorandum that contains guidance for the districts, EPA and the Corps have not yet reached agreement on the content of the document. At EPA's request, over the last year, the Corps has collected data on field staffs' nonjurisdictional determinations, including limited data on wetlands impacted by the court's ruling. However, officials acknowledge that these data will be inadequate to assess the impacts of the ruling on wetlands jurisdiction. As a result, neither agency has conducted or plans to conduct an in-depth analysis of data already collected and they are re-examining their data collection efforts. Moreover, neither agency believes that an effective approach to fully assess the impacts of the ruling can be easily implemented because it would be resource intensive to do so and would require a vast array of data, some of which are not readily available. |
gao_GAO-07-141 | gao_GAO-07-141_0 | The government pays a portion of each enrollee’s total health insurance premium. Growth in Average FEHBP Premiums Has Recently Slowed and Was Lower Than That of Other Purchasers
The average annual growth in FEHBP premiums slowed from 2002 through 2007 and was generally lower than the growth for other purchasers since 2003. The growth in the average FEHBP enrollee premium contribution generally tracked average premium growth and was generally similar to recent growth in enrollee premium contributions for surveyed employers. 1.). FEHBP Premium Growth Varied Less for Large Plans Than for Smaller Plans from 2005 through 2007
The premium growth rates for the 10 largest FEHBP plans by enrollment— accounting for about three-quarters of total FEHBP enrollment—ranged from 0 percent to 15.5 percent in 2007. The average annual growth in enrollee premium contributions during this period was 6.9 percent, while premium growth was 6.1 percent. 3.) Projected Increases in the Cost and Utilization of Health Care Services Accounted for Most of the Premium Growth but Were Mitigated by Use of Reserves in Recent Years
Projected increases in the cost and utilization of health care services and the cost of prescription drugs accounted for most of the average FEHBP premium growth from 2000 through 2007. Projected decreases in the costs associated with other factors, including benefit changes that resulted in less generous coverage and enrollee choice of plans—typically the migration to lower cost plans—generally helped offset average premium increases for 2000 through 2007. However, projected withdrawals from reserves helped offset the effect of increases by about 2 percent for 2006 and 5 percent for 2007. Changes in the Cost and Utilization of Services and Enrollee Demographics Accounted for Differing Premium Growth among FEHBP Plans
Officials we interviewed from most of the plans with higher-than-average premium growth stated that increases in the cost and utilization of services as well as a high share of elderly enrollees and early retirees were key drivers of premium growth. Our analysis of these plans’ financial and enrollee demographic data showed that these plans experienced faster- than-average growth in the cost and utilization of services and faster-than- average growth in their share of elderly enrollees and retirees in recent years. Officials also cited benefit changes that resulted in less generous coverage for prescription drugs. Our analysis of financial data provided by two of these plans showed that the increase in their per-enrollee expenditures for prescription drugs was significantly lower than average in recent years. Our comparison of the demographic characteristics of the eight plans with higher-than-average premium growth with those of all FEHBP plans from 2001 through 2005 supports the officials’ statements that unique demographic profiles contributed to higher premium increases. Plans with Lower-Than- Average Premium Growth Cited Adjustments for Previously Overestimated Cost Growth and Benefit Changes and Had Greater Declines in the Shares of Elderly Enrollees
Officials we interviewed from most of the plans with lower-than-average premium growth for their plans in 2006 cited adjustments for previously overestimated projections of cost growth. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We received comments on a draft of this report from OPM (see app. OPM said the draft report confirms that growth in average FEHBP premiums has slowed and has been lower than that of other large employer purchasers for the last several years. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To identify growth trends in the average Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP) premiums and enrollee premium contributions, we analyzed trend data for 1994 through 2007 from the Office of Personnel Management (OPM). | Why GAO Did This Study
Average health insurance premiums for plans participating in the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP) have risen each year since 1997. These growing premiums result in higher costs to the federal government and plan enrollees. The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) oversees FEHBP, negotiating benefits and premiums and administering reserve accounts that may be used to cover plans' unanticipated spending increases. GAO was asked to evaluate the nature and extent of premium increases. To do this, GAO examined (1) FEHBP premium trends compared with those of other purchasers, (2) factors contributing to average premium growth across all FEHBP plans, and (3) factors contributing to differing trends among selected FEHBP plans. GAO reviewed data provided by OPM relating to FEHBP premiums and factors contributing to premium growth. For comparison purposes, GAO also examined premium data from the California Public Employees' Retirement System (CalPERS) and surveys of other public and private employers. GAO also interviewed officials from OPM and eight FEHBP plans with premium growth that was higher than average, and six FEHBP plans with premium growth that was lower than average to discuss premium growth trends and the variation in growth across plans.
What GAO Found
Growth in FEHBP premiums recently slowed, from a peak of 12.9 percent for 2002 to 1.8 percent for 2007. During this period FEHBP premium growth was generally slower than for other purchasers. Premium growth rates for the 10 largest FEHBP plans by enrollment ranged from 0 percent to 15.5 percent in 2007, while growth rates among smaller FEHBP plans varied more widely. The growth in average enrollee premium contributions--the share of total premiums paid by enrollees--was similar to the growth in total FEHBP premiums from 1994 through 2006, and was generally comparable with recent growth in enrollee premium contributions for surveyed employers. Projected increases in the cost and utilization of health care services and in the cost of prescription drugs accounted for most of the average premium growth increases for 2000 through 2007. Other factors, including benefit changes resulting in less generous coverage and enrollee migration to lower cost plans, were projected to slightly offset premium increases. In 2006 and 2007, projected withdrawals from reserves significantly helped offset the effect of other factors on premium growth. Officials from most of the plans with higher-than-average premium growth cited increases in the cost and utilization of services as well as a high share of elderly enrollees and early retirees. GAO's analysis of financial and enrollment data found that these plans generally experienced faster-than-average growth in the cost and utilization of services and faster-than-average growth in their share of elderly enrollees and retirees in recent years. Officials from most of the plans with lower-than-average premium growth cited adjustments for previously overestimated projections of cost growth. Officials also cited benefit changes that resulted in less generous coverage for prescription drugs. GAO's analysis of financial data provided by these plans found that that their increase in per enrollee expenditures for prescription drugs was significantly lower than average in recent years. In commenting on a draft of this report, OPM said the draft confirms that growth in average FEHBP premiums has slowed and has been lower than that of other large employer purchasers for the last several years. |
gao_GAO-09-779T | gao_GAO-09-779T_0 | Background
Under the DERP, DOD is authorized to identify, investigate and clean up environmental contamination and other hazards at FUDS as well as active installations. DOD delegated its authority for administering the cleanup of FUDS to the Army, which in turn delegated its execution to the Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps). Shortcomings in the Use of Available Information and Guidance Can Lead to Poor Decision-making
When we reviewed the Spring Valley cleanup in 2002, we found that the Army determined that there was no evidence of large–scale burials of hazards remaining at Spring Valley before it received all technical input. Our review of other FUDS nationwide found significant shortcomings in the Corps’ use of available information and guidance for making decisions relating to cleanup of contamination at these sites. For example, in 2002, we reported that the Corps did not have a sound basis for determining that about 1,468 of 3,840 FUDS properties––38 percent––did not need further study or cleanup action. We found that these problems occurred in part because the Corps’ guidance did not specify (1) what documents or level of detail the agency should obtain when looking for information on the prior uses of and the facilities located at FUDS properties to identify potential hazards or (2) how to assess the presence of potential hazards. Incomplete Data on Site Conditions and Emerging Contaminants Can Interfere With the Development of Accurate Cost Estimates and Schedules
At Spring Valley, the Corps’ estimate of the cost to complete cleanup of the site increased by about six fold––from about $21 million to about $124 million––from fiscal year 1997 through 2001. As these assumptions have changed, the cost to cleanup Spring Valley has continued to rise where the most recent estimate for fiscal year 2007 is $173.7 million. The challenges of estimating the costs of the Spring Valley cleanup are common to many FUDS, and our past work has shown that incomplete data on site conditions and emerging contaminants can interfere with the development of accurate cost and schedule estimates. For example, in 2004, we evaluated DOD’s MMRP program and found several weaknesses in preliminary cost estimates for numerous sites. Funding Available for a Particular Site May Be Influenced by Overall Program Goals and Other Priorities
Spring Valley has received priority funding due to its proximity to the nation’s capitol and high visibility; however, our past work shows that this is not the case with most FUDS. Over the past 10 years DOD has invested nearly $42 billion in its environmental programs, which include compliance, restoration, natural resources conservation, and pollution prevention activities. DOD requests separate funding amounts for active sites and FUDS cleanup programs based on specific DERP restoration goals and the total number of sites in each program’s inventory. Better Coordination and Communication with Regulators and Property Owners Can Increase Public Confidence and Facilitate Effective Decision-making
In our 2002 report on Spring Valley, we reported that the Corps, EPA and the District of Columbia had made progress on site cleanup by adopting a partnership approach for making cleanup decisions. However, we have found that this kind of cooperation and coordination does not always occur at other sites nationwide. We reported that federal and state regulators believed that better coordination with the Corps regarding cleanup at FUDS would increase public confidence in the cleanups and improve their effectiveness. In addition to better coordination with regulators, our past work has shown that the Corps frequently did not notify property owners of its determinations that the properties did not need further action, as called for in its guidance, or instruct the owners to contact the Corps if evidence of DOD-caused hazards was found later. | Why GAO Did This Study
Under the Defense Environmental Restoration Program (DERP), the Department of Defense (DOD) has charged the Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps) with cleaning up 4,700 formerly used defense sites (FUDS) and active sites that were under its jurisdiction when they were initially contaminated. The 661-acre Spring Valley site in Washington, D.C is one such site. Like many other FUDS, the U.S. Army used the Spring Valley site during World War I for research and testing of chemical agents, equipment, and munitions. Most of the site is now privately owned and includes private residences, a hospital, and several commercial properties. The primary threats at the site are buried munitions, elevated arsenic in site soils, and laboratory waste; perchlorate was also found onsite. This testimony discusses GAO's past work relating to remediation efforts at FUDS and military munitions sites to provide context for issues at Spring Valley. Specifically, it addresses: (1) the impact that shortcomings in information and guidance can have on decision-making; (2) the impact that incomplete data can have on cost estimates and schedules; (3) how funding for a particular site may be influenced by overall program goals; and (4) how better coordination can increase public confidence in cleanups and facilitate effective decision-making. GAO has made several prior recommendations that address these issues, with which, in most cases, the agency concurred.
What GAO Found
GAO's past work has found significant shortcomings in the Corps' use of available information and guidance for making decisions relating to cleanup of FUDS. For example, in 2002, GAO found that the Army determined that there was no evidence of large-scale burials of hazards remaining at Spring Valley before it had received all technical input. This experience is not unique. In a 2002 national study, GAO reported that the Corps did not have a sound basis for determining that about 1,468 of 3,840 FUDS properties--38 percent--did not need further study or cleanup action. GAO attributed these shortcomings to limitations in the Corps guidance that did not specify what documents or level of detail the agency should obtain to identify potential hazards at FUDS or how to assess the presence of potential hazards. GAO's past work has also shown that incomplete data on site conditions and emerging contaminants can interfere with the development of accurate cost and schedule estimates. At Spring Valley, the Corps' estimates of cleanup costs increased by about six fold, from about $21 million to about $124 million from fiscal year 1997 through fiscal year 2001. As assumptions about site conditions changed and new hazards were discovered, the estimates continued to rise and currently stand at about $174 million. Again, these problems are not unique. In 2004, GAO evaluated DOD's cleanup of sites with military munitions and found several similar weaknesses in preliminary cost estimates for numerous sites across the country. GAO's past work has shown that funding available for specific sites may be influenced by overall program goals and other priorities. Spring Valley has received priority funding due to its proximity to a major metropolitan area and high visibility; however, GAO's past work shows that this is usually not the case with most FUDS sites. Over the past 10 years DOD has invested nearly $42 billion in its environmental programs, but it typically requests and receives a relatively smaller amount of funding for environmental restoration activities at FUDS sites compared to funding available for active sites. GAO's past work has found that better coordination and communication with regulators and property owners can increase public confidence and facilitate effective decision-making for contaminated sites. With regard to Spring Valley, GAO reported in 2002 that the Corps, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the District of Columbia had made progress because they had adopted a partnership approach to cleanup decisions. However, this kind of cooperation and coordination does not always occur nationwide. For example, in 2003, GAO reported that the Corps only informed states of upcoming work and requested input from them about half of the time. Similarly, GAO found that the Corps did not always communicate with property owners about the decisions it makes regarding contamination at FUDS sites and more often than not did not inform property owners about how to contact the Corps in the event that further hazardous substances were identified at the site. |
gao_GAO-01-210 | gao_GAO-01-210_0 | IDEA provides safeguards to ensure that children with disabilities who engage in misconduct are not unfairly deprived of educational services. Regular education and special education students alike had engaged in serious misconduct, but the rate among special education students was higher than that of regular education students. Despite little difference in the actions taken by schools in our survey to discipline regular education and special education students, a sizable minority of principals voiced concern that their schools’ discipline policies impeded proper disciplinary action. Although the 1997 IDEA amendments and final federal regulations gave schools more flexibility in handling discipline issues, our analysis showed that local school district policies can provide additional protections when compared with provisions in the final federal regulations. Where restrictive local policies are applied, they may alter the balance between protecting the rights of disabled students and ensuring that administrators are able to maintain the safe and orderly environment that the Congress and Education sought to achieve. Because the more common concerns we identified about different treatment for special education students resulted largely from local policy, changes to federal law will not address these concerns. | Why GAO Did This Study
Standards for discipline and safety in schools are set primarily by local school districts. Federal and local regulations provide additional protections to special education students who misbehave to ensure that they are not unfairly deprived of their rights to an appropriate education. GAO reviewed regular and special education discipline policies to determine whether there were any differences in how disabled and non-disabled students were disciplined.
What GAO Found
GAO found the rate of misconduct among special education students was higher than that of regular education students. Despite little difference in the actions taken by schools to discipline regular education and special education students, a sizeable minority of principals voiced concern that their schools' discipline policies impeded proper disciplinary action. Although the 1997 Individuals With Disabilities Education Act amendments and final federal regulations gave schools more flexibility in handling discipline issues, GAO's analysis showed that local school district policies can provide additional protections when compared with provisions in the final regulations. Restrictive local policies may alter the balance between protecting the rights of disabled students and ensuring that administrators are able to maintain a safe and orderly environment. Because the more common concerns GAO identified about different treatment for special education students resulted largely from local policy, changes in federal law will not address these concerns. |
gao_GAO-17-681SP | gao_GAO-17-681SP_0 | Issue Total funding for Diplomatic Security operations was almost $4.8 billion in fiscal year 2016. Total funding for Diplomatic Security includes its bureau managed funds as well as other funding—such as personnel salaries— managed by other bureaus and offices but necessary for Diplomatic Security operations. In response to a Benghazi Accountability Review Board recommendation, State established a panel to reexamine Diplomatic Security’s organization and management. As of May 2017, State was continuing to address this recommendation. What steps has State taken to address weaknesses in its waivers and exceptions program? At overseas posts, the Department of State’s (State) Bureaus of Diplomatic Security (Diplomatic Security)—represented by a Regional Security Officer (RSO)—and Overseas Buildings Operations share responsibility for the security of residences and other soft targets overseas. While State has taken measures to enhance security at its embassies and consulates since the 1998 East Africa embassy bombings, these same actions have given rise to concerns that would-be attackers may shift their focus to what they perceive as more accessible targets, such as diplomatic residences, schools, and other places frequented by U.S. personnel and their families. State has taken a variety of actions to manage risks to schools and other soft targets. Issue State has a robust security awareness training program provided by Diplomatic Security. State concurred with the recommendations and took steps to address them. State agreed with all of our recommendations and reported that it has started to address them. According to State and DOD officials, this represented a whole-of-government approach to countering threats to U.S. overseas personnel and facilities. Drawing from existing U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Army units, DOD created three dedicated military forces to respond to crises across Africa and the Middle East: (1) a Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force for Crisis Response (SPMAGTF-CR) assigned to DOD’s U.S. Central Command, which supports U.S. diplomatic missions in the Middle East; (2) a SPMAGTF-CR assigned to U.S. Africa Command, which supports U.S. missions in North and West Africa; and (3) the East Africa Response Force, a U.S. Army force that supports U.S. diplomatic missions in East Africa. State and DOD officials reported in June 2017 that they have experienced some challenges associated with deploying the increased MSG units, including obtaining sufficient numbers of marines to fill the desired number of units and logistical and other support at some posts. Background Issue The Department of State’s (State) Diplomatic Security and overseas posts have processes for Bureau of Diplomatic Security communicating threat information to post personnel (U.S. employees and (Diplomatic Security) is locally employed staff) as well as U.S. citizens in country. However, these responsible for disseminating populations do not always receive important threat information in a timely threat information to posts. Key Findings State has taken steps to improve RSOs’ reporting of terrorism-related threat information to headquarters. Foreign intelligence entities from host nations and third parties are motivated to collect information on a variety of sensitive topics of national importance, including intelligence, defense, and economic information. Key Findings State has established several measures to counter the human intelligence threat at overseas posts. Those measures include (1) requiring all State and other agency personnel serving at these posts to report contacts with foreign nationals, particularly those from countries with critical human intelligence posts; (2) prescreening State personnel assigned to certain posts against 13 criteria designed to identify vulnerabilities and directing other agencies to prescreen their personnel; and (3) briefing personnel about what to expect when working and living in potentially hostile intelligence environments. 11.) Issue Since 1997, GAO has designated federal information security as a government-wide high-risk area and in 2003 expanded this area to include computerized systems supporting the nation’s critical infrastructure. State relies on several aging and obsolete technology systems, which require significant resources to operate and create challenges to ensuring information security. State has convened 12 ARBs since 1998. In response to the attack, the Department of State (State), working with the Department of Defense, formed Interagency Security Assessment Teams to evaluate the security at 19 dangerous posts. As of June 2017, State reported having addressed 268 of the 287 recommendations. In December 2012, the ARB that State convened to investigate the Benghazi attack released the report of its investigation. We used these interviews to refine our key issues, gain updated information and data, follow up on actions taken regarding our past recommendations, and identify relevant lessons learned. Diplomatic Security staffing numbers for its workforce of direct-hire employees, other U.S. government support staff, and contractors. State also collaborates with other U.S. government agencies to secure U.S. missions overseas. Appendix V: GAO Recommendations regarding the Bureau of Diplomatic Security
Over the course of our work on the Department of State’s (State) Bureau of Diplomatic Security (Diplomatic Security) and related efforts, we have identified conditions that affect the success of its programs and recommended a range of improvements that should be considered in program planning and implementation. In letters addressed to the Secretary of State, we identified which of these recommendations we believe should be given high priority for implementation. Fully implementing GAO’s priority recommendations on physical security at overseas posts, such as those regarding risk management associated with physical security of diplomatic facilities, will improve the safety and security of personnel serving overseas, particularly in high-threat locations. Countering Overseas Threats: Gaps in State Department Management of Security Training May Increase Risk to U.S. Enclosure VI: Embassy Crisis and Evacuation Preparedness
Embassy Evacuations: State Should Take Steps to Improve Emergency Preparedness. Diplomatic Missions
Interagency Coordination: DOD and State Need to Clarify DOD Roles and Responsibilities to Protect U.S. Enclosure XI: Status of Recommendations Made in Reports following the Benghazi Attack
Diplomatic Security: Overseas Facilities May Face Greater Risks Due to Gaps in Security-Related Activities, Standards, and Policies. | Why GAO Did This Study
Terrorist attacks against U.S. diplomats and personnel overseas have led to increased attention of State's diplomatic security efforts. In this special publication, GAO identifies key issues affecting Diplomatic Security for Congressional oversight. These issues were identified from a body of related GAO work and State and other reports. GAO also interviewed U.S. officials from State and other agencies to obtain their views on key issues, obtain updated information and data, and follow up on actions they have taken on past GAO and other oversight report recommendations.
What GAO Found
In response to increasing threats to U.S. personnel and facilities at overseas diplomatic posts since 1998, the Department of State (State) has taken a number of steps to enhance its risk management and security efforts. State's Bureau of Diplomatic Security (Diplomatic Security) leads many of these efforts with assistance from other bureaus and U.S. government agencies. Given the ongoing threats and the amount of resources needed to counter them, GAO has identified 11 key issues regarding Diplomatic Security that warrant significant Congressional oversight to monitor the cost, progress, and impact:
Diplomatic Security Funding : Diplomatic Security funding has increased considerably in reaction to a number of security incidents overseas and domestically. In fiscal year 2016, total funding for Diplomatic Security operations--which includes its bureau managed funds as well as other funding such as personnel salaries--was almost $4.8 billion.
Diplomatic Security Staffing Challenges : Diplomatic Security's workforce--including 3,488 direct-hire, 1,989 other U.S. government, and 45,870 contract personnel--continues to grow. However, potential challenges exist regarding the distribution of domestic and overseas positions, posting fully qualified individuals in the assignments with the greatest needs, and ongoing efforts to fill language-designated positions.
Physical Security of U.S. Diplomatic Facilities : Diplomatic Security and the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations collaborate to meet safety standards when constructing new embassies and mitigating risks at existing facilities. However, GAO made recommendations to address gaps in State's security related activities and processes.
Physical Security of Diplomatic Residences and Other Soft Targets : State has taken steps to address residential security vulnerabilities and manage risks at schools and other soft targets overseas. However, GAO recommended actions to address weaknesses in State's efforts.
Security Training Compliance : While State has robust security training requirements, it lacks consistent monitoring and enforcement processes, particularly for its Foreign Affairs Counter Threat training and for security refresher briefings at posts.
Embassy Crisis and Evacuation Preparedness : Gaps in State's implementation and monitoring of crisis and evacuation preparedness could endanger staff assigned to overseas posts and the family members accompanying them. GAO has recommended actions to address these issues.
Department of Defense (DOD) Support to U.S. Diplomatic Missions : Following the Benghazi attacks, DOD increased its support to U.S. diplomatic missions by creating dedicated military forces to respond to crises and expanding the Marine Security Guard program at overseas missions. However, State and DOD reported that they have experienced some logistical and other challenges.
Dissemination of Threat Information : State has processes for communicating threat information to post personnel and U.S. citizens in-country. However, post personnel--including locally employed staff--have not always received important information in a timely manner. GAO has recommended steps State needs to take to address this concern.
Countering Human Intelligence Threats : Foreign intelligence entities from host nations and third parties are motivated to collect information on U.S. operations and intentions. State has established measures to counter the human intelligence threat and works with other U.S. government agencies to identify and assess this threat.
Ensuring Information Security : GAO has designated federal information security as a government-wide high-risk area and made recommendations to address these issues. State faces evolving threats and challenges to maintaining obsolete technology, defining clear roles and responsibilities for information security, and overseeing technology contractors.
Status of Recommendations Made in Reports following the Benghazi Attack : In response to the Benghazi attack, State formed interagency teams to evaluate the security at 19 dangerous posts, convened an Accountability Review Board (ARB) to investigate the attack, and established panels to conduct further assessments. As of June 2017, State reported having addressed recommendations as follows: 268 of 287 made by the interagency teams, 26 of 29 by the ARB, and 64 of 75 by the panels.
