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gao_GAO-14-53 | gao_GAO-14-53_0 | In the first half of 2012, nearly 69 percent of individuals in this population were privately insured. For example, one group of researchers found that having prior insurance was linked to lower spending and lower rates of hospitalization after enrolling in Medicare, while another group of researchers found that having prior insurance had no effect on beneficiaries’ spending or rates of hospitalization after Medicare enrollment.researchers found, however, that beneficiaries without prior insurance were less likely to visit physician offices and more likely to visit hospital emergency and outpatient departments after enrolling in Medicare, which could indicate that beneficiaries without prior insurance continued to access the health care system differently after Medicare enrollment. Beneficiaries with Continuous Insurance before Medicare Were More Likely to Report Better Health after Medicare Enrollment than Those without Continuous Insurance
Beneficiaries with prior continuous insurance were more likely than those without prior continuous insurance to report being in good health or better in the 6 years after Medicare enrollment. On average, the predicted probability of reporting being in good health or better in the first 2 years in Medicare was approximately 84 percent for beneficiaries with prior continuous insurance and approximately 79 percent for beneficiaries without prior continuous insurance. In total, having prior continuous insurance raised the predicted probability that a beneficiary reported being in good health or better by nearly 6 percentage points in the first 6 years after Medicare enrollment. Beneficiaries with Prior Continuous Insurance Had Approximately $2,300 Less in Estimated Total Spending during the First Year in Medicare than Those without Prior Continuous Insurance
Beneficiaries with prior continuous insurance had lower total program spending during the first year in Medicare compared with those without prior continuous insurance.Medicare, average predicted total spending for beneficiaries with and without prior continuous insurance was $4,390 and $6,733, respectively— a difference of $2,343, or 35 percent. Beneficiaries with Prior Continuous Insurance Had More Physician Office Visits during the First 5 Years in Medicare than Those without Prior Continuous Insurance
Beneficiaries with prior continuous insurance had more physician office visits during the first 5 years in Medicare than those without prior continuous insurance. Specifically, during the first 5 years in Medicare, the difference in the average predicted number of physician office visits between beneficiaries with and without prior continuous insurance ranged from 1.3 to 2.5, or 23 to 46 percent (see table 4). This utilization pattern may indicate that, even after Medicare enrollment, beneficiaries with prior continuous insurance continued to access medical services differently compared with those without prior continuous insurance. According to our analyses, the number of institutional outpatient visits was similar for beneficiaries with and without prior continuous insurance. This study adds to the body of evidence suggesting that beneficiaries with prior insurance used fewer or less costly medical services in Medicare compared with those without prior insurance, because they either were in better health or were accustomed to accessing medical services differently. This suggests that the extent to which individuals enroll in private insurance before age 65 has implications for beneficiaries’ health status and Medicare spending. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Health and Human Services for review. In written comments, reproduced in appendix II, the department highlighted a key finding in our report that beneficiaries with prior insurance used fewer or less costly medical services in Medicare compared with those without prior insurance. We used data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) and Medicare claims. We chose to exclude these beneficiaries to avoid overestimating the effects of having prior continuous insurance on health status, spending, and use of services. However, beneficiaries with prior continuous insurance only had lower institutional outpatient spending during the first year in Medicare, rather than during the first and second years in Medicare, when we included these beneficiaries. | Why GAO Did This Study
Nearly 7 million individuals aged 55 to 64--more than 18 percent of the pre-Medicare population--lacked health insurance coverage in the first half of 2012. Health insurance protects individuals from the risk of financial hardship when they need medical care, and uninsured individuals may refrain from seeking necessary care because of the cost. If they forgo medical care beforehand, these individuals may be in worse health and need costlier medical services after enrolling in Medicare compared to those with prior insurance.
GAO was asked to review the effects of having prior health insurance coverage on Medicare beneficiaries. This report examines the health status, program spending, and use of services of Medicare beneficiaries with and without continuous health insurance coverage before Medicare enrollment. To examine the effects of beneficiaries' prior insurance coverage, GAO used data from the Health and Retirement Study and Medicare claims to conduct two types of multivariate analysis. GAO predicted probabilities of beneficiaries' reporting being in good health or better and values for program spending and beneficiaries' use of services.
In comments on a draft of this report, the Department of Health and Human Services highlighted a key finding in GAO's report that beneficiaries with prior insurance used fewer or less costly medical services in Medicare compared with those without prior insurance.
What GAO Found
Beneficiaries with continuous health insurance coverage for approximately 6 years before enrolling in Medicare were more likely than those without prior continuous insurance to report being in good health or better during the first 6 years in Medicare. In particular, having prior continuous insurance raised the predicted probability that a beneficiary reported being in good health or better by nearly 6 percentage points during the first 6 years in Medicare.
Beneficiaries with prior continuous insurance had lower total program spending during the first year in Medicare compared with those without prior continuous insurance. Specifically, during the first year in Medicare, beneficiaries with prior continuous insurance had approximately $2,300, or 35 percent, less in average predicted total spending than those without prior continuous insurance. Similarly, beneficiaries with prior continuous insurance had lower institutional outpatient spending--for example, spending for services provided in a hospital outpatient setting--during the first and second years in Medicare compared with those without prior continuous insurance. In contrast, physician and other noninstitutional spending--spending for services provided by physicians, clinical laboratories, free-standing ambulatory surgical centers, and other noninstitutional providers--were similar during the early years in Medicare for beneficiaries with and without prior continuous insurance. However, during the fourth and fifth years in Medicare, beneficiaries with prior continuous insurance had physician and other noninstitutional spending that was about 30 percent higher than beneficiaries without prior continuous insurance.
Beneficiaries with prior continuous insurance had more physician office visits during the first 5 years in Medicare compared with those without prior continuous insurance. Specifically, during the first 5 years in Medicare, the difference in the average predicted number of physician office visits between beneficiaries with and without prior continuous insurance ranged from 1.3 to 2.5, or 23 to 46 percent. This utilization pattern may indicate that, even after Medicare enrollment, beneficiaries with prior continuous insurance continued to access medical services differently from those without prior continuous insurance. The number of institutional outpatient visits was similar for beneficiaries with and without prior continuous insurance for the first 5 years after Medicare enrollment.
Taken together, GAO's results show that, consistent with those of some other researchers, beneficiaries with prior continuous insurance used fewer or less costly medical services compared with beneficiaries without such insurance during the early years in Medicare, because they either were in better health or were accustomed to accessing medical services differently. This suggests that the extent to which individuals enroll in private insurance before age 65 has implications for beneficiaries' health status and Medicare spending. |
gao_GAO-17-486T | gao_GAO-17-486T_0 | The objectives of the Transformation Program are to allow applicants to establish an account with USCIS to file and track the status of the application, petition, or request online; the USCIS Electronic Immigration System (USCIS ELIS), which is the main component of the program, to apply risk-based rules automatically to incoming applications, petitions, and requests to identify potentially fraudulent applications and national security risks; adjudicators to have electronic access to applications, petitions, and requests, relevant policies and procedures, and external databases;
USCIS to have management information to track and allocate
USCIS ELIS to have electronic linkages to other agencies, such as the Departments of Justice and State, for data sharing and security purposes. Transformation Program Has Experienced Significant Cost Increases and Schedule Delays
Since USCIS began implementation of the Transformation Program in 2006, the effort has experienced significant cost increases and schedule delays. In particular, the program’s most recent baseline, approved in April 2015, indicates that the Transformation Program will cost up to $3.1 billion and be fully deployed no later than March 2019.This is an increase of approximately $1 billion with a delay of more than 4 years from its initial July 2011 acquisition program baseline. In May 2015, we reported that changes in the Transformation Program acquisition strategy intended, in part, to address the breach had contributed to significant delays in the program’s planned schedule. With the continuing delays, however, USCIS will continue to incur such costs while the program awaits full implementation. For example, the Transformation Program is expected to implement organizational and business process changes to better use the new electronic system. Given this history and the subsequent commitment of additional resources for a new USCIS ELIS, it is more important than ever that USCIS consistently follow key practices associated with software development, systems integration and testing, and contract management and execute effective program oversight and governance. Inconsistent Software Development Practices Risk Further Program Costs and Delays In July 2016, we reported that the program had at least partially adhered to 7 of 8 key practices for effectively managing Agile software development in producing USCIS ELIS. For example, the program had established an environment and procedures for continuous integration and was conducting unit and integration, functional acceptance, interoperability, and end user tests, as well as performing code inspection. However, we also found that the program was not consistently adhering to its policies and guidance or meeting benchmarks for unit and integration, and functional acceptance tests, and code inspection. We reported that the implementation of systems integration and testing deviated from key practices in part because policy and guidance were not being updated to reflect changes in the approach. At that time, this risk was already being realized. Specifically, the program had reported experiencing issues with USCIS ELIS as a result of deploying software that had not been fully tested. In January 2016, the program reported more than 800 minutes in unplanned network outages. For example, we reported that
The Agile development services contract contained appropriate performance criteria that linked to the program goals, but the program did not clearly define measures against which to analyze differences between services expected and those delivered. If the agency does not address issues in its efforts to develop and test software, oversee contractors, and govern the program it risks additional cost increases, schedule delays, and performance shortfalls. In addition, continued delays limit the program’s ability to achieve critical goals, such as delivering system functionality to enhance customer service and enhancing national security. Immigration Benefits System: U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services Can Improve Program Management, GAO-16-467 (Washington, D.C.: July 7, 2016). Recommendation 17. | Why GAO Did This Study
Each year, USCIS processes millions of applications from foreign nationals seeking to study, work, visit, or live in the United States, and for persons seeking to become U.S. citizens. In 2006, USCIS began the Transformation Program to enable electronic adjudication and case management tools that would allow users to apply and track their applications online.
It is essential that USCIS deploy a seamless electronic system to help ensure the integrity of the immigration process. Such a system should allow the agency to more accurately process immigration and citizenship benefits in a timely manner and identify fraudulent and criminal activity.
This statement summarizes GAO's most recent reports on USCIS's Transformation Program. These reports focus on cost increases and schedule delays and program management challenges that have contributed to increasing risks to the new system. GAO identified the program as one of ten federal high-risk investments in need of attention in 2015.
What GAO Found
The U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services' (USCIS) most recent cost and schedule baseline, approved in April 2015, indicates that its Transformation Program will cost up to $3.1 billion and be fully deployed no later than March 2019. This is an increase of approximately $1 billion with a delay of more than 4 years from its initial July 2011 acquisition program baseline. In addition, the program is currently working to develop a new cost and schedule baseline to reflect further delays. Due to the program's recurring schedule delays, USCIS will continue to incur costs for maintaining its existing systems while the program awaits full implementation. Moreover, USCIS's ability to achieve program goals, including enhanced national security, better customer service, and operational efficiency improvements, will be delayed.
Recurring delays are partly the result of challenges in program management. In July 2016, GAO reported that the USCIS Transformation Program had fully addressed some, and partially addressed many other key practices for implementing software development, conducting systems integration and testing, and monitoring the largest program contractors. Nevertheless, GAO reported that the program inconsistently adhered to these practices. For example,
The program had established an environment and procedures for continuously integrating functionality and was conducting various tests and inspections of new software code. However, the program was not consistently adhering to its policies and guidance or meeting stated benchmarks for testing and inspections.
The program had reported experiencing issues such as production defects and bugs in the system as a result of deploying software that had not been fully tested.
The program had mixed success in monitoring its contractors for six contracts that GAO reviewed. For example, a development services contract contained appropriate performance criteria that linked to the program goals, but the program did not clearly define measures against which to analyze differences between services expected and those delivered.
Its software development approach deviated from key practices in part because USCIS policy and guidance were not being updated.
Given the history of development for the Transformation Program and the subsequent commitment of additional resources for a new system, it is more important than ever that USCIS consistently follow key practices in its system development efforts. For example, the program has already reported realizing risks associated with deploying software that has not been fully tested, such as system bugs, defects, and unplanned network outages. If the agency does not address the issues GAO has identified in prior work, then it will continue to experience significant risk for increased costs, further schedule delays, and performance shortfalls.
What GAO Recommends
In its prior reports, GAO made 30 recommendations to address weaknesses in the management and acquisition of the Transformation Program. USCIS concurred and has fully addressed 17 of the 30 recommendations to date. |
gao_GAO-08-380 | gao_GAO-08-380_0 | A Statutory Requirement Limits Some States’ Ability to Target Title I School Improvement Funds to Lowest- Performing Schools, but Many States Have Used Other Resources for School Improvement Efforts
The hold-harmless provision, which is designed to protect school districts from reductions in their Title I funding, prevented some states from being able to target school improvement funds to low-performing schools. However, many states have used other federal and state funds for school improvement efforts. Twenty-two states have been unable to set aside the full 4 percent of Title I funds for school improvement for 1 or more years since NCLBA was enacted because they did not have enough funds to do so after satisfying the hold-harmless provision. In addition to Title I funds for school improvement, many states have dedicated other federal funds and state funds to school improvement efforts. In addition to the 22 states affected by the hold-harmless provision, 4 states did not set aside the full portion of Title I school improvement funds for other reasons. 4). States Generally Target Funds to the Most Persistently Underperforming Schools, However, Some States Did Not Fulfill NCLBA Requirements for Allocating or Tracking Funds
States generally target improvement funds to the most persistently underperforming schools, but some states did not fulfill some NCLBA requirements for allocating or tracking funds. Education has not provided guidance on how states should provide this information and does not monitor states’ compliance with this requirement. We identified this issue through our site visits and are uncertain if other states may have also done this. While most states monitor funds, 4 states were unable to make publicly available the complete list of schools receiving improvement funds, as required under NCLBA, because these states do not collect information on each school receiving improvement funds, and Education has not provided guidance on this requirement. Schools and States Are Engaged in a Variety of Improvement Activities and Mainly Assess Them Using Student Achievement Data and Feedback
Schools that received funds and states have employed a range of improvement activities, and most states assess these activities by reviewing trends in student achievement data and obtaining feedback from district and school officials. At least 45 states reported that schools that received school improvement funds were involved in professional development, reorganizing curriculum or instructional time, or data analysis. Nearly all states reported that they assisted schools identified for improvement with school improvement plans and professional development, and officials in 42 states consider this assistance key to helping schools improve. 10). However, while Education points out that set-aside funds come from districts with increasing Title I allocations, it is still not known how removing the hold-harmless provision would affect those districts protected by it. In addition, we asked states to provide information on each school that included (1) the school’s full name; (2) the school’s address, city, and state; (3) the school’s district name; and (4) the school’s National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) school identification; (5) the school’s year of improvement under NCLBA: first year of improvement (school choice), second year of improvement (school choice and supplemental educational services), third year of improvement (school choice, supplemental educational services, and corrective action), fourth year of improvement (school choice, supplemental educational services, and plan for restructuring), or fifth year of improvement (school choice, supplemental educational services, and implementing a restructuring plan); and (6) we asked states, if possible, to provide the amount of Title I set-aside funds (and any other federal/state improvement funds, if applicable) that each school received. No Child Left Behind Act: Education Needs to Provide Additional Technical Assistance and Conduct Implementation Studies for School Choice Provision. | Why GAO Did This Study
Under the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLBA), the federal government provides millions of dollars annually to assist schools that have not met state academic goals. In the 2006-2007 school year, over 10,000 such schools were identified for improvement. NCLBA requires states to set aside 4 percent of their Title I funds to pay for school improvement efforts. GAO was asked to determine (1) the extent to which states have set aside these funds and used other resources for school improvement, (2) which schools received improvement funds and the extent funds are tracked, (3) the activities states and schools have undertaken and how activities are assessed, and (4) how Education supports states' improvement efforts. GAO administered a survey to state education officials and received a 100 percent response rate, matched survey data to an Education database, and conducted site visits to five states.
What GAO Found
A statutory requirement--known as a hold-harmless provision--has limited some states' ability to target the full 4 percent of Title I funds for school improvement to low-performing schools. However, many states have used other federal and state funds for this purpose. While the hold-harmless provision is designed to protect school districts from reductions in their Title I funding, it has also kept 22 states from setting aside the full portion of Title I school improvement funds since 2002 because they did not have enough funds to do so after satisfying the hold-harmless provision. To address this, Education has proposed repealing the hold-harmless provision. However, it is not known how removing this provision would affect districts protected by it. In addition to Title I funds, 38 states have dedicated other federal funds, and 17 have contributed state funds for school improvement. Though states generally target improvement funds to the most persistently underperforming schools, some states did not fulfill key NCLBA requirements. Specifically, 4 states did not follow all requirements to ensure that schools most in need of assistance received funds. Although Education monitors how states allocate improvement funds, it did not identify this issue. Also, 4 states were unable to provide a complete list of schools that received improvement funds, as required by law. Education has not provided guidance on this requirement and does not monitor compliance with it. Schools and states are engaged in a variety of improvement activities, and most states use student data and feedback to assess activities. Most states reported that schools receiving improvement funds used the funds for professional development and for reorganizing curriculum or instruction time. Nearly all states assisted schools with school improvement plans and professional development. Most states use student achievement data and feedback from schools and districts to assess improvement activities. Education provides a range of support for school improvement, including technical assistance and research results. Nearly all states want more help, such as more information on promising improvement practices. Education has a new Web site to provide additional resources and plans to collect more information on promising practices through a new grant program. |
gao_RCED-99-121 | gao_RCED-99-121_0 | On the basis of the financial data provided by the federal agencies, we estimate that from fiscal year 1993 through fiscal year 1999, over $1.2 billion in appropriated funds has been provided to the South Florida Ecosystem Restoration Initiative. Through fiscal year 1998, federal departments and agencies obligated$883 million for various restoration activities. As figure 4 shows, the Department of the Interior and the Corps of Engineers account for the bulk of the total federal expenditures (75 percent) during this 6-year period. The federal funding provided to date represents only a down payment. While an official cost estimate for the total restoration effort has not been made, the implementation of the Central and Southern Florida Project Comprehensive Review Study, a major component of the restoration initiative referred to as the Restudy, is estimated to cost $7.8 billion. The Restudy, which will propose modifications to the existing Central and Southern Florida Project, is designed to substantially increase the amount of water that is delivered to natural areas while enhancing agricultural and urban water supplies. According to the executive director of the Task Force, at least $2 billion more will be needed to acquire additional lands, construct other infrastructure projects, and eradicate exotic plant species. Our review of these projects indicates that the federal and state agencies involved are unable to agree on components of these projects, such as the lands to be acquired and the schedules for operating water pump stations. However, a strategic plan has not yet been developed that clearly lays out how the initiative will be accomplished and includes quantifiable goals and performance measures that can be used to track the initiative’s progress. However, because the Task Force is a coordinating body, not a decision-making body, it is limited in its ability to manage and be accountable for the overall restoration effort. Recommendations
To ensure that the South Florida ecosystem is restored in a timely and efficient manner, we recommend that the Secretary of the Interior, as the Chairperson of the South Florida Ecosystem Restoration Task Force, in conjunction with the other members of the Task Force, develop a strategic plan that will (1) outline how the restoration of the South Florida ecosystem will occur, (2) identify the resources needed to achieve the restoration, (3) assign accountability for accomplishing actions, and (4) link the strategic goals established by the Task Force to outcome-oriented annual goals and work with the organizations and entities participating in the restoration effort to develop and agree upon a decision-making process to resolve conflicts in order to accomplish the initiative in a timely and efficient manner. The agencies also strongly disagreed with our conclusion that additional delays and cost overruns are likely to occur in the future and that the ability to accomplish the initiative’s overall goals is at risk. Because the initiative is just beginning, we reviewed two ongoing infrastructure projects integral to the restoration effort to assess how well the effort was being coordinated and managed. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the South Florida Ecosystem Restoration Initiative, focusing on: (1) how much and for what purposes federal funding was provided for the restoration of the South Florida ecosystem from fiscal year (FY) 1993 through FY 1999; and (2) how well the restoration effort is being coordinated and managed.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) on the basis of the data GAO obtained from the 5 primary federal departments and agencies participating in the initiative, GAO estimates that over $1.2 billion in federal funds was provided from FY 1993 through FY 1999; (2) the key restoration activities undertaken by the federal agencies were: (a) land acquisition; (b) the management of federally-owned facilities or natural resources, and a national marine sanctuary; (c) infrastructure projects; and (d) science-related activities; (3) over 75 percent of the federal expenditures during this 6-year period have been made by agencies within the Department of the Interior and by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers; (4) the federal funding provided to date represents only a down payment; (5) while no official cost projection for the total restoration effort has been made, a major component, the implementation of the Central and Southern Florida Project Comprehensive Review Study, referred to as the Restudy, is estimated to cost an additional $7.8 billion; (6) the Restudy is designed to substantially increase the amount of water that is delivered to natural areas while enhancing agricultural and urban water supplies; (7) according to the South Florida Ecosystem Restoration Task Force's executive director, at least $2 billion beyond the $7.8 billion will be needed to complete the restoration effort; (8) this money will be used to acquire additional lands, construct other infrastructure projects, and eradicate exotic plant species; (9) the Task Force is responsible for coordinating the participating entities' implementation of the initiative; (10) however, a strategic plan that clearly lays out how the initiative will be accomplished and includes quantifiable goals and performance measures has not yet been developed; (11) the Task Force is a coordinating body, not a decisionmaking body, and thus is limited in its ability to manage and make decisions for the overall restoration effort; (12) as GAO's review of two projects integral to the restoration effort indicates, even with coordination, the federal and state agencies involved are unable to agree on components of these projects; (13) their inability to agree has contributed to delays and cost overruns; and (14) given the scope and complexity of the initiative and the difficulties that have already been encountered, additional delays and cost overruns are likely to occur, and the participants' ability to accomplish the initiative's overall goals is at risk. |
gao_GAO-02-701 | gao_GAO-02-701_0 | DOD recently made constructive changes to its acquisition policy that embrace best practices. The development program began in 1992. Specifically, knowledge that a product’s design is stable early in the program facilitates informed decisions about whether to significantly increase investments and reduces the risk of costly design changes that can result from unknowns after initial manufacturing begins. This knowledge comes in the form of completed engineering drawings before transitioning from the system integration phase to the system demonstration phase of product development. Leading Commercial Companies Use a Product Development Process to Capture Design and Manufacturing Knowledge for Decision Making
Leading commercial companies we visited had spent significant amounts of time and resources to develop and evolve new product development processes that ensured design and manufacturing knowledge was captured at the two critical decision points in product development: when the product’s design was demonstrated to be stable—knowledge point 2—and when the product was demonstrated to be producible at an affordable cost—knowledge point 3. For example, Xerox captures knowledge about the producibility of its product early in the design phase. First, they established and used an evolutionary approach to develop products that made the capture of design and manufacturing knowledge a more manageable task. DOD’s policy does not require a decision to move from system integration to system demonstration. | What GAO Found
This report examines how best practices offer improvements to the way the Department of Defense (DOD) develops new weapons systems, primarily the design and manufacturing aspects of the acquisition process. Knowledge about a product's design and producibility facilitates informed decisions about whether to significantly increase investments and reduces the risk of costly design changes later in the program. Leading commercial companies employ practices to capture design and manufacturing knowledge in time to make key decisions during product development. First, the companies kept the degree of the design challenge manageable before starting a new product development program by using an evolutionary approach. Second, the companies captured design and manufacturing knowledge before the two critical decision points in product development: when the design was demonstrated to be stable--the second knowledge point--and when the product was demonstrated to be producible at an affordable cost--the third knowledge point. DOD has made changes to its acquisition policy in an attempt to improve its framework for developing weapons systems, but the policy does not require the capture of design or manufacturing knowledge or sufficient criteria to enter the system demonstration and production phases. In addition, it does not require a decision review to enter the demonstration phase of product development. |
gao_NSIAD-97-119 | gao_NSIAD-97-119_0 | By the early 1990s, almost all countries in the hemisphere were engaged in multilateral or bilateral efforts to liberalize trade. Western Hemisphere Trade Arrangements
The six major multilateral trading arrangements among countries of the Western Hemisphere are NAFTA, Mercosur, the Andean Community, the Caribbean Community, the Central American Common Market, and the Latin American Integration Association (LAIA). 1 and 2.) The United States is a party only to NAFTA. Mercosur currently functions as a customs union, providing not only for a free trade area but also for the establishment of a common external tariff. Other Major Multilateral Agreements
Besides NAFTA and Mercosur, there are four older subregional multilateral trade groupings in the Western Hemisphere. Smaller Trade Arrangements Involving NAFTA Partners
In addition to the larger trade blocs previously discussed, there are more than 20 smaller multilateral and bilateral trade accords among the countries of the Western Hemisphere. Many of these were established during the 1990s. FTAA Working Groups
The areas of responsibility assigned to the 12 FTAA working groups reflect some of the priorities of the United States and other countries in the hemisphere (see table 1). At the ministerial, consensus was reached on several key issues advanced in these proposals. Still, there is disagreement among participating countries on the pace and direction of formal negotiations. Recent Developments in Regional Trade Liberalization Outside the FTAA Process
Adverse economic developments in Mexico in the months immediately following the 1994 Miami Summit raised U.S. concerns about pursuing further free trade initiatives in the region. In practical terms, lack of U.S. participation in shaping these agreements has created disadvantages for some U.S. exporters’ access to markets in the region. According to representatives of several Western Hemisphere countries, regardless of whether the United States resumes a more active role in shaping regional trade liberalization efforts, their countries will continue their own initiatives toward free trade and economic integration, even if these efforts do not coincide with U.S. interests. In the intervening period, fast track authority lapsed. Other Countries Have Moved Forward With Their Own Trade Initiatives
While debate continues in the United States regarding further regional trade liberalization efforts, other countries in the region have proceeded to negotiate new trade agreements and deepen their participation in existing arrangements. Mercosur has been another focus of subregional trade initiatives since the Miami Summit. In addition to the arrangement with Chile, Mercosur has concluded a free trade agreement with Bolivia and is engaged in negotiations to widen its reach to other Andean Group countries. 3). In contrast to the NAFTA partners and Chile, the Mercosur countries’ vision of the FTAA differs significantly from that of the United States. Thus, Brazil has proposed that FTAA negotiations on market access be deferred until 2003, while the United States would like to see this matter addressed as soon as negotiations begin in 1998. For our discussion on the status of FTAA negotiations and recent trade developments in the region outside the FTAA process, we interviewed officials from the OAS, IDB, USTR, the U.S. International Trade Commission, and the U.S. Department of State; representatives from five other Western Hemisphere nations at the forefront of regional trade negotiations; and academicians and other experts on the process of regional economic integration. North American Free Trade Agreement
Established in 1994. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on efforts to liberalize trade among the countries of the Western Hemisphere, focusing on: (1) the principal existing subregional trade arrangements in the Western Hemisphere; (2) the current status of Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) discussions; and (3) certain recent developments in regional trade liberalization outside the FTAA process since "fast track" authority.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) almost all countries in the region participate in at least one subregional trade grouping; (2) there are now six major subregional multilateral trade groupings among countries in the hemisphere; (3) the two most significant trade blocs, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Common Market of the South, known as Mercosur, were both established during the 1990's; (4) NAFTA, the only one of these arrangements to which the United States is a party, created the world's largest free trade area and is the most comprehensive trade agreement in the region; (5) Mercosur has followed a different approach than NAFTA to economic integration through the creation of a customs union; (6) in addition to the major multilateral trade groupings, there are more than 20 smaller trade agreements in the region, most of these have been concluded during the 1990's; (7) U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), Organization of American States (OAS), and Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) officials note that the FTAA working groups have made significant progress to support the launching of formal negotiations; (8) according to these observers, progress in the FTAA process thus far exceeds what had been achieved during the first 2 to 3 years of the Uruguay Round negotiations that led to the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO); (9) substantial agreement has been reached on several key issues; (10) disagreement remains, however, regarding the pace and direction of negotiations; (11) the United States and most other countries favor immediate negotiations on all issues; (12) in contrast, Mercosur proposes that negotiations on certain issues such as market access, which is a priority for the United States, be delayed until 2003; (13) following the Miami Summit, the 1995 Mexican financial crisis raised concerns in the United States about pursuing further regional trade liberalization efforts; (14) in the meantime, other countries have moved forward with their own trade liberalizations efforts; (15) Mercosur has strengthened its position, concluding free trade arrangements with Chile and Bolivia, and is beginning trade negotiations with Mexico and the European Union; (16) these agreements have created disadvantages for some U.S. exporters' access to markets in the region; and (17) representatives of several countries in the region generally agree that their countries will continue to advance their own regional free trade initiatives regardless of whether the United States participates in further regional trade liberation. |
gao_GAO-06-614T | gao_GAO-06-614T_0 | The partners signed the most current agreement, Chesapeake 2000, on June 28, 2000. Chesapeake 2000—identified by the Bay Program as its strategic plan—sets out an agenda and goals to guide the restoration efforts through 2010 and beyond. These commitments are organized under the following five broad restoration goals: Protecting and restoring living resources—14 commitments to restore, enhance, and protect the finfish, shellfish and other living resources, their habitats and ecological relationships to sustain all fisheries and provide for a balanced ecosystem; Protecting and restoring vital habitats—18 commitments to preserve, protect, and restore those habitats and natural areas that are vital to the survival and diversity of the living resources of the bay and its rivers; Protecting and restoring water quality—19 commitments to achieve and maintain the water quality necessary to support the aquatic living resources of the bay and its tributaries and to protect human health; Sound land use—28 commitments to develop, promote, and achieve sound land use practices that protect and restore watershed resources and water quality, maintain reduced pollutant loadings for the bay and its tributaries, and restore and preserve aquatic living resources; and Stewardship and community engagement—23 commitments to promote individual stewardship and assist individuals, community- based organizations, businesses, local governments and schools to undertake initiatives to achieve the goals and commitments of the agreement. While the Bay Program had established these 101 measures, it had not developed an approach that would allow it to translate these individual measures into an overall assessment of the progress made in achieving the five broad restoration goals. For example, although the Bay Program had developed measures for determining trends in individual fish and shellfish populations, it had not yet devised a way to integrate those measures to assess the overall progress made in achieving its Living Resource Protection and Restoration goal. In January 2006, the Bay Program formally adopted an initial integrated approach for assessing both bay health and management actions taken to restore the bay. The Bay Program’s Reports Did Not Effectively Communicate the Status of the Bay’s Health
The Bay Program’s primary mechanism for reporting on the health status of the bay—the State of the Chesapeake Bay report—was intended to provide the citizens of the bay region with a snapshot of the bay’s health. Specifically, the reports mixed actual monitoring information on the bay’s health status with results from a predictive model and the results of specific management actions. The latter two results did little to inform readers about the current health status of the bay and tended to downplay the bay’s actual condition. We believe this lack of independence in reporting led to the Bay Program’s projecting a rosier view of the health of the bay than may have been warranted. In response to our recommendation, the Bay Program developed a new reporting format that was released for public review and comment in March 2006. Federal Agencies and States Provided Billions of Dollars in Both Direct and Indirect Funding for Restoration Activities
Eleven key federal agencies; the states of Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Virginia; and the District of Columbia provided almost $3.7 billion in direct funding from fiscal years 1995 through 2004 to restore the bay. As with direct funding, indirect funding for the restoration effort had also generally increased over fiscal years 1995 through 2004. Despite the almost $3.7 billion in direct funding and more than $1.9 billion in indirect funding that has been provided for activities to restore the bay, the Chesapeake Bay Commission estimated in a January 2003 report that the restoration effort faced a funding gap of nearly $13 billion to achieve the goals outlined in Chesapeake 2000 by 2010. The Bay Program Has Not Always Effectively Coordinated and Managed the Restoration Effort
Chesapeake 2000 and prior agreements have provided the overall direction for the restoration effort over the past two decades. To achieve these 10 keystone commitments, the Bay Program had developed numerous planning documents. However, we found that these planning documents were not always consistent with each other. The Chesapeake Bay Program Office is currently developing a Web-based system to link and organize the program’s various planning documents. While these actions are important, they fall short of the comprehensive, coordinated implementation strategy we recommended. While the Bay Program has made significant strides, our October 2005 report documented how the success of the program has been undermined by the lack of (1) an integrated approach to measure overall progress; (2) independent and credible reporting mechanisms; and (3) coordinated implementation strategies. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Chesapeake Bay Program (Bay Program) was created in 1983 when Maryland, Pennsylvania, Virginia, the District of Columbia, the Chesapeake Bay Commission, and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) agreed to establish a partnership to restore the Chesapeake Bay. The partnership's most recent agreement, Chesapeake 2000, sets out an agenda and five broad goals to guide the restoration effort through 2010. This testimony summarizes the findings of an October 2005 GAO report (GAO-06-96) on (1) the extent to which appropriate measures for assessing restoration progress have been established, (2) the extent to which current reporting mechanisms clearly and accurately describe the bay's overall health, (3) how much funding was provided for the effort for fiscal years 1995 through 2004, and (4) how effectively the effort is being coordinated and managed.
What GAO Found
The Bay Program had developed over 100 measures to assess progress toward meeting certain restoration commitments and providing information to guide management decisions. However, the program had not yet developed an integrated approach that would allow it to translate these individual measures into an assessment of overall progress toward achieving the five broad restoration goals outlined in Chesapeake 2000. For example, while the Bay Program had appropriate measures to track crab, oyster, and rockfish populations, it did not have an approach for integrating the results of these measures to assess progress toward the agreement's goal of protecting and restoring the bay's living resources. In response to GAO's recommendation, the Bay Program adopted an initial integrated approach in January 2006. The State of the Chesapeake Bay reports did not provide effective and credible information on the current health status of the bay. Because these reports focused on individual trends for certain living resources and pollutants, it was not easy for the public to determine what these data collectively said about the overall health status of the bay. The credibility of these reports had been undermined because the program had commingled actual monitoring data with results of program actions and a predictive model, and the latter two tended to downplay the deteriorated conditions of the bay. Moreover, the Bay Program's reports were prepared by the same program staff who were responsible for managing the restoration effort, which led to reports that projected a rosier picture of the bay's health than may have been warranted. In response to GAO's recommendation, the program has developed a new reporting format and plans to have the new report independently assessed. From fiscal years 1995 through 2004, the restoration effort received about $3.7 billion in direct funding from 11 key federal agencies; the states of Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Virginia; and the District of Columbia. These funds were used for activities that supported water quality protection and restoration, sound land use, vital habitat protection and restoration, living resources protection and restoration, and stewardship and community engagement. During this period, the restoration effort also received an additional $1.9 billion in funding from other federal and state programs for activities that indirectly contributed to the restoration effort. The Bay Program did not have a comprehensive, coordinated implementation strategy to help target limited resources to those activities that would best achieve the goals outlined in Chesapeake 2000. Although the program had adopted 10 key commitments to focus the partners' efforts and had developed numerous planning documents, some of these documents were inconsistent with each other or were perceived as unachievable by program partners. In response to GAO's recommendation, the Bay Program is currently developing a Web-based system to unify its various planning documents and has adopted a funding priority framework. These actions, while important, fall short of the strategy recommended by GAO. |
gao_T-RCED-98-271 | gao_T-RCED-98-271_0 | Importers’ Custody Over Products Allows Unsafe Products to Enter Domestic Commerce
Unscrupulous importers bypass FDA inspections of imported food shipments or circumvent requirements for reexporting or destroying food shipments that were refused entry, according to Customs and FDA officials at the ports we visited. Officials began this procedure after periodic examinations found that some importers had substituted garbage for the refused shipments that were being reexported. A number of factors contribute to FDA’s and Customs’ problems in ensuring that targeted shipments are actually inspected and that refused entries are properly disposed of. We believe that FSIS’ controls over import shipments—requiring unique markings on each carton, retaining custody of shipments until they are approved for release or properly disposed of, and stamping “U.S. Current Penalties Are Not Effective Deterrents
Customs’ penalties for failure to redeliver refused shipments do not effectively deter violations because they are either too low compared with the value of the product or not imposed at all, according to Customs and FDA officials at the ports we reviewed. Opportunities Are Available to Improve Controls Over Imported Foods
Customs and FDA officials and importer association representatives suggested ways to strengthen controls over imported foods as they move through Customs’ and FDA’s import procedures. Each of these suggested approaches has advantages and disadvantages, costs, or limitations that would have to be considered before any changes are made. Targeted Shipments Could Be Marked in Order to Trace Them Throughout the Import Process
Customs and FDA could take steps to better ensure that importers with a history of violations are not substituting products before inspection and are not returning the actual refused cargo for destruction or reexport by adopting variations on controls used by FSIS for meat and poultry imports. To help ensure that shipments refused entry are destroyed or reexported, FDA could stamp “refused entry” on each carton/container in shipments that it finds do not meet U.S. food safety requirements. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed: (1) the extent to which federal controls ensure that food importers present shipments for inspection when required and that shipments refused entry are destroyed or reexported; and (2) ways to strengthen these controls.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) controls provide little assurance that shipments targeted for inspection are actually inspected or that shipments found to violate U.S. safety standards are destroyed or reexported; (2) because importers, rather than FDA, retain custody over shipments throughout the import process, some importers have been able to provide substitutes for products targeted for inspection or products that have been refused entry and must be reexported or destroyed, according to Customs Service and FDA officials; (3) moreover, Customs and FDA do not effectively coordinate their efforts to ensure that importers are notified that their refused shipments must be reexported or destroyed; (4) Customs' penalties for violating inspection and disposal requirements may provide little incentive for compliance because they are too low in comparison with the value of the imported products or they are not imposed at all; (5) as a result of these weaknesses, shipments that failed to meet U.S. safety standards were distributed in domestic commerce; (6) because the Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) requires unique identification marks on, and maintains custody of, each shipment of imported foods under its jurisdiction, GAO did not find similar weaknesses in FSIS' controls over the shipments reviewed, although GAO did identify some coordination problems between FSIS and Customs; (7) federal controls would be strengthened by consistently implementing current procedures and by adopting new procedures; (8) Customs and FDA officials and representatives of importer and broker associations identified a number of ways to improve agencies' controls over incoming shipments, strengthen interagency coordination, and provide stronger deterrents against repeat violators; and (9) each of these approaches has advantages and disadvantages that should be considered before making any changes. |
gao_GAO-13-22 | gao_GAO-13-22_0 | NASA Projects Have Not Consistently Implemented Key EVM Practices and Most Did Not Have Access to Reliable EVM Data
Our assessment of 10 major spaceflight projects showed that NASA has not yet fully implemented EVM and thus is not taking full advantage of an important tool that could help reduce acquisition risk. GAO found that the projects had shortfalls in two of the three fundamental practices that we assessed. Specifically, we found that half of the projects did not use an EVM system that was certified as compliant with the ANSI/EIA-748 standard. However, the rigor of both the formal and informal surveillance reviews is questionable given the numerous EVM data anomalies we found in the monthly EVM reports. Out of the 10 projects we reviewed, we found that just 3 projects had reliable EVM data while the remaining 7 had only partially reliable data. Unreliable EVM Data Limit NASA’s Ability to Measure Project Performance
Only 3 of the 10 projects we reviewed, MAVEN, RBSP, and OCO-2, produced fully reliable data for managing the project and reporting status. Cultural, Technical, and Other Challenges Seen as Impediments to EVM Implementation
NASA EVM focal points, headquarters officials, project representatives, and program executives cited cultural and technical challenges, as well as other challenges, as impediments to the effective use of EVM at the agency. NASA’s culture traditionally has focused on solving science and engineering challenges and not on monitoring cost and schedule data such as data produced by an effective EVM system. In addition, though NASA has not conducted an EVM skills gap analysis, NASA representatives said it is a challenge for the agency to implement EVM effectively due to a lack of sufficient staff with the skills and experience to analyze EVM data. Without a sufficient number of trained staff to analyze contractor data and implement in-house EVM efforts, NASA will likely continue to struggle to effectively use EVM as a valuable project management tool. NASA Policy Is in Line with Best Practices but Implementation Remains the Challenge
NASA has undertaken several initiatives aimed at improving the agency’s use of EVM. For example, NASA strengthened its spaceflight management policy to require projects to comply with the 32 ANSI/EIA- 748 guidelines and has developed the processes and tools for projects to meet this requirement through its new EVM system. While these are positive steps, the policy continues to lack a requirement for rigorous oversight or surveillance of how projects are implementing EVM and NASA does not require projects to use the new EVM system to implement the EVM requirement of the revised policy. Strong Leadership Needed to Fully Implement EVM
Over the years, NASA has attempted to address its EVM shortcomings through a series of policy changes, but these efforts have failed to adequately address the cultural resistance to implementing EVM highlighted by many of the NASA officials we interviewed. However, NASA is not making full use of a key tool that could help it address the cost and schedule issues that have kept NASA acquisition management on GAO’s high risk list for more than 20 years. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve NASA management and oversight of its spaceflight projects, we recommend that the NASA Administrator direct the appropriate offices to take the following four actions:
Establish a time frame by which all new spaceflight projects will be required to implement NASA’s newly developed EVM system, unless the project is proposing to use a certified system, to ensure that in- house efforts are compliant with ANSI/EIA-748. Conduct an EVM skills gap analysis to identify areas requiring augmented capability across the agency. In its written comments, reproduced in appendix IV, NASA’s Chief Engineer stated that the agency concurred with two recommendations and partially concurred with two other recommendations. To determine the steps that NASA is taking to improve its use of earned value management, we examined the results of NASA’s EVM capability pilot projects and draft policies and guidance and compared these with best practices in EVM as discussed in GAO’s Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide, the ANSI/EIA-748 standard, and OMB Circular A-11, Preparation, Submission, and Execution of the Budget and the Capital Programming Guide. As part of our analysis, we assessed the projects’ implementation of three fundamental earned value management (EVM) practices that we believe are necessary for maintaining a reliable EVM system—using a certified American National Standards Institute (ANSI) and Electronic Industries Alliance (EIA) compliant system, performing surveillance, and conducting integrated baseline reviews. EVM Surveillance Is Being Performed
JPL also has a formal surveillance plan in place for monitoring the EVM data. | Why GAO Did This Study
NASA historically has experienced cost growth and schedule slippage in its portfolio of major projects and has taken actions to improve in this area, including adopting the use of EVM. EVM is a tool developed to help project managers monitor risks. GAO was asked to examine (1) the extent to which NASA is using EVM to manage its major space flight acquisitions, (2) the challenges that NASA has faced in implementing an effective EVM system, and (3) NASA's efforts to improve its use of EVM. To address these questions, GAO obtained contractor and project EVM data and used established formulas and tools to analyze the data and assess NASA's implementation of EVM on 10 major spaceflight projects; interviewed relevant NASA headquarters, center and mission directorate officials on their views on EVM; and reviewed prior reports on EVM and organizational transformations. GAO compared NASA policies and guidance on EVM to best practices contained in GAO's cost estimating best practices guide.
What GAO Found
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) 10 major spaceflight projects discussed in this report have not yet fully implemented earned value management (EVM). As a result, NASA is not taking full advantage of opportunities to use an important tool that could help reduce acquisition risk. GAO assessed the 10 projects against three fundamental EVM practices that, according to GAO's best practices cost guide, are necessary for maintaining a reliable EVM system. GAO found shortfalls in two of three fundamental practices. Specifically, we found that
More than half of the projects did not use an EVM system that was fully certified as compliant with the industry EVM standard.
Only 4 of the 10 projects established formal surveillance reviews, which ensure that key data produced by the system was reliable. The remaining 6 projects provided evidence of monthly EVM data reviews; however, the rigor of both the formal and informal surveillance reviews is questionable given the numerous data anomalies GAO found.
GAO also found that 3 projects had reliable EVM data while 7 had only partially reliable data. For the EVM data to be considered reliable per best practices it must be complete and accurate with all data anomalies explained.
NASA EVM focal points, headquarters officials, project representatives, and program executives cited cultural and other challenges as impediments to the effective use of EVM at the agency. Traditionally, NASA's culture has focused on managing science and engineering challenges and not on monitoring cost and schedule data, like an effective EVM system produces. As a result, several representatives said this information traditionally has not been valued across the agency. This sentiment was also echoed in a NASA study of EVM implementation. Also cited as a challenge to the effective use of EVM was NASA's insufficient number of staff with the skills to analyze EVM data. Without a sufficient number of staff with such skills, NASA's ability to conduct a sound analysis of the EVM data is limited. However, NASA has not conducted an EVM skills gap analysis to determine the extent of its workforce needs.
NASA has undertaken several initiatives aimed at improving the agency's use of EVM. For example, NASA strengthened its spaceflight management policy to reflect the industry EVM standard and has developed the processes and tools for projects to meet these standards through its new EVM system. While these are positive steps, the revised policy contains only the minimum requirements for earned value management. For example, it lacks a requirement for rigorous surveillance of how projects are implementing EVM and also does not require use of the agency's newly developed EVM system to help meet the new requirements. NASA has attempted to address EVM shortcomings through policy changes over the years, but these efforts have failed to adequately address the cultural resistance to implementing EVM.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that NASA establish a time frame for requiring new spaceflight projects to implement its new EVM system; conduct an EVM skills gap assessment; develop a change management plan for EVM; and strengthen its EVM requirements by requiring projects to implement formal EVM surveillance. NASA concurred with two recommendations and partially concurred with two others citing resource constraints. Despite NASA's plans to address some issues GAO identified, not addressing all key issues lessens the usefulness of EVM at NASA. |
gao_GAO-10-61 | gao_GAO-10-61_0 | Recently adopted accounting standards, however, require governments to change the way they account for the cost of retiree health benefits, specifying that governments should account for these costs on an accrual basis. Unfunded OPEB Liabilities for State and Local Governments Exceed $530 Billion
We found that the total reported unfunded liabilities for OPEB (which are primarily retiree health benefits) for state and select local governments exceed $530 billion. As variation between studies’ totals shows, totaling unfunded OPEB liabilities across states and local governments can be challenging. Approximately 35 percent of the governments for which we reviewed CAFRs—18 of 50 states and 13 of 39 local governments—reported having set aside at least some assets for OPEB liabilities for one or more entities in the government, as of their actuarial valuation. In addition, the ultimate cost of OPEB may significantly differ from estimated OPEB liabilities because (1) the CAFRs we reviewed report data that predate the market downturn and (2) significant uncertainties affect the estimation of OPEB liabilities. Two significant assumptions used in OPEB liability calculations are the discount rate and the health care inflation rate. Some State and Local Governments Have Taken Actions to Address Retiree Health Liabilities through Prefunding and Making Benefit Changes
Some state and local governments have taken actions to address their liabilities associated with retiree health benefits by setting aside assets in order to prefund the liabilities and reducing these liabilities by changing the structure of retiree health benefits. The CAFRs that we reviewed also showed that the percentage of the OPEB liability funded—the funded ratio—varied. Among the 10 selected governments whose actions we reviewed in more detail, officials from the governments that were prefunding at least a portion of their retiree health liability reported using irrevocable trusts. The governments we selected varied with regard to the source of funds used to prefund their retiree health liabilities. The governments we selected also varied in how they determine the level or amount to commit to prefunding their retiree health liabilities each year. Some State and Local Governments Have Worked to Address Retiree Health Liabilities through Three Types of Benefit Changes
Another action some state and local governments have taken to address their retiree health liabilities has been to change the structure of the health benefits they offer retirees. While governments also make relatively routine changes to the health benefits they offer retirees (such as changing co-payments, deductibles, or covered benefits) that could affect their liability, we identified three key types of changes our selected governments have made to the structure of retiree health benefits: changing the type of retiree health benefit plan, changing the level of the government’s contribution toward retirees’ health insurance premiums, and changing the eligibility requirements employees need to meet to qualify for retiree health benefits. Level of government contribution: Some of the governments we selected have changed the level of the contribution they provide toward retiree health insurance premiums by reducing the amount or proportion of health insurance premiums paid for by the government or by changing how the level of contribution is calculated. Changes to the level of government contribution were the most common benefit change reported by the governments we selected. As seen in table 2, in some cases the selected governments made more than one change to their retiree health benefit structures. The changes were most often applied to newly hired employees or currently active employees. Health-Related Spending, Including OPEB Liabilities, Is Increasing State and Local Governments’ Fiscal Pressures
Unfunded OPEB liabilities on their own are large enough to represent a fiscal pressure for state and local governments but are also likely to be considered part of the broader fiscal challenge of managing increasing health care costs. However, spending on state and local government retirees’ health benefits is projected to more than double as a share of total operating revenues by 2050, from 0.9 percent to 2.1 percent. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Supplemental Scope and Methodology for State and Local Government CAFR Review
To describe what is reported about state and local governments’ unfunded other postemployment benefits (OPEB) liabilities, we reviewed the most recent governmentwide comprehensive annual financial reports (CAFR), as of June 30, 2009, for the states and selected local governments. We determined that the state and local government CAFR data were sufficiently reliable for our purposes, which were to describe the total unfunded OPEB liability reported; the total OPEB liability, assets, and unfunded liability for each of the individual governments for which we reviewed CAFRs; as well as the ranges of unfunded OPEB liabilities, assets, and funded ratios reported. | Why GAO Did This Study
Accounting standards require governments to account for the costs of other postemployment benefits (OPEB)--the largest of which is typically retiree health benefits--when an employee earns the benefit. As such, governments are reporting their OPEB liabilities--the amount of the obligation to employees who have earned OPEB. As state and local governments have historically not funded retiree health benefits when the benefits are earned, much of their OPEB liability may be unfunded. Amid fiscal pressures facing governments, this has raised concerns about the actions the governments can take to address their OPEB liabilities. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) was asked to provide information on governments' retiree health liabilities. GAO described (1) what has been reported in state and local governments' comprehensive annual financial reports (CAFR) regarding OPEB liabilities, (2) actions state and local governments have taken to address retiree health liabilities, and (3) the overall fiscal pressures these governments face. GAO reviewed the CAFRs for 50 states and the 39 local governments with at least $2 billion in total revenue. GAO also reviewed the actions taken to address retiree health liabilities by 10 state and local governments, selected based on geography and variation in approaches to address their liability. Finally, GAO simulated the fiscal outlook for the state and local sector and projected health care costs for state and local retirees.
What GAO Found
The total unfunded OPEB liability reported in state and the largest local governments' CAFRs exceeds $530 billion. However, as variations between studies' totals show, totaling unfunded OPEB liabilities across governments is challenging for a number of reasons, including the way that governments disclose such data. The unfunded OPEB liabilities for states and local governments GAO reviewed varied widely in size. Most of these governments do not have any assets set aside to fund them. The total for unfunded OPEB liabilities is higher than $530 billion because GAO reviewed OPEB data in CAFRs for the 50 states and 39 large local governments but not data for all local governments or additional data reported in separate financial reports. Also, the CAFRs we reviewed report data that predate the market downturn. Finally, OPEB valuations are based on assumptions about the health care cost inflation rate and discount rates for assets, which also affect the size of the unfunded liability. Some state and local governments have taken actions to address liabilities associated with retiree health benefits by setting aside assets to prefund the liabilities before employees retire and reducing these liabilities by changing the structure of retiree health benefits. Approximately 35 percent of the 89 governments for which GAO reviewed CAFRs reported having set aside some assets for OPEB liabilities, but the percentage of the OPEB liability funded varied. Among the 10 selected governments whose actions GAO reviewed in more detail, officials from the governments that were prefunding at least a portion of their retiree health liability reported using irrevocable trusts. However, these governments varied with regard to the source of the money used to prefund their retiree health liabilities and how they determined the level or amount to commit to prefunding each year. To address their retiree health liabilities, the governments GAO selected made three key types of changes to their retiree health benefits: changes to the type of retiree health benefit plan, to the level of government contribution, and to the eligibility requirements employees need to meet to qualify for retiree health benefits. Changes to the level of government contribution, such as reductions to the amount or proportion of health insurance premiums paid for by the government, was the most common benefit change reported. Some of the selected governments made more than one change to their retiree health benefit structure. The changes were most often applied to the retiree health benefits of newly hired employees or currently active employees. State and local governments face unfunded OPEB liabilities and decisions about addressing liabilities amid increasing fiscal pressure. Assuming the continuation of current policies, by 2050 the size of the projected operating budget imbalance for the state and local government sector is 4.7 percent of gross domestic product, attributable largely to increases in health-related spending. Though Medicaid is the largest health-related expenditure, spending on state and local government retirees' health benefits is projected to more than double as a share of total operating revenues to 2.1 percent by 2050. |
gao_RCED-99-37 | gao_RCED-99-37_0 | The alliance between Northwest and Continental airlines remains under review at both DOJ and DOT, which has requested additional information from each of the six airlines on the frequent flyer arrangements with its respective alliance partner. Northwest and Continental Have Begun to Implement Their Alliance Agreement
On November 20, 1998, Northwest and Continental announced that Northwest had completed the acquisition of 8.7 million shares of Continental’s stock, which it then deposited in a voting trust. According to the airlines, under the new terms of the agreement between them, Northwest will acquire less than a majority of the voting control of Continental, forgo its right to place someone on Continental’s board of directors, and forgo code-sharing with Continental in certain hub-to-hub domestic markets. airlines.) American-US Airways Began Implementing Their Alliance in August
Also in April 1998, 3 months after Northwest and Continental announced their alliance, American Airlines and US Airways announced that they had agreed on a limited marketing relationship involving their frequent flyer programs and club facilities. The airlines began implementing the frequent flyer agreement in August 1998. Our limited analysis of flight frequencies suggests that the alliance could result in new, possibly improved, route options. Both alliances will provide benefits to members of each airline’s frequent flyer program by offering new destinations to which members can fly. The two airlines have also agreed to allow reciprocal access to all domestic and international club facilities. Although cooperating, they are conducting separate reviews because they have different statutory authorities, responsibilities, and remedies. DOJ said in its complaint that Northwest’s gaining voting control would lessen competition in interstate trade and commerce and unreasonably restrain trade and that the transaction would also likely create “interlocking directors” on the boards of directors of both airlines, with certain individuals sitting on both boards. On October 23, 1998, DOJ filed a civil antitrust action to prevent Northwest from acquiring or holding a majority of the Continental’s voting stock. DOT also imposed waiting periods on the implementation of the Northwest-Continental alliance’s frequent flyer and code-sharing agreements but said on December 4, 1998, that the airlines could proceed with their reciprocal frequent flyer program, which had been modified somewhat at DOT’s request. Specifically, our objectives were to (1) determine the status of each of the alliances; (2) examine, for each alliance individually, the potential beneficial and harmful effects on consumers; and (3) examine the authority of the departments of Justice (DOJ) and Transportation (DOT) to review these alliances and the status of these reviews. Our analysis showed that a code-sharing alliance between United and Delta would serve fewer new airport pairs than the airlines estimated. We found that such an alliance could create on-line single-connection service in 166 markets that served 2.0 million passengers in 1997. IV.1). These 60 markets served 5.2 million passengers in 1997. In addition, the number of markets dominated by the alliances would increase by about 10 percent, causing over two-thirds of U.S. travelers to fly in markets dominated by a single airline. 5, 1998). | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on: (1) the status of the proposed alliances to be formed by the six largest U.S. airlines; (2) the potential beneficial and harmful effects on consumers; and (3) the authority of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Department of Transportation (DOT) to review these alliances and the status of their reviews.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) all six airlines have begun implementing various aspects of their agreements; (2) Northwest Airlines completed its acquisition of equity in Continental Airlines, and the two airlines began implementing their reciprocal frequent flyer programs; (3) since GAO testified in June 1998, however, Northwest and Continental have revised their agreement; (4) under the terms of the revised agreement, Northwest altered its equity investment in Continental, agreed to forgo its right to place someone on Continental's Board of Directors, and agreed to forgo code-sharing with Continental in certain domestic markets; (5) even though Northwest and Continental have implemented their agreement, it remains under review at both DOJ and DOT; (6) the alliance between United Airlines and Delta Air Lines was originally to include code-sharing, but it has been scaled back to an arrangement involving reciprocal frequent flyer programs and access to airport lounges; (7) this arrangement, which the airlines began implementing in September 1998, is much the same as the one American Airlines and US Airways proposed and began implementing in August 1998; (8) GAO analysis of Northwest and Continental's proposed alliance showed that the alliance could result in new, possibly improved, route options, and the alliance's extended frequent flyer program may benefit members of each airline's program; (9) GAO also found that this alliance will create some new markets that are not already served by other airlines; (10) however, GAO's analysis indicated fewer new markets than the alliance partners estimated, and it showed that these new markets will serve relatively few passengers; (11) GAO's analysis indicates that if Northwest and Continental do not act independently, competition could decline in 63 markets that served 2 million passengers in 1997, and the two airlines could also increase by 5 percent in the number of markets that they dominate; (12) DOJ and DOT are separately reviewing the three alliances under different statutory authorities and have different remedies available to them; (13) on October 23, 1998, DOJ filed a civil antitrust action to prevent Northwest from acquiring or holding a majority of Continental's voting stock; (14) DOJ said in its complaint that Northwest's gaining control would lessen competition in interstate trade and commerce and unreasonably restrain trade; and (15) Congress recently authorized DOT to impose waiting periods before certain joint venture arrangements involving major airlines. |
gao_GAO-08-603 | gao_GAO-08-603_0 | A PIA is an analysis of how personal information is collected, stored, shared, and managed in a federal system. In recent years, additional laws have been enacted that also address the roles and responsibilities of senior officials with regard to privacy. Despite much variation, all of these laws require agencies to assign overall responsibility for privacy protection and compliance to a senior agency official. In addition, OMB guidance has directed agencies to designate senior officials with overall responsibility for privacy. These laws and guidance set specific privacy responsibilities for these agency officials. These responsibilities can be grouped into six broad categories: (1) conducting PIAs; (2) Privacy Act compliance; (3) reviewing and evaluating the privacy implications of agency policies, regulations, and initiatives; (4) producing reports on the status of privacy protections; (5) ensuring that redress procedures are in place; and (6) ensuring that employees and contractors receive appropriate training. The laws and guidance vary in how they frame requirements in these categories and which agencies must adhere to them. Agencies Have Varying Privacy Management Structures, and Senior Agency Officials for Privacy Do Not Consistently Have Oversight of All Key Functions
Agencies have varying organizational structures to address privacy responsibilities. For example, of the 12 agencies we reviewed, 2 had statutorily designated CPOs who also served as SAOPs, 5 designated their agency CIOs as their senior officials, and the others designated a variety of other officials, such as the general counsel or assistant secretary for management. Further, not all of the agencies we reviewed had given their designated senior officials full oversight over all privacy-related functions. While 6 agencies had these officials overseeing all key privacy functions, 6 others relied on other organizational units not overseen by the designated senior official to perform certain key privacy functions. However, without oversight and involvement in all key privacy functions, SAOPs may be unable to effectively serve as agency central focal points for privacy. Evolving Requirements in Laws and Related Guidance Have Led to Fragmented Assignment of Privacy Functions
The fragmented way in which privacy functions have been assigned to organizational units in several agencies is at least partly the result of evolving requirements in law and guidance. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) describe laws and guidance that set requirements for senior privacy officials within federal agencies, and (2) describe the organizational structures used by agencies to address privacy requirements and assess whether senior officials have oversight over key functions. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004
Section 1011 of this act required the Director of National Intelligence to appoint a Civil Liberties Protection Officer and gave this officer the following functions: ensuring that the protection of civil liberties and privacy is appropriately incorporated into the policies and procedures of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the elements of the intelligence community within the National Intelligence Program; overseeing compliance by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence with all laws, regulations, and guidelines relating to civil liberties and privacy; reviewing complaints about abuses of civil liberties and privacy in Office of the Director of National Intelligence programs and operations; ensuring that technologies sustain, and do not erode, privacy protections; ensuring that personal information contained in a system of records subject to the Privacy Act is handled in full compliance with fair information practices as set out in that act; conducting privacy impact assessments when appropriate or as required performing such other duties as may be prescribed by the Director of National Intelligence or specified by law. | Why GAO Did This Study
Government agencies have a long-standing obligation under the Privacy Act of 1974 to protect the privacy of individuals about whom they collect personal information. A number of additional laws have been enacted in recent years directing agency heads to designate senior officials as focal points with overall responsibility for privacy. GAO was asked to (1) describe laws and guidance that set requirements for senior privacy officials within federal agencies, and (2) describe the organizational structures used by agencies to address privacy requirements and assess whether senior officials have oversight over key functions. To achieve these objectives, GAO analyzed the laws and related guidance and analyzed policies and procedures relating to key privacy functions at 12 agencies.
