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gao_T-RCED-96-170 | gao_T-RCED-96-170_0 | DOE’s outside litigation costs exceeded $25 million in fiscal year 1995. At that time, DOE’s General Counsel acknowledged that the Department’s management of outside litigation costs had been inadequate and said that DOE was initiating actions to strengthen its controls over these costs. DOE Has Improved Cost Controls
Since we first reviewed DOE’s litigation costs, the Department has made considerable efforts to improve its procedures for controlling these costs, saving hundreds of thousands of dollars. Furthermore, headquarters’ oversight has not been as effective as it could be. DOE’s Cost Control Guidance Not Consistently Applied or Not Followed
We reviewed the bills associated with the Cook v. Rockwell/Dow and In re Hanford cases for fiscal year 1995, and found problems in many of them. Other issues have a far greater impact on the costs associated with the class action suits. These include the number of law firms representing DOE contractors, responding to discovery requests, and database development. Today, only two law firms are handling the litigation. Database Development
The final area that is driving costs is the development and maintenance of litigation databases. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the Department of Energy's (DOE) controls over the litigation costs of defending lawsuits against its management and operating contractors.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) DOE outside litigation costs were over $25 million in fiscal year 1995; (2) DOE has improved its control over outside litigation costs by issuing guidance for reimbursable costs and specifying unreimbursable costs, which has saved hundreds of thousands of dollars; (3) DOE cost control guidance is not consistently applied or followed nor is headquarters oversight of field office billing procedures as effective as it could be; (4) other issues that have a greater impact on overall DOE litigation costs include the number of law firms representing DOE contractors, the handling of discovery requests, and database development; and (5) DOE is taking action to address these issues, such as consolidating law firms and contractors in one lawsuit, requiring future codefendants to hire common counsel, issuing guidance on responding to discovery requests, and developing plans to combine litigation case databases. |
gao_GAO-07-457 | gao_GAO-07-457_0 | Burma is also one of the world’s most impoverished countries. The United Nations and several international organizations have become an important source of outside assistance to the country. International Organizations Are Undertaking Wide Range of Efforts to Address Burma’s Problems
The United Nations and other international organizations have undertaken numerous efforts to address some of Burma’s most pressing problems. These efforts include programs aimed at addressing prison conditions, forced labor, and conflicts in Burma’s ethnic areas. ICRC has attempted to monitor prison conditions in Burma, while ILO has sought to allow victims of forced labor to file complaints without interference from the regime. These organizations include UNHCR and ICRC. Several UN entities have provided assistance to combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis; to support the country capacity in both the human and animal sectors for avian and human influenza pandemic preparedness and response; and to improve reproductive health and combat the manufacture and use of dangerous drugs. Burmese Military Regime Has Blocked or Impeded Activities of Many International Organizations
According to officials of international organizations, Burma’s regime has blocked or impeded activities undertaken by many international organizations following its ouster of the former Prime Minister in 2004. It has blocked international efforts to monitor prison conditions, and, until recently, forced labor cases. The regime has also significantly restricted international assistance to populations living in conflict areas, and, to a lesser degree, impeded food, development, and health programs. The regime formalized its restrictions on the international organizations in 2006 by publishing guidelines to govern their activities in Burma. The guidelines, if fully implemented, would further tighten regime controls over these activities and contain provisions that UN officials consider to be unacceptable. For example, the guidelines would require the international organizations to agree that their international staff may only travel within Burma with permission from the subject area ministry and with a regime representative; obtain prior approval of all international projects by subject area ministries and by the Ministry of National Planning and Economic Development; avoid conducting or distributing any surveys not mentioned and approved in the original project documentation; deposit all incoming funds in Burma’s national bank for subsequent withdrawal as “foreign exchange credits”; agree that their programs will “enhance and safeguard the national interest,” “prevent infringement of the sovereignty of the State,” and “be on the right track…to contributing to the socio-economic development of the Nation”; coordinate their work with local and state coordinating committees that include representatives of the Union Solidarity Development Association and similar groups; and select their Burmese national staff from government-prepared lists of individuals. The regime has halted ICRC’s efforts to assist and protect civilians in conflict areas over the past 2-1/2 years. Regime’s Travel Restrictions Have Hindered Programs
The regime’s policies on travel have hindered international organizations’ efforts to ship food to vulnerable populations within the country. However, UN and other international officials told us that the Burmese regime has impeded their ability to conduct their own surveys and freely share the data they gather regarding the nature and scope of Burma’s problems. Despite Restrictions, International Organization Officials Stressed That Their Organizations Are Still Able to Achieve Meaningful Results
Several international organization officials stressed that their organizations are still able to achieve meaningful results in their efforts to address Burma’s development, humanitarian, and health problems, despite the regime’s post-2004 restrictions. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We requested comments on a draft of this report from the Secretary of State and cognizant officials at the United Nations and ICRC. However, it expressed concern that our draft report did not note that a significant opening of humanitarian space on the ground has been achieved by the UN and its partners in the past decade. This statement is in contrast to information UN officials had provided earlier stating that conditions had deteriorated since the 2004 change in government. The team did not dispute our specific findings about restrictions faced. Key contributors are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To identify the principal efforts of United Nations (UN) and other international organizations in addressing Burma’s problems, we examined documents relating to programs conducted in Burma by the 10 UN entities located in that country. We also traveled to several locations in Burma, where we met with officials of the Food and Agriculture Organization, International Labor Organization, Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS, UN Children’s Fund, UN Development Program, UN High Commissioner for Refugees, UN Office on Drugs and Crime, UN Population Fund, World Health Organization, World Food Program, and International Committee of the Red Cross. GAO Comments
1. 3. | Why GAO Did This Study
Burma is one of the world's most impoverished and isolated countries. The United Nations (UN) and other international organizations have become important sources of outside assistance to the country. In recent years, UN entities have increased their funding for activities aimed at addressing Burma's problems. However, Burma's military regime has imposed restrictions on international organizations' activities in Burma. GAO (1) identified principal efforts of the United Nations and other international organizations to address Burma's problems and (2) described the impact of the regime's recent actions on these efforts. We reviewed UN, U.S., and Burmese official documents and interviewed UN, U.S., Burmese, and nongovernmental organization officials in the United States and Burma. We also visited UN project sites in Burma.
What GAO Found
The United Nations and other international organizations have undertaken numerous efforts aimed at addressing Burma's most pressing problems, which include forced labor, harsh prison conditions, ethnic conflict, an HIV/AIDS epidemic, and poverty. The International Labor Organization (ILO) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) have sought to monitor forced labor and prison conditions in Burma by allowing victims to voice their complaints without interference from the regime. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and ICRC seek to assist populations in conflict areas near Burma's border with Thailand. International organizations also attempt to provide food to vulnerable populations, promote local economic development, improve health conditions, and strengthen the Burmese educational system. For example, several UN entities provide assistance to combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis, and drug abuse, as well as to improve reproductive health. Burma's military regime has blocked or impeded activities undertaken by many international organizations in Burma over the past 3 years. In 2004, the regime distanced itself from these organizations and began adopting increasingly restrictive policies. In 2006, it published formal guidelines to restrict international activities in Burma. These guidelines, which have yet to be fully implemented, contain provisions that UN officials consider to be unacceptable. The regime's restrictions have had the greatest impact on international efforts to monitor prison conditions, investigate claims of forced labor, and assist victims of ethnic conflict. The regime has blocked ICRC efforts to monitor prison conditions and, until recently, ILO efforts to address forced labor. The regime has also restricted UNHCR and ICRC efforts to assist populations living in areas affected by ethnic conflict. To a lesser degree, the regime has impeded UN food, development, and health programs by restricting their ability to (1) move food and international staff freely within the country and (2) conduct research needed to determine the nature and scope of some of Burma's problems. Despite these restrictions, several international organization officials told us they are still able to achieve meaningful results in their efforts to mitigate some of Burma's humanitarian, health, and development problems. We asked the Department of State and officials of international organizations to comment on a draft of this report. State commented that the draft report was thorough, accurate, and balanced. The United Nations' country team for Burma did not dispute our specific findings regarding the regime's restrictions but expressed concern that that we had not noted that it had achieved "a significant opening of humanitarian space on the ground." We believe that this statement is not consistent with information provided to us earlier by UN officials, who stated that conditions in Burma had deteriorated since the 2004 purge within the regime. Other comments and our responses to them are contained in appendixes II, III, and IV. |
gao_GAO-17-242 | gao_GAO-17-242_0 | Selected Facilities Did Not Conduct All Inspections, Follow All Inspection Procedures, or Develop Written Inspection Procedures that Were Fully Consistent with VHA Policy
Two of Four Selected VA Medical Facilities Did Not Conduct All Required Monthly Inspections
VHA policy requires that facilities inspect multiple patient care areas and pharmacies on a monthly basis. At the VA medical facility that missed 43 percent (131 of 308) of the required monthly inspections, we found that most (about 95 percent) of the facility’s missed inspections were for the facility’s patient care areas, while the remaining 5 percent of missed inspections at this facility were for the pharmacy. Controlled Substance Inspections Conducted at Three of Four Selected Medical Facilities Did Not Follow Certain VHA Policy Requirements
We found that three of the four selected VA medical facilities, when conducting inspections, did not include, or correctly follow, three or more of the nine VHA requirements we reviewed. At two of the selected VA medical facilities, inspectors did not verify that controlled substances had been properly transferred from VA pharmacies to automated dispensing machines in patient care areas. VHA recommends but does not require that the coordinators take the online training course for inspectors. Oversight of Controlled Substance Inspection Programs by Selected VA Medical Facilities and Their Networks Is Inconsistent
Facility directors are responsible for reviewing monthly inspection reports that the coordinators at the facilities submit, and these reports must provide information on missed inspections and reasons for missed inspections. We also found that oversight provided by the four networks to which the four selected VA medical facilities in our review report was inconsistent. Officials from two of the four networks we interviewed told us they did not review the quarterly trend reports. In addition, we found that one of two networks that had reviewed the quarterly trend reports did not take action to ensure that one of the facilities in our review had completed quarterly trend reports. The inconsistent oversight provided by facility directors and networks of VA’s controlled substance inspection programs is contrary to federal internal control standards. Without a process to ensure consistent monitoring by facility directors and networks that includes correcting missed inspections and other nonadherence and holding individuals accountable, VHA lacks reasonable assurance that the facilities are meeting the objective of the inspection program. Conclusions
VHA’s controlled substance inspection programs are one of the primary means VHA uses to reduce the risk of the diversion of controlled substances at its VA medical facilities. However, we found weaknesses in the implementation of these programs. As a result, VHA’s ability to detect diversion and protect its veterans from harm that can result from diversion—such as depriving them of needed pain medications—is limited. Although our review focused on four selected facilities, the problems we identified in implementing and overseeing the inspection programs are consistent with the problems identified by the VA OIG in its reviews of controlled substance inspection programs at other VA medical facilities in 2009 and again in 2014. These longstanding program implementation issues and weaknesses in oversight are cause for concern, and VHA has a responsibility to ensure that all of its controlled substance inspection programs are being implemented as it intends. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help VHA achieve its objective of reducing the risk of diversion through effective implementation and oversight of the controlled substance inspection program, the Secretary of Veterans Affairs should direct the Under Secretary for Health to take the following six actions: ensure that VA medical facilities have established an additional control procedure, such as an alternate controlled substance coordinator or additional inspectors, to help coordinators meet their responsibilities and prevent missed inspections; ensure that VA medical facilities have established a process where coordinators, in conjunction with appropriate stakeholders (e.g., pharmacy officials), periodically compare facility inspection procedures to VHA’s policy requirements and modify facility inspection procedures as appropriate; improve the training of VA medical facility controlled substance coordinators by ensuring the training includes the inspection procedures that VHA requires; ensure that medical facility directors have designed and implemented a process to address nonadherence with program requirements, including documenting the nonadherence and the corrective actions taken to remediate nonadherence or the actions that demonstrate why no remediation is necessary; ensure that networks review their facilities’ quarterly trend reports and ensure facilities take corrective actions when nonadherence is identified; and ensure that networks monitor their medical facilities’ efforts to establish and implement a review process to periodically compare facility inspection procedures to VHA’s policy requirements. | Why GAO Did This Study
Diversion of opioid pain relievers and other controlled substances by health care providers has occurred at several VA medical facilities. Such diversions for personal use can pose a threat to patients by depriving them of needed medications. Absent effective practices to mitigate its risk and quickly identify it, diversion can occur undetected. VHA requires each of its facilities to implement a controlled substance inspection program to help reduce the risk of diversion.
GAO was asked to examine VHA's processes to prevent diversion and its oversight of these processes. This report examines VHA's implementation and oversight of controlled substance inspection programs at selected facilities. GAO reviewed VHA policies and interviewed officials from VHA central office and from a nongeneralizable selection of four facilities and the networks that oversee them. Facilities were selected to reflect variation in geography and in the number of opioids dispensed at retail pharmacies in the state in which the facility operates. GAO compared the facilities' implementation and oversight of the programs to VHA's policy requirements and to federal standards for internal control.
What GAO Found
GAO found weaknesses in the way four selected Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) medical facilities were implementing their controlled substance inspection programs. Two of the four did not conduct monthly inspections of controlled substances as required by the Veterans Health Administration (VHA). For example, one facility missed 43 percent of monthly inspections in critical patient care areas and the pharmacy for the period GAO reviewed—January 2015 to February 2016. Further, inspections that three of the four facilities performed did not include or follow three or more of the nine VHA requirements GAO reviewed. At two of the three facilities, for example, inspectors did not properly verify that controlled substances had been transferred from VA pharmacies to patient care areas; nor did inspectors ensure that all controlled substances on hold for destruction were properly documented. The VA Office of the Inspector General identified similar inspection program weaknesses at other VA facilities in 2009 and again in 2014.
GAO found that several factors contributed to nonadherence to VHA policy at selected facilities. First, the two facilities that missed inspections lacked an additional control procedure—such as the use of an alternate controlled substance coordinator—to help prevent missed inspections when inspectors could not conduct them due to professional or other personal responsibilities. Second, while facilities develop their own set of inspection procedures that must follow VHA's policy requirements, three of the four facilities did not ensure their written procedures included the nine VHA program requirements GAO reviewed. Third, VHA relies on coordinators at the facilities to ensure that the inspections are completed appropriately, but GAO found that VHA's training course for the coordinators does not focus on its required inspection procedures. As a result of these weaknesses, VHA cannot ensure that its inspection programs are following all of its requirements.
GAO found inconsistent oversight at the selected facilities of their controlled substance inspection programs by facility directors and the Veterans Integrated Service Networks (network) to which the facilities report. VHA assigns oversight responsibilities to each facility director and network. GAO found that directors at two of the four selected VA medical facilities had not implemented corrective actions to address missed inspections identified in the monthly inspection reports. In addition, two of the four selected networks did not review their facilities' quarterly trend reports, as required by VHA. Such reports identify inspection program trends such as missed inspections and areas for improvement. GAO found that one network that had reviewed the trend reports failed to follow up with a facility to ensure it had submitted missed trend reports. Inconsistent oversight by the directors and networks is contrary to federal internal control standards that state oversight should be ongoing to assess performance and promptly remediate deficiencies in order to achieve objectives, including holding individuals accountable for their responsibilities. Without effective oversight of the inspection programs by directors and networks, VHA lacks reasonable assurance that its programs are being implemented as required to prevent and identify diversion of controlled substances.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making six recommendations, including that VHA establish procedures to prevent missed inspections, review facilities' inspection procedures, improve coordinator training, and direct facility directors and networks to ensure that facilities correct facility nonadherence to VHA policies. VA concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-11-231 | gao_GAO-11-231_0 | There are no statutory requirements mandating that school districts report on the use of these funds. DOD Impact Aid has three distinct funding components for school districts with military dependent students. The program provided 162,570 sessions during fiscal year 2010. Little Is Known About the Specific Use and Effectiveness of DOD Impact Aid and There Are No National Data on Military Dependent Students as a Group
Most School Districts Put DOD Impact Aid Supplemental Funds Into Their General Fund for Overall Expenses and Specific Uses Are Generally Not Tracked
Little is known about the specific use and effectiveness of DOD Impact Aid Supplemental funds because most school districts place the aid into their general fund to support salaries, maintenance, and operation of schools. In our survey of school districts that received DOD Impact Aid Supplemental funds in any year from 2001 through 2009, of the 87 school districts that reported receiving funds for the 2009–2010 school year, 85 percent put at least some of their award in their general fund. Military Dependent Students’ Frequent Moves and Educating Military Dependents with Special Needs are Primary Challenges for School Districts, and Various Strategies Help Address These Challenges
Military Dependent Students’ Mobility and Students with Special Needs Were Primary Educational Challenges Reported by School Districts
Officials at three quarters of the school districts responding to our survey reported that issues associated with military dependent students’ frequent moves to new schools were moderately, very, or extremely challenging. Mobility increased academic needs due to differences in state and district curricula, lack of connectedness with school, and behavioral issues in the classroom. DOD and Education’s Collaborative Practices Have Assisted Military Dependent Students, Their Schools, and Families
DOD and Education have developed and implemented practices that facilitate their collaboration on efforts to assist military dependent students, their schools, and families. Officials from both agencies have made eight joint site visits, beginning in 2008, to high-growth military installations to better understand the specific education issues arising from mission changes and growth. Currently, school districts and states are not required to collect academic achievement data for military dependent students, as they are for certain other groups of students, including economically disadvantaged students and students with disabilities. Recommendation for Executive Action
To better understand the needs of military students and the effectiveness of strategies to assist them, we recommend the Secretary of Education, in collaboration with the Secretary of Defense, determine whether to require school districts to identify military dependent students as a distinct subgroup for reporting on their academic outcomes, such as test scores and high school graduation rates. This should include determining whether the Department of Education needs to obtain any additional legislative authority for this requirement, and seeking it from Congress, if necessary. DoDEA provided oral concurrence with our recommendation. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our review focused on (1) what is known about the use and effectiveness of Department of Defense (DOD) Impact Aid funds, (2) the challenges faced by school districts in serving military dependent students and strategies they have in place to address these challenges, and (3) how DOD and the Department of Education (Education) have coordinated their assistance to districts. Survey of School Districts that Received DOD Impact Aid Supplemental Funds from 2001 to 2009
We designed and implemented a Web-based survey to gather information on the use and effectiveness of DOD Impact Aid funds and the challenges faced by school districts in serving military dependent students. The findings from these five states and seven districts cannot be projected nationwide, but we believe they illustrate valuable perspectives on the challenges of serving military dependent students, and assistance from DOD and other sources to help address the challenges. Coordinate the DOD and Education Impact Aid programs. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since the early 1990s, Congress has supplemented the Department of Education's (Education) Impact Aid program by providing funds for the Department of Defense's (DOD) Impact Aid program to compensate school districts with a high number of military dependent students. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 required GAO to review the use of these funds. GAO reviewed (1) what is known about the utilization and effectiveness of DOD Impact Aid funds, (2) the challenges faced by school districts in serving military dependent students, and (3) how DOD and Education have collaborated on their assistance. To address these issues, GAO conducted a Web-based survey of all 154 school districts that received DOD Impact Aid in any year from 2001 to 2009, with a response rate of 77 percent. GAO also interviewed officials from DOD and Education and seven school districts in five states, ranging in school district size, location, and percentage of military dependent students. The findings from these visits cannot be projected nationwide, but illustrate valuable perspectives.
What GAO Found
DOD Impact Aid has three distinct funding components, with more than three quarters of the funds provided through the DOD Impact Aid Supplemental program. Eighty five percent of the 87 responding school districts that received funds for the 2009-2010 school year reported placing these funds into their general fund to use for overall maintenance and operations. Because there are no reporting requirements on districts' use of the funding, it is difficult to assess how the funds are used and to what extent military dependent students benefit. Further, there are no data available on these students that could be used to assess their academic achievement or educational outcomes, or determine where funding needs are greatest. Such reporting requirements exist for certain other groups of students, such as economically disadvantaged students and students with disabilities. Federal agency officials acknowledged this need for information, and Education has begun discussing how to address this need. School districts GAO contacted reported that issues related to the mobility of military dependent students and serving students with special needs were among the greatest challenges they faced in serving these students. Mobility increased academic needs due to differences in state and district curricula and behavioral and emotional issues in the classroom. To address challenges in serving military dependent students, school districts reported adopting a range of strategies, including additional counseling for students with a deployed parent and flexibility on academic requirements for newly transferred students. Guided by a memorandum of understanding signed in 2008, DOD and Education have implemented practices that facilitate their collaboration to assist military dependent students, according to practices GAO has identified that enhance collaboration. For example, beginning in 2008, the departments completed eight joint site visits to high-growth military installations, which helped them advise school districts on preparation for an influx of military dependent students. To monitor these collaborative efforts, DOD and Education have developed a strategic plan that tracks their progress.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Secretary of Education determine whether to require school districts to report data on the academic outcomes of military dependent students, and if so, to determine the need for any additional legislative authority. Education agreed with GAO's recommendation, and DOD provided oral concurrence. |
gao_GAO-17-81 | gao_GAO-17-81_0 | DOD Complied with Two of the Three Required Reporting Elements and Partially Complied with the Third, and the Report Was Not Complete Due to Some Inaccurate Data
DOD’s 2016 Core Report to Congress complied with two of the three required reporting elements of Section 2464—core capability requirements and planned workload. The Report Included Information on Shortfalls but Did Not Include Mitigation Plans and Detailed Explanations for Some Shortfalls
In the 2016 Core Report, DOD included information on shortfalls; however, DOD did not include mitigation plans and detailed explanations for some of the identified shortfalls. DOD partially complied with the third reporting element in Section 2464— to provide rationales and mitigation plans for identified shortfalls. Including this information in the Core Report would provide Congress visibility into whether the armed services’ plans would address the causes of the shortfalls. DOD concurred with this recommendation and stated that it would take steps to implement it but did not implement it fully for its 2016 Core report. For example, the Army and Air Force calculate and display their shortfalls on the core submission worksheet, while the Navy and Marine Corps’ shortfalls are calculated by DOD and not displayed on the core submission worksheet. The reporting agencies are not calculating or displaying their shortfalls consistently because DOD does not provide the reporting agencies guidance on how to calculate or display their shortfalls. Additional Information Could Increase the Transparency of the Biennial Core Report
While DOD generally reports on the required elements set forth in Section 2464(d), there is additional information on core capabilities that DOD could provide to better inform congressional oversight and funding decisions. Conclusions
Section 2464 requires DOD to maintain a core maintenance capability that is government-owned and government-operated, assign sufficient workload to support this capability, and report information on this capability to Congress, among other things. Such information, if required, has the potential to improve DOD’s Biennial Core Report to Congress so that it will better inform oversight and funding decisions. Recommendation for Executive Action
To ensure that DOD’s biennial core reporting procedures align with the reporting requirements in Section 2464 and each reporting agency provides accurate and complete information, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics to update DOD’s guidance—in particular DOD Instruction 4151.20—to require future Biennial Core Reports to include instructions to the reporting agencies on how to (1) report additional depot workload performed that has not been identified as a core requirement, (2) accurately capture inter-service workload, (3) calculate shortfalls, and (4) estimate the cost of planned workload. However, DOD expressed concerns regarding the matter for Congressional consideration, in which we asked Congress to consider amending 10 U.S.C.§2464 to increase the transparency of future Biennial Core Reports by requiring DOD to include information such as (1) workload shortfalls at lower-level categories; (2) executed workload in similar categories that could be used to mitigate shortfalls; (3) progress on implementing mitigation plans; (4) data reported at the first-level category of the work breakdown structure, except for when shortfalls are identified; (5) explanations for first-level categories (i.e., Special Interest Items and Other) of the work breakdown structure; and (6) whether the core requirements reported in the previous Biennial Core Report have been executed. Therefore, we continue to believe that our matter for Congressional consideration is valid. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD uses both military depots and contractors to maintain many complex weapon systems and equipment. Recognizing the key role of the depots and the risk of overreliance on contractors, Section 2464 of Title 10 of the U.S. Code requires DOD to maintain a core maintenance capability—a government-owned and operated combination of personnel, facilities, equipment, processes, and technology. Section 2464 requires DOD to provide a Biennial Core Report to Congress that includes information for the next fiscal year on three elements of depot workload.
Section 2464 included a provision that GAO review DOD's Biennial Core Reports for compliance and completeness. In reviewing DOD's 2016 Biennial Core Report, GAO assessed the extent to which (1) the report complies with the three elements of the statute and provides complete information and (2) any changes to Section 2464 could enhance transparency. GAO reviewed relevant legislation, DOD guidance, and the 2016 Biennial Core Report.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense's (DOD) 2016 Biennial Core Report to Congress complied with two of the three reporting elements required by Section 2464—core capability requirements and planned workload. It partially complied with the third element—a detailed explanation or rationale for shortfalls and accompanying mitigation plans—because DOD did not include rationales and mitigation plans for all identified shortfalls. In a prior report, GAO recommended that DOD improve its Core Report by including detailed explanations for each identified shortfall. DOD concurred with this recommendation and stated that it was taking steps to implement it. Including rationales and mitigation plans in future core reports will provide Congress visibility into whether the armed services' plans address the causes of the core shortfalls.
Regarding completeness—including accurate data and supporting information from the armed services—the armed services are not calculating their shortfalls consistently. For example, the Army and Air Force calculate their own shortfalls, while the Navy and Marine Corps' shortfalls are calculated by DOD. The armed services are not calculating their shortfalls consistently because DOD does not provide guidance on, among other things, how to calculate the shortfalls. Therefore, DOD cannot be sure that the armed services are calculating their shortfalls accurately to support the information in the Core Report.
While DOD generally reports on the elements required by Section 2464, additional information currently not required by the statute could help improve the transparency of the report so that it would better inform oversight and funding decisions. This would include information on issues such as workload shortfalls, mitigation plans, work breakdown structure categories, and whether the core requirements reported in previous core reports have been executed. To require such information in the report, Congress would need to amend the statute.
What GAO Recommends
Congress should consider requiring DOD to include additional information in future reports that could better inform oversight. GAO recommends that DOD update its guidance to clarify, among other things, how to calculate workload shortfalls. DOD concurred with the recommendation, but expressed concerns with Congress requiring it to include additional information in the report. GAO continues to believe that its matter for Congressional consideration is valid, as discussed in this report. |
gao_GAO-02-147 | gao_GAO-02-147_0 | The upper limits are based on what Medicare (the federal health care program for elderly and some disabled individuals) would pay for comparable services. Previous State Financing Schemes—and Efforts to Curtail Them—Go Back More Than a Decade
Despite limits on federal payments, the flexibility that states have to set Medicaid’s payment rates has provided the opportunity for some to develop various financing schemes in the past that inappropriately increased federal Medicaid payments. Over more than a decade, states have used a variety of schemes to boost federal Medicaid funding without contributing their specified share. Latest Financing Scheme Involved Local Government Providers
The financing scheme we identified last year was the latest variant being used by some states. Such funding arrangements violate the integrity of the Medicaid program for several reasons. In effect, this provision gave the states a period of time during which they could continue to receive excessive federal payments. The length of a state’s transition period depended on how long it had been using the scheme. On September 5, 2001, CMS issued a rule shortening the transition period from September 30, 2002, for those upper payment limit financing schemes in plan amendments that were pending when the January regulation was issued, that were subsequently approved, and that did not comply with the January regulation. September Rule Will Reduce Magnitude of Expected Excessive Payments
By shortening the allowed transition period to comply with the new upper payment limits, the September rule will reduce the magnitude of excessive federal payments for these two states by about $483 million—from over $1.2 billion to about $722 million (see table 4). Virginia did not propose its excessive payment scheme until after HCFA publicly released the draft of its regulation to curb such schemes. Experience tells us that even as the Congress and HCFA have in the past identified and acted to close down various state financing schemes that exploit the federal share of the Medicaid program, other schemes invariably emerge. They disagreed with our conclusion that HCFA’s decision to approve additional state financing schemes was unjustified. | What GAO Found
Some states have taken advantage of the flexibility that Congress built into the Medicaid program by devising schemes that inappropriately boost the federal share of program expenditures. These schemes were adding billions of dollars a year to federal Medicaid costs without the states paying their statutorily specified share of program costs. Moreover, some of the federal funds were being spent for non-Medicaid purposes. After hearing about these financing schemes, Congress passed the Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP Benefits Improvement and Protection Act of 2000 (BIPA). In response, the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) issued regulations in January 2001 to curtail financing schemes involving excessive payments to local government providers for which a separate upper payment limit did not exist. However, less than a month after the revised upper payment limit regulation became effective, HCFA decided to amend the regulation to shorten the time some states were allowed to comply with it. This reversal resulted in the approval of new financing schemes for several states that had pending proposals mimicking the schemes identified last year. The transition periods were of varying lengths, depending on how long a state had been receiving excessive federal payments from one of these schemes. Believing that states just starting to receive excessive federal payments did not need the two-year transition period established in the January regulation, HCFA decided to shorten the transition period to limit federal liability. Although the September regulation--which limited the length of time states can operate their newly approved excessive funding schemes--will reduce the drain on federal Medicaid funds, GAO questions HCFA's decision to approve additional financing schemes, given the explicit effort to curtail them. |
gao_GAO-07-881 | gao_GAO-07-881_0 | These data indicate that whales travel widely up and down the Atlantic coast and encounter and become entangled in commercial fishing gear. While there is general agreement among scientists, conservationists, federal and state regulators, and industry groups that requiring certain commercial fisheries to use sinking groundline—one of the key features of NMFS’s proposed modifications to the ALWTR plan—will reduce risks to whales, uncertainties remain regarding how many fewer serious injuries and mortalities will occur. NMFS Based Its Proposed Gear Modifications on Scientific Studies of Whale Entanglement, Scarification, and Sightings
To support the need to propose changes to the ALWTR plan, NMFS used its annual stock assessment reports of endangered large whale populations and entanglement reports, which showed that—despite current regulatory measures—right and humpback whales were being seriously injured or killed by entanglements in commercial gear at a rate that limits the species’ ability to recover to their maximum sustainable population. A NMFS official acknowledged that weak links are not effective for all types of entanglements. NMFS told us that it is operationally feasible to use sinking groundline in all areas, but that fishermen may have to modify their fishing practices. In contrast, officials from the Maine Lobstermen’s Association (MLA) told us that fishermen who operate in rocky ocean bottom areas will not be able to use sinking groundline because it will abrade on the rocky bottom—requiring them to replace their rope too frequently and causing gear loss—and may create safety hazards for fishermen. However, there were significant uncertainties associated with the data used to develop these cost estimates, which were not fully represented in NMFS’s single cost estimate. NMFS does not expect that all fishermen’s groundline would have the same lifespan as the estimates reported in the DEIS and acknowledges that actual costs to replace groundline could be higher or lower than estimated. NMFS Could Not Fully Assess the Impacts of the Proposed Changes on Fishing Communities Because It Lacked Data on Fishermen’s Ability to Absorb Additional Costs and Remain in Business
In addition to assessing the cost of the proposed gear modifications to the fishing industry, NMFS analyzed the effects of the costs of complying with the proposed gear modifications on both fishermen and fishing communities. Furthermore, because NMFS lacked information about which specific fishermen, living in which communities, would go out of business, it could not predict the extent to which specific communities would be affected. In addition, NMFS has not developed a strategy for determining whether future entanglements are due to industry noncompliance with the gear modification requirements or the ineffectiveness of the gear modifications themselves. Second, NMFS has not proposed marking sinking groundline. Recommendations
Before NMFS finalizes its proposed regulations for the ALWTR plan, we recommend that the Secretary of Commerce direct the Administrator of National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration to direct the Assistant Administrator for NMFS to take the following three actions: adequately represent the uncertainty in data that the agency used to determine the costs of the proposed fishing gear modifications, by presenting a range of possible costs in the economic analysis section of the final environmental impact statement; revise the proposed gear-marking requirements to include markings on sinking groundline and gear marking requirements in exempted areas; and develop a strategy for assessing the extent of industry compliance with the gear modification requirements. Specifically we (1) described the scientific basis for the proposed changes to the ALWTR plan and the extent to which uncertainties exist regarding how effectively they will protect large whales; (2) described how the agency plans to address implementation issues, particularly in the rocky bottom areas of the North Atlantic coast; (3) evaluated the extent to which NMFS fully assessed costs to the fishing industry and economic impacts on fishermen; and (4) evaluated the extent to which NMFS has developed strategies for fully assessing the effectiveness of and industry compliance with the proposed changes. As a result, we did not revise the report in response to this comment. 14. | Why GAO Did This Study
The National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) developed the Atlantic Large Whale Take Reduction (ALWTR) plan to protect endangered large whales from entanglements in commercial fishing gear, which can cause injury or death. Because whales continued to die after the ALWTR plan went into effect, NMFS proposed revisions in 2005. GAO was asked to review these proposed revisions, including (1) their scientific basis and uncertainties regarding their effectiveness, (2) NMFS's plans to address concerns about the feasibility of implementing them, (3) the extent to which NMFS fully assessed the costs to the fishing industry and impacts on fishing communities, and (4) the extent to which NMFS developed strategies for fully evaluating their effectiveness. GAO reviewed the proposed changes to the ALWTR plan and obtained the views of NMFS officials, industry representatives, scientists, and conservationists.
What GAO Found
NMFS used scientific data on whale entanglements, scarification, and sightings as support for its proposed changes to the ALWTR plan. These data indicate that right and humpback whales are being injured and killed by entanglements in commercial fishing gear at a rate that limits the species' ability to recover. One of the key proposed changes to the ALWTR plan involves replacing floating groundline, which forms arcs in the water that can entangle whales, with sinking groundline that lies on the ocean bottom. While there is a consensus among whale experts that using sinking groundline will reduce risks to whales, uncertainties remain regarding how many fewer serious injuries and mortalities will occur as a result of this requirement. NMFS has not yet resolved implementation issues associated with using sinking groundline in rocky bottom areas, particularly off the coast of Maine. While NMFS believes that it is operationally feasible to use sinking groundline in all areas, it recognizes that fishermen may have to modify their fishing practices to use this type of gear effectively. Maine lobster industry representatives told GAO that fishermen who operate in rocky bottom areas will not be able to use sinking groundline because it will wear away and create safety hazards if the line snaps when it is hauled. NMFS's economic assessment of the costs of the proposed gear modifications did not reflect the significant uncertainties associated with the assessment, and the extent to which these costs to the fishing industry could be higher or lower than reported is unclear. Because NMFS lacked verifiable data for some of the key cost variables, it used estimates and assumptions that introduced a significant amount of uncertainty into the cost calculations, which the agency acknowledged. However, instead of presenting a range of costs to account for these uncertainties, NMFS produced a single estimate of compliance costs--about $14 million annually. Moreover, because it lacked key data on fishermen's ability to absorb these costs without going out of business, NMFS could not fully assess the impacts that the cost of gear modifications would have on fishing communities. For example, without knowing which specific fishermen would go out of business, NMFS could not determine the impact lost jobs would have on the communities in which they lived. NMFS has not developed strategies for fully evaluating the effectiveness of the proposed regulatory changes. Specifically, NMFS's gear-marking requirements may not be adequate for effectively assessing future whale entanglements because they do not include comprehensive markings that researchers could use to assess the type of rope involved in entanglements. Additionally, NMFS does not yet have a strategy to monitor the level of industry compliance and therefore lacks a means to determine whether any future entanglements are due to industry noncompliance with the regulatory requirements or the ineffectiveness of the gear modifications. |
gao_GAO-03-45 | gao_GAO-03-45_0 | OSHA has also improved training opportunities for its inspection workforce. OSHA’s Targeting Procedures May Not Effectively Identify Hazardous Worksites for Inspection
The targeting processes that OSHA used have not fully ensured that the agency effectively identifies hazardous worksites for priority inspection. OSHA’s Measurement Efforts Have Not Accurately Demonstrated Its Impact
Several weaknesses in OSHA’s measurement efforts affected its ability to accurately demonstrate its impact on workplace safety. Moreover, the methods OSHA used to measure its progress may have misstated its accomplishments. OSHA’s Efforts to Enhance Inspector Quality Have Potential to Improve Enforcement, but Anticipated Outcomes Could Be Jeopardized
OSHA’s initial efforts to enhance inspector quality are encouraging, but the anticipated outcomes could be jeopardized. The second obstacle that may affect OSHA’s long-term success is the lack of a comprehensive database that tracks training or skills obtained by inspectors. Conclusions
OSHA has taken important steps toward targeting its enforcement resources on high-hazard worksites, measuring its impact, and enhancing the professionalism and quality of its personnel. However, OSHA’s enforcement efforts could be strengthened by better information and procedures that would make targeting efforts more efficient, measurement more precise, and training efforts more effective. OSHA, as the federal agency responsible for overall workplace safety and health, understandably has an interest in tracking national trends in workplace injuries, illnesses, and fatalities. Recommendations for Executive Action
To better ensure that OSHA gets the greatest benefit out of its targeting programs, we recommend that the Secretary of Labor direct OSHA to encourage area offices to supplement inspections of large construction worksites with locally planned efforts to inspect smaller worksites, strengthen the validity of the data used to identify worksites in the site-specific targeting program by addressing the data weaknesses identified in this report, and assess the site-specific targeting program’s impact on workplace injuries and illnesses in light of the resources expended. Appendix II: Comments from the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
The following are GAO’s comments on the OSHA letter dated November 14, 2002. | Why GAO Did This Study
The United States has made great progress in improving working conditions since the construction of the Empire State Building. Yet, since the early 1990s, over 50,000 workers have died from work-related accidents and millions experience work-related injuries or illnesses each year. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) is the primary federal agency responsible for protecting workplace safety and health. GAO was asked to assess how well OSHA was able to target its enforcement resources on hazardous worksites, measure its accomplishments, and ensure inspection staff quality.
What GAO Found
OSHA has taken important steps toward targeting its enforcement resources on hazardous worksites, measure its accomplishments, and enhance the professionalism of its staff. However, these systems could be strengthened by better information and mechanisms that would make targeting efforts more efficient, measurement more precise, and training efforts more effective. OSHA's targeting processes have not fully ensured that it identifies hazardous worksites for priority inspection because its worksite-targeting programs lack the necessary data to effectively identify high-hazard worksites or those with hazards under OSHA's jurisdiction. Also, OSHA's measurement efforts did not accurately demonstrate its impact on workplace safety and health because, for example, it used national data on injuries and illnesses to measure its progress in achieving strategic goals even though only 31 states are covered by these goals. Finally, OSHA's efforts to enhance the quality of its inspection workforce have the potential to improve enforcement, but the anticipated outcomes could be jeopardized by a lack of necessary mechanisms, such as a training directive that reflects current plans, or a comprehensive database that tracks training or skills obtained by inspection staff. |
gao_HEHS-98-74 | gao_HEHS-98-74_0 | Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To better understand the implications of the Social Security trust fund investing in the stock market and of the federal government owning and managing a portfolio of stocks, we considered three different perspectives: the trust fund, the U.S. economy, and the federal budget. At the request of the Senate Special Committee on Aging, we specifically addressed the impact of government stock investing on (1) the investment earnings, investment risks, and financial solvency of the Social Security trust fund, (2) national saving and the financial markets, including implementation issues presented by the government selecting and managing its stock portfolio, and (3) the federal budget and federal debt. Investing in the stock market offers the prospect of higher returns but greater risk. The higher returns possible with stock investing would allow the trust fund to pay benefits longer, even without other program changes. Stock investing, by itself, is unlikely to solve Social Security’s long-term financing problem. If stock investing is implemented in isolation from other program changes, the trust fund would face the certain need to liquidate its assets to pay benefits with no certainty of what future stock prices would be. In exchange for the prospect of higher returns, the trust fund must accept greater risk. Social Security Trust Fund Would Be Vulnerable to Stock Market Risk
Higher stock returns could delay the trust fund’s exhaustion, but, without other program changes, the trust fund inevitably will have to liquidate its stocks to pay benefits. Any higher returns earned by the government would otherwise have accrued to other investors. Benefits and Limitations of Stock Indexing
Proposals for government stock investing typically recommend investing in a broad-based stock index to diversify the government’s stock portfolio, reducing the likelihood of concentrating investments in individual companies, and to reduce administrative costs. Effects of Government Stock Investments on the Federal Budget and Fiscal Policy
Under current budget scoring rules, in the short term stock investing would increase the reported unified deficit or decrease any reported surplus, because stock purchases would be treated as budget outlays. Any money used to purchase stocks would no longer be invested in Treasury securities, reducing the Treasury’s available cash and making the resulting budget measure look more like the on-budget deficit that excludes Social Security’s finances. Although stock investing would increase federal debt held by the public, it would not by itself significantly affect national saving. However, any such gain to the government would not increase national income. Higher Reported Deficits or Lower Reported Surpluses Could Influence Fiscal Policy
Even though stock investing does not alter the government’s fiscal position, it could indirectly lead to changes in fiscal policy by focusing more attention on the budget imbalance that exists when Social Security’s surplus is excluded. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the implications of having the Social Security Trust Fund invest in the stock market, focusing on the impact of such investing on the: (1) Social Security Trust Fund; (2) U.S. economy; and (3) federal budget.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) allowing the Social Security Trust Fund to invest in the stock market is a complex proposal that has potential consequences for the trust fund, the U.S. economy and federal budget policy; (2) for the Social Security Trust Fund, stock investing offers the prospect of higher returns but greater risk; (3) higher investment returns would allow the trust fund to pay benefits longer, even without other program changes; (4) however, if stock investing is implemented in isolation, the trust fund would inevitably have to liquidate its stock portfolio to pay promised benefits, and it would be vulnerable to losses in the event of a general stock market downturn; (5) although stock investing is unlikely to solve Social Security's long-term financial imbalance, it could reduce the size of other reforms needed to restore the program's solvency; (6) beyond the clear tradeoff between greater risk for the prospect of higher returns, the government would face other implementation issues inherent in owning and managing a stock portfolio; (7) proposals for government stock investing typically suggest investing passively in a broad-based stock index to reduce both costs and the risk that the government would control individual companies; (8) for the federal budget, stock investing would have the immediate effect of increasing the reported unified deficit or decreasing any reported unified surplus because, under current budget scoring rules, stock purchases would be treated as outlays; (9) any money used to purchase stocks would no longer be invested in Treasury securities, reducing the Treasury's available cash and more clearly revealing the underlying financial condition of the rest of the government; (10) without compensating changes in fiscal policy, stock investing would not significantly alter the impact of federal finances on national saving and the economy; (11) any higher returns earned by the government would otherwise have accrued to other investors; (12) in short, by itself government stock investing would have no appreciable effect on future national income; (13) although the immediate budgetary effect of investing in stocks would be to increase unified deficits or decrease unified surpluses, stock investing might indirectly lead to changes in federal fiscal policy that could increase national saving; and (14) by making Social Security's surplus unavailable to the Treasury, stock investing could focus more attention on the budgetary imbalance that exists when this temporary source of funds is excluded. |
gao_GAO-11-867T | gao_GAO-11-867T_0 | The difference between the VAT collected on sales and the credit for VAT paid on input purchases is remitted to the government. Like Other Taxes, VATs Have Compliance Risks, Administrative Costs, and Compliance Burden That Increase with the Complexity of the Design
Our study countries’ experiences with noncompliance suggest that even a conceptually simple VAT—one that applies a single tax rate to all goods and services—would have compliance risks and would generate significant administrative costs and compliance burden. While our study countries had VATs of varied designs and complexity at the time of our original review in 2008, they all devoted significant enforcement resources to addressing compliance issues that would be found in even a simple VAT. Compliance Risks
As shown in table 1, compliance risks for a VAT can stem from either underpayment of taxes owed on sales, or overstating taxes paid on purchases. Tax preferences can also exist in other tax systems, such as income taxes or retail sales taxes. An exempt good or service is not taxed when sold, and businesses that sell exempt goods or services cannot claim input tax credits for inputs used in producing the exempt output. As a consequence, no net VAT revenue is actually collected by the government from the sale of zero- rated goods and services. Canada administers its federal VAT and provincial consumption tax systems differently in different provinces. Canada’s experience administering a national VAT along with a variety of provincial VATs and sales taxes demonstrates that multiple arrangements in a federal system are feasible, but results in increased administrative costs and compliance challenges for both government and business. In contrast, businesses, particularly retailers, in provinces with a sales tax face greater compliance burdens than those in other provinces because they are subject to dual reporting, filing, and remittance requirements. VAT Implementation Involved Considerable Resources to Educate, Assist, and Register Businesses
Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, the study countries that most recently implemented a VAT, all built on preexisting administrative structures. All had national consumption taxes that were paid by businesses prior to transitioning to a VAT. Both Canada and Australia also provided direct monetary assistance to qualifying small businesses to defray the costs of acquiring the necessary supplies needed to meet new bookkeeping and reporting requirements. Potential Lessons for the United States
The experiences of our five study countries show that all VAT designs have compliance risks that generate considerable administrative costs and compliance burden and that, similar to the U.S. tax system, adding complexity to the tax’s design increases these risks, costs, and burden. Enforcement activities, such as audits, and record keeping by businesses create administrative costs for the government and compliance burden for businesses. | Why GAO Did This Study
Dissatisfaction with the federal tax system has led to a debate about U.S. tax reform, including proposals for a national consumption tax. One type of proposed consumption tax is a value-added tax (VAT), widely used around the world. A VAT is levied on the difference between a business's sales and its purchases of goods and services. Typically, a business calculates the tax due on its sales, subtracts a credit for taxes paid on its purchases, and remits the difference to the government. While the economic and distributional effects of a U.S. VAT type tax have been studied, GAO issued a report in 2008 that looked at lessons learned from VAT administration in Australia, Canada, France, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. These countries provided a range of VAT designs from relatively simple to more complex. This statement, which is based on the 2008 report, focuses on (1) the effect VAT design choices, such as exemptions and enforcement mechanisms, have on compliance, administrative costs, and compliance burden; (2) Canada's experience with administering a VAT in conjunction with several different subnational consumption tax arrangements; and (3) the experience that some countries had transitioning to a VAT.
What GAO Found
VATs have grown in popularity over the past five decades with recent estimates showing more than 130 countries worldwide using a VAT. Nonetheless, like other tax systems, even a simple VAT--one that exempts no goods or services--has compliance risks and, largely as a consequence, generates administrative costs and compliance burden. For example, all of the study countries reported devoting significant enforcement resources to compliance issues. Like an income tax, VATs can be vulnerable to compliance schemes that either result in undercollection of taxes due or overclaiming of credits for taxes paid. Also, as with other taxes, adding tax preferences--such as exempting certain goods or services from tax--generally decreases revenue, increases complexity, and increases compliance risks. Increased complexity also increases the record-keeping burden on businesses and government resources needed for enforcement. Canada's experience administering a national VAT along with a variety of provincial VATs and sales taxes demonstrates that multiple arrangements in a federal system are feasible, but increase administrative costs and compliance challenges for both governments and businesses. Businesses, particularly retailers, in provinces with a sales tax face greater compliance burdens than those in other provinces because they are subject to dual reporting, filing, and remittance requirements. When implementing their VAT, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand all devoted considerable resources to educate and assist businesses subject to the new tax. Both Australia and Canada provided direct monetary assistance to qualifying small businesses to help meet new bookkeeping and reporting requirements. Both had trouble getting businesses to register for the VAT by the implementation date. |
gao_GAO-16-197T | gao_GAO-16-197T_0 | Background
Established in 1800, the Library of Congress is the world’s largest library and serves as the research arm of Congress. Copyright Office. The U.S. At the time of our review, the Office of Strategic Initiatives was responsible for the overall digital strategic planning for the Library and included the office of Information Technology Services (ITS), which was to support the Library’s IT systems and infrastructure. The Copyright Office also relies extensively on IT to carry out its mission. Weaknesses in IT Management across the Library Demonstrate the Need for Stronger Leadership
In March 2015, we reported that the Library had serious weaknesses in the management of IT across the organization. Specifically, the Library’s policies, procedures, and implementation in six IT management–related areas had significant weaknesses. However, as we reported, the Library had not developed an IT strategic plan that was aligned with the agency’s overall strategic plan and included results-oriented goals and measures, strategies for achieving its goals, and descriptions of how projects fit together to support these goals. Thus, the Library lacked a clear vision of what it wants to accomplish with IT and strategies for achieving those results. Such a strategic approach is essential to the Library as information is increasingly created, shared, and preserved digitally. Consequently, the Library did not know how much it spends on IT. These practices include, among others, risk management, requirements development, cost estimating, and scheduling. However, the Library had not fully implemented key elements of its information security and privacy programs. For example, while the Library did establish and implement a process for reporting and responding to security incidents, it had not always developed a complete and accurate inventory of systems that would allow it to ensure that appropriate security controls had been applied; documented key controls in system security plans to inform officials about the security risks involved in operating those systems; conducted complete and effective security testing of its systems to ensure that controls were implemented and operating as intended; developed remedial action plans for identified security weaknesses and taken timely action to complete those it did develop; ensured that all systems had been appropriately reviewed and authorized to operate, increasing the risk that officials may not be aware of system security risks; ensured that all required users completed security awareness training; included appropriate security-related provisions in contracts for IT products and services; and fully assessed risks to privacy arising from the use of selected systems. These weaknesses limited the effectiveness of security controls and placed sensitive information at risk of unauthorized disclosure, modification, or loss. Specifically, the office is required by law to, among other things, receive and examine copyright registration applications, collect and maintain deposited copies of copyrighted works, produce certificates of registration and certified copies of applications, and maintain records of the transfer of copyright ownership. In particular, the Copyright Office relies heavily on its eCO system to support the registration process. Data integrity: Both the Copyright Office and the Library’s ITS had identified issues with the integrity of data in the eCO system. We also reported that the Copyright Office had not developed an IT strategic plan, including goals, measures, and timelines, to guide its IT improvement efforts and monitor progress in meeting its goals. This effort was hindered by the fact that the Library itself did not have an up-to-date IT strategic plan, and we noted that developing such a plan, aligned with the Library’s future efforts, would help ensure the office’s current and future investments would support its mission needs and avoid duplication with existing activities within the Library. Implementing GAO’s Recommendations Is Crucial to Improving IT Management
In our reports we made a number of recommendations to the Library of Congress and the Copyright Office aimed at improving the management of their IT resources. For the Library, we recommended that the Librarian take a number of actions to address weaknesses in the six IT management areas, to include the following:
Expeditiously hire a permanent CIO responsible for managing the Library’s IT and ensure this official has clearly defined responsibilities and adequate authority, including (1) responsibility for commodity IT, (2) oversight of mission-specific systems, and (3) clearly defined responsibilities and authorities between the Library CIO and service unit IT leadership. For example, while the Library, consistent with our recommendation, hired a new permanent CIO, it remains to be seen whether he will be provided with clear responsibility and adequate authority for leading improvements in the management of the Library’s IT. In conclusion, effectively managing its IT resources is critical for the Library to carry out its mission of preserving and making available the knowledge and creative output of the American people, as well as ensuring the smooth operations of the nation’s copyright system. In addition, dissatisfaction with services and support provided by the Library’s central IT organization had led to other service units pursing activities independently, potentially resulting in overlapping or duplicative activities. For its part, the Copyright Office has taken steps—such as developing a draft strategic plan and detailed plans for new IT improvement initiatives—that can help lay the groundwork for a proactive approach to modernizing its IT environment. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Library of Congress is the oldest federal cultural institution and the world's largest library. Its mission is to preserve and make available works of creativity and human knowledge, and to serve as the research arm of the U.S. Congress. In addition, the Library houses the U.S. Copyright Office, which is charged with administering the nation's copyright law. As information is increasingly created, shared, and preserved digitally, both the Library and Copyright Office rely on IT to support their missions.
GAO was asked to provide a statement summarizing its March 2015 reports on the Library's IT management and the Copyright Office's IT environment and plans for modernization. In preparing this statement, GAO relied on the work supporting these reports. GAO also interviewed Library and Copyright officials about more recent activities to implement GAO recommendations.
What GAO Found
In a March 2015 report, GAO identified widespread weaknesses in the Library of Congress's management of its information technology (IT) resources. These weaknesses spanned six IT management–related areas:
Strategic planning: The Library had not developed an IT strategic plan that defined what it wants to accomplish with IT and strategies for achieving those results. Such a strategic approach is essential to the Library as information is increasingly created, shared, and preserved digitally.
Investment management: The Library had not effectively implemented processes for selecting or overseeing its investments in IT. In addition, it did not have an accurate inventory of its IT assets and did not know how much it was spending on IT.
Acquisition management: The Library had not fully implemented processes for ensuring that its IT acquisitions were guided by well-developed requirements, risk management practices, and reliable cost and schedule elements.
Information security: Weaknesses in its information security and privacy programs, as well as weaknesses in technical security controls, placed the Library's systems at risk of unauthorized access, modification, or loss.
Service management: The Library's central IT office did not provide services that satisfied the other units in the organization, leading to those units engaging in overlapping and duplicative activities and purchases.
Leadership: The Library's lack of a chief information officer with adequate authority and clear responsibility for managing the agency's IT was a key contributing factor to the weaknesses GAO identified.
Since GAO issued its report, the Library has taken actions toward addressing these weaknesses; however, much more remains to be done. For example, it appointed a new chief information officer, but it remains to be seen whether this official will have clear responsibility and adequate authority to drive needed improvements.
Regarding the Copyright Office, GAO reported in March 2015 that the office's IT environment was to support its duties of receiving and examining copyright registration applications, maintaining deposited copies of copyrighted works, producing certificates of registration, and maintaining records of the transfer of copyright ownership. However, the office faced a number of IT challenges, particularly with regard to its Electronic Copyright Office system, which supports the registration of copyrights. These challenges included user complaints about the performance and usability of the system, information security weaknesses, and data retention and integrity issues, among other things. The Copyright Office was also hindered by inadequate IT services and support from the Library.
While the office had proposed investments in several IT improvement projects, it had not developed an IT strategic plan to guide its efforts and monitor progress in meeting its goals. Since GAO's review, the Copyright Office has issued an overall draft strategic plan that, among other things, describes goals and strategies for improving its IT environment.
What GAO Recommends
In its March 2015 reports, GAO recommended that the Library of Congress take 31 actions to address weaknesses in six IT management–related areas and that the Copyright Office, among other things, develop an IT strategic plan. The Library concurred with GAO's recommendations, but it has yet to fully implement any of the 31 actions. GAO continues to believe that actions should be taken to fully implement these recommendations. For its part, the Copyright Office has taken steps to address GAO's recommendations, such as drafting a new strategic plan. |
gao_GGD-96-5 | gao_GGD-96-5_0 | For this reason, SEC rules require companies to disclose in the prospectus detailed information about the company. Both SEC and the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), the self-regulatory body for broker-dealers, conduct periodic examinations of broker-dealers’ underwriting firms to detect rule violations. When violations are found, the regulators can impose a variety of disciplinary actions. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To obtain information on the factors that influence underwriting firms’ allocation of IPO shares between institutional and individual investors, we interviewed SEC officials responsible for market regulation to determine what rules, if any, govern the allocation of IPO shares. Specifically, we obtained information on (1) formal disciplinary actions taken against the 34 underwriting firms for the 5-year period preceding the issuance of the IPO and (2) specific securities violation(s) that gave rise to such actions. Underwriters said they allocated their IPO shares predominantly to institutional investors because of economic factors and their business judgment that institutional investors are better suited for IPOs than individual investors. According to the underwriters we interviewed, they preferred to allocate IPO shares to institutional investors because they believed that these investors are better able than individual investors to buy large blocks of IPO shares, assume financial risk, and hold the investment for the long term. The underwriter has a high percentage of individual clients. Pressure from individual investors can cause underwriters to allocate IPO shares to these investors. To help investors more fully assess their IPO investment risk, we believe it is important for companies to disclose in the prospectus material information on the criminal and disciplinary histories of their underwriter. In contrast, SEC does not specifically require disclosure of material information about the underwriter’s disciplinary history in the prospectus. Description of the Initial Public Offering Process
The initial public offering (IPO) process consists of three phases: (1) developing the information and documents for submission to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), (2) processing these documents through SEC, and (3) marketing and selling the newly public shares. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO addressed concerns about the initial public offerings (IPO) allocation process, focusing on: (1) the factors that influence underwriters to sell IPO shares to institutional investors and individual investors; (2) disclosure requirements concerning the history of disciplinary actions taken against an underwriter; and (3) Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) rules governing the IPO market.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) most underwriters primarily sell IPO to institutional investors because of economic factors and their belief that these investors can buy larger blocks of IPO shares, hold their investments longer, and assume greater financial risk; (2) underwriters market IPO to individual investors when their firms have a high percentage of individual investor clients, the company is well known to individual investors, or institutional investors have little interest in the IPO; (3) SEC and the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) give underwriters wide latitude in marketing and allocating IPO shares among institutional and individual investors; (4) SEC does not require companies to disclose in their prospectus certain information about their underwriters' criminal or disciplinary histories except when market manipulation and fraud are involved; (5) SEC and self-regulatory organizations imposed 25 formal disciplinary actions for securities violations on 13 of 34 underwriting firms for the 5-year period prior to issuance of IPO; and (6) SEC could provide investors a better means of assessing risks associated with IPO if it required companies to disclose material information on underwriters' disciplinary histories in their prospectus. |
gao_GAO-06-342 | gao_GAO-06-342_0 | Federal Mandates May Influence Outsourcing
The federal government and some states have outsourced in response to federal mandates to automate or centralize certain functions of human services programs. Most States Perform Some Functions Offshore in Four State-Administered Programs, but No Offshoring Is Occurring in Two Federally- Administered Student Aid Programs
In the four state-administered programs we reviewed, 43 of 50 states and the District of Columbia have offshoring in one or more programs, but we did not find occurrences of offshoring in the two federally-administered programs. Services most frequently reported as being performed offshore include customer service for the Food Stamp and TANF programs, and software development for the Unemployment Insurance and Child Support Enforcement programs. In the federal student aid programs we examined—the Pell Grant and FFEL—we found no occurrence of offshoring. For example, the U.S. company that holds the majority of state contracts with some offshoring in the Food Stamp and TANF programs estimated that services performed offshore constituted less than 3 percent of the total services provided through these contracts. Like the Department of Education, they have department-level requirements that contractor employees be U.S. citizens or legally permitted to work in the United States in order to perform high-risk work. State Officials Cited Cost Savings as a Benefit of Contracting with Companies That Offshore Services and Few Officials Reported Any Problems with Offshored Services
State officials reported that contracts with some services performed offshore cost less than contracts with all services performed within the United States and the magnitude of cost savings varied across states. Magnitude of Cost Savings for Contracts in Which Some Services Are Performed Offshore Varies by State
All 15 state program directors that reported having performed cost comparisons for their contracts, based on differences in the location of services, reported that cost savings are associated with having some of the work performed offshore. Their contracts, with some services performed offshore, would cost from about 0.3 to 24 percent less than if all the services in these contracts were to be performed somewhere within the United States. Few State Officials Identified Problems Associated with Offshoring
Most state officials we interviewed did not report any problems with the quality of services by offshore contractors. The three officials that indicated problems with offshored services in their contracts said that those problems were related to difficulties in understanding the English of software programmers and customer service representatives in India. Few States Have Taken Actions to Ban Offshoring and No Federal Provisions Specifically Restrict Offshoring of Services in the Six Human Services Programs We Reviewed
While numerous actions have been proposed at the state and federal levels to limit offshoring by government agencies, few restrictions have been enacted—and only at the state level—with respect to the six programs we reviewed. Two states—New Jersey and Arizona—have banned offshoring in state contracts. As we have seen, Education’s security-related policies for contractors in the FFEL and Pell Grant programs restrict the ability to perform work offshore in these programs, whereas the security-related policies of the federal agencies for the state-administered programs we examined do not have this effect on state-level contracting. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
The Departments of Agriculture, Education, Health and Human Services, and Labor did not have comments on this report. First, we surveyed 204 directors for the Child Support Enforcement, Food Stamp, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, and Unemployment Insurance programs in all 50 states and the District of Columbia. | Why GAO Did This Study
As states and the federal government have sought to streamline and improve administrative processes and take advantage of technological advances, both have outsourced certain functions to private firms. In some cases, these firms have used offshore resources to perform these functions. As a result, questions have been raised about the prevalence of offshoring in federal human services programs. In response to widespread congressional interest, we conducted work under the Comptroller General's authority to determine (1) the occurrence and nature of offshoring, (2) the benefits state agencies have achieved through offshoring and problems they have encountered, and (3) the actions, if any, states and the federal government have taken to limit offshoring and why. We examined four federally-funded state-administered programs--Child Support Enforcement, Food Stamp, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), and Unemployment Insurance--and two federally-administered programs that provide student financial aid--Pell Grant and Federal Family Education Loan (FFEL). The Departments of Agriculture, Education, Health and Human Services, and Labor did not have comments on this report.