What GAO Recommends
While State has taken steps to close recommendations made in past GAO reports, GAO identified 27 open recommendations from these reports (as of August 2017) that it believes should be given high priority for implementation. Of the 27 priority recommendations, 24 were related to diplomatic security. |
gao_GGD-97-91 | gao_GGD-97-91_0 | We also used the financial statements to determine the amount of transfers to the tribes. The transfers as described in this report represent the amounts in the financial statements allocated to the “tribes.” The amounts could have been received by the tribal government or tribal members, but we were not able to determine this because the financial statements did not indicate how the transfers were used or who received them. We obtained comments on a draft of this report from the Internal Revenue Service, the Department of the Interior, and the Chair of NIGC. More Than Half of Continental U.S. Tribes Operated Gaming Facilities
According to information provided by NIGC, 184 of the 555 Indian tribes officially recognized by the United States were operating a total of 281 gaming facilities as of December 31, 1996. Revenues From Indian Gaming Facilities Exceeded $4 Billion
From our analyses of the 178 gaming facilities’ financial statements, we found that reported gaming revenues were about $4.5 billion and revenues from other activities, such as food, beverages, and hotel rooms, were over $300 million (see table 1). About 90 percent of the facilities generated net income, and about 10 percent generated net losses. These 106 tribes operated 149 gaming facilities. Comparison of Indian Gaming With Other U.S. Legalized Gaming
Indian Gaming Revenues Represented at Least 10 Percent of the U.S. Market in 1995
Table 2 shows that Indian gaming revenues (class II and III) were at least 10 percent of the revenues estimated to have been generated by legal gaming in 1995 and compares Indian gaming to other legalized gaming. In addition, the average gaming revenues generated by class III Indian facilities and Nevada casinos were similar. A small proportion of both class III Indian facilities and Nevada casinos generated significant amounts in gaming revenues and accounted for a large share of their respective aggregate gaming revenues (see fig. Atlantic City casinos are not shown because their gaming revenues were more equally distributed. Operating Income as a Percentage of Total Revenues of Large Class III Indian Facilities Was Almost Twice That of Large Nevada and Atlantic City Casinos
Operating income as a percentage of total revenues for large class III Indian facilities was almost twice as much as that of large Nevada and Atlantic City casinos. With respect to tribes, IRS based its conclusion on the determination that the tribes are political agencies that Congress did not intend to include within the meaning of the income tax provisions of the Internal Revenue Code. Indian tribes are not, however, tax-exempt organizations within the meaning of the provisions of the Code that exempt certain categories of organizations from income tax. State-chartered Tribal Corporations Are Subject to Federal Income Tax. Payment of Other Federal Taxes. Because the payments are per capita distributions of gaming proceeds, they are generally subject to taxation when distributed. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Objectives
Our objectives in this report were to provide (1) an updated profile of the Indian gaming industry, (2) information on the amount of transfers to the tribes from their gaming facilities, (3) a comparison of Indian gaming revenues with the revenues generated by other legalized gaming activities, and (4) a summary of the federal tax treatment of Indian tribes and tribe members. For this time frame, NIGC had financial statements from 126 tribes representing 178 facilities. Gaming Revenues
Dollars wagered minus payouts. Net Income
Total revenues minus all costs and expenses. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided an updated profile of the Indian gaming industry, focusing on: (1) the amount of transfers to the tribes from their gaming facilities; (2) a comparison of Indian gaming revenues with the revenues generated by other legalized gaming activities; and (3) the federal tax treatment of Indian tribes and tribe members.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) as of December 31, 1996, 184 tribes were operating 281 gaming facilities; (2) for 178 of these facilities, operated by 126 tribes, GAO obtained and examined 1995 financial statements; (3) these 178 facilities reported generating gaming revenues (dollars wagered minus payouts) of about $4.5 billion, with 8 of them accounting for about 40 percent of these revenues; (4) the gaming facilities also reported generating over $300 million in revenues from sales such as food, beverages, and hotel rooms; (5) net income (total revenues minus expenses) reported for the 178 facilities was about $1.9 billion, representing 38 percent of the $4.9 billion total revenues; (6) according to the financial statements, about $1.6 billion was transferred to 106 tribes in 1995; (7) for 20 tribes, the financial statements did not show any transfers; (8) none of the financial statements indicated how the transfers were used by the tribes; (9) gaming revenues generated by all class II and class III Indian facilities for which GAO had financial statements equaled at least 10 percent of the estimated gaming revenues generated by legalized gaming reported by the gaming industry in 1995; (10) in the aggregate, 109 class III Indian facilities generated about the same total amount in gaming revenues as the 12 Atlantic City casinos and more than half the gaming revenues of the 213 Nevada casinos; (11) average gaming revenues for these Indian facilities were significantly less than those of Atlantic City casinos but about equal to the average for the Nevada casinos; (12) in terms of the distribution of gaming revenues among the facilities, class III Indian facilities were similar to Nevada casinos, a small proportion of the facilities accounted for a large share of the aggregate gaming revenues; (13) by contrast, the gaming revenues of the 12 Atlantic City casinos were more equally distributed; (14) the Internal Revenue Service has determined that Indian tribes are not subject to federal income tax because they are political agencies not included within the meaning of the income tax provisions of the Internal Revenue Code; (15) Indian tribes are not, however, tax-exempt organizations within the meaning of provisions of the Code that exempt certain categories of organizations from income tax; (16) individual tribe members are subject to federal income tax; and (17) payments of net revenues from gaming operations to members of Indian tribes are generally taxable, and the tribe is responsible for withholding income taxes from the payments. |
gao_GGD-99-3 | gao_GGD-99-3_0 | As a result, INS did not fully comply with the legal requirements that it (1) place criminal aliens who had committed aggravated felonies in removal proceedings while they are incarcerated or (2) take those aggravated felons into custody upon their release from prison. We requested that LESC conduct a search to determine whether any of these released inmates were potentially deportable criminal aliens. Specifically, for inmates with no records whom LESC determined to be potentially deportable criminal aliens, LESC further found that 33 percent of the 1995 sample were aggravated felons at the time that LESC made its determination, and 63 percent of the 1997 sample were aggravated felons. INS Did Not Complete the IHP for About One-Half of the Released Criminal Aliens, Resulting in Avoidable Detention Costs Amounting to Millions of Dollars
We performed an analysis of data on foreign-born inmates who, according to BOP and the corrections departments of the four states we reviewed, were released from their prison systems during the first 6 months of 1997 and, according to INS and EOIR data, were potentially deportable. Similar to our 1995 analysis, our current analysis of the 12,495 potentially deportable cases for which INS had records showed that INS was able to quickly remove those deportable aliens who had completed the IHP with final deportation orders before they were released from prison—75 percent were removed from the United States within 1 week of their prison release in both 1995 and 1997. Specifically, in 1995, 36 percent of such aliens were removed within 1 month, compared to 59 percent in 1997. INS has taken some action on most of the recommended program improvements; however, none of these actions had been fully implemented as of September 1998. This information is to be used to perform record checks in other databases to make a determination on an alien’s removability. INS Had Not Established Controls to Ensure That Proceedings for Aggravated Felons Are Initiated Before Prison Release
The law requires INS to take certain actions regarding criminal aliens who have been convicted of aggravated felonies beyond those actions required for other criminal aliens. As previously mentioned, INS is required by law to initiate and, to the extent possible, complete removal proceedings against aggravated felons while they are incarcerated and to take these felons into custody upon their release. In June 1998, a draft workload analysis model was submitted to the Office of the Executive Associate Commissioner for Field Operations. Furthermore, for fiscal year 1998, INS did not set goals for regional directors. Conclusions
INS has shown limited improvement in its IHP performance on the basis of our analysis of its 1997 program performance. This, coupled with INS’ limited progress in fully implementing our recommendations, suggests that INS still does not know whether it has identified all potentially deportable criminal aliens in the BOP and state prison systems. To accomplish this, we determined the extent to which deportable criminal aliens were included in the IHP, the extent to which INS completed removal hearings for deportable aliens during their time in prison or after their prison release, and whether INS had acted on recommenations that we made in our July 1997 testimony. GAO Estimate of Avoidable Detention Costs
Because most criminal aliens released from state and federal prisons in fiscal year 1997 had not completed the IHP, INS needed to detain these aliens until their removal hearings could be completed. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Immigration and Naturalization Service's (INS) Institutional Hearing Program's (IHP) performance during 1997, focusing on: (1) the extent to which deportable criminal aliens were included in the IHP; (2) the extent to which INS completed removal hearings for deportable aliens during their time in prison or after their prison release; and (3) whether INS had acted on recommendations that GAO made in its July 1997 testimony.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) INS' performance has shown limited improvement since 1995; (2) in 1995, INS' database of deportable aliens did not have records on about 34 percent of the released inmates included in GAO's analysis who had been identified by the states and the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) as foreign born; (3) about 32 percent of these were subsequently determined by INS' Law Enforcement Support Center (LESC) to be potentially deportable criminal aliens; (4) in 1997, INS had no records on 36 percent of such aliens, 27 percent of whom were determined by LESC to be potentially deportable criminal aliens; (5) although some of these inmates were United States citizens and some were ordered removed through means other than the IHP, a substantial number were aliens on whom INS did not have records; (6) in 1995, about 33 percent of these potentially deportable criminal aliens for whom INS did not have records were aggravated felons at the time of the analysis, as determined by LESC; (7) in GAO's analysis of 1997 data, 63 percent of the potentially deportable criminal aliens for whom INS did not have records were identified by LESC as being aggravated felons; (8) this is important because federal law requires INS to initiate removal proceedings for aggravated felons while they are incarcerated and, to the extent possible, complete deportation proceedings for these felons before their release from prison; (9) in 1995, INS did not complete the IHP before prison release for 57 percent of the potentially deportable criminal aliens for whom INS had records; as a result, INS incurred about $37 million in avoidable detention costs; (10) in 1997, INS did not complete the IHP for about 50 percent of these aliens; the avoidable detention costs were about $40 million; and (11) as of September 1998, INS had made limited progress in implementing GAO's recommendations, as follows: (a) INS had begun to establish an automated system for tracking potentially deportable criminal aliens in BOP facilities, but it had not determined whether it will be able to use this system to track potentially deportable criminal aliens in state prison systems; (b) INS had not taken specific actions to ensure that aggravated felons are placed in removal proceedings while they are incarcerated and then taken into custody upon their release from prison; (c) regarding resource issues, INS completed a draft workload analysis model in June 1998 that IHP managers intend to use to determine what resources are needed to accomplish program goals; and (d) INS has taken limited actions to improve its management practices. |
gao_AIMD-95-230 | gao_AIMD-95-230_0 | To reconcile annual debt service liabilities and total bonds payable from audited financial statements as of December 31, 1993, to the Leigh Fisher Associates report issued by Denver for the September 1994 bond sale, we reviewed these two reports in detail; reviewed audit workpapers prepared by Deloitte & Touche to document the methods they used to compute annual debt service and bonds payable; interviewed officials at DIA’s finance office and obtained explanations of methods used in computing debt service amounts in the Leigh Fisher Associates report; held discussions with DIA’s financial consultant, Leigh Fisher Associates, and obtained and reviewed detailed supporting schedules prepared by them; and reviewed DIA’s Plan of Finance prepared by First Albany Corporation, DIA’s bond financing consultant. To address the issue of SEC jurisdiction over municipal bonds and the status and scope of the SEC investigation at DIA, we met with SEC officials at SEC Headquarters in Washington, D.C., and held discussions with SEC investigators at their Denver office. Construction costs grew from a May 1990 budget of $2.08 billion to a total at airport opening of $3.004 billion, resulting from several substantial scope changes in the project. In addition to growth in DIA construction costs, delays caused by problems with the automated baggage system cost an additional $300 million in capitalized interest. It is important to note that these two financial reports, while closely related, had different purposes and covered different time periods and scopes. Annual debt service amounts, $69 million to $118 million a year lower, were reported in the Leigh Fisher Associates report based on certain assumptions about future events including (1) successful refinancing of the 1984/85 bonds, (2) prepayment of certain bonds with the proceeds of FAA grants, and (3) lower than maximum interest rates on variable rate bonds. Another primary reason for lower annual debt service amounts in the Leigh Fisher Associates report was the assumption that estimated passenger facility charge (PFC) revenues would be used to reduce debt service amounts. Information in these financial reports differed because the financial statements included all debt of the Denver Airport System (including DIA and Stapleton debt), whereas the Leigh Fisher Associates report was using Exhibit B to present only those bonds that provided funds to cover DIA construction and capitalized interest costs. Figure 3 and its accompanying notes present details on the differences between the two financial reports. SEC Issues
While municipal securities are exempt from the registration requirements and civil liability provisions of the Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934, they are not exempt from the antifraud provisions of those acts. The SEC is currently investigating DIA’s disclosures of information related to baggage system issues, to include all Official Statements and supporting documentation covering the period 1990 to the present. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed selected financial issues relating to the Denver International Airport (DIA), focusing on: (1) DIA construction cost growth; (2) differences between the DIA financial consultant's report and audited financial statements relating to the Denver Airport System's bond debt; and (3) Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) jurisdiction over municipal bonds and the status and scope of its DIA investigation.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) DIA construction costs increased from an estimated $2.08 billion in May 1990 to $3.004 billion in February 1995; (2) the cost increases were due to changes in the scope of DIA and capitalized interest increased by $300 million due to the delay in DIA opening; (3) the two financial reports on DIA differed mainly due to their different purposes and the different time periods and scopes covered; (4) the financial statements covered both DIA and the Stapleton International Airport, while the consultant's report presented financial forecasts only for DIA based on certain assumptions about future events; (5) the differences in annual bond debt payments reflected the consultant's assumption that certain bonds would be refinanced in 1995, bond principal would be prepaid, lower interest rates would be paid on variable rate bonds, and passenger facility charges would be used to reduce annual debt service amounts; (6) the audited financial statements included all airport system debts while the consultant's report included only DIA construction bond debt; (7) municipal bonds are exempt from securities registration requirements and civil liability provisions, but they are subject to antifraud provisions; and (8) SEC is investigating DIA disclosures of its baggage system issues under its antifraud authority. |
gao_GAO-11-297 | gao_GAO-11-297_0 | Moreover, it has yet to adequately address managing the day-to-day operations when deploying staff to respond to federal disasters. Unless it takes further steps to address these management challenges, FEMA will be limited in its ability to manage NFIP’s operations or ensure program effectiveness. However, FIMA has not had a set of strategic goals and objectives to guide its administration of NFIP. FEMA has also faced challenges in the acquisition and oversight of its contractors, which are critical to NFIP. While these steps need to be taken, the extent to which they will ensure effective oversight of FEMA’s acquisition activities remains to be seen. A number of acquisition management weaknesses contributed to the project’s failure and cancellation, and as FEMA begins anew to modernize the existing legacy system, it plans to apply lessons learned from its NextGen experience. As mentioned earlier in this report, FEMA has already implemented some changes to its acquisition management practices. FEMA Cancelled Its NextGen Project in November 2009 and Continues to Rely on Outdated Existing System
NFIP currently uses a flood insurance policy and claims processing system that was developed 30 years ago. Acquisition Management Weaknesses Led to the Cancellation of NextGen
Weaknesses in several key system acquisition areas led to NextGen’s failure and cancellation. NFIP’s Operating Environment and External Factors Complicate Administration of the Program, and FEMA Lacks Authority in Areas Critical to Its Long-term Financial Health
NFIP’s operating environment differs from that of traditional insurers and limits FEMA’s ability to keep the program financially sound. In particular, NFIP assumes and retains all of the risks for the policies it sells, is required to accept virtually all applicants for insurance, and cannot deny coverage for potentially high-risk properties. These include lapses in NFIP’s authorization, the role of state and local governments, fluctuations in premium income, and structural and organizational changes that have been made. Finally, as noted in past GAO reports, NFIP also faces external challenges that will continue to threaten the program’s long-term financial health if they are not addressed. Conclusions
While FEMA has begun to take steps to address its issues, it faces significant management challenges in areas that affect NFIP, including strategic planning, human capital planning, collaboration among offices, records management, financial management, acquisition management, and business processes. Without this direction, NFIP lacks a strategic focus, and the agency is limited in its ability to develop effective performance measures to measure NFIP’s progress. In addition, FEMA has spent about 7 years and $40 million in its latest attempt to modernize NFIP’s insurance policy and claims management system. To improve FEMA’s policies, procedures, and systems for achieving NFIP’s program goals, we recommend that the Secretary of DHS direct the FEMA Administrator to take the following four actions: While waiting for DHS to implement an agencywide electronic document management system, consider the costs and benefits of implementing an interim system for FEMA and updating its document management policies and procedures. Matters for Congressional Consideration
As Congress considers NFIP reforms and reauthorization, it should consider ways to better ensure the long-term financial stability of the program, such as 1) allowing NFIP to charge full-risk premium rates to all property owners and providing assistance to some categories of owners to pay those premiums; 2) authorizing NFIP to account for long-term flood erosion in its flood maps; and 3) clarifying and expanding FEMA’s ability to increase premiums or discontinue coverage for owners of repetitive loss properties who do not mitigate their properties or refuse FEMA’s mitigation offers. Develop protocols for collaboration between program and support offices. Finally, DHS concurred with our last two recommendations for improving NFIP’s flood insurance policy and claims processing system. Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and Methodology
Significant management challenges affect the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) ability to administer the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP). Our objectives were to (1) analyze the extent to which FEMA’s key management practices—including strategic planning, human capital planning, records management, financial management, acquisition management, and intra-agency collaboration—affect the agency’s ability to administer NFIP; (2) identify lessons to be learned from the Next Generation Flood Insurance Management System (NextGen) program’s cancellation, including to what extent key acquisition management processes were followed on NextGen; and (3) describe factors that are relevant to NFIP operations and analyze limitations on FEMA’s authority that could affect its financial stability. Further, we reviewed relevant legislation, internal control standards, best practices, and external studies of FEMA’s management challenges. GAO-10-860. GAO’s High-Risk Program. | Why GAO Did This Study
The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) has been on GAO's high-risk list since March 2006 because of concerns about its long-term financial solvency and related operational issues. Significant management challenges also affect the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) ability to administer NFIP. This report examines (1) the extent to which FEMA's management practices affect the administration of NFIP; (2) lessons learned from the cancellation of FEMA's attempt to modernize NFIP's insurance management system; and (3) limitations on FEMA's authority that could affect NFIP's financial stability. To do this work, GAO reviewed internal control standards and best practices, analyzed agency documentation, reviewed previous work, and interviewed relevant agency officials.
What GAO Found
FEMA faces significant management challenges in areas that affect NFIP, including strategic and human capital planning; collaboration among offices; and records, financial, and acquisition management. For example, because FEMA has not developed goals, objectives, or performance measures for NFIP, it needs a strategic focus for ensuring program effectiveness. FEMA also faces human capital challenges, including high turnover and weaknesses in overseeing its many contractors. Further, FEMA needs a plan that would ensure consistent day-to-day operations when it deploys staff to federal disasters. FEMA has also faced challenges in collaboration between program and support offices. Finally, FEMA lacks a comprehensive set of processes and systems to guide its operations, in particular a records management policy and an electronic document management system. FEMA has begun to address some of these challenges, including acquisition management, but the results of its efforts remain to be seen. Unless it takes further steps to address these management challenges, FEMA will be limited in its ability to manage NFIP's operations or better ensure program effectiveness. FEMA also faces challenges modernizing NFIP's insurance policy and claims management system. After 7 years and $40 million, FEMA ultimately canceled its latest effort (NextGen) in November 2009 because the system did not meet user expectations. As a result, the agency continues to rely on an ineffective and inefficient 30-year old system. A number of acquisition management weaknesses led to NextGen's failure and cancellation, and as FEMA begins a new effort to modernize the existing legacy system, it plans to apply lessons learned from its NextGen experience. While FEMA has begun implementing some changes to its acquisition management practices, it remains to be seen if they will help FEMA avoid some of the problems that led to NextGen's failure. Developing appropriate acquisitions processes and applying lessons learned from the NextGen failure are essential if FEMA is to develop an effective policies and claims processing system for NFIP. Finally, NFIP's operating environment limits FEMA's ability to keep the program financially sound. NFIP assumes all risks for its policies, must accept virtually all applicants for insurance, and cannot deny coverage for high-risk properties. Moreover, additional external factors--including lapses in NFIP's authorization, the role of state and local governments, fluctuations in premium income, and structural and organizational changes--complicate FEMA's administration of NFIP. As GAO has previously reported, NFIP also faces external challenges that threaten the program's long-term health. These include statutorily required subsidized premium rates, a lack of authority to include long-term erosion in flood maps, and limitations on FEMA's authority to encourage owners of repetitive loss properties to mitigate. Until these issues are addressed, NFIP's long-term financial solvency will remain in doubt.
What GAO Recommends
GAO makes 10 recommendations to improve the effectiveness of FEMA's planning and oversight efforts for NFIP; improve FEMA's policies and procedures for achieving NFIP's goals; and increase the usefulness and reliability of NFIP's flood insurance policy and claims processing system. GAO also presents three matters for congressional consideration to improve NFIP's financial stability. DHS concurred with all of GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-06-901T | gao_GAO-06-901T_0 | These employers are required to additionally attest that: (1) they did not displace a U.S. worker within the period of 90 days before and 90 days after filing a petition for an H-1B worker; (2) they took good faith steps prior to filing the H-1B application to recruit U.S. workers and that they offered the job to a U.S. applicant who was equally or better qualified than an H-1B worker; and (3) prior to placing the H-1B worker with another employer, they inquired and have no knowledge as to that employer’s action or intent to displace a U.S. worker within the 90 days before and 90 days after the placement of the H-1B worker with that employer. Labor Does Not Use Its Full Authority to Oversee Employers’ Compliance with Program Requirements
Labor’s H-1B authority is limited in scope, but it does not use its full authority to oversee employers’ compliance with program requirements. Labor’s review of employers’ applications to hire H-1B workers overlooks some inaccuracies, such as applications containing invalid employer identification numbers. WHD investigates complaints made against H-1B employers and recently began random investigations of some employers who had previously violated program requirements. Labor uses education as the primary method of promoting employers’ compliance with the H-1B program. We found that of the 960,563 applications that Labor electronically reviewed from January 2002 through September 2005, it certified 99.5 percent. Labor’s review of the application is limited by law to identifying omissions or obvious inaccuracies. For example, although the overall percentage was small, we found 3,229 applications that were certified even though the wage rate on the application was lower than the prevailing wage for that occupation in the specific location (see table 1). As shown in table 2, we found that the number of complaints increased from 117 in fiscal year 2000 to 173 in fiscal year 2005, and the number of cases with violations more than doubled, along with a corresponding increase in the number of employer penalties. In fiscal year 2000, Labor required employers to pay back wages totaling $1.2 million to 206 H-1B workers; by fiscal year 2005, back wages penalties had increased to $5.2 million for 604 workers. From 2000 through 2005, Labor’s district offices conducted six presentations on H-1B compliance. Additionally, Labor posts guidance and fact sheets on its web site. Labor and Homeland Security Face Challenges Sharing Information
Labor, Homeland Security, and Justice all have responsibilities under the H-1B program, but Labor and Homeland Security face challenges sharing information that could help identify possible program violations. In addition to Homeland Security, Labor also shares enforcement responsibilities with Justice, which pursues charges filed by U.S. workers who allege that they were not hired or were displaced because of an H-1B worker. Labor and Homeland Security Coordinate to Process Employers’ Requests to Hire H-1B Workers, but Do Not Use Certain Information to Investigate Possible Violations
Homeland Security reviews Labor’s certified application as part of the adjudication process; however, it cannot easily verify whether employers have submitted petitions for more workers than originally requested on the application. During the process of reviewing employers’ petitions, USCIS may find evidence the employer is not meeting the requirements of the H-1B program, but current law precludes Labor’s Wage and Hour Division from using this information to initiate an investigation of the employer. If the employer is unable to adequately explain the discrepancy, USCIS may deny the petition but does not have a formal mechanism for reporting these discrepancies to Labor. Of the 97 investigations closed, Justice found discriminatory conduct in 6 cases, and assessed $7,200 in penalties in 3 of the 6 cases, all in 2003. GAO-06-720. | Why GAO Did This Study
The H-1B visa program assists U.S. employers in temporarily filling certain occupations with highly-skilled foreign workers. There is considerable interest regarding how Labor, along with Homeland Security and Justice, is enforcing the requirements of the program. This testimony summarizes our report, GAO-06-720 , that describes how Labor carries out its H-1B program responsibilities and how Labor works with other agencies involved in the H-1B program.