What GAO Found
Federal laws set varying roles and responsibilities for senior agency privacy officials. Despite much variation, all of these laws require covered agencies to assign overall responsibility for privacy protection and compliance to a senior agency official. In addition, Office of Management and Budget guidance directs agencies to designate a senior agency official for privacy with specific responsibilities. The specific privacy responsibilities defined in these laws and guidance can be grouped into six broad categories: (1) conducting privacy impact assessments (which are intended to ensure that privacy requirements are addressed when personal information is collected, stored, shared, and managed in a federal system), (2) complying with the Privacy Act, (3) reviewing and evaluating the privacy implications of agency policies, (4) producing reports on the status of privacy protections, (5) ensuring that redress procedures to handle privacy inquiries and complaints are in place, and (6) ensuring that employees and contractors receive appropriate training. The laws and guidance vary in how they frame requirements in these categories and which agencies must adhere to them. Agencies also have varying organizational structures to address privacy responsibilities. For example, of the 12 agencies we reviewed, 2 had statutorily designated chief privacy officers who also served as senior agency officials for privacy, 5 designated their agency chief information officers as their senior privacy officials, and the others designated a variety of other officials, such as the general counsel or assistant secretary for management. Further, not all of the agencies we reviewed had given their designated senior officials full oversight over all privacy-related functions. While 6 agencies had these officials overseeing all key privacy functions, 6 others relied on other organizational units not overseen by the designated senior official to perform certain key privacy functions. The fragmented way in which privacy functions were assigned to organizational units in these agencies is at least partly the result of evolving requirements in law and guidance. However, without oversight of all key privacy functions, designated senior officials may be unable to effectively serve as agency central focal points for information privacy. |
gao_HEHS-97-48 | gao_HEHS-97-48_0 | Diabetes experts generally agree that routine provision of several preventive and monitoring services can help physicians and patients manage the disease more effectively and control its progression. Medicare Beneficiaries With Diabetes Are Not Receiving Recommended Levels of Monitoring Services
Under both fee-for-service and HMO delivery, Medicare beneficiaries with diabetes are falling far short of receiving recommended levels of monitoring services, according to available evidence. A number of factors, both patient- and physician-related, may contribute to the low use of these services. However, less than half of these beneficiaries with diagnosed diabetes received an eye exam (42 percent), only 21 percent received the two recommended glycohemoglobin tests, and only about half (53 percent) had a urinalysis. 2.) The use of diabetes monitoring services varied by geographic area. Many of these factors are not unique to diabetes management; they also affect delivery of preventive care for many other chronic conditions. HMOs told us that they have focused their efforts on educating people with diabetes about self- management and their physicians about the need for recommended preventive and monitoring services. Even HMOs with comprehensive diabetes management programs have initiated their efforts mostly in the past 3 years. As a result, little is known yet about the effectiveness of these efforts or which approaches work better than others. Of the 88 plans surveyed, 13 reported having information about the effect of their diabetes management efforts on the service use or health outcomes of their enrollees with diabetes or on the costs to their plans. Local projects to encourage utilization: HCFA contracts with peer review organizations (PRO) to conduct local projects to improve the quality of care for Medicare beneficiaries. Some experts have suggested that HCFA should do more, including the following: test the effects of easing potential barriers to active diabetes self- management, such as the current limitations on coverage of supplies (including blood-testing strips) and diabetes self-management education; implement incentive systems to reward physicians for achieving and maintaining practice changes that promote better health outcomes;test diabetes management programs, such as mailed reminder cards or a telephone counseling service, with voluntary Medicare patient participation; and support provider-certification programs specifically for diabetes care that are being developed by professional organizations. Most Medicare beneficiaries with diabetes have had the disease for many years and are likely to have other serious chronic conditions. Methodology for Determining Use of Recommended Diabetes Services in Fee-for-Service Medicare
A 1995 HCFA study of eye examinations for Medicare beneficiaries with diabetes in the state of Washington provided a model for identifying people with diabetes and specific services in the Medicare claims data. These numbers provided numerator data to calculate the percentage of cohort members with diabetes who received the services at recommended intervals. In interpreting our results, it should be noted that (1) service utilization rates are not adjusted to reflect differences in the severity of diabetes or the extent of comorbidities among cohort members; (2) physicians and diabetes experts may disagree about optimal frequencies for some monitoring services in some patients because research evidence may be inconclusive and individual patients vary in age, comorbidities, and other factors; and (3) performing monitoring services as recommended does not ensure improved health outcomes. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed how well the health care system provides preventive services to Medicare beneficiaries with diabetes, focusing on: (1) the extent to which Medicare beneficiaries with diabetes receive recommended levels of preventive and monitoring services; (2) what health maintenance organizations (HMO) that serve Medicare beneficiaries are doing to improve delivery of recommended diabetes services; and (3) what activities the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) supports to address these service needs for Medicare beneficiaries with diabetes.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) although experts agree that regular use of preventive and monitoring services can help minimize the complications of diabetes, most Medicare beneficiaries with diabetes do not receive these services at recommended intervals; (2) more than 90 percent of fee-for-service Medicare beneficiaries with diabetes visited their physicians at least twice in 1994; (3) however, only about 40 percent received an annual eye exam, and only about 20 percent received the recommended two specialized blood tests per year to monitor diabetes control; (4) on the whole, these fee-for-service utilization rates did not vary substantially by patient age, sex, or race; (5) the provision of preventive and monitoring services under managed care is also below recommended levels, although data for this service delivery approach are limited; (6) for example, among people with diabetes aged 18 to 64 who were enrolled in private HMO plans, less than half received an eye exam in 1995; (7) according to diabetes experts, several factors may contribute to low use of monitoring services, including physicians' lack of awareness of the latest recommendations and patients' lack of motivation to maintain adequate self-management care; (8) Medicare HMO efforts to improve diabetes care have been varied, but generally limited; (9) most plans report that they have focused on educating their enrollees with diabetes about self-management and their physicians about the need for preventive and monitoring services; (10) some HMOs have begun to take additional steps, such as tracking the degree to which physicians provide preventive care, and a few plans have developed comprehensive diabetes management programs; (11) because virtually all of these efforts have begun within the past 3 years, little is known about their effectiveness; (12) HCFA also has begun to test preventive care initiatives for diabetes and has targeted this area for special emphasis; (13) its efforts include helping to plan a nationwide diabetes education program, encouraging local experiments to increase use of monitoring services and improve quality of care for people with diabetes, and developing performance measures for providers of diabetes care; (14) but like the efforts of Medicare HMOs, HCFA's initiatives are quite recent, and the agency does not yet have results that would allow it to evaluate effectiveness; and (15) to the extent that these initiatives prove cost-effective, they may help promote better management of diabetes care. |
gao_GAO-10-628 | gao_GAO-10-628_0 | Federal policies address the importance of coordination between the government and the private sector to protect the nation’s computer-reliant critical infrastructure. DHS concurred with the recommendations. Private Sector Stakeholders Ex Information on Threats, Alerts, and Other Related Services but Believe Federal Partners A Not Consistently Providing
Private sector stakeholders reported that they expect their federal partners to provide usable, timely, and actionable cyber threat information and alerts, access to sensitive or classified information, a secure mechanism for sharing information, security clearances, and a single centralized government cybersecurity organization to coordinate federal efforts. For example, only 27 percent of private sector survey respondents reported that they were receiving timely and actionable cyber threat information and alerts to a great or moderate extent. While the ongoing efforts may address the public sector’s ability to meet the private sector’s expectations, much work remains, and it is unclear if the efforts will focus on fulfilling the private sector’s most expected services related to information-sharing. Public Sector Stakeholders Expect Threat Information and Commitment, Which the Private Sector Is Generally Providing
Public sector stakeholders reported that they expect the private sector to provide a commitment to execute plans and recommendations, timely and actionable cyber threat information, and appropriate staff and resources. However, government council officials stated that improvements could be made to the partnership. One issue is that private sector stakeholders do not want to share their sensitive, proprietary information with the federal government. In turn, federal partners primarily expect their private sector partners to provide commitment to execute plans and recommendations, timely and actionable cyber threat and alert information, and appropriate staff and resources, which the private sector is primarily providing; however, while most federal partners stated that these expectations are mostly being met, they identified difficulties with the private sector sharing their sensitive information and the need for private sector partners to improve their willingness to engage and provide support to partnership efforts. Federal and private sector partners have initiated efforts to improve the partnerships; however, much work remains to fully implement improved information sharing. Without improvements in meeting private and public sector expectations, the partnerships will remain less than optimal, and there is a risk that owners of critical infrastructure will not have the appropriate information and mechanisms to thwart sophisticated cyber attacks that could have catastrophic effects on our nation’s cyber-reliant critical infrastructure. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Special Assistant to the President and Cybersecurity Coordinator and the Secretary of Homeland Security, in collaboration with the sector lead agencies, coordinating councils, and the owners and operators of the associated five critical infrastructure sectors, take two actions: (1) use the results of this report to focus their information-sharing efforts, including their relevant pilot projects, on the most desired services, including providing timely and actionable threat and alert information, access to sensitive or classified information, a secure mechanism for sharing information, and providing security clearance and (2) bolster the efforts to build out the National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center as the central focal point for leveraging and integrating the capabilities of the private sector, civilian government, law enforcement, the military, and the intelligence community. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
The national Cybersecurity Coordinator provided no comments on a draft of our report. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine (1) private sector stakeholders’ expectations for cyber-related, public-private partnerships and to what extent these expectations are being met and (2) public sector stakeholders’ expectations for cyber-related public-private partnerships and to what extent expectations are being met. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pervasive and sustained computer-based attacks pose a potentially devastating impact to systems and operations and the critical infrastructures they support. Addressing these threats depends on effective partnerships between the government and private sector owners and operators of critical infrastructure. Federal policy, including the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) National Infrastructure Protection Plan, calls for a partnership model that includes public and private councils to coordinate policy and information sharing and analysis centers to gather and disseminate information on threats to physical and cyber-related infrastructure. GAO was asked to determine (1) private sector stakeholders' expectations for cyber-related, public-private partnerships and to what extent these expectations are being met and (2) public sector stakeholders' expectations for cyber-related, public-private partnerships and to what extent these expectations are being met. To do this, GAO conducted surveys and interviews of public and private sector officials and analyzed relevant policies and other documents.
What GAO Found
Private sector stakeholders reported that they expect their federal partners to provide usable, timely, and actionable cyber threat information and alerts; access to sensitive or classified information; a secure mechanism for sharing information; security clearances; and a single centralized government cybersecurity organization to coordinate government efforts. However, according to private sector stakeholders, federal partners are not consistently meeting these expectations. For example, less than one-third of private sector respondents reported that they were receiving actionable cyber threat information and alerts to a great or moderate extent. Federal partners are taking steps that may address the key expectations of the private sector, including developing new information-sharing arrangements. However, while the ongoing efforts may address the public sector's ability to meet the private sector's expectations, much work remains to fully implement improved information sharing. Public sector stakeholders reported that they expect the private sector to provide a commitment to execute plans and recommendations, timely and actionable cyber threat information and alerts, and appropriate staff and resources. Four of the five public sector councils that GAO held structured interviews with reported that their respective private sector partners are committed to executing plans and recommendations and providing timely and actionable information. However, public sector council officials stated that improvements could be made to the partnership, including improving private sector sharing of sensitive information. Some private sector stakeholders do not want to share their proprietary information with the federal government for fear of public disclosure and potential loss of market share, among other reasons. Without improvements in meeting private and public sector expectations, the partnerships will remain less than optimal, and there is a risk that owners of critical infrastructure will not have the information necessary to thwart cyber attacks that could have catastrophic effects on our nation's cyber-reliant critical infrastructure.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the national Cybersecurity Coordinator and DHS work with their federal and private sector partners to enhance information-sharing efforts. The national Cybersecurity Coordinator provided no comments on a draft of this report. DHS concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-10-883T | gao_GAO-10-883T_0 | DHS Scans Cargo and Conveyances Ente the United States through Land Border and Major Seaports but Is Still Develo Options to More Systematically Scan Rail, Air Cargo, and Commercial Aviation
DHS has made significant progress in deploying both radiation detectio equipment and developing procedures to scan cargo and conveyances entering the United States through fixed land and sea ports of entry for nuclear and radiological materials. According to DHS officials, the department scans nearly 100 percent of the cargo and conveyances entering the United States through land borders and major seaports. However, DHS has ma less progress scanning for radiation (1) in railcars entering the United States from Canada and Mexico; (2) in international air cargo; and ( international commercial aviation aircraft, passengers, or baggage. DHS’s Efforts to Prevent Smuggling of Nuclear and Radiological Materials into the United States via the Gaps DNDO Identified Are Still in the Early Stages of Development
DHS efforts to prevent the smuggling of nuclear and radiological materi into the United States through the critical gaps DNDO identified––land border areas between ports of entry, international general aviation, and small maritime craft––remain largely developmental. In addition, these pathways are challenging because of their size, volume of traffic, and the difficulty of deploying available radiological and nucle detection capabilities and technologies. DHS’s actions to address these gaps consist primarily of efforts to develop, test, and deploy current generation or newly developed radiation detectionequipment; conduct studies or analyses to identify and address particular threats or gaps; develop new procedures to guide scanning for radiation in pathways where no scanning had occurred before; and develop and learn from pilot programs. DHS Has Not Yet Completed a Strateg Plan for the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture
DHS does not yet have a strategic plan for the global nuclear detection architecture, but DHS officials told us they began working on a strategic plan earlier this year and expect to complete it by the fall of 2010––2 years after we last recommended such a plan—and more than 7 years after we first identified the need for comprehensive plan in October 2002. DHS Might Have Completed the Architecture Sooner If It Had a Strategic Plan
In our view, the lack of a strategic plan has limited DNDO’s efforts to develop a global nuclear detection architecture. Although each agency with a role in combating nuclear smuggling has its own planning documents, an overarching strategic plan is needed to guide these efforts to address the gaps and move to a more comprehensive global nuclear detection strategy. Moreover, this plan would include agreed-upon processes and procedures to guide the improvement of the efforts to combat nuclear smuggling and coordinate the activities of the participating federal agencies. DNDO’s 4-year effort to develop ASPs is an example of the consequences of not having a strategic plan and not reaching consensus on such a strategic plan with other federal agency partners. We believe the proposed deployment of ASPs distracted DNDO from its mission to fully deploy a nuclear architecture and close the gaps it identified in the architecture. In addition, in 2006 we recommended that the decision to deploy ASPs be based on an analysis of both the benefits and costs— which we later estimated at over $2 billion—and a determination of whether any additional detection capability provided by the ASP is worth its additional cost. DNDO has proceeded with ASP testing without fully completing such an analysis. Furthermore, DNDO focused its ASP deployment efforts on replacing components of the architecture with ASPs where a detection system was already in place––established ports of entry that were using PVTs and RIIDs––and shifting its focus away from finishing the PVT deployments at ports of entry and closing the gaps it identified in the architecture. | Why GAO Did This Study
In April 2005, a Presidential Directive established the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to enhance and coordinate federal, state, and local efforts to combat nuclear smuggling abroad and domestically. DNDO was directed to develop, in coordination with the departments of Defense, Energy, and State, an enhanced global nuclear detection system of radiation detection equipment and interdiction activities. (DNDO refers to this system as an architecture.) DNDO is to implement the domestic portion of the architecture. Federal efforts to combat nuclear smuggling have largely focused on established ports of entry, such as seaports and land border crossings, and DNDO has also been examining nuclear detection strategies along other pathways. Over the past 7 years, GAO has issued numerous recommendations on nuclear or radiological detection to the Secretary of Homeland Security, most recently in January 2009. This testimony discusses the status of DHS efforts to (1) complete the deployment of radiation detection equipment to scan all cargo and conveyances entering the United States at ports of entry, (2) prevent smuggling of nuclear or radiological materials via the critical gaps DNDO identified, and (3) develop a strategic plan for the global nuclear detection architecture. GAO's testimony is based on prior work that was updated by obtaining DHS documents and interviewing DHS officials.
What GAO Found
DHS has made significant progress in both deploying radiation detection equipment and developing procedures to scan cargo and conveyances entering the United States through fixed land and sea ports of entry for nuclear and radiological materials since GAO's 2006 report. While DHS reports it scans nearly 100 percent of the cargo and conveyances entering the United States through land borders and major seaports, it has made less progress scanning for radiation (1) in railcars entering the United States from Canada and Mexico; (2) in international air cargo; and (3) for international commercial aviation aircraft, passengers, or baggage. DHS efforts to prevent the smuggling of nuclear and radiological materials into the United States through gaps DNDO identified in developing the nuclear detection architecture remain largely developmental since GAO's 2009 report. The gaps DHS identified include land border areas between ports of entry into the United States, international general aviation, and small maritime craft such as recreational boats and commercial fishing vessels. These gaps are important because of their size, volume of traffic, and the difficulty of deploying available radiological and nuclear detection technologies. DHS's actions to address these gaps consist primarily of efforts to develop, test, and deploy radiation detection equipment; conduct studies or analyses to identify and address particular threats or gaps; develop new procedures to guide scanning for radiation; and develop and learn from pilot programs. DHS does not yet have a strategic plan for the global nuclear detection architecture, but DHS officials said they began working on a plan earlier this year and expect to complete it by fall 2010--2 years after GAO last recommended this to DNDO--and more than 7 years after we first identified the need for a comprehensive plan in October 2002. The lack of a strategic plan has limited DHS's efforts to complete such an architecture, because although each agency with a role in combating nuclear smuggling has its own planning documents, without an overarching strategic plan, it is difficult to address the gaps and move to a more comprehensive global nuclear detection strategy. DNDO's 4-year effort to develop an advanced radiation detection monitor is an example of the consequences of not having a strategic plan and not reaching consensus on such a plan with other federal agencies. In GAO's view, the proposed deployment of this monitor distracted DNDO from its mission to fully deploy the architecture and close the gaps it identified. Also, in 2006 GAO recommended that the decision to deploy this monitor be based on an analysis of both benefits and costs--which GAO later estimated at over $2 billion--and a determination of whether any additional detection capability provided by the monitor was worth its additional cost. DNDO proceeded with advanced spectroscopic portal (ASP) testing without fully completing such an analysis. Further, DNDO focused this monitor deployment effort on replacing components of the architecture where a radiation detection system was already in place--at established ports of entry--and shifting its focus away from closing the gaps it identified in the architecture. |
gao_GAO-06-718 | gao_GAO-06-718_0 | At the same time, life expectancy is increasing. Consequently, relatively fewer workers will be supporting those receiving Social Security and Medicare benefits, which play an important role in helping older Americans meet their retirement needs. In addition to their saving and consumption patterns, baby boomers also may affect stock returns in particular through broader macroeconomic channels. Financial Evidence from Baby Boomers and Current Retirees Does Not Suggest a Sharp Decline in Asset Prices
Our analysis of national survey data indicates that the baby boom generation is not likely to precipitate a sharp and sudden decline in financial asset prices as they retire. Concentration of Financial Assets among a Minority of Baby Boomers May Lessen Their Market Effect
The potential for the baby boom generation to precipitate a market meltdown in retirement may be substantially reduced by the fact that a small minority of this population holds the majority of the generation’s financial assets. To the extent that baby boomers behave like current retirees, a rapid and mass sell off of financial assets seems unlikely. To the extent that this shift means that boomers have an increased share of retirement wealth held as savings instead of as income, this may require boomers to sell more assets to produce retirement income than did previous generations. If boomers are confronted with higher than expected health care costs in retirement, they would have a greater need to spend down their assets. In addition, the expected increase in the number of baby boomers working past age 62 may also reduce the likelihood of a dramatic decline in financial asset prices. The Role of Housing, a Key Asset for Baby Boomers in Retirement Security, Continues to Evolve
Housing represents a large portion of most baby boomers’ wealth and their management and use of this asset may have some effect on their decisions to sell assets in the financial markets. Financial industry representatives whom we interviewed also generally expect the baby boom retirement not to have a significant impact on financial asset returns because of the concentration of assets among a minority of boomers, the possibility of increased global demand for U.S. assets, and other reasons. Similarly, most of the empirical studies, which statistically examined the impact of past changes in the U.S. population’s age structure on rates of return, suggested that the baby boom retirement will have a minimal, if any, effect on financial asset returns. These factors could dampen the effect of the baby boomer retirement on the markets. Broad Economic Factors Will Likely Have a Greater Impact on Financial Markets Than Will Demographics
Our statistical analysis indicates that macroeconomic and financial factors explain more of the variation in historical stock returns than population shifts and suggests that such factors could outweigh any future demographic effect on stock returns. Baby Boomers and Future Generations Likely to Increasingly Rely on Their Own Savings, Placing Greater Importance on Rates of Return and Financial Management Skills
While the baby boom retirement is not likely to cause a sharp decline in asset prices or returns, the retirement security of boomers and future generations will likely depend increasingly on individual saving and rates of return as guaranteed sources of income become less available. However, studies have found that many individuals have low financial literacy. The long-term financial weaknesses of Social Security and Medicare, coupled with the uncertain future policy changes to these programs’ benefits, and the continued decline of the traditional DB pension system indicate a shift toward individual responsibility for retirement. To assess the role rates of return will play in providing retirement income in the future, we synthesized findings from the analysis of financial asset holdings to draw conclusions about the risk implications for different subpopulations of the baby boom and younger generations. | Why GAO Did This Study
The first wave of baby boomers(born between 1946 and 1964) will become eligible for Social Security early retirement benefits in 2008. In addition to concerns about how the boomers' retirement will strain the nation's retirement and health systems, concerns also have been raised about the possibility for boomers to sell off large amounts of financial assets in retirement, with relatively fewer younger U.S. workers available to purchase these assets. Some have suggested that such a sell-off could precipitate a market "meltdown," a sharp and sudden decline in asset prices, or reduce long-term rates of return. In view of such concerns, we have examined (1) whether the retirement of the baby boomers is likely to precipitate a dramatic drop in financial asset prices; (2) what researchers and financial industry participants expect the effect of the boomer retirement to have on financial markets; and (3) what role rates of return will play in providing retirement income in the future. We have prepared this report under the Comptroller General's authority to conduct evaluations on his own initiative as part of the continued effort to assist Congress in addressing these issues.
What GAO Found
Our analysis of national survey and other data suggests that retiring boomers are not likely to sell financial assets in such a way as to cause a sharp and sudden decline in financial asset prices. A large majority of boomers have few financial assets to sell. The small minority who own most assets held by this generation will likely need to sell few assets in retirement. Also, most current retirees spend down their assets slowly, with many continuing to accumulate assets. If boomers behave the same way, a rapid and large sell off of financial assets appears unlikely. Other factors that may reduce the odds of a sharp and sudden drop in asset prices include the increase in life expectancy that will spread asset sales over a longer period and the expectation of many boomers to work past traditional retirement ages. A wide range of academic studies have predicted that the boomers' retirement will have a small negative effect, if any, on rates of return on assets. Similarly, financial industry representatives did not expect the boomers' retirement to have a big impact on the financial markets, in part because of the globalization of the markets. Our statistical analysis shows that macroeconomic and financial factors, such as dividends and industrial production, explained much more of the variation in stock returns from 1948 to 2004 than did shifts in the U.S. population's age structure, suggesting that demographics may have a small effect on stock returns relative to the broader economy. While the boomers' retirement is not likely to cause a sharp and sudden decline in asset prices, the retirement security of boomers and others will likely depend more on individual savings and returns on such savings. This is due, in part, to the decline in traditional pensions that provide guaranteed retirement income and the rise in account-based defined contribution plans. Also, fiscal uncertainties surrounding Social Security and rising health care costs will ultimately place more personal responsibility for retirement saving on individuals. Given the need for individuals to save and manage their savings, financial literacy will play an important role in helping boomers and future generations achieve a secure retirement. |
gao_GAO-02-191 | gao_GAO-02-191_0 | In addition to the investigation of Yucca Mountain, the nuclear waste program includes preparations for eventually accepting and transporting spent fuel and other highly radioactive wastes from storage sites. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act does not specify a time frame in which the President must act. It May Be Premature for DOE to Make a Site Recommendation
Although within his discretion, it may be premature for the Secretary of Energy to make a site recommendation in the near future because DOE is currently not prepared to submit an acceptable license application to NRC within the statutory limits that would take effect if the President recommended the site to the Congress within the next several years. Further, site recommendation and license application are connected by law with specific timeframes that require DOE to submit a license application to NRC within about 5 to 8 months once the President considers the site qualified for a license application and makes a site recommendation to the Congress. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives for this report were to determine whether (1) the Department of Energy (DOE) has completed the work necessary to support a site recommendation for the development of a repository at Yucca Mountain, and (2) DOE’s goal of opening a repository at Yucca Mountain in 2010 is reasonable. | What GAO Found
The administration's energy policy reflects renewed interest in expanding nuclear power as a source of electricity. However, the nation lacks a facility to permanently dispose of spent fuel from commercial power plants. The Department of Energy (DOE) has been studying Yucca Mountain, Nevada, as a possible repository for these highly radioactive wastes. GAO believes that it may be premature for the Secretary of Energy to recommend Yucca Mountain as a suitable site. Once the President considers the site qualified for a license application and recommends the site to Congress, the Nuclear Waste Policy act requires DOE to submit a license application to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) within five to eight months. DOE will be unable to submit an acceptable application to NRC within the statutory time frames for several years because of unresolved technical issues. DOE is unlikely to achieve its goal of opening a repository at Yucca Mountain by 2010, and it does not have a reliable estimate of when, and at what cost, such a repository can be opened. |
gao_GAO-08-960T | gao_GAO-08-960T_0 | The 9/11 Commission Act provides that the mission of NBIC is to enhance the capability of the federal government to: rapidly identify, characterize, localize, and track a biological event of national concern; integrate and analyze data relating to human health, animal, plant, food, and environmental monitoring systems; and disseminate alerts to member agencies, and state, local, and tribal governments. Prior to the passage of the 9/11 Commission Act, two presidential directives charged federal agencies to coordinate federal efforts and create a new biological threat awareness capacity to enhance detection and characterization of a biological attack. DHS, in cooperation with other federal agencies, created the BioWatch program in 2003 to detect the release of airborne biological agents. The BioWatch program deploys detectors which collect data that, when analyzed, can be used to identify biological agents on the BioWatch threat list. OHA has responsibility for managing the operations of the BioWatch program. S&T, which is the primary research and development arm of DHS, is responsible for developing detectors for the BioWatch program. DHS Has Made Progress in Making NBIC Fully Operational by the Mandated September Deadline, but Faces Difficulties Completing Key Tasks
DHS has made progress making NBIC fully operational by September 30, 2008, as required by the 9/11 Commission Act, but has faced difficulties completing some key tasks, such as defining what capabilities the center will provide once fully operational, formalizing agreements to obtain interagency coordination, and fully implementing its IT system. NBIC is working to establish additional coordination efforts to enhance NBIC’s integration capabilities. For example, member agencies will not have full access to the IT system until NBIC employees have been trained to use the system. Progress Has Been Made, but It Is Unclear What Capabilities NBIC Will Have by the September 30, 2008, Deadline
DHS has made progress making NBIC fully operational by the mandated September 30, 2008, deadline; however, it is unclear what operations the center will be capable of carrying out at that point. NBIC has not yet defined the capabilities the center should have in order to be considered fully operational. Since the new NBIC Director started in January 2008, NBIC has organized interagency working groups and has finalized MOUs with 6 of the 11 agencies that NBIC identified as important to the operational needs of the center. Second, DHS is asking agencies to sign ISAs that formalize the technical exchange of information, such as data on human health, between NBIC and these agencies. NBIC Recently Upgraded Its IT System, but Additional Work Remains
A contractor DHS hired to enhance NBIC’s IT system delivered an upgrade to the system in April 2008; however, NBIC officials stated that they need to complete additional work before granting member agencies full access to the system. DHS Has Two Ongoing Efforts to Improve the BioWatch Technology, Which May Decrease Detection Time or Increase the Number of Agents That Can Be Identified
DHS has two ongoing efforts to improve the detection technology used by the BioWatch program. S&T is developing a new technology. The current technology collects air samples which are periodically manually removed from the equipment and taken to a laboratory for analysis, a process that could take 10 to 34 hours. Operational testing and evaluation of this technology is scheduled for April 2009, about a year later than initially planned because OHA provided S&T with revised functional requirements about 4 months before S&T was scheduled to complete the Generation 3.0 prototype detector. While S&T is completing is work on the Generation 3.0 detectors, OHA is developing an interim solution to enhance the detectors currently in use by adding the capability to automatically analyze air samples for some biological agents. OHA’s interim technology, known as Generation 2.5, is intended to add the capability to automatically analyze air samples for the same number of biological agents currently monitored by the existing BioWatch detector technology. Further, OHA officials stated that they plan to operationally test and evaluate new prototype detectors beginning in November 2008 and to acquire over 100 of these new detectors, contingent on successful completion of operational testing and evaluation. | Why GAO Did This Study
The United States faces potentially dangerous biological threats that occur naturally or may be the result of a terrorist attack. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is developing two major initiatives to provide early detection and warning of biological threats: the National Biosurveillance Integration Center (NBIC), a center for integrating and coordinating information on biological events of national significance, and the BioWatch program that operates systems used to test the air for biological agents. The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 requires DHS to establish a fully operational NBIC by September 30, 2008. This statement discusses the status of DHS's efforts to (1) make NBIC fully operational by the mandated deadline, and (2) improve the BioWatch program's technology. GAO's preliminary observations of these two programs are based on our ongoing work mandated by the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 to review U.S. biosurveillance efforts. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed related statutes; federal directives; and DHS planning, development, and implementation documents on these two initiatives. We also interviewed DHS program officials to obtain additional information about NBIC and BioWatch. DHS reviewed a draft of this testimony and provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
DHS has made progress making NBIC fully operational by September 30, 2008, as required by the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, but it is unclear what operations the center will be capable of carrying out at that point. DHS has acquired facilities and hired staff for the center but has not yet defined what capabilities the center will have in order to be considered fully operational. DHS has also started to coordinate biosurveillance efforts with other agencies, but DHS has not yet formalized some key agreements to fulfill NBIC's integration mission. For example, DHS has signed memoranda of understanding with 6 of 11 agencies DHS identified to support the operations of NBIC. However, DHS has not yet completed other key agreements to, for example, facilitate the technical exchange of information, such as data on human health, between NBIC and the agencies. In addition, a contractor DHS hired to enhance NBIC's information technology system delivered an upgrade to the system on April 1, 2008, intended to enhance data integration capabilities. However, before this upgrade can be used effectively, DHS officials said that NBIC will need to train its employees to use the system and negotiate interagency agreements to define the data that the agencies using the system will provide. DHS officials expect that NBIC will complete the training in early 2009. DHS has two ongoing efforts to improve the detection technology used by the BioWatch program, which deploys detectors to collect data that are then analyzed to detect the presence of specific biological agents. First, the Directorate for Science and Technology (S&T) within DHS is developing next-generation detectors for the BioWatch program. DHS plans for this new technology to collect air samples and automatically test the samples for a broader range of biological agents than the current technology. Under the current system, samples are manually collected and taken to a laboratory for analysis. DHS plans to operationally test and evaluate the new automatic technology in April 2009 and to begin replacing its existing detection technology in 2010. Operational testing and evaluation of the new technology is planned to take place in April 2009, about 1 year later than DHS initially planned, because S&T officials received revised requirements for the new system about 4 months before S&T was scheduled to complete development of the system. Second, while S&T is completing its work on the new detection technology, DHS is developing an interim solution, managed by the Office of Health Affairs, to enhance its current detection technology. This interim solution is intended to automatically analyze air samples for the same number of biological agents currently monitored by the BioWatch program. Contingent on successful operational testing and evaluation that is to start in November 2008, DHS plans to decide whether to acquire over 100 of these enhanced detectors. |
gao_GAO-16-194T | gao_GAO-16-194T_0 | Ineffective protection of these information systems and networks can impair delivery of vital services, and result in loss or theft of computer resources, assets, and funds; inappropriate access to and disclosure, modification, or destruction of sensitive information, such as personally identifiable information; disruption of essential operations supporting critical infrastructure, national defense, or emergency services; undermining of agency missions due to embarrassing incidents that erode the public’s confidence in government; use of computer resources for unauthorized purposes or to launch attacks on other systems; damage to networks and equipment; and high costs for remediation. In addition, the act continues the requirement for federal agencies to develop, document, and implement an agency-wide information security program. Unintentional threats can be caused by, among other things, natural disasters, defective computer or network equipment, software coding errors, and the actions of careless or poorly trained employees. Intentional threats include both targeted and untargeted attacks from a variety of sources, including criminal groups, hackers, disgruntled employees and other organizational insiders, foreign nations engaged in espionage and information warfare, and terrorists. As we reported in February 2015, since fiscal year 2006, the number of information security incidents affecting systems supporting the federal government has steadily increased each year: rising from 5,503 in fiscal year 2006 to 67,168 in fiscal year 2014, an increase of 1,121 percent. Information Security Weaknesses Place Federal Systems and Sensitive Data at Risk
Given the risks posed by cyber threats and the increasing number of incidents, it is crucial that federal agencies take appropriate steps to secure their systems and information. We and agency inspectors general have identified numerous weaknesses in protecting federal information and systems. Specifically, for fiscal year 2014, 19 of the 24 federal agencies covered by the Chief Financial Officers Act reported that information security control deficiencies were either a material weakness or a significant deficiency in internal controls over their financial reporting. Over the last several years, we and agency inspectors general have made thousands of recommendations to agencies aimed at improving their implementation of information security controls. For example, we have made about 2,000 recommendations over the last 6 years. However, many agencies continue to have weaknesses in implementing these controls in part because many of these recommendations remain unimplemented. Until federal agencies take actions to implement the recommendations made by us and the inspectors general—federal systems and information, as well as sensitive personal information about the public, will be at an increased risk of compromise from cyber-based attacks and other threats. Healthcare.Gov: Actions Needed to Address Weaknesses in Information Security and Privacy Controls. Cybersecurity: Threats Impacting the Nation. | Why GAO Did This Study
Effective information security for federal computer systems and databases is essential to preventing the loss of resources; the unauthorized or inappropriate use, disclosure, or alteration of sensitive information; and the disruption of government operations. Since 1997, GAO has designated federal information security as a government-wide high-risk area, and in 2003 expanded this area to include computerized systems supporting the nation's critical infrastructure. Earlier this year, in GAO's high-risk update, the area was further expanded to include protecting the privacy of personal information that is collected, maintained, and shared by both federal and nonfederal entities.
This statement summarizes threats and information security weaknesses in federal systems. In preparing this statement, GAO relied on its previously published work in this area.
What GAO Found
Federal systems face an evolving array of cyber-based threats. These threats can be unintentional—for example, from software coding errors or the actions of careless or poorly trained employees; or intentional—targeted or untargeted attacks from criminals, hackers, adversarial nations, terrorists, disgruntled employees or other organizational insiders, among others. These concerns are further highlighted by recent incidents involving breaches of sensitive data and the sharp increase in information security incidents reported by federal agencies over the last several years, which have risen from 5,503 in fiscal year 2006 to 67,168 in fiscal year 2014 (see figure).
Security control weaknesses place sensitive data at risk. GAO has identified a number of deficiencies at federal agencies that pose threats to their information and systems. For example, agencies, including the Department of Homeland Security, have weaknesses with the design and implementation of information security controls, as illustrated by 19 of 24 agencies covered by the Chief Financial Officers Act declaring cybersecurity as a significant deficiency or material weakness for fiscal year 2014. In addition, most of the 24 agencies continue to have weaknesses in key controls such as those for limiting, preventing, and detecting inappropriate access to computer resources and managing the configurations of software and hardware.
Until federal agencies take actions to address these weaknesses—including implementing the thousands of recommendations GAO and agency inspectors general have made—federal systems and information will be at an increased risk of compromise from cyber-based attacks and other threats.
What GAO Recommends
Over the past 6 years, GAO has made about 2,000 recommendations to improve information security programs and associated security controls. Agencies have implemented about 58 percent of these recommendations. Further, agency inspectors general have made a multitude of recommendations to assist their agencies. |
gao_GAO-06-392 | gao_GAO-06-392_0 | The act requires federal agencies to protect and maintain the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of their information and information systems. NIAP Offers Benefits for Use in National Security Systems, but Process Faces Considerable Challenges
While the NIAP evaluation process offers benefits to national security systems, its effectiveness has not been measured or documented, and considerable challenges to acquiring and using NIAP-evaluated products exist. NIAP Evaluation Process Offers Benefits
NIAP process participants—vendors, laboratories, federal agencies, and NIAP officials—identified benefits to using the process for use in national security systems, including independent testing and evaluation of IT products and accreditation of the performing laboratories, which can give agencies confidence that the products will perform as claimed; international recognition of evaluated products, which provides agencies broader product selection and reduces vendor burden; discovery of software flaws in product security features and functions, which can cause vendors to fix them; and improvements to vendor development processes, which help to improve the overall quality of current and future products. Collectively, these challenges hinder the effective use of the NIAP evaluation process by vendors and agencies. Expanding NIAP Requirement to Non- national Security Systems May Yield Many of the Same Benefits and Challenges and Could Exacerbate Resource Constraints
While the National Security Telecommunications and Information Systems Security Policy Number 11 already allows agencies with non-national security systems to acquire NIAP-evaluated products, expanding the policy to mandate that such systems acquire NIAP-evaluated products may yield many of the same benefits and challenges experienced by current process participants, and could further exacerbate resources. For example, one identified benefit for national security systems—independent testing and evaluation of IT products—gives agencies confidence that validated features of a product, whether acquired for national or non-national security systems, will perform as claimed by the vendor. Moreover, agencies seeking information assurance for their non-national security systems, but who do not acquire NIAP-evaluated products, have guidance and standards available to them. These challenges include the difficulty in matching agencies’ needs with the availability of NIAP-evaluated products, vendors’ lack of awareness regarding the evaluation process, a reduction in the number of validators to certify products, and difficulty in measuring and documenting the effectiveness of the NIAP process. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to identify (1) the governmentwide benefits and challenges of the National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) evaluation process; and (2) the potential benefits and challenges of expanding the requirement of NIAP to non-national security systems, including sensitive but unclassified systems. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 1997, the National Security Agency and the National Institute of Standards and Technology formed the National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) to boost federal agencies' and consumers' confidence in information security products manufactured by vendors. To facilitate this goal, NIAP developed a national program that requires accredited laboratories to independently evaluate and validate the security of these products for use in national security systems. These systems are those under control of the U.S. government that contain classified information or involve intelligence activities. GAO was asked to identify (1) the governmentwide benefits and challenges of the NIAP evaluation process on national security systems, and (2) the potential benefits and challenges of expanding the requirement of NIAP to non-national security systems, including sensitive but unclassified systems.
What GAO Found
While NIAP process participants--vendors, laboratories, and federal agencies--indicated that the process offers benefits for use in national security systems, its effectiveness has not been measured or documented, and considerable challenges to acquiring and using NIAP-evaluated products exist. Specific benefits included independent testing and evaluation of products and accreditation of the performing laboratories, the discovery and correction of product flaws, and improvements to vendor development processes. However, process participants also face several challenges, including difficulty in matching agencies' needs with the availability of NIAP-evaluated products, vendors' lack of awareness regarding the evaluation process, and a lack of performance measures and difficulty in documenting the effectiveness of the NIAP evaluation process. Collectively, these challenges hinder the effective use of the NIAP evaluation process by vendors and agencies. Expanding the requirement of the NIAP evaluation process to non-national security systems is likely to yield similar benefits and challenges as those experienced by current process participants. For example, a current benefit--independent testing and evaluation of IT products--gives agencies confidence that validated features of a product will perform as claimed by the vendor. However, federal policy already allows agencies with non-national security systems to consider acquiring NIAP-evaluated products for those systems, and requiring that they do so may further exacerbate current resource constraints related to the evaluation and validation of products. In the absence of such a requirement, agencies seeking information assurance (measures that defend and protect information and information systems by ensuring their confidentiality, integrity, authenticity, availability, and utility) for their non-national security systems have other federal guidance and standards available to them. |
gao_GAO-10-147 | gao_GAO-10-147_0 | For example, the Defense Science Board Task Force reported that the commercial power grid is “brittle, increasingly centralized, capacity-strained, and largely unprotected from physical attack, with little stockpiling of critical hardware.” Similarly, according to the May 2007 Infrastructure Resiliency Guide for DOD’s Defense Critical Infrastructure Program, “the electric power network is a complex system of interconnected components that can fail and cause massive service disruptions.” Factors that contribute to the grid’s vulnerability include (1) increasing national demand for electricity; (2) an aging electrical power infrastructure; (3) increased reliance on automated control systems that are susceptible to cyberattacks; (4) the attractiveness of electrical power infrastructure as targets for physical or terrorist attacks; (5) long lead times (of several months to several years) for replacing high-voltage transformers—which cost several millions of dollars and are manufactured only in foreign countries—if attacked or destroyed; and (6) more frequent interruptions in fuel supplies to electricity-generating plants. On October 14, 2008, DOD designated 34 assets through DCIP as its most critical assets—assets of such extraordinary importance to DOD operations that according to DOD, their incapacitation or destruction would have a very serious, debilitating effect on the ability of the department to fulfill its missions. Other Risk Management Programs and Activities in DOD
In addition to using DCIP, DOD also identifies vulnerabilities and manages the risks of its most critical assets, including those related to electrical power, through other DOD mission assurance programs or activities, including those related to force protection; antiterrorism; information assurance; continuity of operations; chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-explosive defense; readiness; and installation preparedness. Department of Energy. DOD’s Most Critical Assets Are Vulnerable to Electrical Power Disruptions, but DOD Lacks Sufficient Information to Determine the Full Extent of Their Vulnerability
DOD’s Most Critical Assets Rely on Electrical Power and Depend Overwhelmingly on Commercial Electrical Power Grids as Their Primary Supply
DOD’s most critical assets and the missions they support are vulnerable to disruptions in electrical power supplies because of the extent of their reliance on electricity, particularly from the commercial electrical power grid. These vulnerability assessments—most of which the Defense Threat Reduction Agency has been conducting for DOD—include specific reviews of the critical assets’ supporting electrical power networks “to ensure that the distribution network at a given location and supporting offsite [electrical power] system has the capacity, redundancy, path diversity, security, survivability, and reliability to properly support a given mission.”
DOD Instruction 3020.45 requires DOD to conduct DCIP vulnerability assessments on all of its most critical assets at least once every 3 years. DOD Lacks Additional Guidance for Conducting DCIP Vulnerability Assessments on Its Non- DOD-Owned Most Critical Assets
DOD has not yet conducted or scheduled DCIP vulnerability assessments, including assessments of electrical power vulnerabilities, on any of its non-DOD-owned most critical assets—both those located in the United States and in foreign countries—and has not yet developed guidance addressing the unique challenges related to conducting the assessments on such assets. The Defense Infrastructure Sector Lead Agent for Public Works Has Not Completed Its Technical Analysis of Public Works Infrastructure (Including Electricity) Supporting DOD Critical Assets
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps)—which serves as DCIP’s DISLA for Public Works (including electricity)—has not completed preliminary technical analyses of DOD installation infrastructure. According to a Corps official, the Corps has been unable to begin these analyses because it has not received infrastructure-related information that it requires from the military services. Conclusions
DOD relies on commercial electrical power grids for secure, uninterrupted electrical power supplies to support its most critical assets—those whose incapacitation or destruction would have a very serious, debilitating effect on the department’s ability to fulfill its missions. However, according to the Defense Science Board Task Force on DOD Energy Strategy, the commercial electrical power grids have become increasingly fragile and vulnerable to extended power disruptions that could severely impact DOD’s most critical assets, their supporting infrastructure, and the missions they support, and disruptions to the electrical power grid have occurred. With more comprehensive knowledge of DOD’s most critical assets’ risks and vulnerabilities to electrical power disruptions and more effective coordination with electricity providers, DOD can better avoid compromising crucial DOD-wide missions during electrical power disruptions. This additional information may also improve DOD’s ability to effectively prioritize funding needed to address identified risks and vulnerabilities of its most critical assets to electrical power disruptions. Recommendations for Executive Action
To ensure that DOD has sufficient information to determine the full extent of the risks and vulnerabilities to electrical power disruptions of its most critical assets, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs, in collaboration with the Joint Staff’s Directorate for Antiterrorism and Homeland Defense, combatant commands, military services, and other Defense Critical Infrastructure Program stakeholders, as appropriate, to take the following five actions: Complete Defense Critical Infrastructure Program vulnerability assessments, as required by DOD Instruction 3020.45, on all of DOD’s most critical assets by October 2011. Develop additional guidelines, an implementation plan, and a schedule for conducting Defense Critical Infrastructure Program vulnerability assessments on all non-DOD-owned most critical assets located in the United States and abroad in conjunction with other federal agencies, as appropriate, that have a capability to implement the plan. Finalize guidelines currently being developed to coordinate Defense Critical Infrastructure Program assessment criteria and processes more systematically with those of other DOD mission assurance programs. Develop explicit Defense Critical Infrastructure Program guidelines for assessing the critical assets’ vulnerabilities to long-term electrical power disruptions. As we reported, as of June 2009, DOD had conducted DCIP assessments on 14 of the 34 most critical assets. 18. e. Single points of failure within commercial/DOD electrical power infrastructures. Is this asset located within the United States? 10. 31. 34. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) relies on a global network of defense critical infrastructure so essential that the incapacitation, exploitation, or destruction of an asset within this network could severely affect DOD's ability to deploy, support, and sustain its forces and operations worldwide and to implement its core missions, including those in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as its homeland defense and strategic missions. In October 2008, DOD identified its 34 most critical assets in this network--assets of such extraordinary importance to DOD operations that according to DOD, their incapacitation or destruction would have a very serious, debilitating effect on the ability of the department to fulfill its missions. Located both within the United States and abroad, DOD's most critical assets include both DOD- and non-DOD-owned assets. DOD relies overwhelmingly on commercial electrical power grids for secure, uninterrupted electrical power supplies to support its critical assets. DOD is the single largest consumer of energy in the United States, as we have noted in previous work. According to a 2008 report by the Defense Science Board Task Force on DOD's Energy Strategy, DOD has traditionally assumed that commercial electrical power grids are highly reliable and subject to only infrequent (generally weather-related), short-term disruptions. For backup supplies of electricity, DOD has depended primarily on diesel generators with short-term fuel supplies. In 2008, however, the Defense Science Board reported that "[c]ritical national security and homeland defense missions are at an unacceptably high risk of extended outage from failure of the [commercial electrical power] grid" upon which DOD overwhelmingly relies for its electrical power supplies. Specifically, the reliability and security of commercial electrical power grids are increasingly threatened by a convergence of challenges, including increased user demand, an aging electrical power infrastructure, increased reliance on automated control systems that are susceptible to cyberattack, the attractiveness of electrical power infrastructure for terrorist attacks, long lead times for replacing key electrical power equipment, and more frequent interruptions in fuel supplies to electricity-generating plants. As a result, commercial electrical power grids have become increasingly fragile and vulnerable to extended disruptions that could severely impact DOD's most critical assets, their supporting infrastructure, and ultimately the missions they support.
What GAO Found
DOD's most critical assets are vulnerable to disruptions in electrical power supplies, but DOD lacks sufficient information to determine the full extent of the risks and vulnerabilities these assets face. All 34 of these most critical assets require electricity continuously to support their military missions, and 31 of them rely on commercial power grids--which the Defense Science Board Task Force on DOD Energy Strategy has characterized as increasingly fragile and vulnerable--as their primary source of electricity. DOD Instruction 3020.45 requires DOD to conduct vulnerability assessments on all its most critical assets at least once every 3 years. Also, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs ASD(HD&ASA) has requested the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers--which serves as the Defense Critical Infrastructure Program's Defense Infrastructure Sector Lead Agent for Public Works--to conduct preliminary technical analyses of DOD installation infrastructure (including electrical power infrastructure) to support the teams conducting Defense Critical Infrastructure Program vulnerability assessments on the most critical assets. (1) As of June 2009, and according to ASD(HD&ASA) and the Joint Staff, DOD had conducted Defense Critical Infrastructure Program vulnerability assessments on 14 of the 34 most critical assets.18 DOD has not conducted the remaining assessments because it did not identify the most critical assets until October 2008. To comply with the instruction, DOD would have to complete Defense Critical Infrastructure Program vulnerability assessments on all most critical assets by October 2011. (2) DOD has neither conducted, nor developed additional guidelines and time frames for conducting, these vulnerability assessments on any of the five non-DOD-owned most critical assets located in the United States or foreign countries, citing security concerns and political sensitivities. (3) The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has not completed the preliminary technical analyses requested because it has not yet received infrastructure-related information regarding the networks, assets, points of service, and inter- and intradependencies related to electrical power systems that it requires from the military services. (4) Although DOD is in the process of developing guidelines, it does not systematically coordinate Defense Critical Infrastructure Program vulnerability assessment processes and guidelines with those of other, complementary DOD mission assurance programs--including force protection; antiterrorism; information assurance; continuity of operations; chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-explosive defense; readiness; and installation preparedness--that also examine electrical power vulnerabilities of the most critical assets, because DOD has not established specific guidelines for such systematic coordination. (5) The 10 Defense Critical Infrastructure Program vulnerability assessments we reviewed did not explicitly consider assets' vulnerabilities to longer-term (i.e., of up to several weeks' duration) electrical power disruptions19 on a mission-specific basis, as DOD has not developed explicit Defense Critical Infrastructure Program benchmarks for assessing electrical power vulnerabilities associated with longer-term electrical power disruptions. With more comprehensive knowledge of the most critical assets' risks and vulnerabilities to electrical power disruptions, DOD can better avoid compromising crucial DOD-wide missions during electrical power disruptions. This additional information may also improve DOD's ability to effectively prioritize funding needed to address identified risks and vulnerabilities of its most critical assets to electrical power disruptions. |
gao_GAO-03-520 | gao_GAO-03-520_0 | Navy’s Use of Human Systems Integration to Optimize Crew Size and Efforts to Establish Crew Size Goals Vary Considerably Across Ship Programs
Despite the potential of human systems integration to optimize crew size and reduce total ownership costs, the Navy’s use of human systems integration and goals to reduce crew size varied considerably across the four new ship acquisition programs we examined. Only the DD(X) destroyer program used human systems integration extensively to optimize crewing during the concept and technology development phase of the acquisition. In contrast, the JCC(X) command ship and LHA(R) amphibious assault ship programs had not emphasized human systems integration early in the acquisition process or developed a comprehensive human systems integration approach. The Navy’s crew size reduction goals for the four ships range from an aggressive goal of about 60 to 70 percent on the DD(X) destroyer, to a lack of any formal reduction goal on the JCC(X) command ship and the LHA(R) amphibious assault ship. Requirements for using human systems integration and crew size goals were included in the key acquisition documents to which program managers are held accountable. T-AKE Cargo Ship Program Used Human Systems Integration in Some Aspects of Ship Design, Expects Crew Size Reductions, but Did Not Establish Specific Crew Size Goals
In developing the T-AKE cargo ship, which is in procurement and is expected to become operational in 2005, elements of human systems integration were used to streamline intraship cargo handling and to refine the requirements for civilian mariners and active-duty personnel. The program also did not hold program managers accountable for reducing crew size below that of the legacy command ships. The mission need statement did not require the use of human systems integration. These factors are (1) neither DOD nor Navy acquisition policies establish specific requirements for using human systems integration, such as its timing and whether the approach should be addressed in the key acquisition documents; (2) funding challenges often result in decisions to defer human systems integration activities and use legacy subsystems when acquiring new ships to save near-term costs instead of investing in research and development to reduce costs over the long term; (3) DOD and Navy oversight of human systems integration activities is limited and the Naval Sea Systems Command’s role in certifying that ships delivered to the fleet have optimum crew sizes is unclear; and (4) the Navy lacks an effective process to change its long-standing culture and the extensive network of policies and procedures that have institutionalized current manning practices. According to the Navy’s human systems integration experts, labor-saving technology may add to the acquisition cost of a ship but may also reduce the operating and support costs incurred over the ship’s service life. Unless the Navy more consistently applies human systems integration early in the acquisition process and establishes meaningful goals for crew size reduction, the Navy may miss opportunities to lower total ownership costs for new ships, which are determined by decisions made early in the acquisition process. GAO’s Comment
1. | Why GAO Did This Study
The cost of a ship's crew is the single largest incurred over the ship's life cycle. One way to lower personnel costs, and thus the cost of ownership, is to use people only when it is cost-effective--a determination made with a systems engineering approach called human systems integration. GAO was asked to evaluate the Navy's progress in optimizing the crew size in four ships being developed and acquired: the DD(X) destroyer, T-AKE cargo ship, JCC(X) command ship, and LHA(R) amphibious assault ship. GAO assessed (1) the Navy's use of human systems integration principles and goals for reducing crew size, and (2) the factors that may impede the Navy's use of those principles.
What GAO Found
The Navy's use of human systems integration principles and crew size reduction goals varied significantly for the four ships GAO reviewed. Only the DD(X) destroyer program emphasized human systems integration early in the acquisition process and established an aggressive goal to reduce crew size. The Navy's goal is to cut personnel on the DD(X) by about 70 percent from that of the previous destroyer class--a reduction GAO estimated could eventually save about $18 billion over the life of a 32-ship class. The goal was included in key program documents to which program managers are held accountable. Although the Navy did not set specific crew reduction goals for the T-AKE cargo ship, it made some use of human systems integration principles and expects to require a somewhat smaller crew than similar legacy ships. The two other ships--the recently cancelled JCC(X) command ship and the LHA(R) amphibious assault ship--did not establish human systems integration plans early in the acquisition programs, and did not establish ambitious crew size reduction goals. Unless the Navy more consistently applies human systems integration early in the acquisition process and establishes meaningful goals for crew size reduction, the Navy may miss opportunities to lower total ownership costs for new ships, which are determined by decisions made early in the acquisition process. For example, the Navy has not clearly defined the human systems integration certification standards for new ships. Several factors may impede the Navy's consistent application of human systems integration principles and its use of innovations to optimize crew size: (1) DOD acquisition policies and discretionary Navy guidance that allow program managers latitude in optimizing crew size and using human systems integration, (2) funding challenges that encourage the use of legacy systems to save near-term costs and discourage research and investment in labor-saving technology that could reduce long-term costs, (3) unclear Navy organizational authority to require human systems integration's use in acquisition programs, and (4) the Navy's lack of cultural acceptance of new concepts to optimize crew size and its layers of personnel policies that require consensus from numerous stakeholders to revise. |
gao_GAO-05-737 | gao_GAO-05-737_0 | Security for Civilians and Contractors in Iraq Is Provided by a Mix of Military Forces, State Department Security Personnel, and Private Security Providers
U.S. civilian government agencies and reconstruction contractors have had to contract with private security providers because it is not part of the U.S. military’s stated mission to provide security to these organizations. More than half of the contractors awarded contracts in 2003 replaced their security providers. Contractors Rebuilding Iraq Obtained Their Own Security with Little Assistance from the Agencies
Contractors engaged in reconstruction efforts were generally required to provide for their own security, and they have done so by awarding subcontracts to private security providers. The contractors’ efforts to obtain suitable security providers met with mixed results, as many subsequently found that their security provider could not meet their needs. Contractor officials attributed this turnover to various factors, including the urgent need to obtain security, the increasing threat level, their lack of knowledge of potential sources and the security market, and the absence of useful agency guidance. For example, one agency official noted that his agency’s requests for proposals for security services are publicly available. Initially, coordination between the military and private security providers was informal. First, private security providers continue to report incidents between themselves and the military when approaching military convoys and checkpoints. U.S. Additionally, coordination was inconsistent. Some Coordination Problems Remain between Private Security Providers and the U.S. Military
While security providers, reconstruction contractors, and military representatives of the PCO believe that the ROC has improved coordination on the complex battle space in Iraq, both the private security providers and the military believe that several coordination issues remain to be resolved. Agencies Have Limited Capabilities to Assess the Cost Impact of Using Private Security Providers
Despite the significant role played by private security providers in enabling reconstruction efforts to proceed, neither the Department of State, DOD, nor USAID has complete data on the cost associated with using private security providers. On 15 reconstruction contracts we found that the cost to obtain private security providers and security- related equipment at the reconstruction contract level can be considerable, as it accounted for 15 percent or more on 8 of the 15 contracts we reviewed; on only 4 of those 8 contracts, however, did the agencies formally track security costs under a separate task order or contract line item. Agency and contractor officials acknowledged that security costs had diverted planned reconstruction resources and led to canceling or reducing the scope of certain reconstruction projects, though they also noted that other factors have affected reconstruction projects. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are included in appendix V.
Scope and Methodology
To determine the extent to which U.S. government agencies and contractors working in Iraq at the behest of the U.S. government have acquired security services from private security providers, we reviewed a wide array of documents to determine who was responsible for providing security to those types of organizations, including warning orders and fragmentary orders issued by the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), Combined Joint Task Force-7, Multi National Forces–Iraq, and Multi National Corps-Iraq to determine if any orders had been issued regarding providing security to U.S. government employees or contractors rebuilding Iraq; contracting documents such as statements of work, requests for proposals and contracts and contact modifications; Department of Defense (DOD) regulations and instructions that relate to the management of contractors during contingency operations; Departments of State and Defense memoranda of understanding regarding security and support; proposed guidance between the Department of State and the Department of Defense regarding contractor support; guidance to contractors prepared by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) regarding contractor operations in Iraq; and Department of State rules and regulations, including the Foreign Affairs Manual. | Why GAO Did This Study
The United States is spending billions of dollars to reconstruct Iraq while combating an insurgency that has targeted military and contractor personnel and the Iraqi people. This environment created a need for those rebuilding Iraq to obtain security services. GAO evaluated the extent to which (1) U.S. agencies and contractors acquired security services from private providers, (2) the U.S. military and private security providers developed a working relationship, and (3) U.S. agencies assessed the costs of using private security providers on reconstruction contracts.
What GAO Found
The civilian U.S. government agencies and reconstruction contractors in Iraq that GAO evaluated have obtained security services, such as personal and convoy security, from private security providers because providing security to them is not the U.S. military's stated mission. U.S. military forces provide security for those Department of Defense (DOD) civilians and contractors who directly support the combat mission. In Iraq, the Department of State and other federal agencies contract with several private security providers to protect their employees. Under their contracts, contractors rebuilding Iraq are responsible for providing their own security and have done so by awarding subcontracts to private security providers. As of December 2004, the agencies and contractors we reviewed had obligated more than $766 million for private security providers. The contractors' efforts to obtain suitable security providers met with mixed results, as they often found that their security provider could not meet their needs. Overall, GAO found that contractors replaced their initial security providers on more than half the 2003 contracts it reviewed. Contractor officials attributed this turnover to various factors, including the absence of useful agency guidance. While the U.S. military and private security providers have developed a cooperative working relationship, actions should be taken to improve its effectiveness. The relationship between the military and private security providers is one of coordination, not control. Prior to October 2004 coordination was informal, based on personal contacts, and was inconsistent. In October 2004 a Reconstruction Operations Center was opened to share intelligence and coordinate military-contractor interactions. While military and security providers agreed that coordination has improved, two problems remain. First, private security providers continue to report incidents between themselves and the military when approaching military convoys and checkpoints. Second, military units deploying to Iraq are not fully aware of the parties operating on the complex battle space in Iraq and what responsibility they have to those parties. Despite the significant role played by private security providers in enabling reconstruction efforts, neither the Department of State, nor DOD nor the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) have complete data on the costs of using private security providers. Even at the contract level, the agencies generally had only limited information readily available, even though agency and contractor officials acknowledged that these costs had diverted a considerable amount of reconstruction resources and led to canceling or reducing the scope of some projects. For example, in March 2005, two task orders for reconstruction worth nearly $15 million were cancelled to help pay for security at a power plant. GAO found that the cost to obtain private security providers and security-related equipment accounted for more than 15 percent of contract costs on 8 of the 15 reconstruction contracts it reviewed. |
gao_GAO-11-108 | gao_GAO-11-108_0 | Key Agencies Involved in National Security Issues Offer a Range of Professional Development Activities Intended to Foster Interagency Collaboration
We identified 225 professional development activities intended to improve participants’ abilities to collaborate across organizational lines. These ranged from 10-month joint professional military education programs and year-long rotations to 30-minute online courses. We found some variation within the different types of activities, mostly related to provider, mode of delivery, or participation levels. DOD provided most of the exercise programs and all of the JPME programs. DOD and State provided the majority of interagency rotational programs and all of the leadership development programs that met our criteria. DHS, DOD, and State Provided Majority of Short- Term Training Courses and DHS Online Courses Had Highest Participation Levels of All Training Activities
According to our analysis, DHS, DOD, and State provided the majority of the 101 short-term training courses that met our criteria. State and most of the other agencies providing classroom courses did track interagency participation. Professional Development Activities Provide Opportunities to Build Foundational Knowledge, Skills, and Networks That Are Intended to Improve Interagency Collaboration
Based on our analysis, the relevant professional development activities were intended to improve the ability of national security personnel to collaborate across agency lines by focusing on three general approaches: providing foundational knowledge, developing skills, and providing networking opportunities. According to human capital and training officials we interviewed at several agencies, the level of interagency participation may affect how a given professional development activity can improve its participants’ abilities to collaborate. Although agencies could not provide participation data in every instance, the data we were able to obtain indicated that overall, interagency participation was lower in activities that required a longer time commitment, such as rotations and full-time joint professional military education. This raises questions about barriers to participation and other factors that may influence the success of such professional development activities, which we will explore in a subsequent review. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to identify: training and other professional development activities intended to improve the abilities of personnel from key agencies involved in national security issues to collaborate across organizational lines and how these activities were intended to improve participants’ collaboration abilities. Upon reviewing the data the agencies provided, we found that activities varied widely across dimensions such as length and learning mode, and decided to group the activities in a way that would allow us to analyze their characteristics and make appropriate comparisons. Based on our analysis, we determined that these activities generally employed one or more of the following approaches: building foundational knowledge of the national security arena such as other agencies’ roles, responsibilities, authorities or capabilities; developing skills for interagency collaboration, such as how to plan, lead, and execute interagency efforts; or establishing networks among national security professionals. | Why GAO Did This Study
Agencies must engage in a whole-of-government approach to protect the nation and its interests from diverse threats such as terrorism and infectious diseases. However, GAO has reported that gaps in national security staff knowledge and skills pose a barrier to the interagency collaboration needed to address these threats. Training and other professional development activities could help bridge those gaps. GAO was asked to identify: (1) training and other professional development activities intended to improve the ability of key national security agencies' personnel to collaborate across organizational lines and (2) how these activities were intended to improve participants' collaboration abilities. To address these objectives, GAO asked nine key agencies involved in national security issues to submit information on professional development activities that were explicitly intended to build staff knowledge or skills for improving interagency collaboration. In addition, GAO gathered and analyzed other information such as target audience, participation levels, and participating agencies. GAO also interviewed responsible human capital and training officials. GAO will explore how interagency participation and other factors may influence the success of these activities in a subsequent review.