What GAO Found
Some work is performed offshore in the majority of states for the four state-administered programs we reviewed, but no work is performed offshore for the two federally-administered student aid programs. Offshoring occurred in one or more programs in 43 of 50 states and the District of Columbia, most frequently in the Food Stamp and TANF programs. However, expenditures for services performed offshore in the four state-administered programs appear to be relatively small. The services states most frequently reported as being performed offshore in the Food Stamp and TANF programs were functions related to customer service, such as call centers, and in the Unemployment Insurance and Child Support Enforcement programs functions were related to software development. India was the most prevalent offshore location, followed by Mexico. We did not find any occurrences of offshoring in the Pell Grant and FFEL programs and the Department of Education's U.S. residency requirement for contractors performing high-risk work has the effect of limiting offshoring. State officials reported that lower costs are a benefit of having services performed offshore and few officials identified problems with offshore service providers in their contracts. Fifteen state program directors reported having performed cost comparisons for their current contracts, based on differences in the location of services, and all reported that they would achieve cost savings if some of the work were performed offshore. On average, these comparisons showed that with some services performed offshore, contract costs would be between 0.3 and 24 percent less than if all the services in the contracts were to be performed in the United States. The few state officials that reported any problems with the quality of services provided by offshore contractors said that they involved difficulties in understanding the English of software programmers or customer service representatives. While numerous actions have been proposed at the state and federal levels to limit offshoring by government agencies, few restrictions exist with respect to the six programs we reviewed. Two states--New Jersey and Arizona--have prohibited offshoring in state contracts. Some states have also taken other actions, such as requiring state agencies to disclose when state-contracted work is performed offshore or to report on the implications of offshoring. The federal government does not have regulations specifically related to the offshoring of services in the six programs we reviewed. |
gao_GAO-01-760 | gao_GAO-01-760_0 | Although NRC’s strategies to achieve its safety- related performance outcomes seem clear and reasonable, we could not assess its performance for the three nonsafety performance goals because NRC only recently reported measures to achieve them in its fiscal year 2002 performance plan. However, since NRC has had limited experience in applying the strategies and measures for the three nonsafety goals, it may need to revise them after it completes various planned program evaluations. In its fiscal year 2001 performance plan, NRC established measures for the “maintain safety” performance goal only, saying that it would develop measures for the three nonsafety performance goals—increase public confidence; reduce unnecessary regulatory burden; and enhance the effectiveness, efficiency, and realism of its activities and decisions—for the fiscal year 2002 plan. Therefore, we could not fully assess NRC's progress in meeting the three key outcomes. As NRC noted, its fiscal year 2000 performance report discussed data limitations related to the nuclear material safety key outcome. | Why GAO Did This Study
This report reviews the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) fiscal year 2000 performance report and fiscal year 2002 performance plan required by the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 to assess its progress in achieving selected key outcomes that are important mission areas for the agency.
What GAO Found
NRC reports mixed progress in achieving the three outcomes GAO reviewed. To measure performance for the three outcomes, NRC established the same four goals: one relates to safety and three relate to such nonsafety issues as public confidence, regulatory burden, and organizational enhancements. Although NRC's strategies for the safety-related performance goal outcomes seem clear and reasonable, GAO could not assess NRC's performance for the three nonsafety performance goals because NRC only recently developed and reported strategies for them in its fiscal year 2002 performance plan. Because NRC has had little experience in applying the strategies and measures for the three nonsafety goals, it may need to revise them after it completes various planned evaluations during the next three years. |
gao_NSIAD-98-8 | gao_NSIAD-98-8_0 | This report analyzes the process DOD is using to determine depot maintenance repair strategies for its new weapon systems and major upgrades. DOD’s management policies and plans continue to evolve as it seeks to make greater use of private sector repair capabilities while responding to congressional direction. Greater Use Is Being Made of Private Sector Capabilities, but Some Major Decisions Are Still Pending
Survey results from 71 new and upgraded weapon systems showed that, consistent with DOD’s policy change, programs are deciding or leaning toward having the private sector perform most of the depot maintenance. As shown above, 33 of the 46 programs that have made firm source-of-repair decisions, or are strongly leaning toward either the public or private sector, have selected the private sector for most repairs. Several program officials told us that they were delaying final support decisions, in part, because of the uncertain status of DOD depot and core policies and what they viewed as the potential for changes to the legislative requirements relating to the workload mix between the public and private sectors. Past Plans Preferred Organic Performance
The data for the 71 new systems reflect a marked shift from past policies and practices, which generally preferred the public sector. Our review of programs where source-of-repair decisions have been made or where one source of support is favored showed that key factors were not always taken into account during the decision-making process or were not always consistently applied across programs. We found that cost analyses comparing public and private support options were not always done or were done inconsistently and that core capabilities were not often considered. Of these 14 programs, 12 (86 percent) intend to use the system’s prime contractor or the original equipment manufacturers as their sources of repair. Inadequate, Unclear, and Contradictory Guidance
DOD Regulation 5000.2-R provides the primary policy guidance on source-of-repair decisions. This official further stated that the provisions on public depot core capabilities and weapon system support plans contained in the 1998 Defense Authorization Act require that the department review and possibly revise policies and processes for making source-of-repair decisions based on consideration of the revised core language. For example, guidance places increased emphasis on keeping costs down, and it encourages programs to use long-term contractor support. For this report, we addressed (1) DOD’s policy and implementation plans for allocating depot-repair workloads for new and upgraded weapon systems between the public and private sectors and (2) the decision-making process it used to make source-of-repair decisions. Eighty-four of these programs were taken from DOD’s October 28, 1996, list of major defense acquisition programs and are generally the largest acquisition programs within DOD. 10, 1997). | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed: (1) the Department of Defense's (DOD) policy and implementation plans for allocating depot-repair workloads for new and upgraded weapon systems between the public and private sectors; and (2) the process it uses to make source-of-repair decisions.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) overall, its work shows that DOD is moving to greater reliance on the private sector for depot support of new weapon systems and major upgrades; (2) this condition reflects DOD's shift from past policies and practices, which generally preferred the public sector; (3) DOD officials say that DOD is doing this within the framework of existing legislative requirements, while seeking legislative changes that would allow it to make greater use of the private sector; (4) GAO found that, in those programs where source-of-repair decisions have been made or where a specific source of repair is being strongly favored, these determinations were not always well supported; (5) further, weaknesses existed in guidance for implementing the decisionmaking process; (6) of 71 new system acquisition programs reviewed, 46 programs have made a source-of-repair decision or are strongly leaning toward one sector or the other; (7) of the 46 programs, 33 are selecting the private sector for most repairs and 13 are selecting the public sector; (8) the other programs reviewed have either selected a mixed workload utilizing both public and private sectors or are undecided; (9) uncertainty and unresolved issues related to DOD policy guidance, core capabilities, and DOD's belief there may be changes in legislation relating to depot workload allocation have caused several of the large acquisition programs to defer long-term support decisions; (10) in lieu of making a decision, these programs were opting for some type of interim contractor support arrangement that places initial support responsibilities with the original equipment manufacturers; (11) significant weaknesses exist in DOD's implementation of the decisionmaking process for determining depot maintenance strategies for new systems; (12) GAO's review of programs where source-of-repair decisions have been made showed that key factors were not always taken into account during the decision process nor, when they were, were they always consistently applied across programs; (13) for example, cost comparisons between public and private support options were not always done as required or were inconclusive; (14) inconsistencies in the decisionmaking process are partly attributable to changing and contradictory guidance for making source-of-repair decisions and uncertainties regarding public depot core capability requirements; and (15) DOD revised its primary guidance in October 1997 and continues to examine other possible changes. |
gao_NSIAD-00-264 | gao_NSIAD-00-264_0 | To manage DOD’s programs effectively and efficiently, its managers need reliable cost information. DOD has acknowledged that its Defense Reform Initiative efforts have been hampered by limited visibility into true ownership costs of its weapons systems. Integrated Financial Management System Using Year 2000 Approach
Establishing an integrated financial management system—including both automated and manual processes—will be key to reforming DOD’s financial management operations. DOD has acknowledged that its present system has long-standing inadequacies and does not, for the most part, comply with federal system standards. DOD has set out an integrated financial management system goal. Further, the department is now well- positioned to adapt the lessons learned from addressing the Year 2000 issue and our recently issued survey of the best practices of world-class financial management organizationsand to use the information technology investment criteria included in the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996. The inclusion of feeder systems in the department’s inventory of financial management systems is a significant landmark because of the importance of the programmatic functions to the department’s ability to carry out not only its financial reporting but also its asset accountability responsibilities. In addition, the goal of DOD’s Financial ManagementImprovementPlanshould be to improve DOD’s business processes in order to provide better information to decisionmakers and ensure greater control and accountability over the department’s assets. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed financial management issues at the Department of Defense (DOD).
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) to date no major part of DOD has yet been able to pass the test of an independent audit--auditors consistently have issued disclaimers of opinion because of pervasive weaknesses in DOD's financial management systems, operations, and controls; (2) such problems led GAO in 1995 to put DOD financial management on a list of high-risk areas vulnerable to waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement, a designation that continued in last year's update; (3) lacking such key controls and information not only hampers the department's ability to produce timely and accurate financial information, but also significantly impairs efforts to improve the economy and efficiency of its operations; (4) unreliable cost and budget information affects DOD's ability to effectively measure performance, reduce costs, and maintain adequate funds control, while ineffective asset accountability and control adversely affect DOD's visibility over weapons systems and inventory; (5) establishing an integrated financial management system--including both automated and manual processes--will be key to reforming DOD's financial management operations; (6) DOD has acknowledged that its present system has long-standing inadequacies and does not, for the most part, comply with the federal system standards; (7) DOD has set out an integrated financial management system goal; and (8) further, the department is now well-positioned to adapt the lessons learned from addressing the year 2000 issue and GAO's recently issued survey of the best practices of world-class financial management organizations and to use the information technology investment criteria included in the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996. |
gao_NSIAD-97-117 | gao_NSIAD-97-117_0 | Background
Under authority of the Inspector General Act of 1978, the Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS) and the military criminal investigative organization within each of the services investigate alleged procurement fraud. More specifically, these policies prohibit agents from making promises or threats to gain cooperation; using deceit, which courts could view as overcoming an interviewee’s free will; or indiscriminately displaying weapons. NCIS, DCIS, and FBI policies do not specifically prohibit carrying firearms during interviews. Controls Are in Place to Deter Inappropriate NCIS Agent Behavior
NCIS requires an investigation of allegations of agent misconduct. DOD and NCIS have also established controls to protect individual rights and act as deterrents to inappropriate agent conduct during interviews. Judicial Review
U.S. According to the Navy’s General Counsel, once a case is accepted for prosecution in federal court, the Assistant U.S. Attorney assumes responsibility for the investigation and determines the need for further investigation, the witnesses who will be interviewed, and the timetable for referring the case to the grand jury for indictment. Neither DOD nor the Department of Justice favor routinely audio- or videotaping interviews. Both agencies believe that such a practice would not improve the quality of investigations or court proceedings and that the resources necessary to institute such a practice could be better used elsewhere. Officials told us that an NCIS pilot test of videotaping all interviews in the early 1970s did not support routine use because (1) the agents found that they were devoting disproportionate time and energy to the care of equipment rather than gathering facts; (2) the number and breadth of interviews declined, as did the overall quality of investigations; and (3) investigators’ productivity decreased due to their inability to conduct a sufficient number of in-depth interviews. We focused on the policies and procedures concerning agent conduct and demeanor, the carrying and display of weapons during interviews, and use of audio- and videotaping. To document actual NCIS interview practices, we interviewed fraud case supervisors and agents at the two NCIS field offices responsible for the highest number of closed procurement fraud investigations in fiscal years 1995 and 1996—Los Angeles and Washington, D.C.
To determine whether NCIS policies are in line with generally accepted federal law enforcement standards, we compared NCIS interview policies, especially with regard to agent conduct and demeanor and the carrying and display of weapons, with those of DCIS and FBI—two of the larger federal law enforcement agencies involved in procurement fraud investigations. We also reviewed the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center’s and NCIS internal training curriculum on interviews. Regarding oversight of NCIS, we interviewed DOD Inspector General officials responsible for the oversight of NCIS investigative activities and examined cases of alleged NCIS agent misconduct that received oversight by the DOD Inspector General. Attorneys, the use of audio and video equipment to tape interviews and the desirability and feasibility of providing the transcripts to witnesses and subjects. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the Naval Criminal and Investigative Service's (NCIS) policies and practices regarding agent interviews of suspects and witnesses during procurement fraud investigations, focusing on: (1) NCIS's policies on interviewing, including agent conduct and demeanor and the carrying and display of weapons; (2) controls to deter inappropriate conduct by agents; and (3) the desirability and feasibility of audio- or videotaping interviews and making the recording or transcription available to the person interviewed.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) according to federal law enforcement experts, NCIS interview policies are in accordance with generally accepted federal law enforcement standards and applicable laws; (2) specifically, NCIS interview policies prohibit the indiscriminate display of weapons or the use of threats, promises, inducements, or physical or mental abuse by agents attempting to influence an individual during interviews; (3) NCIS has established controls to deter, detect, and deal with agent misconduct; (4) NCIS agents are trained in interview policies at their initial training at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center and through in-house and contractor training; (5) other controls include periodic inspections of NCIS field offices, internal investigations of alleged agent misconduct, oversight of cases and allegations of agent misconduct by the Department of Defense (DOD) Inspector General, and the involvement of the U.S. Attorney's offices in grand jury investigations and prosecutions; (6) furthermore, judicial review of evidence presented also acts as a deterrent to inappropriate agent conduct since inappropriate or illegal behavior may result in the evidence obtained not being admissible in court; (7) the DOD Inspector General and NCIS could identify only six cases since January 1989 in which misconduct was substantiated, and none of those cases involved procurement fraud investigations; (8) NCIS policies do not prohibit audio- or videotaping of interviews or distributing the written or taped results to the interviewee; (9) the NCIS does not routinely tape interviews; (10) officials from NCIS, the Defense Criminal Investigative Service, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and selected Assistant U.S. Attorneys did not support the idea of routinely taping interviews; (11) NCIS considers routine taping of interviews to be unjustified, given the equipment and transcription costs and the large volume of interviews associated with procurement fraud investigations; (12) DOD and Department of Justice officials noted that routine audio- or videotaping would not improve the quality of the investigation or court proceedings; and (13) the DOD advisory board agreed that the routine taping of interviews was unnecessary, given the lack of evidence supporting a widespread abuse of subjects' rights by agents from military criminal investigative organizations. |
gao_GAO-05-930 | gao_GAO-05-930_0 | Code-sharing is a marketing arrangement in which an airline places its designator code on a flight operated by another airline and sells and issues tickets for that flight. Although that legislation was not enacted, in 2000, DOT’s Office of the Secretary and FAA established the Code-Share Safety Program, which included the development of guidelines for U.S. carriers to follow in auditing the safety of their foreign code-share partners as a condition of DOT’s authorization of code-share passenger services. DOT’s Office of International Aviation Relies on FAA for Safety Assessments and TSA for Security Assessments to Authorize Code-Share Arrangements
DOT’s Office of International Aviation within the Office of the Secretary of Transportation authorizes U.S. airlines’ code-share arrangements with foreign airlines after considering, among other things, safety and security information from FAA and TSA. For its program, DOD reviews many of the same safety audit reports on foreign airlines that FAA reviews for the Code-Share Safety Program. According to DOT officials, on 270 occasions, from February 2000 through the end of fiscal year 2004, DOT authorized or reauthorized U.S. airlines to establish or maintain code-share arrangements with foreign carriers and did not suspend any arrangements during that time. However, FAA officials also said that U.S. airlines have occasionally decided not to pursue code-share arrangements with foreign airlines because they expected FAA would object. According to FAA officials, if FAA has safety concerns, it puts a hold on its review of the proposed code-share arrangement, allowing time for the safety issues to be resolved; and on four occasions, from February 2000 through September 2004, U.S. airlines suspended their code-share arrangements with foreign carriers because FAA was questioning the capabilities of the civil aviation authorities under which the foreign carriers were operating. Code-Share Safety Program Incorporates Auditing Standards, but FAA’s Oversight of the Program Lacks Certain Management Controls
The Code-Share Safety Program incorporates selected government auditing standards involving independence, professional judgment, and competence. These controls are related to establishing reviewers’ qualifications, documenting the closure of safety audit findings, verifying corrective actions taken in response to the findings, and documenting reviews. U.S. Airlines Are Auditing Foreign Partners’ Safety, and Partners Are Taking Corrective Action, but Documentation of Corrective Actions Is Often Lacking
The eight U.S. airlines participating in the Code-Share Safety Program have conducted the safety audits of their foreign code-share partners and have monitored the safety of their code-share partners between audits, as specified under the guidelines. However, on the basis of our review of a sample of the audit reports, we estimate that, for 68 percent of the identified findings, the documentation was insufficient to demonstrate that the findings had been closed or were resolved. In developing the mechanisms, FAA should consider standardizing the qualifications and training needed for agency staff to review the airlines’ safety audit reports; identifying ways to document its reviews of the airlines’ safety audit reports; increasing the scrutiny of audit reports that have an unusually high or low number of findings, periodically selecting a sample of safety audits to conduct a comprehensive review of the underlying documentation collected; and collecting and analyzing information on the audit findings for the foreign code-share partners of U.S. airlines so that the data can be more easily quantified and analyzed to spot possible trends and anomalies, should FAA decide such analyses are needed. To accomplish this, we reviewed (1) the extent to which the Department of Transportation’s (DOT) authorization of U.S. airlines’ code- share arrangements with foreign airlines is designed to consider safety and security, (2) how well FAA has managed the Code-Share Safety Program, and (3) the extent to which U.S. airlines have implemented the Code-Share Safety Program, and the results of their efforts. | Why GAO Did This Study
U.S. airlines are increasingly relying on code-share partnerships with foreign carriers to provide additional sources of revenue. Code-sharing is a marketing arrangement in which an airline places its designator code on a flight operated by another airline and sells and issues tickets for that flight. To determine whether the foreign code-share partners of U.S. airlines meet an acceptable level of safety, in 2000, the Department of Transportation (DOT) established the Code-Share Safety Program, which requires U.S. airlines to conduct safety audits of their foreign code-share partners as a condition of code-share authorization. GAO's objective was to assess the federal government's efforts to provide reasonable assurance of safety and security on foreign code-share flights. GAO reviewed (1) the extent to which DOT's code-share authorization process is designed to consider safety and security, (2) the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) management of the Code-Share Safety Program, and (3) the implementation of the program by airlines and the results.
What GAO Found
In considering U.S. airlines' requests to establish code-share arrangements with foreign carriers, DOT's Office of International Aviation reviews, among other things, any safety and security objections from FAA and TSA. FAA assesses the safety of foreign civil aviation authorities and reviews reports of the safety audits that U.S. carriers have conducted of their foreign airline partners. From fiscal years 2000 through 2004, DOT (1) authorized U.S. airlines to establish or maintain code-share arrangements with foreign carriers 270 times and (2) did not suspend any arrangements because of known safety concerns. According to FAA, however, U.S. airlines occasionally have decided not to pursue code-share arrangements with foreign carriers because they expected FAA would object, and FAA sometimes puts its reviews of proposed code-share arrangements on hold if the agency has safety concerns. FAA and TSA did not object to any of the authorizations during that period for safety or security reasons. Although not involved in the code-share authorization process, the Department of Defense (DOD) reviews the safety of foreign airlines that transport DOD personnel. For their separate programs, FAA and DOD are reviewing many of the same safety audit reports on foreign carriers. The Code-Share Safety Program, which calls for U.S. airlines to conduct periodic safety audits of their foreign code-share partners, incorporates selected government auditing standards involving independence, professional judgment, and competence. However, FAA's reviews of the safety audit reports lacked management controls for reviewers' qualifications, documenting the closure of safety audit findings, verifying corrective actions taken in response to findings, and documenting reviews. Eight U.S. airlines with foreign code-share partners have implemented the DOT program by conducting safety audits of their foreign partners. According to our review of a random sample of audit reports that FAA reviewed from fiscal years 2000 through 2004, the largest numbers of safety findings identified were in the categories of (1) flight operations and (2) maintenance and engineering. GAO estimates that for 68 percent of the findings, the documentation was insufficient to demonstrate that the findings were closed or were resolved. Airlines are beginning to adopt a new safety audit program that requires the documentation of findings and corrective actions. |
gao_GAO-14-195 | gao_GAO-14-195_0 | Federal Regulations and TMA Policy Defined the Acquisition Process for TRICARE’s Third Generation MCSCs
Federal regulations—the FAR and DFARS—largely defined the acquisition process TMA used to obtain health care services through TRICARE’s third generation MCSCs. This acquisition process included steps necessary to plan for, develop, and award these contracts. TMA policy provided further guidance on the acquisition planning and process steps beyond what was required in the federal regulations. This included developing additional documentation and obtaining additional approvals from senior acquisition officials within TMA, as well as conducting peer reviews of the acquisition process. A Three-Phased Approach Was Used for TMA’s Contract Award Process for TRICARE’s Third Generation MCSCs
TMA’s acquisition staff conducted a three-phased approach to the contract award process—(1) planning the acquisition, (2) issuing the RFP and soliciting responses, and (3) awarding the contracts—for TRICARE’s third generation MCSCs. 1.) The document outlined a statement of need that identified why health care services were being acquired and the objectives to be achieved. Request for proposals. Bid Protests for Each of the MCSC Awards in the Three TRICARE Regions Most Often Cited Issues with TMA’s Evaluation of Proposals
For TRICARE’s third generation MCSCs, the offerors that filed the six bid protests raised various issues and each protest varied in the number of issues raised. Offerors challenged TMA’s evaluation of network provider discounts in four protests, two of which were sustained and two of which were denied. TRICARE Acquisition Officials Identified and Applied Some Lessons Learned from the Third Generation MCSC Acquisition
TRICARE acquisition officials reported they have identified several areas where changes could be made to improve the acquisition process for future TRICARE MCSC acquisitions, including those scheduled to be awarded in 2018. According to TRICARE acquisition officials, preliminary lessons learned from the third generation acquisition process and resulting bid protests include (1) improvements in communication and documentation to increase transparency during the evaluation of the proposals and (2) increases to the length of the acquisition process to allow for additional time to evaluate proposals and for the transition from one MCSC to another. Despite the implementation of lessons learned from TRICARE’s third generation acquisition process and the related bid protests, TRICARE acquisition officials told us that they cannot confirm which, if any, of these lessons will be incorporated into the acquisition process for TRICARE’s fourth generation MCSCs scheduled for 2018. However, these officials noted that the acquisition process for previous TRICARE MCSCs, including lessons learned from related bid protests, are generally considered when initiating the acquisition process for the next generation of TRICARE MCSCs. Agency Comments
We requested comments from DOD, but none were provided. GAO staff who made key contribution to this report are listed in appendix II. Appendix I: Description of Bid Protests of TRICARE’s Third Generation Managed Care Support Contract Awards
There were six bid protests filed by unsuccessful offerors across the three TRICARE regions. In response to decisions and recommendations made in the sustained bid protest decisions, TMA implemented corrective actions that resulted in new award decisions in each of the three TRICARE regions.subsequent bid protest challenges that were filed in two of the three TRICARE regions, the South and the West. Therefore, Aetna—Health Net’s competitor—could not have used the information to its advantage. TMA then reviewed the revised proposals and, based on this evaluation of revised proposals, awarded the contract to Humana, a different offeror than was initially awarded the contract. Other. GAO found no merit to these allegations. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD provides certain health care services through its TRICARE Program, which complements the health care services provided in military treatment facilities. DOD acquires these health care services through MCSCs with private sector companies. As of October 1, 2013, DOD's Defense Health Agency is responsible for awarding, administering, and overseeing TRICARE's MCSCs. Prior to this date TMA handled these duties.
DOD's health care costs have more than doubled from $19 billion in fiscal year 2001 to its fiscal year 2014 budget request of more than $49 billion. Senate Report 112-173, which accompanied a version of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, cited concerns with the growth of DOD's health care costs and identified private sector health care contracts as an area for potential savings and efficiencies.
The Senate report mandated that GAO review DOD's process for acquiring TRICARE's MCSCs. This report examines: (1) TMA's acquisition process to award TRICARE's third generation MCSCs; (2) the extent to which issues were raised in the bid protests involving these MCSCs, including identifying any common themes; and (3) lessons learned from the acquisition process to award these MCSCs and how these lessons may be used in future acquisitions. GAO reviewed relevant federal statutes, regulations, policy documentation, and the bid protest decisions for TRICARE's third generation MCSCs. GAO also interviewed TRICARE officials about the acquisition process and lessons learned.
What GAO Found
The TRICARE Management Activity (TMA) within the Department of Defense (DOD) used the acquisition process prescribed by federal regulations to acquire health care services for the TRICARE Program through the third generation of TRICARE's managed care support contracts (MCSC). This process included a three-phased contract award process outlined in the figure below.
TMA policy also defined steps for the acquisition process beyond what was required in the federal regulations, including developing additional documentation and obtaining additional approvals from senior TRICARE acquisition officials. For example, peer reviews of the acquisition process are conducted and documented for certain DOD contracts, including TRICARE's MCSCs.
TMA awarded a contract for each TRICARE region (North, South, and West), but challenges (bid protests) to the agency's award decisions were filed by unsuccessful offerors in all three regions. Of the six bid protests filed, three were sustained and three were denied. Following the resolution of the bid protests, the MCSCs in all three regions were awarded to a different offeror than was initially awarded the contract. The offerors who filed the bid protests cited various issues, most frequently TMA's evaluation of proposals. For example, four bid protests challenged TMA's evaluation of offerors' proposed network provider discounts, which are discounts of provider payment rates negotiated by offerors to reduce overall health care costs to the government.
TRICARE acquisition officials said that sustained bid protests and TMA's implementation of corrective actions prompted them to identify lessons learned where changes could be made to improve the acquisition process for subsequent TRICARE MCSCs. Lessons learned included (1) improvements in communication and documentation to increase transparency during the evaluation of proposals and (2) increases to the length of the acquisition process to allow for more time to evaluate proposals and for the transition from one MCSC to another. TRICARE acquisition officials also said that some of these lessons have been applied in other contracting activities; however, they could not confirm which, if any, of these lessons will be incorporated into the acquisition process for the next generation of TRICARE MCSCs, scheduled for 2018.
GAO requested comments from DOD on the draft report, but none were provided. |
gao_GAO-10-686 | gao_GAO-10-686_0 | Private Shipyards Made Investments to Improve, Upgrade, and Maintain Facilities and Equipment over the Last 10 Years
Over the last 10 years, major shipyards used public and corporate funds to invest more than $1.9 billion in facilities and equipment that improved shipbuilding efficiency, developed new capabilities, and maintained existing capabilities. These categories are defined as follows: Improving shipbuilding efficiency. Developing new capabilities. Maintaining capabilities. For example, Electric Boat officials explained that its shipyard had to make a major investment in dock repair in order to maintain the shipyard’s ability to launch and repair submarines. Through investments to improve efficiencies and develop new capabilities, major shipyards modernized their facilities and equipment, thus transforming their shipbuilding processes. The Navy Supports Facilities and Equipment Investments by Offering Incentives at Most Major Shipyards and Has Expanded This Support over the Last 10 Years
To incentivize investments, the Navy has provided support to most major shipyards with four mechanisms: early release of contract retentions, accelerated depreciation, special contract-incentive fees, and contract share-line adjustments. Navy officials cited the lack of competition and instability of Navy work in shipbuilding as major reasons why the Navy needs to incentivize investments in facilities and equipment at major shipyards. Over the last 10 years, the Navy has expanded its use of investment incentives and is now involved with providing some form of investment support at all major shipyards. By releasing contract retentions early, the Navy disburses money to a shipyard earlier than scheduled from a reserve normally retained to ensure ships are delivered according to specifications. The Navy also manages Hurricane Katrina relief funds, which Congress appropriated for infrastructure improvements at shipyards that build Navy ships in states affected by Hurricane Katrina. Navy officials told us that the Navy negotiates investment incentives with major shipyards because limited competition in the market does not foster an environment that encourages shipyards to invest without incentives. Officials from major shipyards argued that instability in long-range Navy shipbuilding plans discourages shipyards from making investments without guaranteed Navy work. The Navy Lacks a Policy to Ensure Investment Incentives Achieve Expected Outcomes
The Navy does not have a policy outlining its goals and objectives for providing financial incentives to shipyards to encourage facilities and equipment investments. This results in differences in expected outcomes across investment mechanisms. Individual program offices and contracting officers also make decisions about which types of investments to pursue, without any policy from the Navy about the kinds of investments that are in its best interest. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Navy to develop a policy that identifies the intended goals and objectives of investment incentives, criteria for using incentives, and methods for validating outcomes. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To identify facilities and equipment investments over the last 10 years, we obtained and analyzed data on all capital investments over $1 million at all major, privately owned shipyards including General Dynamics Bath Iron Works, General Dynamics NASSCO, General Dynamics Electric Boat, Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding–Gulf Coast, Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding–Newport News, and two smaller, privately owned shipyards, Austal USA and Marinette Marine shipyard. To supplement this analysis, we met with officials from the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy–Ships, the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy–Acquisition and Logistics Management, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense–Industrial Policy to understand how the Navy’s role in investment support at shipyards has evolved over the past 10 years. Due to a Navy scheduling conflict, Newport News was going to have two aircraft carriers that needed to be at this pier at the same time in fiscal year 2007. For these investments, the contractor submits a business case to claim a special incentive fee tied to the first four submarines for the amount necessary to achieve the documented corporate minimum return on investment. | Why GAO Did This Study
As fiscal constraints increasingly shape Navy shipbuilding plans, the pressure to increase efficiency mounts. Modernizing facilities and equipment at shipyards that build Navy ships can lead to improved efficiency, ultimately reducing the cost of constructing ships. In response to a request from the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense, GAO (1) identified investments in facilities and equipment at privately-owned shipyards over the last 10 years; (2) determined the Navy's role in financing facilities and equipment investments at these shipyards; and (3) evaluated how the Navy ensures investments result in expected outcomes. To address these objectives, GAO analyzed shipyard investment data over the past 10 years; interviewed shipyard, corporate, and Navy officials; and reviewed contracts, investment business cases, and other Navy and contractor documents.
What GAO Found
Over the past 10 years, large shipyards that build Navy ships used public and corporate funds to invest over $1.9 billion in facilities and equipment to improve efficiency, develop new shipbuilding capabilities, and maintain existing capabilities. Examples of each category include the following: (1) Improving efficiency--General Dynamics Bath Iron Works built a new facility--the Ultra Hall--that improves efficiency by allowing shipbuilders to access work space more easily in a climate-controlled environment. (2) Developing capabilities--Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding-Newport News built a replacement pier that allowed shipbuilders to work on two aircraft carriers simultaneously due to a Navy scheduling conflict. (3) Maintaining capabilities--General Dynamics Electric Boat invested to repair docks in order to maintain the shipyard's ability to launch and repair submarines. Investments at two smaller shipyards, Austal USA and Marinette Marine shipyard, were primarily to maintain and develop new capabilities as both are competing for new Navy contracts. Over the last 10 years, the Navy expanded its use of investment incentives and has recently provided some form of investment support at all large shipyards. To incentivize facility and equipment investments, the Navy has (1) released money early from the reserve of contract funds normally held back to ensure ships are delivered according to specifications, (2) accelerated asset depreciation schedules, (3) tied a portion of the contractor's fee to investing in new facilities and equipment, and (4) adjusted the contract share-line to give the contractor more of the savings if costs decrease. The Navy also manages funds appropriated by Congress for Hurricane Katrina relief at shipyards in the Gulf Coast. Outside of Hurricane Katrina funding, the Navy has not supported investments at the two smaller shipyards. Navy officials stated that the Navy has to negotiate investment incentives with large shipyards because limited competition and instability of Navy work does not foster an environment for shipyards to invest without incentives. Shipyard officials argued that instability in Navy shipbuilding plans makes it difficult to invest without guaranteed work from the Navy and incentives are necessary to help meet corporate minimum rates of return needed to justify an investment, especially given the large dollar amounts involved with some investments. The Navy lacks policy to help ensure it achieves goals and objectives from providing facility and equipment investment incentives at private shipyards. Absent this policy, individual program offices and contracting officers make decisions about what type of incentive to use, desired return on investments, and what kinds of investments to support. Without policy, program officers and contracting officers use different methods to validate expected outcomes and safeguard the Navy's financial support.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Navy develop a policy that identifies the intended goals and objectives of investment incentives, criteria for using incentives, and methods for validating outcomes. The Department of Defense concurred with this recommendation. |
gao_GAO-11-773T | gao_GAO-11-773T_0 | Grants Play a Significant Role in Implementing and Funding Federal Programs
The federal government’s use of grants to achieve national objectives and respond to emerging trends, such changing demographics and changing threats to homeland security, has grown significantly in the last two decades. According to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), from fiscal years 1990 to 2010, federal outlays for grants to state and local governments increased from $135 billion to $608 billion—almost one-fifth of the federal budget and a 350 percent increase since fiscal year 1990 (see fig. 1). In fiscal year 2010, OMB identified 23 federal grant–making departments and agencies that offered over 1,670 federal grant programs. Risks and Vulnerabilities Exist in Key Controls in the Grant Life Cycle
In awarding federal grants, effective oversight and internal control is of fundamental importance in assuring the proper and effective use of federal funds to achieve program goals. Effective internal control systems provide reasonable assurance to taxpayers that grants are awarded properly, recipients are eligible, and federal funds are used as intended and in accordance with applicable laws and regulations. The grant life cycle is shown in figure 2. Overall our work on grant management and oversight issues found weaknesses in the control systems of the stages of the grant life cycle: the preaward and award stages, implementation, and close out. Federal agencies are dependent on the design and implementation of recipients’ grant management programs to ensure that federal funds are used for their intended purposes and are appropriately safeguarded. Attention Is Needed To Address Governmentwide Issues
Through our work, we found that weaknesses in grant oversight and accountability issues that span the government. For example, in August 2008, we reported that during calendar year 2006 about $1 billion in undisbursed funding remained in expired grant accounts in the largest civilian grant payment system. The expired but still open grant accounts found were associated with thousands of recipients and over 325 different federal programs. Many Grant Programs Have Significant Levels of Improper Payments
Federal agencies reported improper payments of an estimated $125.4 billion in fiscal year 2010. This $125.4 billion estimate comes from over 70 programs spread among 20 federal agencies. Many of those programs reporting improper payments were federal grant programs. Improvements Are Needed to Make Single Audits a More Effective Accountability Mechanism over Federal Grant Funding
OMB has indicated that single audits play a key role in the achievement of its accountability over federal grant funding. We and others have identified and reported on significant concerns with the Single Audit process that diminish its effectiveness as an oversight accountability mechanism and concluded that improvements are needed. The Federal Oversight Structure Is Not Adequate to Monitor the Efficiency and Effectiveness of the Single Audit Process
in June 2007, which raised significant concerns about the quality of single audits and made recommendations aimed at improving the quality of those audits. The four areas of recommendations included (1) instilling federal leadership over the single audit process to improve program accountability and reduce improper payments; (2) managing risks by refocusing the single audit to include those nonfederal entities that present the greatest risk of improper payments; (3) improving the access to information in single audit reports to enhance federal agency follow-up of audit findings and to coordinate single audit and improper payments analysis and results; and (4) amending the stated purposes of the Single Audit Act of 1984, as amended, to emphasize the importance of acting on single audit findings as a way to reduce the risk of improper payments. Need to Focus on High- Risk Activities, Programs, and Recipients While Potentially Streamlining, Simplifying, or Reducing Focus on Areas of Low Risk
Single audit stakeholders have raised concerns about the complexity and relative costs and benefits of the audit requirements for single audits, especially at the smaller entities. OMB Has Implemented Some Recommendations but More Work Is Needed
OMB has taken initiative and is conducting studies to improve the Single Audit process but time frames for implementing the results of these studies are unclear. Legal Services Corporation: Improvements Needed in Controls over Grant Awards and Grantee Program Effectiveness. Legal Services Corporation: Improved Internal Controls Needed in Grants Management and Oversight. American Samoa: Accountability for Key Federal Grants Needs Improvement. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
While federal grant funding has been increasing, long-standing concerns remain about the federal government's grants management and the lack of effective oversight tools to reasonably assure that grants are used for their intended purposes and that risks of fraud, waste, and abuse are minimized. GAO has issued a range of reports raising concerns about the risks and vulnerabilities related to grants management and oversight. The Administration recognizes these concerns. It included improving grants management as a part of its initiative to eliminate waste in the U.S. government and has various efforts underway to improve grants oversight and accountability. This testimony addresses the (1) significance of federal grant funding, (2) risks and vulnerabilities in key controls in the federal grant life cycle, and (3) improvements needed to make the single audit process an effective accountability mechanism. This testimony is primarily based on prior GAO work that reviewed grant accountability and the single audit process.
What GAO Found
Grants Play a Significant Role in Implementing and Funding Federal Programs: The federal government's use of grants to achieve national objectives and to respond to emerging trends, such as changing demographics and changing threats to homeland security, has grown significantly in the last two decades. From fiscal years 1990 to 2010, federal grant outlays to states and local governments, increased from about $135 billion to over $600 billion--almost one-fifth of the fiscal year 2010 federal budget, according to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). In fiscal year 2010, over 1,670 federal grant programs were offered by 23 federal grant-making departments and agencies. Risks and Vulnerabilities Exist in Key Controls in the Grant Life Cycle: Organizations that award and receive grants need effective internal control over the processes and funds involved. These controls are fundamental in assuring the proper and effective use of federal funds to achieve program goals and to ensure that funds are used for their intended purposes. Overall, our work on grant management has found weaknesses in the control systems of federal awarding agencies. We found vulnerabilities at different points in the grant life cycle: in the preaward, award, implementation, and closeout stages. Furthermore, we observed oversight issues that exist across the government. For example, in 2008 we reported that in 2006 about $1 billion remained in undisbursed funding in expired grant accounts in the largest civilian grant payment system, which was associated with thousands of grantees and over 325 different federal programs and could have been identified through improved oversight and grant tracking. In addition, federal agencies reported an estimated $125.4 billion in improper payments for fiscal year 2010. This estimate was attributable to over 70 programs spread across 20 agencies. Many of those programs reporting improper payments were federal grant programs, including Medicaid. Improvements Are Needed to Make Single Audits a More Effective Accountability Mechanism Over Grant Funding: The single audit process for organizations spending $500,000 or more in federal grant awards in a year is intended to play a key role in achieving accountability over federal grant resources. These audits report on the financial statements and internal controls over compliance with laws and grant provisions, among other things. GAO and others have identified and reported on significant concerns with the single audit process that diminish its effectiveness as an oversight accountability mechanism and concluded that improvements are needed. Through our work we found that (1) the federal oversight structure is not adequate to monitor the efficiency and effectiveness of the single audit process; (2) time frames of the single audit process do not facilitate the timely identification and correction of audit findings; and (3) single audit stakeholders have raised concerns about the complexity and relative costs and benefits of the single audit requirements, especially at smaller entities. Currently, OMB is conducting initiatives looking to improve the process, but time frames for implementing the results of ongoing studies are unclear. Through our body of work on federal grant accountability, GAO has made numerous recommendations directed at improving management and oversight. Our recommendations include a range of actions at the agency and governmentwide levels. |
gao_GAO-09-496 | gao_GAO-09-496_0 | However, about 14 percent of fiscal year 2006 funds lapsed— primarily in small urbanized areas—for various reasons, including delays in fulfilling administrative requirements under SAFETEA-LU. FTA Is Making Progress in Awarding Fiscal Year 2006 through 2008 Funds, Although Some Fiscal Year 2006 Funds Lapsed
Overall, FTA has awarded almost half of the apportioned $436.6 million available for fiscal years 2006 through 2008 (about 48 percent) to 49 states and 131 of 152 large urbanized areas, as of March 2009. Recipients Plan to Use Awarded Funds Primarily to Operate Existing Transit Services
Recipients have used or plan to use JARC funds primarily to operate or expand existing transit routes in an effort to target low-income populations. JARC Recipients Report Multiple Challenges in Implementing the Program
Recipients and local authorities we interviewed cited multiple challenges throughout the process for implementing JARC-funded projects. Although many of these recipients and local authorities have addressed these challenges and have received JARC funding, a common concern we heard is that, overall, the amount of effort required to obtain JARC funds is disproportionate to the relatively small amount of funding available compared to other transit programs. Because the process of identifying designated recipients in some areas took more than 2 years after SAFETEA-LU was enacted, it reduced the time available for those areas to conduct a coordinated planning process, develop a coordinated human services transportation plan, conduct a competitive selection process, and apply to FTA for funds before the September 30, 2008, deadline to award fiscal year 2006 funds. Although Recipients Considered Coordination Beneficial, Multiple Factors Make It Difficult
Many state and designated recipient officials we interviewed considered the coordinated planning process beneficial and worthwhile. JARC Program Recipients Cite Benefits, but FTA’s Plans for Current Evaluations May Have Limitations
Although FTA has not completed an evaluation of the JARC program under SAFETEA-LU, recipients we spoke with indicated that projects have benefited low-income individuals by providing a means to get to work. FTA has improved its approach for evaluating the program since 2000 and currently has two studies under way to evaluate the JARC program under SAFETEA-LU. However, both studies—one on performance measures and another on the program’s economic impacts—may have limitations that could affect FTA’s assessment of the program. However, limitations inherent in the performance measures could affect the usefulness of this evaluation: Actual or estimated number of rides (as measured by one-way trips): According to designated recipients and other state and local agency officials we spoke with, determining the number of rides to access jobs presents challenges because individuals use fixed route services for many reasons in addition to traveling to work, including shopping and medical appointments. CES and TranSystems will use this information to estimate the number of jobs accessed. As of May 2009, researchers were in the process of finalizing the survey instruments for this study. Nevertheless, FTA does not have a comprehensive process in place to ensure that evaluations of the impact of the JARC program use generally accepted survey design and data analysis methodologies. Conclusions
FTA has made progress in awarding JARC funds since Congress passed SAFETEA-LU in 2005, although FTA’s delay in issuing final guidance and other challenges contributed to a lapse in some fiscal year 2006 funds. Although FTA and recipients are becoming accustomed to the new formula program and its requirements—which could lessen the severity of these challenges in the future—recipients told us that they continue to face challenges in a number of circumstances, such as when: designated recipients for large urbanized areas have jurisdiction over small urbanized and/or rural areas and when the service provided by an individual transit provider overlaps two or more of these areas; designated recipients are responsible for ensuring that organizations that do not traditionally receive FTA funding comply with FTA requirements; local agencies, particularly those in rural areas, have limited staff, funding, and/or expertise needed to update coordinated public transit-human services transportation plans; and JARC requirements duplicate the requirements for other programs, such as New Freedom and Section 5310. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
We are mandated to evaluate the Job Access and Reverse Commute (JARC) program every 2 years under the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act-A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU). This report addresses (1) the extent to which FTA has awarded available JARC funds for fiscal years 2006 through 2008 and how recipients are using the funds since the changes went into effect under SAFETEA-LU, (2) the challenges recipients have faced in implementing the program, and (3) how FTA plans to evaluate the JARC program. | Why GAO Did This Study
Established in 1998, the Job Access and Reverse Commute Program (JARC)-administered by the Federal Transit Administration (FTA)--awards grants to states and localities to provide transportation to help low-income individuals access jobs. In 2005, the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act--A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU) reauthorized the program and made changes, such as allocating funds by formula to large and small urban and rural areas through designated recipients, usually transit agencies and states. SAFETEA-LU also required GAO to periodically review the program. This second report under the mandate examines (1) the extent to which FTA has awarded JARC funds for fiscal years 2006 through 2008, and how recipients are using the funds; (2) challenges faced by recipients in implementing the program; and (3) FTA's plans to evaluate the program. For this work, GAO analyzed data and interviewed officials from FTA, nine states, and selected localities.
What GAO Found
FTA is making progress in awarding funds and has awarded about 48 percent of the $436.6 million in JARC funds apportioned for fiscal years 2006 through 2008 to 49 states and 131 of 152 large urbanized areas. Recipients plan to use the funds primarily to operate transit services. However, about 14 percent of fiscal year 2006 funds lapsed. According to FTA officials, these funds lapsed for several reasons. For example, some applicants did not meet administrative requirements in time to apply for funds. FTA officials are working with states and localities to reduce the amount of funds that lapse in the future. Recipients plan to use 65 percent of fiscal year 2006 funds to operate transit services, 28 percent for capital projects, and 7 percent for administrative costs. States and local authorities GAO interviewed cited multiple challenges in implementing the JARC program; a common concern is that, overall, the effort required to obtain JARC funds is disproportionate to the relatively small amount of funding available. One challenge cited by recipients was that FTA's delay in issuing final guidance and the process to identify designated recipients reduced the time available to secure funds before the funds expired. In addition, although recipients considered the coordinated planning process beneficial, many cited factors that hindered coordination, including lack of resources and the reluctance of some stakeholders to participate. Moreover, although the JARC program requires human service providers to be included as stakeholders, other transportation planning requirements do not, complicating the coordinated planning process. Some designated recipients also expressed concerns about identifying stable sources of matching funds and duplicative efforts in administering JARC with other FTA programs. These challenges have delayed applications for funds and project implementation, and contributed to the lapse in fiscal year 2006 funds. Although FTA has not completed an evaluation of the JARC program under SAFETEA-LU, recipients we spoke with indicated that projects have benefited low-income individuals by providing a means to get to work. Since 2000, FTA has refined its approach for evaluating the program and currently has two studies under way to evaluate the JARC program under SAFETEA-LU. However, both studies may have limitations that could affect FTA's assessment of the program. One of these studies--due in September 2009--will evaluate projects using FTA's performance measures; specifically, the number of rides provided and number of jobs accessed. However, collecting reliable data for these measures is problematic, particularly for the number of jobs accessed. The other study--due in the spring of 2010--will include results of a survey of JARC recipients and individuals using JARC services and will focus on the program's impact on those using the services. However, this study will use a methodology similar to that used in a prior study which had limitations in the survey instrument design and data analysis. FTA does not have a comprehensive process in place to assess whether its researchers use generally accepted survey design and data analysis methodologies. |
gao_GAO-01-845T | gao_GAO-01-845T_0 | A sound financial management system is critical in helping the District address the continuing pressures that it faces. Since then, Congress has added new reporting requirements that, if effectively implemented, could provide Congress with critical financial and performance information to help Congress in its oversight and decision-making. Options for Additional Mechanisms to Ensure That Congress and the District Have Needed Information
While the reporting requirements enacted since 1995 are to provide Congress with important information and perspective on the financial condition, plans, and program performance of the District—information that was sorely lacking in the past—Congress may wish to consider the need for additional mechanisms to help it and the District ensure that they have the information needed to help the District maintain its financial viability. In summary, the District and its citizens, the Authority, and Congress have jointly achieved an enormous accomplishment in restoring the District to financial viability. Specifically, the District and Congress need current, reliable information about the District’s financial condition and developing trends in order to promptly respond to any pressures or warning signs that could indicate that future difficulties lie ahead. | What GAO Found
Although the District of Columbia, the Financial Responsibility and Management Assistance Authority, and Congress have achieved an enormous accomplishment in restoring the District to financial viability, many of the challenges the District faced in the past continue. The District and Congress need current, reliable information about the District's financial condition and developing trends in order to promptly respond to any pressures or warning signs that could indicate that future difficulties lie ahead. Toward that end, the District must ensure that its new financial management system is effectively implemented and provides decision makers with reliable and timely data. In addition, since 1995, Congress has put in place a number of reporting requirements to help provide the financial, planning, and performance information that it needs to conduct effective oversight and make decisions. Congress may wish to consider additional mechanisms to ensure that it and the District have the information needed to help the District maintain its financial viability and address its current and emerging challenges. Such mechanisms must be considered and implemented within a context that seeks to balance two sets of values: the overriding importance of Home Rule and respect for the District's democratic institutions and Congress' oversight and decision making responsibilities for the nation's capital. |
gao_GAO-08-686T | gao_GAO-08-686T_0 | FSIS has issued regulations and directives to enforce the act. FSIS Has Taken Actions Intended to Improve Its Records on Humane Slaughter Violations, but Public Reporting Can Enhance Transparency
In 2004, we identified weaknesses in FSIS’s regulations and guidance for recording compliance with HMSA in key areas: (1) the frequency and scope of humane handling and slaughter violations, and (2) actions to enforce compliance with humane handling and slaughter provisions. However, although the Congress has urged USDA to report annually on violations and trends in compliance, USDA has not issued such a report since March 2003. In 2004, we reported that incomplete and inconsistent FSIS inspection records made it difficult to determine the frequency and scope of humane handling and slaughter violations. Third, the noncompliance records did not consistently document the scope and severity of violations. We also reported FSIS took inconsistent enforcement actions to address noncompliance with HMSA. To provide more useful information and to help strengthen oversight of HMSA, we recommended in 2004 that the Secretary of Agriculture direct FSIS to (1) include in noncompliance records specific information on the type and cause of violations, (2) establish additional criteria for when districts are to take enforcement actions in cases of repetitive violations, and (3) require that district offices and inspectors clearly document the basis for enforcement actions that they take in response to repetitive violations, among others. In its most recent report, in March 2003, USDA indicated to the Congress that during fiscal year 2002, “very few infractions were for actual inhumane treatment of the animals.” However, we identified shortcomings in the data used to make this finding. In contrast, our analysis of all of the noncompliance records FSIS provided for fiscal year 2002 showed that one-fourth of the 366 noncompliance incidents documented by inspectors were for incidents of ineffective stunning which fails to meet humane standards in USDA regulations. FSIS’s Budget Has Increased as Staffing Has Declined
Unlike the budgets of other federal agencies responsible for food safety, the budget for FSIS has seen a marked increase since 1988. Agency officials noted the overall decline is due, in part, to consolidation in the meat industry, resulting in fewer facilities, and the introduction of the Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point system, which is a risk-based effort to reduce food contamination. Furthermore, in 2004 we reported FSIS did not have data on the number of inspectors devoted to compliance with HMSA or on the amount of time that inspectors spend on humane handling and slaughter requirements. Again, these actions were responsive to our recommendations, but without further evaluation, we do not know the effectiveness of these actions. Although not directly pertaining to FSIS’s enforcement of HMSA, the quantity of meat and poultry inspected by the agency, as well as the quantity of meat and poultry recalled, identifies some of the current challenges the agency faces. Meat and poultry consumption in the United States has increased sharply. Federal Oversight of Food Safety Is a High- Risk Area that Needs Governmentwide Reexamination
While today’s hearing focuses specifically on FSIS’s responsibilities for the oversight of food safety, it is important to note that FSIS is 1 of 15 federal agencies that collectively administer at least 30 laws related to food safety. Primary responsibility for food safety lies with USDA—which has oversight responsibility for meat, poultry, and processed egg products—and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)— which is responsible for the safety of virtually all other foods. While we have reported on problems with the federal food safety system— including inconsistent oversight, ineffective coordination, and inefficient use of resources—most noteworthy for today’s hearing is that federal expenditures for the oversight of food safety have not kept pace with the volume of foods regulated by the agencies or consumed by the public. We have also recommended that the executive branch reconvene the President’s Council on Food Safety to facilitate interagency coordination on food safety regulation and programs. Going forward, to build a sustained focus on the safety and integrity of the nation’s food supply, the Congress and the executive branch can develop expectations for food safety and follow up with congressional oversight and strategic planning by agencies, including USDA. | Why GAO Did This Study
In fiscal year 2007, more than 150 million cattle, sheep, and other animals destined for human consumption were slaughtered in the United States. The U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) Food Safety and Inspection Service is responsible for enforcing the Humane Methods of Slaughter Act (HMSA), which mandates that animals are handled and slaughtered humanely. GAO reported on USDA's efforts to enforce HMSA in 2004 (Humane Methods of Slaughter Act: USDA Has Addressed Some Problems but Still Faces Enforcement Challenges, GAO-04-247). More broadly, GAO has also issued many reports that address federal oversight of the U.S. food safety system. This testimony focuses on (1) GAO's 2004 report on the frequency and scope of reported HMSA violations and enforcement actions by USDA, (2) information on trends in staffing and funding for USDA food inspections, and (3) information on overall federal oversight of food safety. To provide this new information, GAO analyzed personnel and funding data from USDA and the Office of Management and Budget, and interviewed USDA food safety inspection officials.
What GAO Found
In January 2004, GAO reported that incomplete and inconsistent inspection records made it difficult to determine the frequency and scope of HMSA violations, inspectors did not always document violations of the act, and they did not consistently document the scope and severity of each incident. GAO also reported that enforcement actions to address noncompliance with the act were inconsistent, and that USDA was not using consistent criteria to determine when to suspend plant operations in cases of serious or repeated violations. The Congress has urged USDA to report annually on trends in compliance with humane slaughter methods. Such public reporting can enhance transparency, but USDA's most recent report was in March 2003 and relied on incomplete data. For example, that report said very few infractions were for inhumane treatment, but GAO found that at least one-fourth of the infractions were for ineffective stunning which fails to meet humane standards. USDA has taken actions to address the recommendations GAO made in 2004 about oversight of HMSA. However, GAO has not evaluated the effectiveness of these actions. USDA faces resource challenges that may make it difficult for it to enforce HMSA and ensure the safety of the food supply. Although USDA's budget for food safety-related activities has increased since 1988, staffing for these activities has declined from its highest level in 1995. Agency officials noted the overall decline is due, in part, to consolidation in the meat industry, resulting in fewer facilities. In 2004, GAO found that USDA lacked detailed information on how much time its inspectors spend on humane handling and slaughter activities, making it difficult to determine if the number of inspectors is adequate. USDA has taken actions to address most of GAO's recommendations for assessing its resource needs for HMSA, but GAO has not evaluated these actions. Although not directly related to HMSA activities, the quantity of meat and poultry inspected and passed by USDA has grown, and the quantity of meat and poultry recalled has increased. USDA has oversight responsibility for ensuring the safety of meat, poultry, and processed eggs. For example, federal regulations prohibit companies from processing and selling meat from disabled cows--which have a higher probability of being infected with bovine spongiform encephalopathy--without explicit USDA inspector approval. However, USDA is only 1 of 15 agencies that collectively administer at least 30 laws related to food safety. This fragmentation is the key reason GAO added the federal oversight of food safety to its High-Risk Series in 2007 and called for a governmentwide reexamination of the food safety system. GAO has reported on problems with this system--including inconsistent oversight, ineffective coordination, and inefficient use of resources. Going forward, as GAO has recommended, a governmentwide, results-oriented performance plan and a reconvened President's Council on Food Safety could build a sustained focus on the safety of the nation's food supply. |
gao_GAO-11-558T | gao_GAO-11-558T_0 | What GAO Has Found to Indicate Potential Duplication, Overlap, or Fragmentation among Economic Development Programs
Our work involving 80 economic development programs at four agencies—Commerce, HUD, SBA, and USDA—indicates that the design of each of these fragmented programs appears to overlap with that of at least one other program in terms of the economic development activities that they are authorized to fund. For example, as shown in table 1, the four agencies administer a total of 54 programs that can fund “entrepreneurial efforts,” which include helping businesses to develop business plans and identify funding sources. To address issues arising from potential overlap and fragmentation in economic development programs, we previously have identified collaborative practices agencies should consider using to maximize the performance and results of federal programs that share common outcomes. Moreover, we found that most of the collaborative efforts performed by program staff on the front line that we have been able to assess to date have occurred only on a case-by-case basis. However, during our recently- completed review we found that the agency still primarily relies on grantee self-reported data and conducts a limited number of site visits to assess the accuracy of the data. SBA has not yet developed outcome measures that directly link to the mission of its HUBZone program, or implemented its plans to evaluate the program based on variables tied to program goals. In addition, such information would enable congressional decision makers and others to make decisions to better realign resources, if necessary, and identify opportunities for consolidating or eliminating some programs. Control Weaknesses Hinder the Effectiveness of Small Business Contracting and Business Development Programs
As GAO has reported, three small business programs have had varying degrees of internal control weaknesses that affected program oversight. For example, in a June 2008 report, GAO determined that SBA’s mechanisms for certifying and monitoring firms in the HUBZone program gave limited assurance that only eligible firms participated. SBA Has Taken Some Steps to Improve Administration of the HUBZone Program, but the Agency Has Yet to Evaluate Its Effectiveness
In our June 2008 report on the HUBZone program, we found that (1) SBA’s mechanisms for certifying and monitoring firms provided limited assurance that only eligible firms participated in the program and (2) the agency had not evaluated the effectiveness of the program. Specifically, for certification and recertification, firms self-reported information on their applications and SBA requested documentation or conducted site visits of firms to validate the self-reported data in limited instances. To address these deficiencies, we recommended that SBA develop and implement guidance to more consistently obtain supporting documentation upon application and conduct more frequent site visits to help ensure that firms applying for certification were eligible. VA Faced Challenges in Verifying Veteran-Owned and Service-Disabled Veteran-Owned Firms
In May 2010, we reported that VA had made limited progress in implementing an effective verification program. The Act also requires VA to maintain a database of veteran-owned and service-disabled veteran- owned small businesses and verify the ownership, control, and veteran or service-disabled status of businesses in the database. Furthermore, VA contracting officers awarded contracts to businesses that were denied after the verification process. To help address the requirement to maintain a database of verified businesses, we recommended that VA develop and implement a plan for a more thorough and effective verification program. SBA’s Key Controls for Determining Continued 8(a) Eligibility Needed to Be Strengthened
We reported in March 2010 that while SBA relies primarily on its annual reviews of 8(a) firms to help ensure the continued eligibility of firms in the program, we observed inconsistencies and weaknesses in annual review procedures related to determinations of continued eligibility. For example, SBA officials told us that in August 2010 they had provided staff with a new guide for conducting annual reviews of the continuing eligibility of firms in the 8(a) program. Using the Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance and other agency documents, we identified 80 federal programs administered by the four agencies listed below—the Departments of Commerce (Commerce), Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and Agriculture (USDA) and the Small Business Administration (SBA)—that could fund economic development activities. We did not include tax credit programs aimed at economic development in this review. | Why GAO Did This Study
Economic development programs-- administered efficiently and effectively--can contribute to the well-being of the economy at the least cost to taxpayers. Such programs can encompass small business development and contracting. To encourage such contracting, Congress created programs--such as the Historically Underutilized Business Zone (HUBZone), service-disabled veteran-owned small business, and 8(a) Business Development programs--that give contracting preferences to some types of small businesses: in economically distressed communities; to those owned by service-disabled veterans; and to those with eligible socially and economically disadvantaged owners. This testimony addresses (1) potential duplication in economic development programs and (2) internal controls weaknesses in three small business programs. This testimony is based on related GAO work from 2008 to the present and updates it as noted. GAO examined programs at the Departments of Commerce, Housing and Urban Development, and Agriculture and the Small Business Administration (SBA) to assess program overlap, collaboration, and measures of effectiveness (GAO-11-477R). GAO also reviewed data from SBA and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) and conducted site visits. The reports identified opportunities to increase program efficiencies and made recommendations to improve internal controls and develop outcome-oriented measures.