What GAO Found
While Labor's H-1B authority is limited in scope, it does not use its full authority to oversee employers' compliance with program requirements. Labor's review of employers' applications to hire H-1B workers is timely, but lacks quality assurance controls and may overlook some inaccuracies. From January 2002 through September 2005, Labor electronically reviewed more than 960,000 applications and certified almost all of them. Labor's review of the applications is limited by law to checking for missing information or obvious inaccuracies and does this through automated data checks. However, in our analysis of Labor's data, we found more than 3,000 applications that were certified even though the wage rate on the application was lower than the prevailing wage for that occupation. We also found approximately 1,000 certified applications that contained erroneous employer identification numbers, which raises questions about the validity of the applications. In its enforcement efforts, Labor's Wage and Hour Division (WHD) investigates complaints made against H-1B employers. From fiscal year 2000 through fiscal year 2005, Labor reported an increase in the number of H-1B complaints and violations, and a corresponding increase in the number of employer penalties. In fiscal year 2000, Labor required employers to pay back wages totaling $1.2 million to 226 H-1B workers; by fiscal year 2005, back wage penalties had increased to $5.2 million for 604 workers. Program changes, such as a higher visa cap in some years, could have been a contributing factor. In April 2006, WHD began randomly investigating willful violators of the program's requirements. Labor uses education as its primary method of promoting compliance with the H-1B program by conducting compliance assistance programs and posting guidance on its web site. Labor, Homeland Security, and Justice all have responsibilities under the H-1B program, but Labor and Homeland Security face challenges sharing information. After Labor certifies an application, USCIS reviews it but cannot easily verify whether employers submitted petitions for more workers than originally requested on the application because USCIS's database cannot match each petition to Labor's application case number. Also, during the process of reviewing petitions, staff may find evidence that employers are not meeting their H-1B obligations. For example, Homeland Security may find that a worker's income on the W-2 is less than the wage quoted on the original application. USCIS may deny the petition if an employer is unable to explain the discrepancy, but it does not have a formal process for reporting the discrepancy to Labor. Moreover, current law precludes WHD from using this information to initiate an investigation of the employer. Labor also shares enforcement responsibilities with Justice, which pursues charges filed by U.S. workers who allege they were displaced by an H-1B worker. From 2000 through 2005, Justice found discriminatory conduct in 6 out of the 97 investigations closed, and assessed a total of $7,200 in penalties. |
gao_GAO-06-1015 | gao_GAO-06-1015_0 | In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, there is heightened concern that terrorists may try to smuggle nuclear or radiological materials into the United States. DOE Has Unique Capabilities and Assets to Prevent and Respond to a Nuclear or Radiological Attack in the United States
DOE has unique capabilities and assets to prevent and respond to a nuclear or radiological attack in the United States. These include specialized teams and equipment to search for, locate, and deactivate nuclear or radiological devices and to help manage the consequences of a nuclear or radiological attack. DOE’s Current Physical Security Measures May Not Be Sufficient to Protect Its Key Emergency Response Facilities
DOE’s two Remote Sensing Laboratories are protected at the lowest level of physical security allowed by DOE guidance because, according to DOE, their emergency response capabilities and assets have been dispersed across the country and are not concentrated at the laboratories. DOE Has Not Fully Dispersed the Capabilities and Assets at These Facilities, and Their Loss Would Significantly Hamper DOE’s Ability to Respond to Nuclear and Radiological Threats
Contrary to DOE’s assessment that the Remote Sensing Laboratories’ capabilities and assets have been fully dispersed to other parts of the country, we found that the laboratories housed a number of unique emergency response capabilities and assets whose loss would significantly undermine DOE’s ability to respond to a nuclear or radiological threat. The critical capabilities and assets that exist only at the laboratories include (1) the teams that help minimize the consequences of a nuclear or radiological attack, (2) the planes and helicopters designed to measure contamination levels and assist search teams in locating nuclear or radiological devices, and (3) a sophisticated mapping system that tracks contamination and the location of radiological sources in U.S. cities. Despite the Benefits of Conducting Aerial Background Radiation Surveys, They Remain Underutilized Because Neither DOE Nor DHS Has Mission Responsibility for Funding and Conducting Them
There are significant benefits to conducting aerial background radiation surveys of U.S. cities. Once surveys are complete, they can later be used to compare changes in radiation levels to (1) help detect radiological threats in U.S. cities more quickly and (2) measure radiation levels after a radiological attack to assist in and reduce the costs of cleanup efforts. Despite the benefits, there has been a survey of only one major U.S. city. A number of critical capabilities and assets for preventing and responding to nuclear and radiological attacks reside at DOE’s two Remote Sensing Laboratories. Because these capabilities and assets have not been fully dispersed, current physical security measures may not be sufficient for protecting the facilities against a terrorist attack. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Energy (DOE) maintains an emergency response capability to quickly respond to potential nuclear and radiological threats in the United States. This capability has taken on increased significance after the attacks of September 11, 2001, because there is heightened concern that terrorists may try to detonate a nuclear or radiological device in a major U.S. city. This report discusses (1) the capabilities and assets DOE has to prevent and respond to potential nuclear and radiological attacks in the United States, (2) the physical security measures in place at DOE's two key emergency response facilities and whether they are consistent with DOE guidance, and (3) the benefits of using DOE's aerial background radiation surveys to enhance emergency response capabilities.
What GAO Found
DOE has unique capabilities and assets to prevent and respond to a nuclear or radiological attack in the United States. These include specialized teams to search for, locate, and deactivate nuclear or radiological devices and to help manage the consequences of a nuclear or radiological attack. These capabilities are primarily found at DOE's two key emergency response facilities--the Remote Sensing Laboratories at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada, and Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland. DOE's two Remote Sensing Laboratories are protected at the lowest level of physical security allowed by DOE guidance because, according to DOE, capabilities and assets to prevent and respond to nuclear and radiological emergencies have been dispersed across the country and are not concentrated at the laboratories. However, we found a number of critical capabilities and assets that exist only at the Remote Sensing Laboratories and whose loss would significantly hamper DOE's ability to quickly prevent and respond to a nuclear or radiological emergency. These capabilities include the most highly trained teams for minimizing the consequences of a nuclear or radiological attack and the only helicopters and planes that can readily help locate nuclear or radiological devices or measure contamination levels after a radiological attack. Because these capabilities and assets have not been fully dispersed, current physical security measures may not be sufficient for protecting the facilities against a terrorist attack. There are significant benefits to conducting aerial background radiation surveys of U.S. cities. Specifically, the surveys can be used to compare changes in radiation levels to (1) help detect radiological threats in U.S. cities more quickly and (2) measure contamination levels after a radiological attack to assist in and reduce the costs of cleanup efforts. Despite the benefits, only one major city has been surveyed. Neither DOE nor the Department of Homeland Security has mission responsibility for conducting these surveys, and there are no plans to conduct additional surveys. |
gao_GGD-95-39 | gao_GGD-95-39_0 | To identify the possible effects of the plan on measuring taxpayer compliance, we talked to IRS officials responsible for planning the survey and reviewed documents describing the scope of the 1994 TCMP. Many Potential Improvements to TCMP Look Promising
Current plans indicate the 1994 TCMP will differ significantly from previous TCMP surveys, ranging from the sample design to the audit methods. Improved Sample Design
For the 1994 TCMP sample, IRS plans to audit over 150,000 tax returns filed by individuals, small corporations, S corporations, and partnerships—about 40,000 more returns than the aggregate for these entity types in prior surveys. This time, IRS plans to stratify taxpayers into 24 business (including 1 international business) and 3 nonbusiness (individuals) market segments. For each case, auditors are to receive 3 years of tax returns (1994 and the 2 prior years), information return transcripts, and other taxpayer-specific tax data. Improved Efforts to Identify Causes of Noncompliance
Unlike prior surveys, IRS plans to require auditors to identify the cause for most instances of noncompliance found on the return and determine the associated tax issue. It is important that IRS meet its October 1995 schedule to begin auditing tax year 1994 returns. IRS has not developed a compliance measure across the four entity types. IRS Had Not Planned to Collect Significant Compliance Data on Partnerships and S Corporations
The compliance of partnerships and S corporations is becoming an important issue as these entity types become a larger proportion of the business population. Partnerships report on Form 1065, “U.S. Without detailed information on the reasons for this noncompliance and the audit techniques used to identify the noncompliance, DORA sites will find it difficult to develop and test compliance strategies. A recorded menu will provide information on how to obtain these lists. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP), focusing on: (1) program plans for tax year 1994; and (2) the plans' potential effects on measuring taxpayer compliance.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the 1994 TCMP survey will differ significantly from previous surveys and include over 150,000 tax returns from individuals, small corporations, partnerships, and S corporations; (2) IRS plans to analyze survey results by types of businesses and individuals and measure compliance on both a national and smaller geographical area basis; (3) IRS plans to use computers to record audit adjustments, tax issues, and the reasons for the adjustments, provide auditors with tax return data for 1992 through 1994 and other tax information on each taxpayer, use an economic reality audit technique to compare the taxpayer's lifestyle to the information reported on the tax return, and identify the causes of noncompliance and the associated tax; (4) IRS has not met its timetable for TCMP planning decisions which jeopardizes its planned October 1995 start date for the survey; (5) IRS is addressing its lack of a research plan and its lack of data on partnerships and S corporations; and (6) IRS plans to collect information on employees who incorrectly file as self-employed and other known compliance problems, and develop a mechanism to retrieve TCMP audit workpapers for researchers. |
gao_HEHS-97-67 | gao_HEHS-97-67_0 | This technology is expected to affect health care providers, payers, and consumers in both the public and private sectors. Telemedicine is also expected to impact how medical care is delivered, who delivers it, and who pays for it. Although many players throughout the federal government and the private sector are involved in telemedicine, the Department of Defense (DOD) is considered a leader in research related to telemedicine efforts. What Is Telemedicine? As a result, HHS organized the Joint Working Group on Telemedicine (JWGT). Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
As a result of congressional concerns about the federal government’s role in advancing telemedicine, the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Research and Development, House National Security Committee, asked us to help determine the steps that DOD and the federal government need to take to realize the full potential of telemedicine and achieve cooperation with the private sector. Specifically, this report addresses the (1) scope of public and private telemedicine investments; (2) telemedicine strategies among DOD, other federal agencies, and the private sector; (3) potential benefits that the public and private sectors may yield from telemedicine initiatives; and (4) barriers facing telemedicine implementation. Estimates of telemedicine and related technology investments in the private sector have not been quantified because telemedicine costs are difficult to separate from health care delivery costs and most cost data is proprietary. However, as table 2.1 shows, the federal government invested at least $646 million for fiscal years 1994-96. Other Federal Agencies Invest in a Range of Telemedicine Activities
Eight civilian federal departments or independent agencies with various roles in providing or supporting health care delivery invested $384 million in telemedicine from fiscal years 1994 to 1996. Federal Government Does Not Have a Strategy to Maximize Value of Telemedicine Investments
No overarching, governmentwide strategy exists to ensure that the most is gained from numerous federal telemedicine efforts. However, we did not evaluate the program, since it was beyond the scope of our review. No comprehensive studies have been completed to prove that telemedicine delivers cost-effective, quality care. However, it is impossible to determine the full scope of these initiatives. DOD is currently the largest federal investor with $262 million. Successful expansion and sustainment of telemedicine will require resolution of many legal and regulatory, financial, technical, and cultural barriers. Some of the more critical barriers, such as licensure, privacy, and infrastructure costs, are too broad and have implications too far-reaching for any single sector to address. In addition, the proposed strategy should include approaches and actions needed to establish a means to formally exchange information or technology among the federal government, state organizations, and private sector; foster collaborative partnerships to take advantage of other telemedicine investments; identify needed technologies that are not being developed by the public or private sector; promote interoperable system designs that would enable telemedicine technologies to be compatible, regardless of where they are developed; encourage adoption of appropriate standardized medical records and data systems so that information may be exchanged among sectors; overcome barriers so that investments can lead to better health care; and encourage federal agencies and departments to develop and implement individual strategic plans to support national goals and objectives. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the steps that the federal government needs to take to realize the full potential of telemedicine and achieve cooperation with the private sector, focusing on: (1) the scope of public and private telemedicine investments; (2) telemedicine strategies among the Department of Defense (DOD), other federal agencies, and the private sector; (3) potential benefits that the public and private sectors may yield from telemedicine initiatives; and (4) barriers facing telemedicine implementation.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) collectively, the public and private sectors have funded hundreds of telemedicine projects that could improve, and perhaps change significantly, how health care is provided in the future; (2) however, the amount of the total investment is unknown; (3) 9 federal departments and independent agencies invested at least $646 million in telemedicine projects from fiscal years 1994 to 1996; (4) DOD is the largest federal investor with $262 million and considered a leader in developing this technology; (5) state-supported telemedicine initiatives are growing; (6) estimates of private sector involvement are impossible to quantify because most cost data are proprietary and difficult to separate from health care delivery costs; (7) opportunities exist for federal agencies to share lessons learned and exchange technology, but no governmentwide strategy exists to ensure that the maximum benefits are gained from the numerous federal telemedicine efforts; (8) the Joint Working Group on Telemedicine (JWGT) is the first mechanism structured to help coordinate federal programs; (9) however, its efforts to develop a federal inventory, a critical starting point for coordination, have been hampered by definitional issues and inconsistent data; (10) in addition, DOD and other federal departments do not have strategic plans to help guide their telemedicine investments, assess benefits, and foster partnerships; (11) telemedicine is an area in which public and private benefits converge; (12) many anecdotal examples demonstrate how telemedicine could improve access and quality to medical care and reduce health care costs; (13) however, comprehensive, scientific evaluations have not been completed to demonstrate the cost benefits of telemedicine; (14) the expansion of telemedicine is hampered by legal and regulatory, financial, technical, and cultural barriers facing health care providers; (15) some barriers are too broad and have implications too far-reaching for any single sector to address; (16) telemedicine technology today is not only better than it was decades ago, it is becoming cheaper; (17) consequently, the questions facing telemedicine today involve not so much whether it can be done but rather where investments should be made and who should make them; (18) the solution lies in the public and private sectors' ability to jointly devise a means to share information and overcome barriers; and (19) the goal is to ensure that an affordable telecommunications infrastructure is in place and that the true merits and cost benefits of telemedicine are attained in the most appropriate manner. |
gao_GAO-16-456 | gao_GAO-16-456_0 | Background
The Tongass, one of 154 national forests managed by the Forest Service, is located in southeast Alaska and is the largest national forest in the country (see fig. In 2010, USDA announced its intent to transition the Tongass timber program to one predominantly based on young growth. The Forest Service expects to issue a final EIS describing the agency’s final decision regarding how it will implement the planned transition in December 2016. Forest Service Has Initiated Steps to Assess the Economic Viability of a Young- Growth Timber Industry in the Tongass
The Forest Service has initiated some steps to assess whether its planned transition to young-growth harvest in the Tongass is likely to support a viable timber industry in southeast Alaska—one of the key goals laid out in the Secretary of Agriculture’s 2013 memorandum discussing the transition. Forest Service officials told us the agency has also begun an effort to compare the potential market prices for young-growth timber or products to the cost to harvest, transport, and process the timber. Forest Service Has Estimated the Volume of Young-Growth Timber Available for Harvest in the Tongass
One key factor in the viability of the timber industry in southeast Alaska is the volume of timber—both young growth and old growth—available to be harvested. Forest Service officials said the study’s results may help the agency assess the economic viability of a Tongass young-growth timber industry. Federal Agencies Have Taken Steps to Implement Some Actions They Identified to Support the Timber Industry and Other Economic Sectors during the Transition
USDA and the Forest Service identified various actions they and other federal agencies would take to support the timber industry and other economic sectors during the transition to young-growth harvest in the Tongass, and the agencies have taken steps to implement some of these actions. These actions, which are identified in three documents issued by USDA and the Forest Service since 2010, focus on four economic sectors in southeast Alaska: timber, fishing and aquaculture, tourism and recreation, and renewable energy. However, the agencies have not implemented other actions they said they would take, because of other priorities or consideration of other approaches, according to agency officials. For example:
The USDA Investment Strategy in Support of Rural Communities in Southeast Alaska 2011-2013 stated the Forest Service would improve its Tongass timber planning processes by simplifying small timber sales to assist small-mill owners. This action provided small-mill owners with flexibility to harvest at more-advantageous times, according to Forest Service officials. For example:
The Investment Strategy stated that the Forest Service would increase guided access to public land. The agency has taken some initial steps to do so. Stakeholders Identified Options They Said Would Improve Management of the Tongass Timber Program While Expressing Divergent Opinions about the Program’s Overall Direction
Representatives we interviewed from the 30 selected Forest Service stakeholder organizations identified a variety of options they said would improve the agency’s management of the Tongass timber program. Stakeholders Identified Various Options for Improving the Management of the Tongass Timber Program
Options stakeholders identified for improving the Forest Service’s management of the Tongass timber program included: Improving predictability of timber available for sale. The majority of the seven timber industry stakeholders we interviewed told us the Forest Service does not offer a predictable amount of timber for sale from year to year. These stakeholders emphasized the importance of predictability for the timber industry to be able to make decisions about how to retool to accommodate young-growth trees—which they said is important given potential changes to the industry as a result of the planned transition. As part of this effort, Forest Service officials told us they have coordinated with the Alaska Division of Forestry on the timing of timber sales to try to ensure a more predictable and even flow of timber offered to the timber industry. Similarly, the Tongass Advisory Committee emphasized the need for the Forest Service to become more flexible and responsive to timber industry and community interests for the transition to be successful. We selected stakeholders to provide a range of perspectives on the Forest Service’s management of the Tongass National Forest timber program. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Tongass National Forest, managed by the Forest Service within USDA, is located in southeast Alaska and is the nation's largest national forest. Since the early 20th century, the Tongass has had a timber program based on harvesting old-growth trees, which are generally more than 150 years old. In 2010, USDA announced its intent to transition the Tongass timber program to primarily harvest young growth, in part to help conserve remaining old-growth forest while maintaining a viable timber industry. As part of the planned transition, the Forest Service and other federal agencies identified actions they would take to support several economic sectors in southeast Alaska.
This report describes (1) steps the Forest Service has taken to assess whether its planned transition will meet the agency's goal regarding a viable timber industry in southeast Alaska, (2) the status of actions the Forest Service and other federal agencies stated they would take to support the timber industry and other economic sectors during the transition, and (3) options suggested by agency stakeholders for improving the Forest Service's management of the Tongass timber program. GAO reviewed laws and agency documents related to the Tongass and interviewed federal agency officials and representatives from a nongeneralizable sample of 30 stakeholder organizations—including tribal, state, and local governments and industry and conservation entities—selected to provide a range of perspectives.
The Forest Service generally agreed with GAO's findings.
What GAO Found
The Forest Service has initiated some steps to assess whether its planned transition to young-growth harvest on the Tongass National Forest will support a viable timber industry in southeast Alaska—a goal the Department of Agriculture (USDA) established as part of the transition. For example, the Forest Service reported refining the data it uses to estimate the amount of young-growth timber to be available for harvest over the next 100 years. Forest Service officials stated the agency also began a study in 2015, partly in response to a recommendation that year from a USDA-convened advisory committee, to compare potential market prices for young-growth timber or products to the cost to harvest and process the timber, information that may help the agency assess the economic viability of a young-growth industry in the region. The agency expects the initial results from the study to be available in 2017.
USDA and the Forest Service identified various actions they and other federal agencies would take to support four economic sectors—timber, fishing and aquaculture, tourism and recreation, and renewable energy—during the transition to young-growth harvest on the Tongass, and the agencies have taken steps to implement some of these actions. For example, USDA stated that the Forest Service would improve its planning processes to assist the owners of small timber mills in the Tongass. According to Forest Service officials and documents, the agency has lengthened the duration of some timber sales to provide small timber mills some flexibility on when to harvest in the Tongass. However, the agencies have not implemented other actions identified. For example, the Forest Service has not implemented proposed funding increases for improving fish habitat and tourism facilities in the Tongass because of other spending priorities, according to Forest Service officials.
Representative from the 30 stakeholder organizations GAO interviewed identified options they said would improve the agency's management of the Tongass timber program. These options include improving the predictability of timber available for sale and increasing the agency's focus on small timber mills and other timber-related businesses. Forest Service officials said they have taken some steps to address these options. For example, the majority of the timber industry stakeholders GAO interviewed emphasized the importance of the Forest Service offering a predictable amount of timber for sale from year to year for the timber industry to be able to make decisions about how to retool to accommodate smaller-diameter trees—which they said is important given potential changes to the industry with the planned transition to harvest young-growth trees. In an effort to improve predictability, the Forest Service has coordinated with the Alaska Division of Forestry on the timing of timber sales to try to ensure a more predictable and even flow of timber. However, stakeholders also expressed divergent opinions regarding the overall direction of the Tongass timber program, including the volume and location of timber to be harvested. |
gao_GAO-12-845 | gao_GAO-12-845_0 | EPA’s Two-Phase Screening and Review Process Has Identified Few Industrial Categories for New or Revised Effluent Guidelines
EPA uses a two-phase process to review industrial categories potentially in need of new or revised effluent guidelines; from 2003 through 2010, the agency identified few such categories. Since 2003, EPA has annually screened all industrial categories subject to effluent guidelines, as well as other industrial categories that could be subject to new guidelines; it has identified 12 categories for further review and selected 3 categories to update or to receive new effluent guidelines. In ranking industrial categories during the screening phase, EPA considers the extent to which discharged pollutants threaten human health and the environment—the first factor identified in EPA’s 2002 draft strategy. EPA’s Further Review Phase Results in Few Industrial Categories to Consider for Potential New or Revised Effluent Guidelines
In its further review phase, EPA conducts detailed studies of any industrial categories identified in its screening phase, using the four factors listed in its November 2002 draft strategy to determine whether the categories need new or revised effluent guidelines. Focus on Limited Hazard Data to the Exclusion of Technology Information May Have Led EPA to Overlook Industrial Categories for Pollution Reduction
Limitations in the screening phase of EPA’s review process may have caused the agency to overlook some industrial categories that warrant new or revised effluent guidelines and thus hinder the effectiveness of the effluent guidelines program in advancing the goals of the Clean Water Act. EPA’s Screening Phase Does Not Consider Treatment Technologies, Omitting Some Industrial Categories from Further Review
EPA’s primary focus during its screening phase is the relative hazard posed by industrial categories, without consideration of available treatment technologies that could be used as the basis for revised effluent guidelines to help reduce pollutant discharges. EPA does not conduct a further review for these and other industrial categories that it has excluded for other reasons, meaning that EPA does not examine them for the availability of more-effective treatment technologies. EPA Is Adding Hazard Data Sources but Is Not Fully Using Potential Sources of Information on Treatment Technologies
EPA has begun to take actions to improve the hazard data it uses in its screening of industrial categories, but it is not fully using potential sources of information on treatment technologies for consideration in this screening. According to some experts, consideration of treatment technologies is especially important for older effluent guidelines because changes in either the industrial categories or the treatment technologies are more likely to have occurred, making it possible that new, more advanced and cost-effective treatment technologies have become available. Most important, without a more thorough and integrated screening approach that both improves hazard information and considers treatment technology data, EPA cannot be certain that the effluent guidelines program is reflecting advances in the treatment technologies used to reduce pollutants in wastewater. Regarding our second recommendation, that EPA should identify and evaluate additional sources of information to improve its assessment of treatment technologies for industrial dischargers, EPA agreed that treatment technology information is useful to its program. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To examine the process the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) follows to screen and review industrial categories and the results of that process, we reviewed the Clean Water Act and relevant court decisions and agency documents, interviewed agency officials and experts, and documented the steps EPA has taken to screen particular industrial categories for possible new or revised effluent guidelines. We focused our review on the results of the process EPA used from 2003 through 2010 in order to examine the approach it developed after the publication in November 2002 of its draft Strategy for National Clean Water Industrial Regulations: Effluent Limitation Guidelines, Pretreatment Standards, and New Source Performance Standards. To examine limitations to EPA’s screening and review process, if any, that could hinder the effectiveness of the effluent guidelines program in advancing the goals of the Clean Water Act, we pursued three separate methodologies: we (1) interviewed a cross section of experts on EPA’s effluent guidelines program, (2) surveyed the water quality permit directors of the 46 states that are authorized to issue permits for the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES), and (3) analyzed information about the hazard data sources EPA uses in its screening process. For example, in 46 percent of these cases, state officials said that EPA should revise the effluent guidelines for the corresponding industry. | Why GAO Did This Study
Under the Clean Water Act, EPA has made significant progress in reducing wastewater pollution from industrial facilities. EPA currently regulates 58 industrial categories, such as petroleum refining, fertilizer manufacturing, and coal mining, with technology-based regulations called effluent guidelines. Such guidelines are applied in permits to limit the pollutants that facilities may discharge. The Clean Water Act also calls for EPA to revise the guidelines when appropriate. EPA has done so, for example, to reflect advances in treatment technology or changes in industries.