What GAO Found
GAO identified 225 professional development activities intended to improve participants' ability to collaborate across agency lines. These ranged from ten- month joint professional military education programs and year-long rotations to 30-minute online training courses. Because these activities varied widely across dimensions such as length and learning mode, the activities were grouped to allow for appropriate analysis and comparisons of their characteristics. Overall, we found that DOD, State, and DHS provided most of the professional development activities that met our criteria. We found some variation within the different types of activities, mostly related to provider, mode of delivery, or participation levels. DHS, DOD, and State provided the majority of training activities, which primarily consisted of short-term, online, or classroom courses. DOD provided most of the exercise programs and all of the JPME programs. DOD and State provided the majority of interagency rotational programs and all of the leadership development programs that met our criteria. Although agencies could not provide participation data in every instance, the data obtained indicated that overall, interagency participation was lower in activities that required a longer time commitment, such as rotations and full-time joint professional military education. Analysis of the activities GAO identified showed that they are intended to provide opportunities to (1) build common foundational knowledge of the national security arena; (2) develop specific skills, such as how to plan, lead, and execute interagency efforts; and (3) establish networks among personnel from national security agencies that could lead to improved interagency collaboration. According to human capital and training officials at several agencies, the level of interagency participation may affect how a given professional development activity can improve its participants' ability to collaborate. GAO does not have any recommendations in this report. Technical comments from the agencies reviewed were incorporated where appropriate. |
gao_HEHS-96-8 | gao_HEHS-96-8_0 | The Board may order a variety of remedies, including requiring the firm to reinstate unlawfully fired workers or restore wages and benefits to the bargaining unit. II.4.) Nearly 1,000 Individual Workers Directly Affected by Violations and Remedies
Nearly 1,000 individual workers and thousands of additional workers represented in 12 bargaining units were directly affected by violations of the act in these 88 cases. II.6.) We considered a remedy to be comprehensive if the firm received a broad cease and desist order or a Gissel bargaining order, or was ordered to cease and desist 10 or more types of unlawful actions against workers. Took actions affecting the job status of more than 20 workers. Had a history of labor law violations. NLRB’s enforcement of the act could be enhanced by collecting judgments against violators from federal contract awards. More specifically, we were asked to identify characteristics associated with (1) these federal contractors and (2) their NLRA violations. In addition, we were asked to identify ways to improve compliance of federal contractors with NLRA. Figure II.5: Percent of Contract Dollars to Federal Contractors That Violated NLRA Compared With All Federal Contractors, by Agency (Fiscal Year 1993)
Key Federal Contract and Violation Information for All 80 Firms With Labor Violations
This appendix provides information on the 80 firms that have both NLRA violations and federal contracts. directed, controlled, circulated, and assisted in the circulation of a promised workers wage increases, bonuses, and other benefits if the workers would decertify the union; threatened workers with the loss of wage increases, bonuses, and other benefits if the workers did not decertify the union; while engaged in the training of new workers, told these workers that the union could do no more for them than the employer and thus discouraged support for the union and encouraged bypassing the union and dealing directly with the company; surveyed and interrogated workers concerning their union sympathies and preferences by observing them as they were solicited by employer’s agent for their signatures on a decertification petition; failed and refused to bargain with the union as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of its workers in the above-noted unit; withdrew recognition of the union as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of its workers; unilaterally implemented the following changes in wages and working conditions: instituting a performance bonus of between 2 and 3-1/2 percent; implementing a wage increase; and increasing shift premiums; unilaterally implemented a new attendance policy and a new service award and attendance award program; refused to furnish the union with information which it requested; and interfered with workers discussing union business on nonwork time in nonwork areas. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the extent to which federal contractors violate the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), focusing on: (1) the characteristics associated with these NLRA violators; and (2) ways to improve federal contractors' compliance with NLRA.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) in 1993, six firms held 90 percent of the federal contracts awarded to NLRA violators; (2) the cases brought to the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) mainly involved workers' rights, collective bargaining, and discrimination violations; (3) NLRB remedies mainly included the reinstatement of unlawfully fired workers, restoration of workers' job status, payment of back wages or benefits, collective bargaining orders, and orders to cease threatening workers with job loss; (4) the NLRB remedies affected nearly 1,000 individual workers and thousands of additional workers represented by 12 bargaining units; (5) most of the NLRA violators were Departments of Defense and Energy contractors; (6) 15 of the 80 violators had to reinstate or restore more than 20 individuals each, NLRB cease and desist orders issued against them, or a history of NLRA violations; and (7) NLRB could enhance its enforcement of NLRA by collecting judgments against violators from their federal contract awards and increasing coordination with the General Services Administration (GSA) to identify such violators. |
gao_GAO-06-520 | gao_GAO-06-520_0 | Advocates of specialty hospitals contend that the focused mission and dedicated resources of specialty hospitals enable them to offer reduced treatment costs, improved care quality, and enhanced amenities for patients compared with what general hospitals are able to provide. Moreover, some advocates maintain that competition from specialty hospitals can prompt general hospitals to implement efficiency, quality, and amenity improvements, thus favorably affecting the overall health care delivery system. We also reported that physicians were owners or investors in the majority of specialty hospitals we identified. Presence of Specialty Hospitals Had Little Effect on the Number or Type of Operational and Clinical Service Changes Reported by General Hospitals
Nearly all general hospitals responding to our survey reported making operational and clinical service changes to remain competitive in markets they viewed as increasingly competitive; however, there was little evidence to suggest that the absence or presence of specialty hospitals had much of an effect on the number or types of changes general hospitals reported implementing between 2000 and 2005. General hospitals responding to our survey reported facing increasing competition both from other general hospitals and from limited-service facilities—a category that includes specialty hospitals, ambulatory surgical centers, and imaging centers. General Hospitals Reported Implementing a Variety of Operational and Clinical Service Changes from 2000 through 2005
Among the 72 potential operational changes survey respondents could have indicated that they made and the 34 potential clinical services respondents could have indicated that they added, expanded, reduced, or eliminated on our survey, general hospitals reported implementing an average of 30 changes (22 operational changes and 8 clinical service changes) from 2000 through 2005. The majority of hospitals added or expanded imaging/radiology services (73 percent) and cardiology services (57 percent). If there was a specialty hospital in its regional market, an urban general hospital was more likely to have reported making three of the seven operational changes that significantly differed between general hospitals in markets with and without specialty hospitals. That is, on average, general hospitals in markets with specialty hospitals did not make a substantially different number of changes or different types of changes relative to general hospitals in markets without specialty hospitals. In written comments on a draft of this report, CMS stated that our study, by providing quantitative data on the market effect of specialty hospitals, was extremely helpful and that CMS would use the information as the agency developed its DRA-mandated report on physician investment in specialty hospitals. V.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
This appendix provides information on the key aspects of our analysis of the competitive response of general hospitals to specialty hospitals. Second, it discusses the survey used to collect data from a sample of general hospitals and the process of fielding the survey. | Why GAO Did This Study
There has been much debate about specialty hospitals--short-term acute care hospitals with physician owners or investors that primarily treat patients who have specific medical conditions or need surgical procedures--and the competitive effects they may have on general hospitals. Advocates of specialty hospitals contend that competition from these physician-owned facilities can prompt general hospitals to implement efficiency, quality, and amenity improvements, thus favorably affecting the overall health care delivery system. Critics of specialty hospitals are concerned that general hospitals may respond to such competition by making changes that do not necessarily increase efficiency or benefit patients or communities, for example, by adding services already available in the community. The appropriateness of physicians' financial interests in specialty hospitals has also been questioned. GAO was asked to provide information on the competitive response of general hospitals to specialty hospitals. GAO surveyed approximately 600 general hospitals in markets with and without specialty hospitals to provide information on the extent to which these two groups of general hospitals reported implementing operational and clinical service changes to remain competitive. GAO received responses from 401 general hospitals.
What GAO Found
Nearly all general hospitals responding to GAO's survey reported making operational and clinical service changes to remain competitive in what they viewed as increasingly competitive healthcare markets; however, there was little evidence to suggest that general hospitals made substantially more or fewer changes or different types of changes if some of their competition came from a specialty hospital. While the majority of survey respondents indicated that competition from other general hospitals had increased, a larger proportion of respondents--91 percent of urban general hospitals and 74 percent of rural general hospitals--reported increases in competition from limited service facilities, a category that includes approximately 100 specialty hospitals across the nation and thousands of ambulatory surgical centers and imaging centers. To enhance their ability to compete, general hospitals reported making an average of 22 operational changes, such as introducing a formal process for evaluating efforts to improve quality and reduce costs, and 8 clinical service changes, such as adding or expanding cardiology services, from 2000 through 2005. Although specialty hospital advocates have hypothesized that the entrance of a specialty hospital into a market encourages the area's existing general hospitals to adopt changes that make them more efficient and better able to compete, the survey responses largely did not support this view. There were no substantial differences in the average number of operational and clinical service changes made by general hospitals in markets with and without specialty hospitals and, for the vast majority of the potential changes included on GAO's survey, there was no statistical difference between the two groups of hospitals in terms of the specific changes they reported implementing. GAO received comments on a draft of this report from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS). In its comments, CMS stated that GAO's study, by providing quantitative data on the market effect of specialty hospitals, was extremely helpful. |
gao_GAO-05-372 | gao_GAO-05-372_0 | Volume of Prescription Drug Imports Is Unknown but Believed to Be Substantial, and the Safety of These Drug Imports Is Not Assured
CBP and FDA do not systematically collect data on the volume of prescription drugs and controlled substances they encounter at the mail and carrier facilities. On the basis of their own observations and limited information they obtained at selected mail and carrier facilities, CBP and FDA officials believe the volume of prescription drug importation into the United States is substantial and increasing. FDA officials said that they cannot assure the public of the safety and quality of drugs purchased from foreign sources that are largely outside the U.S. regulatory system. For example, a CBP official recently testified that the agency did not have data on the total number of packages containing imported controlled substances. While the new procedures may encourage uniform practices at the mail facilities, packages that contain potentially prohibited prescription drugs continue to be released to the addressee. The procedures outline how FDA personnel are to prioritize packages for inspection, inspect the packages, and make admissibility determinations. Factors beyond Inspection and Interdiction Complicate Efforts to Enforce the Prohibitions on Personal Importation of Prescription Drugs
We identified three factors beyond inspection and interdiction that have complicated federal efforts to enforce the prohibitions on prescription drugs imported for personal use: (1) the volume of importation has strained limited federal resources; (2) Internet pharmacies, particularly foreign-based sites, can operate outside of the U.S. regulatory system for noncontrolled and controlled prescription drugs and can evade federal law enforcement actions; and (3) current law requires that FDA notify addressees that their packages have been detained because they appear unapproved for import and give them the opportunity to provide admissibility evidence regarding their imported items. As of July 2005, according to FDA officials and an HHS official, the Secretary had not responded with a specific legislative proposal to change FDA’s notification requirement. Federal Efforts to Coordinate Law Enforcement Activities Could Benefit from a Strategic Framework
Federal agencies have been taking steps to address Internet sales of prescription drugs since 1999, but these efforts have not positioned them to successfully prevent the influx of prescription drugs that are being imported through foreign pharmacies. CBP has recently organized a task force to coordinate federal efforts related to prescription drugs imported for personal use. This task force appears to be a step in the right direction. They said that their proposal has yet to be finalized with CBP. CBP and other agencies have taken a step in the right direction by establishing a task force designed to address many of the challenges discussed in this report. In addition to the broader issues being addressed by the task force, FDA has said it faces a significant challenge handling the substantial volume of prescription drugs imported for personal use entering international mail facilities. At a minimum, this strategic framework should include establishment of an approach for estimating the scope of the problem, such as the volume of drugs entering the country through mail and carrier facilities; establishment of objectives, milestones, and performance measures and a methodology to gauge results; determination of the resources and investments needed to address the flow of prescription drugs illegally imported for personal use and where resources and investments should be targeted; and an evaluation component to assess progress, identify barriers to achieving goals, and suggest modifications. (2) What procedures and practices are used at selected facilities to inspect and interdict prescription drugs unapproved for import? We performed our work at the Department of Homeland Security’s U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the Department of Health and Human Services’ (HHS) Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the Department of Justice’s Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the U.S. | Why GAO Did This Study
Consumers can be violating the law and possibly risking their health by purchasing imported prescription drugs over the Internet. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), in the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), work with other federal agencies at international mail and express carrier facilities to inspect for and interdict prescription drugs illegally imported for personal use. This report addresses (1) available data about the volume and safety of personal prescription drug imports, (2) the procedures and practices used to inspect and interdict prescription drugs unapproved for import, (3) factors affecting federal efforts to enforce the laws governing prescription drugs imported for personal use, and (4) efforts federal agencies have taken to coordinate enforcement efforts.
What GAO Found
The information currently available on the safety of illegally imported prescription drugs is very limited, and neither CBP nor FDA systematically collects data on the volume of these imports. Nevertheless, on the basis of their own observations and limited information they collected at some mail and carrier facilities, both CBP and FDA officials said that the volume of prescription drugs imported into the United States is substantial and increasing. FDA officials said that they cannot assure the public of the safety of drugs purchased from foreign sources outside the U.S. regulatory system. FDA has issued new procedures to standardize practices for selecting packages for inspection and making admissibility determinations. While these procedures may encourage uniform practices across mail facilities, packages containing prescription drugs continue to be released to the addressees. CBP has also implemented new procedures to interdict and destroy certain imported controlled substances, such as Valium. CBP officials said the new process is designed to improve their ability to quickly handle packages containing these drugs, but they did not know if the policy had affected overall volume because packages may not always be detected. We identified three factors that have complicated federal enforcement of laws prohibiting the personal importation of prescription drugs. First, volume has strained limited federal resources at the mail facilities. Second, Internet pharmacies can operate outside the U.S. regulatory system and evade federal law enforcement actions. Third, current law requires FDA to give addressees of packages containing unapproved imported drugs notice and the opportunity to provide evidence of admissibility regarding their imported items. FDA and HHS have testified before Congress that this process placed a burden on limited resources. In May 2001, FDA proposed to the HHS Secretary that this legal requirement be eliminated, but according to FDA and HHS officials, as of July 2005, the Secretary had not responded with a proposal. FDA officials stated that any legislative change might require consideration of such issues as whether to forgo an individual's opportunity to provide evidence of the admissibility of the drug ordered. Prior federal task forces and working groups had taken steps to deal with Internet sales of prescription drugs since 1999, but these efforts did not position federal agencies to successfully address the influx of these drugs imported from foreign sources. Recently, CBP has organized a task force to coordinate federal agencies' activities to enforce the laws prohibiting the personal importation of prescription drugs. The task force's efforts appear to be steps in the right direction, but they could be enhanced by establishing a strategic framework to define the scope of the problem at mail and carrier facilities, determine resource needs, establish performance measures, and evaluate progress. Absent this framework, it will be difficult to oversee task force efforts; hold agencies accountable; and ensure ongoing, focused attention to the enforcement of the relevant laws. |
gao_GAO-02-116 | gao_GAO-02-116_0 | Increase in Fraud and Abuse Debt Is the Primary Reason for Reported Growth in CMP Debt
The primary reason for the growth of CMS’ CMP receivables was the expansion of fraud and abuse detection activities from fiscal years 1995 through 1997 that significantly increased fraud and abuse debts in fiscal year 1997. However, our work identified that year- end CMP receivables balances for fiscal year 1997 through fiscal year 1999, differed by tens of millions of dollars between HHS’ accountability report and CMS’ audited financial statements. However, incomplete and unreliable CMP information limited us from determining the overall adequacy of the CMP debt collection policies and procedures. We found that debt collection policies and procedures were followed for 11 of the 12 selected delinquent debts. We could not determine whether DOJ followed its debt collection policies and procedures for the remaining selected debt because DOJ was unable to locate supporting documentation. As discussed in this report, as of September 30, 2000, the CMP receivables balance in the general ledger and the detailed subsidiary systems differed by a net of about $22 million. Background
• As of September 30, 2000, the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) reported that CMS’ CMP receivables totaled about $260 million. The Civil Division uses the Debt Collection System. CMP Receivables Have Similar Financial Accountability and Reporting Issues as Non-CMP Receivables
• Our analysis of CMS’ CMP receivables data revealed similar financial
accountability and reporting issues as those identified for non-CMP receivables by CMS’ external financial statement auditors. 2. | Why GAO Did This Study
This report focuses on the debt collection processes and procedures used by the Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS).
What GAO Found
The primary reason for the growth of CMS' civil monetary penalties (CMP) receivables was the expansion of fraud and abuse detection activities from fiscal year 1995 through fiscal year 1997 that significantly increased reported fraud and abuse debts in fiscal year 1997. GAO's analysis of CMS' CMP receivable data revealed similar financial accountability and reporting issues as those identified for non-CMP receivables by CMS' external financial statement auditors. GAO identified (1) unreconciled differences of tens of millions of dollars in the CMP receivables balances reported by HHS and CMS for fiscal years 1997 through 1999 and (2) an unreconciled net difference of about $22 million between the CMP receivables balance in CMS' general ledger and the detailed subsidiary systems as of September 30, 2000. The data reliability issue prevented GAO from determining the overall adequacy of the CMP debt collection policies and procedures. However, GAO's limited tests showed that debt collection policies and procedures were followed for 11 of the 12 selected delinquent debts. GAO could not determine whether debt collection policies and procedures were followed for the 12th selected debt because supporting documentation was unavailable. |
gao_T-RCED-99-83 | gao_T-RCED-99-83_0 | Work Remains to Be Done Regarding the Justification and the Affordability of the Deepwater Replacement Project
In October 1998, we issued a report that raised concerns about the justification and the affordability of the Deepwater Replacement Project. We found that the Coast Guard lacked support for its estimates of the resource hours needed for its deepwater ships and aircraft to perform required missions. The Coast Guard agreed with our recommendation and has made progress in developing data on the condition of its ships and aircraft; however, other data on its roles and missions and any shortfalls in its performance capabilities will not be available until later this year or early next year. Without basic data on the needs of its deepwater ships and aircraft, there is increased risk that the contractors could develop alternatives or designs that would not be the most cost-effective to meet the Coast Guard’s needs for the Deepwater Project. By fiscal year 2002, when capital spending for the project could reach as much as $500 million a year, the project could consume 97 percent of the Coast Guard’s total projected capital budget, leaving little for other capital projects and expenditures. Second, they said that the agency’s independent evaluation group will analyze various funding alternatives to determine what impact they would have on the project. However, until the Coast Guard develops its revised mission analysis in early 2000 and the contractors provide their cost estimates for various alternatives, it will not be known whether the affordability issue has been adequately addressed. A Coast Guard study estimates that between $257 million and $297 million in upgrades and maintenance could extend the service lives of current deepwater aircraft by 11 to 28 years longer than the Coast Guard’s initial estimate of when these aircraft would need to be phased out.However, the estimated cost to upgrade does not include the increased cost of operating older aircraft. The Coast Guard also plans to spend $29.3 million to purchase new sensors and communications systems for its cutters and patrol boats, and it plans to reactivate two ships for $20 million to provide command and control and logistics support for its drug-fighting efforts. The Deepwater Project and the Expansion of Anti-Drug Efforts Heighten the Challenges for Addressing Budget Constraints
While the Coast Guard received a sizable emergency appropriation for fiscal year 1999, which was largely to expand its anti-drug efforts, the agency will need additional funding to sustain these higher operating levels in future years. As we pointed out in our 1997 report, the agency may have to look beyond efficiency measures for cost-cutting options. Driven largely by the potential magnitude and the impact of the Deepwater Project on future budgets, the administration has renewed efforts to evaluate the roles and the missions of the Coast Guard and to push for additional user fees. The Coast Guard plans to have four more boats in operation by the end of fiscal year 2000. The Coast Guard plans to obligate all funds and complete the testing this fiscal year. This equipment will improve the Coast Guard’s ability to detect and classify targets at sea. Additional copies are $2 each. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the Coast Guard's budgets for fiscal years 1999 and 2000, focusing on the: (1) Coast Guard's progress in justifying the Deepwater Replacement Project and addressing GAO's concerns about its affordability; (2) Coast Guard's plans for spending its fiscal year (FY) 1999 emergency funds; and (3) budget strategies the agency may have to consider in the future to address continuing budget constraints.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) while the Coast Guard has made progress in addressing GAO's concerns about the justification and the affordability of the Deepwater Project, additional work is needed; (2) the Coast Guard had not sufficiently justified the project in that it lacked accurate and complete information on the condition and the performance shortcomings of its ships and aircraft and the resource hours needed to fulfill its missions; (3) the Coast Guard and its contractors are currently developing this information, but some of it will not be available until later this year; (4) in the meantime, contractors working on the conceptual design for the project will be assessing alternatives without the benefit of current data on the performance shortcomings of the agency's ships and aircraft and the resource hours needed to fulfill its missions; (5) the Coast Guard plans to have performance data on its current ships and aircraft by April 1999, and the agency plans to provide that information to contractors at that time; (6) GAO reported that if the cost of the Deepwater Project approaches the agency's planning estimate of $500 million dollars annually, it would consume more than the agency now spends for all capital projects and leave little funding for other critical capital needs; (7) Coast Guard officials said that competition among contractors would cut costs and more closely align the potential cost of the project with probable funding levels; (8) however, until the Coast Guard develops its new justification for the Deepwater Project in early 2000 and contractors provide their cost estimates for various alternatives, neither GAO nor the Coast Guard can tell whether the affordability issue has been adequately addressed; (9) by the end of FY 1999, the Coast Guard plans to spend about 78 percent of the $377 million in emergency funds that it received, primarily to expand its anti-drug efforts; (10) as directed by Congress, it has begun buying more patrol boats, reactivating its surveillance aircraft and ships, and obtaining additional equipment to improve its ability to detect drug smugglers and to coordinate its anti-drug activities; (11) in the future, the agency might have to develop different budget strategies and approaches to live within its budget; (12) typically, the Coast Guard has adopted a budget strategy that relies heavily on cost-cutting initiatives to improve efficiency; and (13) GAO's work has shown that additional cost-cutting measures to improve efficiency are possible, and the Coast Guard should renew its efforts in this area. |
gao_GAO-04-558T | gao_GAO-04-558T_0 | The legislation also required that DOD provide Congress in 2004, as part of its budget justification documents, a 20-year force structure plan, a worldwide infrastructure inventory, a description of the infrastructure necessary to support the force structure plan, a discussion of categories of excess infrastructure and infrastructure capacity, an economic analysis of the effect of BRAC on reducing excess infrastructure, and a certification that there is a need for BRAC in 2005 and that annual net savings will be realized by each military department not later than fiscal year 2011. The 2002 legislation also required the Secretary of Defense to publish in the Federal Register the selection criteria proposed for use in the BRAC 2005 round and to provide an opportunity for public comment. With this legislation, a base realignment and closure round was initiated in 1988. Our work in examining lessons learned from prior BRAC rounds found general agreement that the prior legislation and the framework it outlined served the process well, and general agreement that it should provide a useful framework for a future round. GAO Has Had a Long- standing Role in the BRAC Process
GAO has played a long-standing role in the BRAC process. To make informed and timely assessments, we have consistently operated in a real-time setting since the 1991 BRAC round and have had access to significant portions of the process as it has evolved, thus affording the department an opportunity to address any concerns we raised on a timely basis. By mandate, our role in the BRAC 2005 round remains the same, and we have been observing the process since DOD began work on the 2005 round. This has greatly facilitated our ability to monitor the process as it was unfolding and has provided us with opportunities to address issues and potential problem areas during the process. Observations on Key Issues DOD Is Required to Report on in Preparation for the 2005 Round
The legislation authorizing a BRAC round in 2005 also requires that DOD provide information on a number of BRAC-related issues in 2004, and that GAO report to Congress not later than 60 days after the department submits this information to Congress. Since DOD has published its selection criteria for the 2005 round, I can provide you with some observations in that area. Additionally, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 required DOD to consider surge requirements in the 2005 BRAC process. DOD decided to address our concerns through clarifying guidance. DOD officials indicated that they would build on the approach they used in their 1998 report to estimate excess base capacity and address other BRAC issues. That methodology, while providing an indication of excess capacity, has a number of limitations that make it difficult to be precise when trying to project a total amount of excess capacity across DOD. A complete assessment of capacity and opportunities to reduce it must await the completion of DOD’s ongoing official analyses under BRAC 2005. DOD financial data suggest that, assuming conditions similar to those of the 1993 and 1995 rounds, annual net savings for each of the military departments for the 2005 round could be achieved by 2011—that is, by 2011 savings could exceed closure-related costs for that year. While we believe that the potential exists for significant savings to result from the 2005 BRAC round, we are not in a position to say conclusively at this point to what extent DOD will realize annual net savings by 2011. In addition to the imprecision of DOD’s data, there simply are too many unknowns at this time, such as the specific timing of individual closure or realignment actions that affect savings estimates and the implementation costs that may be required. | Why GAO Did This Study
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 authorized an additional Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) round in 2005. The legislation requires the Department of Defense (DOD) to provide Congress in early 2004 with a report that addresses excess infrastructure and certifies that an additional BRAC round is needed and that annual net savings will be realized by each military department not later than fiscal year 2011. GAO is required to assess this information as well as the selection criteria for the 2005 round and report to Congress within 60 days of DOD's submission. The legislation also retains the requirement for GAO to assess the BRAC 2005 decisionmaking process and resulting recommendations. This testimony addresses (1) the BRAC process from a historical perspective, (2) GAO's role in the process, and (3) GAO's initial observations on key issues DOD is required to address in preparation for the 2005 round. Because DOD had not submitted its required 2004 report at the time we completed this statement, this testimony relies on our prior work that addressed issues associated with excess capacity and BRAC savings.
What GAO Found
GAO's work in examining lessons learned from prior BRAC rounds found that the prior legislation and the framework it outlined served the process well, and that it should provide a useful framework for a future round. Furthermore, the legislation and its implementation provided for checks and balances to ensure the integrity of the process. GAO has played a long-standing role as an independent and objective observer of the BRAC process. GAO has operated in a real-time setting and has had access to significant portions of the process as it has evolved, thus affording DOD an early opportunity to address any concerns GAO might identify. GAO's role in the 2005 round remains the same, and GAO has been observing the process since DOD began work on the 2005 round. Timely access to DOD data is key to fulfilling GAO's role. GAO's initial observations on key issues DOD is required to address in its 2004 report are as follows. The selection criteria for the 2005 round are basically sound and provide a good framework for assessing alternatives. Nevertheless, GAO provided DOD with comments on the draft criteria that focused on the need for clarification of how DOD intends to consider total costs to DOD and other federal agencies and environmental costs in its analyses. The department has indicated that it would be issuing clarifying guidance. DOD plans to estimate its excess capacity using a methodology that it used in 1998 for similar purposes. While this methodology provides a rough indication of excess capacity for selected functional areas, it has a number of limitations that create imprecision when trying to project a total amount of excess capacity across DOD. A more complete assessment of capacity and the potential to reduce it must await the results of the current BRAC analyses being conducted by DOD during the 2005 round. DOD financial data suggest that, assuming conditions similar to those in the 1993 and 1995 BRAC rounds, each military department could achieve annual net savings by 2011. While we believe that the potential exists for significant savings to result from the 2005 round, there are simply too many unknowns at this time to say conclusively to what extent annual net savings will be realized by 2011. For example, in 2005 DOD is placing increased emphasis on jointness and transformation and is likely to use BRAC to incorporate any force redeployments from overseas locations that may result from ongoing overseas basing reassessments. This suggests a need for caution in projecting the timing and amount of savings from a new BRAC round. |
gao_GAO-15-155 | gao_GAO-15-155_0 | DHS Performance Program Helps Fusion Centers Assess Capabilities and Address Gaps, and DHS Has Plans to Further Evaluate Capabilities through Exercises
Fusion Center Assessment Process Is Systematically Assessing Capabilities and Monitoring Progress; Most Centers Are Achieving Baseline Capabilities
As the cornerstone of DHS’s efforts to evaluate how fusion centers are meeting designated standards for the four critical capabilities and four enabling capabilities, the fusion center annual assessment process is serving to assess and monitor capability development for both individual fusion centers and the National Network. A center may report the successful completion of such activities and improve its overall assessment scores, but the scores do not reflect if the center effectively administered these activities or if they resulted in any considerable impact. Federal Agencies Have Defined Fusion Center Expectations and Developed Measures to Assess Homeland Security Contributions
Federal Agencies Have Developed a Combination of High-Level Strategic Guidance and Specific Capability Expectations for Fusion Centers
Over the past decade, Congress has enacted laws and federal agencies have issued guidance and related documents that help to define expectations for fusion centers, which have evolved from high-level guidance focused on terrorism-related information sharing to more specific guidance that defines expectations for fusion center capabilities, operations, and functions. DHS Has Developed New Performance Measures to Assess Fusion Center Contributions to Homeland Security
In coordination with fusion centers and federal partners, DHS has developed 45 performance measures designed to capture standardized data to assess the impact and contribution of fusion centers on information sharing and homeland security. Federal Agencies Reported Deploying 288 Personnel to Fusion Centers in 2013 and Generally Defined Roles and Responsibilities
Federal Agencies Reported Deploying 288 Personnel to Fusion Centers in 2013
SLPO produces an annual Fusion Center Federal Cost Inventory report that shows the number of federal personnel agencies report that they deployed to fusion centers—either full- or part- time—as well as the non- personnel support agencies provided. These factors include the extent to which the fusion center mission aligns with the FBI’s mission, particularly related to counterterrorism—for example, both organizations share information on terrorism-related activities;
FBI management participates in the fusion center governance structure; the fusion center operates in an accredited secure work environment and has a process to receive, handle, store, and disseminate classified information; the fusion center is capable of receiving, analyzing, disseminating, and gathering information that contributes to the understanding of the current threat environment; and the fusion center immediately shares all emerging, terrorism-related information with the FBI, such as suspicious activity reports. ICE headquarters officials did not plan to develop additional guidance to help govern field office personnel deployments. DHS also issued the Implementation Guidance for the Federal Resource Allocation Criteria Policy in September 2014. According to the document, this guidance is designed to assist federal agencies in planning and tracking resource deployments. Grant Reforms Are Helping DHS Track Fusion Center Projects, but DHS Cannot Accurately Account for Total Funding Provided to Centers
Grant Reforms Are Helping DHS Ensure That Requests for Federal Funding to Support Fusion Centers Are Aligned with Expected Capabilities
In fiscal year 2011, FEMA initiated a requirement that each fusion center complete DHS’s annual baseline capabilities assessment to be eligible for HSGP funding, and federal officials began reviewing the grant requests to ensure that proposed projects target the achievement or sustainment of identified capabilities. To address this issue, FEMA is planning additional efforts to help states better categorize fusion center projects and improve the reliability of grant reporting. Development of a specific mechanism to ensure that states act in accordance with the forthcoming guidance could provide FEMA reasonable assurance that fusion center projects are properly classified and accurately account for total grant funding provided to centers. As these centers continue to mature, it remains important for DHS to identify the results that centers are achieving and how federal agencies can help support and leverage these centers. DHS grant funding also remains an important component of federal support to fusion centers, but to date, FEMA has not been able to accurately account for and report on the amount of funds it has provided to centers. Recommendation for Executive Action
To help provide reasonable assurance that data states report on the amount of federal grant funding used to support fusion centers is reliable, we recommend that the FEMA Administrator implement a mechanism to verify that states act in accordance with the proposed grant reporting guidance, when implemented. DHS concurred with our recommendation that FEMA develop a mechanism to verify that states act in accordance with proposed guidance to help ensure that data reporting on the amount of federal grant funding used to support fusion centers is reliable. We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Homeland Security; the Attorney General, the Commissioner of Customs and Border Protection, the Director of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and appropriate congressional committees. | Why GAO Did This Study
Fusion centers play a key role in sharing threat information among all levels of government and the private sector. Federal agencies support these centers by providing personnel, funding, and other assistance. GAO was asked to assess how federal agencies are accounting for ongoing support provided.
This report addresses the extent to which (1) DHS has helped centers assess capabilities and address gaps, (2) the federal government has defined its expectations for centers and assessed their contributions to homeland security, (3) federal agencies have deployed personnel to centers, and (4) DHS grant reforms have improved accountability for federal funds that support centers.
GAO analyzed the results of center assessments, documents on center expectations, guidance for deploying personnel, and grant requirements. GAO also interviewed DHS and FBI officials who work with centers, and directors, staff, and deployed personnel at 10 of 78 fusion centers. GAO selected centers based on geographic location and other factors. Interviews are not generalizable, but provided insights on center capabilities and federal support provided.
What GAO Found
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is helping state and major urban area fusion centers assess baseline capabilities—such as the ability to receive, analyze, and disseminate threat information—and address capability gaps through an annual assessment process, resources it provides to centers to mitigate gaps, and an exercise program to evaluate capabilities in practice. Results of the 2013 annual assessment show that centers achieved an average score of about 92 out of 100, which generally indicates that centers have policies and procedures in place to implement key information sharing activities. The scores do not reflect if these activities have resulted in specific homeland security impacts. All 10 fusion center directors GAO contacted said that the annual assessment is a useful tool to identify capabilities and monitor progress.
Since 2004, the federal government has issued guidance and related documents that define its expectations and key roles for fusion centers and also has taken steps to assess their contributions to homeland security. For example, DHS has developed 45 performance measures to help assess fusion center contributions, which generally align with attributes of successful measures. The measures include outputs—such as the number of intelligence products—and outcomes, such as how products have influenced key partners' security decisions.
In 2013, federal agencies deployed a total of 288 personnel to fusion centers. The two agencies that provide the most support—DHS's Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)—have developed nationwide guidance to help these agencies make fusion center support decisions and generally identified key roles and responsibilities for personnel deployed to centers. Other DHS components, including U.S. Customs and Border Protection and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, have not developed such guidance and generally defer to field-level management to make deployment decisions. However, in September 2014, DHS issued guidance that is designed to assist federal agencies in planning and tracking resource deployments to fusion centers.
DHS reforms to the Homeland Security Grant Program are helping to ensure that grant funds intended for fusion centers are used to build or sustain baseline capabilities, but DHS cannot accurately account for federal funds provided to states to support these centers. Specifically, in fiscal year 2011, the Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA)—the lead DHS agency responsible for grant funding—began to require that grant requests for fusion centers identify specific capabilities that proposed projects are to address. FEMA also requires that state grantees biannually report the amount of federal funds spent on fusion center projects. However, after further review of data provided to GAO, FEMA determined that states inaccurately categorized about $60 million in projects as related to fusion centers in 2012. Thus, FEMA could not reliably report on the amount of federal grants used to support centers, which is needed to help inform future investment decisions. FEMA is developing guidance to help grantees better categorize fusion center projects and improve the reliability of grant reporting, but an additional mechanism to verify that states act in accordance with the guidance could help FEMA ensure that projects are properly classified and more accurately account for grant funding provided to centers.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that FEMA develop a mechanism to verify that states act in accordance with proposed guidance, when implemented, to help ensure that data on fusion center projects are sufficiently accurate to provide a reliable accounting of the total amount of federal grant funding provided to centers. DHS concurred. |
gao_GAO-11-570 | gao_GAO-11-570_0 | 1.) The Executive Agreement defines the relationship between VA and DOD for establishing and operating the FHCC, in accordance with the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010, and contains provisions in 12 integration areas regarding specific aspects of FHCC operations. Some provisions relate to establishing and operating the FHCC and have designated deadlines, such as implementing IT strategies. The Executive Agreement also includes 15 integration benchmarks that VA and DOD plan to use to determine the integration’s success. FHCC Officials Have Made Progress Implementing VA and DOD’s Executive Agreement, but Challenges May Impact Further Implementation Progress
FHCC officials (including both VA and DOD officials) have made progress implementing the provisions of the 12 Executive Agreement integration areas. Governance structure. In addition, the advisory bodies described in the Executive Agreement are in place. In the workforce management and personnel integration area, the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010 authorized a transfer from DOD to VA of the positions and personnel necessary to operate the FHCC. Quality assurance. Lack of MTF Designation Has Presented Challenges for FHCC Operations and Health Care Providers
According to DOD policy, an MTF is a military treatment facility owned and operated by DOD that is established for the purpose of furnishing medical and/or dental care to eligible individuals. VA and DOD Use Integration Benchmarks to Assess Provision of Care and Operations at the FHCC, but the Performance Reporting Plan May Not Yield Transparent, Meaningful, and Accurate Results
VA and DOD, through FHCC staff, are using the 15 integration benchmarks set forth in the Executive Agreement (and their corresponding performance measures) to assess the provision of care and operations at the FHCC. The plan is to report on these performance measures using a tool developed by FHCC staff—a scorecard that generates a monthly summary score. However, the summary score does not account for data collection variation, FHCC staff have not specified what target score(s) would indicate successful performance, and the scorecard initially contained an error, all of which raise concerns about the FHCC’s ability to report transparent, meaningful, and accurate performance results. 2. The summary score lacks a set target score(s) to indicate success. Conclusions
The FHCC is a 5-year demonstration project that has the potential to be a model for future VA and DOD integration efforts. To ensure that the plan to report on FHCC performance results is transparent and provides meaningful information that can assist VA and DOD leadership and Congress in decision making with regard to the future of the FHCC or other VA/DOD integration efforts, we recommend that the Secretaries of Veterans Affairs and Defense direct FHCC leadership to conduct further evaluation of the scorecard reporting tool and its methodology and make revisions that will better ensure the transparency and accuracy of the information reported. DOD agreed with our finding that the lack of an MTF designation for the FHCC has posed some challenges and confusion; however, the department did not concur with our recommendation to the Secretary of Defense to seek a legislative change to designate the FHCC as an MTF. | Why GAO Did This Study
The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2010 authorized the Departments of Veterans Affairs (VA) and Defense (DOD) to establish a 5-year demonstration project to integrate VA and DOD medical care into a first-of-its- kind Federal Health Care Center (FHCC) in North Chicago, Illinois. Expectations for the FHCC are outlined in an Executive Agreement signed by VA and DOD in April 2010. The NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010 also directed GAO to annually evaluate various aspects of the FHCC integration. This report examines (1) what progress VA and DOD have made implementing the Executive Agreement to establish and operate the FHCC and (2) what plan, if any, VA and DOD have to assess FHCC provision of care and operations. GAO reviewed FHCC documents and conducted visits to the site; interviewed VA, DOD, and FHCC officials; and reviewed related GAO work.
What GAO Found
FHCC officials have made progress implementing provisions of the Executive Agreement's 12 integration areas. For some areas, all provisions have been addressed, including establishing the facility's governance structure and patient priority system. Progress continues to be made in other areas, such as workforce management and personnel and quality assurance. However, as previously reported by GAO, there have been delays implementing the information technology provisions, which present challenges for operating the FHCC as a fully integrated facility. In addition, while some workarounds are in place, the lack of an military treatment facility (MTF) designation that other DOD medical facilities have presents challenges for efficient FHCC operations and results in uncertainty regarding access to preferred drug prices and provider authority to sign medical readiness forms for active duty Navy servicemembers. Although VA and DOD are assessing the provision of care and operations at the FHCC, their plan to report on performance lacks transparency and may not provide a meaningful and accurate measure of success. Specifically, VA and DOD, through FHCC staff, are using 15 integration benchmarks set forth in the Executive Agreement to assess the integration. From these benchmarks, FHCC staff identified 38 corresponding performance measures to assess the integration's success. While FHCC staff plan to report on these performance measures through a reporting tool they developed--a scorecard that calculates a monthly summary score--the tool lacks transparency and may not provide a meaningful indicator of performance. The scorecard does not account for data collection variation, there is no designated target score(s) to indicate successful integration performance, and the scorecard initially contained a calculation error, all of which raise concerns about its ability to provide transparent, meaningful, and accurate information.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD seek a legislative change to designate the FHCC as a MTF--a DOD facility providing medical or dental care to eligible individuals, and that VA and DOD direct FHCC leadership to further evaluate its integration performance reporting tool. DOD did not agree with the recommendation regarding the MTF designation, but GAO continues to believe such designation is important. VA and DOD agreed with GAO's recommendation regarding the scorecard reporting tool. |
gao_GAO-04-18 | gao_GAO-04-18_0 | Procedures Have Improved, but Lack Some Key Elements of Good Project Management
The Commission has established a set of project management procedures for commissioners and staff to follow when they plan, implement, and report the results of approved Commission projects. Additionally, Commission procedures do not provide for systematic commissioner input throughout projects. In practice, commissioners do not always have the opportunity to review many of the reports and other products drafted by Commission staff before products are released to the public, which serves to significantly reduce the opportunity for commissioners to help shape a report’s findings, recommendations, and policy implications of civil rights issues. Controls Over Commission’s Contracting Procedures Are Insufficient
The Commission on Civil Rights lacks sufficient management controls over its contracting procedures. For example, the Commission’s largest dollar contract—currently $156,000—is for media services and has been ongoing for over 3 years with the same vendor. According to Commission officials, key documentation on how the contract was initially awarded was missing from contract files. Moreover, Commission officials did not follow the legal requirements to obtain competition for subsequent media services contracts. In fiscal year 2002, seven of the commission’s contracts were for amounts over $2,500, and the Commission did not follow proper procedures for any of them. As a result, the Commission is not promoting the transparency necessary to keep the Congress and others informed about the Commission’s contracting activities. As a result of the Commission’s weak contract management operations, the Commission does not have all of the information it should have to determine that the contracts it is entering into are reasonable and offer the best value to the government. The Commission has not had an independent audit of its financial statements in recent years. While the Commission has received waivers from preparing and submitting audited financial statements for fiscal years 2002 and 2003, we recommend that the Commission take steps immediately in order to meet the financial statement preparation and audit requirements of the Accountability of Tax Dollars Act of 2002 for fiscal year 2004. A-11 emphasizes the importance of managing financial assets. 2. 10. 12. | Why GAO Did This Study
Over the past 10 years, GAO, the Congress, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), and others have raised numerous concerns about the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights. GAO was asked to assess (1) the adequacy of the Commission's project management procedures, (2) whether the Commission's controls over contracting services and managing contracts are sufficient, and (3) the extent of recent oversight of the Commission's financial activities.
What GAO Found
The Commission has established a set of project management procedures for commissioners and staff to follow when they plan, implement, and report the results of approved Commission projects. However, the procedures lack, among other things, a requirement for systematic commissioner input throughout projects. As a result, commissioners lack the opportunity to review many of the reports and other products drafted by Commission staff before products are released to the public, which serves to significantly reduce the opportunity for commissioners to help shape a report's findings, recommendations, and policy implications of civil rights issues. The Commission lacks sufficient management control over its contracting procedures. The Commission routinely did not follow proper procedures for its fiscal year 2002 contracting activities. For the Commission's largest dollar contract, key documentation on how the contract was initially awarded was missing from contract files. Moreover, Commission officials did not follow the legal requirements to obtain competition for its subsequent media services contracts. As a result, the Commission did not have all of the information it should have had to determine whether its contracts provided the best value to the government. Little, if any, external oversight of the Commission's financial activities has taken place in recent years. An independent accounting firm has not audited the Commission's financial statements for the last 12 years. Although the Accountability of Tax Dollars Act of 2002 requires the Commission--along with certain other executive agencies--to have its financial statements independently audited annually, the Commission has been granted a waiver by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) from compliance with the financial statement preparation and audit requirements of the act for the fiscal years 2002 and 2003 audit cycles, which OMB was authorized to waive during an initial transition period of up to 2 years. |
gao_GAO-17-575 | gao_GAO-17-575_0 | These technologies, along with new design features like a new propulsion system, an enlarged flight deck, and an aft- positioned island, would improve combat capability, while simultaneously reducing acquisition and life-cycle costs. To date, Congress has not taken action to change the cost cap legislation; however, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 lowered the cost cap for all follow-on ships, to include CVN 79, from $11.5 billion to $11.4 billion. CVN 79 Cost Estimate Is Not Reliable, with Construction Costs Likely to Exceed Cost Cap
The $11.4 billion the Navy has budgeted to construct CVN 79 is likely insufficient, in part because the cost estimate that supports the budget is not reliable and does not address lessons learned from the experiences of the lead ship. Second, we question the credibility of the estimate because it does not sufficiently account for program risks. After developing this cost estimate, the Navy negotiated an 18 percent reduction in the labor hours to construct CVN 79 compared to CVN 78. As previously mentioned, we found the CVN 79 labor hour estimate to be optimistic. Compared to historical aircraft carrier data, the minimum value represents a labor reduction which is significantly more than the largest decrease that has been observed in the past 50 years of carrier construction. Ford Class Oversight Mechanisms Provide Limited Insight into Ship Costs
Current reporting mechanisms, such as budget requests and the SAR, provide limited insight into the overall Ford-Class program and individual ship costs. Because the Navy has designated the entire Ford-Class program as a single major defense acquisition program, independent cost reviews have been infrequent and are not conducted for each ship before the Navy must request funding for ship construction. Additionally, annual acquisition reports to Congress provide only aggregate program cost for all three ships currently in the class, a practice that diminishes transparency into individual ship costs. As a result of unreliable cost estimates and limited acquisition reporting, Congress has limited ability to oversee one of the most expensive programs in the defense portfolio. As a result, no independent cost estimates were conducted during the 11-year period between these milestones. In particular, there was no current independent cost estimate to inform the Department of Navy’s President’s budget request for construction of CVN 78 in 2007, and no independent cost estimate prior to the budget request for construction of CVN 79 in 2012. This reported decline is driven by a decrease in the estimated costs for CVN 80. We have reported for many years on the program’s challenges that contributed to nearly $2.4 billion in cost growth for the lead ship. To improve insight into cost changes for individual ships in the Ford Class, the program office should prepare cost summary and funding summary sections for each individual ship in the class as part of the SAR for the overall Ford-Class program. DOD agreed that an accurate cost estimate for CVN 79 is essential to support the Milestone C review for the program, but did not concur with revising the cost cap should the CVN 79 cost estimate exceed the current cost cap, stating that it will use the cost estimate to determine whether the current cost cap is at risk and if additional cost mitigation strategies are needed. Specifically, we assessed (1) the drivers of CVN 78 cost growth; (2) the extent to which the CVN 79 cost estimate is reliable and addresses known cost risks from the performance of the lead ship; and (3) the extent to which oversight mechanisms—including annual budget requests and selected acquisition reports—provide insight into total ship costs and budget execution. To further corroborate documentary evidence and gather additional information in support of our review, we conducted interviews with relevant DOD and Navy officials responsible for developing and updating the Ford-Class cost estimates, such as the Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation; Naval Center for Cost Analysis; Naval Sea Systems Command’s Cost Engineering and Industrial Analysis Group; Program Executive Office, Aircraft Carriers; CVN 78 and 79 program offices; Aircraft Launch and Recovery program office; and the Program Executive Office, Integrated Warfare Systems. GAO-15-22. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Navy intended for the Ford Class aircraft carrier to improve combat capability while reducing acquisition and life-cycle costs. However, as GAO has reported on extensively since 2007, the lead ship has experienced cost growth of nearly 23 percent, with a reduced capability expected at delivery. CVN 78 is estimated to cost $12.9 billion, while the next ship, CVN 79, is estimated to be $11.4 billion. The Navy plans to buy 1-2 more ships in the coming years.
The Senate Armed Services Committee Report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 included a provision that GAO review Ford-class cost estimates, among related issues. This report assesses: (1) the extent to which the CVN 79 cost estimate is a reliable basis for meeting the cost cap and addresses known cost risks from the lead ship, and (2) the extent to which oversight mechanisms provide Congress with insight into ship costs. To do this work, GAO compared the CVN 79 cost estimate with GAO's Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide, analyzed cost reports, and interviewed relevant officials.
What GAO Found
The cost estimate for the second Ford-Class aircraft carrier, CVN 79, is not reliable and does not address lessons learned from the performance of the lead ship, CVN 78. As a result, the estimate does not demonstrate that the program can meet its $11.4 billion cost cap. Cost growth for the lead ship was driven by challenges with technology development, design, and construction, compounded by an optimistic budget estimate. Instead of learning from the mistakes of CVN 78, the Navy developed an estimate for CVN 79 that assumes a reduction in labor hours needed to construct the ship that is unprecedented in the past 50 years of aircraft carrier construction, as shown in the figure below.
After developing the program estimate, the Navy negotiated 18 percent fewer labor hours for CVN 79 than were required for CVN 78. CVN 79's estimate is optimistic compared to the labor hour reductions calculated in independent cost reviews conducted in 2015 by the Naval Center for Cost Analysis and the Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation. Navy analysis shows that the CVN 79 cost estimate may not sufficiently account for program risks, with the current budget likely insufficient to complete ship construction.
The Navy's current reporting mechanisms, such as budget requests and annual acquisition reports to Congress, provide limited insight into the overall Ford Class program and individual ship costs. For example, the program requests funding for each ship before that ship obtains an independent cost estimate. During an 11-year period prior to 2015, no independent cost estimate was conducted for any of the Ford class ships; however, the program received over $15 billion in funding. In addition, the program's Selected Acquisition Reports (SAR)—annual cost, status, and performance reports to Congress—provide only aggregate program cost for all three ships currently in the class, a practice that limits transparency into individual ship costs. As a result, Congress has diminished ability to oversee one of the most expensive programs in the defense portfolio.
This is a public version of a sensitive but unclassified report that GAO issued in March 2017. Information the Department of Defense deemed sensitive has been removed. Areas where redactions occurred are noted in the body of the report.
What GAO Recommends
The Navy should develop a new, reliable cost estimate for CVN 79 validated by cost reviews and obtain an independent cost estimate before requesting funding for future ships. The Navy partially concurred with these recommendations, but did not concur with a draft recommendation to prepare a SAR for each Ford class ship. In response to comments, GAO revised the recommendation to focus on SAR cost and funding summaries. |
gao_GAO-07-680 | gao_GAO-07-680_0 | 1.) Most States Use Statistical Models to Identify Claimants Likely to Exhaust Benefits, but Many Have Not Updated Them to Account for Changing Economic Conditions
The large majority of states use statistical models to identify unemployment recipients who are most likely to exhaust benefits. Forty-five states use statistical models to identify and rank clients by their likelihood to exhaust benefits, while 7 states use characteristic screens that do not rank claimants. A survey of the states reveals that many have not revised or updated their models in many years. Forty-five of the 53 states and territories use statistical models to identify clients likely to exhaust benefits. One state, Florida, delegates the selection of profiling tools to the local areas because state officials believe profiling can be done more accurately at that level. 2.) Most Study States Did Not Take the In-Depth Approach Recommended by Labor to Ensure That Profiled Claimants Obtain Reemployment Services
Labor data provide a limited picture of states’ implementation of worker profiling, and some aspects of these data were not reliable. These states generally referred claimants to services, held them accountable for attending the services, and provided them with an orientation and some instruction on job search skills. However, 6 of the 7 states did not adhere to Labor’s guidance recommending an in-depth individual needs assessment and a tailored reemployment service plan for referred UI claimants. Data Collected by Labor Provided a Limited Picture of States’ Implementation of Reemployment Services
Between 2002 and 2006, about 94 percent of the UI claimants who received a first payment were profiled. Six of Seven States We Studied Referred Claimants and Enforced Compliance with Referrals
We found that 6 of the 7 study states had, as required by Labor, referred profiled claimants to services and made claimants ineligible for benefits if they failed to attend reemployment services. Little Is Known about Program’s Effectiveness because There Are No Current Studies and Labor’s Data Are of Limited Usefulness
Little is known about the current effectiveness of the worker-profiling initiative. Most of the studies found that claimants who were referred to services increased earnings in the year following the UI claim. 3. How do states identify unemployment claimants who are most likely to exhaust benefits? To what extent do states provide reemployment services as recommended by Labor? What is known about the effectiveness of the worker-profiling initiative in accelerating the reemployment of unemployment insurance claimants? To answer the second question, we reviewed Labor guidance regarding reemployment services provided to Unemployment Insurance (UI) claimants referred through the worker-profiling initiative, and obtained and analyzed national data collected by the Department of Labor from states on the Employment and Training Administration (ETA) 9048 Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services Activity report. As a result, we took the following actions to ensure the accuracy of the data. | Why GAO Did This Study
Changes to the U.S. economy have led to longer-term unemployment. Many unemployed workers receive Unemployment Insurance (UI), which provided about $30 billion in benefits in 2006. In 1993, Congress established requirements--now known as the Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services (WPRS) initiative--for state UI agencies to identify claimants who are most likely to exhaust their benefits, and then refer such claimants to reemployment services. To assess the implementation and effect of the initiative, GAO examined (1) how states identify claimants who are most likely to exhaust benefits, (2) to what extent states provide reemployment services as recommended by the Department of Labor (Labor), and (3) what is known about the effectiveness of the initiative in accelerating reemployment. To answer these questions, we used a combination of national data; review of seven states, including visits to local service providers in four states; and existing studies and interviews with Labor and subject matter experts.
What GAO Found
Forty-five of the 53 states and territories use statistical models that facilitate the ranking of claimants by their likelihood to exhaust benefits, while 7 states use more limited screening tools that do not facilitate a ranking. Florida delegates the selection of profiling tools to local areas in the state. Factors used to determine the probability of exhaustion include a claimant's education, occupation, and job tenure. Many states have not regularly maintained their models, and as a result, the models in some states may not be accurately identifying claimants who are likely to exhaust benefits. Although Labor data provide a limited picture of states' implementation of the worker-profiling initiative, 6 of the 7 states we studied did not provide the in-depth approach to services as recommended by Labor. Overall, an average of 15 percent of profiled UI claimants were referred to reemployment services, and 11 percent completed these services between 2002 and 2006. Six of the 7 states we contacted referred claimants to services, held them accountable for attending the services, and provided an orientation. However, only 1 of the 7 states provided individualized needs assessments, and developed service plans, as recommended. Little is known about the effectiveness of the worker-profiling initiative as it is currently operating. Although studies using data from the 1990s generally indicated that claimants who were referred to services had reduced reliance on UI, there are no more up-to-date studies. Further, some of the program data collected by Labor are not reliable, and the data are not being used by Labor or states to evaluate the initiative. |
gao_GAO-12-88 | gao_GAO-12-88_0 | DCAA’s use of its authority has been addressed in two court decisions involving Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company. Internal Audit Departments We Reviewed Generally Adhered to Institute Standards
All of the companies we reviewed generally followed the Institute’s standards for organizing their internal audit departments. These organizational standards include maintaining independence and objectivity, constructing a risk-based audit plan, employing and maintaining a skilled, professional audit staff, and completing an external assessment. Similarly, based on our examination of internal audit reports and audit documentation (generally referred to as workpapers), we found that the majority of companies followed the standards for performing individual audits. Internal Audit Reports Contain Information Relevant to DCAA Audits
The internal audits conducted by the seven selected defense companies cover a broad spectrum of policies, business systems, and programs. The seven companies conducted 1,125 internal audits from January 1, 2008, through December 31, 2009, with 520—slightly less than half—of these audits relevant to the internal control for defense contracts.defense-related internal audit reports fell into one or more of the following categories:
All 520 audits examined some aspect of the companies’ overall control environment. DCAA’s Access to and Use of Company Internal Audits Are Limited
DCAA’s access to and use of internal audit information were generally limited at the companies we reviewed. The extent to which DCAA has requested or been denied access to internal audits is difficult to determine because DCAA does not track its requests or denials. DCAA Obtains Limited Access to Internal Audit Reports and Workpapers
The seven companies that we reviewed do not have uniform policies about providing DCAA with access to internal audit reports and workpapers. Of the seven companies:
Six companies have policies that provide for DCAA access to at least some internal audits reports upon request. Of those six, four companies have policies that provide for DCAA access to the supporting workpapers for their internal audits upon request. The other two companies have policies to not provide DCAA with access to supporting workpapers. One company adopted a policy of not providing DCAA with access to its internal audits or workpapers. Each of the six companies that have policies for providing access to their internal audit reports require approval for specific requests for access on a case-by-case basis, and most require that the requested internal audit information directly relate to a DCAA audit of a specific contract or proposal. For the company with the policy of not providing DCAA with access to internal audit reports, DCAA has cited the lack of access as preventing it from obtaining an understanding of the company’s internal controls and reported this as a deficiency in the audit of the company’s overall accounting system. In most cases, the number of reports requested was significantly fewer than the number of reports we determined were related to DOD contract oversight. They also acknowledge that they have not used their subpoena authority to get access to internal audits or other company documents since the Newport News decisions were issued in 1988 in part because the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the language in the statutes did not generally include internal audit reports unrelated to a specific contract or proposal.They also stated that the court’s decisions may have resulted in some DCAA auditors limiting their requests for internal audit information. However, DCAA is not making full use of internal audits to help accomplish its critical oversight role. While the courts have held that DCAA does not have unlimited power to demand access to all internal company materials, the courts have also made it clear that DCAA may demand access to materials that are relevant to carrying out its audit responsibilities. Moreover, we believe that by not routinely obtaining access to relevant company internal audits that can inform their audits of the companies’ control environments, as well as audits of specific business systems and contracts, DCAA auditors are hindered in their ability to meet the GAGAS requirement for assessing internal controls. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
In response to a congressional request to assess the role of defense companies’ internal audit departments and their ability to provide the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) with information on their control environments, business systems, and policies affecting government contracts, we examined (1) the adherence of selected major defense companies to internal auditing standards for organizations and individual audits, (2) the extent to which the internal audit reports of those companies address internal controls for the management of defense contracts and associated business systems, and (3) DCAA’s ability to examine and use those reports in carrying out its oversight responsibilities. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) has a critical role in contract oversight. DCAA audits are intended to help provide reasonable assurance that defense company policies for safeguarding assets and complying with contractual requirements are fulfilled. Defense companies also maintain their own internal audit departments to monitor policies, procedures, and business systems related to their government contracts. GAO was asked to assess the role of defense companies' internal audit departments and their ability to provide DCAA with information on their internal controls. GAO assessed (1) selected defense companies' adherence to standards for internal audits, (2) the extent to which those companies' internal audit reports address defense contract management internal controls, and (3) DCAA's ability to examine internal audits and use information from these audits. GAO reviewed a nongeneralizable sample of seven major defense companies including the five largest defense contractors and two smaller contractors; analyzed information on their 2008 and 2009 internal audits, which were the latest available when GAO began its assessment; and reviewed DCAA's ability to examine and use the audits in carrying out its oversight.
What GAO Found
The seven internal audit departments GAO reviewed generally adhered to Institute of Internal Auditors standards for organizing their internal audit departments. These standards include maintaining independence and having a proficient workforce. For example, all seven companies are organized so that the internal audit department is independent of company management. For performing individual audits, the majority of the companies followed the standards in areas such as planning the audit work and obtaining evidence. In its examination of evidentiary workpapers, GAO found documentation of the internal auditors' testing to show the level of compliance with company policies. The selected companies' internal audit reports cover a broad spectrum of policies, business systems, and programs that are relevant to DCAA audits. Each company performs audits with scope and objectives specific to that company and its individual businesses, such as audits about defense programs or audits that review a company's accounting system. In addition, some audits are common across companies, such as reviews of purchase card transactions or controls over information technology. In 2008 and 2009, the seven companies conducted 1,125 internal audits. GAO determined that of these, 520 were related to the defense contract control environment and one or more areas reviewed by DCAA, such as overall internal control functions and specific business systems. DCAA's access to and use of internal audit information from reports and workpapers is limited, in part, because of company interpretations of court decisions concerning DCAA's access to documents. Consequently, the seven companies GAO reviewed have developed differing policies and procedures for providing internal audit information to DCAA but ultimately provide DCAA access to internal audit reports and workpapers on a case-by-case basis. (1) Six of the companies have policies that provide for DCAA access to at least some internal audits reports upon request. Of the six, four have policies for providing access to supporting workpapers for their internal audits upon request. The other two companies have policies of not providing DCAA with access to supporting workpapers. (2) One company has a policy of not providing DCAA with access to internal audits or workpapers. DCAA's use of its access authority has been addressed in two court decisions. The courts held that DCAA does not have unlimited power to demand access to all internal company materials, but they also held that DCAA may demand access to materials relevant to its audit responsibilities. However, DCAA does not generally track its requests or denials for internal audit reports. GAO found that the number of DCAA requests for internal audit reports is small relative to the number of internal audits GAO identified as relevant to defense contract oversight. In explaining why few reports are requested, DCAA auditors noted obstacles such as not being able to identify internal audits relevant to their work and uncertainty as to how useful those reports could be. By not routinely obtaining access to relevant company internal audits, DCAA auditors are hindered in their ability to effectively plan work and meet auditing standards for evaluating internal controls.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DCAA take steps to facilitate access to internal audits and assess periodically whether other actions are needed. DOD generally agreed to implement GAO's recommendations but expressed skepticism that this alone would fully ensure access to internal audits. |
gao_GAO-02-907 | gao_GAO-02-907_0 | USPTO also advises the administration on all domestic and global aspects of intellectual property. Fees and volume of patent activity are different for small and large entities. The majority of patent applicants are large entities filing applications for utility patents. USPTO’s Past and Future Operations
Patent Applications Filed
The number of patent applications filed nearly doubled during fiscal years 1990 through 2001, increasing from about 164,000 to about 326,000, and USPTO’s Corporate, Business, and Strategic Plans projected that the number of applications would increase to between 351,000 and 368,000 in fiscal year 2002. USPTO’s three plans projected that pendency would increase to between 26.1 months and 26.7 months in fiscal year 2002. Fee collections and funding requirements projected for fiscal year 2003 in the Business Plan would be the same in the Strategic Plan—$1.527 billion in fee collections and $1.365 billion in funding requirements—but the specifics would change. In addition, some new fees would be established for such things as surcharges authorized by the USPTO Director in certain instances. If a large entity maintains the patent through the payment of the three maintenance fees, the total fee increase resulting from the proposed legislation would be nearly $4,100, or about a 51 percent increase over current fees. Furthermore, because maintenance fees are higher, if a small entity maintains the patent through the payment of the three maintenance fees, the total fee increase resulting from the proposed legislation would be nearly $2,700, or about a 67 percent increase over current fees. Although we did not independently verify the data provided by USPTO, to the extent feasible we corroborated it with other agency sources. Briefing for the Chairman of the Joint
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office: Information on Past and Future Operations July 25, 2002 U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
Background (con’t.) Methodology
Patent Applications Filed (Fiscal years 1990-2001) and Corporate, Business, and Strategic Plan Projections (Fiscal years 2002-2007)
Patents Granted (Fiscal years 1990-2001) and Corporate, Business, and Strategic Plan Projections (Fiscal years 2002-2007)
End-of-Year Patent Inventory (Fiscal years 1990-2001) and Corporate, Business, and Strategic Plan Projections (Fiscal years 2002-2007)
Total Patent Pendency (Fiscal years 1990-2001) and Corporate, Business, and Strategic Plan Projections (Fiscal years 2002-2007)
Employment of Patent Examiners (Fiscal years 1990-2001) and Business and Strategic Plan Projections (Fiscal years 2002-2007)
Patent Examiners Hired (Fiscal years 1990-2001) and Business and Strategic Plan Projections (Fiscal years 2002-2007)
Examiners Who Left (Fiscal years 1990-2001) and Business and Strategic Plan Projections (Fiscal years 2002-2007)
Fee Collections and Funding Requirements (Fiscal years 1999-2001) and Business Plan Projections (Fiscal years 2002-2007)
Fee Collections and Funding Requirements (Fiscal years 1999-2001) and Strategic Plan Projections (Fiscal years 2002-2007)
Business Plan Pendency—from time applicant
Filing fee would be lower, but other fees would be higher—to
compensate for the eliminated FY 2003 patent fee surcharge and the expected decrease in patent applications. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) has a staff of 6,426 and collected $1.1 billion in patent and trademark fees in fiscal year 2001. As the U.S. economy depends increasingly on new innovations, the need to patent or trademark quickly the intellectual property resulting from such innovations becomes more important. Expressing concerns about USPTO's plans for the future, Congress directed USPTO to develop a 5-year plan. In February 2001, USPTO issued its first 5-year plan, called the USPTO Business Plan. Because the Director of USPTO did not believe that the Business Plan went far enough, in June 2002, USPTO produced another 5-year plan, called the 21st Century Strategic Plan.
