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gao_T-NSIAD-99-20 | gao_T-NSIAD-99-20_0 | Background
Since the mid-1980s, we have reported that DOD employs a systemic bias toward overly optimistic planning assumptions in its budget formulation. We have said that this results in too many programs for the available dollars—plans/funding mismatch. In 1997, infrastructure spending was 59 percent of DOD’s total budget, the same percentage that was reported in DOD’s bottom-up review report for 1994. Planned funding increases for modern weapon systems have repeatedly been shifted further into the future with each succeeding FYDP. The following table compares DOD’s procurement plans for the last five FYDPs. In the QDR, DOD acknowledges that it has a historic, serious problem—the postponement of procurement modernization plans to pay for current operating and support costs. Despite the adjustments to decrease the risk that funds would migrate from procurement to unplanned operating expenses, there are substantial risks that DOD’s program may not be executable as planned. Plans for some cuts included in the 1999 FYDP were incomplete or based on optimistic assumptions. Specifically, DOD’s procurement spending rises and falls with its total budget. The 1999 FYDP procurement projections continue to run counter to the historical trend, although DOD has moderated its position. Specifically, DOD projects that procurement funding will rise in real terms during 1998-2003 by approximately 29 percent, while the total DOD budget will remain relatively flat. Policy decisions and new program demands can also cause perturbations in DOD’s funding plans, according to the QDR report. Implications for DOD’s Future Modernization
In its QDR report, DOD recognized that current procurement trends have long-term implications. Specifically, “As successive FYDPs reduced the amount of procurement programmed in the six-year planning period, some of these reductions have accumulated into long-term projections, creating a so-called ‘bow wave’ of demand for procurement funding in the middle of the next decade.” The QDR report concludes that “this bow wave would tend to disrupt planned modernization programs unless additional investment resources are made available in future years.”
The bow wave is particularly evident when considering DOD’s aircraft modernization plans. Optimistic planning provides an unclear picture of defense priorities because tough decisions and trade-offs are avoided. In order for DOD to have an efficient and effective program and for Congress to properly exercise its oversight responsibilities, it is critical that DOD present realistic assumptions and plans in its future budgets. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the Department of Defense's (DOD) budgetary plans to modernize its forces, focusing on: (1) DOD's experience over the last few years in trying to shift funds from nonmission or infrastructure programs to acquisition programs; (2) the risks in DOD's ability to execute its Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) for fiscal years 1999 through 2003; and (3) the implications of current procurement trends for DOD's future modernization.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) although DOD has reduced military and civilian personnel, force structure, and facilities over several years, it has been unable to follow through with planned funding increases for modern weapon systems; (2) this has occurred, in part, because DOD has not shifted funds from infrastructure to modernization; (3) in 1997, infrastructure spending was 59 percent of DOD's total budget, the same percentage that was reported in the bottom-up review report for 1994; (4) consequently, DOD has repeatedly shifted planned funding increases for modern weapon systems further into the future with each succeeding FYDP; (5) DOD acknowledged in its 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review report that it has had to postpone procurement plans because funds were redirected to pay for underestimated operating costs and new program demands, and projected savings from outsourcing and other initiatives had not materialized; (6) although DOD made adjustments in the 1999 FYDP to decrease the risk that funds would migrate from procurement to unplanned operating expenses, the 1999-2003 program, like previous programs, is based on optimistic assumptions about savings and procurement plans; (7) a further indication of risk can be found in DOD's procurement plans; (8) the rise and fall of DOD's procurement spending over the last 33 years has followed the movement in the total budget; (9) however, DOD projects that procurement funding will rise in real terms during 1998-2003 by approximately 29 percent while the total DOD budget will remain relatively flat; (10) DOD's current procurement trends have longer term implications; (11) as DOD reduced programmed procurement in successive FYDPs, it has reprogrammed some procurement to the years beyond the FYDP to create a bow wave of demand for procurement funds; (12) this bow wave, according to DOD, tends to disrupt planned modernization programs unless additional funds are made available; (13) GAO has reported that DOD employs overly optimistic planning assumptions in its budget formulation which leads to far too many programs for the available dollars; (14) optimistic planning provides an unclear picture of defense priorities because tough decisions and trade-offs are avoided; and (15) in order for DOD to have an efficient and effective program and for Congress to properly exercise its oversight responsibilities, it is critical that DOD present realistic assumptions and plans in its future budgets. |
gao_GAO-01-743T | gao_GAO-01-743T_0 | District’s Performance Management Efforts Remain a Work in Progress
Congress, and this Subcommittee in particular, has demonstrated a sustained interest in working with the District government to ensure that a sound performance management system is in place. Since then, the District has taken a number of actions to implement a performance management process, and Congress has continued to provide oversight directed at strengthening the District’s ability to efficiently and effectively deliver results to its taxpayers. The District’s fiscal year 2000 performance report, issued on March 22 of this year, included several initiatives to address issues raised in congressional hearings on the District’s management and performance. On the other hand, the fiscal year 2000 performance report addressed other key legislatively mandated reporting requirements that were not met in the fiscal year 1999 report. As of April 2001, the District had no timetable or comprehensive plan for fully implementing its financial management system. District Will Request Rescission of Contracting Funds
The District of Columbia Appropriations Act for fiscal year 2001 provided a $250,000 payment to the District Mayor for a contract “for the study and development of a plan to simplify the compensation systems, schedules, and work rules applicable to employees of the District government.” However, the act placed several conditions on the appropriation. | Why GAO Did This Study
The District of Columbia has taken various steps to implement a performance management process, and Congress has continued to provide oversight to strengthen the District's ability to efficiently and effectively deliver results to its taxpayers. This testimony discusses GAO's (1) ongoing review of the District's fiscal year 2000 performance report; (2) report issued in April 2001 on the implementation of the District's new financial management system; and (3) report being issued in May 2001 on the District's decision not to use money that Congress provided to help simplify the District's compensation systems, schedules, and work rules.
What GAO Found
GAO found that although the fiscal year 2000 report more fully met statutory requirements than did the 1999 report, performance planning, measurement and reporting is still a work in progress in the District. The District continues to face significant challenges in its efforts to put in place a financial management framework that ensures timely and reliable data on the cost of the District's operations. Finally, the District no longer plans to use the $250,000 appropriated by Congress for reform of the District's classification and compensation systems because doing so would delay their reform effort. This testimony summarizes two GAO reports ( GAO-01-489 and GAO-01-690R). |
gao_GAO-05-448T | gao_GAO-05-448T_0 | Federal agencies, such as the Coast Guard, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and TSA, have been tasked with responsibilities and functions intended to make seaports more secure, such as monitoring vessel traffic or inspecting cargo and containers, and procuring new assets such as aircraft and cutters to conduct patrols and respond to threats. In addition to these federal agencies, seaport stakeholders in the private sector and at the state and local levels of government have taken actions to enhance the security of seaports, such as conducting security assessments of infrastructure and vessels operated within the seaports and developing security plans to protect against a terrorist attack. The actions taken by these agencies and stakeholders are primarily aimed at three types of protections: (1) identifying and reducing vulnerabilities of the facilities, infrastructure, and vessels operating in seaports, (2) securing the cargo and commerce flowing through seaports, and (3) developing greater maritime domain awareness through enhanced intelligence, information-sharing capabilities, and assets and technologies. Given the wide range of potential targets, an effective security response includes identifying targets, assessing risks to them, and taking steps to reduce or mitigate these risks. This security framework includes assessment of risks, access controls over personnel and facilities, and development and implementation of security plans, among other activities. The amount of effort involved in carrying out these actions and implementing these programs has been considerable. While some of these challenges will be resolved with time, analysis, and oversight, there are other challenges that bear even more careful watching, because they may prove to be considerably more difficult to overcome. These three challenges involve (1) design and implementing programs, (2) coordinating between different agencies and stakeholder interests, and (3) determining how to pay for these efforts. As we noted in a July 2003 report, the former U.S. Customs Service, part of which is now CBP initiated the Container Security Initiative (CSI) in January 2002 in response to security vulnerabilities created by ocean container trade and the concern that terrorists could exploit these vulnerabilities to transport or detonate WMDs in the United States. Lack of Goals and Measures Makes Determining Progress Difficult
Although there is widespread agreement that actions taken so far have led to a heightened awareness of the need for security and an enhanced ability to identify and respond to many security threats, it is difficult to translate these actions into a clear sense of how far we have progressed in making seaports more secure. However, although it has been more than 3 years since the September 11, 2001, attacks, the Coast Guard is still in the process of developing a performance indicator for its seaport security activities that can be used to indicate what progress has been made to secure seaports. Similarly, as discussed earlier in describing the actions taken to secure the cargo transiting through seaports in containers, performance measures are needed to determine the progress such actions are making to reduce vulnerabilities of the international supply chain. In a homeland security setting, possible uses of data produced from risk management efforts include informing decisions on where the federal government might spend billions of dollars within and between federal departments, as well as informing decisions on grants awarded to state and local governments. These activities will thus continue to demand close attention. Port Security: Planning Needed to Develop and Operate Maritime Worker Identification Card Program. Maritime Security: Progress Made in Implementing Maritime Transportation Security Act, but Concerns Remain. | Why GAO Did This Study
More than 3 years after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, concerns remain over the security of U.S. seaports and waterways. Seaports and waterways are vulnerable given their size, easy accessibility by water and land, large numbers of potential targets, and close proximity to urban areas. Seaports are also a critical link in the international supply chain, which has its own potential vulnerabilities that terrorists could exploit to transport a weapon of mass destruction to the United States. Federal agencies such as the Coast Guard and Customs and Border Protection and other seaport stakeholders such as state and local law enforcement officials as well as owners and operators of facilities and vessels have taken actions to try to mitigate these vulnerabilities and enhance maritime security. This testimony, which is based on previously completed GAO work, reports on (1) the types of actions taken by the federal government and other stakeholders to address maritime security, (2) the main challenges that GAO observed in taking these actions, and (3) what tools and approaches may be useful in planning future actions to enhance maritime security.
What GAO Found
Federal agencies and local stakeholders have taken many actions to secure seaports. For example, federal agencies have stepped up vessel monitoring, cargo and container inspection, and security patrol activities. Port stakeholders in the private sector and in state and local government have taken such actions as conducting security assessments of infrastructure and vessels and implementing security plans. These actions provide three types of protections: identifying and reducing vulnerabilities of seaports, securing the cargo moving through seaports, and developing an informed view of maritime activities through intelligence, information-sharing, and new technologies to identify and respond to threats. Due in large part to the urgency with which these actions were implemented, challenges have been encountered in implementing them. While some challenges may be resolved with time, others are more difficult to resolve and could hinder the actions' effectiveness. The main challenges GAO has identified include failure to develop necessary planning components to carry out the programs; difficulty in coordinating the activities of federal agencies and port stakeholders to implement programs; and difficulty in maintaining the financial support to continue implementation of security enhancements. As intensified homeland security efforts continue, assessing their contribution to security and their sustainability over time will become more important. Assessing the progress made in securing seaports is difficult, as these efforts lack clear goals defining what they are to achieve and measures that track progress toward these goals. As Congress and the nation consider how much security is enough, more attention will likely be needed to define these goals and measures. Doing so is important because no amount of money can totally protect seaports from attack by a determined enemy. These realities suggest that the future focus in applying resources and efforts needs to incorporate an approach to assess critical infrastructure, determine what is most at risk, and apply measures designed to make cost effective use of resources and funding. |
gao_GAO-06-496 | gao_GAO-06-496_0 | Some States Are Not Using All Available Data Sources to Determine Employment Outcomes for TAA Participants
Some states are not using all available data sources to determine TAA participants’ employment outcomes. Limited IT system capabilities. Labor Makes Some TAA Performance Data Available, but Its Usefulness Is Limited
Labor reports data on TAA petition and certification activity, program participation, and key performance measures, but this information may not be useful for gauging current program performance. The information may be helpful in providing a long-term national picture of program outcomes, but it represents past, rather than current, performance. Most of the outcome data reported in a given program year actually reflect participants who left the program up to 2 years earlier. However, the information Labor makes publicly available may not provide a clear picture of current TAA performance because, in addition to being incomplete and perhaps inaccurate, the data represent past performance and are not consistently reported by type of service, state, or industry. Most States Find TAA Performance Data Useful, but Many Would Like Additional Information
While approximately one-third of the states found TAA performance information they currently receive from Labor to be greatly useful, some would like Labor to provide them with additional information to help manage their program. Nearly half of the 46 states we surveyed told us that they find the performance information they receive from Labor to be moderately useful (see fig. Labor Has Taken Steps to Improve the Quality of Performance Data, but Issues Remain
While it has limited authority to hold states accountable, Labor has taken steps to improve the quality of TAA data states submit, but these steps do not fully address all issues. It is too soon to fully assess whether Labor’s efforts have improved data quality, but most states reported on our survey that Labor’s new requirements have increased awareness of data quality at the state and local levels. Many states reported that the changes are burdensome, and some states are experiencing delays in implementing the changes. Coordinating exit dates improves data quality by avoiding the problem of counting a participant as unemployed in the program’s performance measures when, in fact, the participant is still receiving services in another program and is not ready to be counted in the performance measures. To help ensure that TAA participant data reported by states are consistent, complete, and accurate, Labor should clarify through guidance and other communications with states that all participants who exit the program should be included in the TAPR and the documentation needed to verify the training completion date; ensure that the core monitoring guide currently under development for regional office site visits includes guidance for assessing whether states’ data collection processes for performance reporting capture all participants; and provide states with opportunities to share lessons learned with other states on issues that may affect data quality. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
We examined (1) whether the Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) performance data provide a credible picture of the program’s performance, (2) what TAA performance data Labor makes available to the public and states and the usefulness of the data for managing the program, and (3) what Labor is doing to address issues with the quality of TAA data submitted by states. | Why GAO Did This Study
In the current tight budgetary environment, program performance is likely to be an increasingly significant factor used to help policymakers assess programs and determine funding levels. Given concerns over the quality of performance data for the Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program and the importance of having meaningful information to assess program performance, we examined (1) whether the TAA performance data provide a credible picture of the program's performance, (2) what TAA performance data the Department of Labor (Labor) makes available to the public and states and the usefulness of the data for managing the program, and (3) what Labor is doing to address issues with the quality of TAA data submitted by states.
What GAO Found
The performance information that Labor makes available on the TAA program does not provide a complete and credible picture of the program's performance. Only half the states are including all participants, as required, in the performance data they submit to Labor--states were more likely to report participants who received training than those who received other benefits and services but not training. In addition, many states are not using all available data sources to determine participants' employment outcomes. This may result in lower reported outcomes because states may be inaccurately recording some workers as unemployed who actually have jobs. To compile their performance data, some states are using manual processes or automated systems that lack key capabilities to help minimizes errors, but many states have plans to improve their systems' capabilities. Labor reports data on TAA activity levels, services provided to TAA participants, and key performance measures. The performance data may be useful for providing a long-term national picture of program outcomes, but it represents participants who left the program up to 30 months earlier and, thus, is not useful for gauging the TAA program's current performance. Also, the performance information is not displayed using categories that would be informative to policymakers, such as type of service received and industry of dislocation. Most states find the performance information they receive from Labor to be at least moderately useful, but many want more information. Labor has taken steps to improve the quality of TAA performance data, but issues remain. In 2003, Labor began requiring states to validate their data, and most states reported that this increased awareness of data quality at the state and local level. However, the validation process does not address the problem of participants being excluded from the performance data. In fiscal year 2006, Labor instituted a set of common measures, and many states reported they are experiencing delays in implementing all required changes. States also expressed interest in receiving more opportunities to share lessons learned on topics relevant to TAA data quality. |
gao_GAO-02-397 | gao_GAO-02-397_0 | Owners of section 515 properties who wished to prepay the loan pursuant to their original loan agreements and remove their properties from the section 515 program have sued the federal government. This number far exceeded the number of properties that left the portfolio after prepayment. Fiscal year 2001 is the only year when the number of prepayments exceeded the number of properties added to the portfolio. Prepayment Potential Limited by Series of Factors
If the statutory requirement covering loans made before December 15, 1989, were changed to allow prepayment without restriction after 20 years from the date of the loan, we estimate that prepayment could be an option for the owners of 3,872, or about 24 percent, of the 16,366 section 515 properties. Heavy dependence on RHS rental assistance that would cease upon prepayment. However, with prepayment and funding restricted, this original expectation has not been realized, and RHS does not know the full cost of the long-term rehabilitation needs of the properties in its portfolio. RHS field staffs perform annual and triennial property inspections. Where data was available, we determined the number of properties whose loans were prepaid. | What GAO Found
Nearly 450,000 elderly and other households depend on federal assistance to live in multifamily rural rental properties that were constructed with subsidized federal loans. Because the properties were built in areas when and where privately financed housing units, affordable by lower income households, were not considered economically feasible, the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Rural Housing Service (RHS) has made direct loans available to developers of affordable multifamily housing under its section 515 program. RHS has funded many more new properties than the portfolio has lost through prepayment. The number of new properties added to the portfolio exceeded the number that left the program after prepayment in every year except 2001. If the statutory requirement restricting prepayment for loans made before December 1989, were changed to allow prepayment without restrictions after 20 years from the date of the loan, prepayment could be an option for the owners of 3,900 of all section 515 properties over the next eight years. RHS field staff routinely inspect properties, complete and retain detailed descriptions of noted deficiencies, and transmit the summaries of the deficiencies identified to a central database. Only current deficiencies are identified, however, so the data are of only limited value for determining the cost of the long-term rehabilitation needs of individual properties. |
gao_GAO-07-315 | gao_GAO-07-315_0 | WTI crude oil is a widely traded oil that is commonly used as a benchmark for measuring crude oil prices in the United States. Price Differentials between California and Other Crude Oils Have Fluctuated Significantly over the Past 20 Years but Have Risen Significantly in Recent Years
From December 1987 to August 2006, price differentials between WTI and California crude oils fluctuated significantly, generally increasing since mid-2004 and reaching a high in January 2005. This recent increase in crude oil price differentials coincided with a general increase in world crude oil prices and reflected a more rapid increase in WTI prices relative to prices of the three California crude oils we evaluated (Kern River, Thums, and Line 63). Because WTI rose faster than California crude oils, price differentials between California crude oils and WTI also increased during this period. Since mid-2005, price differentials for the three California crude oils and the two imported crude oils have moderated somewhat but remain high by historical standards. Changing Conditions and Events in Global Crude Oil Markets Have Affected Price Differentials
EIA and other officials we interviewed told us that price differentials between light and heavier crude oils are driven primarily by supply and demand economics in the global crude oil and petroleum products markets and stated that these factors have influenced recent trends in price differentials between heavy California crude oils and the light crude oil benchmark WTI. For example, increases in the supply of light crude oil result in lower prices for those crude oils, which would decrease the price differential in comparison to heavy crude oil, such as those oils typically produced in California. EIA officials and others stated that this caused prices of WTI to rise at a faster rate than heavy crude oils and contributed to rising price differentials between WTI and heavier crude oils such as those produced in California. This causes the price differentials between WTI and heavier oils to rise further. Consequently, the price differential between these two crude oils expanded from about $6 to about $15. Local and Regional Events Have Affected Prices of Specific Crude Oils and Markets
Local and regional events, such as hurricanes off the U.S. Gulf Coast and refinery outages, can cause fluctuations in the price of crude oils produced in the region and benchmark crude oils. The resulting oversupply of crude oil in a region with comparatively low demand prevented the price of the regional crude oils from increasing similar to WTI prices, causing a large price differential. In the past, the state of California alleged that crude oil companies in California manipulated crude oil prices to lower their royalty payments to the federal government. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this review were to determine (1) the extent to which crude oil price differentials in California have fluctuated over the past 20 years and (2) the factors that may explain the recent changes in the price differential between California’s crude oil and others. To determine the extent to which California crude oil price differentials have fluctuated over time, we obtained data on the spot prices of the North American benchmark crude oil, West Texas Intermediate (WTI), and three California crude oils: two heavy crude oils (Kern River and Thums) and an intermediate crude oil (Line 63). | Why GAO Did This Study
California is the nation's fourth largest producer of crude oil and has the third largest oil refining industry (behind Texas and Louisiana). Because crude oil is a globally traded commodity, natural and geopolitical events can affect its price. These fluctuations affect state revenues because a share of the royalty payments from companies that lease state or federal lands to produce crude oil are distributed to the states. Because there are many varieties and grades of crude oil, buyers and sellers often price their oil relative to another abundant, highly traded, and high quality crude oil called a benchmark. West Texas Intermediate (WTI), a light crude oil, is the most commonly used benchmark in the United States. The price difference between a crude oil and its benchmark is commonly expressed as a price differential. In fall 2004, crude oil price differentials between WTI and California's heavier, and generally lower valued, crude oil rose sharply. GAO was asked to examine (1) the extent to which crude oil price differentials in California have fluctuated over the past 20 years and (2) the factors that may explain the recent changes in the price differential between California's crude oil and others. GAO analyzed historical data on California and benchmark crude oil prices and discussed market trends with state and federal government officials and crude oil experts.
What GAO Found
California crude oil price differentials have experienced numerous and large fluctuations over the past 20 years. The largest spike in the price differential began in mid-2004 and continued into 2005, during which the price differential between WTI and a California crude oil called Kern River rose from about $6 to about $15 per barrel. This increase in the price differential between WTI and California crude oils occurred in a period of generally increasing world oil prices during which prices for both WTI and California crude oils rose. Differentials between WTI and other oils also expanded in the same time period. The differentials have since fallen somewhat but remain relatively high by historical standards. Recent trends in California crude oil price differentials are consistent with a number of changing market conditions. First, beginning in mid-2004, Middle East producers began to increase the supply of heavy crude oils in the world marketplace, which helped depress prices for heavy crude oils, including those produced in California, and contributed to the expanding price differential between California crude oils and WTI. Second, the price differential of California crude oils to WTI increased when the rise in global crude oil prices caused prices of light crude oils to increase faster than the prices of heavier crude oils. This occurred because the petroleum products from heavy crude oils compete against other fuels, such as coal. Third, events that only impact regional crude oil markets or individual crude oils can also affect price differentials. For example, in September 2004, Hurricane Ivan disrupted crude oil production in the U.S. Gulf Coast region, resulting in decreases in the region's crude oil supply. The resulting scarcity of crude oil in the Gulf Coast region caused the prices of WTI and other regional oils to increase relative to crude oils produced outside the region. This also would have increased the price differentials between WTI and California crude oils. Finally, manipulation of crude oil prices could also affect price differentials, but experts and officials GAO interviewed generally believed that this was not a factor during this recent period. |
gao_NSIAD-99-123 | gao_NSIAD-99-123_0 | The Army allocated 8,530 of these reductions to AMC. Plan for Achieving the Personnel Reductions Is Evolving
The Army’s plan for achieving its AMC personnel reduction goals are still evolving. Most, about 80 percent, of the total reductions are expected to occur between fiscal year 2001 and 2004. Basis for the Reductions Has Changed
To achieve the QDR reductions, the Army assumed that about 35,000 of AMC’s civilian positions could be subjected to competitive sourcing studies. Savings Are Likely to Be Less Than Anticipated and Take Longer to Be Realized
The Army expected to achieve cumulative savings of an estimated $1.4 billion between fiscal year 1999 and 2004 and an estimated $589 million in annual recurring savings thereafter from QDR civilian reductions in AMC. While these reductions are expected to achieve savings, our work indicates that savings in both the short and long term are likely to be less than expected and take longer to be realized. The savings totals will be lower in the short term because not all of the investment costs required to achieve the reductions were considered. Also, some of the savings programmed for fiscal year 2000 will be delayed because competitive sourcing studies that are underway are taking longer to complete and implement than planned. The Army used higher than average civilian salary costs to compute the estimated savings. The estimated savings did not include all the investment costs required to implement some initiatives. The Army also did not fully calculate the personnel separation costs associated with the QDR reductions in AMC. Had the Army applied a 2-percent increase consistently through fiscal year 2005, we estimate that the total savings would be reduced by about $52 million. The remaining $103 million, or 17 percent, of the estimated recurring savings is based on eliminating AMC positions that are essentially funded by non-Army organizations through reimbursements for services provided. Impact of Reductions Has Been Limited
Since most of the QDR reductions will occur between fiscal year 2001 and 2004, the impact on workload and readiness of these future reductions is yet to be determined. AMC officials, while expressing concerns about challenges they face in meeting the QDR and ongoing reductions, could not point to any significant effects to date other than employee morale. AMC officials stated that the ongoing reductions continue to have only marginal impacts on operations, which they have dealt with so far through various reorganizations and reengineering actions. Similarly, the Tank-automotive and Armaments Command’s plan to eliminate about 300 positions is based on projected workload decreases in fiscal years 2003 and 2004. To obtain information on the impact of the reductions on workload and readiness, we interviewed AMC’s Chief of Staff and officials at the various commands visited who were responsible for implementing the initiatives. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO provided information on the status of efforts to implement personnel reductions in the Army Materiel Command (AMC) that were directed by the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), focusing on: (1) AMC's plans and timeframe for achieving the reductions; (2) the projected cost savings from such reductions; and (3) the cited impacts the reductions will have on workload and readiness.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) AMC has identified various initiatives to eliminate 8,530 civilian positions by fiscal year (FY) 2004 as called for in the QDR; (2) the majority of the reductions are now based on planned organizational changes, operating efficiencies, and anticipated future workload decreases, with lesser emphasis on competitive sourcing studies than originally anticipated by the QDR; (3) about 20 percent of the reductions are expected to occur over the next 2 years, and actions are under way to achieve the majority of these reductions; (4) about 80 percent of the reductions are expected to occur in FY 2001 through FY 2004; (5) plans for some of these reductions are still being finalized and uncertainties exist about some of these plans; (6) the Army estimated that the personnel reductions in the Command would result in $1.4 billion in cumulative savings from FY 1999 through FY 2004 and $589 million in annual recurring savings thereafter; (7) GAO's analysis indicates that estimated savings will be less than anticipated both in the short and long term; (8) the Army did not account for all of the investment costs that would be required to achieve the savings; (9) the Tank-Automotive and Armament Command estimated that about $35 million in investment costs were not included in the Army's analysis of projected savings; (10) also, the Army did not estimate all the personnel separation costs likely to be associated with implementing the reductions; (11) about $21 million in savings estimated for FY 2000 could be delayed because competitive sourcing studies are taking longer to complete and implement than planned; (12) the savings are overstated by an estimated $52 million at least through FY 2005 because the Army used higher than average civilian salary costs to compute its savings; (13) the long-term annual recurring savings to the Army are likely to be as much as 17 percent lower than expected since some planned personnel reductions reflect positions funded by non-Army organizations for work done on a reimbursable basis; (14) because most of the QDR reductions will occur between 2001 and 2004, much of the impact on workload and readiness is yet to be determined; (15) AMC officials, while expressing concerns about challenges they face in meeting the reductions, could not point to any significant adverse effects to date other than on employee morale; and (16) command officials stated that the ongoing reductions continue to have only marginal impacts on its operations, which they have dealt with so far through various reorganizations and reengineering actions. |
gao_GGD-95-48 | gao_GGD-95-48_0 | In contrast to GSA, for example, they do not (1) establish prescriptive, detailed technical specifications or (2) require extensive, multilevel reviews of proposed lease contracts. Private Sector Relies on Market Expertise and Flexibility to Lease Space
The 12 private firms we contacted focus on results rather than on the process when leasing space. However, the General Services Administration’s (GSA) highly prescriptive and process-oriented leasing approach—grounded in federal procurement law, uniformity, and numerous well-intended procedural controls added over the years—has become at odds with the dynamic commercial real estate market. It impedes GSA’s ability to get good, timely leasing values and may be causing the government to pay more than is necessary for leased space. In contrast, the more results-oriented approach that private sector firms typically use is much simpler, more flexible, and takes less time. GSA recognizes the need to improve the timeliness and cost effectiveness of its leasing process, has already adopted streamlined procedures for certain small leases, and is exploring other changes in response to the National Performance Review (NPR) and the President’s recent initiative to reduce the size of government and realize long-term cost savings. We believe that a more timely, responsive, and cost-effective GSA leasing process will require fundamental changes in the traditional federal leasing paradigm, GSA’s organizational culture, and its role in meeting agencies’ office space needs. In this regard, GSA should work closely with federal customer agencies and the commercial real estate community to more fully explore their concerns about the existing leasing process, identify alternative ways of carrying out the leasing function, and test and evaluate their use and potential adoption; test the benefits, risks, and potential federal application of the private industry leasing practices discussed in chapter 3 of this report that are within its authority and seek the necessary authority from (1) Congress to test other practices and alternatives that GSA believes would require legislation and (2) the Office of Management and Budget to test any needed changes in federal procedural requirements and controls under the managerial accountability and flexibility provisions of GPRA; and adopt administratively or, if GSA determines that legislation is needed, propose to Congress the necessary legislation to enable it to adopt those private industry practices or other alternatives tested that result in documented improvements in GSA’s leasing performance, make sense, and are cost effective. We agree that the federal laws, procurement regulations, and other national policies that now guide and influence GSA’s leasing process, especially CICA, will need to be reexamined. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the General Services Administration's (GSA) policies, procedures, and practices for leasing office space, focusing on how they compare with private industry leasing practices.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) GSA has a highly prescriptive and process-oriented leasing approach which prevents it from timely securing good values on office space leases and impedes its ability to deliver office space to federal agencies; (2) federal procurement laws and procedural controls enacted to ensure leasing uniformity, compliance, and fairness unduly restrict GSA flexibility; (3) GSA may be paying too much for leased space because of its confusing and time-consuming solicitations and standard contracts; (4) the 12 private-sector firms reviewed use a simpler, more flexible, results-oriented leasing approach that reduces their leasing costs; (5) the private firms do not use detailed specifications and contracts or require multilevel reviews of proposed leases; (6) the firms rely on their staff's expertise, conform to customary commercial practices, and assume more leasing risks; (7) GSA has streamlined its procedures for small leases and is exploring other leasing alternatives in response to initiatives to reduce the government's size and improve performance; (8) GSA could make other administrative changes to improve timeliness and reduce costs, but significant improvements will require fundamental changes in its leasing approach, organizational culture, and role in meeting federal office needs; and (9) federal procurement laws and regulations and other national policies need to be reexamined and possibly changed in order for GSA to adopt a more results-oriented leasing approach. |
gao_GGD-98-186 | gao_GGD-98-186_0 | To determine the Customs Aviation Program’s resources and activities for fiscal years 1992 to 1997, we reviewed congressional appropriations to Customs for the program. To determine the adequacy of the performance measures Customs uses to judge the results of its aviation program efforts, we interviewed officials from Customs and other federal agencies involved in drug control and interdiction and reviewed relevant documents provided by these agencies. Aviation Program Missions: Border Interdiction, Foreign Counterdrug Operations, and Other Law Enforcement Support
Since the establishment of the Customs Aviation Program in 1969, its basic mandate to use air assets to counter the drug smuggling threat has not changed. From fiscal year 1993 to fiscal year 1997, the total number of flight hours for all missions decreased over one-third, from about 45,000 hours to about 29,000 hours, as shown in figure 2. The border interdiction mission is generally accomplished through a four-step process: (1) using DOD or FAA radar or other means, such as failure to file a flight plan with FAA or detection by patrol aircraft, to detect aircraft that are suspected of drug smuggling; (2) dispatching an interceptor aircraft, such as the high-speed, multijet engine Citation II, to physically locate the suspect aircraft and check the aircraft’s registration number through various law enforcement databases to determine whether it has been involved in previous illegal activities; (3) employing tracker aircraft, such as the P-3, to follow the suspect aircraft to its destination; and (4) using a Blackhawk helicopter, which is a military aircraft capable of being staffed with several Customs or other federal, state, or local law enforcement officers, to stop the suspect aircraft when it lands, detain the crew, search the aircraft, and, if appropriate, arrest the suspect(s) for drug smuggling and seize any illegal drugs. In constant or inflation-adjusted dollars, the decrease was 31 percent. Customs Aviation Program Mission Takeoffs Have Decreased
As shown in table 1, the total number of aircraft mission takeoffs decreased from about 22,000 in fiscal year 1992 to about 15,000 in fiscal year 1997. Also, the program’s number of actual personnel decreased by 22 percent, from 956 to 745. The number of aircraft declined about 10 percent between fiscal years 1992 and 1997. Operations and maintenance costs per aircraft flight hour have increased over the last several years. Customs officials said increased costs was one of the reasons they were flying fewer hours per year. Customs’ Aviation Program Is Developing New Performance Measures
Customs currently is developing performance measures to more adequately report the results for its aviation program. However, these performance measures track activity, not results or effectiveness. Customs has also used other measures, such as an air-threat index, in an attempt to measure the results of its aviation program. However, the air-threat index, as well as selected other performance measures, have been discontinued because Customs determined they were not good measures of results and effectiveness. Customs Aviation Program officials told us that one of the primary obstacles to developing meaningful performance measures is that much of the program’s success depends on the actions of other federal departments and state and local law enforcement agencies, as well as the cooperation of foreign government law enforcement agencies. Foreign counterdrug operations in South America began. A recorded menu will provide information on how to obtain these lists. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the Customs Service's Customs Aviation Program, focusing on the: (1) program's missions and how they have changed since fiscal year (FY) 1992; (2) annual level of resources and activities since FY 1992; and (3) adequacy of the performance measures Customs uses to judge the results of its aviation program.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) since the establishment of the Customs Aviation Program in 1969, its basic mandate to use air assets to counter the drug smuggling threat has not changed; (2) originally, the Customs Aviation Program had two principal missions: (a) border interdiction of drugs being smuggled by plane into the United States; and (b) law enforcement support to other Customs offices as well as other federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies; (3) in 1993, President Bill Clinton instituted a new policy to control drugs coming from South and Central America; (4) because Customs aircraft were to be used to help carry out this policy, foreign counterdrug operations became a third principal mission for the aviation program; (5) since then, the program has devoted about 25 percent of its resources to the border interdiction mission, 25 percent to foreign counterdrug operations, and 50 percent to other law enforcement support; (6) Customs Aviation Program funding decreased from about $195 million in FY 1992, to about $135 million in FY 1997--about 31 percent in constant or inflation-adjusted dollars; (7) while available funds have decreased, operations and maintenance costs per aircraft flight hour have increased; (8) Customs Aviation Program officials said that this increase in costs is one of the reasons they are flying fewer hours each year; (9) from FY 1993 to FY 1997, the total number of flight hours for all missions decreased by over one-third, from about 45,000 hours to about 29,000 hours; (10) the size of Customs' fleet dropped in FY 1994, when Customs took 19 surveillance aircraft out of service because of funding reductions; and the fleet has remained at about 115 since then; (11) the number of Customs Aviation Program onboard personnel has dropped steadily, from a high of 956 in FY 1992 to 745 by the end of FY 1997; (12) Customs has been using traditional law enforcement performance measures for the aviation program; (13) these measures, however, are used to track activity, not results or effectiveness; (14) until 1997, Customs also used an air threat index as an indicator of its effectiveness in detecting illegal air traffic; (15) however, Customs has discontinued using this indicator, as well as selected other performance measures, because Customs determined that they were not good measures of results and effectiveness; and (16) recognizing that these measures were not providing adequate insights into whether the program was producing desired results, Customs is developing new performance measures in order to better measure results. |
gao_GAO-08-1088 | gao_GAO-08-1088_0 | From fiscal years 2004 through 2008, S&T entered into at least 55 other transaction agreements to support 17 different projects. Most Agreements Involved Nontraditional Contractors to Provide Key Technologies and Services
DHS has used its other transaction authority to leverage the capabilities of nontraditional contractors in prototyping and research and development efforts. We identified a total of 50 nontraditional contractors who participated in 44 (83 percent) of the agreements we examined, with multiple nontraditional contractors involved on 8 agreements. Nearly half of the nontraditional contractors were classified as small businesses. The proportion of dollars obligated on each agreement for nontraditional contractors—which ranged from less than 1 percent to 100 percent—did not necessarily indicate the importance of the contractors’ contributions. For example, only 1 percent of one agreement’s obligations was allocated for work by a nontraditional subcontractor to develop chemical tests for a hazardous substance detection system. Policies and Practices Are in Place to Manage Agreements, but Assessment and Staffing Needs Have Not Been Fully Addressed
Since we reported in 2004, DHS has continued to develop policies and practices for managing other transactions, issuing an operating procedure and a guidebook in May 2008, but has not fully addressed the need to assess its use of these agreements and maintain a contracting workforce. DHS has developed guidance and practices to minimize financial and program risks. However, the capacity of the database is limited as it is not designed to capture data to assess DHS’s use of other transactions—particularly on the extent of nontraditional contractors’ contributions. In addition, the database does not contain information on the nature of the work performed by nontraditional contractors—either prime or subcontractors—or the funding allocated to nontraditional contractors. DHS’s recently issued guidance also requires program staff to take training on other transactions. Conclusion
While other transaction agreements can carry the benefit of tapping into innovative homeland security technologies through nontraditional contractors, as they are exempt from federal procurement regulations, they also carry the risk of reduced accountability and transparency if not properly managed. Recommendations for Executive Action
To promote the efficient and effective use by DHS of its other transactions authority to meet its mission needs, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Under Secretary for Management and the Under Secretary for Science and Technology to take the following two actions: Collect relevant data on other transaction agreements, including the roles of and funding to nontraditional contractors and intellectual property rights, and systematically assess and report to Congress on the use of these agreements to ensure that the intended benefits of the authority are achieved. While DHS stated that its report to Congress includes overarching assessment information, DHS does not systematically evaluate whether it is obtaining the full benefits of other transaction authority. We continue to believe that this would help DHS managers ensure a sufficient contracting workforce to execute S&T’s other transaction authority. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine the extent to which nontraditional contractors have been involved in other transactions with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to fulfill technology and mission needs, we obtained an initial list of agreements from DHS’s Office of Procurement Operations, the contracting office responsible for entering into these agreements; conducted a file review; and interviewed DHS’s Science and Technology (S&T) directorate’s program managers. | Why GAO Did This Study
When the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was created in 2002, it was granted "other transaction" authority--a special authority used to meet mission needs. While the authority provides greater flexibility to attract and work with nontraditional contractors to research, develop, and test innovative technologies, other transactions carry the risk of reduced accountability and transparency--in part because they are exempt from certain federal acquisition regulations and cost accounting standards. In 2004, GAO reported on DHS's early use of this authority. This follow-up report determines the extent to which nontraditional contractors have been involved in DHS's other transactions, and assesses DHS's management of the acquisition process when using this authority to identify additional safeguards. To conduct its work, GAO reviewed relevant statutes, guidance, and prior GAO reports on other transactions, and interviewed contracting and program management officials, as well as contractors. GAO also reviewed 53 files for agreements entered into from fiscal years 2004 through 2008 and identified those involving nontraditional contractors.
What GAO Found
DHS's other transactions documentation indicates that nontraditional contractors played a significant role in over 80 percent of the Science and Technology directorate's other transaction agreements. GAO identified 50 nontraditional contractors who participated in 44 agreements--one-third of them were prime contractors and about half of them were small businesses. These contractors provided a variety of technologies and services that DHS described as critical--including technology designed to detect chemical warfare agents after a suspected or known chemical attack. The proportion of dollars obligated for nontraditional contractors on an agreement did not necessarily indicate the importance of their contributions. For example, only 1 percent of total agreement obligations were allocated to a nontraditional subcontractor that, according to the prime contractor, was specially qualified for developing tests for a hazardous substance detection system. While DHS has continued to develop policies and procedures for other transactions, including some to mitigate financial and program risks for prototype projects, the department faces challenges in systematically assessing its use of other transactions and maintaining a skilled contracting workforce. DHS issued guidance in 2008 and continued to provide training to contracting staff on the use of other transactions. However, DHS does not track information on the amount of funds paid to nontraditional contractors or the nature of the work they performed, which could help the department assess whether it is obtaining the full benefits of other transaction authority. DHS recently updated its procurement database to capture information on other transaction agreements, but the database does not include all of the data DHS would need to assess nontraditional contractor involvement. Further, DHS's ability to maintain a stable and capable contracting workforce remains uncertain due to high staff turnover and the lack of a staff planning method. |
gao_GAO-06-895T | gao_GAO-06-895T_0 | Basic Pilot Program Employment Verification Process
The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996 required INS and SSA to operate three voluntary pilot programs to test electronic means for employers to verify an employee’s eligibility to work, one of which was the Basic Pilot Program. Various Weaknesses Have Undermined the Employment Verification Process, but Opportunities Exist to Enhance It
Current Employment Verification Process Is Based on Employers’ Review of Documents
In 1986, IRCA established the employment verification process based on employers’ review of documents presented by employees to prove identity and work eligibility. Employers must then certify that they have reviewed the documents presented by their employees to establish identity and work eligibility and that the documents appear genuine and relate to the individual presenting them. Form I-9 Process Is Vulnerable to Document and Identity Fraud
Since passage of IRCA in 1986, document and identity fraud have made it difficult for employers who want to comply with the employment verification process to ensure they hire only authorized workers. The Number and Variety of Acceptable Documents Hinders Employer Verification Efforts
The large number and variety of documents that are acceptable for proving work eligibility have complicated employer verification efforts under IRCA. According to DHS officials, the department is assessing possible revisions to the Form I-9 process, including reducing the number of acceptable work eligibility documents, but has not established a target time frame for completing this assessment and issuing regulations on Form I-9 changes. Although the Basic Pilot Program may enhance the employment verification process and a mandatory program could assist ICE in targeting its worksite enforcement efforts, weaknesses exist in the current program. Competing Priorities and Implementation Challenges Have Hindered Worksite Enforcement Efforts
Worksite Enforcement Has Been a Relatively Low Priority
Worksite enforcement is one of various immigration enforcement programs that competes for resources and among INS and ICE responsibilities, and worksite enforcement has been a relatively low priority. ICE Attributes Decline in Numbers of Employer Fine Notices and Worksite Arrests to Document Fraud and Resource Allocation Decisions
The number of notices of intent to fine issued to employers as well as the number of unauthorized workers arrested at worksites have generally declined. Various studies have shown that the availability and use of fraudulent documents have made it difficult for ICE agents to prove that employers knowingly hired unauthorized workers. After September 11, 2001, INS and ICE focused investigative resources on national security cases, and in particular, focused worksite enforcement efforts on critical infrastructure protection, which is consistent with DHS’s primary mission to combat terrorism. As part of the Secure Border Initiative, in April 2006 ICE announced a new interior enforcement strategy to target employers of unauthorized aliens, immigration violators, and criminal networks. Under this strategy, ICE plans to target employers who knowingly employ unauthorized workers by bringing criminal charges against them. ICE has reported increases in the numbers of criminal arrests, indictments, and convictions between fiscal years 2004 and 2005 as a result of these efforts. INS and ICE Have Faced Difficulties in Setting Fine Amounts and in Detaining Unauthorized Workers, but Have Taken Steps to Address Difficulties
INS and ICE have faced difficulties in setting and collecting fine amounts that meaningfully deter employers from knowingly hiring unauthorized workers and in detaining unauthorized workers arrested at worksites. Furthermore, the Basic Pilot Program shows promise for enhancing the employment verification process and reducing document fraud if implemented on a much larger scale. ICE is taking some steps to address difficulties it has faced in its worksite enforcement efforts, but it is too early to tell whether these steps will improve the effectiveness of the worksite enforcement program and help ICE identify the millions of unauthorized workers and the employers who hired them. | Why GAO Did This Study
The opportunity for employment is one of the most important magnets attracting illegal immigrants to the United States. The Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986 established an employment eligibility verification process and a sanctions program for fining employers for noncompliance. Few modifications have been made to the verification process and sanctions program since 1986, and immigration experts state that a more reliable verification process and a strengthened worksite enforcement capacity are needed to help deter illegal immigration. This testimony is based on GAO's August 2005 report on the employment verification process and worksite enforcement efforts. In this testimony, GAO provides observations on (1) the current employment verification process and (2) U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's (ICE) priorities and resources for the worksite enforcement program and the challenges it faces in implementing that program.
What GAO Found
The current employment verification (Form I-9) process is based on employers' review of documents presented by new employees to prove their identity and work eligibility. On the Form I-9, employers certify that they have reviewed documents presented by their employees and that the documents appear genuine and relate to the individual presenting the documents. However, document fraud (use of counterfeit documents) and identity fraud (fraudulent use of valid documents or information belonging to others) have undermined the employment verification process by making it difficult for employers who want to comply with the process to ensure they hire only authorized workers and easier for unscrupulous employers to knowingly hire unauthorized workers with little fear of sanction. In addition, the large number and variety of documents acceptable for proving work eligibility has hindered employer verification efforts. In 1998, the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), now part of DHS, proposed revising the Form I-9 process, particularly to reduce the number of acceptable work eligibility documents, but DHS has not yet finalized the proposal. The Basic Pilot Program, a voluntary program through which participating employers electronically verify employees' work eligibility, shows promise to enhance the current employment verification process, help reduce document fraud, and assist ICE in better targeting its worksite enforcement efforts. Yet, several weaknesses in the pilot program's implementation, such as its inability to detect identity fraud and DHS delays in entering data into its databases, could adversely affect increased use of the pilot program, if not addressed. The worksite enforcement program has been a relatively low priority under both INS and ICE. Consistent with the DHS mission to combat terrorism, after September 11, 2001, INS and then ICE focused worksite enforcement efforts mainly on detecting and removing unauthorized workers from critical infrastructure sites. Since fiscal year 1999, the numbers of employer notices of intent to fine and administrative worksite arrests have generally declined. According to ICE, this decline is due to various factors, such as the prevalence of document fraud that makes it difficult to prove employer violations. ICE officials told us that the agency has previously experienced difficulties in proving employer violations and setting and collecting fine amounts that meaningfully deter employers from knowingly hiring unauthorized workers. In April 2006, ICE announced a new interior enforcement strategy to target employers who knowingly hire unauthorized workers by bringing criminal charges against them, and ICE has reported increases in the number of criminal arrests and indictments since fiscal year 2004. However, it is too early to tell what effect, if any, this new strategy will have on enhancing worksite enforcement efforts and identifying unauthorized workers and their employers. |
gao_GAO-12-584 | gao_GAO-12-584_0 | VA Central Office expected this start-up funding would be repaid by the pilot locations. Planning and Early Implementation Phases of the Dialysis Pilot Had Significant Weaknesses
There were a number of weaknesses in VA’s execution of the planning and early implementation phases of the Dialysis Pilot that collectively could limit the achievement of its goals. VA’s Pilot Location Selection Process Was Not Transparent or Appropriately Documented
While the Dialysis Workgroup reported using several criteria to select the Dialysis Pilot locations and documented some of these criteria in the approval documents for the Dialysis Pilot, it did not document how these criteria were applied or whether it assessed all 153 VAMCs for potential inclusion in the Dialysis Pilot. VA Did Not Produce Consistent and Comparable Cost Estimates for Pilot Locations
It is not possible to determine whether pilot locations completed reliable cost estimations because these estimates are not consistent and comparable. Reliable cost estimates are necessary to ensure that pilot location costs Generating reliable and are comparable across the four pilot locations.comparable cost estimates prior to opening the pilot locations was critical to the early implementation of the Dialysis Pilot in order to ensure that appropriate site-specific baseline cost estimates were generated that would allow VA to evaluate the cost of the Dialysis Pilot and ensure that any cost savings generated by the pilot locations could be accurately calculated. We found that not all pilot locations used the validated formulas developed by VA systems redesign engineers to calculate their cost estimates. VA Did Not Provide Clear and Timely Guidance to Pilot Locations on Start-up Fund Repayment and Cost Savings Calculations
VA Central Office officials did not provide VISN and VAMC officials with clear and timely written guidance or instructions on how to pay back start-up funds or how to calculate cost savings from the Dialysis Pilot. Pilot locations are expected to achieve cost savings through the outpatient dialysis clinics and to repay their start-up funding. VA’s Dialysis Pilot Has a Stated Mission but Lacks Clearly Defined Performance Criteria and an Evaluation Plan
VA Central Office has not yet determined how it will define success for the Dialysis Pilot or created clear performance measures linked to the four Dialysis Pilot goals. When other leading public sector organizations are engaged in efforts to improve their performance and help their organizations become more effective—similar to VA’s goals for the Dialysis Pilot—we found that these organizations commonly take three steps: (1) define a clear mission and goals, (2) measure performance to gauge progress toward achieving goals, and (3) use performance information as a basis for decision making. Despite its success in defining a clear mission and goals for the Dialysis Pilot, VA has not developed a clear plan for evaluating the pilot. In March 2012, the VHA Chief Business Office reported that VA is in the early stages of establishing an agreement with a leading university research center to conduct an evaluation of the Dialysis Pilot; however, no target dates were provided for when this evaluation would begin or what aspects of the Dialysis Pilot beyond cost-effectiveness it would evaluate. Because VA has not yet developed an evaluation plan or formally defined performance measures for pilot locations, it does not have access to consistent and reliable information on the performance of the pilot locations and may not have this information accessible when it is time to either make midcourse corrections for the Dialysis Pilot or decide whether and how to open additional VA-operated outpatient dialysis clinics. VA set four goals for its Dialysis Pilot: (1) improve quality of care, (2) increase access for veterans, (3) provide additional dialysis research opportunities, and (4) achieve cost savings for VA-funded dialysis treatments. In its plan for addressing our recommendations, VA stated that it is developing a plan for the Dialysis Pilot that will address three of our recommendations related to (1) the documentation of Dialysis Pilot key decisions, including the selection of future pilot locations; (2) the creation of reasonable cost estimates for pilot locations; and (3) guidance for the repayment of start-up funding and cost savings calculations. Appendix I: Status of VA Dialysis Pilot Locations
Table 1 provides additional information on the current operating status of the four Dialysis Pilot locations at the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) medical centers (VAMC) in Durham, North Carolina; Fayetteville, North Carolina; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; and Cleveland, Ohio. | Why GAO Did This Study
Veterans diagnosed with end-stage renal diseasea condition of permanent kidney failurerepresent one of the most resource-intensive patient populations at VA. These veterans are often prescribed dialysis, which is a life-saving and relatively expensive medical procedure that removes excess fluids and toxins from the bloodstream. VA began developing its Dialysis Pilot in 2009 with four goals: (1) improved quality of care, (2) increased veteran access, (3) additional medical research opportunities, and (4) cost savings. Through this pilot, VA will establish four VA-operated outpatient dialysis clinics in communities surrounding select VA medical centers by the end of fiscal year 2012 using start-up funding provided by VA Central Office. Pilot locations are expected to achieve cost savings and to repay their start-up funding. GAO examined VAs planning and early implementation efforts for the Dialysis Pilot, and how VA plans to evaluate the pilot.
GAO reviewed relevant VA documents, including those related to pilot location selection and cost estimation, and spoke with VA officials responsible for overseeing the Dialysis Pilot and representatives from all pilot locations.
What GAO Found
GAO found a number of weaknesses in the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) execution of the planning and early implementation phases of the Dialysis Pilot. These weaknesses involved pilot location selection, cost estimation practices, and cost savings calculations that could collectively limit the achievement of the pilots goals. Specifically, VA did not do the following:
Appropriately document its pilot location selection process. VA did not maintain a clear and transparent pilot location selection process; it did not document how its criteria for pilot location selection were applied to all 153 VA medical centers (VAMC) or why substitutions in pilot locations were made. However, VA officials reported that several criteria, including dialysis patient prevalence and average treatment costs, were used to select the pilot locations in Durham and Fayetteville, North Carolina; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; and Cleveland, Ohio.
Produce consistent and comparable cost estimates for pilot locations. VA did not complete consistent and comparable cost estimates for the four pilot locations. Specifically, GAO found several cases where pilot locations did not complete reliable cost estimates because they made changes to formulas and assumptions of the Dialysis Pilot cost estimation model, which was developed by VA systems redesign engineers.
Provide clear and timely guidance on start-up fund repayment and cost savings calculations. VA did not provide Veterans Integrated Service Network and VAMC officials with clear and timely written guidance or instructions on how to pay back start-up funds, or how to calculate cost savings generated by the pilot locations.
VA Central Office has not yet determined how it will achieve its goals for the Dialysis Pilot or created clear performance measures for the pilot locations. Previously, GAO found that leading public sector organizations take three steps to improve their performance and help their organizations become more effective: (1) define a clear mission and goals, (2) measure performance to gauge progress toward achieving goals, and (3) use performance information as a basis for decision making. While VA has defined a clear mission and goals for the Dialysis Pilot, it has only made limited progress in the remaining two steps. In March 2012, VA reported that it was in the early stages of establishing an agreement with a leading university research center to conduct an evaluation of the Dialysis Pilot; however, no target dates were provided for when this evaluation would begin or what aspects of the Dialysis Pilot it would evaluate. Because VA has not yet developed an evaluation plan or defined performance measures for pilot locations, it is not collecting consistent and reliable information on the performance of the pilot locations and thus may not have this information available when it is time to either make midcourse corrections to the Dialysis Pilot or decide whether and how to open additional VA-operated outpatient dialysis clinics. VA officials also told GAO they have developed a limited plan for expanding the Dialysis Pilot despite not having access to performance information on the existing four pilot locations.
What GAO Recommends
Among other actions, GAO recommends that VA improve its Dialysis Pilot by providing guidance for start-up fund repayment, as well as developing an evaluation plan that includes performance measures for the pilot locations. VA concurred with GAOs recommendations and provided an action plan to address them. |
gao_GAO-14-103 | gao_GAO-14-103_0 | EPA Has Implemented All of GAO’s 2011 Recommendations to Improve the UCMR Program
In UCMR3, EPA implemented our recommendations to (1) monitor for 30 contaminants; (2) monitor for most or all contaminants using the program’s more robust monitoring approach; and (3) select minimum reporting levels (MRL) that are sufficiently sensitive to detect the presence of contaminants in public water systems at levels of public health concern as follows: Monitor for 30 contaminants. Use more robust monitoring approach. In particular, several experts we surveyed and studies on contaminant occurrence indicated that the UCMR3 standard monitoring frequency may result in inaccurate estimates of the occurrence of sporadically occurring microbes (e.g., viruses) and seasonally applied pesticides. Under UCMR3, EPA varies the monitoring frequency for systems based on a system’s size and water supply (e.g., surface water or groundwater), but it does not vary it based on the type of contaminant likely to be found. The selection process was also limited by a statutory cap of 30 contaminants, which restricted EPA’s ability to collect data on additional contaminants that could have been monitored for very little additional cost. 1). Officials told us that a contaminant does not have to meet all of the selection factors to be chosen; however, three are very important to consider as follows:
Analytical method availability. According to EPA documents and officials, EPA used a prioritization process to select potential UCMR3 contaminants. 2). 3). Many of the analytical methods that EPA is using for UCMR3 are able to test a single sample of drinking water for more than one contaminant at a time. However, because of the SDWA limit of 30 contaminants, EPA cannot always take advantage of this efficiency and is unable to gain economies of scale by monitoring for additional contaminants using monitoring that is already under way. Health effects information. UCMR Data Support Regulatory Determinations, but Time Lag Results in Delays and Reliance on Older Data
EPA uses the UCMR data to support regulatory determinations but faces a time lag when doing so. It is currently using UCMR1 and UCMR2 data to inform its regulatory determinations for the CCL3 contaminants, which EPA expects to issue in 2015. Time Lag Typically Delays Regulatory Determinations for Contaminants by a Full 5-Year Cycle
A time lag between the statutory deadline for regulatory determinations and the UCMR data’s availability typically delays regulatory determinations on given contaminants until the following cycle. However, in practice, the 2-year window SDWA set from the time EPA publishes the UCMR list to when it makes regulatory determinations has not provided enough time for the agency to monitor the contaminants and incorporate the UCMR data into the determinations. Consequently, UCMR data are not available for EPA to make regulatory determinations for contaminants during the cycle in which they are monitored; rather, UCMR data for contaminants in one cycle typically are not used until the next cycle or later (see fig. The UCMR3 monitoring, data collection, and analysis overlap with the time frame during which EPA will be making its regulatory determinations for contaminants on CCL3. EPA officials told us that most of the UCMR3 data will be used to support regulatory determinations for the CCL4 contaminants, which are expected to be issued in 2020. The larger sample size should allow EPA to make better estimates of exposure to drinking water contaminants. Matters for Congressional Consideration
To take advantage of opportunities to collect UCMR data on additional unregulated contaminants, Congress should consider amending SDWA to give EPA the flexibility to select more than 30 contaminants for monitoring under the UCMR program if high-priority contaminants, such as those on the CCL or contaminants of emerging concern, can be included at minimal cost, with minimal additional burden on public water systems, and while using analytical methods that EPA is already employing. To optimize the ability of the UCMR data to support regulatory determinations, Congress should consider adjusting the statutory time frames for the UCMR and regulatory determinations cycles so that EPA can use the UCMR data to support regulatory determinations in the same cycle. Agency Comments
We provided EPA with a draft of this report for its review and comment. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report addressed the following objectives (1) evaluate the extent to which the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) implemented the recommendations GAO made in 2011 to improve the Unregulated Contaminant Monitoring Rule (UCMR) program and any opportunities that may exist to strengthen it further; (2) identify the factors EPA considered when it selected the contaminants for monitoring under UCMR3 and the limitations, if any, that EPA faced in selecting the contaminants; and (3) examine the extent to which UCMR data support EPA’s regulatory determinations. EPA has implemented this provision as the Contaminant Candidate List. EPA is currently in its third round of the UCMR program (UCMR-3). 10. 12. 30. Safe Drinking Water Act: EPA Should Improve Implementation of Requirements on Whether to Regulate Additional Contaminants. | Why GAO Did This Study
EPA's UCMR program collects data on unregulated contaminants in the nation's drinking water. EPA uses these data and other information to make regulatory determinations-- decisions on whether to regulate additional drinking water contaminants. It is currently in its third data collection cycle, UCMR3.
GAO was asked to examine the UCMR program. This report examines: (1) the extent to which EPA implemented GAO's prior recommendations to improve the program and opportunities, if any, to strengthen it further; (2) the factors EPA considered when it selected the UCMR3 contaminants and the limitations, if any, it faced in selecting them; and (3) the extent to which UCMR data support regulatory determinations.
GAO reviewed EPA documents, surveyed 48 subject matter experts, assessed the UCMR program against statutory requirements and other standards, and interviewed EPA officials.
What GAO Found
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has implemented all of the recommendations GAO made in its May 2011 report to improve the Unregulated Contaminant Monitoring Rule (UCMR) program. In that report, GAO recommended that EPA (1) monitor for the full 30 contaminants allowed by statute, (2) monitor for most or all contaminants using a more robust monitoring approach, and (3) select sufficiently sensitive minimum reporting levels (MRL) for monitoring contaminants. EPA now requires public water systems to monitor for 30 contaminants in the UCMR3 program, using its most robust monitoring approach for a majority of these contaminants, and setting MRLs as low as can be reliably measured, according to EPA. The Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) requires EPA to vary the monitoring frequency based on the type of contaminant likely to be found, but EPA used a standard monitoring frequency for all contaminants. This may result in inaccurate estimates of the occurrence of sporadically occurring microbes (e.g., viruses) or pesticides, according to experts GAO surveyed and studies it reviewed. In such cases, the monitoring data may not provide reliable estimates of contaminant occurrence.
EPA used 10 factors to select the 30 contaminants for UCMR3, but its selection process faced some limitations. Officials told GAO that the contaminants did not have to meet all 10 of the selection factors to be chosen, but 3 were very important (1) the availability of an analytical method to detect contaminants, (2) the reliability of health effects information on the contaminants, and (3) the need for data to support regulatory determinations for priority contaminants. However, EPA is limited by a statutory cap of 30 contaminants every 5 years, which restricts its ability to collect data on additional contaminants that could have been monitored for little additional cost. SDWA's legislative history reflected concerns with the ability of public water systems to absorb such costs, but many of the analytical methods EPA is using for UCMR3 are able to test a single sample of drinking water for more than one contaminant at a time. However, because of the limit of 30, EPA cannot always take advantage of this efficiency and is unable to gain economies of scale using monitoring that is already under way.
EPA uses UCMR data to support regulatory determinations but faces a time lag when doing so. EPA has used UCMR data to support 10 out of 12 regulatory determinations it has made since 2008 and is currently using UCMR data to inform the determinations expected in 2015. However, a time lag between the statutory deadline for making regulatory determinations and when UCMR data are available delays determinations on given contaminants until the following cycle. The 2-year time frame SDWA originally established from the time EPA publishes the UCMR list to when it makes regulatory determinations has not provided enough time for the agency to incorporate the UCMR data into the determinations. The UCMR3 monitoring, data collection, and analysis overlap with the time when EPA will be making its regulatory determinations for contaminants from its most recent Contaminant Candidate List. Consequently, UCMR data are not available to support regulatory determinations for contaminants during the cycle in which they are monitored; rather, UCMR data typically are not used until the next cycle. EPA officials told GAO that most of the UCMR3 data, which are being collected from 2013 to 2015, will be used to support the regulatory determinations it expects to issue in 2020 instead of 2015.
What GAO Recommends
Congress should consider amending the Safe Drinking Water Act to allow EPA to monitor for more than 30 contaminants under certain circumstances, and to adjust statutory time frames so UCMR data can inform regulatory determinations in the same cycle. GAO, among other things, recommends that EPA vary the monitoring frequency based on contaminant type. In commenting on a draft of this report, EPA generally agreed with GAO’s findings, conclusions, and recommendations. |
gao_GAO-01-736T | gao_GAO-01-736T_0 | While the results achieved under these goals—increasing the number of insurance policies in force and reducing flood-related losses—provide valuable insights into how well the NFIP’s mission is being accomplished, they do not gauge participation in the program by the most vulnerable residents—those living in SFHAs. These goals include reducing flood losses, increasing the number of flood insurance policies sold, and improving the program’s financial status. This information would allow FEMA to assess whether the program is penetrating those areas most at risk of flooding, determine whether the financial risks to the government in these areas are increasing or decreasing, and better target marketing efforts to increase participation. This study was initiated to provide information about flood hazards, prevention, and mitigation. FIA officials agree that program participation rates are a useful measure that can provide insights for measuring the program’s success, including the effectiveness of marketing. While FIA maintains data on the number of flood insurance policies, the information it has on the total number of structures within SFHAs is poor, according to FIA’s Acting Administrator. Consequently, older data on the number of structures in these communities are used. Technologies Can Improve the Accuracy of Data Used to Determine Participation Rates
several current mapping technologies can be used to facilitate the collection of data on the number of structures in SFHAs. The Costs of Technology Are Not Fully Known, but Will Be Shared
The costs of using technology to accurately identify the number of structures in SFHAs are not fully known. The partnerships that FEMA has developed with state, local, and other federal agencies should reduce some of its costs to modernize its flood maps. Flood Insurance: Information on Financial Aspects of the National Flood Insurance Program (GAO/T-RCED-99-280, Aug. 25, 1999). | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses the preliminary results of GAO's ongoing review of the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), which is run by the Federal Emergency Management Administration's (FEMA) Federal Insurance Administration (FIA) and Mitigation Directorate, a major component of the federal government's efforts to provide flood assistance. This program creates standards to minimize flood losses.