What GAO Found
Results of GAO's work on 80 economic development programs at the four agencies indicate that the design of each appears to overlap with that of at least one other in terms of the economic development activities they can fund. For example, the agencies administer 54 programs that fund "entrepreneurial efforts," which include business development. SBA has 19 such economic development programs. To address issues arising from potential overlap and fragmentation, GAO relied on previously identified collaborative practices agencies should consider using to maximize performance and results. GAO found that agencies' collaborative efforts were not comprehensive but conducted on a case-by case basis. Further, the agencies generally have not measured outcomes. For instance, SBA has not yet developed outcome measures that directly link to the mission of its HUBZone program. In 2005 and 2008, GAO made recommendations to Commerce and SBA, respectively, aimed at improving the data and methods they rely on to measure the outcomes of some of their economic development programs. Generating key information on outcomes (that measure effectiveness) could help agencies better manage programs. Such information also would enable decision makers to better identify opportunities to realign resources, and if necessary, consolidate or eliminate some programs. As GAO has reported, three small business programs have had varying degrees of internal control weaknesses that affected program oversight. First, in a June 2008 report, GAO determined that SBA's mechanisms for certifying and monitoring firms in the HUBZone program gave limited assurance that only eligible firms participated. For certification and recertification (of initial and continued eligibility), SBA requested documentation or conducted site visits to validate self-reported data in limited instances. In response to GAO's recommendations, SBA has issued guidance requiring supporting documentation upon application and conducted site visits to certified firms. Second, in a May 2010 report, GAO reported that VA has faced challenges in effectively responding to a 2006 statutory mandate to verify the eligibility of small businesses owned by service-disabled or other veterans. Although such businesses self-certify their contracting eligibility, VA (unique among federal agencies) must maintain a database of these firms, verify their status, and only give contracting preferences to verified firms. GAO reported that VA had verified only about 14 percent of firms in its database. Since GAO recommended that VA develop a plan for a more effective verification program, VA stated that it has taken steps to improve its verification process, including awarding contracts to expedite the processing of applications. And finally, in a March 2010 report, GAO found that while SBA conducts annual reviews of 8(a) firms to help ensure continued eligibility, GAO found that key controls needed to be strengthened. GAO's review of a sample of 8(a) firms identified an estimated 55 percent in which SBA staff failed to complete required procedures to assess eligibility criteria. In response to GAO's recommendation that SBA provide more guidance to staff on annual review procedures, SBA stated that it issued a new guide in August 2010. |
gao_NSIAD-98-45 | gao_NSIAD-98-45_0 | The resulting AIM-9X system requirement has five key performance parameters: the ability to operate during the day or at night; the ability to operate over land and at sea in the presence of infrared countermeasures; weight, size, and electrical compatibility with all current U.S. fighters and the F-22; the ability to acquire, track, and fire on targets over a wider area than the AIM-9M; and a high probability that a missile launched will reach and kill its target. Both companies demonstrated, among other things, how they would reduce the technical risk of developing the AIM-9X missile. Our objectives were to determine (1) the services’ efforts to reduce missile development risk, (2) the missile program’s plan to transition from development to production, and (3) the importance of separately managed but essential supporting systems. Among these are: using existing subsystems, components, and items not requiring conducting a competitive demonstration and validation of new technology; combining government and contractor technical expertise through integrated product teams. Whether program efforts to reduce technical, cost, and schedule risk will succeed will not be known for at least another year. This production decision is to be made before completing development flight tests, before adequately testing production representative missiles, and before full operational testing begins. As figure 3.1 shows, the low-rate initial production decision for the AIM-9X missile is to be made about 1 year before completion of the planned developmental flight test program. AIM-9X System of Systems Needs to Be Tested, Produced, and Deployed Together
All three elements of the AIM-9X weapon system—the missile, the helmet-mounted cueing system, and the associated aircraft modifications—must be present and properly working together to ensure that U.S. fighters can prevail against modern threat missiles. By not requiring that the missile, helmet, and aircraft modifications be tested, produced, and deployed together, as a “system of systems,” DOD risks fielding a missile unable to prevail in aerial combat. Development Programs Are Separate but Closely Coordinated
The AIM-9X missile, helmet, and associated aircraft modifications are being developed under separate but closely coordinated programs. We are concerned about this because of the criticality that all three elements work together to ensure that the AIM-9X system will prevail against modern threat missiles. Until the weapon system is tested and evaluated using production representative missiles and helmets, DOD decisionmakers will not have information on whether the AIM-9X weapon system’s key performance parameters are achievable. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the development status of the AIM-9X missile program and its concerns about the testing and production of all elements of the AIM-9X weapon system, focusing on the: (1) services' efforts to reduce missile development risk; (2) missile program's plan to transition from development to production; and (3) importance of separately managed but essential supporting systems.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the AIM-9X missile program includes many initiatives to reduce the risk of technical, cost, and schedule problems; (2) it uses many existing subsystems, components, and items not requiring development, and government and contractor technical experts have joined together in integrated product teams; (3) in addition, the services conducted a competitive demonstration and validation of new technologies to reduce technical risk; (4) GAO is concerned, however, about two situations; (5) the plan to start missile low-rate initial production about 1 year before completing development flight testing and before operational testing of production-representative missiles will risk later discovery of technical or operational suitability problems; (6) accordingly, at this critical juncture, Department of Defense (DOD) decisionmakers will not have enough verifiable information on the system's key performance parameters in an operational environment to make an informed production decision; (7) GAO is concerned that the helmet-mounted cueing system is being developed under a separate program from the missile even though U.S. fighter pilots need both the AIM-9X missile and the helmet-mounted cueing system to ensure that they can prevail in air-to-air combat against modern threat missiles; (8) while the separate development programs are being coordinated, there is no requirement that the missile, helmet, and aircraft modifications be thoroughly and realistically tested and evaluated together as a system of systems prior to initiating AIM-9X missile production; (9) until the weapon system is tested and evaluated using production-representative missiles and helmets, DOD decisionmakers will not have information on whether the AIM-9X weapon system's key performance parameters--such as the ability to acquire, track, and fire on targets over a wider area than the AIM-9M--are achievable; and (10) further, if all elements of the system are not produced and deployed together, the AIM-9X may not be able to prevail in aerial combat against modern threat missiles. |
gao_GAO-02-845T | gao_GAO-02-845T_0 | None of the changes since September 11 have lessened the pressures placed by Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid on the long-term fiscal outlook. This slowing labor force growth is not always considered as part of the Social Security debate. 3.) Social Security Trust Funds, Cash Flow, and the Federal Budget
Within the federal budget, Social Security—more properly, the Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Disability Insurance programs (OASDI)—has two trust funds that authorize Treasury to pay benefits as long as the applicable trust fund has a positive balance. For example, when a trust fund’s cash surpluses are used to reduce debt held by the public, this increases national saving, contributes to higher economic growth over the long term, and enhances the government’s ability to raise cash in the future to pay benefits. According to the Trustees’ intermediate estimates, the combined Social Security Trust Funds will be solvent until 2041. Decline in Budgetary Flexibility Will Be Severely Exacerbated Absent Entitlement Reform
From the perspective of the federal budget and the economy, the challenge posed by the growth in Social Security spending becomes even more significant in combination with the more rapid expected growth in Medicare and Medicaid spending. To obtain balance, massive spending cuts, tax increases, or some combination of the two would be necessary. Thus both sustainability concerns and solvency considerations drive us to act sooner rather than later. Evaluating Social Security Reform Proposals
As important as financial stability may be for Social Security, it cannot be the only consideration. Social Security remains the foundation of the nation’s retirement system. As they fashion a comprehensive proposal, however, policymakers will ultimately have to balance the relative importance they place on each of these criteria. Although the program does not face an immediate solvency crisis as it did in 1983, the fundamental nature of the program’s long-term financing challenge means that timely action is needed. Focusing on comprehensive packages of reforms that protect the benefits of current retirees while achieving the right balance of equity and adequacy for future beneficiaries will help to foster credibility and acceptance. It will help build the bridges necessary to achieve consensus. | What GAO Found
Social Security not only represents the foundation of our retirement income system; it also provides millions of Americans with disability insurance and survivor's benefits. Although the Social Security Trustees now project that under the intermediate or "best estimate" assumptions the combined Social Security Trust Funds will be exhausted 3 years later than in last year's estimates, the magnitude of the long-term funding shortfall is virtually unchanged. Without reform, Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid are unsustainable, and the long-term impact of these entitlement programs on the federal budget and the economy will be dramatic. Social Security reform is part of a larger and significant fiscal and economic challenge. Absent reform, the nation will ultimately have to choose between persistent, escalating federal deficits, significant tax increases, or dramatic budget cuts. Focusing on trust fund solvency alone is not sufficient. Aiming for sustainable solvency would increase the chance that future policymakers would not have to face, on a recurring basis, the difficult questions of whether the government will have the capacity to pay future claims or what else will have to be squeezed to pay those claims. Comparing the beneficiary impact of reform proposals solely to current Social Security promised benefits is inappropriate since all current promised benefits are not funded over the longer term. Reform proposals should be evaluated as packages. If the focus is on the pros and cons of each element of reform, it may prove impossible to build the bridges necessary to achieve consensus. Acting sooner rather than later helps to ease the difficulty of change. Waiting until Social Security faces an immediate solvency crisis will limit the scope of feasible solutions and could reduce the options field to only those choices that are the most difficult and could also delay the really tough decisions on Medicare and Medicaid. |
gao_GAO-02-303 | gao_GAO-02-303_0 | The Federal Reserve System competes with the private sector in providing wholesale payment services. Core Principles Outlines Central Banks’ Objectives and Responsibilities for Systemically Important Payment Systems
Central banks in the G-10 countries and Australia have endorsed the Core Principles, which sets forth 10 basic principles that should guide the design and operation of systemically important payment systems in all countries as well as four responsibilities of the central bank in applying the Core Principles. In some cases, the banks are to serve a particular regulatory function. Central Banks Are Involved in the Operations and Oversight of Wholesale Payment Systems
All of the central banks we studied provide settlement for wholesale payment systems. Some central banks have full ownership and operational involvement in the payment system; others have little operational involvement beyond settlement services. Other central banks participate in partnerships. Central banks provide settlement for retail payments, but commercial banks also settle retail payments. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report are to (1) identify internationally recognized objectives for payment systems and central bank involvement in those systems, (2) describe the roles of central banks in the wholesale payment systems of other major industrialized countries and the key factors that influence those roles, and (3) describe the roles of central banks in the retail payment systems of other major industrialized countries and the key factors that influence those roles. | What GAO Found
The central banks of major industrialized countries have agreed on common policy objectives and presented them in the Core Principles for Systematically Important Payment Systems. Intended to help promote safer and more efficient payment systems worldwide, the Core Principles outline specific policy recommendations for systematically important payment systems and describe the responsibilities of the central banks. All of the central banks GAO studied seek to ensure that their wholesale payment systems operate smoothly and minimize systemic risk. All of the central banks provide settlement services for their countries' wholesale payment systems. Some central banks also provide wholesale clearing services. Other central banks own the system but have little operational involvement in clearing, while others participate in partnerships with the private sector. All of the central banks GAO studied provide settlement for some retail payment systems. Some, but not all, central banks exercise regulatory authority over retail payment systems in their countries. Central banks also tend to have less operational involvement in countries where there is a relatively concentrated banking industry. In some cases, laws governing payments and the structure of the financial services industry direct the involvement of central banks in retail payment systems. |
gao_T-GGD-96-110 | gao_T-GGD-96-110_0 | Statement
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: I am pleased to have this opportunity to discuss the administrative redress system for federal employees. I have three points to make:
First, because of the complexity of the system and the variety of redress mechanisms it affords federal employees, it is inefficient, expensive, and time-consuming. Its protracted processes and requirements divert managers from more productive activities and inhibit some of them from taking legitimate actions in response to performance or conduct problems. Further, the demands of the system put pressure on employees and agencies alike to settle cases—regardless of their merits—to avoid potential costs. Third, alternatives to the current redress system do exist—in the private sector and in some parts of the federal government. These alternatives, including a variety of less formal approaches collectively known as alternative dispute resolution, may be worth further study as Congress considers modifying the federal employee redress system. A Complex and Duplicative System
reviews agencies’ final decisions on complaints. But two facts about mixed cases are particularly worth noting. A Costly System, With Many Costs Unknown
Just how much this multilevel, multiagency redress system costs is hard to ascertain. Among discrimination cases closed during fiscal year 1994 for which there was a hearing before an EEOC administrative judge and an appeal of an agency final decision to the Commission itself, the average time from the filing of the complaint with the employing agency to the Commission’s decision on the appeal was over 800 days. As things stand today, federal workers have substantially greater employment protections than do private sector employees. What are the implications of the extensive opportunities for redress provided federal workers? Federal employees file workplace discrimination complaints at more than 5 times the per capita rate of private sector workers. The first copy of each GAO report and testimony is free. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the administrative redress system for federal employees.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the federal employee redress system is a complex and duplicative system that affords employees redress at three different levels; (2) the system is inefficient, expensive, and time-consuming because of its complexity and the variety of redress mechanisms available; (3) the system contains significant overlap, especially in mixed cases where two or more agencies review an appellant's decision; (4) redress system costs are difficult to determine because many direct costs are not reported and indirect costs are not measurable; (5) the most time-consuming cases involve discrimination complaints, which take an average of 800 days to reconcile; (6) the federal redress system provides its employees with far greater opportunities than do private-sector redress systems; (7) the federal system allows federal workers numerous appeals, evidentiary hearings, and district court trials; (8) federal workers file workplace discrimination complaints five times more often than do private-sector employees; (9) the current system is vulnerable to abuse and diverts managers attention from more productive activities, inhibits managers from taking legitimate actions against poor performers, and pressures employees and agencies to settle cases to contain costs; and (10) alternative dispute resolution offers some promising approaches to handling workers complaints, but these methods are underused and in the early stages of development. |
gao_GAO-17-181 | gao_GAO-17-181_0 | IHS’s Oversight of the Quality of Care Provided in Its Facilities Has Been Limited and Inconsistent, but IHS Has Drafted New Oversight Initiatives
IHS’s Oversight of the Quality of Care Provided in Its Facilities Has Been Limited and Inconsistent
IHS’s oversight of the quality of care provided in its federally operated facilities has been limited and inconsistent. While some oversight functions are performed at the headquarters level, the agency has delegated primary responsibility for the oversight of the quality of care to the area offices. However, our review found that this oversight was limited and inconsistent across IHS areas and facilities, in part due to a lack of agency-wide quality performance standards and significant leadership turnover in some offices. Officials from all nine of the area offices that oversee federally operated IHS facilities told us that they monitor the quality of care provided by facilities through periodic meetings with facility staff—including governing board meetings and other meetings. Reviewing available quality performance data. Monitoring adverse events. These inconsistencies are exacerbated by significant turnover in area leadership. Officials from four of the nine area offices in our review reported that they had at least three area directors in the past 5 years, and officials from three area offices reported that they had at least three chief medical officers. According to IHS officials, the agency has not defined contingency or succession plans for the replacement of key personnel, including area directors. IHS’s limited and inconsistent agency-wide oversight of the quality of care in its federally operated facilities, as well as its lack of contingency and succession plans for key personnel, is inconsistent with federal internal control standards. These standards suggest that agencies should establish and review performance standards and then monitor data to assess the quality of performance over time, and that agencies should define contingency and succession plans for key roles to help continue achieving objectives. IHS Developed a Quality Framework, but Has Just Begun to Implement Planned Changes
Recognizing some of the challenges it faces with overseeing and providing quality health care in its facilities, IHS finalized the development of a quality framework in November 2016 that outlines, at a high level, IHS’s vision, goals, and priorities to develop, implement, and sustain an effective quality program that is intended to improve patient experience and ensure the delivery of reliably high quality health care for IHS direct service facilities. This quality office is to be developed as part of an overall realignment of offices in IHS, and according to the framework, the office will be responsible for identifying resource needs, structures, processes, and supports for an effective and sustainable quality assessment and performance improvement system. More specifically, the framework directs IHS to develop a process for monitoring performance measures, such as measures of clinical care, patient access, and financial performance, for periodic review by leadership. The framework also explains that IHS will enhance its adverse event reporting system to encourage consistent use by facility staff, or replace it with a new system after January 2017. If effectively implemented, the quality framework could address the limited and inconsistent oversight of the quality of care provided in federally operated IHS facilities. In addition, IHS officials stated that the agency has not yet selected quality performance measures but has plans to do so. Conclusions
American Indians and Alaska Natives die at higher rates than other Americans from many causes—such as lower respiratory infections and complications from diabetes—that can be mitigated through access to quality health care services, and concerns continue to be raised about the quality of care provided in federally operated IHS facilities, including misdiagnoses, incorrectly prescribed medications, and unsafe facility conditions. Until IHS develops agency-wide standards for the quality of care provided in its federally operated facilities, systematically monitors facility performance in meeting these standards at all facilities, and develops contingency and succession plans for key personnel to address its significant leadership turnover, it cannot ensure that it is consistently providing quality medical care to the AI/AN population served in its facilities. As part of the implementation of its quality framework, ensure that agency-wide standards for the quality of care provided in its federally operated facilities are developed, that facility performance in meeting these standards is systematically monitored over time, and that enhancements are made to its adverse event reporting system. 2. HHS concurred with both of our recommendations. We are sending a copy of this report to the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services. | Why GAO Did This Study
IHS is charged with providing health care to American Indian/Alaska Native (AI/AN) people who are members or descendants of 567 tribes. AI/AN people born today have a life expectancy that is 4.4 years lower than all races in the United States, and they continue to die at higher rates than other Americans from preventable causes. Concerns about the quality of care provided to AI/ANs in IHS facilities have been identified recently by federal officials and tribal members. GAO was asked to review how IHS oversees the quality of care provided in its facilities.
This report examines IHS's oversight of the quality of care provided in its federally operated facilities. GAO reviewed policies and guidance related to quality of care in federally operated facilities and interviewed IHS officials at the headquarters level and all nine area offices with federally operated facilities. GAO also examined documents from governance meetings between area office and facility staff.
What GAO Found
The Indian Health Service's (IHS) oversight of the quality of care provided in its federally operated facilities has been limited and inconsistent. While some oversight functions are performed at the headquarters level, the agency has delegated primary responsibility for the oversight of care to nine area offices. Area officials stated that the oversight they provide has included, for example, holding periodic meetings with facility staff, reviewing available quality performance data and reviewing adverse events. However, GAO found that this oversight was limited and inconsistent across IHS facilities, due in part to a lack of agency-wide quality of care standards. Specifically, GAO found:
variation in the frequency of governing board meetings and the extent to which quality was a standing agenda item at these meetings;
limited and inconsistent reporting of quality data across IHS areas and facilities; and
inconsistent reporting of adverse events at federally operated facilities.
These inconsistencies are also exacerbated by significant turnover in area leadership. Officials from four of the nine area offices in our review reported that they each had at least three area directors in the past five years. According to IHS officials, the agency has not defined contingency or succession plans for the replacement of key personnel, including area directors. IHS's lack of agency-wide quality of care standards and lack of contingency and succession plans for key personnel are inconsistent with federal internal control standards. These standards suggest that agencies should establish and review performance standards and then monitor data to assess the quality of performance over time, and define contingency and succession plans for the replacement of key personnel to help IHS continue achieving its objectives. As a result, IHS officials cannot ensure that facilities are providing quality health care.
Recognizing the challenges it faces with overseeing and providing quality health care in its facilities, IHS finalized the development of a quality framework in November 2016 that outlines, at a high level, IHS's plan to develop, implement, and sustain a quality program intended to improve patient experience and ensure the delivery of reliably high quality health care. For example, the framework directs IHS to develop a quality office that will be responsible for identifying resource needs, structures, processes, and supports for an effective and sustainable quality assessment and performance improvement system. More specifically, the framework directs IHS to develop a process for monitoring select performance measures, such as measures of clinical care, patient access, and financial performance, for periodic review by leadership. The framework also explains that IHS will enhance its current patient safety reporting systems to encourage consistent use by staff. If effectively implemented, the quality framework could address the limited and inconsistent oversight of the quality of care provided in federally operated IHS facilities. As of November 2016, IHS officials stated that the agency has not yet selected quality performance measures but has plans to do so.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services direct the Director of IHS to (1) as it implements its quality framework, ensure that agency-wide standards for the quality of care provided in its federally operated facilities are developed, that facility performance in meeting these standards is monitored over time, and that enhancements are made to its adverse event reporting system, and (2) develop contingency and succession plans for the replacement of key personnel.
HHS concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-12-326 | gao_GAO-12-326_0 | Savings Incentive Match Plans for Employees (SIMPLE) IRA plans require employers to either match their eligible employees’ voluntary salary reductions (typically up to 3 percent of compensation) or to contribute 2 percent of compensation for each eligible employee. For example, EGTRRA eliminated top-heavy testing requirements for safe harbor 401(k)s, increased contribution limits for employer-sponsored IRA plans and 401(k) plans, and created a tax credit for small employers to offset startup costs, including the cost of educating employees about a new plan. Some providers also include payroll services, which further centralize an employer’s administrative services through a single company. Further, the regression analysis using Labor and IRS data found that small employers with larger numbers of employees were the most likely of all small employers to sponsor a retirement plan, as were those paying average annual wages of $50,000 to $99,999. A separate GAO analysis using Labor and IRS data found an overall small employer sponsorship rate of 14 percent in 2009.sponsorship rate does not include small employers that sponsor SEP IRA plans because IRS currently does not have a means to collect these data, which limits what is known about small employers that sponsor SEP However, the plans. identified various plan options, Plan options and administration requirements: Small employers and other stakeholders said that plan options and administration requirements are frequently complex and burdensome and discourage some small employers from sponsoring a plan. For example, some small employers and retirement experts said that the number of plan types and features make it difficult for small employers to compare and choose plans. Some small employer sponsors found the selection of investment fund options for their plans particularly challenging. Federal Guidance Is Available to Address the Complexities Associated with Plan Sponsorship but May Lack Visibility among Small Employers
Federal agencies provide guidance that can assist small employers in addressing some of the challenges of starting and maintaining retirement plans. However, a number of stakeholders suggested that many small employers are unaware of federal resources on retirement plans. For example, a number of small employers stated that employees prioritized health care benefits over retirement benefits. Proposed Options to Spur Plan Sponsorship Target Simplification, Incentives, and Education
Stakeholders Proposed Simplifying Requirements and Increasing Tax Credits to Encourage Plan Sponsorship
Stakeholders provided several suggestions targeted at addressing some of the administrative and financial challenges they believed inhibited plan These proposals, which they said could reduce complexity sponsorship.and ease administrative and financial burdens for small employer plan sponsors, included simplifying plan administration rules, revising or eliminating top-heavy testing, and increasing tax credits. Stakeholders Said More Education and Outreach Are Needed to Increase Awareness of Plan Options and Requirements
Numerous stakeholders agreed that the federal government could conduct more education and outreach to inform small employers about plan options and requirements; however, opinions varied on the appropriate role for the federal government in this area. Retirement systems in other countries also use asset pooling and other features that reduce administrative and financial burdens for small employers and could spur plan sponsorship. However, much of the information is scattered among a variety of websites and portals in a largely uncoordinated fashion. Recommendations for Executive Action
Department of Labor
To address the need to strengthen the retirement security of employees at small businesses and to build on interagency data-sharing agreements already in place, we recommend that the Secretary of Labor convene an interagency task force with representatives from Treasury, IRS, and SBA, and other agencies deemed appropriate, to review, analyze, and address the challenges facing small business retirement security in the United States. Specifically, this body should focus on, but not be limited to, the following goals:
Conduct plan research on the characteristics associated with small businesses that are more or less likely to sponsor a retirement plan (including employer-sponsored IRA plans) to support agencies’ education and outreach efforts to small employers and provide Congress and the public with information about plan coverage among them. Agencies generally agreed with our recommendations. However, Labor disagreed with our recommendation to create a unified web portal to centralize retirement plan information for small employers, expressing concerns about its necessity. Data Sources and Development of the Analytic Data Set
To perform this work, we combined and analyzed 2009 data from the Department of Labor’s (Labor) Form 5500 database, the Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS) Information Returns Processing (IRP) database, and the IRS Compliance Data Warehouse database (CDW) to obtain information on what would make a small employer more or less likely to sponsor a retirement plan, descriptive statistics on small employer retirement plan sponsors and nonsponsors, and descriptive statistics on the types of retirement plans sponsored by small employers. Data Analysis of Small Employer Plan Sponsorship
We developed bivariate and multivariate regression models to estimate the likelihood that a small employer would sponsor a retirement plan using the following small employer characteristics: the number of employees, the annual average wage of the employees, the industry using the 2007 North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) with a depth of two digits, and the region in which the small employer resided as defined by the Census Bureau. | Why GAO Did This Study
Because about one-third of privatesector employees in the United States work for small employers, Congress and federal agencies have made efforts to encourage small employers to sponsor retirement plans for workers. However, federal data show workers access to plans remains limited, leaving many without a work-based plan to save for retirement. For this report, GAO examined (1) characteristics of small employers that are more or less likely to sponsor a plan for their employees, (2) challenges small employers face in establishing and maintaining a plan for their employees, and (3) options to address these challenges and attract more small employer plan sponsors. GAO defined small employers as forprofit firms that employ 100 or fewer employees. GAO analyzed Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and Department of Labor (Labor) data, interviewed agency officials and experts, held discussion groups with small employers, and reviewed relevant federal rules, literature, and retirement plan proposals.
What GAO Found
Based on available data, about 14 percent of small employers sponsor some type of retirement plan. Overall, GAO found that the likelihood that a small employer will sponsor a retirement plan largely depends on the size of the employers workforce and the workers average wages more than on the industry in which the employer operates and the geographic region in which the employer is located. GAO found the greatest likelihood of plan sponsorship was among small employers with larger numbers of employees and those paying an average annual wage of $50,000 to $99,999. GAO also found that the most common plans sponsored by small employers are 401(k)s and Savings Incentive Match Plans for Employees (SIMPLE) Individual Retirement Arrangements (IRA)an employer-sponsored IRA designed for small employersat 46 percent and 40 percent, respectively, of total plans. However, IRS currently does not have the means to collect information on employers that sponsor another type of IRA plan designed for small employers, the Simplified Employee Pension (SEP) IRA plan, which limits what is known about employers that sponsor these plans.
Small employers and retirement experts identified several challenges to starting and maintaining retirement plans. Many small employers said they feel overwhelmed by the number of retirement plan options, administration requirements, and fiduciary responsibilities. For example, many are concerned about the potential risks associated with sponsoring a plan. Although federal agencies conduct education and outreach on retirement plans, a number of small employers and other stakeholders said small employers were unaware of these initiatives. For example, Labor, IRS, and the Small Business Administration (SBA) collaborate to develop and disseminate information and guidance online but do so through separate websites and in a largely uncoordinated fashion. Small employers and other stakeholders also cited other challenges to plan sponsorship, including a lack of financial resources, time, and personnel. However, some small employers said their employees prioritized health benefits over retirement benefits. To address some of the challenges to plan sponsorship, some small employers said they use contracted service providers that perform plan administration tasks.
Small employers and other stakeholders offered options for addressing some challenges and reducing the complexity of plan sponsorship for small employers. Options included simplification of federal requirements for plan administration, such as easing or eliminating certain plan testing requirements. Some stakeholders said increasing the tax credit for plan startup costs could further defray costs and help boost plan sponsorship. Some stakeholders also said that the federal government could conduct more education and outreach efforts to inform small employers about plans. Pension reform proposals in the United States, along with certain features of pension systems in other countries, may provide additional options that could increase plan sponsorship and increase workers access to retirement plans. For example, asset pooling is a feature that allows small employers to pool resources for economies of scale, which can lower plan costs. In light of the variety of options, Labor, the Department of the Treasury, IRS, and SBA should jointly evaluate existing options and develop new proposals with the goal of mitigating barriers to small employer plan sponsorship.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that Labor convene an interagency task force with Treasury, IRS, and SBA to coordinate existing research, education, and outreach efforts to foster small employer plan sponsorship. GAO also recommends that IRS consider modifying tax forms to gather complete, reliable information about SEP IRAs. Agencies generally agreed with GAOs recommendations; however, Labor disagreed with GAOs recommendation to create a single webportal for federal guidance. However, because federal resources are scattered across different sites, GAO believes consolidating plan information onto one webportal could benefit small employers. |
gao_GAO-17-358 | gao_GAO-17-358_0 | As part of their duties, MWDs can be deployed to assist in operations outside of their assigned military installation. 1.) Medical Care for MWDs
The Army Veterinary Service has the lead responsibility for the medical care of all DOD-owned animals, including MWDs. DOD Uses Three Systems to Track Information on MWDs; the Number of Adopted, Transferred, or Euthanized MWDs Has Varied over Time
DOD uses three systems to track different types of information about MWDs, including information related to their removal from service. The number of MWDs that have been adopted, transferred, or euthanized has varied over the past 5 years. Systems to Track MWD Information
Officials from the Air Force and Army use three separate systems to track information on MWDs. Number of MWDs Adopted, Transferred, or Euthanized
Based on our review of data from these systems and related documentation, the number of MWDs adopted or transferred during 2011 through 2015 varied, with the highest numbers in 2012 and 2013. The number of euthanized MWDs varied to a lesser extent. According to Air Force officials, these dogs were also likely never deployed into service. Available Data Indicate That Prevalent Medical Conditions for MWDs Adopted in 2014 and 2015 Included Skin, Dental, and Musculoskeletal Issues
Available data for 55 percent of the MWDs adopted in 2014 and 2015 indicate that prevalent medical conditions included skin, dental, and musculoskeletal issues. An Army veterinarian told us that “skin conditions or ear infections” and “dental disease or injury”—the two most prevalent medical conditions we identified—are unlikely to result in removal from service as these conditions generally can be treated or resolved. The remaining three prevalent medical conditions we identified are associated with musculoskeletal issues and are more likely to result in MWDs’ removal from service. According to an Army veterinarian, these conditions are common in breeds maintained by the MWD program. The chief of staff of a private network of veterinary hospitals in New Jersey provided us with the types of preventative care they recommend for 9-year old Labrador Retrievers, Belgian Malinois, and German Shepherd dogs—the most common breeds used by the MWD program. Some Assistance with Private Veterinary Care for Adopted MWDs Is Available from Nonprofit Organizations; Some Owners May Purchase Care Offered at Certain Military Installations
Although owners of adopted MWDs are responsible for the costs of their care, some assistance with privately provided veterinary care is available through nonprofit organizations. Individuals with access to DOD medical care may also purchase care for their adopted MWDs at military installations. According to Air Force officials, individuals who adopt MWDs receive information about the U.S. War Dogs Association at the time of adoption. However, the types of veterinary services offered vary by military installation, and some installations do not offer any veterinary services. DOD concurred with the report and provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD has used MWDs since World War II to assist and protect servicemembers at installations within the United States and at deployment sites worldwide. As of October 2016, about 1,800 MWDs were in service. The Air Force is responsible for procuring and assigning all MWDs for the military. The Army is responsible for the medical care of all military animals, including MWDs. Questions have been raised as to whether MWDs' experiences during deployment may result in conditions that pose future health challenges. Based on those questions, a House Report accompanying the proposed version of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 included a provision for GAO to assess end-of-service veterinary care for MWDs.
This report examines (1) how DOD tracks information about MWDs, and how many MWDs were adopted, transferred, or euthanized over the past 5 years (2011-2015); (2) prevalent medical conditions of adopted MWDs for 2014 and 2015; and (3) what assistance is available for individuals who adopt MWDs.
GAO obtained and analyzed data from the three systems used to track information on MWDs, observed system demonstrations, interviewed Air Force and Army officials, and reviewed related documentation. GAO also interviewed relevant nonprofit organizations that provide assistance to individuals who adopt MWDs.
DOD concurred with the report and provided technical comments, which GAO incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense (DOD) uses three systems to track information about Military Working Dogs (MWDs), including information related to their removal from service at which time they can be put up for adoption, transferred to a law enforcement agency, or euthanized for health or behavioral reasons. According to an Air Force official, the number of MWDs adopted or transferred over the past 5 years (2011 through 2015) varied based on changes in deployment needs. The number of euthanized MWDs varied to a lesser extent.
Based on medical data available for 421 of 772 MWDs adopted during 2014 and 2015, GAO found that the most prevalent medical conditions included skin and dental issues. An Army veterinarian told GAO that these medical conditions are unlikely to result in MWDs' removal from service as these conditions generally can be treated or resolved. Other prevalent medical conditions, such as arthritis, are associated with musculoskeletal issues, which are more likely to result in MWDs' removal from service. The veterinarian told us these types of musculoskeletal issues are common in breeds maintained by the MWD program, which include Labrador Retrievers, Belgian Malinois, and German Shepherd dogs.
While owners of adopted MWDs are responsible for the costs of veterinary care, some assistance with these costs is available through nonprofit organizations, such as the U.S. War Dogs Association. Individuals with access to DOD medical care—such as active-duty servicemembers and their dependents—may also purchase care for their adopted MWDs at veterinary clinics located at military installations. However, the types of veterinary services vary by installation, and some installations do not offer any veterinary services. |
gao_GAO-05-169 | gao_GAO-05-169_0 | Background
The AWACS aircraft first became operational in March 1977, and as of November 2004, the U.S. AWACS fleet was comprised of 33 aircraft. Recent AWACS Parts Prices Are Significantly Higher Than Prior Purchase Prices
Since late 2001, the Air Force has negotiated and awarded contracts to Boeing for the purchase of outboard ailerons, cowlings, and radomes totaling over $23 million. Specifically, the Air Force purchased three ailerons for about $1.4 million, 12 right-hand cowlings and 12 left-hand cowlings for about $7.9 million, and three radomes for about $5.9 million. The overall unit cost of the ailerons and cowlings increased by 442 percent and 354 percent, respectively, since they were last purchased in 1986. The unit price for the one radome purchased under the September 2001 contract increased by 38 percent since it was last purchased in 1998, and the unit price nearly doubled two years later under the September 2003 contract. Overall, only a small portion of the price increases could be attributed to inflation. Air Force Did Not Obtain and Evaluate Information Needed to Negotiate Fair and Reasonable Prices
In negotiating contracts for the outboard ailerons, cowlings, and radomes, the Air Force did not obtain and evaluate information needed to knowledgeably assess Boeing’s proposals and ensure that the spare parts prices were fair and reasonable. In general, the Air Force did not obtain sufficient pricing information for a part designated a commercial item, adequately consider DCAA and DCMA analyses of aspects of contractor proposals, or seek other pricing information that would allow it to not only determine the fairness and reasonableness of the prices but improve its position for negotiating the price. However, when purchasing the ailerons, the Air Force did not seek commercial sales information to justify the proposed price. Included in the $7.9 million contract for cowlings, Boeing proposed and the Air Force awarded about $1.1 million for the purchase of new tools, such as large production jigs, associated with the manufacture of the cowlings. Second, and most importantly, the Air Force did not consider Boeing’s costs under the September 2001 contract, which would have provided important information to help the Air Force determine if it was obtaining a fair and reasonable price for the radomes. However, the Air Force has a contract with Boeing that could allow the Air Force to order drawings and technical data for the AWACS and other programs for the purpose of competitively purchasing replenishment spare parts. They also said that, without the ability to compete spare parts purchases, the Air Force is in a vulnerable position in pricing such contracts. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve purchasing of AWACS spare parts, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Air Force to ensure that contracting officers obtain and evaluate available information, including analyses provided by DCAA and DCMA, and other data needed to negotiate fair and reasonable prices; develop a strategy that promotes competition, where practicable, in the purchase of AWACS spare parts; and clarify the Air Force’s access to AWACS drawings and technical data including the Air Force’s and Boeing’s rights to the data. These officials were located at Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma, the location of the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) spare parts program office—the E3 Systems Support Management Office. | Why GAO Did This Study
Over the past several years, the Air Force has negotiated and awarded more than $23 million in contracts to the Boeing Corporation for the purchase of certain spare parts for its Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft. Since they first became operational in March 1977, AWACS aircraft have provided U.S. and allied defense forces with the ability to detect, identify, and track airborne threats. In March 2003, GAO received allegations that the Air Force was overpaying Boeing for AWACS spare parts. This report provides the findings of GAO's review into these allegations. Specifically, GAO identified spare parts price increases and determined whether the Air Force obtained and evaluated sufficient information to ensure the prices were fair and reasonable. GAO also determined the extent to which competition was used to purchase the spare parts.
What GAO Found
Since late 2001, the Air Force has spent about $1.4 million to purchase three ailerons (wing components that stabilize the aircraft during flight), $7.9 million for 24 cowlings (metal engine coverings), and about $5.9 million for 3 radomes (protective coverings for the radar antennae). The unit prices for the ailerons and cowlings increased by 442 percent and 354 percent, respectively, since they were last purchased in 1986. The unit price of the radomes, purchased under two contracts, nearly doubled from September 2001 to September 2003. Although some of the price increases can be attributed to inflation, other factors, such as re-establishing production processes and procuring limited quantities of the parts, contributed more significantly to the increases. In addition, the 2001 radome contract included about $8.1 million for Boeing to relocate equipment and establish a manufacturing capability at a new location. The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) requires contracting officers to evaluate certain information when purchasing supplies and services to ensure fair and reasonable prices. However, Air Force contracting officers did not evaluate pricing information that would have provided a sound basis for negotiating fair and reasonable prices for the spare parts. Moreover, the Air Force did not adequately consider Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) and DCMA analyses of these purchases, which would have allowed the Air Force to better assess the contractor's proposals. For example, when purchasing ailerons, the Air Force did not obtain sales information for the aileron or similar items to justify Boeing's proposed price and did not consider DCMA analyses that showed a much lower price was warranted. Instead, the contracting officer relied on a Boeing analysis. None of the spare parts contracts cited in the allegations were competitively awarded--despite a DCMA recommendation that the cowlings be competed to help establish fair and reasonable prices. The Air Force did not develop alternate sources for competing the purchase of the cowlings because it believed it lacked access to technical drawings and data that would allow it to compete the purchase. Yet the Air Force has a contract with Boeing that could allow the Air Force to order technical drawings and data specifically for the purpose of purchasing replenishment spare parts. |
gao_RCED-95-42 | gao_RCED-95-42_0 | Current Status of the CRP
Currently, 36.4 million acres are enrolled in the CRP. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Concerned about the potential adverse environmental impact from crop production on expiring CRP acres and on other cropland acres, the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry asked us to (1) estimate the amount, and identify the location of, CRP land and other cropland that is environmentally sensitive and should be permanently removed from crop production to achieve environmental benefits; (2) identify ways to modify the CRP to more effectively remove this land from production; and (3) identify CRP land and other cropland that is environmentally sensitive but can be protected by conservation practices and stay in production. Using Buffer Zones Can Reduce the Amount of Cropland Needed for Land Retirement
No comprehensive data are available to specifically identify the amount and location of CRP land and other environmentally sensitive cropland that should be removed from production for environmental benefits. In addition, modifying the CRP could reduce federal costs and increase the amount of time the land is protected by allowing CRP participants to engage in limited uses of the CRP land for a reduced federal payment and encouraging the use of long-term easements instead of 10-year contracts. Appropriate Conservation Practices for Cropland in Production Can Be Pursued Through Current Programs or New Proposals
Except for buffer zones, most CRP land and other environmentally sensitive cropland can generally be in agricultural production without seriously harming water, air, and soil quality if farmers use appropriate conservation practices such as correct chemical application, reduced tillage, and periodic rotations to cover crops. These programs generally provide technical assistance, cost-sharing, and/or incentive payments to farmers to establish conservation structures or conservation practices. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO: (1) estimated the amount and locations of land enrolled in the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) and other environmentally sensitive cropland that should be removed from production; and (2) provided information on alternatives for managing these lands.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) it could not precisely identify the amount of CRP and other environmentally sensitive cropland that should be kept out of production; (2) there are about 36.4 million acres of land enrolled in CRP, but by using buffer zones and other conservation practices, this amount could be reduced substantially; (3) reducing the amount of land enrolled in CRP would reduce federal costs; (4) allowing farmers to earn revenue from environmentally compatible uses of CRP land would also reduce federal costs; (5) CRP benefits would last longer if the program used easements to restrict land use for longer periods than the 10-year contracts CRP presently uses; (6) except for buffer zones, most CRP and other environmentally sensitive cropland can be in production without serious environmental consequences if farmers practice appropriate conservation measures; and (7) environmental benefits could also be increased through incentive payments to farmers to encourage them to adopt conservation practices. |
gao_GAO-03-1102 | gao_GAO-03-1102_0 | IRS Generally Not Planning to Collect or Report Information about the Use of Liberty Zone Tax Benefits or Reductions in Taxpayers’ Tax Liabilities
For one of the seven Liberty Zone tax benefits, the business employee credit, IRS is collecting but not planning to report some information about use—the number of taxpayers claiming the credit and the amount of credit claimed—nor is it planning to use this information to report on how the benefit has reduced taxpayers’ tax liabilities. For the other six benefits, IRS officials said that without information about use, they cannot collect or report on the extent to which the benefits reduced taxpayers’ tax liabilities. According to IRS officials, the agency followed its usual procedures in determining the type of information to collect about the Liberty Zone tax benefits. They added that IRS would collect and report information that would help it to administer the tax laws or if it was legislatively mandated to collect or report information. Also, although the additional information would enable IRS to make an estimate of the revenue loss due to the benefits, it would not be able to produce a verifiable measure of the loss. Several Changes Needed If IRS Were to Report on Use of Benefits and Reduction in Taxpayers’ Tax Liabilities
For six of seven of the Liberty Zone tax benefits, IRS would need to revise forms, tax return processing procedures, and computer programming if it were to collect and report information about the number of taxpayers claiming the benefit and the amount they claimed. Since IRS currently does not have any plans to make these changes, officials were unable to estimate the costs involved in accomplishing these actions or the number of staff needed to do so. To produce the estimate, IRS would have to make assumptions about how taxpayers would have behaved in the absence of the benefits. IRS said the earliest it would be able to collect information on the number of taxpayers using the benefits and the amounts each claimed would be for tax year 2004 returns, which IRS would not process until calendar year 2005. As a result, IRS would not have information for two of the years that the benefits were in effect, which is significant because most of the benefits expire by the end of 2006. We also analyzed the data the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) provided about its estimate of the reduction in federal tax revenues. Our second objective was to determine what steps IRS would need to take and the resources it would need to collect and report information on the use and value of the Liberty Zone tax benefits if it is not already doing so. The building replaces real property damaged as a result of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. | Why GAO Did This Study
The President pledged a minimum of $20 billion in assistance to New York for response and recovery efforts after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. This includes tax benefits, commonly referred to as the Liberty Zone tax benefits, that the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) estimated would reduce federal tax revenues by about $5 billion. The actual amount of benefits realized, however, will depend on the extent to which taxpayers and the city and state of New York take advantage of them. GAO was asked to determine (1) the extent to which the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) is collecting and reporting information about the number of taxpayers using each of the seven Liberty Zone tax benefits and the revenue loss associated with those benefits and (2) if IRS is not collecting and reporting this information, what steps it would need to take and what resources would be needed to do so.
What GAO Found
For one of the seven Liberty Zone tax benefits, the business employee credit, IRS is collecting but not planning to report some information about use--the number of taxpayers claiming the credit and the amount of credit claimed--nor is it planning to use this information to report the revenue loss associated with that benefit. IRS is not planning to collect or report information about the use of the other six benefits or the revenue loss associated with those benefits. According to IRS officials, the agency followed its usual procedures in determining whether to collect information about benefit use and revenue loss. IRS officials said they would collect and report these data if (1) it would help the agency administer the tax laws or (2) IRS was legislatively mandated to do so. IRS would need to make several changes if it were to collect more information on the use of the benefits and the associated revenue loss, and this information would not be complete or lead to a verifiable measure of the reduction in federal tax revenues due to the benefits. IRS would need to change forms, processing procedures, and computer programming, which would add to taxpayer burden and IRS's workload. IRS officials were unable to estimate the costs involved in accomplishing these actions or the number of staff needed to do so. The officials said that the earliest they could make these changes would be for tax year 2004 returns. As a result, IRS would not have information for two of the years that the benefits were in effect, which is significant because most of the benefits expire by the end of 2006. In addition, if IRS were to collect data on the use of the Liberty Zone benefits, it would be able to make an estimate, but could not produce a verifiable measure, of the revenue loss due to the benefits because, for example, IRS would have to make assumptions about how taxpayers would have behaved in the absence of the benefits. |
gao_GAO-12-564 | gao_GAO-12-564_0 | The Federal Pay Comparability Act of 1970 permanently authorized the President to adjust GS pay rates annually, and established a system for recommending adjustments with the goal of increasing federal pay to be comparable with the private sector; however, we previously found that the gap between average federal and private sector salaries for similar jobs continued after implementation of the act because the recommended adjustments were not always made. According to OPM, locality pay is now a broadly accepted practice in federal pay administration. To recommend locality pay adjustments, the President’s Pay Agent compares the annual GS base pay rates of federal workers in each area to the annual pay rates of nonfederal workers in the same area for the same levels and types of work. As another example, for 2012, the FEPCA process specified a 1.1 percent across-the-board increase and an average 18.5 percent locality increase, but annual pay adjustments were frozen instead.Agent had reported that in 2010 (the reference year for setting 2012 pay), taking both across-the-board and locality pay into account, the average federal-nonfederal pay gap was 24 percent. Three pay increases and monetary awards available to GS employees are linked to performance ratings as determined by agencies’ performance appraisal systems:
Within-grade increases are periodic increases in a permanent employee’s rate of basic pay from one step of a grade to the next higher step within the grade. Factors that are to affect GS employee eligibility for these pay increases and awards are specified in legislation and regulations and clarified in OPM guidance. Ratings-based cash awards were more strongly linked to performance depending on the rating system the agency used, and quality step increases were also more strongly linked to performance. Within-grade increases were the least strongly linked to performance of the three pay increases and awards we analyzed, in accordance with their design. Findings of Selected Pay and Total Compensation Comparison Studies Varied Due to Different Approaches, Methods, and Data
Selected Studies Differed in Their Conclusions and Basic Approaches to Analyzing Pay
The different study designs used by the authors of six studies resulted in varying conclusions on how federal pay differed from private sector or nonfederal pay. As shown in table 2, conclusions varied on which sector had the higher pay (which does not include benefits) and the size of pay disparities. However, the overall pay disparity number does not tell the whole story; each of the studies that examined whether differences in pay varied among categories of workers, found such variations (see table 2). The trend analysis approach did not control for attributes. When looking within and across the studies, it is important to understand these differences because they impact how the studies can be interpreted. Simply put, the differences among the selected studies are such that comparing their results to help inform pay decisions is potentially problematic. Given the different approaches of the selected studies, their findings should not be taken in isolation as the answer to how federal pay and total compensation compares with other sectors. POGO provided written comments (see app. V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report examines (1) how annual pay adjustments for the General Schedule (GS) system are determined; (2) the extent to which the pay increases and awards available to GS employees recognize individual performance, and how the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) provides oversight of pay increases and awards; and (3) how selected studies compare federal and private sector pay and total compensation and the factors that may account for the different findings. These pay increases and awards are: within-grade increases, quality step increases, and ratings-based cash awards. We compared and contrasted the differences between the approaches, methodologies, and data sources of the selected studies. For example, the human capital approach controls for personal attributes (e.g., education, job experience) and job-related attributes (e.g., occupation, firm size). Attributes such as occupation, level of work, firm size, locality, education, and job experience were considered relevant by several of the studies’ authors and people with expertise in compensation issues that we interviewed. A job-to-job approach, as demonstrated by the study authors who used the approach, involves matching federal workers to equivalent positions in another sector. They chose the data sources for their studies based on their overall approach and data needs. | Why GAO Did This Study
A careful consideration of federal pay is an essential part of fiscal stewardship and is necessary to support the recruitment and retention of a competent, successful workforce. Recent studies comparing the compensation of federal workers to workers in other sectors have produced varying findings. To improve understanding of federal pay setting, GAO was asked to examine (1) how annual pay adjustments for the GS system are determined; (2) the extent to which the pay increases and awards available to GS employees recognize individual performance, and how the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) provides oversight of pay increases and awards; and (3) how selected studies compare federal and private pay and total compensation and the factors that may account for the different findings.
GAO reviewed legislation, OPM regulations, executive orders, and federal agency documents; analyzed OPM data; and interviewed agency officials. GAO reviewed six studies that met three criteria: issuance since 2005, original analysis, and focus on federal and private sector compensation. GAO compared and contrasted the differences between their approaches, methodologies, and data sources, and interviewed the studies authors, people with expertise in compensation issues, and agency officials responsible for the data. GAO provided drafts to agencies and study authors for review and comment and made technical changes as appropriate in response to comments received. One study author provided written comments concurring with the findings. GAO is not making any recommendations in this report.
What GAO Found
Annual pay adjustments for the General Schedule (GS), the pay system covering the majority of federal workers, are either determined through the process specified in the Federal Employees Pay Comparability Act of 1990 (FEPCA) or set based on percent increases authorized directly by Congress. GS employees receive an across-the-board increase (ranging from 0 to 3.8 percent since FEPCA was implemented) that has usually been made in accordance with a FEPCA formula linking increases to national private sector salary growth. This increase is the same for each employee. GS employees also receive a locality increase that varies based on their location; there were 34 pay localities in 2012. While FEPCA specifies a process designed to reduce federal-nonfederal pay gaps in each locality, in practice locality increases have usually been far less than the recommended amount, which has been over 15 percent in recent years. For 2012, when there was a freeze on annual pay adjustments, the FEPCA process had recommended a 1.1 percent across-the-board increase and an average 18.5 percent locality increase.
GS employees are eligible to receive three types of pay increases and monetary awards that are linked to individual performance appraisals: within-grade increases, ratings-based cash awards, and quality step increases. Within-grade increases are the least strongly linked to performance, ratings-based cash awards are more strongly linked to performance depending on the rating system the agency uses, and quality step increases are also more strongly linked to performance.
Findings of selected pay and total compensation (pay and benefit) comparison studies varied due to different approaches, methods, and data. Regarding their pay analysis, the studies conclusions varied on which sector had the higher pay and the size of pay disparities. However, the overall pay disparity number does not tell the whole story; each of the studies that examined whether differences in pay varied among categories of workers, such as highly or less educated workers or workers in different occupations, found such variations. Three approaches were used to compare pay:
human capital approach (3 studies)compares pay for individuals with various personal attributes (e.g., education, experience) and other attributes (e.g., occupation, firm size);
job-to-job approach (2 studies)compares pay for similar jobs of various types based on job-related attributes such as occupation, does not take into account the personal attributes of the workers currently filling them; and
trend analysis approach (1 study)illustrates broad trends in pay over time without controlling for attributes of the workers or jobs.
When looking within and across the studies, it is important to understand the studies differences in approach, methods, and data because they impact how the studies can be interpreted. The differences among the selected studies are such that comparing their results to help inform pay decisions is potentially problematic. Given the different approaches of the selected studies, their findings should not be taken in isolation as the answer to how federal pay and total compensation compares with other sectors. |
gao_GAO-14-375 | gao_GAO-14-375_0 | According to DOT’s Office of Hazardous Materials Safety, an estimated 1.4 million HAZMAT shipments are transported in the United States each day on average. These shipments amount to more than 3 billion tons of HAZMAT transported every year. The Handling, Labeling, and Packaging of DOD HAZMAT Shipments Is Governed by a Complex Framework of Statutes and Regulations
A Complex Framework of Statutes and Regulations Governs DOD’s Handling, Labeling, and Packaging of HAZMAT Shipments
When transporting HAZMAT, there is a complex framework of statutes and regulations prescribed by multiple civilian and military entities that must be considered and evaluated to ensure safe, secure, and efficient transport. The Hazardous Materials Transportation Act, enacted in 1975 and since amended, is the primary statutory regime governing the transport of HAZMAT in the United States. With regard to DOD, the Defense Transportation Regulation prescribes how DOD is to transport HAZMAT. DOD Has Experienced Some Challenges in Implementing HAZMAT Policies and Procedures, Which Can Adversely Affect the Safe, Timely, and Cost-Effective Transportation of HAZMAT
According to TRANSCOM officials, in general DOD HAZMAT shipments arrive at their final destination without incident or delay; however, the department faces some challenges ensuring the safe, timely, and cost- effective transportation of some HAZMAT shipments. According to DOD data, for HAZMAT transported by surface and air, improper documentation and packaging have led to transportation delays. For example, regarding HAZMAT shipments to be transported by air, Global Air Transportation Execution System data show that, of the 246,747 total shipments of HAZMAT received at all five major domestic military aerial ports for fiscal years 2009 through 2013, 67,149 shipments (or 27 percent) were delayed— primarily because they were not in compliance with the Defense Transportation Regulation requirements for documentation and packaging. 6). DOD Installations Have Not Secured Sensitive Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives Shipments Delivered by Highway in a Timely Manner
According to reports from the Surface Deployment and Distribution Command Operations Center’s Defense Transportation Tracking System, DOD installations did not provide commercial carriers access to a secure hold area for at least 44 out of 70,891 sensitive arms, ammunition, and explosives shipments or did not assist carriers in finding alternative means to secure those shipments in fiscal years 2012 and 2013. Although these instances represent a relatively small percentage of the overall number of sensitive arms, ammunition, and explosives shipments, not providing secure hold for even a small percentage of these sensitive shipments poses a risk to public safety and to national security. DOD uses DOT’s Safety Measurement System scores to determine whether commercial carriers are eligible for transporting HAZMAT under the department’s Transportation Protective Services program. Among other things, most carriers lack sufficient safety performance data to ensure that Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration can reliably compare them with other carriers using Safety Measurement System scores. As a result, DOD may be determining which carriers should be eligible for the Transportation Protective Services program using the Compliance, Safety, Accountability’s Safety Measurement System that, for many carriers, lacks sufficient information to reliably assess carriers’ safety performance. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To examine the statutes, regulations, guidance, policies, and procedures that govern the Department of Defense’s (DOD) handling, labeling, and packaging of hazardous material (HAZMAT) shipments to support military operations, we reviewed the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act, as amended; regulations issued by the Department of Transportation (DOT), including the Hazardous Materials Regulation in Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations; relevant sections of DOD’s Defense Transportation Regulation, Joint Staff guidance, including Joint Publication 4-01, The Defense Transportation System; and international standards for the transport of HAZMAT. | Why GAO Did This Study
Over 3 billion tons of HAZMAT are transported by commercial carriers in the United States each year. DOD accounted for about 1.6 million HAZMAT shipments in fiscal year 2013, using commercial and military carriers. These shipments can be high risk and highly sensitive and if improperly handled, labeled, or packaged could result in the loss of life, property damage, and harm to national security interests.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 mandates GAO to review DOD's guidance, policies, and procedures regarding HAZMAT shipments. GAO examined the (1) statutes, regulations, guidance, policies, and procedures that govern DOD's handling, labeling, and packaging of HAZMAT shipments to support military operations and (2) extent to which DOD faces any challenges in implementing its policies and procedures for transporting HAZMAT in a safe, timely, and cost-effective manner. GAO examined DOD's and DOT's regulations and related DOD documentation for the transport of HAZMAT and found the 2009-13 data it examined sufficiently reliable for the purposes of the review.
What GAO Found
The handling, labeling, and packaging of hazardous materials (HAZMAT) shipments are governed by a complex framework of statutes and regulations prescribed by multiple civilian and military entities (see figure below). The Hazardous Materials Transportation Act is the primary statutory regime governing the transport of HAZMAT in the United States. To implement the act, the Department of Transportation (DOT) issued the Hazardous Materials Regulations. The Defense Transportation Regulation prescribes how the Department of Defense (DOD) is to transport HAZMAT.
DOD has experienced some challenges in implementing HAZMAT regulations and other guidance, which can adversely affect the safe, timely, and cost-effective transportation of HAZMAT. For example, GAO found the following:
Improper documentation and packaging of HAZMAT led to delays at DOD transportation aerial ports. DOD data show that about 27 percent of HAZMAT received at all five major domestic military aerial ports over the past 5 fiscal years were delayed, primarily due to noncompliant documentation and packaging.
At least 44 times during fiscal years 2012 and 2013, DOD installations did not provide commercial carriers with access to secure hold areas for arms, ammunition, and explosives shipments or assist them in finding alternatives, as required by DOD regulations. Although there were about 70,891 of these types of arms, ammunition, and explosives shipments in fiscal years 2012 and 2013, not providing secure hold for even a small percentage of these sensitive shipments poses a risk to public safety and national security.
DOD may determine which carriers should be eligible to transport its most-sensitive HAZMAT shipments using a safety score that lacks sufficient information to reliably assess safety performance for many carriers. DOD uses DOT's Safety Measurement System scores to determine which carriers are eligible to participate in its Transportation Protective Services program. However, in February 2014 GAO found that scores from many carriers lack sufficient safety performance data to reliably compare them with other commercial carriers' scores.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD improve the documentation and secure hold of HAZMAT shipments and examine limitations on data used to select certain HAZMAT carriers. DOD generally agreed with the recommendations but requested one be directed to a different office. GAO agreed and made the associated change. |
gao_NSIAD-97-28 | gao_NSIAD-97-28_0 | The plan also points out that streamlining to a leaner logistics system can be achieved through greater integration of business and production processes but that performance of logistics processes must be continually assessed to identify opportunities for improvement through the adoption of new initiatives. According to DOD’s plan, its overall goals are to (1) reduce logistics cycle times, (2) develop a seamless logistics system, and (3) streamline the logistics infrastructure. The plan also sets forth the objectives and strategies for addressing these goals. The strategies are to help accomplish the plan’s goals and, as a result, “achieving world-class capabilities, while reducing the cost of DOD’s logistics system.”
DOD Has Opportunities to Enhance Implementation of the Plan’s Goals
DOD reported that it has made progress in achieving all three of its goals. DOD can further improve its planning process by (1) linking its priority strategies to resources, (2) better linking the services’ and DLA’s plans to its logistics strategic plan, and (3) identifying interim approaches when milestones of a priority strategy have been extended. The Army’s and the Air Force’s logistics plans have evolved over the last several years to better reflect DOD’s goals and objectives. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) logistics strategic plan to identify opportunities for increasing the likelihood of implementing the plan's goals and objectives successfully.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) DOD's plan gives direction to improvements that are needed to reduce the costs of its logistics system (i.e., reducing logistics cycle times, developing a seamless logistics system, and streamlining the logistics infrastructure) and lays out specific objectives and strategies to produce these improvements; (2) DOD could build on its plan and increase the likelihood of implementing its goals and objectives successfully, as well as be better prepared for implementing the requirements of the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, if the plan: (a) linked its action plans to resources so that both DOD managers and Congress can make more informed decisions on the value and priority of logistics system improvements; (b) better linked the services' and the Defense Logistics Agency's (DLA) plans to DOD's plan; and (c) identified interim approaches that can be developed and implemented when milestones of a priority strategy, aimed at achieving the plan's overall goals and objectives, have been extended; and (3) DOD's success in bringing these elements together hinges on its top-level managers' continued and visible support of efforts to remove institutional cultural barriers. |
gao_GAO-17-651T | gao_GAO-17-651T_0 | In this report, we identified two areas of misalignment between NNSA’s modernization plans and the estimated budgetary resources needed to carry out those plans, which could result in challenges to NNSA in affording its planned portfolio of modernization programs. Second, the costs of some major modernization programs—such as for nuclear weapon refurbishments—may also increase and further strain future modernization budgets. Misalignment between Estimates and Plans May Result in Increased Cost and Schedule Risks and Raises Affordability Concerns
As we reported in April 2017, NNSA estimates of funding needed for its modernization plans sometimes exceeded the budgetary projections included in the President’s planned near- and long-term modernization budgets. With respect to the alignment of NNSA’s estimate of its budget needs and NNSA’s internal cost range estimates, we found that NNSA’s budget estimates were generally consistent with NNSA’s high- and low-range cost estimates. To help NNSA put forth more credible modernization plans, we recommended in our April 2017 report that the NNSA Administrator include an assessment of the affordability of NNSA’s portfolio of modernization programs in future versions of the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan, such as by presenting options (e.g., potentially deferring the start of or canceling specific modernization programs) that NNSA could consider taking to bring its estimates of modernization funding needs into alignment with potential future budgets. DOE Has Taken Steps to Improve Contract and Project Management, but Challenges Persist, Particularly in Contract Management
The Secretary of Energy has taken several important steps that demonstrate DOE’s commitment to improving contract and project management. In our recent reports, we have noted progress as DOE has developed and implemented corrective actions to identify and address root causes of persistent project management challenges, as well as progress in the department’s monitoring of the effectiveness and sustainability of corrective actions. NNSA neither agreed nor disagreed with the recommendations. Areas Where Challenges Continue to Persist
DOE’s recent efforts do not address several areas where it continues to have shortcomings including (1) acquisition planning for its major contracts, (2) the quality of enterprise-wide cost information available to DOE managers and key stakeholders, (3) DOE’s need for a program management policy, (4) how DOE’s new project management requirements will be applied to its major legacy projects, and (5) whistleblower protections. However, as of September 2016, DOE has not yet implemented our recommendations. DOE Annually Spends Billions on Environmental Cleanup, but the Cost of Its Liabilities Continues to Increase
DOE also faces challenges with addressing its environmental liabilities. In February 2017, we added the federal government’s environmental liabilities to our High-Risk List. Specifically, we found that the federal government’s environmental liability has been growing for the past 20 years—and is likely to continue to increase—and that DOE is responsible for over 80 percent ($372 billion) of the nearly $450 billion reported environmental liability. Notably, this estimate does not reflect all of the future cleanup responsibilities that DOE may face. In January 2017, we reported that the cost estimate for DOE’s new approach excluded the costs and time frames for key activities. As a result, the full cost of these activities is likely billions of dollars more than what is reflected in DOE’s environmental liability. We and others have pointed out that DOE needs to take a nation-wide, risk-based approach to cleaning up these sites, which could reduce costs while also reducing environmental risks more quickly. Since 1994, we have made at least 28 recommendations related to addressing the federal government’s environmental liability and 4 recommendations to Congress to consider changes to the laws governing cleanup activities. Of these, 13 recommendations remain unimplemented. NNSA Faces Nonproliferation Performance and Program Management Challenges
NNSA also faces challenges implementing its nonproliferation programs under its Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN). In June 2016, we found that the Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence (NSDD) program had developed a program plan, but that NSDD could not measure its progress towards activities and goals because its goals were not all measurable and performance measures were not aligned with its goals. Under this program, NSDD may not be able to determine when it has fully accomplished its mission and risks continuing to deploy equipment past the point of diminishing returns. Selected GAO Products
The following is a selection of GAO’s recent work assessing the National Nuclear Security Administration’s and the Department of Energy’s Office of Environmental Management’s management efforts: Nuclear Waste: Opportunities Exist to Reduce Risks and Costs by Evaluating Different Waste Treatment Approaches at Hanford. National Nuclear Security Administration: Action Needed to Address Affordability of Nuclear Modernization Programs. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOE's NNSA is responsible for managing the nuclear weapons stockpile and supporting nuclear nonproliferation efforts. DOE's Office of Environmental Management's mission includes decontaminating and decommissioning facilities that are contaminated from decades of nuclear weapons production.
Over the last few years, GAO has reported on a wide range of challenges facing DOE and NNSA. These challenges contribute to GAO's continuing inclusion of DOE's and NNSA's management of major contracts and projects on the list of agencies and program areas that are at high risk of fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement, or are in need of transformation. GAO also recently added the U.S. government's environmental liabilities to this list.
This statement is based on 13 GAO reports issued from May 2015 through May 2017 and discusses (1) challenges related to the affordability of NNSA's nuclear modernization plans, (2) the status of DOE's efforts to improve its management of contracts and projects, (3) challenges in addressing DOE's environmental liabilities, and (4) challenges facing NNSA's nonproliferation programs.