What GAO Found
GAO found that patent activity grew substantially from 1990 through 2001. The numbers of patent applications filed and patents granted nearly doubled; the inventory of patent applications nearly tripled; patent pendency increased from slightly over 18 months to nearly 25 months, and the number of patent examiners increased by about 80 percent. Furthermore, in fiscal year 2001, both fee collections and agency funding requirements exceeded $1 billion for the first time in the agency's history. Although both 5-year plans cover the same period, the assumptions and projected results of the Business Plan are different in several ways from the Strategic Plan. The administration's recent legislative proposal to restructure patent fees to implement the Strategic Plan would result in higher fees for the majority of patent applications--large entities--that receive utility patents and maintain such patents in to the future. Consequently, total fees for these applicants would increase by $4,100 or 51 percent. Also, total fees for most small entities would increase $2,700 or 67 percent over current fees. |
gao_GAO-08-655 | gao_GAO-08-655_0 | Unlike Other Insular Areas, Matters of Federal Law in American Samoa Are Adjudicated in U.S. District Courts in Hawaii or the District of Columbia
Unlike other insular areas, such as CNMI, Guam, and USVI, American Samoa does not have a federal court. Reasons offered against changing the current system of adjudicating matters of federal law focus largely on concerns about the impact of an increased federal presence on Samoan culture and traditions, as well as concerns regarding the impartiality of local juries. Reasons Offered for Changing the Current System Focus Principally on the Difficulties of Adjudicating Matters of Federal Law and Greater Access to Justice
As was the case in the 1990s, and was repeated in the interviews we conducted and e-mail comments we received, the reasons offered for changing the American Samoa judicial system principally stem from challenges associated with adjudicating matters of federal law arising in American Samoa and the desire to provide American Samoans with greater access to justice. Three Scenarios Present Different Structures and Operational Issues to Be Resolved
Based on our review of past legislative proposals, testimonies, and reports, and through discussions with legal experts and American Samoa and federal government officials, we identified three potential scenarios for establishing a federal court in American Samoa or expanding the federal jurisdiction of the High Court of American Samoa: (1) establishing an Article IV district court in American Samoa, (2) establishing a district court in American Samoa that would be a division of the District of Hawaii, or (3) expanding the federal jurisdiction of the High Court of American Samoa. This would be a unique structure, as local courts generally do not exercise federal criminal jurisdiction. Potential Cost Elements Subject to Considerable Uncertainties
The potential cost elements for establishing a federal court in American Samoa include agency rental costs, personnel costs, and operational costs; most of which would be funded by congressional appropriations. U.S. The U.S. Specifically, the objectives of our review were to discuss: (1) the current system and structure for adjudicating matters of federal law arising in American Samoa and how it compares to those in the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI), Guam, and the U.S. Virgin Islands (USVI); (2) the reasons that have been offered for or against changing the current system and structure for adjudicating matters of federal law in American Samoa; (3) the description of different scenarios for establishing a federal court in American Samoa or expanding the federal jurisdiction of the High Court of American Samoa if a change to the current system were made, if a change to the current system were made, and the identification of issues associated with each scenario; and, (4) the potential cost elements and funding sources associated with implementing the different scenarios for establishing a federal court in American Samoa. | Why GAO Did This Study
American Samoa is the only populated U.S. insular area that does not have a federal court. Congress has granted the local High Court federal jurisdiction for certain federal matters, such as specific areas of maritime law. GAO was asked to conduct a study of American Samoa's system for addressing matters of federal law. Specifically, this report discusses: (1) the current system for adjudicating matters of federal law in American Samoa and how it compares to those in the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI), Guam, and the U.S. Virgin Islands (USVI); (2) the reasons offered for or against changing the current system for adjudicating matters of federal law in American Samoa; (3) potential scenarios and issues associated with establishing a federal court in American Samoa or expanding the federal jurisdiction of the local court; and (4) the potential cost elements and funding sources associated with implementing those different scenarios. To conduct this work, we reviewed previous studies and testimonies, and collected information from and conducted interviews with federal government officials and American Samoa government officials.
What GAO Found
Because American Samoa does not have a federal court like the CNMI, Guam, or USVI, matters of federal law arising in American Samoa have generally been adjudicated in U.S. district courts in Hawaii or the District of Columbia. Reasons offered for changing the existing system focus primarily on the difficulties of adjudicating matters of federal law arising in American Samoa, principally based on American Samoa's remote location, and the desire to provide American Samoans more direct access to justice. Reasons offered against any changes focus primarily on concerns about the effects of an increased federal presence on Samoan culture and traditions and concerns about juries' impartiality given close family ties. During the mid-1990s, several proposals were studied and many of the issues discussed then, such as the protection of local culture, were also raised during this study. Based on previous studies and information gathered for this report, GAO identified three potential scenarios, if changes were to be made: (1) establish a federal court in American Samoa under Article IV of the U.S. Constitution, (2) establish a district court in American Samoa as a division of the District of Hawaii, or (3) expand the federal jurisdiction of the High Court of American Samoa. Each scenario would present unique issues to be addressed, such as what jurisdiction to grant the court. The potential cost elements for establishing a federal court in American Samoa include agency rental costs, personnel costs, and operational costs, most of which would be funded by congressional appropriations. Exact details of the costs to be incurred would have to be determined when, and if, any of the scenarios were adopted. The controversy surrounding whether and how to create a venue for adjudicating matters of federal law in American Samoa is not principally focused on an analysis of cost effectiveness, but other policy considerations, such as equity, justice, and cultural preservation. |
gao_GAO-12-307 | gao_GAO-12-307_0 | Our Updated Estimate Shows That Replacing the $1 Note with a $1 Coin Could Provide a Net Benefit of $4.4 Billion to the Government over 30 Years
The federal government realizes a financial gain when it issues notes or coins because both forms of currency usually cost less to produce than their face value. Replacing the $1 note with a $1 coin would provide a net benefit to the government of approximately $4.4 billion over 30 years, amounting to an average yearly discounted net benefit of about $146 million. This benefit would occur because, based on differences in how notes and coins are used in the economy, more coins than notes would have to be circulated to meet demand, and therefore more seigniorage would be created. Our assumptions cover a range of factors including a replacement ratio of 1.5 coins to 1 note to take into consideration the fact that coins circulate with less frequency than notes and therefore a larger number the expected rate of growth in the demand for are required in circulation,currency over 30 years, the costs of producing and processing both coins and notes, and the differential life spans of coins and notes. Our analyses are projected over 30 years to be consistent with previous GAO analyses and because that period roughly coincides with the life expectancy of the $1 coin. As shown in figure 1, the annual benefit would vary over the 30 years— the government would incur a net loss in 6 of the first 7 years and then realize a net benefit in the remaining years. The early net loss would be due in part to the up-front costs to the Mint of increasing its coin production during the transition, together with the limited interest expense the government would avoid in the first few years after replacement began. Because of the far lower coin production costs, the net benefit to the government would temporarily spike in that year. We also found our net benefit estimate was due solely to increased seigniorage and not to reduced production costs. Changes to the inputs and the assumptions used in the estimate could increase or decrease the estimated net benefit. This estimate differs from our 2011 estimate, which found that replacement would result in a net benefit of about $5.5 billion over 30 years, or an average of about $184 million per year, because it takes into account two key actions that occurred since our 2011 report. Replacing the $1 Note with a $1 Coin Would Result in a $531 Million Net Loss over the First 10 Years
For example, officials from the Bureau of Printing and Engraving pointed out that replacing the $1 note with a $1 coin would also have environmental impacts relating to obtaining raw materials and carbon dioxide emissions, among others. Without Counting Seigniorage, Switching to a $1 Coin Would Result in a Net Loss
Under a scenario that does not consider interest savings due to seigniorage, a net loss of approximately $1.8 billion would accrue during the 10-year period for an average cost of $179 million per year. In particular, large costs would be incurred in each of the first 4 years because of the large number of coins that would need to be produced for the transition, as was the case in the scenario discussed above. Thus, in this scenario, we found that even with the longer life of the $1 coin, the cost of producing coins for the growing economy after the transition would exceed the cost of producing $1 notes in each of those years that would have been incurred without the replacement. While this scenario suggests that there would be no net benefits from switching to a $1 coin, we believe that not including the interest savings related to seigniorage omits a monetary benefit to the government. In total, across the 10 years the total net loss of switching to $1 coins would be $582 million, or just over $58 million per year. As shown in figure 4, net losses would be incurred in 9 of 10 years of this scenario. The costs of producing coins for the transition are highest in the first 3 years, followed by benefits in the fourth year because of the overproduction of coins during the transition. In this scenario, net losses would continue through year 10. As is clear from the findings in this report, not accounting for the benefits related to increased seigniorage can substantially affect the estimate. The Federal Reserve noted that it believes our 30-year estimate may overstate the net financial benefit to the government because it (1) does not adequately address the costs to the private sector, state and local government, and the Federal Reserve and (2) does not consider potential increases in the cost of raw material for coins or possible future changes in discount rates. However, we found no quantitative estimates of the costs to the private sector or environmental impacts that could be evaluated or modeled. | Why GAO Did This Study
In March 2011, GAO reported that replacing the $1 note with a $1 coin would provide a net benefit to the government of about $5.5 billion over 30 years, or an average of about $184 million per year. This benefit, which GAO estimated using an economic model based on a set of assumptions, was entirely attributable to seigniorage, a term defined as the difference between the cost of producing coins or notes and their face value. Seigniorage reduces government borrowing and interest costs, resulting in a financial benefit to the government. As GAO noted, the estimated net benefit could increase or decrease with changes in the assumptions.
GAO was asked to provide additional details on its 2011 analysis. Accordingly, GAO (1) updated its analysis to account for recent changes in note processing, among other things, and based on this update determined (2) the specific benefit or loss to the government for each of the first 10 years of its 30-year analysis; (3) the net benefit or loss to the government over 10 years if the interest savings due to seigniorage are excluded from the analysis; and (4) the net benefit or loss to the government over 10 years if it is assumed that each note will be replaced by 1 coin, rather than 1.5 coins, as GAO assumed in its 30-year analysis.
GAO used the economic model it developed for its 2011 report, updated certain factors, and varied the assumptions for seigniorage and the replacement ratio of coins to notes as requested.
What GAO Found
According to GAOs updated analysis, replacing the $1 note with a $1 coin would provide a net benefit to the government of approximately $4.4 billion over 30 years, or an average of about $146 million per year. The overall net benefit was due solely to increased seigniorage and not to reduced production costs. This estimate differs from GAOs 2011 estimate because it considers recent efficiency improvements in note processing that have extended the expected life of the $1 note and other updated information. GAOs estimate covered 30 years to be consistent with previous GAO analyses and because that period roughly coincides with the life expectancy of the $1 coin.
Using the same model and assumptions used for its 30-year analysis, GAO found that replacing the $1 note with a $1 coin would provide a net loss to the government of about $531 million in the first 10 years, or an average of about $53 million per year. The cost of producing a large number of coins necessary for the transition would result in a net loss in 6 of the first 7 years. In the eighth year, and for the remaining 2 years, this situation is reversed: the interest savings outweigh the production costs and the net benefits would be positive. Overall, the net loss over 10 years compared with the net benefit GAO estimated over 30 years would occur because of large costs in the first few years to produce the initial supply of $1 coins.
If the interest savings due to increased seigniorage are excluded from the analysis, the government would incur a total net loss of about $1.8 billion over 10 years, or an average of $179 million per year. With no interest savings to offset the costs of coin production, net losses would be incurred in 9 of the 10 years. As in the preceding scenario, these production costs are greatest in the first 4 years, when a large number of coins need to be produced for the transition. Although this scenario suggests there are no net benefits of switching to a $1 coin, GAO believes that excluding the interest savings related to seigniorage omits a monetary benefit to the government.
If it is assumed that each $1 note will be replaced by 1, rather than 1.5, $1 coins, the government would incur a total net loss of about $582 million over 10 years, or an average of about $58 million per year. The costs of producing coins for the transition dominate in the first 3 years, followed by benefits in the fourth year due to the overproduction of coins during the transition. In this scenario, net losses continue to accrue through year 10. Net losses in this scenario are smaller than in the preceding scenario because fewer coins are produced and coin production costs are lower, but the one-to-one replacement does not provide increased seigniorage. Moreover, this lower replacement ratio is not consistent with the experiences of other countries that have switched from notes to coins and is likely to produce too few coins to meet demand, which could be disruptive to the economy.
In commenting on a draft of this report, the Federal Reserve and Treasury Department noted that GAOs 30-year estimate does not consider the cost to the private sector or environmental impacts. GAO agrees that such costs and impacts are important considerations, but GAO identified no quantitative estimates that could be evaluated or modeled. |
gao_GAO-16-710 | gao_GAO-16-710_0 | DOE Has Not Used or Developed Processes for Using the Enhanced Procurement Authority to Manage Supply Chain Risk
As of May 2016, the Secretary of Energy had not used the enhanced procurement authority, and DOE had not developed processes for using the authority, as it had not fully assessed the circumstances under which the authority might be useful. Once the Secretary was made aware of a significant supply chain risk, to use the enhanced procurement authority he or she must make a determination in writing that use of the authority was necessary to protect national security, and that less restrictive measures were not reasonably available to reduce the supply chain risk, among other things. However, DOE had not developed specific processes to collect such information for a risk assessment report and provide it to the Secretary so that he or she could make a determination about whether to use the authority. According to DOE officials, M&O contractors generally procure the parts for covered systems, and NNSA officials said that it is unlikely that an M&O contractor would need to request that the Secretary use the authority. NNSA and M&O contractor representatives told us, that since M&O contractors are not federal entities, they are not subject to the same procurement restrictions as such entities and already possess the capability to exclude a supplier that poses a supply chain risk. When procuring a part from a supplier, an M&O contractor is generally not required to disclose security-related reasons to a potential supplier to explain why that supplier was not selected. Some DOE officials also told us that there are mechanisms within the Federal Acquisition Regulation for federal entities to mitigate supply chain risks for covered system procurements. Some DOE officials provided us their views about circumstances under which the enhanced procurement authority could be useful; however, as of May 2016, DOE had not fully assessed these or other circumstances under which using the authority would help the department manage supply chain risk. However, DOE and NNSA officials said they had not identified the extent to which their direct procurements were for components of covered systems to which the enhanced procurement authority could apply. However, without assessing the circumstances under which the authority could be useful, DOE will have difficulty determining the authority’s relevance and, if the authority is considered to be relevant, developing processes for using it. As a result, if the authority is needed, DOE may miss opportunities to use the authority to better manage supply chain risk. DOE Has Not Examined Whether Adequate Resources Are in Place for Using the Enhanced Procurement Authority
DOE has identified resources for potentially using the enhanced procurement authority but has not examined whether these resources are adequate. Although DOE has not fully examined whether adequate resources are in place to support using the enhanced procurement authority, DOE and M&O contractor representatives expressed a range of opinions about whether adequate resources are available. For example, some DOE OCIO officials said that they did not anticipate a need for more resources because of the enhanced procurement authority. However, M&O contractor representatives said that they could not assess what resources might be needed to support the use of the authority without a requirement to do so in their M&O contracts and that DOE has not established any such requirements. While DOE officials expect that instances under which the authority would be useful would be infrequent, given other options DOE and its M&O contractors have to manage risks, DOE has not fully assessed the circumstances where the authority could be useful, consistent with federal standards that call for management to periodically review control activities for relevance and effectiveness. Examining whether adequate resources are in place, consistent with internal control standards, could help provide assurance that the resources are available to support using the authority in accordance with any processes that DOE develops. Recommendation for Executive Action
To ensure that DOE’s control activities continue to be relevant and effective for managing supply chain risk, the Secretary should direct the Under Secretary for Nuclear Security, as the Administrator of the NNSA, to work with the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence and other DOE organizations, as appropriate, to assess the circumstances that might warrant using the enhanced procurement authority, and If this assessment identifies circumstances that might warrant using the authority, the Secretary should direct the Under Secretary for Nuclear Security to work with other DOE organizations, as appropriate, to establish processes for using it and examine whether adequate resources are in place to support those processes. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOE, through NNSA, is responsible for ensuring the safety and reliability of the nation's nuclear weapons stockpile, among other nuclear weapons-related activities. According to NNSA, the trend toward a non-domestic supply chain for components of nuclear weapons and related systems may pose risks to these weapons and systems. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 provides the Secretary of Energy with an enhanced procurement authority, which may be used to exclude a supplier that poses a supply chain risk from a contract or subcontract, and limit disclosing the reason for the exclusion to the supplier. The act includes a provision for GAO to report annually on DOE's use of the enhanced procurement authority. This report assesses the extent to which DOE has (1) used and developed processes for using the authority, and (2) examined whether adequate resources are in place for using the authority. GAO reviewed DOE and NNSA documents, interviewed DOE and NNSA officials, and interviewed M&O contractor representatives for seven NNSA sites—selected based on their NNSA management and activities.
What GAO Found
As of May 2016, the Secretary of Energy had not used the enhanced procurement authority, and the Department of Energy (DOE) had not developed processes for using the authority, as it had not fully assessed the circumstances under which the authority might be useful. To use the authority, the Secretary must be made aware of a supply chain risk by officials from DOE or its semiautonomous National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). Once aware of a risk, the Secretary must make a written determination that using the authority is necessary to protect national security and that less restrictive measures are not reasonably available to reduce the supply chain risk, among other things. However, DOE has not developed specific processes to collect information to provide to the Secretary for making the determination. DOE officials said that they expect instances under which the authority would be useful to be infrequent, but DOE has not conducted an assessment to confirm that view. NNSA officials said that it is unlikely that management and operating (M&O) contractors who operate NNSA's sites and are generally responsible for procuring parts for nuclear weapons and related systems, would need to request that the Secretary use the authority. NNSA officials and M&O contractor representatives told GAO that, as nonfederal entities, M&O contractors are generally not required to disclose security-related reasons to explain why a particular supplier was not selected. Additionally, DOE officials stated that mechanisms exist within the Federal Acquisition Regulation for federal entities to reject suppliers that pose a supply chain risk. Some DOE officials identified circumstances under which the authority could be useful, but DOE has not fully assessed these or other circumstances under which using the authority would help it manage supply chain risk. Under federal standards for internal control, management should periodically review policies, procedures, and related control activities for relevance and effectiveness. Without assessing the circumstances under which the authority could be useful, DOE will have difficulty determining its relevance and, if necessary, developing processes for using it. As a result, DOE may miss opportunities to use the authority to manage supply chain risks.
DOE has not examined whether adequate resources are in place for using the enhanced procurement authority. DOE officials stated that there were some resources in place, such as information and trained personnel, that could be important in using the authority. However, DOE has not examined whether these resources were adequate, consistent with federal standards for internal control. DOE officials and M&O contractors expressed a range of opinions about whether the resources in place were adequate to support using the authority if needed. For example, while officials in DOE's Office of the Chief Information Officer said that they did not anticipate a need for more resources, some M&O contractor representatives said they might need more trained personnel. However, M&O contractor representatives stated that they could not assess the need without a requirement to do so in their M&O contracts and that DOE had not established such requirements. Examining whether adequate resources are in place, consistent with internal control standards, can help provide assurance that resources are available to support using the authority in accordance with any processes that DOE develops.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOE assess the circumstances that might warrant using the enhanced procurement authority and take additional actions based on the results, such as developing processes to use the authority, if needed, and examining whether resources for doing so are adequate. DOE concurred with the recommendation. |
gao_GAO-08-182 | gao_GAO-08-182_0 | Background
Bilingual Voting Requirements and Covered Jurisdictions
The Voting Rights Act was intended, among other things, to protect the voting rights of U.S. citizens of certain ethnic groups whose command of the English language may be limited. Election Officials in All But One Jurisdiction Reported Providing Bilingual Voting Assistance, but Experienced Challenges
Election officials in 13 of the 14 jurisdictions included in our review reported providing some type of bilingual voting assistance at each stage of the election process but also reported challenges in providing this assistance. In part because DOJ’s guidance intentionally provides jurisdictions some flexibility in how they implement bilingual voting requirements and the needs and preferences of language minority communities vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, election officials in these 13 jurisdictions reported using varying strategies to organize their bilingual voting assistance program staff and offices, work with CBOs, recruit bilingual poll workers, determine where to target their bilingual voting assistance programs, and conduct outreach to the language minority community. The EAC has taken recent steps to provide additional guidance and information to jurisdictions on providing bilingual assistance. Some Forms of Bilingual Voting Assistance Were Perceived as More Useful than Others, but Formally Evaluating Its Usefulness Presented Many Challenges
Although we identified little data measuring the usefulness of various types of bilingual voting assistance, election officials in eight jurisdictions and CBO representatives in seven jurisdictions in our study told us that they believed certain forms of assistance were more useful than others. While the use of formal program evaluation tools has proven to be a successful means for federal agencies to improve program effectiveness, accountability, and service delivery, conducting formal evaluations of the usefulness and effect of bilingual voting assistance is difficult for a variety of reasons. Election officials and CBO representatives in some jurisdictions stated that modifications could be made that would improve the usefulness of the bilingual assistance currently provided to language minority voters. Some Election Officials and Community-Based Organization Representatives Attempted to Measure Aspects of Bilingual Assistance
None of the jurisdictions we included in our study had formally evaluated the effectiveness of their bilingual voting assistance programs, although most had used some means of gathering information about the assistance provided. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to DOJ and the EAC for review and comment. Specifically, our objectives were to provide information on: the ways that selected jurisdictions covered under Section 203 of the Voting Rights Act have provided bilingual voting assistance as of the November 2006 general election, and the challenges they reportedly faced in providing such assistance; and the perceived usefulness of this bilingual voting assistance, and the extent to which the selected jurisdictions evaluated the usefulness of such assistance to language minority voters. Because we selected a nongeneralizable sample of election jurisdictions, the experiences and views discussed in this report cannot be generalized to all 296 jurisdictions required to provide bilingual voting assistance under Section 203 of the Voting Rights Act or to the community-based organizations (CBO) in these jurisdictions. Using a semi- structured interview guide, we obtained information from the election offices about office staff assigned to provide bilingual assistance; the office’s strategy for identifying needs and providing bilingual assistance; the type(s) and availability of bilingual assistance provided at different stages of the election process for the November 2006 general election and any subsequent elections, including voter education efforts, voter registration, early voting and absentee voting, recruiting and training poll workers, ballot design and voting systems, Election Day activities, and the usefulness of this assistance to voters; and supporting documentation as evidence of the types of bilingual voting assistance (e.g., sample ballots, pamphlets, voter education materials, etc.) | Why GAO Did This Study
The Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended, contains, among other things, provisions designed to protect the voting rights of U.S. citizens of certain ethnic groups whose command of the English language may be limited. The Department of Justice (DOJ) enforces these provisions, and the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) serves as a national clearinghouse for election information and procedures. The Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006 mandated that GAO study the implementation of bilingual voting under Section 203 of the act. This report discusses (1) the ways that selected jurisdictions covered under Section 203 of the Voting Rights Act have provided bilingual voting assistance as of the November 2006 general election and any subsequent elections through June 2007, and the challenges they reportedly faced in providing such assistance; and (2) the perceived usefulness of this bilingual voting assistance, and the extent to which the selected jurisdictions evaluated the usefulness of such assistance to language minority voters. To obtain details about this voting assistance, GAO obtained information from election officials in 14 of the 296 jurisdictions required to provide it, as well as from community representatives in 11 of these jurisdictions. These jurisdictions were selected to reflect a range of characteristics such as geographic diversity and varying language minority groups.
What GAO Found
All but 1 of the 14 election jurisdictions GAO contacted reported providing some form of oral or written bilingual voting assistance through such things as the use of bilingual poll workers, and each of the 14 jurisdictions reported challenges in providing assistance. Election offices reported providing similar types of oral and written bilingual voting assistance at each stage of the voting process--from voter registration to Election Day--for the November 2006 and subsequent elections. In nine of the jurisdictions, this bilingual assistance was supplemented by efforts of community-based organizations. In part because DOJ guidance intentionally provides jurisdictions flexibility in how they implement bilingual voting requirements, election offices used varied strategies to implement bilingual programs. Election officials in each of the 14 jurisdictions reported challenges in implementing bilingual assistance programs, including difficulty in recruiting bilingual poll workers and effectively targeting where to provide bilingual voting assistance. Officials in nine jurisdictions also noted they would benefit from additional guidance for providing bilingual assistance. The EAC has taken steps to provide additional guidance to jurisdictions, including plans to develop a set of management guidelines for jurisdictions to use in implementing their programs. GAO identified little quantitative data measuring the usefulness of various types of bilingual voting assistance. Election officials and community-based organization representatives noted that certain forms of assistance, such as having bilingual poll workers, were more useful than others. Some jurisdictions stated that modifications, including outreach to language minority groups, would improve the usefulness of bilingual assistance. While none of the 14 jurisdictions had attempted to formally evaluate their assistance, most reported gathering information about the usefulness of certain aspects of the assistance. While formal evaluations have proven to be a successful means to improve program effectiveness, conducting formal evaluations of the usefulness and effect of bilingual voting assistance is difficult. Key difficulties include identifying the appropriate indicators of success and isolating the effects of bilingual assistance efforts on voters from other influences on election processes. We provided a draft of this report to DOJ and the EAC for comment. DOJ provided no comments, and the EAC's comments described its recent activities on bilingual voting assistance. |
gao_AIMD-95-79 | gao_AIMD-95-79_0 | We also determined what plans DOD has in place to (1) implement/enhance the selected systems, (2) estimate the costs to improve the selected systems, and (3) eliminate the systems not selected. However, DOD lacks the management tools to accomplish this task. Specifically, DOD has not (1) developed a process to ensure the Fund’s policies are consistently implemented, (2) improved the accuracy and reliability of the Fund’s systems, (3) improved the Fund’s monthly financial reports, (4) adequately managed the Fund’s cash, and (5) developed performance measures and goals. DOD Has Reversed Fund’s Cash Management Policy
Since the Fund was established, its cash balance has been centrally managed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Comptroller). However, there is no assurance that this policy change will enhance DOD’s cash accountability. Financial Management: DOD’s Efforts to Improve Operations of the Defense Business Operations Fund (GAO/T-AIMD/NSIAD-94-170, April 28, 1994). | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) progress in implementing the Defense Business Operations Fund Improvement Plan, focusing on: (1) the policies essential to the Fund's operations; and (2) DOD ongoing efforts to correct problems that hinder Fund operations.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) DOD has no systematic process in place to ensure consistent implementation of the Fund's policies; (2) Fund managers lack guidance to execute daily Fund operations; (3) DOD lacks the financial systems necessary to provide for successful Fund operations; (4) DOD has been unable to improve the accuracy and reliability of its financial systems; and (5) DOD has reversed its cash management policy to return cash control to DOD components, however, there is no assurance that this policy change will enhance DOD cash accountability. |
gao_T-RCED-97-133 | gao_T-RCED-97-133_0 | The EPA Administrator and Deputy Administrator also announced plans to create a new office by January 1997 to consolidate the agency’s planning, budgeting, and accountability processes. In the interim, a work group composed of employees on temporary assignment was established to begin developing the new system. EPA Is in the Process of Staffing Its New Office
In January 1997, the EPA Administrator approved the structure and staffing plans for the new office, called the Office of Planning, Analysis, and Accountability. Given the office’s limited staffing, the development of an integrated system is in the early stages. EPA Must Overcome Information Challenges to Implement Its New System
Although EPA continues to expand and improve the environmental data it compiles, it still needs to fill data gaps; improve the quality of its data; integrate information systems; and build the capability to compile, organize, and analyze the data in ways useful to EPA managers and stakeholders. The scientific and technical challenges include identifying (1) a range of health or environmental conditions that can be measured and (2) changes in these conditions that can be linked to a program’s activities. According to EPA officials, the agency’s and the states’ efforts to develop and use environmental measures have been valuable but disparate. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) efforts to improve its methods of establishing priorities, allocating resources, and measuring performance.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) in March 1996, the EPA Administrator announced plans to create a new Office of Planning, Analysis, and Accountability; (2) the office was established in January 1997; (3) in the interim, an EPA work group composed of employees on temporary assignment started to develop the new planning, budgeting, and accountability system; (4) however, the work group was not fully staffed, and the development of the new system is still in the early stages; (5) the new Office of Planning, Analysis, and Accountability will not be fully staffed before July 1997; (6) EPA faces long-term challenges to obtain the scientific and environmental data needed to fully support its new system; (7) although much environmental information has already been collected, many gaps exist and the data are often difficult to compile because divergent data collection methods have been used; (8) likewise, much effort is still required to identify, develop, and agree on a comprehensive set of environmental measures to link the agency's activities to changes in environmental conditions; and (9) without environmental measures, EPA has to rely solely on administrative measures, such as the number of permits issued or inspections made, to measure its performance or success. |
gao_GAO-06-189 | gao_GAO-06-189_0 | While this data indicates some progress since 1990, changes since then are unknown due to a lack of more current data. Telephone Subscribership for Native American Households on Most Tribal Lands Was Substantially Below the National Rate in 2000
According to the 2000 decennial census, the telephone subscribership rate for Native American households on tribal lands in the lower 48 states was 68.6 percent, while for Alaska Native Villages it was 87 percent—both substantially below the national rate of 97.6 percent. No Federal Data Available on Internet Subscribership Rates For Tribal Lands
The status of Internet subscribership on tribal lands is unknown because no federal survey has been designed to track this information. Without current subscribership data, it is difficult to assess progress or the impact of federal programs to improve telecommunications on tribal lands. FCC also has several general programs to support improved telecommunications services. FCC officials told us that modifications to the Act would require legislative action by the Congress, because such modifications cannot be made by FCC through a Commission order or administrative proceeding. The third most often cited barrier was a lack of technically trained tribal members to plan and implement improvements in telecommunications. These two factors, the rural location of tribal lands (which increases the cost of installing telecommunications infrastructure) and tribes’ limited financial resources (which can make it difficult for residents and tribal governments to pay for services) can combine to deter service providers from making investments in telecommunications on tribal lands. Rights-of-Way Issues Were Also Cited as a Barrier to Improved Telecommunications Services on Tribal Lands
According to several service providers and tribal officials, obtaining a right-of-way through Indian lands is a time-consuming and expensive process that can impede service providers’ deployment of telecommunications infrastructure. Tribes Are Addressing Barriers to Improved Telecommunications in Different Ways
Several tribes are moving towards owning or developing part or all of their own telecommunications systems to address the barriers of tribal lands’ rural location and rugged terrain and tribes’ limited financial resources, which can deter service providers from investing in telecommunications on tribal lands. These tribes are using federal grants, loans, or other assistance, long-range planning, and private-sector partnerships to help improve service on their lands. In addition, some tribes have addressed these barriers by focusing on wireless technologies, which can be less costly to deploy across large distances and rugged terrain. According to tribal and wireless service provider officials, the key to developing this solution was the wireless provider’s ability to use universal service funds to help subsidize the costs of its network and offer discounted telephone service to tribal land residents. In addition, the company offers technical consulting services to other tribes that are interested in providing their own telecommunications network. In at least two cases, tribes have not applied for E-rate funds because their tribal libraries are not eligible for state LSTA funds. In the draft report, we recommended that the Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission direct FCC staff to determine what additional data is needed to help assess progress toward the goal of providing access to telecommunications services, including high-speed Internet, to Native Americans living on tribal lands; determine how this data should be regularly collected; and report to Congress on its findings. Scope and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to determine: 1) the status of telecommunications subscribership (telephone and Internet) for Native Americans on tribal lands in the lower 48 states and Alaska; 2) federal programs available for improving telecommunications services on tribal lands; 3) the barriers that exist to improving telecommunications on tribal lands; and 4) how some tribes have addressed these barriers. | Why GAO Did This Study
An important goal of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, is to ensure access to telecommunications services for all Americans. The Federal Communications Commission has made efforts to improve the historically low subscribership rates of Native Americans on tribal lands. In addition, Congress is considering legislation to establish a grant program to help tribes improve telecommunications services on their lands. This report discusses 1) the status of telecommunications subscribership for Native Americans living on tribal lands; 2) federal programs available for improving telecommunications on these lands; 3) barriers to improvements; and 4) how some tribes are addressing these barriers.
What GAO Found
Based on the 2000 decennial census, the telephone subscribership rate for Native American households on tribal lands was substantially below the national level of about 98 percent. Specifically, about 69 percent of Native American households on tribal lands in the lower 48 states and about 87 percent in Alaska Native villages had telephone service. While this data indicates some progress since 1990, changes since 2000 are not known. The U.S. Census Bureau is implementing a new survey that will provide annual telephone subscribership rates, though the results for all tribal lands will not be available until 2010. The status of Internet subscribership on tribal lands is unknown because no one collects this data at the tribal level. Without current subscribership data, it is difficult to assess progress or the impact of federal programs to improve telecommunications on tribal lands. The Rural Utilities Service and the FCC have several general programs to improve telecommunications in rural areas and make service affordable for low-income groups, which would include tribal lands. In addition, FCC created some programs targeted to tribal lands, including programs to provide discounts on the cost of telephone service to residents of tribal lands and financial incentives to encourage wireless providers to serve tribal lands. However, one of FCC's universal service fund programs that supports telecommunications services at libraries has legislatively based eligibility rules that preclude tribal libraries in at least two states from being eligible for this funding. FCC officials told GAO that it is unable to modify these eligibility rules because they are contained in statute and thus modifications would require legislative action by Congress. The barriers to improving telecommunications on tribal lands most often cited by tribal officials, service providers, and others GAO spoke with were the rural, rugged terrain of tribal lands and tribes' limited financial resources. These barriers increase the costs of deploying infrastructure and limit the ability of service providers to recover their costs, which can reduce providers' interest in investing in providing or improving service. Other barriers include the shortage of technically trained tribal members and providers' difficulty in obtaining rights of way to deploy their infrastructure on tribal lands. GAO found that to address the barriers of rural, rugged terrain and limited financial resources that can reduce providers' interest in investing on tribal lands, several tribes are moving toward owning or developing their own telecommunications systems, using federal grants, loans, or other assistance, and private-sector partnerships. Some are also focusing on wireless technologies, which can be less expensive to deploy over rural, rugged terrain. Two tribes are bringing in wireless carriers to compete with the wireline carrier on price and service. In addition, some tribes have developed ways to address the need for technical training, and one has worked to expedite the tribal decision-making process regarding rights-of-way approvals. |
gao_GAO-17-464 | gao_GAO-17-464_0 | GSA’s customer agencies—those federal agencies acquiring services through the Networx program—have principal responsibility for the transition. GSA compiled lessons learned from previous telecommunications transitions, including 35 lessons that described actions that agencies should take during future transitions. Two of these lessons address issues that are not appropriate for the current transition, leaving 33 lessons for agencies. The guidance sources did not address 7 lessons, including those related to agencies (1) bearing the costs associated with contract extensions resulting from delays in their contract selections, transition planning, or ordering; and (2) not assuming that a transition to a new contract with the same vendor will be easier than a change in vendors. By not including all lessons learned in its plans and guidance to agencies, GSA limits agencies’ ability to plan for actions that will need to be taken later in the transition. As a result, the risk is increased that agencies could repeat prior mistakes, including those that could result in schedule delays or unnecessary costs. Incorporate strategic needs into transition planning. 3. 4. Identify resources necessary for the transition. DOT, SEC, SSA, and USDA) had generally addressed parts of all five practices and one agency had fully implemented one practice. The selected agencies provided various reasons for not fully adopting the practices, ranging from their uncertainty due to delays in awarding the EIS contracts and the lack of specific direction and planned contractor assistance from GSA to implement the practices, to having plans to implement practices later as part of established agency procedures for managing IT projects. However, going forward, if the agencies do not fully implement the practices, they will be more likely to experience the kinds of delays and increased costs that occurred in previous transitions. In addition, one agency had partially implemented this activity. ◒ Agency has partially implemented practice activity. Selected Agencies Have Begun to Establish Transition Objectives, Risks, and Measures of Success
To accomplish Practice 5—developing a plan that identifies objectives, risks, and measures of success, and that approaches the process as a critical project with a detailed timeline— the previously identified transition planning practices state that agencies should complete three activities. The five agencies we reviewed had begun preparations for the transition to a new government-wide telecommunications contract. Four of the agencies (GSA, DOL, SEC, and SSA) provided written comments on the draft report, while two agencies (USDA and DOT) provided comments via email. SSA disagreed with our remaining two recommendations. Additionally, SSA disagreed with our recommendation to identify legal expertise and utilize a structured transition management approach. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine to what extent: (1) GSA’s plans and guidance to agencies for transitioning to EIS incorporate lessons learned from prior transitions, and (2) selected agencies are following established planning practices for their transitions. Based on our assessment, we classified the status of a lesson learned as “fully addressed” if the lesson learned appeared in at least one planning and guidance source or if all of the concepts described in a practice were found collectively in multiple guidance sources; “partially addressed,” if part of the lesson learned appeared in at least one document; or “not addressed,” if the lesson learned did not appear in any of the planning and guidance sources. The resulting five departments and agencies’ selected for review were the U.S. Department of Agriculture; U.S. Social Security Administration; Department of Transportation; Department of Labor; and U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. Appendix II: Summary of GSA Lessons Learned
Based on experiences during previous telecommunications transitions, the General Services Administration (GSA) identified 96 lessons learned. Table 7 describes the 35 agency-focused lessons learned identified by GSA during previous telecommunication transitions and the extent to which each was addressed in GSA’s EIS transition plans and guidance. | Why GAO Did This Study
GSA is responsible for contracts providing telecommunications services for federal agencies. Transitions involving previous contracts faced significant delays resulting in increased costs. Because GSA's current telecommunications program, Networx, expires in May 2020, planning for the next transition has begun.
GAO was asked to review preparations for the transition. This report addresses the extent to which (1) GSA's plans and guidance to agencies incorporate lessons learned from prior transitions, and (2) agencies are following established planning practices in their transitions. In performing this work, GAO analyzed GSA lessons learned and transition guidance. GAO also selected five agencies—USDA, DOL, DOT, SEC, and SSA—based on size, structure, and Networx spending. GAO then reviewed the agencies' documentation to determine how they followed five planning practices identified in previous GAO reports.
What GAO Found
The General Services Administration's (GSA's) transition guidance to agencies addressed roughly half of its previously identified lessons learned. GSA identified 35 lessons learned from previous telecommunications contract transitions that identify actions that agencies should take. In transition guidance released to agencies, GSA fully addressed 17 of the 35 lessons. Two lessons from previous transitions were not appropriate for the current transition. GSA partially addressed an additional nine lessons. Seven lessons were not addressed at all (see figure). For example, GSA's guidance did not address the previous lesson that agencies should not assume that a transition to a new contract with the same vendor will be easier than a change in vendors. By not including all lessons learned in its plans and guidance to agencies, GSA limits agencies' ability to plan for actions that will need to be taken later in the transition. As a result, agencies face an increased risk that they could repeat prior mistakes, including those that could result in schedule delays or unnecessary costs.
Selected agencies—the Departments of Agriculture (USDA), Labor (DOL), and Transportation (DOT); the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and the Social Security Administration (SSA)—have yet to fully apply most of the five planning practices previously identified by GAO as key to a successful telecommunications transition. The practices encompass: (1) developing inventories, incorporating strategic needs into transition planning, (2) incorporating strategic needs into transition planning, (3) developing a structured transition-management approach, (4) identifying resources necessary for the transition, and (5) establishing transition processes and measures of success. SEC fully implemented one practice, partially implemented three practices, and did not implement another. The other four agencies partially implemented each of the five practices. Agencies provided various reasons for not following planning practices, including uncertainty due to delays in GSA awarding the new contracts, plans to implement practices later as part of established agency procedures for managing IT projects, and a lack of direction and contractor assistance from GSA. If agencies do not fully implement the practices in the next transition, they will be more likely to experience the kinds of delays and increased costs that occurred in previous transitions.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that GSA disseminate guidance that includes all agency-directed lessons learned. In addition, GAO recommends that USDA, DOL, DOT, SEC, and SSA complete adoption of the planning practices to avoid schedule delays and unnecessary costs. Five agencies agreed with all of our recommendations. SSA agreed with two recommendations, partially disagreed with one, disagreed with two, and provided updated information. GAO stands by the recommendations, as discussed in the report, and revised the report based on SSA's new information. |
gao_GAO-17-516 | gao_GAO-17-516_0 | FBI Has a Framework In Place To Help Ensure Quality In Its Forensic Examinations of Chemical and Trace Evidence
The FBI Laboratory has established a quality assurance framework through its policies and procedures to help ensure quality in its forensic examinations of chemical and trace evidence. ASCLD/LAB accreditation results and our review of the framework found it to meet international and accreditation standards. The FBI Laboratory’s quality assurance framework consists of several components: policies and procedures, quality assurance mechanisms, corrective actions to address nonconformities, and training requirements designed to ensure quality in its forensic examinations. FBI Laboratory Generally Ensures Chemistry and Trace Evidence Units Adhere to Quality Standards, but Could Review More Testimonies
We found that the FBI Laboratory generally ensures the Chemistry and Trace Evidence Units adhere to a variety of quality standards, including conducting audits, implementing corrective actions, ensuring staff have appropriate training, and reviewing laboratory reports. However, the Laboratory’s testimony monitoring program is limited by difficulties in acquiring testimony transcripts. Based on our review of internal audit reports from 2008 to 2015 we found that all of the internal audits of the Chemistry and Trace Evidence Units functioned in accordance with FBI policies and procedures, and international standards. We reviewed the initial training records for the 47 employees who conducted casework in the Chemistry and Trace Evidence Units or provided court testimony related to chemical or trace evidence from fiscal year 2011 to July 2016 and found that the records were generally complete and met FBI requirements. FBI Laboratory Has Processes to Review Laboratory Reports and Testimony, but Could Review More Examiner Testimonies
The FBI Laboratory implemented a monitoring program to help ensure that the results of its forensic examinations and any related examiner testimony are presented consistently with what is known about each forensic method. From fiscal years 2011 through 2015, a total of 22 forensic examiners in the FBI Laboratory’s Chemistry and Trace Evidence Units produced a total of 164 testimonies. However, the FBI Laboratory did not acquire transcripts and conduct internal evaluations for nearly half of these testimonies (78 of 164). To better understand the factors cited by the FBI Laboratory, we sought to obtain the remaining 78 transcripts directly from the courts. However, while attempting to obtain the outstanding transcripts, we also confirmed some of the reasons the FBI identified for not acquiring transcripts. Consistent with internal control standards, the FBI Laboratory could better ensure that it obtains more transcripts by routinely capturing and using additional information and data that are critical to their acquisition, such as the reason a transcript is unavailable, when it is expected to be available, the court jurisdiction, and a point of contact for the transcript. Increasing the number of transcripts acquired could help the FBI Laboratory expand its monitoring of examiners’ testimonies, which helps ensure that they are accurate, supported by the underlying analyses, and within the scientific limits of the given forensic discipline, as defined by FBI and accreditation standards. Recommendation for Executive Action
To better ensure that the FBI Laboratory obtains additional transcripts, the FBI Director should require that the FBI Laboratory’s procedure for tracking and obtaining transcripts routinely captures and uses additional information and data critical to transcript acquisition, such as the reason a transcript is unavailable, when it is expected to be available, the court jurisdiction, and a point of contact for the transcript. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of Justice and Commerce. FBI concurred with the recommendation, and described actions planned to address it. 2. 5. | Why GAO Did This Study
The FBI Laboratory, within the Department of Justice (DOJ), is responsible for analysis of forensic evidence for the FBI, other parts of DOJ, and domestic law enforcement agencies, among others.
GAO was asked to examine how the FBI Laboratory ensures the reliability of its forensic examinations, in particular within its Chemistry and Trace Evidence Units. For these two units, this report addresses (1) how the FBI Laboratory works to ensure quality in conducting forensic examinations, and (2) the extent to which it has taken steps to ensure adherence to the FBI Laboratory's quality standards.
GAO reviewed policies and procedures of the FBI Laboratory and its Chemistry and Trace Evidence Units; audit and accreditation reports from 2008, when the Laboratory was accredited to international standards, through 2015, the most recent available; the training records of all 47 staff who conducted casework in these two units from fiscal year 2011 to July 2016, the most recent available; and evaluation records for examiner testimonies and related laboratory reports in these two units from fiscal years 2011 to 2015, the 5 fiscal years prior to this review. GAO also independently sought to obtain testimony transcripts the FBI was unable to obtain for this period.
What GAO Found
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Laboratory has a framework in place to help ensure quality in its forensic examinations of chemical and trace evidence. Based on accreditation results and GAO's review, the framework meets international and accreditation standards. The FBI Laboratory quality assurance framework consists of policies and procedures, quality assurance mechanisms, corrective actions, and training requirements that are designed to ensure quality in its forensic examinations and related activities (see figure). The framework includes policies, procedures, and training specific to each unit of the Laboratory, such as the Chemistry and Trace Evidence Units.
GAO found that the FBI Laboratory generally ensures the Chemistry and Trace Evidence Units adhere to quality standards for conducting forensic examinations, including conducting audits, implementing corrective actions, ensuring staff have appropriate training, and reviewing laboratory reports. However, the Laboratory's program to review examiner testimonies to ensure they are accurate and within the scientific limits of the given forensic discipline is limited by difficulties in acquiring testimony transcripts. Specifically, the Laboratory did not acquire transcripts and conduct internal evaluations for nearly half of the testimonies (78 of 164) given by Chemistry and Trace Evidence Unit examiners from 2011 through 2015, citing difficulties in locating transcripts and lack of response from courts. To better understand these factors, GAO sought and obtained almost half of the 78 transcripts (36 of 78). While attempting to obtain the remainder, GAO confirmed some of the difficulties identified by the FBI. Consistent with internal control standards, the FBI Laboratory could better ensure it obtains more transcripts for review by routinely capturing and using additional information that is critical to transcript acquisition, such as court jurisdiction and points of contact. Obtaining additional transcripts could help the FBI Laboratory expand its monitoring of examiner testimonies to help ensure the testimonies are accurate and within scientific limits, as defined by FBI and accreditation standards.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the FBI Laboratory's transcript acquisition procedure routinely capture and use additional information critical to transcript acquisition. The FBI concurred with our recommendation and described planned actions for implementation. |
gao_GAO-07-1042T | gao_GAO-07-1042T_0 | The State of Knowledge About TCE and Perchlorate
While TCE and perchlorate are both DOD-classified emerging contaminants, there are key distinctions between the contaminants that affect the extent to which they are regulated, and the information that may be needed before further steps are taken to protect human health and the environment. EPA Has Established a Standard for TCE and Knowledge is Evolving
We provided details about EPA’s evolving standards for TCE and the evolving knowledge of its health effects in our May 2007 report and June 2007 testimony on issues related to drinking water contamination on Camp Lejeune. DOD has used the chemical in a wide variety of industrial and maintenance processes. The health concerns over TCE have been further amplified in recent years after scientific studies have suggested additional risks posed by human exposure to TCE. Perchlorate is a primary ingredient in propellant and has been used for decades by the Department of Defense, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and the defense industry in manufacturing, testing, and firing missiles and rockets. It is readily dissolved and transported in water and has been found in groundwater, surface water, drinking water, and soil across the country. Some federal funding has been directed to perchlorate studies and cleanup activities. DOD’s Responsibilities to Address Perchlorate and Other Emerging Contaminants Where Federal Regulatory Standards Do Not Exist
DOD has certain responsibilities with regard to emerging contaminants such as TCE that are regulated by EPA or state governments, but its responsibilities and cleanup goals are less definite for emerging contaminants such as perchlorate that lack federal regulatory standards. As we reported in our 2005 perchlorate report, DOD has sometimes responded at the request of EPA and state environmental authorities— which have used a patchwork of statutes, regulations, and general oversight authorities—to act (or require others, including DOD, to act) when perchlorate was deemed to pose a threat to human health and the environment. For example, pursuant to its authority under the Clean Water Act’s NPDES program, Texas required the Navy to reduce perchlorate levels in wastewater discharges at the McGregor Naval Weapons Industrial Reserve Plant to 4 parts per billion, the lowest level at which perchlorate could be detected. Finally, according to EPA, in the absence of a federal perchlorate standard, at least eight states have established nonregulatory action levels or advisories for perchlorate ranging from 1 part per billion to 51 parts per billion. Nevada required the Kerr-McGee Chemical site in Henderson to treat groundwater and reduce perchlorate concentration releases to 18 ppb, which is Nevada’s action level for perchlorate. Another of MERIT’s activities was to create an Emerging Contaminant Action List of materials that DOD has assessed and judged to have a significant potential impact on people or DOD’s mission. DOD is Taking Actions to Address TCE
In 1979, EPA issued nonenforceable guidance establishing “suggested no adverse response levels” for TCE in drinking water. According to EPA’s Region 4 Superfund Director, for example, 46 sites on Camp Lejeune have since been identified for TCE cleanup. The Navy and EPA have selected remedies for 30 of those sites, and the remaining 16 are under active investigation. DOD is Sampling For Perchlorate and Taking Cleanup Actions Under Certain Conditions
In the absence of a federal perchlorate standard, DOD has adopted its own policies with regard to sampling and cleanup. In January 2006, DOD updated its policy with the issuance of its Policy on DOD Required Actions Related to Perchlorate. The new policy applies broadly to DOD’s active and closed installations and formerly used defense sites within the United States, its territories and possessions. It stated, for example, that its adoption of 24 ppb as the current level of concern for managing perchlorate was in response to EPA’s adoption of an oral reference dose that translates to a Drinking Water Equivalent Level of 24.5 ppb. The policy also states that when EPA or the states adopt standards for perchlorate, “DOD will comply with applicable state or federal promulgated standards whichever is more stringent.”
The 2006 policy directs DOD to test for perchlorate when it is reasonably expected that a release has occurred. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD defines emerging contaminants as chemicals or materials with (1) perceived or real threat to health or the environment and (2) lack of published standards or a standard that is evolving or being reevaluated. Two emerging contaminants--trichloroethylene (TCE) and perchlorate--are of particular concern to DOD because they have significant potential to impact people or DOD's mission. TCE, a degreasing agent in metal cleaning which has been used widely in DOD industrial and maintenance processes, has been documented at low exposure levels to cause headaches and difficulty concentrating. High-level exposure may cause dizziness, headaches, nausea, unconsciousness, cancer, and possibly death. Similarly, perchlorate has been used by DOD, NASA, and others in making, testing, and firing missiles and rockets. It has been widely found in groundwater, surface water, and soil across the United States, Perchlorate health studies have documented particular risks to fetuses of pregnant women. GAO was asked for testimony to summarize its past work on perchlorate-, TCE-, and defense-activities related to (1) the state of knowledge about the emerging contaminants TCE and perchlorate, (2) DOD responsibilities for managing TCE and perchlorate contamination at its facilities, and (3) DOD activities to address TCE and perchlorate contamination.
What GAO Found
While TCE and perchlorate are both classified by DOD as emerging contaminants, there are important distinctions in how they are regulated and in what is known about their health and environmental effects. Since 1989, EPA has regulated TCE in drinking water. However, health concerns over TCE have been further amplified in recent years after scientific studies have suggested additional risks posed by human exposure to TCE. Unlike TCE, no drinking water standard exists for perchlorate--a fact that has caused much discussion in Congress and elsewhere. Recent Food and Drug Administration data documenting the extent of perchlorate contamination in the nation's food supply has further fueled this debate. While DOD has clear responsibilities to address TCE because it is subject to EPA's regulatory standard, DOD's responsibilities are less definite for perchlorate due to the lack of such a standard. Nonetheless, perchlorate's designation by DOD as an emerging contaminant has led to some significant control actions. These actions have included responding to requests by EPA and state environmental authorities, which have used a patchwork of statutes, regulations, and general oversight authorities to address perchlorate contamination. Pursuant to its Clean Water Act authorities, for example, Texas required the Navy to reduce perchlorate levels in wastewater discharges at the McGregor Naval Weapons Industrial Reserve Plant to 4 parts per billion (ppb), the lowest level at which perchlorate could be detected at the time. In addition, in the absence of a federal perchlorate standard, at least nine states have established nonregulatory action levels or advisories for perchlorate ranging from 1 ppb to 51 ppb. Nevada, for example, required the Kerr-McGee Chemical site in Henderson to treat groundwater and reduce perchlorate releases to 18 ppb, which is Nevada's action level for perchlorate. While nonenforceable guidance had existed previously, it was not until EPA adopted its 1989 TCE standard that many DOD facilities began to take concrete action to control the contaminant. According to EPA, for example, 46 sites at Camp Lejeune have since been identified for TCE cleanup. The Navy and EPA have selected remedies for 30 of those sites, and the remaining 16 are under active investigation. Regarding perchlorate, in the absence of a federal standard DOD has implemented its own policies on sampling and cleanup, most recently with its 2006 Policy on DOD Required Actions Related to Perchlorate. The policy applies broadly to DOD's active and closed installations and formerly used defense sites within the United States and its territories. It requires testing for perchlorate and certain cleanup actions and directs the department to comply with applicable federal or state promulgated standards, whichever is more stringent. The policy notes, that DOD has established 24 ppb as the current level of concern for managing perchlorate until the promulgation of a formal standard by the states and/or EPA. |
gao_GAO-02-954T | gao_GAO-02-954T_0 | Federal, state, and local government agencies have differing roles with regard to public health emergency preparedness and response. In addition, the President’s proposal transfers control over many of the programs that provide preparedness and response support for the state and local governments to a new Department of Homeland Security. Transfer of Certain Public Health Programs Has Potential to Improve Coordination
The transfer of federal assets and resources in the President’s proposed legislation has the potential to improve coordination of public health preparedness and response activities at the federal, state, and local levels. In addition, we have discussed the need for an institutionalized responsibility for homeland security in federal statute. New Department’s Control of Essential Public Health Capacities Raises Concern
The President’s proposal to shift the responsibility for all programs assisting state and local agencies in public health emergency preparedness and response from HHS to the new department raises concern because of the dual-purpose nature of these activities. Therefore, we are concerned about the transfer of control over the programs, including priority setting, that the proposal would give to the new department. We recognize the need for coordination of these activities with other homeland security functions, but the President’s proposal is not clear on how the public health and homeland security objectives would be balanced. The current proposal does not clearly provide a structure that ensures that the goals of both homeland security and public health will be met. In addition to coordination, we believe the role of the new department should include forging collaborative relationships with programs at all levels of government and developing a strategic plan for research and development. The transfer of the HHS medical response programs has the potential to reduce overlap among programs and facilitate response in times of disaster. Related GAO Products
Homeland Security
Homeland Security: Title III of the Homeland Security Act of 2002. Homeland Security: Responsibility and Accountability for Achieving National Goals. National Preparedness: Integration of Federal, State, Local, and Private Sector Efforts Is Critical to an Effective National Strategy for Homeland Security. Combating Terrorism: Intergovernmental Cooperation in the Development of a National Strategy to Enhance State and Local Preparedness. Determining Performance and Accountability Challenges and High Risks. | What GAO Found
Federal, state, and local governments share responsibility for terrorist attacks. However, local government, including police and fire departments, emergency medical personnel, and public health agencies, is typically the first responder to an incident. The federal government historically has provided leadership, training, and funding assistance. In the aftermath of September 11, for instance, one-quarter of the $40 billion Emergency Response Fund was earmarked for homeland security, including enhancing state and local government preparedness. Because the national security threat is diffuse and the challenge is highly intergovernmental, national policymakers must formulate strategies with a firm understanding of the interests, capacity, and challenges facing those governments. The development of a national strategy will improve national preparedness and enhance partnerships between federal, state, and local governments. The creation of the Office of Homeland Security is an important and potentially significant first step. The Office of Homeland Security's strategic plan should (1) define and clarify the appropriate roles and responsibilities of federal, state, and local entities; (2) establish goals and performance measures to guide the nation's preparedness efforts; and (3) carefully choose the most appropriate tools of government to implement the national strategy and achieve national goals. The President's proposed Homeland Security Act of 2002 would bring many federal agencies with homeland security responsibilities--including public health preparedness and response--into one department to mobilize and focus assets and resources at all levels of government. GAO believes that the proposed reorganization has the potential to repair fragmentation in the coordination of public health preparedness and response programs at the federal, state, and local levels. The proposal would institutionalize the responsibility for homeland security in federal statute. In addition to improving overall coordination, the transfer of programs from multiple agencies to the new department could reduce overlap among programs and facilitate response in times of disaster. There are concerns about the proposed transfer of control of public health assistance programs that have both public health and homeland security functions from Health and Human Services to the new department. Transferring control of these programs, including priority setting, to the new department has the potential to disrupt some programs that are critical to basic public health responsibilities. GAO does not believe that the President's proposal is sufficiently clear on how both the homeland security and public health objectives would be accomplished. |
gao_GAO-16-444T | gao_GAO-16-444T_0 | TSA Has Taken Steps Since 2013 to Enhance Its Canine Program, but Further Opportunities May Exist to Assess the Program and Reduce Costs
TSA has taken steps to enhance NEDCTP since we issued our 2013 report. TSA Uses Data to Assess Canine Team Proficiency and Utilization
In January 2013, we reported that TSA collected and used key canine program data in its Canine Website System (CWS), a central management database, but it could better analyze these data to identify program trends. In January 2013, we recommended that TSA regularly analyze available data to identify program trends and areas that are working well and those in need of corrective action to guide program resources and activities. TSA concurred with our recommendation, and in June 2014 we reported on some of the steps it had taken to implement the recommendation. Therefore, we closed the recommendation as implemented in August 2014. Since we closed the recommendation, according to TSA officials, the agency has continued to take steps to enhance its canine program. For example, TSA eliminated the monthly 240-minute training requirement and instead requires canine teams to train on all explosives training aids they must be able to detect, in all search areas (e.g., aircraft), every 45 days. TSA has Deployed PSC Teams to the Highest-Risk Airports
We also reported in January 2013 that TSA’s 2012 Strategic Framework called for the deployment of PSC teams based on risk; however, airport stakeholder concerns about the appropriateness of TSA’s protocols for resolving PSC team responses resulted in these teams not being deployed to the highest-risk airports or utilized for passenger screening. We recommended that TSA coordinate with airport stakeholders to deploy future PSC teams to the highest-risk airports, and ensure that deployed PSC teams are utilized as intended, consistent with the agency’s statutory authority to provide for the screening of passengers and their property. TSA concurred with our recommendation, and in June 2014, we reported that the PSC teams for which TSA had funding and not already deployed to a specific airport at the time our 2013 report had been deployed to or allocated to the highest-risk airports. In January 2015, we closed the recommendation as implemented after TSA deployed all remaining PSC teams (those which had previously been allocated) to the highest-risk airports and all PSC teams were being utilized for passenger screening. Further Opportunities May Exist for TSA to Assess Its Canine Program and Reduce Costs
In our January 2013 report, we found that TSA began deploying PSC teams in April 2011 prior to determining the teams’ operational effectiveness, and had not completed an assessment to determine where within the airport PSC teams would be most effectively utilized. Although TSA has taken steps to determine whether PSC teams are effective and where in the airport environment to optimally deploy such teams, TSA has not compared the effectiveness of PSCs and conventional canines in order to determine if the greater cost of training canines in the passenger screening method is warranted. In December 2014, TSA reported that it did not intend to include conventional canine teams in PSC assessments and cited concerns about the liability of operating conventional canines in an unfamiliar passenger screening environment. In January 2015, we closed the recommendation as not implemented, reiterating that conventional canines paired with LEO handlers work in close proximity with people since, like PSCs, they also patrol airport terminals. Consistent with our recommendation, we continue to believe that opportunities exist for TSA to conduct an assessment to determine whether conventional canines are as effective at detecting explosives odor on passengers when compared to PSC teams working in specific areas, such as the passenger checkpoint queue. If such an assessment were to indicate that conventional canines are equally as effective at detecting explosives odor on passengers as PSCs, then limiting proficiency training requirements of PSCs to those that currently apply to conventional canine teams could save TSA costs associated with maintaining PSC teams. | Why GAO Did This Study
TSA has implemented a multilayered system composed of people, processes, and technology to protect the nation's transportation systems. One of TSA's security layers is comprised of nearly 800 deployed explosives detection canine teams—a canine paired with a handler. These teams include PSC teams trained to detect explosives on passengers and conventional canines trained to detect explosives in objects, such as cargo.
In January 2013, GAO issued a report on TSA's explosives detection canine program. This testimony addresses the steps TSA has taken since 2013 to enhance its canine program and further opportunities to assess the program.
This statement is based on GAO's January 2013 report, a June 2014 testimony, and selected updates conducted in February 2016 on canine training and operations. The products cited in this statement provide detailed information on GAO's scope and methodology. For the selected updates, GAO reviewed the president's fiscal year 2017 budget request for TSA and interviewed TSA officials on changes made to NEDCTP since June 2014, the last time GAO reported on the program.
What GAO Found
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has taken steps to enhance its National Explosives Detection Canine Team Program (NEDCTP) since GAO's 2013 report, but further opportunities exist for TSA to assess its canine program and potentially reduce costs.
TSA Uses Data to Assess Canine Team Proficiency and Utilization: In January 2013, GAO reported that TSA needed to take actions to analyze NEDCTP data and ensure canine teams are effectively utilized. GAO recommended that TSA regularly analyze available data to identify program trends and areas that are working well and those in need of corrective action to guide program resources and activities. TSA concurred, and in June 2014, GAO reported that the agency had taken actions that address the recommendation. GAO subsequently closed the recommendation as implemented in August 2014. Since then, according to TSA officials, the agency has continued to enhance its canine program. For example, TSA reported that it requires canine teams to train on all explosives training aids they must be able to detect—any explosive used to test and train a canine—in all search areas (e.g., aircraft), every 45 days.