What GAO Found
GAO found that FEMA has several performance goals to improve program results, including increasing the number of insurance policies in force. Although these goals provide valuable insight into the degree to which the program has reduced flood losses, they do not assess the degree to which the most vulnerable residents--those living in flood-prone areas--participate in the program. Capturing data on the number of uninsured and insured structures in flood-prone areas can provide FEMA with another indication of how well the program is penetrating those areas with the highest flood risks, whether the financial consequences of floods in these areas are increasing or decreasing, and where marketing efforts can better be targeted. However, before participation rates can be used to measure the program's success, better data are needed on the total number of structures in flood-prone areas. FIA tracks the number of insurance policies in these areas, but data on the overall number of structures are incomplete and inaccurate. Some communities are developing better data on the number of structures in flood-prone areas. FEMA is also trying to improve the quality of its data on the number of structures in flood-prone areas and is working to develop new mapping technologies that could facilitate the collection of such data. The cost of this new technology is not fully known, but the expense will be shared among federal, state, and local agencies. |
gao_GAO-17-316 | gao_GAO-17-316_0 | (See app. Evaluation questions are aligned with program goals. Thus, evaluations were designed to provide useful information about program results. Limitations we identified revealed that conducting evaluations overseas can pose challenges for evaluators. For example, travel to remote areas with safety and security concerns may limit an evaluator’s ability to conduct appropriate sampling and collect primary data for the study. About 40 percent of evaluations had limitations in, or provided insufficient information about, their sampling methodology. Evaluation Costs Ranged Widely and Varied by Type and Agency, but Most Cost Less Than $200,000
Costs for the majority of the foreign aid evaluations whose costs we reviewed were less than $200,000, but the costs ranged widely and varied by type of evaluation and agency. These costs greatly exceeded the median costs for all evaluations. High-Quality Evaluations Tend to Cost More, but Some Lower-Cost Evaluations also Met All Quality Criteria
Our analysis found that high-quality evaluations tend to be more expensive, but well-designed lower-cost evaluations also met the criteria we identified for a high-quality evaluation. Selected Agencies’ Evaluations Are Generally Available Online, but Some Agencies Can Improve Dissemination
We assessed DOD’s, HHS’s, MCC’s, State’s, USAID’s, and USDA’s use of six dissemination practices that federal, AEA, and other guidance indicate agencies should generally use to ensure effective dissemination of evaluations. In addition to publicly posting the report, all of the agencies used other means to actively disseminate evaluation findings. We examined the agencies’ dissemination of 193 evaluations. While USDA does not currently publicly post its evaluations, USDA reported that it makes these evaluations internally available through its grant management system. Conclusions
Foreign assistance evaluations can be challenging to implement, but they are an essential tool for guiding agency decision making and allocation of resources. Global AIDS Coordinator and Health Diplomacy) each develop a plan for improving the quality of evaluations for the programs included in our review, focusing on areas where our analysis has shown the largest areas for potential improvement. To better ensure that the evaluation findings reach their intended audiences and are available to facilitate incorporating lessons learned into future program design or budget decisions, we recommend that the Secretary of Health and Human Services direct the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to update its guidance and practices on the posting of evaluations to require PEPFAR evaluations to be posted within the timeframe required by PEPFAR guidance; the Chief Executive Officer of MCC adjust MCC evaluation practices to make evaluation reports available within the timeframe required by MCC guidance; the Secretary of State amend State’s evaluation policy to require the completion of dissemination plans for all agency evaluations; and the Secretary of Agriculture implement guidance and procedures for making FAS evaluations available online and searchable on a single website that can be accessed by the general public. HHS did not comment on our recommendation that it develop a plan for improving the quality of evaluations. The six agencies we identified are USAID, the Department of State (State), the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the Department of Defense (DOD). To assess the extent to which the results of foreign assistance program evaluations are supported by their evidence and whether they assess if programs have met their goals, we assessed the sample of agency fiscal year 2015 evaluation reports against quality criteria we identified. The evaluation quality criteria were judged on a four-part scale for most of the judgmental questions: generally addressed: the evaluation mostly addressed the key element(s) of the criterion but did not have to completely address all elements in the subquestions; partially addressed: the evaluation had one or more clear area(s) for improvement on the criterion; not at all addressed: the evaluation did not show that steps were taken to address the criterion; and insufficient information: reviewers could not make a determination due to a lack of information in the evaluation and any other associated materials. Tables 9 through 26 below provide further detail on the characteristics and quality of the design, implementation, and conclusions of fiscal year 2015 evaluations we reviewed summarized for all six agencies and then individually for (1) the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) programs implemented by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), (2) the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), (3) the Department of State (State), (4) the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) , and (5) the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) Foreign Agricultural Service’s food aid programs. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. government plans to spend approximately $35 billion on foreign assistance in 2017. Evaluation is an essential tool for U.S. agencies to assess and improve the results of their programs. Government-wide guidance emphasizes the importance of evaluation, and the Foreign Aid Transparency and Accountability Act of 2016 requires the President to establish guidelines for conducting evaluations. However, evaluations can be challenging to conduct. GAO has previously reported on challenges in the design, implementation, and dissemination of the evaluations of individual foreign assistance programs.
GAO was asked to review foreign aid evaluations across multiple agencies. This report examines the (1) quality, (2) cost, and (3) dissemination of foreign aid program evaluations. GAO assessed a representative sample of 173 fiscal year 2015 evaluations for programs at the six agencies providing the largest amounts of U.S. foreign aid —USAID, State, MCC, HHS's Centers for Disease Control and Prevention under the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, USDA's Foreign Agricultural Service, and DOD's Global Train and Equip program—against leading evaluation quality criteria; analyzed cost and contract documents; and reviewed agency websites and dissemination procedures.
What GAO Found
An estimated 73 percent of evaluations completed in fiscal year 2015 by the six U.S. agencies GAO reviewed generally or partially addressed all of the quality criteria GAO identified for evaluation design, implementation, and conclusions (see fig.). Agencies met some elements of the criteria more often than others. For example, approximately 90 percent of all evaluations addressed questions that are generally aligned with program goals and were thus able to provide useful information about program results. About 40 percent of evaluations did not use generally appropriate sampling, data collection, or analysis methods. Although implementing evaluations overseas poses significant methodological challenges, GAO identified opportunities for each agency to improve evaluation quality and thereby strengthen its ability to manage aid funds more effectively based on results.
Evaluation costs ranged widely and were sometimes difficult to determine, but the majority of evaluations GAO examined cost less than $200,000. Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) evaluations had a median cost of about $269,000, while median costs for the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), and the Department of State (State) ranged from about $88,000 to about $178,000. GAO was unable to identify the specific costs for the Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) evaluations. High-quality evaluations tend to be more costly, but some well-designed lower-cost evaluations also met all quality criteria. Other factors related to evaluation costs include the evaluation's choice of methodology, its duration, and its location.
Agencies generally posted and distributed evaluations for the use of internal and external stakeholders. However, shortfalls in some agency efforts may limit the evaluations' usefulness.
Public posting . USDA has not developed procedures for reviewing and preparing its evaluations for public posting, but the other agencies posted nonsensitive reports on a public website.
Timeliness . Some HHS reports and more than half of MCC reports were posted a year or more after completion.
Dissemination planning. State does not currently have a policy requiring a plan that identifies potential users and the means of dissemination.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that each of the six agencies develop a plan to improve the quality of its evaluations and that HHS, MCC, State, and USDA improve their procedures and planning for disseminating evaluation reports.
The agencies concurred with our recommendations. |
gao_NSIAD-97-50 | gao_NSIAD-97-50_0 | C-17 Primarily Performed an Intratheater Airlift Role During Deployment
Airlift aircraft, particularly the C-17, performed a major transportation support role during the Operation Joint Endeavor deployment, which occurred between the December 1995 and February 1996 time frame. 1.) There were few intertheater deployment requirements, which would have involved moving troops and equipment from the continental United States into the European theater. As this table shows, the C-17 flew about 26 percent of the total deployment airlift missions and carried about 44 percent of total cargo and 30 percent of total passengers. In addition, the contractor reported the C-17 achieved a mission capable rate of 86.2 percent versus a requirement of 81.2 percent during the same time period. The C-17 also performed well when moving outsize cargo, according to AMC representatives. Deployment Did Not Include the Opportunity for the C-17 to Perform the Full Range of Operational Capabilities
The Bosnia deployment airlift requirements did not include the need for any airlift aircraft to perform or demonstrate several of the airlift roles and missions which the Army considers important operational capabilities for the C-17 in providing support for certain Army missions. The C-17 had trouble performing, or did not perform, several of these tasks during operational testing and the RM&A evaluation. Scope and Methodology
To determine (1) how the C-17 was used during the deployment and (2) whether the deployment required airlift aircraft to perform any of the unique operational capabilities the C-17 is expected to perform, we interviewed officials and obtained, reviewed, and analyzed reports and electronic airlift transportation performance information. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed how the C-17 aircraft was used during the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) peacekeeping force deployment to Bosnia, focusing on: (1) how well it performed during the deployment; and (2) whether deployment transportation requirements included the need for airlift aircraft to perform any of the C-17's expected operational capabilities.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) during Operation Joint Endeavor, the C-17 accomplished the airlift tasks required of it, as did other airlifters such as the C-141, the C-5, and the C-130; (2) the C-17 was used to satisfy the Army's immediate need for a high-capacity, short distance air transport to move troops, equipment, and outsize cargo from central Europe into the Bosnia area of operations; (3) the C-17 performed about 26 percent of the deployment airlift missions and carried about 44 percent of the cargo moved during the deployment; (4) the C-17 also performed a limited number of strategic airlift missions in which it delivered cargo from the continental United States to final destinations in Germany, Hungary, and Bosnia; (5) according to contractor reports, the C-17 achieved a mission capable rate of 86.2 percent during the December 1995 through February 1996 time frame compared to a required rate of 81.2 percent; (6) transportation needs of the Bosnia deployment did not offer the opportunity for any airlift aircraft to perform or demonstrate several operational roles and missions; and (7) consequently, the C-17 was not required to perform many tasks which it had trouble doing, or did not do, during operational testing. |
gao_GAO-13-163T | gao_GAO-13-163T_0 | The California high-speed rail project is the largest recipient of HSIPR funds, with approximately $3.5 billion (about 35 percent of program funds obligated). Preliminary Assessment of California’s Cost Estimates
The Authority estimates that the high-speed rail project in California will cost $68.4 billion to construct and hundreds of millions of dollars to operate and maintain annually. Since the project is relying on significant investments of state and federal funds—and, ultimately private funds—it is vital that the Authority, FRA, and Congress be able to rely on these estimates for the project’s funding and oversight (see table 1 below for a summary of the sources of funding). GAO’s Cost Guide identifies best practices that help ensure that a cost estimate is comprehensive, accurate, well documented, and credible. These four characteristics help minimize the risk of cost overruns, missed deadlines, and unmet performance targets. Based on our ongoing review, we have found that the Authority’s cost estimates exhibit strengths and weaknesses. And based in part on evaluations from the Peer Review Group, the Authority is taking some steps to improve the cost estimates that will be provided in the 2014 business plan. The cost estimates include the major components of the project’s construction and operating costs. In addition, the Authority did not clearly describe certain assumptions underlying both cost estimates. The Authority followed some, but not all, best practices in the Cost Guide to ensure that the cost estimate is well documented. Additionally, in some cases where the methodologies were documented, we were unable to trace the estimates back to their source data and recreate the estimates using the stated methodology. For example, we were unable to identify how the operating costs from analogous high-speed rail projects were adjusted for the California project. In order to make cost estimates credible, GAO’s Cost Guide recommends: testing such estimates with sensitivity analysis (making changes in key cost inputs), a risk and uncertainty analysis (discussed above), and an independent cost estimate conducted by an unaffiliated party to see how outside estimates compare to the original estimates. While the Authority performed a sensitivity analysis for the first 30 miles of construction and an independent cost estimate for the first 185 miles of construction in the Central Valley, neither covered the entire Los Angeles to San Francisco project. The Authority also did not compare their operating-cost estimate to an independent cost estimate. The Authority is taking steps to improve its cost estimates. California High-Speed Rail Project Faces Financial and Other Challenges
In addition to challenges in developing reliable cost estimates, the California high-speed rail project also faces other challenges. These include obtaining project funding beyond the first construction segment, continuing to refine ridership and revenue estimates beyond the current forecasts, and addressing the potential increased risks to project schedules from legal challenges associated with environmental reviews and right-of-way acquisitions. While the Authority has secured $11.5 billion from federal and state sources for project construction, almost $57 billion in funding remains unsecured. However, given that the HSIPR grant program has not received funding for the last 2 fiscal years and that future funding proposals will likely be met with continued concern about federal spending, the largest block of expected funds is uncertain. Chief among these are (1) limited data and information, (2) risks of inaccurate assumptions, and (3) accepted forecast methods vary. The Authority’s forecasts included each of these key components in developing the ridership and revenue forecasts for the April 2012 revised business plan. In our ongoing review of the California high speed rail project, we are evaluating the extent to which the Authority’s ridership and revenue forecasts followed best practices when completing each of these tasks. | Why GAO Did This Study
The California high-speed rail project is the single largest recipient of federal funding from the Federal Railroad Administration's (FRA) High Speed Intercity Passenger Rail (HSIPR) grant program. The 520-mile project (see map) would link San Francisco to Los Angeles at an estimated cost of $68.4 billion. Thus far, FRA has awarded $3.5 billion to the California project. The Authority has to continue to rely on significant public-sector funding, in addition to private funding, through the project's anticipated completion date in 2028. This testimony is based primarily on GAO's ongoing review of the California high-speed rail project and discusses GAO's preliminary assessment of (1) the reliability of the project's cost estimates developed by the Authority and (2) key challenges facing the project.
As part of this review, we obtained documents from and conducted interviews with Authority officials, its contractors, and other state officials. GAO analyzed the extent to which project cost estimates adhered to best practices contained in GAO's Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide (Cost Guide), which identifies industry best practices to ensure cost estimates are comprehensive, accurate, well documented, and credible--the four principal characteristics of a reliable cost estimate. GAO also reviewed project finance plans as outlined in the Authority's April 2012 revised business plan. To identify key challenges, GAO reviewed pertinent legislation, federal guidelines and best practices related to ridership and revenue forecasting, and interviewed, among others, federal, state, and local officials associated with the project.
What GAO Found
Based on an initial evaluation of the California High Speed Rail Authority's (Authority) cost estimates, GAO found that they exhibit certain strengths and weaknesses when compared to best practices in GAO's Cost Guide. Adherence with the Cost Guide reduces the risk of cost overruns and missed deadlines. GAO's preliminary evaluation indicates that the cost estimates are comprehensive in that they include major components of construction and operating costs. However, they are not based on a complete set of assumptions, such as how the Authority expects to adapt existing high-speed rail technology to the project in California. The cost estimates are accurate in that they are based on the most recent project scope, include an inflation adjustment, and contain few mathematical errors. And while the cost estimates' methodologies are generally documented, in some cases GAO was unable to trace the final cost estimate back to its source documentation and could not verify how certain cost components, such as stations and trains, were calculated. Finally, the Authority evaluated the credibility of its estimates by performing both a sensitivity analysis (assessing changes in key cost inputs) and an independent cost estimate, but these tests did not encompass the entire cost estimate for the project. For example, the sensitivity analysis of the construction cost estimate was limited to 30 miles of the first construction segment. The Authority also did not conduct a risk and uncertainty analysis to determine the likelihood that the estimates would be met. The Authority is currently taking some steps to improve its cost estimates.
The California high-speed rail project faces many challenges. Chief among these is obtaining project funding beyond the first 130-mile construction segment. While the Authority has secured $11.5 billion from federal and state sources, it needs almost $57 billion more. Moreover, the HSIPR grant program has not received federal funding for the last 2 fiscal years, and future federal funding is uncertain. The Authority is also challenged to improve its ridership and revenue forecasts. Factors, such as limited data and information, make developing such forecasts difficult. Finally, the environmental review process and acquisition of necessary rights-of-way for construction could increase the risk of the project's falling behind schedule and increasing costs. |
gao_GAO-15-519 | gao_GAO-15-519_0 | Under INKSNA, the President cannot apply sanctions to reported persons if he or she finds that (1) the person did not “knowingly transfer to or acquire from Iran, North Korea, or Syria” reportable items; (2) the goods, services, or technology “did not materially contribute to the efforts of Iran, North Korea or Syria, as the case may be, to develop nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons, or ballistic or cruise missile systems, or weapons listed on the Wassenaar Arrangement Munitions List,” (3) the person is subject to the jurisdiction of a government that is an adherent to “one or more relevant nonproliferation regimes” and the transfer was consistent with such regime’s guidelines; or (4) the government of jurisdiction “has imposed meaningful penalties” on the identified person. The President has delegated INKSNA authorities to State. State Is Not Providing Reports to Congressional Committees Every 6 Months as Required by INKSNA
State is not providing reports to the two cognizant congressional committees in accordance with INKSNA’s 6-month reporting requirements. Since 2006, it has provided six reports covering a 6-year period (2006 through 2011), instead of 18 reports covering a 9-year period (2006 through 2014), as required by INKSNA. State provided these six reports at irregular intervals that have averaged 16 months, ranging between 7 and 22 months apart. It provided its most recent report in December 2014, 22 months after its previous report. State Has Not Established a Process That Allows It to Comply with INKSNA’s Required 6-Month Reporting Cycle
State has not established a process that would allow it to comply with the 6-month reporting cycle required by INKSNA. State uses a complex and lengthy process that involves multiple interagency and internal reviews to compile credible information about a group of reportable transfers that first came to its attention in a single calendar year, and to determine whether to impose sanctions on foreign persons associated with those transfers. Because its process focuses on a group of transfers that came to its attention in a single year, State delays providing a report to the committees until it has resolved concerns it may have regarding any of the transfers in the group covered in the report and determined whether to sanction persons associated with any of those transfers. State officials begin preparing a new report every December, regardless of whether they have completed and provided all previous reports. As a result, State required almost 3 years to prepare its December 2014 report, which addressed transfers that first came to its attention in 2011. State officials told us that a variety of political concerns, such as international negotiations and relations with countries involved in transfers, can delay State’s INKSNA process. State officials have told us that they sometimes must delay work on one report to work on another. State’s Process Limits Its Ability to Minimize the Time Required to Impose INKSNA Sanctions
By using a process that does not comply with INKSA’s 6-month reporting cycle, State has limited its ability to minimize delays affecting the potential imposition of INKSNA sanctions. State imposed sanctions on 23 foreign persons in December 2014, when it provided its report on transfers it first learned of in 2011. In addition, State officials told us that the threat of INKSNA sanctions can be an effective deterrent. Recommendation for Executive Action
The Secretary of State should reconsider State’s INKSNA process to ensure that it (1) complies with INKSNA’s 6-month reporting cycle, and (2) minimizes delays in its ability to opt to impose sanctions. Commerce, Defense, Energy, and Treasury declined to provide comments. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report (1) examines the Department of State’s (State) timeliness in providing Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA) reports; (2) reviews State’s reporting process; and (3) identifies the potential impact of State’s reporting timeliness on its imposition of sanctions. | Why GAO Did This Study
The United States uses sanctions to curb weapons of mass destruction proliferation. Under INKSNA, the President is required every 6 months to provide reports to two congressional committees that identify every foreign person for whom there is credible information that the person has transferred certain items to or from Iran, North Korea, or Syria. INKSNA authorizes the President to impose sanctions on the identified person and requires him to provide justification to the two committees if sanctions are not imposed. The President has delegated this authority to State. State's Deputy Secretary makes determinations about whether to impose sanctions.
GAO was asked to review State's INKSNA implementation. This report (1) examines State's timeliness in providing INKSNA reports, (2) reviews State's reporting process, and (3) identifies the potential impact of its reporting timeliness on the imposition of sanctions.
GAO analyzed data and met with officials from the Departments of State, Defense, and Energy, and met with officials from the Department of Commerce.
What GAO Found
The Department of State (State) is not providing reports to congressional committees in accordance with the 6-month reporting requirements of the 2006 Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA). Since 2006, it has provided six reports covering a 6-year period (2006 through 2011), instead of 18 reports covering a 9-year period (2006 through 2014), as required by INKSNA. State provided these six reports at irregular intervals averaging 16 months. It provided its most recent report in December 2014, 22 months after it had provided the prior report.
State has not established a process that would allow it to comply with the 6-month reporting cycle required by INKSNA. It uses a complex and lengthy process that involves multiple interagency and internal reviews. Because it processes cases in calendar-year groups, State delays providing a report to the committees until it has resolved all concerns and determined whether to impose sanctions for each transfer in the group. It begins preparing a new report every December, regardless of whether it has completed all previous reports, with the result that State officials sometimes work on several reports simultaneously and may delay work on one report to work on another. State required nearly 3 years to prepare its December 2014 report on transfers that first came to its attention in 2011. Officials told GAO that negotiations and relations with countries can delay the process and assessing transfers in annual groups reduces prospects for confusion among the parties involved in the process (see figure).
By not complying with INKSA's 6-month reporting cycle, State may have limited its ability to minimize delays in choosing to impose INKSNA sanctions. INKSNA requires State to identify foreign persons in a report before opting to impose sanctions on them. As a result, State did not impose INKSNA sanctions on 23 persons for 2011 transfers until December 2014, when it provided its report addressing 2011 transfers. While officials told GAO that threats of possible sanctions can deter questionable transfers, prolonged delays in eventually imposing potential INKSNA sanctions could erode the credibility of such threats and INKSNA's utility as a tool in helping to curb weapons of mass destruction proliferation associated with Iran, Syria, and North Korea.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Secretary of State reconsider State's INKSNA process to ensure that it (1) complies with INKSNA's 6-month reporting cycle, and (2) minimizes delays in its ability to opt to impose sanctions. State concurred with the recommendation but expressed concerns about the difficulty of conducting its process. The GAO report highlights some process efficiencies that State should consider. |
gao_GAO-10-500T | gao_GAO-10-500T_0 | Military Services and Defense Agencies Face Long-standing Challenges with Using ISR Data and Recognize the Need to Address These Challenges
The military services and defense agencies face three long-standing challenges with processing, exploiting, and disseminating ISR data. First, since 2002, DOD has rapidly increased its ability to collect ISR data in Iraq and Afghanistan; however, its capacity for processing, exploiting, and dissemination is limited and has not kept pace with the increase in collection platforms and combat air patrols. This increase in data collection will also increase the burden on the Air Force’s ground processing system, which processes, exploits, and disseminates the ISR information collected by these platforms. Second, transmitting data from ISR collection platforms to ground stations where analysts process, exploit, and then disseminate intelligence to users requires high-capacity communications bandwidth. However, bandwidth can be limited in a theater of operations by the satellite and ground-based communication capacity. An insufficient amount of bandwidth affects the ability to send, receive, and download intelligence products that contain large amounts of data. Third, the military services and defense agencies are challenged by shortages in the numbers of analytical staff available to exploit all of the electronic signals and geospatial ISR information being collected, raising the risk that important information may not be analyzed and made available to commanders in a timely manner. DOD has recognized the need to enhance its processing, exploitation, and dissemination capabilities and is developing and implementing initiatives to do so, but its initiatives are in the early stages of implementation and it is too soon to tell how effective they will be in addressing current challenges. DOD Is Taking Steps to Improve Intelligence Information Sharing, but Progress Is Uneven
Although DOD has recognized the need for maximizing the efficiency and effectiveness of the information it collects and has been taking steps to increase information sharing across the defense intelligence community, progress has been uneven among the military services. DOD began plans for its Distributed Common Ground/Surface System (DCGS), an interoperable family of systems that will enable users to access shared ISR information, in 1998. DOD subsequently directed the military services to transition their service-unique intelligence data processing systems into DCGS and each of the military services is at a different stage. As shown in table 1, the Air Force and the Navy each plan to have a fully functional version of DCGS by the end of fiscal years 2010 and 2013, respectively, and the Army does not expect to have a fully functional system until 2016. The Marine Corps has not yet established a completion date for the full operational capability of its DCGS. DOD has developed a system of standards and protocols, called the DCGS Integration Backbone (DIB), which serves as the foundation for interoperability between each of the four military services’ DCGS programs. Although the services are responsible for managing their DCGS programs and conforming to information-sharing standards, according to Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and military service officials, DOD has not developed overarching guidance, such as a concept of operations that provides needed direction and priorities for sharing intelligence information within the defense intelligence community. Without this overarching guidance, the services lack direction to set their own goals and objectives for prioritizing and sharing ISR information and therefore have not developed service-specific implementation plans that describe the prioritization and types of ISR data they intend to share with the defense intelligence community. In addition, the inability of users to fully access existing information in a timely manner is a contributing factor to the increasing demand for additional ISR collection assets. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) has numerous intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems--including manned and unmanned airborne, space-borne, maritime, and terrestrial systems--that play critical roles in support of current military operations. The demand for these capabilities has increased dramatically. Today's testimony addresses (1) the challenges the military services and defense agencies face processing, exploiting, and disseminating the information collected by ISR systems and (2) the extent to which the military services and defense agencies have developed the capabilities required to share ISR information. This testimony is based on GAO's January 2010 report on DOD's ISR data processing capabilities. GAO reviewed and analyzed documentation, guidance, and strategies of the military services and defense agencies in regard to processing, exploiting, and disseminating ISR data as well as information-sharing capabilities. GAO also visited numerous commands, military units, and locations in Iraq and the United States.
What GAO Found
The military services and defense agencies face long-standing challenges with processing, exploiting, and disseminating ISR data, and DOD has recently begun some initiatives to address these challenges. First, since 2002, DOD has rapidly increased its ability to collect ISR data in Iraq and Afghanistan, although its capacity for processing, exploiting, and dissemination is limited. Second, transmitting data from ISR collection platforms to ground stations where analysts process, exploit, and then disseminate intelligence to users requires high-capacity communications bandwidth. However, bandwidth can be limited in a theater of operations by the satellite and ground-based communication capacity, and this in turn affects the ability to send, receive, and download intelligence products that contain large amounts of data. Third, shortages of analytical staff with the required skill sets hamper the services' and defense agencies' abilities to exploit all ISR information being collected, thus raising the risk that important information may not be available to commanders in a timely manner. DOD is developing and implementing initiatives to enhance its processing, exploitation, and dissemination capabilities, such as increasing personnel, but its initiatives are in the early stages of implementation and it is too soon to tell how effective they will be in addressing current challenges. DOD is taking steps to improve the sharing of intelligence information across the department, but progress is uneven among the military services. DOD began plans for its Distributed Common Ground/Surface System (DCGS), an interoperable family of systems that will enable users to access shared ISR information in 1998. DOD subsequently directed the military services to transition their service-unique intelligence data processing systems into DCGS and each of the military services is at a different stage. While the Air Force and the Navy each plan to have a fully functional version of DCGS by the end of fiscal years 2010 and 2013, respectively, the Army does not expect to have a fully functional system until 2016. The Marine Corps has not yet established a completion date for the full operational capability of its DCGS. To facilitate the sharing of ISR data on this system, DOD developed the DCGS Integration Backbone, which provides common information standards and protocols. Although the services are responsible for managing their DCGS programs and conforming to information-sharing standards, according to the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and military service officials, DOD has not developed overarching guidance, such as a concept of operations that provides direction and priorities for sharing intelligence information within the defense intelligence community. Without this overarching guidance, the services lack direction to set their own goals and objectives for prioritizing and sharing ISR information and therefore have not developed service-specific implementation plans that describe the prioritization and types of ISR data they intend to share. Moreover, the inability of users to fully access existing information contributes to the increasing demand for additional ISR collection assets. |
gao_GAO-03-321 | gao_GAO-03-321_0 | Background
Our work has repeatedly shown that mission fragmentation and program overlap are widespread in the federal government. In either situation, implementation of federal crosscutting programs is often characterized by numerous individual agency efforts that are implemented with little apparent regard for the presence of efforts of related activities. To identify the agencies involved in each area we relied on previous GAO work and confirmed the agencies involved by reviewing the fiscal year 2001 Results Act performance report and fiscal year 2003 Results Act performance plans for each agency identified as contributing to the crosscutting program area. We did not independently verify or assess the information we obtained from agency performance reports and plans. Each of the five agencies we reviewed in the area of border control— Agriculture, Justice, State, Transportation, and Treasury—discussed in their performance reports and/or plans the agencies they coordinated with on border control issues, although the specific areas of coordination and level of detail provided varied. Transportation reported not meeting either of its two goals related to border control, but provided explanations and strategies for meeting the goals in the future that appeared reasonable. Three of the five agencies—Agriculture, Justice, and Transportation— discussed strategies that appeared to be reasonably linked to achieving their fiscal year 2003 goals. FEMA reported meeting all but one of its fiscal year 2001 goals and indicators related to flood mitigation and insurance. Nevertheless, FEMA’s fiscal year 2003 performance goals and measures are similar to those that appear in its fiscal year 2001 performance plan. Each of the agencies we reviewed had goals related to wetlands that it reported having met or exceeded in fiscal year 2001. Concluding Observations
We have previously stated that the Results Act could provide OMB, agencies, and Congress with a structured framework for addressing crosscutting program efforts. The agencies generally agreed with the accuracy of the information in the report. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO's work has repeatedly shown that mission fragmentation and program overlap are widespread in the federal government. Implementation of federal crosscutting programs is often characterized by numerous individual agency efforts that are implemented with little apparent regard for the presence and efforts of related activities. GAO has in the past offered possible approaches for managing crosscutting programs, and has stated that the Government Performance and Results Act could provide a framework for addressing crosscutting efforts. GAO was asked to examine the actions and plans agencies reported in addressing the crosscutting issues of border control, flood mitigation and insurance, wetlands, and wildland fire management. GAO reviewed the fiscal year 2001 performance reports and fiscal year 2003 performance plans for the major agencies involved in these issues.
What GAO Found
GAO did not independently verify or assess the information it obtained from agency performance reports and plans. On the basis of the reports and plans, GAO found that most agencies involved in the crosscutting issues discussed coordination with other agencies in their performance reports and plans, although the extent of coordination and level of detail provided varied considerably. The progress agencies reported in meeting their fiscal year 2001 performance goals also varied considerably. For example, wetlands was the only area in which all of the agencies GAO reviewed met or exceeded fiscal year 2001 goals. Some of the agencies that did not meet their goals provided reasonable explanations and/or strategies that appeared reasonably linked to meeting the goals in the future. The agencies GAO reviewed generally planned to pursue goals in fiscal year 2003 similar to those in 2001, although some agencies added new goals, dropped existing goals, or dropped goals altogether. Many agencies discussed strategies that appeared to be reasonably linked to achieving their fiscal year 2003 goals. |
gao_GAO-04-43 | gao_GAO-04-43_0 | Improving contract management. An Enterprise Architecture Is Critical to an Organization’s Ability to Effectively Modernize Its Business Operations and Systems
Effective use of enterprise architectures, or modernization blueprints, is a trademark of successful public and private organizations. During the course of our review of IFMP, NASA took steps to correct this situation by establishing key architecture management capabilities and undertaking the development of an initial version of an enterprise architecture that, according to the chief technology officer, will provide some missing contextual information (operational and technical). However, NASA has not established other key architecture management capabilities, such as designating an accountable corporate entity to lead the architecture effort, having an approved policy for developing and maintaining the architecture, and implementing an independent verification and validation function to provide needed assurance that architecture products and architecture management processes are effective. The chief technology officer agreed that NASA needs an effective enterprise architecture program and stated that efforts are under way to establish one. Based on our experience in reviewing other agencies, not having an effective enterprise architecture program is attributable to, among other things, limited senior management understanding and commitment and cultural resistance to having and using an architecture. The architecture artifacts that NASA’s chief technology officer provided to us and represented as those used to date in acquiring and implementing IFMP do not contain sufficient context (depth and scope of agencywide operational and technical requirements) to effectively guide and constrain agencywide business transformation and systems modernization efforts. Our experience with federal agencies has shown that attempting to define and build major IT systems without first completing an enterprise architecture often results in IT systems that are duplicative, are not well integrated, are unnecessarily costly to maintain and interface, and do not effectively optimize mission performance. Appoint a chief architect. Develop an architecture program management plan. Conclusions
NASA’s acquisition and implementation of six major IFMP system components outside the context of an enterprise architecture was not a prudent decision. Such a systems modernization approach unnecessarily increases the risk that system components will not effectively and efficiently support agencywide operations, which in turn leads to costly system rework. It is critical for NASA to discontinue this approach and adopt the best practice of managing its IFMP system investments within the context of a well-defined enterprise architecture. For example, the agency stated that it has developed a 3-year plan for refining the latest version of its architecture, as well as a plan to guide the agency in using the architecture to achieve NASA’s strategic goals. Key contributors to this report are acknowledged in appendix V.
Objective, Scope and Methodology
To determine whether the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) had and was using an enterprise architecture to guide and constrain its investment in its Integrated Financial Management Program (IFMP), we requested all NASA enterprise architecture artifacts and related documentation that had been used to date to guide and constrain IFMP and, based on what we were provided by NASA’s chief technology officer, compared them to relevant guidance. The available architecture products recognize the need for an implementing strategy to streamline financial operations and identify IFMP as that strategy. As written, the policy requires the CIO to develop an information technology (IT) architecture, which is one aspect of an EA. | Why GAO Did This Study
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is in the process of modernizing its financial management operations and supporting information technology systems. This modernization, known as the Integrated Financial Management Program (IFMP), is intended to provide NASA with an agencywide, integrated approach to performing critical business functions, such as contract management--an area that GAO first designated as high risk in 1990 and continues to do so today. GAO was requested to review various aspects of IFMP, and this report is one in a series on the program. The objective of this review was to determine whether NASA has been acquiring and implementing IFMP in the context of an enterprise architecture.
What GAO Found
To date, NASA has acquired and implemented significant components of IFMP without an enterprise architecture to guide and constrain the program. An enterprise architecture is an organizational blueprint that defines--in both business and technology terms--how an organization operates today and how it intends to operate in the future; it also provides a plan for transitioning to this future state. Using an enterprise architecture to guide and constrain systems modernization programs is a federal requirement and a recognized best practice of successful public and private organizations. In addition, GAO's research has shown that attempting major modernization programs such as IFMP without a well-defined enterprise architecture risks, among other things, building systems that are duplicative, are not interoperable, and do not effectively and efficiently support mission operations and performance. During the course of GAO's work, NASA recognized the need for an enterprise architecture and has taken steps to develop one. For example, it has established an architecture program office, designated a chief architect, and selected an architecture framework to use. In addition, after GAO completed its audit work, NASA released an initial version of an enterprise architecture, which the chief technology officer stated was not yet complete and would be improved upon in future versions. However, the agency has yet to establish other key architecture management capabilities, such as designating an accountable corporate entity to lead the architecture effort, having an approved policy for developing and maintaining the architecture, and implementing an independent verification and validation function to provide needed assurance that architecture products and architecture management processes are effective. Moreover, the architecture products used to date to manage NASA's investment in IFMP did not provide sufficient context (depth and scope of agencywide operational and technical requirements) to effectively guide and constrain the program. The chief technology officer agreed that NASA needs an effective enterprise architecture program and stated that efforts are under way to establish one. GAO's experience in reviewing other agencies has shown that not having an effective enterprise architecture program can be attributed to, among other things, an absence of senior management understanding and support, as well as cultural resistance. NASA's current approach to acquiring and implementing IFMP outside the context of an architecture unnecessarily increases the risk that the program's system components will not effectively and efficiently support agencywide operations. The result will be costly system rework. It is critical for NASA to discontinue this approach and adopt the best practice of managing its IFMP system investments within the context of a well-defined enterprise architecture. |
gao_GAO-12-187T | gao_GAO-12-187T_0 | NextGen Test Facilities Share a Purpose but Have Different Capabilities and Participants
The purpose of the NextGen Test Bed is to provide an environment in which laboratory testing and real-world demonstrations help to show the benefits of NextGen technologies. Furthermore, the Test Bed provides access to the systems currently used in the NAS, which allows for testing and evaluating the integration and interoperability of new technologies. The Test Bed is also meant to bring together stakeholders early in the technology development process so participants can understand the benefits of operational improvements, identify potential risks and integration and interoperability issues, and foster partnerships between government and industry. Each of the NextGen test facilities that compose the NextGen Test Bed offers different testing capabilities and brings together different participants. While sharing a common purpose, each facility offers different testing capabilities and brings together different participants from different communities, as follows: The Florida Test Bed is located in a private facility at which companies, including Lockheed Martin and Boeing, come together with academia and FAA to test technologies that fit into the NextGen vision. Private participants contribute financially to research and demonstration projects and collaborate to test concepts and technologies. The facility—which has just undergone an expansion—provides access to the systems currently used in the NAS and to some of the major navigation, surveillance, communications, and weather information programs that are under development. The Park’s establishment is meant to encourage the transfer of scientific and technical information, data, and know-how to and from the private sector and is consistent with FAA’s technology transfer goals. (See table 1 for examples of past and planned activities at NextGen test facilities.) According to officials from the test facilities, they have made some progress in their plans to link the NextGen test facilities to integrate capabilities and share information. Linking the test facilities to leverage the benefits of each is part of the NextGen Test Bed concept. Stakeholders Must See Tangible Results to Participate in NextGen Technology Development, and FAA Has Taken Steps to Improve Technology Transfer and Implementation
In prior work on technology transfer activities, we found that the success of test facilities as a means to leverage private sector resources depends in large part on the extent to which the private sector perceives benefits to its participation. Representatives of firms participating in test facility activities told us that tangible results—that is, the implementation of technologies they helped to develop—were important to maintain the private sector’s interest. FAA’s expansion of the Test Bed concept—linking together its testing facilities, expanding the Florida Test Bed, and building a Research and Technology Park adjacent to the New Jersey Test Bed to complement the capabilities at Embry-Riddle—is a positive step that should help to address some of these issues, allowing private sector participants to remain more involved throughout the process, with a vested interest in seeing the development of selected technologies through to successful implementation. In addition, to improve its ability to implement new technologies, FAA has begun to restructure its Air Traffic Organization (ATO), which is responsible for moving air traffic safely and efficiently, as well as for implementing NextGen. Collaboration among the NextGen partner agencies also depends, in part, on their perceiving positive outcomes. Lack of coordination between FAA and DOD and FAA and DHS could result in duplicative research and inefficient use of resources at both agencies. In addition, contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses the use of test facilities as a means of leveraging public, private, and academic resources to deliver technologies for the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen). NextGen will affect nearly every aspect of air transportation and will transform the way in which the air transportation system operates today. It is a complex undertaking that requires new technologies--including new integrated ground and aircraft systems--as well as new procedures, processes, and supporting infrastructure. The result will be an air transportation system that relies on satellite-based surveillance and navigation, data communications, and improved collaborative decision making. Transforming the nation's air transportation system affects and involves the activities and missions of several federal agencies, though the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is the lead implementer. In addition, NextGen was designed and planned to be developed in collaboration with aviation stakeholders--airlines and other airspace users, air traffic controllers, and avionics, aircraft, and automation systems manufacturers--in order to facilitate coordinated research activities, transfer technologies from FAA and partner agencies to the private sector, and take advantage of research and technology developed by the private sector that could meet NextGen needs, as appropriate. Three NextGen test facilities, collectively referred to as the NextGen Test Bed, are designed to foster the research and development of NextGen-related technologies and to evaluate integrated technologies and procedures for nationwide NextGen deployment. These test facilities provide access to the systems currently used in the national air space (NAS) and house various types of hardware, simulators, and other equipment to allow for demonstrations of new technologies. They also provide opportunities for stakeholders--public and private--to collaborate with FAA, academia, and each other. This statement today discusses (1) the role of the NextGen test facilities in the development of NextGen technologies and how private industry and partner agencies participate in projects at the NextGen test facilities, and (2) our previous findings on NextGen technology transfer and FAA's efforts to improve the transfer and implementation of NextGen-related technologies. This statement is based on our prior NextGen-related reports and testimonies, updated with information we gathered from FAA and test facility officials in October 2011. The GAO reports cited in this statement contain more detailed explanations of the methods used to conduct our work, which we performed in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
What GAO Found
The role of the NextGen Test Bed is to demonstrate the benefits of NextGen initiatives and to do so early in the technology development process. While sharing a common purpose, each of the three facilities that collectively make up the NextGen Test Bed offers different testing capabilities and brings together different participants from different communities. Across the test facilities private and public sector stakeholders contribute personnel, equipment, and funding to develop and integrate technologies. Linking the test facilities to leverage the benefits of each is part of the NextGen Test Bed concept and officials from the test facilities indicated they have made some progress in doing so. In prior work on technology transfer activities, we found that the success of test facilities as a means to leverage private sector resources depends in large part on the extent to which the private sector perceives benefits to its participation. Similarly, collaboration among the NextGen partner agencies depends in part on their seeing outcomes that further their mission and on identifying a common purpose. FAA has taken a number of actions to improve its ability to implement new technologies and increase partner agencies' and private sector participants' involvement in seeing the development of selected technologies through to successful implementation--including restructuring the organization responsible for implementing NextGen and linking the test facilities and improving their capabilities. |
gao_GAO-10-420 | gao_GAO-10-420_0 | In 1992, the year Congress authorized the deepening project, the Corps completed a Final Interim Feasibility Study and Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for the project. The Corps’ Reanalysis Addressed Many of the Economic Analysis Limitations GAO Had Identified in 2002
The Corps’ reanalysis addressed many of the limitations that we had identified in 2002 in the project’s original economic analysis by using more recent information to correct invalid assumptions and outdated data, recalculating benefits and costs to correct miscalculations, and accounting for some of the economic uncertainty associated with the project. In addition, as we recommended, the Corps had independent experts review the reanalysis before submitting it to Congress. Although the Corps’ efforts were responsive overall to the recommendations we made in 2002, we found several additional limitations in the reanalysis. For example, in its analysis of the economic uncertainty associated with the project, the Corps considered the effects of negative-growth scenarios only for crude oil and refined petroleum but not for the remaining benefit categories. The 2004 Supplement to Comprehensive Economic Reanalysis Report also contained sensitivity analyses—four related to crude oil benefits and three related to containerized cargo benefits. The Benefit Assumptions in the Corps’ Reanalysis and Economic Updates Do Not Fully Reflect Current and Anticipated Future Market and Industry Conditions
In the 6 years that have elapsed since the Corps completed its reanalysis, current and anticipated future market and industry conditions have changed significantly. Several of the assumptions that underlie the Corps’ estimates of the project’s benefits are inconsistent with these changes. For example, the Department of Energy has lowered its long-term forecasts for growth in East Coast refinery capacity and U.S. imports of crude oil. The Corps’ 2008 and 2009 economic updates did not analyze the potential effect of these changes on the project’s benefit estimates. Like the 2008 update, the 2009 update provided no updated information about the current status of the weekly shipping services on the two trade routes that account for all containerized cargo benefits. Several Key Issues That Could Affect the Project Remain Outstanding
We identified three key outstanding policy issues that could impact the construction of the Delaware River deepening project as it moves forward. Specifically, the Corps (1) lowered its estimate of the volume of dredged material, which eliminated the need for new disposal sites, but it continues to face resistance to its disposal plan; (2) was sued by Delaware and New Jersey in October and November 2009, respectively, which charged that the Corps lacks the environmental approvals needed to proceed with the project; and (3) has an ongoing dispute with New Jersey and several environmental groups over the project’s National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) process. In response to the Corps’ statements and actions, in fall 2009, Delaware, New Jersey, and several environmental groups filed separate lawsuits against the Corps in U.S. district courts in Delaware and New Jersey. Among other things, environmental groups criticized the Corps for not giving stakeholders sufficient time for commenting on these changes and for scheduling the comment period over a major holiday period. Recommendations for Executive Action
To better ensure that decision makers have the most current information about changes that could affect the benefits of the Delaware River deepening project, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Chief of Engineers and Commanding General of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to provide an updated assessment to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works, and to Congress, of relevant market and industry trends and outlook that specifies the extent to which the data and assumptions underlying each benefit category have changed, and the effect of any changes on each benefit estimate and the project’s net benefit estimate. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine (1) the extent to which the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ (Corps) reanalysis addressed the economic analysis limitations we identified in 2002; (2) the extent to which the benefit projections the Corps included in its reanalysis of the project, as updated, are consistent with current and anticipated future market and industry conditions; and (3) what other key issues, if any, could affect the project, and the extent to which the Corps has accounted for these issues and their potential impacts. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 1992 Congress authorized the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) to implement the Delaware River deepening project, which would deepen the river's shipping channel from 40 to 45 feet. In 2002 GAO reviewed the Corps' economic analysis of the project, concluding that it contained significant limitations. GAO recommended that the Corps prepare a comprehensive economic reanalysis, which the Corps completed in 2004. GAO was asked to determine the extent to which (1) the reanalysis addressed the limitations GAO identified; (2) the reanalysis's benefit projections, as updated, reflect current and anticipated market and industry conditions; and (3) the Corps has accounted for other key issues that could affect the project. GAO reviewed Corps project documentation and interviewed federal officials along with representatives of affected states, firms, and environmental groups.
What GAO Found
The Corps' reanalysis addressed many of the limitations GAO had identified in 2002 in the Delaware River deepening project's original economic analysis by using updated information to correct invalid assumptions and outdated data, recalculating benefits and costs to correct miscalculations, and accounting for some of the economic uncertainty associated with the project. For example, the Corps revised its benefit estimates for transportation cost savings related to such commodities as crude oil, containerized cargo, and steel slabs. In addition, as GAO recommended, the Corps had independent experts review the reanalysis. Although the Corps' efforts were responsive overall to GAO's 2002 recommendations, GAO identified several additional limitations in the reanalysis. For example, in its analysis of economic uncertainty, the Corps considered the effects of negative-growth scenarios only for crude oil and refined petroleum, but not for the remaining commodities. In the 6 years that have elapsed since the Corps completed its reanalysis, current and anticipated future market and industry conditions have changed significantly. Several of the assumptions that underlie the Corps' estimates of the project's benefits are inconsistent with these changes. For example, the Department of Energy has lowered its long-term forecasts for growth in East Coast refinery capacity and U.S. imports of crude oil. Also, in the fall of 2009, Delaware River refinery firms closed two major facilities. Further, steel imports have declined since 2006 according to the benefiting facility identified in the reanalysis, and were well below the reanalysis's growth projection for 2009. However, the Corps' 2008 and 2009 economic updates for the project did not analyze the potential effect of these changes on the project's benefit estimates. The updates also did not determine the current status of shipping services on two trade routes that provide all of the benefits related to containerized cargo. Because of these and other omissions, decision makers do not have sufficient updated information to judge the extent to which market and industry changes would affect the project's net benefits. GAO identified three key outstanding issues that could affect the Delaware River deepening project. First, the Corps lowered its estimate of the volume of dredged material, which eliminated the need for new disposal sites in New Jersey, but its disposal plan continues to face resistance from that state. Second, Delaware, New Jersey, and several environmental groups filed separate lawsuits against the Corps in the fall of 2009, charging that the Corps lacks the environmental approvals needed to proceed with the project, among other concerns. Finally, New Jersey and several environmental groups have challenged in court the Corps' National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) process for the project. Although the Corps completed an environmental assessment (EA) in April 2009, stakeholders believe that the process for soliciting public comment on its scope was unclear, did not allow enough time for comment, and that a new supplemental environmental impact statement is needed. Also, at the Army's direction, the Corps did not provide a public comment period for the draft EA as it had proposed to do. |
gao_GAO-07-742T | gao_GAO-07-742T_0 | Federal Contractors Owe Billions of Dollars in Unpaid Federal Taxes
In each of our audits and related investigations, we found thousands of federal contractors that owed billions of dollars of federal taxes. About 42 percent of this $3 billion represented unpaid payroll taxes. In June 2005, we testified that about 33,000 civilian agency federal contractors owed over $3.3 billion in federal taxes. Over a third of the $3.3 billion represented unpaid payroll taxes. Because federal contractors may do business with more than one federal agency, some federal contractors that owe tax debts may be included in more than one analysis concerning DOD, GSA, and civilian federal contractors that abuse the federal tax system. Employers are subject to civil and criminal penalties if they do not remit payroll taxes to the federal government. The IRS database did not reflect amounts owed by businesses and individuals that have not filed tax returns and for which IRS has not assessed tax amounts due. As result of the work we performed for the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs we made numerous recommendations to DOD and civilian agencies to improve their controls over levying payments to contractors with tax debt. We also referred 122 contractors to IRS for further investigation and prosecution. Examples of Federal Contractors Involved in Abusive and Potentially Criminal Activity Related to the Federal Tax System
In our previous testimonies, we discussed the results of our in-depth audits and related investigations of 122 federal contractors with outstanding tax debt. Many of our case study contractors were small, closely held companies that operated in wage-based industries, such as security, weapon components, space and aircraft parts, building maintenance, computer services, and personnel services. These 122 federal contractors provided goods and services to a number of federal agencies including DOD, GSA, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and the Departments of Homeland Security, Justice, and Veterans Affairs. However, rather than fulfilling their role as “trustees” and forwarding these funds to IRS, many of these federal contractors used the funds for personal gain or to fund their contractor operations. We also found that a number of owners or officers of our case study contractors had significant personal assets, including a sports team, commercial properties, multimillion dollar houses, and luxury vehicles. Several owners also gambled hundreds of thousands of dollars at the same time they were not paying the taxes that their businesses owed. The company’s owner has been investigated for embezzlement and fraud. Contractors with Unpaid Taxes Are Not Prohibited from Receiving Contracts from the Federal Government
Federal law and regulations, as reflected in the FAR, do not prohibit contractors with unpaid federal taxes from receiving contracts from the federal government. At the time of our review, none of the 122 federal contractors described in our previous case study work were debarred from government contracts, despite conducting abusive and potentially criminal activities related to the tax system. Restrictions on IRS Tax Disclosure and Failure to Use Available Tools Hamper Consideration of Tax Debts in Contractor Qualification Determinations
Because of statutory restrictions on the disclosure of taxpayer information, even if contracting officers were required to consider tax debts in contractor qualification determinations, contracting officers do not currently have access to tax debt information unless reported by prospective contractors themselves or disclosed in public records. Contractors with Tax Debts Have Unfair Advantage in Contract Competition
Federal contractors who owe tax debts have an unfair competitive advantage over contractors who pay their fair share. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 1990, GAO has periodically reported on high-risk federal programs that are vulnerable to fraud, waste, and abuse. Two such high-risk areas are managing federal contracts more effectively and assessing the efficiency and effectiveness of federal tax administration. Weaknesses in the tax area continue to expose the federal government to significant losses of tax revenue and increase the burden on compliant taxpayers to fund government activities. Over the last several years, the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations requested GAO to investigate Department of Defense (DOD), civilian agency, and General Services Administration (GSA) contractors that abused the federal tax system. Based on that work GAO made recommendations to executive agencies including to improve the controls over levying payments to contractors with tax debt--many of which have been implemented--and referred 122 contractors to IRS for further investigation and prosecution. As requested, this testimony will highlight the key findings from prior testimonies and related reports. This testimony will (1) describe the magnitude of tax debt owed by federal contractors, (2) provide examples of federal contractors involved in abusive and potentially criminal activity related to the federal tax system, and (3) describe current law and proposed federal regulations for screening contractors with tax debts prior to the award of a contract.
What GAO Found
In our previous audits and related investigations, we reported that thousands of federal contractors had substantial amounts of unpaid federal taxes. Specifically, about 27,000 DOD contractors, 33,000 civilian agency contractors, and 3,800 GSA contractors owed about $3 billion, $3.3 billion, and $1.3 billion in unpaid taxes, respectively. These estimates were understated because they excluded federal contractors that understated their income or did not file their tax returns; however, some contractors may be counted in more than one of these groups. As part of this work, we conducted more in-depth investigations of 122 federal contractors and in all cases found abusive and potentially criminal activity related to the federal tax system. Many of these 122 contractors were small, closely held companies that provided a variety of goods and services, including landscaping, consulting, catering, and parts or support for weapons and other sensitive programs for many federal agencies including the departments of Defense, Justice, and Homeland Security. These contractors had not forwarded payroll taxes withheld from their employees and other taxes to IRS. Willful failure to remit payroll taxes is a felony under U.S. law. Furthermore, some company owners diverted payroll taxes for personal gain or to fund their businesses. A number of owners or officers of the 122 federal contractors owned significant personal assets, including a sports team, multimillion dollar houses, a high-performance airplane, and luxury vehicles. Several owners gambled hundreds of thousands of dollars at the same time they were not paying the taxes that their businesses owed. Federal law, as implemented by the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), does not now require contractors to disclose tax debts or contracting officers consider tax debts in making contracting decisions. Federal contractors that do not pay tax debts could have an unfair competitive advantage in costs because they have lower costs than tax compliant contractors on government contracts. GAO's investigation identified instances in which contractors with tax debts won awards based on price differential over tax compliant contractors. |
gao_GAO-13-136 | gao_GAO-13-136_0 | Multiple Federal Agencies Promoted Wind Energy in Fiscal Year 2011 through Numerous Initiatives Mainly Supporting Deployment
We identified 82 federal wind-related initiatives, with a variety of key characteristics, implemented by nine agencies in fiscal year 2011. In fiscal year 2011, wind-related initiatives incurred about $2.9 billion in obligations for activities specifically related to wind. In addition to initiatives that obligated funds, Treasury’s wind-related tax expenditure initiatives provided estimated tax subsidies of at least $1.1 billion for activities specifically related to wind, although complete data on wind-related tax subsidies were not available. In particular, a tax expenditure and a grant initiative, both at Treasury, accounted for nearly all federal financial support related to wind. Five Agencies Implemented Nearly All Initiatives and Were Responsible for Several Billion Dollars in Federal Support Related to Wind
Of the nine agencies that implemented the 82 federal wind-related initiatives we identified in fiscal year 2011, five lead agencies—DOE, Interior, USDA, Commerce, and Treasury—were collectively responsible for 73 (89 percent) of the initiatives. Initiatives Were Fragmented and Had Overlapping Characteristics with Half Reporting Coordination, but Several Provided Some Duplicative Financial Support for Deployment
The 82 wind-related initiatives we identified were fragmented across agencies, most had overlapping characteristics and, though half reported formally coordinating, several financing deployment of wind facilities have provided some duplicative financial support. Such coordination can, in principle, reduce the risk of unnecessary duplication and improve the effectiveness of federal efforts. However, we identified seven initiatives that have provided duplicative support— financial support from multiple initiatives to the same recipient for deployment of a single project. Specifically, wind project developers have, in many cases, combined the support of more than one Treasury initiative and, in some cases, have received additional support from smaller grant or loan guarantee programs at DOE or USDA. We also identified three other initiatives that did not fund any wind projects in fiscal year 2011 but that could, on the basis of the initiatives’ eligibility criteria, be combined with one or more initiatives to provide duplicative support. Of the 10 initiatives, those at Treasury accounted for over 95 percent of the federal financial support for wind in fiscal year 2011. Agencies Support Projects on the Basis of Initiatives’ Goals or Eligibility Criteria, but the Extent to Which Agencies Assess Applicant Need Is Unclear
Agencies implementing the 10 initiatives that have provided or could provide duplicative support allocate support to projects on the basis of the initiatives’ goals or eligibility criteria, but the extent to which agencies assess applicant need for the support is unclear because we found they do not document assessments. DOE and USDA—which have discretion, to the extent allowed by their statutory authority, over the projects they support through 6 of the 10 initiatives—allocate support to projects based on the projects’ ability to meet initiative goals such as reducing emissions or benefitting rural communities, as well as other criteria such as financial and technological feasibility. DOE and USDA consider applicant need for the financial support of some initiatives, according to officials. However, we found that neither agency documents assessments of applicant need for any of their initiatives; therefore, the extent to which they use such assessments to determine how much support to provide is unclear. While the support of these initiatives may be necessary, in many cases, for wind projects to be built, because the agencies do not document assessments of need, it is unclear, in some cases, whether the entire amount of federal support provided was necessary to build wind projects. In the event that some wind projects receive more federal funding than is required to induce them to be built, this additional funding could potentially be used to induce additional projects to be built or simply withheld, thereby reducing federal expenditures. Unlike DOE and USDA, Treasury generally does not have any discretion regarding which projects receive the support of its initiatives. Recommendation for Executive Action
To support federal agencies’ efforts to effectively allocate resources among wind projects, we recommend that the Secretaries of Energy and Agriculture, to the extent possible within their statutory authority, formally assess and document whether the incremental financial support of their initiatives is needed in order for applicants’ projects to be built and take this information into account in determining whether, or how much, support to provide. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) identify wind-related initiatives implemented by federal agencies in fiscal year 2011 and their key characteristics; (2) assess the extent of fragmentation, overlap, and duplication, if any, among these initiatives, and the extent to which they were coordinated; and (3) examine how agencies allocate support to projects through their initiatives and the extent to which they assess applicant need for support. | Why GAO Did This Study
Wind energy has been the fastest growing source of U.S. electric power generation in recent years. The increase in federal funding for wind technologies and involvement of multiple agencies has raised questions about fragmented, overlapping, or duplicative federal support.
In this report, GAO examines federal wind-related initiatives--programs or groups of agency activities that promoted wind energy through a specific emphasis or focus. GAO (1) identifies wind-related initiatives implemented by federal agencies in fiscal year 2011 and their key characteristics; (2) assesses the extent of fragmentation, overlap, and duplication, if any, among these initiatives, and the extent to which they were coordinated; and (3) examines how agencies allocate support to projects through their initiatives and the extent to which they assess applicant need for support. GAO sent a questionnaire to agencies to identify wind-related initiatives and to obtain data on their characteristics; potential for fragmentation, overlap, or duplication; and related coordination. GAO also reviewed studies of the initiatives and interviewed agency officials and financial professionals.
What GAO Found
GAO identified 82 federal wind-related initiatives, with a variety of key characteristics, implemented by nine agencies in fiscal year 2011. Five agencies--the Departments of Energy (DOE), the Interior, Agriculture (USDA), Commerce, and the Treasury--collectively implemented 73 of the initiatives. The 82 initiatives incurred about $2.9 billion in wind-related obligations and provided estimated wind-related tax subsidies totaling at least $1.1 billion in fiscal year 2011, although complete data on wind-related tax subsidies were not available. Initiatives supporting deployment of wind facilities, such as those financing their construction or use, constituted the majority of initiatives and accounted for nearly all obligations and estimated tax subsidies related to wind in fiscal year 2011. In particular, a tax expenditure and a grant initiative, both administered by Treasury, accounted for nearly all federal financial support for wind energy.
The 82 wind-related initiatives GAO identified were fragmented across agencies, most had overlapping characteristics, and several that financed deployment of wind facilities provided some duplicative financial support. The 82 initiatives were fragmented because they were implemented across nine agencies, and 68 overlapped with at least one other initiative because of shared characteristics. About half of all initiatives reported formal coordination. Such coordination can, in principle, reduce the risk of unnecessary duplication and improve the effectiveness of federal efforts. However, GAO identified 7 initiatives that have provided duplicative support--financial support from multiple initiatives to the same recipient for deployment of a single project. Specifically, wind project developers have in many cases combined the support of more than 1 Treasury initiative and, in some cases, have received additional support from smaller grant or loan guarantee programs at DOE or USDA. GAO also identified 3 other initiatives that did not fund any wind projects in fiscal year 2011 but that could, based on their eligibility criteria, be combined with 1 or more initiatives to provide duplicative support. Of the 10 initiatives, those at Treasury accounted for over 95 percent of the federal financial support for wind in fiscal year 2011.
Agencies implementing the 10 initiatives allocate support to projects on the basis of the initiatives' goals or eligibility criteria, but the extent to which applicant financial need is considered is unclear. DOE and USDA--which have some discretion over the projects they support through their initiatives--allocate support based on projects' ability to meet initiative goals such as reducing emissions or benefitting rural communities, as well as other criteria. Both agencies also consider applicant need for the support of some initiatives, according to officials. However, GAO found that neither agency documents assessments of applicant need; therefore the extent to which they use such assessments to determine how much support to provide is unclear. Unlike DOE and USDA, Treasury generally supports projects based on the tax code's eligibility criteria and does not have discretion to allocate support to projects based on need. While the support of these initiatives may be necessary in many cases for wind projects to be built, because agencies do not document assessments of need, it is unclear, in some cases, if the entire amount of federal support provided was necessary. Federal support in excess of what is needed to induce projects to be built could instead be used to induce other projects to be built or simply withheld, thereby reducing federal expenditures.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that to the extent possible within their statutory authority DOE and USDA formally assess and document whether the federal financial support of their initiatives is needed for applicants' wind projects to be built. DOE agreed with the recommendation and USDA generally concurred with the findings related to its initiatives. |
gao_GAO-05-7 | gao_GAO-05-7_0 | Schools are no longer identified for choice when they have met their yearly performance goals for at least 2 consecutive years. About 1 in 10 Schools Identified for Choice in the First 2 Years of NCLBA, and 1 Percent of Eligible Students Transferred in 2003- 2004
In each of the first 2 school years following enactment of NCLBA, from 10 to 12 percent of schools that received federal funds under Title I were identified for school choice. Although Education has recently begun to collect information on the number of transferring students, little is known about their demographic or academic characteristics. Implementation of Choice Was Challenging in Selected Districts
Officials in most of the 8 districts we visited mentioned that they supported the NCLBA focus on improved student performance and accountability; however, they had difficulties providing school choice, primarily because of tight timeframes and insufficient capacity. Most districts we visited did not have the final performance data before school started in the fall. The compressed timeframe for making school status determinations and implementing the choice option left parents little time to make transfer decisions, and district and school officials expressed concerns that parents did not have adequate time to make an informed decision. However, little information was provided about the transfer schools. Many schools that districts offered as transfer options had not met state performance goals in the prior year, and some were at risk themselves of having to offer choice in the following year. In 2003-2004, the estimated expenditures for transportation represented less than 7 percent of the set-aside funds in all but one district we visited. Some of these questions have been addressed in guidance but others remain. Based on this monitoring, Education should consider whether or not additional flexibility or guidance addressing capacity might be warranted. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to determine (1) the extent to which Title I schools have been affected by the school choice provision of The No Child Left Behind Act (NCLBA) of 2001 in terms of the number of schools identified for choice and the number of students exercising the option; (2) the experiences of selected school districts in implementing the choice provision; and (3) the kinds of guidance and technical assistance that the Department of Education provided states and districts as they implemented public school choice. On the basis of our discussions with state officials and our own research, we selected districts located in seven states— California, Illinois, Ohio, Mississippi, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Washington. Appendix II: NCLBA Interventions for Schools Not Meeting Yearly Performance Goals Over Time
Appendix III: Number of Title I Schools in Each State Identified for Choice in School Year 2002-2003
Number of schools that
Appendix IV: Number of Title I Schools in Each State Identified for Choice in School Year 2003-2004
Number of schools that
Appendix V: Number of Students in Each State Transferring under Choice Option in First 2 Years of NCLBA
Number of students who transferred in 2002-2003
Appendix VI: Poverty and Minority Rates of Schools Required to Offer Choice and Schools Offered as Transfer Options
Number of schools required to offer choice
For Chicago, minority data were not available for one of the 40 transfer schools. | Why GAO Did This Study
The school choice provision of the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLBA) of 2001 applies to schools that receive Title I funds and that have not met state performance goals for 2 consecutive years, including goals set before the enactment of NCLBA. Students in such schools must be offered the choice to transfer to another school in the district. GAO undertook this review to provide the Congress a report on the first 2 years of the implementation of NCLBA school choice. GAO reviewed (1) the number of Title I schools and students that have been affected nationally, (2) the experiences of selected school districts in implementing choice, and (3) the guidance and technical assistance that Education provided. GAO collected school performance data from all states, interviewed Education officials, and visited 8 school districts in California, Illinois, Ohio, Mississippi, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Washington.
What GAO Found
About 1 in 10 of the nation's 50,000 Title I schools were identified for school choice in each of the first 2 years since enactment of the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLBA) of 2001. The proportion of schools identified for choice varied by state. About 1 percent of eligible children, or 31,000 students, transferred in school year 2003-2004. However, little is known about the students who did and did not transfer or factors affecting parents' transfer decisions. Education has launched a study that will yield some information on these topics. Officials in most of the 8 districts GAO visited said they welcomed NCLBA's emphasis on improved performance, but had difficulties providing choice because of tight timeframes and insufficient classroom capacity. Final state determinations of the schools that met state yearly performance goals were not generally available before the school year started, so offers of transfers were based on preliminary determinations. District officials expressed concern that parents had inadequate time and information to make an informed decision. Parents were offered at least 2 possible schools as transfer options, but many of these schools had not met state performance goals in the most recent year. Because of limited classroom capacity in 4 of the districts, some students did not receive the opportunity to transfer. For students who transferred, transportation was provided on school buses, public transit or personal cars, and most districts spent less than 7 percent of the pool of funds that NCLBA required be set aside for that purpose in school year 2003-2004. Education issued extensive guidance on choice. However, the complexity of providing school choice raises a number of issues that have not been addressed in guidance available through October 2004, such as how to handle cases where schools receiving transfers later are identified for choice and how to expand capacity in the short-term within budgetary constraints. |
gao_GAO-03-650T | gao_GAO-03-650T_0 | From the perspectives of the program, the federal budget, and the economy, Medicare in its present form is not sustainable. Under the Trustees’ 2003 intermediate assumptions, program outlays are expected to begin to exceed program tax revenues in 2013. Neither the decline in the cash surpluses nor the cash deficits will affect the payment of benefits, but the negative cash flow will place increased pressure on the federal budget to raise the resources necessary to meet the program’s ongoing costs. The gap between HI income and costs shows the severity of HI’s financing problem over the longer term. Neither slowing the growth of discretionary spending nor allowing the tax reductions to sunset eliminates the imbalance. In addition, while additional economic growth would help ease our burden, the projected fiscal gap is too great for us to grow our way out of the problem. At the same time, the demographic trends and projected rates of growth in health care spending I have described will mean rapid growth in entitlement spending. At the same time, annual rates of growth in entitlement spending will begin to rise. As Bleak Fiscal Future Looms, Efforts to Address Medicare Coverage Gaps Are Being Considered
Despite a common awareness of Medicare’s current and future fiscal plight, pressure has been building to address recognized gaps in Medicare coverage, especially the lack of a prescription drug benefit and protection against financially devastating medical costs. Under the Trustees’ 2003 intermediate assumptions, the present value of HI’s actuarial deficit is $6.2 trillion, a 20-percent increase from the prior year. Beneficiaries may fill this coverage gap in various ways. Those policies that include drug coverage tend to be expensive and provide only limited benefits. Under Medicare, beneficiaries have no limit on their out-of-pocket costs attributable to cost sharing. Recently, several proposals have been made to add a prescription drug benefit to the Medicare program. Private Sector Strategies for Controlling Drug Expenditures May Be Instructive for Medicare
Some proposals to add a Medicare outpatient prescription drug benefit look to private sector strategies as a means to administer a drug benefit and control costs. In considering the application of these findings to Medicare, we are reminded that Medicare’s unique role and nature may temper how the strategies and potential efficiency gains afforded by private sector PBMs may be transferred to benefit the program. Health plans can steer their beneficiaries’ purchases to specific drugs through the use of a formulary—that is, a list of prescription drugs that health plans encourage physicians to prescribe and beneficiaries to use. Concluding Observations
Medicare’s financial challenge is very real and growing. | Why GAO Did This Study
The House Committee on Ways and Means is holding a hearing on modernizing Medicare and integrating prescription drugs into the program. There are growing concerns about gaps in the Medicare program, most notably the lack of outpatient prescription drug coverage, which may leave Medicare's most vulnerable beneficiaries with high out-of-pocket costs. At the same time, Medicare already faces a huge projected financial imbalance that has worsened significantly in the past year. This statement discusses the challenges of adding a drug benefit to Medicare in the context of the program's current and projected financial condition. It also examines program design issues to be considered with respect to administering any proposed drug benefit. Specifically, it discusses how private sector health plans have used entities called pharmacy benefit managers (PBM) to control drug benefit expenditures.