What GAO Found
The Department of Energy's (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) faces challenges related to the affordability of its nuclear modernization programs. GAO found in April 2017 that these challenges were caused by a misalignment between NNSA's modernization plans and the estimated budgetary resources needed to carry out those plans. First, GAO found that NNSA's estimates of funding needed for its modernization plans sometimes exceeded the budgetary projections included in the President's planned near-term and long-term modernization budgets. Second, GAO found that the costs of some major modernization programs—such as for nuclear weapon refurbishments—may also increase and further strain future modernization budgets that currently do not anticipate these potential increases. GAO recommended in April 2017 that NNSA include an assessment of the affordability of its modernization programs in future versions of its annual plan on stockpile stewardship; NNSA neither agreed nor disagreed with that recommendation.
DOE has taken several important steps that demonstrate its commitment to improving contract and project management, but challenges persist. In recent reports, GAO has noted progress as DOE has developed and implemented corrective actions to identify and address root causes of persistent project management challenges and progress in its monitoring of the effectiveness and sustainability of corrective actions. However, DOE's recent efforts do not address several areas of contract and project management where the department continues to struggle. GAO has made several recommendations related to these issues, many of which DOE has not yet implemented.
DOE also faces challenges with addressing its environmental liabilities—the total cost of its cleanup responsibilities. In February 2017, GAO found that DOE was responsible for over 80 percent ($372 billion) of the U.S. government's estimated $450 billion environmental liability. However, this estimate does not reflect all of DOE's cleanup responsibilities. For example, in January 2017, GAO found that the cost estimate for DOE's proposal for separate defense and commercial nuclear waste repositories excluded the costs and time frames for key activities, and therefore full costs are likely to be billions of dollars more than DOE's reported environmental liabilities. To effectively address cleanup, GAO and other organizations have reported that DOE needs to take a nation-wide, risk-informed approach, which could reduce long-term costs as well as environmental risks more quickly. Since 1994, GAO has made at least 28 recommendations to address the federal government's environmental liabilities and 4 suggestions to Congress to consider changes to the laws governing cleanup activities. Of these, 13 recommendations remain unimplemented.
Finally, NNSA faces challenges in implementing its nonproliferation programs. For example, in June 2016, GAO found that NNSA's Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence program had developed a program plan, but NNSA could not measure progress because not all of the program's goals were measurable, and performance measures were not aligned with the goals. As a result, NNSA may not be able to determine when the program has fully achieved its mission. GAO has made several recommendations related to NNSA's nonproliferation programs, some of which NNSA has yet to implement.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making any new recommendations in this statement. GAO has suggested that Congress consider taking certain actions and that DOE continue to act on the numerous recommendations made to address these challenges. GAO will continue to monitor DOE's implementation of these recommendations. |
gao_GAO-09-207 | gao_GAO-09-207_0 | Proposed Plan Buyouts Would Offer Sponsors an Alternative to Standard Plan Terminations, with Significant Differences
Under proposed models for DB plan buyouts, a plan sponsor would transfer plan assets, along with funds to cover any plan underfunding, plus additional money to compensate for risk and administrative costs, to a financial company. The financial company would become the new plan sponsor, taking over all obligations of the original sponsor. A plan buyout, like a standard plan termination via an insurance company, is intended to allow the sponsor to transfer all plan responsibilities to another company, but possibly at lower cost than a termination. Proposed Plan Buyouts Seek to Offer Alternative to Termination, with Possible Flexibility and Cost Advantages to Plan Sponsors
While there are different models for DB plan buyouts, the basic transaction would involve the transfer of the assets and liabilities of a pension plan from a plan sponsor to a financial entity. The objective of the original sponsor, the employer, would be to shed all of its sponsorship responsibilities and liabilities. For example, a sponsor could segregate the benefits for retirees or former employees and sell this “legacy” portion of a plan to a new sponsor, with assets moving to the new sponsor to cover only the benefit liability for these participants; a buyout of this kind would resemble that of a hard-frozen plan in that benefits for retirees and separated employees have ceased accruing. The sponsor would pay PBGC premiums, and PBGC guarantees would continue to apply to plan benefits. Oversight of the plan would remain within the jurisdiction of federal pension regulatory agencies: PBGC, Labor, and Treasury. In contrast, a standard plan termination ends the plan itself. State regulation of insurance companies is grounded in statutory valuations of an insurer’s assets and liabilities and risk-based capital requirements, as laid out by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), the organization of state insurance regulators. Some Plan Buyouts Could Benefit Participants and PBGC, but in General Pose New Risks
DB plan buyouts by financial companies could, in some cases, improve the security of benefits. For example, the new sponsor assuming responsibility for paying plan benefits would not have an employment relationship with participants, raising concerns about its incentives to manage the plan for the exclusive benefit of participants. Buyouts by financial sponsors may also create regulatory ambiguities and conflicts between the goals of agencies regulating financial sponsors and those regulating pensions. For PBGC, the potential risk associated with any particular DB plan buyout depends in part on the structure of the new sponsorship. This ruling decided whether DB plans bought out by third-party sponsors complied with or violated the “exclusive benefit” rule of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC). These include the following: (1) companies should give advance notice of plan buyouts to participants and regulators; (2) only financially strong entities in well- regulated sectors would be permitted to acquire a pension plan in a plan buyout transaction; (3) the parties to the transaction would be required to demonstrate that participants’ benefits and the pension insurance system would be exposed to less risk as a result of the buyout, and that the buyout would be in the best interests of the participants and beneficiaries; (4) limitations on buyouts would be imposed to limit undue concentration of risk; (5) transferees and members of their controlled groups would assume full responsibility for the liabilities of transferred plans and would comply with post-transaction reporting and fiduciary requirements; and (6) subsequent buyout transactions for a plan would be subject to the same rules as the original buyout. | Why GAO Did This Study
Some U.S. financial and pension consulting firms have recently proposed alternatives to terminating a defined benefit (DB) pension plan and contracting with insurance companies to pay promised benefits. In their proposals, a plan sponsor would typically transfer the assets and liabilities of a hard-frozen DB plan--one in which all participant benefit accruals have ceased--along with additional money, to a financial entity, which would become the new sponsor. Such buyouts would have implications for participants, plan sponsors, and the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), the federal agency that insures private DB plans. This report addresses the following questions: (1) What is the basic model of proposed sales of frozen DB plans to third-party financial firms and how does it compare with a standard plan termination? (2) What are the potential risks and benefits of plan buyouts for participants, PBGC, plan sponsors, and other stakeholders? To address these questions, GAO reviewed proposed models for plan buyouts and analyzed regulatory and statutory issues associated with terminations and buyouts. GAO also interviewed labor and pension advocacy groups, pension regulatory agencies, and pension experts.
What GAO Found
In proposed DB plan buyouts, a third-party financial company would take over sponsorship of a hard-frozen plan from the original sponsor, in exchange for money to compensate for plan underfunding, expenses, and risk. As with a standard plan termination, the objective of a buyout would be to allow the original sponsor to shed its obligations to the plan, but potentially at lower cost and possibly with greater flexibility. In buyout proposals, the new sponsor would assume all plan responsibilities and PBGC guarantees would continue to apply to plan benefits. In comparison, a standard termination ends the plan, and an insurance company contracts to pay accrued benefits to participants (to the extent participants' benefits are not paid out by the plan as part of the termination); PBGC guarantees no longer apply, but state guarantees do. Insurance companies generally must comply with state-based risk-based capital requirements, which may provide safeguards against insurer insolvency and protections for pension benefits paid this way. In some cases, plan buyouts could increase the security of DB pensions by allowing weak sponsors to transfer plan sponsorship to firms with stronger financial backing and improved plan management. However, buyouts would sever the employment relationship between sponsors and participants, possibly eroding incentives to manage the plan in the interests of participants. Buyouts could increase the risk of a large claim against PBGC by increasing the concentration of assets and liabilities held by a single sponsor or sector. They could also lead to conflicts between agencies regulating financial companies and those regulating pensions. In August 2008, the Internal Revenue Service issued a ruling declaring that a DB plan that was bought out by a nonemploying entity would not qualify for tax preferences under current law. |
gao_NSIAD-99-3 | gao_NSIAD-99-3_0 | The act also authorizes (1) funds for DOD to assist the Secretary of Health and Human Services in establishing Metropolitan Medical Strike Teams (MMST) to help improve local jurisdictions’ medical response capabilities for a WMD incident; (2) a telephonic link to provide data and expert advice for the use of state and local officials responding to emergencies involving WMD; (3) a rapid response information system, including an inventory of rapid response assets and a database on chemical and biological materials; and (4) a chemical/biological rapid response team. Cities Benefit From Domestic Preparedness Program
Cities that have received training under the Domestic Preparedness Program have a greater awareness of how to respond to a potential chemical or biological terrorist incident. Local officials praised the training program content, instructors, and materials as well as DOD’s willingness to act on constructive criticism and adjust the courses. They also credited the program with bringing local, state, and federal regional emergency response agencies together into a closer working relationship. As authorized under the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici legislation, DOD is in the process of providing $300,000 in training and operational equipment—personal protection, detection, decontamination, and training aids—selected by each city after it is trained. As of June 1998, nine cities had received equipment and other cities were developing their lists. Figure 2 shows the location of the cities nationwide and the clustering effect resulting from DOD’s decision to base training delivery on city population. Figure 3 shows 14 clusters of 44 different cities within 30 miles of at least 1 other program city, or 37 percent of the total number of cities, that DOD selected for the program. 2312 (e)), DOD provided equipment as a 5-year renewable loan for training purposes rather than giving or granting equipment to the cities. Under the terms of the loan agreement, cities are to repair, maintain, and replace the equipment and are to use it only for training purposes. Further, expectations have been raised among some local officials that the federal government may eventually provide funds to sustain the program, if not to provide even more equipment toward meeting cities’ perceived operational requirements. Strategy Needed to Coordinate and Focus Multiple Training, Equipment, and Response Elements
Some local officials viewed the growing number of WMD consequence management training programs, including the Domestic Preparedness Program, the Department of Justice and FEMA courses, FEMA Emergency Management Institute courses, National Fire Academy courses, and a National Guard Bureau’s National Interagency Counterdrug Institute course, as evidence of a fragmented and possibly wasteful federal approach toward combating terrorism. Similarly, multiple programs with equipment segments—such as the separate DOD and PHS initiatives and the new Department of Justice equipment grant program—are causing frustration and confusion at the local level and are resulting in further complaints that the federal government is unfocused and has no coordinated plan or defined end state for domestic preparedness. The separation of the two equipment packages also required local officials to deal with two federal agencies’ differing requirements and procedures. DOD did not agree with our recommendation to refocus the Domestic Preparedness Program or that Congress should consider amending the program’s legislation to allow greater flexibility on the provision of equipment to local jurisdictions. 5. 7. The report discusses the design and implementation of DOD’s training program. 8. 6. 9, 1998). 15, 1997). | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the status and other aspects of the Domestic Preparedness Program, focusing on: (1) the training and other benefits offered to cities under the program; and (2) the methodology for designing and implementing the program, including the way in which cities were selected to participate, how cities' capabilities and needs were assessed, and the effectiveness of interagency coordination on this and other similar consequence management training and equipment programs.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the training and equipment that the Department of Defense (DOD) is providing to cities through the Domestic Preparedness Program have clearly increased cities' awareness of and should better prepare them to deal with a potential chemical or biological terrorist incident; (2) local officials in the seven cities GAO visited praised the training program's content, instructors, and materials as well as DOD's willingness to modify the program based on suggestions from local officials; (3) they also credited the program with bringing local, state, and federal regional emergency response agencies together into a closer working relationship; (4) in designing the training and equipment program, DOD selected 120 cities based solely on city population; (5) this decision resulted in 14 clusters of 44 cities within 30 miles of at least one other city selected; (6) by dealing with cities, DOD did not build upon the states' existing emergency management and training structures; (7) had it used existing structures that reflect how emergency response is actually organized, DOD could have consolidated training and equipment purchases to cover more jurisdictions in fewer locations than presently planned, at less cost; (8) DOD's loan of equipment in support of the training program has caused frustration and confusion among local officials; (9) the legislation authorized DOD to lend equipment to local jurisdictions, and DOD established a 5-year renewable loan agreement to govern the provision of about $300,000 worth of equipment to each city; (10) this agreement restricts the use of the equipment to training rather than operational purposes and requires the cities to repair, maintain, and replace the equipment; (11) cities were concerned about the lack of federal sustainment money to maintain, repair, and replace the equipment; (12) the program has raised expectations among some local officials that the federal government may provide additional funding for operational equipment; (13) the interagency coordination process provided a valuable information-sharing forum but was of limited success in helping steer the design and development of the program; (14) federal agencies' individual efforts to enhance consequence management of possible incidents involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD) terrorism are not guided by an overarching strategy for achieving a defined end state; and (15) local officials in most of the cities raised the issue that the many WMD training, equipment, and consequence management programs are evidence of a fragmented and wasteful federal approach toward combating terrorism. |
gao_GAO-01-839 | gao_GAO-01-839_0 | For a more detailed presentation of selected member states’ efforts to promote U.N. employment for their nationals, see appendix V.
Conclusions
The United Nations and its affiliated entities face the dual challenge of attracting and retaining staff who meet the highest standards of efficiency, competence, and integrity while maintaining the international character of the organizations by ensuring equitable geographic balance in the workforce. Nevertheless, U.N. organizations have made slow progress in addressing U.S. concerns about underrepresentation, and except for the U.N. Secretariat in New York, the organizations with representation targets that we studied have not achieved equitable employment of Americans since 1992. Although the U.N. organizations are ultimately responsible for achieving fair geographic balance among its member countries, the State Department, in coordination with other U.S. agencies, plays a role in ensuring that the United States is equitably represented. U.N. organizations have not fully developed long-range workforce planning strategies, and neither State nor the U.N. agencies have formal recruiting and hiring action plans to improve U.S. representation in the U.N. system. Without these measures, the United States’ ability to even maintain the number of Americans employed in the United Nations could be hampered. | What GAO Found
The United Nations (U.N.) and its affiliated entities face the dual challenge of attracting and retaining staff who meet the highest standards of efficiency, competence, and integrity while maintaining the international character of the organizations by ensuring equitable geographic balance in the workforce. Nevertheless, U.N. organizations have made slow progress in addressing U.S. concerns about underrepresentation, and, except for the U.N. secretariat in New York, the organizations with representation targets that GAO studied have not achieved equitable employment of Americans since 1992. Although the U.N. organizations are ultimately responsible for achieving fair geographic balance among its member countries, the State Department, in coordination with other U.S. agencies, plays a role in ensuring that the United States is fairly represented. U.N. organizations have not fully developed long-range workforce planning strategies, and neither State nor the U.N. agencies have formal recruiting and hiring action plans to improve U.S. representation in the U.N. system. Without these measures, the United States' ability to even maintain the number of Americans employed in the United Nations could be hampered. |
gao_GAO-17-609 | gao_GAO-17-609_0 | Background
Encouraging Competition and Launch Vehicle Development to Assure Access to Space
The U.S. government has sought to help develop a competitive launch industry from which it can acquire launch services in order to lower the price of space launch and assure its access to space. The Commercial Space Act of 1998 prohibited the commercial use of surplus ICBM motors and directed government agencies to purchase and use commercial services with only limited exceptions. In response to a House Armed Services Committee report to a bill for the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2017 and an associated House member request for detailed information on the costs and benefits, the Air Force is also studying the potential effects of changing law and policy to allow surplus ICBM motors to be used on commercial launches and expects to complete its study later this year. The price at which surplus ICBM motors are sold is an important factor for determining the extent of potential benefits and challenges of allowing the motors to be used for commercial launch. However, the breakeven price is just one of several methods that DOD could use to set the sales prices of surplus ICBM motors. Below this price, DOD would not recuperate its costs, and, above this price, DOD would potentially achieve savings. We estimated that DOD could sell three Peacekeeper motors or two Minuteman II motors—the numbers required for one launch—at a breakeven price of about $8.36 million or $3.96 million, respectively. In response to the Air Force’s August 2016 request for information, industry stakeholders proposed that the Air Force use various options for valuing the motors, which resulted in prices ranging from $1.3 million for a set of Peacekeeper motors to $11.2 million for a Peacekeeper first stage motor. However, the commercial use of surplus ICBM motors could create challenges, such as discouraging private investment and disrupting competition among emerging commercial space launch companies. Uncertainties Pose Challenges for Effective Decision Making
Officials conducting the Air Force study told us that they would need to gather additional details and conduct additional analysis beyond the price of the motors if law and policy are changed to allow surplus ICBM motors to be made available for commercial launches, as illustrated in the examples below:
Study officials said that further analysis would be required for allowing commercial providers to take control of the surplus ICBM motors prior to delivering the motor to the launch site for integration into the launch vehicle. Because its study is not completed, it is not clear the extent to which it addresses these uncertainties. As such, we are not making recommendations in this report. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2017 contains a provision for us to analyze the potential effects of allowing the use of surplus Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) motors for commercial launch purposes, including an evaluation of the effects, if any, of allowing such use on national security, the Department of Defense (DOD), the solid rocket motor industrial base, the commercial space launch market, and any other areas the Comptroller General considers appropriate. We assessed: (1) the options for determining the selling prices for these motors; and (2) the potential benefits and challenges, including savings and costs, of allowing surplus ICBM motors to be used for commercial space launch. Additionally, we reviewed Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board (FASAB) criteria to understand other methods for determining the value and price of surplus ICBM motors. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. government spends over a billion dollars each year on launch activities as it strives to help develop a competitive market for space launches and assure its access to space. Among others, one launch option is to use vehicles derived from surplus ICBM motors such as those used on the Peacekeeper and Minuteman missiles. The Commercial Space Act of 1998 prohibits the use of these motors for commercial launches and limits their use in government launches in part to encourage the development of the commercial space launch industry in the United States. Legislative and policy changes would be needed to allow DOD to sell these motors for use on commercial launches.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 contains a provision for GAO to analyze the potential effects of allowing the use of surplus ICBM motors for commercial space launch. This report addresses (1) the options for pricing surplus ICBM motors; and (2) the potential benefits and challenges of allowing surplus ICBM motors to be used for commercial space launch.
GAO used Office of Management and Budget criteria to develop a range of breakeven prices, collected detailed motor storage and disposal costs from the Air Force, reviewed industry stakeholder responses to an Air Force request for information about other pricing methods, and interviewed DOD and industry officials.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense (DOD) could use several methods to set the sale prices of surplus intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) motors that could be converted and used in vehicles for commercial launch if current rules prohibiting such sales were changed. One method would be to determine a breakeven price. Below this price, DOD would not recuperate its costs, and, above this price, DOD would potentially save. GAO estimated that DOD could sell three Peacekeeper motors—the number required for one launch, or, a “motor set”—at a breakeven price of about $8.36 million and two Minuteman II motors for about $3.96 million, as shown below. Other methods for determining motor prices, such as fair market value as described in the Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board Handbook, resulted in stakeholder estimates ranging from $1.3 million per motor set to $11.2 million for a first stage Peacekeeper motor.
The prices at which surplus ICBM motors are sold is an important factor for determining the extent of potential benefits and challenges of allowing the motors to be used for commercial launch. Potential benefits include
increasing the global competitiveness of U.S. launch services, and
Potential challenges include
affecting private investment negatively, hindering innovation, and disrupting competition among emerging commercial space launch companies; and
expanding the workload of the Air Force program office responsible for maintaining and refurbishing the motors.
Further, uncertainties in underlying assumptions and cost estimates—such as Peacekeeper motor storage and disposal costs—could hinder effective decision making. DOD is also conducting a study on the potential effects of allowing surplus ICBM motors to be used for commercial launch. Because DOD's study is not completed, it is not clear the extent to which its study addresses such uncertainties.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making recommendations in this report. |
gao_GAO-09-591 | gao_GAO-09-591_0 | Contractors Report Using a Range of Ethics Program Practices Now Required by the FAR
In September 2008 and before the FAR rules were finalized, to identify contractor ethics program practices, we surveyed all 57 contractors to obtain information on the extent to which their programs included practices required or proposed in the FAR or otherwise addressed in congressional requirements for this report. The ethics program practices information we obtained was not designed to test contractor compliance with the rules that came later. New FAR Rules May Improve DOD Oversight of Contractor Ethics Programs in Some Areas but Not Others
In response to the new FAR rules, DOD has made changes in two key areas that could improve oversight of contractor ethics programs. Specifically, DCAA revised its contract audit guidance to cover the new FAR ethics requirements. In addition, DOD IG established the new Contractor Disclosure Program to implement the new mandatory disclosure requirement. However, additional opportunities exist to improve DOD’s oversight in two other key areas. The impact of the FAR rules on oversight at this point is negligible because the authority for oversight is not explicit nor is organizational responsibility clear. Under the rules, contractors have been exempted from the requirement to display DOD hotline posters if they have their own internal hotlines. In addition, if employees use contractor hotlines instead of DOD hotlines, the employees do not receive the same protections from whistleblower laws. New FAR Rules Do Not Call for Verifying Implementation of Contractor Ethics Programs during Contract Administration
The FAR does not specifically require contracting officials to conduct oversight of contractors’ ethics programs during contract administration, for example, verifying that the contractor has implemented the new mandatory contractor business ethics requirement. With the DOD hotline, DOD has immediate awareness of potential violations from contractor employee calls. Our survey completed in 2009 shows that nearly all of the 57 major defense contractors reviewed included many of the ethics program practices before the FAR rules were finalized consistent with the standards later required for compliance. Given the similarity between some of the ethics program elements in our congressional mandate and the current FAR requirements, our audit and reporting objectives were to (1) describe the extent to which contractors had ethics programs before the finalization of the FAR rules that included practices consistent with standards now required by the FAR and (2) assess the impact the new FAR rules have on DOD oversight of contractor ethics programs. | Why GAO Did This Study
Until recently, ethics programs and practices of defense contractors were self-policed. Given the significant sums spent to acquire goods and services, the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) was amended twice starting in December 2007 to first mandate and later amplify contractor ethics program rules. Before FAR changes were finalized in December 2008, Congress required GAO to report in 2009 on the ethics programs of major defense contractors. This report (1) describes the extent that contractors had ethics programs before the finalization of the FAR rules that included practices consistent with standards now required by the FAR and (2) assesses the impact the new FAR rules have on Department of Defense (DOD) oversight of contractor ethics programs. To do this work, in September 2008 GAO surveyed all 57 contractors--those receiving more than $500 million in 2006 DOD contract awards--and interviewed DOD contractor oversight agency officials on the impact of the new FAR rules on oversight.
What GAO Found
All 57 contractors responded to GAO's survey, and 55 reported having ethics programs that include many of the practices consistent with standards now required for compliance with the FAR. The ethics practices information GAO obtained was from before the FAR rules were finalized and thus was not designed to test contractor compliance with the rules that came later. In response to the new FAR rules, DOD has made two key oversight improvements by revising its contract audit guidance to cover the new ethics requirements and establishing the Contractor Disclosure Program to implement the mandatory disclosure requirement. However, opportunities exist to improve DOD's oversight in two other key areas. For example, in verifying implementation of contractor ethics programs during contract administration, the impact of the FAR rules on oversight at this point is negligible. GAO found that DOD had no plans to change contract administration offices' oversight because authority for oversight is not explicit nor is organizational responsibility clear. Also, with regard to contractors' hotline poster displays, the new FAR rules could reduce DOD's awareness of potential violations. The rules exempt contractors with ethics programs that include their own hotlines from the requirement to display DOD hotline posters. If contractor employees report violations to company hotlines instead of DOD hotlines, the employees do not receive the same protections from whistleblower laws. Whistleblower protections for employees unaware of the DOD hotline could be jeopardized. |
gao_GAO-03-136 | gao_GAO-03-136_0 | Hepatitis C Notification Time Frames Vary
There is considerable variation among VA facilities in the time it takes to notify veterans that they have hepatitis C. Systemwide, 71 facilities, in response to our survey, estimated typical notification time frames of 30 days or less, including 29 facilities with estimates of 7 days or less. In contrast, 30 facilities estimated that notification typically took longer than 30 days, including 7 facilities that estimated time frames of 90 days or longer. Facilities estimating longer notification times (over 30 days) generally relied on primary care providers to notify veterans at their next regularly scheduled appointments, often more than 30 days away and, in some cases, longer than 4 months away. In the meantime, however, veterans with hepatitis C could unknowingly infect others or continue to engage in behaviors, such as alcohol use, that could accelerate the damaging effects of hepatitis C on their livers. For example, providers at 4 facilities scheduled special appointments to discuss hepatitis C test results with veterans, and providers at 17 facilities notified veterans by telephone or mail. This system proactively reminds primary care providers to notify veterans. Evaluations of Medical Conditions of Veterans with Hepatitis C Hampered by Waits for Physician Specialist Appointments
Almost all VA medical facilities involved physician specialists in evaluating veterans with hepatitis C to determine a treatment recommendation, but waiting times for appointments with physician specialists varied considerably. Recommendations for Executive Action
To continue to improve the management of hepatitis C, we recommend that the Secretary of Veterans Affairs direct the Under Secretary for Health to direct facilities to use special arrangements, such as mail or telephone when appropriate, to notify a veteran rather than waiting until the next regularly scheduled visit if it is more than 30 days away; direct facilities to modify their computerized patient record systems so that providers are alerted to positive hepatitis C test results as soon as possible; and help facilities improve the timeliness of evaluations for veterans diagnosed with hepatitis C by encouraging facilities to use nonspecialists to conduct initial evaluations, and develop clinical guidelines for when to refer veterans to physician specialists for additional consultations. We also reviewed and analyzed the current literature pertaining to hepatitis C.
We conducted an E-mail survey to obtain information on hepatitis C notification and disease management processes and practices throughout the VA system, including evaluating veterans’ medical conditions regarding potential treatment options. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 1998, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) launched an initiative to screen and test veterans for hepatitis C--a chronic blood-borne virus that can cause potentially fatal liver-related conditions. Since 2001, GAO has been monitoring VA's hepatitis C program. This year GAO was asked to report on VA's hepatitis C disease management practices. GAO surveyed 141 VA medical facilities about their processes for notifying veterans concerning hepatitis C test results and evaluating veterans' medical conditions regarding potential treatment options. In addition, GAO reviewed medical records of 100 hepatitis C patients at 1 facility and visited 4 other facilities that used unique hepatitis C disease management processes.
What GAO Found
There is considerable variation among VA facilities in the time it takes to notify veterans that they have hepatitis C. For example, 29 VA medical facilities estimated that veterans were typically notified within 7 days of testing while 16 estimated that notification times exceeded 60 days. At facilities with longer notification times, primary care providers generally notified veterans at their next regularly scheduled appointments--sometimes more than 4 months away. In contrast, facilities with shorter notification times generally scheduled special appointments focused on hepatitis C notification or notified veterans by telephone or mail. Longer notification times increase the risk that veterans may unknowingly infect others or continue to engage in behaviors, such as alcohol use, that could accelerate the damaging effects of hepatitis C on their livers. VA medical facilities also varied considerably in the time that veterans must wait before physician specialists evaluate their medical conditions concerning hepatitis C treatment recommendations. For example, 23 facilities estimated that veterans waited 30 days or less for appointments with physician specialists while 52 facilities estimated that veterans waited over 60 days. At facilities with longer waiting times, primary care providers frequently referred all veterans to physician specialists for evaluations. In contrast, facilities with shorter waiting times often relied on nonspecialists, such as primary care providers, to conduct initial hepatitis C evaluations, referring only those with certain conditions, such as liver injury, to specialists for additional evaluations. |
gao_GAO-13-775 | gao_GAO-13-775_0 | Acting under these legislative authorities, USDA inspectors provide continuous government inspection of each and every meat and poultry carcass and its parts at slaughter plants throughout the United States. According to the agreement, the pilot projects for each species are to end when a final rule is published for that species. young chicken and turkey plants. In January 2012, FSIS published in the Federal Register a proposed rule to modernize poultry slaughter inspections based, in part, on the agency’s experience with the pilot projects at young chicken and young turkey plants. FSIS Has Not Thoroughly Evaluated the Three Pilot Projects
FSIS has not thoroughly evaluated the performance of each of the three pilot projects over time even though the agency stated that it would do so when it announced the pilot projects. 1). The second limitation that we identified in FSIS’ evaluation is that the agency collected more than a decade’s worth of data on the extent to which young chicken plants in the pilot project were meeting the food safety and quality performance standards developed for the pilot project, but it based its conclusion about the performance of the pilot project on the use of snapshots of data from the pilot project for two 2-year periods. Without analyzing data for the majority of the years of the pilot project in its evaluation, FSIS could not determine whether an inspection system based on the pilot project would ensure equivalent, if not better, levels of food safety and quality than currently provided at plants not in the pilot project over time. In publishing the proposed rule modernizing poultry slaughter inspections that included an optional new poultry inspection system, the agency stated that the new system was based on its experience with the pilot projects at young chicken and young turkey plants. According to FSIS officials, the agency did not prepare a report evaluating the pilot project at young turkey plants and has no plans to do so because data from five young turkey plants in the pilot project provide limited information due to the small sample size. These officials stated that, when the agency develops a proposed rulemaking to modify its slaughter inspection system for hogs, it will need to decide whether to collect additional data. Representatives of 7 stakeholder groups stated that the pilot projects give plants responsibility and flexibility for ensuring food safety and quality. More focus on food safety. Conflict of interest of plant personnel sorting carcasses. FSIS Did Not Disclose Certain Limitations in the Cost-Benefit Analysis It Developed to Support the Proposed Rule
FSIS did not disclose certain limitations in sources of information it relied on to develop the cost-benefit analysis supporting the proposed rule on modernizing poultry slaughter inspections. FSIS generalized the results from the 12 young chicken plants that responded to the 2001 cost survey to the universe of 335 young chicken and young turkey plants in the United States in 2012 to estimate certain costs for poultry plants to operate under the optional new poultry inspection system. As a result, the public, including stakeholders, did not have complete and accurate information to inform their comments on the proposed rule and provide them with a clearer understanding of the potential impacts of the final rule, including uncertainty behind selected estimates. As a result, FSIS may not have assurance that its evaluation of the pilot project at young chicken plants provides the information necessary to support the proposed rule for both chickens and turkeys. However, the agency will not complete another evaluation before it issues a final rule. In 2011, FSIS began drafting a preliminary report evaluating the pilot project at young hog plants, which uses analyses similar to those presented in the report evaluating the pilot project at young chicken plants, suggesting that similar limitations may apply. Without collecting and analyzing additional data, it will be difficult for FSIS to draw conclusions about whether the pilot project at young hog plants is meeting its purpose of deploying inspection resources more effectively in accordance with food safety and other consumer protection requirements. USDA also concurred with our recommendation to collect and analyze the information necessary to determine whether the pilot project for young hogs is meeting its purpose, while continuing its evaluation of this pilot project. Our objectives were to determine (1) the extent to which USDA has evaluated the three pilot projects, (2) strengths and weaknesses of the three pilot projects based on the views of key stakeholder groups, and (3) the extent to which USDA disclosed limitations, if any, in sources of information it relied on to develop the proposed rule to modernize poultry slaughter inspections. To determine the strengths and weaknesses of the three pilot projects based on the views of key stakeholder groups, we identified key stakeholder groups representing industry, labor (including plant personnel and USDA inspectors and veterinarians), consumer advocacy, and animal welfare that submitted comments on USDA’s proposed rule on modernizing poultry slaughter inspections. 2. 5. | Why GAO Did This Study
USDA inspectors provide continuous inspection of each meat and poultry carcass and its parts that enter interstate commerce. In 1998, USDA began three pilot projects at slaughter plants for healthy young chickens, young turkeys, and young hogs, with a purpose to deploy inspection resources more effectively in accordance with food safety and other consumer protection requirements. Under the pilot projects, plant personnel sort carcasses before USDA's inspection. The pilot projects are to end when a final rule for each species is published. In January 2012, USDA published a proposed rule to modernize poultry slaughter inspections based, in part, on its pilot projects. GAO was asked to review these pilot projects. This report determines (1) the extent to which USDA has evaluated the three pilot projects, (2) strengths and weaknesses of the pilot projects based on the views of key stakeholder groups, and (3) the extent to which USDA disclosed limitations, if any, in sources of information it relied on to develop the proposed rule. GAO reviewed relevant laws and documents and interviewed USDA officials and 11 key industry, labor, consumer advocacy, and animal welfare groups familiar with the pilot projects.
What GAO Found
The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) has not thoroughly evaluated the performance of each of the pilot projects over time even though the agency stated it would do so when it announced the pilot projects. For example, in 2011, USDA completed a report evaluating the pilot project at 20 young chicken plants concluding that an inspection system based on the pilot project would ensure equivalent, if not better, levels of food safety and quality than currently provided at plants not in the pilot project. However, among the limitations of its evaluation was the use of snapshots of data for two 2-year periods instead of data for the duration of the pilot project, which has been ongoing for more than a decade. In addition, USDA did not complete an evaluation on or prepare a report evaluating the pilot project at 5 young turkey plants and has no plans to do so because of the small sample size. Nevertheless, in publishing a proposed rule that includes an optional new poultry (chicken and turkey) inspection system, USDA stated that the new system was based on its experience with the pilot projects at young chicken and young turkey plants. As a result, USDA may not have assurance that its evaluation of the pilot project at young chicken plants provides the information necessary to support the proposed rule for both chickens and turkeys. However, the agency will not complete another evaluation before it issues a final rule. USDA has begun drafting a preliminary report evaluating the pilot project at young hog plants using analyses similar to those presented in the report evaluating young chicken plants, suggesting that similar limitations may apply. Agency officials stated that when USDA develops a proposed rulemaking to modify its slaughter inspection system for hogs, the agency will need to decide whether to collect additional data. Without collecting and analyzing additional data, it will be difficult for USDA to draw conclusions about whether the pilot project at young hog plants is meeting its purpose. While the pilot project is ongoing, USDA has the opportunity to collect and analyze additional information.
GAO identified strengths and weaknesses of the three pilot projects based on the views cited most frequently by 11 key stakeholder groups representing industry, labor, consumer advocacy, and animal welfare. On the basis of these views, GAO identified strengths including giving plants responsibility and flexibility for ensuring food safety and quality and allowing USDA inspectors to focus more on food safety activities. GAO identified weaknesses including that training of plant personnel assuming sorting responsibilities on the slaughter line is not required or standardized and that faster line speeds allowed under the pilot projects raise concerns about food safety and worker safety.
USDA did not disclose certain limitations in sources of information it relied on to develop the cost-benefit analysis supporting the proposed rule on modernizing poultry slaughter inspections. GAO identified three sources of information with certain limitations that were not disclosed. For example, USDA did not disclose that it gathered no cost information from young turkey plants in the pilot project. Furthermore, USDA generalized the results from 12 young chicken plants in the pilot project that responded to a 2001 cost survey to the universe of 335 young chicken and young turkey plants in the United States in 2012. As a result, stakeholders did not have complete and accurate information to inform their comments on the proposed rule and its potential impacts.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that USDA (1) collect and analyze information to determine if the young hog pilot project is meeting its purpose and (2) clearly disclose to the public limitations in the information it relied on for the proposed rule to modernize poultry slaughter inspections. USDA concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-16-122 | gao_GAO-16-122_0 | Federal Agencies Have Undertaken Various Activities to Enhance Understanding of Climate Change Risks to Public Health
Federal agencies have undertaken activities to enhance understanding about the risks that climate change poses to public health, including supporting and conducting research on or related to these risks. Agencies have also communicated about such risks through reporting and outreach efforts to public health officials and the general public. Providing Data and Decision Support Resources for Examining Risks
Federal agencies have provided some data and decision support resources—such as guidance and tools—that state and local officials, and others, can use to examine public health-related risks from climate change and potential actions to address these risks. The U.S. State and Local Health Departments Have Used CDC and Other Federal Resources to Address the Risks That Climate Change Poses to Public Health
Selected state and local health departments included in our review have used a CDC climate and health award that addresses the risks that climate change poses to public health, as well as other federal resources, to address and plan for the public health risks from climate change. In fiscal year 2014, Initiative awards to state and local health departments totaled $3.6 million, with individual awards averaging about $200,000. The officials also stated that they face challenges in identifying potential health risks of climate change, for example, as a result of research gaps. Finally, state and local public health officials said they face other challenges that federal action may not be able to address, such as having insufficient data on health impacts in areas where agreements between states and hospitals limit access by health departments. The officials also identified opportunities for federal agencies to address these communication challenges. Federal officials, including those from HHS, told us that they are taking steps to enhance public awareness. CDC officials told us that they have been focusing on assisting awardees with resolving methodological and data issues related to implementing the BRACE framework, such as identifying models for use in developing projections of climate change in their jurisdictions. Officials from federal agencies told us about actions that they have taken or that they have planned that could help address some of these challenges. While some federal programs collect local data and provide financial resources to selected states and localities, such as CDC’s National Environmental Public Health Tracking Program, the federal government does not collect local data on climate impacts or health outcomes in all locations, and does not make awards to support the climate and health activities of all state and local health departments. Issuing such guidance would also be in line with the core functions of CDC’s Climate and Health Program, which include translating climate change science to inform communities. Recommendation for Executive Action
To enhance HHS’s ability to protect public health from the impacts of climate change, we recommend that the Secretary of HHS direct CDC to develop a plan describing when it will be able to issue climate change communication guidance to state and local health departments, to better position relevant officials to effectively communicate about the risks that climate change poses to public health and address requirements of the Climate Ready States and Cities Initiative. CDC noted its plans to develop and issue climate change communication guidance to state and local health departments after HHS finalizes its climate change communication and outreach strategy, which is expected by July 2016. Specifically, the administration announced the following actions to address this issue: 1. creation of a map tool by the Department of Health and Human Services to improve the ability of health officials and emergency managers to rapidly identify residential areas where people who depend on electricity to power life-critical durable medical equipment live; 2. development of a national integrated heat health information system by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, which is intended to provide a suite of decision support resources that better serve public health needs; 3. launch of a climate and health innovation challenge series by the National Institutes of Health and others to promote innovative approaches and highlight technologies available for understanding the health implications of climate change and improving resilience to adverse effects; 4. creation of a climate change impacts subcommittee within the Federal Interagency Working Group on Environmental Justice, and the workgroup’s launch of a climate justice initiative that is focused on incorporating equity into climate adaptation planning; 5. announcement of a local climate and energy webcast series on climate change, heat islands, and public health, to be hosted by the Environmental Protection Agency; 6. plans to highlight examples of policy actions related to children’s health during national Children’s Health Month; 7. a commitment by CDP, a private organization, to release publicly disclosed data from 61 U.S. cities that summarize the climate risks that the cities are facing and the actions they are taking to improve resilience; and 8. an expansion in the number of medical, public health, and nursing schools that have committed to educate and train their students about the risks of climate change to public health. We also interviewed officials from the United States Global Change Research Program and the Council on Environmental Quality. Appendix VI: Examples of Activities Conducted by Awardees of CDC’s Climate Ready States and Cities Initiative
State and local health officials from the 16 state and two local health departments receiving awards through the Center for Disease Control and Prevention’s (CDC) Climate Ready States and Cities Initiative told us that they have conducted a variety of activities to address and plan for the risks that climate change poses to public health. These include: 1. 2. | Why GAO Did This Study
The World Health Organization projects climate change will adversely affect health significantly over the next several decades. Some health effects of climate change are already being felt in the United States, according to assessments by the National Research Council, USGCRP, and others. Since the federal government is the nation’s largest purchaser of health care services, federal health care expenditures could increase in future years due to climate-related impacts.
GAO was asked to review federal efforts to increase public health system preparedness for climate change. This report addresses (1) federal activities to enhance understanding about the risks climate change poses to public health, (2) federal resources used by selected states and localities to address these risks, and (3) challenges states and localities face and actions federal agencies could take to mitigate them. GAO examined federal, state, and local documents, and interviewed officials from federal agencies such as CDC, NIH, USGCRP, as well as state and local health departments, including all 18 recipients of CDC’s Climate Ready States and Cities Initiative award.
What GAO Found
Federal agencies are enhancing understanding of climate-related risks to public health by (1) supporting and conducting research, (2) providing data and informational resources, and (3) communicating about risks. The Department of Health and Human Services’ (HHS) National Institutes of Health (NIH) supports a portfolio of research directly related to these risks. NIH reports awarding about $6 million for such research in fiscal year 2014, including for one study examining health risks posed by heat and air pollution. Federal agencies have also provided data on climate and health issues, such as the number of extreme heat days that state and local officials can use to assess health risks. They have also reported about these risks, such as through the third National Climate Assessment issued in May 2014 by the U.S. Global Change Research Program (USGCRP).
Selected state and local health departments have used resources from HHS’s Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and other federal agencies to address and plan for the risks of climate change to public health. CDC’s Climate Ready States and Cities Initiative awards an average of about $200,000 per year each to 16 state and two local health departments to implement a risk management framework designed to help incorporate climate projections into public health planning. CDC also requires awardees to increase public awareness of the risks climate change poses to public health. Other federal resources used by health departments to prepare for these risks include funding provided through CDC’s National Environmental Public Health Tracking Program.
When asked to identify challenges they face in addressing and planning for the risks of climate change to public health, state and local health officials identified challenges that GAO grouped into the three most frequently mentioned themes. First, the officials said they face challenges communicating about the public health risks of climate change, due to limited public awareness and the complexity of the issue. These officials reported that enhanced federal leadership could help address this challenge. Although HHS plans to develop a climate change communication and outreach strategy, its development has been delayed by over a year. Also, CDC currently does not have plans to issue climate change communications guidance, which state and local officials said would be helpful. CDC’s limited resources are currently focused on resolving methodological and data issues related to its Climate Ready States and Cities Initiative. Given that health departments that have received awards under CDC’s initiative are required to take steps to enhance public awareness, such guidance may help awardees better meet this requirement. Issuing such guidance would also be in line with CDC’s core functions, which include translating climate change science to inform communities. Second, officials said they face challenges identifying health risks of climate change due to gaps in research and difficulties using climate data. Federal officials told GAO about actions they have taken or plan to take that could help address these challenges, such as issuing an assessment of climate change impacts on health, and creating a national heat health information system. Finally, the officials told GAO about other challenges they face that federal action may not be able to address, such as having insufficient local data on health outcomes, because states may not collect or have access to such data, and having insufficient staff resources for these activities.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that HHS direct CDC to develop a plan describing when it will be able to issue climate change communications guidance to state and local health departments. CDC generally agreed with the recommendation, stating that it will issue guidance once HHS’s climate change communication and outreach strategy is final. |
gao_GAO-11-290 | gao_GAO-11-290_0 | For example, market-based policies that change the relative prices of the modes are likely going to be the most cost-effective. Shifting Traffic to Rail from Other Modes May Generate Benefits, but Many Factors Will Affect Whether Traffic Shifts, and Policies Abroad Have Produced Mixed Results
Determining the Extent of Benefits That Can Be Achieved through Rail Is Complicated by Numerous Factors
In order to generate benefits—such as a decrease in the harmful effects of transportation-related pollution—through mode shift, a policy first has to attract sufficient rail ridership or rail freight demand from other modes that have higher harmful emissions. In practice, the extent to which rail can generate sufficient demand to draw traffic from other modes and generate net benefits will depend on numerous factors. For example, some long-haul trucking and rail shipments may be substitutable. In both the United States and in other countries we visited—where freight and passenger traffic generally share the same rail infrastructure— the potential benefits of a policy designed to shift freight traffic to rail are also affected by the amount of capacity available or planned on the rail network to accommodate a shift in traffic, as well as the capacity available or planned on competing transportation modes. Furthermore, how transport system users respond to a given policy will also impact the extent to which the policy generates any benefits. In Selected European Countries, Experiences Suggest That Policies Intended to Produce Mode Shift May Lead to Varying Amounts of Mode Shift and Some Benefits
Based on experience in the United Kingdom and Germany where decision makers made a concerted effort to move traffic from other modes to rail through pricing policies, targeted grants, and infrastructure investments, these policies resulted in varying amounts of mode shift. While some benefits were attained through implementation of policies designed to shift traffic to rail, these benefits were not necessarily achieved in the manner originally anticipated or at the level originally estimated. Other countries have had similar experiences implementing pricing policies to provide incentives to shift traffic to rail. Grant Applicants’ Assessments of Project Benefits and Costs Are of Varying Quality and Usefulness to Decision Makers
Grant Applicants’ Assessments of Project Benefits and Costs Were Not Comprehensive in Many Respects
According to DOT officials from both programs, as well as our assessment of 40 randomly selected rail-related TIGER and HSIPR applications, information on project benefits and costs submitted by applicants to the TIGER and HSIPR programs varied in both quality and comprehensiveness. However, in some cases, certain categories of impacts may be more difficult to quantify than others and qualitative information on potential benefits and costs can be useful to decision makers. Notably, the majority of the applications to the TIGER and HSIPR programs that we reviewed did not provide information related to uncertainty in projections, data limitations, and the assumptions underlying their models. Short Time Frames, a Lack of Clear Standard Values, and Data Limitations Contributed to the Inconsistent Quality and Limited Usefulness of Assessments of Project Benefits and Costs
Applicants, industry experts, and DOT officials we spoke with reported that numerous challenges related to performing assessments of the benefits and costs of intercity passenger or freight rail projects can contribute to variation in the quality of assessments of project benefits and costs in applications to federal programs such as the TIGER and HSIPR programs. Encourage effective decision making and enhance the usefulness of assessments of benefits and costs, for both intercity passenger and freight rail projects by providing ongoing guidance and training on developing benefit and cost information for rail projects and by providing more direct and consistent requirements for assessing benefits and costs across transportation funding programs. DOT provided technical comments and agreed to consider the recommendations. Amtrak and EPA provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To better understand the potential net benefits of intercity passenger and freight rail, we examined (1) the extent to which transportation policy tools that provide incentives to shift passenger and freight traffic to rail may generate emissions, congestion, and economic development benefits and (2) how project benefits and costs are assessed for investment in intercity passenger and freight rail and how the strengths and limitations of these assessments impact federal decision making. International Case Studies: The United Kingdom and Germany
We conducted case studies of selected policies and programs in the United Kingdom and Germany to learn more about policies to address concerns about emissions, congestion and economic development. | Why GAO Did This Study
Concerns about the weak economy, congestion in the transportation system, and the potentially harmful effects of air emissions generated by the transportation sector have raised awareness of the potential benefits and costs of intercity passenger and freight rail relative to other transportation modes such as highways. GAO was asked to review (1) the extent to which transportation policy tools that provide incentives to shift passenger and freight traffic to rail may generate emissions, congestion, and economic development benefits and (2) how project benefits and costs are assessed for investment in intercity passenger and freight rail and how the strengths and limitations of these assessments impact federal decision making. GAO reviewed studies; interviewed federal, state, local, and other stakeholders regarding methods to assess benefit and cost information; assessed information on project benefits and costs included in rail grant applications; and conducted case studies of selected policies and programs in the United Kingdom and Germany to learn more about their policies designed to provide incentives to shift traffic to rail.
What GAO Found
Although implementing policies designed to shift traffic to rail from other modes may generate benefits, and selected European countries' experiences suggest that some benefits can be achieved through these types of policies; many factors will affect whether traffic shifts. The extent to which rail can generate sufficient demand to draw traffic from other modes to achieve the desired level of net benefits will depend on numerous factors. Some passenger or freight traffic may not be substitutable or practical to move by a different mode. For example, certain freight shipments may be time-sensitive and thus cannot go by rail. Another key factor will be the extent to which sufficient capacity exists or is being planned to accommodate shifts in traffic from other modes. How transport markets respond to a given policy--such as one that changes the relative price of road transport--will also affect the level of benefits generated by that policy. Experiences in selected countries suggest that varying amounts of mode shift and some benefits were attained where decision makers implemented policies to move traffic from other modes to rail. For example, a road freight pricing policy in Germany resulted in environmental and efficiency improvements, and freight rail grants in the United Kingdom led to congestion relief at the country's largest port. Pursuing policies to encourage traffic to shift to rail is one potential way to generate benefits, and other policies may be implemented to generate specific benefits at a lower cost. Information on the benefits and costs of intercity passenger and freight rail is assessed to varying degrees by those seeking federal funding for investment in rail projects; however, data limitations and other factors reduce the usefulness of such assessments for federal decision makers. Applicants to two discretionary federal grant programs--the Transportation Investment Generating Economic Recovery program and the High-Speed Intercity Passenger Rail program--provided assessments of potential project benefits and costs that were generally not comprehensive. For instance, applications varied widely in the extent to which they quantified and monetized some categories of benefits. In addition, GAO's assessment of selected applications found that most applicants did not provide key information recommended in federal guidance for such assessments, including information related to uncertainty in projections, data limitations, or the assumptions underlying their models. Applicants, industry experts, and Department of Transportation (DOT) officials GAO spoke with reported that many challenges impacted their ability to produce useful assessments of project benefits and costs, including: short time frames in which to prepare the assessments, limited resources and expertise for performing assessments, poor data quality, lack of access to data, and lack of standard values for monetizing some benefits. As a result, while information on project benefits and costs was considered as one of many factors in the decision-making process, according to DOT officials, the varying quality and focus of assessments resulted in additional work, and the information provided was of limited usefulness to DOT decision makers.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends DOT conduct a data needs assessment to improve the effectiveness of modeling and analysis for rail and provide consistent requirements for assessing rail project benefits and costs. DOT, Amtrak and EPA provided technical comments, and DOT agreed to consider the recommendations. |
gao_T-GGD-98-66 | gao_T-GGD-98-66_0 | Critical Planning Challenges Remain to Be Addressed
Although all of the strategic plans that we reviewed contained at least some discussion of each element required by the Results Act, we found that critical planning challenges remain. A Clearly Articulated Strategic Direction
We found that the strategic plans often lacked clear articulation of the agencies’ strategic direction, a sense of what they were trying to achieve, and how they would achieve it. Another weakness of agencies’ strategic plans was incomplete and underdeveloped strategies for achieving long-term strategic goals and objectives. Coordinated Crosscutting Program Efforts
program efforts are mutually reinforcing. We have found that uncoordinated program efforts can waste scarce funds, confuse and frustrate program customers, and limit the overall effectiveness of the federal effort. This suggests that federal agencies are to look beyond their organizational boundaries and coordinate with other agencies to ensure that their efforts are aligned and complementary. Our work has shown that the performance planning and measurement stage of the Results Act’s implementation will offer a structured framework to address crosscutting issues. Reliable Data Systems and Analytic Capacity
Our previous work has shown that for agencies to set realistic goals, they need to have reliable data during their planning efforts. They also need reliable data, later, as they gauge the progress they are making toward achieving those goals. However, our work has found serious shortcomings in agencies’ ability to generate reliable and timely data to measure their progress in achieving goals and to provide the analytic capacity to use those data. Under the Results Act, strategic plans are to contain discussions of how agencies used and planned to use program evaluations that are to provide feedback on how well an agency’s activities and programs contributed to the achievement of its goals and to assess the reasonableness and appropriateness of those goals. Our guide to facilitate congressional decisionmakers’ use of agencies’ performance plans is organized around three core questions that correspond to the Act’s requirements for performance plans. The answers to the questions are intended to facilitate a complete assessment of agencies’ performance plans and address concerns that are likely to be common across a variety of congressional users. In summary, Mr. Chairman, although agencies have generally met the statutory requirements of the Results Act in their first cycle of strategic planning, federal strategic planning—and Results Act implementation in general—is still very much a work in progress. The annual performance plans offer the opportunity for Congress and the agencies together to sustain the momentum of the implementation of the Results Act and of performance-based management. Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the Government Performance and Results Act (GAO/GGD-96-118, June 1996). | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed its assessment of the strategic plans that executive agencies produced last September under the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 and the current stage of the Results Act's implementation, annual performance planning and measurement, focusing on: (1) the extent to which agencies' strategic plans met statutory requirements; (2) critical planning challenges that remain to be addressed; and (3) a discussion of how GAO's recent congressional guide for agencies' annual performance plans can facilitate congressional use of those plans and thereby advance the implementation of the Results Act.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the Results Act requires that strategic plans include six broad elements-mission statements, general goals and objectives, approaches (or strategies) for achieving goals, a description of the relationship between general goals and annual performance goals, key external factors, and a description of the actual use and planned use of program evaluations; (2) although all of the strategic plans that GAO reviewed contained at least some discussion of each element required by the Results Act, GAO found that critical planning challenges remain; (3) the strategic plans often lacked clear articulation of the agencies' strategic direction, a sense of what they were trying to achieve, and how they would achieve it; (4) a focus on results, as envisioned by the Results Act, implies that federal programs that contribute to the same or similar results should be closely coordinated to ensure that goals are consistent and, as appropriate, program efforts are mutually reinforcing; (5) uncoordinated program efforts can waste scarce funds, confuse and frustrate program customers, and limit the overall effectiveness of the federal effort; (6) this suggests that federal agencies are to look beyond their organizational boundaries and coordinate with other agencies to ensure that their efforts are aligned and complementary; (7) GAO's previous work has shown that for agencies to set realistic goals, they need to have reliable data during their planning efforts; (8) they also need reliable data, later, as they gauge the progress they are making toward achieving those goals; (9) GAO found serious shortcomings in agencies' ability to generate reliable and timely data to measure their progress in achieving goals and to provide the analytic capacity to use those data; (10) GAO developed a guide to assist the congressional consultations on the development of agencies' strategic plans; (11) the guide is organized around three core questions that correspond to the Act's requirements for performance plans; (12) the answers to the questions are intended to facilitate a complete assessment of agencies' performance plans and address concerns that are likely to be common across a variety of congressional users; and (13) although agencies have generally met the statutory requirements of the Results Act in their first cycle of strategic planning, federal strategic planning; and Results Act's implementation in general-is still very much a work in progress. |
gao_GGD-95-211 | gao_GGD-95-211_0 | As agreed with the Committee, the objectives of this study were to determine the representation of women and minorities at the Departments of the Interior, Agriculture, Navy, and State and changes in the representation levels of these groups, particularly at the upper grade levels and in occupations that lead to those grades; evaluate whether the agencies’ affirmative employment program plans complied with EEOC’s instructions, particularly those that address factors affecting women and minority underrepresentation; and assess the adequacy of EEOC’s and OPM’s oversight of the affirmative employment and recruitment programs. The relative numbers of white women and minorities in the agencies’ workforces increased between 1984 and 1992. As seen in figures 2.1 through 2.3, this condition appears somewhat more pronounced for white and minority women than for minority men. However, as table 2.8 shows, white men continued to dominate the higher ranks of the agencies reviewed, accounting for 75 percent or more of the agencies’ top positions in 1992. The extent of underrepresentation, as discussed below, varied by agency and EEO group. Overall, agencies hired and promoted women and minorities at rates that would increase their share of the agencies’ workforces, but separation rates for certain EEO groups were high. In fiscal year 1992, women and minorities (1) were represented in lower relative numbers in the agencies’ key jobs and in State’s Foreign Service jobs than in the agencies’ total workforces, (2) were often underrepresented when compared to the CLF, and (3) remained less well represented in higher grades than in lower grades. Agencies’ Planning Program Analyses Efforts Did Not Fully Comply With EEOC Directives
Agencies’ affirmative employment planning program analyses efforts did not adhere to EEOC’s MD-714 directive in several ways. They said that senior officials and line managers did not actively participate in preparing the plans. Finally, the agency EEO officials we talked to said that senior officials and senior managers had little involvement in formulating their agencies’ multiyear affirmative employment plans and annual updates. OPM and EEOC Oversight of Agencies’ Affirmative Recruitment and Employment Program Performance
OPM and EEOC did not provide sufficient oversight to ensure that agencies’ affirmative recruitment and employment programs were effectively correcting imbalances in their workforces. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed: (1) the representation of women and minorities at the Departments of the Interior, Agriculture (USDA), Navy, and State as compared to the agencies' total workforce and the nation's civilian labor force (CLF); (2) these agencies' compliance with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's (EEOC) affirmative employment planning instructions; and (3) the extent of EEOC and Office of Personnel Management (OPM) oversight of the agencies' affirmative employment and recruitment programs.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) between 1984 and 1992, the relative number of women and minorities increased in each agency, but certain equal employment opportunity (EEO) groups were underrepresented overall, particularly in key and higher grade positions when compared to the CLF; (2) underrepresentation in key jobs was more pronounced for white and minority women than for minority men; (3) the underrepresented EEO groups varied by agency; (4) white men still occupied 75 percent or more of the agencies' senior executive service or equivalent positions; (5) although women and minorities were hired and promoted into key agency jobs in greater numbers than their workforce representation, they also separated from the agencies at higher rates; (6) the agencies' multiyear affirmative employment planning programs did not fully comply with EEOC directives because the agencies considered the directives to be only guidelines, they lacked certain personnel data, senior managers were not involved in the plans' preparation, the agencies did not take the plans seriously, and EEOC approved incomplete plans; (7) those agencies that set employment goals did not link them to any particular underrepresention problem; (8) there were no formal mechanisms to hold agency heads and senior managers accountable for their agencies' EEO programs; and (9) OPM and EEOC did not provide sufficient oversight to ensure that the agencies' affirmative employment programs effectively corrected their workforce imbalances. |
gao_GAO-02-363 | gao_GAO-02-363_0 | Generally, federal law enforcement agencies do not have information systems that facilitate specific tracking of identity theft cases. Also, the FBI and the Secret Service noted that identity theft is not typically a stand-alone crime; rather, identity theft is almost always a component of one or more white-collar or financial crimes, such as bank fraud, credit card or access device fraud, or the use of counterfeit financial instruments. These sources can include consumer complaints and hotline allegations, as well as law enforcement investigations and prosecutions of identity theft-related crimes such as bank fraud and credit card fraud. Cost of Identity Theft to the Financial Services Industry
We found no comprehensive estimates of the cost of identity theft to the financial services industry. Other data, such as staffing of the fraud departments of banks and consumer reporting agencies, presented a mixed and/or incomplete picture. Federal Criminal Justice System Costs
Regarding identity theft and any other type of crime, the federal criminal justice system incurs costs associated with investigations, prosecutions, incarceration, and community supervision. Nonetheless, while recognizing measurement difficulties, a number of data sources can be used as proxies or indicators for gauging the prevalence of such crime. Five of the six banks had data on identity theft losses involving fraudulent applications and account takeovers. | What GAO Found
Identity theft involves "stealing" another person's personal identifying information, such as their Social Security number (SSN), date of birth, or mother's maiden name, and using that information to fraudulently establish credit, run up debt, or take over existing financial accounts. Precise, statistical measurement of identity theft trends is difficult for several reasons. Federal law enforcement agencies lack information systems to track identity theft cases. Also, identity theft is almost always a component of one or more white-collar or financial crimes, such as bank fraud, credit card or access device fraud, or the use of counterfeit financial instruments. Data sources, such as consumer complaints and hotline allegations, can be used as proxies for gauging the prevalence of identity theft. Law enforcement investigations and prosecutions of bank and credit card fraud also provide data. GAO found no comprehensive estimates of the cost of identity theft to the financial services industry. Some data on identity theft-related losses indicated increasing costs. Other data, such as staffing of the fraud departments of banks and consumer reporting agencies, presented a mixed or incomplete picture. Identity theft can cause victims severe emotional and economic harm, including bounced checks, loan denials, and debt collection harassment. The federal criminal justice system incurs costs associated with investigations, prosecutions, incarceration, and community supervision. |
gao_GAO-02-255 | gao_GAO-02-255_0 | Annually, these programs provide more than $50 billion in student aid to approximately 8 million students and their families. As a consequence, the student financial aid environment is large and complex. In October 1998, Congress established FSA as the government’s first PBO. FSA Has Three Strategic Goals Addressing Important Outcomes
FSA’s performance plan discusses strategic goals for increasing customer and employee satisfaction and reducing unit costs. Measures of customer satisfaction would not capture these initial efforts. FSA Experimenting with Balanced Scorecard to Link Employee’s Day-to- Day Activities to Strategic Goals
In order to help employees connect the work of individual teams to the FSA-wide strategic goals, FSA’s management has adopted the “balanced scorecard.” The scorecard is intended to provide a simple, one-page presentation of FSA’s performance on its three strategic goals. FSA Has Begun to Better Organize and Manage Its Workforce, but Gaps Exist in Its Human Capital Strategy
FSA has begun to better organize its services and manage its employees, but gaps exist in its human capital strategy and it has not yet implemented performance management initiatives to fully develop and assess its employees. Education Continues to Take Steps to Clarify FSA’s Level of Independence
Education continues to take steps to clarify FSA’s level of independence and its relationship with other Education offices. Education is currently reviewing FSA’s role and responsibilities as part of that overall departmentwide management planning effort. | What GAO Found
The Department of Education's Office of Federal Student Aid (FSA) administers more than $53 billion in financial aid for more than 8.1 million students. Since 1990, GAO has included student financial aid on its high-risk list. To address these and other long-standing management weaknesses, Congress established FSA as a performance-based organization (PBO) within Education in 1998. To develop and implement a strategic direction, FSA set three strategic goals, created indicators to measure progress toward these goals, and developed a tool to link employees' day-to-day activities to these goals. The goals are to (1) increase customer satisfaction, (2) increase employee satisfaction, and (3) reduce unit cost. FSA's efforts have generally improved customer and employee satisfaction scores. FSA has begun to implement some human capital practices to better organize its services and manage its employees. But gaps exist, and FSA has not yet implemented performance management initiatives to develop and assess its employees. To better serve customers, FSA reorganized to reflect its different customers--students, schools, and financial partners. To encourage accountability, FSA is linking staff bonuses to FSA's strategic goals. Education continues to clarify FSA's level of independence and is now reviewing FSA's role and responsibilities as part of the departmentwide management planning effort. |
gao_GAO-10-585 | gao_GAO-10-585_0 | These Fleet Readiness Centers and Naval Shipyards are responsible for over 94 percent of the Navy’s depot maintenance workload. 2. NAVAIR and NAVSEA Plans Do Not Fully Address All Elements of a Results-Oriented Management Framework
NAVAIR and NAVSEA Plans Do Not Fully Address Elements of a Results-Oriented Management Framework, and Linkages with Navy- wide Summary Are Unclear
While the NAVAIR and NAVSEA plans focus their efforts on weapon system and equipment availability, they do not fully address the elements of a results-oriented management framework, and the two plans and the Navy-wide executive summary are not clearly integrated. As a result of these weaknesses, the Navy may be limited in its ability to use the information in the plans as a servicewide decision-making tool to meet future challenges. NAVAIR’s and NAVSEA’s mission statements summarize each command’s overarching purpose and address its major functions and operations. With regard to the long-term goals, while both plans identify some strategic goals that generally relate to mission statements, they do not specify time frames for achieving any of these goals. Both plans partially address strategies to achieve the goals. Officials for each command indicated that the metrics listed in their plan are intended to “indirectly” gauge progress toward achieving the plan’s long-term goals. However, the plans do not describe how these metrics correspond to each long-term goal, the desired level for each metric, or how the metrics will be used to evaluate each goal. The Navy Does Not Have an Integrated Servicewide Plan for Depot Maintenance
The Navy does not have an integrated depot maintenance strategic plan that clearly links the elements of the commands’ plans with the servicewide executive summary. NAVAIR and NAVSEA Plans Do Not Fully Respond to OUSD (AT&L)’s Direction Designed to Meet Future Challenges
While the NAVAIR and NAVSEA depot maintenance strategic plans describe many initiatives and programs important to the NAVAIR and NAVSEA depots, they are not fully responsive to OUSD (AT&L)’s direction to the services that was designed to provide the services with a framework to meet future challenges. The NAVAIR and NAVSEA plans each partially address 8 issues and do not address the remaining 2. The two plans generally discuss the future roles of their depots, but the plans do not discuss projected future capabilities of the depots or how those capabilities will be measured. Both plans discuss a management approach for integrating public- and private-sector depot sources. However, both plans are silent with regard to a management approach for integrating joint, interservice, and multinational capabilities. For the second of the two core logistics capability–assurance issues, neither plan discusses the OUSD (AT&L) direction to address the projected effects of weapon system retirements and bed-down (i.e., the act or process of locating a weapon system at a particular base) and retirements, despite changes to the Navy’s force structure for aircraft and ships, as mentioned previously. In addition, the methods for estimating depot workload are not addressed in the NAVAIR and NAVSEA plans. Capital investment in DOD depots has been an issue of concern in our prior work. Recommendations for Executive Action
To provide greater assurance that Navy depots will be postured and resourced to meet future maintenance requirements, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Navy to take the following four actions to revise the Navy’s depot maintenance strategic plan: Fully and explicitly address all elements needed for a comprehensive results-oriented management framework, including those elements that we have identified as partially addressed or not addressed in the current plan. The department also concurred with our recommendation to direct the Secretary of the Navy to revise the Navy’s depot maintenance strategic plan to fully and explicitly address OUSD (AT&L)’s direction that provides a framework for the services to address the four critical areas of logistics transformation, core capability assurance, workforce revitalization, and capital investment, consistent with OUSD (AT&L) criteria. GAO-10-526. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Navy's depots provide critical maintenance support to operations around the world. The Department of Defense's (DOD) increased reliance on the private sector for depot maintenance support coupled with downsizing led to a deterioration of depots' capabilities and cost increases. In 2007, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) directed each service to submit a depot maintenance strategic plan and provided direction for the content of those plans. The 2007 U.S. Navy Depot Maintenance Strategic Plan contained a separate plan for each of five functional areas and an executive summary. GAO used qualitative content analyses to determine the extent to which two of the plans address (1) elements of a results-oriented management framework and (2) OSD's direction for the plan's content. GAO examined the plans for Navy aviation (NAVAIR) and ships (NAVSEA), which account for 94 percent of Navy depot workload.