TSA has Deployed PSC Teams to the Highest-Risk Airports: GAO found in January 2013 that passenger screening canine (PSC) teams were not being deployed to the highest-risk airports as called for in TSA's 2012 Strategic Framework or utilized for passenger screening. GAO recommended that TSA coordinate with airport stakeholders to deploy future PSC teams to the highest-risk airports and ensure that deployed teams were utilized as intended. TSA concurred, and in June 2014, GAO reported that PSC teams had been deployed or allocated to the highest-risk airports. In January 2015, GAO closed the recommendation as implemented after TSA deployed all remaining PSC teams to the highest-risk airports and all teams were being utilized for passenger screening.
Opportunities May Exist for TSA to Reduce Canine Program Costs : GAO reported in 2013 that TSA began deploying PSC teams prior to determining their operational effectiveness and identifying where within the airport these teams would be most effectively utilized. GAO recommended that TSA take actions to comprehensively assess the effectiveness of PSCs. TSA concurred and has taken steps to determine the effectiveness of PSC teams and where in the airport to optimally deploy such teams. However, TSA did not compare the effectiveness of PSCs and conventional canines in detecting explosives odor on passengers to determine if the greater cost of training PSCs is warranted. In December 2014, TSA reported that it did not intend to do this assessment because of the liability of using conventional canines to screen persons when they had not been trained to do so. GAO closed the recommendation as not implemented, stating that conventional canines currently work in close proximity with people as they patrol airport terminals, including ticket counters and curbside areas. GAO continues to believe that opportunities may exist for TSA to reduce costs if conventional canines are found to be as effective at detecting explosives odor on passengers as PSCs.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making no new recommendations in this statement. |
gao_GAO-11-936T | gao_GAO-11-936T_0 | FDA Conducts Relatively Few Inspections of Foreign Drug Establishments
Although inspections of foreign drug manufacturing establishments— which are intended to assure that the safety and quality of drugs are not jeopardized by poor manufacturing practices—are an important element of FDA’s oversight of the supply chain, our previous work has shown that FDA conducts relatively few inspections of the establishments that it considers subject to inspection. Specifically, in our 2008 report, we estimated that FDA inspected 8 percent of such foreign drug establishments in fiscal year 2007. We estimated that FDA inspected 11 percent of foreign establishments subject to inspection and it would take FDA about 9 years to inspect all such establishments at this rate. FDA’s inspection efforts in fiscal year 2009 represent a 27 percent increase in the number of inspections the agency conducted when compared to fiscal year 2007—424 and 333 inspections, respectively. For example, in fiscal year 2009, FDA conducted 1,015 domestic inspections, inspecting approximately 40 percent of domestic establishments. To address these discrepancies, we recommended that FDA conduct more inspections to ensure that foreign establishments manufacturing drugs currently marketed in the United States are inspected at a frequency comparable to domestic establishments with similar characteristics. FDA agreed that the agency should be conducting more foreign inspections, but FDA officials have since acknowledged that the agency is far from achieving foreign drug inspection rates comparable to domestic inspection rates and, without significant increases to its inspectional capacity, the agency’s ability to close this gap is highly unlikely. In addition to conducting few foreign drug manufacturing inspections, the types of inspections FDA conducts generally do not include all parts of the drug supply chain. Specifically, as we identified in our 2008 report on FDA’s foreign drug inspections, FDA continues to experience challenges related to limits on the agency’s ability to require foreign establishments to allow the agency to inspect their facilities. FDA Lacks Complete Information on Foreign Drug Establishments
Our previous reports indicated that FDA has experienced challenges maintaining complete information on foreign drug manufacturing establishments. This lack of information, which is critical to understanding the supply chain, hampers the agency’s ability to inspect foreign establishments. However, we found that these databases contained incorrect information about foreign establishments and did not contain an accurate count of foreign establishments manufacturing drugs for the U.S. market. Since then, FDA has taken steps to address these deficiencies and improve the information it receives from both the registration and import databases, though these efforts have not yet fully addressed the concerns we raised in 2008. Recent FDA Initiatives to Improve Oversight of the Supply Chain
Given the difficulties that FDA has faced in inspecting and obtaining information on foreign drug manufacturers, and recognizing that more inspections alone are not sufficient to meet the challenges posed by globalization, the agency has begun to explore other initiatives to improve its oversight of the drug supply chain. We reported that FDA’s overseas offices had engaged in a variety of activities to help ensure the safety of imported products. We recommended that FDA enhance its strategic planning and develop a workforce plan to help recruit and retain overseas staff and FDA concurred with our recommendations. FDA is also developing initiatives that would assist its oversight of products at the border. FDA also identified statutory changes that would help improve its oversight of drugs manufactured in foreign establishments. These include authority to (1) suspend or cancel drug establishment registrations to address concerns, including inaccurate or out-of-date information; (2) require drug establishments to use a unique establishment identifier; and (3) implement a risk-based inspection process, with flexibility to determine the frequency with which both foreign and domestic establishments are inspected, in place of the current requirement that FDA inspect domestic establishments every 2 years. Concluding Observations
Globalization has fundamentally altered the drug supply chain and created regulatory challenges for FDA. In light of the growing dependence upon drugs manufactured abroad and the potential for harm, FDA needs to act quickly to implement changes across a range of activities in order to better assure the safety and availability of drugs for the U.S. market. Drug Safety: FDA Has Conducted More Foreign Inspections and Begun to Improve Its Information on Foreign Establishments, but More Progress Is Needed. GAO-10-961. Food and Drug Administration: Overseas Offices Have Taken Steps to Help Ensure Import Safety, but More Long-term Planning Is Needed. GAO-10-960. Medical Devices: FDA Faces Challenges in Conducting Inspections of Foreign Manufacturing Establishments. | Why GAO Did This Study
Globalization has placed increasing demands on the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in ensuring the safety and effectiveness of drugs marketed in the United States. The pharmaceutical industry has increasingly relied on global supply chains in which each manufacturing step may be outsourced to foreign establishments. As part of its efforts, FDA may conduct inspections of foreign drug manufacturing establishments, but there are concerns that the complexity of the drug manufacturing supply chain and the volume of imported drugs has created regulatory challenges for FDA. FDA has begun taking steps to address some of these concerns, such as the establishment of overseas offices. This statement discusses (1) FDA's inspection of foreign drug manufacturing establishments, (2) the information FDA has on these establishments, and (3) recent FDA initiatives to improve its oversight of the supply chain. The statement presents findings based primarily on GAO reports since 2008 related to FDA's oversight of the supply chain. These reports include Food and Drug Administration: Overseas Offices Have Taken Steps to Help Ensure Import Safety, but More Long-Term Planning Is Needed ( GAO-10-960 , Sept. 30, 2010) and Drug Safety: FDA Has Conducted More Foreign Inspections and Begun to Improve Its Information on Foreign Establishments, but More Progress Is Needed ( GAO-10-961 , Sept. 30, 2010). GAO supplemented this prior work with updated information obtained from FDA in August and September 2011.
What GAO Found
Inspections of foreign drug manufacturers are an important element of FDA's oversight of the supply chain, but GAO's prior work showed that FDA conducts relatively few such inspections. In 2008, GAO reported that in fiscal year 2007 FDA inspected 8 percent of foreign establishments subject to inspection and estimated that, at that rate, it would take FDA about 13 years to inspect all such establishments. GAO recommended that FDA increase the number of foreign inspections it conducts at a frequency comparable to domestic establishments with similar characteristics. FDA subsequently increased the number of foreign establishment inspections. FDA's inspection efforts in fiscal year 2009 represent a 27 percent increase in the number of inspections it conducted, when compared to fiscal year 2007--424 and 333 inspections, respectively. However, FDA officials acknowledged that FDA is far from achieving foreign drug inspection rates comparable to domestic inspection rates--the agency inspected 1,015 domestic establishments in fiscal year 2009. Also, the types of inspections FDA conducts generally do not include all parts of the drug supply chain. Conducting inspections abroad also continues to pose unique challenges for the agency. For example, FDA faces limits on its ability to require foreign establishments to allow it to inspect their facilities. Furthermore, logistical issues preclude FDA from conducting unannounced inspections, as it does for domestic establishments. GAO previously reported that FDA lacked complete and accurate information on foreign drug manufacturing establishments--information critical to understanding the supply chain. In 2008, GAO reported that FDA databases contained incorrect information about foreign establishments and did not contain an accurate count of foreign establishments manufacturing drugs for the U.S. market. FDA's lack of information hampers its ability to inspect foreign establishments. GAO recommended that FDA address these deficiencies. FDA has taken steps to do so, but has not yet fully addressed GAO's concerns. Given the difficulties that FDA has faced in inspecting and obtaining information on foreign drug manufacturers, and recognizing that more inspections alone are not sufficient to meet the challenges posed by globalization, the agency has begun to implement other initiatives to improve its oversight of the drug supply chain. FDA's overseas offices have engaged in a variety of activities to help ensure the safety of imported products, such as training foreign stakeholders to help enhance their understanding of FDA regulations. GAO recommended that FDA enhance its strategic and workforce planning, which FDA agreed it would do. FDA has also taken other positive steps, such as developing initiatives that would assist its oversight of products at the border, although these are not yet fully implemented. Finally, FDA officials identified statutory changes that FDA believes it needs to help improve its oversight of drugs manufactured in foreign establishments. For example, in place of the current requirement that FDA inspect domestic establishments every 2 years, officials indicated the agency would benefit from a risk-based inspection process with flexibility to determine the frequency with which both foreign and domestic establishments are inspected. In light of the growing dependence upon drugs manufactured abroad and the potential for harm, FDA needs to act quickly to implement changes across a range of activities in order to better assure the safety and availability of drugs for the U.S. market. |
gao_GAO-03-168 | gao_GAO-03-168_0 | Currently, according to DOD records, over 8 million active duty and retired military personnel along with their dependents and survivors are eligible for health care benefits from the military health care system. Thirteen facilities were not adequately identifying patients with third party insurance, and even when sufficient data were available, billing was not always done. In addition to the weaknesses found in the physical controls over personal property assets, the three facilities provided little or no independent documentation to adequately support the cost or acquisition dates of their personal property items. Recommendations for Executive Action
Because having sound financial and management practices affects the ability of program directors and managers to make better decisions and achieve results, we recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and the military services’ Surgeons General, in conjunction with the senior management at the three MTFs, as appropriate, develop a strategy to make short-term and long-term improvements in data quality in the automated eligibility, cost, and clinical health care systems; develop and utilize analytical tools for facilitating the identification of erroneous records in the eligibility, cost, and clinical health care systems such as comparisons between SSA records and facility automated medical management records; reiterate through correspondence with MTF personnel the importance completing or updating the DOD Form 2569, as required, to document whether each health care beneficiary has third party insurance; entering patient insurance coverage information into the automated medical information system so that more complete and accurate reports can be generated to better identify reimbursable care for billing; billing third party insurance carriers promptly for admissions, outpatient visits, and pharmacy care, including items identified in our testing as well as other care not billed; and collecting third party reimbursements due to the government to the fullest extent allowed as required by DOD policy; require MTFs to maintain an itemized list of the names and quantities of drugs to be returned to the pharmaceutical return goods contractor for credit or disposal, and require MTFs to routinely monitor and evaluate, based on the management reports provided by the contractor and the pharmaceutical prime vendor, the credits received from the returns of drugs and net losses of those drugs to use as an indicator in determining whether on hand inventory levels are appropriate; require property office management to maintain, and have readily available, independent documentation supporting the cost and date of acquisition for all accountable personal property; require property office management to promptly report the loss of any personal property items detected during their periodic physical inventories, and to adjust the property records accordingly; and review and modify the existing processes and requirements to improve documentation of purchase card transaction approvals, independent receipt of the items, and invoices to better verify costs and quantities. An additional contact and staff acknowledgments are listed in appendix V.
Scope and Methodology
We used a case study approach to review key internal control activities in five areas—eligibility, third party billings and collections, pharmacy expired drugs, personal property management, and government purchase card usage at three MTFs. We also did not assess the overall control environment or perform a comprehensive risk assessment nor did we independently verify DOD’s financial information used in this report. Comments from the Department of Defense
The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Defense’s letter dated September 27, 2002. Report number was changed to reflect issuance in fiscal year 2003. | What GAO Found
The $24 billion Military Health System provided health care to over 8 million eligible beneficiaries. Although Congress has provided sizeable increases in funding for health care over the past few years, the Department of Defense (DOD) has needed supplemental appropriations for 6 of the last 8 fiscal years from 1994 to 2001 because its costs were higher than expected. The growing budgetary pressure increases the risk of not achieving the mission of the organization. DOD's military treatment facilities (MTF) represent over half of DOD's health care expenditures. The three MTF's reviewed have not effectively implemented internal control activities in the areas of eligibility, billings and collections, expired drugs, personal property management, and government purchase card usage. The three MTFs also did not identify all patients with third party insurance coverage. In addition, they frequently did not bill those insurers even when they knew that such coverage existed, thereby losing opportunities to collect millions of dollars of reimbursements for services. Ineffective physical and financial controls over personal property assets and indications of control breakdowns in the use of government purchase cards existed at the three facilities. |
gao_GAO-02-775 | gao_GAO-02-775_0 | Maintaining the transportation system is critical to sustaining America’s economic growth. Passenger travel on transit systems is expected to increase by 17.2 percent over the same period. Intercity passenger rail ridership is expected to increase by 26 percent from 2001 to 2010. Travel on Public Roads Is Projected to Grow Fairly Steadily
As shown in figure 5, vehicle miles traveled for passenger vehicles on public roads are projected to grow fairly steadily through 2010, by 24.7 percent over the 10-year period from 2000 through 2010, with an average annual increase of 2.2 percent. The aging of the population might increase the market for demand-responsive transit services and improved road safety features, such as enhanced signage. According to our expert panelists and other sources, with increasing passenger and freight travel, the surface and maritime transportation systems face a number of challenges that involve ensuring continued mobility while maintaining a balance with other social goals, such as environmental preservation. Ensuring continued mobility involves preventing congestion from overwhelming the transportation system and ensuring access to transportation for certain underserved populations. As the elderly population increases over the next 10 years, issues pertaining to access are expected to become more prominent in society. These strategies include the following: 1. Use a full range of tools to achieve those desired outcomes. 3. Focus on the Entire Surface and Maritime Transportation System Rather Than on Specific Modes or Types of Travel to Achieve Desired Mobility Outcomes
Some panelists said that mobility should be viewed on a systemwide basis across all modes and types of travel. Provide Options for Financing Mobility Improvements and Consider Additional Sources of Revenue
Several panelists indicated that targeting the financing of transportation to achieving desired mobility outcomes, and addressing those segments of transportation systems that are most congested, would require more options for financing surface and maritime transportation projects than are currently available, and might also require more sources of revenue in the future. Along with population growth, the increasing affluence of the U.S. population is expected to play a key role in local and intercity passenger travel levels and in the modes travelers choose. Scope and Methodology
Our work covered major modes of surface and maritime transportation for passengers and freight, including public roads, public transit, railways, and ports and inland waterways. | What GAO Found
The U.S. surface and maritime transportation systems include roads, mass transit systems, railroads, and ports and waterways. One of the major goals of these systems is to provide and enhance mobility, that is, the free flow of passengers and goods. Mobility provides people with access to goods, services, recreation, and jobs; provides businesses with access to materials, markets and people; and promotes the movement of personnel and material to meet national defense needs. During the past decade, total public sector spending increased for public roads and transit, remained constant for waterways, and decreased for rail. Passenger and freight travel are expected to increase over the next 10 years, according to Department of Transportation projections. Passenger vehicle travel on public roads is expected to grow by 24.7 percent from 2000 to 2010. Passenger travel on transit systems is expected to increase by 17.2 percent over the same period. Amtrak has estimated that intercity passenger rail ridership will increase by 25.9 percent from 2001 to 2010. The key factors behind increases in passenger travel, and the modes travelers choose, are expected to be population growth, the aging of the population, and rising affluence. According to GAO's expert panelists and other sources, with increasing passenger and freight travel, the surface and maritime transportation systems face a number of challenges that involve ensuring continued mobility while maintaining a balance with other social goals, such as environmental preservation. These challenges include (1) preventing congestion from overwhelming the transportation system, (2) ensuring access to transportation for certain undeserved populations, and (3) addressing the transportation system's negative effects on the environment and communities. There is no one solution for the mobility challenges facing the nation, and GAO's expert panelists indicated that numerous approaches are needed to address these challenges. Strategies included are to (1) focus on the entire surface and maritime transportation system rather than on specific modes and types of travel, (2) use a full range of tools to achieve desired mobility outcomes, and (3) provide more options for financing mobility improvements and consider additional sources of revenue. |
gao_GAO-11-551 | gao_GAO-11-551_0 | Within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs works with the seven reserve components to determine whether members of the Selected Reserve are eligible for TRS and to ensure that members have information about TRICARE, including TRS. TMA works with contractors to manage civilian health care and other services in each TRICARE region (North, South, and West). DOD Does Not Have Reasonable Assurance That Selected Reserve Members Are Informed about TRS
DOD does not have reasonable assurance that members of the Selected Reserve are informed about TRS for several reasons. Second, the contractors are challenged in their ability to educate the reserve component units in their respective regions because they do not have comprehensive information about the units in their areas of responsibility. And, finally, DOD cannot say with certainty whether Selected Reserve members are knowledgeable about TRS because the results of two surveys that gauged members’ awareness of the program may not be representative of the Selected Reserve population because of low response rates. Reserve Components Are Responsible for Providing Information about TRS to Selected Reserve Members, but Most Components Have Not Established Centralized Accountability for TRS Education
A 2007 policy from the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness designated the reserve components as having responsibility for providing information about TRS to members of the Selected Reserve at least once a year. Furthermore, officials from three of the seven components told us that they were not aware of this policy. Additionally, while most of the components had someone designated to answer TRICARE benefit questions, only one of the reserve components had an official at the headquarters level designated as a central point of contact for TRICARE education, including TRS. Despite the challenges contractors face, officials with TMA’s Warrior Support Branch told us that they are satisfied with the contractors’ efforts to provide TRS briefings to the reserve component units in their regions. In addition, during the course of our review, TMA initiated additional efforts that specifically examine access to civilian providers for TRS beneficiaries and the Selected Reserve population, including mapping the locations of Selected Reserve members in relation to areas with TRICARE provider networks. DOD Monitors Access to Civilian Providers for TRS Beneficiaries along with TRICARE Standard and Extra Beneficiaries
Because TRS is the same benefit as the TRICARE Standard and Extra options, DOD monitors TRS beneficiaries’ access to civilian providers as a part of monitoring access to civilian providers for beneficiaries who use TRICARE Standard and Extra. As we have recently reported, in the absence of access-to-care standards for these options, TMA has mainly used feedback mechanisms to gauge access to civilian providers for these beneficiaries. Recommendation for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs to develop a policy that requires each reserve component to designate a centralized point of contact for TRS education, who will be accountable for ensuring that the reserve components are providing information about TRS to their Selected Reserve members annually. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred with our recommendation. Appendix I: TRICARE Management Activity Analysis of Claims
We asked the TRICARE Management Activity (TMA) to conduct an analysis of claims filed for TRICARE Reserve Select (TRS) beneficiaries and TRICARE Standard and Extra beneficiaries. | Why GAO Did This Study
TRICARE Reserve Select (TRS) provides certain members of the Selected Reserve--reservists considered essential to wartime missions--with the ability to purchase health care coverage under the Department of Defense's (DOD) TRICARE program after their active duty coverage expires. TRS is similar to TRICARE Standard, a fee-forservice option, and TRICARE Extra, a preferred provider option. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 directed GAO to review TRS education and access to care for TRS beneficiaries. This report examines (1) how DOD ensures that members of the Selected Reserve are informed about TRS and (2) how DOD monitors and evaluates access to civilian providers for TRS beneficiaries. GAO reviewed and analyzed documents and evaluated an analysis of claims conducted by DOD. GAO also interviewed officials with the TRICARE Management Activity (TMA), the DOD entity responsible for managing TRICARE; the regional TRICARE contractors; the Office of Reserve Affairs; and the seven reserve components.
What GAO Found
DOD does not have reasonable assurance that Selected Reserve members are informed about TRS. A 2007 policy designated the reserve components as having responsibility for providing information about TRS to Selected Reserve members on an annual basis; however, officials from three of the seven components told GAO that they were unaware of this policy. Additionally, only one of the reserve components had a designated official at the headquarters level acting as a central point of contact for TRICARE education, including TRS. Without centralized responsibility for TRS education, the reserve components cannot ensure that all eligible Selected Reserve members are receiving information about the TRS program. Compounding this, the managed care support contractors that manage civilian health care are limited in their ability to educate all reserve component units in their regions as required by their contracts because they do not have access to comprehensive information about these units, and some units choose not to use the contractors to help educate their members about TRS. Nonetheless, DOD officials stated that they were satisfied with the contractors' efforts to educate units upon request and to conduct outreach. Lastly, it is difficult to determine whether Selected Reserve members are knowledgeable about TRS because the results of two DOD surveys that gauged members' awareness of the program may not be representative because of low response rates. Because TRS is the same benefit as the TRICARE Standard and Extra options, DOD monitors access to civilian providers for TRS beneficiaries in conjunction with TRICARE Standard and Extra beneficiaries. DOD has mainly used feedback mechanisms, such as surveys, to gauge access to civilian providers for these beneficiaries in the absence of access standards for these options. GAO found that jointly monitoring access for these two beneficiary groups is reasonable because a claims analysis showed that TRS beneficiaries and TRICARE Standard and Extra beneficiaries had similar health care utilization. Also, during the course of GAO's review, TMA initiated other efforts that specifically evaluated access to civilian providers for the Selected Reserve population and TRS beneficiaries, including mapping the locations of Selected Reserve members in relation to areas with TRICARE provider networks.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs to develop a policy requiring each reserve component to designate a centralized point of contact for TRS education. DOD partially concurred with this recommendation, citing a concern about regional coordination. GAO modified the recommendation. |
gao_GAO-05-10 | gao_GAO-05-10_0 | The Navy Has Not Systematically Evaluated the Feasibility and Cost-Effectiveness of Rotational Crewing for Surface Ships
Although the Navy’s senior leadership has initiated a change in how the Navy can operate in the future by demonstrating that rotational crewing is a feasible alternative to traditional 6-month ship deployments, the Navy has not systematically evaluated the feasibility and cost-effectiveness of all rotational crewing options for its current and future classes of surface ships. The Navy is missing an opportunity to collect data and more objectively assess the impact of extended deployments on ship condition. Navy Has Not Provided Effective Guidance or Capitalized on Lessons Learned from Rotational Crewing Experiences
The Navy has done some planning in support of rotational crewing on surface ships, such as for the Sea Swap demonstration project, but because the concept is evolving as an alternative, the service has not provided effective guidance during implementation on all ships to ensure proper oversight and accountability. Furthermore, the Navy has not systematically leveraged lessons learned to effectively support rotational crewing. Effective guidance and sharing of lessons learned are key management tools to overcome challenges associated with institutionalizing change and facilitating efficient operations. The Navy has well-established crew rotation policies and procedures for ballistic missile submarines for use as best practices that include appropriately documenting the ship’s condition and using advanced teams to help prepare for crew turnover and help ensure accountability. As a result, the Navy unnecessarily risks repeating past mistakes that could decrease warfighting effectiveness and crew morale. Navy Conducted Some Planning in Support of Rotational Crewing
Because rotating crews aboard surface ships on extended deployments differs from the traditional 6-month ship deployment, it is important that planning be effective to increase institutional knowledge and gain acceptance for implementing the change. Maintenance Strategies for Alternative Crewing and Potential Impacts Have Not Been Fully Assessed
The impact of ship maintenance on the implementation of rotational crewing has not been fully assessed. Navy destroyers and patrol coastal ships using rotational crews on extended deployments have faced maintenance challenges to ensure the mission capability of ships while overseas. Therefore, while the Navy used rotational crews to keep ships on station for up to 24 months, in the absence of a careful analysis of alternative maintenance strategies, the Navy runs the risk that some maintenance approaches will degrade the long-term condition of ships, diminish crew morale, and discourage crew support for using the practice. Normally, most ship maintenance and repair is completed between 6-month deployments. Higgins’ ship material condition after a 17-month deployment to be comparable to the U.S.S. Successfully overcoming issues that could impede using this alternative and to gain support for implementing this change require knowledge of the various rotational options and their impact on operational requirements, ship condition, and crew morale. For example, the Navy has not established the analytical framework to evaluate all rotational crewing options and related costs. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Navy has traditionally maintained overseas presence by deploying ships for 6 months. Rotating crews aboard ships that remain deployed for longer periods is an alternative the Navy could pursue to increase the utilization of ships. Senior Navy officials have also cited crew rotations as a way to reduce part of the Navy's plans for a larger force structure and reportedly free billions of dollars for other priorities. On its own initiative, GAO examined the Navy's efforts to evaluate and implement several rotational crewing options and the impacts of ship maintenance on extended rotational crewing deployments.
What GAO Found
The Navy has initiated change by demonstrating that rotating crews aboard surface ships on extended deployments may be a feasible alternative to traditional 6-month ship deployments. To effectively institutionalize and implement change, best practices show that a comprehensive analytical framework provides useful information to decision makers. However, the Navy has not established such an analytical framework--consisting of formal measurable goals, objectives, and metrics--that could be used to assess the feasibility of various rotational crewing options and determine their impact on operational requirements, ship condition, and crew morale. Further, the Navy has not systematically collected or developed accurate cost data to perform complete cost-effective analyses. Absent such information, the Navy may not know the full impact of rotating crews on surface ships, the extent to which the various options should be implemented, or whether it is getting maximum return on investment. Because rotating crews on surface ships is evolving as an alternative, the Navy has not provided effective guidance when implementing the practice and has not systematically leveraged lessons learned. Effective guidance and sharing of lessons learned are key tools used to institutionalize change and facilitate efficient operations. While the Navy has well-established crew rotation policies and procedures for ballistic missile submarines that include appropriately documenting a ship's condition and turnover procedures for accountability, it has not provided comparable guidance to surface ships. As a result, the Navy unnecessarily risks repeating mistakes that could decrease warfighting effectiveness and crew morale. Furthermore, the impact of ship maintenance on the implementation of rotational crewing has not been fully assessed. Effective maintenance strategies help ensure ships can perform their missions without adverse impacts on crew morale. It is a challenge to ensure the mission capability of ships that are deployed for longer periods because most maintenance and repair is usually completed between 6-month deployments. While rotating crews has enabled the Navy to keep ships deployed for up to 24 months, the service has not fully examined all issues related to the best maintenance strategies that could affect a ship's condition and crew's morale. Absent effective strategies, the Navy risks degrading long-term ship condition and discouraging crew support for rotational crewing. |
gao_RCED-97-75 | gao_RCED-97-75_0 | Federal Funding for the Rural EZ/EC Program Is Likely to Total Over $1 Billion
The federal funds invested in the rural EZ/EC program, including loans, grants, and forgone tax revenues, will far exceed the $208 million in EZ/EC SSBG funds allocated to the program. This estimate includes the EZ/EC SSBG funds, plus an estimated $428 million from tax incentives and about $600 million from USDA’s loan and grant programs. Most federal agencies had not estimated the amount of support they expect to invest in the rural EZs and ECs over the 10-year life of the program. USDA, however, indicated that it alone intends to provide about $246 million to rural EZs and ECs over the first 4 years through existing funding sources such as its Rural Business Enterprise Grant program and the Water and Waste Disposal Loan and Grant programs. If this funding level is maintained over the 10-year life of the program, an assumption that USDA officials consider a reasonable expectation, USDA will provide about $600 million to EZ/EC communities. EZs and ECs Vary in Their Progress Toward Implementing the Program
The 33 EZs and ECs have established the structures and procedures needed to implement their strategic plans. EZs and ECs Have Faced a Number of Difficulties in Implementing Their Plans
The rural EZs and ECs have experienced difficulties that have slowed their initial efforts, continue to impede their progress, or both. The difficulties were the short time frame allowed for applying to the program and the misinformation provided by officials at USDA headquarters about the program’s basic operations. While these difficulties have been or are in the process of being resolved, two other issues continue to be of concern. These issues are a lack of clarity about which standards the communities should follow for construction projects when using EZ/EC SSBG funds and the disparity between HHS’ verbal guidance and written guidance to the states on their responsibilities for releasing the EZ/EC SSBG funds to the communities for the EZ/EC program. They noted that the federal agencies involved faced organizational pressures as well. It is to carry out its responsibilities through site visits by USDA state coordinators and USDA headquarters’ reviews of the progress reports periodically submitted by the EZs and ECs. However, USDA cannot adequately fulfill its oversight responsibilities because it has not received complete progress reports from all of the USDA state coordinators or the EZs and ECs. Recommendations to the Secretary of Health and Human Services
To reduce confusion about the program’s guidance on the uses of and financial controls over the EZ/EC SSBG funds, the Secretary of Health and Human Services should direct the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation to (1) clarify which construction-related standards the EZs and ECs should follow in using the EZ/EC SSBG funds and (2) eliminate the conflicts between the Department’s verbal and written guidance on the states’ fiduciary responsibility for the EZ/EC SSBG funds. To review the status of the EZ/EC program’s implementation and identify the difficulties that communities have encountered, we talked with officials and obtained information at all 3 rural EZs, 5 of the 30 rural ECs, six states, and the two principal agencies, USDA and HHS. 2. 3. 4. 6. 7. 8. GAO Comments
1. 4. 9. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed selected aspects of the Department of Agriculture's (USDA) rural Empowerment Zone/Enterprise Community (EZ/EC) Program, focusing on: (1) the federal funding levels of the rural EZ/EC program over the 10-year life of the program; (2) the status of the implementation of the program; (3) the difficulties that the communities have encountered in implementing their plans; and (4) USDA's oversight of the program.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) it estimates that federal funding for the rural EZ/EC program will total more than $1 billion over the 10-year life of the program; (2) this amount includes the $208 million in EZ/EC funds from the Social Services Block Grant (SSBG) program and an estimated $428 million from tax incentives; (3) estimates for direct funding from federal, state, and local programs as well as private sources are not generally available; (4) however, one federal agency, USDA, reports that it plans to provide about $246 million to the rural EZs and ECs over the first 4 years alone and that its funding for the 10-year life of the program could reasonably be expected to reach $600 million; (5) the status of the communities' implementation of the EZ/EC program varies; (6) all 33 rural EZs and ECs have established the basic organizational structures and procedures necessary to implement their strategic plans; (7) in terms of implementing the projects contained in these plans, such as day care services, emergency 911 services, and job training, some communities have made considerable progress and some have made very little; (8) the rural EZs and ECs have experienced a number of difficulties that have slowed their initial efforts, continue to impede their progress, or both; (9) these difficulties include the short time frames provided for applying to the program and the initial misinformation provided by officials at USDA headquarters about the program's basic operations; (10) while some of these difficulties have been or are in the process of being resolved, two issues continue to be of concern; (11) these issues are a lack of clarity about which federal regulations are applicable to the construction projects funded by EZ/EC Social Services Block Grants, and the conflict between the verbal guidance and the written guidance that the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has provided to the states on their responsibilities for ensuring that funds are reasonably and prudently spent; (12) under the EZ/EC program, USDA is responsible for overseeing the progress of the rural EZs and ECs and USDA is to accomplish this oversight through reviews of the periodic reports submitted by the EZs and ECs and by site visits conducted by USDA field personnel, known as EZ/EC state coordinators; (13) however, USDA cannot adequately fulfill its oversight responsibilities because the EZs, the ECs, and the EZ/EC state coordinators do not provide USDA with complete and systematic progress reports; and (14) consequently, USDA lacks the basic management information for identifying problem areas. |
gao_GAO-08-522T | gao_GAO-08-522T_0 | MA Plans Projected They Would Allocate Most of the Rebates to Beneficiaries in the Form of Reduced Cost Sharing and Reduced Premiums
MA plans projected that, on average, they would allocate most of the rebates to beneficiaries as reduced cost sharing and reduced premiums for Part B services, Part D services, or both. In 2007, almost all MA plans in our study (1,874 of the 2,055 plans, or 91 percent) received a rebate payment from Medicare that averaged $87 PMPM. MA plans projected they would allocate relatively little of the rebates (11 percent or $10 PMPM) to additional benefits that are not covered under Medicare FFS. 1.) On average, for plans that provided detailed cost estimates, the projected dollar amounts of the common additional benefits ranged from a low of $0.11 PMPM for international outpatient emergency services to $4 PMPM for dental services. MA Plans Projected that MA Beneficiaries, on Average, Would Have Lower Cost Sharing than if They Were in Medicare FFS, but Some MA Beneficiaries Could Pay More
For 2007, MA plans projected that MA beneficiary cost sharing, funded by both rebates and additional premiums, would be 42 percent of estimated cost sharing in Medicare FFS. Although plans projected that beneficiaries’ overall cost sharing was lower, on average, than Medicare FFS cost-sharing estimates, some MA plans projected that cost sharing for certain categories of services was higher than Medicare FFS cost-sharing estimates. For example, 19 percent of MA beneficiaries were enrolled in plans that projected higher cost sharing for home health services, on average, than in Medicare FFS, which does not require any cost sharing for home health services. Some MA beneficiaries who frequently used these services with higher cost sharing than Medicare FFS could have had overall cost sharing that was higher than what they would pay under Medicare FFS. MA Plans Projected Approximately 87 Percent of Total Revenue Would be Spent on Medical Expenses
For 2007, MA plans projected that of their total revenues ($783 PMPM), they would spend approximately 87 percent ($683 PMPM) on medical expenses. Plans further projected they would spend approximately 9 percent of total revenue ($71 PMPM) on nonmedical expenses, such as administration expenses and marketing expenses, and approximately 4 percent ($30 PMPM) on the plans’ profits, on average. In 2007, the average MA plan receives a Medicare rebate equal to approximately $87 PMPM, on average. MA plans projected they would allocate the vast majority of their rebates—approximately 89 percent—to beneficiaries to reduce premiums and to lower their cost- sharing for Medicare-covered services. Plans projected they would use a relatively small portion of their rebates—approximately 11 percent—to provide additional benefits that are not covered under Medicare FFS. Whether the value that MA beneficiaries receive in the form of reduced cost sharing, lower premiums, and extra benefits is worth the increased cost borne by beneficiaries in Medicare FFS is a decision for policymakers. However, if the policy objective is to subsidize health-care costs of low-income Medicare beneficiaries, it may be more efficient to directly target subsidies to a defined low-income population than to subsidize premiums and cost sharing for all MA beneficiaries, including those who are well off. As Congress considers the design and cost of the MA program, it will be important for policymakers to balance the needs of beneficiaries—including those in MA plans and those in Medicare FFS—with the necessity of addressing Medicare’s long-term financial health. | Why GAO Did This Study
Although private health plans were originally envisioned in the 1980s as a potential source of Medicare savings, such plans have generally increased program spending. In 2006, Medicare paid $59 billion to Medicare Advantage (MA) plans--an estimated $7.1 billion more than Medicare would have spent if MA beneficiaries had received care in Medicare fee-for-service (FFS). MA plans receive a per member per month (PMPM) payment to provide services covered under Medicare FFS. Almost all MA plans receive an additional Medicare payment, known as a rebate. Plans use rebates and sometimes additional beneficiary premiums to fund benefits not covered under Medicare fee-for-service; reduce premiums; or reduce beneficiary cost sharing. In 2007, MA plans received about $8.3 billion in rebate payments. This testimony is based on GAO's report, Medicare Advantage: Increased Spending Relative to Medicare Fee-for-Service May Not Always Reduce Beneficiary Out-of-Pocket Costs ( GAO-08-359 , February 2008). For this testimony, GAO examined MA plans' (1) projected allocation of rebates, (2) projected cost sharing, and (3) projected revenues and expenses. GAO used 2007 data on MA plans' projected revenues and covered benefits, accounting for 71 percent of beneficiaries in MA plans.
What GAO Found
GAO found that MA plans projected they would use their rebates primarily to reduce cost sharing, with relatively little of their rebates projected to be spent on additional benefits. Nearly all plans--91 percent of the 2,055 plans in the study--received a rebate. Of the average rebate payment of $87 PMPM, plans projected they would allocate about $78 PMPM (89 percent) to reduced cost sharing and reduced premiums and $10 PMPM (11 percent) to additional benefits. The average projected PMPM costs of specific additional benefits across all MA plans ranged from $0.11 PMPM for international outpatient emergency services to $4 PMPM for dental care. While MA plans projected that, on average, beneficiaries in their plans would have cost sharing that was 42 percent of Medicare FFS cost-sharing estimates, some beneficiaries could have higher cost sharing for certain service categories. For example, some plans projected that their beneficiaries would have higher cost sharing, on average, for home health services and inpatient stays, than in Medicare FFS. If beneficiaries frequently used these services that required higher cost sharing than Medicare FFS, it was possible that their overall cost sharing was higher than what they would have paid under Medicare FFS. Out of total revenues of $783 PMPM, on average, MA plans projected that they would allocate about 87 percent ($683 PMPM) to medical expenses. MA plans projected they would allocate, on average, about 9 percent of total revenue ($71 PMPM) to nonmedical expenses, including administration and marketing expenses; and about 4 percent ($30 PMPM) to the plans' profits. About 30 percent of beneficiaries were enrolled in plans that projected they would allocate less than 85 percent of their revenues to medical expenses. As GAO concluded in its report, whether the value that MA beneficiaries receive in the form of reduced cost sharing, lower premiums, and additional benefits is worth the additional cost to Medicare is a decision for policymakers. However, if the policy objective is to subsidize health care costs of low-income Medicare beneficiaries, it may be more efficient to directly target subsidies to a defined low-income population than to subsidize premiums and cost sharing for all MA beneficiaries, including those who are well off. As Congress considers the design and cost of MA, it will be important for policymakers to balance the needs of beneficiaries and the necessity of addressing Medicare's long-term financial health. |
gao_GAO-15-654T | gao_GAO-15-654T_0 | 1.) For each VA clinical contract, the CO responsible for the contract designates a contracting officers’ representative (COR) at the VA facility to help develop the clinical contract and monitor the contract provider’s performance once the provider begins work. 3.) Significant Weaknesses Exist in VA’s Monitoring and Oversight of Non-VA Medical Care
VA Lacks Critical Data on Wait Times and Cost- Effectiveness of Non-VA Medical Care
As our recent work has found, critical data limitations related to the wait times veterans face in obtaining care from non-VA providers and the cost- effectiveness of such services hinder VA’s efforts to oversee the Non-VA Medical Care Program in an effective manner. VA does not collect data on how long veterans must wait to be seen by non-VA providers. VA Cannot Analyze the Cost-Effectiveness of Non- VA Medical Care
Our recent work found that limitations in the way VA collects non-VA medical care data did not allow the Department to analyze the cost- effectiveness of non-VA medical care provided to veterans. As we reported in May 2013, we found that VA lacked a data system to group medical care delivered by non-VA providers by episode of care—a combined total of all care provided to a veteran during a single office visit For example, we reported that during an office visit to or inpatient stay.an orthopedic surgeon for a joint replacement evaluation, an X-ray of the affected joint may be ordered, the veteran may be given a blood test, and the veteran may receive a physical evaluation from the orthopedic surgeon. Without cost-effectiveness data, we concluded that VA is unable to efficiently compare VA and non-VA options for delivering care in areas with high utilization and spending for non-VA medical care. As a result, this recommendation remains unimplemented. VA Lacks Automated Processes for Monitoring Non-VA Medical Care Claims Processing and Has Limited Oversight Mechanisms for Validating VA Facility Actions
Our recent reports have found that crucial limitations exist in VA’s monitoring and oversight of non-VA medical care claims processing. Specifically, VA does not have automated systems to help VA facility- based claims processing staff determine whether a non-VA medical care claim is eligible for payment or notifying veterans that their claims have In addition, VA’s oversight mechanisms—including field been denied.assistance visits to VA facilities processing non-VA medical care claims and audits of VA facilities’ claims determinations—are limited due to weaknesses in their execution. As we reported in March 2014, we found that there were no automated processes for determining whether a claim for non-VA medical care meets criteria for payment or ensuring that veterans are notified when a claim is denied.and diligence of VA facility-based claims processing staff reviewing each claim and their adherence to VA policies. For example, we found nine instances where a veteran’s claim was denied under VA’s emergency care authority for non-service connected conditions, but should have been paid under VA’s preauthorized non-VA medical care authority because a VA clinician had Instead these processes rely largely on the judgment referred the veteran to the non-VA provider. Significant Limitations Exist in VA’s Monitoring and Oversight of Clinical Contracts and Contractors
Contract Monitoring Is Limited by Heavy COR Workloads and Inadequate Training
As we reported in October 2013, we found that CORs cited two challenges that may compromise VA’s monitoring of contractors’ performance—the heavy workload associated with the COR position and the lack of adequate training for CORs. Many of these CORs’ primary positions require them to manage staff, maintain budgets, and oversee other clinical providers. Specifically, CORs for 8 of the 12 contracts reported that the demands of their primary positions had at times prevented them from fully monitoring contract providers’ performance. In addition, CORs for 6 of these 12 contracts stated that they could not complete certain elements of their COR responsibilities— such as adequately monitoring contract costs—due to limited time and resources. Relating to training, CORs from the four VA facilities we visited noted weaknesses in VA’s COR training courses and our own analysis of these courses confirmed these limitations. The primary examples used in the course did not include a discussion of clinical contracts at VA and instead walked students through the contracting process using examples such as replacing carpet and making a large computer equipment purchase. Included little information on monitoring responsibilities. In October 2013, we recommended that VA modify its COR training to ensure it includes examples and discussion of how to develop and monitor service contracts—including contracts for the provision of clinical care in VA facilities. VA’s Oversight of VA Facility Clinical Contract Monitoring Is Limited
Our recent work has also found that VA has not established a robust method for overseeing the monitoring of clinical contractors by COs and CORs throughout its health care system. While VA has made progress in implementing this recommendation by completing 45 more reviews of COR files in fiscal year 2014 than in fiscal year 2013, these reviews were still only conducted in 5 of the 21 network contracting offices. | Why GAO Did This Study
VA uses both the Non-VA Medical Care Program and clinical contracts to augment its delivery of care to veterans. GAO has previously highlighted weaknesses in the monitoring and oversight of both non-VA medical care and clinical contracts that remain unresolved.
This testimony is based on three GAO reports issued in 2013 and 2014 and addresses the extent to which VA monitors and oversees its (1) Non-VA Medical Care Program and (2) clinical contracts and contracted non-VA providers working in VA facilities. For all three reports, GAO reviewed relevant requirements and visited a total of 14 VA facilities. For its May 2013 report on the oversight and management of the Non-VA Medical Care Program, GAO reviewed non-VA medical care data from fiscal year 2008 through fiscal year 2012. For its October 2013 report on clinical contract monitoring and oversight, GAO administered a data collection instrument to CORs and reviewed 12 selected clinical contracts. For its March 2014 report on non-VA emergency medical care for veterans' non-service connected conditions, GAO reviewed 128 denied claims.
What GAO Found
GAO's recent work has found significant weaknesses in the Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) monitoring and oversight of its Non-VA Medical Care Program. Through this program, care is provided to veterans by non-VA providers in non-VA facilities. As GAO reported in May 2013, VA did not collect data on wait times veterans face in obtaining care from non-VA providers. Having data on wait times for veterans referred to non-VA providers would help VA better determine if veterans are receiving comparable access to non-VA providers and VA-based providers. In addition, GAO found that VA was unable to analyze non-VA medical care data on all services and charges for an episode of care, which is the combined total of all care provided to a veteran during a single office visit or inpatient stay. As a result, VA cannot ensure that non-VA providers are billing VA appropriately for care or determine whether delivering care through non-VA providers is more cost-effective than augmenting its own capacity in areas of high utilization of non-VA medical care. Moreover, in March 2014 GAO reported that crucial limitations existed in VA's monitoring and oversight of non-VA medical care claims processing. Specifically, VA lacked automated processes for (1) determining whether claims met VA's criteria for payment and (2) notifying veterans when their claims were denied. Instead, these processes relied largely on the judgment and diligence of VA facility-based claims processing staff. For example, GAO found several non-VA medical care claims that were inappropriately denied because VA facility-based claims processing staff processed the claims under the wrong payment authority. Moreover, GAO found that VA's oversight was lacking in key aspects of the claims review process, a factor that allowed inappropriate denials and notification issues to persist.
GAO's recent work has also found significant limitations in VA's monitoring and oversight of clinical contracts and contractors—a method VA uses to bring non-VA providers into VA facilities. As GAO reported in October 2013, contracting officer's representatives' (COR) heavy workloads and inadequate training compromised VA's monitoring of contractor performance. CORs are responsible for monitoring the work of non-VA providers working in VA facilities under a contract once the contract is in place. CORs for 8 of the 12 contracts GAO reviewed in depth reported that the demands of their primary positions at the VA facility have at times prevented them from fully monitoring contract providers' performance. Six of these CORs stated that they could not complete certain elements of their COR responsibilities—such as adequately monitoring contract costs—due to limited time and resources. Robust VA oversight would better ensure that the contract providers deliver high quality care to veterans and fulfill the responsibilities of their contracts. In addition, CORs from the four VA facilities GAO visited noted weaknesses in VA's COR training and GAO's analysis confirmed these limitations. Specifically, GAO found this training focused on teaching CORs to develop contracts that purchase goods and not clinical services. The primary examples in this course included discussions of the contracting process for replacing carpet and making a large computer purchase. In addition, COR training included little information on how CORs should engage in post-award monitoring of clinical contractors.
What GAO Recommends
GAO made 22 recommendations to VA in its prior three reports related to improving (1) data on wait times and cost-effectiveness of non-VA medical care; (2) VA's oversight and monitoring of claims processing; and (3) VA's monitoring of clinical contractors. VA agreed with these recommendations, and has taken action on some, but has yet to fully implement many of them. |
gao_GAO-10-223 | gao_GAO-10-223_0 | Recipients in all 50 states reported jobs created or retained with Recovery Act funding provided through a wide range of federal programs and agencies. Table 1 shows the distribution of jobs created or retained across the nation as reported by recipients on Recovery.gov. Recipients of Recovery Act Funds We Contacted Appear to Have Made Good Faith Efforts to Ensure Complete and Accurate Reporting, but It Will Take Time to Improve Data Quality
While recipients GAO contacted appear to have made good faith efforts to ensure complete and accurate reporting, GAO’s fieldwork and initial review and analysis of recipient data from www.recovery.gov, indicate that there are a range of significant reporting and quality issues that need to be addressed. Because this effort will be an ongoing process of cumulative reporting, our first review represents a snapshot in time. Initial Observations on Recipient Reporting Data Identify Areas Where Further Review and Guidance Are Needed
We performed an initial set of edit checks and basic analyses on the recipient report data available for download from Recovery.gov on October 30, 2009. As shown in table 3, we identified 3,978 prime recipient reports where FTEs were reported but no dollar amount was reported in the data fields for amount of Recovery Act funds received and amount of Recovery Act funds expended. There were also 9,247 reports that showed no FTEs but did show some funding amount in either or both of the funds received or expended data fields. Various Interpretations of How to Report FTEs Produced Questionable Data on Jobs Created or Retained
Under OMB guidance, jobs created or retained were to be expressed as FTEs. We found that data were reported inconsistently even though significant guidance and training was provided by OMB and federal agencies. While FTEs should allow for the aggregation of different types of jobs—part-time, full-time or temporary—differing interpretations of the FTE guidance compromise the ability to aggregate the data. In section 5.2 of the June 22 guidance, OMB states that “the estimate of the number of jobs required by the Recovery Act should be expressed as ‘full-time equivalents’ (FTE), which is calculated as the total hours worked in jobs retained divided by the number of hours in a full time schedule, as defined by the recipient.” Further, “the FTE estimates must be reported cumulatively each calendar quarter.” In section 5.3, OMB states that “reporting is cumulative across the project lifecycle, and will not reset at the beginning of each calendar or fiscal year.”
FTE calculations varied depending on the period of performance the recipient reported on. For example, in the case of federal highways projects, some have been ongoing for six months, while others started in September 2009. Particularly given the scale of the project and how quickly it was implemented, within several months, the ability of the reporting mechanisms to handle the volume of data from the range of recipients represents a solid first step in the data collection and reporting process for the fulfillment of the section 1512 mandate. As shown in table 6, more than three quarters of the prime recipient reports were marked as having undergone agency review. Less than one percent was marked as having undergone review by the prime recipient. e e with the reporting requirements. Although there were problems of inconsistent interpretation of the guidance, the reporting process went well for highway projects. We also reviewed federal and state guidance and other documentation. GAO Will Continue to Follow These Issues and Highlight Concerns in Subsequent Reports
As recipient reporting moves forward, we will continue to review the processes that federal agencies and recipients have in place to ensure the completeness and accuracy of data, including reviewing a sample of recipient reports across various Recovery Act programs to assure the quality of the reported information. Job losses in October 2009 numbered 190,000. We examined these contracts and confirmed these requirements. | Why GAO Did This Study
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act) requires recipients of funding from federal agencies to report quarterly on jobs created or retained with Recovery Act funding. The first recipient reports filed in October 2009 cover activity from February through September 30, 2009. GAO is required to comment on the jobs created or retained as reported by recipients. This report addresses (1) the extent to which recipients were able to fulfill their reporting requirements and the processes in place to help ensure data quality and (2) how macroeconomic data and methods, and the recipient reports, can be used to assess the employment effects of the Recovery Act. GAO performed an initial set of basic analyses on the final recipient report data that first became available at www.recovery.gov on October 30, 2009; reviewed documents; interviewed relevant state and federal officials; and conducted fieldwork in selected states, focusing on a sample of highway and education projects.
What GAO Found
On October 30, www.recovery.gov (the federal Web site on Recovery Act spending) reported that more than 100,000 recipients reported hundreds of thousands of jobs created or retained. Given the national scale of the recipient reporting exercise and the limited time frames in which it was implemented, the ability of the reporting mechanism to handle the volume of data from a wide variety of recipients represents a solid first step in moving toward more transparency and accountability for federal funds. Because this effort will be an ongoing process of cumulative reporting, GAO's first review represents a snapshot in time. While recipients GAO contacted appear to have made good faith efforts to ensure complete and accurate reporting, GAO's fieldwork and initial review and analysis of recipient data from www.recovery.gov , indicate that there are a range of significant reporting and quality issues that need to be addressed For example, GAO's review of prime recipient reports identified the following: Erroneous or questionable data entries that merit further review: (1) 3,978 reports that showed no dollar amount received or expended but included more than 50,000 jobs created or retained; (2) 9,247 reports that showed no jobs but included expended amounts approaching $1 billion, and (3) Instances of other reporting anomalies such as discrepancies between award amounts and the amounts reported as received which, although relatively small in number, indicate problematic issues in the reporting. Coverage: While OMB estimates that more than 90 percent of recipients reported, questions remain about the other 10 percent. Quality review: While less than 1 percent were marked as having undergone review by the prime recipient, over three quarters of the prime reports were marked as having undergone review by a federal agency. Full-time equivalent (FTE) calculations: Full-time equivalent (FTE) calculations: Under OMB guidance, jobs created or retained were to be expressed as FTEs. GAO found that data were reported inconsistently even though significant guidance and training was provided by OMB and federal agencies. While FTEs should allow for the aggregation of different types of jobs--part time, full time or temporary--differing interpretations of the FTE guidance compromise the ability to aggregate the data. Although there were problems of inconsistent interpretation of the guidance, the reporting process went relatively well for highway projects. Transportation had an established procedure for reporting prior to enactment of the Recovery Act. In the cases of Education and Housing, which do not have this prior reporting experience, GAO found more problems. Some of these have been reported in the press. State and federal officials are examining these problems and have stated their intention to deal with them. |
gao_GAO-13-618 | gao_GAO-13-618_0 | Forest Service Has Substantial Unmet Trail Maintenance Needs, Resulting in Multiple Negative Effects
The Forest Service has more miles of trail than it has been able to maintain, resulting in a long-standing deferred maintenance backlog. For fiscal year 2012, the agency reported that it accomplished at least some maintenance on about 37 percent of its trail miles, or 59,274 miles of trail, exceeding its fiscal year 2012 target of 46,580 miles. The Forest Service estimated an additional $210 million for that year in three other trail maintenance- related needs: annual maintenance, capital improvement, and operations. Unmaintained Trails Inhibit Trail Use, Harm Natural Resources, and Add to Agency Costs
Trails not maintained to the Forest Service’s standards have a range of negative effects, including inhibiting trail use and posing potential safety hazards, harming natural resources, and adding to agency costs. As one official said, “The longer one waits to fix a problem, the harder it will be to fix.”
To Maintain Trails, the Forest Service Relies on a Combination of Internal and External Resources
The Forest Service relies on a combination of internal and external resources to help maintain its trail system. External resources used by the agency for trail maintenance include volunteer labor and funding from federal programs, states, and other sources. For example, Mt. Varied Factors Complicate the Maintenance of Forest Service Trails
According to agency officials and stakeholders we spoke with, a number of factors complicate the Forest Service’s trail maintenance efforts, including (1) factors associated with the origin and location of trails, (2) some agency policies and procedures, and (3) factors associated with management of volunteers and other external resources. Many Forest Service trails are legacy trails created for purposes other than recreation, such as access for mining, timber harvesting, or firefighting. Managing Volunteers and Other External Resources Can Take Time Away from On-the-Ground Maintenance
Although volunteers and other external resources were repeatedly cited as important to the agency’s trail maintenance efforts, officials and stakeholders we interviewed identified a number of complications related to working with volunteers, including insufficient agency emphasis on managing volunteers; the time and effort it takes to coordinate, train, and supervise them, which decreases the time officials can spend conducting maintenance; safety and liability concerns that limit local use of volunteers; and the tenuous nature of partnerships. Stakeholders Have Identified Numerous Options for Improving Trail Maintenance over the Long and Short Terms
Agency officials and stakeholders identified numerous options aimed at improving Forest Service trail maintenance, which generally fell into the following categories: (1) assessing the sustainability of the trail system, (2) improving certain policies and procedures associated with the Forest Service’s management of the trails program, and (3) better using volunteers and other external resources. The Framework states that the agency is to train staff and develop needed skills. As noted earlier, even with the agency’s emphasis on using volunteers—articulated in the Forest Service Manual—the agency has not established collaboration with and management of volunteers as clear expectations for trails staff responsible for working with volunteers, and training in this area is limited. Given the value of volunteer hours devoted to Forest Service trail maintenance in fiscal year 2012—equivalent to nearly one-third of the agency’s trails allocation—some officials and stakeholders said that making collaboration with and management of volunteers clear expectations for trails staff (e.g., through performance evaluation standards) and offering relevant training could enhance the agency’s management of volunteers, as well as better reflect the central role that volunteers play in trail maintenance. Some agency officials and stakeholders also identified ways they believe the Forest Service could better leverage external funds. To improve agency management of its trails program in the long term, particularly in light of the gap between program needs and available resources, the agency should take the following two actions consistent with the agency’s Framework for Sustainable Recreation: In line with the Framework’s emphasis on evaluating infrastructure investments and program costs, (1) ensure that the agency’s management of its trails program includes an analysis of trails program needs and available resources and (2) develop options for narrowing the gap between program needs and resources. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to examine (1) the extent to which the Forest Service is meeting trail maintenance needs, and effects associated with any maintenance not done; (2) resources, including funding and labor, that the agency employs to maintain its trails; (3) factors, if any, complicating agency efforts to maintain its trails; and (4) options, if any, that could improve the agency’s trail maintenance efforts. To assess the reliability of the data, we reviewed relevant documentation and interviewed agency officials knowledgeable about the data. We selected these organizations to represent a variety of trail user, conservation, and industry perspectives. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Forest Service manages more than 158,000 miles of recreational trails offering hikers, horseback riders, cyclists, off-highway-vehicle drivers, and others access to national forests. To remain safe and usable, these trails need regular maintenance, such as removal of downed trees or bridge repairs. GAO was asked to review the agency's trail maintenance activities. This report examines (1) the extent to which the Forest Service is meeting trail maintenance needs, and effects associated with any maintenance not done; (2) resources, including funding and labor, that the agency employs to maintain its trails; (3) factors, if any, complicating agency efforts to maintain its trails; and (4) options, if any, that could improve the agency's trail maintenance efforts. GAO reviewed laws and agency documents; analyzed Forest Service budget data for fiscal years 2006-2012 and trails data for fiscal years 2008-2012; and interviewed agency officials and representatives of 16 stakeholder groups selected to represent trail users, conservation, and industry. Their views are not generalizable.
What GAO Found
The Forest Service has more miles of trail than it has been able to maintain, resulting in a persistent maintenance backlog with a range of negative effects. In fiscal year 2012, the agency reported that it accomplished at least some maintenance on about 37 percent of its 158,000 trail miles and that about one-quarter of its trail miles met the agency's standards. The Forest Service estimated the value of its trail maintenance backlog to be $314 million in fiscal year 2012, with an additional $210 million for annual maintenance, capital improvement, and operations. Trails not maintained to quality standards have a range of negative effects, such as inhibiting trail use and harming natural resources, and deferring maintenance can add to maintenance costs.
The Forest Service relies on a combination of internal and external resources to help maintain its trail system. Internal resources include about $80 million allocated annually for trail maintenance activities plus funding for other agency programs that involve trails. External resources include volunteer labor, which the Forest Service valued at $26 million in fiscal year 2012, and funding from federal programs, states, and other sources.
Collectively, agency officials and stakeholders GAO spoke with identified a number of factors complicating the Forest Service's trail maintenance efforts, including (1) factors associated with the origin and location of trails, (2) some agency policies and procedures, and (3) factors associated with the management of volunteers and other external resources. For example, many trails were created for purposes other than recreation, such as access for timber harvesting or firefighting, and some were built on steep slopes, leaving unsustainable, erosion-prone trails that require continual maintenance. In addition, certain agency policies and procedures complicate trail maintenance efforts, such as the agency's lack of standardized training in trails field skills, which limits agency expertise. Further, while volunteers are important to the agency's trail maintenance efforts, managing volunteers can decrease the time officials can spend performing on-the-ground maintenance.
Agency officials and stakeholders GAO interviewed collectively identified numerous options to improve Forest Service trail maintenance, including (1) assessing the sustainability of the trail system, (2) improving agency policies and procedures, and (3) improving management of volunteers and other external resources. In a 2010 document titled A Framework for Sustainable Recreation, the Forest Service noted the importance of analyzing recreation program needs and available resources and assessing potential ways to narrow the gap between them, which the agency has not yet done for its trails. Many officials and stakeholders suggested that the agency systematically assess its trail system to identify ways to reduce the gap and improve trail system sustainability. They also identified other options for improving management of volunteers. For example, while the agency's goal in the Forest Service Manual is to use volunteers, the agency has not established collaboration with and management of volunteers who help maintain trails as clear expectations for trails staff responsible for working with volunteers, and training in this area is limited. Some agency officials and stakeholders stated that training on how to collaborate with and manage volunteers would enhance the agency's ability to capitalize on this resource.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends, among otheractions, that the Forest Service (1) analyze trails program needs and available resources and develop options for narrowing the gap between them and take steps to assess and improve the sustainability of its trails and (2) take steps to enhance training on collaborating with and managing volunteers who help maintain trails. In commenting on a draft of this report, the Forest Service generally agreed with GAO's findings and recommendations. |
gao_GAO-04-307 | gao_GAO-04-307_0 | Treasury and Industry Participants Have Made Progress in Implementing TRIA, but Treasury Has Not Yet Achieved Key Goals
More than a year after TRIA’s enactment, Treasury and insurance industry participants have made progress in implementing and complying with its provisions, but Treasury has yet to fully implement the 3-year program. Treasury has issued regulations (final rules) to guide insurance market participants, fully staffed the TRIP office, and started collecting data and performing studies mandated by TRIA. However, Treasury has yet to make the claims payment function operational and decide whether to extend the “make available” requirement through 2005. 2). More specifically, TRIA gave Treasury until September 1, 2004, to decide if the requirement that insurers offer terrorism coverage on terms that do not differ materially from other coverage should be extended for policies issued or renewed in 2005, the third and final year of the program. Additionally, Treasury has not yet developed processes for auditing claims payments to insurers. Insurance Companies Made Changes to Their Operations to Comply with TRIA
In order to comply with TRIA requirements, primarily those concerning disclosure to policyholders, insurers generally have made changes to their operations. Insurers are concerned that Treasury has not already made a decision about extending the “make available” requirement through 2005; they are also concerned about the potential length of time it may take for the Secretary of the Treasury to certify a terrorist event, potential inefficiencies and time lags in processing and paying claims once an event is certified, and the issue of TRIA expiration. Insurers need to make underwriting, price, and coverage decisions for these policies in mid-2004. Despite Availability, Few Are Buying Terrorism Insurance, and the Industry Has Made Little Progress toward Post-TRIA Coverage
While TRIA has improved the availability of terrorism insurance, particularly for high-risk properties in major metropolitan areas, most commercial policyholders are not buying the coverage. Tighter Exclusions Leave Policyholders Exposed to Significant Perils
Since September 11, 2001, the insurance industry has moved to tighten long-standing exclusions from coverage for losses resulting from NBC attacks and radiation contamination. As of March 1, 2004, industry sources indicated that there has been little development or movement among insurers or reinsurers toward developing a private-sector mechanism that could provide capacity, without government involvement, to absorb losses from terrorist events. Key components of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Program defined by TRIA remain uncompleted. The first was to ensure that business activity did not suffer from the lack of insurance by requiring insurers to continue to provide protection from the financial consequences of another terrorist attack. Since TRIA was enacted in November 2002, terrorism insurance generally has been available to businesses. While most have not purchased this coverage, purchases have been higher in areas considered to be at high risk of another terrorist attack. As a result, the first objective of TRIA appears largely to have been achieved. Congress’s second objective was to give the insurance industry a transitional period during which it could begin pricing terrorism risks and developing ways to provide such insurance after TRIA expires. Unfortunately, insurers and reinsurers still have not found a reliable method for pricing terrorism insurance, and although TRIA has provided reinsurers the opportunity to reenter the market to a limited extent, industry participants have not developed a mechanism to replace TRIA. Such an assessment could be a part of Treasury’s TRIA-mandated study to “assess…the likely capacity of the property and casualty insurance industry to offer insurance for terrorism risk after termination of the Program.”
