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gao_GAO-06-765 | gao_GAO-06-765_0 | Agencies are to meet basic information quality standards, noting that the more important the information, “the higher the quality standards to which it should be held,” but that “agencies should weigh the costs … and the benefits of higher information quality in the development of information.”
Agencies are to apply the guidelines in “a common-sense and workable manner,” meaning that agency guidelines are not to “impose unnecessary administrative burdens that would inhibit the agencies from continuing to take advantage of the Internet and other technologies to disseminate information that can be of great benefit and value to the public.”
The guidelines, in elaborating on this last principle, explained that “OMB encourages agencies to incorporate the standards and procedures required by these guidelines into their existing … administrative practices rather than create new and potentially duplicative or contradictory processes.” The guidelines also noted that they were written to provide agencies with flexibility as they developed their own guidelines. Only one cabinet-level agency, DHS, the newest and one of the largest federal agencies, has no department-level IQA guidelines covering its 22 agencies, which issue a wide array of information used by the public. These 44 commissions, agencies, and other independent entities gave no indication of any IQA guidelines or IQA reports, nor any mention of IQA on their Web sites or on OMB’s Web site of agencies’ IQA guidelines. Also, OIRA staff did not have copies of the guidelines and said that they had focused their attention on cabinet agencies and regulatory agencies. In the case of the 15 other agencies, we found that accessing IQA information on their Web sites was difficult because these agencies provided no discernable link to IQA information on their home pages; provided access to their guidelines and other information through “contact us,” “policies,” or other less-than-obvious links, such as “resources”; or required multiple searches using various terms related to IQA, as was the case with the Department of Defense and the Department of State. From Fiscal Years 2003 to 2004, Three Agencies Reclassified Correction Requests to Concentrate on Substantive Matters
From fiscal year 2003 to fiscal year 2004, three agencies shifted to using IQA to address primarily substantive requests—those dealing with the underlying scientific, environmental, or other complex information—which declined from 42 to 38. The total number of all IQA requests dropped from over 24,000 in fiscal year 2003 to 62 in fiscal year 2004. FEMA’s requests were all related to flood insurance rate maps. By comparison, of the 80 substantive requests over the 2-year period, petitioners appealed 39 (almost half) of the agencies’ decisions. As for the source of appeals, businesses, trade groups, and other profit- oriented organizations filed more appeals than other types of organizations or individuals. Of these 25 appeals, 4 resulted in changes. Impact of IQA on Agencies Could Not Be Determined
The impact of IQA on agencies could not be determined because agencies and OMB do not have mechanisms in place to track the effects of implementing IQA. Agency IQA officials and OIRA staff and officials told us that administering IQA has not been overly burdensome and that it has not adversely affected agencies’ overall operations to date. Although there is a lack of comprehensive IQA-related cost or resource data, evidence suggests that certain program staff or units involved in creating IQA guidelines, including the correction mechanism, and addressing IQA correction requests have seen their workloads increase without any corresponding increase in resources. Moreover, our analysis of IQA requests shows that agencies have taken from 1 month to more than 1 year to produce a final decision on substantive IQA requests and appeals, while 2 appeals made during fiscal years 2003 and 2004 are still ongoing after 2 years or longer. Agencies Treated Most IQA Rulemaking-Related Requests as Comments to Proposed Rules
According to OMB staff and agency IQA officials, IQA correction requests have not adversely affected agency rulemaking procedures to date, partly because agencies handled most IQA requests related to rulemaking as public comments to proposed rules under the Administrative Procedure Act rather than as IQA requests. Scope and Methodology
To assess the Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB) role in implementing the Information Quality Act (IQA), we reviewed OMB’s IQA documents, including memorandums sent to agencies, and interviewed Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) staff involved with IQA. Independent Agencies Where Web Sites Were Checked for IQA Guidelines
and on Web site? | Why GAO Did This Study
The importance and widespread use of federal information makes its accuracy imperative. The Information Quality Act (IQA) required that the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issue guidelines to ensure the quality of information disseminated by federal agencies by fiscal year 2003. GAO was asked to (1) assess OMB's role in helping agencies implement IQA; (2) identify the number, type, and source of IQA correction requests agencies received; and (3) examine if IQA has adversely affected agencies' overall operations and, in particular, rulemaking processes. In response, GAO interviewed OMB and agency officials and reviewed agency IQA guidelines, related documents, and Web sites.
What GAO Found
OMB issued governmentwide guidelines that were the basis for other agencies' own IQA guidelines and required agencies to post guidelines and other IQA information to their Web sites. It also reviewed draft guidelines and undertook other efforts. OMB officials said that OMB primarily concentrated on cabinet-level and regulatory agencies, and 14 of the 15 cabinet-level agencies have guidelines. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) does not have department-level guidelines covering its 22 component agencies. Also, although the Environmental Protection Agency and 4 other independent agencies posted IQA guidelines and other information to their Web sites, 44 of 86 additional independent agencies that GAO examined have not posted their guidelines and may not have them in place. As a result, users of information from these agencies may not know whether agencies have guidelines or know how to request correction of agency information. OMB also has not clarified guidance to agencies about posting IQA-related information, including guidelines, to make that information more accessible. Of the 19 cabinet and independent agencies with guidelines, 4 had "information quality" links on their home pages, but others' IQA information online was difficult to locate. From fiscal years 2003 to 2004, three agencies shifted to using IQA to address substantive requests--those dealing with the underlying scientific, environmental, or other complex information--which declined from 42 to 38. In fiscal year 2003, the Federal Emergency Management Agency and two other agencies used IQA to address flood insurance rate maps, Web site addresses, photo captions, and other simple or administrative matters. But, in fiscal year 2004, these agencies changed their classification of these requests from being IQA requests and instead processed them using other correction mechanisms. As a result, the total number of all IQA requests dropped from over 24,000 in fiscal year 2003 to 62 in fiscal year 2004. Also, of the 80 substantive requests that agencies received during the 2-year period--over 50 percent of which came from businesses, trade groups, or other profit-oriented organizations--almost half (39) of the initial agency decisions of these 80 were appealed, with 8 appeals resulting in changes. The impact of IQA on agencies' operations could not be determined because neither agencies nor OMB have mechanisms to determine the costs or impacts of IQA on agency operations. However, GAO analysis of requests shows that agencies can take from a month to more than 2 years to resolve IQA requests on substantive matters. According to agency IQA officials, IQA duties were added into existing staff responsibilities and administering IQA requests has not been overly burdensome nor has it adversely affected agencies' operations, although there are no supporting data. But evidence suggests that certain program staff or units addressing IQA requests have seen their workloads increase without a related increase in resources. As for rulemaking, agencies addressed 16 correction requests related to rulemaking under the Administrative Procedure Act, not IQA. |
gao_NSIAD-96-187 | gao_NSIAD-96-187_0 | NASA estimates that the planned $2.8-billion reduction in the current replacement value of facilities will yield only about $250 million in cost reductions through fiscal year 2000. Problems in Evaluating Cost-Reduction Opportunities
NASA has had problems in identifying, assessing, or implementing some cost-reduction opportunities. NASA personnel (1) did not thoroughly evaluate potential larger cost-reduction options, (2) limited the scope of consideration for consolidation, (3) performed questionable initial cost-reduction studies, (4) made inappropriate closure recommendations, and (5) substantially overstated cost-reduction estimates. In March 1995, NASA began studying ways to cut its supercomputer costs by consolidating their management and operation. Environmental Cleanup Costs Could Affect Facility Disposition Efforts
NASA’s future facility disposition decisions could be affected by environmental cleanup costs. However, NASA officials do not yet fully know what the cleanup requirements will be and lack a policy for identifying other responsible parties and sharing cleanup costs. Both teams did, however, identify barriers to increased cooperation and coordination between NASA and DOD, including differences in cost accounting systems, practices, and standards. Thus, NASA intends to start planning a reduction-in-force during fiscal year 1998, if enough NASA employees do not retire or resign voluntarily. NASA’s ability to reach its workforce reduction goal by the turn of the century is subject to major uncertainties, including the shifting of program management from headquarters to field centers and the award of a single prime contract for managing the space shuttle at Kennedy Space Center. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the status of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) efforts to achieve reductions and efficiencies in key areas of its infrastructure.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) NASA plans for a $2.8-billion reduction in the current replacement value of its facilities will yield only about $250 million in cost reductions through fiscal year (FY) 2000; (2) NASA has experienced problems in assessing cost-reduction opportunities because it did not thoroughly evaluate cost-reduction options, excluded many systems in its review of ways to cut supercomputer costs, performed questionable initial studies for aircraft consolidation, made inappropriate closure recommendations, and overstated cost-reduction estimates; (3) although environmental cleanup costs could affect facility disposition efforts, NASA lacks a policy for identifying other responsible parties and sharing cleanup costs; (4) a joint effort between NASA and the Department of Defense to study potential operation cost reductions through increased cooperation and sharing yielded no specific recommendations for closures, consolidations, or cost reductions but did identify barriers to sharing and increasing interagency reliance; and (5) NASA ability to reach its workforce reduction goal by 2000 is subject to some major uncertainties, and NASA may need to plan a reduction in force if enough employees do not retire or resign voluntarily. |
gao_GAO-11-704T | gao_GAO-11-704T_0 | 1.) The Government Has Adopted a More Strategic Focus to Improve Real Property Management and Has Taken Steps to Increase Data Reliability
The administration and real-property-holding agencies have made progress in a number of areas since we designated federal real property as high risk in 2003. In 2003, we reported that despite the magnitude and complexity of real-property-related problems, there had been no governmentwide strategic focus on real property issues. Consequently, we removed the data element of real property management from our high-risk list this year. CPRA Could Help Agencies Address Underlying Challenges to Disposing of Unneeded Property
The government now has a more strategic focus on real property issues and more reliable real property data, but problems related to unneeded property and leasing persist because the government has not addressed underlying legal and financial limitations and stakeholder influences. The costs of disposing of federal property further hamper some agencies’ efforts to address their excess and underutilized real property problems. In 2007, we recommended that OMB, which is responsible for reviewing agencies’ progress on federal real property management, assist agencies by developing an action plan to address the key problems associated with decisions related to unneeded real property, including stakeholder influences. The administration’s recently proposed legislative framework, CPRA, is somewhat responsive to our recommendation in that it addresses legal and financial limitations, as well as stakeholder influences in real property decision making. With the goal of streamlining the disposal process, CPRA provides for an independent board to determine which properties it considers would be the most appropriate for public benefit uses. This streamlined process could reduce both the time it takes for the government to dispose of property and the amount the government pays to maintain property. To provide financial assistance to the agencies, CPRA establishes an Asset Proceeds and Space Management Fund from which funds could be transferred to reimburse an agency for necessary costs associated with disposing of property. To address stakeholder influences, the independent board established under CPRA would, among other things, recommend federal properties for disposal or consolidation after receiving recommendations from civilian landholding agencies and would independently review the agencies’ recommendations. CPRA does not explicitly address the government’s overreliance on leasing. Our current work examines the efficiency of the federal government’s real property lease management in more detail. Certain key elements of DOD’s process for closing and realigning its installations may be applicable to the realignment of real property governmentwide. Some of these key elements include establishing goals, developing criteria for evaluating closures and realignments, developing a structural plan for applying selection criteria, estimating the costs and savings anticipated from implementing recommendations, establishing a structured process for obtaining and analyzing data, and involving the audit community. Key Elements That DOD Used to Develop Its 2005 BRAC Recommendations That Could Benefit a Civilian Real Property Closure or Realignment Process
In developing its recommendations for the BRAC Commission, DOD relied on certain elements in its process that Congress may wish to consider as it evaluates the administration’s proposed legislation for disposing of or realigning civilian real property, as follows: Establish goals for the process. Estimate costs and savings to implement closure and realignment recommendations. Another important similarity is that both the BRAC and proposed CPRA processes call for an independent board or commission to review recommendations. A key difference between BRAC and the administration’s proposed CPRA is that while the BRAC process placed the Secretary of Defense in a central role to review and submit candidate recommendations to the independent board, CPRA does not provide for any similar central role for civilian agencies. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government holds more than 45,000 underutilized properties that cost nearly $1.7 billion annually to operate, yet significant obstacles impede efforts to close, consolidate, or find other uses for these properties. GAO has designated federal real property management as a high-risk area, in part because of the number and cost of these properties. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is responsible for reviewing federal agencies' progress in real property management. In 2007, GAO recommended that OMB assist agencies by developing an action plan to address key obstacles associated with decisions related to unneeded real property, including stakeholder influences. In May 2011, the administration proposed legislation, referred to as the Civilian Property Realignment Act (CPRA), to, among other things, establish a legislative framework for disposing of and consolidating civilian real property and that could help limit stakeholder influences in real property decision making. This statement identifies (1) progress the government has made toward addressing obstacles to federal real property management, (2) some of the challenges that remain and how CPRA may be responsive to those challenges, and (3) key elements of the Department of Defense's (DOD) base realignment and closure (BRAC) process that could expedite the disposal of unneeded civilian properties. To do this work, GAO relied on its prior work, and reviewed CPRA and other relevant reports.
What GAO Found
In designating federal real property management as a high-risk area, GAO reported that despite the magnitude and complexity of real-property-related problems, there was no governmentwide strategic focus on real property issues and governmentwide data were unreliable and outdated. The administration and real-property-holding agencies have subsequently improved their strategic management of real property by establishing an interagency Federal Real Property Council designed to enhance real property planning processes and implementing controls to improve the reliability of federal real property data. Even with this progress, problems related to unneeded property and leasing persist because the government has not yet addressed other challenges to effective real property management, such as legal and financial limitations and stakeholder influences. CPRA is somewhat responsive to these challenges. For example, CPRA proposes an independent board that would streamline the disposal process by selecting properties it considers appropriate for public benefit uses. This streamlined process could reduce disposal time and costs. CPRA would also establish an Asset Proceeds and Space Management Fund that could be used to reimburse agencies for necessary disposal costs. The proposed independent board would address stakeholder influences by recommending federal properties for disposal or consolidation after receiving recommendations from civilian landholding agencies and independently reviewing the agencies' recommendations. CPRA does not explicitly address the government's overreliance on leasing, but could help do so through board recommendations for consolidating operations where appropriate. GAO is currently examining issues related to leasing costs and excess property. Certain key elements of DOD's BRAC process--which, like CPRA, was designed to address obstacles to closures or realignments--may be applicable to the disposal and realignment of real property governmentwide. These elements include establishing goals, developing criteria for evaluating closures and realignments, estimating the costs and savings anticipated from implementing recommendations, and involving the audit community. A key similarity between BRAC and CPRA is that both establish an independent board to review agency recommendations. A key difference is that while the BRAC process places the Secretary of Defense in a central role to review and submit candidate recommendations to the independent board, CPRA does not provide for any similar central role for civilian agencies. |
gao_GAO-16-704 | gao_GAO-16-704_0 | As shown in figure 2, TSOs then review images of the property running through the X-ray machine and look for signs of prohibited items. Screener Training Requirements
In accordance with ATSA, screeners must complete a minimum of 40 hours of classroom instruction, 60 hours of on-the-job training, and successfully complete an on-the-job training examination before they are certified as security screeners. TSA also requires remedial training for TSOs who fail an annual proficiency review. TSA Uses a Variety of Programs to Train TSOs and Is Developing a Plan to Expand Evaluations of TSO Training
TSA Uses New Hire, Recurrent, Remedial, and Return-to-Duty Training Programs for TSOs
TSO training is comprised of a compendium of courses that includes basic training for initial hires, recurrent training, remedial training, and return-to-duty training. TSOs receive remedial training when they have failed an operational or certification test, or if a supervisor identifies a need for further training, among other things. In addition, TSA expects to approve a Management Directive and Standard Operating Procedures for the training evaluation program by May 2016 to define the roles and responsibilities for TSA offices running the training evaluation program as well as lay out the steps for analyzing and reporting data collected from the training evaluations. TSA Uses a Variety of Methods to Measure TSO Performance, and Results Vary by Type of Task Tested and Airport Risk Category TSA Measures TSO Performance through Tests Conducted in a Non- Operational Setting and at Active Checkpoints
TSA uses a variety of methods to measure the performance of its TSOs, including the Annual Proficiency Review (APR)—an annual certification program to evaluate TSOs’ skill in performing the various screening functions. TSA has other testing programs that take place during active operations at the checkpoints to assess TSOs’ level of adherence to screening SOPs and associated management directives. Results of APR and PACE Screener Performance Tests Varied by Specific Task Tested and Airport Risk Category
TSA data on the results of APR and PACE testing show that TSOs’ pass rates on both of these tests varied by airport risk category over the time periods we reviewed. The specific data reliability concerns related to these two testing programs are discussed later in this report. TSOs’ scores on PACE tests generally remained above 80 percent from fiscal years 2009 through 2014. TSA Uses TSO Performance Data but Is Constrained by Incomplete and Unreliable Data and Lack of National Analysis and Recommendation Follow-Up
In 2014, TSA Reviewed Selected Annual Proficiency Review Results to Develop Courses for the 2015 National Training Plan
As noted previously, TSA normally uses APR testing results primarily to assess individual TSOs’ skills for performing screening functions in order to annually re-certify them to continue participating in screening operations. Officials stated that, due to software compatibility issues with the new machines, TIP image capability was turned off for an extended period of time, meaning that TIP testing was not occurring on these machines and, therefore, TIP data were neither collected nor reported for these airports. ASAP Test Results are Unreliable, and TSA Does Not Ensure that Recommendations from Nationwide Analysis of ASAP Scores are Implemented
ASAP Pass Rate Results Are Unreliable
In an effort to assess the quality of ASAP testing conducted by TSA field officials at commercial airports, TSA headquarters officials brought in a contractor in fiscal year 2015 to independently perform ASAP covert testing at 40 airports and thereby verify the validity of the testing results at the airports. TSA has put an extensive program in place to train its TSOs to perform these critical screening functions and responded to recent covert test findings of the DHS OIG by implementing a retraining program for all its screening officers to address issues identified in the testing. Further, the agency could use these data on a nationwide level to inform and potentially improve training of TSOs in screening passenger carry-on baggage for prohibited items. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve TSA’s ability to take full advantage of testing results to inform and potentially improve screening operations, we recommend that the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security direct the Administrator of TSA to take the following three actions:
Ensure that TSA officials at individual airports submit complete TIP results to the TSA national database as required, including manually submitting data when automated uploading is not available. Track implementation by airports of ASAP recommendations to ensure that corrective actions identified through ASAP testing are being applied. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We provided a draft of the sensitive version of this report to DHS for their review and comment. How does the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) train Transportation Security Officers (TSO), and to what extent does TSA evaluate the training? 2. 3. To what extent does TSA use TSO performance data to enhance TSO performance? For our second objective, to determine how TSA measures the performance of TSOs and what the performance data show, we analyzed data from four different performance evaluation programs and we interviewed TSA officials responsible for collecting and analyzing the data. Officials stated that this was due to two reasons. TSA could not provide us with information on the extent of the missing data and we were not able to determine based on the data provided how many X-ray machines were unaccounted for between 2009 and 2014. | Why GAO Did This Study
TSA trains TSOs to screen passengers and baggage for items that could pose a threat at nearly 440 airports across the country. One way TSA and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) measure TSO performance is through covert testing of TSA screening operations. In response to the findings from recent DHS OIG covert testing, the Secretary of DHS directed TSA in June 2015 to conduct further training for all TSOs and supervisors. GAO was asked to review TSA's efforts to train and test TSOs. This report examines (1) how TSA trains TSOs and evaluates the training; (2) how TSA measures TSO performance and what the data show; and (3) to what extent TSA uses TSO performance data to enhance TSO performance. GAO analyzed TSO performance data from 2009 through 2015, reviewed documents regarding TSA training and testing, and interviewed TSA officials at headquarters and 10 airports. GAO selected these airports based on airport risk categories, among other things. Information from these airports was not generalizable, but provided insights into TSO training and testing. This is a public version of a sensitive report that GAO issued in May 2016.