What GAO Found
While the Navy's plans for aviation and shipyard depot maintenance focus efforts on weapon system and equipment availability, they do not fully address the elements of a results-oriented management framework. GAO's prior work has shown that seven elements of a results-oriented management framework are critical for comprehensive strategic planning. The NAVAIR and NAVSEA plans both fully address one of the elements by including mission statements that summarize their depots' major functions and operations, but the plans partially address or do not address the other six elements. For example, even though the plans describe goals for the depots' mission-related functions, they do not specify interim milestones or time frames for achieving the goals. Additionally, the plans include some measurable warfighter support metrics to gauge progress toward achieving the NAVAIR and NAVSEA plans' long-term goals; however, the plans do not describe how these metrics directly correspond to each long-term goal, desired levels for each, or how they will be used to evaluate each goal. Further, the Navy does not have an integrated Navy-wide depot maintenance strategic plan, but instead uses an overarching executive summary that does not have clear linkages to the separate plans and has the weaknesses resulting from the separate plans' missing or limited information on some elements. The NAVAIR and NAVSEA plans do not fully address these concerns because of weaknesses in oversight. Although OSD established an oversight body, which included senior representatives from OSD and the services, to review the services' plans, this body did not review the plans. Also, the Navy did not establish an oversight mechanism to review its plans. The plans' weaknesses may limit the Navy's ability to use its plan as a tool to meet future challenges effectively and efficiently. In addition, the NAVAIR and NAVSEA plans are not fully responsive to OSD's direction to the services that was designed to provide the services with a framework to meet future challenges. OSD directed the services to address 10 specific issues in four general areas: logistics transformation, core logistics capability assurance, workforce revitalization, and capital investment. Both plans partially address 8 of these issues and do not address the remaining 2. For example, both plans discuss management approaches for integrating public- and private-sector depot sources, but the plans are silent with regard to integrating joint, interservice, or multinational depot capabilities. The plans do not discuss the methods for estimating the amount of workload or the projected effects on depot workload caused by weapon system retirements and locating weapon systems at specific installations. The plans do not fully respond to OSD's direction for the plans' content in part because of weaknesses in oversight in both OSD and the Navy. As a result, these weaknesses could additionally limit the Navy's efforts to posture and resource its depots to meet future maintenance challenges. |
gao_GAO-16-617T | gao_GAO-16-617T_0 | Background
The PSOB program provides death, disability, and education benefits to eligible public safety officers and their families in the event of the officer’s death or permanent and total disability in the line of duty. The PSOB program is administered by the PSOB Office, a unit of the Bureau of Justice Assistance within DOJ’s Office of Justice Programs. In 2009, GAO Identified Issues with Timeliness of Claims Processing, Program Awareness, and DOJ’s Monitoring of Program Performance
Death and Education Claims Were Processed Faster Than Disability Claims
Based on the sample we used for our 2009 report, we estimated that the PSOB Office closed and approved the different types of claims at varying rates. Specifically, the average length was 7 months to a year for death claims, 4 to 6 years for disability claims, and 7 to 10 years for education claims associated with approved death claims. At the time of our report, most of these claims were being processed on paper but the PSOB office had plans to and subsequently implemented an automated information management system in an effort to help ensure efficient claims processing and improve available data on claims. In 2009, Public Safety Organizations In Selected States Expressed Concerns about Program Awareness, Difficulties Establishing Eligibility, and Perceived Long Wait Times for Benefits
In 2009, we reported that state and local officials from police and fire department and other public safety officer organizations did not always know about PSOB program benefits, particularly disability and education benefits. In particular, representatives of 15 of the 44 organizations we spoke with mentioned a lack of awareness about disability and education benefits, while officials from another 6 organizations were concerned that their constituents had a general lack of knowledge of the PSOB program. DOJ Did Not Monitor PSOB Program Performance in 2009
At the time of our 2009 report, the PSOB Office had not followed government guidelines for performance monitoring. As a result, the program had little accountability. To strengthen PSOB’s accountability and enhance awareness of the program and its benefits, we recommended in 2009 that the Bureau of Justice Assistance establish appropriate performance goals and measures and use reliable data to monitor and publicly report on the program’s performance. DOJ agreed with these recommendations. PSOB Office Has Taken Some Actions to Monitor Performance Since 2009, but a Recent OIG Report Identified Continuing Problems
DOJ has taken steps to implement program improvements. By 2014, we observed that the Bureau of Justice Assistance had posted two PSOB performance measures and related data on its public website in consultation with public safety stakeholder groups: average time for the PSOB program to receive basic required documents, and average time for the PSOB program to determine a claim. The Bureau subsequently posted additional performance measures on its public website, including average number of days to assign a PSOB Outreach Specialist and percentage of claims determined within 1 year. While posting data on these performance measures represents an improvement, as of April 2016, the Bureau of Justice Assistance has not taken the additional step of publishing performance goals—which specify the desired level of performance—for the PSOB program. We continue to believe that the Bureau of Justice Assistance should publish performance goals to help the public gauge how well the program is working and enhance stakeholder awareness of the program. In addition, in its July 2015 report, DOJ’s OIG raised questions about claims processing times and performance measurement. The OIG concluded that it did not believe that the PSOB Office’s database, as a management tool, was adequate to evaluate efficiencies in processing or to identify potential causes of timeliness problems. The OIG made four recommendations to DOJ to address these findings, and DOJ agreed with all four recommendations. While DOJ has taken some steps to address these issues, continued attention is needed to help ensure accountability for achieving program goals. | Why GAO Did This Study
The PSOB program, administered by the Department of Justice's Bureau of Justice Assistance, provides three types of benefits (death, disability, and education) to public safety officers and their eligible family members in cases of line-of-duty death or disability. GAO's 2009 report (GAO-10-5) examined the timeliness of claims processing and the extent to which the program followed government guidelines for monitoring program performance. The report made two recommendations to DOJ. DOJ's OIG issued a report in 2015 that provided updated information on the concerns raised by GAO in 2009.
This testimony summarizes key findings of GAO's October 2009 report on the PSOB program and DOJ's actions to implement GAO's recommendations from that report. For its 2009 report, GAO reviewed a generalizable sample of 233 PSOB claims that were opened during fiscal years 2006 to 2008, reviewed relevant agency documents, and interviewed PSOB program officials, representatives of advocacy organizations, and state and local officials in five selected states. For this statement, GAO also reviewed DOJ's actions to date and the findings from the DOJ OIG's 2015 report on the PSOB program.
What GAO Found
GAO's 2009 report on the Public Safety Officers' Benefits (PSOB) program— created to provide certain benefits in cases of public safety officers' death or total disability in the line of duty—identified issues with the timeliness of claims processing, program awareness, and performance measurement. Specifically, GAO found that death and education claims were processed faster than disability claims. GAO estimated that the Department of Justice's (DOJ) PSOB Office generally had processed education and death claims in under a year while disability claims took between 17 and 26 months. In 2009, most claims were being processed on paper, and DOJ had plans to establish an automated claims system to help ensure more efficient claims processing and improve available claims data. This system has since been established.
GAO's 2009 report also identified issues with awareness of program benefits and adherence to federal guidelines for performance monitoring. In particular, representatives of 15 of the 44 public safety organizations GAO spoke with mentioned a lack of awareness about disability or education benefits, while officials from another 6 organizations were concerned that their constituents had a general lack of knowledge of the program. Moreover, GAO found that because DOJ had not set strategic goals and measures for the program, monitored performance, or reported results, the program had little accountability. To enhance claimant awareness and program accountability, GAO recommended that DOJ establish appropriate performance measures and goals for the PSOB program and use reliable data to monitor and report on program performance.
DOJ agreed with GAO's recommendations and has taken some steps to address them. Specifically, by 2014, DOJ had established two PSOB performance measures and posted data for these measures on its public website. DOJ subsequently posted data for additional performance measures on its website, including average number of days to assign a PSOB Outreach Specialist and percentage of claims determined within 1 year. While posting data on these measures represents an improvement, as of April 2016, DOJ had not taken the additional step of publishing performance goals—which specify the desired level of performance--for the PSOB program. GAO continues to believe that publishing performance goals is a key step in gauging how well the program is working and enhancing stakeholder awareness of the program.
Findings from a 2015 report by DOJ's Office of Inspector General (OIG) highlighted the program's continuing problems in the timeliness of claims processing and reporting of reliable program performance data. The OIG concluded that it did not believe that the PSOB Office's database, as a management tool, was adequate to evaluate efficiencies in processing or to identify potential causes of timeliness problems. The OIG made four recommendations to DOJ to address these concerns, and DOJ agreed with the recommendations. Continued attention to these issues by DOJ is needed to help ensure accountability for achieving the program's goals.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making any new recommendations in this testimony. |
gao_GAO-12-272 | gao_GAO-12-272_0 | However, the various presidential directives note that while the TRAs may be used to inform decision making, they are not specific as to when or how these risk assessments should be used by DHS officials to inform CBRN response planning or capability investments. DHS’s CBRN Response Plans and Capabilities
(U) We identified CBRN-specific interagency response plans among three families of interagency plans developed by DHS that are designed for responding to CBRN incidents. DHS Used Its CBRN Risk Assessments to Directly or Indirectly Inform 9 of 12 of Its CBRN Response Plans
Since the first DHS CBRN risk assessments were developed in 2004, DHS used the risk assessments to varying degrees to directly or indirectly inform development of 9 of the 12 CBRN-specific response plans we identified. However, we could not independently verify this for these 7 plans because DHS officials could not document how the risk assessments influenced information contained in the plans. Our analysis of a limited set of planning assumptions in the plans compared to information contained in the risk assessments showed general consistency between the plans and the risk assessments. DHS Used Its CBRN Risk Assessments to Directly or Partially Inform Six of Seven of Its CBRN Capabilities
Since 2004, DHS’s use of its CBRN risk assessments to inform its CBRN- specific capability investments has varied, from directly impacting its capabilities to not being used at all. Six of the seven CBRN capabilities we examined were informed by DHS’s CBRN risk assessments to some extent, according to program officials, DHS documents, and our analysis (see table 4).was directly informed by the risk assessments, while our analysis showed or DHS officials told us that five of the seven capabilities were partially Our analysis showed that one of the seven capabilities informed by the risk assessments. However, we could not independently verify this for three of these five capabilities because DHS officials could not document how the risk assessments influenced the capabilities. The DHS Strategic Plan for 2008-2013 states that resource decisions should be informed by relevant risk assessments, but does not provide specific guidance on when or how such decisions should be informed by the department’s CBRN risk assessments. The official said that based on this initial assessment, the RDCDS was generally aligned with the chemical agents of greatest concern. We found that the BioWatch program was generally consistent with the biological agents of significant concern identified in the BTRA. DHS S&T’s Chief Medical and Science Advisor, the official who oversees the development of DHS’s CBRN risk assessments, agreed that NTNFC’s capabilities need to be able to identify all radiological and nuclear materials, and that therefore the CBRN risk assessments were not relevant for NTNFC’s efforts. Specific Guidance Not Established to Help Ensure DHS’s CBRN Risk Assessments Are Used to Inform Its Response Plans and Capabilities
DHS policy states that DHS components should use risk assessment information to inform planning and capability investment decisions, but DHS has not established specific guidance, such as written procedures, that details when and how DHS components should consider using the department’s CBRN-specific risk assessments to inform such activities. DHS officials told us that while DHS policy calls for the use of risk information to inform the department’s activities, no DHS guidance specifically requires DHS officials to use the TRAs and MTAs for CBRN planning and capability investments or explains how officials should use the risk assessments to inform their decision making. DHS officials said that they considered the risk assessments but chose not to use them to inform one of the plans and one of the capabilities we reviewed because they were not useful for the plan or the capability. Since 2001, DHS has developed a range of CBRN risk assessments, response plans, and related capabilities to prepare for such attacks. DHS has spent at least $70 million developing these risk assessments. More specific guidance on when and how DHS officials should consider using the department’s CBRN risk assessments to inform planning and investments could better help to ensure their consistent use and that this use is sustained beyond the tenure of any given agency official. Recommendation for Executive Action
To better ensure the consistent use of DHS’s CBRN risk assessments at the department’s components and agencies, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security:
Establish more specific guidance, including written procedures, that details when and how DHS components should consider using the department’s CBRN risk assessments to inform related response plan and capability investment decision making. Internal Control: Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government. | Why GAO Did This Study
The 2001 anthrax attacks in the United States highlighted the need to develop response plans and capabilities to protect U.S. citizens from chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) agents. Since 2004, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has spent at least $70 million developing more than 20 CBRN risk assessments. GAO was requested to assess, from fiscal year 2004 to the present, the extent to which DHS has used its CBRN risk assessments to inform CBRN response plans and CBRN capabilities, and has institutionalized their use. GAO examined relevant laws, Homeland Security Presidential Directives, an Executive Order, DHS guidance, and all 12 relevant interagency CBRN response plans developed by DHS. Based on a review of a United States governmentwide CBRN database and DHS interviews, among other things, GAO selected a nongeneralizable set of seven DHS capabilities used specifically for detecting or responding to CBRN incidents to identify examples of DHSs use of its CBRN risk assessments. GAO also interviewed relevant DHS officials. This is a public version of a classified report that GAO issued in October 2011. Information DHS deemed sensitive or classified has been redacted.
What GAO Found
Since 2004, DHSs use of its CBRN risk assessments to inform its CBRN response plans has varied, from directly influencing information in the plans to not being used at all. DHS guidance states that response planning and resource decisions should be informed by risk information. GAOs analysis showed that DHS used its CBRN risk assessments to directly inform 2 of 12 CBRN response plans GAO identified because planners considered the risk assessments to be more accurate than earlier DHS planning assumptions. For another 7 of the 12 plans, DHS officials said that the assessments indirectly informed the plans by providing background information prior to plan development. However, GAO could not independently verify this because DHS officials could not document how the risk assessments influenced the information contained in the plans. GAOs analysis found general consistency between the risk assessments and the plans. For the remaining 3 plans, DHS officials did not use the risk assessments to inform the plans; for 2 of the 3 plans DHS officials told GAO they were not aware of the assessments. DHS officials also noted that there was no departmental guidance on when or how the CBRN risk assessments should be used when developing such plans.
Since 2004, DHSs use of its CBRN risk assessments to inform its CBRN-specific capabilities has varied, from directly impacting its capabilities to not being used at all. Of the 7 capabilities GAO reviewed, one was directly informed by the risk assessments; DHS used its biological agent risk assessments to confirm that its BioWatch program could generally detect the biological agents posing the greatest risk. For 5 of the 7 capabilities, DHS officials said they used the risk assessments along with other information sources to partially inform these capabilities. For example, DHS used its chemical agent risk assessments to determine whether its chemical detectors and the risk assessments were generally aligned for the highest risk agents. For 3 of these 5 capabilities, GAO could not independently verify that they were partially informed by the risk assessments because DHS officials could not document how the risk assessments influenced the capabilities. DHS did not use its CBRN risk assessments to inform the remaining CBRN capability because the assessments were not needed to meet the capabilitys mission.
DHS and its components do not have written procedures to institutionalize their use of DHSs CBRN risk assessments for CBRN response planning and capability investment decisions. Standards for internal control in the federal government call for written procedures to better ensure managements directives are enforced. DHS does not have procedures that stipulate when and how DHS officials should use the departments CBRN risk assessments to inform CBRN response planning and capability investment decisions, and GAO found variation in the extent to which they were used. DHS officials agree with GAO that without written procedures, the consistent use of the departments CBRN risk assessments by DHS officials may not be ensured beyond the tenure of any given agency official. DHS could better help to ensure that its CBRN response plans and capabilities are consistently informed by the departments CBRN risk assessments by establishing written procedures detailing when and how DHS officials should consider using the risk assessments to inform their activities.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DHS develop more specific guidance, including written procedures, that details when and how DHS components should consider using the departments CBRN risk assessments to inform related response planning efforts and capability investment decision making. DHS agreed with the recommendation. |
gao_GAO-06-1107T | gao_GAO-06-1107T_0 | Background
In 1906, Congress passed the Alaska Native Allotment Act, which authorized the Secretary of the Interior to allot individual Alaska Natives a homestead of up to 160 acres of land. In particular, differing interpretations of the phrase “valid existing rights” with regard to rights-of-way, set the stage for conflicts between Native allotees and holders of rights-of-way and resulted in numerous legal appeals. Conflicts Exist in 14 Cases
There are 14 cases where conflict exists regarding the validity of Copper Valley’s rights-of-way within Native allotments. These conflicts exist for three reasons. First, in 5 cases BLM and Alaska Realty have applied the relation back doctrine to invalidate or question Copper Valley’s rights-of-way. In each of these cases BLM and Alaska Realty have invalided or questioned Copper Valley rights-of-way because a Native allottee’s use and occupancy of the land predated the right-of-way. Then in 1989, 30 years after Alaska became a state and was granted the highway easements from the federal government, Interior’s Alaska Office of the Solicitor issued an opinion concerning whether a federal grant of a highway easement to the State of Alaska authorized the state to grant a right-of-way within the highway easement to a utility. Alaska Realty has taken the position, supported by Interior, that Copper Valley is trespassing on the allotment because it installed electric lines without acquiring a federal right-of-way across these allotments. Exiting Remedies to Resolve Disputes Have Produced Limited Results
Few cases have been resolved using existing remedies. Copper Valley currently has three remedies available to it to resolve conflicts. It could (1) negotiate rights-of-way with Native allottees in conjunction with BIA or its realty service provider; (2) relocate its electric lines outside of the Native allotment; or (3) exercise the power of eminent domain, also known as condemnation, to acquire the land. In summary, Copper Valley officials maintain that the options currently available to resolve conflicts over rights-of-way within Native allotments are too costly, impractical, and/or potentially damaging to relationships with the community. Furthermore, Copper Valley takes the position that on principle they should not have to bear the cost of resolving conflicts that they believe the federal government caused by applying the relation back doctrine and by failing to recognize state issued rights-of-way within federally granted highway easements. Copper Valley has stopped trying to settle these disputes and is now seeking legislation to resolve the conflicts. Legislative Alternatives to Resolve Conflicts between Native Allotments and Copper Valley Rights- of-way Have Been Identified
Copper Valley representatives, Alaska Native advocates, and GAO have identified four legislative alternatives to resolve conflicts over Copper Valley rights-of-way within Alaska Native allotments. Alternative 1: Change Interior’s Application of the Relation Back Doctrine to Alaska Native Allotments Congress could enact legislation directing Interior to use the date an allotment application is filed, rather than the date an allottee claimed initial use and occupancy of the land, to determine the rights of allottees and holders of rights-of-way. Alternative 2: Allow the U.S. Government to be Sued with Regard to Alaska Native Allotments A second option is for Congress to allow the U.S. government to be sued with regard to Alaska Native allotments by waiving the U.S. government’s sovereign immunity so that legal challenges involving the relation back doctrine can be heard in federal court. Alternative 3: Ratify Rights-of-way Granted by the State of Alaska within Certain Federally Granted Highway Easements Congress could ratify the rights-of-way granted by the State of Alaska within certain federally granted highway easements. This option could provide Copper Valley with a valid right-of-way across the allotments dating back to the time the state right-of-way was granted. This option would benefit both Native allottees and Copper Valley by compensating allottees for use of their land and by not requiring Copper Valley to pay for the right-of-way across a Native allotment. Since the mid-1990s, Alaska Realty, as the new realty service provider for BIA, has been pursuing Copper Valley to resolve these conflicts. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 1906, the Alaska Native Allotment Act authorized the Secretary of the Interior to allot individual Alaska Natives (Native) a homestead of up to 160 acres. The validity of some of Copper Valley Electric Association's (Copper Valley) rights-of-way within Alaska Native allotments is the subject of ongoing dispute; in some cases the allottees assert that Copper Valley's electric lines trespass on their land. The Department of the Interior's (Interior) Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) are responsible for granting rights-of-way and handling disputes between allottees and holders of rights-of-way. This testimony is based on GAO's report, Alaska Native Allotments: Conflicts with Utility Rights-of-way Have Not Been Resolved through Existing Remedies ( GAO-04-923 , September 7, 2004). Specifically GAO determined (1) the number of conflicts between Native allotments and Copper Valley rights-of-way and the factors that contributed to these conflicts, (2) the extent to which existing remedies have been used to resolve these conflicts, and (3) what legislative alternatives, if any, could be considered to resolve these conflicts.
What GAO Found
There are 14 cases where conflict exists regarding Copper Valley's rights-of-way within Native allotments. These conflicts stem from three principal sources. First, BLM and a BIA realty service provider have applied the relation back doctrine to invalidate or question Copper Valley's rights-of-way in cases where the Native allottee's use and occupancy of the land predates the right-of-way. In these instances, Copper Valley obtained rights-of-way and built electric lines before the land was awarded as an allotment. Second, Interior does not recognize rights-of-way granted by the State of Alaska to Copper Valley to install electric lines within certain highway easements granted to the state by the federal government. Interior's Alaska Office of the Solicitor has taken the position that the federal government did not convey to the State of Alaska the authority to grant rights-of-way for utilities within certain highway easements. Third, Copper Valley constructed electric lines even though they were never issued a right-of-way. Few cases have been resolved using existing remedies. Copper Valley currently has three remedies available to it to resolve conflicts. It could (1) negotiate rights-of-way with Native allottees in conjunction with BIA; (2) relocate its electric lines outside of the allotment; or (3) exercise the power of eminent domain, also known as condemnation, to acquire the land. Since the mid-1990s, Copper Valley has negotiated rights-of-way for 3 Native allotments; however, it has not relocated any of its electric lines and has been reluctant to exercise eminent domain to resolve other conflicts. Copper Valley has stopped trying to resolve these conflicts because it maintains that the existing remedies are too costly, impractical, and/or potentially damaging to relationships with the community. Copper Valley officials told GAO that they should not have to bear the cost of resolving conflicts that they believe the federal government caused by applying the relation back doctrine and by not recognizing their state issued rights-of-way. Copper Valley representatives, Alaska Native advocates, and GAO identified four legislative alternatives that could be considered to resolve these conflicts. Change Interior's application of the relation back doctrine to Alaska Native allotments so that the date an allotment was filed, rather than the date an allottee claimed initial use and occupancy of the land, is used to determine the rights of allottees and holders of rights-of-way. Allow the U.S. government to be sued with regard to Alaska Native allotments so that legal challenges to the relation back doctrine and other legal issues can be heard in federal court. Ratify the rights-of-way granted by the State of Alaska within federally granted highway easements, to provide for a valid right-of-way dating back to the time the state right-of-way was granted. Establish a federal fund to pay for rights-of-way across Alaska Native allotments. |
gao_PEMD-95-5 | gao_PEMD-95-5_0 | NCAP Results and Real-World Fatality Rates
Since NCAP crash tests are designed to simulate full-frontal collisions, we restricted our analysis to those types of crashes and found the results of NCAP crash tests are generally reflected in real-world fatality rates. New Car Assessment Program
A second crash test program we studied is the New Car Assessment Program conducted by NHTSA’s Office of Market Incentives. = 1/2 mv). If a determination of noncompliance is made, the model being tested may not be sold in the United States. We found that a statistically significant first-order correlation exists (r = .72) between the two sets of injury risk probabilities. Relationships Between NCAP and NASS Data
Data from the National Accident Sampling System for 1988 through 1991 were combined to determine whether the results of New Car Assessment Program tests are good predictors of serious injuries and fatalities in real-world automobile crashes. However, the relationship appears to be the result of the high fatality rates associated with the poorest performers in NCAP. 3. 4. 5. There is no contradiction between these statements. Safety Effectiveness Evaluation of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration’s Rule-Making Process. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's (NHTSA) crash test programs, focusing on whether they provide valid and reliable indicators of occupant safety in real world crashes.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the probability of sustaining a serious injury has declined since the inception of NHTSA test programs; (2) cars marketed in the United States have become more crashworthy; (3) the consistency of New Car Assessment Program (NCAP) test results is questionable and its unreliable data may lead to misinformed purchasing decisions; (4) NCAP ability to predict a vehicle occupant's protection in real world crashes is limited, since NCAP results can only be applied to frontal collisions; and (5) there is a statistically significant relationship between fatality rates and NCAP-predicted injuries, however, these high fatality rates are associated with the poorest NCAP performers. |
gao_GAO-14-137 | gao_GAO-14-137_0 | Training services include such activities as occupational skills or on- the-job training. DOL agreed with these recommendations. 803), passed by the House, would establish both credential attainment and training-related employment as performance measures. DOL’s Data Show That Most Training Participants Attained Credentials, but Data on Training-Related Employment Are Unreliable
Most Training Participants Attained Credentials
During the time-period from program year 2006 through program year 2011, the total number of participants in WIA’s Adult and Dislocated Specifically, in the Adult Worker Programs increased significantly.Program, the number of participants increased from about 625,000 to about 1.25 million, and in the Dislocated Worker Program, the number of participants increased from about 272,000 to about 761,000. For example, DOL’s data show the percentage of those who earned credentials in the Adult Program dropped from about 74 percent in program year 2006 to about 58 percent in program year 2011. According to DOL officials, the percentage of training participants who earned credentials may have declined in part as a result of changes in the performance measures that states negotiated. Of the training participants who attained credentials during program year 2011—approximately 89,000 in the Adult Program and 84,000 in the Dislocated Worker Program— about two-thirds in each program earned an occupational credential, such as a welding certificate or clinical medical assistant certificate (see fig. Selected States Cited Some Obstacles to Collecting Data on Credential Attainment and DOL and States Have Taken Steps to Address Challenges and Improve These Data
Manual Process of Collecting Data on Credentials Can Be Resource-Intensive
Workforce officials we interviewed in four of six states said that collecting data on credential attainment can be resource-intensive primarily because it requires manually tracking the information. As a result, case managers must manually collect this information from various sources including participants, training providers, and third-party credentialing organizations. Despite such obstacles to verifying data on participant credentials, several workforce experts and officials noted the importance of collecting this information. In addition to clarifying which credentials should be reported, the 2010 guidance also included strategies that state and local officials can use to increase the quantity and quality of credentials attained. Regarding training providers, officials in four of six states said they have made efforts to address privacy concerns. Local officials in Alabama, Kansas, and Texas, for example, told us that they ask participants to sign consent forms to allow training providers to share credential information with officials. States Face Continuing Challenges Reporting Data on Training- Related Employment, Despite Efforts by States and DOL to Improve Reporting
Reporting Data on Training-Related Employment Is Resource- Intensive and Involves Subjective Decisions
Workforce officials in most states we studied identified challenges reporting data on training-related employment that were greater than those for reporting data on credential attainment, including the high degree of resources required and the subjective nature of determining whether employment is linked to training. Then— in a step beyond what is required for reporting on credential attainment— they must piece this information together to determine whether participants’ employment is substantially related to their training. In addition, officials in all six states said that making training-related employment determinations can be subjective. According to DOL’s reporting guidance, participants’ employment is related to their training if it uses “a substantial portion of the skills taught in training.” workforce experts from one national organization, said that one case manager’s interpretation of what constitutes a substantial portion of the skills obtained in training may differ from another’s. Some case managers contact employers to obtain participants’ employment information, though employers may not be responsive. Checking UI wage records. DOL Has Taken Limited Steps to Address Challenges and Improve Data on Training-Related Employment
While DOL has recently issued guidance aimed at increasing reporting rates for training-related employment data, it has taken limited steps to address states’ ongoing reporting challenges. Recommendation for Executive Action
To provide policymakers and program managers with better quality information to assess the value of training provided by WIA’s Adult and Dislocated Worker Programs, we recommend that the Secretary of Labor identify and share with states strategies for collecting and reporting data on training-related employment that could either increase access to employment information or reduce the subjectivity of determining when training is related to employment. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives for this study on the Workforce Investment Act’s (WIA) Adult and Dislocated Worker Programs were to examine: 1) the extent to which training participants obtain credentials and secure training-related employment, 2) challenges states face reporting on credential attainment and what steps, if any, they and DOL are taking to address them, 3) challenges states face in reporting on training-related employment and what steps, if any, they and DOL are taking to address them. Selection of States and Local Areas
We interviewed state and local workforce officials from a nongeneralizeable sample of six states. We also factored geographic diversity into state selection. | Why GAO Did This Study
As the economy recovers, some employers continue to face difficulty finding qualified workers. The WIA Adult and Dislocated Worker Programs provide services, including job training, which aims to help participants acquire skills and credentials employers need. Under WIA, states are required to report data on training participants who obtain credentials and on those who enter employment related to the training they receive. Given that a WIA reauthorization proposal would establish both of these outcomes as performance measures, GAO was asked to examine the capacity of states to report on these outcomes. This report addresses: 1) the extent to which training participants obtained credentials and training-related employment, 2) challenges states face in reporting data on credentials and what steps, if any, they and DOL are taking to address them, and 3) challenges states face in reporting data on training-related employment and what steps, if any, they and DOL are taking to address them. GAO interviewed DOL officials, workforce experts, and state and local officials and employer organizations from a nongeneralizeable sample of six states selected in part on the basis of geographic diversity. GAO also analyzed data on credential attainment and training-related employment for program years 2010 and 2011.
What GAO Found
Of the more than two million total participants in the Workforce Investment Act's (WIA) Adult and Dislocated Worker Programs, about 11 percent and 16 percent, respectively, received training in program year 2011, and about two-thirds of the training participants in each program attained a credential. Little is known, however, about how many participants got jobs related to their training. From program year 2006 through program year 2011, the percentages of training participants who earned a credential declined from about 74 percent to 58 percent for the Adult Program and from about 75 percent to 63 percent for the Dislocated Worker Program, according to data from the Department of Labor (DOL). Of those training participants who attained a credential in program year 2011, about 65 percent earned occupational credentials, such as a welding certificate, followed by lower percentages who earned occupational skill licenses and associate's degrees, among others. In contrast, GAO found training-related employment data unreliable primarily because a significant portion of the data was missing.
Workforce officials in four of six selected states cited some obstacles in reporting data on credential attainment, and both DOL and states are taking steps to address challenges. Officials in four states GAO contacted said reporting such data can be resource-intensive, largely because case managers must manually track this information from various sources, including participants, training providers, and third-party organizations. To improve credential attainment and reporting, DOL clarified which credentials should be reported and began measuring credential attainment through an agency-wide goal in 2010. Officials in five states have taken similar steps, such as setting goals and tracking credential attainment, and enhancing data exchange with training providers. Officials in most of the six states GAO contacted noted some obstacles to obtaining such data. For example, officials from several states cited student privacy laws as a barrier in verifying credentials with training providers. Officials in three states told us that they ask participants to sign consent forms allowing training providers to give credential information to local officials.
Workforce officials in most of the selected states identified even greater challenges reporting data on training-related employment, including the high degree of resources required and the subjective nature of determining whether employment is linked to training. DOL has taken only limited steps to address these challenges. To report such data, case managers seek participants' employment information from participants, employers, and wage records. Then they must piece it together to determine whether participants' employment is "substantially related" to their training. Officials in most of the six states described this process as resource-intensive and noted that making such determinations are subjective since one case manager's interpretation of "substantially related" may differ from another's. Given these challenges, officials in all six states have taken some steps to increase access to employment information or make decisions less subjective. DOL has recently stressed the importance of reporting data on training-related employment and shared a few practices with states to increase reporting rates; however, it has not identified and disseminated strategies to address the ongoing challenges states face regarding resource intensiveness and subjectivity, which could improve the quality of such data.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOL identify and share with states strategies that may ease collection and improve the quality of training-related employment data. DOL agreed with GAO’s recommendation. |
gao_GAO-01-119 | gao_GAO-01-119_0 | Legislative and Other Changes That Could Affect the Ability of Small Businesses to Obtain Federal Contracts
The federal procurement process underwent many legislative and administrative changes during the 1990s, some of which have the potential to affect the ability of small businesses to obtain federal contracts. In addition, reforms have modified the dollar range of contracts that are reserved for small businesses and encouraged the use of purchase cards, which are similar to corporate credit cards, for the use of certain purchases. Federal agencies combine existing contracts into fewer contracts as a means of streamlining as well as reducing procurement and contract administration costs, a practice generally referred to as “contract consolidation.” A subset of consolidated contracts is “bundled contracts” that the Small Business Reauthorization Act of 1997 defines as the consolidation of two or more procurement requirements for goods or services previously provided or performed under separate, smaller contracts into a solicitation of offers for a single contract that is likely to be unsuitable for award to a small business concern due to the diversity, size, or specialized nature of the elements of the the aggregate dollar value of the anticipated award; the geographic dispersion of contract performance sites; or any combination of these three criteria. Some organizations that represent small businesses believe that the purchase card makes it easier for government personnel to make purchases from sources other than small businesses because that may be more convenient for the purchaser. Federal Government Is Meeting Small Business Procurement Goal
SBA and FPDC data indicate that federal agencies, as a whole, have met their annual governmentwide small business procurement goal from fiscal years 1993 to 1999. Some organizations that represent small businesses have expressed concerns that small businesses are at a disadvantage when competing for new federal contracts. We examined the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 (FASA), the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996, the Small Business Reauthorization Act of 1997, and the Federal Acquisition Regulation. | Why GAO Did This Study
This report focuses on the trends in federal procurement for small businesses during the 1990s.
What GAO Found
Some organizations that represent small businesses and others have expressed concerns over acquisition reforms in the mid-1990s that may have reduced the opportunities for small businesses to compete for federal government contracts. These reforms sought to streamline acquisition processes to help government acquire goods and services more efficiently. The reforms included provisions to facilitate greater use of some types of contracts. However, small business representatives believe that some of these reforms could make it difficult for small businesses to compete for federal contracts. For example, the Clinger-Cohen Act authorizes the use of multiagency contracts. These contracts could potentially consolidate agencies' requirements, which small businesses may not be able to meet. At the same time, some procurement reforms have benefited small businesses. The Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act, for example, increased the value of contracts set aside exclusively for small business participation. In addition, the Small Business Reauthorization Act of 1997 increased the percentage of federal contracts to be awarded to small businesses to 23 percent. Small Business Administration data indicate that federal agencies met the legislative goal for procurement from small businesses from fiscal years 1993 to 1999. |
gao_GAO-10-56 | gao_GAO-10-56_0 | Although LHI administers the PDHRA to Reserve component servicemembers on behalf of DOD, the military services are responsible for identifying and notifying servicemembers to whom the PDHRA requirement applies and for submitting questionnaires to DOD’s central repository. DOD’s Central Repository Did Not Contain PDHRA Questionnaires for a Substantial Percentage of Servicemembers Who Returned from Deployment to Iraq or Afghanistan
On the two occasions we queried DOD’s central repository, we did not find PDHRA questionnaires for a substantial percentage of the active and Reserve component servicemembers in our population of interest. On September 4, 2009, we queried DOD’s central repository again to update our April 2009 data and determine whether any progress had been made in reporting questionnaires to the central repository. When questionnaires for servicemembers from our population of interest are not in the central repository, DOD does not have reasonable assurance that all members of this vulnerable population of active component, Reserve, and National Guard servicemembers that deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan were administered the PDHRA questionnaire, which is intended to help identify deployment-related health concerns that emerge over time and facilitate the opportunity for servicemembers to address these concerns. The office’s documentation does not allow DOD to have reasonable assurance that potential problems that may relate to the welfare and safety of servicemembers have been addressed and resolved. More broadly, the RHRP office also uses the four methods to monitor whether the objective of the PDHRA program—to identify and address servicemembers’ health concerns that emerge over time following deployments—is being met for Reserve component servicemembers. The RHRP office receives several periodic reports that DOD requires from LHI on LHI’s administration of the PDHRA to Reserve component servicemembers. An RHRP official told us that the office reviews LHI’s reports to examine data related to the administration of the PDHRA and identifies potential problems that could pose risks to servicemembers and the objective of the PDHRA program. Inspections of the administration of PDHRA. Feedback on the administration of the PDHRA from military service officials. Weekly telephone discussions with LHI staff. DOD Generally Does Not Clearly Document Its Monitoring of the PDHRA Program
When monitoring the administration of the PDHRA to Reserve component servicemembers, DOD does not maintain clear documentation that is consistent with good management practices outlined in federal internal control standards. In our review of the documentation related to 15 potential problems we selected, we found that the RHRP office’s documentation generally did not clearly describe the problem, the actions taken to address the problem, and whether these actions have resolved the problem. In addition, servicemembers are not eligible to fill out a PDHRA questionnaire until 90 to 180 days after they have returned from deployment. To determine how DOD monitors the administration of the PDHRA to Reserve component servicemembers, we reviewed DOD’s policies for monitoring its contract with Logistics Health, Inc. (LHI), the contractor that administers the PDHRA to Reserve component servicemembers. Appendix III: Post-Deployment Health Reassessment Questionnaires in DOD’s Central Repository and Services’ Databases
Department of Defense (DOD) policy requires that the military services electronically submit post-deployment health reassessment (PDHRA) questionnaires to DOD’s central repository, which DOD uses as a key source of health surveillance information. On April 15, 2009, we found that for approximately 23 percent of the roughly 319,000 servicemembers who, according to DOD deployment data, returned from deployment to Iraq or Afghanistan between January 1, 2007, and May 31, 2008, we could not identify questionnaires in the central repository (see table 2). | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) implemented the post-deployment health reassessment (PDHRA), which is required to be administered to servicemembers 90 to 180 days after their return from deployment. DOD established the PDHRA program to identify and address servicemembers' health concerns that emerge over time following deployments. This report is the second in response to a Senate Armed Services Committee report directing the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to review DOD's administration of the PDHRA, and to additional congressional requests. In this report, GAO examined (1) the extent to which DOD's central repository contains PDHRA questionnaires for active and Reserve component servicemembers who returned from deployment to Iraq or Afghanistan and (2) how DOD monitors the administration of the PDHRA to Reserve component servicemembers. To conduct this review, GAO performed a quantitative analysis using DOD deployment and PDHRA data, reviewed relevant PDHRA policies, and interviewed DOD officials.
What GAO Found
DOD policy requires that the military services electronically submit PDHRA questionnaires to DOD's central repository. Based on two separate queries to this repository in 2009, GAO did not find PDHRA questionnaires for a substantial percentage of the 319,000 active and Reserve component servicemembers who returned from deployment to Iraq or Afghanistan between January 1, 2007, and May 31, 2008. GAO's first query on April 15, 2009, showed that only 77 percent of this population of interest had questionnaires in the central repository, leaving approximately 74,000 servicemembers without questionnaires in the repository. On September 4, 2009, GAO queried DOD's central repository again to update its April 2009 data and found that DOD's central repository was still missing PDHRA questionnaires for about 72,000 servicemembers, or 23 percent of the servicemembers in GAO's original population of interest. When PDHRA questionnaires are not in DOD's central repository, DOD does not have reasonable assurance that servicemembers to whom the PDHRA requirement applies were given the opportunity to fill out the questionnaire and identify and address health concerns that could emerge over time following deployment. DOD uses four methods to monitor the contractor, Logistics Health, Inc. (LHI), that administers the PDHRA to Reserve component servicemembers. The four monitoring methods are: (1) reviews of periodic reports from LHI; (2) inspections of LHI's administration of the PDHRA; (3) feedback on LHI's administration of the PDHRA from military service officials; and (4) weekly telephone discussions with LHI staff. These methods are used to help ensure that the objective of the PDHRA program is being met for Reserve component servicemembers. Through these methods, DOD identified a number of potential problems that may pose risks to the PDHRA program objective and to the welfare and safety of Reserve component servicemembers. However, GAO found that when monitoring the administration of the PDHRA to Reserve component servicemembers, DOD does not maintain clear documentation that is consistent with federal internal control standards. GAO found that the documentation generated by DOD generally did not clearly describe the potential problems, the actions taken to address the problems, and whether these actions had resolved the problems. Overall, this lack of clear documentation does not allow DOD to have reasonable assurance that potential problems related to the administration of the PDHRA to Reserve component servicemembers have been addressed and resolved. |
gao_GAO-02-94T | gao_GAO-02-94T_0 | Background
With WIA, the Congress sought to replace the fragmented employment and training system that existed under the previous workforce system. Among other things, WIA sought to streamline program services at one-stop centers; offer job seekers the ability to make informed choices about training, and provide private-sector leadership to manage this new workforce development system. Although both Education and Labor have provided information to states and local implementers about how to interpret WIA’s requirements, according to state and local implementers we interviewed, the guidance does little to specifically address the concerns about how to integrate services while not adversely affecting target populations or violating program requirements. Training Options May Become Limited as Training Providers Drop Out of the System
Although training providers are making efforts to participate in the WIA system, they believe that the new data collection and reporting requirements it imposed are too burdensome to warrant their participation in the system, especially given the few individuals sent to training. As a result, they are reducing the number of course offerings they make available under WIA–in effect, reducing the training options from which WIA job seekers have to choose. | What GAO Found
The Workforce Investment Act was passed in 1998 to unify a fragmented employment and training system. The act sought to change the workforce development system by streamlining the delivery of employment and training services, enabling job seekers to make informed choices among training providers and course offerings and enhancing the private-sector role. During the early stages of the act's implementation, state and local implementers were challenged by the significant changes to the workforce system. Mandatory partners have concerns about how to participate in one-stops without adversely affecting their respective target populations, violating their own programs' rules, or straining their financial resources. Training providers have struggled to find ways to effectively meet the act's data collection and reporting requirements that they believe are burdensome and, as a result, have reduced the courses offered to job seekers. |
gao_GAO-03-18 | gao_GAO-03-18_0 | Figure 1 shows the Exhibit OP-31 template as it appears in DOD’s Financial Management Regulation. Reports Do Not Provide Congress with Actual and Complete Information on Spare Parts Spending
DOD’s June 2001 and February 2002 reports did not provide Congress with an actual and complete picture of spare parts spending. Because the reports have not cited actual spending and have not been complete, they do not provide Congress with reasonable assurance about the amount of funds being spent on spares. As a result, they have less value to Congress and other decision makers in the Department during their annual deliberations about (1) how best to allocate future operations and maintenance resources to reduce spare parts shortages and improve military readiness and (2) when to make future resource allocation decisions about modernizing the force. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO was asked by the Department of Defense (DOD) to identify ways to improve DOD's availability of high-quality spare parts for aircraft, ships, vehicles, and weapons systems.
What GAO Found
DOD's recent reports do not provide an accurate and complete picture of spare parts funding as required by financial management regulation. As a result, the reports do not provide Congress with reasonable assurance about the amount of funds being spent on spare parts. Furthermore, the reports are of limited use to Congress as it makes decisions on how best to spend resources to reduce spare parts shortages and improve military readiness. |
gao_GAO-04-581 | gao_GAO-04-581_0 | Among other things, this act authorized 3-year grants for student mentoring programs. Congress has increased funding for fiscal year 2004. Key Elements of Successful Mentoring Programs Are Planning, Management, Sustainability, and Evaluation
According to the literature we reviewed, prior to implementation, successful mentoring programs make key decisions about which youth they will serve and expected outcomes, how they will recruit mentors, and how the program will be funded; put in place management structures, such as screening, training, and recruitment policies and procedures to ensure that the program is well-managed on a daily basis; market their programs and pursue strategies to ensure long-term program viability; and evaluate program outcomes and disseminate outcome information to key stakeholders to further garner and sustain support for their programs. 1.) Mentoring Grantees Shared Many Characteristics and Had Some Elements of Successful Programs, but Ease of Implementation Differed among New and Established Grantees
Most of the mentoring grantees Education funded were similar in many respects—most grantees had considerable experience operating mentoring programs, had similar goals for youth, and matched one mentor with one youth. 2.) 3.) 4.) All Grantees Had Some Elements of Successful Programs, though in General More Established Grantees Reported Fewer Implementation Challenges than Newer Grantees
According to grantee applications, all grantees had some of the key elements of successful programs: initial plans for the program design and operations, including for example the number and characteristics of youth served; policies and procedures for program management such as mentor screening and training; and program evaluation activities that include an assessment of program outcomes. 5.) However, officials did not review findings from grantees’ single audit reports. Agency officials also asked grantees questions to assess the extent to which grantees have hired staff and how much staff turnover they have encountered. Education officials told us that the Office of the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) within Education receives and reviews single audit reports. According to Education officials, this office did not forward information to the OSDFS officials responsible for monitoring mentoring grants because none of the information in the single audit reports pertained to the mentoring grants. How well these grantees handled other funds they received from Education could suggest how well they would manage their mentoring grant funds. We found that 8 percent of the mentoring grantees had problems with respect to other Education grants they received that were substantial enough to be reported as audit findings. Education Considering Conducting National Study of Mentoring Programs to Augment the Evaluations It Has Required Grantees to Submit
Education is currently considering whether or not it will undertake a study of its mentoring program. Most grantees plan to do a descriptive evaluation by reporting information on youth outcomes, particularly those related to academic achievement, incidences of harmful behavior, attendance, and drop out rates. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of Education (1) explore ways to facilitate the sharing of successful practices and lessons learned to help new grantees more quickly and effectively implement their programs; (2) ensure that the Office of Safe and Drug Free Schools uses grantees’ single audit reports as part of its monitoring process to take advantage of all monitoring tools that could improve the identification of fiscal and programmatic weaknesses; and (3) undertake a national study of mentoring program outcomes and in doing so, explore the feasibility of examining the effectiveness of the mentoring program in improving youth outcomes and consider collecting limited, uniform data on the next wave of mentoring grantees that could be used as the basis for such study. Related GAO Products
No Child Left Behind Act: More information Would Help States Determine Which Teachers Are Highly Qualified. | Why GAO Did This Study
As part of the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLBA) of 2001, the Congress authorized a 3-year, $17 million per year school-based mentoring grant program. For fiscal year 2004, Congress has increased funding to about $50 million to fund additional mentoring efforts. Congress requested that GAO provide information on the student mentoring program. To do this, GAO answered the following questions: (1) What are the basic elements, policies, and procedures of successful mentoring programs? (2) What are the key characteristics of NCLBA-funded mentoring efforts, including the extent to which they have the basic elements, policies, and procedures of successful mentoring programs? (3) How does the Department of Education monitor program implementation? (4) What are Education's and grantees' plans to assess program outcomes?
What GAO Found
According to the literature GAO reviewed, successful mentoring programs (1) plan their programs carefully prior to implementation; (2) develop policies and procedures to effectively manage their programs, including mentor screening and training; (3) ensure program sustainability through marketing; and (4) evaluate program outcomes and disseminate their evaluation findings. Most of the 121 mentoring grantees that Education funded shared many characteristics--most had 5 years or more of experience mentoring youth, had similar goals, and offered "one-to-one" mentoring. All mentoring grantees listed in their applications that they had some elements of successful programs, but established grantees GAO visited reported fewer implementation challenges, such as problems recruiting mentors, than did newer grantees. Most of the 11 grantees GAO visited said they would benefit from learning about other implementation strategies through information sharing. However, Education has not facilitated information sharing among mentoring grantees, although it is considering doing so. Education used multiple methods to monitor grantees, including expenditure tracking, but the office responsible for monitoring mentoring grants did not review single audit reports as required by its guidance. Education's Chief Financial Officer reviewed the audits but did not forward audits to the office overseeing the mentoring grants because findings did not pertain to these new grants. However, GAO found that 8 percent of the mentoring grantees had audit findings related to how well they handled other Education grants. Education is currently assessing whether it will conduct an overall evaluation of its mentoring program. Education required that all grantees have evaluation plans, and most plan to report on youth outcomes related to academic achievement and attendance. However, grantees plan to use different methodologies, making it difficult for Education to have a cohesive picture of its mentoring program as a whole. |
gao_GAO-04-284 | gao_GAO-04-284_0 | Of the federal funds provided for public television, the Corporation is directed to distribute 75 percent of such funds among licensees of public television stations and 25 percent for support of national public television programming. Of the funds allocated for public television, 75 percent is to be made available for distribution among licensees of stations and 25 percent for national public television programming. However, over 40 percent of licensees in our survey responded that the projects have not resulted in practical methods for reducing costs or enhancing revenues in their own operations. Moreover, our legal review of this program determined that the Corporation’s approach of supporting these projects, in part, with funds designated for distribution among licensees is not consistent with the statutory authority under which the Corporation operates. The Corporation provides PBS with an annual grant to help support its National Program Service, a package of children’s and prime-time series that are broadcast by most public television stations. While our survey shows that over half of the licensees indicated that changes are needed in the selection process for the PBS National Program Service, most respondents nevertheless indicated satisfaction with the extent to which the Service’s programming helps them meet the missions of their stations. After consultation with representatives of the public television community, the Corporation directed these funds toward providing grants to licensees for acquiring digital transmission equipment. However, some licensees did not receive their grants in a timely manner and cited this as contributing to their failure to meet FCC’s initial May 2003 deadline for constructing digital transmission facilities. In addition, the Corporation, licensees, and other public television stakeholders have emphasized the importance of support for the production of digital content as part of the transition. About 85 percent of the licensees responding to our survey indicated that successful completion of the digital transition would improve their ability to serve their communities to a great or moderate extent. The Corporation received an initial $10 million appropriation for fiscal year 2004 for this purpose. working group—funded by the Corporation and comprised of Corporation and PBS officials, as well as public television licensees—highlighted this need in a 2003 report, which stated that the digital transition provides public television with an opportunity to reposition itself to carry out its mission if it is willing to create digital services that are “more responsive to the needs of our constituents and cheaper, simpler, smaller, and more convenient to use.”
Noting that 2 years’ advance time may be needed to plan, develop, and launch digital services, and that digital production costs are generally higher than the costs of creating analog programming, the Corporation has characterized the need for digital content and research as “even more pressing” due to the limited availability of past federal funding for the digital transition. Most licensees responding to our survey supported the existing statutory allocation of the Corporation’s television funds between licensees and national programming and were generally satisfied with the Corporation’s process for periodically reviewing the eligibility criteria for distributing funds through Community Service Grants. As for local programming, most licensees indicated that the amount of local programming they produced was not sufficient to meet their communities’ needs, largely due to their limited financial resources. Scope and Methodology
Our objectives were to review the Corporation’s activities and obtain the views of public television station officials regarding: (1) the statutory allocations for federal funding of public television; (2) the distribution of funds by the Corporation through its Community Service Grant and Television Future Fund programs, including a legal analysis of whether the funding of the Television Future Fund program is consistent with the Corporation’s underlying statutory authority; (3) the distribution of funds by the Corporation for PBS’s National Program Service and for local programming; and (4) Corporation funding to assist public television stations in their transition to digital technologies and services. Not all applicants received funding. | Why GAO Did This Study
For fiscal year 2002 (the most recent data), the Corporation for Public Broadcasting provided about 16 percent of public television's revenues of $1.63 billion. GAO agreed to review the statutory allocations for federal funding of public television, the Corporation's distribution of funds through its Community Service Grant and Television Future Fund programs, its distribution of funds for the Public Broadcasting Service's National Program Service and for local programming, and its grant programs for assisting public television's transition to digital technologies and services.
What GAO Found
By statute, 75 percent of the Corporation's annual federal funding for public television is to be distributed among licensees of public television stations, and 25 percent is to be available to the Corporation for the support of national public television programming. In our survey of all 176 licensees, of which 85 percent responded, more than three-fifths favored maintaining the current allocations. Of those favoring a change, most proposed an increase in the allocation for distribution among licensees. The Corporation uses Community Service Grants as the primary means of distributing funding to licensees. Most licensees were generally satisfied with the recent consultation process for reviewing the eligibility criteria for these grants. Another program, the Television Future Fund, awarded grants to projects designed to reduce licensees' operational costs and enhance revenues. Only about 40 percent of the licensees indicated that these projects had resulted in practical methods to help their stations, and only about 30 percent agreed with the Corporation's approach of using funds designated for distribution among licensees to partly support these projects. In our legal view, the use of such funds for this purpose is not consistent with the statutory authority under which the Corporation operates. The Corporation provides an annual grant to the Public Broadcasting Service to help fund a package of children's and prime-time programming that make up the National Program Service. Most licensees favored continuation of the Corporation's funding, noting that this national programming helps them meet their educational and cultural missions and build community support for their stations. Licensees also indicated that local programming is important in serving their communities. However, most responded that they do not produce enough local programs to meet their communities' needs, and many cited a lack of funds as the reason. About 85 percent of the licensees responding to our survey indicated that the congressionally mandated transition from analog to digital broadcasting will improve their ability to provide local services to their communities. The Corporation has received appropriations to help support this transition since fiscal year 2001. In consultation with licensees, the Corporation has used these funds to provide licensees with grants for acquiring digital transmission equipment. Some grantees, however, did not receive their awards in time to meet FCC deadlines for the construction of digital transmission facilities. In addition, the Corporation received only a few grant applications during the latter part of 2003. Our survey indicates that most licensees' priorities now involve other aspects of the transition, some of which (including digital production equipment and development of digital content) were not included in the scope of the grant programs. The Corporation is also seeking funds for digitally based infrastructure improvements for distributing public television programming to stations and is working with public television stakeholders to develop a strategic plan that includes the creation of digital content. |
gao_RCED-99-47 | gao_RCED-99-47_0 | I for a map of the Recreation Area.) The SNRA’s budget for 1993 was part of a 2-year funding peak brought about by the funding of several special projects. Our analysis shows that if these types of funds are consistently excluded from the 1993 and 1997 budgets, the decrease in the SNRA’s budget from 1993 through 1997 was about 26 percent. Our analysis of agency data shows that the SNRA’s spending for these programs for fiscal years 1993 through 1997 decreased—57 percent for enhancing recreation, 21 percent for preserving conservation values, and 44 percent for managing commodity programs. Enhancing Recreation
The SNRA’s spending for enhancing recreation decreased from $1.8 million in 1993 to $783,100 in 1997—a decrease of about 57 percent. Preserving Conservation Values
The SNRA’s spending to preserve conservation values decreased 21 percent, from $586,200 in 1993 to $461,200 in 1997. As with the recreation and conservation programs, officials said that the reduction in funds for other programs has an impact on the accomplishments and unmet needs in the commodity programs. We found no instances in which funds were allocated to the SNRA and subsequently taken back by the forest or region for other projects. Overall, representatives of the communities that are affected by the SNRA’s management said that the Forest Service had done a good job of preserving the values that the SNRA was created to preserve. We did not determine the amount of these costs. Horse-pack outfitters on the SNRA also have stated that the Recreation Area’s actions are hurting their operations economically and reducing the number of people they can serve. The SNRA reduced the size of horse-pack groups to meet specific objectives of the Wilderness Act that provide that wilderness lands are to be managed so that they generally appear to have been affected primarily by the forces of nature and that they provide outstanding opportunities for solitude. These reductions have closed grazing areas, shortened grazing seasons, and increased ranchers’ grazing costs. In addition, the Forest Service also commented that we did not fully disclose the Sawtooth National Recreation Area’s accomplishments and unmet needs in three areas discussed in the report—recreation, conservation, and commodities. As the report points out, the Recreation Area’s overall budget decreased by 54 percent and its budget for enhancing recreation decreased by 57 percent from 1993 through 1997. In computing these decreases, we included funds for recreation construction. To determine whether regional or forest funds had not been allocated to the SNRA or whether funds had been allocated and then taken back during fiscal years 1993 through 1997 and what was done with those funds, we obtained and compared final budget allocations with expenditures. To identify examples of potentially adverse effects of the SNRA’s actions on individuals, companies, and communities economically dependent on the area, we reviewed and analyzed the testimony presented at the February 16, 1998, hearing on the SNRA before the Subcommittee on Forests and Public Land Management of the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources. SNRA budget (millions)
SNRA budget without special funds (millions)
Percentage change (1993-97)
1997 constant dollars in millions Percentage change (1993-97)
Funds the SNRA Spent for Recreation, Conservation, and Commodity Programs From 1993 Through 1997
Table IV.1 shows the funds the SNRA spent to enhance recreation, preserve conservation values, and manage commodity programs for fiscal years 1993 through 1997. The figures shown in the table include those from funds allocated for special projects, such as the funds for the multiyear recreation initiative and for the construction of recreation facilities. If these items are excluded from the analysis, the decrease in spending for enhancing recreation is about 19 percent rather than 57 percent. The figure for fiscal year 1993 is for the Snake River Adjudication project. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the Sawtooth National Recreation Area's (SNRA) funding, its accomplishments and unmet needs, and on agency actions that have adverse impacts on the area, focusing on: (1) the funds allocated to the SNRA for fiscal years 1993 through 1997; (2) spending for fiscal years 1993 through 1997 to enhance recreation, to preserve conservation values, such as fish and wildlife, and to manage commodity programs, such as grazing, and the accomplishments and unmet needs in these areas; (3) the funds not allocated or the funds allocated and then taken back from the Recreation Area for fiscal years 1993 through 1997 and what was done with those funds; and (4) some examples of potentially adverse effects of how the Recreation Area is managed on individuals, companies, and communities economically dependent on the area.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) SNRA's overall annual budget allocation decreased in constant dollars from about $4.88 million in 1993 to about $2.25 million in 1997--a decrease of about 54 percent; (2) this rather large decrease is somewhat misleading--1993 was the second year of a 2-year funding peak in the Recreation Area's budgets; (3) these peak budgets contained: (a) special funding for recreation management that dramatically decreased in the 1994 budget; (b) funds for the construction of recreation facilities; and (c) funds for land aquisition; (4) SNRA reduced spending between fiscal years 1993 and 1997 for activities such as enhancing recreation, preserving conservation values, and managing commodity programs; (5) spending for enhancing recreation decreased about 57 percent from 1993 through 1997; (6) similarly, spending to preserve conservation values decreased 21 percent from 1993 through 1997; (7) spending for commodities programs decreased 44 percent from 1993 through 1997; (8) however, the size of these decreases is somewhat misleading because of the funds included for special projects and construction in the 1993 budget; (9) if the funds for these special projects and construction are excluded, spending decreased 19 percent for enhancing recreation, and expenditures for preserving conservation values decreased by 9 percent; (10) SNRA officials stated that because of funding shortages, a number of needs were still unmet; (11) GAO did not identify any instances in which funds that were allocated to the Recreation Area were subsequently taken back for use by other Forest Service units; (12) overall, representatives from local governments affected by how the SNRA is managed said that the Forest Service has done a good job of preserving the values that the Recreation Area was created to preserve; (13) however, they said that the declining budgets for the Recreation Area have reduced its ability to meet recreational needs; (14) the Recreation Area placed restrictions and increased requirements on river outfitters, limited the size of groups that horse-pack outfitters can take on wilderness trips, and reduced the amount of grazing allowed on its lands; (15) GAO found that the actions taken by the Recreation Area that affected these groups were taken to protect endangered salmon, rangelands, and wilderness--rather than because of funding reductions; and (16) except for the effects on some ranchers who had large reductions in their grazing privileges, from a monetary standpoint, the adverse impacts on these groups appeared to be small. |
gao_GAO-12-844 | gao_GAO-12-844_0 | Background
Natural disasters, such as droughts, floods, hurricanes, and other adverse weather events, pose risks to agricultural producers. Disaster Assistance Programs Leave Few Gaps in Coverage for Small Agricultural Producers
The 10 FSA and SBA disaster assistance programs we identified that small agricultural producers and businesses that support agriculture can use to recover from natural disasters provide assistance that can cover most losses. Awareness and Eligibility Issues Limit Small Aquaculture and Nursery Producers’ Participation in Disaster Assistance Programs
Three main factors may limit small aquaculture and nursery producers’ participation in the 6 of the 10 disaster assistance programs for which they could be eligible. Third, some producers applied but did not qualify because they did not meet certain program requirements. In general, these producers do not have a past or current relationship with FSA or SBA. Therefore, aquaculture and nursery producers may be missing opportunities to receive assistance that could help them maintain a viable business after experiencing a natural disaster. FSA and SBA Efforts to Collaborate on Disaster Assistance to Small Aquaculture and Nursery Producers Are Limited
FSA and SBA engaged in some efforts to collaborate in providing disaster assistance to small aquaculture and nursery producers, but the efforts were limited to referring producers from one agency to the other without identifying the assistance that may be available to these producers. Both FSA national-level officials and state-level Emergency Loan officials told us that FSA field staff know little about SBA’s disaster assistance programs, and SBA staff know little about what factors affect whether an agricultural loan will be repaid. As we reported in October 2005, agencies that have complementary programs can enhance the value of these programs through interagency collaboration. Without more formal collaboration, applicants for disaster assistance may not be consistently referred by one agency to the other, leading to fewer opportunities for these small producers to get assistance for which they otherwise might qualify, and the value of these disaster assistance programs is diminished for aquaculture and nursery producers. Conclusions
FSA’s and SBA’s 10 disaster assistance programs serve largely different populations but can provide an important safety net to help small agricultural producers recover from disasters. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help ensure that small aquaculture and nursery producers are aware of the disaster assistance programs available to them, we recommend that the Secretary of Agriculture and the Administrator of the Small Business Administration direct FSA and SBA officials to take the following two actions:
Conduct targeted outreach to small aquaculture and nursery producers, for example, by building on existing agency outreach programs. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives for this engagement were to (1) examine selected U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) Farm Service Agency (FSA) and Small Business Administration (SBA) disaster assistance programs and the types of small agricultural producers that they cover; (2) identify the main factors, if any, that may limit small aquaculture and nursery producers’ participation in disaster assistance from FSA and SBA; and (3) examine FSA and SBA efforts to collaborate in providing disaster assistance to small aquaculture and nursery producers. | Why GAO Did This Study
Farmers and other agricultural producers are exposed to natural disasters, such as droughts, floods, hurricanes, and tornadoes. In the aftermath of such events, FSA and SBA disaster assistance programs can provide an important safety net for these producers. However, after past natural disasters, industry groups and others have raised concerns that some small agricultural producersparticularly aquaculture (such as farmed fish and shellfish) and nursery (such as trees and plants) producersreported being ineligible to obtain this assistance.