GAO was asked to examine (1) the process EPA follows to screen and review industrial categories potentially needing new or revised guidelines and the results of that process from 2003 through 2010; (2) limitations to this process, if any, that could hinder EPAs effectiveness in advancing the goals of the Clean Water Act; and (3) EPAs actions to address any such limitations.
GAO analyzed the results of EPAs screening and review process from 2003 through 2010, surveyed state officials, and interviewed EPA officials and experts to obtain their views on EPAs process and its results.
What GAO Found
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) uses a two-phase process to identify industrial categories potentially needing new or revised effluent guidelines to help reduce their pollutant discharges. EPAs 2002 draft Strategy for National Clean Water Industrial Regulations was the foundation for EPAs process. In the first, or screening, phase, EPA uses data from two EPA databases to rank industrial categories according to the total toxicity of their wastewater. Using this ranking, public comments, and other considerations, EPA has identified relatively few industrial categories posing the highest hazard for the next, or further review, phase. In this further review phase, EPA evaluates the categories to identify those that are appropriate for new or revised guidelines because treatment technologies are available to reduce pollutant discharges. Since 2003, EPA has regularly screened the 58 categories for which it has issued effluent guidelines, as well as some potential new industrial categories, and it has identified 12 categories for its further review phase. Of these 12 categories, EPA selected 3 for updated or new effluent guidelines. EPA chose not to set new guidelines for the others.
Limitations in EPAs screening phase may have led it to overlook some industrial categories that warrant further review for new or revised effluent guidelines. Specifically, EPA has relied on limited hazard data that may have affected its ranking of industrial categories. Further, during its screening phase, EPA has not considered the availability of advanced treatment technologies for most industrial categories. Although its 2002 draft strategy recognized the importance of technology data, EPA has stated that such data were too difficult to obtain during the screening phase and, instead, considers them for the few categories that reach further review. Officials responsible for state water quality programs and experts on industrial discharges, however, identified categories they believe EPA should examine for new or updated guidelines to reflect changes in their industrial processes and treatment technology capabilities. According to some experts, consideration of treatment technologies is especially important for older effluent guidelines because changes are more likely to have occurred in either the industrial categories or the treatment technologies, making it possible that new, more advanced treatment technologies are available.
Recognizing the limitations of its hazard data and overall screening approach, EPA has begun revising its process but has not assessed other possible sources of information it could use to improve the screening phase. In 2012, EPA supplemented the hazard data used in screening with four new data sources. EPA is also developing a regulation that, through electronic reporting, will increase the completeness and accuracy of its hazard data. In 2011, EPA also began to obtain recent treatment technology literature. According to EPA, the agency will expand on this work in 2013. Nonetheless, EPA has not thoroughly examined other usable sources of information on treatment technology, nor has it reassessed the role such information should take in its screening process. Without a more thorough and integrated screening approach that both uses improved hazard data and considers information on treatment technology, EPA cannot be certain that the effluent guidelines program reflects advances in the treatment technologies used to reduce pollutants in wastewater.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making recommendations to improve the effectiveness of EPAs effluent guidelines program by expanding its screening phase to better assess hazards and advances in treatment technology. EPA agreed with two recommendations in principle and said it is making progress on them, but said that one is not workable given current agency resources. GAO believes improvements can be made. |
gao_GAO-08-1051T | gao_GAO-08-1051T_0 | OMB plays a key role in overseeing the implementation and management of federal IT investments. According to OMB, agencies with projects on the Management Watch List are to submit remediation plans addressing the weaknesses. While these changes—generally referred to as rebaselining—can be done for valid reasons—including, for example, changes in a project’s objectives, scope, requirements, or funding stream—they can also be used to mask cost overruns and schedule delays. The guide also identifies best practices that are relevant to rebaselining policies. Hundreds of Projects Totaling Billions of Dollars in Estimated Expenditures for Fiscal Year 2009 Are Poorly Planned or Poorly Performing
OMB and federal agencies have identified approximately 413 IT projects— totaling at least $25.2 billion in expenditures for fiscal year 2009—as being poorly planned, poorly performing, or both. Finally, 26 projects totaling $3 billion have been identified as both poorly planned and poorly performing. Steps Have Been Taken to Improve the Identification of Management Watch List and High Risk Projects, but Projects Totaling Billions of Dollars Still Require Oversight
OMB has taken steps to improve the identification of the Management Watch List and high-risk projects since we testified last September, including publicly disclosing reasons for placement on the Management Watch List, and clarifying high-risk project criteria, however, more needs to be done by both OMB and the agencies to fully address recommendations we have previously made to improve the planning, management, and oversight of the poorly planned and poorly performing projects so that potentially billions in taxpayer dollars are not wasted. High-Risk Projects: To improve the identification and oversight of the high-risk projects, in 2006 we recommended, among other things, that OMB establish a structured, consistent process to update the list of high- risk projects on a regular basis, including identifying new projects and removing previous ones to ensure that the list is current and complete. About Half of Major IT Projects Have Been Rebaselined Using Policies that Are Not Fully Consistent with Best Practices
Given that cost and schedule variances are the primary reason for poorly performing projects, having accurate and transparent cost and schedule information is essential to effective oversight. In a report being released today, we estimate that about 48 percent of the federal government’s major IT projects have been rebaselined. Of those rebaselined projects, 51 percent were rebaselined at least twice, and about 11 percent were rebaselined 4 times or more. These projects were rebaselined for several reasons, including changes in project goals and changes in funding. While the major agencies have all established rebaselining policies, these policies are not comprehensive. Specifically, none of the policies are fully consistent with best practices, including describing a process for developing a new baseline and requiring the validation of the new baseline, identified in our cost assessment guide. Agencies’ policies vary in part because OMB has not issued guidance specifying what elements these policies are to include. About Half of IT Projects Were Rebaselined for Several Reasons
In our report we project that 48 percent of the major projects federal agencies plan to fund in fiscal year 2008 have been rebaselined, and about half of those have been rebaselined at least twice. 2. 3. 4. Require management review. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government spends billons of dollars on information technology (IT) projects each year. Consequently, it is important that projects be managed effectively to ensure that public resources are wisely invested. To this end, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), which plays a key role in overseeing the federal government's IT investments, identifies major projects that are poorly planned by placing them on a Management Watch List and requires agencies to identify high-risk projects that are performing poorly (i.e., have performance shortfalls). Having accurate and transparent project cost and schedule information is also essential to effective oversight. At times, changes to this information--called a rebaselining-- are made to reflect changed development circumstances. These changes can be done for valid reasons, but can also be used to mask cost overruns and schedule delays. GAO has previously testified on the Management Watch List and high risk projects. GAO was asked to (1) provide an update on these projects, (2) identify OMB's efforts to improve the identification and oversight of these projects, and (3) summarize the results of GAO's IT project rebaselining report being released today. In preparing this testimony, GAO analyzed current Management Watch List and high risk project information.
What GAO Found
OMB and federal agencies have identified approximately 413 IT projects--totaling at least $25.2 billion in expenditures for fiscal year 2008--as being poorly planned, poorly performing, or both. Specifically, through the Management Watch List process, OMB determined that 352 projects (totaling about $23.4 billion) are poorly planned. In addition, agencies reported that 87 of their high risk projects (totaling about $4.8 billion) were poorly performing. Twenty-six projects (totaling about $3 billion) are considered both poorly planned and poorly performing. OMB has taken steps to improve the identification of the Management Watch List and high-risk projects since GAO testified last September, including publicly disclosing reasons for placement on the Management Watch List and clarifying high-risk project criteria. However, more needs to be done by both OMB and the agencies to address recommendations GAO has previously made to improve the planning, management, and oversight of poorly planned and performing projects so that potentially billions in taxpayer dollars are not wasted. In its rebaselining review, GAO reports that 48 percent of the federal government's major IT projects have been rebaselined for several reasons, including changes in project goals and changes in funding. Of those rebaselined projects, 51 percent were rebaselined at least twice and about 11 percent were rebaselined 4 times or more. In addition, while the major agencies have all established rebaselining policies, these policies are not comprehensive. Specifically, none of the policies were fully consistent with best practices, including describing a process for developing a new baseline and requiring the validation of the new baseline. Agencies' policies varied in part because OMB has not issued guidance specifying what elements these policies are to include. In its report, GAO makes recommendations to OMB to issue guidance for rebaselining policies and to the major agencies to develop comprehensive rebaselining policies that address identified weaknesses. |
gao_GAO-08-388 | gao_GAO-08-388_0 | Background
The JSF program goals are to develop and field an affordable, highly common family of stealthy, next-generation strike fighter aircraft for the Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and U.S. allies. DOD is planning to buy a total of 2,458 JSFs. Progress Measured against Cost, Schedule, and Performance Goals Was Mixed over the Last Year
The total program acquisition cost estimate by the JSF program office has increased since our report last year, primarily due to higher projected procurement unit prices. DOD and the contractor reported progress in several areas, including international partner agreements, first flights of a JSF prototype and test bed, and a more realistic procurement schedule. The Program Cost Estimate Increased, while Schedule and Performance Estimates Remained about the Same
JSF costs increased since last year. However, there were significant changes in scope and planned use of funds in order to maintain that estimate as officials reduced requirements, did not include full funding for the alternate engine program despite congressional interest in the program, and spent management reserves much faster than budgeted. The program faced a probable contract overrun. With almost 90 percent (in terms of dollars) of the acquisition program still ahead, these and other improvements could be leveraged to help better meet cost, schedule and performance goals. Development Program Faces Increased Risks of Further Cost Increases and More Schedule Delays
Late in 2007, DOD officials approved a risky and controversial plan that replenishes management reserves by reducing development test aircraft and test flights in order to stay within current cost and schedule estimates. By mid-2007, the development program had completed one-half of the amount of work scheduled, but had expended two-thirds of the budget. JSF program management identified a continuing persistent cost variance of $250 million to $300 million in the aircraft development contract and the associated shortfall in reserves that required near-term action beyond “belt tightening.”
An overarching integrated product team considered several alternative actions, including doing nothing and adding funds from procurement, but the team chair concluded that replenishment of the management reserve was essential to position the JSF program to successfully address its anticipated future development challenges. The Mid-Course Risk Reduction plan does not directly address design and manufacturing inefficiencies that created the problem in the first place. Eliminating development test activities and deferring additional tasks to be completed during operational testing increase the likelihood that design and performance problems will not be identified and resolved until late in the program, when it is more costly and disruptive and could delay the delivery of capabilities to the warfighter. Future Challenges as Program Moves Forward
The JSF is entering its most challenging phase as it finalizes three designs, matures manufacturing processes, conducts flight tests, and ramps up production. Rising unit procurement prices, and somewhat lower commonality than expected, raise concerns that the United States and its allies may not be able to buy as many aircraft as currently planned. The program also places an unprecedented demand for funding on the defense budget—an annual average of about $11 billion for the next two decades--with attendant funding risk should political, economic or military conditions change. The JSF will have to annually compete with other defense and nondefense priorities for the shrinking discretionary federal dollar. The operating cost per flying hour for the JSF CTOL is now estimated to be greater than current flying hour cost for the F-16, one of the legacy aircraft to be replaced. DOD also substantially agreed with our three recommendations on cost estimating. We found that the JSF program office has not followed best practices for developing a reliable and valid life cycle cost estimate because it did not include certain key costs, assumptions used to develop the estimate are overly optimistic, the estimate is not well documented, and no analysis has been done to state the confidence and certainty it has in its estimate. Alternate engine program. This omits about $6.8 billion left out of the JSF cost estimate for this program. Joint Strike Fighter: Progress Made and Challenges Remain. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program seeks to produce and field three aircraft variants for the Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and eight international partners. The estimated total investment for JSF now approaches $1 trillion to acquire and maintain 2,458 aircraft. Under congressional mandate, GAO has annually reviewed the JSF program since 2005. GAO's prior reviews have identified a number of issues and recommended actions for reducing risks and improving the program's outcomes. This report, the fourth under the mandate, focuses on the program's progress in meeting cost, schedule, and performance goals; plans and risks in development and test activities; the program's cost-estimating methods; and future challenges facing the program. To conduct its work, GAO identified changes in cost and schedule from prior years and their causes, evaluated development progress and plans, assessed cost-estimating methodologies against best practices, and analyzed future budget requirements.
What GAO Found
Since last year's report, the JSF program office estimates that total acquisition costs increased by more than $23 billion, primarily because of higher estimated procurement costs. The JSF development cost estimate stayed about the same. Development costs were held constant by reducing requirements, eliminating the alternate engine program, and spending management reserve faster than budgeted. Facing a probable contract cost overrun, DOD implemented a Mid-Course Risk Reduction Plan to replenish management reserves from about $400 million to about $1 billion by reducing test resources. Progress has been reported in several important areas, including partner agreements, first flights of a JSF prototype and test bed, and a more realistic procurement schedule. The midcourse plan carries the risk of design and performance problems not being discovered until late in the operational testing and production phases, when it is significantly more costly to address such problems. The plan also fails to address the production and schedule concerns that depleted management reserves. Cost and schedule pressures are mounting. Two-thirds of budgeted funding for JSF development has been spent, but only about one-half of the work has been completed. The contractor is on its third, soon to be fourth, manufacturing schedule, but test aircraft in manufacturing are still behind, the continuing impacts of late designs, delayed delivery of parts, and manufacturing inefficiencies. We believe that JSF costs will likely be much higher than reported. The estimates do not include all costs, including about $6.8 billion for the alternate engine program. In addition, some assumptions are overly optimistic and not well documented. Three independent defense offices separately concluded that program cost estimates are understated by as much as $38 billion and that the development schedule is likely to slip from 12 to 27 months. Discrepancies in cost estimates add to program risks and hinder congressional oversight. Even so, DOD does not plan for another fully documented, independent total program life-cycle cost estimate until 2013. As JSF finalizes the three designs, matures manufacturing processes, conducts flight tests, and ramps up production, it faces significant challenges. JSF's goal--to develop and field an affordable, highly common family of strike aircraft--is threatened by rising unit procurement prices and lower commonality than expected. The program also makes unprecedented funding demands--an average of $11 billion annually for two decades--and must compete with other defense and nondefense priorities for the shrinking federal discretionary dollar. Further, expected cost per flight hour now exceeds that of the F-16 legacy fighter, one of the aircraft it is intended to replace. With almost 90 percent (in terms of dollars) of the acquisition program still ahead, it is important to address these challenges, effectively manage future risks, and move forward with a successful program that meets our and our allies' needs. |
gao_GAO-17-196 | gao_GAO-17-196_0 | Following the enactment of the Newborn Screening Saves Lives Reauthorization Act of 2014, some of these programs focused on newborn screening timeliness. Missing data for several states and variations in data collection limit a full understanding of newborn screening timeliness trends, but HRSA has been taking steps to address these challenges. Most States that Reported Timeliness Data Had Not Met the Advisory Committee’s Benchmark, but Improved Over Time
Most states that reported 2015 timeliness data (the most recent data available) to NewSTEPs had not met the advisory committee’s 95 percent benchmark for newborn screening timeliness for all conditions within 7 days. Missing Data and Variations in Data Collection Limit a Full Understanding of Newborn Screening Timeliness Trends, but HRSA Has Been Addressing These Challenges
Missing data for a number of states limit a full understanding of newborn screening timeliness trends. According to APHL officials, the data in the NewSTEPs August 2016 report generally represent with accuracy the time taken to screen specimens in reporting states, but there are a number of limitations, including the following examples:
Although the advisory committee’s time-frame goals apply to first specimens only, some states’ data did not distinguish a lab’s receipt of a first specimen from receipt of a subsequent specimen, which can result in the appearance of longer screening times (that is, longer times from birth to specimen collection and birth to reporting results) for such states. Clarifying data definitions. NewSTEPs is working with states participating in the program to help ensure they use these revised definitions consistently when submitting timeliness data to the data repository. States Identified Numerous Barriers to Timeliness throughout the Newborn Screening Process and Some States Have Developed Strategies to Address Them
Newborn screening officials from 51 states who responded to the advisory committee’s 2014 survey identified numerous barriers to timeliness in each of the three stages of the newborn screening process. Newborn screening officials in the four selected states we interviewed reported developing strategies to address the barriers. Stage 2: Specimen Collection to Lab Arrival
Newborn screening officials who responded to the 2014 survey identified a variety of barriers that may delay the arrival of newborn screening specimens at the state lab, including hospitals and other providers waiting to send specimens to the lab in batches, insufficient lab operating hours, and a lack of courier services for transporting specimens. It is too soon to determine which strategies, if any, developed through HRSA-supported technical assistance have a measurable impact on improving timeliness in states participating in NewSTEPs 360, and whether these strategies could be effective in additional states. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We provided a draft of this report to HHS for review and comment. We report that data provided by 38 states for 2012-2015 showed that states generally had not met the advisory committee’s recommended 2017 benchmark of meeting each time-frame goal for at least 95 percent of specimens. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To examine what is known about the timeliness of newborn screening for heritable conditions, we reviewed timeliness data from states included in an August 2016 report from the Newborn Screening Technical assistance and Evaluation Program (NewSTEPs). NewSTEPs is administered by the Association of Public Health Laboratories (APHL), in collaboration with the University of Colorado’s School of Public Health, through a cooperative agreement with the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA), an agency within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). These annual timeliness data are based on time-frame goals recommended by HHS’s Advisory Committee on Heritable Disorders in Newborns and Children in April 2015 and data definitions developed by a workgroup composed of newborn screening experts and stakeholders convened by APHL. To examine the barriers identified as contributing to delays in newborn screening for heritable conditions, and strategies being used to address them, we reviewed the advisory committee’s 2014 Newborn Screening Timeliness Survey Report, which included findings from a survey of states intended to assist with assessing policies and practices related to the timeliness of newborn screening. | Why GAO Did This Study
Each year, over 12,000 newborns are born with heritable or other conditions that require early detection and treatment. Newborn screening is a state public health activity, and includes the collection of a blood specimen from the newborn, specimen arrival at a state's lab, and results reporting. Barriers at any stage of this process can lead to delays in treatment and potential harm to the newborn. The Newborn Screening Saves Lives Reauthorization Act of 2014 included improving timeliness as an explicit goal for HRSA-supported newborn screening programs, which include technical assistance for and data collection from participating states.
The act included a provision for GAO to review newborn screening timeliness. This report examines (1) what is known about the timeliness of newborn screening for heritable conditions; and (2) barriers identified as contributing to screening delays, and strategies used to address them. GAO reviewed time-frame goals from the advisory committee, an August 2016 report from NewSTEPs with an analysis of annual timeliness data from states for 2012 through 2015 (the most recently available data), and a 2014 report on a survey conducted for the advisory committee. GAO also reviewed relevant documents and interviewed officials from NewSTEPs, two advisory committee members who worked on timeliness issues, and newborn screening officials in four states selected because they were focusing on activities related to newborn screening timeliness.
What GAO Found
Most states that reported timeliness data had not screened newborns within recommended goals to detect conditions that may require treatment. The Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) Advisory Committee on Heritable Disorders in Newborns and Children recommended time-frame goals in 2015 for newborn screening, such as reporting all results within 7 days of birth. Data provided by 38 states for 2012-2015 showed that states generally had not met the committee's suggested benchmark of meeting each time-frame goal for at least 95 percent of specimens, which the committee encouraged states to achieve by 2017. Missing data and variations in data collection limit a full understanding of timeliness trends, but HHS's Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) has supported activities to address these challenges. HRSA supports the Newborn Screening Technical assistance and Evaluation Program (NewSTEPs), which collects newborn screening data. NewSTEPs has been taking steps to improve data for future analysis, such as by clarifying data definitions and working with states to help ensure they use these definitions when submitting timeliness data.
State newborn screening officials identified numerous barriers to timely newborn screening, and a variety of strategies to address them. Newborn screening officials who responded to the advisory committee's 2014 survey identified barriers, such as a lack of understanding of the importance of timely screening for out-of-hospital births, limited courier availability to transport specimens to a lab, and insufficient lab hours. Selected state newborn screening officials interviewed by GAO reported developing various strategies to address these barriers. For example, one state increased courier service so rural hospitals located far from the state's lab could shorten specimen transport time. HRSA has been providing states with technical assistance, but it is too soon to determine which strategies developed through this technical assistance, if any, will have a measurable impact on timeliness.
In commenting on a draft of this report, HHS generally agreed with the report's findings, but questioned the use of 2017 benchmark goals to measure performance and the exclusion of two conditions. GAO believes its use of the 2017 benchmark and scope were appropriate, as discussed in the report. |
gao_GAO-07-1096 | gao_GAO-07-1096_0 | In our 2007 survey, states reported that 13 of the 16 mandatory programs required under WIA were available at the majority of comprehensive one-stop centers. Over the last 4 years, 19 states reported a decrease in one-stop centers, frequently identifying a decrease in funds as one of the primary reasons. In contrast, 10 states reported an increase during this period, citing, among other reasons, an increase in demand for services and an increase in the number of on-site partners. While states reported they were providing Wagner-Peyser-funded Employment Service on-site at one-stop centers, some states also provided services through stand-alone Employment Service facilities—offices that focus primarily on job search and placement assistance. While Labor has the option to withhold funding, it has not done so, but has taken other steps to encourage states to provide all employment services through the one-stop system. Despite the range of Labor’s efforts, states have made only modest progress in bringing these systems together. WIA and the Employment Service were the two programs most often identified as funding sources used for infrastructure—the nonpersonnel costs—of operating comprehensive one- stop centers. Three states reported that TANF funds were the largest funding source. Of the states that could report, more states reported that a greater percentage of their Employment Service funds than WIA funds were used to finance the infrastructure of the one-stop comprehensive centers. Moreover, for program year 2005, states reported less reliance on other programs for funding the one-stop infrastructure costs than in the past. In addition, 12 states reported that they had established measures for customer satisfaction beyond what is required. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our study assessed (1) the current composition of states’ one-stop systems and how this has changed over time, (2) what funds are primarily used to support states’ one-stop system infrastructure and how this has changed over time, and (3) the extent to which states are monitoring customer satisfaction with service delivery at one-stop centers. To provide information on how state and local one-stop delivery systems established under Workforce Investment Act (WIA) deliver employment and training services to job seekers and employers, we conducted an electronic survey of state workforce officials in 50 states. The survey included questions on states’ one-stop delivery systems related to the numbers of local workforce investment areas and participants served; numbers of comprehensive one-stop centers, satellite or affiliated sites, and how these changed from program year 2003 to April 1, 2007; infrastructure cost data for program year 2005; use of stand-alone Employment Service offices; mandatory programs and how these services were provided; extent of integration of certain functions (e.g., reception area, information systems, and intake forms) at comprehensive one-stop centers; and program monitoring of customer satisfaction. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 1998, Congress passed the Workforce Investment Act (WIA), requiring states and localities to bring together employment and training programs into a single workforce system, the one-stop system. States have flexibility in how they provide these services--colocated within the one-stop--through electronic linkage or referral. WIA did not provide funds to pay for the infrastructure costs, but programs must share the costs of operating one-stop centers. As Congress considers reauthorization of WIA, GAO assessed (1) the current composition of states' one-stop systems and how this has changed, (2) what funds are primarily used to support states' one-stop system infrastructure and how this has changed, and (3) the extent to which states are monitoring customer satisfaction. Our work was primarily based on a 50-state survey of state workforce officials, updating work we previously did in 2000 and 2001.