What GAO Found
The recent publication of the 2003 Medicare Trustees' annual report reminds us that Medicare in its current condition--without a prescription drug benefit--is not sustainable. At the same time there are growing concerns about gaps in the Medicare program, most notably the lack of outpatient prescription drug coverage, that may leave Medicare's most vulnerable beneficiaries with high out-of-pocket costs. The Hospital Insurance (HI) portion of Medicare faces a huge projected financial imbalance that has worsened significantly in the past year. Under the Trustees' 2003 intermediate estimates, the present value of HI's actuarial deficit is $6.2 trillion--a 20 percent increase over the prior year. Beginning in 2013, HI's program outlays are expected to begin to exceed program tax revenues, putting increased pressure on the federal budget to raise the resources necessary to meet program costs. In addition, Supplementary Medical Insurance is projected to place an increasing burden on taxpayers and beneficiaries. GAO's long-term budget simulations show that, absent meaningful entitlement reforms, demographic trends and rising health care spending will drive escalating federal deficits and debt. Neither slowing the growth of discretionary spending nor allowing the 2001 tax reductions to sunset will eliminate the imbalance. While additional economic growth will help ease our burden, the potential fiscal gap is too great to grow our way out of the problem. The application of basic health insurance principles to any proposed benefit could help moderate the cost for both beneficiaries and taxpayers. These include beneficiary protections against the risk of catastrophic medical expenses and premium contributions and cost-sharing arrangements that encourage beneficiaries to be cost conscious. The private sector's use of PBMs to control drug expenditures may be instructive for Medicare, but the program's unique role and nature may moderate how such entities would be used and the potential efficiency gains afforded in attempting to transfer PBM-like strategies to Medicare. |
gao_GGD-99-91 | gao_GGD-99-91_0 | This included obtaining information on Internet banking risks and each regulator’s strategy for overseeing Internet banking activities, the methods used to identify depository institutions that offer Internet banking, the existence of safety and soundness and information systems examination procedures for reviewing Internet banking, and the extent of examinations of third- party firms. Regulators Agree Internet Banking Presents Risks and Oversight Challenges, While Extent of Any Industrywide Problems Is Unknown
Internet banking services heighten various types of risks that are of concern to banking regulators, and the regulators have advised institutions to mitigate these risks through the implementation of risk management systems that emphasize, among other things, (1) active board of directors’ oversight, (2) effective internal controls, and (3) comprehensive internal audits. Most regulators provided such guidance in advisory letters to all covered depository institutions. Too Few Examinations Had Been Conducted to Identify the Extent of Any Industrywide Internet Banking-Related Problems
While examiners found that some depository institutions were not taking all of the prescribed precautions to mitigate risks, too few examinations with documented on-line banking assessments were available at the time of our review to identify the extent of any industrywide Internet banking- related problems. OTS recently established a requirement that it receive advance notice of an institution’s plans to establish a transactional Web site. Other Monitoring Methods to Identify Depository Institutions Offering Internet Banking
Regulators use a variety of other methods to identify depository institutions that are already offering Internet banking services. In contrast, FRS and OCC do not require that an institution’s new Internet banking activity be thoroughly examined. However, OTS and FDIC were the only regulators with procedures to gather centralized information on depository institutions’ plans to offer Internet banking. With the exception of NCUA, the banking regulators were developing, testing, or implementing new on-line banking examination procedures and had conducted at least some examinations of institutions’ Internet banking services. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) describe risks posed by Internet banking and any identified industrywide Internet banking-related problems, (2) assess the methods used by regulators to track depository institutions’ plans to provide Internet banking services, (3) determine how regulators examined Internet banking activities, and (4) determine the extent to which regulators examined firms providing Internet banking support services to depository institutions. To identify the risks posed by Internet banking, we interviewed officials from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), Federal Reserve System (FRS), Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), and National Credit Union Administration (NCUA). 5. 6. OTS commented that the draft of this report did not include information on its Web site reporting requirement and the agency’s national database. 4. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed federal oversight of depository institutions' Internet banking activities, focusing on: (1) the risks posed by Internet banking and the extent of any industrywide Internet banking-related problems; (2) the methods used by regulators to track depository institutions' plans to provide Internet banking services; (3) how regulators examined Internet banking activities; and (4) the extent to which regulators examined firms providing Internet banking support services to depository institutions.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) Internet banking heightens various types of traditional banking risks of concern to regulators, including strategic, compliance, security, reputation, and transactional risks; (2) as provided in regulatory guidance to banks, savings and loan associations, and credit unions, these risks should be managed through implementation of risk management systems that emphasize active board and senior management oversight, effective internal controls, and comprehensive and ongoing internal audit programs; (3) examinations of Internet banking that GAO reviewed found that some depository institutions were not taking all the necessary precautions to mitigate Internet banking risks; (4) while deficiencies were found, none of these examinations reported any financial losses or security breaches; (5) during GAO's review, too few examinations had been completed to identify the extent of any industrywide Internet banking-related problems; (6) regulators use a variety of methods to identify depository institutions that are already offering Internet banking services, however, only two regulators had systematically obtained centralized information on depository institutions' plans to provide such services and had a database of this information at the time of GAO's review; (7) the Office of Thrift Supervision recently established a requirement that depository institutions: (a) notify it in advance of plans to establish a transactional Web site; and (b) report their Web site address in quarterly Thrift Financial Report filings; (8) the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation developed a centralized database that contains information on a depository institution's plans to provide Internet banking services; (9) most regulators were developing, testing, or implementing new on-line banking examination procedures, which included procedures for examinations of Internet banking, and most had conducted at least some examinations of depository institutions' Internet banking operations; (10) the Federal Reserve System (FRS) and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency do not require that an institution's new Internet banking activity be thoroughly examined; (11) the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) was the only regulator that had not developed requirements and procedures for Internet banking examinations; and (12) each regulator has the authority to examine depository institutions' banking services provided by a third party and to avoid duplication of effort, regulators often cooperate in examining third-party firms. |
gao_GAO-03-1107 | gao_GAO-03-1107_0 | Since its inception, the station program has been plagued with cost and schedule overruns. Grounding of Shuttle Fleet Has Further Delayed On-Orbit Assembly of Space Station and Research
The grounding of the U.S. shuttle fleet has presented a number of operational challenges for the space station program. With the fleet grounded, NASA is heavily dependent on its international partners— especially Russia—for operations and logistics support for the space station. However, due to the limited payload capacity of the Russian space vehicles, on-orbit assembly has been halted. This process, however, will require a new device to be developed and expending resources not previously planned for this function. NASA officials have maintained that assembly delays will be at least a “month for month” slip from the previous schedule, depending on the frequency of flights when the shuttles resume operations. Further, NASA states that although the crew has been reduced from three to two members, more crew time will be available to carry out research tasks because no assembly or space walks are planned. Regardless, the limited payload capability of the Russian vehicles directly affects the extent of research that can be conducted, as illustrated in the following examples:
Outfitting of U.S. research facilities halted: Lacking the shuttle fleet’s greater lift capability, the amount of research hardware transported to and from the station has been significantly limited. As a result, research experiments for the current flight increment have been reduced. Cost Implications Have Yet to Be Determined, but Increases Are Likely
Since the program’s inception, we have repeatedly reported on the challenges NASA has faced in maintaining goals and objectives for the space station program. However, they have identified a number of factors that will likely result in increased costs—including the continued maintenance and storage of ready-to- launch station components as well as the testing and recertification of some components and the need to extend contracts to complete development and assembly of the station. NASA officials told us that soon after the Columbia accident, they published ground rules and assumptions that stated there would be no significant changes to the station’s budget execution and would maintain budget requests at current levels until the shuttle returns to flight. NASA has also implemented a management decision analysis that anticipates additional costs to be incurred in keeping a crew on-board the station while the shuttle fleet is grounded. Other factors, according to NASA officials, that the station program office identified could also result in cost increases, but it has not fully quantified these costs: disassembly and reassembly of component parts; unpacking and repacking equipment from the logistics module that was storage of station components that are ready for launch; maintaining battery life; unfurling and testing solar array wings, which could be affected by additional travel to Russia to facilitate discussions on Soyuz and Progress vehicles’ schedules and payloads and export controls issues; additional resupply flights; and retention of some critical skills necessary to complete development and assembly of the station. Uncertainty of the Shuttle’s Return-to- Flight Date Delays International Partner Agreements
In addition to the operational challenges facing NASA, funding and partner agreements present significant challenges. At the same time, NASA and its partners must develop a plan for assembling the partners’ modules and reaching agreement on the final station configuration. In addition, since the final on-orbit configuration is likely to be different from the configuration when the Intergovernmental Agreements were signed in 1998, NASA officials state the partners may have to adjust agreements that cover the partners’ responsibility for shared common operations costs. Depending on contributions made by the partners while the shuttle fleet is grounded, the share that each partner contributes to the common operations costs may have to be adjusted and could result in NASA’s paying a larger share of those costs. However, the U.S. may be prohibited from making certain payments due to a statutory restriction. NASA officials acknowledge that the loss of the space shuttle Columbia poses cost and schedule risks that have direct implications on completing the development and assembly of the station and the research that is to be conducted on-board as well as on NASA’s budgets for fiscal year 2004 and beyond. Scope and Methodology
To describe the current status of the space station program in terms of on- orbit assembly and research, we reviewed NASA’s plans for completing station assembly prior to the Columbia accident and compared those plans to the agency’s actions following the accident to continue on-board operations while the shuttle fleet is grounded. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 1998, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and its international partners--Canada, Europe, Japan, and Russia--began on-orbit assembly of the International Space Station, envisioned as a permanently orbiting laboratory for conducting scientific research under nearly weightless conditions. Since its inception, the program has experienced numerous problems, resulting in significant cost growth and assembly schedule slippages. Following the loss of Columbia in February 2003, NASA grounded the U.S. shuttle fleet, putting the immediate future of the space station in doubt, as the fleet, with its payload capacity, has been key to the station's development. If recent discoveries about the cause of the Columbia's disintegration require that the remaining shuttles be redesigned or modified, delays in the fleet's return to flight could be lengthy. In light of these uncertainties, concerns about the space station's cost and progress have grown. This report highlights the current status of the program in terms of on-orbit assembly and research; the cost implications for the program with the grounding of the shuttle fleet; and identifying significant program management challenges, especially as they relate to reaching agreements with the international partners.
What GAO Found
Although the effects of the Columbia accident on the space station are still being explored, it is clear that the station will cost more, take longer to complete, and have further delay in the achievement of key research objectives. Due to the limited payload capacity of Russia's Soyuz and Progress vehicles--which the program must now rely on to rotate crew and provide logistics support--the station is currently in a survival mode. Onorbit assembly is at a standstill, and the on-board crew has been reduced from three to two members. NASA officials maintain that delays in on-orbit assembly will be at least a "month for month" slip from the previous schedule. However, these delays have presented a number of operational challenges. For example, several key components that were ready for launch when the Columbia accident occurred have been idle at Kennedy Space Center and now require additional maintenance or recertification before they can be launched. Moreover, certain safety concerns on-board the station cannot be addressed until the shuttle fleet's return to flight. The grounding of the shuttle fleet has also further impeded the advancement of the program's science investigations. Specifically, the limited availability of research facilities and new science materials has constrained on-board research. NASA has yet to estimate the potential costs and future budget impacts that will result from the grounding of the shuttle fleet. Throughout the life of the program, however, maintaining goals and objectives for the space station has been a challenge for NASA. NASA has analyzed anticipated costs that the program will incur to keep a limited crew on board the station until the U.S. shuttles resume flight, and officials have stated that there would not be significant changes to the execution of the current budget and that the fiscal year 2004 budget request would remain at current levels. NASA plans to continue to develop hardware and deliver station elements to Kennedy Space Center to be prepared for launch as previously scheduled. However, a number of factors will likely result in increased costs, including costs to maintain and store station components and costs for extending contracts. Important decisions regarding funding and partner agreements still need to be made. For example, agreements that cover the partners' responsibility for shared common operations costs may need to be adjusted, an adjustment that could result in NASA's paying a larger share of these costs. In addition, logistics flights using Russian vehicles may need to be accelerated to ensure continued operations on-board the station. Russia has stated that additional flights are possible, but it could need additional funding from the other partners. However, the United States may be prohibited from providing certain payments due to a statutory restriction. NASA and its partners must also develop a plan for assembling the partners' modules and reaching agreement on the final station configuration. The partners were on a path to agree on final configuration by December 2003, but this process has been delayed by the Columbia accident. |
gao_GAO-03-330 | gao_GAO-03-330_0 | Small Communities Face Challenges in Sustaining Desired Levels of Air Service
The challenges now faced by small communities in obtaining or enhancing air service center on two main issues—(1) limitations created by having a small population base from which to draw passengers and (2) an airline industry that, for the most part, is losing money and seeking ways to return to profitability. A small population base may not generate sufficient demand to attract or retain competitive air service because the demand may be too low to generate a profit for airlines. Ironwood, Michigan, illustrates the effect of declining population and lowered economic activity on a community’s passenger enplanements. ATA also reported that average domestic fares in September 2002 were almost 18 percent below September 2000 fares. Some communities made presentations to airlines to try to obtain new or additional service. Analysis of 12 Projects Indicates Financial Incentives Are Key to Increasing Service, but No Guarantee of Success
We studied 12 communities that had taken a variety of actions to improve air service; all but 1of the 12 communities instituted some form of financial incentive program for the carrier to attract additional service.All of these communities had undertaken some combination of studies or marketing in the past. Many network air carriers, experiencing unprecedented financial losses, are taking steps to minimize losses such as cutting unprofitable service. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this project were to identify (1) challenges that small communities face in obtaining or retaining commercial passenger air service; (2) what actions state and local governmental units or small communities have taken to enhance air service and how successful they have been; (3) what factors, if any, affect the likelihood of success; and (4) what implications this analysis has for federal efforts to assist small community airports. We also selected them because they varied in population, level of economic activity, and geographic location. Ultimately, however, some communities may not have the sheer size or level of economic activity or be able to compete with the lower fares and/or better service of a nearby airport, to maintain the necessary demand for air service. As a result, more passengers may choose to use this service rather than driving elsewhere, so demand increases due to a reduction in passenger leakage. Big Sky discontinued service to these communities in March 2001. 20.) | Why GAO Did This Study
The airline industry, facing unprecedented financial losses as a result of the economic downturn and the terrorist attacks, has taken steps to minimize losses, including reducing or eliminating service to some small communities. In March 2002, GAO reported that small communities had almost 20 percent fewer departures in October 2001, as compared to October 2000. GAO was asked to follow up on that work by examining the challenges small communities face in attracting and keeping the air service they desire and what steps they have taken to overcome these challenges.
What GAO Found
Small communities face a range of fundamental economic challenges in obtaining and retaining commercial passenger air service. The smallest of these communities typically lack the population base and level of economic activity that would generate sufficient passenger demand to make them profitable to air carriers. While larger communities in this group may have less difficulty in sustaining a base level of service, they may not be able to attract additional carriers to provide greater choice and lower fares. Smaller communities located near larger airports may also face reduced demand because passengers choose to use the larger airport with lower fares or more choices for flights. These communities also have difficulty because the airline industry is in turmoil, making less profitable operations increasingly vulnerable. Communities have taken a variety of steps to try to obtain or improve air service, such as marketing to increase passengers' demand for local service or offering financial incentives to airlines to attract new or enhanced service. At communities GAO studied in depth, financial incentives were most effective in attracting new service. However, the additional service often ceased when incentives ended. Longer-term sustainability may rest on a community's commitment to making air service a priority. |
gao_GAO-01-599 | gao_GAO-01-599_0 | Background
NPRC maintains the personnel and medical records of nearly all former members of the U.S. military service departments who served during the twentieth century and responds to requests for these records. NPRC officials expect these two features to significantly improve timeliness. NPRC Response Time Lagging
In fiscal year 2000, on average, NPRC took 54 days to respond to written requests for records. Although NPRC completed about 6 percent of record requests within 10 days in fiscal year 2000, its goal is to eventually complete 95 percent of requests within 10 days by fiscal year 2005. Conclusion
NPRC is attempting to improve its timeliness in responding to requests for veterans’ records. NARA stated that the NPRC backlog is not a factor in the timeliness of the Veterans Benefits Administration’s (VBA’s) servicing of disability compensation claims. Appendix: Comments from the National Archives and Records Administration | Why GAO Did This Study
The National Personnel Records Center (NPRC) is responsible for maintaining the official military personnel records of discharged members of the military services. Veterans frequently need their records for a variety of reasons, such as obtaining disability compensation, health benefits, GI bill education benefits, home loan guarantees, and burial in national cemeteries. However, access to these benefits has been hampered due to delays in obtaining documentation of their military service from NPRC. This report evaluates NPRC's timeliness in responding to veterans' requests for records. GAO reviewed (1) how long it took NPRC to answer veterans' requests for records and (2) whether the actions NPRC was taking would improve response time.
What GAO Found
GAO found that, in fiscal year 2000, NPRC took an average of 54 days to respond to written requests for records, answering about six percent of written requests within 10 working days. Actions NPRC was taking to respond more quickly were unlikely to significantly improve timeliness soon, and the prospects for meeting its fiscal year 2005 goal of answering 95 percent of requests within 10 working days were unclear. |
gao_GAO-12-799 | gao_GAO-12-799_0 | The panel determined that overseas staffing levels had not been adjusted to reflect changing missions, requirements, and security concerns. In 2004, Congress mandated the establishment of the Office of Rightsizing within State. M/PRI uses GAO’s definition of rightsizing: aligning the number and location of staff assigned overseas with foreign policy priorities, security concerns, and other constraints. State Has Improved the Consistency of Its Approach, but Unanticipated Events and Other Factors Contribute to Differences between Actual and Projected Staff Levels
State has improved the consistency of its analyses across overseas missions, but differences between actual and projected staffing levels still exist due to unanticipated events and other factors. We reported in 2006 that the Office of Management Policy, Rightsizing, and Innovation (M/PRI) had not been conducting its rightsizing reviews in a consistent manner.State has since improved the consistency of its reviews by developing a variety of methodological tools and a standard template that it applies to each mission. Some missions provided narratives discussing various rightsizing elements, such as outsourcing and post security, while others did not. Over Half of Staffing Projections Were within 10 Percent of Actual Staffing Levels as of December 2011, but Some Posts Have Larger Differences
For more than half of the 144 staffing projections based on rightsizing reviews that we analyzed, actual staffing levels as of December 2011 were within 10 percent of review staffing projections, either higher or lower. According to the management officer in Mozambique, the increase in the number of U.S. direct-hire and locally-employed staff positions as a result of PEPFAR’s initiation was greater than anticipated. State’s Recommendations Generally Focus on State Administrative and Management Staff at a Specific Post to Improve Efficiency
Rightsizing reviews contain recommendations to improve post operations and eliminate duplicative services and positions; these recommendations often focus on State’s administrative and management staff. To develop its recommendations, M/PRI reviews the levels of all staff at missions and seeks input from both State and non-State agencies. Many of M/PRI’s recommendations that we analyzed focused on State administrative and management staff rather than programmatic staff or staff from other agencies. However, State officials said that it is difficult to assess the efficiency of program staff due to the qualitative nature of their activities, such as discussing policy issues with their diplomatic counterparts or drafting briefing documents for visiting officials. State Does Not Often Make Recommendations Directed at Other U.S. Government Agencies and Relies on These Agencies to Determine Their Own Staffing Needs Overseas
M/PRI reviews all U.S. government staffing overseas and incorporates staffing data and projections from non-State agencies with a presence overseas. State Offices Vary in Their Use of Rightsizing Reviews, and State Does Not Monitor Implementation of Rightsizing Recommendations
State uses rightsizing reviews to plan facilities construction and for certain staffing considerations, but some U.S. officials said that use of the reviews is limited, and State officials do not monitor whether recommendations are implemented. State’s Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO) uses the staffing projections in rightsizing reviews to plan the size and estimate the initial costs of new embassy and consulate compounds. However, some regional bureau officials said that they do not actively use the reviews except as a historical overview of staffing, and some post officials said that they do not use the reviews at all. In addition, State often uses documents other than rightsizing reviews to inform decisions in areas such as determining staffing levels and regionalization. Further, M/PRI and post officials stated that they use rightsizing reviews when assessing requests by State or other agencies through the NSDD- 38 process to add staff to overseas posts, although the final decision on requests is made by the chief of mission. Several officials stated that undertaking the rightsizing process acts as a check on growth in overseas staffing levels. Some post officials, particularly those in management functions, said that they refer to rightsizing reviews to support staffing changes. State Does Not Monitor Implementation of Rightsizing Recommendations and Has Not Clearly Designated an Office Responsible for Following Up on Recommendations
State has not clearly designated an office with responsibility for pursuing implementation of rightsizing recommendations and does not track recommendation status after completing a rightsizing review, making it The legislation that established the difficult for M/PRI to assess impact.rightsizing process states that the Secretary of State shall take actions to carry out the recommendations made in each rightsizing review. State indicated that it would carefully consider our recommendations, and it described a number of actions it intends to take that could address them. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to examine (1) the consistency of the Department of State’s (State) approach to conducting rightsizing reviews and how its projections compare to actual staffing levels; (2) the focus of State’s rightsizing recommendations; and (3) the extent to which State uses its rightsizing reviews and monitors implementation of recommendations. To obtain information on the consistency of State’s approach to conducting rightsizing reviews, the focus of rightsizing recommendations, and the extent to which State uses its rightsizing reviews and monitors implementation of recommendations, we reviewed agency documents— including M/PRI’s annual reports to Congress, and Office of Inspector General (OIG) reports—and interviewed officials from State and non- State agencies, both in Washington, D.C., and at overseas posts. | Why GAO Did This Study
After the 1998 bombings of two U.S. embassies, a U.S. government panel determined that staffing levels had not been adjusted to reflect changing missions, requirements, and security concerns. In 2004, Congress mandated the establishment of the Office of Rightsizing within the Department of State. The office reviews levels of overseas staffing for all U.S. government agencies at every post every 5 years, projects future staffing levels it determines are appropriate to meet mission needs, and recommends ways to improve efficiency. Rightsizing is intended to align the number and location of staff with foreign policy priorities, security, and other constraints.
GAO examined (1) the consistency of States approach to conducting rightsizing reviews and how its projections compare to actual staffing levels; (2) the focus of States rightsizing recommendations; and (3) the extent to which State uses its rightsizing reviews and monitors implementation of recommendations. GAO reviewed 181 rightsizing reviews, compared projections in reviews with current actual staffing data, and interviewed officials from State and other agencies in Washington, D.C., and at overseas posts.
What GAO Found
The Department of State (State) has improved the consistency of its rightsizing approach across overseas posts. However, differences between future staffing levels it projects are appropriate to meet mission needs and actual staffing levels still exist due to unanticipated events and other factors. GAO reported in 2006 that States Office of Management Policy, Rightsizing and Innovation (M/PRI) had not been conducting its rightsizing reviews consistently. Some reviews discussed various rightsizing elements, such as outsourcing, while others did not. State has since improved the consistency of its reviews by developing a variety of methodological tools and a standard template which it applies to each post. GAO found that over half of the 144 rightsizing projections analyzed were within 10 percent of actual staffing levels as of December 2011. In contrast, over 40 percent of the posts have staffing level differences of over 10 percent. Unanticipated events and other factors, such as changes in policies, contributed to these differences. For example, according to the management officer in Mozambique, M/PRI projected staffing increases as a result of the Presidents program to combat AIDS, but the actual funding level for the program was much higher than anticipated. This resulted in higher actual staffing levels for both U.S. direct-hire and locally-employed staff positions.
Rightsizing reviews contain recommendations to improve post operations and eliminate duplicative services and positions. To develop its recommendations, M/PRI reviews the levels of all staff at posts and seeks input from State and non-State agencies. M/PRI relies on non-State agencies to determine independently their own staffing needs. Many of States recommendations for a specific post focus on the level of States administrative or management staff, rather than States programmatic staff or staff from other agencies. Some State officials stated that the activities of administrative and management staff are better suited to quantitative measurement while the qualitative nature of programmatic staff activities, such as discussing policy issues with foreign diplomatic counterparts, is more difficult to measure.
States use of rightsizing reviews varies, and State does not follow up on review recommendations. States Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations uses the staffing projections in rightsizing reviews to plan the size of new embassy compounds. Further, M/PRI uses rightsizing reviews when it assesses requests by State or other agencies to add staff to overseas posts, although the final decision is made by the respective Chief of Mission. In addition, Bureau of Diplomatic Security officials said that they incorporate rightsizing reviews into their annual staffing planning exercise, and some post officials said that they refer to rightsizing reviews to support staffing changes. Some U.S. officials stated that undertaking the rightsizing process acts as a check on growth in overseas staffing levels. However, some State regional bureau officials said that they do not actively use the reviews except as a historical overview of staffing, and some post officials said that they do not use the reviews at all. State often uses documents other than rightsizing reviews for decisions in areas including staffing levels. Finally, State does not monitor the implementation of rightsizing review recommendations and has not designated an office with responsibility for their implementation. State issues an annual report to Congress in which it lists the rightsizing reviews it has completed, number of positions recommended for elimination, and potential cost savings; the report does not address whether recommendations have been implemented. Because State does not track or report on the implementation of recommendations, State cannot determine if rightsizing reviews are achieving their purpose of aligning overseas staffing levels with U.S. priorities.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Secretary of State designate the appropriate entities to ensure that rightsizing recommendations are addressed and to track and report the actions taken to implement the recommendations. State described a number of actions it intends to take that could address GAOs recommendations. |
gao_GAO-12-237 | gao_GAO-12-237_0 | In recent years, approximately two-thirds of all top-level bank holding companies that are subject to capital requirements (generally those with more than $500 million in total assets) have included hybrid instruments in their Tier 1 capital (see fig. These hybrid instruments had a total value of $157 billion, representing 13 percent of all bank holding company Tier 1 capital. Excluding Tier 1 Hybrid Capital Likely Will Have Limited Negative Effects
With the exclusion of hybrid instruments from Tier 1, few banking institutions will fall below minimum amounts of regulatory capital, and greater reliance on common equity should improve the overall safety and soundness of banking institutions. Some market participants identified likely safety and soundness benefits for banking institutions that increase their share of common equity or other stronger capital sources. Long-term effects of the hybrid capital exclusion on loan rates will likely also be small, although the exact impact is unknown. The lack of tax-deductible Tier 1 hybrid capital instruments could result in a cost disadvantage for U.S. institutions relative to their foreign peers, although the overall competitive effects are unclear. Smaller Banking Institutions Face Limited Capital- Raising Options but Report Little Unmet Capital Need
Smaller banking institutions generally had limited options for raising capital, and one important form of capital—trust preferred securities—is now largely unavailable to these banks. According to market participants, investors were no longer interested in purchasing trust preferred securities, partly because of their performance during the financial crisis and concerns about new regulatory restrictions such as those under the Dodd-Frank Act. Smaller Institutions’ Ability to Raise Capital Varies by Financial Condition and Other Factors
Smaller institutions consider their financial condition and performance (for example, profitability, debt and capital levels, and asset quality) as the most important factor in their ability to successfully access capital. Market participants also identified several factors that inhibited smaller institutions’ access to public capital markets. Specifically, we estimate that 65 percent of smaller institutions have not raised capital since January 1, 2008, and 88 percent of those did not need or want to raise more regulatory capital. Only 3 percent of smaller institutions that had not raised capital since January 1, 2008, attempted to raise capital but were unable to do so. The smaller institutions that had raised capital since January 1, 2008, were generally satisfied with the capital they had raised. Institutions whose financial condition was relatively strong generally had a more favorable view of the capital-raising environment. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to FDIC, the Federal Reserve, and OCC for their review and comment. FDIC and the Federal Reserve provided technical comments that were incorporated, as appropriate. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our report were to examine (1) the use of hybrid capital instruments as Tier 1 capital and the benefits and risks of including them in this category, (2) the potential effects on banking institutions and the economy of prohibiting the use of hybrid instruments to meet Tier 1 capital requirements, and (3) options that exist for smaller banking institutions to access regulatory capital. These instruments— defined by the Federal Reserve as restricted core capital elements—will be excluded from Tier 1 capital by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) and include trust preferred securities, which are widely recognized as the most common hybrid capital instrument. Because federal banking regulators did not allow these instruments as Tier 1 capital for depository institutions— banks and thrifts—our review focused on the use of hybrid instruments by holding companies. Effects of Excluding Tier 1 Hybrid Instruments on Capital Adequacy and International Competitiveness
To assess the effects of excluding Tier 1 hybrid capital on the capital adequacy of financial institutions, we analyzed regulatory capital data to determine the extent to which bank holding companies may fall below minimum regulatory capital levels without Tier 1 hybrid instruments. Assuming that the loan is priced so that the rate charged at least covers the weighted cost of capital and that institutions hold common equity and hybrid capital as equity, we can write the following: L*(1-t) >= (E*(EK*rce + EH*rtps(1-t))+((D*r)+C+A-O)*(1-t)
L = effective interest rate on the loan t = marginal tax rate for the bank E = proportion of equity backing the loan rtps = required rate of return (yield) on the marginal hybrid securities (trust preferred securities) rce = required rate of return (yield) on the marginal common equity EK = proportion of equity held as common equity EH = proportion of equity held as hybrid securities (trust preferred securities)
D = Proportion of debt and deposits funding the loan r = Effective marginal interest rate on D C = the credit spread (equal to probability weighted expected loss on the loan portfolio)
A = administrative and other expenses related to the loan O = other offsetting benefits to the bank of making the loan This formula is used to capture the lower cost of hybrid securities, including the associated tax benefits (EH*rtps(1-t)). In practice these instruments are largely trust preferred securities. | Why GAO Did This Study
Hybrid capital instruments are securities that have characteristics of both equity and debt. The Federal Reserve allowed bank holding companies to include limited amounts of hybrid instruments known as trust preferred securities in the highest level of required capital (Tier 1), although other federal banking regulators never approved these or other hybrid instruments for this purpose. Responding to concerns that these instruments did not perform well during the 2007-2009 financial crisis, in 2010 the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) required regulators to establish rules that will exclude the instruments from Tier 1 capital and required GAO to study the possible effects of this provision. This report addresses (1) the use, benefits, and risks of hybrid instruments as Tier 1 capital; (2) the potential effects of the exclusion on banking institutions and the economy; and (3) options for smaller banking institutions to access regulatory capital. For this work, GAO analyzed data from financial regulatory filings and other sources, interviewed regulators and market participants, conducted economic analysis, and surveyed smaller banking institutions.
GAO makes no recommendations in this report. GAO provided a draft to the banking regulators for their review and comment. FDIC and the Federal Reserve provided technical comments that were incorporated, as appropriate.
What GAO Found
Tier 1 hybrid capital instruments, particularly trust preferred securities, have been heavily used by bank holding companies because of their financial advantages, but they are not as effective in absorbing losses as traditional forms of Tier 1 capital, such as common equity. As of December 31, 2010, almost two-thirds of all top-level bank holding companies that were subject to capital requirements included hybrid instruments in their Tier 1 capital, for a total value of $157 billion. Hybrid instruments such as trust preferred securities have offered institutions the benefit of lower-cost capital, largely because of their debt-related featuresincluding tax-deductible dividends. These instruments also are accessible to a broader range of potential investors. However, trust preferred securities do not absorb losses like other Tier 1 instruments because of their obligation to repay principal and dividends. Trust preferred securities may provide limited financial flexibility in times of stress, but they may also hinder efforts to recapitalize troubled banking institutions.
Eliminating Tier 1 hybrid capital likely will have modest negative effects on the existing capital measures of individual banking institutions and lending and could improve institutions financial stability. Few institutions will fall below minimum regulatory capital levels without Tier 1 hybrid instruments, and banking institutions overall safety and soundness should improve with higher reliance on common equity. GAOs analysis of the relationship between bank regulatory capital and lending activity suggests that any negative effects on the cost and availability of credit should be small, but the exact impact is unknown. Market participants said that losing access to tax-advantaged Tier 1 instruments could place U.S. institutions at a competitive disadvantage, as some foreign banks may still have access to such instruments. The international competitive effects are unclear, however, given the scope of ongoing worldwide regulatory reforms.
Smaller banking institutions, which often had larger proportions of hybrid instruments as Tier 1 capital, have limited options for raising regulatory capital but indicated little unmet need for it. These smaller institutions now have access primarily to common equity raised from private sources. GAOs survey results showed that smaller institutions consider their financial condition and performance as the most important factor affecting their ability to raise capital. Market participants identified challenges that could impact smaller institutions ability to raise capital, including limitations related to the size of capital raised, liquidity, and return potential for investors. However, GAO estimated that most smaller institutions (65 percent) had not raised regulatory capital since January 1, 2008, and of these, a large majority (88 percent) indicated that they had no need or interest in raising more. Further, most smaller institutions that had raised capital since 2008 were satisfied with the amount and terms involved. Only a small percentage of institutions (3 percent) that had attempted to raise capital since January 1, 2008, were unable to do so. Institutions with a stronger financial condition generally had a more favorable view of the capital raising environment. |
gao_GAO-11-804 | gao_GAO-11-804_0 | While one purpose of the Recovery Act was to preserve and create jobs, it also required states to report information quarterly to increase transparency and SFSF required recipients to make assurances relating to progress on educational reforms. 2. 3. According to data from Education, as of September 9, 2011, about 4 percent of the states’ obligated Recovery Act funds remain available for expenditure. Given that nearly half of education funding, on average, is provided by the states, the impact of state-level reductions to education could significantly affect LEA budgets. 3). 4). LEAs Reduced Support for Special Education Due to Flexibility Allowed under IDEA
According to our survey, over a quarter of LEAs decreased their spending on special education because of the local MOE spending flexibility allowed under IDEA and the large influx of Recovery Act IDEA funds. If LEAs that use the flexibility to decrease their local spending do not voluntarily increase their spending in future years—after Recovery Act funds have expired—the total local, or state and local, spending for the education of students with disabilities may decrease, compared to spending before the Recovery Act. For states whose waivers are denied or are partially granted, according to Education officials, the state must provide the amount of the MOE shortfall for special education during the state fiscal year in question or face a reduction in its federal IDEA grant award by the amount equal to the MOE shortfall. Education Plans to Assess Results of Recovery Act Funds
Education plans to conduct two common types of systematic program assessment: program evaluation and performance measurement. In the coming years, Education plans to produce an evaluation that will provide an in-depth examination of various Recovery Act programs’ performance in addressing educational reform. In addition to this overall assessment of the programs’ results, for the SFSF program, Education plans to measure states’ ability to collect and publicly report data on preestablished indicators and descriptors of educational reform. Education intends for this reporting to be a means for improving accountability to the public in the shorter term. Including these Recovery Act education programs in one evaluation will allow for a broad view of the results of programs focused on education reform. Education and States Help Ensure Accountability, but Education Did Not Consistently Communicate SFSF Monitoring Concerns to States
A Range of Accountability Efforts Are in Place and Identified Areas for Improvement
To help ensure accountability of Recovery Act funds, a wide variety of entities oversee and audit Recovery Act programs, and Education officials told us they routinely review monitoring and audit results from many of these sources. Education and States Continue to Review Data Quality and Use Recipient Reports for Monitoring
Education uses various methods to review the accuracy of recipient reported data to help ensure data quality. Education and several selected states also told us they examined recipient reports as part of their monitoring efforts. In addition, Iowa and New York officials said they used recipient reported data to ensure appropriate uses of funds. While FTE Data Have Limitations, Education Found These Data to Be Useful
According to Recovery.gov, during the quarter beginning April 1, 2011, and ending June 30, 2011, the Recovery Act funded approximately 286,000 FTEs using funds under the programs in our review (see fig. Recommendation for Executive Action
To ensure all states receive appropriate communication and technical assistance for SFSF, consistent with what some states received in response to SFSF monitoring reviews, we recommend that the Secretary of Education establish mechanisms to improve the consistency of communicating monitoring feedback to states, such as establishing internal time frames for conveying information found during monitoring. Education officials reported that the feedback provided to states through this new approach was ongoing and that not all states have required the same level of follow up discussions. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To obtain national level information on how Recovery Act funds made available by the U.S. Department of Education (Education) under SFSF; ESEA Title I, Part A; and IDEA, Part B were used at the local level, we designed and administered a Web-based survey of local educational agencies (LEA) in the 50 states and the District of Columbia. Department of Labor
Newly Implemented Recommendations
To enhance the Department of Labor’s (Labor) ability to manage its Recovery Act and regular Workforce Investment Act (WIA) formula grants and to build on its efforts to improve the accuracy and consistency of financial reporting, we recommended that the Secretary of Labor take the following actions: To determine the extent and nature of reporting inconsistencies across the states and better target technical assistance, conduct a one-time assessment of financial reports that examines whether each state’s reported data on obligations meet Labor’s requirements. | Why GAO Did This Study
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act) provided $70.3 billion for three education programs--the State Fiscal Stabilization Fund (SFSF); Title I, Part A of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (Title I); and Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), Part B. One goal of the Recovery Act was to save and create jobs, and SFSF also requires states to report information expected to increase transparency and advance educational reform. This report responds to two ongoing GAO mandates under the Recovery Act. It examines (1) how selected states and local recipients used the funds; (2) what plans the Department of Education (Education) and selected states have to assess the impact of the funds; (3) what approaches are being used to ensure accountability of the funds; and (4) how Education and states ensure the accuracy of recipient reported data. To conduct this review, GAO gathered information from 14 states and the District of Columbia, conducted a nationally representative survey of local educational agencies (LEA), interviewed Education officials, examined recipient reports, and reviewed relevant policy documents.
What GAO Found
As of September 9, 2011, in the 50 states and the District of Columbia, about 4 percent of the obligated Recovery Act funds remain available for expenditure. Teacher retention was the primary use of Recovery Act education funds according to GAO's nationally representative survey of LEAs. The funds also allowed recipients to restore state budget shortfalls and maintain or increase services. However, the expiration of funds and state budget decreases may cause LEAs to decrease services, such as laying off teachers. We also found that nearly a quarter of LEAs reported lowering their local spending on special education, as allowed for under IDEA provisions that provide eligible LEAs the flexibility to reduce local spending on students with disabilities by up to half of the amount of any increase in federal IDEA funding from the prior year. However, even with this flexibility, many LEAs reported having difficulty maintaining required levels of local special education spending. In addition, two states have not been able to meet required state spending levels for IDEA or obtain a federal waiver from these requirements. States whose waivers were denied and cannot make up the shortfall in the fiscal year in question face a reduction in their IDEA funding equal to the shortfall, which may be long-lasting. Education plans to conduct two types of systematic program assessments to gauge the results of Recovery Act-funded programs that focus on educational reform: program evaluation and performance measurement. In the coming years, Education plans to produce an evaluation that will provide an in-depth examination of various Recovery Act programs' performance in addressing educational reform. In addition, for the SFSF program, Education plans to measure states' ability to collect and publicly report data on preestablished indicators and descriptors of educational reform, and it plans to provide a national view of states' progress. Education intends for this reporting to be a means for improving accountability to the public in the shorter term. Further, Education officials plan to use states' progress to determine whether a state is qualified to receive funds under other future reform-oriented grant competitions. Numerous entities help ensure accountability of Recovery Act funds through monitoring, audits, and other means, which have helped identify areas for improvement. Given the short time frame for spending these funds, Education's new SFSF monitoring approach prioritized helping states resolve monitoring issues and allowed Education to target technical assistance to some states. However, some states did not receive monitoring feedback promptly and this feedback was not communicated consistently because Education's monitoring protocol lacked internal time frames for following up with states. Education and state officials reported using a variety of methods to ensure recipient reported data are accurate. They also use recipient reported data to enhance their oversight and monitoring efforts. According to Recovery.gov, the Recovery Act funded approximately 286,000 full-time equivalents (FTE) during the eighth round of reporting, which ended June 30, 2011, for the education programs GAO reviewed. Despite the limitations associated with FTE data, Education found these data to be useful in assessing the impact of grant programs on saving and creating jobs.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Secretary of Education establish mechanisms to improve the consistency of communicating SFSF monitoring feedback to states. Education agreed with our recommendation. |
gao_AIMD-99-88 | gao_AIMD-99-88_0 | The guide outlines three phases of a successful investment management approach—selection, control, and evaluation. This report addresses the extent to which FAA, through AMS, (1) has established a structured approach for selecting and controlling its investments; (2) incorporates all investments, including those in operation, in the agency’s portfolio; and (3) selects, controls, and evaluates its investments with complete and reliable information. Although AMS does not include an explicit screening step, screening activities are part of the agency’s mission analysis process. The project is then incorporated into the agency’s financial plan for projects funded by the facilities and equipment budget account. AMS provides a defined set of policies, procedures, and reporting requirements that are designed to facilitate FAA’s efforts to analyze mission needs, identify alternative solutions to meet those needs, assess the solutions’ affordability, and establish and control a project’s performance once a solution is selected. Lack of Oversight of the Operations Portion of Projects Prevents FAA From Managing Investments as a Complete Portfolio
FAA’s oversight of its investments is confined to new projects and those under development, limiting its ability to fully assess and make trade-offs between new and existing systems and preventing the agency from managing all of its investments as a complete portfolio. Such a portfolio approach allows the organizations to evaluate the relative merits of spending funds to develop new systems, enhance current systems, or continue operating and maintaining existing systems. FAA Does Not Have a Complete and Sound Operations Cost Baseline for Its Investments
While FAA’s policy requires baseline cost estimates for the full life cycles of all projects under AMS, in practice, FAA has not yet developed a sound estimate of the operations costs for each of its projects. FAA officials told us that the agency lacks the information needed to reliably estimate operations costs over a project’s life cycle or to track actual operations costs against estimates because it does not have a cost accounting system. Second, FAA has not fully implemented an effective process for controlling the baselines for the cost, schedule, benefits, performance, and risks of its investments. Third, FAA lacks a post-implementation evaluation process for assessing projects’ outcomes and feeding lessons learned back into the selection and control phases for future projects. However, the cost data used in FAA’s selection process are of questionable reliability. First, AMS does not require the validation of all data used in the selection process. FAA Has Not Fully Implemented Its Process for Establishing and Tracking Key Project Baselines
To control its projects at the agencywide level, FAA relies on periodic reviews of each project’s acquisition program baseline, which, as noted earlier, is a document that establishes a project’s cost, schedule, benefits, and performance boundaries and is intended to be used to monitor a project’s status in achieving those baselines. This, in turn, restricts the ability of FAA’s senior management to make sound decisions about continuing the agency’s investments. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) modernization investment management approach as carried out through the Acquisition Management System (AMS), focusing on the extent to which FAA, through AMS: (1) has established a structured approach for selecting and controlling its investments; (2) incorporates all investments, including those in operation, in the agency's portfolio; and (3) selects, controls, and evaluates its investments with complete and reliable information.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) AMS is a good first step in establishing a structured investment management approach for selecting and controlling the agency's investments; (2) the system contains a set of policies, procedures, and reporting requirements to analyze mission needs, assess the affordability of proposed projects, and establish life-cycle costs, schedules, benefits, and performance baselines to control the performance of the projects that are selected; (3) under this system, a senior management investment review group makes key decisions about which investments best meet the agency's needs and are to be funded; (4) however, the system is not comprehensive in that it does not incorporate all of FAA's projects into a complete strategic investment portfolio; (5) key decisionmaking processes and requirements of AMS are applied only to proposed projects and those under development but not to projects already in operation; (6) agency officials have not yet developed a sound estimate of the costs to operate projects and these costs are not included in the agency's financial plan for modernization; (7) because FAA does not apply the same scrutiny to all of its projects, senior officials are unable to fully assess and make trade-offs about the relative merits of spending funds to develop new systems, to enhance current systems, or to continue operating and maintaining existing systems; (8) AMS does not provide complete and reliable information for selecting, controlling, and evaluating the agency's investments; (9) the cost data used to select projects are of questionable reliability because of weaknesses in FAA's cost estimating practices and processes and the lack of a cost accounting system; (10) the information used to control projects is incomplete since FAA has not fully implemented an effective process for controlling the baselines for the costs, schedules, benefits, performance, and risks of its investments; (11) FAA has approved the baseline information for only half of the required universe of projects, and the agency's processes for tracking actual performance against estimates frequently has provided incomplete information; and (12) FAA lacks information needed to evaluate its investments since AMS does not have a post-implementation evaluation process for assessing projects' outcomes and feeding lessons learned back into the selection and control phases to help improve its management of future projects. |
gao_GAO-13-437 | gao_GAO-13-437_0 | The registration and subsequent LD-2 reports contain the following elements, if applicable: the name of the organization, lobbying firm, or self-employed individual that is lobbying on that client’s behalf; a list of individuals who acted as lobbyists on behalf of the client during the reporting period; whether any lobbyists served as covered executive branch or legislative branch covered officials in the previous 20 years; the name of and further information about the client, including a general description of its business or activities; information on the specific lobbying issue areas and corresponding general issue codes used to describe lobbying activities; any foreign entities that have an interest in the client; whether the client is a state or local government; information on which federal agencies and houses of Congress the lobbyist contacted on behalf of the client during the reporting period; the amount of income related to lobbying activities received from the client (or expenses for organizations with in-house lobbyists) during the quarter rounded to the nearest $10,000; and a list of constituent organizations that contribute more than $5,000 for lobbying in a quarter and actively participate in planning, supervising, or controlling lobbying activities, if the client is a coalition or association. The LDA, as amended, also requires lobbyists to report certain contributions semiannually in the LD-203 report. Documentation to Support Some LD-2 Report Elements Varied, but Most Newly Registered Lobbyists Met Disclosure Reporting Requirements
Lobbyists Provided Documentation for Most LD-2 Reports, but Documentation for Some Report Elements Did Not Match Their Disclosure Reports
As in our prior reviews, most lobbyists reporting $5,000 or more in income or expenses were able to provide documentation to varying degrees for the reporting elements in their disclosure reports. Based on our analysis, we estimate that a minimum of 15 percent of all LD-2 reports did not properly disclose one or more previously held covered positions compared to 11 percent for 2011 and 9 percent for 2010. Lobbyists for an estimated 85 percent (85 of 100) of LD-2 reports filed year-end 2011 or midyear 2012 LD-203 contribution reports for all lobbyists and lobbying firms listed on the report as required. We estimate that overall, a minimum of 6 percent of reports failed to disclose one or more contributions. This is a match rate of 90 percent of registrations, which is consistent with our prior reviews. Most lobbyists we interviewed rated the terms associated with LD-2 reporting requirements as “very easy” or “somewhat easy” to understand with regard to meeting their reporting requirements. U.S. Attorney’s Office Actions to Enforce the LDA
The Office’s Authorities, Processes, and Resources to Enforce LDA Compliance
The Office stated that it has sufficient authority and resources to enforce compliance with LDA requirements, including imposing civil or criminal penalties for noncompliance. Noncompliance of LDA reporting requirements refers to the lobbying firm’s failure to file its quarterly LD-2 disclosure reports and semiannual LD-203 reports on certain political contributions by the filing deadline. Officials reported that for the 2012 reporting period, the Office sent demand letters, made phone contacts or sent emails to eight registrants on the chronic offenders list. Four of the registrants filed the outstanding reports or terminated their registration after being contacted by an Assistant U.S. Attorney. Additionally, in September 2012, the Office reached settlement agreements with two of the registrants from the chronic offenders list. One firm agreed to pay $50,000 and the other $30,000 in civil penalties for repeatedly failing to file disclosure reports. As of March 2013, both firms have paid the fines in full and complied fully with their outstanding and ongoing reporting requirements. As of March 5, 2013, the two registrants have not responded to the demand letters. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to the Attorney General for review and comment. The Assistant U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia responded on behalf of the Attorney General that the Department of Justice had no comments. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Consistent with the audit mandates in the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act (HLOGA), our objectives were to determine the extent to which lobbyists are able to demonstrate compliance with the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 as amended (LDA) by providing documentation to support information contained on registrations and reports filed under the LDA; identify challenges and potential improvements to compliance, if any; and describe the resources and authorities available to the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia (the Office) and the efforts the Office has made to improve enforcement of the LDA. We used the House database for sampling LD-2 reports from the third and fourth quarters of calendar year 2011and the first and second quarters of calendar year 2012, as well as for sampling year-end 2011 and midyear 2012 political contributions (LD-203) reports and finally for matching quarterly registrations with filed reports. | Why GAO Did This Study
HLOGA requires lobbyists to file quarterly lobbying disclosure reports and semiannual reports on certain political contributions. HLOGA also requires that GAO annually (1) audit the extent to which lobbyists can demonstrate compliance with disclosure requirements, (2) identify challenges to compliance that lobbyists report, and (3) describe the resources and authorities available to the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia and the efforts the Office has made to improve its enforcement of the LDA, as amended. This is GAO's sixth report under the mandate.
GAO reviewed a stratified random sample of 100 quarterly disclosure LD-2 reports filed for the third and fourth quarters of calendar year 2011 and the first and second quarters of calendar year 2012. GAO also reviewed two random samples totaling 160 LD-203 reports from year-end 2011 and midyear 2012. This methodology allowed GAO to generalize to the population of 49,286 disclosure reports with $5,000 or more in lobbying activity and 31,894 reports of federal political campaign contributions. GAO also met with officials from the Office to obtain updated statuses on the Office's efforts to focus resources on lobbyists who fail to comply.
GAO provided a draft of this report to the Attorney General for review and comment. The Assistant U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia responded on behalf of the Attorney General that the Department of Justice had no comments on the draft of this report.
What GAO Found
Most lobbyists were able to provide documentation to demonstrate compliance with the disclosure requirements of the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 (LDA), as amended by the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007 (HLOGA). For lobbying disclosure reports (LD-2), GAO estimates that
97 percent could provide documentation to support reported income and expenses;
74 percent of the reported income and expenses were properly rounded to the nearest $10,000;
85 percent filed year-end 2011 or midyear 2012 federal political campaign (LD-203) reports as required; and
a minimum of 15 percent of all LD-2 reports did not properly disclose formerly held covered positions as required. The LDA defines several types of covered positions, including members of Congress and their staff and certain executive branch officials.
These findings are consistent with reviews from prior years.
For LD-203 reports, GAO estimates that a minimum of 6 percent of all LD-203 reports omitted one or more reportable political contributions that were documented in the Federal Election Commission (FEC) database. Twenty-eight lobbyists in GAO's sample, compared to17 last year, stated that they planned to amend their lobbying registration (LD-1) or LD-2 report following GAO's review to correct one or more data elements. Of these, 19 lobbyists had filed an amended report as of March 2013.
The majority of newly registered lobbyists filed LD-2 reports as required. Lobbyists are required to file LD-2 reports for the quarter in which they first register. GAO could identify corresponding reports on file for lobbying activity for 90 percent of registrants, which is similar to last year's findings.
Most lobbyists in our sample rated the terms associated with LD-2 reporting as "very easy" or "somewhat easy" to understand with regard to meeting their reporting requirements. However, a few cited challenges to complying with the LDA, as amended, such as differentiating between lobbying and non-lobbying activities.
The U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia (the Office) stated that it has sufficient authority and resources to enforce compliance with LDA requirements, including imposing civil or criminal penalties for noncompliance. Officials reported that during the 2012 reporting period, the Office took steps to pursue legal action, made phone contacts, or sent emails to eight registrants that had been repeatedly referred for failure to file required disclosure reports. Four of the registrants filed the outstanding reports or terminated their registration after being contacted by an Assistant U.S. Attorney. Additionally, in September 2012, the Office reached settlement agreements with two of the registrants for $50,000 and $30,000 in civil penalties. As of March 2013, both firms have paid their fines in full and complied with their ongoing reporting requirements. In February 2013, the Office sent demand letters to the two other registrants who, as of March 2013, have not responded. |
gao_GAO-12-623 | gao_GAO-12-623_0 | Even though DOD has not used the draft since 1973, DOD officials told us that the Selective Service System provides a low-cost insurance policy in case a draft is ever necessary and a structure and organization that would help ensure the equity and credibility of a draft should one be authorized and implemented. The Selective Service System also offers capabilities that are hard to quantify in terms of dollars, including its structure of unpaid volunteers who could be activated as soon as a draft is implemented and its no-cost agreements with civilian organizations that have agreed to supply jobs to conscientious objectors. Selective Service System officials expressed concern that, as currently resourced, they cannot meet DOD’s requirements to deliver inductees without jeopardizing the fairness and equity of the draft. The lack of an updated requirement from DOD presents challenges to policymakers for determining whether the Selective Service System is properly resourced or necessary. While DOD officials stated that the 1994 manpower requirement may still be valid, without an updated assessment of requirements for the Selective Service System, policymakers cannot be certain whether the resources to support the Selective Service System are necessary to meet DOD’s manpower needs, whether the Selective Service System is prepared to supply the skills most critical to DOD in the 21st century, or whether the Selective Service System is necessary at all. Selective Service System Said It Is Not Resourced to Meet DOD’s Requirements but Provides a Structure That Could Be Used for a Fair and Equitable Draft
According to official spokespersons for the Selective Service System, the agency is not currently resourced to meet DOD’s requirement for it to deliver the first inductees in 193 days and 100,000 inductees in 210 days, without jeopardizing the fairness and equity of the draft. If a draft occurred, the Selective Service System is also required to manage a 2-year program of alternative civilian service for conscientious objectors. Restructuring or Disestablishing the Selective Service System Requires Consideration of Fiscal and National Security Implications
Restructuring or disestablishing the Selective Service System would require consideration of various fiscal and national security implications, some of which may be difficult to quantify. Terminating the Selective Service System would also require amending the Military Selective Service Act and potentially other laws involving the Selective Service System. Since that time, the security environment and the national security strategy have changed significantly. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help ensure that DOD and Congress have visibility over the necessity of the Selective Service System to meeting DOD’s needs, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to take the following two actions: (1) evaluate DOD’s requirements for the Selective Service System in light of recent strategic guidance and report the results of this evaluation to Congress and (2) establish a process of periodically reevaluating DOD’s requirements for the Selective Service System in light of changing threats, operating environments, and strategic guidance. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD agreed with our recommendations and noted its plans for implementation. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) has evaluated the necessity of the Selective Service System to meeting DOD’s future manpower requirements in excess of the all-volunteer force, we analyzed documentation and information obtained from interviews with relevant officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, Office of Management and Budget, and Selective Service System. To review the fiscal and national security considerations of various alternatives to the Selective Service System, we obtained cost estimates from Selective Service System officials for two scenarios involving reducing or eliminating the Selective Service System: (1) disestablishing the Selective Service System and (2) placing the agency in a standby mode while having it continue to register potential draftees. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Selective Service System is an independent agency in the executive branch. Its responsibilities include maintaining a database that will enable it to provide manpower to DOD in a national emergency, managing a program for conscientious objectors to satisfy their obligations through a program of civilian service, and ensuring the capability to register and induct medical personnel if directed to do so. Section 597 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (Pub. L. No. 112-81) requires that GAO assess the military necessity of the Selective Service System and examine alternatives to its current structure. Specifically, GAO (1) determined the extent to which DOD has evaluated the necessity of the Selective Service System to meeting DODs future manpower requirements beyond the all-volunteer force and (2) reviewed the fiscal and national security considerations of various alternatives to the Selective Service System. GAO reviewed legislation, analyzed relevant documents, verified cost data provided by the Selective Service System, and interviewed DOD, Office of Management and Budget, and Selective Service System officials.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense (DOD) has not recently evaluated the necessity of the Selective Service System to meeting DODs future manpower requirements for carrying out the defense strategy or reexamined time frames for inducting personnel in the event of a draft. DOD officials told GAO that the Selective Service System provides a low-cost insurance policy in case a draft is ever necessary. The Selective Service System maintains a structure that would help ensure the equity and credibility of a draft. For example, the Selective Service System manages the registration of males aged 18 through 25 and maintains no-cost agreements with organizations that would offer alternative service to conscientious objectors. The Selective Service System also has unpaid volunteers who could be activated as soon as a draft is enacted to review claims for deferment. However, DOD has not used the draft since 1973, and because of its reliance and emphasis on the all-volunteer force, DOD has not reevaluated requirements for the Selective Service System since 1994, although significant changes to the national security environment have occurred since that time. Periodically reevaluating an agencys requirements is critical to helping ensure that resources are appropriately matched to requirements that represent todays environment. Selective Service System officials expressed concern that, as currently resourced, they cannot meet DODs requirements to deliver inductees without jeopardizing the fairness and equity of the draft. However, the lack of an updated requirement from DOD presents challenges to policymakers for determining whether the Selective Service System is properly resourced or necessary.
Restructuring or disestablishing the Selective Service System would require consideration of various fiscal and national security implications. GAO reviewed data on costs and savings associated with maintaining the Selective Service Systems current operations, operating in a deep standby mode with active registration, and disestablishing the Selective Service System altogether.
If Congress disestablishes the Selective Service System it would need to amend the Military Selective Service Act and potentially other laws involving the Selective Service System. There are also limitations that would need to be considered if Selective Service System functions were transferred to another agency. Selective Service System officials said that while other databases could be used for a registration database, these databases might not lead to a fair and equitable draft because they would not be as complete and would therefore put some portions of the population at a higher risk of being drafted than others.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD (1) evaluate its requirements for the Selective Service System in light of recent strategic guidance and (2) establish a process of periodically reevaluating these requirements. In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD agreed with the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-04-430 | gao_GAO-04-430_0 | Agencies Generally Have Not Taken Advantage of Opportunities to Obtain Savings
Although we found some initiatives under way to obtain vendor discounts from major purchase card vendors, agencies generally had not seized opportunities to obtain more favorable prices on purchase card buys— opportunities that could yield hundreds of millions of dollars in savings. Agency efforts to obtain more favorable prices for purchase cardholders had generally been limited to a few agencywide agreements with major vendors—that is, vendors with whom an agency spent $1 million or more in fiscal year 2002. As a result, cardholders often paid higher prices than necessary. Second, some agency discount agreements covered a limited range of products and therefore did not provide cardholders more favorable prices on all the items they purchase from a vendor. However, most of the guidance and training programs did not provide cardholders with practical information to help them get better pricing by using Schedule contracts or agency discount agreements, as in the following examples. Given the range of savings under discount agreements currently in place with major vendors (8 to 35 percent) at the agencies we reviewed, a conservative approach indicates that, if these agencies were to achieve savings of just 10 percent on their purchase card expenditures with major vendors, annual savings of $300 million could be realized. Lack of Management Focus Has Limited Efforts to Capture Savings
The primary reason that agencies have not taken advantage of potential opportunities to capture savings through the purchase card program is the lack of management focus on this issue. Further, OMB has not leveraged its governmentwide oversight role by collecting and disseminating information on the successful initiatives some agencies have undertaken. Despite these concerns, some agencies have been able to leverage purchasing power while providing opportunities for small businesses, as highlighted in the following examples. For example, we obtained from the banks a listing of all fiscal year 2002 purchase card transactions for each agency we reviewed. Recommendations for Executive Action
We are making the following eight recommendations to OMB, GSA, and the agencies we reviewed: To focus governmentwide management attention on taking advantage of opportunities to achieve savings on purchase card buys, we recommend that the director of OMB take the following two actions: Require agencies to report—either through the current quarterly reports or another mechanism—on the steps they are taking to leverage their purchase card buys in areas such as negotiating discount agreements with major purchase card vendors, implementing initiatives to better inform cardholders of opportunities to achieve savings, conducting analyses to identify such opportunities, and assessing, through mechanisms such as vendor reports, whether cardholders are taking advantage of savings opportunities. To assist agencies in identifying opportunities to achieve savings on purchase card buys and to facilitate cardholder access to discounted prices, we recommend that the administrator of GSA direct the purchase card program manager to take the following three actions continue efforts to improve reporting by the banks that provide purchase cards so that GSA will have the data it needs—including basic information such as top vendors and level 3 data where feasible—to assist agencies in effectively identifying opportunities to leverage their purchasing power; work with GSA’s acquisition center contracting officers to pursue point-of-sale discounts with large vendors; and as part of the existing cross-agency forums for purchase card discussions, encourage agencies to share information on their successes in leveraging the purchase card to obtain better prices as well as strategies for overcoming challenges that could hinder agencies’ ability to achieve purchase card savings. We also performed our work at the Departments of Agriculture, Defense (DOD), the Interior, Justice, Transportation, and Veterans Affairs. Discounts offered under these agreements varied—for example, 8 percent under an Interior agreement for desktop computers, 10 percent under an Agriculture agreement for office supplies, and 35 percent under an Interior agreement for laptop computers. Nonetheless, we believe it is reasonable to anticipate that the federal government could save hundreds of millions of dollars if agencies negotiated discounts with major purchase card vendors. 11, 2003). 21, 2003). | Why GAO Did This Study
From 1994 to 2003, the use of government purchase cards exploded from $1 billion to $16 billion. Most purchase card transactions are for small purchases, less than $2,500. While agencies estimate that using purchase cards saves hundreds of millions of dollars in administrative costs, the rapid growth of the purchase card presents opportunities for agencies to negotiate discounts with major vendors, thereby better leveraging agencies' buying power. To discover whether agencies were doing this, we examined program management and cardholder practices at the Departments of Agriculture, Army, Navy, Air Force, Interior, Justice, Transportation, and Veterans Affairs. GAO also examined why agencies may not have explored these opportunities.