GAO was asked to (1) examine FSA and SBA disaster assistance programs and the coverage they provide to small producers; (2) identify the main factors, if any, that may limit small aquaculture and nursery producers participation in these disaster assistance programs; and (3) examine FSA and SBA efforts to collaborate in providing such assistance to these producers. GAO reviewed the 10 FSA and SBA disaster assistance programs that become available following a natural disaster and that provide direct financial assistance or loans to these producers, interviewed agency officials and industry representatives, and reviewed agency documents and regulations.
What GAO Found
The U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) Farm Service Agency (FSA) and the Small Business Administration (SBA) have 10 disaster assistance programs that small agricultural producers and businesses that support agriculture can use to recover from natural disasters. These programs serve largely different populations but leave few gaps in the disaster assistance available to most small agricultural producers. Aquaculture and nursery producers could be eligible for six of these programs, but their participation is limited by awareness and eligibility issues.
GAO identified three factors that may limit small aquaculture and nursery producers' participation in the 6 disaster assistance programs for which they could be eligible. In particular, the producers are often not aware of the programs, have other options for assistance, or do not qualify because they do not meet certain program requirements. Both FSA and SBA conduct outreach related to their disaster assistance programs, but neither agency has specifically targeted its efforts toward small aquaculture and nursery producers. As a result, eligible producers are missing opportunities to obtain assistance that could help them maintain a viable business after experiencing a natural disaster.
FSA and SBA engaged in some informal efforts to collaborate in providing disaster assistance to small aquaculture and nursery producers. However, the efforts were limited because FSA field staff know little about SBA's disaster assistance programs, and SBA staff know little about the factors that affect whether an agricultural loan will be repaid. GAO has reported that agencies with complementary programs can enhance the value of these programs through interagency collaboration. Without more formal collaboration, small producers may not be consistently referred by one agency to the other, leading to fewer opportunities for these small producers to get assistance for which they otherwise might qualify.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that USDA and SBA target outreach to small aquaculture and nursery producers, for example, by building on existing outreach, and develop a strategy to formally collaborate on disaster assistance for such producers. USDA and SBA generally concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_T-AIMD-98-161 | gao_T-AIMD-98-161_0 | Risk of Year 2000 Disruptions Requires Leadership
The public faces the risk that critical services could be severely disrupted by the Year 2000 computing crisis. Our reviews of federal agency Year 2000 programs have found uneven progress, and our reports contain numerous recommendations, which the agencies have almost universally agreed to implement. As we testified in March, there are a number of actions we believe the Council must take to avert this crisis. We see significant progress at SSA, and it is essential that this progress continue. SSA has been anticipating the change of century since 1989, initiating an early response to the potential crisis. We found that HCFA had not required systems contractors to submit Year 2000 plans for approval. Further, it did not have contracts or other specific legal agreements with any contractors, other than one recently selected contractor, stating how or when the Year 2000 problem would be corrected, or whether contractors would certify that they would correct the problem. HCFA had also not identified critical areas of responsibility for Year 2000 activities. We are currently evaluating the effectiveness of HCFA’s actions, at the request of the Senate Special Committee on Aging. Department of the Treasury
With respect to the Department of the Treasury, we must first point out that—unlike with Social Security and Medicare—we have not completed a thorough assessment of the Department’s Year 2000 readiness. However, the Department’s progress in making systems Year 2000 compliant has been mixed. Treasury Year 2000 program officials are aware of these and other related risks facing the Department, and have established program management structures and processes to address them, which we are presently evaluating. As our guidance points out, business area priorities and system dependencies must be examined in light of possible Year 2000-induced failures; contingency planning to help ensure continuity of business operations must then be developed and tested. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the computing challenges that the upcoming change of century poses to virtually all major organizations, public and private, including government programs with a high degree of interaction with the public.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the public faces the risk that critical services could be severely disrupted by the year 2000 computing crisis; (2) GAO's reviews of federal agency year 2000 programs have found uneven progress, and GAO reports contain numerous recommendations, which the agencies have almost universally agreed to implement; (3) there are a number of actions GAO believes the President's Council on Year 2000 Conversion must take to avert the year 2000 crisis; (4) GAO has seen significant progress at the Social Security Administration (SSA), and it is essential that this progress continue; (5) SSA has been anticipating the change of century since 1989, initiating an early response to the potential crisis; (6) GAO found that the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) had not required systems contractors to submit year 2000 plans for approval; (7) further, it did not have contracts or other specific legal agreements with any contractors, other than one recently selected contractor, stating how or when the year 2000 problem would be corrected, or whether contractors would certify that they would correct the problem; (8) HCFA had also not identified critical areas of responsibility for year 2000 activities; (9) GAO is currently evaluating the effectiveness of HCFA's actions to make their systems year 2000 compliant; (10) with respect to the Department of the Treasury, GAO must first point out that--unlike with Social Security and Medicare--GAO has not completed a thorough assessment of the Department's year 2000 readiness; (11) Treasury year 2000 program officials are aware of these and other related risks facing the Department, and have established program management structures and processes to address them, which GAO is presently evaluating; and (12) as GAO guidance points out, business area priorities and system dependencies must be examined in light of possible year 2000-induced failures; contingency planning to help ensure continuity of business operations must then be developed and tested. |
gao_GAO-01-723 | gao_GAO-01-723_0 | Demonstration Projects Have Tried Various Approaches and Included Some Activities Not Directly Related to Home Energy
Through the end of fiscal year 2000, OCS had awarded $30 million in REACH grants to states and tribal organizations for 54 projects (29 state and 25 tribal projects) to address the home heating and cooling needs of low-income households using a variety of approaches. Some REACH projects included social services not directly related to home energy needs. Some REACH projects have involved innovative activities. The legislation authorizing the REACH program requires that REACH project plans describe performance goals for each project, which are to include a reduction in the energy costs of participating households over 1 or more an increase in the regularity of home energy bill payments by eligible an increase in energy vendor (such as utility companies) contributions towards reducing energy burdens of eligible households. HHS Has Not Yet Planned How to Communicate REACH Project Successes and Lessons Learned
OCS has not yet planned how it can best communicate information to state officials and others about the results of REACH projects, such as what approaches prove to be the most successful in meeting the home energy needs of low-income households. While the evaluations conducted on the first year of state grants have many shortcomings that limit their usefulness in assessing project effectiveness, the REACH program recognizes the problems and has been taking steps to help improve future project evaluations. Families would reduce their demand for Low-Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP) payment assistance. Utility bills were to be obtained from energy suppliers. The project’s design and implementation allowed statistically valid conclusions to be made about the effect of project services on participant energy use. Appendix VIII: Comments From the Department of Health and Human Services
The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Health and Human Services’ letter dated July 23, 2001. 2. 3. 6. | What GAO Found
Rising prices for natural gas, electricity, and other fuels have made it even harder for low-income families to pay their utility bills. By the end of fiscal year 2000, the Office of Community Services had awarded $30 million in Residential Energy Assistance Challenge Option (REACH) program grants to 24 states and 12 tribal organizations to fund 54 separate projects to help meet the home energy (heating and cooling) needs of low-income households. These grants ranged from $50,000 to $1.6 million. Most of the 54 REACH projects have educated low-income clients about home energy efficiency through group workshops or on individual home visits. Many REACH projects have involved energy-related repairs to homes and budget counseling, and three state REACH projects are developing consumer cooperatives to purchase electricity or bulk fuels, such as heating oil. However, some REACH projects have included social services not directly related to meeting home energy needs. The legislation authorizing REACH identifies the following three performance goals for individual REACH projects, (1) reduce the energy costs of participating households, (2) increase the regularity of home energy bill payments, and (3) increase energy suppliers' contributions to reduce eligible households' energy burden. Of the six project evaluations completed by states as of May 2001, only one project's design and implementation allowed statistically valid conclusions to be made about the effect of project services on participant energy use. The five other state project evaluations had analytical problems and other shortcomings that limited their usefulness in assessing project results. The Department of Health and Human Services has not yet developed a comprehensive plan for how it can best communicate summary information on best practices and lessons learned from the REACH program. |
gao_GAO-14-369 | gao_GAO-14-369_0 | Background
Under NEPA, federal agencies are to evaluate the potential environmental effects of projects they are proposing by preparing either an Environmental Assessment (EA) or a more detailed Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), assuming no Categorical Exclusion (CE) applies. Agencies may prepare an EA to determine whether a proposed project is expected to have a potentially significant impact on the human environment. If a proposed project fits within a category of activities that an agency has already determined normally does not have the potential for significant environmental impacts—a CE—and the agency has established that category of activities in its NEPA implementing procedures, then it generally need not prepare an EA or EIS. Data on the Number and Type of Most NEPA Analyses Are Not Readily Available
Governmentwide data on the number and type of most NEPA analyses are not readily available, as data collection efforts vary by agency (see app. EPA publishes and maintains governmentwide information on EISs. Many Agencies Do Not Routinely Track the Number of EAs or CEs, but CEQ Estimates That EAs and CEs Comprise Most NEPA Analyses
Many agencies do not routinely track the number of EAs or CEs. However, based on information provided to CEQ by federal agencies, CEQ estimates that about 95 percent of NEPA analyses are CEs, less than 5 percent are EAs, and less than 1 percent are EISs. Projects requiring an EIS are a small portion of all projects but are likely to be high-profile, complex, and expensive. As the Congressional Research Service (CRS) noted in its 2011 report on NEPA, determining the total number of federal actions subject to NEPA is difficult, since most agencies track only the number of actions requiring an EIS. Little Information Exists on the Costs and Benefits of Completing NEPA Analyses
Little information exists at the agencies we reviewed on the costs and benefits of completing NEPA analyses. Complicating matters, agency activities under NEPA are hard to separate from other environmental review tasks under federal laws, such as the Clean Water Act and the Endangered Species Act; executive orders; agency guidance; and state and local laws. EPA officials also told us that there is no governmentwide mechanism to track the costs of completing EISs. However, DOE tracks limited cost data associated with NEPA analyses. DOE’s median EIS contractor cost was $1.4 million over that time period. For context, a 2003 task force report to CEQ—the only available source of governmentwide cost estimates—estimated that an EIS typically cost from $250,000 to $2 million. In comparison, DOE’s payments to contractors to produce an EA ranged from $3,000 to $1.2 million with a median cost of $65,000 from calendar year 2003 through calendar year 2012, according to DOE data. Information on the Benefits of Completing NEPA Analyses Is Largely Qualitative
According to agency officials, information on the benefits of completing NEPA analyses is largely qualitative. According to studies and agency officials, some of the qualitative benefits of NEPA include its role as a tool for encouraging transparency and public participation and in discovering and addressing the potential effects of a proposal in the early design stages to avoid problems that could end up taking more time and being more costly in the long run. Some Information Is Available on the Frequency and Outcome of NEPA Litigation
Some information is available on the frequency and outcome of NEPA litigation. Agency data, interviews with agency officials, and available studies indicate that most NEPA analyses do not result in litigation, although the impact of litigation could be substantial if a lawsuit affects numerous federal decisions or actions in several states. The federal government prevails in most NEPA litigation, according to CEQ and NAEP data, and legal studies. In 2011, the most recent data available, CEQ reported 94 NEPA cases, down from the average of 129 cases filed per year from 2001 through 2008. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This appendix provides information on the scope of work and the methodology used to collect information on how we described the (1) number and type of National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) analyses, (2) costs and benefits of completing those analyses, and (3) frequency and outcomes of related litigation. We included available information on both costs and benefits to be consistent with standard economic principles for evaluating federal programs and generally accepted government auditing standards. Our findings for these agencies are not generalizeable to other federal agencies. To assess the availability of information to respond to these objectives, we (1) conducted a literature search and review with the assistance of a technical librarian; (2) reviewed our past work on NEPA and studies from the Congressional Research Service; (3) obtained documents and analyses from federal agencies; and (4) interviewed officials who oversee federal NEPA programs from the Departments of Defense, Energy, the Interior, Justice, and Transportation; the Forest Service within the Department of Agriculture; the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA); the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) within the Executive Office of the President; and individuals with expertise from academia and the National Association of Environmental Professionals (NAEP)—a professional association representing private and government NEPA practitioners. Department of Energy (DOE). | Why GAO Did This Study
NEPA requires all federal agencies to evaluate the potential environmental effects of proposed projects—such as roads or bridges—on the human environment. Agencies prepare an EIS when a project will have a potentially significant impact on the environment. They may prepare an EA to determine whether a project will have a significant potential impact. If a project fits within a category of activities determined to have no significant impact—a CE—then an EA or an EIS is generally not necessary. The adequacy of these analyses has been a focus of litigation.
GAO was asked to review issues related to costs, time frames, and litigation associated with completing NEPA analyses. This report describes information on the (1) number and type of NEPA analyses, (2) costs and benefits of completing those analyses, and (3) frequency and outcomes of related litigation. GAO included available information on both costs and benefits to be consistent with standard economic principles for evaluating federal programs, and selected the Departments of Defense, Energy, the Interior, and Transportation, and the USDA Forest Service for analysis because they generally complete the most NEPA analyses. GAO reviewed documents and interviewed individuals from federal agencies, academia, and professional groups with expertise in NEPA analyses and litigation. GAO's findings are not generalizeable to agencies other than those selected.
This report has no recommendations. GAO provided a draft to CEQ and agency officials for review and comment, and they generally agreed with GAO's findings.
What GAO Found
Governmentwide data on the number and type of most National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) analyses are not readily available, as data collection efforts vary by agency. NEPA generally requires federal agencies to evaluate the potential environmental effects of actions they propose to carry out, fund, or approve (e.g., by permit) by preparing analyses of different comprehensiveness depending on the significance of a proposed project's effects on the environment—from the most detailed Environmental Impact Statements (EIS) to the less comprehensive Environmental Assessments (EA) and Categorical Exclusions (CE). Agencies do not routinely track the number of EAs or CEs, but the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ)—the entity within the Executive Office of the President that oversees NEPA implementation—estimates that about 95 percent of NEPA analyses are CEs, less than 5 percent are EAs, and less than 1 percent are EISs. Projects requiring an EIS are a small portion of all projects but are likely to be high-profile, complex, and expensive. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) maintains governmentwide information on EISs. A 2011 Congressional Research Service report noted that determining the total number of federal actions subject to NEPA is difficult, since most agencies track only the number of actions requiring an EIS.
Little information exists on the costs and benefits of completing NEPA analyses. Agencies do not routinely track the cost of completing NEPA analyses, and there is no governmentwide mechanism to do so, according to officials from CEQ, EPA, and other agencies GAO reviewed. However, the Department of Energy (DOE) tracks limited cost data associated with NEPA analyses. DOE officials told GAO that they track the money the agency pays to contractors to conduct NEPA analyses. According to DOE data, its median EIS contractor cost for calendar years 2003 through 2012 was $1.4 million. For context, a 2003 task force report to CEQ—the only available source of governmentwide cost estimates—estimated that a typical EIS cost from $250,000 to $2 million. EAs and CEs generally cost less than EISs, according to CEQ and federal agencies. Information on the benefits of completing NEPA analyses is largely qualitative. According to studies and agency officials, some of the qualitative benefits of NEPA include its role in encouraging public participation and in discovering and addressing project design problems that could be more costly in the long run. Complicating the determination of costs and benefits, agency activities under NEPA are hard to separate from other required environmental analyses under federal laws such as the Endangered Species Act and the Clean Water Act; executive orders; agency guidance; and state and local laws.
Some information is available on the frequency and outcome of NEPA litigation. Agency data, interviews with agency officials, and available studies show that most NEPA analyses do not result in litigation, although the impact of litigation could be substantial if a single lawsuit affects numerous federal decisions or actions in several states. In 2011, the most recent data available, CEQ reported 94 NEPA cases filed, down from the average of 129 cases filed per year from calendar year 2001 through calendar year 2008. The federal government prevails in most NEPA litigation, according to CEQ and legal studies. |
gao_GAO-02-610 | gao_GAO-02-610_0 | However, the federal government does not yet have commonly accepted and authoritative definitions for key terms, such as homeland security. At the same time, we could not confirm that another key element, a definition of homeland security, was being addressed at the time we collected data for our report. Public and Private Sector Relationships Are Evolving
Partnerships are being established among federal, state, and local governments, and private sector entities to promote a unified homeland security approach. In terms of the private sector, partnerships between it and the public sector are forming, but they are not yet developed to the level of those in Y2K efforts, generally due to the emerging nature of homeland security. Nonetheless, some progress has been made. An Official, Governmentwide Definition of Homeland Security Does Not Exist
Commonly accepted definitions help provide assurance that organizational, management, and budgetary decisions are made consistently across the organizations involved in a crosscutting effort. In the interim, the potential exists for an uncoordinated approach to homeland security caused by duplication of efforts or gaps in coverage, misallocation of resources, and inadequate monitoring of expenditures. As shown in our previous reports on combating terrorism, duplication and gaps in coverage can occur when the nation’s capabilities are not effectively integrated. | Why GAO Did This Study
The issue of homeland security crosscuts numerous policy domains, impinging on the expertise and resources of every level of government, the private sector, and the international community.
What GAO Found
GAO found that although combating terrorism crossed organizational boundaries, it did not sufficiently coordinate the activities of the 40 federal entities involved, resulting in duplication and gaps in coverage. The homeland security efforts of public and private entities do not yet represent a unified approach, although key supporting elements for such an approach are emerging. Progress has been made in developing a framework to support a more unified effort. Other remaining key elements--a national strategy, establishment of public and private sector partnerships, and the definition of key terms--are either not in place yet or are evolving. At the same time, key terms, such as "homeland security," have not been defined officially; consequently, certain organizational, management, and budgetary decisions cannot currently be made across agencies. In the interim, the potential exists for an uncoordinated approach to homeland security that may lead to duplication of efforts or gaps in coverage, misallocation of resources, and inadequate monitoring of expenditures. |
gao_GAO-03-696 | gao_GAO-03-696_0 | Background
The Mint and BEP, which are part of the Treasury Department, produce the nation’s coins and currency. How Security Is Provided at the Mint, BEP, and Selected Other Organizations
The Mint and BEP use their own police forces to protect their facilities and the money they produce. Eight of the 12 coin and currency organizations in the other G7 nations responded to our requests for information. Four organizations reported that they only used their own security forces; 2 organizations said they used their own security forces supplemented with contractor personnel; 1 organization said it used an outside agency to supplement its own security force; and 1 organization said that it used an outside agency to provide its security. The six casino and banking businesses that we contacted, which handle large amounts of cash, used either their own security staff or contract staff. We reviewed these incidents with Mint and BEP security officials in terms of what happened, why, and how they occurred, and what steps have been taken to prevent thefts from recurring. Further, both the Mint and BEP have had threat assessments conducted regarding their facilities and have generally implemented the recommendations that were made to improve security. Thefts at the Mint
Although we requested that the Mint provide information on thefts that occurred during the past 10 years, the Mint indicated that it did not have records of thefts that occurred more than 5 years ago and provided records regarding incidents that occurred from 1998 through 2002. Thefts at BEP
BEP reported 11 incidents of theft from 1993 through 2002 involving about $1.8 million. Potential Benefits and Costs of Having the Secret Service Provide Mint and BEP Security
According to the Secret Service, if it were given the responsibility of protecting the Mint and BEP, those agencies could benefit from the Secret Service’s expertise in protection and criminal investigations. However, unlike the Secret Service’s Uniformed Division, the Mint and BEP police are already familiar with the coin and currency production processes, which is an advantage in identifying security risks. Potential Costs Associated with Having the Secret Service Protect the Mint and BEP
If the Secret Service protected the Mint and BEP, the government could incur additional costs because the Secret Service requires more initial training for its officers than the Mint and BEP police, Uniformed Division officers can retire with less government service than the Mint and BEP police, and the Secret Service would have to increase management and overhead to handle the additional workforce. The Mint Director said that the Mint concurred with the findings and conclusions that apply to the Mint. BEP and Secret Service liaisons with GAO provided by E-mail technical comments regarding the draft report, which we incorporated where appropriate, but did not provide overall comments on the report. We also asked the 12 coin and currency producing organizations in the six other G7 nations (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom); the Federal Reserve; and businesses that handle a large amount of cash, such as banks and casinos, about who provides their security, why, and whether they had experienced thefts of items in value of more than $1,000 in each incident during the last 10 years. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. Mint and the Bureau of Engraving and Printing (BEP), which produce the nation's coins and currency, provide their own security and have experienced some problems with theft by employees. Although security is necessary to carry out the agencies' missions, their primary function is producing money. In light of these thefts, a congressional committee asked GAO whether the Mint and BEP should continue to provide their own security or whether the United States Secret Service should provide their security. Among the issues that GAO was asked to address were (1) how do the Mint, BEP, and other organizations that produce or handle large amounts of cash provide their security; (2) what thefts have occurred at the Mint and BEP and what steps have they taken to prevent thefts from recurring; and (3) what are the potential benefits and costs of having the Secret Service provide Mint and BEP security? The Mint said it generally agreed with the findings and conclusions that applied to the Mint. BEP and the Secret Service provided technical comments regarding the report, which GAO incorporated where appropriate, but had no overall comments on the report.
What GAO Found
The Mint and BEP use their own police forces to provide security. Eight of the 12 coin and currency organizations in the other G7 nations responded to our requests for information. Four organizations reported that they only used their own security forces; 2 organizations said they used their own security forces supplemented with contractor personnel; 1 organization said it used an outside agency to supplement its own security force; and 1 organization said that it used an outside agency to provide its security. Private businesses that handle large amounts of cash, such as banks and casinos, that we contacted said they used either their own security staff or contractor staff. The Mint and BEP have experienced some thefts by employees over the last decade. The Mint, which did not have records of security incidents that occurred more than 5 years ago, reported 74 incidents of theft involving about $93,000 from 1998 though 2002, while BEP reported 11 incidents of theft from 1993 through 2002 involving about $1.8 million. Both the Mint and BEP had threat assessments made of their facilities and processes and took corrective action to enhance security. The Secret Service said that if its Uniformed Division were charged with the responsibility of protecting the Mint and BEP, the two agencies could benefit from the Secret Service's expertise in protection and criminal investigations. However, unlike Secret Service police officers, Mint and BEP security personnel are already familiar with the coin and currency production processes, which is a benefit in identifying security risks in these manufacturing facilities. Further, if the Secret Service protected the Mint and BEP, the government could incur additional costs because the Secret Service requires more training for its officers than the Mint and BEP police. The Secret Service police officers also are provided more costly retirement benefits than the Mint and BEP police. |
gao_GAO-03-936T | gao_GAO-03-936T_0 | Inherent Features of Electronic Records Make Management and Preservation Challenging
The rapid evolution of information technology makes the task of managing and preserving electronic records complex and costly. Electronic records are increasingly being created in volumes that pose a significant technical challenge to our ability to organize them and make them accessible. Storage media are affected by the dual problems of obsolescence and decay. As computer hardware and application software become obsolete, they may leave behind electronic records that cannot be read without the original hardware and software. However, most electronic records—including databases of major federal information systems—remained unscheduled, and records of historical value were not being identified and provided to NARA; as a result, they were at risk of loss. NARA Is Continuing to Respond to Records Management Challenges, but Its Progress on Inspections is Limited
Since June 2002, NARA has taken steps to strengthen its guidance, to address the low priority accorded to records management programs and the associated lack of technology tools, and to revise its approach to inspections as part of a comprehensive strategy for assessing agencies’ management of records. For example, although 36 CFR Part 1234, the basic guidance on electronic records, has not been updated to reflect new types of electronic records, NARA has produced a variety of guidance on electronic records. Efforts Continue to Raise the Priority of Agency Records Management Programs and Address Technology Issues
In response to our recommendation that it develop a documented strategy for raising agency senior management awareness of records management, NARA devised a strategy intended to raise awareness of the importance of agency records management. Finally, no implementation plan or schedule for this new strategy has yet been devised. NARA’s Acquisition of ERA Continues to Face Risks
In addition to its efforts to improve records management across the government, NARA is also acquiring ERA as a means to archive all types of electronic records and make them accessible, regardless of changes to hardware and software over time. However, NARA faces significant challenges in acquiring ERA. ERA will be a major information system; NARA has no previous experience in acquiring major information systems. NARA has made progress in strengthening these capabilities, but these efforts are incomplete. Unless NARA can address these issues, the risk is increased that the ERA system will fail to meet user expectations, and that NARA may not have the information required to control the cost of the system or the time it will take to complete it. In light of these risks, our briefing included recommendations to NARA to address the weaknesses in its acquisition policies, plans and procedures and to improve its ability to adequately track the project’s cost and schedule. | Why GAO Did This Study
The difficulties of managing, preserving, and providing access to the vast and rapidly growing volumes of electronic records produced by federal agencies present challenges to the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), the nation's recordkeeper and archivist. Complex electronic records are being created in volumes that make them difficult to organize and keep accessible. These problems are compounded as computer hardware, application software, and even storage media become obsolete, as they may leave behind electronic records that can no longer be read. As a result, valuable government information may be lost. GAO was requested to testify, among other things, on NARA's recent actions to address the challenges of electronic records management, including its effort to address the problem of preserving electronic records by acquiring an advanced Electronic Records Archive (ERA).
What GAO Found
As reported in GAO's past work, most electronic records--including databases of major federal information systems--remained unscheduled: that is, their value had not been assessed, and their disposition--to destruction or archives--had not been determined. In addition, records of historical value were not being identified and provided to NARA; as a result, they were at risk of loss. NARA has begun to address these problems by taking steps to improve federal records management programs; among other things, it has (1) updated guidance to reflect new types of electronic records, (2) devised a strategy for raising awareness among senior agency management of the importance of good federal records management, and (3) devised a comprehensive approach to improving agency records management that includes inspections and identification of risks and priorities. Through these and other actions, NARA is making progress, but its approach to improving records management does not include provisions for using inspections to evaluate the efficacy of its governmentwide guidance, and an implementation plan for the approach has yet to be established. Without these elements, the risk is increased that federal records management problems will persist. In addition to its efforts to improve records management, NARA is also acquiring ERA as a means to archive all types of electronic records and make them accessible. GAO found, however, that NARA faces significant challenges in acquiring ERA, a major information system. While NARA has made progress in building its organizational capabilities for acquiring major information systems, it has not developed adequate policies, plans and practices to guide the ERA acquisition or established the means to track the cost and schedule of the project. Unless NARA addresses these and other issues, the ERA system may not meet user expectations, and NARA may not have the information required to control the cost of the system or the time it will take to complete it. |
gao_GAO-10-369 | gao_GAO-10-369_0 | Programming for broadcast and subscription video service differs, as illustrated in figure 1. Sources of Broadcast and Cable Television Programming Have Changed Little in the Last Decade
Major Broadcasters and Their Affiliated Studios Have Produced the Majority of Broadcast Prime Time Programming
Major broadcasters and their affiliated studios have produced the majority of broadcast prime time programming in each of the selected years that we analyzed. In particular, major broadcaster-affiliated studios produced from 76 to 84 percent of broadcast prime time programming hours, with the remaining hours coming from independent producers. Numerous Companies Own Cable Networks, but Major Broadcasters and Their Affiliated Companies Have Continued to Own about Half of the Most Widely Distributed Cable Networks
Since basic cable networks are also a source of television programming, we analyzed the ownership of those networks as an indicator of which entities control the television programming on the networks. Combining ownership in both prime time broadcast programming and widely distributed basic cable networks, the major broadcasters have had an interest in a significant share of television programming over the last decade. Cable operators without a major broadcaster affiliation are not a source of prime time broadcast network programming, and over the last decade their interest in the top 20 most widely distributed basic cable networks has decreased. FCC annually reports on cable network programming variety and ownership as part of its video competition report, but the report does not assess the extent to which the sources of programming affect variety in television and selection choices for the public. Stakeholders Cited Economic Factors, Technical Issues, and Legal Conditions as Affecting the Availability of Independent Television Programming
In Broadcast Television, Economic Factors Influence the Availability of Independent Programming
Industry stakeholders we interviewed stated that the high cost of developing, producing, and distributing television programs is a significant factor that affects the availability of independent programming in broadcast television. According to television broadcast executives and representatives of independent producers, developing and producing broadcast television programs is costly and financially risky. However, representatives of independent producers stressed that it is difficult for them to obtain financing for development and production costs, and oftentimes they must secure financing through the major broadcaster-affiliated studios. Representatives of independent networks we contacted and a study we reviewed indicated that a new network usually faces considerable uncertainty as to whether it will be distributed by a sufficient number of video providers to make its operations viable. By contrast, cable networks developed by cable operators, major broadcasters, or other media companies are generally more able to finance the development of affiliated networks over new independent networks. Basic cable networks that are affiliated with cable operators, major broadcasters, or other media companies can negotiate carriage of an affiliated cable network as part of an agreement for carriage of an established affiliated network. Local Interests Also Affect Programming Decisions in Both Commercial and Public Radio Stations
Stakeholders stated that in both commercial and public radio, programming decisions such as selection of format and music playlists are based on the interests of listeners in a given market. We found that within selected individual markets, the top radio formats differ from the top radio formats nationally, indicating that programming decisions are locally based on the preferences and interests of listeners within a given market. 8). Opinions Vary on How Consolidation in the Radio Industry Has Affected Programming Decisions
Stakeholders that we interviewed generally agreed that since 1996, the number of stations owned by a single radio station owner has increased; however, viewpoints varied about the extent to which consolidation has affected programming decisions. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to FCC for official review and comment. FCC provided technical comments that we incorporated where appropriate. To determine the factors and conditions that stakeholders identified as affecting the availability of independent programming in television and factors that influence radio programming decisions, we interviewed or obtained written comments from a variety of experts and industry stakeholders, including academics, industry representatives, media companies, and public interest groups (as shown in table 4) to obtain their views on the factors that affect the availability of independent programming in television and radio. | Why GAO Did This Study
The media industry plays a vital role in informing and entertaining the public. Media ownership and the availability of diverse programming have been a long-standing concern of Congress. Despite numerous programming choices in television and radio available to the public, some studies have reported that independently produced programming--that is, programming not affiliated with broadcast networks or cable operators--has decreased through the years. This requested report discusses (1) the extent to which the sources of television programming have changed over the last decade, (2) the factors industry stakeholders identified as affecting the availability of independent television programming, and (3) the factors industry stakeholders identified as influencing programming decisions in radio. To address these issues, GAO analyzed data from the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and industry on sources of broadcast television programming in prime time (weeknights generally from 8:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m.) and companies owning cable networks, as well as radio format data to determine programming variety. GAO also reviewed legal, agency, and industry documents and interviewed industry stakeholders, public interest groups, and others. GAO provided FCC with a draft of this report for comment. In response, FCC provided technical comments that we incorporated where appropriate.
What GAO Found
The sources of broadcast and basic cable television programming have changed little in recent years. As a source of programming for prime time television, major broadcasters (ABC, CBS, Fox, and NBC) and their affiliated studios produced the majority of programming in each of the selected years that GAO analyzed. In particular, GAO found major broadcasters produced about 76 to 84 percent of prime time programming hours. The remaining programming came from independent producers, which are not affiliated with the major broadcasters. Since basic cable networks are also a source of television programming, GAO analyzed the ownership of those networks as an indicator of which entities control the television programming. On the basis of GAO analysis of ownership in the 20 most widely distributed basic cable networks, major broadcasters and companies affiliated with both major broadcasters and cable operators have owned half or more of the top 20 cable networks for each year reviewed. Combining ownership in both prime time programming and basic cable networks, the major broadcasters have controlled a significant share of television programming over the last decade. Stakeholders primarily cited economic factors as influencing the availability of independent television programming. In this regard, producers GAO contacted stated that developing and producing broadcast television programs is costly and financially risky. And while funds need to be secured early on in the development and production process to finance these costs, independent producers stressed that it is difficult to obtain financing for production costs. For cable television (viewed through a subscription video service), representatives of independent cable networks said a new network faces considerable uncertainty as to whether it will be distributed by a sufficient number of video providers (such as Comcast and DirecTV) to make its operations viable. By contrast, cable networks developed by cable operators or major broadcasters are able to negotiate distribution of the network with video providers as part of an agreement for distribution of an established affiliated network. For radio, stakeholders cited economic factors, local community interests, and consolidation in the radio industry as influences on programming decisions. Among both commercial and public radio stations, stakeholders said that programming decisions are based on listeners' interests in a given market. GAO found that within two of the three largest local markets nationwide, many of the most common local radio formats differ from the most common radio formats nationally, indicating that programming decisions are affected by local community interests. Over the last 10 years there has been consolidation in the radio industry; however, stakeholders' opinions varied about the extent to which consolidation has affected programming decisions. While some studies show that consolidation has led to homogenized radio playlists in different markets nationwide, GAO's analysis shows diverse formats and preferences are reflected within individual local markets. |
gao_GAO-05-1054T | gao_GAO-05-1054T_0 | Background
According to the Institute of Medicine, health care delivery in the United States has long-standing problems with medical errors and inefficiencies that increase health care costs. In April 2004, the President issued an executive order that called for the establishment of a National Coordinator for Health IT and the issuance of a strategic plan to guide the nationwide implementation of interoperable health information systems. However, while they had made progress in defining standards, the identification and implementation of data standards necessary to support interoperability were incomplete across the health care sector. Second, not all of the federal government’s standard setting initiatives had milestones associated with efforts to define and implement standards. For example, while the CHI initiative—the primary initiative to establish standards for federal health programs—had announced several standards and implementation requirements for health care information exchange, it had not yet established milestones for future announcements. NCVHS had reported on a need for a mechanism, such as compliance testing, to ensure that health care standards were uniformly adopted as part of a national strategy, but without an implementation mechanism and leadership at the national level, problems associated with systems’ incompatibility and lack of interoperability would persist throughout the different levels of government and the private sector and, consequently, throughout the health care sector. We recommended that the Secretary of HHS define activities for ensuring that the various standards-setting organizations coordinate their efforts and reach further consensus on the definition and use of standards; establish milestones for defining and implementing standards; and create a mechanism to monitor the implementation of standards through the health care industry. The Coordinator also assumed responsibility for identifying standards for federal health programs as part of the CHI initiative. We reiterated our conclusions that unless these standards were more fully implemented, federal agencies and others throughout the health care industry could not ensure that their systems would be capable of exchanging data with other systems when needed. Further, we concluded that as federal health IT initiatives moved forward, it would be essential to have continued leadership, clear direction, measurable goals, and mechanisms to monitor progress. In June of this year, we issued a report to this committee on the challenges faced by federal agencies in implementing the public health infrastructure. Recent Actions Taken by HHS to Develop Health Information Technology Standards
Following up on our recommendations, we reported in May 2005 that HHS was working towards a national strategy for health IT that called for a sustained set of actions to help to further define standards for the health care industry. Among other activities:
The Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality is working to identify and establish clinical standards and research to help accelerate the adoption of interoperable health IT systems, including industry clinical messaging and terminology standards, national standard nomenclature for drugs and biological products, and standards related to clinical terminology. HHS expects to award a contract to develop and evaluate a process to unify and harmonize industry-wide information standards. In addition, in July of this year, HHS announced plans for a public- private committee—known as the American Health Information Community—to help transition the nation to electronic health records and to provide input and recommendations on standards. Although federal leadership has been established and plans and several actions have positioned HHS to further define and implement relevant standards, consensus on the definition and use of standards still needs to occur. Otherwise, the health care industry will continue to be plagued with incompatible systems that are incapable of exchanging key data that is critical to delivering care and responding to public health emergencies. | Why GAO Did This Study
Health care delivery in the United States has long-standing problems with medical errors and inefficiencies that increase costs. Hence, health information technology (IT) has great potential to improve the quality of care, bolster preparedness of our public health infrastructure, and save money on administrative costs. The threats of natural disasters and terrorist attacks further underscore the need for interoperable information systems, and the critical importance of defining and implementing standards that would enable such interoperability. GAO has reported on the quality of care benefits derived by using IT, federal agencies' existing and planned information systems to support national preparedness for public health emergencies, and the status of health IT standards settings initiatives. The House Committee on Government Reform asked GAO to summarize (1) its previously issued reports and recommendations on health IT standards and (2) recent actions taken by HHS to facilitate the development of health IT standards.
What GAO Found
As GAO reported in 2003, health care data, communications, and security standards are necessary to support interoperability between IT systems; however, the identification and implementation of such standards at that time was incomplete across the health care industry. Further, while several standard setting initiatives were underway, GAO raised concerns about coordinating and implementing these initiatives. To address these coordination and implementation challenges, it recommended that the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS), among other things, reach further consensus across the health care industry on the definition and use of standards, establish milestones for defining and implementing these standards, and create a mechanism to monitor their implementation throughout the health care industry. Last summer, GAO testified before the House Committee on Government Reform's technology subcommittee, highlighting progress made in announcing additional standards and plans to incorporate standard setting initiatives into the Federal Health Architecture. GAO reported that progress in assuming leadership had occurred with the President's establishment of the National Coordinator for Health IT to guide the nationwide implementation of interoperable health information systems, but noted that as health IT initiatives were pursued, it would be essential to have continued leadership, clear direction, measurable goals, and mechanisms to monitor progress. In following up on these recommendations, GAO determined that HHS has taken several actions that should help to further define standards for the health care industry. First, the coordinator has assumed responsibility for the Federal Health Architecture that is expected to establish standards for interoperability and communication throughout the federal health community. Second, several HHS agencies continue their efforts to define standards as part of the department's Framework for Strategic Action. For example, the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality is working with the private sector to identify standards for clinical messaging, drugs, and biological products. Third, HHS expects to award a contract to develop and evaluate a process to unify and harmonize industry-wide information standards. Fourth, in July of this year, HHS announced plans for a public-private committee to help transition the nation to electronic health records and to provide input and recommendations on standards. All of these are positive steps, however, much work remains to reach further consensus across the health care sector on the definition and use of standards. Until this occurs, federal agencies and others throughout the health care industry will not be able to ensure that their systems are capable of exchanging data when needed, and consequently will not be able to reap the cost, clinical care, and public health benefits associated with interoperability. |
gao_GAO-03-653T | gao_GAO-03-653T_0 | Efforts to Increase Aviation Capacity and Service Face Funding and Other Challenges
During this reauthorization period, the Congress and the administration face several key challenges in attempting to increase the capacity of the national airspace system and expand service to small communities. For these airports, ACI’s estimate of planned development costs is about twice as large as FAA’s. As the Congress moves forward with reauthorizing FAA’s programs, it will have to determine what level of planned capital development is appropriate to increase the capacity, efficiency, and safety of the national airspace system. Although projections made in November 2002 indicate that the Trust Fund will be able to meet its traditional obligations over the next 10 years, the financial outlook for the next 5 to 8 years is uncertain, in part, because passenger traffic has decreased with the slowdown in the economy. The current hiatus in air traffic growth creates an opportunity for the development of long-term transportation plans. Efforts to Improve the Efficiency of the Air Traffic Control System Face Ongoing Challenges
Improving the efficiency of the air traffic control system will be important to accommodate the expected return to pre-September 11 air traffic levels. FAA is making progress in managing the air traffic control modernization effort and has implemented some key projects. However, other key projects continue to experience cost, schedule, and performance problems. The Inspector General has reported that the costs of five acquisitions have grown by $3 billion—the equivalent of 1 year’s budget for the modernization program—and the delay in completing these acquisitions has ranged from 3 to 5 years. In addition, with the transfer of most aviation security responsibilities to the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), FAA faces the challenge of maintaining close coordination with TSA to ensure that aircraft safety is maintained as TSA implements new security enhancements. FAA and Industry Have Taken Actions to Reduce the Fatal Accident Rate
Reducing fatal aviation accidents is key to improving aviation safety. FAA’s New Safety Inspection System Offers Promise, but Problems Still Need to Be Addressed
Improving the effectiveness of FAA’s inspections of airline operations is key to improving aviation safety. FAA Faces Challenges in Implementing Controls over Its Costs
As the administration and the Congress focus on increasing aviation capacity, efficiency, and safety, they do so in an extremely challenging fiscal environment—the federal budget deficit has increased and competition for federal resources has intensified. FAA has improved its ability to track its costs by partially implementing a new cost accounting system that the Congress directed it to develop in 1996. We also interviewed officials from FAA, the Air Traffic Services Subcommittee, and aviation industry organizations. Department of Transportation, Transportation Security Administration: Aviation Security Infrastructure Fees. Air Traffic Control: Role of FAA’s Modernization Program in Reducing Delays and Congestion. | Why GAO Did This Study
Much has changed since the Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century (AIR-21) reauthorized the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) programs 3 years ago. At that time, air traffic was increasing, and concerns about congestion and flight delays were paramount. Since then, the downturn in the nation's economy, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and, most recently, the war in Iraq have taken a heavy toll on aviation. Analysts nonetheless expect the demand for air travel to rebound, and the nation's aviation system must be ready to accommodate the projected growth safely and securely. The current reauthorization of FAA's programs provides an opportunity for the Congress and the administration to focus on challenges in increasing aviation capacity, efficiency, and safety and in controlling aviation program costs.
What GAO Found
Increasing capacity and service in the national airspace system poses several challenges. While airports currently receive enough funding to cover FAA's estimate of their planned capital development costs, a declining surplus in the trust fund that helps to support development and the need to spend up to $5 billion over the next 5 years for security-related capital improvements make the financial outlook for the next 5 to 8 years uncertain. Runway development, the principal means of increasing capacity, is now taking 10 to 14 years to complete, in large part because of time-consuming environmental reviews and community concerns. Providing air service for small communities is also becoming more difficult as costs increase and passenger ticket revenues decline. Intermodal alternatives may hold promise. Efforts to improve the efficiency of the national airspace system by modernizing the air traffic control system face challenges despite actions taken by the Congress and the administration to eliminate the cost overruns, schedule delays, and performance shortfalls that have plagued FAA's modernization efforts. Overall, FAA is improving its management of the air traffic modernization program and has implemented some systems, but key projects continue to experience problems. To enhance aviation safety, FAA and the aviation industry have undertaken an initiative to reduce the fatal accident rate, and FAA is working to strengthen its safety inspections of airlines' operations. Interagency coordination of aviation safety and aviation security activities has emerged as a challenge with the transfer of aviation security responsibilities from FAA to the Transportation Security Administration. FAA faces challenges in implementing controls over its costs. Although it has partially implemented a new cost accounting system that enables it to track 70 percent of its air traffic services costs, this system lacks internal controls over $3.1 billion in labor costs, according to the Department of Transportation's Inspector General. Congressional oversight is important to ensure that FAA implements controls and spends its resources effectively. |
gao_GAO-04-425T | gao_GAO-04-425T_0 | 1.) In recognition of this change in approach to how long-term care is provided, the Federal Advisory Committee on the Future of VA Long-Term Care recommended, in 1998, that VA update its long-term care policy by meeting the growing demand for long-term care through significant expansion of its capacity to provide home and community-based services—also known as noninstitutional long-term care services—while maintaining its nursing home capacity at the 1998 level. Medicare also pays for home health care. Nursing Home Workload Declined Slightly And Use Of Nursing Home Care By Setting Changed
VA’s overall nursing home workload—-average daily census—-was 33,214 in fiscal year 2003, slightly below its fiscal year 1998 workload. Nursing home workload varied over this period but was consistently below the fiscal year 1998 level, decreasing by as much as 8 percent in fiscal year 2000 from its fiscal year 1998 level. In addition, workload in community nursing homes declined by 1,434. 2.) This increase is attributable in large part to 18 more state veterans’ nursing homes receiving payment from VA to provide such care. VA is authorized to pay for about two-thirds of the costs of construction of state veterans’ nursing homes and pays about a third of the costs per day to provide care to veterans in these homes. In Network 21 (San Francisco), the percentage of care in VA-operated nursing homes increased by 7 percent and in the remaining 6 networks the percentage of care in VA-operated nursing homes increased 3 percent or less. Among VA’s networks, 16 had declines in the number of long-stay patients in VA-operated homes during this period. The percentage of workload in community nursing homes declined from 17 to 13 percent from fiscal year 1998 through fiscal year 2003. This decline occurred because VA reduced the number of patients served and the number of days paid for under contract in this setting. VA officials told us that now shorter-term contracts are often used to transition veterans to nursing home care, which is paid by other payers such as Medicaid. VA Noninstitutional Long-Term Care Workload Increased
VA’s noninstitutional long-term care workload—-average daily census—- for the six services in our review increased by approximately 75 percent from fiscal years 1998 through 2003. Workload increased by 4,655 during this period to 10,892. Much of this growth came from increases in skilled home health and homemaker/home health aide care— services that are most likely to help veterans prevent or delay the need for nursing home care. Concluding Observations
Over the last 6 years, the veteran population most in need of long-term care has grown dramatically. During this period, VA’s use of nursing home care by setting has changed so that state veterans’ nursing homes now provide one-half of all nursing home workload provided or paid for by VA. At the same time, VA decreased the workload it serves in its own nursing homes consistent with VA’s policy to emphasize short-stay, post-acute care in its own nursing homes. These trends over the last 6 years raise important questions for how VA is meeting current long-term care need and what it may need to do to meet future long-term care need. To what extent does total VA long-term care workload—-composed of a fairly constant nursing home workload and a rapidly expanding but smaller noninstitutional workload—-meet the needs of a rapidly growing elderly veteran population? | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) is likely to see a significant increase in long-term care need over the next decade. The number of veterans most in need of longterm care services--those 85 years old and older--is expected to increase from about 870,000 to 1.3 million over this period. Many of these veterans will rely on VA to provide or pay for nursing home care or noninstitutional services that may help them remain at home and, for some, delay or prevent the need for nursing home care. VA operates its own nursing home care units in 132 locations. VA also pays for nursing home care under contract in non-VA nursing homes--referred to as community nursing homes. In addition, VA pays part of the cost of care for veterans at state veterans' nursing homes and also pays a portion of the construction costs for some state veterans' nursing homes. Congress has expressed concerns about recent trends in VA long-term care service delivery and how VA plans to meet the nursing home care needs and related longterm care needs of veterans as the elderly population most in need of long-term care increases. GAO was asked to determine for fiscal years 1998 through 2003 (1) how VA nursing home workload has changed and (2) how VA noninstitutional long-term care workload has changed.
What GAO Found
Recent trends in VA nursing home care and noninstitutional service delivery raise important questions, particularly whether access to services is sufficient to meet the needs of a rapidly growing elderly veteran population. VA's overall nursing home workload--average daily census--was 33,214 in fiscal year 2003, 1 percent below its fiscal year 1998 workload. The workload was below the fiscal year 1998 level each year, decreasing by as much as 8 percent below the fiscal year 1998 level in fiscal year 2000. VA's use of nursing home care by setting also changed over the 6-year period. First, the percentage of workload in state veterans' nursing homes increased as the number of state veterans' nursing homes receiving VA payments increased. Second, the percentage of workload in VA's own nursing homes declined, in part, because VA decreased the number of long-stay patients and increased the number of short-stay patients it treats in the nursing homes it operates. This is consistent with VA's increased emphasis on post-acute care. Third, the percentage of workload in community nursing homes declined from 17 to 13 percent. VA officials told us that now shorter-term contracts are often used to transition veterans to nursing home care, which is paid for by other payers such as Medicaid. VA's noninstitutional long-term care workload--average daily census--increased by approximately 75 percent from fiscal years 1998 through 2003. Workload increased by 4,655 during this period to 10,892, reflecting a change in VA's approach to care which includes meeting more long-term care need through noninstitutional services. Most of the growth in noninstitutional workload came from VA's greater use of contract skilled home health care, which includes medical services provided to veterans at home, and homemaker/home health aide such as grooming and meal preparation. |
gao_HEHS-96-18 | gao_HEHS-96-18_0 | Carriers’ automated claims processing systems include computerized controls, or screens, that screen claims for diagnosis coding errors, billing abuses, and incorrect or incomplete documentation. Instances of Wrongful Billing Suggest Widespread Activity
Fraudulent and abusive practices by some providers who furnish services and supplies to nursing facility patients entail billing Medicare for unnecessary or undelivered services and supplies or misrepresenting a service or supply item to obtain Medicare reimbursement as the following examples show:
A company billed Medicare for heart monitoring services provided to nursing facility patients. Medicare overpaid this company an estimated $4.3 million. Because data on fraud and abuse have not been accumulated based on place of service, investigators cannot quantify the extent of Medicare fraud and abuse involving the provision of services and supplies to nursing facility patients. As a result, services provided to Medicare beneficiaries in nursing facilities offer a target of opportunity for the fraudulent schemes and billing abuses of the dishonest provider. Second, nursing facilities should be held accountable for the unauthorized disclosure of patient medical records. To examine the nature and extent of inappropriate and abusive billing for services and supplies to nursing facility patients, we (1) asked the carriers’ fraud units to identify cases involving services and supplies provided to patients in nursing facilities—both ongoing cases and those referred to OIG in the previous 24 months; (2) performed a detailed file review of each identified case and obtained and reviewed copies of relevant documents; (3) discussed cases with carrier officials, as needed, and met with OIG officials to discuss the status of cases that carriers had referred to them for investigation; and (4) asked OIG officials to identify any additional investigations completed within the previous 12 months and ongoing investigations dealing with services and supplies furnished to Medicare patients in nursing facilities. The facility administrators gave the provider complete access to patient medical records. Medicare: Reducing Fraud and Abuse Can Save Billions (GAO/T-HEHS-95-157, May 16, 1995). Additional copies are $2 each. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed allegations of fraud and abuse related to services and supplies provided to nursing facility patients, focusing on: (1) the nature and extent of such fraud and abuse exist; (2) why nursing facility patients are an attractive target for miscreants; and (3) options for reducing fraudulent billing practices.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) fraudulent and abusive billing of Medicare is widespread and frequent and a wide variety of providers have been involved in Medicare fraud or abusive billing related to nursing facility patients' care; (2) most fraud and abuse involves billing Medicare for unnecessary or undelivered services and supplies or misrepresenting services to obtain reimbursement; (3) Medicare patients in nursing facilities are attractive fraud targets because of the high volume and concentration of Medicare beneficiaries in nursing facilities, easier access to patients' medical records, billing without confirmation, the lack of sufficient and timely warning flags in Medicare's automated claim processing systems, and inadequate recovery of unwarranted payments; (4) to change its reimbursement method to incorporate the nursing facilities' monitoring of the provision of services and supplies Medicare will need long-term commitment, structural changes, unified billing, and capped payments; and (5) short-term steps to reduce fraud and abusive billing include instituting federal penalties for unauthorized disclosure of patients' medical records and incorporating various early warning controls into Medicare's claim processing systems. |
gao_GAO-13-871T | gao_GAO-13-871T_0 | Transparency Efforts Under Way Focus on Standardizing Data to Integrate Systems and Enhance Spending Oversight
The GAT Board, the Recovery Board, and OMB, have initiatives under way to improve the accuracy and availability of federal spending data. The GAT Board, with a mandate of providing strategic direction, has four working groups charged with developing approaches for improving the quality of data in federal contract, grants, and financial management systems, and for expanding the availability of these data to improve oversight of federal funds. Through these working groups, the GAT Board has begun to develop approaches to (1) standardize data elements across systems; (2) link financial management systems with award systems so that spending data can be reconciled with obligations; and (3) use the data to help identify and reduce fraud, waste, and abuse. However, the GAT Board’s mandate does not provide it with the authority to implement these reforms; therefore, it must rely on its working groups’ lead agencies to implement approaches that it has approved. Current efforts are focused on identifying approaches to standardize contract and grant award data elements to improve data accuracy, and to date some progress has been made, such as:
Based in part on work of the GAT Board for the Federal Acquisition Regulatory Council, DOD proposed a regulation requiring federal agencies to use a uniform procurement identifier—a number that could be attached to a contract so it can be tracked across various systems throughout the procurement process. As Transparency Efforts Get Under Way, Opportunities Remain to Incorporate Lessons Learned from the Recovery Act
In many cases, the transparency initiatives of the GAT and Recovery Boards, OMB, and key federal agencies build on lessons learned from the operation of existing transparency systems. Because agencies did not collect spending data in a consistent manner, the most expedient approach for Recovery Act reporting was to collect data from fund recipients, which placed additional burden on them to provide these data. Given the longer time frames to develop current transparency initiatives, OMB and the GAT Board are working toward greater data consistency by focusing on data standards. Their plans, however, do not include long-term steps, such as working toward uniform award identifiers that would improve award tracking with less burden on recipients. Second, we found that early in the development of both the Recovery Act reporting system and its procedures, federal officials listened to the concerns of recipients and made changes to guidance in response, which helped ensure they could meet those requirements. As we learned through our work examining Recovery Act implementation, without similar outreach under the current initiatives, reporting challenges may not be addressed, potentially impairing the data’s accuracy and completeness, and increasing burden on those doing the reporting. In contrast, authority for implementing the current transparency initiatives is not as clearly defined and authority for expanding transparency is centered in an executive order rather than legislation. Moreover, unlike under the Recovery Act, new transparency initiatives are being funded through existing agency resources using agency personnel, as separate funding is unavailable. Going forward, without clear, legislated authority and requirements, the ability to sustain progress and institutionalize transparency initiatives may be jeopardized as priorities shift over time. In our recently released report, we recommended that OMB and the GAT Board develop a long-term strategy for implementing data standards across the federal government and for obtaining input from federal fund recipients. The GAT Board, OMB and other cognizant agencies generally agreed with our recommendations and identified actions underway or planned, which they believe will operationalize comprehensive transparency reforms and help them obtain stakeholder input. Our recently issued report also suggested that Congress could consider legislating transparency requirements and establish clear lines of authority to ensure that recommended approaches for improving spending data transparency are implemented across the federal government. Appendix I: Government Accountability and Transparency Board and Work Group Agency Partners
The Government Accountability and Transparency Board (GAT Board) is composed of the following 11 members designated by the President from among agency inspectors general, agency chief financial officers or deputy secretaries, and senior officials from OMB. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government spends more than $3.7 trillion annually, with more than $1 trillion awarded through contracts, grants, and loans. Improving transparency of this spending is essential to improve accountability. Recent federal laws have required increased public information on federal awards and spending.
This testimony is based on GAO's recently issued report GAO-13-758 . It addresses (1) the status of transparency efforts under way and (2) the extent to which new initiatives address lessons learned from the Recovery Act. GAO reviewed relevant legislation, executive orders, OMB circulars and guidance, and previous GAO work, including work on Recovery Act reporting. GAO also interviewed officials from OMB, the GAT Board, and other federal entities; government reform advocates; associations representing fund recipients; and a variety of contract and grant recipients.
What GAO Found
Several federal entities, including the Government Accountability and Transparency Board (GAT Board), the Recovery Accountability and Transparency Board (Recovery Board), and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), have initiatives under way to improve the accuracy and availability of federal spending data. The GAT Board, through its working groups, developed approaches to standardize key data elements to improve data integrity; link financial management systems with award systems to reconcile spending data with obligations; and leverage existing data to help identify and reduce fraud, waste, and abuse. With no dedicated funding, GAT Board plans are incremental and leverage ongoing agency initiatives and resources designed to improve existing business processes as well as improve data transparency. These initiatives are in an early stage, and some progress has been made to bring greater consistency to contract and grant award identifiers. The GAT Board's mandate is to provide strategic direction, not to implement changes. Further, while these early plans are being developed with input from a range of federal stakeholders, the GAT Board and OMB have not developed mechanisms for obtaining input from non-federal fund recipients.
Lessons from implementing the transparency objectives of the Recovery Act could help inform these new initiatives:
Standardize data to integrate systems and enhance accountability. Similar to the GAT Board's current focus on standardization, the Recovery Board recognized that standardized data would be more usable by the public and the Recovery Board for identifying potential misuse of federal funds. However, reporting requirements under the Recovery Act had to be met quickly. Because agencies did not collect spending data in a consistent manner, the most expedient approach was to collect data from fund recipients, even though similar data already existed in agency systems. Given the longer timeframes to develop current transparency initiatives, OMB and the GAT Board are working toward greater data consistency by focusing on data standards. Their plans, however, do not include long-term steps, such as working toward uniform award identifiers, that would improve award tracking with less burden on recipients.
Obtain stakeholder involvement as reporting requirements are developed. During the Recovery Act, federal officials listened to the concerns of recipients and made changes to guidance in response, which helped ensure they could meet those requirements. Without similar outreach under the current initiatives, reporting challenges may not be addressed, potentially impairing the data's accuracy and completeness, and increasing burden on those reporting.