What GAO Found
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) uses a variety of programs to train and evaluate Transportation Security Officers (TSO) who are responsible for screening passengers and baggage for threats to aviation security. For example, by law, TSOs must complete 40 hours of classroom training, 60 hours of on-the-job training, and certification tests before performing screening. Once certified, TSA requires TSOs to complete annual training under the National Training Plan. Since 2013, TSA has been phasing in a program to evaluate its training to inform use of training resources. TSA expects that this evaluation program should help the agency determine how well training meets TSOs' needs, provides them with needed knowledge and skill, and has an impact on their performance.
TSA measures TSO performance in various ways, including (1) annual proficiency reviews, which certify TSOs by evaluating their ability to carry out screening standard operating procedures; (2) assessments of X-ray machine operators' ability to identify prohibited items by displaying fictional threat items, such as guns or explosives, onto X-ray images of actual baggage; and (3) covert testing programs that use role players to take prohibited items through screening checkpoints to test TSOs or determine how TSOs interact with the public, among other things. Over the time periods GAO reviewed, TSA data on the results of annual proficiency reviews and covert testing on how TSOs interact with the public show that TSOs' scores (pass rates) varied by airport security risk category. GAO is not providing TSOs' scores for annual proficiency reviews, X-ray machine operator assessments, or covert testing for prohibited items at checkpoints in this report due to the sensitive or classified nature of the data or the data reliability concerns discussed below.
TSA has made use of annual proficiency review data to enhance TSO training, but its use of other testing data is constrained by incomplete and unreliable data. Specifically, due to software compatibility issues and a lack of automatic uploading capability, airport reporting on assessments of X-ray machine operators was not complete, as required by TSA policy, for each year of data GAO examined (fiscal years 2009 through 2014), limiting their reliability and use to enhance TSO training. In addition, for the data it does collect on these assessments, TSA has not taken steps to analyze these data nationwide, which could help the agency identify potential trends or opportunities to improve TSO performance. Furthermore, in 2015, TSA determined that prior year results of one of its two covert testing programs to assess TSOs' ability to identify prohibited items at checkpoints were unreliable, resulting in pass rates that were likely higher than actual TSO performance. TSA has since taken steps to enhance reliability by hiring a contractor to perform independent validation testing, among other things. Finally, TSA does not require or track implementation by field personnel of national recommendations related to these covert tests, thereby limiting the agency's ability to take advantage of the corrective actions identified from the tests.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that TSA (1) collect complete data on assessments of X-ray machine operators, (2) analyze these data nationally for opportunities to enhance TSO performance, and (3) track the implementation of covert testing recommendations. TSA concurred with the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-01-600T | gao_GAO-01-600T_0 | In addition to such benefits, however, this widespread interconnectivity poses significant risks to our computer systems and, more important, to the critical operations and infrastructures they support. Weaknesses Remain Pervasive
Evaluations published since July 1999 show that federal computer systems are riddled with weaknesses that continue to put critical operations and assets at risk. Weaknesses in these areas placed a broad range of critical operations and assets at risk for fraud, misuse, and disruption. Agencies have taken steps to address problems and many have good remedial efforts underway. However, these efforts will not be fully effective and lasting unless they are supported by a strong agencywide security management framework. Establishing such a management framework requires that agencies take a comprehensive approach that involves both (1) senior agency program managers who understand which aspects of their missions are the most critical and sensitive and (2) technical experts who know the agencies’ systems and can suggest appropriate technical security control techniques. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses GAO's analysis of security audits at federal agencies.
What GAO Found
The widespread interconnectivity of computers poses significant risks to federal computer systems and the operations and the infrastructures they support. GAO's evaluations show that federal computer systems are riddled with weaknesses that continue to put critical operations and assets at risk. GAO found weaknesses in following six areas: (1) security program management, (2) access controls, (3) software development and change controls, (4) segregation of duties, (5) operating systems controls, and (6) service continuity. Weaknesses in these areas place a broad range of critical operations and assets at risk for fraud, misuse, and disruption. Federal agencies have tried to address these problems, and many have good remedial efforts underway. However, these efforts will not be fully effective and lasting unless they are supported by a strong agencywide security management framework. Establishing such a management framework requires that agencies take a comprehensive approach that involves both (1) senior agency program managers who understand which aspects of their missions are the most critical and sensitive and (2) technical experts who know the agencies' systems and can suggest appropriate technical security control techniques. |
gao_GAO-12-726 | gao_GAO-12-726_0 | However, a significant number of veterans with those issues are expected to be helped within the program’s target population of veterans experiencing chronic homelessness. That they are eligible for VA health care. That they are willing to participate in case management services that are intended to promote housing stability and link the veteran to needed clinical services. However, no members of Except for a sex offender provision, HUD-VASH the veteran household can be subject to a lifetime registration requirement under a state registration program for sex offenders. VAMC staff submit Dashboard reports to their respective Veterans Integrated Service Networks (VISN), which in VA officials told turn submit facility-level reports to the national center.us that VA implemented a new data collection system, the Homeless Operations Management and Evaluation System (HOMES), in April 2011, and VA is in the process of fully implementing reporting mechanisms required to generate reports based on HOMES data.information for several of VA’s homeless programs, including HUD-VASH. HUD-VASH Eligibility Is Determined at the Local Level
According to VA and HUD, the departments rely on VAMCs and PHAs to make determinations on veteran eligibility for the HUD-VASH program. As previously noted, VA refers veterans who meet its requirements for HUD-VASH to PHAs, subject to voucher availability. Income: PHA staff told us that they generally relied on third-party sources, such as the Social Security or Veterans Benefits administrations, to verify the reported income of HUD-VASH applicants. Both VA and HUD Have Been Taking Steps to Address Data Reliability
VA Provides the Primary Data for HUD-VASH Reporting
Both VA and HUD report on HUD-VASH using information from VA’s Dashboard database. VA Has Taken a Number of Steps to Help Ensure Data Reliability
VA has taken a number of steps to help ensure the reliability of HUD- VASH data reported though the Dashboard database. As of June 2012, the information-sharing agreement was under review. HUD-VASH Data Show the Program Has Moved Veterans into Housing
HUD-VASH Performance
Information VA reports for the HUD-VASH program has focused on voucher utilization (such as the number of veterans housed), but HOMES is supposed to provide VA with additional data on veteran outcomes. Nearly 31,200 veterans lived in HUD-VASH-supported housing as of March 28, 2012; veterans in housing represented about 83 percent of the vouchers authorized under the program. According to VA, the department’s goal is for veterans in housing to represent at least 88 percent of authorized HUD- VASH vouchers by September 30, 2012. VA data show that both VAMCs had assigned 100 percent of their authorized vouchers to a veteran as of March 2012. Identifying housing for veterans. In April 2012, HUD released a best practices document that included practices submitted by PHAs and VAMCs that administer HUD-VASH. Similarly, several PHAs had established a loan fund or trust fund to assist veterans with move-in costs, and one PHA applied for county Community Development Block Grant funds to assist veterans with security and utility deposits. In their responses, HUD, VA, and the Interagency Council generally agreed with our conclusions. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in Appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to examine (1) how the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) and the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) determine that veterans who participate in the HUD-VA Supportive Housing (HUD-VASH) program meet the statutory eligibility criteria, (2) what data VA and HUD collect and report on the HUD-VASH program and the steps that VA and HUD take to help ensure the reliability of these data, and (3) what is known about the performance of the HUD-VASH program. We selected a purposive, non- representative sample of 10 locations in which to interview management and staff at VA medical centers (VAMC) and their partnering public housing agencies (PHA) (see fig. To address our second objective, we reviewed program manuals and guidance on data that VA and HUD collect on HUD-VASH, their data collection mechanisms, and reliability controls. In addition, we interviewed representatives of, and gathered documentation from, HUD and VA headquarters; the U.S. Interagency Council on Homelessness (Interagency Council); and veteran and homeless advocacy organizations, including the National Coalition for Homeless Veterans, the National Coalition for the Homeless, the National Alliance to End Homelessness, and Vietnam Veterans of America. | Why GAO Did This Study
According to a HUD and VA report, veterans are overrepresented among the homeless population. The HUD-VASH program combines rental assistance for homeless veterans in the form of section 8 Housing Choice vouchers provided by HUD with case management and clinical services provided by VA at VAMCs and community-based outpatient clinics. This collaborative initiative between the two agencies is intended to target the most vulnerable, most needy, and chronically homeless veterans. GAO was asked to examine (1) how VA and HUD determine veteran eligibility for HUD-VASH, (2) what data VA and HUD collect and report on HUD-VASH and their data reliability efforts, and (3) what is known about HUD-VASH performance.
To address these objectives, GAO reviewed HUD-VASH program requirements and reported program data through March 2012; and interviewed VA and HUD headquarters officials, staff at a non-representative sample of 10 VAMCs and 10 PHAs, and representatives of organizations that advocate for veterans or individuals experiencing homelessness.
GAO makes no recommendations in this report. HUD, VA, and the U.S. Interagency Council on Homelessness generally agreed with GAOs conclusions.
What GAO Found
The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) and Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) rely on VA medical centers (VAMC) and public housing agencies (PHA) that serve veterans directly to determine participant eligibility for the HUD-VA Supportive Housing (HUD-VASH) program. VAMC staff GAO contacted said that they interview veterans interested in the HUD-VASH program to assess whether the veteran met the programs definition of homelessness, check VAs electronic patient record system to determine whether the veteran was eligible for VA health care, and obtain the veterans agreement to participate in case management. VAMCs refer eligible veterans to partnering PHAs (subject to rental assistance voucher availability) and are required to place them on an interest list when no vouchers are available. PHA staff GAO contacted said that they compare the veterans reported income to information provided by third-party sources, such as the Social Security Administration, to verify that the veterans household income did not exceed HUD-VASH program limits and check state sex offender registries to help ensure that no member of the veterans household was subject to a lifetime registration requirement.
VA and HUD collect various data on veteran participation and voucher utilization and are taking steps to address the reliability of data collected and reported on HUD-VASH. Since 2008, VA has used an electronic database referred to as the Dashboard to collect and report various data, such as the number of veterans issued a voucher and seeking housing and the number of veterans housed. VA described taking a number of steps intended to help ensure the reliability of Dashboard-based reports, including routine reviews of underlying reports. VA expects to fully implement reporting based on data collected with its new Homeless Operations Management and Evaluation System (HOMES) by July 2012. According to VA, HOMES incorporates additional data reliability controls, such as data fields that automatically limit responses to predefined ranges. HUD also collects data on HUD-VASH voucher utilization, although HUD officials acknowledged discrepancies between VA and HUD data. VA and HUD are working to finalize an information-sharing agreement intended to help the departments better identify the source of the discrepancies and validate reports based on HOMES data.