What GAO Found
Although some agencies have begun to take actions to achieve savings through their purchase card programs, most have not identified and taken advantage of opportunities to obtain more favorable prices on purchase card buys--opportunities that could yield hundreds of millions of dollars in savings. For example, most agencies have established some discount agreements with major purchase card vendors (those vendors with whom they did more than $1 million in purchase card business in fiscal year 2002), but these agreements cover only a few of the hundreds of major vendors and a limited number of products. Further, because agency purchase card training programs lack practical information to help cardholders take advantage of existing discount agreements or GSA's Federal Supply Schedule contracts, cardholders paid higher prices than necessary. The agencies that have taken steps to obtain better prices by negotiating discounts with their major vendors have achieved notable savings on purchase card buys. For example, in fiscal year 2003, the Agriculture Department negotiated a discount agreement for office supplies that yielded savings of $1.8 million--about 10 percent off Schedule contract prices--and the Interior Department recently negotiated agreements with information technology vendors for discounts up to 35 percent off Schedule prices. A conservative approach indicates that, if the agencies we reviewed obtained discounts of only 10 percent with their major vendors, annual savings of up to $300 million could be achieved. Most agencies have not more aggressively pursued savings through the purchase card because of a lack of management focus--simply put, this issue has not been the center of attention for managers. Further, the Office of Management and Budget has not leveraged its governmentwide oversight role by collecting and disseminating information on the successful initiatives some agencies have undertaken. Agency officials also expressed concerns that imposing additional requirements on cardholders would undermine the program's intent to streamline acquisitions and that pursuing discount agreements with large suppliers would limit their ability to provide opportunities for small businesses. They also cited poor data as a barrier to identifying savings opportunities. However, as individual agencies have demonstrated, these concerns are not insurmountable. For example, the Air Force's Air Mobility Command provides its cardholders a list of community vendors--many of which are small businesses--that offer discounts, making it easy for the cardholders to obtain discounts from local small businesses. Despite data limitations, information such as vendor sales reports could be used to identify major vendors with whom to pursue discount agreements and to provide insight into cardholder activity. |
gao_GAO-08-408 | gao_GAO-08-408_0 | In addition, the Army is struggling to synchronize the schedules and capabilities of numerous essential complementary programs with the FCS program. This assessment should provide an objective technical opinion regarding the status of FCS critical technologies, enabling more knowledgeable decisions at the 2009 milestone review. Ideally, this review, which confirms that a design performs as expected, occurs about halfway through a program’s development schedule. Production Commitments Are Planned to Be Made Early Despite Late Demonstration of FCS Capabilities
While the FCS low-rate production decision for the core FCS program is to be held in fiscal year 2013, in fact, production commitments are planned to begin in fiscal years 2008 and 2009 with production for the first of a series of three planned spin out efforts and the early versions of the NLOS-C vehicle. As noted previously, key demonstrations of FCS capabilities will not yet have taken place. As seen in figure 6 below, this commitment to NLOS-C production comes 5 years before the Army plans to produce the core FCS program in 2013. Advance procurement funding for the first full suite of FCS systems will begin in fiscal year 2011, the budget for which will be presented to Congress in February 2010—less than a year after the milestone review and before the stability of the FCS design is assessed at the critical design review. As LSI, Boeing’s role is multifaceted: it is a partner with the Army in developing requirements and defining the FCS solution; it is overseeing the development efforts of all of the individual system subcontractors, a role that will extend well beyond the 2013 production decision; it is responsible for developing two key software products—the system-of-systems common operating environment, the core of the FCS network, and the Warfighter Machine Interface; it is the prime contractor for the production of spin outs and the NLOS-C; and now it is to be responsible for the low-rate production of the first three combat brigades of FCS core systems. FCS Costs Likely to Be Higher Than Current Army Estimate
The Army’s $160.9 billion cost estimate for the FCS program is largely unchanged from last year’s estimate despite a program adjustment that reduced the number of FCS systems from 18 to 14. Given the program’s relative immaturity in terms of technology and requirements definition, there is not a firm foundation for a confident cost estimate. The Army maintains that when it becomes necessary, it will further reduce FCS content to keep development costs within available funding levels. Should the higher cost estimates prove correct, the Army will have to make significant changes in planned capabilities to absorb the higher program costs. We have previously reported that the Army’s estimates are limited by the low level of knowledge in the FCS program today. As it is currently structured, the Army is planning to make substantial financial investments in the FCS program before key knowledge is gained on requirements, technologies, system designs, and system performance. By the time of the low-rate initial production decision for the core program in 2013, the Army expects that a total of $39.1 billion will have been appropriated and another $8 billion requested for FCS. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To develop the information on the Future Combat System program that we used to assess (1) how the definition, development, and demonstration of FCS capabilities is proceeding, particularly in light of the go/no-go decision scheduled for 2009; (2) the Army’s plans for making production commitments for FCS and any risks relative to the completion of development; and (3) the estimated costs for developing and producing FCS and risks the Army faces in both meeting the estimate and providing commensurate funding, we interviewed officials at the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics); the Secretary of Defense’s Cost Analysis Improvement Group; the Institute for Defense Analyses; the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command; the Future Force Integration Directorate; the Army Evaluation Task Force; the Army Test and Evaluation Command; the Director of the Combined Test Organization; the Program Manager for the Future Combat System (Brigade Combat Team); the Future Combat System LSI; and LSI One Team Partners. Examples include components that are not yet integrated or representative. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Future Combat System (FCS) program--which comprises 14 integrated weapon systems and an advanced information network--is the centerpiece of the Army's effort to transition to a lighter, more agile, and more capable combat force. The substantial technical challenges, the Army's acquisition strategy, and the cost of the program are among the reasons why the program is recognized as needing special oversight and review. Section 211 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 requires GAO to report annually on the FCS program. This report includes an examination of (1) how the definition, development, and demonstration of FCS capabilities are proceeding, particularly in light of the go/no-go decision scheduled for 2009; (2) the Army's plans for making production commitments for FCS and any risks related to the completion of development; and (3) the estimated costs for developing and producing FCS.
What GAO Found
The progress made during the year by the FCS program, in terms of knowledge gained, is commensurate with a program in early development. Yet, the knowledge demonstrated thus far is well short of a program halfway through its development schedule and its budget. This portends additional cost increases and delays as FCS begins what is traditionally the most expensive and problematic phase of development. Thus, FCS's demonstrated performance, as well as the reasonableness of its remaining resources, will be paramount at the 2009 milestone review for the FCS program. In the key areas of defining and developing FCS capabilities, requirements definition and preliminary designs are proceeding but not yet complete; critical technologies are immature; complementary programs are not yet synchronized; and the remaining acquisition strategy is very ambitious. Beginning in 2008, the Army plans to make a series of commitments to produce FCS-related systems in advance of the low-rate production decision for the FCS core program in 2013. In general, production commitments are planned before key information is available. In 2008 and 2009, the Army plans to begin funding production of the first of three planned spin outs of FCS technologies to current forces. However, its commitment to the first spin out may be made before testing is complete. Also starting in 2008, the Army intends to commit to production of early versions of the Non-Line-of-Sight Cannon. This commitment is being made to respond to congressional direction to field the cannon. FCS technologies, network, and designs are not yet mature enough for production, and thus the cannons produced will not be deployable without significant modifications. Advance procurement funding for the first full suite of FCS systems will begin in fiscal year 2011, the budget for which will be presented to Congress in February 2010--less than a year after the milestone review and before the stability of the FCS design is assessed at the critical design review. In addition, the Army plans to commit to using Boeing, its lead system integrator, for the early production of FCS systems through the initial production phase of the FCS system of systems. By the time of the production decision in 2013, $39 billion will have already been invested in FCS, with another $8 billion requested. Thus, while demonstration of the FCS's capability falls late in the schedule, commitments to production are likely to come early--an untenable situation for decision makers. The Army's $160.9 billion cost estimate for the FCS program is largely the same as last year's but yields less content as the number of FCS systems has since been reduced from 18 to 14. There is not a firm foundation of knowledge for a confident cost estimate. Also, two independent cost assessments are significantly higher than the Army's estimate. However, the Army maintains that it will further reduce FCS content to stay within its development cost ceiling. Should the higher cost estimates prove correct, it seems unlikely that the Army could reduce FCS content enough to stay within the current funding constraints while still delivering a capability that meets requirements. |
gao_GAO-05-219 | gao_GAO-05-219_0 | The primary purpose of these programs is to use a court’s authority to reduce crime by changing defendants’ substance abuse behavior. Our analysis of evaluations reporting recidivism data for 23 programs showed that lower percentages of drug court program participants than comparison group members were rearrested or reconvicted. Completion rates, which refer to the number of individuals who successfully completed a drug court program as a percentage of the total number admitted, in the programs we reviewed that assessed completion ranged from 27 to 66 percent. No other program factor, such as the severity of the sanction that would be invoked if participants failed to complete the program and the manner in which judges conducted status hearings, predicted participants’ program completion. A limited number of evaluations in our review discussed the costs and benefits of adult drug court programs. Four evaluations of seven drug court programs provided sufficient cost and benefit data to estimate their net benefits (that is, the benefits minus costs). However, all seven programs yielded positive net benefits, primarily from reductions in recidivism affecting both judicial system costs and avoided costs to potential victims. Financial cost savings for the criminal justice system (taking into account recidivism reductions) were found in two of the seven programs. These results are consistent with those of past reviews of drug court evaluations. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act requires that we assess drug court program effectiveness. Our objectives were to assess the results of methodologically sound, published empirical evaluations of adult drug court programs, particularly relating to (1) recidivism outcomes of participants and other comparable offenders, (2) substance use relapse of participants and other comparable offenders, (3) program completion of participants, and (4) costs and benefits of drug court programs. The quasi-experiments used one of two types of comparison groups: historical comparison group—formed from individuals who received conventional case processing during a period of time shortly before the drug court program was implemented and contemporaneous comparison group—formed from defendants (1) who were eligible for drug court but received conventional case processing during the same time period as the drug court program participants, (2) who were from a district within a court’s jurisdiction from which arrestees were not eligible to participate in the drug court program, or (3) who had similar charges and were matched on characteristics. Appendix V: Drug Court Programs Are Associated with Recidivism Reductions
In most of the evaluations we reviewed, adult drug court programs led to statistically significant recidivism reductions during periods of time that generally corresponded to the length of the drug court program—that is, within-program. In most of the programs that reported post-program data, recidivism reductions occurred for some period of time after participants completed the drug court program. The specific types of substance abuse treatment provided to participants differ among programs. Appendix VI: Limited and Mixed Evidence on Drug Court Programs’ Impacts on Substance Use Relapse
Evidence about the effectiveness of drug court programs in reducing participants’ substance use relapse is limited and mixed. Drug test results generally showed significant reductions in use during participation in the program, while self-reported results generally showed no significant reductions in use. All Seven Drug Court Programs Reported Positive Net Benefits
Although six of the seven drug court programs were more costly than conventional case processing, the monetary value of the benefits from reduced recidivism—to the justice system and potential victims—was greater than the costs, producing positive net benefits in all seven programs. 27, no. “A Systematic Review of Drug Court Effects on Recidivism.” Forthcoming. | Why GAO Did This Study
Drug court programs, which were established in the late 1980s as a local response to increasing numbers of drug-related cases and expanding jail and prison populations, have become popular nationwide in the criminal justice system. These programs are designed to reduce defendants' repeated crime (that is, recidivism), and substance abuse behavior by engaging them in a judicially monitored substance abuse treatment. However, determining whether drug court programs are effective at reducing recidivism and substance use has been challenging because of a large amount of weak empirical evidence. he 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act requires that GAO assess drug court program effectiveness. To meet this mandate, GAO conducted a systematic review of drug court program research, from which it selected 27 evaluations of 39 adult drug court programs that met its criteria for, among other things, methodological soundness. This report describes the results of that review of published evaluations of adult drug court programs, particularly relating to (1) recidivism outcomes, (2) substance use relapse, (3) program completion, and (4) the costs and benefits of drug court programs. DOJ reviewed a draft of this report and had no comments. Office of National Drug Control Policy reviewed a draft of this report and generally agreed with the findings.
What GAO Found
Most of the adult drug court programs assessed in the evaluations GAO reviewed led to recidivism reductions during periods of time that generally corresponded to the length of the drug court program. GAO's analysis of evaluations reporting these data for 23 programs showed the following: (1) lower percentages of drug court program participants than comparison group members were rearrested or reconvicted; (2) program participants had fewer recidivism events than comparison group members; (3) recidivism reductions occurred for participants who had committed different types of offenses; and (4) there was inconclusive evidence that specific drug court components, such as the behavior of the judge or the amount of treatment received, affected participants' recidivism while in the program. Recidivism reductions also occurred for some period of time after participants completed the drug court program in most of the programs reporting these data. Evidence about the effectiveness of adult drug court programs in reducing participants' substance use relapse is limited to data available from eight drug court programs. Evaluations of these eight drug court programs reported mixed results on substance use relapse. For example, drug test results generally showed significant reductions in use during participation in the program, while self-reported results generally showed no significant reductions in use. Completion rates, which refer to the percentage of individuals who successfully completed a program, in selected adult drug court programs ranged from 27 to 66 percent. Other than participants' compliance with drug court program procedures, no other program factor (such as the severity of the sanction that would be invoked if participants failed to complete the program) consistently predicted participants' program completion. A limited number of evaluations--four evaluations of seven adult drug court programs--provided sufficient cost and benefit data to estimate their net benefits. Although the cost of six of these programs was greater than the costs to provide criminal justice services to the comparison group, all seven programs yielded positive net benefits, primarily from reductions in recidivism affecting judicial system costs and avoided costs to potential victims. Financial cost savings for the criminal justice system (taking into account recidivism reductions) were found in two of the seven programs. |
gao_GAO-13-427 | gao_GAO-13-427_0 | To achieve U.S.
U.S. Officials Experience Delays in Obtaining Pakistani Visas, Which Disrupt Implementation and Oversight of U.S. Assistance to Pakistan
Available agency data show that U.S. officials experience delays in the issuance of both visas for travel to Pakistan and visa extensions, which have affected the implementation and oversight of U.S. assistance to Pakistan. Agencies reported that these delays affect the implementation of U.S. programs in multiple ways—for example, creating staffing gaps for critical embassy positions and necessitating the cancellation of training to assist the Pakistani government in areas such as antiterrorism and counternarcotics. According to the Pakistani embassy, and as reported by State, the embassy’s policy is to issue visas for U.S. officials within 6 weeks of their application date. However, about 18 percent of the visas took longer than 6 weeks to be issued, with approximately 3 percent taking 16 weeks or longer. U.S. officials also experience delays in obtaining visa extensions after arrival in Pakistan. Approximately 59 percent of these visa extensions took longer than 6 weeks to be issued, with approximately 5 percent taking 16 weeks or longer. Officials from DOD, DOJ, State, USAID, and the U.S. embassy in Islamabad said that they receive little specific information from Pakistan on the reasons for visa delays. State noted that visas for approximately 40 Regional Security Officers and Marine Security Guards were significantly delayed, some for as long as 9 months. Visa delays also slow program implementation. Agencies Have Taken Various Steps to Address Pakistani Visa Delays, but Reporting on These Delays Could Be Improved
Agencies have taken various steps to address Pakistani visa delays, but reporting to Congress does not provide comprehensive information on the risk of visa delays government-wide. According to officials, agencies have taken various steps to manage visa delays and their effects. For instance, State has conducted high-level discussions with the Pakistani government regarding visa delays, and agencies affected by Pakistani visa delays have shifted training to other countries. State has reported visa delays as a challenge to the implementation of its programs. However, State’s reports do not include information regarding the risks of visa delays to the human resources of other agencies, although components of DOD, DOJ, and USAID told us that they had experienced staffing gaps caused by visa delays. Reporting comprehensive information about the risks of visa delays could provide a more complete picture of the challenges to implementing U.S. assistance and better inform any potential diplomatic discussions between the United States and Pakistan regarding delays. Reporting to Congress Does Not Provide Comprehensive Information on the Risks of Pakistani Visa Delays Government-wide
In reporting to Congress, State has not provided comprehensive information on the risks of Pakistani visa delays government-wide. The Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009 requires State, in consultation with DOD, to identify and report on a semiannual basis to Congress about risks to effective use and oversight of U.S funds to Pakistan, including any shortfall in U.S. human resources, among other things. Without comprehensive reporting about the risks of visa delays and related staffing gaps, State’s reporting to Congress may not provide a complete picture of the challenges the United States faces in managing and overseeing U.S. assistance to Pakistan, and agencies may lack information that could help them manage such risks. Conclusions
Although the United States invested more than $26 billion in fiscal years 2002 through 2012 to assist the government of Pakistan, U.S. officials applying for Pakistani visas continue to face delays that they have identified as disrupting their efforts to provide assistance. Recommendation for Executive Action
To improve the information provided to Congress and to inform potential diplomatic discussions, we recommend that the Secretary of State consult with U.S. agencies engaged in providing assistance to Pakistan to obtain information on Pakistani visa delays and include this information in State’s future reporting to Congress. In addition, we are encouraged that our report prompted State to develop new procedures to enhance its tracking of visa applications government-wide. Specifically, we examined (1) the extent to which U.S. officials experience delays obtaining Pakistani visas and the effects of these delays and (2) steps U.S. agencies have taken to address Pakistani visa delays. To evaluate the extent to which U.S. officials experience delays obtaining Pakistani visas, and the effects of these delays, we collected available data on processing times for official and diplomatic visa applications to Pakistan in fiscal years 2010 through 2012 from DOD’s Office of the Defense Representative Pakistan, DOJ’s Federal Bureau of Investigation, State’s Special Issuance Agency and Orientation and In-Processing Center, and USAID’s Office of Afghanistan and Pakistan Affairs. Combating Terrorism: U.S. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pakistan is a key U.S. partner in the effort to combat terrorism and violent extremism. In fiscal years 2002 through 2012, Pakistan received more than $26 billion in U.S. funding. To travel to Pakistan to implement and oversee programs, U.S. officials are required to obtain a Pakistani visa and, depending on the length of their stay, may need to apply for a visa extension once in Pakistan. U.S. officials have expressed concerns about delays in obtaining Pakistani visas. Congress has also expressed interest in receiving information on Pakistani visa delays, such as requiring that State and DOD certify information regarding timely issuance of visas to officials before providing or reimbursing certain funding for Pakistan.
GAO was asked to review issues related to visa delays. This report examines (1) the extent to which U.S. officials experience delays obtaining Pakistani visas and the effects of these delays and (2) steps U.S. agencies have taken to address Pakistani visa delays. GAO analyzed data on visa wait times, reviewed planning documents, and met with officials from DOD, DHS, DOJ, State, and USAID.
What GAO Found
U.S. officials have experienced delays in obtaining Pakistani visas that disrupt the delivery and oversight of U.S. assistance to Pakistan. According to Pakistani Consular Services, and as confirmed by the Department of State (State), the goal of the embassy of Pakistan is to issue visas for U.S. officials within 6 weeks. GAO's analysis of data provided by State, the Departments of Defense (DOD) and Justice (DOJ), and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) found that U.S. officials experience delays in the issuance of both visas to travel to Pakistan and visa extensions. For instance, GAO found that of about 4,000 issued visas, approximately 18 percent took more than 6 weeks, with approximately 3 percent taking 16 weeks or longer. Moreover, of approximately 2,200 visa extensions, about 59 percent took longer than 6 weeks to be issued, with approximately 5 percent taking 16 weeks or longer. U.S. officials stated that they receive little specific information from Pakistan on the reasons for visa delays, but they noted that visa delays disrupt the effective implementation and oversight of U.S. programs and efficient use of resources in Pakistan. Visa delays also have created staffing gaps for critical embassy positions, such as Regional Security Officers and Marine Security Guards, and have necessitated the cancellation of training to assist the Pakistani government in areas such as antiterrorism, counternarcotics, and law enforcement assistance.
Agencies have taken various steps to address Pakistani visa delays, but reporting to Congress does not provide comprehensive information on the risk of visa delays government-wide. The Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009 requires State to identify and report to Congress on a semiannual basis about risks to effective use and oversight of U.S funds to Pakistan, such as any shortfall in U.S. human resources. In addition, federal standards for internal control state that once agencies identify a risk to their programs, they should collect and analyze information to allow them to develop better approaches to manage it. According to officials, agencies have taken various steps to manage visa delays and their effects. For instance, State has conducted high-level discussions with the Pakistani government regarding visa delays and has reprogrammed $10 million budgeted for antiterrorism trainings in Pakistan, which were canceled due to visa delays, toward other priority initiatives. However, GAO found that State's reporting does not include comprehensive information on the risks of visa delays government-wide. State has reported to Congress that visa delays create challenges to the implementation of its programs in Pakistan. However, State's reports do not include information regarding the risks of visa delays to the human resources of other agencies, although components of DOD, DOJ, and USAID told GAO that they experience staffing gaps caused by visa delays. Reporting comprehensive information about the risks of visa delays could provide a more complete picture of the challenges that the United States faces in managing and overseeing U.S. assistance to Pakistan. More comprehensive reporting may also help to better inform any potential diplomatic discussions between the United States and Pakistan regarding visa delays.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that State consult with U.S. agencies engaged in providing assistance to Pakistan to obtain information on visa delays and include this information in its reporting to Congress. State partially concurred, citing challenges with interagency coordination, but noted that GAO's report has prompted State to improve its tracking of visa applications to Pakistan government-wide. |
gao_GAO-14-65 | gao_GAO-14-65_0 | For fiscal year 2014, federal agencies plan to spend about $82 billion. PortfolioStat is structured around five phases: (1) baseline data gathering in which agencies are required to complete a high-level survey of their IT portfolio status and establish a commodity IT baseline; (2) analysis and proposed action plan in which agencies are to use the data gathered in phase 1 and other available agency data to develop a proposed action plan for consolidating commodity IT; (3) PortfolioStat session in which agencies are required to hold a face-to-face, evidence-based review of their IT portfolio with the Federal Chief Information Officer (CIO) and key stakeholders from the agency to discuss the agency’s portfolio data and proposed action plan, and agree on concrete next steps to rationalize the agency’s IT portfolio that would result in a final plan; (4) final action plan implementation, in which agencies are to, among other things, migrate at least two commodity IT investments; and (5) lessons learned, in which agencies are required to document lessons learned, successes, and challenges. All 26 agencies that were required to implement the PortfolioStat process took actions to address OMB’s requirements. However, there were shortcomings in their implementation of selected requirements, such as addressing all required elements of the final action plan and migrating two commodity areas to a shared service by the end of 2012. However, OMB’s overall estimate of the number of opportunities and cost savings is underreported. Among other things, it does not include the Departments of Defense and Justice because these agencies did not report their plans in the template OMB was using to compile its overall estimate. Our analysis of data collected from the 26 agencies shows that they are reporting 204 opportunities and at least $5.8 billion in savings through fiscal year 2015, at least $3.3 billion more than the number initially reported by OMB. Selected Departments’ Plans Identified Billions in Potential Cost Savings Using Various Processes, but Support for These Savings Is Uneven
In their portfolio improvement plans, the five agencies selected for our review—the Departments of Agriculture, Defense, the Interior, the Treasury, and Veterans Affairs—identified a total of 52 initiatives expected to achieve at least $3.7 billion in potential cost savings or avoidance through fiscal year 2015, as well as several improvements of processes for managing their IT portfolios. More consistently using the processes recommended by OMB could assist agencies in identifying further opportunities for consolidation and shared services. In addition, four agencies did not always provide support for their estimated savings or show how it linked to the estimates. These consolidation opportunities include those classified as Business Systems, IT Infrastructure, and Enterprise IT. In addition, Treasury has yet to develop a valuation model for assessing the value of its IT investments. Until CIOs are able to exercise their full authority, they will be limited in their ability to implement PortfolioStat and other initiatives to improve IT management. Specifically, OMB agreed with the recommendation to require agencies to disclose limitations their CIOs might have in exercising the authorities and responsibilities provided by law and OMB guidance but stated that it had already addressed this issue as part of its fiscal year 2013 PortfolioStat process. We therefore removed the recommendation from the report. In written comments, the Social Security Administration agreed with one recommendation and disagreed with the other. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) determine the status of efforts to implement key required PortfolioStat actions, (2) evaluate selected agencies’ plans for making portfolio improvements and achieving associated cost savings, and (3) evaluate Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB) plans to improve the PortfolioStat process. In addition, to improve the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ implementation of PortfolioStat, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to take the following two actions: In future reporting to OMB, fully describe the following PortfolioStat action plan elements: (1) consolidate commodity IT spending under the agency CIO; (2) target duplicative systems or contracts that support common business functions for consolidation; (3) establish criteria for identifying wasteful, low-value, or duplicative investments; and (4) establish a process to identify these potential investments and a schedule for eliminating them from the portfolio..
Report on the agency’s progress in consolidating eCPIC to a shared service as part of the OMB integrated data collection quarterly reporting until completed. | Why GAO Did This Study
Federal agencies plan to spend at least $82 billion on IT in fiscal year 2014, and GAO has previously reported on challenges in identifying and reducing duplicative IT investments. In 2012, OMB launched its PortfolioStat initiativea process where agencies gather information on their IT investments and develop plans for consolidation and increased use of shared-service delivery models.GAO was asked to review the implementation of PortfolioStat. GAOs objectives were to (1) determine whether agencies completed key required PortfolioStat actions, (2) evaluate selected agencies plans for making portfolio improvements and achieving associated cost savings, and (3) evaluate OMBs plans to improve the PortfolioStat process. To do this, GAO analyzed plans, status reports, and other documentation from agencies and interviewed agency and OMB officials. GAO also interviewed officials and reviewed documentation from five agencies selected based on their IT expenditures and management structures.
What GAO Found
The 26 major federal agencies that were required to participate in the PortfolioStat initiative fully addressed four of seven key requirements established by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). However, only 1 of the 26 agencies addressed all the requirements. For example, agencies did not develop action plans that addressed all elements, such as criteria for identifying wasteful, low-value or duplicative information technology (IT) investments, or migrate two commodity IT areassuch as enterprise IT systems and IT infrastructureto a shared service by the end of 2012.
Further, OMBs estimate of about 100 consolidation opportunities and a potential $2.5 billion in savings from the PortfolioStat initiative is understated because, among other things, it did not include estimates from the Departments of Defense and Justice. GAOs analysis, which includes these estimates, shows that, collectively, the 26 agencies are reporting about 200 opportunities and at least $5.8 billion in potential savings through fiscal year 2015.
Five selected agenciesthe Departments of Agriculture, Defense, the Interior, the Treasury, and Veterans Affairsidentified 52 consolidation initiatives, along with other IT management improvements, and estimated at least $3.7 billion in potential cost savings through fiscal year 2015. However, four agencies did not always provide sufficient support for all of their estimates, and they varied in their use of processessuch as an enterprise architecture and a method for assessing the value of investmentsrecommended by OMB to identify consolidation opportunities. More consistently using these tools may reveal further opportunities for consolidation, and better support for estimated savings may increase the chances that they will be achieved.
OMBs fiscal year 2013 PortfolioStat guidance identifies a number of planned improvements but does not fully address certain weaknesses in the implementation of the initiative, such as limitations in CIOs authority, weaknesses in agencies commodity IT baselines, accountability for migrating selected commodity IT areas, or the information on agencies progress that OMB intends to make public.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is recommending, among other things, that OMB require agencies to fully disclose limitations in CIOs ability to exercise their authority and that 24 agencies take steps to improve their PortfolioStat implementation. OMB agreed with some of the recommendations and disagreed with others; and responses from the 21 agencies commenting on the report varied. GAO continues to believe that the majority of the recommendations are valid, but has removed two, and modified one, as discussed in the report. |
gao_GAO-05-127 | gao_GAO-05-127_0 | According to the Department of Justice, under current law, inclusion on a terrorist watch list is not a stand- alone factor that would prohibit a person from receiving or possessing a firearm. However, the Attorney General and the FBI ultimately are responsible for managing the overall NICS program. Of this total, 35 transactions were allowed to proceed because the background checks found no prohibiting information, such as felony convictions or illegal immigrant status, as shown in table 2. FBI counterterrorism officials told us that receiving all available personal identifying information and other details from terrorism-related NICS transactions could be useful in conducting investigations. Justice noted, however, that information about a NICS transaction can be shared with law enforcement agents or other government agencies in the legitimate pursuit of establishing a match between the prospective gun buyer and a VGTOF record and in the search for information that could prohibit the firearm transfer. Also, most state agency officials told us they were not aware of any restrictions or specific FBI guidance on the types of information that could or could not be shared with counterterrorism officials. As part of routine state audits the FBI conducts every 3 years, the FBI plans to assess the states’ handling of terrorism-related NICS transactions. The primary purpose of the revised procedures is to better ensure that known or suspected members of terrorist organizations who have disqualifying factors do not receive firearms in violation of federal or state law. However, our work revealed that federal and state procedures for handling terrorism-related NICS transactions do not clearly address the specific types of information that can or should be routinely provided to counterterrorism officials or the sources from which such information can be obtained. However, given that these NICS background checks involve known or suspected terrorists who could pose homeland security risks, more frequent FBI oversight or centralized management is needed. Further, more frequent FBI oversight or centralized management would help address other types of issues we identified—such as several states’ delays in implementing procedures and one state’s mishandling of a terrorism- related NICS transaction. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Objectives
Our overall objective was to review how the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS) handles checks of prospective firearms purchasers that hit on and are confirmed to match terrorist watch list records. How many NICS transactions have resulted in valid matches with terrorist watch list records? For valid matches, what are federal and state procedures for sharing NICS-related information with federal counterterrorism officials? Number of NICS Transactions with Valid Matches to Terrorist Watch List Records
To determine the number of NICS transactions that resulted in valid matches with terrorist records in VGTOF—during the period February 3 through June 30, 2004—we interviewed officials from the FBI’s NICS Section and reviewed FBI data. FBI Monitoring of the States’ Handling of NICS Transactions and Issues Encountered by State Agencies
To determine the extent to which the FBI has monitored the states’ handling of NICS transactions involving VGTOF records, we interviewed officials from the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Policy, the FBI’s NICS Section, and state agencies. | Why GAO Did This Study
Membership in a terrorist organization does not prohibit a person from owning a gun under current law. Thus, during presale screening of prospective firearms purchasers, the National Instant Criminal Background Check System historically did not utilize terrorist watch list records. However, for homeland security and other purposes, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and applicable state agencies began receiving notices (effective February 3, 2004) when such screening involved watch lists records. GAO determined (1) how many checks have resulted in valid matches with terrorist watch list records, (2) procedures for providing federal counterterrorism officials relevant information from valid-match background checks, and (3) the extent to which the FBI monitors or audits the states' handling of such checks.
What GAO Found
During the period GAO reviewed--February 3 through June 30, 2004--a total of 44 firearm-related background checks handled by the FBI and applicable state agencies resulted in valid matches with terrorist watch list records. Of this total, 35 transactions were allowed to proceed because the background checks found no prohibiting information, such as felony convictions, illegal immigrant status, or other disqualifying factors. Federal and state procedures--developed and disseminated under the Department of Justice's direction--do not address the specific types of information from valid-match background checks that can or should be provided to federal counterterrorism officials or the sources from which such information can be obtained. Justice officials told GAO that information from the background check system is not to be used for general law enforcement purposes but can be shared with law enforcement agents or other government agencies in the legitimate pursuit of establishing a match between the prospective gun buyer and a terrorist watch list record and in the search for information that could prohibit the firearm transfer. Most state agency personnel GAO contacted were not aware of any restrictions or limitations on providing valid-match information to counterterrorism officials. FBI counterterrorism officials told GAO that routinely receiving all available personal identifying information and other details from valid-match background checks could be useful in conducting investigations. As part of routine audits the FBI conducts every 3 years, the Bureau plans to assess the states' handling of firearm-related background checks involving terrorist watch list records. However, given that these background checks involve known or suspected terrorists who could pose homeland security risks, more frequent FBI oversight or centralized management would help ensure that suspected terrorists who have disqualifying factors do not obtain firearms in violation of the law. The Attorney General and the FBI ultimately are responsible for managing the background check system, although they have yet to assess the states' compliance with applicable procedures for handling terrorism-related checks. Also, more frequent FBI oversight or centralized management would help address other types of issues GAO identified--such as several states' delays in implementing procedures and one state's mishandling of a terrorism-related background check. |
gao_GAO-08-685T | gao_GAO-08-685T_0 | Redesign Implications for Decennial Census Operations
The Decennial Census is at a critical stage in the 2008 Dress Rehearsal, in which the Bureau has its last opportunity to test its plans for 2010 under census-like conditions. The largest field operation of the dress rehearsal was to have begun this month. The redesign approach selected by the Secretary will require that the Bureau quickly develop and test a paper-based nonresponse follow-up operation. Dropping the use of the HHCs for nonresponse follow-up and reverting to paper for that operation this late in the decade also precludes nonresponse follow-up from being fully tested in the dress rehearsal. Field staff experienced difficulties using the technology during the address canvassing dress rehearsal. The Bureau has recently made efforts to further define requirements for the FDCA program, and it has estimated that the revised requirements will result in significant cost increases. On January 16, 2008, the Bureau provided the FDCA contractor with a list of over 400 requirements for the FDCA program to reconcile. Given the redesigning effort, implementing our recommendations associated with managing the IT acquisitions is as critical as ever. Specifically, the Bureau needs to strengthen its acquisition management capabilities, including finalizing FDCA requirements. Further, it also needs to strengthen its risk management activities, including developing adequate risk mitigation plans for significant risks and improving its executive-level governance of these acquisitions. The Bureau also needs to plan and conduct key tests, including end-to-end testing, to help ensure that decennial systems perform as expected. Redesign Implications for Decennial Census Life Cycle Costs
Even without considering the recent expected cost increases announced by the Bureau to accommodate the redesign of the FDCA program, the Bureau’s cost projections for the 2010 Census revealed an escalating trend from the 1970 Census. The Bureau estimated that the 2000 Census would cost around $5 billion. We have repeatedly reported that the Bureau would be challenged to control the cost of the 2010 Census. To manage the 2010 Census and contain costs, we recommended that the Bureau develop a comprehensive, integrated project plan for the 2010 Census that should include the itemized estimated costs of each component, including a sensitivity analysis and an explanation of significant changes in the assumptions on which these costs were based. It included inputs and outputs and described linkages among operations and systems. As the Bureau updates its estimate of the life cycle cost annually and as part of the redesigning effort, it will be important that it reflect changing assumptions for productivity and hours worked. Further, it is essential that the Bureau implement our recommendations related to information technology. The Bureau must solidify the FDCA program requirements, strengthen risk management activities, and plan and conduct critical testing of the Decennial Census systems. The challenges we highlighted today call for effective risk mitigation by the U.S. Census Bureau, and careful monitoring and oversight by the Department of Commerce, the Office of Management and Budget, the Congress, GAO, and other key stakeholders. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2007, the U.S. Census Bureau (Bureau) estimated the 2010 Census would cost $11.5 billion, including $3 billion on automation and technology. At a March hearing, the Department of Commerce (Commerce) stated that the Field Data Collection Automation (FDCA) program was likely to incur significant cost overruns and announced a redesign effort. At that time, GAO designated the 2010 Decennial Census as high risk, citing long-standing concerns in managing information technology (IT) investments and uncertain costs and operations. This testimony is based on past work and work nearing completion, including GAO's observation of the address canvassing dress rehearsal. For IT acquisitions, GAO analyzed system documentation, including deliverables, cost estimates, other acquisitions-related documents, and interviewed Bureau officials and contractors. This testimony describes the implications of redesign for (1) dress rehearsal and decennial operations, (2) IT acquisitions management, and (3) Decennial Census costs.
What GAO Found
The Decennial Census is at a critical stage in the 2008 Dress Rehearsal, in which the Bureau has its last opportunity to test its plans for 2010 under census-like conditions. On April 3, 2008, Commerce announced significant changes to the FDCA program. It also announced that it expected the cost of the decennial to be up to $3 billion greater than previously estimated. The redesign will have fundamental impacts on the dress rehearsal as well as 2010 Census operations. Changes this late in the decade introduce additional risks, making more important the steps the Bureau can take to manage those risks. The content and timing of dress rehearsal operations must be altered to accommodate the Bureau's design. For example, Commerce has selected an option that calls for the Bureau to drop the use of handheld computers (HHCs) during the nonresponse follow-up operation, and the Bureau may now be unable to fully rehearse a paper-based operation. Additionally, reverting to a paper-based nonresponse follow-up operation presents the Bureau with a wide range of additional challenges, such as arranging for the printing of enumerator forms and testing the systems that will read the data from these forms once completed by enumerators. Given the redesign effort, implementing GAO's recommendations associated with managing the IT acquisitions is as critical as ever. Specifically, the Bureau needs to strengthen its acquisition management capabilities, including finalizing FDCA requirements. Further, it also needs to strengthen its risk management activities, including developing risk mitigation plans for significant risks and improving its executive-level governance of these acquisitions. The Bureau also needs to plan and conduct key tests, including end-to-end testing, to help ensure that decennial systems perform as expected. According to the Bureau, the redesign and related revision of the FDCA program is expected to result in significant increases to the life cycle cost estimate for the 2010 Census. Even without considering the recent expected cost increases announced by the Bureau to accompany the redesign of the FDCA program, the Bureau's cost projections for the 2010 Census revealed an escalating trend from previous censuses. Previously, GAO recommended that the Bureau develop an integrated and comprehensive plan to manage operations. Specifically, to understand and manage the assumptions that drive the cost of the decennial census, GAO recommended, among other actions, that the Bureau annually update the cost of the 2010 Census and conduct sensitivity analysis on the $11.5 billion estimate. However, while the Bureau understands the utility of sensitivity analysis, it has not conducted such an analysis. |
gao_GAO-04-1033T | gao_GAO-04-1033T_0 | We agree the intelligence community needs to move from a culture of “need to know” to “need to share.” The 9/11 Commission has made observations regarding information sharing, and recommended procedures to provide incentives for sharing and creating a “trusted information network.” Many Commission recommendations address the need to improve information and intelligence collection, sharing, and analysis within the intelligence community itself. However, reconciling the need to share with actually sharing has been at the heart of the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations and our own findings and observations on practices to improve information sharing. At that time, we recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security work with the heads of other federal agencies and state and local authorities to: incorporate the existing information-sharing guidance that is contained in the various national strategies and information-sharing procedures required by the Homeland Security Act, establish a clearinghouse to coordinate the various information-sharing initiatives to eliminate possible confusion and duplication of effort, fully integrate states and cities into the national policy-making process for information sharing and take steps to provide greater assurance that actions at all levels of government are mutually reinforcing, identify and address the perceived barriers to federal information sharing, and use a survey method or a related data collection approach to determine, over time, the needs of private and public organizations for information related to homeland security and to measure progress in improving information sharing at all levels of government. DHS concurred with the above recommendations. Some of the saddest aspects of the 9/11 story are the outstanding efforts of so many individual officials straining, often without success, against the boundaries of the possible. While Changes May be Needed, Caution and Care Must be Taken
As the committee is aware, GAO has done extensive work on federal organizational structure and how reorganization can improve performance. The 9/11 Commission has recommended major changes to unify strategic intelligence and operational planning with a National Counterterrorism Center and provide the intelligence community with a new National Intelligence Director. In response to the emerging trends and long-term fiscal challenges the government faces in the coming years, we have an opportunity to create highly effective, performance-based organizations that can strengthen the nation’s ability to meet the challenges of the twenty first century and reach beyond our current level of achievement. Many are still focused on their original mission that may not be relevant or as high a priority in today’s world. These are the charges highlighted by the 9/11 Commission’s findings and recommendations. As I have testified before this committee, the granting of executive reorganization authority to the President can serve to better enable the President to propose government designs that would be more efficient and effective in meeting existing and emerging challenges involving the intelligence community and information sharing with other entities. Similarly, the 9/11 Commission recommends realigning congressional oversight to support its proposals to reorganize intelligence programs. We believe, Mr. Chairman, that at the center of any serious change management initiative are the people involved—people define the organization’s culture, drive its performance, and embody its knowledge base. As such, strategic human capital (or people) strategy is the critical element to maximizing government’s performance and ensuring accountability of our intelligence community and homeland security efforts. Thus, organizational transformations that incorporate strategic human capital management approaches will help to sustain agency efforts and improve the efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability of the federal government. To help, we have identified a set of practices that have been found to be central to any successful transformation effort. Importantly, this is not to delay needed reforms for any agency, but to accelerate reform across the federal government and incorporate appropriate principles and safeguards. The federal government is well short of where it needs to be in setting national homeland security goals, including those for intelligence and other mission areas, to focus on results—outcomes—not inputs and outputs which were so long a feature of much of the federal government’s strategic planning. However, because of historical resistance from the intelligence agencies and the general lack of support from the intelligence committees in the Congress, GAO has done limited work in this community over the past 25 years. The Challenges Faced in Intelligence Reform
In conclusion, on the basis of GAO’s work in both the public and the private sector over many years, and my own change management experience, it is clear to me that many of the challenges that the intelligence community faces are similar or identical to the transformation challenges applicable to many other federal agencies, including GAO. In addition, this person should be appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate in order to help facilitate success and ensure effective oversight. With regard to the oversight structure of the Congress, the 9/11 Commission noted that there are numerous players involved in intelligence activities and yet not enough effective oversight is being done. In the intelligence arena, we know the potential end result is failure for the nation. As the 9/11 Commission and others have noted, such a restructuring is needed in both the executive branch and the Congress. We can and we must enhance and integrate our intelligence efforts as suggested by the 9/11 Commission to significantly improve information sharing and analysis. Several models to achieve this result exist, and despite the unique missions of the intelligence community can readily be adapted to guide this transformation. | Why GAO Did This Study
The sorrow, loss, anger, and resolve so evident immediately following the September 11, 2001, attacks have been combined in an effort to help assure that our country will never again be caught unprepared. As the 9/11 Commission notes, we are safer today but we are not safe, and much work remains. Although in today's world we can never be 100 percent secure, and we can never do everything everywhere, we concur with the Commission's conclusion that the American people should expect their government to do its very best. GAO's mission is to help the Congress improve the performance and ensure the accountability of the federal government for the benefit of the American people. GAO has been actively involved in improving government's performance in the critically important homeland security area both before and after the September 11 attacks. In its request, the House Committee on Government Reform have asked GAO to address two issues: the lack of effective information sharing and analysis and the need for executive branch reorganization in response to the 9/11 Commission recommendations. Further, the Committee has asked GAO to address how to remedy problems in information sharing and analysis by transforming the intelligence community from a system of "need to know" to one of a "need to share."
What GAO Found
The 9/11 Commission has recommended several transformational changes, such as the establishment of a National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) for joint operational planning and joint intelligence and replacing the current Director of Central Intelligence with a National Intelligence Director (NID) to oversee national intelligence centers across the federal government. The NID would manage the national intelligence program and oversee agencies that contribute to it. On August 2, 2004, the President asked Congress to create a NID position to be the principal intelligence advisor, appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate and serving at the pleasure of the President. Unlike the 9/11 Commission, the President did not propose that the NID be within the Executive Office of the President. He also announced that he will establish a NCTC whose Director would report to the NID, and that this center would build upon the analytic work of the existing Terrorist Threat Integration Center. He suggested that a separate center may be necessary for issues of weapons of mass destruction. Finally, he endorsed the 9/11 Commission's call for reorganization of the Congressional oversight structure. There are, however, several substantive differences between the President's proposal and the Commission's recommendations. While praising the work of the 9/11 Commission, and endorsing several of its major recommendations in concept, the President differed with the Commission on certain issues. These differences reflect that reasoned and reasonable individuals may differ, and that several methods may exist to effectuate the transformational changes recommended. However, certain common principles and factors outlined in this statement today should help guide the debate ahead. Although the creation of a NID and a NCTC would be major changes for the intelligence community, other structural and management changes have occurred and are continuing to occur in government that provide lessons for the intelligence community transformation. While the intelligence community has historically been addressed separately from the remainder of the federal government, and while it undoubtedly performs some unique missions that present unique issues, its major transformational challenges in large measure are the same as those that face most government agencies. As a result, GAO's findings, recommendations, and experience in reshaping the federal government to meet Twenty-First Century challenges will be directly relevant to the intelligence community and the recommendations proposed by the 9/11 Commission. The goal of improving information sharing and analysis with a focus upon the needs of the consumers of such improved information for specific types of threats can provide one of the powerful guiding principles necessary for successful transformation. This testimony covers four major points. First, it describes the rationale for improving effective information sharing and analysis, and suggest some ways to achieve positive results. Second, it provides some overview perspectives on reorganizational approaches to improve performance and note necessary cautions. Third, it illustrates that strategic human capital management must be the centerpiece of any serious change management initiative or any effort to transform the cultures of government agencies, including that of the intelligence community. Finally, it emphasizes the importance of results-oriented strategic planning and implementation for the intelligence arena, focusing management attention on outcomes, not outputs, and the need for effective accountability and oversight to maintain focus upon improving performance. It concludes by applying these concepts and principles to the challenges of reform in the intelligence community. |
gao_GAO-08-890T | gao_GAO-08-890T_0 | Congress created IRAs, in part, to help those individuals not covered by a DB or DC plan save for retirement. IRAs Are Primarily Used to Preserve Savings through Rollovers
Most assets flowing into IRAs come not from direct contributions, but from transfers, or rollovers, of retirement assets from other retirement plans, including 401(k) plans. These rollovers allow individuals to preserve their retirement savings when they change jobs or retire. This, again, may be partly attributed to the emerging role of traditional IRAs as a means to preserve rollover assets rather than build retirement savings. Payroll-deduction IRA programs could provide a retirement savings opportunity at work for the millions of workers without an employer- sponsored retirement plan. In theory, all workers under age 70½ who lack an employer-sponsored retirement plan could be eligible to contribute to a traditional IRA through payroll deduction, should their employer offer such a program. As we previously reported, we found that several factors may discourage employers from establishing employer-sponsored SIMPLE and SEP IRAs. We also found that several barriers may discourage small employers even from offering payroll-deduction IRAs, including: (1) costs to employers for managing payroll deductions, (2) a perceived lack of flexibility to promote payroll-deduction IRAs to employees, (3) lack of incentives to employers, and (4) lack of awareness about how these IRAs work. Several retirement and savings experts said additional incentives should be in place to increase employer sponsorship of IRAs. Employee incentives to participate in IRAs. As a result of our findings, we made recommendations to Labor and IRS to improve IRA information and oversight and suggested that Congress may wish to consider whether payroll-deduction IRAs should have some direct oversight. Consequently, Labor does not receive important information on employers who have established employer-sponsored IRAs, over which it has oversight responsibilities. Ensuring that regulators obtain information about employer-sponsored and payroll-deduction IRAs is one way to help them and others determine the status of these IRAs and whether those individuals who lack employer- sponsored pension plans are able to build retirement savings through employer-sponsored and payroll-deduction IRAs. Experts that we interviewed said that, without such information, they are unable to determine how many employers and employees participate in payroll-deduction IRAs and the extent to which these IRAs have contributed to the retirement savings of participants. They also offer employers less burdensome reporting and legal responsibilities than defined benefit pension plans and defined contribution plans, such as 401(k) plans. Although the limited reporting requirements for employer-sponsored IRAs and the absence of reporting requirements for payroll-deduction IRAs were meant to encourage small employers to offer retirement savings vehicles to employees, there is also a need for agencies that are responsible for overseeing retirement savings vehicles to have the information necessary to do so. | Why GAO Did This Study
Congress created individual retirement accounts (IRAs) with two goals: (1) to provide a retirement savings vehicle for workers without employer-sponsored retirement plans, and (2) to preserve individuals' savings in employer-sponsored retirement plans when they change jobs or retire. Questions remain about IRAs' effectiveness as a vehicle to facilitate new, or additional, retirement savings. GAO was asked to report on (1) the role of IRAs in retirement savings, (2) the prevalence of employer-sponsored and payroll-deduction IRAs and barriers discouraging employers from offering these IRAs, and (3) changes that are needed to improve IRA information and oversight. GAO reviewed published reports from government and financial industry sources and interviewed retirement and savings experts, small business representatives, IRA providers, and federal agency officials.
What GAO Found
Although Congress created IRAs to allow individuals to build and preserve their retirement savings, IRAs are primarily used to preserve savings through rollovers rather than build savings through contributions. Over 80 percent of assets that flow into IRAs come from assets rolled over, or transferred, from other accounts and not from direct contributions. Assets in IRAs now exceed assets in the most common employer-sponsored retirement plans: defined contribution plans, including 401(k) plans, and defined benefit, or pension plans. Payroll-deduction IRA programs, which allow employees to contribute to IRAs through deductions from their paychecks, and employer-sponsored IRAs, in which an employer establishes and contributes to IRAs for employees, were established to provide more options for retirement savings in the workplace. Experts GAO interviewed said that several factors may discourage employers from offering these IRAs to employees, including administrative costs and concerns about employer fiduciary responsibilities. Information is lacking on how many employers offer employer-sponsored and payroll-deduction IRAs and the actual costs to employers for administering payroll-deduction IRAs. Earlier this month, GAO reported on the role that federal agencies can have in helping employers provide IRAs to employees and in improving oversight of these savings vehicles. GAO made several recommendations to the Department of Labor (Labor) and the Internal Revenue Service to provide better information and oversight, but in the course of the review, GAO found that Labor does not have jurisdiction over payroll-deduction IRAs. Consequently, GAO also suggested that Congress may wish to consider whether payroll-deduction IRAs should have some direct oversight. A clear oversight structure could be critical if payroll-deduction IRAs become a more important means to provide a retirement savings vehicle for workers who lack an employer-sponsored retirement plan. |
gao_GAO-08-742 | gao_GAO-08-742_0 | NARA and Federal Agencies Have Responsibilities for Federal Records Management
Under the Federal Records Act, NARA is given general oversight responsibilities for records management as well as general responsibilities for archiving. If e-mail records are retained in such systems and not in recordkeeping systems, they may be harder to find and use, as well as being at increased risk of loss from inadvertent or automatic deletion. However, despite NARA’s plans, in recent years its oversight activities have been primarily limited to performing studies. In addition, although NARA’s reporting to the Congress and OMB has generally described progress in improving records management at individual agencies and provided an overview of some of its major records management activities, it has not consistently provided evaluations of responses by federal agencies to its recommendations, as required, or details on records management problems or recommended practices that were discovered as a result of inspections, studies, or targeted assistance projects. Without a consistent oversight program that provides it with a governmentwide perspective, NARA has limited assurance that agencies are appropriately managing the records in their custody, thus increasing the risk that important records will be lost. According to NARA, it planned to carry out its oversight responsibilities using inspections, studies, and reporting. Agencies Reviewed Generally Used Paper Processes for E-Mail Records Management, but Three Are Moving Toward Electronic Recordkeeping
The four agencies reviewed—the Department of Homeland Security (DHS); the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA); the Federal Trade Commission (FTC); and the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)—generally preserved e-mail records through paper- based processes, although one agency—EPA—is in the process of deploying an electronic content management system that is to be used for managing e-mail messages that are agency records; two others have long- term plans to develop electronic recordkeeping. Each of the business units that we reviewed (one at each agency) maintained “case” files to fulfill its mission that were used for recordkeeping. The practice at the units was to include e-mail printouts in the case files if they contained information necessary to document the case—that is, record material. These printouts included transmission data and distribution lists, as required. The e-mail records of two other senior officials were not being managed in compliance with requirements, because e-mail records were not being stored in appropriate recordkeeping systems, but rather in the e-mail system: One of these officials was in the process of migrating e-mail records from the e-mail system to ECMS. Factors contributing to the inconsistent practices at the three agencies include inadequate training and oversight, as well as the difficulties of managing large volumes of e-mail with the tools and resources available, which in most cases do not include electronic recordkeeping systems. Unless agencies train staff adequately in records management and perform periodic evaluations or establish other controls to ensure that staff receive training and are carrying out their responsibilities, agencies have little assurance that e-mail records are appropriately identified, stored, and preserved. Senior officials at three of the four agencies stored e-mail records in e-mail systems, rather than in recordkeeping systems, which is not in accordance with NARA’s regulations. Recommendations for Executive Action
To better ensure that federal records, including those that originated as e- mail messages, are appropriately identified, retained, and archived, we recommend that the Archivist of the United States develop and implement an approach to oversight of agency records management programs that provides adequate assurance that agencies are following NARA guidance, including developing various types of inspections, surveys, and other means to evaluate the state of agency records and records management programs; developing criteria for using these means of assessment that ensure that they are regularly performed; and regularly report to the Congress and OMB on the findings, recommendations, and agency responses to its oversight activities, as required by law. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
assess to what extent the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) provides oversight of federal records management programs and practices, particularly with regard to e-mail, describe processes followed by selected federal agencies to manage assess to what extent the selected agencies’ e-mail records management policies comply with federal requirements, and assess compliance of selected senior officials with key e-mail recordkeeping requirements. 4. 7. 8. | Why GAO Did This Study
Federal agencies are increasingly using electronic mail (e-mail) for essential communication. In doing so, they are potentially creating messages that have the status of federal records, which must be managed and preserved in accordance with the Federal Records Act. Under the act, both the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) and federal agencies have responsibilities for managing federal records, including e-mail records. In view of the importance that e-mail plays in documenting government activities, GAO was asked, among other things, to review the extent to which NARA provides oversight of federal records management, describe selected agencies' processes for managing e-mail records, and assess these agencies' e-mail policies and key practices. To do so, GAO examined NARA guidance, regulations, and oversight activities, as well as e-mail policies at four agencies (of contrasting sizes and structures) and the practices of selected officials.
What GAO Found
Although NARA has responsibilities for oversight of agencies' records and records management programs and practices, including conducting inspections or surveys, performing studies, and reporting results to the Congress and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), in recent years NARA's oversight activities have been primarily limited to performing studies. NARA has conducted no inspections of agency records management programs since 2000, because it uses inspections only to address cases of the highest risk, and no recent cases have met its criteria. In addition, NARA has not consistently reported details on records management problems or recommended practices that were discovered as a result of its studies. Without more comprehensive evaluations of agency records management, NARA has limited assurance that agencies are appropriately managing the records in their custody and that important records are not lost. The four agencies reviewed generally managed e-mail records through paper-based processes, rather than using electronic recordkeeping. A transition to electronic recordkeeping was under way at one of the four agencies, and two had long-term plans to use electronic recordkeeping. (The fourth agency had no current plans to make such a transition.) Each of the business units that GAO reviewed (one at each agency) maintained "case" files to fulfill its mission and used these for recordkeeping. The practice at the units was to include e-mail printouts in the case files if the e-mail contained information necessary to document the case--that is, record material. These printouts included transmission data and distribution lists, as required. All four agencies had e-mail records management policies that addressed, with a few exceptions, the requirements in NARA's regulations. However, the practices of senior officials at those agencies did not always conform to requirements. Of the 15 senior officials whose practices were reviewed, the e-mail records for 7 (including all 4 at one agency) were managed in compliance with requirements. (One additional official was selected for review but did not use e-mail.) The other 8 officials generally kept e-mail messages, record or nonrecord, in e-mail systems that were not recordkeeping systems. (Among other things, recordkeeping systems allow related records to be categorized according to their business purposes.) If e-mail records are not kept in recordkeeping systems, they may be harder to find and use, as well as being at increased risk of loss from inadvertent or automatic deletion. Factors contributing to noncompliance included insufficient training and oversight as well as the difficulties of managing large volumes of e-mail. Without periodic evaluations of recordkeeping practices or other controls to ensure that staff are trained and carry out their responsibilities, agencies have little assurance that e-mail records are properly identified, stored, and preserved. |
gao_NSIAD-98-33 | gao_NSIAD-98-33_0 | The act defines military construction as projects that result in the creation of complete and usable new facilities or complete and usable improvements to existing facilities on military installations. Projects costing less than $500,000 may be funded from other appropriations, such as operation and maintenance. The statute also allows construction costing less than $1.5 million to be carried out as unspecified minor construction, which is funded as a single amount rather than by individual project. Programming Process Varies Depending on Project Funding
The programming process for any construction or repair project varies according to the project funding source. Because the law requires military construction projects to be specifically authorized, the services and DOD review each compliance construction project to be funded with 5-year military construction appropriations and request individual project funding approval from Congress. Reporting of Future Requirements Estimates
While DOD has made some improvements to its annual compliance reporting in its annual report and supporting budget documents, the information provided is still insufficient for oversight purposes. Conclusions and Recommendation
DOD’s criteria for determining which appropriation account should be used to fund construction and repair projects is set forth in laws and regulations. The law requires military construction appropriations to be used for all military construction projects costing over $500,000. Operation and maintenance appropriations are available to fund construction projects costing less than $500,000 and repairs of any value. The process for programming funds for environmental compliance construction or repair activities varies according to the project funding source. Under the process, the level of project justification detail that DOD provides to Congress is greater for military construction projects than for projects funded under other appropriations. Thus, to improve the specificity of its reporting, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Environmental Security to revise the DOD annual report to Congress to (1) identify all proposed construction and repair projects over $300,000 for all services and (2) include the funding sources for them. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed: (1) the Department of Defense's (DOD) environmental compliance projects funded as construction or repair; (2) DOD's criteria for determining which appropriation account is used for programming funds; (3) the process for programming funds; and (4) reporting on future funding requirements.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the basis for determining which funding source should be used for funding environmental compliance construction and repair projects is set forth in laws and regulations; (2) the law requires military construction appropriations to be used for all construction projects costing over $500,000; (3) the law defines construction as the creation of complete and usable new facilities or complete and usable improvements to existing facilities on military installations; (4) in general, operation and maintenance appropriations are available to fund construction projects costing less than $500,000 and repairs of any value; (5) other appropriations such as research, development, test, and evaluation, may also be used in appropriate circumstances; (6) the programming process for environmental compliance construction or repair activities varies according to the project funding source; (7) under the process, the level of project justification detail that DOD provides to Congress is greater for military construction projects than for projects funded under other appropriations; (8) in general, any military construction project, including environmental compliance projects, is programmed, reviewed, budgeted, and funded individually; (9) projects to be funded from operation and maintenance appropriations are rolled up into a single amount for budgeting and funding purposes; (10) the law permits some smaller value military construction projects to be carried out as unspecified minor construction; (11) these are budgeted as a single amount; (12) DOD has made some improvements to its annual compliance reporting by identifying specific projects that will cost over $300,000; (13) DOD has improved the detailed budget information provided to Congress by identifying recurring and nonrecurring compliance costs by appropriation; and (14) however, information provided to Congress in this report does not identify proposed construction and repair projects costing over $300,000 and their funding sources. |
gao_GAO-17-675 | gao_GAO-17-675_0 | Duties of OSDBU directors and functions of OSDBUs. Some of the required functions of the OSDBU director in section 15(k) of the Small Business Act include the following: identifying proposed solicitations that involve significant bundling of contract requirements; working with agency acquisition officials, where appropriate, to revise such proposed solicitations to increase the probability of participation by a small business; assisting small businesses in obtaining payments from an agency (or prime contractor) with which they have contracted; assigning a small business technical adviser to each office with an SBA-appointed procurement center representative (an SBA staff member assigned to federal agencies or contract administration offices and who carries out SBA policies and programs); and providing the chief acquisition officer and senior procurement executive of the agency with advice and comments on acquisition strategies, market research, and justifications related to certain provisions of the act. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 amended the statutory requirements of 15 U.S.C. Agencies Demonstrated High Levels of Compliance with Two OSDBU Director Requirements, but Three Other Requirements Had Lower Rates of Compliance
Of the five director-related requirements we reviewed, the level of demonstrated compliance varied, but was not universal for any one requirement (see table 1):
Four of the 10 agencies we reviewed for the requirement that the director report to the head or deputy head of the agency did not demonstrate compliance. Nineteen of 24 agencies demonstrated compliance with a requirement for collateral duties of the director. Eighteen of 24 agencies demonstrated compliance with a requirement for the director’s compensation and seniority. Not All OSDBU Directors Reported to the Head or Deputy Head of the Agency
Section 15(k)(3) generally requires that the OSDBU director report directly to and be responsible only to the agency head or the deputy head. Director experience. Reporting to lower levels of management may result in OSDBU directors not having direct access to top agency management, which may limit their influence. Identify and address bundling of contract requirements. One agency did not demonstrate compliance. Provide assistance on payments. Some OSDBUs Did Not Demonstrate Compliance for Assigning Small Business Technical Advisers, Advising on In- Sourcing, and Responding to Notifications of Undue Restrictions
In reviewing information from our survey, follow-up questions, interviews, and policy documentation, we determined that 10 of the 24 agencies did not demonstrate compliance with the requirement for assigning small business technical advisers, and 8 of the 24 agencies did not demonstrate compliance with providing advice on proposed in-sourcing decisions. As required, the SBPAC peer review panel annually conducts reviews of each OSDBU to determine compliance with section 15(k) requirements. In addition, agencies in the most recent review received overall scores (across the seven success factors) of 94–98 percent. According to federal standards for internal control, management should use quality information to make informed decisions and evaluate an entity’s performance in achieving key objectives. Other than reviewing the documentation provided by agencies, SBA’s guidance for the peer review panel does not indicate any other means by which peer reviewers could obtain or clarify information. Preliminary information that SBA provided in a description of changes to the fiscal year 2017 scorecard suggests that the new review process will be similar to the current process. This is consistent with what we recommended. The agency said that it has begun to implement the recommendation for fiscal year 2017 and that it has been developing more detailed guidelines that provide more objective criteria than the current guidelines, such as indicating whether agencies comply with the 21 section 15(k) requirements. We also note that the documentation SBA provided on its plans for the revised process suggests that similar methods to assess compliance will be used in the new process as under the current process. More specifically, we examined (1) the extent to which selected federal agencies with procurement powers demonstrated compliance with five requirements of section 15(k) relating to the OSDBU director (including reporting relationships, qualifications, and supervisory duties); (2) the extent to which selected federal agencies demonstrated compliance with eight section 15(k) requirements for carrying out selected OSDBU functions or activities; and (3) the Small Business Procurement Advisory Council review of OSDBU compliance with section 15(k) requirements. Assessment of Compliance with Other Selected Section 15(k) Requirements
We surveyed OSDBU directors at the 24 agencies about the other section 15(k) requirements relating to OSDBU directors (such as rank and responsibilities) and about OSDBU functions. We had a 100 percent response rate. Appendix I Compliance with Select Section 15 Requirements : Overall Agencies’ Demonstrated )
Appendix IV: Demonstrated Compliance with Section 15(k), Defense Logistics Agency
We reviewed policy documents and survey and interview responses and determined that the Office of Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization (OSDBU) at the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) demonstrated compliance with 8 of the 12 section 15(k) requirements within our review (see table 5). | Why GAO Did This Study
Section 15(k) of the Small Business Act requires federal agencies with procurement powers to establish an OSDBU to advocate for small businesses. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 established additional requirements for OSDBUs and required SBPAC to review OSDBU compliance with section 15(k) requirements.
GAO was asked to review compliance with selected requirements of section 15(k). GAO examined (1) the extent to which selected federal agencies demonstrated compliance with 13 requirements for OSDBUs and (2) SBPAC review process results. GAO selected a sample of 10 agencies, based on contracting obligations, to review a reporting requirement for OSDBU directors. For the other 12 requirements, GAO surveyed OSDBU directors at 24 agencies, selected based on contracting obligations (100 percent response rate). To review and augment survey responses, GAO also analyzed guidance and documents and interviewed OSDBU directors.
What GAO Found
Demonstrated compliance with selected section 15(k) requirements for the Office of Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization (OSDBU) varied across the 24 agencies GAO surveyed. Five agencies demonstrated compliance with all the requirements, four agencies demonstrated compliance with all but one requirement, and 15 agencies did not demonstrate compliance with two or more requirements. Examples of GAO findings include the following:
Four OSDBU directors did not report directly to the agency head or deputy (the one requirement for which GAO reviewed only 10 agencies).
Five agencies did not demonstrate compliance with a requirement for collateral duties of OSDBU directors.
Six agencies did not demonstrate compliance with a requirement for compensation and seniority of OSDBU directors.
Twenty-three agencies demonstrated compliance for four requirements on OSDBU director experience, supervisory duties of the OSDBU director, identifying and addressing significant bundling of contracts (consolidation of two or more procurement requirements into a solicitation for a single contract), and providing assistance on payments.
Fifteen agencies demonstrated compliance with a requirement to respond to notifications that solicitations unduly restricted the ability of small businesses to compete for contracts.
Noncompliance with section 15(k) requirements may limit the extent to which an OSDBU can advocate for small businesses. For example, OSDBU influence in agencies might be limited if directors reported to lower levels of management. Directors with other duties might be less able to carry out all section 15(k) duties.
Results of the Small Business Procurement Advisory Council's (SBPAC) annual review of compliance with section 15(k) requirements differed from GAO's assessments. The Small Business Administration (SBA) chairs SBPAC, and its members are nearly all OSDBU directors. All agencies in the most recent review scored 94–98 percent. But where GAO's review considered the same section 15(k) requirements as the SBPAC review, GAO found some agencies had not demonstrated compliance with multiple requirements. Other than reviewing documentation agencies choose to provide, SBA's guidance for the review panel does not indicate any other means by which reviewers could obtain or clarify information. GAO's review included follow-up discussions with agency officials to obtain or clarify information. SBA has been developing a new review process, but preliminary information GAO reviewed indicates the process will be similar to the current one. According to federal standards for internal control, management should use quality information to make informed decisions. Under the new process, the review results (which SBA uses in another process that determines an agency's overall grade for small business contracting) also will carry twice as much weight as under the current process—underscoring the importance of the review results. A new review process substantially similar to the old one (especially in relation to guidance) may not provide a reliable indicator of OSDBU compliance with section 15(k) requirements.
What GAO Recommends
GAO makes 20 recommendations, including that agencies not demonstrating compliance with section 15(k) requirements comply or report to Congress on why they have not, and that SBA should provide more detailed guidance for the new SBPAC review process than exists for the current process. Agency responses to the recommendations varied. As discussed in the report, GAO maintains that implementation of its recommendations is warranted. |
gao_GAO-06-474T | gao_GAO-06-474T_0 | Background
On average, about 3 people have died and about 8 people have been injured each year over the last 10 years in natural gas transmission pipeline incidents. As a means of enhancing the security and safety of gas pipelines, the 2002 act included an integrity management structure that, in part, requires that operators of gas transmission pipelines systematically assess for safety risks the portions of their pipelines located in highly populated or frequently used areas, such as parks. The act requires that operators perform these assessments (called baseline assessments) on half of the pipeline mileage in highly populated or frequented areas by December 2007 and the remainder by December 2012. Operators must then repair or replace defective pipelines. The act further provides that pipeline segments in highly populated or frequented areas must be reassessed for safety risks at least every 7 years. Under these regulations, and consistent with industry national consensus standards, operators must also reassess their pipeline segments for any safety risk at least every 5, 10, 15, or 20 years, depending on the pressure under which the pipeline segments are operated and the condition of the pipeline. Early Indications Suggest that Gas Integrity Management Enhances Public Safety, but Operators Raise Some Concerns About Implementation
While the gas integrity management program is still being implemented, early indications suggest that it enhances public safety by supplementing existing safety standards with risk-based management principles. While the operators we contacted did not disagree with the need to document their policies and procedures, some said that the detailed documentation required for every decision is very time consuming and does not contribute to the safety of pipeline operations. Another concern raised by most of the operators is the requirement to reassess their pipelines at least every 7 years. Furthermore, in response to our 2002 recommendation, PHMSA has been working to improve its communication with states about their role in overseeing integrity management programs. Most operators expect to be able to acquire the services and tools needed to conduct these reassessments including during an overlap period when they are starting to reassess pipeline segments while completing baseline assessments. Operators Favor a Risk- based, Rather than a One- Size-Fits-All Reassessment Standard
As discussed earlier, as of December 2005, operators nationwide have notified PHMSA of 338 problems that required immediate repair in the 6,700 miles they have assessed—about one immediate repair required for every 20 miles of pipeline assessed in highly populated or frequented areas. 1.) Some operators told us that the 7-year reassessment requirement is conservative for pipelines that operate under lower-stress. An industry concern about the 7-year reassessment requirement is that operators will be required to conduct reassessments starting in 2010 while they are still in the 10-year period (2003-2012) for conducting baseline assessments. 2.) We are addressing this issue and will report on it in the fall. PHMSA has established overall goals for its enforcement program to reduce incidents and damage due to operators’ noncompliance. To meet these goals, PHMSA has developed a multi-pronged strategy that is directed at the pipeline industry and stakeholders (such as state regulators), and ensuring that its processes make effective use of its resources. For example, PHMSA’s strategy calls for using risk-based enforcement to, among other things, take enforcement actions that clearly reflect potential risk and seriousness and deal severely with significant operator noncompliance and repeat offenses. Third, the strategy, among other things, calls for improving PHMSA’s own enforcement activities through developing comprehensive guidance tools and training inspectors on their use, and effectively using state inspection capabilities. | Why GAO Did This Study
About a dozen people are killed or injured in natural gas transmission pipeline incidents each year. In an effort to improve upon this safety record, the Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002 requires that operators assess pipeline segments in about 20,000 miles of highly populated or frequented areas for safety risks, such as corrosion, welding defects, or incorrect operation. Half of these baseline assessments must be done by December 2007, and the remainder by December 2012. Operators must then repair or replace any defective pipelines, and reassess these pipeline segments for corrosion damage at least every 7 years. The Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) administers this program, called gas integrity management. This testimony is based on ongoing work for Congress, as required by the 2002 act. The testimony provides preliminary results on the safety effects of (1) PHMSA's gas integrity management program and (2) the requirement that operators reassess their natural gas pipelines at least every 7 years. It also discusses how PHMSA has acted to strengthen its enforcement program in response to recommendations GAO made in 2004. GAO expects to issue two reports this fall that will address these and other topics.