What GAO Found
Over the last 4 years, 19 states reported a decrease in one-stop centers, often citing a decrease in funds as one of the primary reasons. At the same time, 10 states reported an increase, citing an increase in demand for services and an increase in on-site programs. In our 2007 survey, states reported that 13 of the 16 mandatory programs were available at the majority of one-stop centers. States reported they were providing Wagner-Peyser-funded Employment Service on-site at one-stop centers, but some states also provided services through stand-alone Employment Service offices--facilities that focus primarily on job search and placement assistance. While states are required to maintain these offices within the one-stop delivery system, 9 states reported operating at least one stand-alone office unaffiliated with the one-stop system. While Labor has taken steps to encourage states to provide all employment services through the one-stop system, states have made only modest progress in bringing these systems together. WIA and Employment Service were the largest funding sources for states to support the infrastructure--the nonpersonnel costs--of their one-stop centers. Of the two programs, states reported that a greater percentage of Employment Service funds than WIA funds were used for infrastructure costs. States also reported less reliance on other programs to support the infrastructure costs than in the past. Nearly all states reported that they submitted customer satisfaction data to Labor for program year 2005. In addition, 12 states reported that they have established additional customer satisfaction measures beyond those required by Labor. |
gao_GAO-12-813T | gao_GAO-12-813T_0 | Clearly Defining Recovery Roles and Responsibilities Is a Critical First Step for Effective Recovery
When recovering from a disaster, having clearly defined and well understood roles and responsibilities is a critical first step in coordinating and implementing the responsibilities of the various parties involved in the long-term recovery process. Roles, responsibilities, and lines of authority at all levels of government must be clearly defined, communicated, and understood in order to be effective. Our previous work provides examples of the challenges that result when this does not take place, and conversely, illustrations of benefits that can occur when it does, which I describe below. Our 2009 review of the operations of the Office of the Federal Coordinator (OFC) for Gulf Coast Rebuilding found confusion and disagreements among key recovery stakeholders as well as with the Federal Coordinator himself regarding the office’s appropriate scope and function. This confusion, accompanied by the lack of clear decision-making authority on the part of OFC, may have ultimately slowed down the resolution of recovery problems in some cases by increasing the number of meetings and the amount of paperwork involved. Coordination and Collaboration among Stakeholders Facilitates Successful Recovery
Recovery from a major disaster is a long, complex process that involves an extensive group of participants both across the federal government and at the state and local level. At least 14 federal departments and agencies are responsible for administering dozens of recovery-related programs, many of which rely heavily on active participation by state and local government for their implementation. Our past work has explored this issue in considerable detail. Today, I would like to briefly focus on three of the ways the federal government has sought to improve coordination and collaboration in order to facilitate disaster recovery. Second, in addition to coordination at the federal level, we have previously reported on the federal government’s efforts to work with state and local governments to help them take advantage of all available disaster assistance and achieve long-term recovery goals. For example, in the wake of the 2008 Midwest floods, LTCR provided technical assistance to affected communities by conducting or facilitating recovery assessments to identify the long-term effects of the disaster, providing staff to advise the communities on steps to take as they developed recovery plans, creating planning tools that the communities used to guide their planning activities, and hosting workshops to discuss and share recovery-planning lessons, among other things. For example, in Mississippi after Hurricane Katrina, federal, state, and local officials adopted strategies that helped to facilitate the sharing of information on specific Public Assistance Grant projects. One of these involves the creation of the position of Federal Disaster Recovery Coordinator (FDRC). Periodic Evaluation and Reporting of Recovery Progress Is Key
Periodic reporting on organizational activities can help decision makers, clients, and stakeholders obtain feedback for improving both policy and operational effectiveness of recovery efforts. The City of Kobe, Japan, and Hyogo prefecture (the larger governmental unit, similar to a county, that covers the city’s surrounding region) both provide examples of how evaluation and reporting can be effectively incorporated into community and regional recovery. Hyogo prefecture and the City of Kobe created a system of periodic assessments of recovery in the wake of their 1995 earthquake. For example, as a result of its 10-year evaluation, Hyogo prefecture gained insight into the unintended consequences of its policies regarding the relocation of victims, an insight that subsequently led to policy revisions. Because these parties often depend on each other to accomplish recovery goals, effective coordination and collaboration is essential. Since such collaboration often must continue for years, it can be enhanced by periodically looking back to evaluate what worked, what can be improved, and what progress is still needed. While the creation of the NDRF is a significant step, the implementation of this broad framework will be a key to determining its ultimate success. | Why GAO Did This Study
The many challenges and difficulties experienced in the wake of Hurricane Katrina and other catastrophes have led to considerable reflection on what lessons might be learned regarding disaster recovery. Congress has recognized the importance of improving the way our nation approaches disaster recovery by including in the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 the requirement that FEMA develop a National Disaster Recovery Strategy. The administration has also placed a greater focus on recovery, as demonstrated by its development of the National Disaster Recovery Framework (NDRF) with the goal of helping federal agencies and others to more-effectively organize in order to promote recovery.
GAO was asked to testify on themes from its previous work on disaster recovery that may assist the subcommittee in its oversight of disaster-recovery issues.
What GAO Found
From 2008 to 2010, GAO produced a body of work on disaster recovery, including reviews of the Federal Emergency Management Agencys (FEMA) Long-Term Community Recovery efforts, recovery lessons based on past experiences at home and abroad, the use of Community Development Block Grants and Public Assistance grants and the operation of the Office of the Federal Coordinator for Gulf Coast Rebuilding (OFC). Among other things, this work highlighted themes that are important to successful disaster recovery efforts. Three of these key themes are: (1) the need for clearly defined recovery roles and responsibilities; (2) the importance of effective coordination and collaboration among recovery stakeholders; and (3) the value of periodic evaluation of, and reporting on, recovery progress.
When recovering from a major disaster, having clearly defined and well-understood roles and responsibilities is a critical first step in coordinating and implementing the responsibilities of the various parties involved in the long-term recovery process. These roles, responsibilities, and lines of authority for all levels of government must be clearly defined, communicated, and understood in order to be effective. GAOs previous work provides numerous examples of the challenges that result when this does not take place and, conversely, illustrations of benefits that can occur when it does. For example, GAOs 2009 review of the OFC found confusion and disagreements among key recovery stakeholders as well as with the Federal Coordinator himself regarding the offices appropriate scope and function. This confusion, accompanied by the lack of clear decision-making authority on the part of OFC, may have ultimately slowed down the resolution of some recovery problems.
Recovery from a major disaster is a long, complex process that involves an extensive group of participants both across the federal government and at the state and local level. At least 14 federal departments and agencies are responsible for administering dozens of recovery-related programs, many of which rely heavily on active participation by state and local government for their implementation. Because these parties are dependent on each other to accomplish recovery goals, effective coordination and collaboration is essential. GAOs past work has explored this issue in considerable detail. For example, in the wake of the 2008 Midwest floods, federal, state, and local officials said that FEMAs facilitation of regular interagency meetings to coordinate federal and state partners helped to identify and effectively leverage recovery resources, as well as identify coordination problems and other concerns.
Finally, the collaboration between recovery partners can be enhanced by periodically evaluating and reporting on what worked, what can be improved, and what progress is still needed to address long-term recovery goals. This last step will assist decision makers, clients, and stakeholders to obtain the feedback needed to improve both the policy and operational effectiveness of recovery efforts. For example, after a 1995 earthquake, the city of Kobe, Japan and the surrounding region held periodic external reviews over a span of 10 years on the progress made toward achieving recovery goals. As a result, the city of Kobe gained insight into unintended consequences of how it relocated elderly earthquake victims, which subsequently led to a change in policy.
What GAO Recommends
In multiple reports between 2008 and 2010, we made several recommendations to FEMA and others addressing recovery challenges involving coordination, communication, and information sharing, among other topics. The NDRF is directly responsive to several of the recommendations contained in these reports. However, it will require the successful implementation of this framework in order to ultimately resolve these issues. |
gao_GAO-07-895T | gao_GAO-07-895T_0 | The Administration and Major Real Property-Holding Agencies Have Taken Actions to Strategically Manage Real Property and Address Some Long- standing Problems
Pursuant to Executive Order 13327, the administration has taken several key actions to strategically manage real property. Long-standing Problems in Real Property Largely Persist and Obstacles Remain
Although clear progress has been made toward strategically managing federal real property and addressing some long-standing problems, real property remains a high–risk area because the problems persist and obstacles remain. Agencies continue to face long-standing problems in the federal real property area, including excess and underutilized property, deteriorating facilities and maintenance and repair backlogs, reliance on costly leasing, and unreliable real property data. Federal agencies also continue to face many challenges securing real property. For example, officials with Energy, DHS, and NASA—which are three of the largest real property-holding agencies—reported that over 10 percent of the facilities in their inventories were excess or underutilized. Energy, NASA, GSA, Interior, State, and VA reported repair and maintenance backlogs for buildings and structures that total over $16 billion. In addition, DOD reported a $57 billion restoration and modernization backlog. Five of the nine largest real property-holding agencies—Energy, Interior, GSA, State, and VA—reported an increased reliance on operating leases to meet new space needs over the past 5 years. Individual Agencies Continue to Struggle with Data Reliability Issues
While agencies have made significant progress in collecting the data elements from their real property inventory databases for the FRPP, data reliability is still a problem at some of the major real property-holding agencies and agencies lack a standard framework for assessing the validity of data used to populate the FRPP. All of the nine agencies reported using risk-based approaches to some degree to prioritize facility security needs, as we have suggested; but some agencies cited challenges, including a lack of resources for security enhancements and issues associated with securing leased space. Underlying Obstacles Hamper Agency Real Property Reform Efforts Governmentwide
In past high-risk reports, we called for a transformation strategy to address long-standing real property problems. While the administration’s current approach is generally consistent with what we envisioned and the administration’s central focus on real property management is a positive step, certain areas warrant further attention. Specifically, problems are exacerbated by underlying obstacles that include competing stakeholder interests and legal and budgetary limitations. For example, some agencies cited local interests as barriers to disposing of excess property. In addition, agencies’ limited ability to pursue ownership often leads them to lease property that they could more cost-effectively own over time. We made three recommendations to OMB’s Deputy Director for Management in our April 2007 report on real property high risk issues. For our second recommendation to develop an action plan for how the FRPC will address key problems, OMB said that the FRPC is currently drafting a strategic plan for addressing long-standing issues such as the continued reliance on costly leasing in cases where ownership is more cost effective over the long-term, the challenge of securing real property assets, and reducing the effect of competing stakeholder interests on businesslike outcomes in real property decisions. | Why GAO Did This Study
In January 2003, GAO designated federal real property as a high-risk area due to long-standing problems with excess and underutilized property, deteriorating facilities, unreliable real property data, and costly space challenges. Federal agencies were also facing many challenges protecting their facilities due to the threat of terrorism. This testimony is based largely on GAO's April 2007 report on real property high-risk issues (GAO-07-349). The objectives of that report were to determine (1) what progress the administration and major real property-holding agencies had made in strategically managing real property and addressing long-standing problems and (2) what problems and obstacles, if any, remained to be addressed.
What GAO Found
The administration and real property-holding agencies have made progress toward strategically managing federal real property and addressing long-standing problems. In response to the President's Management Agenda real property initiative and a related executive order, agencies have, among other things, established asset management plans; standardized data reporting; and adopted performance measures. Also, the administration has created a Federal Real Property Council (FRPC) and plans to work with Congress to provide agencies with tools to better manage real property. These are positive steps, but underlying problems still exist. For example, the Departments of Energy (Energy) and Homeland Security (DHS) and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) reported that over 10 percent of their facilities are excess or underutilized. Also, Energy, NASA, the General Services Administration (GSA), and the Departments of the Interior (Interior), State (State), and Veterans Affairs (VA) reported repair and maintenance backlogs for buildings and structures that total over $16 billion. The Department of Defense (DOD) reported a $57 billion restoration and modernization backlog. Also, Energy, Interior, GSA, State, and VA reported an increased reliance on leasing to meet space needs. While agencies have made progress in collecting and reporting standardized real property data, data reliability is still a challenge at DOD and other agencies, and agencies lack a standard framework for data validation. Finally, agencies reported using risk-based approaches to prioritize security needs, which GAO has suggested, but some cited obstacles such as a lack of resources for security enhancements. In past high-risk updates, GAO called for a transformation strategy to address the long-standing problems in this area. While the administration's approach is generally consistent with what GAO envisioned, certain areas warrant further attention. Specifically, problems are exacerbated by underlying obstacles that include competing stakeholder interests, legal and budgetary limitations, and the need for improved capital planning. For example, agencies cited local interests as barriers to disposing of excess property, and agencies' limited ability to pursue ownership leads them to lease property that may be more cost-effective to own over time. |
gao_GAO-01-661T | gao_GAO-01-661T_0 | VA budgeted $195 million for these activities, but only spent $50 million, a $145 million difference. However, VA’s briefing paper shows only a $95 million difference because VA’s reported expenditures include $50 million for activities not specifically budgeted, such as treatment of conditions related to Hepatitis C. (See table 1.) Concluding Observations
At this time, VA appears unable to develop a budget estimate that can reliably forecast Hepatitis C funding needs. VHA, however, appears to be taking reasonable steps to improve future budget estimates and thereby minimize the potential for large differences. Most notably, VHA’s proposed Hepatitis C patient registry could provide critical data needed to improve budgetary estimates, as well as overall program management. VHA, however, estimates that it could take 15 months before this registry becomes operational, which suggests that it may not provide budgetary information in time to help formulate VA’s fiscal year 2004 budget. In the meantime, VHA’s ongoing efforts to upgrade its data collection systems should help improve budget estimates for fiscal year 2003. These efforts, however, have provided only minimal help in the development of VA’s fiscal year 2002 budget for Hepatitis C spending. As a result, it is not possible to conclude with certainty whether VA’s $171 million spending estimate for fiscal year 2002 is appropriate. | What GAO Found
The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) requested and received $195 million for Hepatitis C screening and treatment in fiscal year 2000. VA's budget documentation showed that it had spent $100 million on Hepatitis C screening and treatment, leaving a difference of $95 million between its estimated and actual expenditures. However, GAO's review revealed that the difference was actually much larger--$145 million. VA's documentation showed that only $50 million was used for budgeted activities and $50 million was used for an activity not included in its original budget--treatment of conditions related to Hepatitis C. It appears that VA is unable to develop a budget estimate that can reliably forecast its Hepatitis C funding needs at this time. However, VA's Veterans Health Administration (VHA) appears to be taking reasonable steps to improve future budget estimates and thereby minimize the potential for large differences. Such steps include developing a Hepatitis C patient registry that could provide the critical data needed to improve budgetary estimates. However, this registry could take as long as 15 months to become operational, which suggests that it may not provide budgetary data in time to formulate the 2004 budget. In the meantime, VHA's ongoing efforts to upgrade its data collection systems should help improve budget estimates for fiscal year 2002. These efforts, however, have provided only minimal help in the development of VA's 2002 budget for Hepatitis C spending. As a result, it is not possible to conclude with certainty whether VA's fiscal year 2002 spending estimate of $171 million is appropriate. |
gao_GAO-03-794 | gao_GAO-03-794_0 | The most current data available, for tax year 1999, show EIC overclaim rates estimated to be between 27 and 32 percent of dollars claimed or between $8.5 billion and $9.9 billion. Task Force Considered Much Information Related to EIC Compliance before Recommending Qualifying Child Certification Program
When IRS’s study of EIC compliance rates for 1999 was released, the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury and IRS Commissioner convened a task force in February 2002 to find ways of reducing EIC overclaims while minimizing the burden to taxpayers and maintaining the EIC’s relatively high participation rate. Some of these changes include (1) postponing relationship certification for an undetermined period of time, (2) delaying program implementation, and (3) reducing the test sample from 45,000 to 25,000. Despite these challenges, the process for selecting taxpayers, what taxpayers will receive from IRS, and what taxpayers will be required to provide remains basically the same as originally planned. In addition, IRS has emphasized that program expansions, if any, will depend on the results of this year’s test. That is, the certification proposal is based on analyses of the leading sources of EIC errors detected in earlier studies, thus focusing attention and burden on the subset of taxpayers making those errors, as opposed to all EIC recipients. Officials designed the program to include, and thus burden, only the taxpayers most likely to make the errors that contribute most to the EIC’s overclaim rate. From its inception, the certification program was intended to: (1) reduce the EIC’s overclaim rate, (2) minimize burden on taxpayers and (3) maintain the EIC’s relatively high participation rate. However, the plan proposed potential options for identifying how and when some critical data will be obtained and analyzed, but does not provide further details on when decisions will be made on specific data that will be collected, how, and by whom. They have, for instance, developed preliminary drafts identifying additional data needed and have begun considering how to use contractors to gather the data. Although the balance IRS has struck supports proceeding with the test, IRS’s plan for evaluating the certification program test is incomplete. Because the data are related to taxpayers’ actions that will occur later this year or next spring, IRS appears to have some time to finalize its evaluation plan. In consultation with our requesters’ offices, we grouped these questions into three objectives, as follows: (1) describe the design and basis for the EIC qualifying child certification program as proposed by the EIC task force, (2) describe the current status of the program, including significant changes since program approval, and (3) assess whether the program is adequately developed to (a) prevent unreasonable burdens on EIC taxpayers and (b) improve compliance so that the test should proceed. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Earned Income Credit (EIC), a tax credit available to the working poor, has experienced high rates of noncompliance. Unlike many benefit programs, EIC recipients generally receive payments without advance, formal determinations of eligibility; the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) checks some taxpayers' eligibility later. IRS estimated that tax year 1999 EIC overclaim rates, the most recent data available, to be between 27 and 32 percent of dollars claimed or between $8.5 billion and $9.9 billion. To address overclaims, IRS plans to test a new certification program. Because IRS's plans have garnered much attention, Congress asked us to (1) describe the design and basis for the EIC qualifying child certification program, (2) describe the current status of the program, including significant changes, and (3) assess whether the program is adequately developed to prevent unreasonable burden on EIC taxpayers and improve compliance so that the test should proceed.