Recommendation for Executive Action
As part of the response to Treasury’s TRIA-mandated study requiring an assessment of the effectiveness of TRIA and evaluating the capacity of the industry to offer terrorism insurance after TRIA expires, we recommend that the Secretary of the Treasury, after consulting with the insurance industry and other interested parties, also identify for Congress an array of alternatives that may exist for expanding the availability and affordability of terrorism insurance after TRIA expires. | Why GAO Did This Study
After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, insurance coverage for terrorism largely disappeared. Congress passed the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA) in 2002 to help commercial property-casualty policyholders obtain terrorism insurance and give the insurance industry time to develop mechanisms to provide such insurance after the act expires on December 31, 2005. Under TRIA, the Department of Treasury caps insurer liability and would process claims and reimburse insurers for a large share of losses from terrorist acts that Treasury certified as meeting certain criteria. As Treasury and industry participants have operated under TRIA for more than a year, GAO was asked to describe (1) their progress in implementing the act and (2) changes in the terrorism insurance market under TRIA.
What GAO Found
Treasury and industry participants have made significant progress in implementing TRIA during its first year, but Treasury has important work to complete in order to comply with its responsibilities under the act. For example, Treasury has issued regulations to define program requirements, created and fully staffed the Terrorism Risk Insurance Program office, and begun data collection efforts in support of mandated studies. Insurers also have adjusted their operations and policies to comply with TRIA. However, insurers have expressed concerns that Treasury has not yet decided whether to extend through 2005 the requirement that insurers offer terrorism coverage on terms that do not differ materially from other coverage. Although the act gives Treasury until September 1, 2004, to decide this issue, a more timely decision is needed to avoid hindering underwriting and pricing decisions for policies that are issued or renewed through 2005. In addition, Treasury has not fully established a claims processing and payment structure. Insurers are concerned that a delayed payment of claims by Treasury, whether because of the length of time taken to certify that an act of terrorism met the requirements for federal reimbursement or from inadequate claims processing capability, might seriously impact insurer cash flows or, in certain circumstances, insurer solvency. It appears that Congress's first objective in creating TRIA--to ensure that business activity did not materially suffer from a lack of available terrorism insurance--has been largely achieved. Since TRIA was enacted in November 2002, terrorism insurance has been generally available to businesses. But most commercial policyholders are not buying the coverage. According to insurance industry experts, purchases have been higher in areas considered to be at high risk of another terrorist attack. However, many policyholders with businesses or properties not located in perceived high-risk locations are not buying coverage because they view any price for terrorism insurance as high relative to their perceived risk exposure. Further, those who have bought terrorism insurance remain exposed to significant perils. Insurers have broadened long-standing policy exclusions of nuclear, biological, and chemical events. Congress's second objective--to give private industry a transitional period during which it could begin pricing terrorism insurance and develop ways to cover losses after TRIA expired--has not yet been achieved. Industry sources indicated that under TRIA, insurance market participants have made no progress to date toward the development of reliable methods for pricing terrorism risks and made little movement toward developing any mechanism that would enable insurers to provide terrorism insurance to businesses without government involvement. |
gao_NSIAD-95-142 | gao_NSIAD-95-142_0 | Introduction
The Department of Defense (DOD) operates a worldwide logistics system to buy, store, and distribute inventory items. Traditionally, the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) buys and stores consumable items (such as food, clothing, and hardware supplies) in large quantities until they are needed by the military services. This report summarizes our past reviews and addresses (1) the extent to which DOD has adopted the specific practices we recommended, (2) the savings and benefits being achieved through the use of these practices, and (3) DOD’s overall progress in improving consumable item management. Our discussions focused on (1) the inventory management practices that DOD is using for consumable items; (2) commercial practices, programs, and tests underway or planned to improve DOD operations and reduce costs; and (3) DOD officials’ positions on the use of best practices as alternatives to traditional DOD inventory practices. For the personnel items it manages, which account for 23 percent of DLA’s inventory value, DLA has made the most progress to adopt best inventory practices by establishing prime vendor programs that have reduced inventories and improved service to the customer. As a result of its improvement efforts, DLA expects to reduce its inventories and days of supply of personnel items by over 50 percent between 1992 and 1997. Since 1993, DLA has taken steps that use prime vendors to supply personnel items directly to military facilities. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) efforts to adopt best inventory management practices, focusing on: (1) whether DOD has adopted the specific practices recommended for consumable items; (2) the savings and benefits being achieved through the use of these practices; and (3) DOD overall progress in improving consumable item management.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) has taken steps to improve its logistics practices and reduce consumable inventories, although it could make further improvements with items such as bolts, valves, and fuses that cost millions of dollars to manage and store; (2) DLA inventories are expected to decrease only 20 percent by 1997, but these inventories could last over two years; (3) DLA has not tested the most innovative commercial practices of using supplier parks and other techniques that give established distribution networks the responsibility to manage, store, and distribute inventory on a frequent basis directly to end users; (4) DLA use of best inventory practices is exemplified for personnel items where prime vendors are used to supply personnel items directly to military facilities; (5) DLA expects to reduce the 1992 personnel item inventory by 53 percent in 1997; and (6) DOD hospitals still hold larger inventories than those civilian hospitals that have reduced inventories through effective partnering arrangements with prime vendors. |
gao_GAO-15-687 | gao_GAO-15-687_0 | In particular, PPACA standardized health insurance plans into four “metal” tiers of coverage—bronze, silver, gold, and platinum—which reflect out-of-pocket costs that may be incurred by an enrollee. Premium variation based on health status or gender was effectively prohibited. Individual Market Consumers Generally Had Access to More Plans in 2015 Compared to 2014, and the Lowest-Cost Plans Were Available through Exchanges in Most Counties in Both Years
Individual market consumers in every county in our analysis had access to a variety of plan options each year, and the number of plans available to consumers generally increased from 2014 to 2015. For example, in 28 states for which we had reliable data for all plans (offered either on or off exchanges), the percentage of counties for which six or more plan options were available to consumers increased from 2014 to 2015 for three of the metal tiers—bronze, silver, and gold—and in 2015 consumers in every county in these states had access to six or more plans in each of these three metal tiers. Not all consumers had access to platinum plans, however, the availability of platinum plans generally also increased from 2014 to 2015. We also found that the lowest-cost plan options available in a county were available on an exchange in a majority of the counties included in our analysis. For example, among the 1,886 counties in the 28 states for which we had sufficiently reliable data for plans both on and off an exchange, we found that the lowest-cost silver plan option for a 30-year old was available on an exchange in 63 percent of the counties in 2014 and in 81 percent of the counties in 2015—an increase of 18 percentage points. The Range of Premiums Available to Consumers Varied among the States and Counties in Our Analysis in Both 2014 and 2015 Premiums Varied Widely among the States in Our Analysis, and from 2014 to 2015 Premiums Were More Likely to Increase than Decrease
The premiums for the lowest-cost plan options available in each state included in our analysis varied significantly from state to state. By contrast, in Maine (a state for which the lowest-cost premiums were among the highest in the country) the lowest-cost silver plan options for a 30-year-old were $252 in 2014 and $237 in 2015 for plans both on and off an exchange. For example, in both years Hawaii had among the lowest median premium costs for silver plans offered to a 30-year-old either on or off the exchange—$217 per month in 2014 and $180 per month in 2015. For example, in the 28 states included in our analysis, from 2014 to 2015 the minimum premium values for silver plans available to a 30-year-old increased in 18 states, decreased in 9 states, and remained unchanged in 1 state. For example, our analysis of the minimum premiums for silver plans in states where we analyzed data on plans offered either on or off exchanges found that premiums for a 30-year-old increased by 5 percent or more in 51 percent of the counties. In Rhode Island, 2014 premiums for plans ranged from a low of $241 per month to a high of $266 per month, a difference of 10 percent, and in 2015 ranged from a low of $217 per month to a high of $285 per month, a difference of 32 percent. By contrast, in Arizona, 2014 premiums for these plans ranged from a low of $147 per month to a high of $508 per month, a difference of 244 percent, and in 2015 ranged from a low of $147 per month to a high of $545 per month, a difference of 270 percent. For example, among the 1,886 counties in the 28 states for which we had sufficiently reliable data on all plans offered on or off an exchange, we found that the range in silver plan premiums for a 30-year-old in 2015 was wider in 79 percent of the counties compared to 2014. In the interactive graphic linked to below, we provide files showing the range of health insurance premiums, by county, that were available to selected categories of consumers for exchange plans and all plans (whether or not they were available on an exchange)—for both 2014 and 2015. Agency Comments
We received technical comments on a draft of this report from the Department of Health and Human Services and incorporated them as appropriate. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. | Why GAO Did This Study
PPACA, as of 2014, changed how insurers determine health insurance premiums and how consumers shop for individual market health insurance plans. For example, PPACA prohibited insurers from denying coverage or varying premiums based on consumer health status or gender. At the same time, PPACA required health plans to be marketed based on their metal tiers (bronze, silver, gold, and platinum), which helps consumers compare the relative value of each plan; it also required the establishment of health insurance exchanges in each state, through which consumers can compare and select from among participating health plans.
GAO was asked to examine variation in the health plan options and premiums available to individuals under PPACA, and how the options available in 2014 compared to those in 2015. GAO examined: (1) the numbers of health plans available to individuals and how they changed from 2014 to 2015, and (2) the range of health insurance premiums in 2014 and 2015, and how they changed for individuals in each state and county for selected consumers. GAO analyzed data from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS); reviewed applicable statutes, regulations, guidance, and other documentation; and interviewed officials from CMS. Comparisons across years were conducted for states that had sufficiently reliable data in both years—including comparisons of plans offered either on or off an exchange in 28 states (1,886 counties) and comparisons of plans offered only on an exchange for 38 states (2,613 counties) although GAO is reporting some data on 49 states.
What GAO Found
As of 2014, key provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) resulted in the establishment of health insurance exchanges in each state and changed how insurers determined health insurance premiums. Individual market consumers generally had access to more health plans in 2015 compared to 2014, and in both years the lowest-cost plans were available through exchanges in most of the 1,886 counties GAO analyzed in the 28 states for which it had sufficiently reliable data for plans offered either on or off an exchange. In addition, consumers in most of the counties analyzed had six or more plans to choose from in three of the four health plan metal tiers (bronze, silver, and gold) in both 2014 and 2015, and the percentage of counties with six or more plans in those metal tiers increased from 2014 to 2015. Consumers had fewer options regarding platinum plans, although the availability of platinum plans generally also increased from 2014 to 2015. The lowest-cost plan available in a county was available on an exchange in most counties. For example, among the 1,886 counties analyzed, GAO found that the lowest-cost silver plan for a 30-year-old was available on an exchange in 63 percent of these counties in 2014 and in 81 percent of these counties in 2015—an increase of 18 percentage points.
The range of premiums available to consumers in 2014 and 2015 varied among the states and counties GAO analyzed. For example, in Arizona the lowest-cost silver plan option for a 30-year-old was $147 per month in both years, but in Maine, the lowest-cost silver plan options for a 30-year-old were $252 in 2014 and $237 in 2015. In the 28 states included in GAO’s analysis, from 2014 to 2015 the minimum premiums for silver plans available to a 30-year-old increased in 18 states, decreased in 9 states, and remained unchanged in 1 state. At the county level, GAO found that premiums for the lowest-cost silver option available for a 30-year-old increased by 5 percent or more in 51 percent of the counties in the 28 states. GAO also found that the range of premiums—from the lowest to highest cost—differed considerably by state. For example, in Rhode Island, 2014 premiums for silver plans available to a 30-year-old either on or off an exchange ranged from a low of $241 per month to a high of $266 per month, a difference of 10 percent, and in 2015 ranged from a low of $217 per month to a high of $285 per month, a difference of 32 percent. By contrast, in Arizona, 2014 premiums for these plans ranged from a low of $147 per month to a high of $508 per month, a difference of 244 percent, and in 2015 ranged from a low of $147 per month to a high of $545 per month, a difference of 270 percent.
An interactive graphic reporting by state and county the minimum, median, and maximum premium values for all individual market plans (either on or off the exchange) and for exchange-only plans, is available at http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-15-687 . It includes either data for both years, or partial data (e.g., data for one of the two years) for 49 states.
GAO received technical comments on a draft of this report from the Department of Health and Human Services and incorporated them as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-03-135 | gao_GAO-03-135_0 | According to INS, it has invested about $5 million in the plan in fiscal year 2002. However, Justice has not established an effective process for overseeing its component agency IT investments, and for the four key INS system investments that we reviewed, it has not ensured that INS satisfied approved cost, schedule, and performance investment commitments. In effect, Justice and INS recognize that baseline investment information is vital to Justice’s ability to oversee progress and performance in delivering promised system capabilities and value, on time and within budget. For the four key IT investments that we reviewed, Justice has not followed its own guidance and measured progress against approved cost, schedule, performance, and benefit commitments. According to Justice officials, they do not monitor the progress of INS IT investments against project commitments because doing so has not been a high enough priority to justify adequate oversight resources and because INS does not have up-to-date baseline and project data available to permit such oversight. Specifically, Justice intends to (1) develop process steps and procedures for managing investments in departmentwide IT projects; (2) implement a tool to improve its collection and oversight of component agency budget information and assist in overseeing these agencies’ IT investments; (3) develop a process to support the department in overseeing component agency IT investments so that they meet cost, schedule, and performance goals; and (4) identify and assess the skills, staffing, and other resources needed to conduct this oversight, among other things. Recommendations for Executive Action
To strengthen Justice’s oversight of its component agency IT investments, we recommend that the Attorney General direct the Justice CIO to ensure that oversight of IT investments is treated as a departmental priority, that initiatives intended to introduce missing oversight controls and capabilities are expeditiously planned and implemented, and that significant deviations from these oversight improvement initiative plans be reported to the Attorney General. Objective, Scope, and Methodology
Our objective was to determine whether the Department of Justice (Justice) has effectively overseen four key Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) information technology (IT) investments: the Automated I-94 System, the Enforcement Case Tracking System, the Automated Biometric Identification System, and the Integrated Card Production System. | Why GAO Did This Study
To help carry out its mission to protect the public from criminal activity, the Department of Justice invests about $2 billion annually in information technology (IT). In particular, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), a Justice agency, invested about $459 million in IT in fiscal year 2002. GAO was asked to determine, for key INS IT system investments, whether Justice's oversight has been effective, ensuring that these systems deliver promised capabilities and benefits on time and within budget.
What GAO Found
Justice has not effectively overseen INS's investment in IT systems. A key indicator of oversight effectiveness is the quality of the process followed in conducting oversight. In this regard, successful public and private organizations ensure that such processes, at a minimum, provide for measuring progress against investment commitments--that is, project agreements defining what system capabilities and benefits will be delivered, by when, and at what cost. Justice does not yet have such an oversight process. Moreover, for four key INS IT investments that GAO was asked to review (see table), oversight activities that Justice has performed have not included measuring progress against approved cost, schedule, performance, and benefit commitments. As a result, Justice has not been positioned to take timely corrective action to address its component agencies' deviations from established investment commitments, and adequately ensure that promised capabilities are delivered on time and within budget. According to Justice officials, the department has not conducted this level of oversight because it has not given enough priority to the task, and because INS does not have the data that Justice would need to conduct such oversight. Justice recognizes the need to strengthen its oversight of component agencies' IT investments, and has plans to do so. Among these is an initiative to develop steps and procedures for overseeing component agency IT investments so that they meet cost, schedule, and performance goals. However, these initiatives have not progressed to the point that the department has detailed plans governing what will be done and when it will be done. Moreover, the process improvements that these initiatives are intended to put in place must still be implemented and followed before they will produce real benefits. |
gao_GAO-03-803 | gao_GAO-03-803_0 | The act also requires the Service to designate critical habitat for listed species. Procedures Are in Place to Ensure That Listing and Critical Habitat Decisions Are Based on the Best Available Science
The Endangered Species Act requires the Service to use the best available scientific data when deciding to list species or designate critical habitat. Additionally, Service procedures provide for listing and critical habitat decisions to be reviewed internally to help ensure that the professional judgment that the Service’s scientists exercise when weighing and interpreting the collected data is sound and conforms to contemporary scientific theories and principles. While the Service generally complied with its policy to seek peer reviewers, reviewers often did not respond. Peer Reviewers and Others Conclude that Most Listing Decisions Are Based on Best Available Science, but Concerns about Critical Habitat Decisions Remain
External reviews of listing and critical habitat decisions indicate that most decisions are generally scientifically supported, but concerns about the adequacy of critical habitat determinations remain. Critical habitat designations, on the other hand, are more complex and often require further information on the species’ habitat requirements and other management considerations. Peer reviewers often expressed concerns about the specific areas designated as critical habitat, while other experts expressed concerns about the adequacy of the information available to make the designation. Experts knowledgeable about the Endangered Species Act and recent studies assessing the Service’s use of science in making listing decisions concur that the Service’s listing decisions are generally supported. The Service has been aware of problems with its critical habitat program for a number of years. In April 2003, the Assistant Secretary for Fish and Wildlife and Parks testified before Congress on the critical habitat program, stating that it is “broken” and in “chaos.” He noted that litigation support is consuming valuable resources and that complying with court orders and settlement agreements has sharply reduced the Service’s ability to prioritize its listing and critical habitat actions. Recommendation for Executive Action
Because the Service’s critical habitat program faces serious challenges, we recommend that the Secretary of the Interior require the Service to provide clear strategic direction for the critical habitat program, within a specified time frame, by clarifying the role of critical habitat and how and when it should be designated, and recommending policy/guidance, regulatory, and/or legislative changes necessary to provide the greatest conservation benefit to threatened and endangered species in the most cost-effective manner. Specifically, we were asked to review the extent to which (1) the Service’s policies and practices ensure that listing and critical habitat decisions are based on the best available science and (2) outside reviewers have supported the scientific data and conclusions that the Service uses to make listing and critical habitat decisions. The decision to list a species must be based solely on the best available scientific and commercial data. | Why GAO Did This Study
Recent concerns about the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service's (Service) endangered species listing and critical habitat decisions have focused on the role that "sound science" plays in the decision-making process--whether the Service bases its decisions on adequate scientific data and properly interprets those data. In this report, GAO assesses the extent to which (1) the Service's policies and practices ensure that listing and critical habitat decisions are based on the best available science and (2) external reviewers support the scientific data and conclusions that the Service used to make those decisions. In addition, GAO highlights the nature and extent that litigation is affecting the Service's ability to effectively manage its critical habitat program.
What GAO Found
The Endangered Species Act requires the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to identify, or "list," species that are at risk of extinction and provide for their protection. The act also generally requires the Service to designate critical habitat--habitat essential to a species' conservation--for each listed species. The Service must use the best available science when making listing and critical habitat decisions. The Service's policies and practices generally ensure that listing and critical habitat decisions are based on the best available science. The Service consults with experts and considers information from federal and state agencies, academia, other stakeholders, and the general public. Decisions are subject to external "peer review" and extensive internal review to help ensure that decisions are based on the best available science and conform to contemporary scientific principles. External reviews indicate that the Service's listing and critical habitat decisions generally have scientific support, but concerns over the adequacy of critical habitat determinations remain. Listing decisions are often characterized as straightforward, and experts, peer reviewers, and others generally support the science behind these decisions. Critical habitat designations, on the other hand, are more complex and often require additional scientific and nonscientific information. As a result, peer reviewers often expressed concern about the specific areas designated, while other experts expressed concerns about the adequacy of the data available to make designations. The Service's critical habitat program has been characterized by frequent litigation. Specifically, the Service has lost a series of legal challenges that will require significant resources for the next 5 fiscal years to respond to court orders and settlement agreements for designating critical habitat. As a result, the Service is unable to focus resources on activities it believes provide more protection to species than designating critical habitat. While the Service recognizes that it has lost control of the program, it has yet to offer a remedy. Without taking proactive steps to clarify the role of critical habitat and how and when it should be designated, the Service will continue to have difficulty effectively managing the program. |
gao_AIMD-95-177 | gao_AIMD-95-177_0 | We requested comments on a draft of this report from the Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency. Data in the central financial systems are insufficiently detailed, and are sometimes inaccurate or incomplete. Further, the records management systems do not provide for the efficient retrieval of supporting cost and work-performed documentation, which, if not located, can result in unrecovered costs. Data Problems Impede the Efficiency of Cost Recovery
EPA staff need accurate and complete financial data to efficiently and effectively pursue cost recovery actions. EPA has no assurance that its application controls are sufficient to prevent these data quality problems. Conclusions
EPA’s financial and records management systems do not efficiently support cost recovery, a critical business process that is vital to the continued existence of the Superfund program. To evaluate the extent to which EPA’s planned information systems modifications could improve the efficiency of cost recovery efforts, we (1) applied relevant segments of the information systems audit methodology published by the EDP Auditors Foundation, (2) interviewed officials from several EPA headquarters offices in Washington, D.C., and from EPA regional offices involved in developing new information systems or modifications to existing systems, and (3) reviewed and analyzed documents on EPA’s actions, including documentation on users’ requirements, feasibility, costs, benefits, and detailed specifications pertaining to the agency’s efforts to enhance and develop system capabilities to support cost recovery. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the adequacy of the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) information systems that support the Superfund cost recovery process, focusing on whether planned modifications to the information systems will improve the efficiency of EPA cost recovery efforts.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) EPA financial and records management systems do not provide all the detailed cost information EPA staff need for the Superfund cost recovery process; (2) EPA staff have to conduct excessive manual searches and reconciliations to gather the needed data, which prolongs the cost recovery process; (3) EPA financial management systems are not sophisticated enough to cope with the complexity of certain transactions and the data contained in the systems are not always accurate; (4) EPA internal controls to prevent inaccurate data entry are inadequate and undocumented; and (5) although planned information systems modifications will improve cost information collection and retrieval, EPA needs to do more to enhance its records management capabilities. |
gao_GAO-08-90 | gao_GAO-08-90_0 | These reimbursements were for treatment at IHS-funded facilities of patients who were eligible for Medicare and Medicaid, in addition to IHS health care. IHS HIV/AIDS Prevention Services Generally Were Available, but Varied Across Areas
IHS area officials reported that HIV/AIDS prevention services were generally available in all 12 areas. Testing services were also available in every IHS area, though the type and extent of the services varied. HIV/AIDS Education Was Provided in All Areas
Officials from IHS area offices reported that HIV/AIDS education services were offered in all 12 areas. Other Prevention Services Were Provided
In addition to HIV testing and education services, IHS officials described some other services that were provided as part of their HIV/AIDS prevention activities. Some IHS Facilities Provided HIV/AIDS Treatment Services, but Most American Indians and Alaska Natives Received Services from Outside Providers for a Variety of Reasons
While some IHS facilities offered HIV/AIDS treatment services, area officials reported that most patients received treatment from providers at facilities outside of IHS. While other facilities provided limited HIV/AIDS treatment, most relied on outside providers, such as Ryan White-funded facilities or local hospitals. Five IHS Facilities Regularly Treated Patients with HIV/AIDS
Of the more than 45 IHS-funded hospitals, officials from IHS headquarters and facilities identified 5 hospitals that regularly treated patients with HIV/AIDS. According to IHS headquarters, 3 facilities have committed the most resources to sustaining HIV/AIDS treatment services: the Alaska Native Medical Center in the Alaska area, the Gallup Indian Medical Center in the Navajo area, and the HIV Center of Excellence at the Phoenix Indian Medical Center in the Phoenix area. Some patients who receive HIV/AIDS treatment outside of IHS may continue to receive other types of health care from IHS-funded facilities. For example, one IHS official reported that these patients might see a specialist quarterly or once a year for their HIV/AIDS treatment services and an IHS provider for routine care. Other health concerns. Some American Indians and Alaska Natives with HIV/AIDS May Not Access or Continue Treatment
IHS area officials and facility providers noted that some American Indians and Alaska Natives with HIV/AIDS may not access or continue care, even if treatment is available, for reasons such as concerns about confidentiality and lack of transportation. IHS Has HIV/AIDS Outreach and Planning, Capacity Building, and Surveillance Initiatives
IHS has undertaken outreach and planning, capacity building, and surveillance initiatives related to HIV/AIDS. These initiatives are overseen by national and area-level officials. IHS has also carried out several initiatives aimed at building the capacity of its providers to offer HIV/AIDS-related prevention and treatment services, such as training of health care providers and implementation of an HIV-related data system. Additionally, IHS has undertaken initiatives related to improving the surveillance of HIV/AIDS in the American Indian and Alaska Native population by developing a prenatal HIV screening measure and an early detection surveillance system. Outreach and Planning Initiatives
IHS has undertaken several outreach and planning initiatives, including an HIV/AIDS program Web site, an HIV listserv, and a national HIV/AIDS administrative work plan. We received written comments from HHS. HHS substantially agreed with the findings of our report and offered technical comments to provide additional information or clarify specific findings, which we incorporated as appropriate. We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Health and Human Services. | Why GAO Did This Study
American Indians and Alaska Natives have the third highest rate of HIV/AIDS diagnosis in the United States. They are also more likely than individuals with HIV/AIDS from other racial and ethnic groups to receive treatment at later stages of the disease and have shorter life spans. The Indian Health Service (IHS), located within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), provides health care services, including HIV/AIDS treatment, to eligible American Indians and Alaska Natives. IHS patients with HIV/AIDS may also receive care through other sources depending on their access to private health insurance or their eligibility for other federal health care programs, such as Medicare and Medicaid. GAO examined the extent to which IHS provided (1) HIV/AIDS prevention services and (2) HIV/AIDS treatment services. GAO also examined (3) what other HIV/AIDS-related initiatives IHS has undertaken. GAO reviewed documents and interviewed officials from IHS headquarters, area offices, and IHS-funded facilities, as well as advocacy groups. We also conducted site visits in two IHS areas.
What GAO Found
HIV/AIDS prevention services were generally available from IHS, but these services varied across the 12 IHS areas. HIV/AIDS education was provided in all areas in a variety of settings, such as IHS-funded facilities, schools, and health fairs. In addition to education, IHS offered HIV testing services in all areas; however, the type and extent of services varied. In addition, some IHS officials described other services that were provided as part of their HIV/AIDS prevention activities, such as condom distribution. According to IHS officials, HIV/AIDS treatment services, while offered at some IHS facilities, were generally received outside of IHS. Five IHS-funded hospitals, such as the Phoenix Indian Medical Center in Arizona, regularly treated patients. Although some other IHS facilities provided limited treatment services, most relied on outside providers. For example, IHS patients with HIV/AIDS might see a specialist outside of IHS every 3 months for their HIV/AIDS treatment services and an IHS provider for other routine care. IHS officials reported that most IHS facilities did not provide treatment services because they had few American Indian or Alaska Native patients known to have HIV/AIDS, had limited resources, focused on other health concerns, or their providers had limited training or experience treating the disease. Additionally, some patients may not access or continue treatment from IHS or outside providers due to concerns about confidentiality and lack of transportation to distant facilities. IHS has undertaken outreach and planning, capacity building, and surveillance initiatives related to HIV/AIDS. These initiatives are overseen by national and area-level IHS officials. The outreach and planning initiatives include an HIV/AIDS Web site and the development of a national HIV/AIDS administrative work plan. IHS has also undertaken several initiatives aimed at building the capacity of providers to offer HIV/AIDS-related prevention and treatment services, such as training of health care providers and implementation of an HIV/AIDS-related data system that can send providers reminders when patients with HIV/AIDS need care. Finally, IHS has undertaken initiatives related to improving the surveillance of HIV/AIDS in the American Indian and Alaska Native population by developing a prenatal HIV screening measure and an early detection surveillance system. GAO received written comments from HHS on a draft of this report. HHS substantially agreed with the findings of this report. HHS also offered technical comments to provide additional information or clarify specific findings, which we incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_NSIAD-97-89 | gao_NSIAD-97-89_0 | Each of the academies produces about 1,000 graduates a year. The policy proposal we examined specified that placement of academy graduates would be in an active reserve status, which includes only those in the selected reserve. Academy Graduates in the Drilling Guard/Reserve
As of October 1, 1996, the drilling guard/reserve officer corps of 109,594 included 5,014 academy graduates, or about 4.6 percent (see fig. 1). This percentage compares to academy graduates comprising about 17.4 percent of the active duty officer corps (see fig. About 424 academy graduates were on full-time active duty in a reserve component under 10 U.S.C. 12301(d) and 32 U.S.C. See appendix III for additional details on the number of academy graduates serving in the selected reserve. Feasibility of Academy Graduates Serving in the Guard/Reserve Upon Graduation
Concerns Raised Regarding Lack of Experience and Training for Immediate Reserve Duty
DOD, the active services, and the reserve components, with the exception of the Army National Guard and the Air National Guard, stated that sending service academy graduates directly to the drilling guard/reserve without officer skill training or active duty experience would not enhance the capability of the reserve component. The Congress has expressed concern about ensuring an adequate payback for the cost of officer training. They cited problems regarding the absence of an employment placement process at the academies; placement of graduates into drilling guard/reserve units; enforcement of guard/reserve service obligations; development of a fair and efficient selection process for determining which academy graduates would go to the guard/reserve, additional funding to provide skill training; the need to increase Navy ROTC enrollments to take the place of the academy graduates on active duty; and limited capacity in the Naval Reserve to absorb additional officers. Sending 5 percent of academy graduates to the reserve components would require rescheduling a similar number of ROTC graduates to active service. Efforts to Enhance the Capability of the Reserve Component
The Army National Guard Combat Readiness Reform Act of 1992 provided several initiatives for enhancing the capability of the Army National Guard to deploy. ROTC graduates with 2 years of service are allowed to serve the remainder of their obligation in the Army National Guard. This program has since been consolidated into the Voluntary Early Release/Retirement Program (VERRP) under category G.
The number of academy and ROTC graduates leaving active duty before completing their initial active duty service obligation under VERRP are shown in tables 2 and 3. Those leaving active duty under category G before completing their military service obligation were required to serve out their remaining service obligation in the selected reserve. However, the program to attract academy- and ROTC-educated officers with 2 to 3 years active duty experience under the Army’s VERRP into the selected reserve appears to be relatively successful and offers the potential to access a number larger than 50 junior officers, who would be trained and experienced. Scope and Methodology
To evaluate the feasibility of sending service academy graduates directly to the drilling guard/reserve, we interviewed officials at the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the service headquarters, the service academies, reserve headquarters, and the National Guard Bureau about the potential benefits and difficulties in accessing academy graduates directly into the drilling guard/reserve. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the policy and cost implications of up to 5 percent of each military service academy's graduating class serving in the reserve with a corresponding increase in the number of Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) graduates serving on active duty, focusing on: (1) the number of academy graduates serving in an active status in the reserve component; (2) the feasibility and implications of a proposal to have academy graduates serve in a drilling status in the reserve component without having served on active duty as a means of enhancing the capability of the guard/reserves; and (3) other means through which the reserve components are recruiting junior officers.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) as of October 1, 1996, 5,014 service academy graduates were serving in the active reserve components; (2) additionally, 424 academy graduates were on active duty with a reserve component performing full-time Active Guard/Reserve support functions under the authority of 10 U.S.C. 12301(d) and 32 U.S.C. 502(f); (3) about 4.6 percent of the officers in the drilling guard/reserves were academy graduates compared to 17.4 percent of the active forces; (4) Department of Defense (DOD), service, and academy officials, with the exception of those representing the National Guard, believe that sending academy graduates to the drilling guard/reserves upon graduation would be counterproductive; (5) they pointed to the need for new officers, regardless of their commissioning source, to receive skill training and experience before they can be productive guard/reserve members; (6) since the academies are the most expensive source of new officers, concerns were expressed that sending academy graduates to the reserves before they complete their active duty obligation would not produce a sufficient payback for the cost of their education; (7) DOD officials additionally cited a number of administrative and practical problems that would require policy changes at the academies and the selected reserves; (8) National Guard officials, however, noted that they have vacancies for officers in the junior officer grades and believe that the assignment of academy graduates directly to the National Guard would be feasible; (9) based on their experiences with programs for new ROTC graduate accessions, National Guard officials believe that the policy and administrative difficulties in accessing academy graduates could be managed; (10) the reserve components presently receive academy graduates through normal attrition as academy-produced officers join the drilling guard/reserves after completing their obligated active duty service; (11) in addition, efforts to downsize the active duty force have had a side benefit of enhancing the capability of the reserve component by getting more trained and experienced officers into active reserve status; (12) recently, these early release programs have been opened to graduates from the academies and the ROTC; and (13) since 1994, the Army National Guard Combat Readiness Reform Act of 1992 has allowed the Army to bring in 482 academy graduates and 108 graduates from the ROTC with 2 to 3 years of experience to serve the remainder of their military service obligations in the selected reserves. |
gao_GAO-07-901T | gao_GAO-07-901T_0 | In 2001, the Comptroller General changed the name of the Office of Civil Rights to the Office of Opportunity and Inclusiveness and gave the office responsibility for creating a fair and inclusive work environment by incorporating diversity principles in GAO’s strategic plan and throughout our human capital policies. Along with this new strategic mission, the Comptroller General changed organizational alignment of the Office of Opportunity and Inclusiveness by having the office report directly to him. Additional Efforts to Enhance Diversity Are Needed and Planned
Despite our continuing efforts to ensure a level playing field at GAO, more needs to be done. The data show that for 2002 to 2005 the most significant differences in average appraisal ratings were among African-Americans at all bands for most years compared with Caucasian analysts. Furthermore, the rating data for entry level staff show a difference in ratings for African- Americans in comparison to Caucasian staff at the entry-level from the first rating, with the gap widening in subsequent ratings. These differences are inconsistent with the concerted effort to hire analysts with very similar qualifications, educational backgrounds, and skill sets. In June 2006, we held an SES off-site meeting specifically focusing on concerns regarding the performance ratings of our African-American staff. Shortly thereafter, the Comptroller General decided that in view of the importance of this issue, GAO should undertake an independent, objective, third-party assessment of the factors influencing the average rating differences between African-Americans and Caucasians. We should approach our concern about appraisal ratings for African- Americans with the same analytical rigor and independence that we use when approaching any engagement. We must also be prepared to implement recommendations coming out of this review. While we continue to have a major challenge regarding the average performance ratings of African-Americans, the percentages of African- Americans in senior management positions at GAO have increased in the last several years. I believe that the O&I monitoring reviews, direct access to top GAO management, and the other safeguards have played a significant role in these improvements. Specifically, from fiscal year 2000 to fiscal year 2007, the percentage of African-American staff in the SES/Senior Level (SL) increased from 7.1 percent to 11.6 percent, and at the Band III level the percentages increased from 6.7 percent to 10.8 percent. Furthermore, the percentages of African-Americans in senior management positions at GAO compare favorably to the governmentwide percentages. While the percentage of African-Americans at the SES/SL level at GAO was lower than the governmentwide percentage in 2000, by September 2006, the GAO percentage had increased and exceeded the governmentwide percentage. At the Band III/GS-15 level, the percentage of African- American staff at GAO exceeded the governmentwide percentage in 2000 as well as in 2006. Nonetheless, as an agency that leads by example, additional steps should be taken. | Why GAO Did This Study
Vigorous enforcement of anti-discrimination laws remains an essential responsibility of government. Moreover, diversity in the federal government can be a key component for executing agency missions and achieving results. Not only is it the right thing to do, but an inclusive work environment can improve retention, reduce turnover, increase our ability to recruit, and improve overall organizational effectiveness. In 2001, the Comptroller General changed the name of the Office of Civil Rights to the Office of Opportunity and Inclusiveness and gave the office responsibility for creating a fair and inclusive work environment by incorporating diversity principles in GAO's strategic plan and throughout our human capital policies. Along with this new strategic mission, the Comptroller General changed organizational alignment of the Office of Opportunity and Inclusiveness (O&I) by having the office report directly to him.
What GAO Found
Despite our continuing efforts to ensure a level playing field at GAO, more needs to be done. The data show that for 2002 to 2005 the most significant differences in average appraisal ratings were among African-Americans at all bands for most years compared with Caucasian analysts. Furthermore, the rating data for entry level staff show a difference in ratings for African-Americans in comparison to Caucasian staff at the entry-level from the first rating, with the gap widening in subsequent ratings. These differences are inconsistent with the concerted effort to hire analysts with very similar qualifications, educational backgrounds, and skill sets. In June 2006, we held an Senior Executive Service (SES) off-site meeting specifically focusing on concerns regarding the performance ratings of our African-American staff. Shortly thereafter, the Comptroller General decided that in view of the importance of this issue, GAO should undertake an independent, objective, third-party assessment of the factors influencing the average rating differences between African-Americans and Caucasians. We should approach our concern about appraisal ratings for African-Americans with the same analytical rigor and independence that we use when approaching any engagement. We must also be prepared to implement recommendations coming out of this review. Additional Efforts to Enhance Diversity Are Needed and Planned While we continue to have a major challenge regarding the average performance ratings of African-Americans, the percentages of African-Americans in senior management positions at GAO have increased in the last several years. GAO believes that the O&I monitoring reviews, direct access to top GAO management, and the other safeguards have played a significant role in these improvements. Specifically, from fiscal year 2000 to fiscal year 2007, the percentage of African-American staff in the SES/Senior Level (SL) increased from 7.1 percent to 11.6 percent, and at the Band III level the percentages increased from 6.7 percent to 10.8 percent. Furthermore, the percentages of African-Americans in senior management positions at GAO compare favorably to the governmentwide percentages. While the percentage of African-Americans at the SES/SL level at GAO was lower than the governmentwide percentage in 2000, by September 2006, the GAO percentage had increased and exceeded the governmentwide percentage. At the Band III/GS-15 level, the percentage of African-American staff at GAO exceeded the governmentwide percentage in 2000 as well as in 2006. Nonetheless, as an agency that leads by example, additional steps should be taken. |
gao_GAO-04-508 | gao_GAO-04-508_0 | GAO’s Previous Survey of U.S. Companies
In 2002, we conducted a study of U.S. companies’ views about the importance of, the anticipated effects of, and the prospects for, China’s implementing its WTO commitments. Responses were mixed when company representatives assessed the commitment areas that we found to be of greatest importance to their businesses. In addition, the importance placed on specific commitment areas differed among respondents of the four industry groups--agriculture, banking, machinery, and pharmaceuticals. It is also important to note that many respondents reported they had no basis to judge the extent to which China had made reforms related to some WTO commitment areas, for reasons that varied depending on each company’s experience and operations in China. The five specific commitment areas ranked as most important to respondents overall were (1) standards, certifications, registration, and testing requirements; (2) customs procedures and inspection practices; (3) intellectual property rights; (4) tariffs, fees, and charges; and (5) consistent application of laws, regulations, and practices. Most Respondents Reported a Positive Impact from China’s WTO Implementation
Most respondents reported that China’s implementation of its WTO commitments had had a positive impact on their companies, even though some company representatives indicated that China’s reform efforts would continue to present challenges for their company operations in China. The majority of respondents reported that most of the 13 business activities such as revenue stream and volume of production in China had increased. Company Business Activities in China Increasing
Overall, our questionnaire respondents reported that their company activities have increased since China joined the WTO. Our results also show that despite the problems U.S. companies are facing in China’s implementation of specific commitment areas, more than two thirds of respondents indicated that China’s WTO implementation had a positive impact on their companies’ ability to do business in China. Our objectives for this report were to assess the views and experiences of selected U.S. companies with a presence in China regarding (1) the extent to which China has implemented its WTO commitments in key industries and (2) the impact of China’s implementation of its WTO commitments on these U.S. companies’ business operations. The four industries included: agriculture, banking, machinery, and pharmaceuticals. From the study population of 149 U.S. companies with a presence in China, we received 79 questionnaires, for an overall response rate of 60 percent. Questionnaire of U.S. Companies in China (and U.S. [ ] Foreign-invested Stock Companies 7. Tariff & nontariff trade restrictions (increased market access)
1. [ (4)] Some or little extent 4. World Trade Organization: Observations on China’s Rule of Law Reforms. | Why GAO Did This Study
As the second largest source of foreign direct investment in China, U.S. companies continue their keen interest in China's implementation of its World Trade Organization (WTO) commitments. China's 2001 WTO commitments include specific pledges to increase market access, liberalize foreign investment, continue fundamental market reforms, and improve the rule of law. In 2002, GAO reported on selected U.S. companies' views, finding that many commitment areas, particularly those related to rule of law, were important to U.S. companies. GAO also found that company representatives expected China's reforms would have a positive impact on their business operations but expected some difficulties during implementation. In 2003, GAO continued to analyze companies' views about (1) the extent to which China has implemented its WTO commitments and (2) the impact of China's implementation of its WTO commitments on U.S. companies' business operations. GAO collected the views of representatives from 82 U.S. companies with a presence in China. GAO focused on companies in the agriculture, banking, machinery, and pharmaceutical industries. Results reflect a response rate of 60 percent of the study population. These responses may not reflect the views of all U.S. companies with activities in China.
What GAO Found
U.S. company representatives who completed GAO's 2003 questionnaire thought that China had implemented most of the 26 listed WTO commitment areas on average only to some or little extent. When respondents assessed five areas found to be of greatest importance to their companies overall--(1) standards, certifications, registration, and testing requirements; (2) customs procedures and inspection practices; (3) intellectual property rights; (4) tariffs, fees, and charges; and (5) consistent application of laws, regulations, and practices--responses were mixed, but they reported that China had taken at least some steps to implement these commitment areas. Our analysis showed that the importance placed on specific areas differed among the agriculture, banking, machinery, and pharmaceutical industries. For example, agricultural respondents identified tariffs as important while banking respondents identified scope of business restrictions for services as important. Few respondents were able to assess all of China's commitment areas for reasons that varied depending on each company's experience and operations in China. More than two thirds of respondents reported that China's implementation of its WTO commitments had a positive impact on their companies' ability to do business in China. However, some respondents indicated that China's reform efforts had created difficulties for their company operations in China. Overall, company representatives reported that company activities, such as volume of production in China and company revenue stream, have increased since China joined the WTO. However, respondents noted that changes in business activities cannot be directly attributed to China's WTO accession. |
gao_GAO-06-20 | gao_GAO-06-20_0 | USCIS’s application-processing procedures vary by application type and by office. USCIS Estimated a Backlog of About 1.2 Million Unadjudicated Applications as of June 30, 2005
As of June 30, 2005, USCIS estimated it had about 1.2 million cases remaining in its backlog, down from 3.7 million at the end of fiscal year 2003. According to USCIS, the data management systems it currently uses to manage its backlog elimination efforts cannot comprehensively produce data to measure and track the time that all applications have been pending, and therefore the agency cannot readily retrieve information on the number of applications that have been pending for more than 180 days, as specified in the definition of backlog in the Immigration Services and Infrastructure Improvements Act of 2000. In addition to its efforts to reduce the backlog by September 30, 2006, the agency has developed a staffing allocation model and is planning a major transformation of its information technology systems to prevent future backlogs. However, it is still in the early stages of planning. Despite Progress, USCIS Seems Unlikely to Eliminate the Backlog for All Application Types in Every Office by September 30, 2006
Although USCIS has made progress in reducing its backlog of benefit applications as it defines backlog, it seems unlikely that USCIS will meet its September 30, 2006, goal of reducing the number of pending applications to a level no greater than the previous 6 months’ receipts for every form type at every office. Furthermore, although USCIS officials have stated that the agency has sufficient staff resources to process its overall projected workload by the end of fiscal year 2006, in certain offices, where the volume of applications exceeds adjudicator staff capacity, the backlog may remain. Other Factors May Hinder USCIS’s Ability to Complete Certain Applications within 6 Months
Factors beyond the agency’s control could prevent some applications from being adjudicated within 6 months. Legislative Changes
USCIS officials noted that its current backlog elimination plan is based on the assumption that the agency will continue to operate under current laws. The other program measures both compliance with standard operating procedures and the reasonableness of adjudicator decisions for selected application types. USCIS’s Agencywide Quality Assurance Program Tracks Process Compliance for Two Application Types
USCIS’s Performance Management Division administers an agencywide quality assurance program, which reviews adjudicator compliance with selected processes for adjudicating 2 of the 15 major application types: applications for naturalization and for adjustment of status to lawful permanent resident. For this review, a sample of case files is selected and independently reviewed by the quality assurance unit. The agency has not identified these potential effects in its staffing and technology plans. We also spoke with the USCIS Chief Information Officer and officials in the Office of the Citizenship and Immigration Services Ombudsman. To determine the actions USCIS has taken to eliminate the backlog of applications and prevent future backlogs, we reviewed USCIS’s planning documents on the agency’s staffing, budget, and information technology modernization. However, we did not independently verify the extent and quality of supervisory review. | Why GAO Did This Study
Long-standing backlogs of immigration benefit applications result in delays for immigrants, their families, and prospective employers who participate in the legal immigration process. In response to a statutory mandate to eliminate the backlog, the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) set a goal of September 30, 2006, to eliminate the backlog and adjudicate all applications within 6 months. This report examines (1) the status of the backlog, (2) actions to achieve backlog elimination and prevent future backlogs, (3) the likelihood of eliminating the backlog by the deadline, and (4) USCIS's quality assurance programs to achieve consistency of decisions while eliminating its backlog.
What GAO Found
By June 2005, USCIS estimated it had reduced its backlog from a peak of 3.8 million cases to about 1.2 million. However, this estimate is not a measure of the number of pending cases older than 6 months--the definition of backlog used by the Immigration Services and Infrastructure Improvements Act of 2000. USCIS's current data systems cannot provide precise data on the age of all application types. A proposed technology transformation offers an opportunity to develop a case management system with this capability. USCIS has reduced its backlog mainly by increasing and realigning staff. To prevent future backlogs, USCIS will rely on additional staffing reallocation and technology transformation. However, the technology plan is in the early planning stages, and USCIS has not finalized its estimated cost or identified the gains it could yield. Despite progress, it is unlikely that USCIS will completely eliminate the backlog by the 2006 deadline. While it met fiscal year 2006 targets for half of the 15 backlogged application types, USCIS may have difficulty eliminating its backlog for two complex application types that constitute nearly three-quarters of the backlog. A backlog may also remain in offices where the volume of cases exceeds adjudicator staff capacity. Other factors, such as lengthy background checks, could also hinder USCIS's ability to achieve and maintain its backlog elimination goals. USCIS officials noted that its current plan is premised on current legislation and would be affected by proposed legislative changes that could impose additional demands on the agency. Aside from regular supervisory review, USCIS operates two programs to ensure the quality of its postadjudication decisions, yet neither program provides a systematic and inclusive review of all application types. One program reviews adjudicators' compliance with standard processes for two application types, and the other evaluates compliance with standard processes and the reasonableness of decisions rendered, but only for selected applications processed in four centers. |
gao_GAO-02-1073 | gao_GAO-02-1073_0 | Background
During fiscal year 2002, U.S. military forces participated in a number of contingency operations, and Congress appropriated funds to cover DOD’s costs. U.S. forces have been involved in enforcing the no-fly zone over parts of Iraq since the end of the Persian Gulf War in 1991. Balkans and Southwest Asia Funding for Fiscal Year 2002
The military services received a combination of funding provided by the DOD appropriations act for fiscal year 2002 and funds that remained in the OCOTF. In response to the reduction in funding, the military services took steps to reduce costs in order to keep costs in line with available funding, although they will have to absorb some costs related to operations in both the Balkans and Southwest Asia. Plans to Further Reduce Balkans Force Levels May Reduce Fiscal Year 2003 Funding Needs
Both NATO and DOD plan to reduce troop levels in the Balkans during fiscal year 2003, which may reduce funding needs to support Balkan operations during the year. Army in Europe officials told us—and we agree—that a decline in troop strength does not necessarily correspond to an equal reduction in costs. However, given the large anticipated reduction in troop levels, we would expect a decrease in estimated costs for fiscal year 2003. An Army headquarters budget official told us that the fiscal year 2003 budget request was developed from the already reduced fiscal year 2002 appropriation level and that any further reduction in the fiscal year 2003 level would pose a funding challenge. Appendix I: Location of the Department of Defense’s Major Contingency Operations in Fiscal Year 2002 | What GAO Found
From the end of the Persian Gulf War in February 1991 through May 2002, the Department of Defense (DOD) reported over $43.9 billion in incremental costs for its overseas contingency operations. These operations include the enforcement of no-fly zones, humanitarian assistance, and peace enforcement operations, as well as combating terrorism beginning in fiscal year 2001. The majority of these costs were incurred in the Balkans and Southeast Asia. In fiscal year 2002, U.S. military forces are continuing to participate in a number of contingency operations, primarily in the Balkans, Southwest Asia, and a number of locations that involve combating terrorism. The military services received a combination of funding provided in the DOD appropriations act for fiscal year 2002 and money remaining in previously funded contingency fund accounts. The services also took steps to reduce costs in order to keep them in line with available funding. Both the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and DOD plan to reduce troop levels in the Balkans during fiscal year 2003, which may reduce funding needs during the year. In Europe, the Army anticipates an overall reduction of 1,160 troops during fiscal year 2003. Although a decline in troop strength does not necessarily correspond to an equal reduction in costs, given the large anticipated reduction in troop levels, there should be a decrease in estimated costs for fiscal year 2003. Since the fiscal year 2003 budget request was developed from an already reduced fiscal year 2002 appropriation level, any further reduction in fiscal year 2003 level would pose a funding challenge. |
gao_GAO-17-52 | gao_GAO-17-52_0 | Women’s Health Care at VA Medical Facilities
Through its medical facilities, VA provides a wide range of sex-specific health care services to women veterans. More specialized sex-specific care for women is typically provided by a gynecologist. Current VA care in the community options include:
Veterans Choice Program. Specifically, after the TPAs have confirmed veterans would like to receive Choice care, the TPAs are contractually required to, among other things: schedule appointments within 5 business days (for routine care) from the time the veteran agrees to participate in Choice or within 2 business days (for urgent care) of accepting the authorization from the referring VA medical facility; ensure that veterans receive care within 30 days of scheduling an appointment for routine care or within 2 business days (for urgent care) of accepting the authorization from the referring VA medical facility; return authorizations to the referring VA medical facility when appointments cannot be scheduled within required time frames; and track the number of authorizations for which they did not schedule appointments for veterans and the reasons why. VHA Lacks Complete and Accurate Data on VAMC Compliance with Environment of Care Requirements for Women Veterans and Does Not Consistently Identify or Address Noncompliance
VHA Central Office lacks complete and accurate data on the extent to which VAMCs are in compliance with environment of care requirements. Among the six VAMCs we visited, based on our inspections, we observed varying levels of compliance with selected VHA requirements related to the environment of care for women veterans, ranging from 65 percent to 81 percent. Some common areas of noncompliance that we observed in outpatient clinics included the following:
Lack of auditory privacy at check-in clerk station. VHA policy requires that all examination rooms be equipped with a privacy curtain. VHA’s Oversight Processes Do Not Consistently Identify or Address Noncompliance Due to Weaknesses in Environment of Care Rounds and Related Policies
We found weaknesses in VHA’s oversight processes of the environment of care rounds and related policies. This failure to verify reported information is inconsistent with federal internal control standards for monitoring, which call for management to establish activities to monitor the quality of performance over time and promptly resolve the findings of audits and other reviews. While the Number of VHA Gynecologists and Women’s Health Primary Care Providers Has Increased Overall, Availability Was Limited in Some Locations
The Number of VA Gynecologists Has Increased Over Time, but More than a Quarter of VAMCs and VA Health Care Systems Did Not Have an Onsite Gynecologist
Our analysis of VHA data shows that the number of VHA gynecologists increased about 3 percent nationally from fiscal year 2014 to fiscal year 2015. VHA Central Office officials said that, based on workload, not all VA medical facilities need an onsite gynecologist, and women veterans may receive necessary gynecological services through a care in the community program. The increase in providers significantly outpaced the increase in women veteran enrollment (1 percent) during the same time period. The fact that nearly 18 percent of VAMCs and outpatient clinics providing primary care lacked a women’s health primary care provider in fiscal year 2015 suggests that VHA may face challenges ensuring that all women veterans have timely access to these providers, as required under VHA policy. In our interviews with VHA officials, they acknowledged a shortage of women’s health primary care providers at VA medical facilities. While the number of obstetricians and gynecologists increased, some geographic areas lacked these types of providers, which provided access challenges for women veterans seeking care. 3). VHA Does Not Have Performance Measures for Monitoring Access to Sex- Specific Care under Choice
VHA lacks performance measures for the availability under Choice of sex- specific care, such as mammograms, maternity care, or gynecology. However, VHA data show that the TPAs did not meet VHA’s performance standards for providing timely access for veterans, including women veterans. Federal standards of internal control for monitoring call for management to establish activities to monitor the quality of performance over time and promptly resolve the findings of audits and other reviews. In addition, we found instances where women veterans’ care under Choice was significantly delayed and we found a lack of participating obstetricians and gynecologists in some areas, both of which further underscore the importance of VHA’s ability to monitor access to sex- specific care for women veterans. If VHA does not strengthen its environment of care inspections policies, it will remain unable to provide reasonable assurance that it is protecting the privacy, safety, and dignity of women veterans who receive care at VA medical facilities. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve care for women veterans, we recommend that the Secretary of Veterans Affairs direct the Under Secretary for Health to take the following two actions:
Strengthen the environment of care inspections process and VHA’s oversight of this process by expanding the list of requirements that facility staff inspect for compliance to align with VHA’s women’s health handbook, ensuring that all patient care areas of the medical facility are inspected as required, clarifying the roles and responsibilities of VA medical facility staff responsible for identifying and addressing compliance, and establishing a process to verify that noncompliance information reported by facilities to VHA Central Office is accurate and complete. Monitor women veterans’ access to key sex-specific care services— mammography, maternity care, and gynecology—under current and future community care contracts. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2010, GAO found a number of weaknesses related to care for women veterans at VA medical facilities. GAO was asked to update that study. This report examines (1) the extent that VA medical centers complied with requirements related to the environment of care for women veterans and VHA's oversight of that compliance; (2) what is known about the availability of VHA medical providers who can provide sex-specific care for women veterans at VA facilities; and (3) VHA's efforts to provide and monitor access to sex-specific care for women veterans through Choice. To do this work, GAO reviewed VHA data on environment of care deficiencies; the number, location, and availability of VHA and Choice medical providers; women veteran enrollment; and Choice access-related performance measures. In addition, GAO inspected the environment of care for compliance with VHA policy at a nongeneralizable sample of six VA medical centers, which were selected to achieve variation in different care models, the size of the women veterans' population, and geographical locations. GAO also interviewed VHA Central Office and VA medical center officials.
What GAO Found
The Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) Veterans Health Administration (VHA) does not have accurate and complete data on the extent to which its medical centers comply with environment of care standards for women veterans. VHA policy requires its medical facilities, including VA medical centers, to meet environment of care standards related to the privacy, safety, and dignity of women veterans. VHA Central Office relies on medical centers to conduct regular inspections and to report instances of noncompliance, which are compiled in a VHA database. However, almost all the noncompliance GAO identified through inspections at six VA medical centers it visited had not been reported or recorded in the VHA database, and compliance rates ranged from 65 percent to 81 percent. For example, GAO found a lack of auditory privacy at check-in clerk stations and a lack of privacy curtains in examination rooms, as required by VHA policy. GAO also found weaknesses in VHA's oversight of the environment of care for women, including a lack of thorough inspections and limited verification of facility-reported data which results in inaccurate and incomplete data. As a result, the privacy, safety, and dignity of women veterans may not be guaranteed when they receive care at VA facilities. Federal internal control standards for monitoring call for management to establish activities to monitor the quality of performance over time and promptly resolve any identified issues.
GAO's analysis of VHA data shows that nationally the number of VHA full-time-employee equivalent gynecologists and the number of women's health primary care providers—VHA primary care providers specially trained in women's health care services, such as breast exams—increased by 3 percent and 15 percent respectively, from fiscal year 2014 through fiscal year 2015, and those percentages exceeded the 1 percent growth in women veteran enrollment during the same period. However, about 27 percent of VA medical centers and health care systems lacked an onsite gynecologist and about 18 percent of VA facilities providing primary care lacked a women's health primary care provider, according to VHA data. VHA officials said not all facilities require onsite gynecologists and facilities may authorize gynecological services from non-VA providers. They acknowledged a shortage of at least 675 women's health primary care providers and have a plan to train at least 535 providers by the end of fiscal year 2016.
The Veterans Choice Program (Choice) is a primary option for veterans to receive care from non-VA providers in the community if care cannot be provided at VA facilities. While the number of obstetricians and gynecologists under Choice has increased, some areas lack these providers, according to a VHA analysis. While VHA monitors access-related Choice performance measures (such as timely appointment scheduling) for all veterans, it does not have such measures for women veterans' sex-specific care, such as mammography, maternity care, or gynecology. VHA's data show poor performance on access-related performance measures for all veterans, and GAO found cases where women veterans' maternity care was significantly delayed, suggesting that veterans, including women, face challenges receiving timely access to care. Federal internal control standards for monitoring call for management to establish activities to monitor the quality of performance over time and promptly resolve any identified issues.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that VA (1) strengthen the policies and guidance for its environment of care inspection process and (2) monitor women veterans' access to sex-specific care under current and future community care contracts. VA concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_RCED-99-36 | gao_RCED-99-36_0 | Since the program began in June 1998, the Department has made preliminary decisions to maximize the number of first-year grants by setting suggested limits on the amount of grants available to areas with different population levels, such as areas with over 1 million people. TEA-21 requires DOT to allocate the available funding between urban and rural areas. The Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations Act for fiscal year 1999 provided DOT with $75 million for its Access to Jobs program. In addition, DOT officials noted that an average of $150,000 for each rural applicant is in line with the potential need of these areas. Grants of $1 million for large urban areas are smaller than those awarded by other federal agencies, such as DOL. In addition, DOT will give bonus points for other program elements, such as innovation. The weighted, merit-based factors may be sufficient to rank projects according to their relative merits; however, if the additional factors are needed, their use may imply that the merit-based criteria are less important than other factors, such as a project’s location, that are not based on merit. Until DOT receives and begins scoring Access to Jobs grant applications, it will not know if its weighted criteria will be sufficient to distinguish among applications or if it will need to rely on the additional factors it identified, such as geographic dispersion. TEA-21 requires DOT to coordinate its Access to Jobs activities with other federal agencies’ welfare-to-work programs. To facilitate coordination among federal welfare-to-work programs, FTA initiated a policy council in July 1998 and invited representatives from DOL, HHS, HUD, the Office of Management and Budget, and the White House to join. However, the data collected by the grantees may not measure the program’s overall performance until DOT establishes goals or benchmarks to evaluate the information it receives from the grantees. Experts Cite Evaluation as a Critical Component of Welfare-to-Work Initiatives
Experts say that evaluation is critical in determining the effect of welfare reform. DOT expects grantees to monitor the performance of their Access to Jobs project and to provide the Department with data on (1) how many transportation services the project added (service frequency, hours, and miles); (2) how the target area’s accessibility to jobs and support services improved (i.e., how the percentage of available jobs accessible to the target population by public transportation increased with the program); (3) how many people are using these expanded services; and (4) how the project’s sponsors collaborated. Specifically, it has made some important decisions about how it will distribute the program’s funds, what criteria it will use to review grant applications, and how it will coordinate the program with other federal agencies’ efforts. Scope and Methodology
To obtain information on the steps DOT has taken to implement the Access to Jobs program—specifically, to distribute funds and select criteria for awarding grants—we interviewed DOT officials; examined program documentation, preliminary reports, and other descriptive materials; and attended the October 22, 1998, conference in which DOT announced the Access to Jobs program, as well as a September 23, 1998, listening session on TEA-21, sponsored by FTA. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the Department of Transportation's (DOT) efforts to implement the Access to Jobs program, focusing on DOT's: (1) overall plan to distribute Access to Jobs funds among grantees in urban and rural areas; (2) criteria to award specific Access to Jobs grants to states, localities, and other organizations; (3) efforts to coordinate the Access to Jobs program with other welfare-to-work programs; and (4) proposals to evaluate the program's success.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) DOT has decided it will distribute the $75 million available for the program in fiscal year 1999 to as many people as possible by setting suggested limits on the amount areas can receive on the basis of their population levels; (2) under this approach, DOT intends to provide first-year grants that average $1 million for large urban areas and $150,000 for rural areas; (3) DOT will use four key criteria for evaluating grant applications on the basis of their merits; (4) DOT will assess each grant application and assign points on the basis of these criteria, as well as bonus program components such as particularly innovative transportation approaches; (5) whether these criteria will enable DOT to make sufficient distinctions among the many applications it expects is unclear; (6) accordingly, DOT may use other factors; (7) however, DOT may unintentionally suggest that merit-based criteria used to score applications are less important than other factors that are not based on merit; (8) DOT has made efforts to coordinate its Access to Jobs program with other welfare-to-work programs; (9) DOT established a policy council of representatives from four other federal agencies and the White House and it met with local human service organizations; (10) because grantees can use other federal funds to match the DOT's grants, sustained coordination between DOT and other federal agencies, as well as sustained collaboration among local agencies, is critical for ensuring the effective use of federal welfare-to-work programs; (11) as part of its evaluation effort, DOT will require Access to Jobs grantees to collect data on four important program outputs: (a) the number of new and expand transportation services; (b) the number of jobs made accessible by public transportation to the targeted riders; (c) the number of people using the new transportation services; and (d) the level of collaboration achieved; and (12) however, the data alone will not be sufficient to measure the program's overall success because DOT has yet to establish goals or benchmarks against which the cumulative data on new routes, new system users, and newly accessible jobs can be compared. |
gao_T-NSIAD-96-240 | gao_T-NSIAD-96-240_0 | Efforts to Control Heroin
U.S. funding of heroin control efforts accounts for a small portion of the overall international drug control budget. However, the United States faces the following significant obstacles in implementing this approach:
Since 1988, the United States has not provided direct counternarcotics assistance to Burma because of its record of human rights abuses and its refusal to yield control of the country to a democratically elected government. Much of Burma’s opium-producing region is not under the effective control of the Burmese government. The impact of U.S. regional interdiction efforts to date has been limited by the ability of traffickers to shift their routes into countries with inadequate law enforcement capability and by poor law enforcement cooperation between the United States and China. Although some U.S. programs in countries such as Thailand and Hong Kong that possess the political will and capability to engage in counternarcotics activities have achieved positive results, the problems in Burma have limited the progress in the region. From Southeast Asia, heroin is transported to the United States primarily by ethnic Chinese and West African drug-trafficking organizations. However, we found that the projects have not significantly reduced opium production because (1) the scope of the projects has been too small, (2) the Burmese government has not provided sufficient support to ensure project success, and (3) inadequate planning has reduced project effectiveness. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed U.S. efforts to control heroin trafficking from Southeast Asia to the United States.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) U.S. efforts have achieved some positive results in Thailand and Hong Kong, but not in Burma; (2) the United States has supported United Nations (UN) drug control projects in Burma, but these efforts have met with limited success because the projects' scope has been small, planning has been inadequate, and Burma has not provided sufficient support; (3) the United States suspended direct counternarcotics assistance to Burma because of human rights violations; (4) much of Burma's heroin-producing region is not under government control because of insurgencies headed by drug traffickers; (5) law enforcement efforts against heroin traffickers are impeded by the traffickers' ability to shift transportation routes to countries with inadequate law enforcement capabilities; and (6) U.S. heroin control efforts are also impeded by a lack of cooperation with China on counternarcotics activities. |
gao_GAO-13-24 | gao_GAO-13-24_0 | NHTSA’s Changes to Its Collection of Data on Unsecured Loads Will Take Time to Implement
While NHTSA currently collects limited information on crashes involving unsecured loads, the agency intends to make changes to its data systems to follow Congress’s direction to distinguish road obstructions resulting from human error from those involving natural elements. However, as noted previously, these data categories do not currently distinguish between different types of roadway debris (i.e., debris resulting from natural/environmental sources versus debris resulting from human error). As a result, NHTSA cannot currently identify how many crashes involve vehicles carrying unsecured loads. In response to the congressional direction to improve its data on unsecured-load crashes, NHTSA officials stated that they are currently making changes to the FARS and the NASS GES to collect better information and better track crashes involving unsecured loads. Two primary factors affect NHTSA’s ability to collect this information: (1) law enforcement officials face difficulties in determining whether a crash involved an unsecured load and (2) states do not collect uniform data on unsecured loads in their police crash reports. Even with the changes that NHTSA is making in its data collection processes and procedures, the resulting data will be imprecise because it relies on state reporting of crashes and data improvements will take time to implement as acknowledged by NHTSA. NHTSA does not have independent authority to seek changes in state police reports; however, NHTSA officials stated that they will likely recommend changes to MMUCC guidelines. MMUCC released its revised guidelines in July 2012, and the next update is not expected until 2017. All 50 States and the District of Columbia Have Laws That Pertain to Non- Commercial Unsecured Loads, but Exemptions, Fines, and Penalties Vary
All fifty states and the District of Columbia have statutes regarding unsecured loads that pertain to non-commercial vehicles. While nine states reported having no exemptions related to their statute, a majority of states and the District of Columbia reported exempting vehicles from unsecured-load statutes most commonly for roadway maintenance or agriculture activities, but these exemptions are primarily related to commercial activities. All fifty states and the District of Columbia reported having fines or penalties for violating unsecured-load statutes ranging from $10 to $5,000; fifteen of these states add the possibility of imprisonment. Some States Have Programs for Educating the Public about Unsecured Loads
Ten of the 50 states and the District of Columbia reported they have a safety or education program that pertains to unsecured loads on non- commercial vehicles. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to NHTSA for review and comment. NHTSA provided technical comments that were incorporated as appropriate. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report examines (1) efforts the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) has undertaken to monitor crashes involving vehicles carrying unsecured loads and (2) existing state laws, exemptions, and punitive measures regarding non-commercial vehicles carrying unsecured loads. NHTSA collects data on crashes involving non-commercial and commercial crashes. Finally, we analyzed NHTSA’s crash data from the Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS) and the National Automotive Sampling System General Estimates System (NASS GES) to identify the number of crashes in 2010 in which a vehicle struck falling or shifting cargo or an object lying in the roadway. We received completed responses from the 51 survey respondents for a response rate of 100 percent. | Why GAO Did This Study
Vehicles carrying objects that are not properly secured pose a safety risk on our nation's roadways. Debris that falls from a vehicle can collide with other vehicles or pedestrians, causing serious injuries or fatalities. According to data collected by NHTSA, there were about 440 fatalities caused by roadway debris in 2010. However, the exact number of incidents resulting from vehicles carrying unsecured loads is unknown.