What GAO Found
Early indications suggest that the gas transmission pipeline integrity management program enhances public safety by supplementing existing safety standards with risk-based management principles. Operators have reported that they have assessed about 6,700 miles as of December 2005 and completed 338 repairs for problems they are required to address immediately. Operators told GAO that the primary benefit of the program is the comprehensive knowledge they must acquire about the condition of their pipelines. For some operators, the integrity management program has prompted such assessments for the first time. Operators raised concerns about (1) their uncertainty over the level of documentation that PHMSA requires and (2) whether their pipelines need to be reassessed at least every 7 years. The 7-year reassessment requirement is generally consistent with the industry consensus standard of at least every 5 to 10 years for reassessing pipelines operating under higher stress (higher operating pressure in relation to wall strength). The majority of transmission pipelines in the U.S. are estimated to be higher stress pipelines. However, most operators told GAO that the 7-year requirement is conservative for pipelines that operate under lower stress because they found few problems requiring reassessments earlier than the 15 to 20 years under the industry standard. Operators GAO contacted said that periodic reassessments are beneficial for finding and preventing problems; but they favored reassessments on severity of risk rather than a one-size-fits-all standard. Operators did not expect that the existence of an "overlap period" from 2010 through 2012, when operators will be conducting baseline assessments and reassessments at the same time, would create problems in finding resources to conduct reassessments. PHMSA has developed a reasonable enforcement strategy framework that is responsive to GAO's earlier recommendations. PHMSA's strategy is aimed at reducing pipeline incidents and damage through direct enforcement and through prevention involving the pipeline industry and stakeholders (such as state regulators). Among other things, the strategy entails (1) using risk-based enforcement and dealing severely with significant noncompliance and repeat offenses, (2) increasing knowledge and accountability for results by clearly communicating expectations for operators' compliance, (3) developing comprehensive guidance tools and training inspectors on their use, and (4) effectively using state inspection capabilities. |
gao_GAO-14-418 | gao_GAO-14-418_0 | Background
Under the Railroad Retirement Act of 1974, RRB makes independent determinations of railroad workers’ claimed T&P disability using the same general criteria that SSA uses to administer its Disability Insurance (DI) program—that is, the worker must have a medically determinable physical or mental impairment that (1) has lasted (or is expected to last) at least 1 year or is expected to result in death and (2) prevents them from engaging in substantial gainful activity, defined as work activity that involves significant physical or mental activities performed for pay or profit. SSA staff review about one-third of the cases that RRB has determined to be eligible for T&P benefits for which Social Security benefits may potentially be paid. 1). In fiscal year 2012, RRB completed 1,212 CDR activities. Figure 2 shows RRB’s disability T&P claims determination process, including how this process relates to the occupational disability claims process. Policies and Procedures for Awarding Total and Permanent Disability Benefits Are Not Adequate to Ensure Proper Payments
Evidence Used to Establish Eligibility May Be Inadequate
The procedures RRB uses to verify a claimant’s work and earnings and the severity and duration of physical or mental impairments are inadequate to ensure that only eligible claimants qualify for T&P benefits. In addition, the Department of Health and Human Services’ National Directory of New Hires (NDNH)—established in part to help states enforce child support orders against noncustodial parents— contains quarterly state wage information which is also more recent than the annual wage information included in the MEF. RRB Policies and Procedures Do Not Ensure Initial Claims Are Properly Reviewed
RRB policies and procedures do not require that all initial determinations are reviewed by an independent person to ensure that there is sufficient evidence to support the determination. At the determination level, RRB policy allows for some claims to be approved without independent supervisory review. Consequently, in recent years, about one-quarter to one-third of all T&P initial claims were approved by the same claims examiner that reviewed the application (see fig. RRB’s Management Strategy Does Not Ensure That Total and Permanent Disability Determinations Are Accurate and Does Not Adequately Address Potential Fraud
Program Oversight Has Not Ensured the Quality of Disability Determinations
RRB’s T&P program oversight process does not evaluate the accuracy of disability determinations or provide managers with regular feedback about the effectiveness of the determination process. According to RRB’s strategic plan and agency officials, RRB’s key program objectives are to make accurate and timely determinations and payments, and to pay accurate benefits to eligible claimants. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that agency management should assess and continually monitor program performance to provide reasonable assurance that the agency is achieving its objectives. Without similarly tracking and reporting on the accuracy of T&P disability determinations in addition to measuring payment accuracy and timeliness, RRB does not know whether it is paying benefits only to eligible individuals and cannot observe trends over time. RRB Has Not Engaged in a Comprehensive Effort to Continuously Identify and Prevent Fraud System- wide
RRB has not engaged in a comprehensive effort to continuously identify and prevent potential fraud program-wide even after the high-profile LIRR incident exposed fraud as a key program risk. RRB hired an analyst to conduct ongoing reviews of agency data to identify patterns that suggest potential fraud, but the analyst’s work has thus far been focused on the occupational disability program. However, claims representatives in all four of the district offices that we contacted said they had not received any training directly related to fraud awareness. Despite RRB’s efforts, claims representatives in two of the four district offices we contacted said that it was not their job to be on the lookout for potential fraud. In addition, the agency is further at risk due to its policies that allow claims examiners to unilaterally approve selected claims without independent supervisory review. Recommendations
To enhance RRB’s ability to prevent improper payments and deter fraud in the T&P disability program, we recommend that the Railroad Retirement Board Members direct RRB staff to: 1. explore options to obtain more timely earnings data to ensure that claimants are working within allowable program limits prior to being awarded benefits; 2. revise the agency’s policy concerning the supervisory review and approval of determinations to ensure that all T&P cases are reviewed by a second party; 3. strengthen oversight of the T&P determination process by establishing a regular quality assurance review of initial disability determinations to assess the quality of medical evidence, determination accuracy, and process areas in need of improvement; 4. develop performance goals to track the accuracy of disability 5. develop procedures to identify and address cases of potential fraud before claims are approved, requiring annual training on these procedures for all agency personnel, and regularly communicating management’s commitment to these procedures and to the principle that fraud awareness, identification, and prevention is the responsibility of all staff. GAO-10-351R. | Why GAO Did This Study
In recent years, the U.S. Department of Justice has investigated and prosecuted railroad workers who were suspected of falsely claiming over $1 billion in disability benefits, raising concerns about RRB's disability claims process. GAO was asked to evaluate the integrity of RRB's disability program. This report examines (1) whether RRB's policies and procedures for processing claims were adequate to ensure that only eligible claimants receive T&P disability benefits; and (2) the extent to which RRB's management strategy ensures that approved claims are accurate and addresses program risks. To answer these questions, GAO reviewed T&P determination policies and procedures, interviewed RRB officials in headquarters and four district offices—selected for geographic dispersion—reviewed relevant federal laws and regulations, and reviewed a nongeneralizable random sample of 10 T&P cases that were approved in fiscal year 2012 to illustrate RRB's claims process.
What GAO Found
The Railroad Retirement Board's (RRB) policies and procedures for processing total and permanent (T&P) disability benefit claims do not adequately ensure that claimants meet program eligibility requirements. To find a railroad worker eligible for T&P benefits, RRB makes an independent determination of disability using the same general criteria that the Social Security Administration (SSA) uses to administer its Disability Insurance (DI) program—that is, a worker must have a medically determinable physical or mental impairment that (1) has lasted (or is expected to last) at least 1 year or is expected to result in death and (2) prevents them from engaging in substantial gainful activity, defined as work activity that involves significant physical or mental activities performed for pay or profit. RRB's policy states that, to establish eligibility for financial benefits, examiners should assess medical records for evidence that a claimant is too severely disabled to maintain gainful employment, and establish that a claimant's earnings fall below a certain threshold. However, the procedure for establishing if claimants meet the income threshold relies on SSA earnings data that can be up to 1 year old. Sources of more timely earnings information, such as the Department of Health and Human Services' National Directory of New Hires and The Work Number , exist and include both non-railroad and self-employment earnings, but RRB has not sufficiently explored the possibility of using them to help establish eligibility for T&P disability benefits. In addition, RRB lacks a policy to require independent supervisory review for all claims determinations. As a result, the procedures that claims examiners use to review a claim also allow them sole discretion to decide whether to approve it. Between 2008 and 2012, RRB data show that about one-quarter to one-third of T&P claims are considered and approved without independent supervisory review. According to generally accepted standards for internal controls in the federal government, essential tasks—such as establishing and determining that benefits should be awarded—should be performed by separate individuals to reduce the risk of fraud.
RRB's strategy for post-eligibility quality assurance review is inadequate to ensure that disability determinations for approved claims are accurate and does not address program risks due to potential fraud. While RRB checks the accuracy of payment amounts, and periodically reviews compliance with its policies, it does not evaluate the accuracy of disability determinations made or regularly monitor the effectiveness of the determination process. Similarly, performance goals for the disability program focus on measures of timeliness and do not track the accuracy of determinations made. The agency also has not engaged in a comprehensive effort to continuously identify fraud within the program, even after a high-profile incident exposed fraud as a key program risk. RRB has conducted some analyses to identify patterns in claims data that may suggest potential fraud, but the work has not led to new practices in the T&P program. Finally, while RRB officials stated that the agency has developed and provided some fraud awareness training, staff in all four of the district offices that GAO interviewed did not recall receiving this training, and some stated that it was not their responsibility to be alert for potential fraud, further limiting RRB's ability to ensure it is paying benefits only to eligible claimants.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that RRB explore options for obtaining more timely earnings information; revise its policy concerning the supervisory review of disability claims; establish a regular quality assurance review of T&P disability decisions; develop a performance goal to track decision accuracy; and develop and implement fraud awareness policies, procedures, and annual training. RRB agreed with these recommendations. |
gao_GAO-05-199 | gao_GAO-05-199_0 | Further, as previously noted, in the wake of catastrophic events reinsurers and insurers may sharply increase premiums and significantly restrict coverage. Because insurance markets have been severely disrupted by catastrophic events, state and federal governments also have taken a variety of steps to enhance the capacity of insurers to address catastrophic risk. Despite Enhancements to Insurer Capacity, Industry May Not Be Able to Address a Major Natural Catastrophe
Despite steps taken in recent years to strengthen insurer capacity for catastrophic risk, the industry has not yet been tested by a major catastrophic event or series of events. For example, only 1 company failed in 2004 in contrast to 11 that failed after Andrew. It follows that a more severe hurricane (or series of hurricanes) or earthquake with estimated losses of $50 billion or more would have even more severe consequences. Catastrophe Bonds and Tax-Deductible Reserves May Have the Potential to Enhance Insurers’ Capacity for Catastrophe Risk
Insurers’ reactions to past catastrophic events—for example, restrictions on reinsurance coverage and higher reinsurance premiums—and the potential consequences for insurers from an even more severe catastrophe have generated financial instruments and proposals designed to enhance industry capacity for both natural events and terrorist attacks. Some state authorities we contacted and many insurers view the total costs of catastrophe bonds—including transaction costs such as legal fees—as significantly exceeding the costs of traditional reinsurance. In particular, permitting tax-deductible reserves would result in lower federal tax receipts according to industry analysts we contacted. The other three countries generally rely on insurance markets to provide natural catastrophe coverage. Each of these countries has considered the necessity for a national terrorism insurance program. Insurance Companies in European Countries We Studied Are Permitted to Establish Tax-Deductible Reserves for Future Catastrophic Events
As of 2004, regulations, tax law, and accounting standards in the six European countries we reviewed allowed insurance companies to establish tax-deductible reserves for potential losses associated with catastrophic events. Further, industry participants do not consider catastrophe bonds feasible for terrorism risks at this time. Further, all six countries we studied use their tax codes to encourage insurers to establish reserves for potential catastrophic events. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We provided a draft of this report to the Department of the Treasury and the National Association of Insurance Commissioners. Treasury provided technical comments on the report that were incorporated as appropriate. Our objectives were to (1) provide an overview of the property-casualty insurance industry’s current capacity to cover natural catastrophic risk and discuss the impacts that four hurricanes in 2004 had on the industry; (2) analyze the potential of catastrophe bonds and permitting insurance companies to establish tax-deductible reserves to cover catastrophic risk to enhance private-sector capacity; and (3) describe the approaches six selected European countries—France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom—have taken to address natural and terrorist catastrophe risk, including whether these countries permit insurers to use tax-deductible reserves for such events. We also obtained estimates of the insured losses and claims resulting from the 2004 hurricanes from the Florida Office of Insurance Regulation. Institutional Investor
An organization such as a bank or insurance company that buys and sells large quantities of securities. | Why GAO Did This Study
Natural catastrophes and terrorist attacks can place enormous financial demands on the insurance industry, result in sharply higher premiums and substantially reduced coverage. As a result, interest has been raised in mechanisms to increase the capacity of the insurance industry to manage these types of events. In this report, GAO (1) provides an overview of the insurance industry's current capacity to cover natural catastrophic risk and discusses the impacts of the 2004 hurricanes; (2) analyzes the potential of catastrophe bonds--a type of security issued by insurers and reinsurers (companies that offer insurance to insurance companies) and sold to institutional investors--and tax-deductible reserves to enhance private-sector capacity; and (3) describes the approaches that six European countries have taken to address natural and terrorist catastrophe risk, including whether these countries permit insurers to use tax-deductible reserves for such events. We provided a draft of this report to the Department of the Treasury and the National Association of Insurance Commissioners. Treasury provided technical comments that were incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
Despite steps that governments and insurers have taken in recent years to strengthen insurer capacity for catastrophic risk, the industry has not been tested by a major catastrophic event or series of events (at least $50 billion or more in insured losses). While insurers suffered losses of over $20 billion in Florida from the 2004 hurricanes, steps such as implementing stronger building codes and stricter underwriting standards may have limited market disruptions as compared with the aftermath of Hurricane Andrew in 1992. For example, in 2004, only 1 Florida insurance company failed in contrast to the 11 that failed after Hurricane Andrew in 1992. However, a more severe catastrophic event or series of events could severely disrupt insurance markets and impose recovery costs on governments, businesses, and individuals. Some insurers and reinsurers benefit from catastrophe bonds because the bonds diversify their funding base for catastrophic risk. However, these bonds currently occupy a small niche in the global catastrophe reinsurance market and many insurers view the costs associated with issuing them as significantly exceeding traditional reinsurance. In addition, industry participants do not consider catastrophe bonds for terrorism risk feasible at this time. Authorizing insurers to establish tax-deductible reserves for potential catastrophic events has been advanced as a means to enhance industry capacity, but according to some industry analysts such reserves would lower federal tax receipts and not necessarily bring about a meaningful increase in capacity because insurers may substitute the reserves for other types of capacity. The six European countries GAO studied use a variety of approaches to address catastrophe risk. Some governments require insurers to provide natural catastrophe insurance and provide financial assistance to insurers in the wake of catastrophic events, while others generally rely on the private market. However, the majority of these governments have established national terrorism insurance programs. Although their approaches vary, insurers in all six countries were allowed to establish tax-deductible reserves for potential catastrophic events as of 2004. |
gao_AIMD-97-30 | gao_AIMD-97-30_0 | To determine whether FAA has a target architecture(s), and associated subarchitectures, to guide the development and evolution of its ATC systems, we researched current literature and interviewed systems architecture experts to identify the key components of a complete systems architecture; analyzed FAA’s National Airspace System Architecture (versions 1.5 and 2.0) and interviewed officials responsible for developing this architecture to determine whether the proposed systems architecture is complete and comprehensive; reviewed additional FAA efforts to develop systems architectures, including the Corporate Systems Architecture; interviewed the 10 IPTs responsible for ATC systems development to determine how architectural considerations are incorporated in development efforts; reviewed the NAS System Requirements Specification (NAS-SR-1000), the NAS Level 1 Design Document (NAS-DD-1000), and the NAS System Specification (NAS-SS-1000) to determine whether existing guidance constitutes the components of a systems architecture; interviewed ARA organizations responsible for developing software, communications, data management, and security guidance about existing guidance and efforts to improve this guidance; interviewed FAA’s Chief Information Officer (CIO) to determine what role the CIO plays in the development of FAA’s systems architecture and whether this role is consistent with recently passed legislation; and analyzed FAA’s current structure and processes associated with architectural development and enforcement. To determine what, if any, architectural incompatibilities exist among systems and what is the effect of these architectural incompatibilities, we acquired and analyzed information on the hardware, operating systems, application languages, database management, communications, and security characteristics of seven existing and under development ATC systems to identify architectural incompatibilities; reviewed key technical documents associated with some of these systems, including interface control documents and technical briefings; analyzed the cost, schedule, and performance impacts of the architectural incompatibilities that exist among ATC systems; interviewed the Director of Operational Support to obtain ATC maintenance concerns and to obtain his opinion about system incompatibilities; and identified the application languages used in 54 operational ATC systems. As a result, the IPTs have been left to proceed individually in setting architectural standards and developing and evolving systems. Without an ATC-wide technical architecture, FAA’s ATC systems have and will continue to suffer from costly and inefficient incompatibilities. Lack of a Technical Systems Architecture Means Costly System Incompatibilities
The lack of a complete systems architecture has produced architectural differences and incompatibilities among ATC systems, such as different communication protocols and proprietary operating environments, and will continue to do so for future systems. Overcoming these incompatibilities means “higher than need be” system development, integration, and maintenance costs, and reduced overall systems performance. Since most of the ATC languages are obsolete, there is no readily available cadre of newly trained programmers and current and future maintenance becomes even more difficult and costly. However, without a guiding systems architecture that specifies specific open systems standards, FAA will likely not develop the oceanic and en route replacement systems that are to perform the FDP functions to common standards, thus precluding the opportunity to share software components. However, other system incompatibilities are the result of FAA’s failure to adopt and effectively enforce a technical architecture. FAA’s Logical Architecture Management Structure Is Not Effective
FAA does not have an effective management structure for developing, maintaining, and enforcing a logical ATC systems architecture. This is not the case. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) air traffic control (ATC) modernization effort, focusing on: (1) whether FAA has a target architecture and associated subarchitectures, to guide the development and evolution of its ATC systems; and (2) what, if any, architectural incompatibilities exist among ATC systems and the effect of these incompatibilities.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) FAA lacks a complete systems architecture, or overall blueprint, to guide and constrain the development and maintenance of the many interrelated systems comprising its ATC infrastructure; (2) FAA is developing one of the two principal components of a complete systems architecture, the "logical" description of FAA's current and future concept of ATC operations as well as descriptions of the ATC business functions to be performed, the associated systems to be used, and the information flows among systems; (3) however, FAA is not developing, nor does it have plans to develop, the second essential component, the ATC-wide "technical" description which defines all required information technology and telecommunications standards and critical ATC systems' technical characteristics; (4) the lack of a complete and enforced systems architecture has permitted incompatibilities among existing ATC systems and will continue to do so for future systems; (5) overcoming these incompatibilities means "higher than need be" system development, integration, and maintenance costs, and reduced overall systems performance; (6) because there are no standards for programming languages or open systems, ATC systems' software has been written in many different application programming languages, often exhibiting proprietary system characteristics; (7) this not only increases software maintenance costs but also effectively precludes sharing software components among systems; (8) without a technical architecture specifying the information technology standards and rules, the opportunity to share software will likely be lost; (9) in some cases, system incompatibilities exist because the technology and standards now available to permit system integration and interoperability did not exist or were only emerging when the systems were designed and developed; (10) other system incompatibilities are the result of FAA's failure to adopt and effectively enforce a technical architecture; (11) by failing to formulate a complete systems architecture, FAA permits and perpetuates inconsistency and incompatibility; (12) as a result, future ATC system development and maintenance will continue to be more difficult and costly than it need be and system performance will continue to be suboptimal; (13) FAA's management structure for developing, maintaining, and enforcing an ATC systems architecture is not effective; and (14) instead, processes now in place permit the acquisition of architecturally non-compliant systems without special waiver of architectural standards. |
gao_GAO-14-550 | gao_GAO-14-550_0 | Combined Heat and Power Plant Overview
The existing combined heat and power plant at Clear Air Force Station is owned by the Air Force and became operational in 1961. For Options Considered in the Feasibility Study, Some Plant-Closure Costs Were Not Fully Developed, but Adding This Information Would Not Have Materially Affected the Outcome
In reviewing the cost estimates for the five options for the plant, we found there were some items and associated costs that were not fully developed in the feasibility study but were later more fully developed as the Air Force took steps to carry out its plans. While adding this information is unlikely to have materially affected the Air Force’s decision to close the plant, fully developing those costs in the feasibility study would have provided decision makers with more complete information and a better understanding of the proposed actions. Several Noneconomic Goals Significantly Influenced the Air Force’s Decision Concerning the Power Plant
The Air Force identified goals other than cost savings in relation to the power plant at Clear Air Force Station. These included the
Air Force goal of no longer operating and maintaining the plant because the Air Force does not consider power generation to be a core competency,
Air Force goal of reducing energy costs at Clear Air Force Station,
Air Force need to ensure reliable power for current and future mission-critical facilities and supporting facilities. The Air Force Considered Several Alternatives to Closing the Power Plant but Did Not Find Them to Be Economical, and Some Options Were Not Fully Evaluated
The Air Force considered and evaluated several options before selecting the option to close the plant after first connecting to the local grid and building a separate heat system. Officials said that they obtained ideas for the options they considered from stakeholders, including Clear Air Force Station, 21st Space Wing, and power plant employees, and fully evaluated some of the options that looked more promising. Still other options were considered but were not fully evaluated in formal studies because they did not generate as much savings or the Air Force did not consider them to be economically feasible. For example, the Air Force did not fully assess the costs of more incremental changes to current operations of the existing plant, such as retaining ownership of the plant but downscaling its operations, because extensive capital improvement costs would remain (although the costs of coal would be reduced). The feasibility study also found that the utilities privatization option would generate slightly greater savings than an enhanced-use lease and that the option to close the plant would generate the most savings for the Air Force compared to the status quo.The feasibility study concluded that the Air Force should pursue the enhanced-use lease in order to obtain realistic valuations of the plant from potential lessees, or, if the lease project were unsuccessful, close the plant. 1. 2. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
In written comments on a draft of our restricted report, the Air Force concurred with our observations. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine the extent to which the Air Force has evaluated options for the Clear Air Force Station combined heat and power plant, we reviewed the documentation for the project, including the 2010 feasibility study, contract data, Department of Defense (DOD) and Air Force guidance, and the Air Force analyses used to document and support the service’s final determination for the plant, including the environmental assessment and subsequent finding of no significant impact for the tie-in to the local grid and construction of a new heat system. To determine what other options, if any, the Air Force considered before deciding on the alternative power source it selected, we reviewed the Air Force’s analyses on the options it considered, including the concept opportunity study, which first laid out some options for the plant, and the feasibility study. The costs that make up the Government Should Cost Estimate are summarized in table 4 below, which represents the estimated costs of continuing to operate and maintain the existing plant for the next 50 years. | Why GAO Did This Study
Clear Air Force Station, located in the interior of Alaska where temperatures can drop as low as -60 o Fahrenheit, currently generates its own heat and power from a coal-fired combined heat and power plant. The station performs a critical radar mission for the Department of Defense, for which it is vital to have reliable sources of heat and power. Air Force Space Command has determined that the existing 50-year-old plant is operating inefficiently, and the Air Force plans to close the existing plant, after first connecting to the local power grid for electricity and constructing a new heat system for the administrative and residential areas of the installation. GAO was asked to review the Air Force's feasibility study and analyses of alternatives before the Air Force closes the plant.
This report addresses (1) the extent to which the Air Force evaluated options regarding the Clear Air Force Station combined heat and power plant and (2) what other options, if any, the Air Force considered before deciding on the alternative power source it selected. GAO reviewed the feasibility study; Department of Defense and Air Force guidance; and other analyses, contract information, and documentation related to the power plant.
GAO also issued a restricted version of this report, which includes additional details on some estimated costs. In written comments on a draft of the restricted report, the Air Force concurred with GAO's observations.
What GAO Found
The Air Force's decision to close the existing power plant at Clear Air Force Station is based, in part, on a 2010 study examining the feasibility of implementing alternative power sources at the installation in order to reduce operating costs while ensuring reliable power for the installation's mission. This study, along with other associated studies and analyses, initially led the Air Force to pursue leasing the plant to a private-sector entity or public utility. When no lease proposals were submitted, the Air Force pursued the option to close the plant, finding that the estimated costs of closing it were significantly less than the estimated costs of continuing to operate and maintain it. GAO found that the Air Force generally followed its own guidance for preparing cost estimates and analyses of alternatives. However, in the plant-closure option considered in the feasibility study, some costs—such as labor costs for operating and maintaining the new heat system—were not fully developed. While it is unlikely that adding this information would have materially affected the final outcome, more fully developing those costs would have provided decision makers with more complete information and a better understanding when considering the proposed options. In addition to economic factors, several noneconomic goals significantly influenced the Air Force's decision concerning the power plant, including the goals of no longer operating and maintaining a power plant, reducing energy costs, and ensuring reliable power for current and future missions.
The Air Force considered and evaluated several options for the plant's future before selecting the option to close the plant after first connecting to the local power grid and building a separate heat system. Officials said that they obtained ideas from stakeholders for the options they considered and evaluated in detail some of the options that looked more promising. Still other options were considered but were not fully evaluated because they did not generate as much savings or the Air Force did not consider them to be economically feasible. For example, the Air Force looked in detail at options for leasing the plant but did not fully assess the costs of more incremental options, such as retaining ownership of the plant but downscaling its operations. For the options that the Air Force evaluated in detail, it found that some generated significantly more savings than others and that some were not feasible from the Air Force's perspective. |
gao_GAO-12-665 | gao_GAO-12-665_0 | Background
Under Title I of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), employers are permitted to sponsor two broad categories of pension plans. A MEP may be a defined benefit plan or a defined There are three types of pension plans that share some features with MEPs but are not the focus of this report: (1) A single-employer plan is established and maintained by only one employer and for that employer’s employees. Labor, IRS, and PBGC share federal responsibility for regulating pension plans under ERISA. 26 U.S.C. Little Is Known About Key MEP Characteristics
Little is known about the characteristics of private sector MEPs, particularly information about the employers that participate in them. However, basic plan and sponsor-level information on MEPs is available in the Form 5500 data, and we were able to analyze this data. The data show that MEPs are a small portion of the overall pension universe and that the bulk of plan assets and participants reside among the largest 25 defined contribution and defined benefit MEPs. Unlike the other sponsors we identified, the employers that participate in open MEPs share no common relationship or affiliation with the other employers in the plan. MEPs Are Characterized by the Employers Participating in Them
As described previously, a MEP is a type of pension plan maintained by more than one employer. current data with respect to participating employers in a MEP.Participating employer information for a MEP is important because each employer may be unique in relation to the plan overall, with regard to discretionary plan options or its portion of the overall participants in the MEP. 2.) Three major sponsor types appear among the largest 25 MEPs: large corporations, associations, and professional employer organizations (PEO). The large corporate MEP sponsors we interviewed reported few participating employers in their plans. According to pension experts familiar with the industry and our analysis, PEO-sponsored MEPs grew both in size and number after IRS issued guidance in 2002 that identified defined contribution MEPs as a plan design some PEOs could use to avoid plan tax disqualification.According to one plan sponsor, since the guidance was issued, MEPs have been the default plan design for PEOs—but the guidance did not address what constituted a PEO. MEP Advantages Marketed to Employers May Not Be Unique
Reflecting some of the content of the marketing material we reviewed from PEO MEPs and open MEPs, MEP representatives told us that MEPs provide several advantages for employers over single-employer plan sponsorship: reduced fiduciary liability, reduced administrative responsibility, and reduced cost. However, we found that these advantages may not always be unique to MEPs. Overall, no consensus existed among MEP representatives and pension experts on whether or not MEPs such as PEO MEPs or open MEPs would substantially expand pension coverage. The pension expert also observed that small businesses do not extensively research retirement plans or actively seek them out. One pension expert agreed that there was potential for MEPs to charge excess fees without the enrolled employer being aware of those fees. Specifically, in order to retain its tax-qualified status and the associated tax advantages for the employer and employees, IRS requires the firm offering the MEP to annually test each employer to ensure that the contributions or benefits provided under the plan do not discriminate against rank-and-file workers in favor of highly compensated employees. In contrast to Labor, IRS is responsible for determining whether plans qualify for preferential tax treatment under Title II of ERISA, which amended the IRC. Labor and IRS have not fully coordinated their statutory interpretations related to MEPs with Labor’s advisory opinions. This presumably means that an open MEP will have to file annual reports on behalf of each individual employer to satisfy Labor and also as one single plan to satisfy IRS. There also appears to be a lack of coordination between IRS and Labor on the application of different statutory requirements to MEPs. The IRS may continue to find that an open MEP qualifies for preferential tax treatment and promoters may use such qualification as a tool for marketing their arrangements to employers—even though Labor does not consider an open MEP to be a single employer benefit plan under ERISA. A likely source for collection of this data would be the Form 5500, as it is the primary source of private pension data for government oversight activities. Furthermore, the agencies should coordinate to develop compliance-related guidance on the establishment and operation of MEPs under ERISA and the IRC. The agencies generally agreed with the recommendation on data and suggested that, as part of their regular evaluations of changes to the Form 5500, they would consider the merits of alternative methods of collecting additional data about employers that participate in MEPs, among other possible changes to the Form 5500. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO has reported that millions of U.S. workers lack access to employer-sponsored pension plans and that some small businesses, which offered plans at lower rates than large businesses, may be deterred by the cost of plan administration. MEPs, a type of pension plan maintained by more than one employer, have been supported as an option that could expand coverage by lowering administrative costs. For this report, GAO examined (1) the characteristics of private-sector MEPs, (2) the advantages and disadvantages of MEPs and how their perceived advantages are used to market them, and (3) how IRS and Labor regulate MEPs.
GAO interviewed MEP sponsors, pension experts, officials at the Department of Labor (Labor), the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), and the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), and analyzed the primary source of pension data reported to the governmentthe Form 5500.
What GAO Found
Little is known about the characteristics of private sector multiple employer plans (MEP), especially information regarding the employers that participate in them. Although no participating employer information is currently collected in the Form 5500, the primary source for pension information reported to the government, some plan-level information on MEPs is available. GAOs analysis of 2009 plan-level data shows that the bulk of MEP participants and assets resided in the largest 25 private-sector MEPs. Three major sponsor types emerged among the top 25 plans: large corporations, associations, and professional employer organizations (PEO), which are firms that provide payroll and other human resources services to clients. These sponsor types differ in various ways, but notably, associations and PEO sponsors GAO interviewed tended to have a large number of employers participating in their plans. Little is also known about a fourth category of sponsor type called open MEPs, a type of MEP in which employers in the plan share no common relationship or affiliation with the other employers in the plan. This sponsor type appears to have come about in response to 2002 IRS guidance that allowed certain PEOs to avoid tax disqualification of their pension plans if they were converted to MEPs. Soon after this guidance was issued, practitioners began offering open MEPs.
MEPs are marketed as providing several advantages for employers over single-employer plans, but GAO found that these advantages may not always be unique to MEPs. MEPs are marketed as providing reduced fiduciary liability, administrative responsibility, and cost. However, other types of single-employer plans may also offer reduced fiduciary responsibility and third-party administrators can reduce administrative responsibilities. Overall, among MEP representatives and pension experts, there was no consensus on whether or not open MEPs or PEO-sponsored MEPs could substantially expand pension coverage. Given that employers do not directly oversee the plan, there was also some concern from Labor officials regarding the risk of MEP abuses, such as charging excess fees or mishandling the plans assets. Additionally, because all of the participating employers are responsible for maintaining the MEP, if one employer becomes noncompliant with the tax requirements the plans of all the employers in the MEP may lose their tax-qualified status.
Labor regulates MEPs for participant protections under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), while the IRS regulates them for preferential tax treatment under the Internal Revenue Code (IRC). However, ERISA places requirements on plans that are not required under the IRC, and Labor and IRS do not coordinate to reduce the impacts of defining a MEP differently. For example, although Labor recently opined that open MEPs are a collection of single plans, each separately sponsored by participating employers for their employees, open MEPs still qualify for preferential tax treatment under the IRC. Pension experts told GAO that such differing treatment can create compliance challenges. For example, an open MEP may be able to file a single annual report for the IRS but may also have to file annual reports for each of its component plans for Labor. Pension experts agreed that compliance guidance from either agency would be helpful.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that Labor lead an effort to collect data on the employers that participate in MEPs. GAO also recommends that Labor and IRS formalize their coordination with regard to statutory interpretation efforts with respect to MEPs. Furthermore, Labor and IRS should jointly develop guidance on the establishment and operation of MEPs. Agencies generally agreed with GAOs recommendations. |
gao_RCED-95-3 | gao_RCED-95-3_0 | Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Concerned about whether the nation has sufficient capacity for the safe disposal of solid waste, the Ranking Minority Member, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, asked us to examine (1) how the states are addressing solid waste issues, including what efforts state and local governments are making to pay for higher waste management costs and to develop additional solid waste management capacity amid growing opposition to placing waste facilities in local communities, and (2) where the states see the need for a federal role in addressing these issues. We reviewed studies and surveys of states’ solid waste management conducted by national solid waste organizations and editors of trade publications, such as Biocycle and the Solid Waste Report, to obtain an overview of the states’ rates of generating solid waste, disposal methods, recycling programs, goals and laws, and trends and potential problems with solid waste management. Some states’ plans also address where or how to locate new waste management facilities. State and Local Governments Have Developed Plans to Address Concerns About Solid Waste
As of December 1994, a total of 46 states had either developed plans or were in the process of developing plans for managing solid waste. Alternative Funding Mechanisms Are Needed to Pay Rising Costs of Waste Management
Nationwide, a majority of states continue to rely on general revenue funds to finance the majority of their solid waste management planning and programs. States See a Federal Role in Waste Reduction, Recycling, and Planning for Capacity
Because the states’ progress has been slow towards meeting goals and objectives for source reduction and recycling and towards ensuring that waste disposal capacity is sufficient, state and industry officials believe the federal government has a role in (1) developing current national goals for source reduction, (2) setting standards for packaging, (3) setting standards for products containing material recovered from recycled goods, and (4) promoting the development of markets for recyclable materials. Industry experts also support these views. EPA does not believe that it should take the lead in promoting source reduction or recycling because it views solid waste management, for both municipal and industrial nonhazardous wastes, as primarily a state responsibility. EPA projected in 1994 that recycling rates of between 25 and 35 percent may be achievable in 2000. To achieve the recycling rates that EPA projects, however, 50 percent or more of some wastes may have to be recovered. This lack of data makes it difficult to determine the impact of legislative action that places restrictions on interstate waste shipments. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed state and federal efforts to manage municipal, commercial, and industrial solid waste, focusing on: (1) how states are addressing the rising costs of solid waste management and public opposition to solid waste facilities; and (2) the federal role in addressing solid waste management issues.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) as of December 1994, 46 states had developed or were developing solid waste management plans to address diminishing disposal capacity, the rising costs of solid waste management, and public opposition to new disposal sites in local communities; (2) the eight state plans reviewed propose options for managing solid waste and alternative financing mechanisms to support local recycling programs and landfill closings; (3) states have used special fees and taxes to finance 74 percent of their solid waste programs; (4) although local opposition to solid waste management facilities has delayed site selection and construction, two of the eight plans contain procedures for selecting waste management sites; (5) some state officials and industry experts believe that the federal government should assist in developing national source reduction goals, setting packaging and recovered material standards, developing markets for recyclable materials, and ensuring sufficient disposal capacity; (6) although the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) supports state source reduction and recycling efforts, it does not plan to enforce its 1992 municipal solid waste agenda or believe that it should lead recycling or source reduction activities; (7) although EPA projects that recycling rates of 25 to 35 percent may be achieved by the year 2000, additional advances may have to be made to achieve these rates; and (8) although legislation has been proposed authorizing states to restrict the interstate and intrastate shipment of solid waste, sufficient data do not exist to determine the impact of this authority on the solid waste management industry. |
gao_GAO-05-147 | gao_GAO-05-147_0 | Large intense fires in these and other ecosystems also increasingly threaten human lives, health, property, and infrastructure in the wildland-urban interface. Important Progress Has Been Made in Addressing Federal Wildland Fire Management Problems over the Last 5 Years
The federal government has made important progress over the last 5 years in improving its management of wildland fire. Nationally, it has worked to formulate a comprehensive strategy, established a priority to protect communities in the wildland-urban interface, and increased funding for wildland fire management activities, including fuels reduction and suppression. At the local level, it enhanced its data and research on wildland fire problems, made significant progress in developing local fire management plans, and improved coordination among federal agencies and collaboration with nonfederal partners. In addition, it strengthened its overall accountability for investments in wildland fire activities by establishing more meaningful goals and performance measures. This measure will allow them to better determine the extent to which their fuel reduction efforts accomplish the key goal of reducing risks to communities and ecosystems. The agencies also made progress in developing a system to monitor the effects of wildland fires. Agencies Face Several Challenges to Completing a Long-Needed Cohesive Strategy for Reducing Fuels and Responding to Wildland Fire Problems
While federal land management agencies have made important progress over the past 5 years in addressing wildland fire management issues, they continue to face a number of challenges that will need to be met if they are to complete development of a cohesive strategy that explicitly identifies available long-term options and funding needed to reduce fuels on national forests and rangelands and respond to the nation’s wildland fire threats. Without a cohesive strategy and better data, agencies will have difficulty determining the extent and severity of the wildland fire problem, targeting and coordinating their efforts and resources, and resolving the problem in a timely and cost-effective manner. A clear understanding of the options and funding needs are essential to both the agencies and the Congress for determining the most effective and affordable approach. These steps include (1) completing and implementing the LANDFIRE data and modeling system so that the extent and location of wildland fire threats are more precisely known, (2) updating local fire management plans with more precise LANDFIRE information and the latest research so that the most promising wildland fire management practices are included to effectively address wildland fire threats, and (3) based on these plans, identifying the various national options and related funding needed to reduce fuels and respond to wildland fire threats. The agencies need LANDFIRE to more precisely identify the extent and location of wildland fire threats and better target fuel reduction efforts. The agencies have several efforts under way that should help them identify these options and funding needs. In order for the Congress to make informed decisions about effective and affordable long-term approaches for addressing our nation’s wildland fire problems, it should have, as soon as possible, a broad range of long-term options and related funding needed to reduce and maintain wildland fuels at acceptable levels and respond to wildland fire threats. Recommendation for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretaries of Agriculture and the Interior provide the Congress, in time for its consideration of the agencies’ fiscal year 2006 wildland fire management budgets, with a joint tactical plan outlining the critical steps the agencies will take, together with related time frames, to complete a cohesive strategy that identifies long-term options and needed funding for reducing and maintaining fuels at acceptable levels and responding to the nation’s wildland fire problems. Wildland Fires: Forest Service’s Removal of Timber Burned by Wildland Fires. Forest Service: A Framework for Improving Accountability. | Why GAO Did This Study
Over the past two decades, the number of acres burned by wildland fires has surged, often threatening human lives, property, and ecosystems. Past management practices, including a concerted federal policy in the 20th century of suppressing fires to protect communities and ecosystem resources, unintentionally resulted in steady accumulation of dense vegetation that fuels large, intense, wildland fires. While such fires are normal in some ecosystems, in others they can cause catastrophic damage to resources as well as to communities near wildlands known as the wildland-urban interface. In 1999, GAO recommended that the Forest Service develop a cohesive strategy for responding to wildland fire threats. As a follow-up, 5 years later, GAO was asked to identify the (1) progress the federal government has made in responding to wildland fire threats and (2) challenges it will need to address within the next 5 years.
What GAO Found
Over the last 5 years, the Forest Service in the Department of Agriculture and land management agencies in the Department of the Interior, working with the Congress, have made important progress in responding to wildland fires. The agencies have adopted various national strategy documents addressing the need to reduce wildland fire risks; established a priority for protecting communities in the wildland-urban interface; and increased efforts and amounts of funding committed to addressing wildland fire problems, including preparedness, suppression, and fuel reduction on federal lands. In addition, the agencies have begun improving their data and research on wildland fire problems, made progress in developing long-needed fire management plans that identify actions for effectively addressing wildland fire threats at the local level, and improved federal interagency coordination and collaboration with nonfederal partners. The agencies also have strengthened overall accountability for their investments in wildland fire activities by establishing improved performance measures and a framework for monitoring results. While the agencies have adopted various strategy documents to address the nation's wildland fire problems, none of these documents constitutes a cohesive strategy that explicitly identifies the long-term options and related funding needed to reduce fuels in national forests and rangelands and to respond to wildland fire threats. Both the agencies and the Congress need a comprehensive assessment of the fuel reduction options and related funding needs to determine the most effective and affordable long-term approach for addressing wildland fire problems. Completing a cohesive strategy that identifies long-term options and needed funding will require finishing several efforts now under way, each with its own challenges. The agencies will need to finish planned improvements in a key data and modeling system--LANDFIRE--to more precisely identify the extent and location of wildland fire threats and to better target fuel reduction efforts. In implementing LANDFIRE, the agencies will need more consistent approaches to assessing wildland fire risks, more integrated information systems, and better understanding of the role of climate in wildland fire. In addition, local fire management plans will need to be updated with data from LANDFIRE and from emerging agency research on more cost-effective approaches to reducing fuels. Completing a new system designed to identify the most cost-effective means for allocating fire management budget resources--Fire Program Analysis--may help to better identify long-term options and related funding needs. Without completing these tasks, the agencies will have difficulty determining the extent and location of wildland fire threats, targeting and coordinating their efforts and resources, and resolving wildland fire problems in the most timely and cost-effective manner over the long term. |
gao_GAO-01-657 | gao_GAO-01-657_0 | 3). The 1994 reauthorization of BEA created the four bilingual education grant programs—Program Development and Implementation Grants (PDI), Program Enhancement Projects (Enhancement), Comprehensive School Grants (Comprehensive), and Systemwide Improvement Grants (Systemwide)—to distribute funds directly to school districts serving children with limited English proficiency. Although the application forms and the selection criteria for all four programs are very similar, school districts and schools use the application to describe projects tailored to their specific local needs. No Enhancement grants were awarded in fiscal year 2000. The Four Bilingual Education Programs Are Similar in Many Important Respects
All four federal bilingual education programs share the same performance goals and measures, possess similar eligibility criteria, and allow similar uses of program funds (see table 1). The Four Programs Served Similar Grantees and Funded Comparable Services, but Individual Schools Typically Did Not Receive Funding From More Than One Program
OBEMLA officials awarded grants to school districts with similar characteristics that provided similar services; however, individual schools typically did not receive funding from more than one bilingual education program. 4). Effectiveness of Bilingual Programs on National Level is Unknown
The effectiveness of the four bilingual education programs on a national level is unknown because locally collected data are not comparable. One study prepared for Education found that it was difficult to aggregate data to provide a national picture of program effectiveness for these reasons, and also because of the variability in the quality and amount of data reported by school districts. Even if Education were able to obtain uniform data across local programs, it would still be difficult to isolate the effects of BEA funding. Because services provided to students with limited English proficiency are funded through multiple federal, state, and local sources, it would be difficult to isolate the effects of the four bilingual education program funds from other funding effects. Consolidation of Bilingual Education Programs Offers Little Federal Cost Savings but May Improve Efficiency
Because all four bilingual education programs share the same goals, target the same types of children, and provide similar services, these programs lend themselves to consolidation. Federal Cost Savings From Program Consolidation Would Likely Be Small
While opportunities exist for consolidating the four bilingual education programs, federal cost savings, if any, from this action would likely be small for two reasons. | Why GAO Did This Study
In fiscal year 2000, the federal government funded four bilingual education programs--Program Development and Implementation Grants, Program Enhancement Projects, Comprehensive School Grants, and Systemwide Improvement Grants--that award grants to school districts to serve children with limited English proficiency. This report reviews (1) how similar the performance goals and measures, eligibility criteria, and allowable services are among the four bilingual education programs; (2) to what extent the different kinds of grants were made to the same types of schools or school districts and were used to provide the same services; (3) what is known about these programs' effectiveness; and (4) whether these programs can be better coordinated or if opportunities exist for program coordination and cost savings.
What GAO Found
GAO found that all four federal bilingual education programs share the same performance goals and measures, use similar eligibility criteria, and allow for similar uses of program funds. In fiscal year 2000, the four bilingual programs made grants to school districts that shared some characteristics and provided similar services; however, individual schools typically did not receive funding from more than one program. The services provided with program funds are similar, but are tailored by school districts and schools to meet local needs. Currently, the effectiveness of the four bilingual programs on a national level is not known. The authorizing legislation requires the use of local evaluations to assess students' progress in meeting state standards. The variation in local assessment tests complicates the task of providing a national picture of program effectiveness. Even if the Department of Education were able to obtain uniform information on local projects, it faces challenges in trying to isolate the funding effects of the four bilingual programs from funding effects of other programs that support students with limited English proficiency. Finally, these four bilingual programs lend themselves to consolidation. Although cost savings from consolidation would likely be small, there may be advantages to consolidation, such as freeing up staff for other important activities and reducing the administrative burden associated with redundant federal programs. |
gao_GAO-09-844 | gao_GAO-09-844_0 | Background
NASA’s Vision for Space Exploration calls for a return of humans to the Moon and eventual human spaceflight to Mars. Among the first major efforts of this program are the developments of new space flight systems—including the Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle and the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle. Progress has been made; however, technical and design challenges are still significant and until they are resolved NASA will not be able to reliably estimate the time and money needed to execute the program. In addition, cost issues and a poorly phased funding plan continue to hamper the program. Consequently, NASA is changing the acquisition strategy for the Orion project as the agency attempts to increase confidence in its ability to meet a March 2015 first crewed launch. The Constellation program’s integrated risk management system also identified this strategy as high risk and warned that funding shortfalls could occur in fiscal years 2009 through 2012, resulting in planned work not being completed to support schedules and milestones. According to project officials, these shortfalls limited NASA’s ability to mitigate technical risks early in development and precluded the orderly ramp-up of workforce and developmental activities. Changing Acquisition Strategy
In response to technical challenges and cost and funding issues, NASA is changing the Orion project acquisition strategy. Though these changes to overarching requirements are likely to increase the confidence level associated with the March 2015 first crewed flight, they do not guarantee that the program will conduct a successful first crewed flight in March 2015. As NASA addresses the findings and recommendations of the Review of U.S. Human Space Flight Plans Committee, we recommend that the new NASA Administrator direct the Constellation program, or its successor, to develop a sound business case—supported by firm requirements, mature technologies, a preliminary design, a realistic cost estimate, and sufficient funding and time—before proceeding into implementation, and, if necessary, delay the preliminary design review until a sound business case demonstrating the program’s readiness to move forward into implementation is in hand. NASA acknowledged that, while substantial work has been completed, the Constellation program faces knowledge gaps concerning requirements, technologies, funding, schedule, and other resources. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To assess NASA’s progress toward establishing a sound business case for the Ares I and Orion projects and identify key technical challenges NASA faces in developing the Ares I Crew Launch and the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicles, we obtained and analyzed Constellation plans and schedules, risk mitigation information, and contract performance data relative to the standards in our knowledge-based acquisition practices including program and project plans, contracts, schedules, risk assessments, funding profile, budget documentation, earned value reports, and the results of NASA’s assessments of the program. NASA: Ares I and Orion Project Risks and Key Indicators to Measure Progress. | Why GAO Did This Study
NASA's Constellation program is developing the Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle and the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle as the agency's first major efforts in a plan to return to the moon and eventually send humans to Mars. GAO has issued a number of reports and testimonies on various aspects of this program, and made several recommendations. GAO was asked to assess NASA's progress in implementing GAO's recommendations for the Ares I and Orion projects, and identify risks the program faces. GAO analyzed NASA plans and schedules, risk mitigation information, and contract performance data relative to knowledge-based acquisition practices identified in prior GAO reports, and interviewed government officials and contractors.
What GAO Found
NASA is still struggling to develop a solid business case--including firm requirements, mature technologies, a knowledge-based acquisition strategy, a realistic cost estimate, and sufficient funding and time--needed to justify moving the Constellation program forward into the implementation phase. Gaps in the business case include significant technical and design challenges for the Orion and Ares I vehicles, such as limiting vibration during launch, eliminating the risk of hitting the launch tower during lift off, and reducing the mass of the Orion vehicle, represent considerable hurdles that must be overcome in order to meet safety and performance requirements; and a poorly phased funding plan that runs the risk of funding shortfalls in fiscal years 2009 through 2012, resulting in planned work not being completed to support schedules and milestones. This approach has limited NASA's ability to mitigate technical risks early in development and precludes the orderly ramp up of workforce and developmental activities. In response to these gaps, NASA delayed the date of its first crewed-flight and changed its acquisition strategy for the Orion project. NASA acknowledges that funding shortfalls reduce the agency's flexibility in resolving technical challenges. The program's risk management system warned of planned work not being completed to support schedules and milestones. Consequently, NASA is now focused on providing the capability to service the International Space Station and has deferred the capabilities needed for flights to the moon. Though these changes to the overarching requirements are likely to increase the confidence level associated with a March 2015 first crewed flight, these actions do not guarantee that the program will successfully meet that deadline. Nevertheless, NASA estimates that Ares I and Orion represent up to $49 billion of the over $97 billion estimated to be spent on the Constellation program through 2020. While the agency has already obligated more than $10 billion in contracts, at this point NASA does not know how much Ares I and Orion will ultimately cost, and will not know until technical and design challenges have been addressed. |
gao_GAO-13-531 | gao_GAO-13-531_0 | Background
Overview of the Federal Judiciary
The federal judiciary consists of the Supreme Court, regional circuit courts of appeals, district courts, bankruptcy courts, as well as courts of special jurisdiction including the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the Court of International Trade, and the Court of Federal Claims.1 provides an overview of the district and bankruptcy courts. In 1986, a new statutory provision was added prohibiting the consolidation of the offices of the district and bankruptcy clerks of court without the prior approval of the Judicial Conference and Congress.further clarified the process for consolidation of clerks’ offices in the district courts and bankruptcy courts, which was promulgated in the Guide to Judiciary Policy. For example, different court units may share a joint contract for telephone service, share individual staff, or share space, among other arrangements. Few Districts Have Consolidated Clerks’ Offices, and Courts Are Sharing Services, but the Costs and Benefits Are Unclear
Four Districts Have Consolidated Clerks’ Offices, and No Known Others Plan to Do So in the Future
Of the 91 federal judicial districts served by bankruptcy courts, 4 function with consolidated district and bankruptcy clerks’ offices. The Judiciary Is Assessing and Considering Further Efforts to Share Services
Since the extent of cost savings and other benefits in courts with consolidated clerks’ offices or shared services is unclear at this time, AOUSC is assessing whether additional arrangements would be beneficial. Because, according to AOUSC officials and court officials we interviewed, consolidation of clerks’ offices in additional districts is unlikely, AOUSC has focused on assessing whether shared services results in cost savings, and its efforts are ongoing. In August 2011, AOUSC began a study to determine the extent to which court units have been sharing administrative services; what the results have been, including any cost savings; and how courts may be able to contain costs through sharing more services. For the study, AOUSC distributed surveys to district and bankruptcy courts and probation and pretrial services offices to collect data on the number of court units that are sharing services and the number of court unit employees categorized as performing administrative versus operational functions. AOUSC plans to use the data collected from these surveys to conduct an analysis of the percentage of time devoted to administrative work in court units that share services and consequently whether there are associated cost savings with sharing services. According to officials, AOUSC is still analyzing the data and has drafted a report from the study, which after further review, they anticipate providing to the Judicial Conference’s Committee on the Budget in July 2013, but they did not know when the report would be final. While AOUSC studies the potential cost savings, the Judicial Conference continues to encourage shared services as a way to save money while maintaining high-quality court services. In a 2012 hearing, the Chair of the Budget Committee of the Judicial Conference stated that shared administrative services would reduce the duplication caused by multiple human resources, procurement, financial management, and information The Chair also stated that technology staffs in a single judicial district.shared administrative services would reduce staffing and overhead costs and streamline the administrative process in the courts. However, AOUSC officials said that these preliminary results did not take into account the varying levels of shared services that courts have, since the self-reported surveys did not ask for this information. As courts consider whether to begin or increase shared services arrangements, the results of AOUSC’s cost savings study will likely be important to help determine whether shared services could result in savings or other benefits. In addition to determining whether shared services could save money, as courts consider how to reduce costs and meet decreasing budgets, the results of AOUSC’s study could provide courts with information or promising practices to aid in their decisions about sharing services in their particular districts. For example, AOUSC officials said that after the study is completed, they may conduct case studies of courts that, according to the survey data, are sharing services and show an efficient use of administrative staff, and disseminate information on these courts’ practices to all courts. For example, courts noted that they did not have access to measures that would allow them to compare their staff numbers and utilization with those of other similarly sized courts, such as if their human resource staff numbers were at an optimal level. However, since the study is ongoing and subsequent case study plans are not firm, it is too early to tell whether the results, the final report, or subsequent AOUSC actions will provide this information. AOUSC stated that the judiciary’s cost containment efforts, including sharing administrative services, will not fully offset the effects of sequestration on the judiciary’s budget. We are sending copies of this report to the Judicial Conference, the Director of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, and other interested parties. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal judiciary has the critical responsibility for the fair and swift administration of justice in the United States. Like the rest of the federal government, the judiciary has been affected by decreasing federal resources, and is implementing and considering various cost containment initiatives, including sharing administrative services between district and bankruptcy courts, such as human resources, procurement, or financial management. In most federal judicial districts, the offices of the clerkresponsible for operational and administrative court functionsfor the district and bankruptcy courts are separate, but in a few districts, these have been consolidated into one clerks office.
GAO was requested to examine the potential savings from consolidating or sharing services between district and bankruptcy clerks offices. This report addresses (1) the steps the judiciary has taken to consolidate these clerks offices or share services between them and the costs and benefits of doing so, and (2) the extent to which the judiciary is assessing and considering further clerks office consolidations or shared services. GAO reviewed judicial guidance related to consolidation and shared services, budget documentation, surveys and data on the extent of shared services, and information on potential cost savings from 10 federal judicial districts, selected based on geography and size, and to include courts with consolidated and nonconsolidated clerks offices. GAO also interviewed court and judiciary officials. While the information and views obtained cannot be generalized, they provided insights.
What GAO Found
Few federal judicial districts have consolidated their court clerks' offices; courts are sharing services among the clerks' offices, but the costs and benefits are unclear. Four of the 91 districts served by bankruptcy courts have consolidated the clerks' offices of the district and bankruptcy courts. Court officials in districts that are not considering consolidation told GAO that they are not considering consolidation primarily because the bankruptcy courts in those districts did not want to give up their independence or risk the possibility that services would be prioritized in favor of the district court, and the courts did not have evidence of cost savings or other benefits that would make consolidation worthwhile. Officials from the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (AOUSC), which provides a wide range of services to the federal judiciary, were not aware of other districts considering consolidation and noted that the consolidation process is complicated--for example, it requires congressional approval. The judiciary has taken steps to share administrative services as part of its cost containment initiatives, but the cost savings and operational benefits of sharing services are unclear. In an AOUSC survey, 154 of 283 court units--district courts, bankruptcy courts, and probation and pretrial services offices--reported that they are sharing services with other court units, though the extent of this sharing is unknown because the survey did not ask for this information. For example, sharing can comprise various methods, such as shared staff, shared contracts for service, or shared space. According to AOUSC officials, since staff expenses make up the majority of judiciary expenses, sharing staff and eliminating positions may be the most promising way to achieve cost savings through shared services. However, the ability to cut staff based on sharing services is dependent on the attributes of each district, including the level of staff utilization, and courts GAO spoke with did not provide documented evidence of cost savings or the lack thereof. Court opinions on the operational benefits from sharing services also varied. For example, court officials stated that sharing can provide opportunities for staff specialization and better-quality service, but can also negatively affect courts if services are not provided equitably.
In August 2011, AOUSC began a cost savings study on shared administrative services. AOUSC plans to use data collected from the courts to conduct an analysis of the percentage of time devoted to administrative work in court units that share services and consequently whether there are associated cost savings. AOUSC plans to provide a draft report from the study to the Budget Committee of the Judicial Conference--the conference is the judiciary's principal policy-making body--in July 2013, but did not know when the report would be final. In addition to determining whether shared services could save money, the results of the study could provide courts with information to aid in their decisions about sharing services. For example, AOUSC officials said that after the study is completed, they may conduct case studies of courts that are sharing services and disseminate information on these courts' practices. As courts consider whether to begin or increase shared services arrangements, the results of AOUSC's cost savings study will likely be important to help determine whether shared services could result in savings or other benefits. However, since the study is ongoing and case study plans are not firm, it is too early to tell whether the results, the final report, or subsequent AOUSC actions will provide this information. |
gao_GAO-07-1012 | gao_GAO-07-1012_0 | HUD provides rental housing assistance through three major programs— housing choice voucher, public housing, and project-based. More Than Half of Low- Income Veteran Renters Had Housing Affordability Problems
According to our analysis of ACS data, an estimated 1.3 million low- income veteran households, or about 56 percent of the 2.3 million such households, had rents that exceeded 30 percent of their household income in 2005 (see table 4). The extent of housing affordability problems among low-income veteran renter households varied significantly by state in 2005 (see fig. Further, HUD policies generally do not distinguish between income sources that are specific to veterans, such as VA-provided benefits, and other sources of income. Most Contacted Housing Agencies and Owners of Project- Based Properties Did Not Offer a Veterans’ Preference for Admission to HUD’s Rental Assistance Programs
Less than half of the 41 largest PHAs we contacted employed a veterans’ preference for admission to their public housing or voucher programs, while the 13 largest PBCAs we contacted reported that owners of project- based properties that they oversee generally did not use a veterans’ preference. Although the reasons for this difference are unclear, various factors—such as different levels of need for affordable housing among veteran and other households—could contribute to the disparity. Eleven Percent of All Low- Income Veteran Households Received HUD Rental Assistance Compared with 19 Percent of Other Low-Income Households
Low-income veteran renter households were less likely to receive HUD rental assistance than other households. As shown in table 6, of the total 2.3 million veteran renter households with low incomes, at least 250,000 (or 11 percent) received HUD assistance. The housing choice voucher program served the largest number of veteran households, followed by the project-based program, and the public housing program (see fig. The Assistant Secretary’s letter states that “HUD objects to the characterization that policies for its three major rental assistance programs generally do not take veteran status into account when determining eligibility or assistance levels” and notes that “HUD cannot mandate that a PHA establish any particular type of preference” for their voucher program. As our report states, our reporting objectives addressed both of these issues: (1) how HUD’s rental assistance programs treat veteran status (that is, whether a person is a veteran or not) and veteran-specific benefits in determining eligibility and subsidy amounts and (2) the extent to which PHAs and property owners participating in HUD’s rental assistance programs establish a veterans’ preference in their administrative and tenant selection plans. Accordingly, we did not change our report in this regard. To determine the income status and demographic and housing characteristics of veteran households, we analyzed data from the U.S. Bureau of the Census’s (Census) 2005 American Community Survey (ACS), which identified households’ veteran status, income, and other demographic characteristics, in conjunction with HUD’s defined income categories: low (80 percent or less of area median income or AMI), very low (50 percent or less of AMI), and extremely low (30 percent or less of AMI). We also interviewed officials from HUD and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). | Why GAO Did This Study
Veterans returning from service in Iraq and Afghanistan could increase demand for affordable rental housing. Households with low incomes (80 percent or less of the area median income) generally are eligible to receive rental assistance from the Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) housing choice voucher, public housing, and project-based programs. However, because rental assistance is not an entitlement, not all who are eligible receive assistance. In response to a congressional mandate, GAO assessed (1) the income status and demographic and housing characteristics of veteran renter households, (2) how HUD's rental assistance programs treat veteran status (whether a person is a veteran or not) and whether they use a veterans' preference, and (3) the extent to which HUD's rental assistance programs served veterans in fiscal year 2005. Among other things, GAO analyzed data from HUD, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), and the Bureau of the Census, surveyed selected public housing agencies, and interviewed agency officials and veterans groups. GAO makes no recommendations in this report. VA agreed with the report's findings. HUD objected to the characterization in the report regarding HUD's policies on veteran status and program eligibility and subsidy amounts.