HUD-VASH data show that the program has moved previously homeless veterans into housing. As of March 2012, nearly 31,200 veterans lived in HUD-VASH supported housing (about 83 percent of the rental assistance vouchers authorized under the program). The program goal is to have veterans in housing represent 88 percent of authorized vouchers by September 2012; several states had met or exceeded the goal as of March 2012. VAMC and PHA staff GAO contacted also cited challenges in administering the HUD-VASH program, including a lack of resources to assist veterans with moving into housing. In April 2012, HUD released a best practices document that illustrated how some of the challenges identified had been addressed. For example, one PHA applied for county Community Development Block Grant funds to assist veterans with security and utility deposits. |
gao_GAO-11-432 | gao_GAO-11-432_0 | Background
The 1935 Indian Arts and Crafts Act created the Indian Arts and Crafts Board within Interior to promote the economic welfare of Indian tribes and individuals through the development of Indian arts and crafts and through the expansion of the market for the products of Indian art and craftsmanship. A priority of the Board is the implementation and enforcement of the act’s provisions to prevent misrepresentation. The Size of the Indian Arts and Crafts Market and the Extent of Misrepresentation Are Unknown
The actual size of the Indian arts and crafts market, and extent of misrepresentation that is occurring, are unknown, because existing estimates are outdated, limited in scope, or anecdotal and no national sources contain the data necessary to make reliable estimates. Conducting a comprehensive study to estimate the size of the market and level of misrepresentation would be complex and costly and may not provide reliable results. For example, the most recent and relevant national estimates were provided in a 1985 Department of Commerce study. Our analysis of the methodology used to produce the study, however, found that these estimates are not only outdated but also unreliable. Many Indian artists, agency officials, and others with whom we spoke who have knowledge of the national, state, and local Indian arts and crafts markets offered anecdotal estimates of the size of the Indian arts and crafts market and the extent of misrepresentation but generally could not provide reliable support for their estimates. We found that because these data sources were designed for other purposes and not intended to track the size of the Indian arts and crafts market or extent of misrepresentation, the information they contain is not specific or comprehensive enough to be used for that purpose. Moreover, neither of these organizations collects information on the sales of goods by these sellers. To Curtail Misrepresentation of Indian Arts and Crafts, Agencies Have Relied on Educational Efforts over Law Enforcement Actions, but Fundamental Challenges Exist
Federal and state agencies have relied on educational efforts more than law enforcement actions to curtail misrepresentation of Indian arts and crafts, but these efforts are hampered by fundamental challenges, such as ignorance of the law, competing law enforcement priorities, the high cost of pursuing legal actions, and limitations on the enforcement of customs regulations. According to the database, from fiscal year 2006 through fiscal year 2010, the Board received 649 complaints of alleged violations. The Board’s investigation of these 649 complaints identified apparent violations of federal or state laws in 23 percent of the complaints—148 violations of the Indian Arts and Crafts Act and 2 of state law, but for 61 percent of the complaints— 395 of the 649—the Board, upon investigation, identified no violation of the federal law or could not make a determination; for example, according to Board officials, anonymous complaints sometimes do not provide sufficient information to identify a violation. A Variety of Challenges Exist to Curtailing Misrepresentation
Even with its partnerships and educational and other outreach efforts, the Board acknowledges that a number of challenges exist to curtailing misrepresentation of Indian arts and crafts. Attorneys and Interior, FBI, tribal, and state law enforcement personnel, and it is planning future training for federal law enforcement officers. Some Potential Options for Protecting Indian Traditional Knowledge and Cultural Expression Exist
U.S. federal and state laws protecting intellectual property do not explicitly include Indian traditional knowledge and cultural expression and therefore do not provide adequate protection from misappropriation or distortion. International Frameworks Exist or Are Under Development to Provide Guidance for Nations Interested in Protecting the Intellectual Property of Indigenous Peoples
Existing international frameworks offer protections for traditional knowledge, but the United States has not implemented them to date. Other Countries Have Undertaken Protection Actions That Provide Options for Consideration
Options for protecting traditional knowledge and cultural expressions are also found in the experiences of other countries that have established or attempted to establish laws and programs to address the issue. New Zealand has also taken steps to protect the intangible intellectual property of its indigenous groups. Agency Comments
We provided a copy of our draft report to the Departments of Commerce, Homeland Security, the Interior, and Justice for review and comment. In their written responses, the Department of Commerce’s U.S. Patent and Trademark Office and the Department of Homeland Security generally agreed with the contents of the report and also provided technical comments, which we incorporated into the report as appropriate. In addition, this report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 1935 the Indian Arts and Crafts Act was enacted, establishing the Indian Arts and Crafts Board as an entity within the Department of the Interior. A priority of the Board is to implement and enforce the act's provisions to prevent misrepresentation of unauthentic goods as genuine Indian arts and crafts. As the market for Indian arts and crafts grew and the problem of misrepresentation persisted, the act was amended to, among other things, enhance the penalty provisions and strengthen enforcement. GAO was asked to examine (1) what information exists regarding the size of the market and the extent to which items are misrepresented and (2) actions that have been taken to curtail the misrepresentation of Indian arts and crafts and what challenges, if any, exist. In addition, this report provides information on some options available to protect Indian traditional knowledge and cultural expressions. GAO analyzed documents and interviewed international, federal, state, and local officials about the arts and crafts market and enforcement of the act. GAO is making no recommendations in this report. In commenting on a draft of this report, the Departments of Commerce and Homeland Security generally agreed with the contents of the report. The Departments of Commerce, Homeland Security, the Interior, and Justice also provided technical comments which were incorporated into the report as appropriate..
What GAO Found
The size of the Indian arts and crafts market and extent of misrepresentation are unknown because existing estimates are outdated, limited in scope, or anecdotal. Also, there are no national data sources containing the information necessary to make reliable estimates. For example, the most often cited national estimates about the size of the market and the extent of misrepresentation come from a 1985 Department of Commerce study. GAO found that not only is this study outdated, but the estimates included in the study are unreliable because they were based on anecdotal information and not systematically collected data. No national database specifically tracks Indian arts and crafts sales or misrepresentation, and GAO found that no other national databases contain information specific or comprehensive enough to be used for developing reliable estimates. Moreover, GAO determined that to conduct a study that could accurately estimate the size of the Indian arts and crafts market and the extent of misrepresentation would be a complex and costly undertaking and may not produce reliable estimates. Federal and state agencies have relied largely on educational efforts rather than law enforcement actions to curtail misrepresentation of Indian arts and crafts, but these efforts are hampered by a number of challenges, including ignorance of the law and competing law enforcement priorities. From fiscal year 2006 to fiscal year 2010, the Indian Arts and Crafts Board received 649 complaints of alleged violations of the Indian Arts and Crafts Act. The Board determined that 150 of these complaints, or 23 percent, involved an apparent violation of the law, and it referred 117 of the complaints for further investigation by law enforcement officers, but no cases were filed in federal court as a result. According to the Board and law enforcement officials, support from law enforcement personnel and others to prosecute these cases has been sporadic because of higher law enforcement priorities. Therefore, the Board has relied primarily on educational efforts to curtail misrepresentation. For example, in response to complaints, the Board sent educational and warning letters to about 45 percent of alleged violators, and it produced educational brochures and participated in other educational efforts for artists, sellers, consumers, and law enforcement officers. GAO identified one arts organization that has successfully used civil actions to curtail misrepresentation, but this approach can be costly and time-consuming. U.S. federal and state laws protecting intellectual property do not explicitly include Indian traditional knowledge and cultural expressions--such as ceremonial dances or processes for weaving baskets--and therefore provide little legal protection for them. Some international frameworks offer protection for traditional knowledge and cultural expressions, but the federal government has not yet undertaken steps to implement these frameworks in the United States. Other countries, like Panama and New Zealand, have taken actions--which offer options for consideration--to protect the intellectual property of indigenous groups. |
gao_GAO-07-683T | gao_GAO-07-683T_0 | We also reported that the establishment of the Operations Directorate provided DHS with an opportunity to more consistently implement these practices. The Centers Do Not Define and Articulate Common Outcomes and Joint Strategies, a Key Practice Intended to Enhance and Sustain Collaboration
At the time of our review, the three DHS components responsible for the four multi-agency centers had not developed or documented common goals or joint strategies that incorporated all the agencies within the centers and that our work has shown could, in turn, enhance collaboration among these agencies. For example, DHS said it has developed national reporting requirements and a coordinated national reporting chain for submitting homeland security information during a crisis, in part in response to Hurricane Katrina lessons learned. Therefore, while we understand that the Operations Directorate has taken the position it does not have control over the component center resources, we maintain that providing guidance to component agencies to assist them in conducting such staffing needs assessments would allow the component sponsoring the center to leverage resources more efficiently to meet the operational needs of the center. According to DHS, since our report, it has taken steps to further define the role and responsibilities of the watchstanders in its National Operations Center and documented them in its Standard Operating Procedures, as well as to develop Memoranda of Agreements with the components that will codify the role of the watchstanders they provide to the National Operations Center. However, we, the DHS IG, and the department itself have identified continuing concerns with this system, which is used for sharing a variety of information, including law enforcement and emergency response information used to support situational awareness and incident response In April 2007, we reported that DHS did not fully adhere to collaborative practices or Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance in coordinating its efforts to implement HSIN through state and local information-sharing initiatives. Key practices to help implement the guidance include establishing joint strategies and developing compatible policies and procedures to operate across agency boundaries. Nor were performance measures or other mechanisms in place to monitor and evaluate the joint efforts of multiple DHS agencies at the Transportation Security Operations Center and the National Targeting Center. To date, DHS has not provided guidance to the multiagency centers to help implement mechanisms to monitor and evaluate the results of collaborative efforts. DHS’s Operations Directorate Has Given Priority to Fixing the Problems that Hurricane Katrina Exposed
According to DHS officials, the Operations Directorate and the National Operations Center have been focused on responding to the congressional and administration reports and corresponding recommendations generated in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. In response to these concerns, among others, DHS reported that it made a series of changes to its operations, organization, and procedures for sharing information in order to maintain situational awareness and provide for incident management. Disaster Situational Awareness Teams. While DHS provided us with background briefings, some supporting documentation, and some after action reports on the initiatives we have outlined, we did not evaluate the extent to which they have been implemented and are effective at addressing the problems Katrina identified, in part because they are so new and in some cases still concepts. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony summarizes GAO's October 2006 report on the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) operations centers--centers run by three DHS components and operating 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 365 days a year to conduct monitoring and surveillance activities of potential terrorist activities and other crises. Specifically, GAO assessed the extent to which the centers implemented key practices GAO's work has shown will enhance and sustain collaboration. In addition, GAO is aware of Congress's concerns about the performance of certain DHS components with regard to situational awareness during Hurricane Katrina, and the recent efforts made in response to these concerns identified in hurricane after-action studies and reports. Because these efforts to some extent affect DHS's response to the recommendations made in GAO's previous report, this testimony briefly describes some of the steps DHS reported that it has taken to address situational awareness problems Katrina exposed. However, because these actions are relatively new, it is too early to assess how well they are being implemented.
What GAO Found
The DHS operations centers GAO studied--the Air and Marine Operations Center, the National Targeting Center, the Transportation Security Operations Center, and the National Operations Center--could improve implementation of the key practices GAO identified as having a positive effect on inter-agency collaboration. These key practices include (1) defining common outcomes and joint strategies; (2) assessing each center's needs to leverage resources; (3) defining the roles and responsibilities of the personnel conducting surveillance activities; (4) establishing compatible standards, policies, and procedures for using DHS's primary information sharing network; (5) developing mechanisms to monitor and evaluate results of joint operations; and (6) reinforcing accountability by recognizing joint efforts and outcomes achieved in annual performance plans and reports. The Operations Directorate, established in November 2005 to improve operational efficiency and coordination, provides DHS with an opportunity to more fully implement these key practices by providing guidance to the operations centers. Although GAO recommended that the Directorate provide this guidance, DHS stated that the Directorate does not have control over the component operations centers; therefore, it has not provided guidance to improve collaboration among the centers. According to DHS, it has given priority to fixing issues that affect situational awareness and its ability to respond to national incidents and disasters, such as Hurricane Katrina. The actions in response to Katrina include establishing standard roles and procedures for reporting information during a major incident and creating a Web-based tool to provide a common view of critical information during a crisis. While DHS has not fully responded to GAO's recommendation for implementing key collaborative practices, it maintains that the initiatives it has implemented since Katrina will improve collaboration and create an environment to address the recommendations in the future. |
gao_GAO-08-640 | gao_GAO-08-640_0 | FDA Used Several Methods to Recruit Candidates for Advisory Committee Membership and Prescreened Candidates for Potential Conflicts of Interest
Prior to the FDA Amendments Act of 2007, FDA employed several methods to recruit candidates for advisory committees and to evaluate candidates by prescreening them for advisory committee membership. Common recruitment methods used by FDA include announcing vacancies in the Federal Register, distributing recruitment brochures at advisory committee meetings and national meetings, receiving nominations by word-of-mouth or asking current advisory committee members for nominations, and posting information about recruitment on FDA’s Web site. To prescreen candidates, FDA reviewed the candidates’ curricula vitae and usually conducted a prescreening interview. Barriers Existed to Recruiting Qualified FDA Advisory Committee Candidates, Particularly Those without Potential Conflicts of Interest, but FDA May Have Been Able to Mitigate Barriers by Expanding Outreach Efforts
According to FDA officials, former FDA advisory committee members, and a PhRMA representative, FDA faced barriers to recruiting qualified individuals to serve on its advisory committees, particularly candidates without potential conflicts of interest, although FDA may have been able to mitigate these barriers by expanding its outreach efforts. FDA officials, former FDA advisory committee members, and a PhRMA representative identified the following barriers: FDA sought the same leading experts as industry; FDA’s most effective recruitment method—word-of-mouth—was limited in the number of potential candidates it could generate; and aspects of FDA advisory committee service deterred some potential advisory committee members. The FDA Amendments Act of 2007 modifies FDA’s process for prescreening candidates for advisory committee membership. In the 83 advisory committee meetings held by CBER, CDER, and CDRH in 2004 and 2006, standing and temporary members were 58 and 42 percent, respectively, of the 1,218 total meeting participants. At Least One Standing or Temporary Member Had a Conflict of Interest Determination in over Half of the Advisory Committee Meetings
Forty-nine of the 83 advisory committee meetings we analyzed—over half of all the meetings—had at least 1 standing or temporary member with a conflict of interest determination. FDA may permit an advisory committee member who has a conflict of interest and whose expertise is needed to participate in an advisory committee meeting under certain circumstances by granting a conflict of interest determination. Two hundred standing and temporary members—about 16 percent of the 83 meetings’ 1,218 participants—had at least one conflict of interest determination. The FDA Amendments Act of 2007 limits the number of certain conflict of interest determinations—the statutory waivers—that FDA can grant and FDA’s conflict of interest policy revisions change the amount of the disqualifying financial interests. In its comments, HHS noted that on August 4, 2008, after we had provided the draft report for its review on July 29, 2008, FDA issued four final guidance documents concerning management of its advisory committees. Conflict of interest determinations to allow a member with a conflict to participate in an advisory committee meeting are affected by both FDA’s draft March 2007 guidance and the FDA Amendments Act of 2007. We did not examine FDA’s other centers’ advisory committee meetings. Specifically, we describe (1) how FDA recruited individuals for advisory committee membership and evaluated candidates by prescreening them for potential conflicts of interest, (2) barriers that were reported to recruiting qualified individuals to serve on FDA advisory committees, particularly candidates without potential conflicts of interest, and (3) the proportion of standing and temporary members who participated in advisory committee meetings, and the frequency with which members with one or more conflict of interest determinations participated in advisory committee meetings. We also interviewed officials from organizations we previously identified as employing specific recruitment and prescreening methods that could ensure independent and balanced advisory committees. National Research Center for Women & Families 2006 report: The National Research Center’s report, which included information from other studies of FDA advisory committees and their members with conflicts of interest, concluded that “it is possible to understand how a few committee members with conflicts of interest can have a disproportionate impact on approval recommendations.” The report stated that because FDA has its advisory committees meet to discuss controversial or innovative products, “the public might therefore expect that many of the drugs and devices reviewed by advisory committees would not be recommended for approval.” Using 11 randomly selected CDER and CDRH advisory committees, the report found that 79 percent of the 89 products reviewed between 1998 and 2005 were recommended for approval, and that the recommendations were usually unanimous. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has been criticized about how it recruits individuals to become members of its advisory committees and how it grants some determinations that allow members with conflicts of interest to participate in committee meetings. Advisory committee meetings can include both standing and temporary members. Temporary members only serve for a particular meeting. GAO was asked to examine FDA's advisory committee processes. GAO reported on (1) how FDA recruited individuals for membership and evaluated candidates for potential conflicts of interest, (2) barriers that were reported to recruiting qualified individuals to serve on committees, and (3) the proportion of standing and temporary members, and the frequency with which members with conflict of interest determinations participated in meetings. GAO reviewed FDA advisory committee policies and analyzed meeting records for FDA's Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research (CBER), Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER), and Center for Devices and Radiological Health (CDRH). GAO also interviewed individuals familiar with FDA's committee member recruiting process. GAO did not examine the effects of changes in FDA's advisory committee processes resulting from the FDA Amendments Act of 2007 and 2007 FDA policy revisions as it was too soon to assess them.