What GAO Found
The Assistant Treasury Secretary and IRS Commissioner convened a task force to identify ways of reducing EIC overclaims while minimizing taxpayer burden and maintaining the EIC's relatively high participation rate. In August 2002, the Secretary approved a recommendation to certify taxpayers' eligibility to claim EIC qualifying children. The proposal is based on analyses of the leading sources of EIC errors, thus focusing attention and burden on the subset of taxpayers most likely to make those errors. Since August 2002, IRS has made key changes to the certification program, including concentrating on residency certification and postponing relationship certification, delaying program implementation until later this year, and reducing the test sample from 45,000 to 25,000. Despite the changes, the process for selecting taxpayers, what taxpayers will receive from IRS, what taxpayers are required to provide, and the program's goals remain fundamentally the same as originally planned. In addition, IRS has emphasized that program expansions, if any, will depend on the results of this year's test. The process would involve three key stages. These changes, including the most recent, help achieve a better balance between preventing unreasonable taxpayer burden and addressing the EIC's high overclaim rate and support IRS's plans to test the certification program. However, IRS's plan for evaluating the test is incomplete, presenting only some information on how IRS would evaluate whether certification would reduce the EIC overclaim rate, minimize burden, and maintain a relatively high participation rate. The plan proposes potential options for identifying how and when certain critical data will be obtained, but does not provide further details on when decisions will be made or on the specific data that will be collected. Officials have developed preliminary drafts identifying data to be obtained and have begun considering how to use contractors to gather the data. Because the data relate to taxpayers' actions that will occur next spring, IRS appears to have some time to finalize its evaluation plan. |
gao_GAO-07-827T | gao_GAO-07-827T_0 | Background
In March 2003, the United States—along with the United Kingdom, Australia, and other members of the coalition—began combat operations in Iraq. The term “coalition of the willing” refers to those countries that declared political support for the war effort; not all of these countries contributed troops to multinational operations. These funds were used to make initial equipment purchases for countries participating in Polish and U.S.-led divisions in Iraq. Troop Contributions from Coalition Members Have Declined and Represent a Small Percentage of Total Forces
As of May 2007, 25 coalition nations were contributing about 12,600 troops to multinational force operations in Iraq. This compares to the 145,000 U.S. troops in Iraq, for the same time period. See figure 1 for a comparison of U.S. and coalition troops from December 2003 through May 2007. Non-U.S. coalition troops represent about 8 percent of multinational forces in Iraq as of May 2007. In addition, the number of coalition forces has declined by 47.5 percent— from 24,000 in December 2003 to 12,600 in May 2007, as shown in figure 2. Although the number of troops is declining, three countries—the United Kingdom, Poland, and the Republic of Korea—have led operations in three of seven security sectors in Iraq (see figure 3). Poland’s troops have conducted joint combat operations and performed humanitarian, medical, advisory, and training missions, and have sustained 20 fatalities. The United States Has Provided about $1.5 Billion to Support Coalition Troops in Iraq
Some countries that have provided troops to the multinational force in Iraq are not financially able to support those troops in the field for extended periods of time or may need assistance in preparing their troops for this type of operation. Since 2003, the United States has provided about $1.5 billion to 20 countries. Jordan was the next largest recipient of support, receiving reimbursement or services worth about $300 million for border operations and other activities. In addition, since 2003, the United States has provided Jordan about $1.34 billion in security assistance. International Donors Have Pledged Billions of Dollars for Reconstruction Efforts in Iraq
International donors have pledged about $14.9 billion in support of Iraq reconstruction. In addition, some countries exceeded their pledges by providing an additional $744 million for a total of $15.6 billion, according to the State Department. As of April 2007, Iraq had accessed about $436 million in loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Most Pledges Were in the Form of Loans
About $11 billion, or 70 percent, of the $14.9 billion pledged in support of Iraq reconstruction is in the form of loans. Most Grants Have Been Provided
As of April 2007, international donors for Iraq reconstruction had pledged $3.9 billion in grants to be provided multilaterally and bilaterally. | Why GAO Did This Study
In March 2003, a U.S.-led multinational force began operations in Iraq. At that time, 48 nations, identified as a "coalition of the willing," offered political, military, and financial support for U.S. efforts in Iraq, with 38 nations other than the United States providing troops. In addition, international donors met in Madrid in October 2003 to pledge funding for the reconstruction of Iraq's infrastructure, which had deteriorated after multiple wars and decades of neglect under the previous regime. This testimony discusses (1) the troop commitments other countries have made to operations in Iraq, (2) the funding the United States has provided to support other countries' participation in the multinational force, and (3) the financial support international donors have provided to Iraq reconstruction efforts. This testimony is based on GAO's prior work and data collected for this hearing. Although we reviewed both classified and unclassified documents, the information in this statement is based only on unclassified documents. We completed this work in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
What GAO Found
As of May 2007, 25 countries were contributing 12,600 troops to multinational forces in Iraq. Compared with 145,000 U.S. troops, coalition countries represent about 8 percent of multinational forces in Iraq. From December 2003 through May 2007, the number of coalition troops decreased from 24,000 to 12,600; the number of coalition nations contributing troops decreased from 33 to 25. The United Kingdom, Poland, and Republic of Korea are responsible for leading operations in three of seven security sectors in Iraq. In addition, coalition troops have performed humanitarian, medical, and reconstruction missions. Some have provided combat capabilities, such as infantry and explosive ordinance capabilities. The United States has spent about $1.5 billion to transport, sustain, and provide other services for military troops from 20 countries other than the United States and Iraq. The United States used about $1 billion of the $1.5 billion to feed, house, and equip these countries. In terms of allocation by country, about $988 million, or 66 percent, was used to support Poland and the countries under its command, and $300 million, or 20 percent, supported Jordan for border operations and other activities. In addition to support for operations in Iraq, the United States, through the State Department, has provided about $1.9 billion in security assistance for military training and equipment to 10 coalition members and Jordan since 2003. As of April 2007, international donors had pledged about $14.9 billion for reconstruction efforts in Iraq. Some countries exceeded their pledges by an additional $744 million for a total of $15.6 billion. About $11 billion, or 70 percent, of these pledges are loans, with the remaining $4.6 billion in the form of grants. As of April 2007, Iraq had accessed about $436 million in loans and $3 billion in grants. |
gao_NSIAD-99-28 | gao_NSIAD-99-28_0 | The truck replacement effort is known as the Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles (FMTV) program. While the current contractor is producing under the follow-on contracts, the Army plans to develop a second source to produce FMTV trucks. Recent government inspection data indicates that the contractor is still not consistently producing trucks within the quality standards set for FMTV trucks. The Army does not know whether fielded FMTV trucks are performing adequately. Also, the Army plans to continue to accept new models under the relaxed final acceptance inspection method. Conclusions
Because the FMTV program experienced significant problems under the current production contract, the Army needs to implement safeguards to ensure that the government receives trucks that meet FMTV program quality standards under the follow-on production contracts. The current contract allowed the contractor to continue producing trucks during testing even though the trucks were unable to pass the tests and demonstrate that they met FMTV performance and reliability, availability, and maintainability requirements. These trucks required modifications to achieve satisfactory performance, and the modification effort caused program delays. To provide a safeguard on the follow-on contracts that could preclude the type of problems that occurred under the current contract, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to include a clause in the follow-on production contracts that would delay the start of production until the new FMTV model trucks demonstrate that they meet FMTV performance and reliability, availability, and maintainability requirements. Army Has Not Determined Whether Its Second-Source Plan Will Reduce Program Costs
The Army plans to compete future procurement of the FMTV trucks with the expectation that program costs can be reduced. However, it has not performed an analysis to determine the costs and benefits of its plan or compared its plan with other alternatives, including (1) dividing the program into 5-year production increments and competing each increment among all qualified contractors, (2) delaying the development of the second source until funds are available to support both the current contractor and the second source without a fielding break, or (3) continuing with the current contractor for the remainder of the program. Our preliminary analysis of the production quantities that the contractors could expect to share from the competition indicates that the Army’s plan will not result in program cost savings. The current contractor and second source will share the annual production. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Army's Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles (FMTV) program.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the Army's plan for implementing its follow-on production contracts needs to ensure that the government receives trucks that meet FMTV program quality standards; (2) the current contract allowed the contractor to produce trucks during testing even though the trucks were unable to pass testing and demonstrate that they met FMTV performance and reliability, availability, and maintainability requirements; (3) these trucks required modifications to achieve satisfactory performance that caused program delays; (4) recent government inspection data and quality deficiency reports on trucks in the field show that the contractor is not consistently producing trucks within the quality standards set for FMTV trucks; (5) however, because of incomplete data, the Army does not know overall whether FMTV trucks are performing adequately in the field; (6) under the follow-on contracts, full-rate production of new model trucks will be allowed to start before the trucks pass testing; (7) also, the Army plans to continue to accept the new models under its sampling inspection method; (8) this approach, which was followed under the current contract, caused program delays and uncertainty about the quality of the fielded trucks; (9) the Army has not instituted safeguards to ensure that the follow-on contracts do not result in problems similar to those experienced under the current contract; (10) the Army plans to compete future procurement of the FMTV trucks with the expectation that program costs can be reduced; (11) therefore, it has decided to develop a second source to produce FMTV trucks; (12) the current contractor and second source will share the annual production; (13) the Army has not performed an analysis to determine the costs and benefits of this plan or compared it to other alternatives, including: (a) dividing the program into 5-year production increments and competing each increment among all qualified contractors; (b) delaying the development of the second source until funds are available to support both the current contractor and the second source without a fielding break; or (c) continuing with the current contractor for the rest of the program; and (14) GAO's preliminary analysis of the production quantities that the two contractors could expect to share from the competition indicates that the Army's plan may not result in program cost savings. |
gao_GAO-04-699T | gao_GAO-04-699T_0 | Background
As reliance on our nation’s critical infrastructures grows, so do the potential threats and attacks that could disrupt critical systems and operations. CIP Policy Has Continued to Evolve
Federal awareness of the importance of securing our nation’s critical infrastructures has continued to evolve since the mid-1990s. To facilitate private-sector participation, PDD 63 also encouraged the voluntary creation of information sharing and analysis centers (ISACs) to serve as mechanisms for gathering, analyzing, and appropriately sanitizing and disseminating information to and from infrastructure sectors and the federal government through NIPC. Although improvements have been made in protecting our nation’s critical infrastructures and continuing efforts are in progress, further efforts are needed to address the following critical CIP challenges that we have identified: developing a comprehensive and coordinated national plan to facilitate CIP information sharing that clearly delineates the roles and responsibilities of federal and nonfederal CIP entities, defines interim objectives and milestones, sets timeframes for achieving objectives, and establishes performance measures; developing fully productive information-sharing relationships within the federal government and among the federal government and state and local governments and the private sector; improving the federal government’s capabilities to analyze incident, threat, and vulnerability information obtained from numerous sources and share appropriate timely, useful warnings and other information concerning both cyber and physical threats to federal entities, state and local governments, and the private sector; and providing appropriate incentives for nonfederal entities to increase information sharing with the federal government. The ten trade associations that are members of it fund the Real Estate ISAC. Discusses the importance of the ISACs and the private infrastructure sectors being involved in government exercises that demonstrate responses to possible incidents. DHS and the sector-specific agencies have undertaken a number of efforts to address the public/private partnership that is called for by federal CIP policy, and they continue to work on their cooperation and interaction with the ISACs and with each other. Department of the Treasury (Treasury). Challenges to ISAC Establishment and Partnership with the Federal Government
Our discussions with the ISACs and the series of ISAC Council white papers confirmed that a number of challenges remain to the successful establishment and operation of ISACs and their partnership with DHS and other federal agencies. In its recent white papers, the ISAC Council also has identified a number of barriers to information sharing between the private sector and government. According to a DHS official, the department is developing a plan (referred to as a “roadmap”) that documents the current information- sharing relationships among DHS, the ISACs, and other agencies; goals for improving that information-sharing relationship; and methods for measuring the progress in the improvement. | Why GAO Did This Study
Critical infrastructure protection (CIP) activities that are called for in federal policy and law are intended to enhance the security of the cyber and physical public and private infrastructures that are essential to our nation's security, economic security, and public health and safety. As our reliance on these infrastructures increases, so do the potential threats and attacks that could disrupt critical systems and operations. Effective information-sharing partnerships between industry sectors and government can contribute to CIP efforts. Federal policy has encouraged the voluntary creation of Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs) to facilitate the private sector's participation in CIP by serving as mechanisms for gathering and analyzing information and sharing it among the infrastructure sectors and between the private sector and government. This testimony discusses the management and operational structures used by ISACs, federal efforts to interact with and support the ISACs, and challenges to and successful practices for ISACs' establishment, operation, and partnerships with the federal government.
What GAO Found
Federal awareness of the importance of securing the nation's critical infrastructures--and the federal government's strategy to encourage cooperative efforts among state and local governments and the private sector to protect these infrastructures--have been evolving since the mid- 1990s. Federal policy continues to emphasize the importance of the ISACs and their information-sharing functions. In addition, federal policy established specific responsibilities for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and other federal agencies involved with the private sector in CIP. The ISACs themselves, although they have similar missions, were developed to serve the unique needs of the sectors they represent, and they operate under different business models and funding mechanisms. According to ISAC representatives and a council that represents many of them, a number of challenges to their successful establishment, operation, and partnership with DHS and other federal agencies remain. These challenges include increasing the percentage of entities within each sector that are members of its ISAC; building trusted relationships and processes to facilitate information sharing; overcoming barriers to information sharing, clarifying the roles and responsibilities of the various government and private sector entities that are involved in protecting critical infrastructures; and funding ISAC operations and activities. According to a DHS official, these issues are being considered, and the department is developing a plan that will document the current information-sharing relationships among DHS, the ISACs, and other agencies; goals for improving those information-sharing relationships; and methods for measuring progress toward these goals. |
gao_GAO-07-9 | gao_GAO-07-9_0 | 2). In September 2004, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution stating that the UN Secretary-General should “rapidly establish an international commission of inquiry in order immediately to investigate reports of violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law in Darfur by all parties, to determine also whether or not acts of genocide have occurred, and to identify the perpetrators of such violations with a view to ensuring that those responsible are held accountable.” In January 2005, the UN issued a report stating that “the Government of Sudan and the Janjaweed are responsible for serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law amounting to crimes under international law.” The report concluded that a policy of genocide had not been pursued but noted that “the crimes against humanity and war crimes that have been committed in Darfur may be no less serious and heinous than genocide.”
The UN Security Council has also adopted resolutions establishing a travel ban and asset freeze for those determined to impede the peace process or violate human rights and referring the situation in Darfur to the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court and calling on the government of Sudan and all other parties to the conflict to cooperate with the court. In addition, IDP malnutrition and mortality rates decreased over time, a trend that U.S., UN, and other officials attribute in part to humanitarian assistance. 9). U.S. Assistance Addressed Range of Other Needs
In addition to providing food aid, as of September 30, 2006, the United States had obligated approximately $315 million for other humanitarian assistance in a range of sectors, including shelter, water and sanitation, health care, and nutrition. Continued insecurity restricts humanitarian organizations’ access to IDPs and affected residents of Darfur. Numerous Challenges Have Hampered U.S. Assistance Efforts and Oversight
Since the beginning of the humanitarian crisis in Darfur, entities delivering U.S. humanitarian assistance to affected residents and IDPs have faced numerous challenges. Impact on food assistance. African Union Has Taken Actions to Meet Mandate, but Some Actions Have Been Incomplete or Inconsistent
Although the African Union’s peace support operation has reportedly contributed to a reduction of large-scale violence in Darfur, AMIS’s actions to fulfill its mandate in Darfur have been taken in an incomplete or inconsistent manner. To monitor compliance with the cease-fire agreement, the first component of its mandate, AMIS military observers in Darfur have actively investigated alleged cease-fire agreement violations. However, the Joint Commission has not consistently reviewed the resulting Ceasefire Commission investigation reports. Sudanese government. U.S. Government Has Funded AMIS Camps
To support AMIS’s efforts to carry out its mandate, the U.S. government expended about $240 million from June 2004 to August 2006 and obligated another $40 million in September of 2006, primarily to build and maintain the 32 camps that house AMIS forces throughout Darfur, according to a State official who tracks this funding. NATO has also provided training for AMIS personnel and has assisted with troop rotation efforts. These factors include inadequacies in management, organization, and capacity; a relatively small force; resources that have been constrained or inefficiently allocated; and a lack of information regarding, and cooperation from, parties to the conflict. As AMIS has faced operational and other challenges, the UN has approved a UN peacekeeping operation in Darfur when AMIS’s mandate expires; however, as of October 2006, the Sudanese government had rejected the proposal. As insecurity continues in Darfur, such support may be required well into the future. We received written comments from the Department of State and USAID. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report examines (1) U.S. humanitarian assistance provided to help relieve the crisis in Darfur, (2) challenges that the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and its implementing partners have encountered, (3) the African Union’s efforts to fulfill its peace support mandate in Darfur, and (4) factors affecting the implementation of this mandate. GAO Comments
1. GAO Comments
1. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2003, violent conflict in Darfur, Sudan broke out between rebel groups, government troops, and government-supported Arab militias, known as the Janjaweed. The conflict has displaced about 2 million Darfurians and has so affected over 1.9 million others that they require assistance. Since October 2003, the U.S. government has provided humanitarian assistance in Darfur and supported African Union Mission in Sudan's (AMIS) efforts to fulfill a peace support mandate. This report reviews (1) U.S. humanitarian assistance provided to Darfur and the challenges that have been encountered and (2) African Union efforts to fulfill its mandate and challenges that have affected these efforts.
What GAO Found
The United States has been the largest donor of humanitarian aid to Darfur, obligating nearly $1 billion from October 2003 through September 2006. Although more than 68 percent of this assistance consisted of food aid, U.S. assistance has also supported other needs, such as water and sanitation, shelter, and health care. Since 2003, humanitarian organizations have made significant progress in increasing the number of people in Darfur receiving aid. In addition, malnutrition and mortality rates in Darfur dropped, a trend that U.S. and other officials attribute in part to humanitarian assistance efforts. However, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the entities providing U.S. humanitarian assistance have encountered several challenges that have hampered delivery of, or accountability for, humanitarian services in Darfur. These challenges include continued insecurity in Darfur; Sudanese government restrictions on access to communities in need; the timing of funding; and an incapacity to ensure monitoring of, and reporting on, U.S.-funded programs. AMIS has taken several positive actions in Darfur to pursue its mandate, although some actions have been incomplete or inconsistent. For example, to monitor compliance with a 2004 cease-fire agreement--one mandate component--AMIS investigated alleged cease-fire violations and identified numerous violations; however, the resulting reports were not consistently reviewed at higher levels or made fully publicly available to identify those violating the agreement. The U.S. government, via private contractors, provided about $280 million from June 2004 through September 2006 tobuild and maintain 32 camps for AMIS forces in Darfur, according to the Department of State. Numerous challenges have been identified by African Union or U.S. officials, among others, as negatively affecting AMIS's efforts in Darfur. These challenges include inadequacies in AMIS's organization, management, and capacity, such as inconsistent interpretation of the AMIS mandate; its relatively small forces; limited or poorly allocated resources; and a lack of intelligence regarding, and cooperation from, the parties to the conflict. A transition from AMIS to a UN peacekeeping operation is being considered, although the Sudanese government has rejected such a transition. A possible NATO-assisted review of AMIS operations has not been conducted. Meanwhile, insecurity and violence continue in Darfur. |
gao_GAO-06-57 | gao_GAO-06-57_0 | HUD Made Three- fourths of Its Housing Assistance Payments On Time in Fiscal Years 1995 Through 2004
Between fiscal years 1995 and 2004, HUD disbursed three-fourths of its monthly housing assistance payments by the due date, but thousands of payments each year were late, affecting many property owners. For this 10-year period, about 8 percent of all payments were delayed by 2 weeks or more, a time frame we characterize as significant. 3). HUD’s contract renewal process itself also may take longer than expected, contributing to late housing assistance payments, because the process is largely manual and paper driven and requires multiple staff in the PBCAs and HUD to complete (see fig. Three of the 16 owners with whom we spoke reported having to pay their mortgages or other bills late as a result of HUD’s payment delays. Effects of Delayed Payments on Owners Varied Based on Several Factors, Particularly the Owners’ Financial Condition and Degree of Reliance on HUD’s Subsidy
According to owners as well as industry group and HUD officials, owners who are heavily reliant on HUD’s subsidy to operate their properties are more severely affected by payment delays than other owners. HUD also allows owners to withdraw funds from this account in the event of HUD’s payment delays, so that owners are able to make their mortgage payments. Most of the owners with whom we spoke reported that they received no warning from HUD that their payments would be delayed. Delayed Housing Assistance Payments Were Unlikely to Cause Owners to Opt Out of HUD’s Programs or Discontinue Involvement in Providing Affordable Housing
Project owners, industry group officials, contract administrators, and HUD officials we interviewed generally agreed that market factors primarily drove an owner’s decision to opt out of HUD programs. However, while the timeliness of housing assistance payments has improved in recent years, the number of significantly late payments remains a concern. Although HUD has made changes to improve contract administration, it has not comprehensively addressed the factors that most affect the timeliness of payments—that is, its contract renewal and contract funding and monitoring processes. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve the timeliness of housing assistance payments and mitigate the effects on owners when payments are delayed, we recommend that the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development take the following three actions: streamline and automate the contract renewal process to prevent processing errors and delays and eliminate paper/hard-copy requirements to the extent practicable; develop systematic means to better estimate the amounts that should be allocated and obligated to project-based housing assistance payment contracts each year, monitor the ongoing funding needs of each contract, and ensure that additional funds are promptly obligated to contracts when necessary to prevent payment delays; and notify owners if their monthly housing assistance payments will be late and include in such notifications the date by which HUD expects to make the monthly payment to the owner. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) provides subsidies, known as housing assistance payments, under contracts with privately owned, multifamily projects so that they are affordable to low-income households. Project owners have expressed concern that HUD has chronically made late housing assistance payments in recent years, potentially compromising owners'ability to pay operating expenses, make mortgage payments, or set aside funds for repairs. GAO was asked to discuss the timeliness of HUD's monthly housing assistance payments, the factors that affect payment timeliness, and the effects of delayed payments on project owners.
What GAO Found
From fiscal years 1995 through 2004, HUD disbursed three-fourths of its monthly housing assistance payments on time, but thousands of payments were late each year, affecting many property owners. Over the 10-year period, 8 percent of payments were delayed by 2 weeks or more. Payments were somewhat more likely to be timely in more recent years. The process for renewing HUD's subsidy contracts with owners can affect the timeliness of housing assistance payments, according to many owners, HUD officials, and contract administrators that HUD hires to work with owners. HUD's renewal process is largely a manual, hard-copy paper process that requires multiple staff to complete. Problems with this cumbersome, paper-intensive process may delay contract renewals and cause late payments. Also, a lack of systematic internal processes for HUD staff to better estimate the amounts that HUD needs to obligate to contracts each year and monitor contract funding levels on an ongoing basis can contribute to delays in housing assistance payments. Although HUD allows owners to borrow from reserve accounts to lessen the effect of delayed housing assistance payments, 3 of 16 project owners told GAO that they had to make late payments on their mortgages or other bills--such as utilities, telephone service, or pest control--as a result of HUD's payment delays. Owners who are heavily reliant on HUD's subsidy to operate their properties are likely to be more severely affected by payment delays than other, more financially stable, owners. Owners reported receiving no warning from HUD when payments would be delayed, and several told GAO that such notification would allow them to mitigate a delay. Nonetheless, project owners, industry group officials, and HUD officials generally agreed that late housing assistance payments would be unlikely to cause an owner to leave HUD's housing assistance programs, because such a decision is generally driven primarily by local market factors. |
gao_GAO-06-499T | gao_GAO-06-499T_0 | IRS’s Filing Season Performance to Date Has Improved in Important Areas, Continuing a Recent Trend
IRS improved its 2006 filing season performance in important areas that affect large numbers of taxpayers. Taxpayer assistance has improved in the two most commonly used services—toll-free telephones and the Internet Web site. Direct deposit is faster, more convenient for taxpayers, and less expensive for IRS than mailing paper checks. Electronic filing continues to grow but at a slower rate than previous years. Taxpayers Continue Their Recent Pattern of Using IRS’s Walk-In Sites Less and Using Volunteer Sites More, And Information About the Quality of Service Remains Limited
Fewer taxpayers have used IRS’s 400 walk-in sites so far in the 2006 filing season compared to the same period in prior years. 2). Many of the problems we identified put paid preparers, taxpayers, or both at risk of IRS enforcement actions. The amount requested is about a 1.6 percent increase over fiscal year 2006 enacted levels, but is a slight decrease after adjusting for expected inflation. For every one of the major taxpayer services listed in the budget, 2007 planned performance goals are higher or equal to 2006 performance goals. 3). IRS’s Proposed BSM Budget Reduction Could Impede Future Progress
BSM is a high-risk, highly complex effort that involves developing and delivering a new set of information systems that are intended to replace the agency’s aging tax processing and business systems. IRS’s Budget Request Identified Some Savings, but Opportunities Exist for Enhancing Savings
In its 2007 budget request, IRS identified savings as it has done in prior years and plans to redirect some of those savings to front-line taxpayer service and enforcement activities. IRS Sets Long-Term Goals, but Lacks a Data-Based Plan for Achieving the Goals, and Addressing the Tax Gap Requires Solutions Beyond Funding and Staffing for IRS
For the first time, IRS’s budget request sets long-term goals aimed at reducing the tax gap, although IRS does not have a data-based plan for achieving the goals. Unfortunately, quantifying the impact of IRS’s service and enforcement programs on compliance or cheating is very challenging. Finally, IRS has continually improved taxpayer service by increasing, for example, the accuracy of responses to tax law questions. The effect of this overall approach and the 2007 budget proposal will have on voluntary compliance has not been quantified by IRS. Addressing the Tax Gap Requires Solutions Beyond Funding and Staffing for IRS
For years, we have reported that tax law enforcement is a high-risk area, in part because of the size of the gross estimated tax gap, which IRS most recently estimated to be $345 billion for tax year 2001. We have reported that significant reductions in the tax gap will likely require exploring new and innovative solutions. Such solutions that may not require significant additional IRS resources, but are nonetheless difficult to achieve, include simplifying the tax code to make it easier for individuals and businesses to understand and comply with their tax obligations; increasing tax withholding for income currently not subject to withholding; improving information reporting; and leveraging technology to improve IRS’s capacity to receive and process tax returns. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) filing season performance affects tens of millions of taxpayers who expect timely refunds and accurate answers to their tax questions. IRS's budget request is a planning tool showing how it intends to provide taxpayer service and enforce the tax laws in 2007. It is also the first in a series of annual steps that will determine whether IRS meets its new long-term goals of increasing tax compliance and reducing taxpayers' acceptance of cheating on their taxes. Tax law enforcement remains on GAO's list of high-risk federal programs, in part, because of the persistence of a large tax gap. IRS recently estimated the gross tax gap, the difference between what taxpayers owe and what they voluntarily pay, to be $345 billion for 2001. GAO assessed (1) IRS's interim 2006 filing season performance; (2) the budget request; and (3) how the budget helps IRS achieve its longterm goals. GAO compared performance and the requested budget to previous years.