What GAO Found
In 2005, an estimated 2.3 million veteran renter households had low incomes. The proportion of veteran renter households that were low income varied by state but did not fall below 41 percent. Further, an estimated 1.3 million, or about 56 percent of these low-income veteran households, had housing affordability problems--that is, rental costs exceeding 30 percent of household income. Compared with other (nonveteran) renter households, however, veterans were somewhat less likely to be low income or have housing affordability problems. HUD's policies for its three major rental assistance programs generally do not take veteran status into account when determining eligibility or assistance levels, but eligible veterans can receive assistance. Also, HUD generally does not distinguish between income that is specific to veterans, such as VA-provided benefits, and other sources of income. The majority of the 41 largest public housing agencies that administer the housing choice voucher or public housing programs have no veterans' preference for admission. The 13 largest performance-based contract administrators that oversee most properties under project-based programs reported that owners generally did not adopt a veterans' preference. In fiscal year 2005, an estimated 11 percent of all eligible low-income veteran households (at least 250,000) received assistance, compared with 19 percent of nonveteran households. Although the reasons for the difference are unclear, factors such as differing levels of need for affordable housing among veteran and other households could influence the percentages. |
gao_RCED-96-187 | gao_RCED-96-187_0 | Figure 1 shows Amtrak’s financial projections for reducing operating losses, holding down cost increases, and increasing revenues. It also plans to reduce costs by $4 million in fiscal year 1996 by improving the productivity of Amtrak’s reservations office. Amtrak Generally Met Financial Targets for Fiscal Year 1995 but Is Projecting to Be Overbudget in Fiscal Year 1996
In fiscal year 1995, the first year under its Strategic Business Plan, Amtrak reduced its operating loss from the $1.0145 billion projected without the implementation of the Plan to $843.8 million, or by $171 million, which was about $3 million less than it had planned. The Plan included actions to reduce the fiscal year 1996 operating loss by an additional $61.6 million by increasing revenues $81 million while holding expenses to a net increase of only $19.8 million. West Coast and Northeast Corridor Units Are Meeting or Nearly Meeting Goals, but the Intercity Unit Is Not
The results for each strategic business unit vary. However, Amtrak has reduced its operating loss by about 29 percent through its fiscal year 1995 actions. Even if it were fully successful in implementing the fiscal year 1996 actions, it would reduce the operating loss by only an additional 8 percent—and second quarter revisions reduce this projection to less than 1 percent. Monitoring the Plan’s Implementation Is Important
Top management at the Northeast Corridor and Intercity units is systematically monitoring whether specific actions in the Strategic Business Plan are implemented and meeting financial targets; the West Coast Unit’s senior management monitors whether it is operating within its budget and delegates to its department directors the monitoring of whether specific actions have been successfully taken. Each strategic business unit reports its results monthly to the corporate level, where the results are verified and consolidated into corporationwide monthly and quarterly reports. Scope and Methodology
To identify the actions Amtrak plans to take to improve its financial condition, review its progress to date towards achieving improvements and its longer-term goal of operating without a federal operating subsidy, and describe its monitoring of the Strategic Business Plan’s implementation, we obtained and analyzed data from Amtrak. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed Amtrak's Strategic Business Plan, focusing on: (1) specific planned actions and their expected results; (2) Amtrak's success in achieving financial improvements and its progress toward realizing its long-term goal of self-sufficiency; and (3) Amtrak's efforts to monitor the plan's implementation.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) by fiscal year (FY) 2001, Amtrak plans to reduce its annual operating loss to about $180 million, which it will offset with funds from sources other than federal subsidies; (2) Amtrak plans to double its revenues and hold operating cost increases to less than 20 percent through FY 2001; (3) Amtrak's actions reduced its FY 1995 operating loss by $171 million, which was $3 million less than expected; (4) Amtrak expects its 1995 loss-reduction efforts to produce $315 million in annual savings beginning in FY 1996; (5) Amtrak planned additional FY 1996 actions to reduce its operating loss by another $61.6 million, but severe winter weather reduced revenues and increased operating costs; (6) if Amtrak reaches its revised FY 1996 goal of a $5.2-million reduction, it will have reduced its operating loss by 30 percent overall; (7) two Amtrak business units are meeting or nearly meeting their goals, but one is not; (8) Amtrak has made progress in its plan's first 18 months, but it is too early to determine whether Amtrak will reach its operating self-sufficiency goal, because success depends on further improvements and realizing certain funding, service, and productivity assumptions; (9) two units' top management monitors implementation of specific plan actions and financial goals, while the third unit focuses on whether it is operating within its budget and makes department directors responsible for implementing and monitoring individual plan actions; and (10) Amtrak prepares monthly and quarterly reports based on monthly unit reports. |
gao_GAO-09-226 | gao_GAO-09-226_0 | As authorized by Annunzio-Wylie, FinCEN issued a regulation in 1996 requiring banks and other depository institutions to report, using a SAR form, certain suspicious transactions involving possible violations of law or regulation, including money laundering. After identification of unusual activity, depository institution staff conduct additional research to determine whether to file a SAR. Representatives also cited an increased awareness of the risks of terrorist financing and other financial crimes after September 11 and improved knowledge of BSA requirements and issues resulting from regulator and institution guidance and training. Multiple Factors Contributed to the Increases in Depository Institutions’ SAR Filings from 2000 through 2007
Representatives from depository institutions, federal banking regulators, and law enforcement agencies identified a number of factors that, in their view, collectively contributed to the increases in SAR filings by depository institutions from 2000 through 2007. FinCEN and Law Enforcement Agencies Took Multiple Actions to Improve SAR Filings and Educate Filers about Their Usefulness in Investigations
FinCEN and law enforcement agencies have taken several steps to improve SAR filings and educate filers about their usefulness in investigations. Additionally, FinCEN representatives regularly participated in conferences and outreach events for BSA/AML issues, including events focused on SARs. Law Enforcement Agencies Conduct Outreach Efforts and Build Relationships to Improve the Quality of SAR Narratives and Communication with Institutions
Representatives from federal law enforcement agencies we interviewed said that they conducted outreach events and developed relationships with local depository institutions to improve SAR narratives and alert the institutions to criminal activity the agencies are targeting in investigations. Federal Agencies Use SARs in a Variety of Ways and Have Taken a Number of Actions in Recent Years to Make Better Use of Them
FinCEN, law enforcement agencies, and financial regulators use SARs in investigations and financial institution examinations and have taken steps in recent years to make better use of them. FinCEN uses SARs to provide a number of public and nonpublic analytical products to law enforcement agencies and depository institution regulators. Some Federal Law Enforcement Agencies Have Facilitated Complex Analyses by Using SAR Data with Their Own Data Sets
Federal agencies, separately and in collaboration with other agencies, have taken actions to more effectively analyze SAR data, particularly by better integrating BSA data with other law enforcement data. Although they generally supported a key proposed revision, some law enforcement agency representatives we interviewed believed certain proposed revisions could be detrimental to their investigations. FinCEN Has Developed a New Process for Revising Forms, but Details about the Process Are Limited and Do Not Include Some Important Collaborative Practices and Mechanisms
FinCEN has developed a new process it intends to use in the future when revising SAR and other forms; however, documentation on the process does not include some collaborative practices. If FinCEN continues to use the process as it is currently outlined, it may not achieve some potential benefits that could come from closer adherence to practices that can help enhance and sustain collaboration, such as greater consensus from all stakeholders on proposed SAR form revisions, and fuller documentation of the process. SARs are a key information source for federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies, as well as the federal regulators. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report examines (1) the underlying factors that affected the number of suspicious activity reports (SAR) filed by depository institutions from 2000 through 2007, (2) actions that federal agencies have taken to improve the usefulness of SARs for law enforcement, (3) ways in which federal agencies use SARs and actions they have taken to make better use of them, and (4) whether the process the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) uses to revise SAR forms is effective in assuring that the information collected is appropriate for law enforcement needs. | Why GAO Did This Study
To assist law enforcement agencies in their efforts to combat money laundering, terrorist financing, and other financial crimes, the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) requires financial institutions to file suspicious activity reports (SAR) to inform the federal government of transactions related to possible violations of law or regulation. Depository institutions have been concerned about the resources required to file SARs and the extent to which SARs are used. GAO was asked to examine (1) factors affecting the number of SARs filed, (2) actions agencies have taken to improve the usefulness of SARs, (3) federal agencies' use of SARs, and (4) the effectiveness of the process used to revise SAR forms. GAO reviewed laws and agency documents; analyzed SAR filings; and interviewed representatives from the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), law enforcement agencies, bank regulators, and depository institutions.
What GAO Found
In 2000 through 2007, SAR filings by depository institutions increased from about 163,000 to 649,000 per year; representatives from federal regulators, law enforcement, and depository institutions with whom GAO spoke attributed the increase mainly to two factors. First, automated monitoring systems can flag multiple indicators of suspicious activities and identify significantly more unusual activity than manual monitoring. Second, several public enforcement actions against a few depository institutions prompted other institutions to look more closely at client and account activities. Other factors include institutions' greater awareness of and training on BSA requirements after September 11, and more regulator guidance for BSA examinations. FinCEN and law enforcement agencies have taken actions to improve the quality of SAR filings and educate filers about their usefulness. Since 2000, FinCEN has issued written products with the purpose of making SAR filings more useful to law enforcement. FinCEN and federal law enforcement agency representatives regularly participate in outreach on BSA/anti-money laundering, including events focused on SARs. Law enforcement agency representatives said they also establish relationships with depository institutions to communicate with staff about crafting useful SAR narratives. FinCEN, law enforcement agencies, and financial regulators use SARs in investigations and financial institution examinations and have taken steps in recent years to make better use of them. FinCEN uses SARs to provide public and nonpublic analytical products to law enforcement agencies and depository institution regulators. Some federal law enforcement agencies have facilitated complex analyses by using SAR data with their own data sets. Federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies collaborate to review and start investigations based on SARs filed in their areas. Regulators use SARs in their examination process to assess compliance and take action against abuse by depository institution insiders. After revising a SAR form in 2006 that still cannot be used because of information technology limitations, in 2008, FinCEN developed a new process for revising BSA forms, including SARs, that may increase collaboration with some stakeholders, including some law enforcement groups concerned that certain of the 2006 revisions could be detrimental to investigations. However, the limited documentation on the process does not provide details to determine the degree to which the new process will incorporate GAOidentified best practices for enhancing and sustaining federal agency collaboration. For example, it does not specify roles and responsibilities for stakeholders or depict monitoring, evaluating, and reporting mechanisms. By incorporating some of these key collaboration practices and more fully developing and documenting its new process for form revisions, FinCEN could achieve some potential benefits that could come from closer adherence to the practices--such as greater consensus from all stakeholders on proposed SAR form revisions. |
gao_T-RCED-99-161 | gao_T-RCED-99-161_0 | USDA reimburses the insurance companies for the administrative expenses associated with selling and servicing crop insurance policies, including the expenses associated with adjusting claims. Changes in Premium Rates for Traditional Crop Insurance Have Improved the Program’s Actuarial Condition, but Some Rates Remain Too Low
In 1995, we reported that for the six crops we reviewed—barley, corn, cotton, grain sorghum, soybeans, and wheat—basic premium rates overall were 89 percent adequate, on average, to meet the Congress’s legislative requirement of actuarial soundness. However, we found that while overall premiums were approaching actuarial soundness, USDA’s rates for some crops and locations and for some coverage and production levels were too low. However, the other 89 programs, representing about 24 percent of the crop insurance premiums for the six crops in 1994, had basic rates that were less than 80 percent adequate for actuarial soundness. These actions have contributed to the federal crop insurance program’s achieving a loss ratio well below the target in recent years, thereby improving the program’s financial soundness. Opportunities to Reduce Government Costs for Private Sector Delivery
In 1997, we reported that USDA’s administrative expense reimbursements to participating insurance companies selling traditional buyup insurance—31 percent of premiums—were much higher than the expenses that can be reasonably associated with the sale and service of federal crop insurance. Subsequent to our report, the Agricultural Research, Extension, and Education Reform Act of 1998 revised reimbursement rates downward to 24.5 percent of premiums for traditional buyup insurance. Government’s 1995 Cost to Deliver Catastrophic Insurance Through USDA Was Less Than Through Private Companies
In 1997, we also reported that the government’s costs to deliver catastrophic insurance policies in 1995 were higher through private companies than through the local offices of USDA’s Farm Service Agency. The basic cost to the government for selling and servicing catastrophic crop insurance was comparable for both delivery systems. While favorable weather and stable crop prices generated very favorable claims experience over the first 2 years that the plans were available to farmers, these shortcomings raise questions about whether the rates established for each plan will be actuarially sound and fair—that is, appropriate to the risk each farmer presents over the long term. With respect to Crop Revenue Coverage, which does not incorporate the interrelationship between crop prices and farm-level yields, we recommended that the Risk Management Agency direct the plan’s developer to base premium rates on a revenue distribution or another appropriate statistical technique that recognizes this interrelationship. While USDA subsequently took action to improve the actuarial soundness of the Revenue Assurance plan, it has not, to date, acted on our recommendations regarding the other two plans. Increased program participation and sales volume that could result from crop insurance reform may lead to lower delivery costs, warranting a downward adjustment in the rate. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the Department of Agriculture's (USDA) federal crop insurance program, focusing on whether USDA: (1) has set adequate insurance rates to achieve the legislative requirement of actuarial soundness; (2) appropriately reimburses participating crop insurance companies for their administrative costs; (3) can deliver catastrophic crop insurance at less cost to the government than private insurance companies; and (4) has established methodologies in the revenue insurance plans that set sound premium rates.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) GAO has reported that several aspects of USDA's crop insurance program are of concern and need attention; (2) in 1995, GAO reported that premiums charged farmers for crop insurance were not adequate to achieve the actuarial soundness mandated by Congress; (3) GAO's review showed that the basic premium rates for the six crops reviewed were approaching actuarial soundness in 1995, but USDA's rates for some crops and locations and for some coverage and production levels were well below the legislative requirement; (4) about 24 percent of the crop insurance premiums for the six crops GAO reviewed had basic rates that were less than 80-percent adequate for actuarial soundness; (5) USDA subsequently took actions to improve the program's actuarial soundness, but some rates remain too low; (6) the government's administrative expense reimbursement to insurance companies--31 percent of premiums--were greater than the companies' reported expenses to sell and service federal crop insurance; (7) GAO stated that some of these reported expenses did not appear to be reasonably associated with the sale and service of federal crop insurance; (8) the Agricultural Research, Extension, and Education Reform Act of 1998 subsequently revised reimbursement rates downward to 24.5 percent of premiums for most crop insurance; (9) increased program participation and sales volume that could result from crop insurance reform may lead to lower delivery costs, warranting a downward adjustment in the rate; (10) GAO reported that the government's costs to deliver catastrophic insurance in 1995 were higher through private companies than through USDA; (11) although the basic costs associated with selling and servicing catastrophic crop insurance through USDA and private companies were comparable, delivery through USDA avoids paying an underwriting gain to companies in years when there is a low incidence of catastrophic loss claims; (12) GAO reported its doubts about whether new USDA-supported revenue insurance plans will be actuarially sound over the long term and appropriate to the risk each farmer presents to the program; and (13) with respect to the most popular plan, Crop Revenue Coverage, GAO recommended that USDA's Risk Management Agency require the plan's developer to base premium rates on a revenue distribution or other appropriate statistical technique that recognizes the interrelationship between farm-level yields and expected crop prices. |
gao_HEHS-99-38 | gao_HEHS-99-38_0 | VA Has Reduced Many Barriers to Care
VA has taken several actions to remove barriers identified by GAO, VA, and women veteran proponents over the years that prevent women veterans from obtaining care in VA medical facilities. VA has also designated coordinators to assist women veterans in accessing the system. Efforts Increased to Inform Women Veterans of Services, but Effectiveness Unknown
Over the last few years, VA has increased its outreach efforts to inform women veterans of their eligibility for care in response to problems highlighted by GAO, VA, and veteran service organizations between 1982 and 1994. This survey should allow VA to assess the effectiveness of its outreach to women veterans. Women Veterans Coordinators More Effective in Assisting Women Veterans in Obtaining Care
Women veterans coordinators assist in obtaining care, advocate for women veterans’ health care, and collaborate with medical center management to make facilities more sensitive to women veterans. Others may only offer certain services on a contractual or part-time basis. The increase in the availability of services and the emphasis on women veterans’ health have contributed to increases in the number of women veterans served and visits made, with the exception of inpatient care.Between fiscal years 1994 and 1997, the number of gender-specific services provided to women veterans increased about 42 percent, from over 85,000 to over 121,000. Services for Women Are Available but Vary by Facility
While women veterans can obtain gender-specific services as well as other health care services at most VA medical facilities, the extent to which care, especially gender-specific care, is available varies by facility. Based on VA’s survey of its medical facilities, the number of women veterans receiving gender-specific services increased about 42 percent from more than 85,000 to almost 121,200 during the same period. Concluding Observations
VA’s health care program for women veterans has made important strides in the last few years. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the status of the Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) health care program for women, focusing on: (1) the progress VA made in removing barriers that may prevent women veterans from obtaining VA health care services; and (2) the extent to which VA health care services, particularly gender-specific services, are available to and used by women veterans.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) VA has made considerable progress in removing barriers that prevent women veterans from obtaining care; (2) VA has increased outreach to women veterans to inform them of their eligibility for health care services and designated women veterans coordinators to assist women veterans in accessing VA's health care system; (3) VA has also improved the health care environment in many of its medical facilities, especially with respect to accommodating the privacy needs of women veterans; (4) however, VA recognizes that it has more working these areas and plans to address concerns about the effectiveness of its outreach efforts and privacy barriers that still exist in some facilities; (5) in response to women veterans' concerns, VA has begun to assess its capacity to women veterans; (6) with regard to gender-specific services, VA's efforts to emphasize women veterans' health care have contributed to a significant increas of all services over the last 3 years; (7) the range of services differs by facility; services may be provided in clinics designated specifically for women veterans, or they may be provided in the overall medical facility health care system; (8) more importantly, utilization has increased significantly between 1994 and 1997; (9) for example, gender-specific services grew from over 85,000 to more than 121,000; and (10) during the same time period, the number of women veterans treated for all health care services on an outpatient basis increased by about 32 percent or 119,300. |
gao_GAO-16-494 | gao_GAO-16-494_0 | Agencies Use a Variety of Processes to Determine Investments’ CIO Ratings
Agencies determine investments’ CIO ratings using a variety of processes, which include OMB’s suggested factors. However, their interpretation of these factors varies significantly. As noted above, we reviewed data reported to OMB as part of the federal budget process to identify major investments which planned to spend at least 80 percent of their fiscal year 2015 funding on development, modernization, and enhancement activities. Each of the 17 agencies has incorporated at least 2 of OMB’s suggested factors into their CIO’s risk rating processes and 9 use all of the factors. In particular, most agencies considered active risks when rating investments, but others only evaluated compliance with risk processes. Most Selected Agencies Require Monthly CIO Rating Updates
Thirteen agencies’ process guidance calls for at least monthly updates to CIO ratings, one agency (DHS) schedules its reviews based on risk, and three agencies require less frequent updates. These provisions require that agencies report at least semi-annually to OMB on each major IT investment and include data on cost, schedule, and performance. This resulted in 95 investments at 15 agencies. Our assessments of these investments generally showed more risk than the associated CIO ratings. In particular, of the 95 investments we reviewed, our assessments matched the CIO ratings 22 times, showed more risk 60 times, and showed less risk 13 times. We identified three factors which contributed to these differences: (1) 40 of the 95 CIO ratings were not updated in April 2015, (2) three agencies’ rating processes span longer than 1 month, and (3) seven agencies’ rating processes did not focus on active risks (as previously discussed). Such updates will help to ensure that the information on the Dashboard is timely and accurately reflects recent changes. Longer processes mean that CIO ratings are based upon older data and may not reflect the current level of investment risk. In all cases, CIO ratings that do not incorporate active risks increase the chance that ratings do not reflect the true likelihood of investment success. Recommendations for Executive Action
To better ensure that the Dashboard ratings more accurately reflect risk, we recommend that: the Secretaries of the Departments of Agriculture, Education, Energy, Health and Human Services, the Interior, State, and Veterans Affairs; and the Director of the Office of Personnel Management direct their CIOs to factor active risks into their IT Dashboard CIO ratings; the Secretaries of the Departments of Defense, Education, and Homeland Security; and the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration direct their CIOs to update their CIO ratings at least as frequently as required in OMB’s guidance; and the Secretaries of the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Education, Energy, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, State, Transportation, the Treasury, Veterans Affairs; the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency; and the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration direct their CIOs to ensure that their CIO ratings reflect the level of risk facing an investment relative to that investment’s ability to accomplish its goals. In written comments, SSA agreed with our recommendation to update its CIO ratings on a monthly basis. Comments from the agencies to which we did not make recommendations are discussed in more detail here. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) describe agencies’ processes for determining the Chief Information Officer (CIO) risk ratings for major information technology (IT) investments and (2) assess the risk of federal IT investments and analyze any differences with the investments’ CIO risk ratings. According to OMB’s guidance, CIO ratings “should reflect the CIO’s assessment of the risk and the investment’s ability to accomplish its goals.” To create our assessments of risk, we combined each investment’s detailed risk lists, known as risk registers, with several additional metrics. | Why GAO Did This Study
Although the government spends more than $80 billion in information technology (IT) annually, many of the investments have failed or have been troubled. In December 2014, provisions commonly referred to as the Federal Information Technology Acquisition Reform Act (FITARA) were enacted. Among other things, FITARA states that OMB shall make available to the public a list of each major IT investment including data on cost, schedule, and performance. OMB does so via the Federal IT Dashboard—its public website that reports on major IT investments, including ratings from CIOs which should reflect the level of risk facing an investment.
GAO's objectives were to (1) describe agencies' processes for determining CIO risk ratings for major federal IT investments primarily in development and (2) assess the risk of federal IT investments and analyze any differences with the investments' CIO risk ratings. To do so, GAO selected major IT investments with at least 80 percent of their fiscal year 2015 budget allocated to development (resulting in 95 investments across 15 agencies) and compared CIO rating processes to OMB guidance. GAO also analyzed data on those investments to create its own risk assessments.
What GAO Found
Agencies determined investments' Chief Information Officer (CIO) ratings using a variety of processes, which included the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) six suggested factors (including risk management, requirements management, and historical performance). Specifically, all 17 selected agencies incorporated at least two of OMB's factors into their risk rating processes and 9 used all of the factors. However, agencies' interpretations of these factors varied. For example, most agencies considered active risks, such as funding cuts or staffing changes, when rating investments, but others only evaluated compliance with the agency's risk management processes. Further, 13 agencies required monthly updates to CIO ratings as does OMB (as of June 2015), 1 agency scheduled its reviews based on risk, and 3 agencies required updates less often than on a monthly basis.
GAO's assessments generally showed more risk than the associated CIO ratings. In particular, of the 95 investments assessed, GAO's assessments matched the CIO ratings 22 times, showed more risk 60 times, and showed less risk 13 times (see graphic).
Forty of the 95 CIO ratings were not updated during the month GAO reviewed, which led to more differences between GAO's assessments and the CIOs' ratings. This underscores the importance of frequent rating updates, which help to ensure that the information on the Dashboard is timely and accurately reflects recent changes to investment status.
Three agencies' rating processes span longer than 1 month. Longer processes mean that CIO ratings are based upon older data and may not reflect the current level of investment risk.
Seven agencies' rating processes did not focus on active risks. According to OMB's guidance, CIO ratings should reflect the CIO's assessment of the risk and the investment's ability to accomplish its goals. CIO ratings that do not incorporate active risks increase the chance that ratings overstate the likelihood of investment success.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making 25 recommendations to 15 agencies to improve the quality and frequency of CIO ratings. Twelve agencies generally agreed with or did not comment on the recommendations and three agencies disagreed, stating their CIO ratings were adequate. GAO continues to believe these recommendations are valid. |
gao_GAO-03-714T | gao_GAO-03-714T_0 | Under the act, cigarette vendors who sell and ship cigarettes into another state to anyone other than a licensed distributor must report (1) the name and address of the person(s) to whom cigarette shipments were made, (2) the brands of cigarettes shipped, and (3) the quantities of cigarettes shipped. Limited Federal Involvement with the Jenkins Act and Internet Cigarette Sales
The federal government has had limited involvement with the Jenkins Act concerning Internet cigarette sales. States Have Taken Action to Promote Jenkins Act Compliance by Internet Cigarette Vendors, but Results Were Limited
Officials in nine states that provided us information all expressed concern about Internet cigarette vendors’ noncompliance with the Jenkins Act and the resulting loss of state tax revenues. The officials said that Internet cigarette sales will continue to grow in the future and are concerned that a much greater and more substantial impact on tax revenues will result. Most Internet Cigarette Vendors Do Not Comply with the Jenkins Act or Notify Consumers of Their Responsibilities
Through our Internet search efforts, we identified 147 Web site addresses for Internet cigarette vendors based in the United States and reviewed each website linked to these addresses. Some vendors cited reasons for not complying that we could not substantiate. Our review of the applicable statutes indicates that neither the Internet Tax Freedom Act nor any privacy laws exempt Internet cigarette vendors from Jenkins Act compliance. ATF has stated that sales or shipments of cigarettes from Native American reservations are not exempt from the requirements of the Jenkins Act. Conclusions
Our report concluded that states are hampered in attempting to promote Jenkins Act compliance because they lack authority to enforce the act. Transferring primary investigative jurisdiction is also appropriate at this time because of the FBI’s new challenges and priorities related to the threat of terrorism and the FBI’s increased counterterrorism efforts. To improve the federal government’s efforts in enforcing the Jenkins Act and promoting compliance with the act by Internet cigarette vendors, which may lead to increased state tax revenues from cigarette sales, our report suggested that the Congress should consider providing ATF with primary jurisdiction to investigate violations of the Jenkins Act (15 U.S.C. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Jenkins Act requires any person who sells and ships cigarettes across a state line to a buyer, other than a licensed distributor, to report the sale to the buyer's state tobacco tax administrator. The act establishes misdemeanor penalties for violating the act. Compliance with this federal law by cigarette sellers enables states to collect cigarette excise taxes from consumers. However, some state and federal officials are concerned that as Internet cigarette sales continue to grow, particularly as states' cigarette taxes increase, so will the amount of lost state tax revenue due to noncompliance with the Jenkins Act. One research firm estimated that Internet tobacco sales in the United States will exceed $5 billion in 2005 and that the states will lose about $1.4 billion in tax revenue from these sales.
What GAO Found
Overall, we found that the federal government has had limited involvement with the Jenkins Act concerning Internet cigarette sales. We also noted that states have taken action to promote Jenkins Act compliance by Internet cigarette vendors, but results were limited. We determined that most Internet cigarette vendors do not comply with the Jenkins Act or notify their customers of their responsibilities under the act. Vendors cited the Internet Tax Freedom Act, privacy laws, and other reasons for noncompliance. A number of Native Americans cited sovereign nation status. GAO's review indicated that these claims are not valid and vendors are not exempt from the Jenkins Act. We concluded that states are hampered in attempting to promote Jenkins Act compliance because they lack authority to enforce the act. We suggested that to improve the federal government's efforts in enforcing the Jenkins Act and promoting compliance with the act by Internet cigarette vendors, which may lead to increased state tax revenues from cigarette sales, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF), instead of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), should be provided with primary jurisdiction to investigate violations of the act. We noted that transferring primary investigative jurisdiction was particularly appropriate because of the FBI's new challenges and priorities related to the threat of terrorism and the FBI's increased counterterrorism efforts. |
gao_GAO-17-172 | gao_GAO-17-172_0 | DOD’s Office of Small Business Programs (OSBP) manages the program, including developing and overseeing the policies and procedures for the program. DOD’s Procedures Do Not Provide Reasonable Assurance That Mentor-Protégé Agreements Contain All Required Elements
DOD components have the authority to approve mentor-protégé agreements, and they are required to follow the regulations, policies, and procedures DOD has established for the program. Specifically, based on our review, we estimate that 27 percent of the agreements did not address all required elements. Federal internal control standards state that management should implement control activities through policies, and that this principle may be applied by, among other things, periodically reviewing control activities for continued relevance and effectiveness in achieving the entity’s objective or addressing related risks. As a result, OSBP cannot ensure that the program requirements are serving their intended purposes—for example, as previously discussed, missing industry codes are used to determine whether protégés are eligible to participate in the program, and the signatures of the mentor and protégé are required for the agreement to meet the program requirements. DOD Lacks Performance Goals and Measures to Facilitate Effective Program Assessment
Although DOD has established some performance measures for its Pilot Mentor-Protégé Program, the department lacks performance goals and other measures needed to fully assess the program. We have previously identified performance measurement as a best practice that allows organizations to track progress in achieving their goals and gives managers crucial information to identify gaps in program performance and plan any needed improvements. While DOD collects and reports information on protégés’ annual revenue, employment levels, and prime contract and subcontract awards, it has not established goals for these measures. In addition, DOD has not established measures for one part of the program’s statutory purpose. However, DOD does not include this information in its annual report for the program, and it has not developed performance measures or goals related to this information. However, DOD had yet to establish any such measures as of January 2017. However, we found that program participants did not consistently include all of the required elements in these agreements and that DOD’s OSBP does not review the procedures that DOD components use to approve the agreements, as suggested by federal internal control standards. Conduct periodic reviews of the processes DOD components follow to approve agreements and take oversight actions, as appropriate. DOD also concurred with our recommendation to complete actions to develop performance goals and related measures that are consistent with the program’s stated purpose. Finally, DOD stated that it collects information from mentors on how they have enhanced the capabilities of protégés and plans to begin including these data in the annual report to Congress once performance measures and goals have been established. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report examines (1) the Department of Defense’s (DOD) procedures for approving mentor-protégé agreements; (2) DOD’s performance measures for the program; and (3) differences between DOD’s Pilot Mentor-Protégé Program and the Small Business Administration’s (SBA) All Small Mentor-Protégé Program and the agencies’ efforts to harmonize the two programs. We also reviewed a randomly selected probability sample of 44 of the 78 active DOD mentor-protégé agreements in place as of June 2016 to assess how well DOD’s procedures provide reasonable assurance that mentor-protégé agreements meet program requirements. This review included the annual reports prepared by the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) for fiscal years 2011 through 2015 that provide aggregate data on protégé firms’ annual revenues, number of employees, and awards of prime contracts and subcontracts during their tenure in the program and for 2 years after they leave the program. Appendix III: Selected Changes to DOD’s Pilot Mentor-Protégé Program in the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2016
The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2016 made a number of changes to the Department of Defense’s (DOD) Pilot Mentor-Protégé Program. Department of Defense (DOD) Pilot Mentor-Protégé Program
A mentor, among other requirements, must be: (1) not affiliated with the protégé firm prior to the approval of the agreement; (2) demonstrate that it is qualified to provide assistance that will contribute to the purpose of the program and is in good financial health and character and does not appear on a federal list of debarred or suspended contractors; (3) an entity other than small business that is a DOD prime contractor with an active subcontracting plan (unless a waiver to the small business exception has been obtained from the Director, Small Business Programs, Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics); or (4) a graduated 8(a) firm that provides documentation of its ability to serve as a mentor; and (5) approved to participate as a mentor. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD's Pilot Mentor-Protégé Program, was first authorized as a pilot program in 1990, and has been repeatedly renewed as a pilot program, most recently through September 30, 2018. For fiscal year 2016, total funding for this program was $28.3 million.
The joint explanatory statement to accompany the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 includes a provision for GAO to report on DOD's pilot program. This report examines, among other things, (1) DOD's procedures for approving mentor-protégé agreements and (2) DOD's performance measures for the program. GAO analyzed DOD guidance, reviewed a randomly selected probability sample of active DOD mentor-protégé agreements and estimated their completeness at a 95 percent confidence interval, reviewed DOD's annual program reports for fiscal years 2011 through 2015, and interviewed agency officials.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense (DOD) relies on military services and agencies (DOD components) to approve the agreements that establish relationships between participants in its Pilot Mentor-Protégé Program. This program provides incentives for major defense contractors (mentors) to provide assistance to small disadvantaged firms (protégés) in an effort to enhance their capability to compete for federal and commercial contracts. However, DOD does not have reasonable assurance that approved agreements include all elements required by the program's regulations and policies. These elements include, among others, the protégé's industry code and the signature and date of the mentor and protégé. These elements serve a variety of purposes—for example, the industry code is used to determine the protégé's eligibility to participate in the program, and the signature and date of mentor and protégé are required in order for the agreement to be legally bindingto meet program requirements. Based on a review of a randomly selected probability sample of 44 of the 78 active mentor-protégé agreements in place as of June 2016, GAO estimates that 27 percent of agreements were missing required elements. For example, GAO estimates that 25 percent of agreements were not signed by both the mentor and protégé. Federal internal control standards state that management should implement control activities through policies and practices, including periodically reviewing control activities for continued effectiveness. DOD's Office of Small Business Programs (OSBP) manages the program and oversees program policies and procedures. However, OSBP does not review the DOD components' processes for approving mentor-protégé agreements and therefore has not taken appropriate oversight actions to provide reasonable assurance that agreements meet all requirements. As a result, the components have approved agreements that do not include required elements, and OSBP cannot ensure that the requirements are serving their various purposes.
DOD's fiscal year 2011 through 2015 annual reports on its Pilot Mentor-Protégé Program include performance measures for several areas, but DOD lacks performance goals and other measures needed to effectively assess the program. Some of these measures show that during this period, protégés' revenue, number of employees, and DOD prime and subcontract awards increased while protégés participated in the program, but revenues and employment levels decreased in the 2 years after their participation ended. GAO found that DOD has not established any measurable goals for these measures. In addition, DOD collects information from mentors on how they have enhanced the capabilities of protégés, but DOD does not include this information in the program's annual report and has not developed performance measures or goals related to this information. GAO has previously identified performance measurement as a best practice that allows organizations to track progress and gives managers information to plan needed improvements. DOD officials told GAO they are working to develop measures that better indicate program outcomeseffectiveness, but as of January 2017 they had not established such measures. Without performance goals and related measures, DOD may be limited in its ability to analyze the effectiveness of the program, and Congress may not have information needed to inform future decisions regarding the program.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD (1) conduct periodic reviews of the components' processes for approving agreements and address identified deficiencies, as appropriate, and (2) develop performance goals and related measures that are consistent with the program's stated purpose. DOD concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-17-545T | gao_GAO-17-545T_0 | Background
In 2007, VA established the VCL, a 24-hour crisis line staffed by responders trained to assist veterans in emotional crisis. Extended Call Wait Times Were Uncommon in July and August 2015, but VA Did Not Meet Its Call Response Time Goals and Some Text Messages Did Not Receive Responses
VA Responded to Most Calls within 30 Seconds in July and August 2015, but Did Not Meet Its Goal to Answer 90 Percent of Calls within 30 Seconds at the VCL Primary Center
In our covert testing of the VCL’s call response time in July and August 2015, we found that it was uncommon for VCL callers to wait an extended period before reaching a responder since all of our calls that reached the VCL were answered in less than 4 minutes. However, we also found VA did not meet its goal of answering 90 percent of calls to the VCL within 30 seconds for test calls that we made. VA officials told us that, during fiscal year 2015, about 65 to 75 percent of VCL calls were answered at the VCL primary center and about 25 to 35 percent of VCL calls were answered at the backup call centers. These VA-reported results indicate that about 65 to 75 percent of VCL calls were answered within either 30 or 60 seconds. These included: (1) incompatibilities between some devices used to send text messages to the VCL and the software VA used to process the text messages, (2) occasional software malfunctions that freeze the text messaging interface at the VCL primary center, (3) inaudible audio prompts used to alert VCL primary center responders of incoming text messages, (4) attempts by people with bad intentions to disrupt the VCL’s text messaging service by overloading the system with a large number of texts, and (5) incompatibilities between the web browsers used by the VCL primary center and the text messaging software. They said that the provider had not reported any issues with this system. We recommended that VA regularly test the VCL’s text messaging system to identify issues and correct them promptly. In response, VA developed and implemented procedures to regularly test the VCL’s text messaging system, as well as its telephone and online chat systems. VA Had Taken Steps to Improve Its Monitoring of VCL Primary Center Performance but Had Not Established Targets and Time Frames for VCL Key Performance Indicators
VA Established a Call Center Evaluation Team, Implemented Revised Responder Performance Standards, and Analyzed VCL Caller Complaints
As we reported in May 2016, VA had sought to enhance its capabilities for overseeing VCL primary center operations through a number of activities—including establishing a call center evaluation team, implementing revised performance standards for VCL primary center responders, implementing silent monitoring of VCL primary center responders, and analyzing VCL caller complaints. In October 2014, VA created a mechanism for tracking complaints it receives from VCL callers and external parties, such as members of Congress and veterans, about the performance of the VCL primary and backup call centers. These targets should be quantifiable or otherwise measurable and indicate how well or at what level an agency or one of its components aspires to perform. For example, for VA’s key performance indicator for the percentage of calls answered by the VCL, the department had not included a date by which it would expect the VCL to complete this action. We recommended that VA document clearly stated and measurable targets and time frames for key performance indicators needed to assess VCL performance. VA Was Strengthening Requirements for VCL Backup Call Centers, but VA and SAMHSA Did Not Collect Information to Assess How Often and Why Callers Were Not Reaching the VCL
VA Was Enhancing Performance Requirements for Its Backup Call Coverage Contractor
As we reported in May 2016, VA’s backup call coverage contract, awarded in October 2012 and in place at the time of our review, did not include detailed performance requirements in several key areas for the VCL backup call centers. Using the information collected from the Lifeline local crisis centers on how often and why veterans reach Lifeline, as opposed to the VCL, VA and SAMHSA officials could then assess whether the extent to which this occurs merits further review and action. We concluded that without collecting information to examine how often and why veterans do not press “1” when prompted to reach the VCL, VA and SAMHSA could not determine the extent veterans reach the Lifeline network when intending to reach the VCL and may experience longer wait times as a result. We recommended VA and SAMHSA collaborate in taking the following two actions: (1) collect information on how often and why callers intending to reach the VCL instead reach Lifeline local crisis centers and (2) review the information collected and, if necessary, develop plans to address the underlying causes. We understand that VA and SAMHSA have been coordinating on these issues. However, as of March 2017, both of these recommendations remain open. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. | Why GAO Did This Study
VA established the VCL in July 2007 to provide support to veterans in emotional crisis. Between fiscal years 2008, its first full year of operation, and 2015, the number of calls received by the VCL increased almost 700 percent, exceeding VA's expectations. As VA began to address increasing numbers of requests for assistance, reports of dissatisfaction with VCL's service periodically appeared in the media.
This statement summarizes GAO's May 2016 report on VA's oversight of the VCL. Specifically, the statement describes (1) the extent to which VA met response-time goals for VCL calls and text messages, (2) how VA monitored VCL primary center call center operations, and (3) how VA worked with VCL service partners to help ensure veterans receive high-quality service. For the May 2016 report, GAO visited the VCL's primary center and two backup call centers; tested VCL response time through a generalizable sample of covert telephone calls and a nongeneralizable sample of text messages in July and August 2015; reviewed internal reports and policies and plans; and interviewed VA officials. GAO contacted VA and SAMHSA for an update on actions taken in response to the report's recommendations.
What GAO Found
In May 2016, GAO found that the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) did not meet its call response-time goals for the Veterans Crisis Line (VCL), although extended call wait times were not common; issues with text messages were also found. VA's goal was to answer 90 percent of VCL calls at the VCL primary center within 30 seconds in the period GAO studied. Calls not answered within 30 seconds were to route to VCL backup call centers; however, for 5 months of fiscal year 2015, calls were routed to VCL backup call centers after 60 seconds. According to VA officials about 65 to 75 percent of VCL calls were answered at the VCL primary center in fiscal year 2015 within either 30 or 60 seconds. GAO's covert testing in July and August 2015 confirmed this. Specifically, 119 covert test calls showed that an estimated 73 percent of calls made during this period were answered within 30 seconds. GAO also covertly tested the VCL's text messaging services and found that 4 of 14 GAO test text messages did not receive responses. GAO recommended that VA regularly test the VCL's text messaging system to identify issues and correct them promptly. In response, VA developed and implemented procedures to regularly test the VCL's text messaging system, as well as its telephone and online chat systems.
In May 2016, GAO found that VA had taken a number of steps to improve its monitoring of the VCL primary center operations. For example, VA had established a permanent VCL call center evaluation team and created a mechanism for tracking complaints about the performance of the VCL primary center from VCL callers or external parties. However, GAO found that VA had not specified quantifiable or otherwise measurable targets and had not included dates for when it would expect the VCL to complete actions covered by each key performance indicator. This was inconsistent with guidance provided by the Office of Management and Budget. GAO recommended that VA document clearly stated and measurable targets and time frames for key performance indicators needed to assess VCL performance. Although VA agreed, as of March 2017, this recommendation remains open.
GAO also found that VA had established an interagency agreement with its service partner, the Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA), to manage the shared operations of the VCL and Lifeline (a public-private network that provides free and confidential support to people in suicidal crisis or emotional distress). Despite these efforts to coordinate, VA and SAMHSA did not collect information needed to assess how often and why callers intending to reach the VCL do not follow voice prompts and instead reach Lifeline local crisis centers. As a result, VA and SAMHSA did not know the extent to which this occurred and could not determine the underlying causes that may need to be addressed. GAO recommended that VA and SAMHSA (1) collect information on how often and why callers intending to reach the VCL instead reach Lifeline local crisis centers and (2) review the information collected and, if necessary, develop plans to address the underlying causes. Although VA and SAMHSA agreed, as of March 2017, these recommendations remain open.
What GAO Recommends
In its May 2016 report, GAO made four recommendations to VA and HHS to improve the VCL. VA and HHS concurred with the recommendations and while action has been taken on one, three remain open as of March 2017. |
gao_GAO-09-1024T | gao_GAO-09-1024T_0 | On October 30, 2004, the Crime Victims’ Rights Act, as a component of the Justice for All Act, was signed into law. The CVRA left in place 42 U.S.C. Mechanisms for Crime Victims to Assert Their Rights
The CVRA also established two mechanisms to ensure adherence to victims’ rights under the law, neither of which had been available under previous statutes. Victims may also submit complaints directly to the VRO. Multiple Efforts Have Been Made to Implement the CVRA, and DOJ and Federal Courts Have Taken Actions to Address Various Factors that Have Presented Challenges for Affording Crime Victims Their Rights
DOJ and the federal judiciary have made various efforts to implement the CVRA—from revising internal guidelines and developing training materials for DOJ staff and judges to providing victims with emergency, temporary housing in some cases to protect them from the accused offender and proactively asking victims if they would like to speak in court. Complaint Process and Victims’ Ability to File Motions Are Intended to Ensure Adherence to CVRA, but Some Victims Are Not Aware of These Enforcement Mechanisms and the Complaint Process Could Be Restructured to Ensure Independence
Many Victims Who Responded to Our Survey Reported Not Being Aware of Their Ability to File Complaints Related to Their CVRA Rights, and the Structure of the Complaint Process Could Impede Impartiality
To enforce the provisions of the CVRA, the act established two mechanisms to help victims ensure that their rights are granted. However, many of the victims who responded to our survey reported that they were not aware of these enforcement mechanisms. DOJ’s Office of Professional Responsibility, which investigates other types of complaints against DOJ employees, also does not use investigators who are located in the same office with the subject of the complaint. In our December 2008 report, we recommended that DOJ restructure the process for investigating federal crime victim complaints in a way that ensures independence and impartiality, for example, by not allowing individuals who are located in the same office with the subject of the complaint to conduct the investigation. The results of our victim survey also suggest that victims lack this awareness. Several Key Issues Have Arisen as the Courts Interpret and Apply the CVRA in Cases, and Judges Have Differing Interpretations Regarding Whether the Law Applies to the District of Columbia Superior Court
Several key issues have arisen as courts interpret and apply the CVRA in cases, including (1) when in the criminal justice process CVRA rights apply, (2) what it means for a victim to be “reasonably heard” in court proceedings, (3) which standard should be used to review victim appeals of district court decisions regarding CVRA rights, and (4) whether the CVRA applies to victims of local offenses prosecuted in the District of Columbia Superior Court. Without clarification on this issue, the question of whether the D.C. Superior Court has responsibility to implement the CVRA will remain, and judges in the D.C. Superior Court may continue to differ in whether they apply the law in their cases. The general perception among the criminal justice system participants we spoke with and surveyed is that CVRA implementation has improved the treatment of crime victims, although many also believe that victims were treated well prior to the act because of the influence of well-established victims’ rights laws at the state level. Furthermore, while 72 percent of the victim-witness personnel who responded to our survey perceived that the CVRA has resulted in at least some increase in victim attendance at public court proceedings, 141 of the 167 victims who responded to our survey question regarding participation reported that they did not attend any of the proceedings related to their cases, primarily because the location of the court was too far to travel or they were not interested in attending. | Why GAO Did This Study
On October 30, 2004, the Crime Victims' Rights Act (CVRA) was enacted, establishing eight rights for federal crime victims and two mechanisms to enforce those rights. The legislation also directed GAO to evaluate the implementation of the CVRA. To address this mandate, GAO reviewed, among other things: (1) efforts made to implement the CVRA, (2) mechanisms in place to ensure adherence to the CVRA, (3) key issues that have arisen in the interpretation of the CVRA by the federal courts, and (4) perspectives of criminal justice system participants on the CVRA. This testimony is based on GAO's December 2008 report on CVRA, where GAO reviewed guidance and conducted surveys and interviews with criminal justice system participants. GAO cannot generalize its crime victim survey results due to a low response rate. In September 2009, GAO obtained updated information on victim's efforts to enforce their rights.
What GAO Found
To implement the CVRA, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the federal judiciary have, among other things, revised internal guidelines, trained DOJ staff and judges, provided victims with emergency, temporary housing to protect them, and proactively asked victims if they would like to speak in court. DOJ and the courts have also implemented two mechanisms to ensure adherence to the CVRA, including processes for victims to submit complaints against DOJ employees and assert their rights in court; however, the majority of victims who responded to GAO's survey said they were not aware of these mechanisms. If victims are not aware of these enforcement mechanisms, they will not be effective at helping to ensure victims are afforded their rights. GAO also found that DOJ's complaint investigation process lacked independence, impeding impartiality. In July 2009, in response to our recommendation, DOJ revised its victim complaint investigation process such that if investigators who are located in the same office with the subject of the investigation believe that their review of the complaint could bias the investigation or give the appearance of this, they are instructed to inform a designated official at DOJ headquarters. This official may suggest that the complaint be investigated by another DOJ office. Several key issues have arisen that require the courts to interpret various provisions of the law, including (1) when in the criminal justice process CVRA rights apply, (2) what it means for a victim to be "reasonably heard" in court, and (3) what legal standard should be used to review victim appeals of district court decisions. While judicial interpretation of various aspects of a law typically occurs after new legislation is enacted, DOJ and court officials believe that one CVRA issue may benefit from a change to the law itself. The CVRA is not explicit about whether the law applies to victims of local offenses prosecuted in the District of Columbia Superior Court. Without clarification on this issue, judges in this court may continue to differ in whether they apply the CVRA in their cases. As to the overall impacts of the CVRA, the victims as well as the DOJ and judicial officials GAO interviewed had mixed perceptions. Most maintained that CVRA has improved victim treatment. For example, 72 percent of the victim-witness professionals--individuals who are responsible for providing services to crime victims and witnesses--who responded to GAO's survey perceived that the CVRA has resulted in at least some increase in victim attendance at court proceedings. Other officials maintained that the federal government and the courts were already treating victims well prior to the act. Victims responding to GAO's survey also reported mixed views on their knowledge of, and satisfaction with, the provision of various rights. For example, 141 of the 167 victims who responded to GAO's survey question regarding participation in the judicial process reported that they did not attend any of the proceedings related to their cases, primarily because the location of the court was too far to travel or they were not interested in attending. |
gao_GAO-04-313 | gao_GAO-04-313_0 | Since 1984, EPA has progressively implemented more and more stringent diesel emissions standards, for example, reducing the level of allowable nitrogen oxide emissions from diesel engines from 10.7 grams per unit of work in 1988 to 2.5 grams in 2004 (see fig. This adversely affected their operations, at least in the short term, according to company officials. To meet the increased demand for trucks with older engines, the major engine manufacturers increased production of new trucks with older engines before October, but had to decrease production when demand subsequently dropped until about early 2003, with detrimental effects, according to representatives of the engine manufacturers we contacted. These manufacturers also said that they lost market share to others that were not subject to the consent decrees or that decided to pay penalties rather than make a new engine on time. EPA roughly estimated that two provisions of the consent decrees would reduce nitrogen oxide emissions by roughly 4 million tons. However, as discussed, trucking companies bought more trucks with the older engine technology than planned, and truck owners are now operating trucks longer than expected, thereby reducing the number of trucks with cleaner engines on the road below anticipated levels. Therefore, by mid-2003, the U.S. heavy-duty diesel engine market was dominated by (1) the four manufacturers subject to the decrees that were selling engines that met the new emissions standards—Cummins, Detroit Diesel, Mack Trucks, and Volvo; (2) two manufacturers subject to the decrees that were selling engines that did not meet the standards—Navistar International and Caterpillar; and (3) Mercedes, that entered the U.S. market in 1999 but that did not have to meet the standards until 2004. Engine manufacturers we contacted expect to have new engines ready for 2007 and to be able to meet the trucking companies’ time frames for delivering trucks with prototype engines for testing. But, they believe they can resolve these issues before 2007. However, even at these lower levels, the nine fuel industry representatives said that the likelihood of contamination during the delivery of the fuel through the distribution system is extremely high. All of the representatives said that they are highly supportive of the 2007 standards. In addition, representatives of some of these companies questioned whether the availability of a relatively small number of test vehicles in a limited number of fleets could provide sufficient information to allay the concerns of the trucking industry as a whole. Some Stakeholders Commended EPA’s Efforts to Ensure Technology Is Ready by 2007, but Others Would Like the Agency to Provide More Certainty
EPA has taken a number of steps to help with and monitor the engine and fuel technology development. However, some of the engine manufacturers and the trucking companies we contacted would like more help and reassurance that the technology will be ready when needed, including economic incentives to manufacturers to produce engines on time and trucking companies to buy them as scheduled. Some Stakeholders Believe EPA Has Done Enough to Promote the Technology, While Others Would Like More Help and Outreach
In general, a number of stakeholders we contacted—the association of emissions control equipment manufacturers, a number of the fuel industry representatives, the environmental and public health groups, and two of the engine manufacturers—either commended EPA for its efforts to ensure the needed technology is ready on time, or believe the agency is already doing enough to provide such assurances. As to convening an independent review panel, we do not believe that this would unduly delay the schedule for implementing the standards. Scope and Methodology
Our objectives in this review were to determine (1) the effects, if any, of EPA’s 1998 consent decrees with diesel engine manufacturers on trucking companies, engine manufacturers, and expected emissions reductions; (2) stakeholders’ views on industries’ ability to comply with the 2007 standards and EPA’s actions to ensure that the new engine technologies and low-sulfur fuel will be ready in time; and (3) if not, EPA’s options and plans for mitigating any potential negative effects on key industry sectors. Because ATA could not identify which of its member companies had purchased engines in the months before and immediately after October 2002, GAO and ATA agreed that the largest trucking companies, as determined by the total number of trucks in their fleets, were more likely than smaller companies to have purchased trucks during that period and, therefore, would be in the best position to recount their experience with both the new engines and the impacts of the accelerated schedule. For example, we used the information showing that: (1) the industry pre-bought older engines prior to October 2002 because companies did not have engines in time to test their reliability and possible costs; (2) companies that had bought the new engines determined both the purchase price, and operations and maintenance costs, were higher than estimated and anticipated; and (3) EPA developed its estimate of what it would cost to buy and operate new engines for 2007 in 2000, before technology designs were completed and selected to assess the trucking representatives’ concerns about meeting the 2007 standards. This increase in truck production may be associated with the decrees. Addressing concerns about whether fuel will be available in sufficient quantities and locations and the new engines will be ready in time to test should not be overly burdensome and will help to prevent a significant pre- buy of older engines before 2007 that would delay emissions and health benefits as occurred in 2002. | Why GAO Did This Study
Diesel engine emissions pose health risks, but one major source--heavy-duty diesel vehicles--is critical for our economy. To reduce risks, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has set stringent emissions standards for diesel engines. In 1998, EPA found that some engine makers were violating standards, so they agreed to build engines that meet 2004 standards early, by October 2002. EPA has set even more stringent standards for 2007. GAO was asked to (1) assess the October 2002 deadline's effects on industry and emissions, and (2) obtain stakeholders' views on the readiness of technology for the 2007 standards and EPA's efforts to ensure this. GAO analyzed information from EPA, 10 large trucking companies, the engine makers subject to the early deadline, and other stakeholders.
What GAO Found
Implementing the 2004 diesel emissions standards 15 months early disrupted some industries' operations but also helped reduce pollution earlier. More specifically, because some manufacturers had to build new engines sooner than planned, most could not provide trucking companies with prototype engines early enough to test. Concerned that the new engines would be costly and unreliable, some of the companies said they bought more trucks with old engines than planned before October 2002. Our analysis of truck production and financial data also shows this surge. This adversely affected some companies' operations and profits. To meet the increased demand for trucks with old engines, some manufacturers reported that they ramped up production of such engines before October. But when demand subsequently dropped, they had to decrease production and release workers, reducing profits and disrupting operations, at least until demand increased later in 2003. Manufacturers of the new engines also continued to lose market share to manufacturers that either did not have to meet the early date, or that did but chose not to, paying penalties instead. While accelerating the schedule for new engines affected some industries, it accelerated emissions benefits, although not to the extent or in the time frames anticipated. For example, EPA roughly estimated that its agreements with engine manufacturers that violated standards would reduce nitrogen oxide emissions by about 4 million tons over the life of the engines. But because companies initially bought more trucks with old engines and owners are now operating trucks longer, some of the expected emissions reductions will be delayed. As for the 2007 standards, EPA has taken a number of steps to aid the transition to the new diesel engines and fuel, but some stakeholders would like more help. Most engine, emissions control, and fuel industry representatives said the needed technologies will be ready on time; but other engine, trucking, and fuel representatives have concerns and would like more help to ensure that the technology will be available. For example, manufacturers plan to have limited numbers of prototype engines ready for a few fleets to test by mid- to late-2005-- trucking companies say they need new engines 18 to 24 months before the 2007 deadline to test the engines in all weather conditions and to develop their longterm purchasing plans. Some companies, however, are concerned that providing test engines to only a few fleets may not provide the industry as a whole with sufficient information to judge the engines' performance. In addition, they are still concerned that the new engines may be too costly and much less fuelefficient. As a result, they expect companies will again buy more trucks with old engines before the deadline, disrupting industry operations and emissions benefits. The fuel industry representatives said they can produce the low-sulfur fuel the new engines require on time and see no reason to delay the standards. Nevertheless, they worry the fuel initially may not be available nationwide and it may be difficult not to contaminate it with other fuels in the distribution system. Environmental and health groups do not want to delay the standards or the expected emissions benefits. Some stakeholders would like more information on technological progress. In addition, they would like more reassurance--such as from an independent review panel--that the technology will be ready on time and additional assistance--such as economic incentives--to encourage timely purchases of trucks with the new technologies. |
gao_GAO-14-138T | gao_GAO-14-138T_0 | The Personnel Security Clearance Process
Multiple executive-branch agencies are responsible for different phases of the federal government’s personnel security clearance process. As such, the DNI is responsible for developing policies and procedures to help ensure the effective, efficient, and timely completion of background investigations and adjudications relating to determinations of eligibility for access to classified information and eligibility to hold a sensitive position. OPM provides the resulting investigative reports to the requesting agencies for their internal adjudicators, who use the information along with the federal adjudicative guidelines to determine whether an applicant is eligible for a personnel security clearance. In a 2008 memorandum, the President called for a reform of the security clearance and suitability determination processes and subsequently issued Executive Order 13467, which in addition to designating the DNI as the Security Executive Agent, also designated the Director of OPM as the Suitability Executive Agent. Steps in the Personnel Security Clearance Process
To help ensure the trustworthiness and reliability of personnel in positions with access to classified information, executive branch agencies rely on a personnel security clearance process that includes multiple phases: requirements determination, application, investigation, adjudication, appeals (if applicable, where a clearance has been denied), and reinvestigation (where applicable, for renewal or upgrade of an existing clearance). Reinvestigation Phase
Once an individual has obtained a personnel security clearance and as long as he or she remains in a position that requires access to classified national security information, that individual is reinvestigated periodically at intervals that depend on the level of security clearance. Actions Needed to Ensure Quality of Clearance Investigations and Adjudications
Executive branch agencies do not consistently assess quality throughout the personnel security clearance process, in part because they have not fully developed and implemented metrics to measure quality in key aspects of the process. We have emphasized—since the late 1990s—the need to build and monitor quality throughout the personnel security clearance process to promote oversight and positive outcomes such as maximizing the likelihood that individuals who are security risks will be scrutinized more closely. For example, in May 2009, we reported that, with respect to DOD initial top secret clearances adjudicated in July 2008, documentation was incomplete for most OPM investigative reports. We independently estimated that 87 percent of about 3,500 investigative reports that DOD adjudicators used to make clearance decision were missing at least one type of documentation required by federal investigative standards. The type of documentation most often missing from investigative reports was verification of all of the applicant’s employment followed by information from the required number of social references for the applicant and investigative reports did not contain a required personal subject interview. Extent of Clearance Reciprocity Is Not Measured
Although executive branch agency officials have stated that reciprocity is regularly granted as it is an opportunity to save time as well as reduce costs and investigative workloads, we reported in 2010 that agencies do not consistently and comprehensively track the extent to which reciprocity is granted government-wide. In addition to establishing objectives for timeliness, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 established requirements for reciprocity, which is an agency’s acceptance of a background investigation or clearance determination completed by any authorized investigative or adjudicative executive branch agency, subject to certain exceptions such as completing additional requirements like polygraph testing. The guidance requires, except in limited circumstances, that all Intelligence Community elements “accept all in-scope security clearance or access determinations.” Additionally, Office of Management and Budget guidance requires agencies to honor a clearance when (1) the prior clearance was not granted on an interim or temporary basis; (2) the prior clearance investigation is current and in-scope; (3) there is no new adverse information already in the possession of the gaining agency; and (4) there are no conditions, deviations, waivers, or unsatisfied additional requirements (such as polygraphs) if the individual is being considered for access to highly sensitive programs. Because of these issues identified by agency officials as hindrances to reciprocity and because the extent of reciprocity was unknown, we recommended in 2010 that the Deputy Director of Management, Office of Management and Budget, in the capacity as Chair of the Performance Accountability Council, should develop comprehensive metrics to track reciprocity and then report the findings from the expanded tracking to Congress. In conclusion, to avoid the risk of damaging, unauthorized disclosures of classified information, oversight of the reform efforts to measure and improve the quality of the security clearance process is imperative. Assurances that all clearances are of a high quality may further encourage reciprocity of investigation and adjudications. DOD Personnel Clearances: Preliminary Observations on DOD’s Progress on Addressing Timeliness and Quality Issues. | Why GAO Did This Study
Recently the DNI reported that more than 5.1 million federal government and contractor employees held or were eligible to hold a security clearance. GAO has reported that the federal government spent over $1 billion to conduct background investigations (in support of security clearances and suitability determinations for federal employment) in fiscal year 2011. A high quality process is essential to minimize the risks of unauthorized disclosures of classified information and to help ensure that information about individuals with criminal activity or other questionable behavior is identified and assessed as part of the process for granting or retaining clearances.
This statement addresses (1) a general overview of the security clearance process; (2) what is known about the quality of investigations and adjudications, which are the determinations made by executive branch agency officials to grant or reject clearance requests based on investigations; and (3) the extent of reciprocity, which is the decision of agencies to honor clearances previously granted by other agencies. This statement is based on GAO work issued from 2008 to 2013 on DOD's personnel security clearance program and government-wide suitability and security clearance reform efforts. As part of that work, GAO (1) reviewed relevant statutes, federal guidance, and processes, (2) examined agency data on the timeliness and quality of investigations and adjudications, (3) assessed reform efforts, and (4) reviewed a sample of case files for DOD personnel.
What GAO Found
Several agencies have key roles and responsibilities in the multi-phased personnel security clearance process, including the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) who, as the Security Executive Agent, is responsible for developing policies and procedures related to security clearance investigations and adjudications, among other things. The Deputy Director for Management at the Office of Management and Budget chairs the Performance Accountability Council that oversees reform efforts to enhance the personnel security process. The security process includes: the determination of whether a position requires a clearance, application submission, investigation, and adjudication. Specifically, agency officials must first determine whether a federal civilian position requires access to classified information. After an individual has been selected for a position that requires a personnel security clearance and the individual submits an application for a clearance, investigators—often contractors—from the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) conduct background investigations for most executive branch agencies. Adjudicators from requesting agencies use the information from these investigations and federal adjudicative guidelines to determine whether an applicant is eligible for a clearance. Further, individuals are subject to reinvestigations at intervals based on the level of security clearance.
Executive branch agencies do not consistently assess quality throughout the personnel security clearance process, in part because they have not fully developed and implemented metrics to measure quality in key aspects of the process. For more than a decade, GAO has emphasized the need to build and monitor quality throughout the clearance process to promote oversight and positive outcomes such as maximizing the likelihood that individuals who are security risks will be scrutinized more closely. GAO reported in 2009 that, with respect to initial top secret clearances adjudicated in July 2008 for the Department of Defense (DOD), documentation was incomplete for most of OPM's investigative reports. GAO independently estimated that 87 percent of about 3,500 investigative reports that DOD adjudicators used to make clearance eligibility decisions were missing some required documentation, such as the verification of all of the applicant's employment, the required number of social references for the applicant, and complete security forms. In May 2009, GAO recommended that OPM measure the frequency with which its investigative reports met federal investigative standards to improve the completeness—that is, quality—of investigation documentation. In January 2014, DNI officials said that metrics to measure quality of investigative reports had not been established.
GAO reported in 2010 that executive branch agencies do not consistently and comprehensively track the extent to which reciprocity is occurring because no government-wide metrics exist to consistently and comprehensively track when reciprocity is granted. The acceptance of a background investigation or personnel security clearance determination completed by another authorized agency is an opportunity to save resources and executive branch agencies are required by law to grant reciprocity, subject to certain exceptions, such as completing additional requirements like polygraph testing. GAO's 2010 recommendation that the leaders of the security clearance reform effort develop metrics to track reciprocity has not been fully implemented. |
gao_GAO-04-325T | gao_GAO-04-325T_0 | CBP Has A Layered Approach to Select and Inspect Cargo Containers
CBP is responsible for preventing terrorists and weapons of mass destruction from entering the United States. As part of its responsibility, it has the mission to address the potential threat posed by the movement of oceangoing containers. It includes external peer review, testing, and validation. In addition, CBP developed a training course for staff responsible for targeting cargo containers. Further, CBP also promulgated regulations aimed at improving the quality and timeliness of transmitted cargo manifest data for use in the targeting system. However, while its strategy incorporates some elements of risk management, CBP has not performed a comprehensive set of threat, criticality, vulnerability and risk assessments that experts said are vital for determining levels of risk for each container and the types of responses necessary to mitigate that risk. CBP officials told us that, given the urgency to take steps to protect against terrorism after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, that they had to take an “implement and amend” approach. The National Targeting Center also assists targeters in conducting research on incoming cargo, attempts to improve the targeting of cargo, and manages a national targeting training program for CBP targeters. Targeting Strategy Does Not Incorporate Key Elements of Risk Management
While CBP’s targeting strategy incorporates some elements of risk management, our discussions with terrorism experts and our comparison of CBP’s targeting system to recognized risk management practices showed that the strategy does not fully incorporate all key elements of a risk management framework. Further, we found that space limitations and safety concerns constrain the ports in their utilization of screening equipment, which can affect the efficiency of examinations. CBP Lacks National System To Track Cargo Container Inspections By Risk Category
A CBP official told us that CBP does not have a national system for reporting and analyzing inspection statistics by risk category. While officials at all the ports provided us with inspection data, the data from some ports were generally not available by risk level, were not uniformly reported, were difficult to interpret, and were not complete. While the ATS findings module shows potential as a useful tool for capturing inspection results, it is too soon to tell whether it will provide CBP management with consistent, complete inspection data for analyzing and improving the targeting strategy. In closing, as part of a program to prevent terrorists from smuggling weapons of mass destruction into the United States, CBP has taken a number of positive steps to target cargo containers for inspection. CBP faces a number of other challenges in implementing its strategy to identify and inspect suspicious cargo containers. To assess how well the targeting strategy has been implemented at selected seaports in the country, we visited various CBP facilities and the Miami, Los Angeles-Long Beach, Philadelphia, New York-New Jersey, New Orleans, and Seattle seaports. | Why GAO Did This Study
After the attacks of September 11, 2001, concerns intensified that terrorists would attempt to smuggle a weapon of mass destruction into the United States. One possible method for terrorists to smuggle such a weapon is to use one of the 7 million cargo containers that arrive at our nation's seaports each year. The Department of Homeland Security's U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is responsible for addressing the potential threat posed by the movement of oceangoing cargo containers. Since CBP cannot inspect all arriving cargo containers, it uses a targeting strategy, which includes an automated targeting system. This system targets some containers for inspection based on a perceived level of risk. In this testimony, GAO provides preliminary findings on its assessment of (1) whether CBP's development of its targeting strategy is consistent with recognized key risk management and computer modeling practices and (2) how well the targeting strategy has been implemented at selected seaports around the country.