What GAO Found
Prior to the FDA Amendments Act of 2007, FDA employed several methods to recruit candidates for advisory committees and to evaluate candidates by prescreening them for potential conflicts of interest. FDA recruited candidates by announcing vacancies in the Federal Register, distributing recruitment brochures at advisory committee meetings and national meetings, word-of-mouth or asking current advisory committee members, and posting recruitment and conflict of interest information on FDA's Web site. To evaluate advisory committee candidates for conflicts of interest, FDA reviewed the candidates' curricula vitae and usually conducted a prescreening interview. FDA employed many of the same recruitment and evaluation practices used by organizations previously identified by GAO as employing methods that could ensure an independent and balanced advisory committee. FDA faced barriers to recruiting qualified advisory committee candidates, particularly those without potential conflicts of interest, according to FDA officials and former FDA advisory committee members. However, GAO found that the agency may have been able to mitigate these barriers by expanding its outreach efforts. FDA staff and former FDA advisory committee members GAO interviewed generally agreed that individuals with the expertise FDA sought for its advisory committees were the same leading experts that industry sought to conduct research. In addition, word-of-mouth--the advisory committee member recruitment method FDA officials generally agreed was most effective--was limited in the number of candidate nominations it could generate. The FDA Amendments Act of 2007 modifies FDA's process for prescreening candidates for committee membership. Standing and temporary members were 58 and 42 percent, respectively, of the 1,218 participants in the 83 advisory committee meetings held by CBER, CDER, and CDRH in 2004 and 2006 that GAO reviewed. FDA may permit an advisory committee member who has a conflict of interest, or an appearance of a conflict, and whose expertise is needed to participate in an advisory committee meeting under certain circumstances by granting a conflict of interest determination. More than half of the meetings had at least one standing or temporary member with at least one conflict of interest determination. The 200 members found to have at least one conflict of interest determination represented about 16 percent of all 83 meetings' participants. The FDA Amendments Act of 2007 limits the number of certain conflict of interest determinations that FDA can grant and FDA's conflict of interest policy revisions limit the amount of the disqualifying financial interests. In its comments on a draft of this report, HHS noted that on August 4, 2008, after GAO provided the draft report for its review, FDA issued four final guidance documents concerning management of its advisory committees. HHS also provided additional clarifications about aspects of FDA's advisory committees. GAO revised the report to cite the final guidances and to incorporate HHS's clarifications where appropriate. |
gao_GAO-13-180 | gao_GAO-13-180_0 | Research suggests that U.S. output losses associated with the 2007- 2009 financial crisis could range from several trillion to over $10 trillion. 2007-2009 Crisis Was Also Associated with Large Declines in Employment, Household Wealth, and Other Economic Indicators
While studies often use output losses to measure the overall costs associated with financial crises, many researchers also discuss trends in unemployment, household wealth, and other economic indicators, such as the number of foreclosures, to provide a more granular picture of the effects of financial crises. Factors contributing to these challenges include decreased tax revenues from reduced economic activity and increased spending associated with government efforts to mitigate the effects of the recession. The Dodd-Frank Act May Enhance Financial Stability and Provide Other Benefits, with the Extent of the Benefits Depending on a Number of Factors
The Dodd-Frank Act contains several provisions that may benefit the financial system and the broader economy, but the realization of such benefits depends on a number of factors. Several Dodd-Frank Provisions May Help Reduce the Probability or Severity of a Future Crisis, but Uncertainty Exists about Their Effectiveness
Through our review of the literature and discussions with a broad range of financial market regulators, academics, and industry and public interest group experts, we found no clear consensus on the extent to which, if at all, the Dodd-Frank Act will help reduce the probability or severity of a future financial crisis. In addition, a few experts with whom we spoke said that some of the act’s provisions could increase systemic risk and, thus, have adverse effects on financial stability. FSOC is authorized, among other things, to collect information across the financial system from member agencies and other government agencies, so that regulators will be better prepared to address emerging threats; designate certain nonbank financial companies for supervision by the Federal Reserve and subject them to enhanced prudential standards; designate as systemically important certain financial market utilities and payment, clearing, or settlement activities, and subject them to enhanced regulatory oversight; recommend stricter standards for the large, interconnected bank holding companies and nonbank financial companies designated for enhanced supervision; vote on any determination by the Federal Reserve that action should be taken to break up a SIFI that poses a “grave threat” to U.S. financial stability; facilitate information sharing and coordination among the member agencies to eliminate gaps in the regulatory structure; and make recommendations to enhance the integrity, efficiency, competitiveness, and stability of U.S. financial markets, promote market discipline, and maintain investor confidence. Quantifying Potential Benefits Is Difficult, but Some Approaches May Provide Useful Insights
The Dodd-Frank Act’s potential benefit of reducing the probability or severity of a future financial crisis cannot be readily observed and this potential benefit is difficult to quantify. Nonetheless, as we noted previously in this report, a working group of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision summarized several studies that analyze the costs of financial crises, and that used different macroeconomic models of the economy to estimate the impact of more stringent capital and liquidity standards on the annual likelihood of a financial crisis, and the benefits of avoiding associated output losses. Significance of the Act’s Costs Is Not Fully Known
The Dodd-Frank Act requires federal agencies and the financial services industry to expend resources to implement or comply with its requirements, and some of its reforms are expected to impose costs on the economy. First, federal agencies are devoting resources to fulfill rule- making and other new regulatory responsibilities created by the act. For example, financial institutions may charge their customers more for credit or other financial services. In such cases, these new funding resources do not represent an incremental cost of the act’s implementation. A large portion of the federal entities’ resources devoted to the act’s implementation are funded by fees paid by regulated institutions or other sources outside the congressional appropriations process, limiting the impact of these activities on the federal budget deficit. According to some academics and others, certain types of costs imposed by the act on financial institutions serve to make such institutions internalize costs that they impose on others through their risk-taking and thereby reduce the risk that they pose to the financial system. Regulators and others have collected some data on certain compliance costs. Although the Dodd-Frank Act reforms are directed primarily at large, complex U.S. financial institutions, many of the act’s provisions are expected to impose costs on other financial institutions as well. Many of the rules implementing the act’s reforms have not been finalized, and it is difficult to predict how regulated institutions will respond to the act’s reforms. The Potential for Unintended Consequences Adds to Challenges of Assessing Benefits and Costs
Academics, industry representatives, and others we spoke with also have expressed concern about the potential for the Dodd-Frank Act’s reforms to have unintended consequences that could harm U.S. economic growth or the global competitiveness of U.S. financial markets. Experts have a wide range of views on the act’s potential to enhance financial stability, with some maintaining that certain reforms could make the financial system more vulnerable to a crisis. All of the agencies provided technical comments, which we have incorporated, as appropriate. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our report were to examine what is known about (1) the losses and related economic impacts associated with the 2007-2009 financial crisis; (2) the benefits of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the Dodd-Frank Act), particularly its key financial stability provisions, for the U.S. financial system and broader economy; and (3) the costs associated with the act, particularly its key financial stability provisions. In addition, we reviewed relevant reports and public statements by federal financial regulators, industry associations, and others. We obtained additional perspectives from regulators, academics, and representatives of industry and public interest groups through interviews and an expert roundtable we held with the assistance of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS). State and Local Governments: Knowledge of Past Recessions Can Inform Future Federal Fiscal Assistance. | Why GAO Did This Study
The 2007-2009 financial crisis threatened the stability of the U.S. financial system and the health of the U.S. economy. To address regulatory gaps and other problems revealed by the crisis, Congress enacted the Dodd- Frank Act. Federal regulators will need to issue hundreds of rules to implement the act. Industry representatives, academics, and others generally have supported the act's goal of enhancing U.S. financial stability, but implementation of certain of the act's provisions has led to much debate. These experts have expressed a wide range of views on the potential positive and negative effects that the act could have on the U.S. financial system and broader economy.
GAO was asked to examine the (1) losses associated with the recent financial crisis; (2) benefits of the act for the U.S. financial system and the broader economy; and (3) costs of the act's reforms. GAO reviewed empirical and other studies on the impacts of financial crises and the Dodd-Frank reforms, as well as congressional testimonies, comment letters, and other public statements by federal regulators, industry representatives, and others. GAO obtained and analyzed data on agency resources devoted to the act's implementation. GAO also obtained perspectives from regulators, academics, and representatives of industry and public interest groups through interviews and an expert roundtable held with the assistance of the National Academy of Sciences. GAO provided a draft of this report to the financial regulators for review and comment and received technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
The 2007-2009 financial crisis has been associated with large economic losses and increased fiscal challenges. Studies estimating the losses of financial crises based on lost output (value of goods and services not produced) suggest losses associated with the recent crisis could range from a few trillion dollars to over $10 trillion. Also associated with the crisis were large declines in employment, household wealth, and other economic indicators. Some studies suggest the crisis could have long-lasting effects: for example, high unemployment, if persistent, could lead to skill erosion and lower future earnings for those affected. Finally, since the crisis began, federal, state, and local governments have faced greater fiscal challenges, in part because of reduced tax revenues from lower economic activity and increased spending to mitigate the impact of the recession.
While the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act's (Dodd- Frank Act) reforms could enhance the stability of the U.S. financial system and provide other benefits, the extent to which such benefits materialize will depend on many factors whose effects are difficult to predict. According to some academics, industry representatives, and others, a number of the act's provisions could help reduce the probability or severity of a future crisis and thereby avoid or reduce the associated losses. These include subjecting large, complex financial institutions to enhanced prudential supervision, authorizing regulators to liquidate a financial firm whose failure could pose systemic risk, and regulating certain complex financial instruments. In contrast, some experts maintain these measures will not help reduce the probability or severity of a future crisis, while others note that their effectiveness will depend on how they are implemented by regulators, including through their rulemakings, and other factors, such as how financial firms respond to the new requirements. Quantifying the act's potential benefits is difficult, but several studies have framed potential benefits of certain reforms by estimating output losses that could be avoided if the reforms lowered the probability of a future crisis.
Federal agencies and the financial industry are expending resources to implement and comply with the Dodd-Frank Act. First, federal agencies are devoting resources to fulfill rulemaking and other new regulatory responsibilities created by the act. Many of these agencies do not receive any congressional appropriations, limiting federal budget impacts. Second, the act imposes compliance and other costs on financial institutions and restricts their business activities in ways that may affect the provision of financial products and services. While regulators and others have collected some data on these costs, no comprehensive data exist. Some experts stated that many of the act's reforms serve to impose costs on financial firms to reduce the risks they pose to the financial system. Third, in response to reforms, financial institutions may pass increased costs on to their customers. For example, banks could charge more for their loans or other services, which could reduce economic growth. Although certain costs, such as paperwork costs, can be quantified, other costs, such as the act's impact on the economy, cannot be easily quantified. Studies have estimated the economic impact of certain of the act's reforms, but their results vary widely and depend on key assumptions. Finally, some experts expressed concern about the act's potential unintended consequences and their related costs, adding to the challenges of assessing the benefits and costs of the act. |
gao_GAO-14-469T | gao_GAO-14-469T_0 | Background
VA’s mission is to promote the health, welfare, and dignity of all veterans in recognition of their service to the nation by ensuring that they receive medical care, benefits, social support, and memorials. The use of information technology (IT) is crucial to the department’s ability to provide these benefits and services, but without adequate protections, VA’s systems and information are vulnerable to those with malicious intentions who wish to exploit the information. VA Has Reported an Increasing Number of Information Security Incidents
The number of incidents affecting VA’s information, computer systems, and networks has generally risen over the last several years. VA Continues to Face Long-Standing Challenges in Effectively Implementing Its Information Security Program
Information security remains a long-standing challenge for the department. Specifically, VA has consistently had weaknesses in major information security control areas. In fiscal year 2013, for the 12th year in a row, VA’s independent auditor reported that inadequate information system controls over financial systems constituted a material weakness. In addition, the VA OIG reported in 2013 that development of an effective information security program and system security controls continued to be a major management challenge for the department. These more recent findings are consistent with the challenges VA has historically faced in implementing an effective information security program. In addition, we have recently reported on issues regarding the protection of personally identifiable information (PII) at federal agencies, including VA. In addition, it had implemented its policies and procedures by preparing breach reports and performing risk assessments for cases of data breach. the computerized matching of personal information for purposes of determining eligibility for federal benefits programs. VA concurred and described steps it would take to implement our recommendations. The draft bill addresses governance of the department’s information security program and security controls for the department’s information systems. It requires the Secretary of Veterans Affairs to improve the transparency and coordination of the information security program and to ensure the security of the department’s critical network infrastructure, computers and servers, operating systems, and web applications, as well as its Veterans Health Information Systems and Technology Architecture system, from vulnerabilities that could affect the confidentiality of veterans’ sensitive personal information. Many of the actions and activities specified in the proposed legislation are sound information security practices and consistent with federal guidelines, if implemented on a risk-based basis. The provisions in the draft bill may prompt VA to refocus its efforts on actions that are necessary to improve the security over its information systems and information. In a dynamic environment where innovations in technology and business practices supplant the status quo, control activities that are appropriate today may not be appropriate in the future. These challenges have been further highlighted by recent determinations that weaknesses in information security have contributed to a material weakness in VA’s internal controls over financial reporting and continue to constitute a major management challenge for the department. While the draft legislation being considered by the Subcommittee may prod VA into taking needed corrective actions, emphasizing that these should be taken based on risk can provide the flexibility needed to respond to an ever-changing technology and business environment. Information Security: Protecting Personally Identifiable Information. Information Systems: The Status of Computer Security at the Department of Veterans Affairs. | Why GAO Did This Study
The use of information technology is crucial to VA's ability to carry out its mission of ensuring that veterans receive medical care, benefits, social support, and memorials. However, without adequate security protections, VA's systems and information are vulnerable to exploitation by an array of cyber-based threats, potentially resulting in, among other things, the compromise of veterans' personal information. GAO has identified information security as a government-wide high-risk area since 1997. The number of information security incidents reported by VA has more than doubled over the last several years, further highlighting the importance of securing the department's systems and the information that resides on them.
GAO was asked to provide a statement discussing the challenges VA has experienced in effectively implementing information security, as well as to comment on a recently proposed bill aimed at improving the department's efforts to secure its systems and information. In preparing this statement GAO relied on previously published work as well as a review of recent VA inspector general and other reports related to the department's security program. GAO also analyzed the draft legislation in light of existing federal requirements and best practices for information security.
What GAO Found
The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) continues to face long-standing challenges in effectively implementing its information security program. Specifically, from fiscal year 2007 through 2013, VA has consistently had weaknesses in key information security control areas (see table).
In addition, in fiscal year 2013, the department's independent auditor reported, for the 12th year in a row, that weaknesses in information system controls over financial systems constituted a material weakness. Further, the department's inspector general has identified development of an effective information security program and system security controls as a major management challenge for VA. These findings are consistent with challenges GAO has identified in VA's implementation of its security program going back to the late 1990s. More recently, GAO has reported and made recommendations on issues regarding the protection of personally identifiable information at federal agencies, including VA. These were related to developing and implementing policies and procedures for responding to data breaches, and implementing protections when engaging in computerized matching of data for the purposes of determining individuals' eligibility for federal benefits.
Draft legislation being considered by the Subcommittee addresses the governance of VA's information security program and security controls for the department's systems. It would require the Secretary of VA to improve transparency and coordination of the department's security program and ensure the security of its critical network infrastructure, computers and servers, operating systems, and web applications, as well as its core veterans health information system. Toward this end, the draft legislation prescribes specific security-related actions. Many of the actions and activities specified in the bill are sound information security practices and consistent with federal guidelines. If implemented on a risk-based basis, they could prompt VA to refocus its efforts on steps needed to improve the security of its systems and information. At the same time, the constantly changing nature of technology and business practices introduces the risk that control activities that are appropriate in the department's current environment may not be appropriate in the future. In light of this, emphasizing that actions should be taken on the basis of risk may provide the flexibility needed for security practices to evolve as changing circumstances warrant and help VA meet the security objectives in the draft legislation. |
gao_GAO-06-562T | gao_GAO-06-562T_0 | According to a provision of AIR-21, which was continued in the Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act (Vision 100)—FAA’s current authorizing legislation—total appropriations made available from the fund in each fiscal year shall equal the level of receipts plus interest in that year, and these appropriations can be used only for aviation investment programs, which are defined as FAA’s capital accounts plus the Trust Fund’s share of FAA operations. Specifically, the Trust Fund’s uncommitted balance decreased from $7.3 billion at the end of 2001 to $4.8 billion at the end of 2002 and has continued to decrease since then, reaching about $1.9 billion at the end of 2005. However, the rate of decrease has slowed; in 2005, the uncommitted balance decreased by about $500 million, after falling by at least $900 million in each of the previous 3 years. The uncommitted balance has fallen in recent years because Trust Fund revenues have fallen short of forecasted levels by over $1 billion in 3 out of the last 4 fiscal years. For example, in 2001, the difference between forecasted revenue and actual revenue coming in to the Trust Fund was $383 million less than expected. In 2002, the difference jumped to $2.3 billion due to the impact that unanticipated external events such as the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks had on the aviation industry. Thus, if actual revenues approximate forecasted revenues, there should be no substantial change in the uncommitted balance. However, as shown in figure 5, for each year beginning with 2001, actual revenues, including interest, have been less than forecasted, so that in each year since then, the uncommitted balance has fallen. Fund’s Uncommitted Balance Is Projected to Be Positive through 2007 but Depends on Realization of Forecasted Passenger Traffic Levels and Airfares
Based on its revenue forecast and appropriations for 2006, FAA forecasts that the Trust Fund’s uncommitted balance will decrease by the end of 2006 to about $1.7 billion. FAA forecasts that if, for 2007, the Congress continues to follow the Vision 100 formula for linking budget resources made available from the fund to expected revenues, then there will be little change in the uncommitted balance—$1.7 billion—during that year. If, instead, the Congress adopts the President’s budget request for FAA for 2007, FAA forecasts that the fund’s uncommitted balance by the end of 2007 will rise to about $2.7 billion. This higher forecasted uncommitted balance occurs because the President’s budget calls for an appropriation from the Trust Fund that is about $1 billion lower than the Vision 100 formula. We believe these scenarios raise concerns because, in the past, the Trust Fund’s uncommitted balance was used to offset lower-than-expected Trust Fund revenues and decreased general fund contributions. FAA could help address these concerns by continuing to look for ways to improve efficiency and reduce costs. However, the zero-balance scenario would most likely have implications for Congress in funding FAA programs. To assess the current financial status and projected financial viability of the Airport and Airway Trust Fund, we obtained financial data from FAA and interviewed FAA officials familiar with the information. We used a sensitivity analysis to project what would happen if Trust Fund revenues in fiscal years 2006 and 2007 were 5 percent and 10 percent lower than the levels projected by FAA in March 2006 under each of these proposals. Accordingly, our findings on the financial outlook of the Trust Fund are based on GAO projections, not FAA’s. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Airport and Airway Trust Fund was established by the Airport and Airway Revenue Act of 1970 (P.L. 91-258) to help fund the development of a nationwide airport and airway system and to fund investments in air traffic control facilities. It provides all of the funding for the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) capital accounts, including: (1) the Airport Improvement Program, which provides grants for construction and safety projects at airports; (2) the Facilities and Equipment account, which funds technological improvements to the air traffic control system; and (3) the Research, Engineering, and Development account, which funds continued research on aviation safety, mobility, and environment issues. In addition, at various times during its history, the Trust Fund has funded all or some portion of FAA's operations. To fund these accounts, the Trust Fund is credited with revenues from a variety of excise taxes related to passenger tickets, passenger flight segments, international arrivals/departures, cargo waybills, and aviation fuels. Including interest earned on its balances, the Trust Fund received $10.8 billion in fiscal year 2005. The various taxes that accrue to the Trust Fund are scheduled to expire at the end of fiscal year 2007. GAO was asked to provide information and analysis about the financial condition and future viability of the Trust Fund.