What GAO Found
IRS has improved its filing season performance so far in 2006, continuing a trend. More refunds were directly deposited, which is faster and more convenient. Electronic filing continued to grow, but at a slower rate than in previous years. IRS's two most commonly used services--telephone and Web site assistance--continued to improve. IRS estimates that the accuracy rate for its telephone answers is now at 90 percent or more. Taxpayers continued the recent pattern of using IRS's walk-in sites less and community-based volunteer sites more. While millions of taxpayers use chain paid tax preparers, taxpayers may not be receiving accurate and complete assistance, putting them at risk of owing back taxes, interest, and penalties. The 2007 budget request of $11 billion (a small decrease after adjusting for inflation) sets performance goals for service and enforcement that are all equal to or higher than the 2006 goals. The budget reduces funding by 15 percent for Business Systems Modernization, the ongoing effort to replace IRS's aging information systems. The reduction could impede progress delivering improvements to taxpayers. The budget request identified over $121 million in savings; however, opportunities exist for further savings. For example, IRS officials told us IRS's 25 call centers have underutilized space. Those centers could be consolidated without affecting service to taxpayers. Achieving IRS's long-term compliance goals will be challenging because the tax gap has persisted for many years at about its current level. In addition, because the effect of taxpayer service and enforcement on compliance has never been quantified, IRS does not have a data-based plan demonstrating how it will achieve its goals. Nor does IRS have a plan for measuring compliance by 2009, the date for achieving the goals. Reducing the tax gap will likely require new and innovative solutions such as simplifying the tax code, increasing income subject to withholding, and increasing information reporting about income. |
gao_GAO-08-1114 | gao_GAO-08-1114_0 | The effect of temperature on fuel volume varies depending on the density of the fuel. 1). State and local governments adopt and enforce weights and measures regulations, including those to ensure that retail fuel pumps accurately measure motor fuels. NIST publishes NCWM’s newly adopted model regulatory standards in handbooks. The Magnitude of Equipment and Education Costs of Adopting Automatic Temperature Compensation Is Unclear
Stakeholders said that implementing automatic temperature compensation for retail fuel sales would involve costs to purchase, install, and inspect new equipment on gasoline pumps, as well as costs to educate consumers about the change. Some stakeholders estimate the costs to purchase and install the temperature compensation devices would range from $1,300 to $3,000 per pump. These manufacturers said the costs can vary by the type of equipment. A small number of state officials said that automatic temperature compensation could increase inspection time by 20 to 50 percent and might require the purchase of testing equipment. In contrast, officials in three other states said that inspection costs to adopt temperature compensation would not be significant, although they had not estimated the cost. No stakeholders have developed estimates of the costs to educate consumers when automatic temperature compensation is in use. It Is Unclear Who Would Bear the Costs of Implementing Automatic Temperature Compensation
Stakeholders differ on whether consumers or a combination of retailers and consumers would bear the costs of implementing automatic temperature compensation. Specifically, many stakeholders, including state officials and industry representatives, said that the costs to purchase, install, and inspect compensation equipment would be passed on to consumers, generally through higher retail fuel prices, higher prices for nonfuel goods sold at retail fueling stations, or a combination of both. However, other stakeholders, such as consumer groups, said that retailers and consumers would share in both the costs and the benefits of implementing temperature compensation. For example, one stakeholder noted that some retailers could use funds they receive from the major oil companies for remodeling to cover the cost of temperature compensation equipment. Regardless of their views, stakeholders based their opinions largely on professional judgment and general economic theory or assumptions about how the fuel market operates rather than on studies or other data. In contrast, other stakeholders said that retailers may already adjust their prices to account for the expansion and contraction of fuel, while still others questioned the benefit to consumers from investing in temperature-compensating devices in areas where the average ambient temperature is close to 60 degrees F.
The majority of stakeholders—including state officials, consumer and industry representatives, and fleet owners—said that a cost-benefit study such as the one under way in California would provide policymakers with important information. Governments That Have Adopted Automatic Temperature Compensation Did So Largely to Improve Purchasing Equity, and Those That Have Not Cited Concerns That the Costs Would Outweigh the Benefits
Governments that have adopted or permitted automatic temperature compensation, or are considering doing so, cited improved measurement accuracy and greater equity between retailers and consumers as reasons for making the change, whereas those governments that do not allow temperature compensation cited concerns that the costs would outweigh the benefits. Belgium adopted temperature compensation for retail sales, in part, because some retailers were artificially heating fuel, and the government sought greater consistency in the energy content of the fuel sold to consumers, according to a weights and measures official. Specifically, Canada established technical and other standards in the early 1990s that allowed retailers to sell temperature-compensated fuel, but it did not require them to do so. In the United States, officials in eight states that have laws or regulations prohibiting automatic temperature compensation largely said the decision should be based on an analysis of the costs and benefits, with some expressing concern that the anticipated costs would outweigh any benefit to consumers and fuel retailers. In some cases, these decisions were made more than 20 years ago, and the officials we interviewed had limited information about the reasons. To develop the questions, we reviewed NCWM and National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) documents, as well as congressional testimony. | Why GAO Did This Study
The volume, but not the energy content, of hydrocarbon fuels, such as gasoline and diesel, varies in response to changes in temperature. Thus, because of expansion, the energy content per gallon of 90 degree fuel is less than that of 60 degree fuel. States and localities adopt and enforce weights and measures regulations, often using the model regulatory standards published by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). Although technology now exists to compensate for the effects of temperature on gas volume, the costs of doing so at the retail level have become the subject of much debate among weights and measures officials, consumer groups, and representatives of the petroleum and fuel marketing industries. GAO was asked to provide information on (1) the views of U.S. stakeholders on the costs to implement automatic temperature compensation, (2) the views of U.S. stakeholders on who would bear these costs, and (3) the reasons some state and national governments have adopted or rejected automatic temperature compensation. To do this work, GAO reviewed NIST and other documents and congressional testimony; interviewed stakeholders from 3 federal agencies, 17 states, and 15 groups representing a variety of interests, including consumers, truck drivers, and the oil and gas industry; and interviewed officials in 5 other nations. Various stakeholders and officials provided technical and other comments, which were incorporated in the report as appropriate
What GAO Found
The costs to implement automatic temperature compensation are unclear. Most stakeholders said that implementing automatic temperature compensation for retail sales would involve the cost to purchase, install, and inspect new equipment on pumps, as well as costs to educate consumers about the change. Some stakeholders said the costs to adopt automatic temperature compensation ranged from $1,300 to $3,000 per pump, but none had estimated the total costs nationwide, in part because complete data are not available. Estimates of the cost to inspect the new equipment varied. Officials in a small number of states said inspection times would increase by 20 to 50 percent, while officials in three other states said the costs would not be significant. No stakeholders had developed estimates of the costs to educate consumers. Stakeholders differ on whether retailers, consumers, or both would ultimately bear the costs of implementing automatic temperature compensation at the retail level. Some stakeholders, including state officials and industry representatives, said that the costs would be passed on to consumers through higher prices for fuel or other goods sold at retail stations. Others, such as consumer groups, said that retailers and consumers would share the costs and benefits. That is, some retailers could use funds they receive from major oil companies for remodeling to pay for the equipment. These stakeholders also said the benefits include consistent energy content for consumers and improved inventory management for retailers. Stakeholder views were largely based on professional judgment and general economic theory rather than on studies or other data, and most stakeholders said that a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis would provide policymakers with important information. Governments that have adopted or permitted automatic temperature compensation for retail fuel sales cited improved measurement accuracy and greater equity between retailers and consumers as reasons for making the change; those that have prohibited it largely cited concerns that the costs would outweigh the benefits. Hawaii adopted temperature compensation more than 26 years ago because it provided purchasing equity for the industry and consumers. In 2008, Belgium mandated temperature compensation to help ensure more consistent energy content for consumers. Canadian officials cited improved measurement equity and accuracy as reasons for allowing retailers to sell temperature-compensated fuel in the early 1990s. In the United States, officials from eight states that have laws or regulations that prohibit automatic temperature compensation said the decision should be based on an analysis of the costs and benefits, with some expressing concern that the costs would outweigh the benefits. None of the governments that have adopted automatic temperature compensation have studied its impact. |
gao_GAO-13-28 | gao_GAO-13-28_0 | According to DFAS-IN, of the $52.5 billion in fiscal year 2011 military personnel appropriations, nearly 800,000 active duty Army servicemembers received nearly $47 billion in pay and allowances. Scope and Methodology
To assess the effectiveness of the design of the process for unit commander review of monthly payroll disbursements as a compensating control for assuring active duty Army payroll accuracy, we compared related processes and systems to applicable internal control standards, as well as applicable laws and regulations, and DOD, DFAS, and Army policies and procedures. Specifically, we found that the design of Army and DFAS-IN procedures for using the UCFR to assist in detecting and correcting military payroll errors is not an effective compensating control for assuring the accuracy of the Army’s active duty military payroll because they do not (1) provide for monitoring of required UCFR reviews to better assure detection of payroll errors, (2) require reporting of completed UCFR reviews in all cases, and (3) clearly establish time frames for completing and reporting on UCFR reviews. Undetected Payroll Errors Resulted in Overpayments and Debts Owed to the Government by Soldiers No Longer in the Army
Our review of DFAS Debt and Claims Management data and Army CID reports on investigations of potential military pay-related fraud identified numerous instances of military pay errors and irregularities that the Army and DFAS-IN did not detect and correct for several months, or only after soldiers had left the service. The following examples from our analysis of DDMS data illustrate the types of pay errors that went undetected for lengthy periods of time. A soldier who was absent without leave (AWOL) from January 2010 to September 2011 received military pay of $33,268 to which she was not entitled. We identified the following deficiencies in the Army’s procedures that impaired the effectiveness of the UCFR reviews. Ineffective Procedures for Capturing Information on Payroll Errors to Identify and Correct Systemic Weaknesses
Existing monitoring processes and controls for resolving Army active duty payroll errors were not designed to serve as effective compensating controls to provide for monitoring to capture data on the extent and causes of any over- and underpayments, unauthorized payments, and other pay errors. Moreover, to the extent that errors in Army active duty pay are not identified and addressed in a timely manner, they can have a negative effect on soldier welfare and, ultimately, could erode the focus on Army mission readiness. Data on Payroll Adjustments for Underpayment or Overpayment of Active Duty Military Pay Are Not Used to Help Identify Potential Systemic Control Weaknesses
The system that DFAS-IN uses to pay Army active duty soldiers (DJMS- AC) does not have the capability to identify and report the extent and causes of under- and overpayments and other types of payroll errors related to active duty Army soldier pay. For example, a colonel in the Army National Guard reported experiencing numerous underpayments throughout his 28 years of service, including suffering financial hardship when he was on active duty in 2003 to Afghanistan and his active duty pay was stopped for 1-1/2 months. Without a CMS monitoring capability, the Army is limited in its ability to identify and address any additional systemic military payroll control weaknesses. Conclusions
The Army’s weaknesses in the design of processes, systems, and controls for detecting and correcting errors in payroll disbursements to active duty Army military personnel increase the risk that its active duty military payroll includes servicemembers who received pay to which they were not entitled and others who did not receive the full pay they were due. In addition, because DFAS-IN and the Army do not have a comprehensive accuracy metric for military payroll and current processes, systems, and controls are not designed to identify and document the extent and cause of payroll errors, irregularities, and corrections, DFAS-IN and the Army are limited in their ability to determine the overall accuracy of Army active duty military pay or whether there are any related unidentified systemic weaknesses that should be corrected. With regard to our three recommendations to strengthen UCFR controls, DOD partially agreed, stating that it concurred fully with the goal of improving the accuracy of military pay to the extent that cost-effective corrective actions are warranted. However, as discussed in our report, Army and DFAS systems and processes do not currently capture data on all errors and their causes. 1. | Why GAO Did This Study
In March 2012, GAO reported on challenges that DOD and the Army face in achieving audit readiness with respect to the over $45 billion in reported fiscal year 2010 Army active duty military payroll disbursements. In performing that work, GAO identified indications of possible weaknesses in selected processes, systems, and controls relied on to reasonably assure the validity and accuracy of reported Army active duty military payroll that were beyond the scope of that audit. GAO subsequently completed work on those issues and is presenting the results in this report. GAO (1) assessed the design of key controls for payroll accuracy and (2) determined the extent to which the Army and DFAS-IN have monitoring controls to identify and address any systemic weaknesses. GAO compared selected Army and DFAS-IN processes, systems, and controls for assuring payroll accuracy to applicable internal control standards and to applicable provisions of law, regulations, and policies and procedures. GAO also interviewed officials and examined related data and information.
What GAO Found
GAO identified deficiencies in the design of key control procedures relied on by the Army and the Defense Finance and Accounting Service-Indianapolis (DFAS-IN) to detect errors in payroll disbursements to active duty Army military personnel. Specifically, GAO found that the Army's procedures for reviewing Unit Commander Finance Reports (UCFR) do not (1) provide for monitoring of required UCFR reviews to better assure detection of payroll errors, (2) require reporting on completed UCFR reviews in all cases, and (3) clearly establish time frames for completing and reporting on UCFR reviews. GAO's analysis of DFAS data on military pay debts and Army investigations of potential fraud completed over the past 2 years identified numerous instances of the effect of errors or irregularities in Army active duty payroll disbursements that went undetected for lengthy periods of time, including some that were not detected for up to 2 years or until the soldier left the Army. For example:
A soldier who separated from the Army in 2009 continued to receive active duty pay totaling about $185,000 until 2011.
A soldier who was absent without leave from January 2010 to September 2011 received military pay of $33,268 to which she was not entitled.
A soldier under investigation for possible fraud allegedly received over $34,000 in paratrooper and language proficiency pay but did not have a documented record of jumps performed or up-to-date proficiency certifications.
GAO's analysis determined that the Army could reduce its risk of lengthy delays in detecting and correcting pay errors with more stringent UCFR monitoring and reporting requirements.
GAO also found that DFAS and the Army have procedures and metrics in place that focus on the timeliness of manual processing and payroll adjustments for error corrections. However, they do not have procedures and metrics to enable them to gather data on active duty pay errors that were related to causes other than timeliness, such as over- and underpayments, data entry errors, and unauthorized payments. Further, the design of existing Defense Joint Military Pay System-Active Component and DFAS-IN Case Management System procedures for transaction processing and error correction did not provide for monitoring to capture data on all types of pay errors and their causes that would be useful in identifying the extent to which there are any additional systemic payroll control weaknesses. For example, an Army National Guard colonel deployed on active duty to Afghanistan reported that he experienced financial hardship when his military pay was stopped for 1-1/2 months. The absence of data on the extent and causes of all types of Army active duty military payroll errors impairs the Army's ability to identify and address any adverse trends that may indicate the existence of other systemic control weaknesses. Overall, the control deficiencies that GAO identified increase the risk that the nearly $47 billion in reported fiscal year 2011 Army active duty military payroll includes Army servicemembers who received pay to which they were not entitled and others who did not receive the full pay they were due. Further, to the extent that errors in Army active duty pay are not identified and addressed in a timely manner, they can have a negative effect on soldier welfare and, ultimately, could erode soldiers' focus on their Army mission.
What GAO Recommends
GAO made five recommendations to strengthen Army and DFAS monitoring and reporting controls over Army active duty military payroll accuracy. DOD partially concurred with all five recommendations, stating that it concurs fully with the goal of improving military pay but additional testing is needed to identify any cost-effective corrective actions. GAO continues to believe that its recommendations for corrective action are appropriate, as discussed more fully in the report. |
gao_GAO-09-647 | gao_GAO-09-647_0 | CMS may at times also make changes to fees for services independent of RUC recommendations. CMS has a long-standing policy called a multiple procedure payment reduction (MPPR) to avoid duplicate payments for portions of practice expenses that are incurred only once when two or more surgical services are furnished together by the same physician during the same operating session. Under the MPPR policy, the full fee is paid for the more expensive service, but a reduction is applied to the fees for each subsequent service. For example, through the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (DRA), Congress mandated that savings resulting from the MPPR for certain imaging services that were furnished together be exempted from budget neutrality. CMS Has Recognized Efficiencies in Some Services, but Has Not Focused on High- Spending Services
CMS has taken steps to recognize efficiencies for services commonly furnished together through the use of the RUC process and the MPPR, but has not targeted services with the greatest potential for savings, and the RUC process depends on specialty societies. The MPPR is limited in scope because it does not apply to a broad range of services, nor does it capture efficiencies occurring in the physician work component. RUC Workgroup Examines Efficiencies in Services Commonly Furnished Together, but Does Not Target Services with Greatest Potential for Savings
CMS stated that it is reviewing the efforts of a workgroup recently created by the RUC to identify efficiencies in services that are commonly furnished together. However, these service pairs would likely result in limited savings. This element is inherent in a process based on input and consensus from specialty societies. 1). CMS estimated that its use of the MPPR for certain imaging procedures produced savings of about $96 million in 2006. In this instance, Congress exempted these savings from the budget neutrality provision; as a result, the $96 million was not redirected to other services but accrued as savings to the Medicare program. For example, a physician’s review of a patient’s medical history and prior imaging or other test results before the service, and dictation of the final report for the medical record, occur only once. CMS’s MPPR Policy Could Be Applied to Other Services Commonly Furnished Together and Expanded to Reflect Efficiencies in Physician Work
Our review of Medicare claims data indicated the potential for reducing excessive physician payments by implementing an MPPR to reflect efficiencies generally occurring in the practice expense component of certain nonsurgical and nonimaging service pairs commonly furnished together. Potential Exists for Reducing about $175 Million Annually through Expanding the Current MPPR for Imaging Services to Reflect Efficiencies in the Physician Work Component
Our analysis of 118 imaging service pairs suggests that efficiencies in physician work occur when services are furnished together, and an MPPR policy that reflected these efficiencies could save Medicare over $175 million annually. However, based on our review of the workgroup’s processes and progress to date, we continue to believe that these processes are resource intensive and will likely limit CMS’s ability to quickly identify opportunities for savings from those service pairs that account for a high share of Medicare spending. Appendix I: Estimating Potential for Further Savings from Efficiencies in Multiple Services
In this appendix, we describe the processes we used to determine opportunities for the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) to avoid excessive payments for services commonly furnished together. We generated a list of all service pairs that were furnished by the same physician to the same beneficiary on the same day and made the following exclusions: service pairs with low utilization—those that were billed fewer than 5,000 service pairs containing only the professional portion of a service; service pairs that were already subject to payment policies that reduced payments for one of the services in the pair; service pairs containing supplemental services, which are priced to exclude duplication of physician work and practice expenses that are already included in the primary service; and service pairs containing duplicate services. The AMA/Specialty Society Relative Value Scale Update Committee (RUC) bases its estimates of physician work and practice expenses on these vignettes. 3) describes the nonphysician clinical labor, supplies, and equipment resources required for each service. | Why GAO Did This Study
Medicare's physician fees may not always reflect efficiencies that occur when a physician performs multiple services for the same patient on the same day, and some resources required for these services do not need to be duplicated. In response to a request from Congress, GAO examined (1) the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services' (CMS) efforts to set appropriate fees for services furnished together and (2) additional opportunities for CMS to avoid excessive payments when services are furnished together. GAO examined relevant policies, laws, and regulations; interviewed CMS officials and others; and analyzed claims data to identify opportunities for further savings.
What GAO Found
CMS has taken steps to ensure that physician fees recognize efficiencies that occur when certain services are commonly furnished together, that is, by the same physician to the same beneficiary on the same day, but has not targeted services with the greatest potential for savings. CMS is reviewing the efforts of a workgroup created by the American Medical Association/Specialty Society Relative Value Scale Update Committee (RUC) in 2007 to examine potential duplication in resource estimates for services furnished together. However, the RUC workgroup has not focused on services that account for the largest share of Medicare spending. For this and other reasons, its methodology to identify and review services furnished together likely will result in limited savings. The workgroup's process is also resource intensive because it depends on input and consensus from specialty societies. Independent of the RUC, CMS has implemented a multiple procedure payment reduction (MPPR) policy for certain imaging and surgical services when two or more related services are furnished together. Under an MPPR, the full fee is paid for the highest-priced service and a reduced fee is paid for each subsequent service to reflect efficiencies in overlapping portions of the practice expense component--clinical labor, supplies, and equipment. For example, a nurse's time preparing a patient for a medical procedure or technician's time setting up the required equipment is incurred only once. The MPPR produced savings of about $96 million in 2006 for imaging services. However, the scope of the policy is limited because the policy does not apply to nonsurgical and nonimaging services commonly furnished together, nor does it specifically reflect efficiencies occurring in the physician work component--the financial value of a physician's time, skill, and effort. For example, when two services are furnished together, a physician reviews a patient's medical records once, but the time for that activity is generally reflected in fees paid for both services. CMS has additional opportunities to reduce excess physician payments that can occur when services are furnished together and Medicare's fees do not reflect the efficiencies realized. GAO's review found that expanding the MPPR to reflect practice expense efficiencies that occur when nonsurgical, nonimaging services are provided together could reduce payments for these services by an estimated one-half billion dollars annually. GAO's review also indicated that expanding the existing MPPR policy to reflect efficiencies in the physician work component of certain imaging services could reduce these payments by an estimated additional $175 million annually. Under the budget neutrality requirement, by law, savings from reductions in fees are redistributed by increasing fees for all other services. Thus, these potential savings would accrue as savings to Medicare only if Congress exempted them from the budget neutrality requirement, as was done in the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 for savings from the changes to certain imaging services fees. |
gao_GAO-02-235T | gao_GAO-02-235T_0 | CDC’s Research and Preparedness Activities on Bioterrorism
CDC is conducting a variety of activities related to research on and preparedness for a bioterrorist attack. Research activities focus on detection, treatment, vaccination, and emergency response equipment. Preparedness efforts include increasing state and local response capacity, increasing CDC’s response capacity, preparedness and response planning, and building the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile Program. Besides improving emergency response at the special events, the agency gains valuable experience in developing and practicing plans to combat terrorism. This plan focuses on preparing CDC officials to respond to bioterrorism and includes the development of exercises to assess progress in achieving bioterrorism preparedness at the federal, state, and local levels. CDC and the Office of Emergency Preparedness (another agency in HHS that also maintains a stockpile of medical supplies) have encouraged state and local representatives to consider stockpile assets in their emergency planning for a biological attack and have trained representatives from state and local authorities in using the stockpile. Bioterrorism: Federal Research and Preparedness Activities (GAO-01- 915, Sept. 28, 2001). | What GAO Found
Federal research and preparedness activities related to bioterrorism center on detection; the development of vaccines, antibiotics, and antivirals; and the development of performance standards for emergency response equipment. Preparedness activities include (1) increasing federal, state, and local response capabilities; (2) developing response teams; (3) increasing the availability of medical treatments; (4) participating in and sponsoring exercises; (5) aiding victims; and (6) providing support at special events, such as presidential inaugurations and Olympic games. To coordinate their efforts to combat terrorism, federal agencies are developing interagency response plans, participating in various interagency work groups, and entering into formal agreements with other agencies to share resources and capabilities. However, coordination of federal terrorism research, preparedness, and response programs is fragmented, raising concerns about the ability of states and localities to respond to a bioterrorist attack. These concerns include insufficient state and local planning and a lack of hospital participation in training on terrorism and emergency response planning. This testimony summarizes a September 2001 report (GAO-01-915). |
gao_GAO-13-205 | gao_GAO-13-205_0 | Individual Medical Readiness
Each of the military services is responsible for maintaining the medical readiness of its active-duty force. DOD’s IMR policy establishes six elements for the military services to assess in order to determine a servicemember’s medical readiness to deploy: 4. individual medical equipment,5. Research Organizations
DOD and the military services have a number of organizations that fund or conduct research, including research on health care issues that affect those who have served in a combat zone. DOD’s Policies for Assessing Individual Medical Readiness Are Mainly Gender- Neutral but Include Some Aspects That Are Female-Specific
DOD’s policy establishes six elements for assessing the IMR of a servicemember to deploy, most of which are gender-neutral. Four of the six elements—immunization status, medical readiness laboratory tests, individual medical equipment, and dental readiness—are gender-neutral; they apply equally to female and male servicemembers. The remaining elements of IMR—deployment-limiting conditions and PHAs—include some aspects that are specific to female servicemembers. The Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps have policies that define pregnancy as a deployment-limiting condition. Health Care and Behavioral Health Services Were Generally Available to Female Servicemembers through Domestic Army Installations
Routine and Specialized Female-Specific Health Care Services Were Generally Available at the Domestic Army Installations We Reviewed or from Other Sources
On the basis of our survey, we found that most routine female-specific health care services—including pelvic examinations, clinical breast examinations, pap smears, screening mammographies, prescription of contraceptives, and pregnancy tests—were available through the MTFs at the 27 domestic Army installations with a primary MTF. On the basis of our survey, the availability of specialized health care services varied by the type of primary MTF on the domestic Army installation; however, when services were not available at the installation, they were available through other MTFs or from a civilian network provider. Additionally, both male and female providers were available to provide specialized female-specific services— such as treatment of abnormal pap smear, prenatal care, labor and delivery, benign gynecological disorders, and postpartum care—that were offered at the 27 domestic Army installations. Officials from 18 of 27 domestic Army installations provided examples of female-specific behavioral health programs or activities, including a post-deployment group for female servicemembers, postpartum groups, and specific therapy groups for female servicemembers. One DOD Organization Is in the Process of Identifying Research Gaps on Health Care Needs for Female Servicemembers
The Women’s Health Research Interest Group, which is supported by the TriService Nursing Research Program, is currently in the process of identifying research gaps on health issues affecting female servicemembers. Interest group officials said that the goal is to develop a repository for peer-reviewed research articles related to health issues for female servicemembers, including those who served in combat, and to use this repository to identify research that could enhance the health care of female servicemembers, including those who have served in a combat zone. To ensure that researchers will have access to the results of their work, officials have plans to distribute their results in presentations at local and national conferences. In addition, officials told us that they will disseminate their findings through peer-reviewed publications and post this information on the TriService Nursing Research Program website, which is available to the public. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to DOD for comment. DOD responded that it did not have any comments on the draft report. Appendix I: List of Domestic Army Installations with a Primary Military Treatment Facility
Appendix II: Scope and Methodology for the Survey Sent to Domestic Army Military Treatment Facilities
To describe the availability of routine, specialized, and behavioral health care services to female servicemembers at domestic Army installations and from other sources, we surveyed senior health care officials at the 27 domestic Army installations that had a primary military treatment facility (MTF). | Why GAO Did This Study
Female servicemembers are serving in more complex occupational specialties and are being deployed to combat operations, potentially leading to increased health risks. Similar to their male counterparts, female servicemembers must maintain their medical readiness; however, they have unique health care needs that require access to gender-specific services. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 directed GAO to review a variety of issues related to health care for female servicemembers. This report describes (1) the extent that DOD's policies for assessing individual medical readiness include unique health care issues of female servicemembers; (2) the availability of health care services to meet the unique needs of female servicemembers at domestic Army installations; and (3) the extent that DOD's research organizations have identified a need for research on the specific health care needs of female servicemembers who have served in combat.