What GAO Found
CBP has taken steps to address the terrorism risks posed by oceangoing cargo containers. These include establishing a National Targeting Center, refining its automated targeting system, instituting a national training program for its personnel that perform targeting, and promulgating regulations to improve the quality and timeliness of data on cargo containers. However, while CBP's strategy incorporates some elements of risk management, it does not include other key elements, such as a comprehensive set of criticality, vulnerability and risk assessments that experts told GAO are necessary to determine risk and the types of responses necessary to mitigate that risk. Also, CBP's targeting system does not include a number of recognized modeling practices, such as subjecting the system to peer review, testing and validation. By incorporating the missing elements of a risk management framework and following certain recognized modeling practices, CBP will be in a better position to protect against terrorist attempts to smuggle weapons of mass destruction into the United States. CBP faces a number of challenges at the six ports we visited. CBP does not have a national system for reporting and analyzing inspection statistics and the data provided to us by ports were generally not available by risk level, were not uniformly reported, were difficult to interpret, and were incomplete. CBP officials told us they have just implemented a new module for their targeting system, but it is too soon to tell whether it will provide consistent, complete inspection data for analyzing and improving the targeting strategy. In addition, CBP staff that received the national targeting training were not tested or certified to ensure that they had learned the basic skills needed to provide effective targeting. Further, space limitations and safety concerns about inspection equipment constrained the ports in their utilization of screening equipment, which has affected the efficiency of examinations. |
gao_GGD-97-33 | gao_GGD-97-33_0 | Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to assess: the potential effects of cooperative purchasing on state and local governments, the government of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Indian tribal governments, and federal agencies; the potential effects of cooperative purchasing on industry, including small businesses and local dealers; and
GSA’s plans to implement the cooperative purchasing program. Extent of Administrative Savings Unclear
The extent to which state and local governments could reduce administrative costs through a cooperative purchasing program is unclear. Of these 28 industries, only 14 supplied goods or services that are available through the schedules program. Of these 10 contractors, 7 said they were small businesses. GSA has not, however, made any final decisions on excluding other schedules. Our work indicates that a successful plan would require, at a minimum, several components: guidance on the data that should be sought and analysis conducted in determining the (1) expected effects on federal agencies; (2) expected effects on nonfederal governments; and (3) expected effects on businesses, including non-GSA vendors; identification of potentially affected parties and the various means to be used to notify them when schedules will be considered for opening to nonfederal governments; designation of an official at an appropriate level of responsibility to make final determinations on whether individual schedules should be made available to nonfederal governments, particularly when businesses express concerns about significant adverse effects; provisions for evaluating the actual effects of opening schedules; and provisions for opening part of a schedule. Evaluating Decisions to Open Schedules and Dealing With Unexpected Effects
Neither GSA’s Federal Register notice nor changes GSA officials told us they were considering included a provision for evaluating GSA’s implementation of the cooperative purchasing program, including the effects of opening schedules to state and local governments, even though GSA officials said that at one time it had considered implementing the program in a series of “pilots.” Because the effects of cooperative purchasing are likely to vary by industry or even product or service, the uncertainties over the extent to which state and local governments and business will actually exercise their options to participate in the program and purchase items from vendors listed on the schedules, and because it will likely be very difficult to get sufficient data before implementation to predict effects, we believe evaluations would be helpful to GSA. These evaluations could also provide objective information on whether the program may be lowering prices or administrative costs. The potential effects of the cooperative purchasing program are likely to vary among state, local, and the Puerto Rican governments. Since participation is voluntary, these governments would use the schedules only if they perceived benefits from doing so. Several factors are likely to affect the extent to which these expected benefits would materialize. It appears reasonable to us that at least some of the benefits perceived by some businesses, including small businesses and dealers, may occur. On the other hand, it is doubtful that the federal government would experience adverse effects since GSA plans to exclude schedules when such effects are anticipated and would be able to act if unexpected negative effects arise. GSA’s plan for implementing the cooperative purchasing program is evolving and has not yet been put into a final written document. We believe that certain elements in the approach GSA has been considering should particularly be incorporated into its final written plan. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO assessed the potential effects of a cooperative purchasing program administered by the General Services Administration (GSA) on nonfederal governments and federal agencies, and on industry, including small businesses and dealers.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the potential effects of the cooperative purchasing program are likely to vary among state, local, and the Puerto Rican governments; (2) since participation is voluntary, these governments would use the schedules only if they perceived benefits from doing so; (3) most of the nonfederal entities GAO surveyed anticipated that they would participate; (4) although some of these governments may experience benefits, several factors may limit the extent of these benefits; (5) the program is likely to have little if any effect on Indian tribal governments because the schedules program is already available to them under separate authority; (6) if the GSA effectively implements its plan to exclude schedules from the program when adverse effects on federal agencies are indicated, there is little risk that the program will negatively affect the federal government, but whether it will have positive effects depends largely on whether increased use of the schedules by state and local governments would lead to lower prices and reduced administrative charges by GSA; (7) it is unclear at this time whether either of these would occur; (8) the potential effects of the cooperative purchasing program on industry, including small businesses and dealers, are also likely to vary, although sufficient data are not available to conclusively predict these effects; (9) some businesses, particularly GSA vendors, expect to benefit from increased sales or reduced administrative costs, while other businesses expect to lose sales or have lower profits; (10) still other businesses do not believe they will be affected by the program; (11) most of the concerns that businesses have expressed about significant adverse effects involve only a few GSA schedules; (12) GSA's plan to implement the cooperative purchasing program is still evolving; (13) in 1995, GSA published its initial approach and has been considering changes while implementation has been suspended; (14) GSA has not yet completed a more current, detailed plan, but such a plan would better enable Congress to weigh the merits of cooperative purchasing since so much depends on implementation decisions; (15) although the approach GSA has been considering appears reasonable in key respects, GAO believes a number of improvements would better position GSA to make decisions on making particular schedules available to nonfederal users; and (16) these improvements include the preparation of a written implementation plan and guidance to staff on factors to consider when making decisions. |
gao_GAO-06-521 | gao_GAO-06-521_0 | Background
The narrow margin of victory in the 2000 presidential election raised concerns about the extent to which members of the military, their dependents, and U.S. citizens living abroad were able to vote via absentee ballot. For 2004, FVAP had a full-time staff of 13 and a fiscal year budget of approximately $6 million. FVAP Expanded Its 2004 Voting Assistance Efforts
For the 2004 presidential election, FVAP expanded its efforts beyond those taken in the 2000 election by providing military personnel and overseas citizens with more tools and information needed to vote by absentee ballot. First, FVAP distributed more voting materials, and improved its Web site to enable greater access for participants. Third, FVAP developed an electronic version of the Federal Write-in Absentee Ballot, which is accepted by all states and U.S. territories. In its 2005 report to the Congress and the President on the effectiveness of its federal voting assistance program, on the basis of its postelection surveys, FVAP attributed higher 2004 voter participation rates to the effective implementation of its voter outreach program. However, because of low survey response rates, GAO has concerns about FVAP’s ability to project changes in voter participation rates between the 2000 and 2004 presidential elections. FVAP Increased Absentee Voting Training Opportunities
For the 2004 election, FVAP increased the number of VAO training workshops it conducted to 164. DOD and DOS Implemented Prior Recommendations on Absentee Voting; However, Assistance Continued to Vary
In 2001, we reported that implementation of the federal voting assistance program by DOD and DOS was uneven due to incomplete service guidance, lack of oversight, and insufficient command support. Because the VAO role is a collateral duty and VAOs’ understanding and interest in the voting process differ, some variance in voting assistance may always exist. DOD and DOS plan to continue their efforts to improve absentee voting assistance. Voting Assistance Continued to Vary
The services and DOS revised their voting guidance, increased top-level support, and improved program oversight. However, voting assistance to servicemembers and overseas citizens continued to vary. Given these factors, some variance in absentee voting assistance may always exist; however, DOD and DOS plan to continue efforts to improve the process. Some Challenges Remain in Providing Absentee Voting Assistance
Despite the efforts of FVAP, DOD, and DOS, we identified three challenges that remain in providing voting assistance to military personnel and overseas citizens, which are: simplifying and standardizing the time-consuming and multistep absentee voting process, which includes different requirements and time frames for each state; developing and implementing a secure electronic registration and voting system; and proactively reaching all overseas citizens. In attempting to simplify and standardize the absentee voting process, FVAP continued working with the states, through its Legislative Initiatives program, to facilitate the absentee voting process for military servicemembers and overseas citizens. The Legislative Initiatives program is designed to make it easier for military servicemembers and overseas citizens to vote by absentee ballot. If these citizens do not contact the embassy or consulate and provide DOS with appropriate contact information, DOS cannot proactively reach them. Specifically, to determine differences in FVAP’s efforts between the 2000 and 2004 presidential elections, we reviewed our 2001 report to obtain an assessment of FVAP’s efforts for the 2000 election and compared that assessment with actions taken by FVAP for the 2004 election. To identify actions taken in response to prior GAO recommendations to reduce variance in program implementation, we reviewed prior GAO reports on absentee voting. To identify challenges that remain in providing voting assistance to military personnel and overseas citizens, we met with leaders of organizations representing members of the military and American citizens living overseas to obtain their opinions on assistance efforts provided by FVAP, DOD, and DOS for the 2004 presidential election. | Why GAO Did This Study
The narrow margin of victory in the 2000 presidential election raised concerns about the extent to which members of the military, their dependents, and U.S. citizens living abroad were able to vote via absentee ballot. In September 2001, GAO made recommendations to address variances in the Department of Defense's (DOD) Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP). Along with the military services and the Department of State (DOS), FVAP is responsible for educating and assisting military personnel and overseas citizens in the absentee voting process. Leading up to the 2004 presidential election, Members of Congress raised concerns about efforts under FVAP to facilitate absentee voting. Because of broad Congressional interest, GAO initiated a review under the Comptroller General's authority to address three questions: (1) How did FVAP's assistance efforts differ between the 2000 and 2004 presidential elections? (2) What actions did DOD and DOS take in response to prior GAO recommendations on absentee voting? and (3) What challenges remain in providing voting assistance to military personnel and overseas citizens? This review is one of several GAO reviews related to various aspects of the 2004 election. GAO provided DOD and DOS with a draft of this report for comment, and they both generally concurred with the report's contents.
What GAO Found
For the 2004 presidential election, FVAP expanded its efforts beyond those taken for the 2000 election to provide military personnel and overseas citizens tools needed to vote by absentee ballot. With 13 full-time staff members and a fiscal year 2004 budget of about $6 million, FVAP distributed more voting materials and modified its Web site, which includes absentee voting information, and made it accessible to more military and overseas citizens worldwide. It also added an online voting assistance training program and an online version of the Federal Write-in Absentee Ballot. FVAP also conducted 164 voting training workshops for military servicemembers and overseas citizens, as compared to 62 workshops for the 2000 election. In its 2005 report on the effectiveness of its federal voting assistance program, on the basis of its postelection surveys, FVAP attributed higher 2004 voter participation rates to the effective implementation of its voter outreach program. However, because of low survey response rates, GAO has concerns about FVAP's ability to project changes in voter participation rates between the 2000 and 2004 elections. In 2001, GAO recommended that DOD and DOS revise their voting guidance, improve program oversight, and increase command emphasis to reduce the variance in voting assistance to military servicemembers and overseas citizens. DOD and DOS took actions to implement these recommendations; however, absentee voting assistance continued to vary. Voting Assistance Officers (VAOs) provide voting assistance as a collateral duty. Because of competing demands on VAOs and differences in their understanding and interest in the voting process, some variance in absentee voting assistance may always exist. DOD and DOS plan to continue their efforts to improve absentee voting assistance. Despite the efforts of FVAP, DOD, and DOS, GAO identified three challenges that remain in providing absentee voting assistance to military personnel and overseas citizens. One challenge involves simplifying and standardizing the time-consuming, multistep absentee voting process, which has different requirements and time frames established by each state. In attempting to simplify and standardize the absentee voting process, FVAP continued working with the states through its Legislative Initiatives program to facilitate absentee voting for military servicemembers and overseas citizens. Another challenge involves efforts to implement an electronic registration and voting system given persistent issues regarding security and privacy. For the 2004 election, FVAP developed an electronic voting experiment that it planned to make available to the entire military, their dependents, and overseas citizens; however, the experiment was never implemented because of security concerns publicly raised by four of the ten members of a peer review group. A challenge for DOS is having the ability to reach all overseas citizens. Overseas citizens are not required to provide contact information to an embassy or consulate. If these citizens do not provide appropriate contact information, DOS cannot proactively reach these overseas voters. |
gao_GGD-99-103 | gao_GGD-99-103_0 | The amount of unsecured nonpriority debt that each report estimated these “can-pay” debtors could repay over 5 years ranged from about $1 billion to about $4 billion. It is important to note that these estimates do not necessarily represent unsecured nonpriority creditors’ potential net gain from implementing needs-based bankruptcy, compared with current bankruptcy practice. Currently, many chapter 7 debtors repay at least some of their debts. Some debts, including such unsecured nonpriority debts as most student loans, cannot be discharged in bankruptcy. Following the close of their bankruptcy cases, debtors remain financially responsible for all debts reaffirmed with the bankruptcy court and all debts that cannot be discharged in bankruptcy. In developing its estimates of “can-pay” debtors and the total amount of debt such debtors could repay, each report made a number of assumptions, which varied by report. However, none of these assumptions has been validated. The final estimates of the percentage of “can-pay” debtors in each sample ranged from 3.6 percent to 15 percent. Based on the data available to us, the reports reached different estimates of “can-pay” debtors principally because each report used different and noncomparable samples of debtors, different proposed “needs-based” legislative provisions, and different methods and assumptions for determining debtors’ allowable living expenses. Which report most accurately reflects what would happen under chapter 7 if needs-based bankruptcy reform were enacted is unknown. Three Assumptions Used in All Three Reports
In estimating the proportion of chapter 7 debtors who could pay a substantial portion of their debts, all three reports used three assumptions that have not been validated: (1) the information on debtors’ income, expenses, and debts, as reported in the debtors’ financial schedules, was accurate and could be used to project debtors’ income and expenses over a 5-year period; (2) debtors’ income and expenses would remain stable over a 5-year debt repayment period; and (3) all debtors required to enter a 5-year repayment plan under chapter 13 would successfully complete that plan. The major steps in each report’s analysis were the following: identify the debtors whose gross annual income, adjusted for household size, meets or exceeds a specific median national household income for households of the same size (all three reports); for those debtors who passed the median income test, determine their allowable living expenses using data from the debtors’ expense schedules and the IRS collection financial standards (all three reports); for those debtors who passed the median income test, determine their total nonhousing secured debts, total unsecured priority debts, and total unsecured nonpriority debts (all three reports); for those debtors who passed the median income threshold, determine whether they had more than $50 in projected net monthly income after paying allowable living expenses and paying all of their nonhousing secured debt and unsecured priority debt over 5 years (1998 Ernst & Young and Creighton/ABI); for those debtors who passed both the median annual income test and the monthly net income test, determine whether they could repay at least 20 percent of their unsecured nonpriority debt over 5 years if they devoted 100 percent of their projected net monthly income to the repayment of their unsecured nonpriority debt (1998 Ernst & Young and Creighton/ABI); for those debtors with household incomes at or above the median income threshold for households of comparable size, determine whether the debtors had sufficient income, after paying allowable living expenses, to pay all their nonhousing secured debt, all their unsecured priority debt, and $5,000 or 25 percent, whichever was less, of their unsecured nonpriority debt over 5 years (1999 Ernst & Young). “Can-pay” debtors were defined in the proposed legislation used in the four reports’ analyses as those debtors who (1) met a specific household income test and (2) could potentially repay a specific minimum amount of their unsecured nonpriority debt over 5 years. 4. 6. We believe that each of the four reports provided Congress with important information about the potential impact of proposed “needs-based” legislation. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the methodologies used in four reports on bankruptcy debtors' ability to pay their debts--two by Ernst Young LLP, one by Creighton University, and one by the Executive Office for U.S. Trustees.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) determining which of these four reports most accurately reflects what would happen to chapter 7 debtors if needs-based bankruptcy reform were enacted would depend on the details of the legislation eventually enacted as well as which assumptions about debtors' income, expenses, debts, and repayment capacity prove to be more accurate; (2) each of the four reports represents a reasonably careful effort to estimate: (a) the percentage of chapter 7 debtors who would be required to enter a chapter 13 debt repayment plan if a specific set of proposed needs-based legislative provisions were enacted; and (b) the amount of debt such debtors could potentially repay over a 5-year repayment period; (3) can-pay debtors were defined as those debtors whose gross income met or exceeded a household income test and who could potentially repay a specific minimum amount of unsecured nonpriority debt over 5 years; (4) the reports' estimates of the proportion of the can-pay debtors in their respective samples were 15 percent, 10 percent, and 3.6 percent; (5) the reports' estimates of the amount of unsecured nonpriority debt that the can-pay debtors could potentially repay over 5 years ranged from about $1 billion to $4 billion; (6) it is important to note that these repayment estimates do not necessarily represent unsecured nonpriority creditors' potential net gain from implementing needs-based bankruptcy, compared with current practice; (7) under the bankruptcy law, many chapter 7 debtors already repay at least some of their debt, either because they voluntarily reaffirm some debts or because the debts cannot be discharged in bankruptcy; (8) following the close of their bankruptcy cases, debtors remain financially responsible for all debts that they reaffirm with the bankruptcy court and all debts that cannot be discharged in bankruptcy; (9) to develop its percentage and dollar estimates, each of the reports made a number of assumptions, which varied by report; (10) however none of these assumptions has been validated; and (11) the reports reached different estimates of can-pay debtors principally because each report used different and noncomparable samples of debtors, different proposed needs-based legislative provisions, and different methods and assumptions for determining debtors' allowable living expenses. |
gao_GGD-98-30 | gao_GGD-98-30_0 | Section 201 states that “ach agency shall, unless otherwise prohibited by law, assess the effects of ederal regulatory actions on tate, local, and tribal governments, and the private sector (other than to the extent that such regulations incorporate requirements specifically set forth in law).” Other sections in title II require agencies to prepare a written statement containing specific descriptions and estimates for any proposed rule or any final rule for which a proposed rule was published that includes any federal mandate that may result in the expenditure of $100 million or more in any 1 year by state, local, and tribal governments, in the aggregate, or the private sector—one of the items required in the written statement is a qualitative and quantitative assessment of the anticipated costs and benefits of the federal mandate (sec. We compared the substance of these 80 economically significant rules to the requirements in UMRA and concluded that 2 of the rules were required to have an UMRA written statement on file at CBO. Only 2 of the 30 rules had a separate written statement prepared specifically to comply with UMRA. Requirements in Sections 202 and 205 of UMRA Are Similar to Previous Statutory and Executive Order Requirements
Several of the requirements in sections 202 and 205 of UMRA are similar to the requirements in previous statutes and executive orders. Only 2 of the 110 economically significant rules that were promulgated during the first 2 years of UMRA were described as significant federal intergovernmental mandates in OIRA’s reports on agencies’ compliance with title II of the act. Of the 132 rules that either RISC or we identified as economically significant rules that had been promulgated during the 2 years following the enactment of UMRA, 73 were final rules for which small government plans would have been required if the rules had a significant or unique effect on small governments. Conclusions
Our review of federal agencies’ implementation of title II of UMRA indicates that this title of the act has had little direct effect on agencies’ rulemaking actions during the first 2 years of its implementation. First, many of the UMRA requirements did not appear to apply to most economically significant rules promulgated during this period. Economically significant rules that may cost individuals or businesses more than $100 million per year are not covered by UMRA’s requirement to develop a written statement if they (1) do not have an associated notice of proposed rulemaking; (2) do not impose an enforceable duty; (3) impose such a duty but only as a condition of federal assistance or as part of a voluntary program; or (4) do not involve an expenditure of $100 million in any 1 year by the private sector or by state, local, and tribal governments. Sections 203 and 204 of UMRA also appeared to have had little impact on agencies’ rulemaking actions. Officials in the agencies where the section 207 pilot programs were established said that the pilots were not initiated to satisfy UMRA requirements. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed federal agencies' implementation of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA), focusing on what effect title II of UMRA has had on agencies' rulemaking actions.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the enactment of title II of UMRA appears to have had only limited direct impact on agencies' rulemaking actions in the first 2 years since its implementation; (2) most of the economically significant rules promulgated during UMRA's first two years were not subject to the requirements of title II; (3) title II contains exemptions that allowed agencies not to take certain actions if they determined that the actions were duplicative or not reasonably feasible; (4) written statements were not on file at the Congressional Budget Office for 80 of the 110 economically significant rules promulgated in the first 2 years of UMRA's implementation; (5) GAO concluded that UMRA did not require written statements for 78 of these 80 rules; (6) some of the rules did not have an associated notice of proposed rulemaking; (7) many did not impose an enforceable duty other than as a condition of federal financial assistance or as a duty arising from participation in a voluntary program; (8) others did not result in expenditures of $100 million by the state, local, and tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector in any 1 year; (9) the written statements that agencies prepared for 30 of the economically significant rules appeared to meet most of the UMRA requirements for those statements; (10) in almost every case, the written statements were not separate documents specifically prepared to comply with UMRA but were the rules themselves and any associated economic analysis; (11) also, sections 202 and 205: (a) give agencies discretion in how they can comply with the requirements; and (b) are similar to requirements in previous statutes and Executive Order 12866, which was issued in 1993; (12) during the first 2 years of UMRA's implementation, the requirement in section 204 of the act that agencies develop a process to consult with state, local, and tribal governments before promulgating any significant federal intergovernmental mandate appears to have applied to no more than four Environmental Protection Agency rules and no rules from other agencies; (13) section 203 small government plans were not developed for any of the 73 final rules promulgated during the first 2 years of UMRA implementation; (14) officials in the four agencies that GAO contacted said none of their final rules had a significant or unique effect on small governments; and (15) the Office of Management and Budget designated three UMRA pilot programs in two agencies, but none of these efforts appears to have been initiated because of UMRA. |
gao_GAO-11-358T | gao_GAO-11-358T_0 | Background
Sources of Trust Fund Revenues
The Trust Fund provides the primary source of funding for FAA and receives revenues principally from a variety of excise taxes paid by users of the national airspace system. Revenues deposited in the Trust Fund are subject to congressional appropriations. Uses of Airport and Airway Trust Fund Revenues
The Trust Fund is the primary source of funding for FAA’s capital programs and also provides funds for FAA’s Operations account. The capital accounts include (1) the Facilities and Equipment (F&E) account, which funds technological improvements to the air traffic control system, including the modernization of the air traffic control system, called the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen); (2) the Research, Engineering, and Development (RE&D) account, which funds research on issues related to aviation safety, mobility, and NextGen technologies; and (3) the Airport Improvement Program (AIP), which provides grants for airport planning and development. In addition, the Trust Fund has provided all or some portion of the funding for FAA’s Operations account, which funds the operation of the air traffic control system and safety inspections, among other activities. Finally, the Trust Fund is used to pay for the Essential Air Service (EAS) program. In fiscal year 2010, FAA’s expenditures totaled about $15.5 billion, with Trust Fund revenues covering about $10.2 billion, or 66 percent, of those expenditures. As figure 2 shows, while total FAA expenditures grew about 60 percent from fiscal year 2000 through fiscal year 2010, the Trust Fund’s revenue contribution only increased 12 percent, while the contribution of general revenues from the U.S. Treasury has increased to cover a larger share of FAA’s operations expenditures. The Financial Condition of the Trust Fund Has Deteriorated over the Last Decade
Since the Trust Fund’s creation in 1970, revenues have in the aggregate generally exceeded spending commitments from FAA’s appropriations, resulting in a surplus. This surplus is referred to as the Trust Fund’s uncommitted balance—the balance in the Trust Fund that remains after funds have been appropriated from the Trust Fund and contract authority has been authorized. As of the end of fiscal year 2010, the Trust Fund’s uncommitted balance was about $770 million (see fig. As figure 3 shows, the Trust Fund’s uncommitted balance has declined since reaching $7.35 billion in fiscal year 2001. This decline is largely a result of how Congress determines the amount of appropriations that should be made from the Trust Fund. Starting with the Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act of the 21st Century (AIR-21) in 2000 and continuing with Vision 100, Congress has based FAA’s fiscal year appropriation from the Trust Fund on the forecasted level of Trust Fund revenues, including interest on Trust Fund balances, as set forth in the President’s baseline budget projection for the coming fiscal year. Each year’s forecast, and accordingly FAA’s appropriation, is based on information available in the first quarter of the preceding fiscal year. For example, the revenue forecast for fiscal year 2011 is prepared in the first quarter of fiscal year 2010. These revenue forecasts can be uncertain because it is difficult to anticipate, a year in advance, events that may significantly affect the demand for air travel or fuel usage, the fares that passengers pay, and other variables that affect Trust Fund revenues. Later this month, in the President’s budget, the administration will release its newest estimate of the Trust Fund’s fiscal year 2011 year-end uncommitted balance. These improvements are intended to improve the efficiency and capacity of the air transportation system while maintaining its safety so that it can accommodate anticipated future growth. Options for Ensuring a Sustainable Trust Fund
Given the uncertainty inherent in forecasting revenues and the decline in the uncommitted balance of the Trust Fund, we have suggested that Congress should work with FAA to develop alternative ways to reduce the risk of overcommitting budgetary resources from the Trust Fund. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses the status of the Airport and Airway Trust Fund (Trust Fund). Established in 1970, the Trust Fund helps finance the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) investments in the airport and airway system, such as construction and safety improvements at airports and technological upgrades to the air traffic control system, as well as FAA operations, such as providing air traffic control and conducting safety inspections. FAA, the Trust Fund, and the excise taxes that support the Trust Fund (which are discussed later in this statement) must all be periodically reauthorized. The most recent reauthorization expired at the end of fiscal year 2007. Proposed reauthorization legislation was considered but not enacted in the 110th and 111th Congresses, although several short-term measures were passed to extend the authorization of aviation programs, funding, and Trust Fund revenue collections. The latest of these extensions--the Airport and Airway Extension Act of 2010, Part IV--was enacted on December 22, 2010, extending FAA programs, expenditure authority, and aviation trust fund revenue collections through March 31, 2011. The financial health of the Trust Fund is important to ensure sustainable funding for a safe and efficient aviation system without increasing demands on general revenues. This testimony provides an update on the status of the Airport and Airway Trust Fund, including the current financial condition of the Trust Fund, anticipated Trust Fund expenditures for planning and implementing improvements in the nation's air traffic management system that are expected to enhance the safety and capacity of the air transport system, and options for ensuring a sustainable Trust Fund. This statement draws on our body of work on these issues, supplemented with updated information on the Trust Fund from FAA and the Congressional Budget Office. All dollars reported in this statement are nominal, unless otherwise noted.
What GAO Found
The Trust Fund is the primary source of funding for FAA's capital programs and also provides funds for FAA's Operations account. The capital accounts include (1) the Facilities and Equipment (F&E) account, which funds technological improvements to the air traffic control system, including the modernization of the air traffic control system, called the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen); (2) the Research, Engineering, and Development (RE&D) account, which funds research on issues related to aviation safety, mobility, and NextGen technologies; and (3) the Airport Improvement Program (AIP), which provides grants for airport planning and development. In addition, the Trust Fund has provided all or some portion of the funding for FAA's Operations account, which funds the operation of the air traffic control system and safety inspections, among other activities. Finally, the Trust Fund is used to pay for the Essential Air Service (EAS) program. In fiscal year 2010, FAA's expenditures totaled about $15.5 billion, with Trust Fund revenues covering about $10.2 billion, or 66 percent, of those expenditures. While total FAA expenditures grew about 60 percent from fiscal year 2000 through fiscal year 2010, the Trust Fund's revenue contribution only increased 12 percent, while the contribution of general revenues from the U.S. Treasury has increased to cover a larger share of FAA's operations expenditures. Since the Trust Fund's creation in 1970, revenues have in the aggregate generally exceeded spending commitments from FAA's appropriations, resulting in a surplus. This surplus is referred to as the Trust Fund's uncommitted balance--the balance in the Trust Fund that remains after funds have been appropriated from the Trust Fund and contract authority has been authorized. As of the end of fiscal year 2010, the Trust Fund's uncommitted balance was about $770 million. the Trust Fund's uncommitted balance has declined since reaching $7.35 billion in fiscal year 2001. This decline is largely a result of how Congress determines the amount of appropriations that should be made from the Trust Fund. Starting with the Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act of the 21st Century (AIR-21) in 2000 and continuing with Vision 100,10 Congress has based FAA's fiscal year appropriation from the Trust Fund on the forecasted level of Trust Fund revenues, including interest on Trust Fund balances, as set forth in the President's baseline budget projection for the coming fiscal year. Each year's forecast, and accordingly FAA's appropriation, is based on information available in the first quarter of the preceding fiscal year. For example, the revenue forecast for fiscal year 2011 is prepared in the first quarter of fiscal year 2010. These revenue forecasts can be uncertain because it is difficult to anticipate, a year in advance, events that may significantly affect the demand for air travel or fuel usage, the fares that passengers pay, and other variables that affect Trust Fund revenues. |
gao_GAO-02-581 | gao_GAO-02-581_0 | Background
The Congress enacted the Endangered Species Act of 1973 to prevent the extinction of threatened or endangered plant and animal species. Service Headquarters Budgets and Allocates Its Endangered Species Program Funds by Program Area
Congress provides funding for the endangered species program through the resource management appropriations account. The Service maintains these distinct program area budgets as it allocates funds to the regional office, doing so in two steps. For example, in the consultation program area, the Service follows two methodologies when allocating funds: (1) funds for consultations with federal agencies and habitat conservation planning with nonfederal groups are allocated according to the weighted number of candidate, proposed, and listed species found in each region, and (2) a set amount every year ($2 million in fiscal year 2001) is allocated across regional offices for implementing and monitoring habitat conservation plans based on specific formulas that take into account such factors as the size of the planning area and the number of participating partners. These percentages do not reflect the time field staff spent on general endangered species program activities (see footnote 4). Litigation Drove Listing Workload
Section 4 of the Endangered Species Act requires the Service to list any species that is at risk of extinction. For fiscal year 2001, field staff reported spending 10 percent of their total time devoted to the endangered species program on listing activities, with 51 percent of this time on adding new species to the threatened or endangered species list and 49 percent spent on designating critical habitats. A Service official acknowledged that the cost to implement the landowner incentives program was partially borne by the candidate conservation and recovery programs. Table 5 presents information on the percentage of time field staff spent on the major activities within each program area (consultation, recovery, candidate conservation, listing, landowner incentives) in fiscal year 2001. | What GAO Found
The Endangered Species Act of 1973 was enacted to conserve plant and animal species facing extinction as well as their habitats. The act requires that at-risk species that may be candidates for listing and conservation efforts be identified and listed as threatened or endangered, critical habitat that requires special management be identified, proposed projects that could harm the listed species be mitigated, and plans to improve the status of listed species until they no longer need protection be developed and implemented. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (Service) established an endangered species program within its ecological services program to implement the requirements of the act. The Service budgets separately allocates its endangered species program funds by distinct subcategories corresponding to the program areas of recovery, consultation, candidate conservation, listing, and landowner incentives. The Service maintains these allocations by program area as it distributes funds from headquarters to its regional offices and again as the regional offices distribute funds to their field offices. GAO's survey results showed that in fiscal year 2001, of the total time field staff spent on specific endangered species program activities, consultation accounted for 42 percent and recovery accounted for 28 percent. The remaining 30 percent was spent on candidate conservation, landowner incentives, and listing. These percentages do not reflect the time field staff spent on general endangered species program activities. |
gao_GAO-13-269 | gao_GAO-13-269_0 | Local governments may challenge these population estimates through a process established by the Bureau’s Population Estimates Challenge Program. In practice, according to agency officials, the Bureau generally accepted all challenges, largely without regard to the data sources provided so long as they supported calculations of population change and covered the reporting periods required by the challenge program. According to Bureau officials, these changes are based on research that shows that estimates based on some methods and records (e.g., births, deaths, and migration) are substantially more accurate than estimates based on others. The Bureau modified procedures so that challenges by subcounty governments to the Bureau’s estimates of people living in traditional housing—not living in group quarters arrangements—will no longer affect county-level population estimates. According to the change, any challenge that results in an increase to the estimate of a subcounty community’s population living in traditional housing will be offset by a downward revision to the estimate for all other communities in the same county, in effect reallocating the estimated population within the county. The Bureau also changed procedures so that it routinely reviews subcounty population challenges in light of each community’s population growth trend, requiring corroborating information when a government claims population growth that is inconsistent with the trend. The Bureau Reviews Quality of Calculations and Requires Local Governments to Certify that Data Are Accurate
Challenge program officials told us that the program focuses its quality assurance on (1) reviewing the calculations presented in the documentation submitted by local governments as part of challenge submissions and (2) checking documents and calculations for internal consistency. Moving forward, according to officials, the Bureau is preparing a quality assurance plan for Bureau staff who review challenges to better ensure proper handling and processing of challenges, as well as the review of calculations. The Bureau has Limited Plans for Using Local Records to Supplement National Records for 2020
The Bureau is exploring the use of local records for the 2020 Census, but this effort will be of a lower priority than research on the use of national administrative records, in part because national records show greater promise than local records for controlling costs. In contrast, Bureau officials believe that the use of local administrative records is most likely to support the development of the 2020 address list. However, the process of going door-to-door is labor intensive. The Bureau would like to update this information continuously rather than wait to receive the input as part of a one-time decennial update. The officials stated that while it is important to continue research on local records, because they may be helpful in targeting decennial operations to hard-to-count groups or those in certain geographic areas, the results of 2010 Census research and testing on national records has led Bureau officials to conclude that continuing research on national records, such as those listed in figure 2, should be a higher priority. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Commerce. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To describe the U.S. Census Bureau’s (Bureau) changes to how local administrative records will be used in the challenge program, we reviewed the August 10, 2012, Federal Register outlining proposed changes; the final rule, which was issued in the January 3, 2013, Federal Register; Bureau reports and presentations, which served as the basis for the changes; and comments received from state and local data experts solicited by the Federal Register on the proposed changes prior to the Bureau’s issuance of the final rule. To describe the changes to how the Bureau will assure the quality of population estimates updated by the challenge program, we reviewed the Federal Register notice outlined earlier, and we interviewed Bureau officials to identify additional quality assurance steps the Bureau intends to implement. To examine the Bureau’s plans to use the types of local administrative records currently used by the challenge program to improve the cost or quality of the 2020 Decennial Census, we reviewed Bureau documentation on research and testing of administrative records for the 2020 Census, as well as our prior reports on the Bureau’s research and testing efforts. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Bureau's Population Estimates Challenge Program gives local governments the opportunity to challenge the Bureau's annual estimates of their population counts during the years between decennial censuses. Challenges rely on local administrative records, such as building and demolition permits. In addition to their role in the challenge program, these and national administrative records, such as tax data and Medicare records, could save the Bureau money if they are used to help build the Bureau's master address list, and reduce the need for certain costly and labor-intensive door-to-door visits among other things. GAO was asked to review changes to the challenge program and the Bureau's use of administrative records.
This report describes the changes to: (1) how local administrative records will be used in the challenge program; (2) how the Bureau will assure the quality of population estimates updated by the challenge program; and describes (3) what plans, if any, the Bureau has to use the types of local administrative records used for the challenge program to improve the cost or quality of the 2020 Decennial Census.
GAO reviewed documentary and testimonial evidence from Bureau officials and state and local data experts. Additionally, GAO interviewed Bureau officials to identify changes to the challenge program and reviewed documentation on the challenge program's quality assurance processes. GAO provided a draft of this report to the Department of Commerce. In response the Bureau provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
The Census Bureau (Bureau) issued significant changes to rules governing the records that communities use to challenge the Bureau's population estimates. Previously, the Bureau routinely accepted all challenges, largely without regard to the data sources cited or provided so long as they supported the calculations and covered the appropriate reporting periods. According to Bureau officials, these changes are based on research that shows that estimates based on some methods and records (e.g., births, deaths, and migration) are substantially more accurate than estimates based on others. Among other changes, the Bureau modified procedures so that challenges by subcounty governments to the Bureau's estimates of people living in housing units will no longer affect countylevel population estimates. Moving forward, any such challenge resulting in an increase in the estimate of a subcounty population will be offset by a downward revision to the population estimate of all other communities in the same county. Also, the Bureau plans to routinely review population challenges in light of each community's population growth trend.Corroborating data will be required for challenges inconsistent with the trend.
Challenge program officials told GAO that in the past the program focused quality assurance on (1) reviewing the calculations in the documentation submitted by local governments as part of challenge submissions and (2) checking documents and calculations for internal consistency. Moving forward, the Bureau is preparing a quality assurance plan for Bureau staff who review challenges to better ensure proper handling and processing of challenges, as well as the review of calculations.
The Bureau's 2020 research and testing program is exploring the use of local administrative records for the 2020 Census, such as those used in the challenge program, but this effort is a lower priority than research on the use of national records, in part because national administrative records show greater promise than local records for controlling costs. Bureau officials said local records show the most promise for supporting the development of the 2020 address list. Specifically, the Bureau is exploring how it can use local records to more seamlessly and continually update address lists and maps, rather than waiting to receive such information as part of a one-time decennial update. Bureau officials stated that it is important to continue research on local records because they may be helpful in targeting decennial operations to hard-to-count groups or those in certain geographic areas. However, the results of 2010 Census research and testing on national records have led Bureau officials to conclude that continuing research on national records should be a higher priority. |
gao_GAO-04-1031 | gao_GAO-04-1031_0 | Unit readiness also affects time frames. Availability of Reserves Is Greatly Influenced by Mobilization Authorities and Personnel Policies
The availability of reserve component forces to meet future requirements is greatly influenced by DOD’s implementation of the partial mobilization authority and by the department’s personnel policies. In addition, DOD was considering a change in its implementation of the partial mobilization authority. This approach was necessary because the department had not developed a strategic framework that identified DOD’s human capital goals necessary to meet organizational requirements. Requirements for reserve component forces increased dramatically after September 11, 2001, and are expected to remain high for the foreseeable future. As noted earlier, during our review, DOD was considering changing its implementation of the partial mobilization authority from its current approach, which limits mobilizations to 24 cumulative months, to an approach that would have limited mobilizations to 24 consecutive months to expand its pool of available personnel. However, in commenting on a draft of this report, DOD stated that it would retain its current cumulative implementation approach. In June 2004, DOD noted that about 30,000 reserve members had already been mobilized for 24 months. Under DOD’s cumulative approach, these personnel will not be available to meet future requirements. In its comments on a draft of our report, DOD did not elaborate on how it expected to address its increased personnel requirements. The Army Was Not Able to Efficiently Execute Its Mobilization and Demobilization Plans
The Army was not able to efficiently execute its mobilization and demobilization plans, because mobilization and demobilization site officials faced uncertainties concerning demands for facilities, turnover among support personnel, and the arrival of reserve component forces. The Army’s mobilization and demobilization plans assumed that active forces would be deployed abroad, thus vacating installations when reserve component forces were mobilizing and often demobilizing. Facility Construction and Renovation Projects Are Not Based on Updated Planning Assumptions
To address housing and other facilities shortages at mobilization and demobilization sites, the Army has embarked on a number of facility construction and renovation projects without updating its planning assumptions regarding the availability of facilities and personnel. As a result, the Army risks spending money inefficiently on projects that may not be located where the need is greatest. Ability to Effectively Manage Health of Servicemembers Is Limited
DOD’s ability to effectively manage the health status of its reserve component members is limited because (1) its centralized database has missing and incomplete health records and (2) it has not maintained full visibility over reserve component members with medical issues. Air Force
In the Air Force, a lack of central visibility of some reserve component personnel with medical problems who are serving on active duty has resulted in delayed resolution to their medical problems. We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to take, within the context of establishing DOD’s strategic framework for force availability, the following two actions: update mobilization and demobilization planning assumptions to reflect the new operating environment for the Global War on Terrorism—long-term requirements for mobilization and demobilization support facilities and personnel and the likelihood that active forces will continue to rotate through U.S. bases while reserve component forces are mobilizing and demobilizing and develop a coordinated approach to evaluate all the support costs associated with mobilization and demobilization at alternative sites— including both facility (construction, renovation, and maintenance) and support personnel (reserve component, civilian, contractor, or a combination) costs—to determine the most efficient options; and then update the list of primary and secondary mobilization and demobilization sites as necessary. The Department specifically concurred with our recommendations to (1) update Army mobilization and demobilization planning assumptions to reflect the new operating environment for the Global War on Terrorism; (2) develop a coordinated approach to evaluate all the support costs associated with Army mobilizations and demobilizations at alternative sites—including both facility and support personnel costs—to determine the most efficient options, and then update the list of primary and secondary mobilization and demobilization sites as necessary; (3) issue updated Marine Corps mobilization guidance that specifically lists the requirement to submit pre-deployment health assessments to AMSA; (4) set a timeline for the military departments to electronically submit pre- and post-deployment heath assessments; and (5) develop a mechanism for tracking Air Force reserve component members who are on voluntary active duty orders with medical problems. To examine the extent to which DOD can effectively manage the health status of its mobilized reserve component members, we collected and analyzed data from a variety of sources throughout DOD. | Why GAO Did This Study
Over 335,000 reserve members have been involuntarily called to active duty since September 11, 2001, and the Department of Defense (DOD) expects future reserve usage to remain high. This report is the second in response to a request for GAO to review DOD's mobilization and demobilization process. This review specifically examined the extent to which (1) DOD's implementation of a key mobilization authority and personnel polices affect reserve force availability, (2) the Army was able to execute its mobilization and demobilization plans efficiently, and (3) DOD can manage the health of its mobilized reserve forces.
What GAO Found
DOD's implementation of a key mobilization authority to involuntarily call up reserve component members and personnel policies greatly affects the numbers of reserve members available to fill requirements. Involuntary mobilizations are currently limited to a cumulative total of 24 months under DOD's implementation of the partial mobilization authority. Faced with some critical shortages, DOD changed a number of its personnel policies to increase force availability. However, these changes addressed immediate needs and did not take place within a strategic framework that linked human capital goals with DOD's organizational goals to fight the Global War on Terrorism. DOD was also considering a change in its implementation of the partial mobilization authority that would have expanded its pool of available personnel. This policy revision would have authorized mobilizations of up to 24 consecutive months without limiting the number of times personnel could be mobilized, and thus provide an essentially unlimited flow of forces. In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD stated that it would retain its current cumulative approach, but DOD did not elaborate in its comments on how it expected to address its increased personnel requirements. The Army was not able to efficiently execute its mobilization and demobilization plans, because the plans contained outdated assumptions concerning the availability of facilities and support personnel. For example, plans assumed that active forces would be deployed abroad, thus vacating facilities when reserves were mobilizing and demobilizing but reserve forces were used earlier and active forces had often not vacated the facilities. As a result, some units were diverted away from their planned mobilization sites, and disparities in housing accommodations existed between active and reserve forces. Efficiency was also lost when short notice hampered coordination efforts among planners, support personnel, and mobilizing or demobilizing reserve forces. To address shortages in housing and other facilities, the Army has embarked on several construction and renovation projects without updating its planning assumptions regarding the availability of facilities. As a result, the Army risks spending money inefficiently on projects that may not be located where the need is greatest. Further, the Army has not taken a coordinated approach evaluating all the support costs associated with mobilization and demobilization at alternative sites in order to determine the most efficient options for the Global War on Terrorism. DOD's ability to effectively manage the health status of its reserve forces is limited because its centralized database has missing and incomplete health records and it has not maintained full visibility over reserve component members with medical problems. For example, the Marine Corps did not send pre-deployment health assessments to DOD's database as required, due to unclear guidance and a lack of compliance monitoring. The Air Force has visibility of involuntarily mobilized members with health problems, but lacks visibility of members with health problems who are on voluntary orders. As a result, some personnel had medical problems that had not been resolved for up to 18 months, but the full extent of this situation is unknown. |
gao_GAO-08-1180T | gao_GAO-08-1180T_0 | The orders further describe different levels of physical protection for sensitive and classified assets, depending on the risk they would pose if they were lost, stolen, or otherwise compromised. In addition, two DOE organizations are required to periodically review physical and cyber security at LANL. NNSA’s Los Alamos Site Office is required to conduct security surveys annually. While Physical Security at Los Alamos National Laboratory Has Improved, Management Approaches to Sustain Security Improvements Are in the Early Stages of Development or Contain Weaknesses
Physical security at LANL is in a period of significant improvement, and LANL is implementing over two dozen initiatives to reduce, consolidate, and better protect its classified assets, as well as reduce the physical footprint of the laboratory by closing unneeded facilities. We found that DOE’s Office of Independent Oversight and the Los Alamos Site Office identified significant physical security problems at LANL that the laboratory had not fully addressed. In addition, external security evaluations had repeatedly identified concerns about the adequacy of LANL’s assessments of its own security performance. LANL officials identified three management approaches that they asserted would sustain security improvements over the long term. We made three recommendations to the Secretary of Energy and the Administrator of NNSA that, if effectively implemented, will improve physical security at LANL and help ensure that improvements LANL has achieved are sustained over the long term. Preliminary Observations on Physical Security at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
In June 2008, the Committee requested that we review the security status at Livermore. During our visit to the laboratory 2 weeks ago, Livermore officials told us they are finalizing corrective action plans to address deficiencies in their performance assurance and self-assessment programs and have already conducted a significant number of performance assurance tests with the protective force and on equipment since the completion of the Office of Independent Oversight’s 2008 evaluation. NNSA and the Livermore Site Office have not always provided effective security oversight. Six months before the Office of Independent Oversight’s 2008 evaluation, the 2007 Livermore Site Office’s annual security survey gave the laboratory a 100-percent satisfactory rating on its security performance, the highest possible rating. Though our observations are preliminary, Livermore appears to be experiencing difficulties similar to LANL’s in sustaining physical security performance. Los Alamos National Laboratory Has Implemented Measures to Enhance Cyber Security on Its Unclassified Network, but Weaknesses Remain
LANL has implemented measures to enhance its cyber security, but weaknesses remain in protecting the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information on its unclassified network. However, LANL has vulnerabilities in several critical areas, including (1) identifying and authenticating users of the network, (2) encrypting sensitive information, (3) monitoring and auditing compliance with security policies, (4) controlling and documenting changes to a computer system’s hardware and software, and (5) restricting physical access to computing resources. A key reason for the information security weaknesses we identified is that LANL has not yet fully implemented an information security program to ensure that controls are effectively established and maintained. Although LANL cyber security officials told us that funding has been inadequate to address some of their security concerns, NNSA officials raised questions about the basis for LANL’s funding request for cyber security. NNSA’s Chief Information Officer told us that LANL has not adequately justified requests for additional funds to address the laboratory’s stated shortfalls. To help strengthen information security controls over LANL’s unclassified network, we made a series of recommendations to the Secretary of Energy and the Administrator of NNSA, 11 of which focus on improving LANL’s information security program and determining resource requirements for the unclassified network. For example, we recommended that the Secretary of Energy and the NNSA Administrator require the Director of LANL to, among other things, (1) ensure that the risk assessment for the unclassified network evaluates all known vulnerabilities and is revised periodically and (2) strengthen policies with a view toward further reducing, as appropriate, foreign nationals’ access to the unclassified network, particularly those from countries identified as sensitive by DOE. | Why GAO Did This Study
Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) is one of three National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) laboratories that designs and develops nuclear weapons for the U.S. stockpile. LANL employees rely on sensitive and classified information and assets that are protected at different levels, depending on the risks posed if they were lost, stolen, or otherwise compromised. However, LANL has experienced several significant security breaches during the past decade. This testimony provides GAO's (1) views on physical security at LANL, as discussed in Los Alamos National Laboratory: Long-Term Strategies Needed to Improve Security and Management Oversight, GAO-08-694 (June 13, 2008); (2) preliminary observations on physical security at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory; and (3) views on cyber security at LANL as discussed in Information Security: Actions Needed to Better Protect Los Alamos National Laboratory's Unclassified Computer Network, GAO-08-1001 (Sept. 9, 2008). To conduct this work, GAO analyzed data, reviewed policies and procedures, interviewed laboratory officials, and conducted site visits to the two laboratories.
What GAO Found
Physical security at LANL is in a period of significant improvement, and LANL is implementing over two dozen initiatives to better protect its classified assets. However, while LANL's current initiatives address many physical security problems previously identified in external security evaluations, other significant security problems have received insufficient attention. In addition, the management approaches that LANL and NNSA intend to use to sustain security improvements over the long term are in the early stages of development or contain weaknesses. Furthermore, LANL's ability to sustain its improved physical security posture is unproven because (1) the laboratory appears not to have done so after a significant security incident in 2004, with another significant security breach in 2006, and (2) NNSA's Los Alamos Site Office--which is responsible for overseeing security at LANL--may not have enough staff or the proper training to execute a fully effective security oversight program. GAO's report made recommendations to help further improve physical security at LANL and ensure that these improvements are sustained over the long term. As a result of poor performance on an April 2008 physical security evaluation conducted by the Department of Energy's (DOE) Office of Independent Oversight, GAO is reviewing physical security at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (Livermore). GAO's preliminary observations are that Livermore appears to experience difficulties similar to LANL's in sustaining security performance. Furthermore, it appears that NNSA has not always provided effective oversight of Livermore. Specifically, an NNSA security survey conducted only 6 months prior to the April 2008 DOE evaluation gave Livermore the highest possible rating on its security program's performance. These results differ markedly from those documented by DOE's Office of Independent Oversight. LANL has implemented measures to enhance cyber security, but weaknesses remain in protecting information on its unclassified network. This network possesses sensitive information such as unclassified controlled nuclear information, export control information, and personally identifiable information about LANL employees. GAO found vulnerabilities in critical areas, including (1) identifying and authenticating users, (2) encrypting sensitive information, and (3) monitoring and auditing security policy compliance. A key reason for these information security weaknesses is that the laboratory has not fully implemented an information security program to ensure that controls are effectively established and maintained. Furthermore, deficiencies in LANL's policies and procedures raise additional concern, particularly with respect to foreign nationals' accessing the network from the laboratory and remotely. Finally, LANL cyber security officials told GAO that funding to address some of their security concerns with the laboratory's unclassified network has been inadequate. However, NNSA officials asserted that LANL had not adequately justified its requests for additional funds. GAO made 52 recommendations to help strengthen LANL's information security program and controls over the unclassified network. |
gao_GAO-08-59 | gao_GAO-08-59_0 | FTA partner countries were selected for a variety of foreign and economic policy reasons. Since 2002, the United States Has Pursued Negotiations of 17 FTAs with 47 Countries
In the 5-year period that TPA was granted to the President, from 2002- 2007, the administration pursued negotiations toward 17 FTAs with 47 countries. Six FTAs have been approved and are in force. This is in addition to the FTAs the United States already had with Israel and Jordan. 1.) FTAs Pursued Account for Limited Share of U.S. Trade and Investment but Include Diverse Markets for U.S. Exports
Trade with countries for which FTAs were pursued under TPA accounted for about 16 percent of U.S. trade in 2006 and about 16 percent of U.S. foreign direct investment in 2005. Of the remaining 84 percent of U.S. trade, 27 percent was with countries for which the U.S. had an FTA prior to TPA (e.g., Canada and Mexico) and 56 percent was with countries not pursued under TPA, including the EU, Japan, and China. There are several reasons why the United States has chosen not to pursue some of the largest trade partners for FTA negotiations. USTR Consulted Extensively with Congressional Staff, but Staff Have Mixed Views about Having a Meaningful Opportunity for Input
Although USTR consulted frequently with Congress, some congressional staff said that both the nature of the consultations and issues such as timing of the consultations limited congressional input into FTAs. During negotiations, or before entering into (signing) trade agreements, the President must: consult with the House Ways and Means, Senate Finance, other committees with jurisdiction over legislation involving matters affected by the trade agreement, and COG, with respect to the nature of the agreement, how it achieves congressional objectives set forth in TPA, and the effect the agreement may have on existing laws; report to the House Ways and Means and Senate Finance committees on any changes to U.S. trade remedy laws that an agreement would require at least 180 days before entering into the agreement; notify Congress of intent to enter into the agreement at least 90 days submit private sector advisory committee reports to Congress within 30 days of notifying Congress of intent to enter into an agreement; and provide the ITC, at least 90 days before entering into the agreement, with the details of the agreement and request that ITC conduct an assessment of the likely economic impact of the agreement; the ITC must then present this assessment to the President and Congress no later than 90 days after the President enters into the agreement. 4.) Thus, about two-thirds of USTR’s consultations were with these four committees. However, slightly more than half of the congressional committee staff with whom we spoke felt that they did not have any real input or influence on the trade negotiations. Current reporting by the administration on the trade advisory committee status does not provide sufficient transparency, so Congress may be unaware of some committees’ inability to meet and how statutory representation requirements are achieved. To assure Congress that it is receiving the private sector advisory opinions that it intended in the Trade Act of 1974, we recommend that the Secretaries of Agriculture and Labor work with the U.S. Trade Representative to take the following two actions: Start the advisory committee rechartering and member appointment processes with sufficient time to avoid any lapse in the ability to hold committee meetings, and Notify Congress if a committee is unable to meet for more than 3 months due to an expired charter or a delay in the member appointment process. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To determine how Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) has been used in negotiation of free trade agreements (FTA), we reviewed: (1) What FTAs have been pursued under TPA and why? (2) Overall, what is the economic significance of these agreements to the United States? (3) What is the nature of the consultation process for Congress, and how well has it worked in practice? (4) What is the nature of the consultation process for trade advisory committees and other stakeholders, and how well has it worked in practice? | Why GAO Did This Study
Congress granted the President Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) to negotiate agreements, including free trade agreements (FTA) in 2002. TPA stipulated negotiating objectives and procedural steps for the administration, including consulting with Congress and trade advisory committees. TPA lapsed in July 2007 amidst questions about its use. GAO was asked to review: (1) What FTAs have been pursued under TPA and why? (2) Overall, what is the economic significance of these agreements for the United States? (3) What is the nature of the consultation process for Congress and how well has it worked in practice? (4) What is the nature of the consultation process for trade advisory committees, and how well has it worked in practice? GAO interviewed staff of the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), the International Trade Commission (ITC), congressional committees with jurisdiction, trade advisory committees, and others, and reviewed USTR documents.
What GAO Found
In the 5-year period thatTPA was granted to the President, from 2002-2007, the United States pursued 17 FTAs with 47 countries for a variety of foreign and economic policy reasons. Six FTAs have been approved and are in force, and negotiations for another 4 FTAs have been concluded. The United States has simultaneously pursued comprehensive, high-standard trade agreements on the bilateral and multilateral levels. Trade with countries for which FTAs were pursued under TPA comprises about 16 percent of U.S. trade and foreign direct investment. Twenty-seven percent of U.S. trade is with countries with FTAs in force prior to TPA (e.g., Canada and Mexico); 56 percent is with countries with which the United States does not have FTAs. The largest U.S. trade partners not pursued under TPA are the European Union, Japan, and China; the rest account for relatively small shares of U.S. trade. USTR held 1,605 consultations with congressional committee staff from August 2002 through April 2007, but satisfaction with the consultations was mixed. About two-thirds of these meetings were with the House and Senate trade and agriculture committees. Almost all the congressional staff GAO contacted viewed the consultations as providing good information, but slightly more than half said that they did not provide opportunities for real input or influence. These staff often said that they were not given sufficient time to provide meaningful input. The trade advisory committee chairs GAO contacted said that USTR and managing agencies consulted with their committees fairly regularly, although process issues at times hindered some from functioning effectively. For example, about half said that the 30-day deadline for reporting on the likely impact of FTAs can be difficult to meet, and the ITC had a similar problem. In addition, adherence to statutory representation requirements is not always transparent. Several committees have not been able to meet while their charters were expired, or members had not been reappointed. However, USTR and managing agencies are not required to report to Congress such lapses in a committee's ability to meet. |
gao_GAO-06-21 | gao_GAO-06-21_0 | DOT’s Implementation of the Small Community Air Service Development Program Includes Awarding Grants by Using Legislatively Established Priority and Other Factors and Providing Grant Oversight
In the first 4 years of the Small Community Air Service Development Program, DOT awarded a total of 157 grants. However, only about one-third of the airports we surveyed that applied for but did not receive a grant expressed satisfaction over the clarity of selection criteria. Our survey of grantee airports showed that a large majority of the directors at these airports were satisfied with DOT’s selection criteria and process for the program, while fewer nongrantee airport directors thought the selection criteria were clear. Variety of Goals and Strategies to Improve Air Service are Used, but the Results to Date of Completed Projects are Mixed
The Small Community Air Service Development Program allows communities to set a variety of goals for projects, and individual projects have been directed at adding flights, airlines, and destinations; lowering fares; changing the aircraft serving the community; completing a study for planning and marketing air service; increasing enplanements; and curbing the leakage of passengers to other airports. To achieve these goals, grant sponsors have used a number of strategies, commonly including subsidies and revenue guarantees to the airlines, marketing to the public and to the airlines, hiring personnel and consultants, and establishing travel banks in which a community guarantees to buy a certain number of tickets. In general, we found that the airport officials reported almost all the completed projects had some positive effect on air service during the life of the grant, but in some cases the improvements did not remain after the initial grant period, or that the improvements were not self-sustaining. Because a large majority of Small Community Air Service Development Project grants are not complete (127 of the 157 grants were ongoing as of September 30, 2005), it is too soon to determine which strategies have performed the best or assess the overall effectiveness of this program to improve air service to small communities. DOT has designated one airport each year of the program as an Air Service Development Zone— Augusta, GA (2002); Dothan, AL (2003); Waterloo, IA (2004); and Hibbing, MN (2005). This may be particularly important since our work on the limited number of completed projects found that only about half of the grantees reported that the improvements were self-sustaining after the grant was complete. We are sending copies of this report to appropriate congressional committees and the Secretary of Transportation. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To determine how the Department of Transportation (DOT) has implemented the Small Community Air Service Development Grant Program, we obtained and reviewed legislation authorizing and funding the program as well as related orders and guidelines. To determine what strategies have been used and what results have been obtained, we reviewed the grant applications and agreements for all 157 grants awarded from 2002 through 2005. Low-cost carriers provide a challenge to small communities. DOT Additional Selection Factors
How many carriers are serving the community? | Why GAO Did This Study
Over the last decade significant changes have occurred in the airline industry. Many legacy carriers are facing challenging financial conditions and low cost carriers are attracting passengers away from some small community airports. These changes, and others, have challenged small communities to attract adequate commercial air service. To help small communities improve air service, Congress established the Small Community Air Service Development Program in 2000. This study reports on (1) how the Department of Transportation (DOT) has implemented the program; and (2) what goals and strategies have been used and what results have been obtained by the grants provided under the program.
What GAO Found
The Small Community Air Service Development Program grants are awarded at the discretion of the Secretary of Transportation. GAO found that DOT considered the statutory eligibility criteria and priority factors as well as other factors in evaluating proposals and in making awards. The number of grant applications has declined since 2002. DOT officials see this as a consequence of the large number of ongoing grants and the impact of 2003 legislative changes. In surveying airport directors we found that grantee airports generally responded positively to DOT's process for awarding grants, about two-thirds were satisfied with the clarity of the selection criteria, while about one-third of directors at airports not receiving grants were satisfied with the clarity. DOT oversight is based on reviews of grantee reports and reimbursement requests, and DOT has terminated some projects and reallocated the unexpended funds to others. Individual grant projects had goals including adding flights, airlines and destinations, lowering fares, obtaining better planning data, increasing enplanements, and curbing the loss of passengers to other airports. Grantees used a number of strategies to achieve their goals, including subsidies and revenue guarantees to the airlines, marketing to the public and to the airlines, hiring personnel and consultants, and establishing travel banks. Results for the 23 projects completed by September 30, 2005 were mixed: about half of the airports reported air service improvements that were self-sustaining after the grant was over. Some projects were not successful due to factors beyond the project, such as an airline decision to reduce flights at a hub. However, it is too soon to assess the overall effectiveness of the program, because most funded projects are not complete--127 of the 157 awarded grants are ongoing. DOT designates one airport each year as an Air Service Development Zone. The communities selected in 2002, 2003, and 2004 expressed similar concerns about the usefulness of this designation. None of the communities could cite any effect the Air Service Development Zone had for them. Instead, communities expressed confusion as to what DOT's designation was supposed to provide. |
gao_GAO-08-448 | gao_GAO-08-448_0 | The agency’s second 2-year block—Block 2006—culminated on December 31, 2007, and fielded additional BMDS assets. More Capability Fielded but Less than Planned and at Higher Cost
MDA made progress in developing and fielding the BMDS during 2007. Additional assets were fielded and/or upgraded, several tests met planned objectives, and other development activities were conducted. On the other hand, fewer assets were fielded than originally planned, the cost of the block increased, some flight tests were deferred, and the performance of fielded assets could not be fully evaluated. MDA Does Not Meet Original Goals, but Meets or Exceeds Most Revised Goals
In March 2005, MDA submitted to Congress the number of assets it planned to field during Block 2006. With the deferral of the work, its cost was no longer counted as a Block 2004 cost, but as a Block 2006 cost. The cost of Block 2006 was further blurred as MDA found it necessary to defer some Block 2006 work until a future block. For example, when the STSS contractor overran its fiscal year 2007 budget because of testing problems, the program did not have sufficient funds to launch the demonstration satellites in 2007 as planned. During that event, the program was able to demonstrate that the Aegis BMD could simultaneously track and intercept a ballistic missile and an anti-ship cruise missile. Second, too few flight tests have been completed to ensure the accuracy of the models’ and simulations’ predictions. In the past year, MDA has begun implementing two initiatives—a new block construct and a new executive board–to improve transparency, accountability, and oversight. MDA has not yet estimated the full cost of a block. At some future date, MDA does expect to develop a full cost estimate for each committed block and is in discussions with DOD’s Cost Analysis Improvement Group on having the group verify each estimate; but documents do not yet include a timeline for estimating block cost or having that estimate verified. Functions of the New Board
According to its charter, the MDEB is vested with more responsibility than its predecessor, the MDSG. Because MDA does not follow this cycle, it does not enter System Development and Demonstration and it does not trigger the statutes requiring the development of information that the Defense Acquisition Board uses to inform its decisions. As noted earlier, the limited amount of testing completed, which has been primarily developmental in nature, and the lack of verified, validated, and accredited models and simulations prevent the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation from fully assessing the effectiveness, suitability, and survivability of the BMDS in annual assessments. This is generally true for technology development programs in DOD because they are in a period of discovery, which makes schedule and cost difficult to estimate. Using procurement funds will mean that MDA generally will be required to adhere to congressional policy that assets be fully funded in the year of their purchase, rather than incrementally funded over several years. The Congressional Research Service reported in 2006 that “incremental funding fell out of favor because opponents believed it could make the total procurement costs of weapons and equipment more difficult for Congress to understand and track, create a potential for DOD to start procurement of an item without necessarily stating its total cost to Congress, permit one Congress to ‘tie the hands’ of future Congresses, and increase weapon procurement costs by exposing weapons under construction to uneconomic start-up and stop costs.” Our analysis of MDA developed costs, which are presented in table 7, also shows that incremental funding is usually more expensive than full funding, in part, because inflation decreases the buying power of the dollar each year. Since 2002, MDA has been granted the flexibility to incrementally fund the fielding of its operational assets with research and development funds. As a result, fielded capability has increased. On the other hand, some problems continue that make it difficult to assess how well the BMDS is progressing relative to the funds it has received and the goals it has set for those funds. Recommendations for Executive Action
To build on efforts to improve the transparency, accountability, and oversight of the missile defense program, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct: MDA to develop a full cost for each block and request an independent verification of that cost; MDA to clarify the criteria that it will use for reporting unit cost MDA to examine a contractor’s planning efforts when 20 percent or more of a contract’s work is proposed as level of effort; MDA to investigate ways of developing a baseline or some other standard against which the progress of technology programs may be assessed; and MDA and the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation to agree on criteria and incorporate corresponding scope into developmental tests that will allow a determination of whether a block of BMDS capability is suitable and effective for fielding. | Why GAO Did This Study
By law, GAO annually assesses the Missile Defense Agency's (MDA) progress in developing and fielding a Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS). Funded at $8 billion to nearly $10 billion per year, it is the largest research and development program in the Department of Defense (DOD). The program has been managed in 2-year increments, known as blocks. Block 2006, the second BMDS block, was completed in December 2007. GAO assessed MDA's progress in (1) meeting Block 2006 goals for fielding assets, completing work within estimated cost, conducting tests, and demonstrating the performance of the overall system in the field, and (2) making managerial improvements to transparency, accountability, and oversight. In conducting the assessment, GAO reviewed the assets fielded; contractor cost, schedule, and performance; and tests completed during 2007. GAO also reviewed pertinent sections of the U.S. Code, acquisition policy, and the charter of a new missile defense board.