What GAO Found
The Trust Fund's uncommitted balance decreased from $7.3 billion at the end of fiscal year 2001 to about $1.9 billion at the end of fiscal year 2005. In 3 of the last 4 fiscal years, the Trust Fund's uncommitted balance has fallen by over $1 billion because revenues were lower than FAA forecasted due to the impact of unanticipated events such as the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. However, the rate of decrease has slowed; during fiscal year 2005, the uncommitted balance decreased by about $500 million. Under FAA's current authorization, appropriations from the Trust Fund are based on forecasted revenues. Thus, if actual revenues approximate forecasted revenues, there should be no substantial change in the uncommitted balance. However, for each fiscal year since 2001, because actual revenues have been less than forecasted, the uncommitted balance has fallen. Based on its revenue forecast and appropriation for fiscal year 2006, FAA forecasts that the Trust Fund's uncommitted balance will fall by the end of 2006 to about $1.7 billion. If the Congress continues to follow the formula from Vision 100--FAA's current authorizing legislation that links appropriations made available from the fund to revenue forecasts--then FAA expects there will be little change in the uncommitted balance for fiscal year 2007. If, instead, the Congress adopts the President's budget for FAA for fiscal year 2007, FAA forecasts that the fund's uncommitted balance by the end of 2007 will rise to about $2.7 billion. This higher forecasted uncommitted balance occurs because the President's budget calls for an appropriation to FAA from the Trust Fund that is about $1 billion lower than the Vision 100 formula. If revenues in fiscal years 2006 and 2007 are below forecasted levels, the Trust Fund's uncommitted balance will be less than forecasted and, in one scenario we analyzed, will reach zero by the end of 2007. This scenario raises concerns because, in the past, the Trust Fund's uncommitted balance was used to offset lower-than-expected Trust Fund revenues and decreased general fund contributions. FAA could help address these concerns by continuing to look for ways to improve efficiency and reduce costs. However, the zero-balance scenario would most likely have implications for the Congress in funding FAA programs. |
gao_GAO-06-111 | gao_GAO-06-111_0 | Critical Equipment Shortages Have Degraded the Overall Equipment Readiness of Nondeployed Army National Guard Units
While deploying Army National Guard units have had priority for getting the equipment they needed, readying these forces has degraded the equipment inventory of the Guard’s nondeployed units and equipment shortages threaten the Guard’s ability to prepare forces for future deployments. The Army National Guard’s Initial Equipment Shortages and the Continuing Need for Fully Equipped Forces for Current Operations Have Resulted in Critical Equipment Shortages
Most Army National Guard units mobilized for recent overseas operations had equipment shortages that had to be filled so that the unit could meet the combatant commander’s equipment requirements for their mission. As an increasing number of Army National Guard forces have been needed to support current operations, the Army National Guard has supplied the equipment its deploying units need to meet combatant commander requirements by transferring equipment from within the Army National Guard. We previously reported that as of June 2004 the Army National Guard had transferred more than 35,000 pieces of equipment to ready units for recent operations. The National Guard Bureau estimates that when substitute items, equipment undergoing maintenance, and equipment left overseas for follow-on forces are subtracted, its nondeployed units had available only about 34 percent of essential warfighting equipment as of July 2005. As of July 2005, the Army National Guard reported that equipment transfers had reduced its inventory of more than 220 items to less than 5 percent of the required amount or a quantity of fewer than 5 items. Among these 220 high-demand items are generators, trucks, and radios. This has challenged Guard units preparing to deploy because equipment requirements are not defined and communicated to them until close to their deployment dates. Army’s Lack of Accountability and Plans to Replace All Army National Guard Equipment Retained in Theater Hinder the Guard’s Ability to Prepare and Train Units
The Army National Guard estimates that, since 2003, it has left more than 64,000 equipment items valued at over $1.2 billion overseas to support continuing operations. But, the Army lacks a full accounting of this equipment and has not prepared plans to replace it as required under DOD policy. While the Army has now instituted processes to account for certain high- demand equipment items that are being left in theater for the duration of the conflict and expects replacement plans for this equipment to be developed by August 2005, it does not appear that these replacement plans will account for all items transferred to the active component because the Army has not been tracking all Guard equipment left in theater in a centralized manner. Army National Guard Units Are Changing to New Designs, but Will Continue to Lack Equipment Comparable to Active Forces
Army National Guard units are scheduled to convert to new designs within the Army’s modular force by 2008, but they are expected to convert with the equipment they have on hand and will lack some equipment for these designs until at least 2011. While the Army estimated in June 2005 that it would cost about $15.6 billion to convert most of the Guard’s units, this estimate did not include all expected costs and the Army was unable to provide detailed information to support the estimate. Further, it has not developed detailed equipping plans that specify the Guard’s equipment requirements as it progresses through the new rotation cycle used to provide ready forces for ongoing operations. In the short term, units nearing deployment will continue to receive priority for equipment, which may delay when units will receive the equipment needed for modular conversions. Further, without more complete equipment requirements and cost estimates, the DOD and Congress will not have all the information they need to evaluate funding requests for the Army National Guard’s transition to the modular force. This plan should include: the specific equipment requirements, costs, timelines, and funding strategy for converting Army National Guard units to the modular force and the extent to which Guard units will have comparable types of equipment and equipment levels as the active modular units, an analysis of the equipment the Army National Guard’s units will need for their missions in each phase of the rotation cycle, and how the Army will manage implementation risks to modular forces if full funding is not provided on the expected timeline. | Why GAO Did This Study
Recent military operations have required that the Army rely extensively on Army National Guard forces, which currently comprise over 30 percent of the ground forces in Iraq. Heavy deployments of Army National Guard forces and their equipment, much of which has been left overseas for follow-on forces, have raised questions about whether the Army National Guard has the types and quantities of equipment it will need to continue supporting ongoing operations and future missions. GAO was asked to assess the extent to which (1) the Army National Guard has the equipment needed to support ongoing operations and (2) the Army can account for Army National Guard equipment left overseas. GAO also assessed the Army's plans, cost estimates, and funding strategy for equipping Guard units under its modular and rotational force initiatives.
What GAO Found
While deploying Army National Guard units have had priority for getting the equipment they needed, readying these forces has degraded the equipment inventory of the Guard's nondeployed units and threatens the Guard's ability to prepare forces for future missions at home and overseas. Nondeployed Guard units now face significant equipment shortfalls because (1) they have been equipped at less than war-time levels with the assumption that they could obtain additional resources prior to deployment and (2) current operations have created an unanticipated high demand for certain items, such as armored vehicles. To fully equip its deploying units, as of July 2005, the Army National Guard had transferred more than 101,000 pieces of equipment from its nondeployed units. As of May 2005, such transfers had exhausted the Guard's inventory of more than 220 high demand equipment items, such as night vision equipment, trucks, and radios. Further, as equipment requirements for overseas operations continue to evolve, the Army has been unable to identify and communicate what items deploying units need until close to their scheduled deployments, which challenges the Guard to transfer needed equipment quickly. To meet the demand for certain types of equipment for continuing operations, the Army has required Army National Guard units to leave behind many items for use by follow-on forces, but the Army can account for only about 45 percent of these items and has not developed a plan to replace them, as DOD policy requires. DOD has directed the Army to track equipment Guard units left overseas and develop replacement plans, but they have not yet been completed. The Army Guard estimates that since 2003 it has left more than 64,000 items, valued at more than $1.2 billion, overseas to support operations. Without a completed and implemented plan to replace all Guard equipment left overseas, Army Guard units will likely face growing equipment shortages and challenges in regaining readiness for future missions. Thus, DOD and Congress will not have assurance that the Army has an effective strategy for addressing the Guard's equipping needs. Although Army National Guard units are scheduled to convert to new designs within the Army's modular force by 2008, they are not expected to be equipped for these designs until at least 2011. The Army has not developed detailed equipping plans that specify the Guard's equipment requirements to transform to a modular force while supporting ongoing operations. As of June 2005, the Army estimated that it would cost about $15.6 billion to convert most of the Guard's units, but this estimate did not include all expected costs and the Army was unable to provide detailed information to support the estimate. In the short term, units nearing deployment will continue to receive priority for equipment, which may affect the availability of equipment needed for modular conversions. Until the Army fully identifies the Guard's equipment requirements and costs for both the near and long term, DOD and Congress will not be in a sound position to weigh the affordability and effectiveness of the Army's plans. |
gao_GAO-04-459 | gao_GAO-04-459_0 | Out of an $7.6 billion fiscal year 2003 budget, EPA awarded $4.2 billion in grants and $934 million in contracts, as shown in figure 1. In fiscal year 2003, EPA awarded $656 million in discretionary grants. Discretionary Grant and Contract Funding Have Had Similar Trends, but Existing Data Make It Difficult to Analyze Trends in Goods and Services
EPA’s funding for discretionary grants and contracts have had similar trends from fiscal years 1993 through 2003, and this trend suggests there has been limited migration between discretionary grant and contract funds in EPA’s budget over this period. We estimate, on the basis of our survey responses from recipients of discretionary grants closed in fiscal years 2001 and 2002 and that had project start dates after October 1, 1997, that the majority of discretionary grants’ goods and services fell into three categories: research and development; training, workshops, and education; and journals, publications, and reports. EPA Generally Has More Specific Procedures Than Other Federal Agencies but Often Does Not Adequately Document Its Reasons for Choosing a Grant or a Contract
EPA has procedures to guide decisions on choosing a grant or a contract, but often has not followed one of its most important procedures— documenting in its award decision memorandums the reasons for choosing a grant instead of a contract. It is unclear whether this documentation shortcoming obscured inappropriate decisions to use grants instead of contracts. On the one hand, on the basis of our survey results, we estimate that 8 percent of EPA’s grantees would identify EPA as the grant’s primary and direct beneficiary. This estimate could suggest that the principal purpose of the award was to acquire property or services for EPA’s direct benefit, and that EPA should therefore have awarded some grants as contracts. However, for those grant recipients we surveyed who identified EPA as the grant’s primary and direct beneficiary, we could not determine from our file reviews and grantee interviews that the principal purpose of the award was to benefit EPA directly and that a contract should have been used instead. Conclusions
Although EPA has specific guidance to implement the Federal Grants and Cooperative Agreement Act, our review showed that EPA often did not follow its own requirements for adequately documenting in its decision memorandums the reasons for choosing a grant or a cooperative agreement instead of a contract. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.
Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine (1) the trends over the last 11 years on the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) expenditures on grants and contracts and the types of goods and services obtained by each and (2) the extent to which EPA has and follows procedures for deciding when to use grants or contracts. Was this financial assistance award made in the form of a grant or a cooperative agreement? | Why GAO Did This Study
Grants and contracts constitute over two-thirds of the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) budget. In fiscal year 2003, EPA awarded $3.6 billion in grants directed by Congress, $656 million in grants awarded at its own discretion, and $934 million in contracts. Under the Federal Grant and Cooperative Agreement Act of 1977, whether EPA should award a grant or a contract depends upon the principal purpose of the award. In this context, GAO was asked to determine (1) the trends over the last 11 years on EPA's expenditures on discretionary grants and contracts and the types of goods and services obtained by each and (2) the extent to which EPA has and follows procedures for deciding when to use grants or contracts.
What GAO Found
EPA's funding for discretionary grants and contracts had similar trends from fiscal years 1993 through 2003, suggesting limited migration between these funds in EPA's budget over this period. Although EPA grants data provide little information on goods and services obtained with discretionary grants, GAO estimates, based on its survey of grantees with grants closed in fiscal years 2001 and 2002 and that had project start dates after October 1, 1997, that the majority of goods and services fell into three categories: (1) research and development; (2) training, workshops, and education; and (3) journals, publications, and reports. EPA has specific procedures to guide decisions on choosing grants or contracts but often has not followed a very important one--documenting in its award decision memorandums the reasons for choosing a grant instead of a contract. EPA procedures define staff roles and responsibilities, provide examples of when to use a grant or a contract, and require documentation in the award decision memorandum to justify the use of a grant or a contract. However, in 64 percent (43 of 67) of the memorandums GAO reviewed, EPA did not fully justify its reasons for choosing a grant instead of a contract. It is unclear whether this shortcoming obscured inappropriate decisions to use grants instead of contracts. On the one hand, GAO's survey results showed that an estimated 8 percent of EPA's discretionary grantees would identify EPA as the primary and direct beneficiary. This estimate could suggest that the principal purpose of the grant award was acquiring property or services for EPA's direct benefit, and that EPA should have awarded some grants as contracts. However, for those grantees who identified EPA as the grant's primary and direct beneficiary, GAO's review of grant files and follow-up interviews indicated that some of these grants benefited both the federal government and the public and therefore could arguably have been awarded as either a grant or a contract. |
gao_GAO-05-394 | gao_GAO-05-394_0 | The Coast Guard and other federal agencies share their security responsibilities with several local stakeholder groups. Interagency Operational Centers Involve Multiple Participants and Offer Another Means of Improving Information Sharing
Another approach at improving information sharing and port security operations involves interagency operational centers—command centers that bring together the intelligence and operational efforts of various federal and nonfederal participants. These centers provide intelligence information and real-time operational data from sensors, radars, and cameras at one location to federal and nonfederal participants 24 hours a day. The types of information shared include assessments of vulnerabilities at specific port locations, information about potential threats or suspicious activities, and strategies the Coast Guard intends to use in protecting key infrastructure. Regardless of the structures and communication networks a committee adopted, stakeholders at all four locations we reviewed agreed that the committees fostered improved information sharing. However, the potential relationship between interagency operational centers and the Coast Guard’s new sector command centers remains to be determined, pending a Coast Guard report to Congress. Coast Guard Plans to Develop Sector Command Centers at Ports
The Coast Guard is planning to develop its own operational centers— called sector command centers—at additional ports. The primary reason given for this was that Coast Guard field office officials did not clearly understand their role in helping nonfederal officials apply for a security clearance. The Coast Guard’s program does not have formal procedures for using data to manage the program, but developing such procedures would allow the Coast Guard to identify and deal with possible problems in the future. Port stakeholders involved in the four area maritime security committees consistently stated that the lack of federal security clearances for nonfederal members was an impediment to effective information sharing. Coast Guard Has Taken Steps to Grant Additional Clearances to State, Local, and Industry Officials, but Efforts to Date Have Been Mixed
As part of its effort to improve information sharing at ports, the Coast Guard initiated a program in July 2004 to sponsor security clearances for members of area maritime security committees, but nonfederal officials have been slow in submitting their applications for a security clearance. After receiving a draft of this report, the Coast Guard finalized this guidance and sent it to field office officials in early April 2005. In addition, as the Coast Guard’s security clearance program evolves, participants on area maritime security committees or in sector command centers may change over time, thus highlighting the importance of having ways to raise the awareness of nonfederal officials about the security clearance process. Conclusions
Effective information sharing among members of area maritime security committees and participants in interagency operational centers can enhance the partnership between federal and nonfederal officials, and it can improve the leveraging of resources across jurisdictional boundaries for deterring, preventing, or responding to a possible terrorist attack at the nation’s ports. What impact have interagency operational centers had on information sharing? What barriers, if any, have hindered improvements in information sharing among port security stakeholders? | Why GAO Did This Study
Sharing information with nonfederal officials is an important tool in federal efforts to secure the nation's ports against a potential terrorist attack. The Coast Guard has lead responsibility in coordinating maritime information sharing efforts. The Coast Guard has established area maritime security committees--forums that involve federal and nonfederal officials who identify and address risks in a port. The Coast Guard and other agencies have sought to further enhance information sharing and port security operations by establishing interagency operational centers--command centers that tie together the efforts of federal and nonfederal participants. GAO was asked to review the efforts to see what impact the committees and interagency operational centers have had on improving information sharing and to identify any barriers that have hindered information sharing.