GAO reviewed DOD and military-service policies on individual medical readiness and surveyed senior health care officials about the availability of specific health services at the 27 domestic Army installations with MTFs that report directly to the domestic regional medical commands. GAO focused on the Army because it has more female servicemembers than the other military services. GAO also visited six Army installations--two from each of the Army's three domestic regional medical commands--and interviewed DOD officials who conduct research on health issues for servicemembers.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense's (DOD) policy for assessing the individual medical readiness of a servicemember to deploy establishes six elements to review, most of which are gender-neutral. Four of the six elements--immunization status, medical readiness laboratory tests, individual medical equipment, and dental readiness--apply equally to female and male servicemembers. The remaining elements of individual medical readiness--deployment-limiting conditions and periodic health assessments--include aspects that are specific to female servicemembers. For example, the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps have policies that define pregnancy as a deployment-limiting condition.
Officials surveyed by GAO reported that female-specific health care services and behavioral health services were generally available through domestic Army installations. Specifically, according to GAO's survey results:
Most routine female-specific health care services--pelvic examinations, clinical breast examinations, pap smears, prescription of contraceptives, and pregnancy tests--were available at the 27 surveyed domestic Army installations.
The availability of specialized health care services--treatment of abnormal pap smears, prenatal care, labor and delivery, benign gynecological disorders, postpartum care, and surgical, medical, and radiation treatment of breast, ovarian, cervical, and uterine cancers--at the 27 surveyed domestic Army installations varied. However, when these services were not available at the installation, they could be obtained through either another military treatment facility (MTF) or from a civilian network provider.
The availability of behavioral health services, such as psychotherapy or substance abuse treatment, which were not gender-specific, varied across the 27 domestic Army installations; however, similar to specialty care, these services could be obtained from other MTFs or civilian network providers. In addition, 18 of the 27 surveyed Army installations reported offering female-specific programs or activities, such as a post-deployment group for female servicemembers or a postpartum group.
One DOD organization, the Women's Health Research Interest Group, is currently in the process of identifying research gaps on health issues affecting female servicemembers. Interest group officials said that the goal is to develop a repository for peer-reviewed research articles related to health issues for female servicemembers, including those who served in combat, and to use this repository to identify research that could enhance the health care of female servicemembers, including those who have served in a combat zone. To ensure that researchers will have access to the results of their work, officials have plans to distribute their results in presentations at local and national conferences. In addition, officials told GAO that they will disseminate their findings through peer-reviewed publications and post this information on the Internet to make it available to the public.
GAO provided a draft of this report to DOD for comment. DOD responded that it did not have any comments on the draft report. |
gao_GAO-10-295 | gao_GAO-10-295_0 | Under CMS’s proposed rule, the ESRD drugs covered under the new bundled payment would include injectable ESRD drugs as well as oral ESRD drugs, such as calcimimetics, that are currently covered under Medicare Part D.
Accounting for Beneficiary Cost Differences under Medicare Bundled Payment Systems
Bundled payment systems in Medicare typically include a case-mix adjustment and may also use an outlier policy to account for differences in the cost of beneficiaries’ care. In particular, Medicare expenditures on injectable ESRD drugs in 2007 were $782 per African American beneficiary per month—about 13 percent more than the $693 spent for all Medicare beneficiaries on dialysis (see fig. Similarly, the $708 that Medicare spent per month on non-Hispanic beneficiaries was about 2 percent higher than the average across all beneficiaries on dialysis and about 19 percent higher than the average for Hispanic beneficiaries. A Majority of Selected Clinicians and Researchers Identified Primarily Clinical Factors as Likely to Result in Above Average Doses of Injectable ESRD Drugs
While we report that certain demographic groups were associated with above average Medicare expenditures for injectable ESRD drugs in 2007, we did not identify the factors that led to these differences in expenditures across groups of beneficiaries. However, we collected information from nephrology clinicians and ESRD researchers on the factors they consider likely to result in above average doses of injectable drugs—ESAs, IV iron, and IV vitamin D.
A majority of the 73 clinicians and researchers who completed our Web- based data collection instrument identified clinical factors, rather than demographic characteristics, as likely to result in above average doses of injectable ESRD drugs. Specifically, at least 50 percent of these experts identified 14 such factors, including chronic blood loss, low iron stores, and recent hospitalization, as likely to result in above average doses of ESAs (see table 1). In addition to a case-mix adjustment model, CMS proposed using an outlier policy, as required by MIPPA, to increase payments to providers when they treat beneficiaries whose costs of dialysis care substantially exceed what would be expected. CMS’s Preliminary Monitoring Plans Build on Existing Initiatives, but Whether CMS Will Monitor Quality of and Access to Care for Groups of Beneficiaries Is Unclear
CMS officials told us that their preliminary plans for monitoring the effects of the new bundled payment system on beneficiaries include three current CMS initiatives that focus on monitoring the quality of dialysis care (see table 4). We and others have noted the importance of monitoring quality of and access to care under bundled payment systems to help ensure that beneficiaries receive appropriate care. In commenting on a draft of this report, CMS stated that it plans to have a comprehensive monitoring strategy in place when the new bundled payment system is implemented on January 1, 2011. However, because CMS’s monitoring plans are preliminary, the extent to which CMS intends to monitor quality for various groups of beneficiaries, such as those with above average costs of care, is unclear. Recommendation for Executive Action
To help ensure that changes in Medicare payment methods for dialysis care do not adversely affect beneficiaries, we recommend that the Administrator of CMS monitor the access to and quality of dialysis care for groups of beneficiaries, particularly those with above average costs of dialysis care, under the new bundled payment system. We have reprinted CMS’s letter in appendix V.
Comments from Industry Representatives
We invited representatives of both large and small dialysis facility organizations and a nephrologist specialty association to review and provide oral comments on the draft report. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) provide information on Medicare expenditures for injectable end-stage renal disease (ESRD) drugs, by beneficiaries’ demographic characteristics; (2) identify the factors that clinicians and researchers indicate are likely to result in a higher-than-average dose of injectable drugs for a dialysis patient; (3) describe the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services’ (CMS) approach for addressing differences among beneficiaries in the cost of dialysis care under the new bundled payment system for these services; and (4) examine CMS’s plans for monitoring the effects of the new bundled payment system on beneficiaries. | Why GAO Did This Study
Medicare covers dialysis for most individuals with end-stage renal disease (ESRD). Beginning in January 2011, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) is required to use a single payment to pay for dialysis and related services, which include injectable ESRD drugs. Questions have been raised about this new payment system's effects on the access to and quality of dialysis care for certain groups of beneficiaries, such as those who receive above average doses of injectable ESRD drugs. GAO examined (1) Medicare expenditures for injectable ESRD drugs, by demographic characteristics; (2) factors likely to result in above average doses of these drugs; (3) CMS's approach for addressing beneficiary differences in the cost of dialysis care under the new payment system; and (4) CMS's plans to monitor the new payment system's effects. GAO analyzed 2007 data--the most recent available--on Medicare ESRD expenditures and input from 73 nephrology clinicians and researchers collected using a Web-based data collection instrument. GAO also reviewed reports and CMS's proposed rule on the payment system's design and interviewed CMS officials.
What GAO Found
Certain demographic groups had above average Medicare expenditures for injectable ESRD drugs in 2007. For example, Medicare spent $782 per month on injectable ESRD drugs per African American beneficiary, which was about 13 percent more than the average across all beneficiaries on dialysis and was also higher than for other racial groups. Similarly, monthly Medicare spending per beneficiary with additional coverage through Medicaid was about 6 percent higher than the average across all beneficiaries on dialysis. Although GAO did not identify the factors that led to the differences described above, it did obtain information from 73 nephrology clinicians and researchers, selected through referrals from dialysis-related professional organizations and a literature review, on the factors that they consider likely to result in above average doses of injectable ESRD drugs. A majority of these experts identified primarily clinical factors as likely to result in above average doses of these drugs. For example, at least 50 percent of the 73 clinicians and researchers from whom GAO obtained information identified 14 factors (including chronic blood loss and low iron stores) as likely to result in above average doses of erythropoiesis stimulating agents, which accounted for about 75 percent of expenditures on injectable ESRD drugs in 2007. CMS's proposed design for the new payment system for dialysis care includes, as required by law, two payment mechanisms to address differences across beneficiaries in their costs of dialysis care. Under the first payment mechanism--a case-mix adjustment--CMS proposed to adjust payments based on characteristics such as age, sex, and certain clinical conditions that are associated with beneficiaries' costs of dialysis care. The second proposed payment mechanism--an outlier policy--involves making additional payments to providers when they treat patients whose costs of care are substantially higher than would be expected. CMS's preliminary plans for monitoring the effects of the new payment system build on existing initiatives, but it is unclear whether CMS will monitor the effects on the quality of and access to dialysis care for groups of beneficiaries. In prior work, GAO and others have emphasized the importance of monitoring both the quality of and access to care to ensure that Medicare payment system changes do not result in certain groups of beneficiaries experiencing poor care quality or problems accessing services. CMS intends to monitor the quality of dialysis care under the new payment system, but the extent to which CMS will conduct such monitoring for various groups of beneficiaries is currently unclear because CMS's plans are preliminary. Furthermore, CMS's preliminary plans for monitoring access to dialysis care are limited. However, CMS has stated that it will have a comprehensive monitoring strategy in place by January 2011. GAO obtained comments on a draft of this report from CMS and from industry groups representing both large and small dialysis providers and nephrologists. |
gao_GAO-07-890T | gao_GAO-07-890T_0 | In the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Congress authorized IRS to contract with private sector debt collection companies to collect federal tax debts. On November 27, 2006, the consulting company began administering the survey. PCA Program Data, Survey Data, and Key Related Findings
According to the PCAs, 37,030 tax debt cases were referred by IRS from September 2006 through February 2007. PCAs reported a total number of 13,630 right party contacts from September 2006 through February 2007, with 6,793 of these contacts made after the survey was available. Because PCAs began calling taxpayers in September 2006 before the survey was available, about 50 percent of all right party contacts identified during the period of our review were not eligible to take the survey. According to the consulting company, the validity of the survey was based on the key underlying assumption that all right party contacts would be offered a chance to take the survey. Although IRS instructed the PCAs to offer the survey to all right party contacts, we could not obtain information on how many of the 6,793 contacts were offered the survey. One PCA reported that it offered the survey to 999 right party contacts and made 2,694 right party contacts during this period. Beginning in early April 2007, IRS officials reemphasized the need for PCAs to offer the survey to all right party contacts and to keep records in this regard. The consulting company that administered the survey provided us with records indicating that of those offered the survey, 1,572 right party contacts agreed to be transferred to the automated survey system from November 27, 2006, through February 28, 2007. Of these, records further indicate that 1,011 individuals completed the survey. A consulting company representative told us that the company was not aware, until several months after the survey was first offered, that the PCAs had used differing methodologies for offering the survey and that not all right party contacts were offered it. According to IRS, it did not provide PCAs with telephone numbers for the taxpayers as a matter of policy. As a result, in attempting to contact taxpayers by telephone, PCA representatives tried to determine the taxpayers’ phone numbers through electronic searches, for example, through the Lexis-Nexis database. PCAs told us that they made a total of 252,173 outbound connected telephone calls from September 2006 through February 2007 in an attempt to resolve the 37,030 cases referred by IRS. In an attempt to make contact with the right party, PCAs may have contacted a substantial number of taxpayers who were not part of the 37,030 cases referred to PCAs by IRS—these taxpayers represent a potentially large group of incorrect contacts. Examples of individuals who were not offered the survey would include individuals who refused to provide personal information to the PCAs and individuals who provided personal information but were not authenticated as part of the 37,030 IRS referrals. Those respondents who completed the entire survey had their results counted by the consulting company. | Why GAO Did This Study
Every year the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) does not collect tens of billions of dollars in delinquent taxes. In 2004, Congress authorized IRS to use private collection agencies (PCA) to help collect some of these debts. To ensure that taxpayers are treated properly and that the program achieves the desired results, IRS contracted with a consulting company to perform a survey of right party contacts--those individuals who confirmed their identity and tax debt to PCAs over the telephone. The consulting company reported overall taxpayer satisfaction ratings from 94 to 96 percent for contacts made from November 2006 through February 2007. At the request of the Chairman, House Committee on Ways and Means, GAO attempted to obtain, for the period September 2006 through February 2007, the number of tax debt cases IRS referred to PCAs, right party contacts who were offered the taxpayer survey, and right party contacts who took the survey. GAO was also asked to report any other key observations related to the PCA program and taxpayer survey. To perform this work, GAO collected information and interviewed officials from IRS, the consulting group that administered the survey, and the PCAs.
What GAO Found
According to the PCAs, 37,030 tax debt cases were referred to them by IRS from September 2006 through February 2007. PCAs reported making contact with, and authenticating the identity of, 13,630 right party contacts. Of these, 6,793 were eligible to take the taxpayer survey which did not start until the end of November 2006. According to the consulting company, the validity of the survey was based on the key underlying assumption that all right party contacts would be offered a chance to take the survey. However, GAO could not determine the number of right party contacts offered the survey because not all PCAs kept records on who was offered it. Further, the three PCAs used different methods to determine which right party contacts were offered the survey. The consulting company that administered the survey told GAO that between November 27, 2006, and February 28, 2007, 1,572 of the individuals offered the survey, agreed to take the survey, and 1,011 of these individuals completed the survey. A consulting company representative told GAO that the company was not aware, until several months after the survey was first offered, that the PCAs used differing methodologies for offering the survey and that not all right party contacts were offered an opportunity to complete the survey. According to IRS, beginning in April 2007, PCAs began offering the survey to all right party contacts. Among other key observations, IRS advised GAO that they did not provide the PCAs with taxpayer telephone contact information for referred cases. As a result, in attempting to contact taxpayers by telephone, PCA representatives tried to determine the taxpayers' phone numbers through electronic searches. PCA representatives told GAO that they made a total of 252,173 outbound connected telephone calls from September 2006 through February 2007 in an attempt to make contact with the 37,030 tax debt cases IRS referred. PCAs did not offer the survey to incorrect contacts, such as individuals who provided personal information but were not authenticated as right party contacts. |
gao_GAO-09-93 | gao_GAO-09-93_0 | Background
The United States shares nearly 4,000 miles of border with Canada stretching from the Pacific to the Atlantic coasts, and the U.S.-Canadian border is considered to be the world’s longest open border between two nations. In addition to the 9/11 Act, for example, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, directs DHS to prepare and submit a biennial National Land Border Security Plan. DHS Report Is Not Fully Responsive to Congress in Providing Information for Improving Northern Border Security
While the DHS report to Congress discusses northern border vulnerabilities and ongoing initiatives in place as required in law, information is missing that identifies the extent that various vulnerabilities remain unaddressed, and recommendations and resources to address these security gaps. Also not mentioned in the report is the timeline DHS is using to request and deploy resources necessary to increase the levels of control of the northern border. The absence of such information makes it difficult for Congress to consider future action and resources needed on the northern border in the context of other areas of national security. At the ports of entry, CBP reports that much technology is in place to address vulnerabilities related to the transport of illegal radiological and nuclear materials, illegal contraband, and misrepresentation of identity through the use of fraudulent documents. Officials from DHS component agencies provided several reasons this information was missing from the report. CBP officials stated that they supported the President’s budget and had nothing further to recommend or request in the report to Congress. DHS Is Taking Action to Improve Northern Border Security, and Implementing Past GAO Recommendations Would Also Provide Benefit
DHS is developing strategic plans, a risk-management process, and new initiatives that could change the level and mix of resources needed to protect the northern border; however, most efforts were incomplete and unavailable for our review. DHS action to fully implement these recommendations would provide benefit in addressing northern border vulnerabilities. DHS Is Developing Strategic Plans and a Risk- Management Process
DHS and CBP have reported the need to provide a coherent framework to coordinate federal, state, local, and tribal northern border security efforts, and are developing northern border strategic plans, as well as a risk- management process to further these goals. DHS Action to Implement Past GAO Recommendations Would Strengthen Northern Border Security
DHS has an opportunity to address some northern border vulnerabilities by fully implementing recommendations made in past evaluations of its security efforts. However, 39 recommendations from the 11 GAO reports are still open. In regard to the remaining 21 recommendations, DHS and other agencies agreed to take action, but at least 1 and, in some cases, over 3 years have passed without full implementation. We believe that these outstanding recommendations continue to have merit and should be implemented. Recommendation for Executive Action
To provide Congress with information that will facilitate policy discussions and resource decisions for northern border security, we recommend that for future reporting requirements the Secretary of Homeland Security include more specific information on the actions, resources, and time frame needed to improve security of the northern border along with any attendant uncertainties, and the basis used to prioritize action and resources for northern border security relative to other areas of national security. DOJ did not provide formal comments. Border Security: Opportunities to Increase Coordination of Air and Marine Assets. | Why GAO Did This Study
Covering nearly 4,000 miles of land and water from Washington to Maine, the U.S.-Canadian border is the longest undefended border in the world. Various Department of Homeland Security (DHS) component agencies share responsibility for northern border security, primarily U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), in collaboration with other federal, state, local, tribal, and Canadian entities. The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Act of 2007 required the Secretary of Homeland Security to submit a report to Congress that addresses the vulnerabilities along the northern border, and provides recommendations and required resources to address them. The act also required GAO to review and comment on this report. In response to this mandate, GAO examined (1) the extent to which the DHS report to Congress is responsive to the legislative requirements and (2) actions that may be necessary to address northern border vulnerabilities in addition to the actions addressed in the report. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed DHS plans, reports, and other documents, and interviewed DHS officials.
What GAO Found
The DHS February 2008 report to Congress is not fully responsive to legislative requirements in providing information for improving northern border security. In particular, DHS provided a listing of northern border vulnerabilities and initiatives to address them, but did not include recommendations and additional resources that are needed to protect the northern border. DHS officials provided several reasons for the lack of specificity and gaps in reported information, including the fact that the component agencies' priorities for action and resources are reflected in the existing budget process, and that they had nothing further to recommend or request through this report. However, budget documents do not reflect the resources needed over time to achieve control of the northern border. The lack of this information makes it difficult for Congress to consider future actions and resources needed. DHS is developing northern border strategic plans and a risk-management process to help guide and prioritize action and resources, and fully implementing recommendations from past GAO evaluations would also provide benefit in addressing northern border security vulnerabilities. DHS is currently developing strategic plans that are intended to provide overall direction in addressing vulnerabilities in northern border security. DHS is also developing a risk-management process to assist in prioritizing efforts and resources that will provide greatest benefit to national security. DHS officials have said that the success of various pilot projects, such as DHS's testing of new technology, will likely change the level and mix of resources needed to protect the northern border. In the meantime, DHS could take action to reduce vulnerabilities by implementing recommendations made in past evaluations. DHS has implemented 11 GAO recommendations designed to improve border security, but 39 recommendations are yet to be fully addressed. Eighteen of these open recommendations were made within the last year. However, 21 recommendations for improving use of air and marine assets, improving screening processes at the ports of entry, and deploying nuclear detection equipment--which DHS and other agencies generally agreed to take action to implement--have remained open for at least 1 year and, in some cases, over 3 years. GAO believes these outstanding recommendations continue to have merit and should be implemented. |
gao_GAO-02-833T | gao_GAO-02-833T_0 | Background
CMS, an agency within HHS, is responsible for much of the federal government’s multi-billion-dollar payments for health care, primarily through the Medicare and Medicaid programs. Medicare part B pays for most medical equipment and supplies using a series of fee schedules. Payment Approaches Lack Flexibility to Keep Pace with Market Changes
Medicare’s size and complexity make it extremely challenging to develop payment methods that prudently reimburse providers while promoting beneficiary access to items and services. In addition, Medicare has had difficulty relying on competition to determine prices. Prior to 1987, Medicare payments for medical equipment and supplies were based on supplier charges, subject to some limitations. As a result, disparities between fee schedule amounts and market prices developed over time, and Medicare significantly overpaid for some medical equipment and supplies. Given the latitude manufacturers have in setting AWPs, Medicare’s payments are often not related to market prices that physicians and suppliers actually pay for the products. BBA Reforms Sought to Improve Medicare’s Ability to Set Appropriate Rates
Despite such dramatic illustrations of disparities between Medicare payments and prices widely available to others acquiring medical equipment and supplies and covered outpatient drugs, Medicare has not had the tools to respond quickly in such instances. In 1997, in response to concerns about HCFA’s difficulties in adjusting payment rates determined to be excessive, the Congress included a provision in the BBA that gave HCFA authority to use a streamlined inherent reasonableness process to adjust payments for medical equipment and supplies and covered outpatient drugs by up to 15 percent a year. One major problem CMS has when going to the marketplace to collect information is that it cannot determine the specific products Medicare is paying for when carriers process claims for medical equipment and supplies. | What GAO Found
Medicare has paid higher than market rates for various medical equipment and supplies and often considerably higher than provider acquisition costs for Medicare-covered outpatient drugs. Congress has enacted a series of legislative changes affecting payment methods and payment adjustment authority for medical equipment and supplies and outpatient drugs since the late 1980s. However, progress in setting appropriate rates has been mixed, owing, in part, to various constraints faced by the agency responsible for administering Medicare--the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). Because of the program's size, scope, and role as a public payer, Medicare has limited options to set and adjust payments for medical equipment, supplies and outpatient drugs. Medicare's method of paying for medical equipment and supplies is through fee schedules that remain tied to suppliers' historical charges to Medicare rather than market prices. Medicare's payment approaches lack flexibility to keep pace with market changes, and, as a result, Medicare often pays higher prices than other public payers. Previous efforts to lower Medicare's overly generous payments suggest several lessons. First, payment changes are most effectively implemented when the process used to set or adjust a rate is defensible. Second, the information on Medicare claims for medical equipment and supplies is not specific enough to enable CMS to determine which products Medicare is actually paying for. Also, for the foreseeable future, CMS will have to continue to rely on fee schedules based on historical charges in setting payment rates for medical equipment and supply items. |
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