What GAO Found
MDA made progress in developing and fielding the BMDS during Block 2006 but fell short of meeting its original goals. Specifically, it fielded additional assets such as land-based interceptors and sea-based missiles and upgraded other assets, including Aegis BMD-equipped ships. It also met most test objectives, with a number of successful tests conducted. As a result, fielded capability has increased. On the other hand, it is difficult to assess how well BMDS is progressing relative to the funds it has received because fewer assets were fielded than originally planned, the cost of the block increased by at least $1 billion, some flight tests were deferred, and the performance of the fielded system remains unverified. In particular, GAO could not determine the full cost of Block 2006 because MDA continued to defer budgeted work into the future, where it is no longer counted as a Block 2006 cost. Also making cost difficult to assess is a work planning method--referred to as level of effort--used by contractors that does not link time and money with what is produced. When not appropriately used, level-of-effort planning can obscure work accomplished, portending additional cost in the future. MDA is working to minimize the use of this planning method--a needed step as contractors overran their fiscal year 2007 budgets. Performance of the fielded system is as yet not verifiable because too few tests have been conducted to validate the models and simulations that predict BMDS performance. Moreover, the tests that are done do not provide enough information for DOD's independent test organization to fully assess the BMDS' suitability and effectiveness. GAO has previously reported that MDA has been given unprecedented funding and decision-making flexibility. While this flexibility has expedited BMDS fielding, it has also made MDA less accountable and transparent in its decisions than other major programs, making oversight more challenging. MDA, with direction from Congress, has taken several steps to address these concerns. MDA implemented a new way of defining blocks--its construct for developing and fielding BMDS increments--that should make costs more transparent. For example, under the newly-defined blocks, MDA will no longer defer work from one block to another. Accountability should also be improved as MDA will, for the first time, estimate unit costs for selected assets and report variances from those estimates. DOD also chartered a new board with more BMDS oversight responsibility than its predecessor, although it does not have approval authority for some key decisions made by MDA. Finally, MDA will begin buying certain assets with procurement funds like other programs. This will benefit transparency and accountability, because procurement funding generally requires that assets be fully paid for in the year they are bought. Previously, MDA, with Congressional authorization, was able to pay for assets incrementally over several years. Additional steps could be taken to further improve oversight. For example, MDA has not yet estimated the total cost of a block, and therefore, cannot have its costs independently verified--actions required of other programs to inform decisions about affordability and investment choices. However, MDA does plan to estimate block costs and have them verified at some future date. |
gao_GAO-08-645 | gao_GAO-08-645_0 | The U.S. Treasury disburses the great majority of federal government payments, including benefit payments. Most of the 34 programs that made electronic payments indicated that they did so for a majority of their recipients. The remaining 2 programs that reported making 100 percent of their payments electronically were USDA’s Nutrition Assistance for Puerto Rico and Food Stamp programs. 4). For those 13 programs, the percentage of payments made by paper check ranged from about 1 to 100 percent. Agencies Consider Various Factors When Implementing or Encouraging the Use of Electronic Payments
Federal and state agencies, industry representatives, and others widely agree on the advantages of electronic payments, including timely payments for recipients and reduced costs for agencies. According to Treasury, ACH provides the recipient with a secure, dependable, and efficient way to receive payments. Various Options Exist for Increasing the Use of Electronic Payments, Including Further Treasury Actions
Federal and state agencies could employ various options to increase the use of electronic payments to distribute federal benefit payments. These options include requiring recipients to receive their benefits electronically through mandates, making electronic payment the default option, promoting the benefits of electronic payment through public outreach, using pilot programs, and applying EPCs in a variety of ways. These alternatives also include piloting electronic distribution programs and applying EPCs in new ways. For example, Treasury has met with CFOs from the largest federal agencies to discuss Treasury’s program initiatives, such as increasing electronic payments. However, Treasury has no plans to meet with CFO agencies and other smaller agencies on a regular basis. Treasury Has Introduced Three Initiatives and Conducted Limited Outreach with Federal Agencies to Support the Use of Electronic Payments
Treasury, as the primary disbursing agency for the federal government, has introduced two initiatives and is working on a third program to encourage the use of electronic payments to distribute federal benefit payments for programs for which they disburse payments. Conducting such an outreach effort on a more regularly scheduled basis—including meeting with the agencies we identified in this report that did not use electronic payments or did not fully use electronic payments to disburse benefits—would allow Treasury to include more detailed discussions about electronic payments and develop ongoing relationships with agencies’ CFOs and staff who could use Treasury’s expertise to move toward the use of electronic payments governmentwide. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) describe the extent to which federal programs are using electronic payment methods to disburse benefits; (2) identify factors that agencies consider when implementing or using electronic payments; and (3) identify potential options for increasing the use of electronic payments, particularly the Department of the Treasury’s (Treasury) actions to increase electronic payments. To respond to these objectives, we reviewed agency documents, reports, and studies on electronic payments. These queries ultimately returned 455 federal benefit programs. In selecting programs for case illustrations, we considered survey responses that were important for describing the characteristics of each program, such as the type and frequency of the benefit payment; the number of recipients in the program; the dollar value of benefit payments made to recipients in the program; and the extent to which the program used electronic payments to disburse benefits. | Why GAO Did This Study
Traditionally, federal agencies made benefit payments by paper check, but they faced increased pressure to reduce costs and increase the convenience, security, and timeliness of payment delivery. In response to a 1996 congressional mandate, the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Food Stamp Program implemented Electronic Benefit Transfer (EBT) to distribute food stamps. According to agency evaluations, EBT has reduced program costs and fraud and offered recipients a quick, secure way to receive payment. These results spurred interest in using electronic payment methods for other benefit programs. GAO was asked to report on (1) the extent to which federal benefit programs are using electronic payments, and factors agencies consider for their use and (2) options for increasing the use of electronic payments, particularly the Department of the Treasury's (Treasury) actions to that end. GAO surveyed federal benefit programs identified from two federal databases; reviewed documents, reports, and studies on electronic payments; and interviewed federal and state agency, industry, and consumer representatives.
What GAO Found
Most federal benefit programs GAO surveyed (34 of 42) reported using 1 or more electronic payment methods, and the majority of those programs also indicated that most of their recipients received their benefits electronically. Less than half (18 of 42) of the programs surveyed provided data that would allow GAO to determine the percentage of payments made electronically, in part because state agencies disburse payments for many programs. For the 5 largest, by dollar value, programs that provided data, about 54 to 100 percent of payments were made electronically (see figure below). Agencies consider various factors, including financial burden to recipients, program and recipient characteristics, program costs, and fraud and security risks, when making a decision to use an electronic payment method for the delivery of benefits. Various options exist for agencies to increase electronic distribution of federal benefits, including (1) mandating that recipients receive benefits electronically, (2) making electronic payment the default option upon enrollment, (3) promoting electronic payments through public outreach, (4) piloting electronic distribution programs, and (5) using electronic payment cards in new ways. Treasury has introduced key initiatives in its efforts to support and increase the use of electronic payments, particularly programs for which Treasury disburses payments, such as Social Security benefits. However, Treasury does not disburse payments for all federal benefit programs. In 2006 and 2007, Treasury met with federal Chief Financial Officers (CFO) to discuss Treasury's cash management initiatives, such as increasing electronic payments. Treasury also discussed electronic payments with program staff from larger agencies for which Treasury disburses payments. However, Treasury has no plans to conduct these meetings regularly with CFO agencies and other smaller agencies. Treasury's role as the federal government's leader for payments and its experience with electronic payment methods suggest that it could provide valuable information and assistance to smaller agencies with less experience or expertise. Regularly scheduled outreach efforts to other agencies could provide opportunities for Treasury to increase the use of electronic payments. |
gao_GAO-03-19 | gao_GAO-03-19_0 | U.S. teachers typically do not receive the allowances and services that many DOD overseas teachers receive. DOD Overseas Teachers’ Compensation Package Generally Competitive with U.S. Teachers’, but Health Care an Issue
DOD overseas teachers’ salaries compare favorably to U.S. teachers’ salaries. On average, salaries for teachers in DOD overseas schools are higher than the U.S. national average teacher salary. DOD Appears to Have Little Difficulty Recruiting and Retaining Well- Qualified Teachers for the Overseas School System
In general, DOD has been successful in recruiting and retaining well- qualified teachers. DOD Generally Successful Recruiting Well-Qualified Teachers
In school year 2001-02, DOD recruiters filled over 99 percent of vacant classroom teaching positions. It is not surprising that DOD has some difficulty recruiting teachers for these subjects. Based on Certification, Experience, and Education, the Quality of DOD Overseas Teachers Is High
DOD overseas teachers are well-qualified, with virtually all teachers in DOD schools certified in the subjects or grades they teach. The Current Process for Determining and Paying Teacher Salaries Is Time- Consuming, but DOD Has Little Flexibility to Modify This Process Because of Statutory Requirements
DOD has developed a process for determining and paying overseas teachers’ salaries to meet the requirements of the law and subsequent court cases and arbitrations. Conclusions
DOD overseas schools play a critical role, educating more than 70,000 children of parents in the armed services and the federal civilian workforce. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
The National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2002 directed GAO to assess whether the Department of Defense (DOD) overseas teachers’ compensation package is adequate to recruit and retain qualified teachers and to recommend any necessary revisions to the law governing DOD overseas teachers’ salaries. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) overseas schools educate more than 70,000 children of military service members and DOD civilian employees throughout the world. In order to ensure the continued success of this school system, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 directed GAO to assess whether the DOD overseas teachers' compensation package is adequate to recruit and retain qualified teachers. The act also required GAO to determine whether any revisions to the law governing DOD overseas teachers' salaries were advisable.
What GAO Found
DOD overseas teachers' compensation compares favorably to that of U.S. teachers. In general, DOD overseas teachers receive a standard federal benefit package, including health and life insurance and coverage under the Federal Employees' Retirement System. Many DOD overseas teachers also receive allowances, such as a living quarters allowance, that U.S. teachers do not receive. On average, salaries for DOD overseas teachers are higher than U.S. teachers' salaries. Despite the generous compensation package, there is some dissatisfaction among overseas teachers regarding health care. DOD has little difficulty recruiting and retaining well-qualified teachers for overseas schools. In school year 2001-02, DOD recruiters filled over 99 percent of vacant teacher positions. Based on certification, experience, and education, the quality of DOD overseas teachers is high. Virtually all teachers in DOD schools are certified in the subjects or grades they teach. DOD may have some difficulties recruiting and retaining teachers in a few subject areas and geographic locations, but any such difficulties do not appear to threaten the quality of the overseas teachers workforce. DOD has developed a process for determining and paying teachers' salaries that meets statutory requirements. Although this system is time-consuming and burdensome, techniques that could address these difficulties do not meet legal requirements. Given DOD's success recruiting and retaining well-qualified teachers, it is not advisable at this time to revise the law. |
gao_GAO-11-268 | gao_GAO-11-268_0 | Federal, State, and Other Data Indicated Variation in Application Denial Rates and Provided Little Information on the Reasons for Denials
Nationwide data from HHS showed variation in application denial rates across insurers operating in the individual market. Specifically, data collected by HHS from 459 state-licensed insurers on the number of applications received and denied from January through March 2010 indicated that, while the aggregate rate of application denials was 19 percent nationally, the rate varied significantly across insurers. For example, just over a quarter of insurers had application denial rates from 0 percent to 15 percent while another quarter of insurers had rates of 40 percent or higher. However, the insurers with rates of 40 percent or higher reported fewer applications. Data reported by Maryland—the only state we identified as collecting data on the incidence of application denials—indicated that variation in application denial rates across insurers operating in the state’s individual market has occurred in that state for several years. 1.) The available data on application denial rates provided little information on the reasons that applications were denied. There are several issues to consider when interpreting application denial rates. First, application denial rates may not provide a clear estimate of the number of individuals that were ultimately able to secure health coverage, because individuals may submit applications with more than one insurer and be denied by one insurer but offered enrollment by another. Another consideration when interpreting application denial rates is that the rates do not reflect applications that have been accepted by an insurer but for coverage with a premium that is higher than the standard rate or with exclusions for coverage of specified services. State and Other Data Indicated That Coverage Denial Rates and the Reasons for Denials Vary and That Denials, If Appealed, Are Often Reversed
Data from selected states and others indicated that the rates of coverage denials, including denials for preauthorizations and claims, varied significantly, and a number of factors may have contributed to that variation. The data also indicated that coverage denials occurred for a variety of reasons, frequently for billing errors and eligibility issues and less often for judgments about the appropriateness of a service. Further, the data we reviewed indicated that coverage denials, if appealed, were frequently reversed in the consumer’s favor and that appeals and complaints related to coverage denials sometimes resulted in financial recoveries for consumers. Specifically, aggregate claim denial rates for the three states that we identified as collecting such data ranged from 11 percent in Ohio in 2009 to 24 percent in California in the same year. Several factors may have contributed to the variation in rates across the four states and the AMA data. In addition to variation across states in aggregated rates, state and other data also indicated that coverage denial rates varied significantly across insurers. For example, the California data indicated that in 2009 claim denial rates ranged from 6 percent to 40 percent across six of the largest managed care organizations operating in the state. With regard to claims missing required information, the 2010 AMA data indicated that five of the seven insurers represented in the data made 15 percent or more of denials on the basis that the claim was missing information, such as documentation of preauthorization. For example, for six of the seven insurers in the 2010 AMA data, over 20 percent of claim denials occurred as a result of eligibility issues such as services being provided before coverage was initiated or after coverage was terminated. HHS agreed with our findings, noting in particular the need to improve the quality and scope of existing data, and suggested clarifications, which we incorporated. HHS and DOL also provided technical comments to the draft report, which we incorporated as appropriate. Appendix I: Methodology for Selecting States and State Data Reviewed by GAO
In order to describe the data on denials of applications for enrollment and coverage of medical services, we contacted six states to interview officials and to obtain data the states collect and track on denials and appeals related to denials. The six states accounted for at least 20 percent of national enrollment in private health insurance. We reviewed data from one state on the incidence of application denials, from four states on the incidence of coverage denials, from four states on the number and outcomes of internal appeals, and from all six states on the number and outcomes of external appeals. Appendix II: Methodology for and Studies Identified by Structured Literature Review
To identify research that examined private health insurance denials, including the incidence of denials of applications for enrollment and of coverage for medical services (i.e., “coverage denials”) and the incidence and outcomes of appeal related to coverage denials, we conducted a structured literature review. American Association of Health Plans. 2. 3. 6. | Why GAO Did This Study
The large percentage of Americans that rely on private health insurance for health care coverage could expand with enactment of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) of 2010. Until PPACA is fully implemented, some consumers seeking coverage can have their applications for enrollment denied, and those enrolled may face denials of coverage for specific medical services. PPACA required GAO to study the rates of such application and coverage denials. GAO reviewed the data available on denials of (1) applications for enrollment and (2) coverage for medical services. GAO reviewed newly available nationwide data collected by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) from 459 insurers operating in the individual market on application denials from January through March 2010. GAO also reviewed a year or more of the available data from six states on the rates of application and coverage denials and the rates and outcomes of appeals related to coverage denials. The six states included all states identified by experts and in the literature as collecting data on the rates of application or coverage denials and together represented over 20 percent of private health insurance enrollment nationally. GAO conducted a literature review to identify studies related to application and coverage denials and reviewed data from selected studies. GAO interviewed HHS and state officials and researchers about factors to consider when interpreting the data.
What GAO Found
The available data indicated variation in application denial rates, and there are several issues to consider in interpreting those rates. Nationwide data collected by HHS from insurers showed that the aggregate application denial rate for the first quarter of 2010 was 19 percent, but that denial rates varied significantly across insurers. For example, just over a quarter of insurers had application denial rates from 0 percent to 15 percent while another quarter of insurers had rates of 40 percent or higher. Data reported by Maryland--the only of the six states in GAO's review identified as collecting data on the incidence of application denials--indicated that variation in application denial rates across insurers has occurred for several years, with rates ranging from about 6 percent to over 30 percent in each of 3 years. The available data provided little information on the reasons that applications were denied. There are also several issues to consider when interpreting application denial rates. For example, the rates may not provide a clear estimate of the number of individuals that were ultimately able to secure coverage, as individuals can apply to multiple insurers, and the rates do not reflect applicants that have been offered coverage with a premium that is higher than the standard rate. The available data from the six states in GAO's review and others indicated that the rates of coverage denials, including rates of denials of preauthorizations and claims, also varied significantly. The state data indicated that coverage denial rates varied significantly across states, with aggregate rates of claim denials ranging from 11 percent to 24 percent across the three states that collected such data. In addition, rates varied significantly across insurers, with data from one state indicating a range in claim denial rates from 6 percent to 40 percent across six large insurers operating in the state. There are several factors that may have contributed to the variation in rates across states and insurers, such as states varying in the types of denials they require insurers to report. The data also indicated that coverage denials occurred for a variety of reasons, frequently for billing errors, such as duplicate claims or missing information on the claim, and eligibility issues, such as services being provided before coverage was initiated, and less often for judgments about the appropriateness of a service. Further, the data GAO reviewed indicated that coverage denials, if appealed, were frequently reversed in the consumer's favor. For example, data from four of the six states on the outcomes of appeals filed with insurers indicated that 39 percent to 59 percent of appeals resulted in the insurer reversing its original coverage denial. Data from a national study conducted by a trade association for insurance companies on the outcomes of appeals filed with states for an independent, external review indicated that coverage denials were reversed about 40 percent of the time. GAO provided a draft of the report to HHS and the Department of Labor (DOL). HHS agreed with GAO's findings, noting the need to improve the quality and scope of existing data, and suggested clarifications, which were incorporated. HHS and DOL also provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_NSIAD-96-158 | gao_NSIAD-96-158_0 | However, past BRAC budget submissions are not as effective as they can be for monitoring BRAC expenditures because they historically overstate O&M and military construction costs and understate environmental costs. In April 1995, the Congress rescinded an additional $32 million. Reducing the fiscal year 1997 budget by $148 million (the amount of long-term unobligated BRAC balances as of December 31, 1995) would help control the amount of unobligated funds in the BRAC account. Because BRAC construction projects may be canceled as a result of ongoing IG audits, additional reductions in the BRAC budget are possible. Specifically, DOD stated that (1) very little of the $148 million in unobligated funds will remain unobligated at the end of the fiscal year, (2) the approximately $144 million in O&M funds that we identified as unsupported by valid requirements will be used for environmental requirements, and (3) the IG audit data we used was not accurate and IG findings from the past cannot be projected to the 1997 budget. Comments From the Department of Defense
The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Defense’s (DOD) letter dated June 5, 1996. GAO Comments
1. 2. However, in the past, DOD actions, along with congressional budget reductions and rescissions, were needed subsequent to the appropriation of Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) funds to control unobligated balances. Given the slower rate of obligations in fiscal year 1996 (see comment 4), the continuing levels of unobligated funds in the BRAC account, and the potential reductions in fiscal year 1997 construction that could be expected to result from IG audits, we continue to believe congressional reductions to the fiscal year 1997 BRAC budget would more closely align funds in the BRAC account with expected expenditures from now to the end of fiscal year 1997. 6. 7. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) accounts, focusing on: (1) the accuracy of BRAC budget estimates; and (2) opportunities to reduce the fiscal year 1997 BRAC budget.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) because BRAC expenditures vary substantially from budget submissions, Congress cannot be assured that appropriated BRAC funds will be used as requested; (2) past DOD budget requests have understated environmental costs and overstated other BRAC costs for military construction and operation and maintenance; (3) DOD had $342 million in unobligated budget balances as of December 1995; (4) although Congress has rescinded some of these high unobligated balances, DOD continues to request funds in advance of its needs; (5) the DOD fiscal year 1997 budget request can be reduced by about $148 million, since funds from prior year appropriations will be available to fund future expenditures; (6) reducing the fiscal year 1997 budget would help control the amount of unobligated funds in the BRAC account; (7) about $144 million in 1996 O&M funds are not supported by valid Army requirements; (8) the DOD Inspector General (IG) identified additional reductions that are possible by eliminating or reducing certain BRAC construction projects; and (9) if the DOD IG identifies reductions in FY 1997 construction projects similar to the reductions identified in 1996 and 1995, the amount of unneeded funds would total $60 million. |
gao_GAO-04-177 | gao_GAO-04-177_0 | Opinion on Schedules of Federal Debt
The Schedules of Federal Debt including the accompanying notes present fairly, in all material respects, in conformity with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles, the balances as of September 30, 2003, 2002, and 2001, for Federal Debt Managed by BPD; the related Accrued Interest Payables and Net Unamortized Premiums and Discounts; and the related increases and decreases for the fiscal years ended September 30, 2003 and 2002. Compliance with Laws and Regulations
Our tests in fiscal year 2003 disclosed no instances of noncompliance with selected provisions of laws that would be reportable under U.S. generally accepted government auditing standards or OMB audit guidance. We limited our internal control testing to controls over financial reporting and compliance. Notes to the Schedules of Federal Debt Managed by the Bureau of the Public Debt For the Fiscal Years Ended September 30, 2003 and 2002 Note 2. Note 3. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO audited the Bureau of Public Debt's schedule of Federal Debt for fiscal years 2003 and 2002.
What GAO Found
GAO found that (1) the Schedules of Federal Debt were presented fairly, in all material respects, in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles; (2) the Bureau had effective internal control over financial reporting and compliance with laws and regulations related to the Schedule of Federal Debt for fiscal year 2003; and (3) there was no reportable noncompliance in fiscal year 2003 with a selected provision of a law GAO tested. |
gao_GAO-09-1014T | gao_GAO-09-1014T_0 | Interior’s Policies for Offshore and Onshore Oil and Gas Leases Differ in Key Ways
In October 2008, we reported that Interior’s policies for identifying and evaluating lease parcels and bids differ in key ways depending on whether the lease is located offshore—and therefore overseen by OEMM—or onshore—and therefore overseen by BLM. For onshore leases, BLM—which must follow the Federal Onshore Oil and Gas Leasing Reform Act of 1987—is not required to develop a long-term leasing plan and instead relies on the industry and the public to nominate areas for leasing. BLM selects lands to lease from these nominations, as well as some parcels it has identified on its own. Specifically: For offshore leases, OEMM compares sealed bids with its own independent assessment of the value of the potential oil and gas in each lease. For onshore leases, BLM relies exclusively on competitors, participating in an oral auction, to determine the lease’s market value. Interior’s Oversight of Federal Oil and Gas Production Has Not Kept Pace with Increased Activity
Oil and gas activity has generally increased over the past 20 years, and our reviews have found that Interior has—at times—been unable to meet its oversight obligations for (1) completing environmental inspections, (2) verifying oil and gas production, (3) performing environmental monitoring in accordance with land use plans, and (4) using categorical exclusions to streamline environmental analyses required for certain oil and gas activities. Verifying oil and gas production. Interior May be Missing Opportunities to Fundamentally Shift the Terms of Federal Oil and Gas Leases to Increase Revenues
In our past work, we have identified several areas where Interior may be missing opportunities to increase revenue by fundamentally shifting the terms of federal oil and gas leases. As we reported in September 2008, (1) federal oil and gas leasing terms result in the U.S. government receiving one of the smallest shares of oil and gas revenue when compared to other countries and (2) Interior’s royalty rate, which does not change to reflect changing prices and market conditions, led to pressure on Interior and Congress to periodically change royalty rates. Specifically: The U.S. government receives one of the lowest shares of revenue for oil and gas resources compared with other countries and resource owners. We also examined selected states and private landowners that lease land for oil and gas development and found that some did more than Interior to encourage lease development. In addition, we found that some states and private landowners also did more to structure leases to reflect the likelihood of finding oil and gas. Interior’s Oil and Gas IT Systems Lack Key Functionalities
Our past work and preliminary findings have identified shortcomings in Interior’s IT systems for managing oil and gas royalty and production information. In September 2008, we reported that Interior’s oil and gas IT systems did not include several key functionalities, including (1) limiting a company’s ability to make adjustments to self-reported data after an audit had occurred and (2) identifying missing royalty reports. MMS’s royalty IT system is also unable to automatically detect instances when a royalty payor fails to submit the required royalty report in a timely manner. Interior’s RIK Program Continues to Face Challenges
Interior’s management and oversight of its RIK program has raised concerns as to whether Interior is receiving the correct royalty volumes of oil and gas. Both we and Interior’s Inspector General have issued reports detailing deficiencies in both program management and management ethics, including (1) problems with reporting the benefits of the RIK program to Congress, (2) Interior’s failure to use available third-party data to confirm gas production volumes, (3) inappropriate relationships between RIK staff and industry representatives, and (4) insufficient controls for monitoring natural gas imbalances, among others. | Why GAO Did This Study
In fiscal year 2008, the Department of the Interior collected over $22 billion in royalties and other fees related to oil and gas. Within Interior, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) manages onshore federal oil and gas leases, and the Minerals Management Service's (MMS) Offshore Energy and Minerals Management (OEMM) manages offshore leases. A federal lease gives the lessee rights to explore for and develop the lease's oil and gas resources. MMS is responsible for collecting royalties for oil and gas produced from both onshore and offshore leases. GAO has reviewed federal oil and gas management and revenue collection and found many material weaknesses. This testimony is based primarily on key findings from past GAO reports and some preliminary findings from ongoing work. These findings focus on Interior's: (1) policies for oil and gas leasing, (2) oversight of oil and gas production, (3) royalty regime and policies to boost oil and gas development, (4) oil and gas information technology (IT) systems, and (5) royalty-in-kind program. GAO's past reports provided recommendations that Interior officials report that they are working to implement.
What GAO Found
GAO's numerous evaluations of federal oil and gas management have identified five key areas where Interior could provide greater oversight: Interior's policies for leasing offshore and onshore oil and gas differed in key ways. Specifically, MMS sets out a 5-year strategic plan identifying both a leasing schedule and the areas it would lease. In contrast, BLM relies on industry and others to nominate areas for leasing, then selected lands to lease from these nominations, as well as areas it had identified. Additionally, MMS independently assessed the value of the lease and reserves the right to reject low bids, whereas BLM relied exclusively on the results of its bid auctions to determine the lease's market value. Oil and gas activity has generally increased in recent years, and Interior has, at times, been unable to meet its legal and agency mandated oversight obligations for (1) completing required environmental inspections, (2) verifying oil and gas production, (3) using categorical exclusions to streamline environmental analyses required for certain oil and gas activities, and (4) performing environmental monitoring in accordance with land use plans. Interior may be missing opportunities to fundamentally shift the terms of federal oil and gas leases and increase revenues. Compared to other countries, the United States receives one of the lowest shares of revenue for oil and gas. In addition, Interior's royalty rate, which does not change to reflect changing prices and market conditions, has at times, led to pressure on Interior and Congress to periodically change royalty rates in response to market conditions. Interior also has done less than some states and private landowners to encourage lease development and may be missing opportunities to increase production and, subsequently, revenues. Interior's oil and gas IT systems lack key functionalities. GAO's past work found that MMS's ability to maintain the accuracy of oil and gas production and royalty data was hampered by two key limitations in its IT system (1) it did not limit companies' ability to adjust self-reported data after MMS had audited them, and (2) it did not identify missing royalty reports. Preliminary GAO findings have also identified technical problems within BLM's IT systems and their compatibility with MMS's IT systems. Interior's royalty-in-kind program, in which oil and gas producers submit royalties in oil and gas rather than cash, continues to face challenges. GAO found problems with MMS's analysis of program benefits that were reported to Congress, and that MMS failed to use third party data to verify companies' self-reported data. Meanwhile, Interior's Inspector General identified major ethical lapses, including inappropriate relationships between MMS royalty-in-kind program officials and industry representatives. |
gao_RCED-99-112 | gao_RCED-99-112_0 | Furthermore, such a law could be difficult to enforce. The additional efforts and associated costs for compliance would depend on the specific requirements of the law and the extent to which current practices would have to be changed. According to the Food Marketing Institute, an association representing grocery retailers, it would take about 2 staff hours per store per week to ensure that imported produce is properly labeled. It is unclear who would bear the burden of compliance. Such documentation is often unavailable at the retail store. FDA estimated that the federal cost for 1-year’s monitoring under this proposed amendment would be about $56 million. However, they said they sometimes have no reliable means to verify the accuracy of these signs and labels. USDA officials and food industry representatives expressed concern that mandatory country-of-origin labeling at the retail level could be viewed as a trade barrier and might lead to actions that could hurt U.S. exports. Labeling Would Provide Limited Benefits in Responding to Outbreaks of Foodborne Illnesses
Considerable time—several weeks or months—generally passes between the outbreak of a produce-related illness, the identification of the cause, and a warning to the public about the risks of eating a specific produce item, according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and FDA officials. By the time a warning is issued, country-of-origin labeling would benefit consumers only if they remembered the country of origin or still had the produce, or if the produce were still in the store. Consequently, country-of-origin labeling would be of limited value in helping consumers respond to a warning of an outbreak. The remaining 12 cases were traced to contamination in food handling and to seed that was contaminated. Although Consumers Favor Labeling, Other Information Is More Important to Them
Surveys representing households nationwide, sponsored by the produce industry between 1990 and 1998, showed that between 74 and 83 percent of consumers favor mandatory country-of-origin labeling for fresh produce at the retail level. U.S. Trading Partners That Require Country-Of-Origin Labeling for Fresh Produce and the Scope of Their Requirements
This appendix identifies the U.S. trading partners that have country-of-origin labeling requirements for fresh produce at the retail level, the nature and scope of these requirements, and the record of U.S. challenges to those requirements. Of the 45 countries, 28 account for most of U.S. trade in produce. Specifically, this report provides information on (1) the potential costs associated with compliance and enforcement of a mandatory country-of-origin labeling requirement at the retail level for fresh produce, (2) the potential trade issues associated with such a requirement, (3) the potential impact of such a requirement on the ability of the federal government and the public to respond to outbreaks of illness caused by contaminated fresh produce, and (4) consumers’ views of country-of-origin labeling. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO provided information on the: (1) potential costs associated with the compliance and enforcement of a mandatory country-of-origin labeling requirement at the retail level for fresh produce; (2) potential trade issues associated with such a requirement; (3) potential impact of such a requirement on the ability of the federal government and the public to respond to outbreaks of illness caused by contaminated fresh produce; and (4) consumers' views of country-of-origin labeling.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the magnitude of compliance and enforcement costs for a country-of-origin labeling requirement at the retail level would depend on several factors, including the extent to which labeling practices would have to be changed; (2) according to an association representing grocery retailers, changing store signs to ensure that produce is properly labeled would cost about 2 staff hours per store per week; (3) however, it is unclear who would bear the burden of any such additional labeling costs--retailers could absorb some or all of the costs or pass them to consumers or to their suppliers; (4) regarding enforcement, the Food and Drug Administration, in commenting on a recently proposed bill, estimated that federal monitoring would cost about $56 million annually and said that enforcement would be difficult; (5) inspectors would need documentary evidence to determine the country-of-origin of the many produce items on display, and this documentation is often not available at each retail store; (6) enforcement is carried out in only one of the three states with labeling laws; (7) Florida inspectors told GAO that they sometimes have no reliable means to verify the accuracy of labels; (8) according to Department of Agriculture officials and industry representatives, mandatory labeling at the retail level could be viewed by other countries as a trade barrier; (9) officials also noted that countries concerned with a labeling law could take actions that could adversely affect U.S. exports; (10) about half of the countries that account for most of the U.S. trade in produce require country-of-origin labeling for fresh produce at the retail level; (11) when outbreaks of foodborne illness occur, country-of-origin labeling for fresh produce would be of limited benefit to food safety agencies in tracing the source of contamination and to the public in responding to a warning of an outbreak; (12) it can take weeks or months for food safety agencies to identify an outbreak, determine the type of food involved, identify the source of the food contamination, and issue a warning; (13) retail labeling would help consumers only if they remembered the country of origin or still had the produce, or if the produce were still in the store; and (14) according to nationwide surveys sponsored by the fresh produce industry, between 74 and 83 percent of consumers favor mandatory country-of-origin labeling for fresh produce, although they rated information on freshness, nutrition, and handling and storage as more important. |
gao_AIMD-96-54 | gao_AIMD-96-54_0 | While this report focuses on cash management problems, they are symptomatic of the persistent weaknesses in DOD’s and the Fund’s financial management operations. Having systems and reports that provide timely and accurate information on the Fund’s cash balances for individual business areas and on collections and disbursements is integral to having effective controls over cash management. Cash Management Information Lacking
The Fund’s financial reports are untimely, incomplete, and inaccurate and, therefore, do not provide Fund managers with the information they need to manage cash. Specifically, we found that (1) the monthly financial reports do not contain cash balances for each individual Fund business area, (2) collection and disbursement data are not timely since the data are reported approximately 3 to 4 weeks after the month in which the transaction took place, and (3) monthly financial reports do not fully disclose billions of dollars of adjustments made to accounts receivable and payable balances, which could mask the actual amount of future collections and disbursements. As part of our ongoing work, we will continue to monitor the Fund’s effort to eliminate the outstanding advance billing balances. Successful implementation of the CFO Act will be key to solving DOD’s long-standing financial management weaknesses. In fiscal year 1993, a system change request was made to automate the billing process. Navy Faces Formidable Challenge in Managing Fund Cash
The Navy—and DFAS activities providing accounting services to the Navy—had the most problems accurately accounting for and reporting on the Fund’s cash. These problems could (1) result in an increase in the Fund’s cash requirement to cover the day-to-day fluctuations in the Fund’s cash balance and (2) impact major programmatic decisions, which may be driven largely by cash balance considerations. Financial Management: Opportunities to Strengthen Management of the Defense Business Operations Fund (GAO/T-AFMD-93-6, June 16, 1993). | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Defense Business Operations Fund's (DBOF) cash management practices, focusing on: (1) Department of Defense (DOD) efforts to manage cash; and (2) ways DOD could provide additional management oversight.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) DBOF cash management problems persist and reflect long-standing DOD financial management weaknesses; (2) DBOF managers do not have timely, accurate, and complete data on individual business areas' cash balances and do not fully disclose adjustments to account balances in their monthly financial reports; (3) the Defense Finance and Accounting Service consistently has the most severe problems in accurately accounting for and reporting the Navy's cash balances, but it is developing reporting procedures to identify monthly cash balances in each business area; (4) collection and disbursement data cannot be provided more promptly until DBOF financial systems and processes are improved; (5) DOD continues to rely on advance billing to supply cash for day-to-day operations, but billing and collection problems have resulted in billions of dollars in outstanding accounts receivable; (6) DOD needs to enhance accountability and employ tools to effectively manage its cash to prevent inaccurate, untimely, and incomplete cash balances, collections, and disbursements when new financial systems are implemented; and (7) if cash management practices do not change, DOD could require excessive cash amounts to maintain ongoing DBOF operations, violate the Antideficiency Act, and limit its opportunities to fulfill DBOF objectives. |
gao_GAO-08-1158T | gao_GAO-08-1158T_0 | Efforts to Adopt and Implement Federal Interoperability Standards Are Ongoing
Any level of interoperability depends on the use of agreed-upon standards to ensure that information can be shared and used. The President’s executive order of April 2004 that called for widespread adoption of interoperable electronic health records by 2014, established the Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to, among other things, develop, maintain, and direct the implementation of a strategic plan to guide the nationwide implementation of interoperable health IT in both the public and private health care sectors. DOD and VA Are Sharing Some, but Not All, Health Information at Different Levels of Interoperability
DOD and VA are electronically sharing health information as a result of their long- and short-term initiatives to achieve interoperability; some of this information is exchanged in computable form, while other information is viewable only. However, not all electronic health information is yet shared. In this regard, DOD and VA have agreed upon numerous common standards that allow them to share health data, which include standards that are part of current and emerging federal interoperability specifications. The foundation built by this collaborative process has allowed the two departments to begin sharing computable health data (the highest level of interoperability). Under the act, the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Veterans Affairs were required to jointly develop schedules and benchmarks for setting up the DOD/VA Interagency Program Office, and for other activities to achieve interoperable health information (that is, establishing system requirements, acquisition and testing, and implementation of interoperable electronic health records or capabilities). The Acting Director added that program staff are expected to be in place, and the office is expected to be fully operational by December 2008. In addition, according to department officials, the interagency program office will play a crucial role in coordinating the departments’ efforts to accelerate their interoperability efforts. To better ensure that the effort by DOD and VA to achieve fully interoperable electronic health record systems or capabilities is accelerated, our July report included recommendations that the departments give priority to fully establishing the interagency program office and finalizing the implementation plan. Prompt action by the departments to address these recommendations is critical to developing and implementing electronic health record systems or capabilities that allow for full interoperability of personal health care information by September 30, 2009, as specified in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008. Recognizing the importance of timely implementation of such capabilities, Congress established a requirement for an interagency program office as a single point of accountability, and a deadline of about one year from now to achieve full interoperability of personal health care information between the departments. In view of this short timeframe and as we have recommended, a fully functioning program office and a finalized plan with set milestones are critical steps toward achieving interoperable electronic health records and capabilities. Although completion of the DOD/VA Information Interoperability Plan is an important and positive accomplishment, without permanent program office leadership, staff, and facilities or fully established milestones, the departments may nonetheless remain challenged in achieving interoperable electronic health information to the extent and in the manner that most effectively serves military service members and veterans. | Why GAO Did This Study
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 required the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) to accelerate the exchange of health information between the departments and to develop systems or capabilities that allow for full interoperability (generally, the ability of systems to use data that are exchanged) and that are compliant with federal standards. The act also established an interagency program office to function as a single point of accountability for the effort and whose role is to implement such systems or capabilities by September 30, 2009. Further, the act required that GAO semi-annually report on the progress made in achieving these goals; its first report was issued in July 2008. In that report, GAO described the departments' progress in sharing electronic health information, developing electronic health records that comply with federal standards, and establishing the interagency program office. In this testimony, GAO discusses its July 2008 report and updated information obtained from the departments.
What GAO Found
DOD and VA are sharing some, but not all, electronic health information. This includes exchanging some information in computable form, which is the highest level of interoperability. In other cases, data can be viewed only--a lower level of interoperability that still provides clinicians with important information. The departments have undertaken a number of initiatives, resulting in varied sharing capabilities. However, information is still being captured in paper records at many DOD medical facilities, and not all electronic health information is being shared. Further enhancing sharing and interoperability depends on adherence to common standards. The two departments have agreed on numerous common standards and are working with federal groups and each other to ensure adherence to such standards and to align their initiatives with emerging standards. These efforts, led by the Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology (within the Department of Health and Human Services), include identifying relevant existing standards, identifying and addressing overlaps and gaps in the standards, and developing interoperability specifications and certification criteria based on these standards. The departments are also in the process of setting up a new interagency program office that will play a crucial role in accelerating their efforts to achieve electronic health records and capabilities that allow for full interoperability. However, the program office is not expected to be fully operational until the end of the year, which will allow the departments only 9 months to meet the deadline for full interoperability between the departments by September 2009. While DOD and VA have produced a plan for achieving interoperability within this time period, many milestones have yet to be determined. In view of the short timeframe and without a fully established program office and a complete plan with fully established milestones, the departments may be challenged in achieving interoperable electronic health records and capabilities that most effectively serve military service members and veterans. |
gao_GGD-96-12 | gao_GGD-96-12_0 | Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to assess (1) IRS’ progress in achieving its electronic filing goal, (2) the availability of data needed to develop an electronic filing strategy, and (3) the implications for IRS if it does not reach its electronic filing goal and reduce its reliance on paper. We used IRS data on the average cost to process electronic returns and various types of paper returns in 1993 (the latest available), along with data on the number of returns filed in 1994, to estimate (1) the potential savings if all forms 1040, 1040A, and 1040EZ had been filed electronically in 1994 and (2) the portion of potential savings that IRS realized, given the number of returns that were actually filed electronically in 1994. IRS attributes the decrease in electronic filing in 1995 to steps it took to prevent refund fraud. Since electronic filing began, IRS has focused its marketing efforts on individual income tax returns. IRS Does Not Have Adequate Data to Focus Its Electronic Filing Strategy
IRS recognizes that it needs to increase the appeal of electronic filing to attract more taxpayers. If fewer returns are filed electronically or if the returns filed electronically do not substantially decrease IRS’ paper-processing workload, IRS will have to process more paper, which would decrease productivity and increase costs. If the growth and impact of electronic filing fall short of expectations, IRS’ paper-processing workload will increase. However, these actions are steps IRS is taking to achieve its existing performance goal of 80 million returns. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) plans to maximize electronic filing, focusing on: (1) IRS progress in broadening the use of electronic filing; (2) the availability of data needed to develop an electronic filing strategy; and (3) the implications for IRS if it does not significantly reduce its paper-processing workload.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) IRS will fall far short of its 2001 goal of 80 million electronic returns if the increase in electronic filing continues at its present pace; (2) IRS believes the decrease in the number of returns filed electronically in 1995 was due to its actions against electronic filing fraud; (3) IRS is having little success in increasing the electronic filing of individual 1040 and business tax returns which constitute the bulk of returns and take the most time to process manually; (4) the transmittal fees for electronic filing tend to deter filers unless they need their tax refunds quickly; (5) IRS does not have the data needed to determine whether greater electronic filings of 1040 and business returns would reduce its administrative costs; (6) IRS has contracted to gather some data on why taxpayers do not use electronic filing more and how many returns it could expect if it could motivate people to file electronically; (7) IRS plans to use scanning more to process paper returns, which should reduce some costs; and (8) unless IRS can increase electronic filing, its customer service and paper processing workloads may overwhelm its planned staffing and alter various aspects of its modernization efforts. |
gao_NSIAD-98-60 | gao_NSIAD-98-60_0 | These objectives support the international goals in the U.S. national drug-control strategy. Specifically, we examined (1) the nature of the drug-trafficking threat; (2) the political, economic, and operational impact of counternarcotics activities in Colombia since the initial U.S. decertification decision; and (3) U.S. efforts to plan and manage counternarcotics activities in Colombia. To address the impact of the 1996 and 1997 decertification decisions on Colombia and U.S. efforts to plan and manage counternarcotics activities, we visited various agencies in Washington, D.C.; Panama; and Colombia. Conclusion
The narcotics threat from Colombia continues and may be expanding. Coca cultivation has increased significantly in recent years, and Colombian heroin is becoming more prevalent in the United States. Political, Economic, and Operational Implications of the U.S. Decertification of Colombia
Since the initial decision to decertify Colombia in 1996, the State Department has reported that Colombia has made some progress in strengthening its political will to work with the United States to achieve U.S. counternarcotics objectives. When Colombia was initially decertified, the State Department was unprepared to determine whether some programmed assistance intended for the Colombian police and military could be provided. It took State, in conjunction with other executive branch agencies, about 8 months to decide what could be provided. As a consequence, approximately $35 million in U.S. counternarcotics assistance was canceled or delayed. Operational Implications of Assistance Delays Are Unclear
After the decertification decision on March 1, 1996, the Departments of State and Defense canceled or delayed about $35 million worth of assistance to the counternarcotics units of the Colombian police and military. Moreover, State did not take steps to ensure that equipment included in a $40 million assistance package from Defense Department inventories was consistent with the priority needs of the counternarcotics forces of the Colombian police and military or with the Embassy’s counternarcotics plan. As a result, the assistance package included equipment that may be of limited benefit to the Colombian police and military and will require additional funding not budgeted for in Embassy plans. Moreover, the military assistance was delayed for 10 months because State and the Embassy could not reach agreement with the government of Colombia over acceptable end-use provisions to ensure that the assistance was not being provided to units suspected of human rights violations. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the status of drug control efforts in Colombia and the impact of the 1996 and 1997 U.S. decisions to decertify Colombia as a drug-fighting ally, focusing on: (1) the nature of the drug-trafficking threat from Colombia; (2) the political, economic, and operational implications of the decertification decisions; and (3) U.S. efforts to plan and manage counternarcotics activities in Colombia.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the narcotics threat from Colombia remains and may be growing, and U.S. efforts in Colombia continue to face major challenges; (2) the United States has had limited success in persuading the Colombian government to take aggressive actions to address corruption within the government, which limits its ability to arrest and convict traffickers; (3) for its part, the United States has had difficulty implementing a well-planned and coordinated strategy to assist Colombian authorities; (4) according to recent Department of State and Drug Enforcement Administration reports, the cultivation of coca leaf in Colombia increased by 50 percent between 1994 and 1996, and the prevalence of Colombian heroin on the streets of the United States has steadily increased; (5) since the initial decertification decision in March 1996, Colombia has taken several actions to address U.S. concerns; (6) at the initial decertification decision in March 1996, State was not prepared to determine whether some programmed assistance intended for the Colombian police and military could continue to be provided; (7) it took State, in conjunction with other executive branch agencies, about 8 months to decide what could be provided; (8) as a consequence, about $35 million in programmed counternarcotics assistance was cancelled or delayed; (9) however, the overall operational implications of the cutoff on U.S. and Colombian counternarcotics program is unclear; (10) the U.S. counternarcotics effort in Colombia has continued to experience management challenges; (11) State did not take adequate steps to ensure that equipment included in a 1996 $40 million assistance package from the Department of Defense inventories could be integrated into the U.S. Embassy's plans and strategies to support the Colombian police and military counternarcotics forces; (12) as a result, the assistance package contained items that had limited immediate usefulness to the Colombian police and military and will require substantial additional funding to become operational; and (13) moreover, the military assistance was also delayed for 10 months because State and the Embassy could not reach agreement with the government of Colombia over acceptable end-use provisions to ensure that the assistance was not being provided to units suspected of human rights violations. |
gao_GAO-17-279T | gao_GAO-17-279T_0 | The LCS Program Has Changed Significantly over Time
When the Navy first conceived the LCS in the early 2000s, the concept was that two shipbuilders would build prototypes based on commercial designs—Lockheed Martin’s Freedom variant and Austal USA’s Independence variant. The Navy planned to experiment with these ships to determine its preferred design variant. Thus, the program has evolved from concept experimentation, to LCS, and more recently, to an LCS that will be upgraded to a frigate. This evolution is captured in figure 1. Whereas acquisition best practices embrace a “fly before you buy” approach, the Navy has subscribed to a buy before you fly approach for LCS. LCS Cost, Schedule, and Performance Expectations Have Eroded
In addition to significant changes to the acquisition strategy for LCS, the program has also deviated substantially from expectations about its cost, schedule, and the capabilities the ship would provide with the seaframes as well as with the modular mission packages. The Navy has attributed a series of recent engineering casualties on delivered LCS to shortfalls in crew training, seaframe design, and construction quality. LCS was designed with reduced requirements as compared to other surface combatants, and over time the Navy has lowered several survivability and lethality requirements further and removed some design features— making the ships less survivable in their expected threat environments and less lethal than initially planned. Frigate Acquisition Strategy Rushes Procurement in Light of Continued Unknowns
The Navy has elected to pursue an acquisition strategy that starts with getting what it calls block buy pricing from both shipyards for 12 LCS. Still, many questions remain to be settled about the frigate’s design, cost, schedule, and capabilities. In addition to the continued cost uncertainty, the schedule and approach for the frigate acquisition have undergone substantial changes in the last year, as shown in table 4. Frigate Does Not Address All Navy Priorities and Will Likely Carry Forward Some LCS Design Limitations
As LCS costs grew and capabilities diluted, the Secretary of Defense directed the Navy in February 2014 to explore alternatives to the LCS to address key deficiencies. We found that the proposed frigate does not add any new offensive anti-submarine or surface warfare capabilities that are not already part of one of the LCS mission packages, so while the frigate will be able to carry what equates to two mission packages at once, the capabilities in each mission area will be the same as LCS. Limited Opportunities Remain to Shape LCS and Frigate Programs
Over the past 10 years, we have made recommendations to DOD on a number of issues with the LCS program. Our recommendations to DOD since 2005 have largely focused on LCS combat capability shortfalls and the Navy’s acquisition strategy. In addition to these recommendations to DOD, our past reports have made suggestions to Congress on actions to support better LCS program outcomes. The Navy’s plans for fiscal year 2018 involve significant decisions for Congress in terms of the way forward in the immediate future the frigate program, including potential future commitments of about $9 billion based on early budget estimates. If these plans hold, the Navy will ask Congress in a few months to consider authorizing a block buy of 12 frigates and funding the lead frigate when the fiscal year 2018 budget is proposed. This request appears premature, as it requires Congress to make a decision on the frigate before detail design has begun and before the scope and cost of the design changes needed to turn an LCS into a frigate are well understood. This prolonged workload, when combined with the two LCS awarded earlier in 2016 and the two LCS planned to be awarded in fiscal year 2017, takes construction at both shipyards into 2021. Related GAO Products
Littoral Combat Ship and Frigate: Congress Faced with Critical Acquisition Decisions. National Defense: Navy’s Proposed Dual Award Acquisition Strategy for the Littoral Combat Ship Program. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Navy envisioned a revolutionary approach for the LCS program: dual ship designs with interchangeable mission packages intended to provide mission flexibility at a lower cost. This approach has fallen short, with significant cost increases and reduced expectations about mission flexibility and performance. The Navy has changed acquisition approaches several times. The latest change involves minor upgrades to an LCS design—referred to now as a frigate. Yet, questions persist about both the LCS and the frigate.
GAO has reported on the acquisition struggles facing LCS and now the frigate. This statement discusses: (1) the evolution of the LCS acquisition strategy and where it stands today; (2) key risks in the Navy's plans for the frigate based on the LCS program; and (3) remaining oversight opportunities for the LCS and frigate programs. This statement is largely based on GAO's prior reports and larger work on shipbuilding and acquisition best practices. It incorporates limited updated audit work where appropriate.
What GAO Found
The Navy's vision for the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program has evolved significantly over the last 15 years, reflecting degradations of the underlying business case. Initial plans to experiment with two different prototype ships adapted from commercial designs were abandoned early in favor of an acquisition approach that committed to numerous ships before proving their capabilities. Cost, schedule, and capability expectations have eroded over time, as shown in the table below. More recently, the Navy attributed a series of engineering casualties on delivered LCS to shortfalls in crew training, seaframe design, and construction quality.
Concerned about the LCS's survivability and lethality, in 2014 the Secretary of Defense directed the Navy to evaluate alternatives. After rejecting more capable ships based partly on cost, schedule, and industrial base considerations, the Navy chose the existing LCS designs with minor modifications and re-designated the ship as a frigate. Many of the LCS's capabilities are yet to be demonstrated and the frigate's design, cost, and capabilities are not well-defined. The Navy proposes to commit quickly to the frigate in what it calls a block buy of 12 ships.
Soon, Congress will be asked to make key decisions that have significant funding and oversight implications, but without having important information. The Navy plans to request fiscal year 2018 authorization for its frigate block buy approach. Of note, the pricing the Navy intends to seek from the shipyards will be for 12 basic LCS. Only later will the shipyards submit their proposals for adding frigate capabilities to the LCS hulls. Congress will be asked to authorize this approach many months before the Department of Defense (DOD) prepares an independent cost estimate. Further, there is no industrial base imperative to continue with the Navy's planned pace for the frigate acquisition. LCS workload backlogs, when combined with 2 LCS awarded earlier in 2016 and 2 more planned for award in fiscal year 2017, will take construction at both shipyards into 2021.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making any new recommendations in this statement but has made numerous recommendations to DOD in the past on LCS and frigate acquisition, including strengthening the program's business case before proceeding with acquisition decisions. While DOD has, at times, agreed with GAO's recommendations, it has taken limited action to implement them. GAO has also suggested that Congress take certain actions to support better LCS and frigate outcomes. |
gao_GAO-17-332 | gao_GAO-17-332_0 | Prior GAO Work
In June 2012, we reported on DOD’s initial implementation of DAWDF; we found that the ability of DOD components to effectively plan for and execute efforts supported by DAWDF was hindered by delays in DOD’s DAWDF funding processes and the absence of clear guidance on the availability and use of funds. Congressional Actions Have Enabled DOD to Overcome Previous DAWDF Funding Challenges
DOD, enabled by recent congressional action, has improved its ability to fund DAWDF, which allowed DOD to fund DAWDF in 2 months, compared to the 24 months the credit funding process took in fiscal year 2014. Despite the improved timeliness of funding DAWDF by transferring expired funds, DOD experienced a significant increase in the amount of carryover funds by the beginning of fiscal year 2016. Specifically, the carryover balance increased from $129 million as of October 1, 2014, to $875 million as of October 1, 2015, or nearly twice the amount DOD eventually obligated in fiscal year 2016. When coupled with DOD’s fiscal year 2017 spending and funding plans, we estimate that these actions will result in a carryover balance of about $156 million at the beginning of fiscal year 2018 in the DAWDF account, or about 26 percent of DOD’s estimated fiscal year 2018 spending (see fig. DOD Has Taken Some Steps to Improve Management and Oversight of the Fund, but Opportunities Exist to Improve Guidance and Data Quality
DOD has taken several actions to improve management and oversight processes for DAWDF over the past year, including issuing an updated acquisition workforce strategic plan and DAWDF operating guidance. DOD components identified more than $3 billion in potential DAWDF funding requirements for fiscal years 2018 through 2022, which is expected to exceed available funding by $500 million over this period. Without additional clarification on whether DAWDF funds may be used to pay for personnel to manage DAWDF, and under what conditions, DOD components will continue to be at risk of not using DAWDF funding consistently, or, if DAWDF can be used to help manage and oversee the fund, potentially missing opportunities to enhance management and oversight. For example, in addition to the requirement for the DOD components to submit annual and 5-year spending plans, DOD’s August 2016 guidance formalized the requirement to hold a midyear review to assess DAWDF execution and discuss best practices, among other issues, as a part of HCI’s management and oversight of the fund. To meet this standard, programs require procedures to verify that required data are complete and accurate. Clearly aligning DAWDF funding with DOD’s strategic plan—as we recommended in 2012—may help DOD determine how to prioritize component spending plans. At the tactical level, our work found that DOD components’ guidance, practices, and views on whether they could use DAWDF to pay for personnel to help manage the fund varied. In its comments, reproduced in appendix II, DOD partially concurred with both of the recommendations, and indicated actions that will be or have been taken to address them. In response to our recommendation that DOD ensure that processes are in place to verify the accuracy and completeness of data on the execution of DAWDF initiatives, DOD noted that it had made significant management and other changes to improve the accuracy and completeness of data used and provided by components on the execution of initiatives funded by DAWDF. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report examines (1) the process the Department of Defense (DOD) uses to fund the Defense Acquisition Workforce Development Fund (DAWDF) and (2) DOD’s management and oversight of DAWDF initiatives. To obtain an understanding of how the planning, review, and implementation processes for DAWDF initiatives worked, we selected a nongeneralizable sample of 10 fiscal year 2015 DAWDF initiatives. | Why GAO Did This Study
Congress established DAWDF in 2008 to provide DOD with a dedicated source of funding to help recruit and train members of the acquisition workforce. Since 2008, DOD has obligated more than $3.5 billion to meet those objectives. However, in 2012, GAO reported that DOD's ability to execute hiring and other initiatives had been hindered by delays in the DAWDF funding process, resulting in a large amount of unused funds being carried over from year to year.
GAO was asked to review DOD's management of DAWDF. This report examines (1) the process DOD uses to fund DAWDF and (2) DOD's DAWDF management and oversight. GAO analyzed relevant legislation; DOD's, the military departments', and other defense agencies' guidance and processes; and DAWDF budget and initiative execution data. GAO also interviewed DOD officials and conducted a nongeneralizable sample of 10 fiscal year 2015 DAWDF initiatives based on type of initiative and dollar value.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense (DOD), enabled by congressional action, has improved the timeliness of the funding process for the Defense Acquisition Workforce Development Fund (DAWDF). For fiscal year 2015, DOD was authorized to transfer expired funds, which allowed it to fund DAWDF in 2 months. In contrast, for fiscal year 2014, DOD relied on the military departments and other defense agencies (referred to as components) to remit funds to the DOD Comptroller, which took 24 months to complete. As a result, hiring, training, and other initiatives were delayed. Congress also took action in 2016 to reduce the amount of funding carried over from year to year, which totaled $875 million at the beginning of fiscal year 2016, or nearly twice the amount DOD eventually obligated for that year (see figure). GAO estimates that the amount of carryover funds at the beginning of fiscal year 2018 will be reduced to about $156 million.
In the past year, DOD has taken several actions to improve its management and oversight of DAWDF, including issuing an updated acquisition workforce strategic plan and DAWDF operating guidance. For example, DOD's August 2016 DAWDF guidance required components to submit annual and 5-year spending plans and formalized the requirement to hold a midyear review to assess DAWDF execution and discuss best practices. However, GAO found that DOD components identified more than $3 billion in potential DAWDF funding requirements for fiscal years 2018 through 2022, which may exceed available funding over this period. Clearly aligning DAWDF funding with DOD's strategic plan—as GAO recommended in June 2012—may help DOD determine how to prioritize these requirements. GAO also found that components' guidance, practices, and views on whether they could use DAWDF to pay for personnel to manage the fund varied. Further, GAO found components did not have processes to verify the accuracy and completeness of data reported on DAWDF-funded initiatives. Internal control standards indicate that consistent policies and accurate data can help ensure that funds are used effectively and as intended. Without such controls, DOD could be missing opportunities to use DAWDF more effectively to improve its acquisition workforce.
What GAO Recommends
DOD should (1) clarify whether DAWDF funds could be used to pay for personnel to help manage the fund and (2) ensure that DOD components have processes in place to verify the accuracy and completeness of DAWDF data. DOD partially concurred with both recommendations, and has taken or plans to take actions to address them. |
gao_GAO-09-323 | gao_GAO-09-323_0 | In January 2008, NOAA approved a key decision milestone that allowed the program to move from the preliminary design and definition phase to the development phase of the acquisition life cycle. After reconciling the program office’s cost estimate of $7 billion with the independent cost estimate of about $9 billion, the agency established a new program cost estimate of $7.67 billion. This is an increase of $670 million from the previous estimate. Further delays in the launch of the first GOES-R satellite would run counter to NOAA’s policy of having a backup satellite in orbit at all times and could lead to gaps in satellite coverage. If NOAA experiences a problem with either of its operational satellites before a backup satellite is in orbit, it will need to rely on older decommissioned satellites that may not be fully functional. The GOES-R Program Office Has Taken Steps to Address Lessons Learned from Other Satellite Programs, but Important Actions Remain
GOES-R has taken steps to address lessons from other satellite programs, but important actions remain to be completed. Specifically, the agency conducted preliminary studies on the technologies to be used on the awarded contracts for the preliminary design of the planned instruments and the overall GOES-R system; awarded instrument development contracts that include provisions to develop prototypes or engineering models before the flight units for each instrument are developed; conducted a major review of the Advanced Baseline Imager before the certified that the technology for the spacecraft and ground segments was mature before awarding the contracts; removed the Hyperspectral Environmental Suite from the GOES-R series after preliminary studies showed that it was technically complex; established independent review teams responsible for assessing the program’s technical, programmatic, and management risks on an annual basis to ensure sufficient technical readiness prior to the critical design review milestone; and established processes for reviewing the maturity and readiness of algorithms for each of the products. However, key technology risks remain—affecting both the ground segment and the instruments. NOAA Plans to Address Requirements for Current Products but Has Not Developed Plans for Meeting Requirements for Advanced Products
The Hyperspectral Environmental Suite instrument was originally planned as part of the GOES-R satellite to meet requirements for products that are currently produced by GOES satellites (such as temperature and moisture profiles at different atmospheric levels), as well as new technically- advanced products (such as moisture fluctuations and ocean color) that are not currently produced by GOES satellites. NOAA still considers these requirements to be valid. Doing so would include justifying the funding for any new initiatives within the agency’s investment decision process. Until a decision is made on whether and how to proceed in providing the advanced products, key system users such as the National Weather Service will not be able to meet their goals for improving the lead times or accuracy of severe weather warnings, including warnings for tornadoes and hurricanes. Further, climate research organizations will not obtain the data they need to enhance the science of climate, coastal, environmental, and oceanic observations. In addition, recent events make it likely that schedules will continue to slip. The program did not perform a comprehensive review after rebaselining a critical instrument—the Advanced Baseline Imager—and has not documented the reasons for all cost overruns. Until these issues are addressed, NOAA faces an increased risk that the GOES-R program will repeat the cost increases, schedule delays, and performance shortfalls that have plagued other satellite programs. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) determine the status of the Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite-R series (GOES-R) program, (2) evaluate whether the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA) plans for the GOES-R acquisition address problems experienced on similar programs, and (3) determine whether NOAA’s plan to address the capabilities that were planned for the satellites, but then removed, will be adequate to support current data requirements. We also interviewed NOAA and National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) officials from the GOES-R program office. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Commerce's National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), with the aid of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), plans to procure the next generation of geostationary operational environmental satellites, called the Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite-R series (GOES-R). GOES-R is to replace the current series of satellites, which will likely begin to reach the end of their useful lives in approximately 2014. This series is considered critical to the United States' ability to maintain the continuity of data required for weather forecasting through the year 2028. GAO was asked to (1) determine the status of the GOES-R program, (2) evaluate whether plans for the acquisition address problems experienced on similar programs, and (3) determine whether NOAA's plan will be adequate to support current data requirements. To do so, GAO analyzed contractor and program data and interviewed officials from NOAA and NASA.
What GAO Found
NOAA has made progress on the GOES-R acquisition, but the program's cost, schedule, and scope have changed. The GOES-R program has moved into the development phase of its acquisition life cycle. It has awarded development contracts for the instruments and plans to award contracts for the spacecraft and ground segments by mid-2009. However, after reconciling program and independent cost estimates, the program established a new cost estimate of $7.67 billion--a $670 million increase from the prior $7 billion estimate. The program also reduced the number of products the satellites will produce from 81 to 34 and slowed the delivery of these products in order to reduce costs. More recently, the program also delayed key milestones, including the launch of the first satellite, which was delayed from December 2014 to April 2015. Such delays could lead to gaps in satellite coverage if NOAA experiences problems with its current operational satellites before a backup satellite is in orbit. GOES-R has taken steps to address lessons from other satellite programs, but important actions remain to be completed. NOAA has made progress in its efforts to address prior lessons by taking steps to ensure technical readiness on key components, using an acceptable cost estimating approach, implementing techniques to enhance contractor oversight, and regularly briefing agency executives. However, technical challenges remain on both the ground segment and the instruments. In addition, the program did not perform a comprehensive review after rebaselining a critical instrument, and it has not documented all of the reasons for cost overruns. Until these issues are addressed, NOAA faces an increased risk that the GOES-Rprogram will repeat the same mistakes that have plagued other satellite programs. NOAA has a plan to meet some, but not all, data requirements. An instrument that was originally planned as part of the GOES-R satellite was to meet requirements for 15 products that are currently produced, as well as 11 new, technically advanced, products. When NOAA removed this instrument from the GOES-R satellite program, it arranged to obtain the current products from another instrument. However, the agency has not developed plans or a timeline to address the requirements for the new products. Doing so would include justifying the funding for any new initiatives within the agency's investment decision process. Until a decision is made on whether and how to proceed in providing the advanced products, key system users, such as weather forecasters, will not be able to meet their goals for improving the accuracy of severe weather warnings. Further, climate research organizations will not obtain the data they need to enhance the science of climate, environmental, and oceanic observations. |
gao_GAO-04-790 | gao_GAO-04-790_0 | Process Used to Design the Human Capital System
The design process of the DHS human capital management system included DHS and OPM employees and union representatives. Below the headquarters level, strategic human capital planning of different levels of detail is being done in the five legacy components we studied. DHS headquarters has not yet been systematic or consistent in gathering relevant data on the successes or shortcomings of legacy component human capital approaches or current and future workforce challenges, despite the potential usefulness of this information to strategic human capital planning activities. Efforts are now under way to gather such data. Moving forward, the department plans to design a centralized information system so that human capital data can be gathered and reported at the corporate level. With this information, the department will be better positioned to conduct data-driven evaluations of the successes and shortcomings of its new human capital management system. Continued Leadership Is Necessary to Marshal the Capabilities Required for Successful Implementation
DHS and OPM leaders have consistently underscored their personal commitment to the design process and speak openly in support of it. Resources. In our September 2003 report, we commended the structured approach the department developed to communicate with stakeholders on the human capital system and recommended that the Secretary of DHS ensure that the message communicated across the department was consistent. Since the release of the proposed regulations, DHS has provided information to employees through a variety of formats. DHS formed three implementation teams at the end of February 2004 to support the design and implementation of the human capital management system because of the multiple areas that require management attention. DHS Proposes Implementing Key Safeguards
In its proposed regulations, DHS outlines its intention to implement key safeguards that we have found essential to implementing performance management systems in a fair, effective, and credible manner. For example, the DHS performance management system must comply with the merit system principles and avoid prohibited personnel practices; provide a means for employee involvement in the design and implementation of the system; and overall, be fair, credible, and transparent. The department also plans to align individual performance management with organizational goals and provide for reasonableness reviews of performance management decisions through its Performance Review Boards. Conclusions
The proposed DHS human capital management system has both significant precedent-setting implications for the executive branch and far-reaching implications on how the department is managed. To date, DHS’s actions in designing its human capital management system and its stated plans for future work on the system are positioning the department for successful implementation. Communication and training -- As we previously noted, communicating with employees and their representatives about the new system and providing opportunities for feedback, placing a special emphasis on reaching out to line employees in the field, can facilitate gaining employee buy-in to the new human capital management system. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
In commenting on a draft of this report, DHS generally agreed with its findings. FHCS data are the most current information available on the perceptions of employees currently employed by DHS and are valuable because of their illustration of the challenges the department faces. | Why GAO Did This Study
DHS was provided with significant flexibility to design a modern human capital management system. Its proposed system has both precedent-setting implications for the executive branch and farreaching implications on how the department is managed. GAO reported in September 2003 that the effort to design the system was collaborative and consistent with positive elements of transformation. In February, March, and April 2004 we provided preliminary observations on the proposed human capital regulations. Congressional requesters asked GAO to describe the infrastructure necessary for strategic human capital management and to assess the degree to which DHS has that infrastructure in place, which includes an analysis of the progress DHS has made in implementing the recommendations from our September 2003 report. DHS generally agreed with the findings of our report and provided more current information that we incorporated. However, DHS was concerned about our use of results from a governmentwide survey gathered prior to the formation of the department. We use this data because it is the most current information available on the perceptions of employees currently in DHS and helps to illustrate the challenges facing DHS.
What GAO Found
To date, DHS's actions in designing its human capital management system and its stated plans for future work on the system are helping to position the department for successful implementation. Nonetheless, the department is in the early stages of developing the infrastructure needed for implementing its new human capital management system. DHS has begun strategic human capital planning efforts at the headquarters level since the release of the department's overall strategic plan and the publication of proposed regulations for its new human capital management system. Strategic human capital planning efforts can enable DHS to remain aware of and be prepared for current and future needs as an organization. However, this will be more difficult because DHS has not yet been systematic or consistent in gathering relevant data on the successes or shortcomings of legacy component human capital approaches or current and future workforce challenges. Efforts are now under way to collect detailed human capital information and design a centralized information system so that such data can be gathered and reported at the departmentwide level. DHS and Office of Personnel Management leaders have consistently underscored their personal commitment to the design process. Continued leadership is necessary to marshal the capabilities required for the successful implementation of the department's new human capital management system. Sustained and committed leadership is required on multiple levels: securing appropriate resources for the design, implementation, and evaluation of the human capital management system; communicating with employees and their representatives about the new system and providing opportunities for feedback; training employees on the details of the new system; and continuing opportunities for employees and their representatives to participate in the design and implementation of the system. In its proposed regulations, DHS outlines its intention to implement key safeguards. For example, the DHS performance management system must comply with the merit system principles and avoid prohibited personnel practices; provide a means for employee involvement in the design and implementation of the system; and overall, be fair, credible, and transparent. The department also plans to align individual performance management with organizational goals and provide for reasonableness reviews of performance management decisions through its Performance Review Boards. |
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