What GAO Found
Area maritime security committees provide a structure that improves information sharing among port security stakeholders. At the four port locations GAO visited, federal and nonfederal stakeholders said that the newly formed committees were an improvement over previous information sharing efforts. The types of information shared included assessments of vulnerabilities at port locations and strategies the Coast Guard intends to use in protecting key infrastructure. The three interagency operational centers established to date allow for even greater information sharing because the centers operate on a 24-hour-a-day basis, and they receive real-time information from data sources such as radars and sensors. The Coast Guard is planning to develop its own centers--called sector command centers--at up to 40 additional port locations to monitor information and to support its operations. The relationship between the interagency operational centers and the planned expansion of sector command centers remains to be determined. The major barrier hindering information sharing has been the lack of federal security clearances for nonfederal members of committees or centers. By February 2005--or 4 months after the Coast Guard developed a list of 359 committee members who needed a security clearance--28 of the 359 members had submitted the necessary paperwork for a security clearance. Coast Guard field officials did not clearly understand that they were responsible for contacting nonfederal officials about the clearance process. To deal with this, in early April 2005, the Coast Guard issued guidance to field offices that clarified their role. In addition, the Coast Guard did not have formal procedures that called for the use of data to monitor application trends. Developing such procedures would aid in identifying deficiencies in the future. As the Coast Guard proceeds with its program, another way to improve the submission of paperwork involves educating nonfederal officials about the clearance process. |
gao_GAO-04-977 | gao_GAO-04-977_0 | Corporate Network Faces an Increasingly Challenging Business Environment, Creating Potential Stress on Its Financial Condition
Like other financial institutions, corporates face a challenging business environment that affects their financial condition and is characterized by increasing competition, changing product and service offerings, and rapid technological advances. Corporates appear to be managing risk by shifting toward more variable-rate and shorter-term securities, providing a potentially better match for the relatively short-term nature of their members’ deposits. The Challenging Business Environment in Which Corporates Operate May Impact Their Financial Condition
Corporate credit unions are operating in a challenging business environment characterized by increased competition, pressure to increase returns on their investments in a low-interest-rate environment, and the need to invest in technology and personnel to meet the demands of their credit union members for new and more sophisticated products and services. However, since 2000 capital ratios have declined as growth in assets outpaced growth in capital. However, a regulatory change effective in 2003 allowed certain corporates to purchase securities with lower credit quality, but few have used this investment authority. This shift highlights the importance of risk monitoring and management by the corporates and NCUA. NCUA Strengthened Its Oversight of Corporates, but Could Do More to Anticipate and Address Emerging Network Issues
NCUA has made numerous changes over the last several years to strengthen its oversight of corporates but faces challenges in such areas as networkwide assessments, obtaining and utilizing technical staff resources, developing merger guidance for corporates, and assuring the quality of corporates’ internal control structures. NCUA established the Office of Corporate Credit Unions (OCCU) in 1994, partly in response to problems with selected investments at U.S. Central. NCUA Identified Deficiencies but Did Not Systematically Track Their Resolution or Evaluate Trends in Examination Data
NCUA’s risk-focused approach has helped it identify weaknesses in corporates’ operations and require corrective actions at corporates; however, we found that NCUA did not methodically aggregate and track the resolution of deficiencies or systematically conduct trend analyses to identify recurrent or networkwide issues. According to NCUA, information systems specialists had reviewed the system’s performance in prior examinations. Recommendations for Executive Action
To promote a more systematic and consistent approach in NCUA’s oversight of corporates to ensure they are safely providing financial services to natural person credit unions, we recommend that the Chairman of the National Credit Union Administration take the following five actions: Establish a process and structure to ensure more systematic involvement of specialists in identifying and addressing problems and developing and consistently applying policies, and reassess whether there are sufficient specialists to oversee corporates; Track and analyze examination deficiencies on a networkwide basis to identify and track recurring and pervasive issues throughout the network and to ensure that corporates take required corrective actions; Pay increased attention to oversight of corporates’ risk management functions to ensure corporates have sufficient capacity and skills to monitor and manage their risks; Provide specific guidance to corporates for merger proposal packages to ensure they are providing sufficient and relevant information, and improve guidance to examiners to ensure that merger proposals are reviewed consistently and meet the goals of serving members while not placing NCUSIF at undue risk; and Require corporates with assets of $500 million or more to be subject to the internal control reporting requirements of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporate Improvement Act of 1991 to ensure that corporates are held to the same standards as other financial institutions that face similar risks. 2. 1. | Why GAO Did This Study
Thousands of credit unions have placed about $55 billion of their excess funds in corporate credit unions (corporates). In a three-tiered system, corporates provide lending, investment, and processing services for their member credit unions. Problems with investments in the past prompted regulatory changes that required higher capitalization and stricter risk management, but allowed for expanded investment authorities. GAO assessed (1) the changes in financial condition of the corporate network and (2) the oversight of corporates by the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA), the federal regulator of credit unions.
What GAO Found
Corporates face an increasingly challenging business environment that potentially could stress their overall financial condition. In response to the competitive environment, corporates are offering new and more sophisticated products and services, expanding their use of technology, and seeking opportunities to merge or collaborate with other corporates. The corporates' financial condition as measured by profitability and capital ratios remained close to a range that has prevailed since the mid-1990s. However, since 2000, a large influx of deposits, coupled with low returns on traditional corporate investments, has constrained earnings and caused a downward trend in corporates' overall profitability. To generate earnings, corporates increasingly have targeted more sophisticated and potentially riskier investments, but appear to be managing risk by shifting toward more variable-rate and shorter-term investments, providing a potentially better match for the relatively short-term nature of their members' deposits. However, the corporates' changing business environment and utilization of more sophisticated and riskier investments increases the importance of NCUA regularly assessing its oversight processes to ensure that corporates are properly managing these risks. NCUA has strengthened its oversight of corporates by creating a centralized office for oversight, revising regulations, implementing risk-focused supervision, and hiring specialists. However, NCUA faces challenges in identifying networkwide problems on a consistent basis, using specialists effectively, providing relevant guidance on mergers, and assuring the quality of corporates' internal controls. Although NCUA identified deficiencies during its examinations, it has not systematically tracked their resolution or evaluated trends in examination data, which could help anticipate emerging issues facing corporates. NCUA also did not fully consider all risks when allocating resources or assigning specialists to examinations, leading to NCUA overlooking some information system deficiencies. Although corporates continue to consider mergers to remain competitive, NCUA had not developed adequate guidance for submitting and reviewing merger proposals. Finally, NCUA has not ensured that corporates' internal controls have remained consistent with those of similarly sized financial institutions |
gao_GAO-11-556T | gao_GAO-11-556T_0 | The manufacturer must demonstrate to FDA that the new device is substantially equivalent to a device already legally on the market that does not require a PMA. We recommended that FDA expeditiously take steps to issue regulations for each class III device type allowed to enter the market through the 510(k) process, including to (1) reclassify each device type into class I or class II, or requiring it to remain in class III, and (2) for those device types remaining in class III, require approval for marketing through the PMA process. Postmarket Oversight of Voluntary Medical Device Recalls
Overseeing recalls is an important element of FDA’s postmarket responsibilities. FDA’s role is generally to oversee a firm’s management of a recall. FDA Has Taken Some Actions in Response to Our Recommendation to Strengthen the Premarket Review Process, but Concerns About the 510(k) Process Remain
FDA has begun to take steps to address our 2009 recommendation about class III devices that are still allowed to enter the U.S. market through the less stringent 510(k) process, but progress has been limited. Since our report was issued, the agency has set strategic goals to address this matter, but has issued a final rule regarding the classification of only one device type. As of April 1, 2011, 26 additional class III device types could still enter the U.S. market through the less stringent 510(k) process. FDA has been taking steps to address the 26 class III device types— including automated external defibrillators and implantable hip joints— that can still enter the U.S. market through the 510(k) process. Since we issued our report in January 2009, FDA cleared at least 67 individual submissions that fall within 12 of these class III device types through the 510(k) process. Subsequent to the issuance of our 2009 report and in response to numerous concerns over the effectiveness of the 510(k) process, including its ability to provide adequate assurance that devices are safe and effective, FDA announced it would take additional actions to enhance premarket device safety. Shortcomings in FDA’s Oversight of the Highest-Risk Medical Device Recalls Increase the Risk That Unsafe Devices Continue to Be Used
Our preliminary findings suggest that shortcomings in FDA’s oversight of the medical device recall process may limit the agency’s ability to ensure that the highest-risk recalls are being implemented in an effective and timely manner. However, FDA has not routinely used these recall data as a surveillance tool or for examining broad trends of medical device recalls. FDA Inconsistently Assessed the Effectiveness of Recalls
Our preliminary analysis revealed inconsistencies in FDA’s assessments of the effectiveness of recalls. FDA Lacks Specific Criteria to Determine Whether Firms Have Taken Adequate Steps to Correct or Remove Recalled Devices
One of the gaps in FDA’s recall process suggested by our preliminary work is that FDA lacks specific criteria for making decisions about whether recalling firms have effectively completed their recalls by taking adequate steps to correct or remove recalled devices. Our preliminary review shows that firms are not always able to correct or remove all unsafe medical devices from the market. Of the 53 class I recalls we reviewed, we found 10 were ongoing, 14 were completed— meaning that FDA district office officials concluded that the firm had fulfilled its responsibilities for correcting or removing the devices—and 29 were terminated—meaning that FDA headquarters determined that recalling firms had taken sufficient corrective actions to prevent reoccurrence of the problems that led to the recalls. This approach is inconsistent with internal control standards for the federal government, which indicate “that all transactions and other significant events need to be clearly documented,” and stress the importance of “the creation and maintenance of related records which provide evidence of execution of these activities as well as appropriate documentation.”
Also, we found that FDA termination decisions were frequently not made in a timely manner—within 3 months of the completion of the recall— increasing the risk that unsafe or defective devices remained available for use. While FDA’s recent actions to try to improve the premarket approval process are positive steps—such as commissioning the Institute of Medicine to conduct an independent review of the process—it remains to be seen whether these actions will help ensure that medical devices marketed in the United States receive appropriate premarket review. Related GAO Products
High Risk Series: An Update. Food and Drug Administration: Opportunities Exist to Better Address Management Challenges. Medical Devices: FDA Should Take Steps to Ensure That High-Risk Device Types Are Approved through the Most Stringent Premarket Review Process. GAO-09-190. Washington, D.C.: January 15, 2009. High-Risk Series: An Update. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is responsible for overseeing medical devices sold in the United States. In general, new devices are subject to FDA review via either the 510(k) premarket notification process, which determines if a device is substantially equivalent to another legally marketed device, or the more stringent premarket approval (PMA) process, which requires the manufacturer to supply evidence providing reasonable assurance that the device is safe and effective. FDA also has broad responsibilities for postmarket surveillance of devices, including oversight of recalls. A recall involves the correction or removal of a product from the market and is an important remedial action that can mitigate the risks associated with a defective or unsafe medical device. In recent years, GAO has identified a wide variety of concerns related to FDA's ability to fulfill its mission of protecting the public health and added FDA's oversight of medical products, including devices, to its list of high-risk areas. This statement provides an update on FDA's actions in response to a recommendation made in GAO's report, Medical Devices: FDA Should Take Steps to Ensure That High-Risk Device Types Are Approved through the Most Stringent Premarket Review Process ( GAO-09-190 , January 15, 2009). It also contains preliminary information on FDA's oversight of medical device recalls. Because of the preliminary nature of this work, GAO is not making recommendations at this time.
What GAO Found
FDA has begun to take steps to address GAO's 2009 recommendation about high-risk devices that are allowed to enter the U.S. market through the less stringent 510(k) process, but progress has been limited. High-risk devices include those which are implantable or life sustaining. In 2009, GAO recommended that FDA expeditiously take steps to issue regulations for the device types classified as high risk that are currently allowed to enter the market via the 510(k) process. Since then, FDA has set strategic goals to address these device types, but has issued a final rule regarding the classification of only one device type. As of April 1, 2011, FDA's action on the 26 remaining types of high-risk devices was incomplete. Thus, these types of devices--such as automated external defibrillators and implantable hip joints--can still enter the U.S. market through the less stringent 510(k) process. GAO found that, since its report was issued in January 2009, FDA has cleared at least 67 510(k) submissions that fall within these high-risk device types. FDA has taken some additional steps to enhance premarket device safety since GAO's 2009 report was issued--for example, it commissioned the Institute of Medicine to conduct an independent review of the premarket review process--but it is too early to tell whether any forthcoming changes will enhance public health. GAO's preliminary analysis shows that, from 2005 through 2009, firms initiated 3,510 voluntary medical device recalls, an average of just over 700 per year. Although FDA maintains extensive information on each recall, it has not been routinely analyzing recall data that would allow it to explain trends in recalls over time, thus missing an opportunity to proactively identify and address the risks presented by unsafe devices. GAO's preliminary work also identified several gaps in the medical device recall process that limited recalling firms' and FDA's abilities to ensure that the highest-risk recalls were being implemented in an effective and timely manner. GAO found that firms frequently were unable to correct or remove all devices subject to the highest-risk recalls. GAO's preliminary findings indicate that FDA lacks clear guidance for overseeing recalls which has led to inconsistencies in FDA's assessments of whether individual recalls were implemented effectively. Consequently, FDA officials examining similar situations sometimes reached opposite conclusions regarding whether recalls were effective. In addition, FDA had not established thresholds for assessing whether firms effectively completed recalls by correcting or removing a sufficient number of recalled devices. Further, GAO determined that FDA's decisions to terminate completed recalls--that is assess whether firms had taken sufficient actions to prevent a reoccurrence of the problems that led to the recalls--were frequently not made within its prescribed time frames. Finally, GAO found that FDA did not document its justification for terminating recalls. Taken together, GAO's preliminary work suggests that the combined effect of these gaps may increase the risk that unsafe medical devices could remain on the market. |
gao_GAO-09-874 | gao_GAO-09-874_0 | Roughly two-thirds of these posts are in locations that qualify for a special salary differential to compensate officers for the harsh living conditions experienced there. Persistent Staffing and Experience Gaps at Hardship Posts Can Compromise Diplomatic Readiness
Despite some progress since we last reported in 2006, State has continued to face staffing and experience gaps at hardship posts that may compromise its diplomatic readiness. Staffing and Experience Gaps Remain at Key Hardship Posts
State continues to face staffing and experience gaps at hardship posts, including many of significant strategic importance to the United States. First, State has faced difficulty in filling critical positions at hardship posts. Several Factors Contribute to Gaps at Hardship Posts
A number of factors lead to gaps at hardship posts, including: State’s overall staff shortage, which is compounded by the significant personnel demands of Iraq and Afghanistan; a persistent mid-level staffing deficit exacerbated by continued low bidding on hardship posts; and an assignment system that does not explicitly address the continuing experience gap at hardship posts. According to these officials, gaps can lead to decreased reporting coverage, loss of institutional knowledge, and increased supervisory requirements for senior staff, which take time away from other critical diplomatic responsibilities. State Has Wide Range of Measures and Incentives to Staff Hardship Posts but Their Effectiveness is Unclear Due to Lack of Evaluation
State uses a range of incentives to staff hardship posts, but their effectiveness remains unclear due to a lack of evaluation. Incentives to serve in hardship posts range from monetary benefits to changes in service and bidding requirements. In 2006, we recommended that State evaluate the effectiveness of its incentive programs for hardship post assignments, but the department has not yet done so systematically. Further, recent legislation will increase the cost of existing incentives, thereby increasing the need for State to fully evaluate its incentives to ensure resources are effectively targeted and not wasted. The survey also does not ask respondents for key demographic information, such as age and family status. State Did Not Undertake Congressionally Mandated Report to Assess Impact of Increased Hardship and Danger Pay on Staffing Shortfalls
State has not complied with a congressional mandate to assess the effectiveness of increasing hardship and danger pay ceilings to recruit experienced officers to certain posts, hampering oversight of State’s use of the authority to increase such differentials. Despite the hardship and danger pay increases, these high-priority posts continue to have difficulties attracting bidders. For example, the department acknowledged that many hardship posts may face experience gaps. To assess the extent to which State has used incentives to address staffing gaps at hardship posts, we reviewed GAO and State OIG reports, as well as applicable legislative documents and guidance from the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and the Office of Management and Budget; examined surveys conducted by State; analyzed State documents that outline incentives for hardship service, including those available to officers serving in Iraq and Afghanistan; collected data on participation in and funds expended on hardship interviewed officials in State’s Bureau of Human Resources, Bureau of Administration, and six regional bureaus regarding State’s use of incentives. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of State (State) has designated about two-thirds of its 268 overseas posts as hardship posts. Staff working at such posts often encounter harsh conditions, including inadequate medical facilities and high crime. Many of these posts are vital to U.S. foreign policy objectives and need a full complement of staff with the right skills to carry out the department's priorities. As such, State offers staff at these posts a hardship differential--an additional adjustment to basic pay--to compensate officers for the conditions they encounter and as a recruitment and retention incentive. GAO was asked to assess (1) State's progress in addressing staffing gaps at hardship posts since 2006 and the effect of any remaining gaps, and (2) the extent to which State has used incentives to address staffing gaps at hardship posts. GAO analyzed State data; reviewed relevant documents; met with officials in Washington, D.C.; and conducted fieldwork in five hardship posts.