Delineate clear requirements and lines of authority for implementing transparency initiatives. Unlike the present efforts to expand spending transparency, the Recovery Act provided OMB and the Recovery Board with clear authority and mandated reporting requirements. Given this clarity, transparency provisions were carried out successfully and on time. Going forward, without clear, legislated authority and requirements, the ability to sustain progress and institutionalize transparency initiatives may be jeopardized as priorities shift over time.
What GAO Recommends
In its report GAO recommended that the director of OMB, with the GAT Board, develop a long-term plan to implement comprehensive transparency reform, and increase efforts for obtaining stakeholder input to ensure reporting challenges are addressed. Further, Congress should consider legislating transparency requirements and establishing clear authority to implement these requirements to ensure that recommended approaches for improving transparency are carried out across the federal government. The GAT Board, OMB and other cognizant agencies generally concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-14-52 | gao_GAO-14-52_0 | Through these mechanisms, HRSA provides funding and support for a wide variety of programs. HRSA’s staff of nearly 1,900 provides oversight, technical assistance, and operational support for the agency’s programs. HRSA’s Organizational Structure
HRSA’s organization consists of the Office of the Administrator and 16 other organizational components—7 programmatic bureaus and 9 cross- cutting operational support offices (see fig. HRSA Has Mechanisms in Place for Multi-Directional Communication Throughout the Agency
HRSA has mechanisms in place to share information important for supporting the agency’s mission across various levels of staff in the agency, including among agency leaders, programmatic bureau and operational support office leaders, and staff. These communication mechanisms include the agency’s operational planning process; cross- cutting workgroups and meetings; and regular communications among the Office of the Administrator, leaders in the bureaus and offices, and agency staff. HRSA’s Staff Has Grown in Recent Years; About Half of Its Leadership Will Be Eligible to Retire by 2017
HRSA’s staff has grown approximately 30 percent over the last 5 years. HRSA periodically tracks attrition and retirement eligibility and has focused its succession planning efforts on leadership development. HRSA’s Staff Has Grown in Recent Years with the Largest Segment of Staff Concentrated at the GS-13 Level
HRSA’s staff grew by more than 30 percent from fiscal years 2008 to 2012; the number of HRSA employees at the end of each fiscal year grew from 1,418 in fiscal year 2008 to 1,857 in fiscal year 2012. Officials indicated that within HRSA, the most common job function is a project officer. HRSA has over 400 project officers who are responsible for the ongoing oversight of an assigned portion of program funding recipients, such as grantees. From fiscal years 2008 through 2012, HRSA lost an average of about 9 percent of its staff per year to attrition. Of those who left HRSA in that year, approximately 59 percent resigned, 35 percent retired, and 4 percent were terminated or removed. Agency-wide, 31.3 percent of HRSA’s permanent employees will be eligible to retire by the end of fiscal year 2017; a rate similar to that for the entire federal government. However, a larger portion of HRSA’s leadership, nearly 50 percent, is eligible to retire in the next few years. Although eligibility to retire does not necessarily mean that employees will do so at the time they become eligible, if there were a large number of retirements among the agency’s leadership during this time period, HRSA runs the risk of having gaps in leadership and potential loss of important institutional knowledge. To respond to retirements and other types of attrition, HRSA has instituted succession planning efforts which generally focus on providing leadership development to agency staff. HRSA Obligated Over $240 Million for Contracts in Fiscal Year 2012, the Majority of Which Were for Information Technology and Program Support
In fiscal year 2012, HRSA obligated over $240 million, or about 3 percent of its appropriations, to contracts to acquire goods or services necessary to support its operations. Nearly 60 percent of HRSA’s fiscal year 2012 contract (1) information obligations were for two categories of services:technology and telecommunications services, which includes HRSA’s contract to support the operation and management of the agency’s online system for documenting its grantee oversight activities, called the Electronic Handbook; and (2) professional support services, which includes HRSA’s contracts for the provision of technical assistance, such as site visits, to grantees. Conversely, 69 percent of the Maternal and Child Health According to HRSA officials, the agency uses contracts to support its operations for a variety of reasons, including to supplement HRSA staff because of time constraints, or to fulfill short-term needs. In addition, HRSA uses contracts to perform functions that require specialized skills for which HRSA staff do not have the appropriate expertise, such as clinical or financial expertise. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to HHS for its review. In its written comments, HHS noted that the report recognized the mechanisms HRSA has in place to ensure the coordinated flow of communication and plan for succession. Appendix II: HRSA Contracts with the Highest Total Amount of Obligations by Organizational Component, Fiscal Year 2012
Provides services to maintain, update, and enhance the National Practitioner Data Bank Provides supplemental expert assistance and support to health center grantees and federal staff by providing technical and consultative assistance through site visits, documentation reviews, and consultations to new and existing grantees Establishes and maintains the National Bone Marrow Coordinating Center Provides technical assistance for the Ryan White HIV/AIDS CARE Act Program Operates the Maternal, Infant, and Early Childhood Home Visiting Program Technical Assistance Coordinating Center Provides technical assistance for grantee programs to expand access to, coordinate, restrain the cost of, and improve the quality of health care through the development of health care networks in rural areas and regions Supports development, maintenance, and enhancement efforts for HRSA’s Electronic Handbook, the agency’s online system for documenting its grantee oversight activities, by integrating new business processes into the Electronic Handbook or integrating the Electronic Handbook with other existing systems We have included contract data for the National Hansen’s Disease Program with the data for the Healthcare Systems Bureau, as this bureau took oversight responsibility for this program in August 2012. Administrative Support Services 1. | Why GAO Did This Study
HRSA is charged with improving access to health care services for people who are uninsured, isolated, or medically vulnerable. HRSA carries out its mission by providing funding and support to a wide variety of programs, which have grown in number and size since the agency was established in 1982. To manage these programs, HRSA has a staff of nearly 1,900 employees, supplemented by contract staff who perform a variety of tasks to support HRSA's programs and operations. HRSA's staff are organized into seven programmatic bureaus that are responsible for overseeing HRSA's programs and nine cross-cutting operational support offices--each of which reports to the Office of the Administrator. In recent years, GAO reported on weaknesses in HRSA's oversight and monitoring of certain programs.
Given GAO's past findings and the expansion of the agency's programs, GAO was asked to review HRSA's management and operations. This report examines (1) HRSA's internal communication mechanisms and how they are used to support the agency's mission; (2) HRSA's staffing and how the agency plans for attrition; and (3) HRSA's use of contracts to support its operations. GAO reviewed and analyzed HRSA's communication methods and organizational structure; analyzed data on HRSA personnel and contracts for fiscal years 2008 through 2012; interviewed HRSA officials knowledgeable about the agency's organization, staffing, and use of contracts; and reviewed relevant documentation.
What GAO Found
The Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) has mechanisms in place to share information important for supporting the agency's mission across its various organizational components and levels of staff--a practice that is consistent with internal control standards for the federal government. These communication methods include an annual operational planning process for allocating agency resources, workgroups that involve staff from across the agency to work on issues of a cross-cutting nature, and regular meetings between the Office of the Administrator and leaders of the agency's various organizational components.
HRSA's staff grew by more than 30 percent from fiscal years 2008 to 2012. The number of HRSA employees grew from 1,418 in fiscal year 2008 to 1,857 in fiscal year 2012. According to agency officials, the most common job function within HRSA is a project officer--an employee responsible for the oversight of grantees funded by the agency's programs; and HRSA has over 400 project officers. From fiscal years 2008 through 2012, HRSA lost an average of 9 percent of its staff annually to attrition. Of those who left HRSA in fiscal year 2012, approximately 59 percent resigned and 35 percent retired. Agency-wide, over 30 percent of HRSA's permanent employees will be eligible to retire by the end of fiscal year 2017. An even larger portion of HRSA's leadership, nearly 50 percent, will be eligible to retire by 2017. If a large portion of the agency's leadership were to actually retire during this time period, HRSA runs the risk of having gaps in leadership and potential loss of important institutional knowledge. HRSA periodically tracks attrition and retirement eligibility. To respond to retirements and other attrition, HRSA has instituted succession planning efforts which generally focus on leadership development for agency staff. For example, HRSA has instituted two leadership development programs, has two other programs under development, and has established mentoring and coaching programs.
In fiscal year 2012, HRSA obligated over $240 million, or about 3 percent of its appropriations, to contracts to acquire goods and services necessary to support its operations, an amount that has generally remained steady over the past few years. Over half of the fiscal year 2012 contract obligations were for two categories of services--information technology and telecommunications services, and professional support services, which includes providing technical assistance to grantees. According to HRSA officials, the agency uses contracts to support its operations for a variety of reasons; these include supplementing HRSA staff or fulfilling short-term needs and performing functions that require specialized skills for which HRSA staff do not have the appropriate expertise, such as clinical or financial expertise.
We provided a draft of this report to HHS for its review. In its written comments, HHS noted that the report recognized the mechanisms HRSA has in place to ensure the coordinated flow of communication and plan for succession. |
gao_GAO-13-518 | gao_GAO-13-518_0 | In our past reviews of its implementation, we found that GPRA provided a solid foundation to achieve greater results in the federal government, but several key governance challenges remained—particularly related to: addressing crosscutting issues; ensuring performance information was useful and used by agency leadership and managers and the Congress; strengthening the alignment between individual performance and agency results as well as holding individuals and organizations responsible for achieving those results; measuring performance for certain types of programs; and providing timely, useful information about the results achieved by agencies. The website—implemented by OMB as Performance.gov—is required to make available information on APGs and CAP goals, updated on a quarterly basis; agency strategic plans, annual performance plans, and annual performance reports; and an inventory of all federal programs. As another positive development, OMB and agencies have also put into place key aspects of the act’s performance management leadership roles. Even among the CAP goals, OMB and agencies are missing opportunities to identify tax expenditures as contributors. The only statistically significant change from 2007 to 2013 was a decline in the percentage of managers that agreed to a great or very great extent that their agencies’ top leadership demonstrates a strong commitment to achieving results, from 67 percent to 60 percent. Agencies Have Taken Steps to Align Daily Operations with Agency Results, but Some Continue to Face Difficulties Measuring Performance
Agencies Have Taken Steps to Align Individual Performance with Results
It is important for individuals to see a connection between their daily operations and results to help understand how individual performance can contribute to organizational success. Without a comprehensive examination, it will be difficult for the PIC and agencies to fully understand these measurement issues and develop a crosscutting approach to help address them, which will likely result in agencies experiencing difficulties in measuring program performance in the future. Communication of Performance Information Could Better Meet Users’ Needs
Federal Managers Reported that Performance Information Is Not Always Available or Easily Accessible to Federal Managers or the Public
According to our 2013 survey of federal managers, 34 percent reported that performance information is easily accessible to agency employees to a great or very great extent, while 17 percent reported that their agency’s performance information is easily accessible to the public to a great or very great extent. OMB staff agreed with these recommendations. To help ensure agency performance information is useful for congressional decision making, GPRAMA strengthens the consultation requirement. In addition, our recent work indicated that the performance information provided on Performance.gov also may not be meeting congressional needs. GPRAMA provides a number of tools that could help address these challenges. Since enactment in 2011, the executive branch has taken a number of important steps to implement key provisions of the act, by developing interim CAP goals and APGs, conducting quarterly reviews, assigning key performance management roles and responsibilities, and communicating results more frequently and transparently through Performance.gov. However, the executive branch needs to do more to fully implement and leverage the act’s provisions to address these challenges. In addition, examples from our past work along with the most recent results from our survey of federal managers show that the executive branch has made little progress addressing long-standing governance challenges related to improving coordination and collaboration to address crosscutting issues, using performance information to drive decision making, measuring the performance of certain types of federal programs, and engaging Congress in a meaningful way in agency performance management efforts to ensure the resulting information is useful for congressional decision making. Of particular concern, OMB has yet to develop a framework for reviewing the performance of tax expenditures, which represented approximately $1 trillion in forgone revenue in fiscal year 2012. To help ensure that the contributions made by tax expenditures toward the achievement of agency goals and broader federal outcomes are properly recognized, we recommend that the Director of OMB take the following three actions:
Revise relevant OMB guidance to direct agencies to identify relevant tax expenditures among the list of federal contributors for each appropriate agency goal. Given the common, long-standing difficulties agencies continue to face in measuring the performance of various types of federal programs and activities—contracts, direct services, grants, regulations, research and development, and tax expenditures—we also recommend the Director of OMB work with the PIC to develop a detailed approach to examine these difficulties across agencies, including identifying and sharing any promising practices from agencies that have overcome difficulties in measuring the performance of these program types. Our specific objectives for this report were to assess the executive branch’s (1) progress in implementing the act and (2) effectiveness in using tools provided by the act to address challenges the federal government faces. To address both objectives, we reviewed GPRAMA, related congressional documents and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance, and our past and recent work related to managing for results and the act. We also interviewed OMB staff. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government faces significant and long-standing fiscal, management, and performance challenges. The acts implementation offers opportunities for Congress and the executive branch to help address these challenges. This report is the latest in a series in which GAO, as required by the act, reviewed the acts initial implementation. GAO assessed the executive branchs (1) progress in implementing the act and (2) effectiveness in using tools provided by the act to address key governance challenges. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed the act, related OMB guidance, and past and recent GAO work related to federal performance management and the act; and interviewed OMB staff. In addition, to determine the extent to which agencies are using performance information and several of the acts requirements to improve agency results, GAO surveyed a stratified random sample of 4,391 federal managers from 24 agencies, with a 69 percent response rate which allows GAO to generalize these results.
What GAO Found
The executive branch has taken a number of steps to implement key provisions of the GPRA Modernization Act (the act). The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) developed interim cross-agency priority (CAP) goals, and agencies developed agency priority goals (APG). Agency officials reported that their agencies have assigned performance management leadership roles and responsibilities to officials who generally participate in performance management activities, including quarterly performance reviews (QPR) for APGs. Further, OMB developed Performance.gov, a government-wide website, which provides quarterly updates on the CAP goals and APGs.
However, the executive branch needs to do more to fully implement and leverage the acts provisions to address governance challenges.
OMB and agencies have identified many programs and activities that contribute to goals, as required, but are missing additional opportunities to address crosscutting issues. For example, few have identified tax expenditures, which represented about $1 trillion in forgone revenue in fiscal year 2012, due to a lack of OMB guidance and oversight. Therefore, the contributions made by tax expenditures towards broader federal outcomes are unknown.
Ensuring performance information is useful and used by federal managers to improve results remains a weakness. GAO found little improvement in managers reported use of performance information or practices that could help promote this use. There was a decline in the percentage of managers that agreed that their agencies top leadership demonstrates a strong commitment to achieving results. However, agencies QPRs show promise as a leadership strategy for improving the use of performance information in agencies.
Agencies have taken steps to align daily operations with agency results, but continue to face difficulties measuring performance. Agencies have established performance management systems to align individual performance with agency results. However, agencies continue to face long-standing issues with measuring performance across various programs and activities. The Performance Improvement Council (PIC) could do more to examine and address these issues, given its responsibilities for addressing crosscutting performance issues and sharing best practices. Without a comprehensive examination of these issues and an approach to address them, agencies will likely continue to experience difficulties in measuring program performance.
Communication of performance information could better meet users needs. Federal managers and potential users of Performance.gov reported concerns about the accessibility, availability, understandability, and relevance of performance information to the public. Further outreach to key stakeholders could help improve how this information is communicated.
Agency performance information is not always useful for congressional decision making. Consultations with Congress are intended, in part, to ensure this information is useful for congressional decision making. However, GAO found little evidence that meaningful consultations occurred related to agency strategic plans and APGs. GAO also found that the performance information provided on Performance.gov may not fully be meeting congressional needs.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends OMB improve implementation of the act and help address challenges by ensuring that the contributions of tax expenditures to crosscutting and agency goals are identified and assessed, and developing a detailed approach for addressing long-standing performance measurement issues. OMB staff agreed with these recommendations. GAO also reports on the status of existing recommendations related to CAP goals, APGs, QPRs, the PIC, agency performance management training, and Performance.gov. |
gao_GAO-16-554 | gao_GAO-16-554_0 | Section 3 of IPERA also calls for executive agencies’ IGs to annually determine and report on whether their respective agencies complied with the following six criteria: publish a report in the form and content required by OMB—typically an AFR or a PAR—for the most recent fiscal year, and post that report on the agency website; conduct a program-specific risk assessment for each program or activity that conforms with IPIA as amended; publish improper payment estimates for all programs and activities deemed susceptible to significant improper payments under the agency’s risk assessment; publish corrective action plans for those programs and activities assessed to be at risk for significant improper payments; publish and meet annual reduction targets for all programs and activities assessed to be at risk for significant improper payments; and report a gross improper payment rate of less than 10 percent for each program and activity for which an improper payment estimate was published. This is the largest number of agencies deemed noncompliant under IPERA since IGs began reporting on their agencies’ compliance with these criteria in fiscal year 2011. Further, this represents an increase of 4 agencies reported to be noncompliant compared to fiscal year 2013. A total of 38 programs accounting for a reported $100.6 billion in estimated improper payments were responsible for identified instances of noncompliance in fiscal year 2014. Had these programs decreased their reported error rates to 10 percent, the government-wide improper payment estimate would have been $23.1 billion, or 18.6 percent, lower. Eighteen Programs Were Noncompliant with IPERA Criteria for 3 Consecutive Years or More, as of Fiscal Year 2014, and Some Agencies Did Not Submit Information Required to Address Consecutive Noncompliance
IGs at nine CFO Act agencies determined that 18 programs were noncompliant with IPERA criteria for at least 3 consecutive years as of fiscal year 2014. When a program is reported as noncompliant by its IG for 3 or more consecutive years, the responsible agency is required to submit proposals to Congress within 30 days to reauthorize the program or change the statute that established it. However, we found that only three of the nine agencies submitted the required information to Congress in response to 3 or more years of consecutive noncompliance in fiscal year 2014. Although officials at some of the agencies maintain that reauthorization or statutory change will not achieve compliance under IPERA, by not reporting to Congress as required when an agency does not comply for 3 consecutive years and informing Congress of the agency’s challenges with achieving compliance under IPERA, Congress is limited in its ability to monitor the law’s implementation and ensure that its intent is being fulfilled. Certain IGs Did Not Fully Adhere to Statutory Requirements and OMB Guidance for IPERA Reporting for Fiscal Year 2014
We found that in conducting their IPERA compliance reviews for fiscal year 2014, certain IGs did not consistently adhere to the requirements contained in IPERA and other applicable laws, such as the Disaster Relief Appropriations Act, 2013 as well as the guidance provided by OMB to clarify IPERA criteria and establish reporting requirements for OMB- designated high-priority programs. We verified that these deficiencies have been corrected for fiscal year 2015 reporting and therefore determined that no recommendations to these IGs are warranted. Conclusions
Estimated improper payments across the federal government have increased by over $30 billion in the last 2 fiscal years. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to review (1) the number of agencies, among those listed in the Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990, as amended (CFO Act), that complied with the criteria listed in the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010 (IPERA), as reported by their inspectors general (IG), for fiscal years 2011 through 2014, and what criteria and programs the IGs concluded were primarily responsible for instances of agency noncompliance; (2) the number of programs at the 24 CFO Act agencies that were determined noncompliant with IPERA criteria by their IGs for 3 or more consecutive years, as of fiscal year 2014, and the extent to which the responsible agencies submitted the required information to Congress; and (3) the extent to which CFO Act agency IGs have adhered to certain IPERA requirements and the related Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance contained in OMB Circular No. To determine if certain IGs corrected deficiencies identified in preliminary GAO findings shared with them and followed OMB guidance for fiscal year 2015 reporting, we reviewed the fiscal year 2015 IPERA reports issued in May 2016 by the seven IGs in whose fiscal year 2014 reports we identified deficiencies. | Why GAO Did This Study
IPERA calls for executive branch agencies' IGs to annually determine whether their agencies complied with six criteria related to the estimation of improper payments, including conducting risk assessments, publishing corrective action plans, and meeting annual reduction targets. In the last 2 fiscal years, total estimated improper payments reported by federal agencies have increased considerably. Specifically, improper payment estimates across the government for fiscal year 2015 totaled $136.7 billion, over $30 billion higher than the estimated total for fiscal year 2013.
GAO was asked to review compliance under IPERA as reported by IGs for fiscal year 2014. This report examines to what extent the 24 CFO Act agency IGs (1) reported that agencies complied with the IPERA criteria for fiscal years 2011 through 2014, and what criteria and programs were responsible for agency noncompliance; (2) reported programs to be noncompliant for 3 consecutive years as of fiscal year 2014, and whether agencies submitted the required information to Congress; and (3) adhered to statutory requirements and OMB guidance for reporting on fiscal year 2014 IPERA compliance reviews.
What GAO Found
For fiscal year 2014, 15 of the 24 Chief Financial Officers Act (CFO Act) agency inspectors general (IG) determined that their agencies did not comply with criteria in the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010 (IPERA). This is the largest number of CFO Act agencies reported as noncompliant under IPERA since the requirement for IGs to report on their agencies' compliance was implemented in fiscal year 2011, and represents an increase of 4 agencies from fiscal year 2013. In fiscal year 2014, IGs reported 38 programs accounting for $100.6 billion in estimated improper payments as responsible for instances of noncompliance. Agency noncompliance for fiscal year 2014 was largely due to agencies failing to meet improper payment reduction targets or to report improper payment error rates at less than 10 percent for all programs. If the 5 agencies with programs exceeding 10 percent error rates had reported error rates under the threshold set in IPERA, the government-wide improper payment estimate would have been $23.1 billion, or 18.6 percent, lower.
In addition, 18 programs at 9 agencies were reported as noncompliant with IPERA criteria by their agencies' IGs for at least 3 consecutive years as of fiscal year 2014. Agencies with programs reported as noncompliant for 3 consecutive years are required to submit proposals to Congress to reauthorize the programs or change the statutes that established them. However, GAO found that only 3 agencies submitted such information to Congress. When agencies do not report to Congress as required, Congress is limited in its ability to monitor the implementation of IPERA and ensure that its intent is being fulfilled.
Certain IGs also did not fully adhere to Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance or statutory requirements for IPERA reporting for fiscal year 2014 by either failing to (1) clearly state the agency's compliance status overall and with each of the six criteria, (2) report on programs designated high priority by OMB as necessary, or (3) report compliance determinations for disaster relief programs. In the past year, OMB has made efforts to clarify its guidance to IGs. To determine if IGs made changes in response to OMB's efforts and deficiencies identified in GAO's preliminary findings shared with them, GAO reviewed select fiscal year 2015 IPERA reports issued by IGs in May 2016. GAO concluded that the IGs corrected the issues identified during this review in their fiscal year 2015 IPERA reports, and no recommendations to IGs are warranted.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that four agencies submit proposals as required to Congress in response to 3 years of noncompliance with IPERA criteria. The Departments of Defense and Transportation concurred with GAO's recommendations and the Department of Agriculture and the Small Business Administration stated that they had no comments on the draft report. |
gao_T-AIMD-00-314 | gao_T-AIMD-00-314_0 | Weaknesses Remain Pervasive
Evaluations published since July 1999 continue to show that federal computer systems are riddled with weaknesses that continue to put critical operations and assets at risk. More areas have been reviewed at more agencies and, as in 1998, weaknesses were reported in all six major areas of general controls—the policies, procedures, and technical controls that apply to all or a large segment of an entity’s information systems and help ensure their proper operation. These weaknesses placed a broad range of critical operations and assets at risk for fraud, misuse, and disruption. Virtually all federal operations are supported by automated systems and electronic data, and agencies would find it difficult, if not impossible, to carry out their missions and account for their resources without these information assets. Hence, the degree of risk caused by security weaknesses is extremely high. While Nature of Risk Varies, Control Weaknesses Across Agencies Are Strikingly Similar
The nature of agency operations and the related risks vary. Security Program Management
Each organization needs a set of management procedures and an organizational framework for identifying and assessing risks, deciding what policies and controls are needed, periodically evaluating the effectiveness of these policies and controls, and acting to address any identified weaknesses. Of the 21 agencies for which this aspect of security was reviewed, all had deficiencies. As we reported in 1998, our auditors have been successful, in almost every test, in readily gaining unauthorized access that would allow intruders to read, modify, or delete data for whatever purpose they had in mind. Weaknesses in software program change controls were identified for 19 of the 21 agencies where such controls were evaluated. Segregation of duties was evaluated at 20 of the 24 agencies covered by our analysis, and weaknesses were identified at 17 of these agencies. Weaknesses were identified at each of the 18 agencies for which operating system controls were reviewed. Service continuity controls were evaluated for 21 of the 24 agencies included in our analysis. Of these 21, weaknesses were reported for 20 agencies. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed information security audits at federal agencies, focusing on: (1) the pervasive weaknesses that continue since the results of a similar analysis 2 years ago; (2) the serious risks that these weaknesses pose; and (3) major common weaknesses that agencies need to address in order to improve their information security programs.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) evaluations published since July 1999 continue to show that federal computer systems are riddled with weaknesses that continue to put critical operations and assets at risk; (2) just as in 1998, weaknesses were reported in all six major areas of general controls--the policies, procedures, and technical controls that apply to all or a large segment of an entity's information systems and help ensure their proper operation; (3) these weaknesses placed a broad range of critical operations and assets at risk for fraud, misuse, and disruption; (4) virtually all federal operations are supported by automated systems and electronic data, and agencies would find it difficult, if not impossible, to carry out their missions and account for their resources without these information assets; (5) hence, the degree of risk caused by security weaknesses is extremely high; (6) the nature of agency operations and the related risks vary; (7) each organization needs a set of management procedures and an organizational framework for identifying and assessing risk, deciding what policies and controls are needed, periodically evaluating the effectiveness of these policies and controls, and acting to address any identified weaknesses; (8) of the 21 agencies for which security program management was reviewed, all had deficiencies; (9) access controls were evaluated at all 24 of the agencies covered by GAO's analysis, and all were reported to have significant weaknesses; (10) GAO's auditors have been successful, in almost every test, in readily gaining unauthorized access that would allow intruders to read, modify, or delete data; (11) weaknesses in software program change controls were identified for 19 of the 21 agencies where such controls were evaluated; (12) segregation of duties was evaluated at 20 of the 24 agencies and weaknesses were identified at 17 of these agencies; (13) weaknesses were identified at each of the 18 agencies for which operating system controls were reviewed; (14) service continuity controls were evaluated for 21 of the 24 agencies included in the analysis; and (15) of these 21, weaknesses were reported for 20 agencies. |
gao_GAO-10-106 | gao_GAO-10-106_0 | TSA’s responsibilities include, among other things, establishing security requirements governing domestic and foreign passenger air carriers that transport cargo, and domestic freight forwarders. The resulting May 2009 report made a number of recommendations to improve the nation’s approach. Maritime Security
CBP Has Made Some Progress in Working with Foreign Ports to Scan U.S.- Bound Containers, but Challenges Remain in Expanding the Program to Larger Ports and Meeting the Statutory Target Date
In October 2009, we reported that CBP has made some progress in working with the initial SFI ports to scan U.S.-bound cargo containers; but because of challenges to expanding scanning operations, especially to larger ports, the feasibility of scanning 100 percent of U.S.-bound cargo containers at over 600 foreign seaports remains largely unproven. According to CBP, it does not have a plan for fully implementing the scanning requirement by this date because it questions the feasibility; however, it has not performed a feasibility analysis of expanding 100 percent scanning, as required by the SAFE Port Act. TSA and the Coast Guard Took Steps to Enroll Transportation Workers into the TWIC Program by the Mandated Deadline, but Challenges in Program Scheduling and Evaluation May Hinder the TWIC Reader Pilot’s Usefulness
In November 2009 we reported that, based on lessons learned from its early experiences with enrollment and activation, TSA and its contractor took steps to prepare for a surge in TWIC enrollments and activations as local compliance dates approached. As a result of these efforts, TSA reported enrolling 1,121,461 workers in the TWIC program, or over 93 percent of the estimated 1.2 million users, by the April 15, 2009 deadline. DHS and Coast Guard Have a Strategy and Programs in Place, but Identifying and Preventing Small Vessel Attacks Remains a Challenge
While DHS and the Coast Guard have developed a strategy and programs to reduce the risks associated with small vessels, they face ongoing challenges in tracking small vessels and preventing attacks by such vessels. As part of its effort to improve security in the maritime domain, the Coast Guard is also implementing two major unclassified systems to track a broad spectrum of vessels. TSA’s approach involves multiple air cargo industry stakeholders sharing screening responsibilities across the air cargo supply chain. Effective February 1, 2009, TSA also required air carriers to ensure the screening of 50 percent of all nonexempt air cargo transported on all passenger aircraft. Finally, TSA has taken some steps to meet the screening mandate as it applies to inbound cargo but does not expect to achieve 100 percent screening of inbound cargo by the August 2010 deadline. However, TSA does not expect to meet the mandated 100 percent screening level by August 2010. This is due, in part, to existing inbound screening exemptions, which TSA has not reviewed or revised, and to challenges TSA faces in harmonizing the agency’s air cargo security standards with those of other nations. We will continue to explore these issues as part of our ongoing review of TSA’s air cargo security efforts, to be issued next year. TSA Has Taken Actions to Strengthen Airport Security, but Faces Challenges in Assessing Risk, Evaluating Worker Screening Methods, Addressing Airport Technology Needs, and Developing a National Strategy for Airport Security
In our September 2009 report on airport security, we reported that TSA has implemented a variety of programs and protective actions to strengthen the security of commercial airports. TSA issued a final report on the pilots in December 2006. Cybersecurity
DHS Has Made Progress in Strengthening Cybersecurity, but Further Actions are Warranted
Federal law and policy establish DHS as the focal point for efforts to protect our nation’s computer-reliant critical infrastructures. Since 2005, we have reported that DHS has not yet fully satisfied its key responsibilities for protecting these critical infrastructures and have made recommendations for DHS to address in key cyberscurity areas, to include the five key areas shown in table 1. DHS has since developed and implemented certain capabilities to satisfy aspects of its responsibilities, but the department has not fully implemented our recommendations and, thus, further action needs to be taken to address these areas. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
Securing the nation's transportation and information systems is a primary responsibility of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Within DHS, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is responsible for securing all transportation modes; U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is responsible for cargo container security; the U.S. Coast Guard is responsible for protecting the maritime environment; and the National Protection and Programs Directorate is responsible for the cybersecurity of critical infrastructure. This statement focuses on the progress and challenges DHS faces in key areas of maritime, aviation, and cybersecurity. It is based on GAO products issued from June 2004 through November 2009, as well as ongoing work on air cargo security. GAO reviewed relevant documents; interviewed cognizant agency officials; and observed operations at 12 airports, chosen by size and other factors. The results are not generalizable to all airports.
What GAO Found
DHS hasmade progress in enhancing security in the maritime sector, but key challenges remain. For example, as part of a statutory requirement to scan 100 percent of U.S.-bound container cargo by July 2012, CBP has implemented the Secure Freight Initiative at select foreign ports. However, CBP does not have a plan for fully implementing the 100 percent scanning requirement by July 2012 because it questions the feasibility, although it has not performed a feasibility analysis of the requirement. Rather, CBP has planned two new initiatives to further strengthen the security of container cargo, but these initiatives will not achieve 100 percent scanning. Further, TSA, the Coast Guard, and the maritime industry took a number of steps to enroll over 93 percent of the estimated 1.2 million users in the Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) program (designed to help control access to maritime vessels and facilities) by the April 15, 2009 compliance deadline, but they experienced challenges resulting in delays and in ensuring the successful execution of the TWIC pilot. While DHS and the Coast Guard have developed a strategy and programs to reduce the risks posed by small vessels, they face ongoing resource and technology challenges in tracking small vessels and preventing attacks by such vessels. In the aviation sector, TSA has made progress in meeting the statutory mandate to screen 100 percent of air cargo transported on passenger aircraft by August 2010 and in taking steps to strengthen airport security, but TSA continues to face challenges. TSA's efforts include developing a system to allow screening responsibilities to be shared across the domestic air cargo supply chain, among other steps. Despite these efforts, TSA and the industry face a number of challenges including the voluntary nature of the program, and ensuring that approved technologies are effective with air cargo. TSA also does not expect to meet the mandated 100 percent screening deadline as it applies to air cargo transported into the U.S., in part due to existing screening exemptions for this type of cargo and challenges in harmonizing security standards with other nations. GAO is reviewing these issues as part of its ongoing work and will issue a final report next year. In addition, TSA has taken a variety of actions to strengthen airport security by, among other things, implementing a worker screening program; however, TSA still faces challenges in this area. DHS has made progress in strengthening cybersecurity, such as addressing some lessons learned from a cyber attack exercise, but further actions are warranted. Since 2005, GAO has reported that DHS has not fully satisfied its key responsibilities for protecting the nation's computer-reliant critical infrastructures and has made related recommendations to DHS, such as bolstering cyber analysis and warning capabilities and strengthening its capabilities to recover from Internet disruptions. DHS has since developed and implemented certain capabilities to satisfy aspects of its responsibilities, but it has not fully implemented GAO's recommendations and, thus, more action is needed to address the risk to critical cybersecurity infrastructure. |
gao_T-GGD-98-163 | gao_T-GGD-98-163_0 | The most recent of these reports, which is being released today, gathered the views of federal advisory committee members and federal agencies on specific FACA matters. The other report, which was issued last month, assessed the General Services Administration’s (GSA) efforts in carrying out its oversight responsibilities under FACA. 1. Advisory committees appear to be adhering to the requirements of FACA and Executive Order 12838. These requirements do not appear to be overly burdensome to agencies. 2. 3. In response to our June 1998 report, GSA said it will take immediate action to improve its oversight. As I noted earlier, Executive Order 12838 established ceilings for each agency on its maximum allowable number of discretionary advisory committees. Concerns Surfaced About Certain Advisory Committee Requirements
Although committee members and agencies responding to our questionnaires generally provided a more positive than negative image of FACA, their responses also pointed to concerns and issues that the Subcommittee may wish to explore in its consideration of FACA. Finally, there appears to be some concern among agencies about the possibility of being sued for noncompliance with FACA if they obtain input from parties who are outside of the agency and its advisory committees. GSA Has Fallen Short of Fulfilling Its FACA Oversight Responsibilities
Although the GSA Committee Management Secretariat does not have authority to stop the formation or continuation of an advisory committee, FACA and GSA regulations assign it certain responsibilities for overseeing the federal advisory committee program. For example, even though all charters and justification letters had been reviewed by the Secretariat, 36 percent of the 203 charters and 38 percent of the 107 letters from October 1996 through July 1997 that we reviewed were missing one or more items required by FACA or GSA regulations. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the: (1) views of federal advisory committee members and federal agencies on specific Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) matters; and (2) General Services Administration's (GSA) efforts in carrying out its oversight responsibilities under FACA.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) advisory committees appear to be adhering to the requirements of FACA and Executive Order 12838, which led to the establishment of ceilings for each agency on the number of discretionary advisory committees; (2) these requirements do not appear to be overly burdensome to agencies; (3) although the responses of committee members and agencies portrayed a more positive than negative image of FACA, their responses did raise concerns and issues that the House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, Subcommittee on Government Management, Information, and Technology may wish to explore in its consideration of FACA; (4) there appears to be some concern among agencies about the possibility of being sued for noncompliance with FACA if they obtain input from parties who are outside of the agency and its advisory committees; (5) GSA's Committee Management Secretariat has fallen short of fulfilling its FACA oversight responsibilities; (6) further, GSA did not ensure that the advisory committees were established with complete charters and justification letters; (7) 36 percent of the 203 advisory committee charters and 38 percent of the 107 justification letters from October 1996 through July 1997 that GAO reviewed were missing one or more items required by FACA or GSA regulations; and (8) GSA said that it will take immediate action to improve its oversight. |
gao_GAO-06-819 | gao_GAO-06-819_0 | Under one program, New Starts, FTA identifies and selects fixed guideway transit projects for funding—including heavy, light, and commuter rail; ferry; and certain bus projects (such as bus rapid transit). The New Starts program serves as an important source of federal funding for the design and construction of transit projects throughout the country. 1). 2). Although many projects receive a summary rating that would make them eligible for FFGAs, only a few are proposed for FFGAs in a given fiscal year. 3). FTA recommended five projects for new FFGAs. In addition, FTA recommended funding for two projects with pending FFGAs. The administration’s fiscal year 2007 budget proposal requests that $1.47 billion be made available for the New Starts program. FTA Proposed Nine Procedural Changes to the New Starts Program and Adopted Four after Considering Comments from the Transit Community
In January 2006, FTA proposed nine procedural changes for the New Starts program beginning with the fiscal year 2008 evaluation cycle. These changes include linking the New Starts and NEPA planning requirements and processes and capping New Starts funding when projects enter the final design phase. SAFETEA-LU’s Changes to the New Starts Program Include Identifying New Evaluation Criteria to Establishing the Small Starts Program
SAFETEA-LU made a number of changes to the New Starts program, including establishing a new eligibility category, the Small Starts program, and identifying new evaluation criteria. FTA has also proposed and sought public input on the new evaluation criteria and other possible changes to the New Starts program that would affect traditional New Starts projects. FTA has taken some initial steps in implementing SAFETEA-LU changes. For example, in January 2006, FTA published the proposed New Starts policy guidance and, as will be discussed later in this report, the ANPRM for the Small Starts program. The Small Starts program is a component of the existing New Starts program that, according to the conference reports accompanying SAFETEA-LU, is intended to provide project sponsors with an expedited and streamlined evaluation and ratings process. In addition, others were concerned that FTA’s proposals minimized the importance of the new land use and economic development evaluation criteria introduced by SAFETEA-LU, and they recommended that the measures for land use and economic development be revised. Since FTA does not plan to issue its final rule for the New Starts and Small Starts programs until early 2008, FTA issued final interim guidance for the Small Starts program in July 2006 to ensure that project sponsors would have an opportunity to apply for Small Starts funding and proposed projects could be evaluated in the upcoming cycle (i.e., the fiscal year 2008 evaluation cycle). In its guidance, FTA also identified potential challenges in implementing some SAFETEA-LU changes. FTA officials provided technical clarifications, which we incorporated as appropriate. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To address our objectives, we reviewed the administration’s fiscal year 2007 budget request, the Federal Transit Administration’s (FTA) annual New Starts report, FTA’s New Starts policy guidance and Small Starts Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM), public comments received on FTA’s docket on New Starts and Small Starts, FTA’s fiscal year 2008 reporting instructions for the New Starts program, federal statutes pertaining to the New Starts program, and previous GAO reports. Our interviews were designed to gain project sponsors’ perspectives on three main topics, including the impact of FTA’s proposed changes to the New Starts application and project development process during the fiscal year 2008 evaluation cycle, FTA’s implementation of the newly established Small Starts program, and FTA’s plans to align and revise its evaluation and ratings process with the changes required by the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU). Table 7 summarizes FTA’s proposed changes to the definition of eligibility, the evaluation and rating process, and the project development process as well as FTA’s rationale for the proposed changes and the transit community’s response to the proposed changes. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU) authorized about $7.9 billion in commitment authority, through fiscal year 2009, for the Federal Transit Administration's (FTA) New Starts program, which is used to select fixed guideway transit projects, such as rail and trolley projects, and to award full funding grant agreements (FFGAs). The New Starts program serves as an important source of federal funding for the design and construction of transit projects throughout the country. SAFETEA-LU requires GAO to report each year on FTA's New Starts process. As such, GAO examined (1) the number of projects that were evaluated, rated, and proposed for FFGAs for the fiscal year 2007 evaluation cycle and the proposed funding commitments for the fiscal year 2007 budget; (2) procedural changes that FTA proposed for the New Starts program beginning with the fiscal year 2008 evaluation cycle; and (3) changes SAFETEA-LU made to the New Starts program and FTA's implementation of these changes. GAO reviewed New Starts documents and interviewed FTA officials and project sponsors, among other things, as part of its review. GAO is not making recommendations in this report. In commenting on a draft of this report, FTA provided technical clarifications, which we incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
For the fiscal year 2007 evaluation cycle, FTA evaluated and rated 20 projects, recommended 5 projects for new FFGAs and 2 projects with pending FFGAs. FTA also identified 5 other projects that may be eligible for funding outside of FFGAs. The administration's fiscal year 2007 budget proposal requests $1.47 billion for the New Starts program, which is about $200 million more than the amount received last year. FTA proposed nine procedural, or nonregulatory, changes for the New Starts program beginning with the fiscal year 2008 evaluation cycle that were generally intended to improve the management of the New Starts process. These changes include linking the New Starts and National Environmental Policy Act planning requirements and processes and capping New Starts funding when projects enter the final design phase. As required by SAFETEA-LU, FTA published these proposals in policy guidance and sought public input. Members of the transit community supported changes that they thought would make the New Starts process more efficient, but many commenters expressed strong opposition to other changes, citing, for example, the time and resources required to analyze ridership and cost uncertainties. Consequently, FTA implemented only 4 of the proposed procedural changes, but indicated that a final decision on the other 5 proposed changes would be made through the rulemaking process. SAFETEA-LU introduced eight statutory changes to the New Starts program that include establishing the Small Starts program and identifying new evaluation criteria. FTA has taken some initial steps to implement these changes, including issuing an Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM) for the Small Starts program and proposed policy guidance for the New Starts program, both in January 2006. The Small Starts program is a new component of the New Starts program and is intended to offer an expedited and streamlined application and review process for small projects. The transit community, however, questioned whether the Small Starts program, as outlined in the ANPRM, would provide such a process. In July 2006, FTA introduced a new eligibility category called Very Small Starts, which is for the simplest and least costly projects. Very Small Starts projects will qualify for an even simpler and more expedited evaluation process. FTA also identified and sought public input on possible changes to the New Starts program that would have an impact on traditional New Starts projects, such as revising the evaluation process to incorporate the new evaluation criteria identified by SAFETEA-LU. According to FTA, a potential challenge in moving forward is incorporating both land use and economic development as separate criteria in the evaluation process, including developing appropriate measures for the criteria and avoiding duplication in counting benefits. |
gao_GAO-06-638 | gao_GAO-06-638_0 | Background
In regulating dual-use exports, the Commerce Department’s BIS faces the challenge of weighing various U.S. interests, which can be divergent or even competing, so U.S. companies can compete globally while minimizing the risk of controlled dual-use items falling into the wrong hands. 1). BIS Has Not Systematically Evaluated the Dual- Use Export Control System to Ensure Its Effectiveness and Efficiency
BIS has not systematically evaluated the overall effectiveness and efficiency of the system to determine whether its stated goal of protecting U.S. national security and economic interests is being achieved. Further, contrary to what is called for under government management standards, BIS has not established performance measures to assess how effectively the system is protecting U.S. interests in the existing security and economic environment. According to BIS officials, no fundamental changes to the system were needed, but they cited the review as the basis for some adjustments—primarily related to controls on chemical and biological agents. However, because BIS did not document its review, we could not assess the sufficiency of the review and the resulting changes. Instead, BIS officials informed us that they regularly review intelligence reports and meet with industry officials to gauge how well the system is working. Absent systematic evaluations, BIS conducted an ad hoc review after the September 2001 attacks to determine what changes, if any, needed to be made to the system in light of the new security environment. According to BIS officials, their review did not result in changes to the license application review process after the events of September 2001. As a result, the watchlist’s utility in the license application review process is undermined, which increases the risk of dual-use items falling into the wrong hands. Based on our comparison of the watchlist to publicly available U.S. government documents, including ones available through BIS’s Web site, we identified 147 parties that had either violated U.S. export control requirements, been determined to be suspicious end users, or committed acts of terror but were not on BIS’s watchlist. To screen parties on applications against the watchlist, BIS relies on a computerized process. Among the weaknesses identified in prior GAO reports is the lack of clarity as to which items are controlled and whether they are controlled by the Commerce Department or the State Department. Recommendations for Executive Action
To ensure that the dual-use export control system is effective as well as efficient in protecting U.S. interests, we recommend that the Secretary of Commerce direct the Under Secretary for Industry and Security to take the following four actions identify and obtain data needed to evaluate the system; review existing measures of efficiency to determine their appropriateness and develop measures that address commodity classifications; develop, in consultation with other agencies that participate in the system, measures of effectiveness that provide an objective basis for assessing whether progress is being made in achieving the goal of protecting U.S. interests; and implement a plan for conducting regular assessments of the dual- use export control system to identify weaknesses in the system and corrective actions. While the Commerce Department cites some measures BIS has taken recently to refine the watchlist, these measures do not address the weaknesses created by the lack of criteria and reviews of who should be on the watchlist or the technical limitations that result in some parties not being screened against the watchlist. Specifically, BIS’s failure to implement recommendations that would provide for clear, transparent decisions about export control jurisdiction increases the risk that sensitive defense- related items will be improperly exported and that some exporters will be placed at a competitive disadvantage—undermining BIS’s goal of protecting national security and economic interests. We reviewed BIS’s regulatory notices to determine whether BIS made regulatory changes in response to GAO’s recommendations. Appendix I: Trends in Dual-Use Export Licensing
The number of dual-use export license applications processed by the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) has increased over the last several years. Not applicable. Not applicable. 2. 3. | Why GAO Did This Study
In regulating exports of dual-use items, which have both commercial and military applications, the Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) seeks to allow U.S. companies to compete globally while minimizing the risk of items falling into the wrong hands. In so doing, BIS faces the challenge of weighing U.S. national security and economic interests, which at times can be divergent or even competing. In light of the September 2001 terror attacks, GAO was asked to examine BIS's dual-use export control system. In response, GAO is reporting on BIS's (1) evaluations of and changes to the system, (2) screening of export license applications against its watchlist, and (3) actions to correct weaknesses previously identified by GAO.
What GAO Found
Lack of systematic evaluations. Although BIS made some regulatory and operational changes to the dual-use export control system, it has not systematically evaluated the system to determine whether it is meeting its stated goal of protecting U.S. national security and economic interests. Specifically, BIS has not comprehensively analyzed available data to determine what dual-use items have actually been exported. Further, contrary to government management standards, BIS has not established performance measures that would provide an objective basis for assessing how well the system is protecting U.S. interests. Instead, BIS relies on limited measures of efficiency that focus only on narrow aspects of the license application review process to assess the system's performance. BIS officials use intelligence reports and meetings with industry to gauge how the system is operating. Absent systematic evaluations, BIS conducted an ad hoc review of the system to determine if changes were needed after the events of September 2001. BIS officials determined that no fundamental changes were needed but opted to make some adjustments primarily related to controls on chemical and biological agents. GAO was unable to assess the sufficiency of the review and resulting changes because BIS officials did not document their review. Omissions in BIS's watchlist. GAO found omissions in the watchlist BIS uses to screen export license applications. This screening, which is part of the license application review process, is intended to identify ineligible parties or parties warranting more scrutiny. The omissions undermine the list's utility, which increases the risk of dual-use exports falling into the wrong hands. GAO identified 147 parties that had violated U.S. export control requirements, had been determined by BIS to be suspicious end users, or had been reported by the State Department as committing acts of terror, but these parties were not on the watchlist of approximately 50,000 names. Reasons for the omissions include a lack of specific criteria as to who should be on the watchlist and BIS's failure to regularly review the list. In addition, a technical limitation in BIS's computerized screening system results in some parties on license applications not being automatically screened against the watchlist. Some prior GAO recommendations left unaddressed. BIS has implemented several but not all of GAO's recommendations for ensuring that export controls on sensitive items protect U.S. interests. Among weaknesses identified in prior GAO reports is the lack of clarity on whether certain items are under BIS's control, which increases the risk of defense-related items being improperly exported. BIS has yet to take corrective action on this matter. |
gao_NSIAD-99-209 | gao_NSIAD-99-209_0 | Companies Reported Most Commitments Met and Believe Agreements Improve Their Ability to Compete, but Some Concerns Remain
In our January 1999 survey, almost all of the U.S. companies (12 of 13) and brokers (2 of 3) operating in Japan reported that overall, the Japanese government had implemented the 1994 and 1996 agreements to a moderate or greater extent. Our analysis of company responses to our survey indicates that most of these commitments have been implemented. A Few Key Transparency and Deregulation Commitments Not Fully Met
Several companies reported concerns regarding Japan's implementation of a few commitments in key areas. USTR is the principal U.S. government agency responsible for monitoring and enforcing the insurance agreements. The Departments of the Treasury and Justice play much less active roles. In monitoring the agreements, USTR has determined that Japan has made progress in deregulating its insurance industry but has identified key commitments that remain unmet. U.S. Government Monitoring and Enforcement Efforts Rely Heavily on Private Sector Information
For monitoring and enforcing the agreements, USTR and the U.S. embassy in Tokyo rely primarily on information provided by U.S. insurance companies and industry groups, as well as on information collected by officials at the U.S. embassy in Tokyo from Japanese sources. The Japanese government has stated that it has fully implemented both agreements, including all deregulation actions. U.S. Insurance Industry Views U.S. Government Monitoring Efforts More Favorably Than Enforcement Actions
More U.S. insurance companies expressed favorable views of U.S. government actions to monitor the insurance agreements than reported favorable views of enforcement efforts. Four companies reported that U.S. government monitoring efforts had been as effective as ineffective. Concerns of large U.S. insurers regarding U.S. government actions related to this sale continued beyond creation of the “minute” and involved (1) U.S. government discussions with the Japanese government during the fall of 1997 that, while not opposing Japan's approval of the sale, expressed concern over whether the ongoing third sector activities of Yasuda and INA met the terms of the agreements and the “minute”; (2) USTR discussions with Japanese officials regarding Japan's December 1997 decision to include the 1996 U.S.-Japan insurance agreement in the WTO financial services agreement and what this development meant for the proposed majority sale of INA and its subsequent third sector sales; and (3) two 1998 U.S. government interagency reviews of the third sector activities of Yasuda and INA that determined that no agreement violations had occurred. However, officials from one company have also noted that Yasuda's activities in the third sector have slowed. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Trade, Committee on Ways and Means, asked us to examine (1) the views of U.S. insurance companies operating in Japan regarding the agreements' implementation and impact on their ability to compete in the Japanese market; (2) the roles and efforts of the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative and the Departments of Commerce, State, and the Treasury in monitoring and enforcing the agreements, and U.S. government views on whether Japan has met its commitments under the agreements; and (3) U.S. insurance industry views on U.S. government monitoring and enforcement efforts. To obtain the views of U.S. insurance companies regarding the agreements' implementation and impact on their ability to compete in Japan, we distributed a questionnaire to all 13 U.S. insurers and three brokers in Japan that are either wholly or majority U.S. owned. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the implementation and monitoring of the U.S.-Japan insurance agreements, focusing on: (1) the views of U.S. insurance companies operating in Japan regarding the agreements' implementation and impact on their ability to compete in the Japanese market; (2) the roles and efforts of the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) and the Departments of Commerce, State, and the Treasury in monitoring and enforcing the agreements, and U.S. government views on whether Japan has met its commitments under the agreements; and (3) U.S. insurance industry views on U.S. government monitoring and enforcement efforts.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) GAO's 1999 survey of the 13 U.S. insurance companies and 3 brokers in Japan revealed that all but 2 think that Japan has made moderate or better progress overall in implementing the 1994 and 1996 insurance agreements; (2) GAO's analysis of survey results shows that Japan has met most of its transparency (openness), procedural protection, and deregulation commitments; (3) overall, most U.S. companies reported that the agreements have had a positive effect on their ability to compete in Japan; (4) nevertheless, almost half the companies expressed concerns over Japan's implementation of key commitments such as expediting approval of insurance products and rates and limiting the activities of large Japanese companies in the specialized third sector; (5) USTR is the principal agency responsible for monitoring and enforcing the insurance agreements, with assistance primarily from the U.S. embassy in Tokyo; (6) USTR also receives assistance from Commerce and State, with a lesser level of assistance by the Departments of the Treasury and Justice; (7) USTR and U.S. embassy monitoring efforts include obtaining information on the agreements' implementation from industry groups and individual U.S. insurance companies, as well as consulting with the Japanese government; (8) in conducting their monitoring and enforcement work, U.S. government officials have noted Japanese progress in implementing the agreements; (9) however, they have also identified a few issues, which are similar to those cited by some U.S. companies, where they believe Japan has not fully met its commitments; (10) Japan, on the other hand, believes that it has fully implemented both agreements; (11) more U.S. insurance companies expressed favorable views of U.S. government actions to monitor the insurance agreements than reported favorable views of enforcement efforts; (12) about half (7 of 13) of all U.S. insurers and 2 of the 3 brokers GAO surveyed reported that U.S. government efforts to monitor agreements have been effective; (13) with regard to enforcement, about one-third of the companies and no brokers reported that U.S. government efforts have been effective; (14) around one-third of the companies reported that U.S. government monitoring and enforcement efforts have been as effective as ineffective; and (15) three major U.S. insurers expressed concerns over U.S. government monitoring and enforcement efforts concerning the protection of various U.S. company interests in the third sector. |
gao_GAO-09-45 | gao_GAO-09-45_0 | SRFMI has a goal to reduce the federal tax gap by improving the tax compliance of individuals and businesses who do not file (nonfilers) or who do not report all of their income (underreporters). Although IRS Has Begun Developing One, IRS Does Not Yet Have a Sound Evaluation Plan for SRFMI
According to IRS officials, the SRFMI pilot includes plans to evaluate program results to make decisions about expanding data sharing with states and using compliance data to evaluate whether SRFMI cases are more or less productive than other cases. Well-Developed Evaluation Plans Increase the Likelihood That Evaluations Will Yield Methodologically Sound Results and Support Effective Program and Policy Decisions
A well-developed and documented evaluation plan can help ensure that agency evaluations generate performance information needed to make effective program and policy decisions. IRS has no criteria or standards for determining where the pilot program performs adequately to be incorporated into normal IRS compliance processes. IRS officials said the agency plans to use research results to help formulate standards but did not provide a target date when this will occur. IRS has not completely articulated its methodology to evaluate the pilot program. IRS officials provided action plans and testing sample plans for individual units when asked about their methodology. The action plans primarily contained project-management- type information such as actions or tasks to be taken by individuals, start date, completion date, and problem areas rather than a comprehensive description of the methodological approach for the overall pilot project. The testing sample plans were questionnaires soliciting information about compliance measures for the individual unit and the resources available for testing SRFMI data. None of the plans they presented outline the methods, timing, or frequency of data collection. While IRS officials have begun developing a sampling approach and determining appropriate sample sizes, IRS officials encountered challenges that have delayed progress. IRS is exploring new territory by obtaining and using state taxpayer data to match against its own to identify taxpayers who do not file federal tax returns or underreport income on their federal tax returns. However, 2½ years after the pilot began, as it is entering phase III and is less than 1 year away from a national rollout with 45 states enrolled to deliver SRFMI files, IRS has yet to develop and document a sound evaluation plan. The need to evaluate the program is underscored because obtaining and using SRFMI data imposes costs not only on IRS but also on the states. Without a sound assessment of pilot program results, IRS may make poor decisions about the program’s future. This plan should address all components of the pilot program and include key evaluation features of a sound plan: well-defined, clear, and measurable objectives; criteria or standards for determining pilot program performance; clearly articulated methodology, including sound sampling methods, determination of appropriate sample size for the evaluation design, and a strategy for comparing the pilot results with other efforts; and a clear plan that details the type and source of data necessary to evaluate the pilot, methods for data collection, and the timing and frequency of data collection; and a detailed data-analysis plan to track the program’s performance and evaluate the final results of the project. | Why GAO Did This Study
The State Reverse File Match Initiative (SRFMI) is one of the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) data-sharing strategies to reduce the estimated $345 billion gross federal tax gap. SRFMI matches federal and state taxpayer data to identify noncompliant taxpayers--individuals and businesses who do not file tax returns or do not report all of their income. IRS's document-matching program has proven to be a highly cost-effective way of identifying underreported income, thereby bringing in billions of dollars of tax revenue while boosting voluntary compliance. Based on concerns about whether IRS is fully using data from state and local governments to reduce the tax gap, GAO was asked to assess IRS's plan for evaluating the effectiveness of the SRFMI pilot taxpayer data-sharing program. To address these objectives, GAO consulted social science and evaluation literature, published GAO guidance, and IRS guidance; reviewed and analyzed SRFMI planning and evaluation documents; and interviewed IRS officials about IRS's plans to evaluate SRFMI.
What GAO Found
IRS is developing a plan for evaluating SRFMI data but does not currently have a documented plan even as the agency enters phase III of the pilot program and is less than 1 year away from rolling out the pilot to 45 states. According to IRS officials, the SRFMI pilot includes plans to evaluate program results to make decisions about expanding data sharing with states and using compliance data to assess whether SRFMI cases are more or less productive than other cases. IRS has little documentation on its evaluation. A well-developed and documented plan can help ensure that the evaluation generates performance information needed to make effective management decisions. A sound evaluation approach should also include criteria or standards for determining pilot-program performance. However, IRS has no criteria or standards for determining where the pilot program performs adequately to be incorporated into normal IRS compliance processes. IRS officials told GAO that they plan to use research results to help formulate standards to determine pilot success but did not provide a target date when this will occur. Moreover, IRS has not completely articulated its methodology to evaluate the pilot program. IRS officials have action plans and testing sample plans for individual units. The action plans primarily contained project-management-type information such as actions or tasks to be taken by individuals, start date, completion date, and comments rather than a comprehensive description of the methodological approach for the overall pilot project. The testing sample plans were questionnaires soliciting information about compliance measures for the individual unit and the resources available for testing SRFMI data. None of the plans outline the methods, timing, or frequency of data collection. While IRS officials have begun formulating plans for developing a sampling approach and determining appropriate sample size, they encountered challenges such as delays in information-technology assistance and time limits for using taxpayer data that have impeded progress in moving forward on its evaluation methodology. The need to evaluate the program is underscored because obtaining and using SRFMI data imposes costs not only on IRS but also on the states. Without a sound assessment of pilot program results, IRS may make poor decisions about the program's future. |
gao_GAO-16-366 | gao_GAO-16-366_0 | The statutory time frames for submitting and issuing appeal decisions can vary by level. Medicare Appeals and Untimely Appeal Decisions Increased from Fiscal Years 2010 through 2014
The total number of Medicare appeals filed and the number of appeal decisions that were issued after statutory time frames at Levels 1 through 4 increased from fiscal years 2010 through 2014, with the largest rate of increase at Level 3. Reversal rates also decreased during this time for most levels of appeals. While Level 3 handled fewer appeals overall, it experienced the largest rate of increase in appeals from 41,733 to 432,534 appeals—936 percent—during this period. Among the four levels, Level 3 experienced both the largest increase in appeals overall, as well as the largest increase in Part A appeals, which increased over 2,000 percent between fiscal years 2010 and 2014. HHS also attributed the increase in appeals to a greater propensity among providers to appeal denied claims. In fiscal year 2014, Levels 3 and 4 issued decisions within the statutory time frames for a greater percentage of beneficiary-filed appeals than appeals filed by providers or state Medicaid agencies. As a result, CMS interest payments have increased. Data Systems Used by HHS to Monitor Appeals Process Do Not Capture Data to Identify Important Trends or Provide Consistent Data for Monitoring Appeals across Levels
HHS agencies use appeals data to monitor the Medicare appeals process, but do not collect information on the reasons for Level 3 appeal decisions or the amounts of allowed Medicare payments in dispute. HHS Agencies Use Data to Monitor Appeals but Do Not Collect Other Data on Reasons for Level 3 Appeal Decisions and Actual Amounts of Medicare Payments at Issue
HHS agencies use data collected in CROWD, MAS, and MODACTS to monitor the Medicare appeals process for Levels 1 through 4. These data systems collect information such as the date when the appeal was filed, the type of service or claim appealed, and the length of time taken to issue appeal decisions. This would be consistent with the federal standards for internal control that require agencies to conduct ongoing monitoring to assess the quality of performance over time to ensure operational effectiveness, and to run and control agency operations using relevant, reliable, and timely information. Inconsistencies across Appeals Data Systems Limit HHS Agencies’ Ability to Monitor Appeals
Our review found data inconsistencies across the three appeals data systems and within the appeal levels that use MAS, such as variation in how appeal decisions are recorded at the claim level and how HHS agencies track appeal decisions. These data inconsistencies limit HHS agencies’ ability to monitor emerging trends in appeals using consistent and reliable data. Specifically, the three data systems use different categories to track the type of Medicare service at issue in the appeal, such as whether the appeal relates primarily to an inpatient hospital claim or a transportation claim. However, the Medicare appeals backlog is likely to persist despite actions taken to date, and HHS efforts thus far do not address inefficiencies with the way certain repetitive claims are adjudicated. HHS Agencies Took Actions to Reduce the Number of Medicare Appeals, the Number of Appeals Reaching Levels 3 and 4, and the Current Appeals Backlog
In order to provide more timely adjudication of appeals of Medicare claim denials, HHS agencies have taken various actions, which can be grouped into three categories: 1. changes to Medicare prepayment and postpayment claims reviews, which may reduce claim denials and, therefore, the number of filed appeals; 2. actions aimed at reducing the number of decisions at lower appeal levels that lead to appeals at Levels 3 and 4; and 3. actions aimed at resolving the current backlog of undecided appeals at Levels 3 and 4. If the appeal for the initial claim is later reversed in favor of the appellant, the appeals of the subsequent claims must continue to go through the appeals process, awaiting separate decisions, because the favorable appeal decision on the initial claim cannot generally be applied to the other appeals of subsequently denied claims. HHS generally agreed with four of the five draft recommendations and outlined a number of initiatives it is taking to improve the efficiency of the Medicare appeals process, reduce the backlog of pending appeals, and mitigate the possibility of future backlogs. In commenting, HHS provided further information for two of the recommendations with which it generally agreed. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
This appendix provides additional details regarding our analysis of (1) trends in Medicare fee-for-service (FFS) appeals for fiscal years 2010 through 2014; (2) differences in claim-level and appeal-level reversal rates; (3) appeals resolved by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services’ (CMS) global settlement; (4) CMS’s estimate of interest paid by the agency to certain providers; and (5) data reliability. According to the Department of Health and Human Services’ (HHS) budget justification materials, this filing fee will allow HHS to invest in the appeals system to improve responsiveness and efficiency. | Why GAO Did This Study
In fiscal year 2014, Medicare processed 1.2 billion FFS claims submitted by providers on behalf of beneficiaries. When Medicare denies or reduces payment for a claim or a portion of a claim, providers, beneficiaries, and others may appeal these decisions through Medicare's appeals process.