Congress, through the Conference Report for the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, (2012), directed NHTSA to improve its data on unsecured-load incidents and directed GAO to report on state laws and related exemptions, and punitive measures regarding unsecured loads on non-commercial vehicles, such as cars and light trucks used for non-commercial purposes. This report examines NHTSAs data collection efforts as well as states laws related to unsecured loads. GAO reviewed NHTSA documents and interviewed officials from NHTSA, as well as representatives of highway safety associations and state police agencies. GAO also conducted a survey of all 50 states and the District of Columbia, with a response rate of 100 percent, and researched the laws, punitive measures, and education efforts in each state.
GAO provided a draft of this report to NHTSA for review and comment. NHTSA provided technical comments that were incorporated, as appropriate.
What GAO Found
The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) collects limited information on crashes involving vehicles carrying unsecured loads but plans to make changes to collect better information. Currently, NHTSA collects some data in the Fatality Analysis Reporting System and the National Automotive Sampling System General Estimates System. However, the systems do not currently have a data category to distinguish between debris resulting from natural sources (such as a tree branch) and debris resulting from human error (such as an unsecured load). As a result, NHTSA cannot currently identify how many crashes involve vehicles carrying unsecured loads. NHTSA intends to make changes to both its systems to better identify crashes involving unsecured loads. These changes will go into effect in 2013. However, NHTSA may still face challenges collecting this data because 1) law enforcement officials face difficulties in determining whether a crash involved an unsecured load and 2) states do not collect uniform data on unsecured loads in their police crash reports. NHTSA officials stated that they would likely recommend changes to the Model Minimum Uniform Crash Criteria (MMUCC)voluntary guidelines intended to create uniform data in police crash reports; however, the revised guidelines will not be released until 2017 because of MMUCCs 5-year cycle of updates. NHTSA officials acknowledged that even with the changes in its data systems, data improvements will take time to implement and data on unsecured-load crashes will likely continue to be imprecise.
All 50 states and the District of Columbia have statutes regarding unsecured loads that pertain to non-commercial and commercial vehicles. A majority of states and the District of Columbia reported exempting vehicles from unsecured load statutes for primarily commercial activities such as roadway maintenance or agriculture activities, while 9 states have statutes that apply to all vehicles. All 50 states and the District of Columbia reported having fines or penalties for violating unsecured load statutes ranging from $10 to $5,000; fifteen states add the possibility of imprisonment. Ten states also reported having a safety or education program related to unsecured loads. |
gao_GAO-07-213 | gao_GAO-07-213_0 | Social Security Is One Part of the Long-Term Fiscal Challenge
Our work on Social Security reform has emphasized the need for change not only because future program revenues are expected to fall short of what is needed to pay currently scheduled benefits in full but because Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid taken together will consume an increasing share of the budget and the economy. It is different from OCACT’s definition, which is focused solely on the trust fund, for which they are responsible. OCACT Scoring Memos Are Primary Source of Information on Reform Proposals, but Detailed Tables Are Difficult to Use for Understanding General Revenue and Federal Budget Effects
OCACT scoring memos are the primary source of information on recent Social Security reform proposals. The type and amount of information included in the tables has increased over time. General revenue transfers specified by formula or amount. None of the five general revenue mechanisms in the plans we examined would come from new revenue sources and hence would bring no new revenue to the federal budget; the four payroll tax mechanisms would bring new revenue to the budget as a whole. Additional Revenue Improves Trust Fund Solvency but Effects on the Federal Budget May Differ Greatly
The effect of a reform proposal on federal budget balances and debt cannot be determined from its effect on trust fund solvency. Four of the 17 proposals we reviewed for this report included this type of provision; 3 of the 4 also provided for unlimited transfers of reallocated general revenue to maintain trust fund solvency. Although raising taxes (payroll or other) or cutting benefits would have tangible consequences for taxpayers and beneficiaries, e.g., less take-home pay or smaller benefit checks, the consequences of transfers from the non- Social Security budget in the form of reallocated general revenue are less likely to be clearly observable. Regardless of how general revenue is provided to Social Security, it must be paid for at some point. The question is when, and by whom. Recommendation for Executive Action
To improve public understanding of proposed changes to Social Security, we recommend that the Commissioner of SSA direct the Office of the Chief Actuary at SSA to include a summary presentation of its analysis in future scoring memoranda that will enable policymakers and the general public to quickly and easily compare Social Security reform proposals especially with respect to proposed use of general revenue and federal budget implications. This report also does not address the effects of general revenue use on program equity. | Why GAO Did This Study
Absent reform, Social Security's financing gap will grow until currently scheduled benefits can no longer be paid in full. Recent reform proposals often include general revenue (GR)--a major change that can have significant implications for the budget as a whole. This report addresses these issues: (1) What information is available about GR in recent proposal scorings by Social Security's Office of the Chief Actuary (OCACT)? (2) What common mechanisms, especially GR mechanisms, are used to increase program revenue? (3) What are the implications of GR for the trust fund and the federal budget? We have prepared this report under the Comptroller General's statutory authority to conduct evaluations on his own initiative as part of a continued effort to assist Congress in addressing the challenges facing Social Security.
What GAO Found
Although focused on the trust fund, OCACT scoring memos are also the primary source of information on how proposals would impact the federal budget. Memos provide information on GR use and its effects, but experts said comparing proposals on this element presents challenges, requiring extensive efforts to understand complex tables shown at the end of the memos. Fourteen of 17 proposals GAO reviewed provided GR (1) as needed to maintain trust fund solvency or (2) as specified by formula, amount, or source. Nine of the 17 achieved "sustainable solvency" under OCACT's definition using the first approach. This type of unlimited transfer poses the greatest potential risk to the federal budget, especially when combined with benefit guarantees. In proposals reviewed, amounts of GR under both types of approaches ranged up to about twice program shortfall. In all proposals using GR, the GR was reallocated from the non-Social Security budget. While any additional revenue to the trust fund will help solvency, unified federal budget effects depend on the type of revenue--whether it is new revenue (additional payroll tax revenue or GR that is new to the federal budget) versus reallocated GR. Absent other changes, new revenue would improve the long-term fiscal imbalance while reallocated GR would do nothing to address it. Although raising taxes (payroll or other) or cutting benefits would have tangible consequences for taxpayers and beneficiaries, e.g., less take-home pay or smaller benefit checks, the consequences of transfers from the non--Social Security budget in the form of reallocated GR are less likely to be clearly observable. Reallocated GR, however, is not free. Regardless of how GR is provided to Social Security, it must be paid for at some point. The question is when, and by whom. |
gao_GAO-04-601 | gao_GAO-04-601_0 | Consequently, DOD’s overall cost estimates were based on assumptions, estimates, and actual data that differed across the services and that raise questions about the reliability of DOD’s estimated costs to clean up operational ranges. Operational Range Inventory Process Lacked a Common Framework and Analytical Rigor
Each service inventoried its operational ranges and collected data on range acreage and munitions used, using various methodologies over different periods of time. DOD provided cost assumptions to the services based on operational range acreage and other variables. However, as reflected in table 4, a tenfold difference in the average cost to clean up an acre of highly contaminated rangeland calls into question the mix of different assumptions and data used by the services to estimate costs. As a result, the services cost estimates are not comparable. DOD Does Not Have a Comprehensive Policy on Contaminants Associated with Military Munitions and Has Not Specifically Cleaned Up Known Perchlorate Contamination
DOD does not have a comprehensive policy requiring sampling or cleanup of the more than 200 chemical contaminants associated with military munitions on operational ranges. However, DOD installations have sampled for and cleaned up munitions-based constituents when directed by state regulatory authorities. With regard to perchlorate, DOD has issued sampling policies but does not provide specific funding for such sampling. Three of the seven installations we visited tested for perchlorate under the Safe Drinking Water Act’s Unregulated Contaminant Monitoring Regulation program. Recommendations for Executive Action
In order to the assist Congress, EPA, and state regulators in assessing and planning for the cleanup of contamination associated with military munitions at operational ranges, we are making the following two recommendations: To improve congressional oversight of DOD and its operational ranges, including providing Congress with more realistic estimates of the potential liability associated with cleaning up contamination related to the use of military munitions, we recommend that DOD, using a more consistent estimating methodology, use its most complete operational range inventory to revise its cost estimates for the cleanup of operational ranges. We acknowledge that DOD is sampling for, and in some cases, cleaning up munitions constituents when directed to do so by EPA or a state environmental agency under various environmental laws. Scope and Methodology
You asked us to determine (1) how DOD identified the location and last active use of all operational ranges and the basis for DOD’s cost estimates for cleaning up those ranges; and (2) DOD’s policy on sampling for contaminants linked to the use of ordnance on operational ranges and, where munitions-related contaminants have been detected, what corrective actions the services have taken. | Why GAO Did This Study
For decades, the Department of Defense (DOD) has tested and fired munitions on more than 24 million acres of operational ranges. Munition constituents such as lead, trinitrotoluene (TNT), and perchlorate may cause various health effects, including cancer. Concerned about the potential cost to clean up munitions, Congress required DOD to estimate the cost to clean up its operational ranges. Congress asked GAO to determine (1) how DOD identified the location and last use of operational ranges and the basis for DOD's cost estimates for cleaning up those ranges; and (2) DOD's policy to address contaminants linked to the use of munitions on operational ranges and, where contaminants such as perchlorate have been detected, what corrective actions the military services have taken.
What GAO Found
DOD identified the location and status of its operational ranges based on inventory data developed by the individual military services. However, the reliability of DOD's inventory is questionable because the services did not use a common framework to collect and analyze data on the number of existing operational ranges. Because DOD's cost estimates to clean up its operational ranges were based on individual service calculations that combined inventory data with unvalidated DOD cost assumptions, various service assumptions, and computer-generated cost rates, these cost estimates are also questionable. Specifically, GAO found that each service compiled inventory data using various methodologies over different time periods and developed cost estimates using a mix of differing assumptions and estimates, along with actual data. As a result, the services' estimates to clean up an acre of highly contaminated land vary from about $800 for the Air Force to about $7,600 for the Army. DOD does not have a comprehensive policy requiring sampling or cleanup on operational ranges for the more than 200 chemicals associated with military munitions. However, when required by the Safe Drinking Water Act or other environmental laws, DOD has sampled and cleaned up munitions and munitions constituents. With regard to perchlorate, DOD has issued sampling policies but cannot assure funding is provided for such sampling. In some cases, DOD has sampled for perchlorate when required under the Safe Drinking Water Act's Unregulated Contaminant Monitoring Regulation and for other contaminants when directed by state environmental agencies. However, DOD generally has not independently taken actions specifically directed at cleaning up munitions contaminants, such as perchlorate, on operational ranges when they have been detected. |
gao_GAO-06-398T | gao_GAO-06-398T_0 | The act guaranteed that communities served by air carriers before deregulation would continue to receive a certain level of scheduled air service. Number of Airports and Amount of EAS Subsidies Has Been Growing
Mr. Chairman, demand for EAS subsidies has been growing over the past 10 years, as has the amount of funds appropriated for the program. If EAS subsidies were removed, air service may end at many small communities. EAS subsidies have helped communities that were served by air carriers before deregulation continue to receive scheduled air service. The Small Community Grant Program Has Had Mixed Results
Mr. Chairman, our previous work was not able to evaluate the overall effectiveness of SCASDP; however, we found that SCASDP grantees pursued several goals and strategies to improve air service, and that the projects have obtained mixed results. In addition, the number of applications for SCASDP has declined each year. DOT officials said that this decline was, in part, a consequence of several factors, including: (1) many eligible airport communities had received a grant and were still implementing projects at the time; (2) the airport community as a whole was coming to understand the importance DOT places on a fulfilling the local contribution commitment part of the grant proposal; and (3) legislative changes in 2003 that prohibited communities or consortiums from receiving more than one grant for the same project, and that established the timely use of funds as a priority factor in awarding grants. However, after the 23 SCASDP grants were completed, 11 grants resulted in improvements that were self-sustaining. We found that grantees had identified a variety of project goals to improve air service to their community. To achieve these goals, grantees have used many strategies, including subsidies and revenue guarantees to the airlines, marketing, hiring personnel and consultants, and establishing travel banks in which a community guarantees to buy a certain number of tickets. Options Exist for Reforming EAS and Evaluating SCASDP
Mr. Chairman, let me now turn to a discussion of options both for the reform of EAS and the evaluation of SCASDP. I raise these options, in part, because they link to our previous report on the challenges facing the federal government in the 21st century, which notes that the federal government’s long-term fiscal imbalance presents enormous challenges to the nation’s ability to respond to emerging forces reshaping American society, the United States’ place in the world, and the future role of the federal government. Moreover, the passenger response to regionalizing local air service is unknown. While some EAS communities might be able to transition to self-sustaining air service through use of one of the grants, for some communities this would not be the case. This could systematically eliminate the poorest communities, unless other sources of funds—such as state support or local industry support—could be found. Vision-100 Small Community Programs Have Not Progressed
In Vision-100, Congress authorized several programs relevant to small communities. These programs have not progressed for various reasons. This information will be important as Congress considers the reauthorization of this program in 2008. 12. Commercial Aviation: Initial Small Community Air Service Development Projects Have Achieved Mixed Results. GAO-05-945 Washington, D.C.: September 30, 2005. Commercial Aviation: Factors Affecting Efforts to Improve Air Service at Small Community Airports. Essential Air Service: Changes in Subsidy Levels, Air Carrier Costs, and Passenger Traffic. | Why GAO Did This Study
Over the last decade, significant changes have occurred in the airline industry. Network carriers are facing challenging financial conditions and low-cost carriers are attracting passengers away from some small community airports. These changes, and others, have challenged the ability of small communities to attract adequate commercial air service. In response to these challenges, Congress has established two key funding programs--the Essential Air Service (EAS) and the Small Community Air Service Development Program (SCASDP)--to help small communities retain or attract air service. However, the sustainability of such funding could be affected by the federal government's fiscal imbalance. In addition, GAO reports have raised questions about how these programs support commercial air service to small communities. Given this environment, this testimony discusses (1) the development and impact of EAS, (2) the status of SCASDP and (3) options for reforming EAS and evaluating SCASDP. The testimony is based on previous GAO research and interviews related to these programs, along with program updates.
What GAO Found
The EAS program guarantees that communities that were served by air carriers before deregulation continue to receive a certain level of scheduled air service, under certain conditions. A growing number of communities are receiving subsidies under this program and funding for the EAS program has risen more than four-fold over the past 10 years. The federal subsidies have resulted in continued air service to the EAS communities, but if the subsidies were removed, air service might end at many of these communities. SCASDP grantees have used their grants to pursue a variety of goals and have used a variety of strategies, including marketing and revenue guarantees, to improve air service. The program has had mixed results: 11 of the 23 projects completed as of September 30, 2005, showed self-sustaining improvements to air service; while the remaining 12 grantees either discontinued the improvement or the improvement was not self-sustaining. Finally, the number of applications for SCASDP grants has declined--from 179 in 2002 to 75 in 2006. There are options for reforming EAS such as consolidating service into regional airports, which might make it more cost-effective, but also could reduce service to some communities. In 2003, Congress established several programs as alternatives for EAS, but these programs have not progressed. The Department of Transportation has agreed to evaluate completed SCASDP projects, an effort that will be useful when Congress considers the reauthorization of this program in 2008; this could also identify "lessons learned" from successful projects. |
gao_GAO-14-503T | gao_GAO-14-503T_0 | Overview of the Creation of IG Offices
The IG Act originally established IGs appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate in 12 major departments and agencies of the government in 1978. The Inspector General Act Amendments of 1988 established IGs appointed by their respective entity heads in designated federal entities (DFE) identified by the act with duties and responsibilities similar to those of IGs appointed by the President. DFEs are generally smaller agencies established in various statutes as commissions, boards, authorities, corporations, endowments, foundations, institutions, agencies, and administrations. Prior to the 1988 amendments, both GAO and the President’s Council on Integrity and Efficiency, which preceded the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE), had found that the internal audit offices of small federal agencies lacked independence and provided inadequate coverage of important programs that could benefit from independent oversight by an IG. Additional criteria used by the Congress to determine where to establish these new IG offices included a budget threshold of at least $100 million for the DFEs. However, other agencies below this budget threshold were also included for specific reasons. IG Oversight of Small Agencies
GAO has long supported the creation of independent IG offices in appropriate federal departments, agencies, and entities, and we continue to believe that significant federal programs and entities should be subject to oversight by independent IGs. At the same time, we have reported some concerns about creating and maintaining small IG offices with limited resources, where an IG might not have the ability to obtain the technical skills and expertise needed to provide adequate and cost- effective oversight. As a result, we believe there are alternative approaches that the Congress may wish to consider to achieve IG oversight that is appropriate for federal agencies with relatively small budgets and resources. For example, we have recommended, on a case-by-case basis, that specific small agencies could benefit by obtaining IG oversight from another agency’s IG office where the missions of the two agencies are somewhat similar. The alternatives we provided for IG oversight of the Export-Import Bank included (1) establishing a new IG office through an amendment to the IG Act with an IG appointed by either the President or by the Export-Import Bank Chairman of the Board of Directors; (2) designating through legislation an existing IG office to provide oversight, such as the Agency for International Development IG; and (3) implementing a memorandum of understanding, which acts like a contract for outside IG services and would not require an amendment to the IG Act or other legislation. IG Independence and Budgetary Resources
Independence is the cornerstone of professional auditing and one of the most important elements of an effective IG function. The IG Act provides specific protections to IG independence that are unprecedented for an audit and investigative function located within the organization being reviewed. The Congress passed the IG Reform Act of 2008 (Reform Act) to further enhance IG independence and accountability. In 2010, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) amended the IG Act with provisions to enhance the independence of IGs in DFEs with boards or commissions. If the DFE has a board or commission, the IG Act now requires each of these IGs to report organizationally to the entire board or commission as the head of the DFE rather than an individual chairman. In addition, the IG Act requires the written concurrence of a two-thirds majority of the board or commission to remove an IG. | Why GAO Did This Study
The IGs play a key role in federal agency oversight by enhancing government accountability and protecting the government's resources. This includes a strong leadership role in making recommendations to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of government offices and programs at a time when they are needed most.
This testimony focuses on (1) the creation of independent IG offices, (2) IG oversight of small agencies, and (3) IG independence and budgetary resources.
This testimony provides updates of current IG responsibilities; provisions of the IG Act, as amended; and draws on prior GAO reports and testimonies conducted in accordance with GAO's Quality Assurance Framework.
GAO has made numerous observations and provided matters for the Congress to consider in prior reports when addressing IG oversight at small federal agencies and IG independence.
What GAO Found
The Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended (IG Act), originally established inspectors general (IG) appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate in 12 major departments and agencies of the government to conduct and supervise independent audits and investigations; recommend policies to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness; and prevent and detect fraud and abuse in their departments' and agencies' programs and operations. Based in part on GAO's findings that the internal audit offices of small federal agencies lacked independence and provided inadequate coverage of important programs, the Congress passed the IG Act Amendments of 1988 to establish IGs in designated federal entities (DFE), which are generally smaller agencies established in various statutes as commissions, boards, authorities, corporations, endowments, foundations, institutions, agencies, and administrations identified by the act. The DFE IGs are appointed by their respective entity heads with duties and responsibilities similar to those of IGs appointed by the President. The Congress used a budget threshold of $100 million to help determine which DFEs should have IGs. However, additional DFEs below this threshold were also included for specific reasons.
Significant federal programs and agencies should be subject to oversight by independent IGs; however, small IG offices with limited resources might not have the ability to obtain the technical skills and expertise needed to provide adequate, cost-effective oversight. GAO has previously found that alternative approaches exist to achieve IG oversight that may be appropriate for federal agencies with small budgets and few resources. For example, GAO has recommended on a case-by-case basis that specific small agencies could benefit by obtaining IG oversight from another agency's IG office where the missions of the two agencies are somewhat similar.
Independence is one of the most important elements of an effective IG function. The IG Act, as amended, provides specific protections to IG independence. The IG Reform Act of 2008 further enhanced the IGs' independence by providing specified pay levels, IG legal counsel, a process for handling allegations of IG wrong-doing, and required notification to the Congress before an IG is removed or transferred. The IG Reform Act also requires the IGs' budget requests to be visible in the budget of the U.S. government submitted by the President to the Congress. Additional provisions to enhance the independence of IGs in DFEs with boards or commissions were included in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010. Specifically, these IGs are to report organizationally to the entire board or commission rather than a single chairperson. In addition, the IG Act requires a two-thirds majority of the board or commission to remove the IG. |
gao_GAO-05-328 | gao_GAO-05-328_0 | Background
Established in 1985, LOGCAP is an Army program that preplans for the use of global corporate resources to support worldwide contingency operations. Examples of the types of support available include supply operations, laundry and bath, food service, sanitation, billeting, personnel support, maintenance, transportation, engineering and construction, and power generation and distribution. Some of the initiatives the Army has completed or has under way that should contribute to stronger management of LOGCAP include (1) rewriting its guidance, including its field manual for the use of contractors on the battlefield, and its primary regulation for obtaining contractor support in wartime operations; (2) implementing near- and longer-term training for commanders and logisticians; (3) developing a deployable unit to provide training and assistance for commands using LOGCAP; (4) restructuring the LOGCAP contracting office to provide additional personnel resources in key areas; and (5) eliminating the backlog of contract task orders requiring definitization and conducting award fee boards in order to improve the financial oversight and control of LOGCAP. Definitization is the process by which the government and the customer come to agreement or a determination is made on the terms, specifications, and price of the task orders. First, there is no formal process for seeking economy and efficiency in the use of LOGCAP. DOD concurred with our recommendation. AMC is the executive agent for LOGCAP, but several other DOD components also have important LOGCAP responsibilities, and these components must work in coordination with AMC to ensure the contract’s effective and efficient use. However, as of February 2005 no policy memorandum has been issued and no teams of subject matter experts have been established or deployed to review contract activities. However, while AMC has sought to influence the manner in which the other components carry out their roles, AMC does not have command authority over the components, and thus its influence is limited. While AMC was aware that the Army Central Command’s plan for the use of the contract was not comprehensive, it lacked the authority to direct better planning. Given the $6.8 billion that the Army plans to spend on LOGCAP contract activities in fiscal year 2005, the importance of the contract to the success of current military operations, and the existing command authorities, we believe that more direct oversight and coordination is needed. Conclusions
In response to our prior reports, the Army has taken or is in the process of taking steps designed to improve the management and oversight of LOGCAP as well as related contracts and it continues to proactively look for additional areas for improvement. At the DOD level, no one is in a position to coordinate these components in using the contract. Scope and Methodology
To determine the actions the Army has taken for improving the management and oversight of the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP), we met with representatives of the Army Field Support Command’s (AFSC) LOGCAP Program Manager, LOGCAP Contracting Office, and LOGCAP Support Unit to gain a comprehensive understanding of the status of efforts regarding the LOGCAP contract, the contract management process, and issues related to using the contract effectively. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) is an Army program that plans for the use of a private-sector contractor to support worldwide contingency operations. Examples of the types of support available include laundry and bath, food service, sanitation, billeting, maintenance, and power generation. LOGCAP has been used extensively to support U.S. forces in recent operations in southwest Asia, with more than $15 billion in estimated work as of January 2005. While we issued two reports on LOGCAP since 1997 that made recommendations to improve the Army's management of the contract, broader issues on coordination of LOGCAP's contract functions were beyond the scope of our earlier work. This report assesses the extent to which the Army is taking action to improve the management and oversight of LOGCAP and whether further opportunities for using this contract effectively exist.
What GAO Found
The Army has taken or is in the process of taking actions to improve the management and oversight of LOGCAP on the basis of our earlier reporting. The actions that the Army has completed or has underway include (1) rewriting its guidance, including its field manual for using contractors on the battlefield and its primary regulation for obtaining contractor support in wartime operations; (2) implementing near- and longer-term training for commanders and logisticians in using the contract; (3) developing a deployable unit to assist commands using LOGCAP; (4) restructuring the LOGCAP contracting office to provide additional personnel resources in key areas; and (5) taking steps to eliminate the backlog of contract task orders awaiting definitization--that is, coming to agreement on the terms, specifications, and price of the task orders--and conducting award fee boards. While improvements have been made, GAO believes that the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Army need to take additional action in two areas. First, although DOD continues to agree with our July 2004 recommendation to create teams of subject matter experts to review contract activities for economy and efficiency, it has not done so yet because the need to respond to statutory requirements took precedence. Prior GAO reviews have shown that when commanders look for savings in contract activities, they generally find them, as illustrated in the table. The second area needing attention is the coordination of contract activities between DOD components involved with using LOGCAP. While the Army Materiel Command (AMC) is the executive agent for LOGCAP, other DOD components also play important LOGCAP roles, including the combatant commander, individual deployed units, and the Defense Contract Management Agency. The effective and efficient use of the contract depends on the coordinated activities of each of these agencies. However, at the DOD level, no one is responsible for overall leadership in using the contract and, while AMC has sought to influence the way in which the other components carry out their roles, it does not have command authority over the other components and thus its influence is limited. For example, AMC knew that planning for the use of LOGCAP for Operation Iraqi Freedom was not comprehensive but lacked the command authority to direct better planning. AMC officials believe that training will resolve these problems over time. However, given the importance of LOGCAP to supporting military operations and the billions of dollars being spent on LOGCAP activities, we believe that more immediate and direct oversight is needed. |
gao_GAO-02-942 | gao_GAO-02-942_0 | Direct Farm Loan Application National Processing Times Were Longer for Hispanic Farmers than for Non-Hispanic Farmers but Were Shorter in Most States with Large Numbers of Hispanic Borrowers
Although the average direct loan application processing time was longer for Hispanic farmers than for non-Hispanic farmers during fiscal years 2000 and 2001, over 90 percent of loan applications from Hispanic farmers (and 94 percent from non-Hispanic farmers) were processed within the agency’s 60-day requirement. During fiscal year 2000 and 2001, the national average processing time for direct loans from Hispanic farmers was 20 days—4 days longer than for non-Hispanic farmers—but well within FSA’s 60-day requirement. However, the loan approval rate for Hispanic farmers was lower than for non-Hispanic farmers during this 2-year period—83 and 90 percent, respectively. In cases where individuals file an administrative discrimination complaint with USDA’s OCR, agency policy is to automatically issue a stay of adverse action—including foreclosures—until the complaint has been resolved. The department has not issued stays of foreclosure in either of these lawsuits. To put these figures into context, during this period, FSA foreclosed on approximately 600 borrowers, 16 (or 3 percent) of whom were Hispanic. Office of Civil Rights’ Problems with Processing Discrimination Complaints Persist
Despite implementing many improvements recommended by USDA’s Inspector General and task forces, OCR has only made modest progress in its timely processing of complaints. Specifically, USDA’s internal requirements direct OCR to complete its investigative reports within 180 days after accepting a discrimination complaint. Conclusions
The purpose of USDA’s direct loan program is to provide loans to farmers who are unable to obtain private commercial credit. However, unless OCR reduces the time it takes to process complaints, the inventory will expand once again. 4. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Farm Service Agency (FSA) runs a direct loan program that provides loans to farmers who are unable to obtain private commercial credit to buy and operate farms. FSA is required to administer this program in a fair, unbiased manner.
What GAO Found
GAO found that during fiscal years 2000 and 2001, FSA averaged 4 days longer to process loan applications from Hispanic farmers than it did for non-Hispanic farmers: 20 days versus 16 days. However, the processing times in three of the four states with the highest number of Hispanic borrowers was faster that it was for non-Hispanic borrowers in those states. FSA's direct loan approval rate was somewhat lower for Hispanic farmers than for non-Hispanic farmers nationwide--83 and 90 percent, respectively. The Department of Agriculture's (USDA) policies for staying foreclosures when discrimination has been alleged depend on the method used to lodge complaints. When an individual has a discrimination complaint accepted by USDA's Office of Civil Rights (OCR), FSA's policy is to automatically issue a stay of foreclosure until the complaint has been resolved. A GAO survey revealed that during fiscal years 2000 and 2001, FSA foreclosed on the loans of 600 borrowers nationwide. Although Hispanic farmers make up 4 percent of the agency's direct loan portfolio, 3 percent of these foreclosures involved Hispanic farmers. OCR has made modest progress in the length of time it takes to process discrimination complaints. USDA requirements direct OCR to complete its processing up through the investigative phase of complaints within 180 days of acceptance. It does not, however, have a time requirement for all of the phases of complaint processing. |
gao_GAO-09-416T | gao_GAO-09-416T_0 | DOD Has Made Progress in Addressing GAO Recommendations, but Additional Actions Are Needed
Our January 2006 and September 2006 reports contained 14 recommendations aimed at improving DOD’s management oversight and implementation of DTS and related travel policies. The 7 closed recommendations pertained to premium-class travel, unused airline tickets, use of restricted airfare, proper testing of system interfaces, and streamlining of certain travel processes, such as the process for approving travel voucher expenses. Our preliminary analysis of the 7 closed recommendations found that the actions taken by the department responded to the intent of our recommendations; however, we need to perform additional work to validate the department’s closed status regarding these recommendations. Of the 7 open recommendations, 3 related to the adequacy of DTS’s requirements management and system testing, 3 related to DTS underutilization, and 1 related to developing an approach that will permit the use of automated methods to reduce the need for hard copy receipts to substantiate travel expenses. Requirements management and system testing. Based upon our preliminary analysis and discussions with DTMO, PMO-DTS, and the prime contractor for the development and implementation of DTS, we found that while DTS’s requirements management and testing process has improved, problems still persist. The problems were generally related to missing documentation, the limited scope of requirements testing performed, or both. The three recommendations we made in the area remain open. Military service officials stated that they are unable to determine the number of legacy system vouchers that should have been processed by DTS (total universe of travel vouchers). DOD Lacks Complete and Accurate Information About Legacy Travel Systems
A key component of DOD’s efforts to transform its travel process is the elimination of the department’s legacy travel systems. Our preliminary work found that the department has not yet identified and validated the number of legacy travel systems still used by the military services and the cost of operating them. Information provided by DTMO indicates that the military services are still using 23 legacy travel systems. However, information provided by the military services identified only 12 legacy travel systems— 10 of which were included on the DTMO list. However, 20 of the 23 systems on DTMO’s list were not identified in the budget. Without a valid inventory of legacy travel systems, it is unlikely that DOD management or the Congress—in particular, this subcommittee—will receive reliable reports regarding when these systems are likely to be eliminated and the continuing annual cost to operate and maintain them. Electronic Processing of Travel Vouchers Is More Cost Effective
Continued operation of legacy travel systems, particularly where DTS has been deployed, diminishes savings available through electronic processing of travel vouchers and related travel information. DFAS provides only limited manual travel voucher processing for the Navy and the Air Force. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine the status of our 14 recommendations to improve the Department of Defense’s (DOD) travel processes and Defense Travel System (DTS) implementation, we met with representatives of the Defense Travel Management Office (DTMO) and the Program Management Office- Defense Travel System (PMO-DTS) to obtain an understanding of actions taken, under way, or planned by the department in response to our recommendations. We obtained and analyzed documentation, such as policies, procedures, and testing documentation, that supported the actions DOD has taken. We also obtained from the military services a listing of the legacy travel systems that will continue to operate once the DTS is deployed to all intended locations and the rationale for the continued operation of these systems. In addition, we reviewed the department’s fiscal year 2009 information technology budget request to identify the universe of legacy travel systems and their associated operating and maintenance costs. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 1995, the Department of Defense (DOD) began an effort to implement a standard departmentwide travel system--the Defense Travel System (DTS). As part of its ongoing monitoring, GAO's April 2008 testimony before this subcommittee highlighted challenges confronted by the department in its implementation efforts. GAO's testimony today is based on its current follow-up work conducted at the request of this subcommittee, as well as the Subcommittee on Readiness. GAO's testimony today focuses on the actions DOD has taken to (1) implement previous GAO recommendations regarding implementation of DTS and related travel policies, (2) phase out legacy travel systems and their associated costs, and (3) implement electronic travel voucher processing. To address these objectives, GAO (1) analyzed specific documentation, such as test documentation, travel policies, and budget data, and (2) interviewed appropriate DOD travel personnel.
What GAO Found
GAO has made 14 recommendations aimed at improving DOD's management oversight and implementation of DTS and related travel policies to make DTS the standard departmentwide travel system. GAO considers 7 of the 14 recommendations closed and the remaining 7 recommendations as being open. The 7 closed recommendations pertained to premium-class travel, unused airline tickets, use of restricted airfare, proper testing of system interfaces, and streamlining of certain travel processes, such as the process for approving travel voucher expenses. GAO's analysis of the 7 closed recommendations found that the actions taken by the department responded to the intent of the recommendations. Of the 7 open recommendations, 3 related to the adequacy of DTS's requirements management and system testing, 3 to DTS underutilization, and 1 to developing an approach that will permit the use of automated methods to reduce the need for hard copy receipts to substantiate travel expenses. In the area of requirements management and testing, GAO found that while DTS's requirements management and testing process has improved, problems still persist. The problems were generally related to missing documentation, the limited scope of requirements testing performed, or both. In the area of DTS utilization, GAO found that the department still does not have in place the metrics to determine the number of manual travel vouchers that should have been processed through DTS. Further, DOD does not have accurate and complete information on the number of legacy travel systems that are still in use by the military services. Defense Travel Management Office (DTMO) data indicates that there are 23 legacy travel systems, but military services' data identify 12--10 of which are on the DTMO list. In addition, GAO found that the department lacks visibility of the cost to operate and maintain these legacy systems. The DTMO and the military services could only provide limited cost data for each identified legacy travel system and the department's fiscal year 2009 information technology budget contained cost data for only 3 of the 23 systems on the DTMO list. According to the military services, some of the legacy systems will be needed even after DTS has been deployed to all intended locations because DTS will not include certain functionality, such as the processing of civilian permanent duty travel. Without a valid inventory of legacy travel systems, it is unlikely that DOD management or the Congress will receive reliable reports regarding when duplicative systems are likely to be eliminated and the annual savings available from avoiding the associated operating and maintenance costs. Finally, GAO found that there is a significant difference between the costs of processing a travel voucher manually and electronically. Based upon departmental data , the fee charged to process a travel voucher manually is about 15 times greater than electronic voucher processing--approximately $37 manually and $2.50 electronically. Shutting down legacy travel systems, which require manual processing, would provide cost savings to the department related to the processing of travel vouchers. |
gao_GAO-05-34 | gao_GAO-05-34_0 | In response to congressional concerns about NASA’s decision to cancel the servicing mission, NASA requested that the National Research Council conduct an independent assessment of options for extending the life of the Hubble Space Telescope. The CAIB concluded that the Columbia accident was caused by both physical and organizational failures. NASA’s Cost Estimate for a Hubble Servicing Mission Using the Shuttle Is Not Definitive
NASA does not currently have a definitive cost estimate for servicing the Hubble Telescope using the shuttle. The agency focused on safety concerns related to a servicing mission by the space shuttle in deciding not to proceed, and did not develop a cost estimate. At our request NASA prepared an estimate of the funding needed for a Hubble servicing mission by the space shuttle. At our request NASA began development of an estimate of the funding needed for a shuttle servicing mission to the Hubble. NASA has determined that the additional funds needed to perform a shuttle servicing mission for Hubble would be in the range of $1.7 billion to $2.4 billion. For example, NASA officials told us that the Hubble project’s sustaining engineering costs run $9 to10 million per month, but they were unable to produce a calculation or documents to support the estimate because they do not track these costs by servicing mission. The lack of documented support for portions of NASA’s estimate increases the risk of variation to the estimate. Further, NASA recognizes that there are many uncertainties that could change the current estimate. Since we began our review, attention has focused on alternatives to a shuttle mission, such as robotic servicing of Hubble. NASA provided us with documentary support for portions of the return to flight estimate, but we found it to be insufficient. According to NASA, the agency’s cost for returning the shuttle to flight, which is slightly over $2 billion, will remain uncertain until the completion of the first shuttle missions to the International Space Station in fiscal year 2005. However, NASA cautions that the total cost of returning the shuttle to flight will remain uncertain until completion of the first shuttle missions to the space station, scheduled to begin in spring 2005. According to NASA, the estimates will mature as the technical solutions mature, but the estimates were not refined at the time of our review. To determine the basis for NASA’s cost estimate for implementing all of the CAIB recommendations, we reviewed the CAIB report (volume 1), NASA’s return to flight implementation plan and budget estimates, and agency documentation discussing the return to flight budget estimate. | Why GAO Did This Study
Hubble's continued operation has been dependent on manned servicing missions using the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) shuttle fleet. The fleet was grounded in early 2003 following the loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia, as NASA focused its efforts on responding to recommendations made by the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB). In January 2004, NASA announced its decision to cancel the final planned Hubble servicing mission, primarily because of safety concerns. Without some type of servicing mission, NASA anticipates that Hubble will cease to support scientific investigations by the end of the decade. NASA's decision not to service the Hubble prompted debate about potential alternatives to prolong Hubble's mission and the respective costs of these alternatives. This report addresses the basis of NASA's cost estimates to (1) service Hubble using the shuttle and (2) implement recommendations made by the CAIB. GAO is continuing its work on the Congressional request that GAO examine the potential cost of a robotic servicing mission to the Hubble Telescope.
What GAO Found
Although a shuttle servicing mission is one of the options for servicing the Hubble Space Telescope, to date, NASA does not have a definitive estimate of the potential cost. At our request, NASA prepared an estimate of the funding needed for a shuttle servicing mission to the Hubble. NASA estimates the cost at between $1.7 billion to $2.4 billion. However, documentary support for portions of the estimate is insufficient. For example, NASA officials told us that the Hubble project's sustaining engineering costs run $9 to 10 million per month, but they were unable to produce a calculation or documents to support the estimate because they do not track these costs by servicing mission. Additionally, the agency has acknowledged that many uncertainties, such as the lack of a design solution for autonomous inspection and repair of the shuttle, could change the estimate. A t the same time, NASA has yet to develop a definitive cost estimate for implementing all of the CAIB's recommendations but has developed a budget estimate for safely returning the shuttle to flight--a subset of activities recommended by the CAIB as needed to return the shuttle to full operations. NASA currently estimates return to flight costs will exceed $2 billion, but that estimate will likely be refined as the agency continues to define technical concepts. NASA provided support for portions of the estimate, but we found the support to be insufficient--either because key documents were missing or the estimates lacked sufficient detail. Further, NASA cautions that return to flight costs will remain uncertain until the first return to flight shuttle mission, which is scheduled to go to the International Space Station in spring 2005. |
gao_GAO-01-325 | gao_GAO-01-325_0 | Figure 1 is an example of a type of wetland. Under these guidelines, developers must first avoid and then minimize adverse impacts to wetlands to the extent practicable and then compensate for any unavoidable impacts. The arrangements have been designed predominantly to restore, enhance, and/or preserve wetlands, with some arrangements also allowing for the creation of wetlands. Corps officials in 11 of the 17 districts with the in-lieu-fee option stated that the number of wetland acres restored, enhanced, created, or preserved by the in-lieu-fee organizations equaled or exceeded the number of wetland acres adversely affected. When asked about functions and values of wetlands, officials in 9 of the 17 districts reported that the functions and values lost from the adversely affected wetlands were replaced at the same level or better through the in- lieu-fee organizations’ mitigation efforts. Recent Guidance May Affect Competition Between In-Lieu-Fee Organizations and Mitigation Banks in Districts With the In- Lieu-Fee Option
In-lieu-fee organizations have the potential to compete with mitigation banks for developers’ mitigation business to the extent that organizations and banks provide similar mitigation services and serve the same geographic areas. Effectiveness of Ad Hoc Mitigation Unknown
Our survey showed that since January 1, 1996, 24 of the 38 Corps districts allowed developers to mitigate adverse impacts to wetlands through ad hoc arrangements. Oversight of mitigation efforts performed under ad hoc arrangements was lacking in almost half of the 24 districts using such arrangements. Officials in seven districts said that they had not monitored either the mitigation efforts or use of funds made under ad hoc arrangements, and officials in three others did not know whether such monitoring had occurred. To better ensure the ecological success of mitigation efforts under ad hoc arrangements, we recommend that the Secretary of the Army instruct the Corps to establish procedures to clearly identify whether developers or recipients of funds are responsible for the ecological success of mitigation efforts and, using the same success criteria applicable to in-lieu-fee arrangements, to develop and implement procedures for assessing success. Scope and Methodology
To obtain information on the extent to which the in-lieu-fee option has been used and been effective in mitigating adverse impacts to wetlands, and on the extent to which in-lieu-fee organizations compete with mitigation banks for developers’ mitigation business, we conducted a two- phase telephone survey of Corps officials from the 38 district regulatory offices. We also asked Corps districts to supply, in writing, information not suited for collection by telephone, such as the number of permits issued per district that used in-lieu-fees to satisfy mitigation requirements during fiscal years 1998–2000; the total dollar amounts received by in-lieu-fee organizations; and the number of acres that in-lieu-fee organizations restored, enhanced, created and/or preserved from the time that the in-lieu-fee arrangements were established through fiscal year 2000. We judgmentally selected these districts because they had in- lieu-fee arrangements that were established in 1997 or earlier and had mitigation banks available as a mitigation option. 2. 3. 5. 9. As explained in our report, ad hoc fund recipients usually do not have a formal agreement with the Corps and typically perform mitigation at a single site with funds received from one developer for one development project. 2. 3. | Why GAO Did This Study
More than half the estimated 220 million acres of marshes, bogs, swamps, and other wetlands in the United States during the colonial times, have disappeared, and others have become degraded. This decline is due, primarily, to farming and development. Developers whose projects may harm wetlands must, according to environmental regulations, first avoid and then minimize adverse impacts to wetlands to the extent practicable. If harmful impacts are unavoidable, the developer must compensate by restoring a former wetland, enhancing a degraded wetland, creating a new wetland, or preserving an existing wetland. Such mitigation efforts can occur under the following three types of arrangements: (1) mitigation banks, under which for-profit companies restore wetlands under Army Corps of Engineers agreements and then sell credits for these wetlands to developers; (2) in-lieu-fee arrangements under which developers pay public or non-profit organizations fees for establishing wetland areas, usually under formal Corps agreements; and (3) ad hoc arrangements, under which developers pay individuals or companies to perform the mitigation. This report, determines the extent to which (1) the in-lieu-fee option has been used to mitigate adverse impacts to wetlands, (2) the in-lieu-fee option has achieved its intended purpose of mitigating such impacts, and (3) in-lieu-fee organizations compete with mitigation banks for developers' mitigation business. This report also discusses the use of ad hoc arrangements as a mitigation option. Most of the arrangements were designed to use fees received from developers to restore, enhance, or preserve wetlands, with a few arrangements designed to allow wetlands to be created. During fiscal years 1998 through 2000, developers used the in-lieu-fee option to fulfill mitigation requirements for more than 580 acres of adversely affected wetlands, and paid more than $39.5 million to in-lieu-fee organizations. The extent to which the in-lieu-fee option has achieved its purpose of mitigating adverse impacts to wetlands is uncertain. Although Corps officials in 11 of the 17 districts with the in-lieu-fee option said that the number of wetland acres restored, enhanced, created, or preserved by in-lieu-fee organizations equaled or exceeded the number of wetland acres adversely affected, data submitted by more than half of those districts did not support these claims. Officials in 9 of the 17 districts said that functions and economic values lost from the adversely affected wetlands were replaced at the same level or better through in-lieu-fee mitigation, but officials in more than half of those districts also acknowledged that they have not tried to assess whether mitigation efforts have been ecologically successful. As a result, the Corps cannot be certain that in-lieu-fee mitigation has been effective. Corps district officials in 9 of the 17 districts with the in-lieu-fee option said that organization and mitigation banks were competing with each other by providing similar mitigation services in the same geographic area. No competition existed in 5 of the 17 districts because either no mitigation banks were available, or in-lieu-fee organizations and mitigation banks provided different services, or served different geographic areas.
What GAO Found
GAO found that hoc arrangements typically were for one-time projects without a formal agreement. Oversight of mitigation affairs was lacking in almost half of the districts using such arrangements. Corps districts disagreed on whether responsibility for the ecological success of ad hoc mitigation rests with the ad hoc fund recipient or the developer. |
gao_GAO-14-770 | gao_GAO-14-770_0 | DOT concurred with these recommendations, but as of August 2014, had not yet implemented them. Industry Stakeholders Were Generally Positive Regarding the Performance of the Current ATC System but Cited Challenges to Transitioning to a Modernized System
Stakeholders Said that the United States’ Current ATC System is Efficient, whereas NextGen Has Experienced Difficulties
Stakeholders’ views on FAA’s capability to operate an efficient ATC system generally align with the two international analyses described previously. Four stakeholders did not rate FAA on this issue. (See table 1 for the stakeholders’ ratings.) Stakeholders Identified Challenges Related to Overcoming NextGen Implementation Difficulties
Almost all (75) of the 76 stakeholders identified challenges that they stated FAA faces in improving ATC operations and overcoming difficulties in implementing NextGen. Mitigating the Effects of an Uncertain Fiscal Environment
Both the aviation stakeholders and FAA officials we interviewed regard budget uncertainty as a challenge for FAA. We have also reported on FAA’s workforce training and staffing issues in the past. Industry Stakeholders Suggested Changes That Could Improve ATC System Performance and Modernization and Identified Issues to Be Considered If ATC Operations Were Separated from FAA
Stakeholders Suggested Changes to Improve Performance of ATC Operations and Modernization of the ATC
Overall, while stakeholders generally thought the current ATC system was operating at least moderately efficiently under FAA’s leadership, when asked what potential changes, if any, to FAA could improve the performance of ATC operations and NextGen implementation, 64 of the 76 stakeholders we interviewed suggested changes. The change suggested by the most stakeholders (36 of the 64 stakeholders who suggested a change) was to modify how FAA’s ATC operations and NextGen programs are funded. Improve Coordination with Industry Stakeholders. While Most Stakeholders Agreed That Separating ATC Operations from FAA Was an Option to Consider, They Identified Several Issues That Would Need to be Taken into Account
In light of the ongoing discussion within the aviation industry on new approaches for operating and modernizing the ATC system, we also asked stakeholders about changing the provision of ATC services to improve ATC efficiency and NextGen implementation. Congressional involvement: Twenty-nine of these 65 stakeholders suggested that the extent of Congress’s role in overseeing a separate ATC system must be clarified. Agency Comments
We provided DOT with a draft of this report for its review and comment. DOT provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. This report examines stakeholder perspectives on: (1) the performance of the current ATC system and its modernization through the NextGen initiative, and any challenges the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) may face in managing these activities; and (2) potential changes, if any, that could improve the performance of the ATC system, including FAA’s modernization initiative. To obtain aviation stakeholders’ perspectives on these issues, we interviewed a non-probability sample of 76 aviation stakeholders. We used a semi-structured interview format with both closed- and open-ended questions to obtain aviation stakeholder perspectives on the efficiency of the current ATC, implementation of NextGen, and changes, if any, that could improve the operation of the ATC and implementation of NextGen. GAO classified respondents’ answers as “Maybe” for those who answered that this was an option, but generally said either it was not a good idea, it was not feasible in the United States, or that they had very strong reservations about such a change. For the three industry categories with fewer than four respondents—other federal government agencies, passenger and safety groups, and research and development organizations—we combined these into one category and refer to them in table 2 as Other stakeholders. Appendix IV: List of Challenges FAA Faces in Improving the Efficiency of the Air Traffic Control (ATC) System and Implementing NextGen, as Raised by the 76 Aviation Industry Stakeholders GAO Interviewed
Description and examples of challenge cited by stakeholders Due to the expense and uncertainty over FAA’s ability to meet timelines for deploying NextGen technologies users have been reluctant to equip their aircraft Budget uncertainty makes it difficult for FAA to continue operation of an efficient ATC system and/or implement NextGen FAA does not match workforce skills with needs for hiring and staffing, provides insufficient training, and has insufficient planning for upcoming retirements FAA’s development and implementation of PBN-related procedures is not working well or is moving too slowly. FAA needs to improve human capital activities including updating the air traffic controller handbook, improving the training air traffic controllers receive on new technologies, and streamlining the hiring process. Next Generation Air Transportation System: FAA Has Made Some Progress in Implementation, but Delays Threaten to Impact Costs and Benefits. | Why GAO Did This Study
Over the past two decades, U.S. aviation stakeholders have debated whether FAA should be the entity in the United States that operates and modernizes the ATC system. During this period, GAO reported on challenges FAA has faced in operating and modernizing the ATC system. FAA reorganized several times in attempts to improve its performance and implement an initiative to modernize the ATC system, known as NextGen. Recent budgetary pressures have rekindled industry debate about FAA's efficiency in operating and modernizing the ATC system.
GAO was asked to gather U.S. aviation industry stakeholder views on the operation and modernization of the current ATC system. This report provides perspectives from a wide range of stakeholders on
(1) the performance of the ATC system and the NextGen modernization initiative and any challenges FAA may face in managing these activities and
(2) potential changes that could improve the performance of the ATC system, including the NextGen modernization initiative.
Based on GAO's knowledge and recommendations from interviewees, GAO interviewed a non-probability, non-generalizable sample of 76 U.S. aviation industry stakeholders—including airlines, airports, labor unions, manufacturers, and general aviation—using a semi-structured format with closed and open-ended questions. GAO also discussed the perspectives with current FAA officials. The Department of Transportation provided technical comments on a draft of this product.
What GAO Found
The 76 aviation industry stakeholders with whom GAO spoke were generally positive regarding the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) operation of the current air traffic control (ATC) system but identified challenges about transitioning to the Next Generation Air Traffic Control System (NextGen). Specifically, the majority of stakeholders rated FAA as moderately to very capable of operating an efficient ATC system, but the majority also rated FAA as only marginally to moderately capable of implementing NextGen, FAA's initiative to modernize the system. Almost all (75) of the stakeholders identified challenges that they believe FAA faces, particularly in implementing the NextGen initiatives. These challenges included difficulty in (1) convincing reluctant aircraft owners to invest in the aircraft technology necessary to benefit from NextGen (46 stakeholders) and (2) mitigating the effects of an uncertain fiscal environment (43 stakeholders). FAA officials acknowledged and generally agreed with these challenges.
Sixty four stakeholders suggested a range of changes they believe could improve the efficiency of ATC operations and NextGen's implementation. The change stakeholders suggested most often was to modify how FAA's ATC operations and NextGen programs are funded, including the need to ensure that FAA has a predictable and long-term funding source. Other suggested changes were to improve human capital activities, such as air traffic controllers' training, and improve coordination with industry stakeholders. GAO has reported on these issues in the past, and in some cases, made recommendations, with which FAA concurred but has not yet implemented. GAO also asked stakeholders whether separating ATC services from FAA, such as the privatization of the ATC service provider, was an option; 27 of the stakeholders believed it was an option; another 26 believed it was an option, but had significant reservations about such a change. Support for this option was mixed among categories of stakeholders (see table below). Stakeholders identified several issues that would need to be taken into account before making any changes to the provision of ATC services, including lessons learned from other countries, funding sources for such a system, and the extent of Congress's role in overseeing a separate ATC system.
a Maybe represents stakeholders who qualified their “Yes” responses with significant reservations.
b Included in this other category are three industry categories with fewer than four stakeholders—Research & Development Organizations, Other Federal Agencies, and Passenger and Safety Groups. |
gao_GAO-16-346 | gao_GAO-16-346_0 | Background
In February 2011, Boeing won the competition to develop the Air Force’s next generation aerial refueling tanker aircraft, the KC-46. It features two key delivery dates, requiring Boeing to first deliver four development aircraft between April and May 2016, and second, if the Air Force exercises the first two production options, deliver a total of 18 operational aircraft by August 2017. It also specifies that Boeing must correct any deficiencies and bring development and production aircraft to the final configuration at no additional cost to the government.In addition, all required aircrew and maintainer training must be complete and the required support equipment and sustainment support must be in place by August 2017. Barring any changes, the development contract specifies a target price of $4.4 billion and a ceiling price of $4.9 billion, at which point Boeing assumes responsibility for all additional costs. Estimated Program Costs Are Decreasing and Performance Goals Are Expected to Be Met
For the third consecutive year, the program office has reduced its acquisition cost estimate and it continues to estimate that Boeing will meet performance goals. The total KC-46 program acquisition cost estimate (development, procurement, and military construction costs) has decreased $3.5 billion or about 7 percent—from $51.7 billion to $48.2 billion—since the program started in February 2011. The decrease is due primarily to stable requirements, fewer than expected engineering changes, and changes in military construction plans. Program Has Revised Testing and Delivery Schedules Due to Problems Early in Development
The KC-46 program originally planned to hold its low-rate initial production decision in August 2015, but had to delay the decision 9 months, to May 2016, because Boeing experienced problems developing the aircraft. As Boeing implements the new schedule, challenges to flight test completion could affect its ability to deliver aircraft on time. Boeing Plans to Deliver Aircraft in a Compressed Timeframe
As a result of the development problems, Boeing has used all of its schedule reserve and had to revise its testing schedule. Originally, Boeing contracted to complete developmental flight testing and deliver the four development aircraft by April and May 2016. Boeing also planned to bring the four development aircraft to operational configuration and deliver those aircraft, along with 14 additional production aircraft, to the Air Force over 14 months, prior to August 2017. It plans to bring two development aircraft to operational configuration and deliver those aircraft, along with 16 additional production aircraft (2 more than it originally planned to deliver in this timeframe), to the Air Force over the 6 months leading up to August 2017. While this risks late discoveries of aircraft deficiencies, Boeing must correct them at its own cost. Figure 2 illustrates the original and current schedules for test and delivery. This included a demonstration of the aircraft’s aerial refueling capability with an F-16 aircraft using the boom, which is needed to support the low-rate initial production decision. DOD developmental test officials believe that the schedule for completing the remaining test activities is risky because Boeing has not completed test activities at the rate it planned and upcoming tests will be more complex. To mitigate these risks, Boeing test officials told us that they are working to improve test efficiency. Obtain FAA approval of key components: FAA and program officials report that while most of the KC-46 components have been deemed ready for certification by the FAA, two key aerial refueling systems have not. The Air Force and Boeing have agreed in principle to contract changes that reflect the delay. We provided a draft of this report to the KC-46 program office for review and comment. The program office provided technical comments, which we incorporated into this report as appropriate. Probability an aircraft will be ready for operational use when required. | Why GAO Did This Study
Aerial refueling—when aircraft refuel while airborne—allows the U.S. military to fly farther, stay airborne longer, and transport more weapons, equipment, and supplies. The Air Force initiated the KC-46 program to replace its aging KC-135 aerial refueling fleet. Boeing was awarded a fixed price incentive contract with a ceiling price of $4.9 billion to develop the first four aircraft, which will be used for testing. Boeing is contractually required to deliver the four development aircraft between April and May 2016. Boeing is also required to deliver a total of 18 aircraft by August 2017, which could include some of the development aircraft if they are brought to operational configuration. The program plans to eventually field 179 aircraft in total.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 included a provision for GAO to review the KC-46 program annually through 2017. This report addresses progress made in 2015 toward (1) meeting cost and performance goals and (2) delivering the aircraft on schedule. GAO analyzed key cost, schedule, development, test, and manufacturing documents and discussed results with officials from the KC-46 program office, other defense offices, the FAA, and Boeing, the prime contractor.
What GAO Found
KC-46 tanker aircraft acquisition cost estimates have decreased for a third consecutive year and the prime contractor, Boeing, is expected to achieve all the performance goals, such as those for air refueling and airlift capability. As the table below shows, the total acquisition cost estimate has decreased from $51.7 billion in February 2011 to $48.2 billion in December 2015, about 7 percent, due primarily to stable requirements that led to fewer than expected engineering changes. The fixed price development contract also protects the government from paying for any development costs above the contract ceiling price.
Source: GAO presentation of Air Force data. | GAO-16-346
Regarding the schedule, the program office delayed the low-rate initial production decision 9 months because Boeing had problems developing the first four aircraft. Boeing has largely addressed the problems, but proposed a new schedule to reflect the delays. (See figure below.) Boeing still plans to deliver 18 operational aircraft to the Air Force by August 2017—assuming the Air Force approves production. Operational testing will be completed later, in October 2017. While aircraft deficiencies could be discovered late, the plan presents little cost risk to the government because Boeing must correct deficiencies using its own resources. Boeing plans to deliver the aircraft over 6 months, instead of 14.
Note: The original schedule included delivery of four development aircraft in operational configuration by May 2016. Under the current schedule the last of these aircraft will be delivered by November 2017.