What GAO Found
Despite some progress in addressing staffing shortfalls since 2006, State's diplomatic readiness remains at risk due to persistent staffing and experience gaps at key hardship posts. Several factors contribute to these gaps. First, State continues to have fewer officers than positions, a shortage compounded by the personnel demands of Iraq and Afghanistan. Second, while State has reduced its mid-level experience gap, the department does not anticipate eliminating this gap until 2012 and continues to face difficulties attracting experienced applicants to hardship posts--especially posts of greatest hardship. Third, although State's assignment system has prioritized the staffing of hardship posts, it does not explicitly address the continuing experience gap at such posts, many of which are strategically important, yet are often staffed with less experienced officers. Staffing and experience gaps can diminish diplomatic readiness in several ways, according to State officials. For example, gaps can lead to decreased reporting coverage, loss of institutional knowledge, and increased supervisory requirements for senior staff, detracting from other critical diplomatic responsibilities. State uses a range of incentives to staff hardship posts, but their effectiveness remains unclear due to a lack of evaluation. Incentives to serve in hardship posts range from monetary benefits to changes in service and bidding requirements, such as reduced tour lengths at posts where dangerous conditions prevent some family members from accompanying officers. In a 2006 report on staffing gaps, GAO recommended that State evaluate the effectiveness of its incentive programs for hardship post assignments. In response, State added a question about hardship incentives to a recent employee survey. However, the survey does not fully meet GAO's recommendation for several reasons, including that State did not include several incentives in the survey. State also did not comply with a legal requirement to assess the effectiveness of increasing danger and hardship pay in filling certain posts. Recent legislation increasing Foreign Service Officers' basic pay will increase the cost of existing incentives, thereby heightening the importance that State evaluate its incentives for hardship post assignments to ensure resources are effectively targeted and not wasted. |
gao_GAO-01-941 | gao_GAO-01-941_0 | Medigap coverage is widely available to most beneficiaries. Medicare beneficiaries who purchase Medigap plans have coverage for essentially all major Medicare cost-sharing requirements, including coinsurance and deductibles. But offering this “first-dollar” coverage may undermine incentives for prudent use of Medicare services, especially with regard to discretionary services, which could ultimately increase costs for beneficiaries and the entire Medicare program. While the lack of coverage for outpatient prescription drugs through Medicare has led to various proposals to expand Medicare benefits, relatively few beneficiaries purchase standardized Medigap plans offering these benefits. Low enrollment in these plans may be due to fewer plans being marketed with these benefits, their relatively high cost, and the limited nature of their prescription drug benefit, which still requires beneficiaries to pay more than half of their prescription drug costs while receiving a maximum of $3,000 in benefits. As a result, Medigap beneficiaries with prescription drug coverage continue to incur substantial out-of-pocket costs for prescription drugs and other health care services. | What GAO Found
To protect themselves against large out-of-pocket expenses and help fill gaps in Medicare coverage, most beneficiaries buy supplemental insurance, known as Medigap; contribute to employer-sponsored health benefits to supplement Medicare coverage; or enroll in private Medicare+Choice plans rather than traditional fee-for-service Medicare. Because Medicare+Choice plans are not available everywhere and many employers do not offer retiree health benefits, Medigap is sometimes the only supplemental insurance option available to seniors. Medicare beneficiaries who buy Medigap plans have coverage for essentially all major Medicare cost-sharing requirements, including coinsurance and deductibles. But this "first-dollar" coverage may undermine incentives for prudent use of Medicare services, which could ultimately boost costs for the Medicare program. Although various proposals have been made to add a prescription drug benefit to Medicare, relatively few beneficiaries buy standardized Medigap plans with this benefit. Low enrollment in these plans may be due to the fact that fewer plans are being marketed with these benefits; their relatively high cost; and the limited nature of their prescription drug benefit, which still requires beneficiaries to pay more than half of their prescription drug costs. Most plans have a $3,000 cap on benefits. As a result, Medigap beneficiaries with prescription drug coverage continue to incur substantial out-of-pocket expenses for prescription drugs and other health care services. |
gao_GAO-17-14 | gao_GAO-17-14_0 | In both of these plans, agencies are directed to identify the various strategies and resources they will use to achieve their goals. These outside parties include those in the private, nonprofit, and academic sectors. Practices That Facilitate the Effective Implementation of Open Innovation Initiatives
Based on our review of agency Open Government Plans and other sources, we found that agencies have frequently used the five open innovation strategies shown below to collaborate with citizens and external parties, and encourage their participation in agency efforts. We identified seven practices that federal agencies can use to help effectively design, implement, and assess open innovation initiatives. These practices are detailed below. Select the Strategy Appropriate for the Purpose of Engaging the Public and the Agency’s Capabilities
Through our analysis of relevant literature and interviews with experts, we identified several factors agency officials should consider when selecting the most appropriate open innovation strategy or strategies to use for an initiative. In March 2014, NASA officially announced the Asteroid Data Hunter challenge and citizen science effort to develop the more accurate algorithm. It can also help mobilize a broader community of external stakeholders and partner organizations. DOT Involves Stakeholders in an Ideation Initiative to Identify and Implement Improvements in Highway Transportation
The Federal Highway Administration’s (FHWA) Every Day Counts (EDC) is an example of an ideation initiative. According to our literature review and interviews with experts and agency officials, the agency and any partners should develop a detailed implementation plan for the initiative that clearly identifies the specific tasks and actions needed to carry out the initiative, the parties responsible for completing them, and the timeframes for doing so; potential participant groups to engage in the initiative, including when and how the agency and any partners will reach out to various participant groups and encourage them to participate, and how they will engage with participants during and after the initiative’s implementation; and what data will be collected, and how, during and after implementation, and how the data will be evaluated to determine overall results and progress towards the initiative’s stated goals. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 includes a provision for us to periodically review how implementation of its requirements is affecting agency performance. Our specific objective for this report is to identify, and illustrate through selected agency examples, practices that facilitate the effective implementation of open innovation strategies and the effects, if any, the use of those strategies have had on agency performance and opportunities for citizen engagement. To identify the various open innovation strategies federal agencies have used to facilitate participation by, and collaboration with, citizens and other non-profit, academic, and private sector partners, we reviewed documents, reports, and resources from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), and the General Services Administration (GSA), and analyzed the Open Government Plans of federal agencies. To illustrate how actions that selected agencies have taken to carry out open innovation initiatives have reflected effective practices, and the effects the application of these practices had on agency performance and citizen engagement, we selected six agencies for more in-depth review: the Departments of Energy, Health and Human Services, Housing and Urban Development, and Transportation (DOT); the Environmental Protection Agency; and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. | Why GAO Did This Study
To address the complex and crosscutting challenges facing the federal government, agencies need to effectively engage and collaborate with those in the private, nonprofit, and academic sectors, other levels of government, and citizens. Agencies are increasingly using open innovation strategies for these purposes.
The GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 (GPRAMA) requires federal agencies to identify strategies and resources they will use to achieve their goals. GPRAMA also requires GAO to periodically review how implementation of its requirements is affecting agency performance. This report identifies and illustrates practices that help agencies effectively implement open innovation strategies, and how the use of those strategies has affected agency performance and opportunities for citizen engagement.
To identify these practices, GAO analyzed relevant federal guidance and academic literature, and interviewed open innovation experts. To refine and illustrate the practices, GAO reviewed documents and interviewed officials from the Office of Management and Budget, Office of Science and Technology Policy, General Services Administration, and six selected federal agencies. GAO selected the agencies and a sample of their initiatives based on several factors, including the number and type of initiatives outlined in their Open Government Plans.
What GAO Found
Open innovation involves using various tools and approaches to harness the ideas, expertise, and resources of those outside an organization to address an issue or achieve specific goals. GAO found that federal agencies have frequently used five open innovation strategies to collaborate with citizens and external stakeholders, and encourage their participation in agency initiatives.
GAO identified seven practices that agencies can use to effectively implement initiatives that involve the use of these strategies:
Select the strategy appropriate for the purpose of engaging the public and the agency’s capabilities.
Clearly define specific goals and performance measures for the initiative.
Identify and engage external stakeholders and potential partners.
Develop plans for implementing the initiative and recruiting participants.
Engage participants and partners while implementing the initiative.
Collect and assess relevant data and report results.
Sustain communities of interested partners and participants.
Aspects of these practices are illustrated by the 15 open innovation initiatives GAO reviewed at six selected agencies: the Departments of Energy, Health and Human Services, Housing and Urban Development, and Transportation (DOT); the Environmental Protection Agency; and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). For example:
With the Asteroid Data Hunter challenge, NASA used a challenge and citizen science effort, beginning in 2014, to improve the accuracy of its asteroid detection program and develop an application for citizen scientists.
Since 2009, DOT’s Federal Highway Administration has used an ideation initiative called Every Day Counts to identify innovations to improve highway project delivery. Teams of federal, state, local, and industry experts then implement the ideas chosen through this process. |
gao_GAO-07-29 | gao_GAO-07-29_0 | NCUA Rules Interpreting CUMAA Appear to Have Fueled Expansion of Community-Chartered Credit Unions
Since the passage of CUMAA in 1998 and subsequent NCUA rule changes, NCUA has approved community charters with increasingly larger geographic fields of membership—for example, covering entire cities or multiple counties. NCUA has undertaken a pilot effort to capture information on the income characteristics of credit union members, but the data will not allow NCUA to reach statistically valid conclusions by charter type. Congressional findings contained in CUMAA linked the tax-exempt status of credit unions, in part, to their “specified mission of meeting the credit and savings needs of consumers, especially persons of modest means.” NCUA incorporated this emphasis into its current strategic plan, which gives its mission as “facilitating the availability of credit union services to all eligible consumers, especially those of modest means through a regulatory environment that fosters a safe and sound credit union system.” According to NCUA officials, the changes in chartering requirements should allow credit unions to serve a more diverse membership, including those of modest means. As a result, although NCUA data indicate increased adoption of underserved areas and increased participation in the LICU program, data do not exist to specifically show the extent to which these programs have increased services provided to individuals of modest means. Federal Reserve Survey Data Suggest that Credit Unions Continued to Serve a Lower Proportion of Low- and Moderate-Income Households than Banks
Despite the shift toward community charters and the increase in the number of credit unions participating in NCUA’s low-income and underserved programs, our analysis of data from the Federal Reserve’s 2004 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) indicated that credit unions had a lower proportion of customers who were of low- and moderate-income than did banks. As of September 2006, the officials indicated that the data collection effort had started, and that they expected the results to be available in the first quarter of 2007.
Credit Unions Offered Better Interest Rates on Some Products, but the Extent to Which the Benefits of Tax- Exempt Status Have Been Passed to Members Is Unclear
Our analysis showed that credit unions tended to offer better interest rates than similarly sized banks for a variety of products and loans, but rate data alone cannot be used to determine the extent to which the benefits of tax exemption have been passed to members. The difference between credit unions and banks was more pronounced for consumer loans. Lack of Guidance and Criteria for Applying UBIT to State Credit Union Activities Makes Determining Compliance with the Requirement Difficult
As stated earlier, state-chartered credit unions are subject to tax on unrelated business income while federal credit unions specifically are exempt. However, the NCUA effort provides a snapshot of federal credit union compensation for a single year, 2005, and it is unclear whether NCUA will conduct future reviews of credit union executive compensation. The value and utility of the information collected would be greatly enhanced if NCUA were to move beyond a pilot and continue the data collection effort and address some of the limitations of the pilot. To achieve this, NCUA may want to consider options such as requiring federal credit unions to include specific information on executive compensation in call reports or issuing regulations that would require all federal credit unions to make executive compensation information available to members of credit unions at annual meetings. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our report objectives were to (1) assess the effect of the 1998 Credit Union Membership Access Act (CUMAA) on federal credit union membership and charter expansion, (2) review the National Credit Union Administration’s (NCUA) efforts to expand credit union services to low- and moderate- income individuals, (3) compare rates offered by credit unions to comparably sized banks as one indicator of how tax-exemption might benefit credit union members, (4) discuss issues associated with the application of the federal unrelated business income tax (UBIT) to credit unions, and (5) assess the transparency of credit union executives and board member compensation. That suggestion is not accurate. | Why GAO Did This Study
Legislative and regulatory changes have blurred distinctions between credit unions and other depository institutions and raised questions about the tax-exempt status of credit unions. This report (1) assesses the effect of the Credit Union Membership Access Act on credit union membership and charters, (2) reviews the National Credit Union Administration's (NCUA) efforts to expand services to low- and moderate-income individuals, (3) compares rates offered by credit unions with comparably sized banks, (4) discusses unrelated business income tax issues, and (5) assesses transparency of credit union senior executive compensation. To address our objectives, we obtained NCUA data on credit union membership, charter changes, efforts to target those of modest means, and executive disclosure requirements. We also analyzed Federal Reserve Board's Survey of Consumer Finances and Internal Revenue Service data.