In recent years there have been increases in the number of filed and backlogged appeals (i.e., pending appeals that remain undecided after statutory time frames). GAO was asked to examine Levels 1 through 4 of Medicare's appeals process. This report examines (1) trends in appeals for fiscal years 2010 through 2014, (2) data HHS uses to monitor the appeals process, and (3) HHS efforts to reduce the number of appeals filed and backlogged. GAO analyzed data from the three data systems used to monitor appeals, reviewed relevant HHS agency documentation and policies, federal internal control standards, and interviewed HHS agency officials and others.
What GAO Found
The appeals process for Medicare fee-for-service (FFS) claims consists of four administrative levels of review within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and a fifth level in which appeals are reviewed by federal courts. Appeals are generally reviewed by each level sequentially, as appellants may appeal a decision to the next level depending on the prior outcome. Under the administrative process, separate appeals bodies review appeals and issue decisions under time limits established by law, which can vary by level. From fiscal years 2010 and 2014, the total number of filed appeals at Levels 1 through 4 of Medicare's FFS appeals process increased significantly but varied by level. Level 3 experienced the largest rate of increase in appeals—from 41,733 to 432,534 appeals (936 percent)—during this period. A significant portion of the increase was driven by appeals of hospital and other inpatient stays, which increased from 12,938 to 275,791 appeals (over 2,000 percent) at Level 3. HHS attributed the growth in appeals to its increased program integrity efforts and a greater propensity of providers to appeal claims, among other things. GAO also found that the number of appeal decisions issued after statutory time frames generally increased during this time, with the largest increase in and largest proportion of late decisions occurring at appeal Levels 3 and 4. For example, in fiscal year 2014, 96 percent of Level 3 decisions were issued after the general 90-day statutory time frame for Level 3.
The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) and two other components within HHS that are part of the Medicare appeals process use data collected in three appeal data systems—such as the date when the appeal was filed, the type of service or claim appealed, and the length of time taken to issue appeal decisions—to monitor the Medicare appeals process. However, these systems do not collect other data that HHS agencies could use to monitor important appeal trends, such as information related to the reasons for Level 3 decisions and the actual amount of Medicare reimbursement at issue. GAO also found variation in how appeals bodies record decisions across the three systems, including the use of different categories to track the type of Medicare service at issue in the appeal. Absent more complete and consistent appeals data, HHS's ability to monitor emerging trends in appeals is limited and is inconsistent with federal internal control standards that require agencies to run and control agency operations using relevant, reliable, and timely information.
HHS agencies have taken several actions aimed at reducing the total number of Medicare appeals filed and the current appeals backlog. For example, in 2014, CMS agreed to pay a portion of the payable amount for certain denied hospital claims on the condition that pending appeals associated with those claims were withdrawn and rights to future appeals of them waived. However, despite this and other actions taken by HHS agencies, the Medicare appeals backlog continues to grow at a rate that outpaces the adjudication process and will likely persist. Further, HHS efforts do not address inefficiencies regarding the way appeals of certain repetitious claims—such as claims for monthly oxygen equipment rentals—are adjudicated, which is inconsistent with federal internal control standards. Under the current process, if the initial claim is reversed in favor of the appellant, the decision generally cannot be applied to the other related claims. As a result, more appeals must go through the appeals process.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that HHS take four actions, including improving the completeness and consistency of the data used by HHS to monitor appeals and implementing a more efficient method of handling appeals associated with repetitious claims. HHS generally agreed with four of GAO's recommendations, and disagreed with a fifth recommendation, citing potential unintended consequences. GAO agrees and has dropped that recommendation. |
gao_RCED-99-165 | gao_RCED-99-165_0 | The Bureau Relies Mostly on Appraisals to Establish the Lease Value of Indian Trust Land
Bureau officials are responsible for ensuring that leases of Indian trust land reflect a fair annual rental, and they rely primarily on appraisals to estimate that value. However, the Bureau has not defined fair annual rental and does not have a clear policy on how that amount should be estimated. However, we found no statutory or regulatory requirement that appraisals be used to estimate fair market rental, and, in fact, some area offices use other methods in addition to appraisals to establish lease values. Agricultural Leases
The Bureau’s method for establishing the lease value of land for agriculture varied depending on the crops grown and, in some cases, on the number of appraisers employed in the area. Federal, State, and Private Lease Values Are Established by Other Methods in Addition to Appraisals
The Bureau’s appraisers are held to the same general standards and use similar appraisal techniques as other federal appraisers, state appraisers, and private appraisers. However, these land managers also use other methods to establish lease values. The Bureau’s Appraisals and Processes for Appraising and Leasing Land Were Named as Impediments to Leasing
There are several reasons that any land—including Indian land—might not be leased. The Bureau Could Use Methods Other Than Appraisals to Establish Lease Values for Indian Land
In addition to appraisals, a number of other methods may be used to establish lease values. These other methods include advertising for competitive bids, conducting market surveys, and applying fee schedules or formulas. Alternative approaches that are already in use in some Bureau offices include competitive bidding and the use of market surveys:
Under its regulations, the Bureau is allowed to advertise tracts of unleased trust land for competitive lease bids if the landowner wishes to explore the market and is required to do so for leases that are not negotiated or for which a fair annual rental cannot be obtained through negotiations. Changes in current laws or regulations would not be necessary for the Bureau to adopt these or other alternative methods. A representative of the Deputy Commissioner’s office emphasized that this position has not been adopted by the Bureau and that a legal review that examines laws and court cases that apply Bureau-wide would be required before it would consider doing so. According to the improvement plan, these tracking systems are designed to provide the Bureau with information on when most of the appraisals are needed and to enable Bureau management to use appraisal resources (funding and staff) more effectively. Conclusions
Under its regulations, the Bureau of Indian Affairs is required to ensure that Indian land is leased for a fair annual rental. The Bureau often relies on appraisals, which must be prepared in conformance with professional appraisal standards—the same standards that apply to all professional appraisers, including other federal, state, and private appraisers. However, we believe that, in addition to appraisals, other methods are available to Bureau officials for estimating a fair annual rental for Indian land and could be used under certain circumstances. Recommendations
In addition to concurring with the Department of the Interior’s ongoing efforts to review and revise the Bureau’s appraisal program, we recommend that the Secretary of the Interior direct the Commissioner of the Bureau of Indian Affairs to do the following:
Develop a clear policy on how fair annual rental can be estimated using other methods in addition to appraisals, such as market surveys, fee schedules, and formulas, where appropriate. We identified alternative methods of establishing the rent value of land through discussions with Bureau and other land-management officials and with private appraisers and landowners, as well as through a review of prior GAO reports on land-management practices. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the Bureau of Indian Affairs' methods of establishing the lease value of Indian land, focusing on: (1) how the Bureau uses appraisals and other methods to establish the lease value of Indian land; (2) how its appraisal methods compare to those of other federal and state agencies and of private appraisers and what other methods are used to value federal, state, and private leases; (3) what impediments to leasing Indian trust land have been identified; (4) what alternatives to appraisals could be used to establish the lease value of Indian land, including any changes in federal laws and regulations that would be required; and (5) what efforts the Bureau has made to improve its appraisal methods.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the Bureau relies mostly on appraisals to ensure that Indian land is leased for a fair annual rental; (2) however, the Bureau has not defined fair annual rental and does not have a clear policy on how that amount should be determined; (3) GAO found no statutory or regulatory requirement that appraisals be used to establish lease values; (4) under certain circumstances, some Bureau offices use other methods in addition to appraisals; (5) the standards and methods that apply to Bureau appraisers also apply to other appraisers, including other federal, state, and private appraisers; (6) however, managers of other lands also use other methods to establish lease values; (7) according to several private appraisers GAO spoke to, the rents for agricultural leases on private land are often not set by appraisal; (8) however, leases for other uses on private land, such as business uses, may be valued by appraisal; (9) appraisal amounts were considered a particular problem because of Bureau officials' reluctance to approve leases for less than the appraised value; (10) in addition, while Bureau and other appraisers stated that there is no standard for the amount of time it should take to prepare or review an appraisal, some Indian communities expressed frustration with the time taken by the Bureau's processes; (11) in addition to appraisals, other methods are available for establishing lease values in some circumstances; (12) such other methods include advertising for competitive lease bids, conducting market surveys, and applying fee schedules or formulas; (13) laws and regulations do not require the use of appraisals to establish lease values and would not need to be changed for the Bureau to adopt these or other alternative methods to establish rents for leases; (14) Bureau officials said a more comprehensive review of laws, regulations, and court cases would need to be conducted before Bureau-wide changes would be considered; (15) the Department of the Interior is reviewing the Bureau's use of appraisals and is considering improvements to the Bureau's processes; (16) proposed improvements include training realty staff on the circumstances under which appraisals should be requested to limit the number of unnecessary appraisals and automating and thus streamlining the valuation processes for certain types of real estate transactions; and (17) the improvement plan also includes a recommendation that the Bureau develop a system for tracking appraisals to allow more effective use of appraisal resources. |
gao_GAO-01-1116T | gao_GAO-01-1116T_0 | Management Concerns Include Suitability, Security, and Costs of Telecommuting
In our examination of barriers to telecommuting in the private sector, we found that decisions on whether an organization ultimately adopted telecommuting programs or expanded them over time was heavily dependent on the resolution of three concerns: identifying the positions and employees suitable for telecommuting; protecting data; and controlling the costs associated with telecommuting. These laws and regulations include those covering taxes, workplace safety, recordkeeping, and liability for injuries. Because several of these laws and regulations predate the shift toward a more technological and information-based economy in which telecommuting has developed, their application to telecommuting is still evolving and unclear at this time. Second, federal wage and hour law and regulations may also pose a barrier to telecommuting programs in both the private and public sectors. | What GAO Found
Telecommuting refers to work that is done at an employee's home or at a job site other than a traditional business office. Perhaps the biggest challenge to establishing and expanding telecommuting programs in both the public and private sectors is management's concerns about the types of positions and employees suitable for telecommuting, protecting proprietary and sensitive data, and establishing cost-effective telecommuting programs. Some federal and state laws and regulations, including those governing taxes, workplace safety, workforce recordkeeping, and liability for home workplace injuries, are also potential obstacles to telecommuting. Overall, the application of state tax laws to telecommuting arrangements, as well as other laws and regulations enacted before the transition to a more technological and information based economy, is evolving and their ultimate impact remains unclear. |
gao_GAO-15-459 | gao_GAO-15-459_0 | DOD leases commercial SATCOM primarily though the Defense Information Systems Agency. Prior GAO Findings on Procurements of Commercial Satellite Bandwidth Services
In 2003, we found that while the process for acquiring commercial satellite bandwidth is fair to DOD’s vendors and their subcontractors, some major DOD users of commercial satellite bandwidth services were They viewed the process as being too dissatisfied with DISA’s process.lengthy, particularly for time-critical military operations, and they believed that the cost was too high. Thus, we specifically recommended DOD implement a strategic management framework for improving the acquisition of commercial bandwidth, that, among other things, inventories current and potential users of commercial bandwidth to determine their existing and long-term requirements; identifies and exploits opportunities to consolidate bandwidth requirements of combatant commanders, the military services, and defense agencies; and adopt commonly used commercial practices, such as conducting spend analyses and negotiating pricing discounts based on overall DOD volume, to strengthen DOD’s position to acquire bandwidth; and finally, improve the current funding structure by considering new funding approaches such as centralized funding of commercial bandwidth, and seeking legislative authority for multi-year procurements. At the time of our 2003 review, DOD generally agreed with our recommendations. That is, some DOD components independently procure commercial SATCOM to meet their individual needs, rather than relying on DISA. Additionally, these procurements limit opportunities for sharing commercial SATCOM among components and for creating savings by streamlining purchases. For example, DOD reported in its most recent commercial SATCOM usage report that the average cost for commercial capacity leased though DISA was 16 percent lower than comparable services not acquired through DISA.report, approximately $280 million or about 32 percent of fixed satellite commercial SATCOM services was procured outside of DISA, in conflict with current DOD policy. Specifically, in its congressionally mandated 2014 Satellite Communication Strategy Report (Strategy Report), DOD did not identify a specific mix of military and commercial SATCOM to meet its needs, but it was able to outline a strategy that may allow DOD to project the appropriate military/commercial mix in the future. At the request of the Strategic Command, DISA also conducted a study looking into the optimal mix of military and commercial SATCOM—its 2014 Mix of Media Report (Media Report)—which indicated DOD demand for SATCOM is growing, but expected capacity will remain flat, suggesting military capability will need to be significantly supplemented with commercial SATCOM in the future. DOD’s 2014 Strategy Report Outlines Plans to Determine Optimal Mix of Military and Commercial Satellite Communications
DOD prepared its 2014 Strategy Report in response to committee direction that DOD provide a 5-, 10-, and 25-year strategy for using an appropriate mix of military and commercial SATCOM. DOD Study Aimed at Identifying SATCOM Needs Was Partially Based on Incomplete Information
In September 2014, DISA completed its Media Report, which was intended to provide a representation of future SATCOM demand and capacity in a planning scenario, but the data on which the SATCOM demand predictions in that study were based were incomplete. As stated previously, DOD’s most recent commercial SATCOM usage report indicates that roughly 32 percent of fixed satellite services are procured outside of DISA. Other Steps Being Taken to Improve Commercial SATCOM Procurement, but Challenges Remain
DOD is taking other actions to better understand its commercial and military SATCOM needs and improve management, but as DOD moves forward with its plans to reform its commercial SATCOM acquisition and management processes, the department faces challenges, the most prominent being a lack of critical data and resistance to centralizing procurements. The pathfinders are intended to identify various opportunities to improve DOD procurement of commercial and military SATCOM, but it will be several years before DOD gains enough information and experience from its pathfinder efforts to determine what, if any, changes to make to its acquisition approach. The WGS analysis is not expected to begin until fiscal year 2017, but DOD officials are optimistic that the resulting investments could mitigate DOD’s future reliance on commercial SATCOM, and could also help the department maximize its military SATCOM capability and usage. Second, centralized management of service procurements is a leading practice that DOD has already embraced. This approach is inefficient and costly. Utilizing strategic sourcing best practices for DOD’s use of commercial and military satellite bandwidth, beginning with robust analyses of spending and better enforcement of centralized management, would increase chances of success for DOD’s improvement efforts. To address DOD’s fragmented procurement of commercial SATCOM, to better position DOD to identify needs, manage and acquire commercial SATCOM, and to address the incomplete data on commercial SATCOM spending and demand, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Joint Chiefs, U.S. Strategic Command, combatant commands, military services, and DISA, enforce current policy requiring DISA to acquire all commercial SATCOM for DOD. To better leverage DOD’s buying power and help DOD understand its military and commercial SATCOM spending, and enable DOD to reform its commercial SATCOM acquisition and management processes, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense, in conjunction with the Air Force and DISA, complement the pathfinder efforts by conducting the following:
A spend analysis that identifies procurement inefficiencies and opportunities to consolidate purchases. In its written comments, DOD concurred with all three of our recommendations to improve the department’s procurement of SATCOM. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD depends on commercial SATCOM to support a variety of critical mission needs, from unmanned aerial vehicles and intelligence to voice and data for military personnel. In fiscal year 2011, the most recent information available, DOD spent over $1 billion leasing commercial SATCOM. In prior work, GAO found that some major DOD users of commercial satellite bandwidth were dissatisfied with DISA's acquisition process seeing it as too costly and lengthy. These users also indicated that the contracts used were too inflexible.
The Senate Armed Services Committee's report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 included a provision for DOD to report on the future mix of military and commercial SATCOM and for GAO to review DOD's report, issued in August 2014. This report (1) assesses the extent to which DOD efficiently procures bandwidth, (2) analyzes the extent to which DOD has identified its future SATCOM requirements using DOD and commercial satellite services, as well as how those requirements will be met, and (3) identifies the steps DOD is taking to improve its procurements of commercial SATCOM.
To conduct this work, GAO reviewed DOD's reports, DOD SATCOM procurement guidance, prior GAO reports, and interviewed DOD officials.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense's (DOD) procurement of commercial satellite communications (SATCOM), or bandwidth, is fragmented and inefficient. Historically, commercial SATCOM was used to augment military capability, but DOD has become increasingly reliant on commercial SATCOM to support ongoing U.S. military operations. DOD policy requires all of its components to procure commercial SATCOM through the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), but GAO found that some components are independently procuring SATCOM to meet their individual needs. DOD's most recent SATCOM usage report estimates that over 30 percent of commercial SATCOM is bought independently by DOD components, even though DOD found the average cost of commercial SATCOM bought through DISA is about 16 percent lower than independently bought commercial SATCOM. Fragmentation limits opportunities for DOD to bundle purchases, share services, and streamline its procurement of commercial SATCOM.
DOD recently completed two studies aimed at identifying the appropriate future mix of military and commercial SATCOM and predicting future SATCOM needs, however, the reports are partially based on incomplete data. First, the 2014 Satellite Communications Strategy Report did not identify the appropriate future mix of military and commercial SATCOM; rather, it outlined a plan that, if successful, may allow DOD to do so at a later time. Second, the 2014 Mix of Media Report based its predictions of future SATCOM requirements and demand on DOD's SATCOM Database, which DOD officials acknowledge lacks comprehensive usage and demand data.
DOD is taking steps to improve its SATCOM procurement and address challenges through “pathfinder” efforts aimed at identifying short- and long-term options. For example, DOD intends to study the potential benefits of using innovative contracting approaches as it procures military and commercial SATCOM, and refine its understanding of DOD's global SATCOM requirements. However, it may be several years before DOD is able to evaluate the results of its pathfinder efforts. For example, all of the 10 pathfinders planned or already underway are expected to be completed in or beyond fiscal year 2017. DOD's efforts to improve its procurement of military and commercial SATCOM will also be hampered by two long-standing challenges—lack of knowledge of what DOD is spending on commercial SATCOM and resistance to centralized management of SATCOM procurement—both of which GAO reported on and made recommendations to improve in 2003—regarding commercial SATCOM. Specifically, GAO recommended that DOD strengthen its capacity to provide accurate and complete analyses of commercial bandwidth spending and implement a strategic management framework for improving the acquisition of commercial bandwidth. DOD generally concurred with GAO's 2003 recommendations and developed a plan to address them, but none of DOD's corrective actions was carried out as intended. These challenges are commonly faced by organizations seeking to strategically source procurements of services, but they can be overcome by employing best practices, which include conducting detailed spend analyses and centralized management of service procurements to identify procurement inefficiencies and opportunities.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD (1) enforce current policy requiring DISA to acquire all commercial SATCOM; (2) conduct a spend analysis identifying procurement inefficiencies and opportunities; and (3) assess whether further centralization of commercial SATCOM procurement could be beneficial. DOD concurred. |
gao_GAO-09-849 | gao_GAO-09-849_0 | 1). NORTHCOM conducts or participates in exercises to improve readiness to perform its assigned missions. 3). NORTHCOM’s Exercise Program Is Consistent with DOD’s Joint Training System, but Exercise Reporting is Inconsistent
NORTHCOM’s Exercise Program is Consistent with DOD’s Joint Training System
NORTHCOM’s Commander’s Training Guidance requires that NORTHCOM establish a training and exercise program consistent with the Joint Training System and establishes that training efforts and resources will be focused on two large-scale exercises annually. In addition, access to this system is generally limited to DOD officials. We found that 17 civilian federal agencies and organizations have participated to varying degrees in one or more of the seven large-scale NORTHCOM exercises that have occurred since Hurricane Katrina made landfall in August 2005. One of DOD’s challenges is adapting its exercise system and practices to accommodate the coordination and involvement of other federal, state, local, and tribal agencies that do not have the same kinds of practices or level of planning effort. Inconsistencies with how NORTHCOM involves states in planning, conducting, and assessing exercises is occurring in part because NORTHCOM officials lack experience dealing with the various state agencies and emergency management structures. Without an informed and consistent process for including the states in planning, conducting, and assessing its exercises, NORTHCOM increases the risk that its exercises will not provide benefits for all participants, impacting the seamless exercise of all levels of government and potentially affecting NORTHCOM’s ability to provide support to civil authorities. NORTHCOM has been identifying observations, lessons learned, and needed corrective actions from its exercises and operations since the command was created in 2002. NORTHCOM Has Taken Steps to Integrate Its Exercises with the National Exercise Program, but Guidance Is Not Consistently Applied
NORTHCOM Has Participated in National Exercises and Taken Steps to Integrate with the NEP
Since the NEP Charter was approved in January 2007, NORTHCOM has participated in the major national exercise held under the NEP and taken steps to integrate its exercises into the national program. We found that NORTHCOM generally has used DOD’s Joint Training System guidance for planning NEP exercises, defining capabilities, and reporting exercise results. Further, a key element to developing effective working relationships with all states is a consistent process for including states in planning and executing NORTHCOM’s exercises that incorporates state-specific knowledge and information. To improve NORTHCOM’s involvement of interagency partners and states in its lessons learned and corrective action process and its management of corrective actions, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct: NORTHCOM’s Commander to establish and publicize valid and easily accessible procedures for non-DOD exercise participants to submit observations relevant to NORTHCOM, such as placing a template on NORTHCOM’s publicly accessible Web site or DHS’s Homeland Security Information Network, so that NORTHCOM officials have a clear, secure avenue to obtain observations and assess potential lessons that originate with its exercise partners; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in consultation and coordination with DHS, to either resolve information assurance issues so that the combatant commands, including NORTHCOM, can post Exercise Summary Reports with lessons learned and observations from NEP exercises on DHS’s Lessons Learned Information Sharing system to make them easily accessible to interagency partners and states or establish an alternative method to systematically collect and share lessons learned; and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to revise the joint lessons learned operating instruction to include procedures to ensure that appropriate corrective actions are implemented and verified in a subsequent exercise or operation before being closed and that the reasons for closure are documented. However, this does not fully address our recommendation. Finally, to determine the extent to which NORTHCOM is integrating its training and exercises with the NEP we reviewed DOD, NORTHCOM, and Department of Homeland Security guidance to identify any differences in exercise planning and documentation between DOD’s guidance and that for the NEP. Homeland Defense: Steps Have Been Taken to Improve U.S. Northern Command’s Coordination with States and the National Guards Bureau, but Gaps Remain. | Why GAO Did This Study
U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) exercises to test preparedness to perform its homeland defense and civil support missions. GAO was asked to assess the extent to which NORTHCOM is (1) consistent with Department of Defense (DOD) training and exercise requirements, (2) involving interagency partners and states in its exercises, (3) using lessons learned and corrective actions to improve preparedness, and (4) integrating its exercises with the National Exercise Program (NEP). To do this, GAO reviewed NORTHCOM and NEP guidance and postexercise documentation, assessed NORTHCOM compliance, and compared DOD and NEP exercise requirements.
What GAO Found
NORTHCOM's exercise program is generally consistent with the requirements of DOD's Joint Training System, but its exercise reporting is inconsistent. Since the command was established in 2002, NORTHCOM has conducted 13 large-scale exercises and generally completed exercise summary reports within the required time frame. However, those reports did not consistently include certain information, such as areas needing improvement, because NORTHCOM lacks guidance that specifies exercise reports' content and format, potentially impacting its ability to meet internal standards for planning and execution of joint exercises, and to compare and share exercise results over time with interagency partners and states. Nineteen federal agencies and organizations and 17 states and the District of Columbia have participated in one or more of the seven large-scale exercises that NORTHCOM has conducted since September 2005. However, NORTHCOM faces challenges in involving states in the planning, conduct, and assessment of its exercises, such as adapting its exercise system and practices to involve other federal, state, local, and tribal agencies that do not have the same practices or level of planning resources. Inconsistencies with how NORTHCOM involves states in exercises are occurring in part because NORTHCOM officials lack experience dealing with states and do not have a consistent process for including states in exercises. Without such a process, NORTHCOM increases the risk that its exercises will not provide benefits for all participants, impact the seamless exercise of all levels of government, and potentially affect NORTHCOM's ability to provide civil support capabilities. NORTHCOM has a systematic lessons learned and corrective action program to improve preparedness, but gaps remain with collecting and sharing lessons with agency and state partners and managing corrective actions. Access to the system NORTHCOM uses for managing exercise observations is limited for non-DOD participants, and DOD believes that the Department of Homeland Security's system is not adequately protected from unauthorized users. NORTHCOM's mitigation steps have not resolved the issues. In addition, about 20 percent of the corrective actions tracked by NORTHCOM were being closed prematurely due to gaps in oversight. Closing issues prematurely increases the risk that issues will reoccur and limits the knowledge gained and value of the exercise. NORTHCOM has taken steps to integrate its exercises with the NEP, but guidance is not consistently applied. NORTHCOM has participated in several NEP exercises and is leading its first major NEP exercise in the fall of 2009. However, NORTHCOM has used DOD's Joint Training System planning and documentation requirements rather than DHS's requirements, because NEP guidance is not clear on what exercise planning standard should be used and DOD guidance does not address the issue. The states we visited use NEP guidance. Differences between NEP and DOD guidance could affect the ability of all participants to develop effective working relationships. |
gao_GAO-09-309 | gao_GAO-09-309_0 | Background
Title III and Title V of the Higher Education Act (HEA) authorize federal funding for postsecondary institutions that provide large proportions of low-income and minority students access to higher education. Eligible Institutions Had Fewer Resources to Serve Proportionately More Students at Academic Risk
Lower Revenues May Make It Difficult for Eligible Institutions to Meet Needs of Current and Future Students
We estimate that 28 percent of 2-year and 4-year public and private not-for- profit postsecondary institutions are eligible to participate in the Title III and V programs, and together these institutions enrolled just over 4 million students. In 2006, per-student spending on instructional equipment at eligible institutions was almost 47 percent less than spending at ineligible institutions. Institutions Faced Challenges across the Grant Programs’ Four Focus Areas but Spent Most of Their Funds in Two Areas, Academic Quality and Student Support
In their grant applications, Title III and V grantees reported challenges across all four grant focus areas: academic quality, student support, institutional management, and fiscal stability. Academic Quality
Based on our review of a representative sample of grant applications, we estimate that all grantees reported challenges in improving academic quality, such as recruiting and training highly qualified faculty, using the latest technology in the classroom for instruction, improving academic space, and tailoring courses to student needs. Student Support Services
Nearly all grantees reported difficulty providing student support services, including remedial courses, tutoring, and academic counseling. Two-thirds of fiscal year 2006 grantees reported dedicating at least one activity to improving student support services, and expenditures in this area represented 34 percent of total Title III and V grant funds spent. Twenty-eight percent of all fiscal year 2006 grantees funded at least one activity in this area, and expenditures on institutional management represented about 17 percent of total grant funds spent. Long-standing Deficiencies in Grant Monitoring and Technical Assistance Limit Education’s Ability to Ensure That Funds Are Used Properly and Grantees Are Supported
Education Has Made Limited Progress in Improving Its Monitoring, and Still Lacks a Systematic Approach to Coordinate Its Efforts
Five times since 1996, GAO and Education’s Inspector General have recommended that Education implement a systematic approach to monitoring to better assess the fiscal and programmatic performance of Title III and V grantees. In fiscal year 2008, for example, five site visits that program oversight staff conducted were to Title III grant recipients. Education Lacks Assurance That Grant Funds Are Used Appropriately
Education has not fully implemented its planned monitoring initiatives and lacks assurance that grantees appropriately manage federal funds, increasing the potential for fraud, waste, or abuse. Of that amount, we found that the institution used more than $79,975 to pay for numerous student trips to locations such as resorts and amusement parks. Officials from about half of the schools and some officials from advocacy groups we interviewed also reported that Education could strengthen grantee performance by more broadly disseminating information about successful projects. As we reported in 2004 and 2007, Education’s ability to target technical assistance is also limited in that the annual performance reports used to obtain feedback about program improvements may discourage candor because the reports identify grantees and are used to make continued funding decisions. The department also does not readily use the feedback it obtains from grantees to improve the programs. Education has made progress in developing tools, such as an electronic monitoring system and risk-based criteria, to assess potential risks associated with Title III and V grants, but it lacks a comprehensive risk-based monitoring and technical assistance approach to target its efforts. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
We reviewed Title III and V grants programs to determine (1) what are the characteristics of institutions eligible to receive grants under Titles III and V, including the characteristics of students served, (2) what challenges do grantees face , and how have they spent Title III and V funds to address these challenges, and (3) to what extent does the Department of Education (Education) monitor the financial and programmatic performance of Title III and V grantees, and use this information to target its technical assistance. | Why GAO Did This Study
Institutions that serve large proportions of low-income and minority students may receive funding under Titles III and V of the Higher Education Act. In fiscal year 2008, $667 million in grants were awarded to over 500 institutions. GAO was asked to determine (1) the characteristics of institutions eligible to receive grants under Titles III and V and characteristics of students served; (2) any challenges grantees face, and how they spent Title III and V funds to address these challenges; and (3) the extent to which the Department of Education (Education) monitors the financial and programmatic performance of grantees, and uses this information to target its technical assistance. To address these objectives, GAO analyzed data from a representative sample of grant applications and annual performance reports for the entire population of fiscal year 2006 grantees. GAO also interviewed officials from Education and 27 grantee institutions, and conducted financial site visits at other 7 grantee institutions.
What GAO Found
Twenty-eight percent of all 2-year and 4-year public and private, not-for-profit institutions are eligible to receive Title III and V grants. Eligible institutions had fewer resources, including endowment holdings and revenue from tuition and fees, and lower per student spending on equipment than ineligible institutions. Eligible institutions also served more students who were minority, low-income, and attended part-time. In their grant applications, Title III and V grantees reported challenges in all four grant focus areas: academic quality, student support, institutional management, and fiscal stability. Grantees reported spending almost $385 million in fiscal year 2006 grant funds to address challenges in these areas, primarily to strengthen academic quality and student support services. Specifically, grantees reported using 43 percent of grant funds on efforts designed to improve academic quality, such as using the latest technology in the classroom and improving academic space. Efforts to improve student support services, including remedial courses, tutoring, and academic counseling represented about one-third of grantee expenditures. While nearly all grantees reported challenges related to strengthening institutional management and fiscal stability, expenditures in these areas represented less than one-quarter of all grant funds spent. Since GAO reported and made recommendations on the management of these programs in 2004 and 2007, Education has continued to take steps to improve monitoring, but many of its initiatives have not been completed. Education has made recent progress in developing an electronic monitoring system and risk-based criteria to improve monitoring, but it discontinued the use of annual plans to guide its efforts. Also, limited progress in addressing staff skill gaps and substantial declines in site visits to grantees has impeded Education's ability to adequately monitor grantees. Because Education lacks a comprehensive approach to target monitoring, it lacks assurance that grantees appropriately manage federal funds, increasing the potential for fraud, waste, or abuse. For example, GAO identified more than $100,000 in questionable expenditures at one grantee institution, including student trips to locations such as resorts and amusement parks, and an airplane global positioning system. Education provides limited technical assistance to grantees, but it has not developed a systematic approach that targets the needs of grantees. For example, some grantees told GAO that Education could strengthen grantee performance by sharing more information regarding common implementation challenges and successful projects. Additionally, GAO found that Education's ability to target technical assistance is limited because its current approach for obtaining feedback does not encourage candor, and it does not use the feedback it currently receives from grantees. |
gao_GAO-12-388 | gao_GAO-12-388_0 | PHMSA has estimated there are roughly 2 million miles of distribution pipelines, most of which are intrastate pipelines. 2). In response to GAO’s survey, state pipeline safety agencies cited construction quality, maintenance practices, unknown or uncertain locations, and limited or no information on current pipeline integrity as safety risks for federally unregulated gathering pipelines. According to responses to our survey and interviews with industry officials and representatives, land-use changes and the increased extraction of oil and natural gas from shale deposits are two changes in the operating environments that could increase the safety risks for unregulated gathering pipelines. 4.) Specifically, some of these new gathering pipelines have larger diameters and operate at higher pressures that are equivalent to traditional transmission pipelines, but without the regulatory requirements. However, PHMSA’s plans for collecting data are preliminary, and the extent to which PHMSA will collect data sufficient to evaluate the potential safety risks associated with these pipelines is uncertain. The survey reported that neither states nor the District of Columbia collected comprehensive data on federally unregulated gathering pipelines, as is required for federally regulated pipelines. States Could Benefit from Sharing Safety Practices
State pipeline safety agencies reported using five safety practices most frequently to help ensure the safety of onshore hazardous liquid and gas gathering pipelines not regulated by PHMSA, according to our survey of state agencies (see fig. Damage prevention programs. Considering areas of highest risk. Safety inspections. Public outreach and communication. However, sharing of information among states on the safety practices they use for unregulated gathering pipelines appears to be limited. Some state and PHMSA officials we interviewed had limited awareness of what other states were doing to help ensure the safety of gathering pipelines not regulated by PHMSA. However, information targeted at gathering pipelines, including relevant safety practices and state activities, is limited. Increased communication and information sharing about pipeline safety practices could boost the use of those practices in states with unregulated gathering pipelines. Conclusions
While the safety risks of federally unregulated, onshore hazardous liquid and gas gathering pipelines are generally considered to be lower than other types of pipelines, PHMSA is currently not able to determine the performance and safety of these gathering pipelines because it does not collect the necessary pipeline operator data. Establish an online clearinghouse or other resource for states to share information on practices that can help ensure the safety of federally unregulated onshore hazardous liquid and gas gathering pipelines. Agency Comments
We provided the Department of Transportation with a draft of this report for review and comment. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to determine (1) the safety risks that exist, if any, with onshore hazardous liquid and natural gas gathering pipelines that are not currently under the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) regulation and (2) the practices states are using to help ensure the safety of unregulated onshore gathering pipelines. We also interviewed officials at PHMSA, state pipeline safety agencies, pipeline companies and other industry stakeholders, and related associations. To determine what safety risks may be associated with federally unregulated gathering pipelines—in addition to reviewing federal agency regulations, regulated pipeline safety data, and conducting various interviews—and because of the lack of historical and nationwide data, we developed and administered a web-based survey to state pipeline safety agencies in all 50 states and the District of Columbia. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pipelines are a relatively safe mode of transportation for hazardous liquid and natural gas and are regulated by the Department of Transportations (DOT) Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) and state entities. Included in the nations pipeline network are an estimated 200,000 or more miles of onshore gathering pipelines, which transport products to processing facilities and larger pipelines. Many of these pipelines have not been subject to federal regulation based on their generally rural location and low operating pressures. While incidents involving gathering pipelines regulated by PHMSA have resulted in millions of dollars in property damage in recent years, comparable statistics for federally unregulated gathering pipelines are unknown. This report identifies (1) the safety risks that exist, if any, with onshore hazardous liquid and natural gas gathering pipelines that are not currently under PHMSA regulation and (2) the practices states use to help ensure the safety of these pipelines. GAO surveyed state pipeline safety agencies in all 50 states and the District of Columbia; interviewed officials at PHMSA, state pipeline safety agencies, pipeline companies, and industry associations; and analyzed data and regulations.
What GAO Found
While the safety risks of onshore gathering pipelines that are not regulated by PHMSA are generally considered to be lower than for other types of pipelines, PHMSA does not collect comprehensive data to identify the safety risks of unregulated gathering pipelines. In response to a GAO survey, state pipeline safety agencies cited construction quality, maintenance practices, unknown or uncertain locations, and limited or no information on pipeline integrity as among the highest risks for federally unregulated pipelines. Without data on these risk factors, pipeline safety officials are unable to assess and manage safety risks associated with these pipelines. Furthermore, changes in pipeline operational environments cited in response to GAOs survey and by industry officials could also increase safety risks for federally unregulated gathering pipelines. Specifically, land-use changes are resulting in development encroaching on existing pipelines and the increased extraction of oil and natural gas from shale deposits is resulting in the development of new gathering pipelines, some of which are larger in diameter and operate at higher pressure than older pipelines. PHMSA is considering collecting data on federally unregulated gathering pipelines, but the agencys plans are preliminary, and the extent to which PHMSA will collect data sufficient to evaluate the potential safety risks associated with these pipelines is uncertain.
A small number of state pipeline safety agencies GAO surveyed reported using at least one of five practices that were most frequently cited to help ensure the safety of federally unregulated pipelines. These practices include (1) damage prevention programs, (2) considering areas of highest risk to target resources, (3) safety inspections, (4) public outreach and communication, and (5) increased regulatory attention on operators with prior spills or leaks. However, the sharing of information among states on the safety practices used appears to be limited. Some state and PHMSA officials GAO interviewed had limited awareness of safety practices used by other states. Increased communication and information sharing about pipeline safety practices could boost the use of such practices for unregulated pipelines. However, information targeted at gathering pipelines on PHMSAs website, including relevant safety practices and state activities, is limited.
What GAO Recommends
DOT should (1) collect data on federally unregulated hazardous liquid and gas gathering pipelines and (2) establish an online clearinghouse or other resource for sharing information on pipeline safety practices. DOT provided technical corrections on a draft of this report. |
gao_GAO-04-545 | gao_GAO-04-545_0 | Background
NNSA, a separately organized agency within DOE, is responsible for the management and security of the nation’s nuclear weapons, nonproliferation, and naval reactor programs. Without first clarifying such key management issues, NNSA cannot, among other things, ensure the improved discipline and accountability it seeks in managing its programs. NNSA’s Reorganization Will Not Ensure Sufficient Staff with the Right Skills in the Right Places to Meet the Agency’s Mission and Program Goals
NNSA’s reorganization is not likely to ensure that it has sufficient staff with the right skills in the right places because NNSA chose to downsize its federal workforce without first determining what critical skills and capabilities it needed to meet its mission and program goals. Consequently, NNSA will not know the composition of its workforce until it completes the 17 percent workforce reduction on September 30, 2004— the deadline specified in the reorganization plan—and then determines the knowledge, skills, and capabilities of its remaining employees. Without a functional long-term workforce plan, NNSA runs the risk of facing further, more serious staff shortages or skill imbalances, thereby affecting its ability to adequately oversee its contractors. NNSA’s Proposed Transition to Less Direct Federal Oversight Could Be Compromised by Outstanding Reorganization Issues
NNSA’s implementation of its proposed risk-based approach to rely more on contractors’ assurances and self-assessments and less on NNSA’s direct oversight may be premature because NNSA’s reorganization has not yet established a program management structure or long-term workforce plan for ensuring that it has sufficient staff with the right skills in the right places. Under this new approach, contractors will develop comprehensive contractor assurance systems, or systems of management controls, and NNSA will primarily rely upon these systems and controls to ensure that contractors properly execute their missions and activities. Recommendations for Executive Action
In order to increase the likelihood that NNSA’s reorganization will achieve NNSA’s goal of increased management discipline and accountability in program management and contractor oversight, we are making three recommendations to the NNSA Administrator and the Secretary of Energy: establish a formal program management structure, policy, and implementation guidance for directing the work of its contractors, especially concerning how program managers will interact with contracting officers at site offices to help direct and oversee contractor activity; complete and implement data-driven workforce planning for the longer term that (1) determines the critical skills and competencies that will be needed to achieve current and future programmatic results, including contractor oversight; (2) develops strategies tailored to address gaps in number, skills and competencies, and deployment of the workforce; and (3) monitors and evaluates the agency’s progress toward its human capital goals and the contribution that human capital results have made toward achieving programmatic results, and postpone any decrease in the level of NNSA’s direct federal oversight of contractors until NNSA has a program management structure in place and has completed its long-term workforce plan. | Why GAO Did This Study
The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a separately organized agency within the Department of Energy (DOE), is responsible for the management and security of the nation's nuclear weapons, nonproliferation, and naval reactor programs. NNSA oversees contractors that operate its facilities to ensure that activities are effective and in line with departmental policy. In December 2002, NNSA began implementing a major reorganization aimed at solving important long-standing organizational issues. GAO reviewed NNSA's overall reorganization efforts to assess (1) the extent to which it is addressing in practice the past problems concerning the unclear delineation of authority and responsibility, (2) workforce planning, and (3) its impact on federal oversight of contractor activities.
What GAO Found
NNSA's reorganization has addressed some past problems by better delineating lines of authority and improving communication; however, NNSA has not formalized a program management structure that identifies program managers or details their responsibilities and qualifications as they relate to the direction and oversight of contractor activity under the new organization. Without first resolving such key management issues, NNSA cannot, among other things, ensure the improved discipline and accountability it seeks in managing its programs. NNSA's reorganization is not likely to ensure that the agency has sufficient staff with the right skills in the right places because NNSA downsized its federal workforce without first determining the critical skills and capabilities needed to meet its mission and program goals. Consequently, NNSA will not know the composition of its workforce until it completes the 17 percent workforce reduction on September 30, 2004--the deadline specified in the reorganization plan--and then determines the knowledge, skills, and capabilities of its remaining employees. Without a functional long-term workforce plan, NNSA runs the risk of facing further, more serious staff shortages or skill imbalances, thereby diminishing its ability to adequately oversee its contractors. NNSA's implementation of a proposed risk-based approach to rely more on contractors' assurances and self-assessments and less on NNSA's direct oversight may be premature because it has not yet established a program management structure or long-term workforce plan for ensuring sufficient staff with the right skills in the right places. Under this proposal, contractors will develop comprehensive assurance systems, or systems of management controls, and NNSA will primarily rely upon these contractor systems and controls to ensure that contractors properly execute their work. Although the overall concept of a risk-based approach to federal oversight has merit, NNSA's proposed transition to conduct less direct federal oversight could be compromised by outstanding reorganization issues. |
gao_HEHS-00-176 | gao_HEHS-00-176_0 | Beginning in October 2000, HHAs will be paid under the PPS. An agency will receive a single payment for each 60-day episode of care for a Medicare beneficiary, regardless of the services actually delivered during the period.There is no limit on the number of episodes a beneficiary may receive. The drop in spending reflected a decrease in home health service use, both in the number of beneficiaries using home health care and the number of visits provided to each user. The average number of visits per user decreased for all visit types, although the amount of the decline varied significantly. 2). In our previous work on agency closures, we found that the caseload of agencies that had stopped serving Medicare beneficiaries included patients who were ineligible for Medicare home health care.In a study of four states, HHS’ Office of Inspector General found that improper or highly questionable home health services dropped from 40 percent of the total in 1995 to 19 percent of services in 1998.In the MedPAC survey, 77 percent of agencies reported an increased reluctance on the part of physicians to refer Medicare patients for services. Beneficiaries, Providers, and Areas With Highest Service Use Experienced Largest Declines
The historically wide variation in home health service use across beneficiaries, types of providers, and geographic areas has narrowed substantially because of disproportionate declines in utilization among the highest users in these categories. 3). We found similar patterns of changes in utilization across agency ownership categories (see fig. Despite Larger Declines in High-Use States, Wide Variation Among States Persists
The wide range of utilization among HHAs is likewise seen across states, as are the substantial changes in use over time. Fewer Rural Home Health Users, but Visits per Patient Remained Higher Than for Urban Users
In 1999, 75 out of 1,000 Medicare beneficiaries in rural areas received home health services, compared with 82 beneficiaries per 1,000 who lived in urban areas.The number of home health users in rural areas declined more than in urban areas between 1996 and 1999, although the number of visits rural users received remained higher (see table 4). HHA Response to PPS May Cause Some Providers to be Overpaid and Increase Program Spending
In the past, home health service provision has fluctuated in response to changes in Medicare’s payment and coverage policies. HHA behavior could result in substantial overpayments relative to the level of services actually delivered and huge increases in Medicare home health spending. PPS Payment Rates May Allow Some Agencies to Increase Visits and May Be Excessive for Others
The PPS will use payment rates based on 1998 home health spending and utilization data. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on Medicare home health care's recent declines in spending, focusing on: (1) the declines in service use underlying the changes in spending; (2) the extent of the changes in use across beneficiaries, home health agencies (HHA), and locations; and (3) identify any implications these new patterns of home health use have for the impact of the prospective payment system (PPS).
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the 48-percent reduction in Medicare home health care spending following the Balanced Budget Act (BBA) of 1997 was due to sharp declines in both the numbers of users and services used; (2) the number of Medicare beneficiaries receiving home health services fell by 22 percent; (3) during the same period, the average number of home health visits received by each user went down 44 percent; (4) changes in home health care varied across agencies and types of users as well; (5) in nearly all instances, declines were greatest for the types of agencies that had provided and the patients who had used the most services in 1996; (6) there was a similar pattern in the drop in usage across states; (7) states that had the highest levels of service use in 1996 had larger declines than states where beneficiaries received fewer service; (8) declines in rural areas were larger than in urban areas ewer; (9) the recent changes in home health utilization occurred at least in part in response to changes in Medicare's payment policies mandated by the BBA; (10) because the new PPS payment rates are based on the historically high utilization in 1998, even after adjusting for projected declines in utilization, they likely will be generous compared with current use patterns; (11) for this reason, home health agency responses to the PPS could result in overpayments relative to services provided while simultaneously raising Medicare spending; (12) under the PPS, Medicare will make a single payment for each 60-day episode of home health care; (13) the PPS will give agencies an incentive to increase the episodes of care they provide; and (14) this, in turn, could cause total Medicare home health spending to rise. |
gao_GAO-16-152 | gao_GAO-16-152_0 | The Nation Faces an Evolving Array of Cyber- Based Threats
Threats to systems supporting critical infrastructure and federal information systems are evolving and growing. Federal Policy and Law Address the Protection of Cyber Critical Infrastructure
Because the private sector owns the majority of the nation’s critical infrastructure—such as banking and financial institutions, commercial facilities, and energy production and transmission facilities—it is vital that the public and private sectors work together to protect these assets and systems. Respondents to our survey were generally satisfied with NIST’s efforts and methods to develop the framework. NIST’s Cybersecurity Framework Meets Requirements
NIST implemented the requirements for development of a cybersecurity approach as required by Executive Order 13636 and the Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2014. Executive Order 13636 required NIST to develop among other things a flexible, repeatable, performance-based, and cost-effective approach to help owners and operators of critical infrastructure identify, assess, and manage cyber risk. Further, based on our analysis, the framework supported and developed by NIST is intended to be:
Flexible: The NIST framework can be modified to an organization’s cybersecurity condition and needs. Federal Entities Are Promoting the Cybersecurity Framework, but DHS Is Not Measuring the Effectiveness of Its Efforts
DHS, SSAs, and NIST have promoted adoption and use of the cybersecurity framework by critical infrastructure owners and operators through a variety of methods. Specifically, DHS established a program, in accordance with Executive Order 13636, to encourage adoption of the framework and has taken a number of actions, including disseminating guidance and working with stakeholders to promote it. Executive Order 13636 requires SSAs to determine whether or not it is necessary for their sector to develop sector- specific framework implementation guidance, and SSAs for 15 of the 16 sectors had made this determination as of October 2015. According to officials, these sectors were finalizing their guidance and had involved their sector stakeholders to review it. DHS and the General Services Administration (GSA), which are the co- SSAs for the government facilities sector, have yet to determine if sector implementation guidance should be developed. Conclusions
NIST has generally fulfilled its requirements, established in Executive Order 13636 and the Cybersecurity Enhancement Act, to develop a cybersecurity framework for adoption by critical infrastructure sectors. In addition, while most SSAs have determined the need for sector-specific guidance to implement the framework, DHS and GSA have yet to meet this requirement for the government facilities sector, which may hinder adoption of the framework in this sector. Recommendations for Executive Action
To better facilitate adoption of the NIST Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, we are making the following recommendations: We recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct officials responsible for the Critical Infrastructure Cyber Community Voluntary Program to develop metrics for measuring the effectiveness of efforts to promote and support the framework. We also recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Administrator of GSA set a time frame for determining the need for sector-specific guidance to implement the framework in the government facilities sector. IV), DHS concurred with our two recommendations. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to determine the extent to which (1) the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) facilitated the development of voluntary standards and procedures to reduce cyber risks to critical infrastructure, and (2) federal agencies promote the standards and procedures to reduce cyber risks to critical infrastructure. Specifically, we reviewed documentation and videos of the six workshops hosted by NIST intended to obtain industry, academia, and government representative feedback in the development of the framework, in addition to NIST’s two requests for information to the public for input on cybersecurity standards and methodologies. For DHS, we analyzed agency documentation and the website of its Critical Infrastructure Cyber Community (C) Voluntary Program to identify the framework promotional guidance and tools provided to the critical infrastructure sectors. | Why GAO Did This Study
U.S. critical infrastructures, such as financial institutions and communications networks, are systems and assets vital to national security, economic stability, and public health and safety. Systems supporting critical infrastructures face an evolving array of cyber-based threats. To better address cyber-related risks to critical infrastructure, federal law and policy called for NIST to develop a set of voluntary cybersecurity standards and procedures that can be adopted by industry to better protect critical cyber infrastructure.
The Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2014 included provisions for GAO to review aspects of the cybersecurity standards and procedures developed by NIST. This report determines the extent to which (1) NIST facilitated the development of voluntary cybersecurity standards and procedures and (2) federal agencies promoted these standards and procedures. GAO examined NIST's efforts to develop standards, surveyed a non-generalizable sample of critical infrastructure stakeholders, reviewed agency documentation, and interviewed relevant officials.
What GAO Found
In accordance with requirements in a 2013 executive order which were enacted into law in 2014, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) facilitated the development of a set of voluntary standards and procedures for enhancing cybersecurity of critical infrastructure. This process, which involved stakeholders from the public and private sectors, resulted in NIST's Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity . The framework is to provide a flexible and risk-based approach for entities within the nation's 16 critical infrastructure sectors to protect their vital assets from cyber-based threats. To develop the framework in a collaborative manner, NIST solicited input from sector stakeholders through a formal request for information and conducted multiple workshops with critical infrastructure owners and operators, industry associations, government agencies, and other stakeholders. Participants GAO surveyed were generally satisfied with the approach NIST took to develop the framework. Further, the framework meets the requirements established in federal law that it be flexible, repeatable, performance-based, and cost-effective. For example, the framework contains multiple implementation “tiers,” which allows it to be adapted to an organization's specific conditions and needs.
Agencies with responsibilities for supporting protection efforts in critical infrastructure sectors (known as sector-specific agencies), and NIST have promoted and supported adoption of the cybersecurity framework in the critical infrastructure sectors. For example, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) established the Critical Infrastructure Cyber Community Voluntary Program to encourage adoption of the framework and has undertaken multiple efforts as part of this program. These include developing guidance and tools that are intended to help sector entities use the framework. However, DHS has not developed metrics to measure the success of its activities and programs. Accordingly, DHS does not know if its efforts are effectively encouraging adoption of the framework.
Sector-specific agencies have also promoted the framework in their sectors by, for example, presenting to meetings of sector stakeholders and holding other promotional events. In addition, all of the sector-specific agencies except for DHS and the General Services Administration (GSA), as co-SSAs for the government facilities sector, had decided whether or not to develop tailored framework implementation guidance for their sectors, as required by Executive Order 13636. Specifically, DHS and GSA had not yet set a time frame to determine whether sector-specific implementation guidance is needed for the government facilities sector. By not doing so, DHS and GSA may be hindering the adoption of the cybersecurity framework in this sector.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DHS develop metrics to assess the effectiveness of its framework promotion efforts. In addition, DHS and GSA should set a time frame to determine whether implementation guidance is needed for the government facilities sector. DHS and GSA concurred with the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-06-622T | gao_GAO-06-622T_0 | Contractors Role in Responding to Emergencies is Increasing
The private sector is an important partner with the government in responding to and recovering from natural disasters such as Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. There Was Inadequate Planning and Preparation in Anticipating Requirements for Needed Goods and Services
The need for strong planning is one of the themes identified by the Comptroller General in regard to the government’s overall response to the hurricanes. In this regard, we found that some key agencies did not always have adequate plans for contracting in a major contingency situation. We also noted the competing tensions between the selection of national contractors and the requirement under the Stafford Act for a preference for contractors from the affected area. Better planning could have alleviated those tensions. While contracts for some items were in place prior to the storm, the Federal Emergency Management Agency did not adequately anticipate needs for such services as providing temporary housing and public buildings. There Was a Lack of Clearly Communicated Responsibilities Across Agencies and Jurisdictions
We also found that processes for executing contracts were hindered by poor communication. In some instances, the local or state officials determine the requirements and communicate them to FEMA; FEMA may write and award the contract or communicate the requirements to another agency that writes and awards the contract; and then FEMA or another agency oversees contract performance. This approach puts a premium on aligning roles and responsibilities clearly and maintaining good communications to ensure effective execution of the contract. Our fieldwork identified examples where unclear responsibilities and poor communications resulted in poor acquisition outcomes. The process for ordering and delivering ice heavily depends on effective communications between FEMA and the Corps. However, according to Corps officials, FEMA did not fully understand the contracting approach used by the Corps and ordered at least double the amount of ice required, resulting in an oversupply of ice and a lack of distribution sites available to handle the volume ordered. There Were Insufficient Numbers and Inadequate Deployment of Personnel to Provide for Effective Contractor Oversight
The purpose of agencies’ monitoring processes is to ensure that contracted goods and services are delivered in accordance with the agreed-upon schedule, cost, quality, and quantity provisions stated in the contract. Without sufficient numbers of trained people properly deployed, however, effective monitoring is hampered and agencies may not be able to identify and correct poor contractor performance in a timely manner. Furthermore, agencies can be at risk of paying contractors more than the value of the services performed. Our work indicated that while monitoring was occurring on the contracts we reviewed, the number of monitoring staff available was not always sufficient, and staff were not always effectively deployed. For example: FEMA’s contracts for installing temporary housing in four states had only 17 of the 27 technical monitors that had been determined necessary to oversee contractor performance. Federal Emergency Management Agency: Challenges for the National Flood Insurance Program. Army Corps of Engineers: Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity Hurricane Projection Project. Hurricane Katrina: Providing Oversight of the Nation’s Preparedness, Response, and Recovery Activities. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
The devastation experienced throughout the Gulf Coast region in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita has called into question the government's ability to effectively respond to such disasters. The government needs to understand what went right and what went wrong, and to apply these lessons to strengthen its disaster response and recovery operations. The federal government relies on partnerships across the public and private sectors to achieve critical results in preparing for and responding to natural disasters, with an increasing reliance on contractors to carry out specific aspects of its missions. At the same time, the acquisition functions at several agencies are on GAO's high-risk list, indicating a vulnerability to fraud, waste, and abuse. This testimony discusses how three agencies--the General Services Administration, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps)--conducted oversight of key contracts used in response to the hurricanes. Efforts are ongoing by these agencies to address issues GAO and others have identified.
What GAO Found
Agency acquisition and contractor personnel have been recognized for their hard work in providing the goods and services required to be responsive. The response efforts nonetheless suffered from three primary deficiencies: First, there was inadequate planning and preparation in anticipating requirements for needed goods and services. Some key agencies did not always have adequate plans for contracting in a major contingency situation. For example, while contracts for some items were in place prior to the storm, the Federal Emergency Management Agency did not adequately anticipate needs for such services as providing temporary housing and public buildings. There were also competing tensions between the selection of national contractors and the Stafford Act requirement that there be a preference for contractors from the affected area. Better planning could have alleviated those tensions. Second, there was a lack of clearly communicated responsibilities across agencies and jurisdictions to ensure effective outcomes. In a disaster situation, sometimes local or state officials determine the requirements and communicate them to FEMA, which then may write and award the contract or communicate the requirements to another agency that writes and awards the contract; and then FEMA or another agency will oversee contract performance. To ensure effective execution of the contract, this approach puts a premium on clear alignment of responsibilities and good communications, but our fieldwork identified examples where unclear responsibilities and poor communications resulted in poor acquisition outcomes. For example, the process for ordering and delivering ice heavily depends on effective communications between FEMA and the Corps. However, according to Corps officials, FEMA did not fully understand the contracting approach used by the Corps and ordered at least double the amount of ice required, resulting in an oversupply of ice and a lack of distribution sites to handle the volume ordered. And third, there were insufficient numbers and inadequate deployment of personnel to provide for effective contractor oversight. The purpose of monitoring is to ensure that contracted goods and services are delivered in accordance with the agreed upon schedule, cost, quality, and quantity provisions stated in the contract. Without sufficient numbers of trained people properly deployed, however, monitoring will not be effective, agencies may not be able to quickly identify and correct poor contractor performance, and agencies will be at risk of overpaying contractors. Our work indicated that while monitoring was occurring on the contracts we reviewed, the number of staff available was not always sufficient and staff were not effectively deployed. For example: FEMA's contracts for installing temporary housing in four states had only 17 of the 27 technical monitors that had been determined necessary to oversee contractor performance. |
gao_GAO-12-231SP | gao_GAO-12-231SP_0 | In 1976 and since, Congress has granted some statutory exceptions to confidentiality and repealed or modified certain existing exceptions. Exceptions to the general rule of confidentiality can be very narrowly prescribed. How This Guide Was Developed
To identify what criteria or other policy factors Congress might wish to consider when deciding whether to grant exceptions to the general rule of tax information confidentiality, we reviewed
Treasury and JCT reports; congressional reports and hearing records dated between 1999 through April 2011 with references to Section 6103, including proposals enacted and not enacted; available research on the effect of tax-information confidentiality on
Treasury and IRS criteria used in assessing proposals to disclose tax information for nontax purposes, the Fair Information Practices; and
GAO internal guidance for recommendations on using tax data for nontax purposes. The guide consists of two sections of key questions for evaluating Section 6103 exception proposals, as shown in figure 2. Because tax information is generally recognized as being collected and developed to administer tax laws, its use for other purposes needs to be transparent. It is also important that taxpayers receive notice about the use of their information. Because continued willingness of taxpayers to provide their personal information is critical to voluntary compliance and tax administration, any proposed disclosure’s effect on such willingness warrants specific consideration. Some in the tax community are concerned that granting exceptions to confidentiality could compromise voluntary taxpayer compliance. One possible general effect of increased use of FTI by entities other than IRS could be a sense among taxpayers that the information reported to IRS is not kept private, so providing information to IRS is a bad idea. Appendix I: Internal Revenue Code Section 6103—Current Taxpayer Confidentiality and Disclosure Provisions, and Safeguard and Record-Keeping Requirements
Current Taxpayer Confidentiality and Disclosure Provisions
Under Internal Revenue Code (IRC) § 6103, tax returns and tax-return information are confidential and may not to be disclosed unless specifically authorized. Safeguard Requirements
To safeguard taxpayer privacy and ensure confidentially, Section 6103 imposes the following requirements for government entities receiving returns and return information from IRS: establish and maintain a permanent system of standardized records of requests including the reason for such requests, date of requests, and any disclosures; establish and maintain a secure area for storage; restrict access to the information to only those whose duties or responsibilities require access and those to whom disclosures are permitted under section 6103; establish and maintain any other safeguards IRS deems necessary or provide IRS a report describing the safeguard procedures; and dispose of the information in an appropriate manner after use. What are the expected costs of obtaining and using the tax information to be disclosed? Internal Revenue Service. | What GAO Found
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) receives a great deal of personal information about individuals and businesses. While taxpayers are required to provide this information to IRS under penalty of fine or imprisonment, confidentiality of information reported to IRS is widely held to be a critical element of taxpayers willingness to provide information to IRS and comply with the tax laws. As a general rule, anything reported to IRS is held in strict confidenceInternal Revenue Code (IRC) Section 6103 provides that federal tax information is confidential and to be used to administer federal tax laws except as otherwise specifically authorized by law.
Although tax information is confidential, nondisclosure of such information is not absolute. Section 6103 contains some statutory exceptions, including instances where Congress determined that the value of using tax information for nontax purposes outweighs the general policy of confidentiality. Since making amendments to Section 6103 in 1976, Congress has expanded the statutory exceptions under which specified taxpayer information can be disclosed to specific parties for specific purposes. Today, Section 6103 exceptions enable law enforcement agencies to use relevant tax information to investigate and prosecute tax and nontax crimes and allow federal and state agencies to use it to verify eligibility for need-based programs and collect child support, among other uses.
Periodically, new exceptions to the general confidentiality rule are proposed, and some in the tax community have expressed concern that allowing more disclosures would significantly erode privacy and could compromise taxpayer compliance. In evaluating such proposals, it is important that Congress consider both the benefits expected from a disclosure of federal tax information and the expected costs, including reduced taxpayer privacy, risk of inappropriate disclosure, and negative effects on tax compliance and tax-system administration. This guide is intended to facilitate consistent assessment of proposals to grant or modify Section 6103 exceptions. This guide consists of key questions that can help in (1) screening a proposal for basic facts and (2) identifying policy factors to consider. |
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