Boeing has a challenging road ahead to complete testing and deliver aircraft. Test officials believe Boeing's test schedule is optimistic and it may not have all aircraft available when needed to complete planned testing. Boeing also has not gotten several key aerial refueling parts qualified by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and cannot get final FAA certification of KC-46 aircraft until this occurs. Program officials estimate there are 4 months of schedule risk to delivering 18 aircraft by August 2017 due to testing and parts qualification issues. Boeing is working on ways to mitigate the schedule risks.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making recommendations at this time. DOD's technical comments on a draft are incorporated as appropriate in the final report. |
gao_GAO-02-120 | gao_GAO-02-120_0 | Member countries agree to control exports of Regime items in accordance with their respective national laws. The United States fulfills its MTCR commitments primarily through the export control systems of the Departments of Commerce and State. These items, however, appear on the Commerce Control List. First, officials at the Departments of Commerce and State have expressed different understandings of how to define which Regime items are Commerce Department-controlled and which are State Department- controlled. Munitions List and disagreements between the Departments over which one has jurisdiction may result in the same Regime item being subject to different restrictions and reviews, which may affect U.S. national interests and companies’ ability to export Regime items. Conclusions
The U.S. government has committed internationally to controlling Regime items because of its concerns about the threat missile proliferation poses to U.S. interests. Munitions List, in consultation with others as appropriate, to jointly review the Regime Annex, determine the appropriate jurisdiction for items on the Annex, and revise their respective export control lists accordingly; the Secretary of Commerce ensure that, when a Regime item generally controlled by the Commerce Department becomes subject to the State Department’s control if it meets certain parameters, the Commerce Control List specify those parameters and provide a cross-reference to the U.S. Appendix I: Missile Technology Control Regime Items Subject to Unclear Jurisdiction
Forty-seven of the 196 items listed in the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Equipment, Software, and Technology Annex appear subject to the export control jurisdictions of both the Departments of Commerce and State. | What GAO Found
The U.S. government has long been concerned about the growing threat posed by the proliferation of missiles and related technologies that can deliver weapons of mass destruction. The United States is working with other countries through the Missile Technology Control Regime to control the export of missile-related items. The Departments of Commerce and State share primary responsibility for controlling exports of Regime items. The Commerce Department is required to control Regime items that are dual-use on its export control list--the Commerce Control List. All other Regime items are to be controlled by the State Department on its export control list--the U.S. Munitions List. However, the two departments have not clearly established which of them has jurisdiction for almost 25 percent of the items the United States agreed to control. The Departments disagree on how to determine which Regime items are controlled by Commerce and which are controlled by State. Consultations between the departments about respective control lists have not resolved these jurisdiction issues. Unclear jurisdiction may result in the same Regime item being subject to different export control restrictions and processes at the two departments. |
gao_RCED-00-64 | gao_RCED-00-64_0 | Moreover, the one commercial disposal site that is readily available to DOE can accept only low-level and mixed wastes that contain very low concentrations of radioactivity. On February 25, 2000, DOE issued a new waste disposal policy, making the low-level and mixed waste disposal facilities at two of its sites—the Nevada Test Site (NTS) and the Hanford Site—available to all of its waste- generating sites. But before DOE can fully implement this new policy, it will need to secure the cooperation of Nevada and Washington State. 3). Neither site currently disposes of mixed wastes from sites outside its respective state. Hanford must obtain a RCRA permit from Washington, NTS from Nevada. DOE Is Spending Millions on Waste Management, but Managers Lack Information and Guidance for Making Cost-Effective Disposal Decisions
DOE spent over $700 million over the last 3 fiscal years to manage and dispose of its low-level and mixed wastes.These costs, particularly for waste storage, may have been higher than they would have been without DOE’s restrictions on disposal options- all but two waste-generating sites have had to store their mixed wastes while awaiting DOE’s policy decision on the management and disposal of low-level and mixed wastes. Treatment, Storage, and Disposal Costs Are Substantial
For fiscal years 1997 through 1999, DOE’s waste-generating and disposal sites reported spending about $705 million to manage and dispose of their low-level and mixed wastes. 5.) III for the waste management and disposal costs at DOE’s six disposal sites.) These fees are not consistent among the disposal sites and do not include all of each site’s annual disposal costs. Specifically, the Secretary should develop reasonable and consistent estimates of the life-cycle costs of each of DOE’s disposal facilities, including the costs to close, monitor, and maintain each facility; decide if the operators of DOE’s disposal facilities should charge waste- generating sites fees for disposal services; if charging disposal fees is the preferred policy, provide the operators of disposal facilities with guidance on how to develop and use fees and what those fees should include; if charging fees is not the preferred policy, provide DOE’s waste- generating sites with guidance on how to compare the costs of disposing of their wastes at each available DOE and commercial disposal facility, including consideration of the estimated life-cycle costs of those facilities; and assess the effects of using commercial waste disposal facilities on the costs of operating DOE’s disposal facilities and develop guidance on how to compare and consider the total costs of using both types of disposal facilities in disposal decision-making. Scope and Methodology
The Chairman of the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources and the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Senate Committee on Armed Services, asked us to review (1) the factors that influence DOE’s decisions about the treatment, storage, and disposal of low-level and mixed wastes and (2) DOE’s costs to treat, store, and dispose of these wastes and the cost-effectiveness of DOE’s disposal decisions. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Energy's (DOE) management and disposal of its low-level radioactive wastes, focusing on: (1) the factors that influence DOE's decisions about the treatment, storage, and disposal of the wastes; and (2) DOE's costs to treat, store, and dispose of these wastes and the cost-effectiveness of DOE's disposal decisions.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the limited availability of disposal alternatives is the principal factor influencing DOE's decisions about the treatment, storage, and disposal of its low-level and mixed wastes; (2) four of DOE's six disposal sites are restricted to disposing almost exclusively of their own wastes because of limits on their remaining disposal capacity and unfavorable site conditions; (3) the other two disposal sites have relatively dry climates and enough capacity to dispose of nearly all the low-level and mixed wastes generated at DOE's nuclear facilities nationwide; (4) some waste-generating sites have been able to use a commercial disposal facility, but the only facility that is readily available can accept only wastes that are very lightly contaminated with radioactivity; (5) on February 25, 2000, DOE adopted a new policy that will make the disposal facilities at the Nevada Test Site and the Hanford Site available to all of its waste-generating sites, for both low-level and mixed wastes; (6) however, there are roadblocks to fully implementing this policy--the states that host the disposal facilities may oppose increases in waste disposal at the sites, and DOE needs to obtain environmental permits from these states to dispose of mixed wastes; (7) from fiscal year (FY) 1997 through FY 1999, DOE spent over $700 million to prepare, treat, store, and dispose of its low-level and mixed wastes; (8) treatment and storage costs increased during this 3-year period while waste generators waited for DOE to issue its new policy making the Hanford and Nevada disposal facilities available to them; (9) when DOE fully implements this new policy, waste managers will have at least two disposal options and may be able to lower their waste disposal costs; (10) however, these managers currently lack complete information and guidance from the Department for making cost-effective disposal decisions; (11) the fees charged to waste generators by some DOE disposal facilities are not based on all of the facilities' costs to dispose of wastes; (12) moreover, the disposal facilities do not use uniform cost accounts in developing their respective fees; and (13) DOE has not developed full life-cycle costs for its six waste disposal facilities or established guidance to ensure that its waste managers base their disposal decisions on considerations of cost-effectiveness for DOE's entire program rather than on each site's annual budgetary interests. |
gao_NSIAD-98-5 | gao_NSIAD-98-5_0 | Customs officials believe that the more export information they have, the more focused their efforts to target illegal shipments will be. The trade community has varying views on AES. Finally, AES will not likely serve as a central point for collecting and processing all export documents because other export-related agencies have information needs that they say cannot be fulfilled through AES. Of the companies that plan to use AES, only 4 percent of the freight forwarders and 5 percent of the exporters have filed a notice with Customs that they plan to participate in AES or are testing AES. According to industry groups and several companies’ officials we interviewed, filing information predeparture is inconsistent with their business practices. Third, AES allows SED information to be transmitted only hours before a shipment’s departure (as with the current paper system), and inspectors told us that in most cases this is not sufficient time for targeting possible illegal shipments. Finally, since participation in AES is voluntary, an illegal exporter is unlikely to use the system for filing export data. Most Other Agencies’ Export Requirements Cannot Be Fully Satisfied by AES
According to both Census and Customs, AES has the potential to provide exporters with “one-stop shopping” by creating a single electronic filing center for all U.S. export data. For example, 8 of the 13 agencies identified by Customs as having regulatory authority over exports are not using AES to fulfill their export licensing or permit requirements because of existing regulations that require them to retain their own licensing procedures, including collecting information provided by the exporter. In making this assessment, attention needs to be given to determining whether predeparture filing of export data is critical to improved export statistics and enforcement of U.S. laws and regulations and, if so, how far in advance inspectors need the information for AES to be an effective enforcement tool; a link between AES and the databases of law enforcement agencies can be allowing some exporters to file SEDs after departure would undermine the objective of achieving improved export data and/or render AES ineffective as an enforcement tool; and the requirements of other agencies can be modified or otherwise accommodated to permit their use of AES. These errors are "fatal." Senator Orrin Hatch, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, has asked us to obtain the views of the export community regarding the Customs Service's new Automated Export System, AES, and to collect information on company export practices which may be affected by AES. 3. 11. (Asked of those planning to use AES or whose companies had not yet decided whether to use AES.) Are you concerned or not about the predeparture SED filing requirement of AES? Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To determine whether AES is likely to achieve its objectives of improving export data, enhancing enforcement efforts, and streamlining export data collection, we interviewed Customs and Census headquarters officials and representatives of 12 government agencies with export-related responsibilities. 3. GAO Comments
1. 2. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the potential impact of the Customs Service's Automated Export System (AES) and the views of the export community regarding AES, focusing on whether AES is likely to achieve its objectives of improving export data, enhancing enforcement efforts, and streamlining export data collection.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) it is not yet clear what benefits will result from the use of AES because many critical implementation issues remain unsolved; (2) although AES has the potential to improve export reporting and enhance enforcement efforts, it is unlikely to achieve these objectives unless more exporters are willing to participate and limitations that prevent other agencies from fully using the system are resolved; (3) concerning the trade community's limited participation, GAO found that: (a) only a small fraction of the export community is using AES; (b) most exporting companies responding to GAO's survey are not likely to use AES over the next 3 years; and (c) twenty-five percent of all U.S. ocean freight forwarders had not heard of AES; (4) benefits cited by companies using AES include automated filing, reduced paperwork, personnel, and administrative costs, participating in the initial development of AES, and filing all data at a central filing point; (5) some segments of the trade community contend that the predeparture filing requirement is inconsistent with their business practices and costly; (6) AES is designed to help target illegal shipments, identify high-risk shipments, and compile exporter histories; (7) the system's usefulness as an enforcement tool is limited because: (a) it is not linked with the databases of other law enforcement agencies; (b) a proposal to allow exporters to file data after shipment could undermine efforts to detect export violations; (c) AES allows export data to be transmitted only hours before a shipment departure, which may not provide sufficient time to target possible illegal shipments; and (d) many Customs inspectors anticipate that illegal exporters are unlikely to use AES to file their export data; (8) AES faces limitations in achieving its goal to create a single information collection and processing center for the electronic filing of required export documentation; (9) many export-related agencies are subject to existing regulations requiring them to retain their own licensing procedures and have requirements that will not be satisfied through AES; (10) Customs is attempting to resolve these issues through several means; and (11) a cost-benefit analysis is needed to determine how or whether to proceed with implementation of AES. |
gao_GAO-10-226 | gao_GAO-10-226_0 | FDA Uses 3R Incentives to Recruit and Retain Mission- Critical Staff, but Lacks Agencywide Indicators for Tracking the Progress of 3R Incentives in Addressing Its Recruitment and Retention Goals
Employees in mission-critical occupations as identified by FDA make up the majority of FDA’s workforce and have also received the greatest number of 3R incentives from 2007 to 2009. While FDA collects data on workforce indicators at the agency and center levels, it has not analyzed how 3R incentives are helping the agency achieve its recruitment and retention goals. However, several of the incentive files we reviewed lacked adherence to certain other requirements, such as approval prior to the incentive payment, proof of employee relocation, and prescribed contents of a service agreement, which in most instances may have resulted from a lack of documentation. Over the past 3 years, FDA has made some changes to its internal controls, such as continuing to revise its centralized review and approval process for 3R incentive requests and updating its guidance including the standard forms for 3R incentive requests. If effectively implemented, the revisions to its internal controls may help ensure that in the future 3R incentives are properly awarded and documentation exists to support the incentives. As a next step, OPM could provide guidance to all agencies on the importance of considering succession planning in the decision process for awarding retention incentives. While HHS’s 3R incentive policy generally addressed the requirements for 3R incentive plans as outlined in OPM’s regulations, there were several instances where the policy omitted or did not clearly address certain important requirements. As FDA implements the results of its 2009 review of 3R incentives, we recommend that the Commissioner of FDA continue to strengthen FDA’s internal controls for requesting, approving, and processing 3R incentives by taking the following two actions: update the guidance for awarding 3R incentives to include the payment method used for retention incentives and all the conditions for terminating a retention incentive when no service agreement is required, and ensure 3R incentive files are properly completed and reviewed to address policy and regulatory requirements before the employees receive the incentive payments. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report examines (1) the extent to which the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is linking its use of recruitment, relocation, and retention (3R) incentives to its strategic human capital approaches to address its current and emerging challenges; (2) the extent to which FDA’s 3R incentives were awarded consistent with the law, regulations, and guidance and the internal controls FDA has in place to ensure proper disbursement of 3R incentives and encourage efficient use; and (3) the steps the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) has taken to help ensure that agencies, including the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), have effective strategic oversight of their 3R incentive programs, and how HHS is providing oversight of its 3R incentive program. We reviewed the files of a random, stratified sample of 3R incentives awarded from January 2007 through October 2008 to determine whether they met requirements in law, OPM regulations, HHS policy, and FDA guidance. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has faced challenges in obtaining the workforce needed to support its responsibilities and similar to other agencies, has paid selected employees recruitment, relocation, and retention (3R) incentives. This report examines (1) the extent to which FDA is linking its use of 3R incentives to its strategic human capital approaches to address its current and emerging challenges; (2) the extent to which FDA's 3R incentives were awarded consistent with regulations and the internal controls FDA has in place to ensure proper disbursement of 3R incentives; and (3) the steps the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) has taken to help ensure that agencies have effective oversight of their 3R incentive programs and how HHS is providing oversight. GAO analyzed a stratified sample of FDA's 3R incentives files, 3R data provided by HHS, HHS's 3R policy and FDA's guidance, and interviewed HHS, FDA, and OPM senior officials.
What GAO Found
Retention incentives encompass the majority of 3R incentives awarded to FDA employees in recent years. FDA's employees in mission-critical occupations received the greatest number of 3R incentives from 2007 to 2009. However, without an updated strategic workforce plan or established agencywide indicators for tracking its use of 3R incentives, FDA cannot assess the impact that these incentives have on its overall human capital strategy. While FDA collects data on workforce indicators at the agency and center levels, it has not analyzed how 3R incentives are helping the agency achieve its recruitment and retention goals. On the basis of GAO's review of a stratified sample of FDA's 3R incentive files awarded from January 2007 through October 2008, GAO found that FDA maintained documentation which provided sufficient explanation to justify each award. However, several of the incentive files we reviewed lacked adherence to certain other requirements, such as prescribed contents of a service agreement, which in most instances may have resulted from a lack of documentation. To help ensure the proper awarding of 3R incentives, FDA has various internal controls in place, such as a centralized review and approval process for incentive requests. Over the past 3 years, FDA has made some changes to its internal controls, such as updating its guidance including the standard forms for 3R incentive requests. If effectively implemented, FDA's revisions to its internal controls may help ensure that in the future 3R incentives are properly awarded and documentation exists to support the incentives. While both OPM and HHS provide oversight of 3R incentives through various mechanisms, including guidance and periodic evaluations and accountability reviews, there are opportunities for improvement. As a next step, OPM could provide guidance to all agencies on the importance of considering succession planning in the decision process for awarding retention incentives. While HHS's 3R incentive policy generally addressed the requirements for 3R incentive plans as outlined in OPM's regulations, there were several instances where the policy omitted or did not clearly address certain important requirements, such as the conditions for terminating or reducing an incentive. |
gao_GAO-04-990T | gao_GAO-04-990T_0 | Case Studies Illustrate Significant Pay Problems
We found significant problems with the active duty pays, allowances, and related tax benefits received by the soldiers at the eight Army Reserve units we audited. Overall, we found that 332 of the 348 soldiers (95 percent) from our case study units had at least one pay problem associated with their mobilization to active duty. Mobilized Army Reserve Pay Process, Human Capital, and Systems Deficiencies
Deficiencies in three key areas—process, human capital, and automated systems—were at the heart of the pay problems we identified. Human capital weaknesses included insufficient resources, inadequate training, and poor customer service. Process Deficiencies
A substantial number of payment errors we found were caused, at least in part, by design weaknesses in the extensive, complex set of processes and procedures relied on to provide active duty pays, allowances, and related tax benefits to mobilized Army Reserve soldiers. These flawed procedures, which were relied on to account for Army Reserve soldiers’ actual locations and their related pay entitlements while deployed, resulted in pay problems in all seven of our case study units that deployed soldiers overseas. Human Capital Issues
Human capital weaknesses also contributed to the pay problems mobilized Army Reserve soldiers experienced in our eight case study units. The fact that mobilized Army Reserve soldiers received any of their entitled active duty pays, allowances, and tax benefits accurately and on-time is largely due to the dedication and tireless efforts of many of these pay-support personnel to do the right thing for these mobilized Army Reserve soldiers. Servicing soldiers and their families with pay inquiries and problems is particularly critical in light of the error-prone processes and limited automated system processing capabilities. As a result, lacking any explanations, soldiers often had no means to determine if these types of payments were appropriate and accurate. For example, in response to our recommendations in the National Guard report, DOD reported taking actions to (1) automate manual monthly hardship duty pay in March 2004, (2) eliminate the use of “other credits” for processing hardship duty pay and instead process these pays using a unique transaction code to facilitate implementing a system edit to identify and stop erroneous payments, (3) compare active duty release dates in the Army’s system used to generate Release From Active Duty Orders with soldiers’ end of active duty tour dates shown in DJMS-RC to identify and stop any erroneous active duty payments, and (4) increase the reliability and timeliness of documentation used to support soldiers’ arrival at and departure from designated overseas locations. Each of these units had mobilized, deployed, and demobilized at some time during the 18-month period from August 2002 through January 2004. | Why GAO Did This Study
In light of GAO's November 2003 report highlighting significant pay problems experienced by Army National Guard soldiers mobilized to active duty in support of the global war on terrorism and homeland security, GAO was asked to determine if controls used to pay mobilized Army Reserve soldiers provided assurance that such pays were accurate and timely. GAO's audit used a case study approach to focus on controls over three key areas: processes, people (human capital), and automated systems.
What GAO Found
The processes and automated systems relied on to provide active duty pays, allowances, and tax benefits to mobilized Army Reserve soldiers are so error-prone, cumbersome, and complex that neither DOD nor, more importantly, Army Reserve soldiers themselves, could be reasonably assured of timely and accurate payments. Weaknesses in these areas resulted in pay problems, including overpayments, and to a lesser extent, late and underpayments of soldiers' active duty pays and allowances at eight Army Reserve case study units. Specifically, 332 of 348 soldiers (95 percent) we audited at eight case study units that were mobilized, deployed, and demobilized at some time during the 18-month period from August 2002 through January 2004 had at least one pay problem. Many of the soldiers had multiple problems associated with their active duty pays and allowances. Some of these problems lingered unresolved for considerable lengths of time, some for over 1 year. Further, nearly all soldiers began receiving their tax exemption benefit at least 1 month late. These pay problems often had a profound adverse impact on individual soldiers and their families. For example, soldiers were required to spend considerable time, sometimes while deployed in remote, hostile environments overseas, seeking help on pay inquiries or in correcting errors in their active duty pays, allowances, and related tax benefits. The processes in place to pay mobilized Army Reserve soldiers, involving potentially hundreds of DOD, Army, and Army Reserve organizations and thousands of personnel, were deficient with respect to (1) tracking soldiers' pay status as they transition through their active duty tours, (2) carrying out soldier readiness reviews, (3) after-the-fact report reconciliation requirements, and (4) unclear procedures for applying certain pay entitlements. With respect to human capital, weaknesses identified at our case study units included (1) insufficient resources allocated to key unit-level pay administration responsibilities, (2) inadequate training related to existing policies and procedures, and (3) poor customer service. Several automated systems issues also contributed to the significant pay errors, including nonintegrated systems and limited processing capabilities. |
gao_GAO-05-574T | gao_GAO-05-574T_0 | The Congress enacted a number of statutory reforms during the 1990s in the area of financial management. The executive branch management scorecard for the financial performance area not only recognizes the importance of achieving an unqualified or “clean” opinion from auditors on financial statements, but also focuses on the fundamental and systemic issues that must be addressed in order to routinely generate timely, accurate, and useful financial information and provide sound internal control and effective compliance systems, which represents the end goal of the CFO Act. PMA provides the visibility needed for sustaining these efforts. This is not surprising, considering the well-recognized need to transform financial management and other business processes at agencies such as the Department of Defense (DOD), the results of our analyses under FFMIA, the various financial management operations we have designated as high risk, and known long-standing material weaknesses. The objective of establishing a separate initiative for improper payments was to ensure that agency managers are held accountable for meeting the goals of the IPIA and are therefore dedicating the necessary attention and resources to meeting IPIA requirements. Effective implementation of the IPIA will be an important step towards addressing the longstanding, significant issue of improper payments. Strategic Human Capital Management
The PMA recognizes that people are an important organizational asset to an agency. Considerable progress has been made in strategic human capital management since we designated it as high risk in 2001. To be effective, human capital reform needs to avoid further fragmentation within the civil service, ensure reasonable consistency within the overall civilian workforce, and help maintain a reasonably level playing field among federal agencies competing for talent. The budget and performance integration initiative includes elements such as the Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) used to review programs, an emphasis on improving outcome measures, and improving monitoring of program performance. Integrating management and performance issues with budgeting is absolutely critical for progress in government performance and management. OMB’s PART builds on GPRA by actively promoting the use of results-oriented information to assess programs in the budget. Further, although the evaluation of programs in isolation may be revealing, it is often critical to understand how each program fits with a broader portfolio of tools and strategies to accomplish federal missions and performance goals. Although substantial progress has been made, the government continues to face challenges in fully reaching its potential in this area. To implement the PMA initiative, OMB has taken a number of actions. While many e-government initiatives are showing tangible results, we found, in March 2004, that overall progress on the 25 OMB-sponsored e- government initiatives was mixed. For example, the scorecard assesses whether an agency has an enterprise architecture in place that is linked to the Federal Enterprise Architecture, which is intended to provide a government wide framework to guide and constrain federal agencies’ enterprise architectures and information technology investments. We continue to review various aspects of this initiative. In DOD’s support infrastructure management area, which we identified as high-risk in 1997, DOD has made progress and expects to continue making improvements. The inclusion of real property asset management on the President’s Management Agenda, the executive order, and agencies’ actions are clearly positive steps in an area that had been neglected for many years. However, despite the increased focus on real property issues in recent years, the underlying conditions—such as excess and deteriorating properties and costly leasing—continue to exist and more needs to be done to address various obstacles that led to our high risk designation. | Why GAO Did This Study
As part of its work to improve the management and performance of the federal government, GAO monitors progress and continuing challenges related to the President's Management Agenda (PMA). The Administration has looked to GAO's high-risk program to help shape various governmentwide initiatives, including the PMA. GAO remains committed to working with the Congress and the Administration to help address these important and complex issues.
What GAO Found
The administration's implementation of the PMA has been a very positive initiative. It has served to raise the visibility of key management challenges, increased attention to achieving outcome-based results, and reinforced the need for agencies to focus on making sustained improvements in addressing long-standing management problems, including items on GAO's high-risk list. Our work shows that agencies have made progress in the areas covered by the PMA, and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has indicated it will continue to focus on high-risk areas during the President's second term. Importantly, OMB needs to place additional attention on the Department of Defense's (DOD) many high-risk areas and overall business transformation efforts. While considerable progress has been made in connection with PMA issues, a number of significant challenges remain. In the area of financial performance, the PMA recognizes the importance of timely, accurate and useful financial information and sound internal control. Agencies made significant progress in meeting accelerated financial statement reporting deadlines, and OMB has refocused attention on improving internal controls. However, agencies face several challenges--improvement lags on financial management reforms, especially at DOD which must overhaul its financial management and business operations. The PMA established a separate initiative for improper payments to ensure that agency managers are held accountable for meeting the goals of the Improper Payments Information Act of 2002. Effective implementation of this Act will be an important step toward addressing this area, which involves tens of billions of dollars. The PMA recognizes that people are an important organizational asset. A governmentwide framework for advancing human capital reform is needed to avoid further fragmentation within the civil service, ensure management flexibility as appropriate, allow a reasonable degree of consistency, provide adequate safeguards within the overall civilian workforce, and help maintain a level playing field among federal agencies competing for talent. The initiative to integrate management and performance issues with budgeting is critical for progress in government performance and management. OMB's Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) is designed to use results-oriented information to assess programs in the budget formulation process. However, more should be done to assess how each program fits within the broad portfolio of tools and strategies used to accomplish federal missions. Many e-government initiatives are showing tangible results. However, the government continues to face challenges, such as establishing a federal enterprise architecture intended to provide a framework to guide agencies' enterprise architectures and investments. The inclusion of real property asset management on the PMA, an executive order, and agencies' actions are all positive steps in an area that had been neglected for years. However, the underlying conditions--such as excess and deteriorating properties--continue to exist. More needs to be done in areas such as improving capital planning among agencies. |
gao_GAO-04-298T | gao_GAO-04-298T_0 | In implementing EEOICPA, the President acknowledged that it had been Energy’s past policy to encourage and assist its contractors in opposing workers’ claims for state workers’ compensation benefits based on illnesses said to be caused by exposure to toxic substances at Energy facilities. Energy then develops the claims by requesting records of employment, medical treatment, and exposure to toxic substances from the Energy facilities at which the workers were employed. If Energy determines that the worker was not employed by one of its facilities or did not have an illness that could be caused by exposure to toxic substances, the agency finds the claimant ineligible. Energy Has Fully Processed Few Cases, and Systems Limitations Complicate Program Management
As of June 30, 2003, Energy had completely processed about 6 percent of the nearly 19,000 cases that had been filed, and the majority of all cases filed were associated with facilities in nine states. At the time of our study, Energy had not yet begun processing more than half of the cases, and an additional 40 percent of cases were in processing (see fig. 2). The contractors considered to be willing payers are those that have an order from, or agreement with, Energy to not contest claims. A Majority of Cases in Nine States Potentially Have a Willing Payer
A majority of cases in nine states will potentially have a willing payer of workers’ compensation benefits, assuming that for all cases there has been a positive physician panel determination and the claimant can demonstrate a loss from the worker’s illness that has not previously been compensated. Specifically, based on our analysis of worker’s compensation programs and the different types of workers compensation coverage used by the major contractors, it appears that approximately 86 percent of these cases will potentially have a willing payer—that is, contractors and their insurers who will not contest the claims for benefits. However, since no claimants to date have received compensation as a result of their cases filed with Energy, there is no actual experience about how contractors and state workers’ compensation programs treat such cases. Concerns about the extent to which there will be willing payers of benefits have led to various proposals for addressing this issue. Bottlenecks In Energy’s Claims Process Delay Filing Of Workers Compensation Claims
As a result of Energy’s policies and procedures for processing claims, claimants have experienced lengthy delays in receiving the determinations they need to file workers’ compensation claims. In particular, the number of cases developed during initial case processing has not always been sufficient to allow the physician panels to operate at full capacity. Moreover, even if these panels were operating at full capacity, the small pool of physicians qualified to serve on the panels would limit the agency’s ability to produce more timely determinations. When Energy first began developing cases, in the fall of 2002, the case development process had a staff of about 14 case managers and assistants. Currently, approximately 100 physicians are assigned to panels of 3 physicians. Energy officials are exploring ways that the panel process could be made more efficient. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Energy (Energy) and its predecessor agencies and contractors have employed thousands of workers in the nuclear weapons production complex. Some employees were exposed to toxic substances, including radioactive and hazardous materials, during this work and many subsequently developed illnesses. Subtitle D of the Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act of 2000 allows Energy to help its contractor employees file state workers' compensation claims for illnesses determined by a panel of physicians to be caused by exposure to toxic substances in the course of employment at an Energy facility. Energy began accepting applications under this program in July 2001, but did not begin processing them until its final regulations became effective on September 13, 2002. The Congress mandated that GAO study the effectiveness of the benefit program under Subtitle D of this Act. This testimony is based on GAO's ongoing work on this issue and focuses on three key areas: (1) the number, status, and characteristics of claims filed with Energy; (2) the extent to which there will be a "willing payer" of workers' compensation benefits, that is, an insurer who--by order from, or agreement with Energy--will not contest these claims; and (3) the extent to which Energy policies and procedures help employees file timely claims for these state benefits.
What GAO Found
As of June 30, 2003, Energy had completely processed only about 6 percent of the nearly 19,000 cases it had received. More than three-quarters of all cases were associated with facilities in nine states. Processing had not begun on over half of the cases and, of the remaining 40 percent of cases that were in processing, almost all were in the initial case development stage. While the majority of cases (86 percent) associated with major Energy facilities in nine states potentially have a willing payer of workers' compensation benefits, actual compensation is not certain. This figure is based primarily on the method of workers' compensation coverage used by Energy contractor employers and is not an estimate of the number of cases that will ultimately be paid. Since no claimants to date have received compensation as a result of their cases filed with Energy, there is no actual experience about how contractors and state programs treat such claims. Claimants have been delayed in filing for state worker's compensation benefits because of two bottlenecks in Energy's claims process. First, the case development process has not always produced sufficient cases to allow the panels of physicians who determine whether the worker's illness was caused by exposure to toxic substances to operate at full capacity. While additional resources may allow Energy to move sufficient cases through its case development process, the physician panel process will continue to be a second, more important, bottleneck. The number of panels, constrained by the scarcity of physicians qualified to serve on panels, will limit Energy's capacity to decide cases more quickly, using its current procedures. Energy officials are exploring ways that the panel process could be more efficient. |
gao_GAO-05-231 | gao_GAO-05-231_0 | Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine (1) the potential risks to federal information systems from emerging cybersecurity threats such as spam, phishing, and spyware; (2) the 24 Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act agencies’ reported perceptions of these risks and their actions and plans to mitigate them; (3) government and private-sector efforts to address these emerging cybersecurity threats on a national level, including actions to increase consumer awareness; and (4) governmentwide challenges to protecting federal information systems from these emerging cybersecurity threats. Emerging Cybersecurity Threats to Federal Agencies
Federal agencies are facing a set of emerging cybersecurity threats that are the result of changing sources of attack, increasingly sophisticated social engineering techniques designed to trick the unsuspecting user into divulging sensitive information, new modes of covert compromise, and the blending of once distinct types of attack into more complex and damaging forms. Spam consumes employee and technical resources and can be used as a delivery mechanism for malware and other cyber threats. Phishing Can Lead to Identity Theft, Loss of Sensitive Information, and Reduced Trust in E- Government Services
Federal agencies and employees can be victims of phishing scams. These efforts range from targeting cybercrime to educating the user and the private-sector community on how to detect and protect systems and information from these threats. Lack of Coordinated Incident Reporting Limits Federal Capability to Address Emerging Threats
Although federal agencies are required to report incidents to a central federal entity, they are not consistently reporting incidents of emerging cybersecurity threats. Pursuant to FISMA, OMB and DHS share responsibility for the federal government’s capability to detect, analyze, and respond to cybersecurity incidents. However, governmentwide guidance has not been issued to clarify to agencies which incidents they should be reporting, as well as how and to whom they should report. Without effective coordination, the federal government is limited in its ability to identify and respond to emerging cybersecurity threats, including sophisticated and coordinated attacks that target multiple federal entities. Recommendations
In order to more effectively prepare for and address emerging cybersecurity threats, we recommend that the Director, Office of Management and Budget, take the following two actions: ensure that agencies’ information security programs required by FISMA address the risk of emerging cybersecurity threats such as spam, phishing, and spyware, including performing periodic risk assessments; implementing risk-based policies and procedures to mitigate identified risks; providing security-awareness training; and establishing procedures for detecting, reporting, and responding to incidents of emerging cybersecurity threats; and coordinate with the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Attorney General to establish governmentwide guidance for agencies on how to (1) address emerging cybersecurity threats and (2) report incidents to a single government entity, including clarifying the respective roles, responsibilities, processes, and procedures for federal entities— including homeland security and law enforcement entities. | Why GAO Did This Study
Federal agencies are facing a set of emerging cybersecurity threats that are the result of increasingly sophisticated methods of attack and the blending of once distinct types of attack into more complex and damaging forms. Examples of these threats include spam (unsolicited commercial e-mail), phishing (fraudulent messages to obtain personal or sensitive data), and spyware (software that monitors user activity without user knowledge or consent). To address these issues, GAO was asked to determine (1) the potential risks to federal systems from these emerging cybersecurity threats, (2) the federal agencies' perceptions of risk and their actions to mitigate them, (3) federal and private-sector actions to address the threats on a national level, and (4) governmentwide challenges to protecting federal systems from these threats.
What GAO Found
Spam, phishing, and spyware pose security risks to federal information systems. Spam consumes significant resources and is used as a delivery mechanism for other types of cyberattacks; phishing can lead to identity theft, loss of sensitive information, and reduced trust and use of electronic government services; and spyware can capture and release sensitive data, make unauthorized changes, and decrease system performance. The blending of these threats creates additional risks that cannot be easily mitigated with currently available tools. Agencies' perceptions of the risks of spam, phishing, and spyware vary. In addition, most agencies were not applying the information security program requirements of the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 (FISMA) to these emerging threats, including performing risk assessments, implementing effective mitigating controls, providing security awareness training, and ensuring that their incident-response plans and procedures addressed these threats. Several entities within the federal government and the private sector have begun initiatives to address these emerging threats. These efforts range from educating consumers to targeting cybercrime. Similar efforts are not, however, being made to assist and educate federal agencies. Although federal agencies are required to report incidents to a central federal entity, they are not consistently reporting incidents of emerging cybersecurity threats. Pursuant to FISMA, the Office Management and Budget (OMB) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) share responsibility for the federal government's capability to detect, analyze, and respond to cybersecurity incidents. However, governmentwide guidance has not been issued to clarify to agencies which incidents they should be reporting, as well as how and to whom they should report. Without effective coordination, the federal government is limited in its ability to identify and respond to emerging cybersecurity threats, including sophisticated and coordinated attacks that target multiple federal entities. |
gao_GAO-10-4 | gao_GAO-10-4_0 | NASA’s mission is to pioneer the future of space exploration, scientific discovery, and aeronautics research. Control Weaknesses Jeopardize NASA Systems and Networks
Although NASA had implemented many information security controls to protect networks supporting its missions, weaknesses existed in several critical areas. Specifically, the centers did not consistently implement effective electronic access controls, including user accounts and passwords, access rights and permissions, encryption of sensitive data, protection of information system boundaries, audit and monitoring of security-relevant events, and physical security to prevent, limit, and detect access to their networks and systems. NASA did not adequately identify and authenticate users in systems and networks supporting mission directorates. These controls include policies, procedures, and control techniques to (1) appropriately segregate incompatible duties and (2) manage system configurations and implement patches. FISMA requires agencies to develop, document, and implement an information security program that, among other things, includes periodic assessments of the risk and magnitude of harm that could result from the unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of information and information systems; policies and procedures that (1) are based on risk assessments, (2) cost effectively reduce information security risks to an acceptable level, (3) ensure that information security is addressed throughout the life cycle of each system, and (4) ensure compliance with applicable requirements; plans for providing adequate information security for networks, facilities, periodic testing and evaluation of the effectiveness of information security policies, procedures, and practices, to be performed with a frequency depending on risk, but no less than annually, and that includes testing of management, operational, and technical controls for every system identified in the agency’s required inventory of major information systems; a process for planning, implementing, evaluating, and documenting remedial action to address any deficiencies in its information security policies, procedures, or practices; plans and procedures to ensure continuity of operations for information systems that support the operations and assets of the agency; and procedures for detecting, reporting, and responding to security incidents. For example, NASA had not always (1) fully assessed information security risks; (2) fully developed and documented security policies and procedures; (3) included key information in security plans; (4) conducted comprehensive tests and evaluation of its information system controls; (5) tracked the status of plans to remedy known weaknesses; (6) planned for contingencies and disruptions in service; (7) maintained capabilities to detect, report, and respond to security incidents; and (8) incorporated important security requirements in its contract with JPL. Despite Actions to Address Security Incidents, NASA Remains Vulnerable
NASA has experienced numerous cyber attacks on its networks and systems in recent years. Significantly, these were not isolated incidents since NASA reported 209 incidents of unauthorized access to US- CERT during fiscal years 2007 and 2008. In addition, the SOC was established in 2008 to enhance prevention and provide early detection of security incidents and coordinate agency-level information related to NASA’s security posture. The control vulnerabilities and program shortfalls that we identified collectively increase the risk of unauthorized access to NASA’s sensitive information, as well as inadvertent or deliberate disruption of its system operations and services. They make it possible for intruders, as well as government and contractor employees, to bypass or disable computer access controls and undertake a wide variety of inappropriate or malicious acts. As a result, increased and unnecessary risk exists that sensitive information will be subject to unauthorized disclosure, modification, and destruction and that mission operations could be disrupted. A key reason for these vulnerabilities is that NASA has not yet fully implemented its information security program to ensure that controls are appropriately designed and operating effectively. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to (1) determine the effectiveness of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA) information security controls in protecting the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of its networks supporting mission directorates and (2) assess the vulnerabilities identified during the audit in the context of NASA’s prior security incidents and corrective actions. | Why GAO Did This Study
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) relies extensively on information systems and networks to pioneer space exploration, scientific discovery, and aeronautics research. Many of these systems and networks are interconnected through the Internet, and may be targeted by evolving and growing cyber threats from a variety of sources. GAO was directed to (1) determine whether NASA has implemented appropriate controls to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the information and systems used to support NASA's mission directorates and (2) assess NASA's vulnerabilities in the context of prior incidents and corrective actions. To do this, GAO examined network and system controls in place at three centers; analyzed agency information security policies, plans, and reports; and interviewed agency officials.
What GAO Found
Although NASA has made important progress in implementing security controls and aspects of its information security program, it has not always implemented appropriate controls to sufficiently protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the information and systems supporting its mission directorates. Specifically, NASA did not consistently implement effective controls to prevent, limit, and detect unauthorized access to its networks and systems. For example, it did not always sufficiently (1) identify and authenticate users, (2) restrict user access to systems, (3) encrypt network services and data, (4) protect network boundaries, (5) audit and monitor computer-related events, and (6) physically protect its information technology resources. In addition, weaknesses existed in other controls to appropriately segregate incompatible duties and manage system configurations and implement patches. A key reason for these weaknesses is that NASA has not yet fully implemented key activities of its information security program to ensure that controls are appropriately designed and operating effectively. Specifically, it has not always (1) fully assessed information security risks; (2) fully developed and documented security policies and procedures; (3) included key information in security plans; (4) conducted comprehensive tests and evaluation of its information system controls; (5) tracked the status of plans to remedy known weaknesses; (6) planned for contingencies and disruptions in service; (7) maintained capabilities to detect, report, and respond to security incidents; and (8) incorporated important security requirements in its contract with the Jet Propulsion Laboratory. Despite actions to address prior security incidents, NASA remains vulnerable to similar incidents. NASA networks and systems have been successfully targeted by cyber attacks. During fiscal years 2007 and 2008, NASA reported 1,120 security incidents that have resulted in the installation of malicious software on its systems and unauthorized access to sensitive information. To address these incidents, NASA established a Security Operations Center in 2008 to enhance prevention and provide early detection of security incidents and coordinate agency-level information related to its security posture. Nevertheless, the control vulnerabilities and program shortfalls, which GAO identified, collectively increase the risk of unauthorized access to NASA's sensitive information, as well as inadvertent or deliberate disruption of its system operations and services. They make it possible for intruders, as well as government and contractor employees, to bypass or disable computer access controls and undertake a wide variety of inappropriate or malicious acts. As a result, increased and unnecessary risk exists that sensitive information is subject to unauthorized disclosure, modification, and destruction and that mission operations could be disrupted. |
gao_GAO-08-935 | gao_GAO-08-935_0 | The Asylum Division and EOIR Have Designed Quality Assurance Mechanisms to Help Ensure the Integrity of Asylum Adjudications, but Some Can Be Improved
To help ensure quality in adjudications, the Asylum Division has designed training programs and quality reviews and EOIR has designed training programs, but some can be improved. Although supervisors review all asylum officer decisions and headquarters personnel review certain cases, other quality reviews had not occurred in three of the eight Asylum Offices. Fraud-detection training. Eighty-eight percent of asylum officer respondents reported that they moderately or greatly understood the type of information contained in the various databases or systems they check as well as the results they receive. Local quality-assurance review. Majority of Immigration Judges Reported Needing Additional Training; EOIR Expanded Training for New Immigration Judges and Solicited Input on Training Needs
Although the majority of immigration judges reported that EOIR’s training for newly hired immigration judges and annual training enhanced their ability to adjudicate asylum cases, the majority reported needing additional training in several areas, including identifying fraud. Challenges in Assessing the Authenticity of Claims and Time Constraints Are Key Factors Affecting Asylum Officers’ Adjudications
Asylum officers reported difficulties in assessing the authenticity of asylum claims, despite mechanisms USCIS designed to help asylum officers assess claims, and also reported time constraints in adjudicating cases. Furthermore, it is difficult to know the extent to which any of these measures have deterred fraud. The Asylum Division has worked with other federal entities to provide asylum officers with access to databases to conduct identity and security checks and expanded and implemented new identity and security check requirements on existing checks. U.S. Asylum Officers Report Time Constraints Affect Adjudications; Adjudication Requirements Have Increased While the Productivity Standard Is Unchanged
Asylum Officers and Supervisors Report Asylum Officers Have Insufficient Time to Thoroughly Adjudicate Cases, but Management Views Are Mixed
The majority of asylum officers and supervisory asylum officers who responded to our survey reported that the 4 hours, on average, they have to complete an asylum case is insufficient to be thorough—that is, to complete the case in a manner consistent with their procedures manual and training—although views among managers varied. Of the 111 asylum officer survey respondents who explained what prevented them from referring suspected fraud cases to their FDNS-IO, about half attributed this to time limitations. The Asylum Division had not conducted a time study or gathered empirical data. As shown in figure 9, of the 11 aspects of adjudicating asylum cases we inquired about in our survey, immigration judge survey respondents most frequently cited verifying fraud (88 percent) as a moderately or very challenging aspect of adjudicating asylum cases. The vast majority also reported time limitations (82 percent) and assessing credibility (81 percent) as moderately or very challenging. Immigration Judges Reported Challenges in Identifying Fraud and Assessing Credibility
Most immigration judges who responded to our survey identified fraud and assessing credibility as significant challenges in adjudicating asylum cases. Eighty-one percent of immigration judges reported that assessing credibility was a moderately or very challenging aspect of adjudicating asylum cases and an area in which they needed additional training. Until all authorized immigration court staff are on board, it is too soon to determine the extent to which increased staffing will affect immigration judges’ ability to manage their caseload. Furthermore, by more fully implementing its quality review framework, the Asylum Division would be in a better position to identify deficiencies in the quality of asylum decisions asylum officers make, identify the root causes of such deficiencies, and take appropriate action, such as focusing training opportunities. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve the integrity of the asylum adjudication process, we recommend that the Chief of the Asylum Division take the following five actions: explore ways to provide additional opportunities for asylum officers to develop a framework for soliciting information in a structured and consistent manner on asylum officers’ and supervisors’ respective training needs, including, at a minimum, training needs discussed in this report; ensure that the information collected on training needs is used to provide training to asylum officers and supervisory asylum officers at the offices where the information shows it is needed or nationally, when training needs are common; develop a plan to more fully implement the quality review framework— and complement existing supervisory and headquarters reviews—to include, among other things, how to ensure that in each Asylum Office a sample of decisions of asylum officers are reviewed for quality and consistency and interviews conducted by asylum officers are observed; and develop a cost-effective way to collect empirical data on the time it takes asylum officers to thoroughly complete the steps in the adjudication process and revise productivity standards, if warranted. Asylum Adjudication Process within DOJ
Within the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Executive Office for Immigration Review’s (EOIR) asylum process generally consists of the following steps. | Why GAO Did This Study
Each year, tens of thousands of noncitizens apply in the United States for asylum, which provides refuge to those who have been persecuted or fear persecution. Asylum officers (AO) in the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), and immigration judges (IJ) in the Department of Justice's (DOJ) Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) assess applicants' credibility and eligibility. GAO was asked to evaluate aspects of the asylum system. This report addresses the extent to which quality assurance mechanisms have been designed to ensure adjudications' integrity, how key factors affect AOs' adjudications, and what key factors affect IJs' adjudications. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed agency documents, policies, and procedures; surveyed all AOs, supervisory AOs, and IJs; and visited three of the eight Asylum Offices. These offices varied in size and percentage of cases granted asylum. Results of these visits provided additional information but were not projectable.
What GAO Found
USCIS and EOIR have designed quality assurance mechanisms to help ensure the integrity of asylum adjudications, but some can be improved. While 75 percent of AO survey respondents reported that basic training prepared them at least moderately well to adjudicate cases, they also reported that despite weekly training, they needed additional training to help them detect fraud, conduct security checks, and assess the credibility of asylum seekers. The Asylum Division does not consistently solicit AOs' and supervisory AOs' input on a range of their training needs. Without this, the Asylum Division lacks key information for making training decisions. The Asylum Division has designed a quality review framework to ensure the quality and consistency of asylum decisions. Although supervisors review all cases and headquarters reviews certain cases, other local quality assurance reviews rarely took place in three of the eight Asylum Offices primarily due to competing priorities. By fully implementing its quality review framework, the Asylum Division would better identify deficiencies, examine their root causes, and take action. The majority of IJ survey respondents reported that training enhanced their ability to adjudicate asylum cases, although the majority also reported having additional training needs. EOIR expanded its training program in 2006, particularly for newly hired IJs, and annually solicits IJs' views on their training needs. Asylum officers reported challenges in identifying fraud and assessing applicants' credibility, as well as time constraints, as key factors affecting their adjudications. The majority of AO survey respondents reported it moderately or very difficult to identify various types of fraud, despite mechanisms designed to help identify fraud and assess credibility. Further, assistance from other federal entities to AOs in assessing the authenticity of asylum claims has been hindered in part by resource limitations and competing priorities. With respect to time constraints, 65 percent of AOs and 73 percent of supervisory AOs reported that AOs have insufficient time to thoroughly adjudicate cases--that is, in a manner consistent with procedures and training--while management's views were mixed. The Asylum Division set a productivity standard equating to 4 hours per case in 1999 without empirical data. Without empirical data on the time it takes to thoroughly adjudicate a case, the Asylum Division is not best positioned to know if its productivity standard reflects the time AOs need for thorough adjudications. Verifying fraud, assessing credibility, and time constraints are also key factors affecting IJs' adjudications. IJ survey respondents cited verifying fraud (88 percent) and assessing credibility (81 percent) as a moderately or very challenging aspect of asylum adjudications. Responding to 2006 Attorney General reforms, EOIR implemented a program to which IJs can refer instances of suspected fraud and receive information to aid in fraud detection. Eighty-two percent of IJs reported time limitations as moderately or very challenging aspects of their adjudications. EOIR has detailed IJs to courts with high caseloads and plans to hire additional staff, but it is too soon to know the extent to which additional staff will alleviate IJs' time challenges. |
gao_GAO-06-529T | gao_GAO-06-529T_0 | Background
The Corps’ Civil Works program is responsible for investigating, developing, and maintaining the nation’s water and related environmental resources. Each year, the Corps’ Civil Works program receives funding through the Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act. The Corps’ Cost and Benefit Analyses Were Inadequate to Support Decision-Making
Our review of four Civil Works projects or actions found that the cost and benefit analyses the Corps used to support these actions were fraught with errors, mistakes, and miscalculations, and used invalid assumptions and outdated data. The Corps’ analyses often understated costs and overstated benefits. As such, we concluded that they did not provide a reasonable basis for decision-making. In two instances, we also found that the Corps’ three-tiered review process, consisting of district, division, and headquarter reviews, did not detect the problems we uncovered. These instances raised concerns about the adequacy of the Corps’ internal reviews. We found that project benefits for which there was credible support were about $13.3 million a year compared with the $40.1 million a year claimed by the Corps’ 1998 report. Oregon Inlet Jetty Project
Our review of the Oregon Inlet Jetty project found that the Corps’ most recent cost benefit analysis of the project, issued in 2001, had several limitations, and as a result did not provide a reliable basis for deciding whether to proceed with the project. We determined that if the Corps had incorporated more current data on the actual number of trawlers that used the inlet in its analysis, benefits would have been reduced by about 90 percent, from over $2 million annually to less than $300,000. The Corps also incorrectly calculated project benefits because it overstated the number of properties protected by about 20 percent and used an inappropriate methodology to calculate the value of protected properties. The Corps’ Reprogramming Activities Resulted in Inefficient Management of Civil Works Program Funds
The Corps’ reprogramming guidance states that only funds surplus to current year requirements should be a source for reprogramming and that temporary borrowing or loaning is inconsistent with sound project management practices and increases the Corps’ administrative burden. However, we recently reported that, over a two year period (fiscal years 2003 through 2004), the Corps moved over $2.1 billion through over 7,000 reprogramming actions. This movement of funds occurred because during these two years the Corps managed its civil works project funds using a “just-in-time” reprogramming strategy. The Corps’ reprogramming practices place a large demand on the administrative resources of the agency. In response to the findings in our report, the Congress directed the Corps to revise its procedures for reprogramming of funds starting in fiscal year 2006 to reduce the amount of reprogramming actions that occur and would institute a more rationale financial discipline for the Corps Civil Works appropriations accounts. Specifically, according to the Corps’ revised policy, external peer review of such documents will take place where the “risk and magnitude of the proposed project are such that a critical examination by a qualified person or team outside of the Corps and not involved in the day-to-day production of a technical product is necessary.” In addition, the Corps has reported that it has undertaken a number of other improvements, including (1) updating and clarifying its project study planning guidance, (2) establishing communities of practice to foster technical competence and share knowledge among individuals who have a common functional skill, and (3) reorganizing to foster integrated teamwork and streamline the project review and approval process. In closing, Mr. Chairman, we have found that the Corps’ track record for providing reliable information that can be used by decision makers to assess the merits of specific Civil Works projects and for managing its appropriations for approved projects is spotty, at best. While we are encouraged that the Corps and/or the Congress have addressed or are in the process of addressing many of the issues we have identified relating to these individual projects, we remain concerned about the extent to which these problems are systemic in nature and therefore prevalent throughout the Corps’ Civil Works portfolio. | Why GAO Did This Study
Through the Civil Works Program, the Corps of Engineers (Corps) constructs, operates, and maintains thousands of civil works projects across the United States. The Corps uses a two-phase study process to help inform congressional decision makers about civil works projects and determine if they warrant federal investment. As part of the process for deciding to proceed with a project, the Corps analyzes and documents that the costs of constructing a project are outweighed by the benefits. To conduct activities within its civil works portfolio, the Corps received over $5 billion annually for fiscal years 2005 and 2006. During the last 4 years, GAO has issued five reports relating to the Corps' Civil Works Program. Four of these reports focused on the planning studies for specific Corps' projects or actions, which included a review of the cost and benefit analyses used to support the project decisions. The fifth report focused on the Corps management of its civil works appropriation accounts. For this statement, GAO was asked to summarize the key themes from these five studies. GAO made recommendations in the five reports cited in this testimony. The Corps generally agreed with and has taken or is taking corrective action to respond to these recommendations. GAO is not making new recommendations in this testimony.
What GAO Found
GAO's recent reviews of four Corps civil works projects and actions found that the planning studies conducted by the Corps to support these activities were fraught with errors, mistakes, and miscalculations, and used invalid assumptions and outdated data. Generally, GAO found that the Corps' studies understated costs and overstated benefits, and therefore did not provide a reasonable basis for decision-making. For example: (1) for the Delaware Deepening Project, GAO found credible support for only about $13.3 million a year in project benefits compared with the $40.1 million a year claimed in the Corps' analysis; (2) for the Oregon Inlet Jetty Project, GAO's analysis determined that if the Corps had incorporated more current data into its analysis, benefits would have been reduced by about 90 percent; and (3) similarly, for the Sacramento Flood Control Project, GAO determined that the Corps overstated the number of properties protected by about 20 percent and used an inappropriate methodology to calculate the value of these protected properties. In addition, the Corps' three-tiered internal review process did not detect the problems GAO uncovered during its reviews of these analyses, raising concerns about the adequacy of the Corps' internal reviews. The agency agreed with GAO's findings in each of the four reviews. For three projects the Corps has completed a reanalysis to correct errors or is in the process of doing so; it decided not to proceed with the fourth project. GAO's review of how the Corps manages its appropriations for the civil works program found that instead of an effective and fiscally prudent financial planning, management, and priority-setting system, the Corps relies on reprogramming funds as needed. While this just-in-time reprogramming approach can provide funds rapidly to projects that have unexpected needs, it has also resulted in many unnecessary and uncoordinated movements of funds, sometimes for reasons that were inconsistent with the Corps' own guidance. Because reprogramming has become the normal way of doing business at the Corps, it has increased the Corps' administrative burden for processing and tracking such a large number of fund movements. For example, in fiscal years 2003 through 2004 the Corps moved over $2.1 billion through over 7,000 reprogramming actions. In response to GAO's findings, the Congress directed the Corps to revise its procedures for managing its civil works appropriations, starting in fiscal year 2006, to reduce the number of reprogramming actions and institute more rational financial discipline for the program. |
gao_T-AIMD-99-141 | gao_T-AIMD-99-141_0 | Customs Is Developing ACE Without a Complete Enterprise Systems Architecture
Customs is not building ACE within the context of an enterprise systems architecture, or “blueprint” of its agencywide future systems environment. Using SEI’s method, we found that Customs’ $1.05 billion ACE life cycle cost estimate was not reliable, and that it did not provide a sound basis for Customs’ decision to invest in ACE. For example, the analysis includes $203.5 million in savings attributable to 10 years of avoided maintenance and support costs on the Automated Commercial System (ACS)—the system ACE is to replace. Also, these estimates are subject to change in light of experiences on nearer term increments and changing business needs. Failure of the grand design approach was a major impetus for the IT management reforms contained in the Clinger-Cohen Act. Customs Has Committed to Implementing Our Recommendations for Strengthening ACE Management
To address ACE management weaknesses, we recommended that Customs analyze alternative approaches to satisfying its import automation needs, including addressing the ITDS/ACE relationship; invest in its defined ACE solution incrementally, meaning for each system increment (1) rigorously estimate and analyze costs and benefits, (2) require a favorable return-on-investment and compliance with Customs’ enterprise systems architecture, and (3) validate actual costs and benefits once an increment is piloted, compare actuals to estimates, use the results in deciding on future increments, and report the results to congressional authorizers and appropriators; establish an effective software process improvement program and correct the software process weaknesses in our report, thereby bringing ACE software process maturity to a least an SEI level 2; and require at least SEI level 2 processes of all ACE software contractors. Conclusions
Successful systems modernization is absolutely critical to Customs’ ability to perform its trade import mission efficiently and effectively in the 21st century. Systems modernization success, however, depends on doing the “right thing, the right way.” To be “right,” organizations must (1) invest in and build systems within the context of a complete and enforced enterprise systems architecture, (2) make informed, data-driven decisions about investment options based on expected and actual return-on-investment for system increments, and (3) build system increments using mature software engineering practices. Fortunately, Customs fully recognizes the seriousness of the situation and has committed to correcting its ACE management and technical weaknesses. We are equally committed to working with Customs as it strives to do so and with Congress as it oversees this important initiative. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the Customs Service's management of its Automated Commercial Environment (ACE) system.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the need to leverage information technology to improve the way that Customs does business in the import arena is undeniable; (2) Customs' existing import processes and supporting systems are simply not responsive to the business needs of either Customs or the trade community, whose members collectively import about $1 trillion in goods annually; (3) these existing processes and systems are paper-intensive, error-prone, and transaction-based, and they are out of step with the just-in-time inventory practices used by the trade; (4) recognizing this, Congress enacted the Customs Modernization and Informed Compliance Act to define legislative requirements for improving import processing through an automated system; (5) Customs fully recognizes the severity of the problems with its approach to managing import trade and is modernizing its import processes and undertaking ACE as its import system solution; (6) begun in 1994, Customs' estimate of the system's 15-year life cycle cost is about $1.05 billion, although this estimate is being increased; (7) in light of ACE's enormous mission importance and price tag, Customs' approach to investing in and engineering ACE demands disciplined and rigorous management practices; (8) such practices are embodied in the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 and other legislative and regulatory requirements, as well as accepted industry system/software engineering models, such as those published by the Software Engineering Institute; (9) unfortunately, Customs has not employed such practices to date on ACE; (10) GAO's February 1999 report on ACE describes serious management and technical weaknesses in Customs' management of ACE; and (11) the ACE weaknesses are: (a) building ACE without a complete and enforced enterprise systems architecture; (b) investing in ACE without a firm basis for knowing that it is a cost effective system solution; and (c) building ACE without employing engineering rigor and discipline. |
gao_GAO-02-142 | gao_GAO-02-142_0 | WIC Faces Challenges in Delivering High- Quality Nutrition Services
The WIC program faces the following challenges in delivering high-quality nutrition services: (1) coordinating its nutrition services with health and welfare programs undergoing considerable change; (2) responding to health and demographic changes in the low-income population that it serves; (3) recruiting and keeping a skilled staff; (4) improving the use of information technology to enhance service delivery and program management; (5) assessing the effect of nutrition services; and (6) meeting the increased program requirements without a corresponding increase in funding. While each of the approaches offer certain advantages, they also have potential negative consequences that policymakers should consider. 16. | What GAO Found
The Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) serves almost half of all infants and about one-quarter of all children between one and four years of age in the United States. The WIC program faces the following challenges: (1) coordinating its nutrition services with health and welfare programs undergoing considerable change, (2) responding to health and demographic changes in the low-income population, (3) recruiting and keeping a skilled staff, (4) improving the use of information technology to enhance service delivery and program management, (5) assessing the effect of nutrition services, and (6) meeting increased program requirements without a corresponding increase in funding. This report identifies 16 approaches to address these challenges. Each of the approaches has advantages and disadvantages that policymakers should consider. |
gao_GAO-09-671 | gao_GAO-09-671_0 | FEMA assists disaster victims in part through its Individuals and Households Program (IHP), a component of the federal disaster-response efforts established under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act. FEMA determines whether individuals or households meet eligibility requirements for IHP assistance after they apply for registration either online or over the telephone. FEMA Has Significantly Improved Fraud Prevention Controls over Disaster Assistance, but Weaknesses Still Exist
Since Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, FEMA has improved its controls over identity and address verification and inspections, housing assistance in FEMA-paid-for hotels, and duplicate registrations. For example, for Hurricanes Ike and Gustav, FEMA conducted identity and address verification on all applications and required inspections prior to approving rental assistance. In addition, FEMA required individuals in need of housing assistance to provide valid registration numbers before checking into FEMA-paid-for hotels. FEMA has also taken steps to flag duplicate registrations submitted for the same disaster. We were successful on this application not only because we submitted fictitious documentation, but also because FEMA’s inspector failed to properly inspect our bogus damaged address. Identity and Address Verification and Inspections
The following information describes (1) the control weaknesses related to identity and address verification and inspections that we identified during our work on Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, (2) the improvements we found as a result of our undercover tests during Hurricanes Gustav and Ike, and (3) flaws that still exist in the identity and address verification and inspection processes. Improvements Identified during the Response to Hurricanes Gustav and Ike: FEMA made several improvements to the verification and inspection processes. This application was also approved for a free hotel room and received duplicate payments for previously incurred hotel expenses. Using a manual process, the contractor reviews this list to determine what payments need to be made. FEMA also made millions of dollars in duplicate payments to thousands of individuals who submitted claims for damages to the same primary residences for both Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Difficulties Exper by Undercover GAO Applicants and Real Disaster Victims
Although we encountered little or no difficulty when applying for assistance over the Internet, we observed several problems with FEMA’s customer service when we made applications by phone. For one of o Hurricane Ike applications, an investigator had to call nine times over the course of 3 days before being able to speak to a call center staf member. On a Hurricane Gustav application, the investigator had to call after 1:00 a.m. in order to speak with an operator. Incorrect information. s, In an effort to understand the experiences of actual disaster victim we contacted registrants chosen from a database provided by FEMA About half of the individuals we spoke with told us that they did not experience any problems with FEMA’s application process; the other half confirmed that they encountered delays in getting through to . FEMA’s Staffing Models and Call Center Operational Plan
FEMA cited several factors that contributed to poor customer service in the aftermath of Hurricanes Ike and Gustav: a higher-than-expected call volume, unmet staffing needs, contractor failure, and problems with its automatic call system. FEMA said that this heightened security check prevented the contractor from providing additional staff in a timely fashion. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO's previous work on Hurricanes Katrina and Rita identified fraud, waste, and abuse resulting from a lack of fraud-prevention controls within the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) assistance programs. For example, FEMA did not verify the identities or addresses of individuals applying for aid under its Individuals and Households Program (IHP). FEMA also did not verify the eligibility of individuals seeking shelter in FEMA-paid-for hotels and made duplicate payments to individuals who applied multiple times. GAO made numerous recommendations designed to improve these controls. To follow up on this work, GAO conducted undercover tests of the IHP process during the response to Hurricanes Gustav and Ike. This report discusses (1) whether FEMA's controls have improved since Katrina and Rita and (2) issues GAO identified related to the customer service that FEMA provided. GAO submitted bogus applications for disaster assistance, met with FEMA officials, and contacted actual disaster victims to determine their experiences applying for aid.
What GAO Found
FEMA has significantly improved its fraud prevention controls over disaster assistance. For example, FEMA now conducts identity and address verification on all applications and requires inspections prior to approving rental assistance. In addition, FEMA requires individuals in need of housing assistance to provide valid registration numbers before checking into FEMA-paid-for hotels. FEMA has also taken steps to flag and cancel duplicate registrations for the same disaster. These improvements made it more difficult for GAO to penetrate IHP controls for Hurricanes Gustav and Ike--only 1 of 10 fraudulent applications submitted by GAO received cash payments. However, GAO found flaws in FEMA's controls that still leave the government vulnerable to fraud, waste, and abuse. GAO's undercover tests show that a persistent fraudster can bypass many of these controls by submitting fabricated documents to prove identity or address and, as a result, obtain housing assistance. GAO also received duplicate payments for bogus hotel expenses. In addition, FEMA failed to properly inspect a bogus address GAO used to apply for assistance, ultimately sending GAO multiple checks for thousands of dollars in rental assistance. GAO observed several problems with FEMA's customer service, which made it difficult for many real victims to apply for assistance or obtain shelter in a timely fashion. For example, one of GAO's investigators called nine times over the course of 3 days--several times being put on hold for 20 minutes----before being connected to an operator. Other investigators received incorrect information about the application process. Actual disaster victims confirmed these problems. One applicant reported having to call FEMA at 4 a.m. in order to reach an operator. FEMA cited several factors that contributed to this poor service, including a higher-than-expected call volume and an inability to meet projected call center staffing needs because a contractor failed to provide adequate staffing. Despite these issues, FEMA told GAO that it has made few changes in preparation for the 2009 hurricane season. |
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