What GAO Found
Since the passage of the Credit Union Membership Access Act (CUMAA) in 1998, larger community-based credit unions have constituted a much greater proportion of the industry. NCUA has approved federal community charters with increasingly larger geographic areas and potential for economically diverse membership. Much of the shift toward the larger community-based credit unions was due to conversions from other charters. NCUA's approval of these charters appears to have been triggered by changes in the economic environment and financial services industry and to diversify membership to accomplish goals such as increasing service to those of modest means. NCUA has established the low-income credit union program and allowed adoption of "underserved areas" to increase credit union services to individuals of modest means. Despite increased credit union participation in these programs and the expansion of community charters, the 2004 and 2001 Survey of Consumer Finances indicated that credit unions lagged behind banks in serving low- and moderate-income households. NCUA officials told GAO that, given the nascent nature of its two initiatives and the relatively recent shift to community charters, they did not yet expect observable changes in the data. Also, NCUA recently has undertaken a pilot effort to collect data on the income characteristics of credit union members. Because limited data exist on the extent to which credit unions serve those of modest means, any assessment would be enhanced if NCUA were to move beyond its pilot and systematically collect income data. Based on GAO analysis, credit unions typically had more favorable rates than banks, particularly for consumer loans. For example, credit unions auto loans were 1 to 2 percentage points lower than similarly sized banks, on average. However, it was not clear the extent that the more favorable rates fully reflected the tax subsidy that credit unions receive by tax-exemption. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has been reviewing state-chartered credit union activities (federal credit unions are exempt) to determine compliance with unrelated business income tax (UBIT) requirements, but such determinations are difficult due to complicated criteria and because many credit unions file group rather than individual returns. IRS stated that it plans to issue technical guidance in the first quarter of 2007 that the agency believes will help ensure credit union compliance with UBIT. Finally, credit union executive compensation is not transparent. Federal credit unions, unlike other tax-exempt organizations, do not file information returns, which contain data on executive compensation, with IRS. NCUA is collecting compensation data as part of its pilot, but it is unclear whether NCUA will conduct future reviews. NCUA officials noted a number of alternatives that could be used to increase transparency, such as requiring federal credit unions to provide compensation information in call reports or require that credit unions disclose compensation data at annual meetings. |
gao_HEHS-97-9 | gao_HEHS-97-9_0 | 1). Disability Ratings May Not Reflect Economic Loss
Disability ratings in the current schedule may not reflect the actual economic loss that disabled veterans, on average, now experience. While the law contains no definition of “impairments in earning capacity,” ratings assigned to conditions in the schedule are based more on judgments of the loss in functional capacity, rather than in earning capacity, resulting from these conditions. It set disability ratings on this basis. Changes in the Economy and Society Since 1945 Indicate That Ratings May Need Updating
Even if functional capacity accurately approximated disabled veterans’ reduction in earning capacity in 1945, changes have occurred since then that have implications for how accurately those ratings reflect disabled veterans’ reduction in earning capacity today. There have also been changes in the labor market and social attitudes toward the disabled that may affect disabled veterans’ ability to work. As part of this study, the Commission examined VA’s Schedule for Rating Disabilities. The ECVARS is the most comprehensive assessment of the validity of the ratings ever done. Although the ECVARS found that many of the ratings in the schedule did not correspond to the actual earnings loss experienced by veterans, no changes were made to the schedule on the basis of these findings. Using Data on Earnings Has Advantages in Determining Impairment in Earning Capacity
Although VA has chosen not to do so, using an estimate of actual loss in earnings to approximate loss in earning capacity would help VA make certain that veterans are compensated to an extent commensurate with the economic losses attributable to service-connected conditions. This would also help to ensure that disability compensation funds are equitably distributed among disabled veterans given today’s work environment. Cost of Estimating Average Impairment in Earning Capacity
As a result of their experience with similar studies, officials at the Bureau of the Census estimated that it would cost between $5 million and $10 million to conduct a study to determine the average impairment in earning capacity resulting from all, or nearly all, the conditions in the schedule. Estimates of disabled veterans’ average loss in earnings attributable to specific service-connected conditions could be (1) compared with the ratings for these conditions to determine whether the ratings correspond to economic loss and (2) used to adjust ratings that do not reasonably reflect this loss. The cost, however, represents a small fraction of the approximately $11.5 billion in disability compensation benefits paid to veterans in fiscal year 1995. Matter for Congressional Consideration
VA’s disability ratings do not reflect the effect economic, medical, and other changes since 1945 may have had on disabled veterans’ earning capacity. We believe disability ratings in the schedule should be based primarily but not solely on estimates of veterans’ average loss in earnings. Other major contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.
Design and Methodology for the Economic Validation of the Rating Schedule
Study Objectives
The Economic Validation of the Rating Schedule (ECVARS) was designed to provide information that could be used to estimate the average economic loss attributable to individual recognize trends toward increases or decreases in the rate of economic loss that can be expected with the passage of time and aging of the veteran population, recognize and evaluate the basic differences between the disability evaluation policy of VA and that of other federal agencies for comparable disabilities, and formulate proposals for the refinement of the schedule on the basis of these estimates and evaluations. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information that would enable the subcommittee to assess the need for a comprehensive study of the economic validity of the Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) disability rating schedule, focusing on: (1) the basis for the disability ratings assigned to conditions in the current schedule; (2) socioeconomic changes that have occurred since the original version of the schedule was developed that may have influenced the earning capacity of disabled veterans; (3) the results of a previous study that examined the validity of ratings in the schedule; (4) VA's efforts to help ensure that the ratings do reflect disabled veterans' average impairment in earning capacity; and (5) the advantage of basing ratings in the schedule on actual loss in earnings, and approaches that could be used to estimate this loss.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the disability ratings in VA's current schedule are still primarily based on physicians' and lawyers' judgments made in 1945 about the effect service-connected conditions had on the average individual's ability to perform jobs requiring manual or physical labor; (2) although the ratings in the schedule have not changed substantially since 1945, dramatic changes have occurred in the labor market and in society since then; (3) the results of an economic validation of the schedule conducted in the late 1960s indicated that ratings for many conditions did not reflect the actual average loss in earnings associated with them; (4) it is likely that some of the ratings in the schedule do not reflect the economic loss experienced by veterans today; (5) the schedule may not equitably distribute compensation funds among disabled veterans; (6) VA has done little since 1945 to help ensure that disability ratings correspond to disabled veterans' average loss in earning capacity; (7) despite the results of the economic validation study, VA's efforts to maintain the schedule have concentrated on improving the appropriateness, clarity, and accuracy of the descriptions of the conditions in the schedule rather than on attempting to ensure that the schedule's assessments of the economic loss associated with these conditions are accurate; (8) basing disability ratings at least in part on actual earnings loss rather than solely on judgments of loss in functional capacity would help to ensure that veterans are compensated to an extent commensurate with their economic losses and that compensation funds are distributed equitably; (9) GAO's work demonstrates that there are generally accepted and widely used approaches to statistically estimate the effect of specific service-connected conditions on veterans' average earnings; (10) these estimates could be used to set disability ratings in the schedule that are appropriate in today's socioeconomic environment; and (11) it could cost between $5 million and $10 million to collect the data that produce these estimates, a small fraction of the over $11 billion VA paid in disability compensation to veterans in fiscal year 1995. |
gao_GAO-02-515 | gao_GAO-02-515_0 | CDDs and CDFs are byproducts of combustion and some industrial processes. The principal contributors to the WHO reassessments of dioxin risks that are discussed in this report have been (1) the International Agency for Research on Cancer, which coordinates and conducts both epidemiological and laboratory research into the causes of cancer; (2) the WHO European Centre for Environment and Health, which coordinates comprehensive efforts, in collaboration with the International Programme on Chemical Safety, to evaluate the possible health risks of dioxins as well as methods of prevention and control of environmental exposure of the general population to these chemicals; and (3) the Joint Expert Committee on Food Additives of the United Nations’ Food and Agriculture Organization and WHO, which provides scientific evaluations as a basis for the development of food standards by the Codex Alimentarius (food code) Commission. EPA Used Data on the Presence of Dioxins, Toxicity, and Food Consumption to Estimate Human Dietary Exposure
To estimate dietary exposure to dioxins, EPA obtained and reviewed information on (1) the dioxins present in 10 types of foods with high fat content, (2) the toxicity of individual dioxins contained in these food types, and (3) the quantities of these foods that people in the United States typically eat. EPA has incorporated new studies into its analysis of dietary exposure to dioxins to try to develop more reliable national estimates of such exposure. may have different effects on dioxin levels. 106, No. EPA and WHO Used Similar Analytical Methods
Despite differences in some of the specific objectives and processes of their respective reassessment efforts, EPA and WHO used similar analytical methods to identify and assess the potential health risks of dioxins. Cancer Threshold
EPA and WHO disagreed about whether there is a threshold below which exposure to dioxins would not cause cancer. But WHO noted that its estimates for this benchmark dose ranged quite widely and strongly depended on the assumptions made during the modeling. EPA’s Draft Dioxin Reassessment Report Generally Reflects the Views of Recent Peer Reviews
Two independent peer review panels, including an EPA Science Advisory Board panel, reviewed major sections of EPA’s draft dioxin reassessment report in 2000. In such cases, the panels refrained from making recommendations or suggestions to the agency. by dioxins. mixtures of dioxins. is pending. is pending. assessments. 12. | What GAO Found
Dioxins--chemical compounds that share structural and biological characteristics--have been linked to human illnesses, including cancer. Often the byproducts of combustion and industrial processes, complex mixtures of dioxins enter the food chain and human diet through emissions into the air. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the World Health Organization (WHO) noted the potential human health risks of dioxins in the 1970s when animal studies showed them to be among the most potent cancer-causing chemicals. EPA derived its estimates of human dietary exposure to dioxins in the United States from (1) chemically analyzed samples of 10 food types, (2) toxicity estimates of levels of individual dioxins in these foods, and (3) estimates of the quantities of these foods consumed by Americans. To develop more reliable national estimates of dietary exposure, EPA incorporated into its analysis some food studies that were nationally representative. Although both EPA and the WHO have assessed the human health risks of dioxins during the last decade, some of their objectives and processes have differed. Nonetheless, the analytical methods used and the conclusions reached have much in common. A major difference in the assessments is whether there are threshold levels below which exposure to dioxins would pose a negligible risk of cancer. EPA assumed there is no safe threshold level for cancer effects, but the WHO assumed there is. EPA's draft reassessment report reflects the recommendations and suggestions provided to the agency by the two most recent independent peer review panels. The panels, one consisting of 12 independent reviewers and the other convened by EPA's Science Advisory Board, concurred with many key assumptions and approaches that EPA used. |
gao_RCED-98-184 | gao_RCED-98-184_0 | The five nuclear weapon states that are parties to the NPT—China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States—are not obligated by the NPT to accept IAEA safeguards but have voluntarily submitted designated materials and facilities to IAEA safeguards inspections to signal to the non-nuclear weapon states their willingness to share in the administrative and commercial costs of safeguards. IAEA expects that changes to strengthen its safeguards program will enhance its capability to detect clandestine or undeclared nuclear activities in non-nuclear weapon states. This new protocol supplements member states’ safeguards agreements and will give the Agency new authority to collect information and conduct inspections. While IAEA has conducted some preliminary planning for implementing certain aspects of the new system, IAEA does not know whether in the long run it can implement the new system with existing resources because it has not developed a long-term plan that (1) identifies the total resource requirements for implementing the new measures, (2) provides an implementation schedule with milestones for equipment and estimated projections for adoption of the Additional Protocol, or (3) establishes criteria for assessing the effectiveness of the new measures and whether they could be used to reduce inspection efforts. However, IAEA’s assumptions about the extent of cost savings may not materialize. IAEA has limited options for funding the new, Strengthened Safeguards System as long as its regular budget is held to zero real growth and competing funding priorities and political constraints inhibit reallocation of resources. The future effectiveness of IAEA’s safeguards depends on whether IAEA will receive sufficient legal and financial support from its member states to permit full implementation of the new safeguards measures and how well the Agency implements changes to strengthen its ability to detect clandestine nuclear activities in countries with treaty obligations not to develop nuclear weapons. We recognize that the Additional Protocol will be implemented differently than the existing safeguards system. We believe that a long-term implementation plan for the Strengthened Safeguards System is valuable for several reasons. We recognize that State’s concerns need to be addressed, but we believe that reevaluating the zero-real growth policy for IAEA and the one-for-one balance between IAEA’s safeguards and technical cooperation programs could (1) provide a more stable funding basis for the safeguards program while the Agency is implementing the Strengthened Safeguards System and (2) reduce IAEA’s reliance on extrabudgetary contributions from the United States. Scope and Methodology
To describe changes IAEA is undertaking to strengthen its safeguards program and to assess the reasonableness of IAEA’s assumptions regarding the impact of these changes on program costs and efficiency, we visited IAEA headquarters in Vienna, Austria, in October and November 1997. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed: (1) changes the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is undertaking to strengthen its safeguards program; (2) the reasonableness of IAEA's assumptions regarding the impact of these changes on program costs and efficiency; and (3) comments on the extent of IAEA's reliance on the United States to finance the Agency's safeguards activities.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) in response to Iraq's secret nuclear weapons program, the international community, led by the United States, launched an intensive effort to create a new capability within the IAEA's safeguards system to detect secret or undeclared activities; (2) IAEA is beginning to implement a strengthened safeguards system by introducing advanced safeguards techniques under its existing safeguards agreements; (3) it is also seeking additional rights to conduct more intrusive inspections and collect information on nuclear activities through an Additional Protocol that supplements the existing safeguards agreements; (4) IAEA's changes to its safeguards systems are intended to give its inspectors greater ability to detect clandestine nuclear activities in non-nuclear weapons states that are signatories to the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons or other regional nonproliferation treaties; (5) under existing safeguards agreements with states and regional organizations, IAEA has increased its access to information on all nuclear activities at declared facilities in non-nuclear weapons states; (6) IAEA's member states expect that the Agency will implement the strengthened safeguards system through cost neutrality, that is, through savings from expected future efficiency gains and cutbacks on certain types of inspections that on an annual basis offset the cost increases resulting from implementation; (7) while IAEA has performed some preliminary planning, it does not have a long-term implementation plan that: (a) identifies the total resource requirements for implementing the new measures; (b) provides an implementation schedule with milestones for equipment and estimated projections of adoption of the Additional Protocol; and (c) provides criteria for assessing the effectiveness of the new measures and their usefulness for reducing inspection efforts; (8) IAEA has limited options for funding the new Strengthened Safeguard System because of the practice, imposed by its major contributors, that limits the Agency's regular budget to zero-real growth, and by the Agency's practice, insisted on by IAEA's less developed member states, of maintaining a balance between IAEA's technical cooperation and its safeguards programs; and (9) as a result, if these constraints continue and IAEA's assumptions about cost neutrality for the new program are not borne out by experience, IAEA will likely turn to the United States for substantial voluntary extrabudgetary contributions to implement the Strengthened Safeguards System. |
gao_T-NSIAD-98-83 | gao_T-NSIAD-98-83_0 | We further reported that DOD’s progress in chemical and biological research and development was slower than planned, training of Army and Marine Corps forces was inadequate, there was little evidence that joint training and exercises included chemical and biological defense elements, stocks of vaccines for biological agents were in short supply, and medical units lacked necessary chemical and biological defense equipment and training. The Congress and DOD have taken action that has improved U.S. forces’ ability to survive and operate if chemical and biological agents are used against them. Still, DOD must address remaining critical deficiencies that affect its ability to protect forces from chemical and biological attack. Moreover, DOD has insufficient quantities of biological agent vaccines to protect U.S. forces, and servicemembers deployed in high-threat areas overseas normally have no biological agent detection capability. DOD’s Program to Immunize Forces Against Anthrax
Anthrax is an infectious disease that afflicts certain animals, especially cattle and sheep. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff considers anthrax to be the greatest biological weapons threat to U.S. military forces. Prior to beginning the immunizations, DOD wanted time to (1) perform testing of the vaccine to ensure its sterility, safety, potency, and purity; (2) implement a system to track personnel who receive the vaccinations; (3) approve plans to administer the immunizations and inform military personnel of the program; and (4) have the program reviewed by an independent expert. DOD plans to vaccinate the remaining active and reserve force over the next several years. The Presidential Advisory Committee on Persian Gulf War Veterans’ Illnesses and the Institute of Medicine reported problems concerning the completeness and accuracy of medical record-keeping during the Gulf War. Increased emphasis by the commanders in chief in their areas of responsibility, a DOD-wide spending increase leading to increased numbers of fielded chemical and biological detection and protective equipment, and planned procurements of equipment over the next several years will make U.S. forces better prepared to deal with chemical and biological weapons than in the past. Related GAO Reports on Chemical and Biological Defense
Gulf War Illnesses: Public and Private Efforts Relating to Exposures of U.S. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the Department of Defense's (DOD) continuing efforts to protect U.S. military forces against chemical and biological weapons, including its plan to inoculate all U.S. military forces against anthrax.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) in examining DOD's experience in preparing its forces to defend against potential chemical and biological agent attacks during the Gulf War, GAO identified numerous problems; (2) specifically, GAO found: (a) shortages in individual protective equipment; (b) inadequate chemical and biological agent detection devices; (c) inadequate command emphasis on chemical and biological capabilities; and (d) deficiencies in medical personnel training, and supplies; (3) while many deficiencies noted during the Gulf War remain unaddressed today, DOD has increasingly acknowledged and accepted the urgency of developing a capability to deal with the chemical and biological threat to its forces; (4) both Congress and DOD have acted to provide greater protection for U.S. forces; (5) their actions have resulted in increased funding, and the fielding of more and better chemical and biological defense equipment; (6) DOD must address remaining critical deficiencies if U.S. forces are to be provided with the resources necessary to better protect themselves; (7) DOD is now embarking on a major effort to protect U.S. forces from the threat of the deadly biological agent anthrax; (8) its program to immunize millions of active and reserve forces against anthrax, ensuring that each receives the prescribed vaccinations in the proper time sequence, will be a challenge; and (9) however, if DOD considers lessons learned from previous, smaller-sized immunization programs and from the medical record-keeping errors in the Gulf War and Bosnia in formulating detailed implementation plans, it can reduce the risks and improve the prospects for successfully managing the program. |
gao_GAO-04-768T | gao_GAO-04-768T_0 | Background
The Social Security Act of 1935 authorized SSA to establish a record- keeping system to help manage the Social Security program, and this resulted in the creation of the SSN. In addition, SSNs are used as breeder information to create additional false identification documents, such as drivers’ licenses. We found that these entities usually use SSNs for various purposes, such as to build tools that verify an individual’s identity or match existing records. Certain federal laws have limited the disclosures private sector entities are allowed to make to their customers, and some states have also enacted laws to restrict the private sector’s use of SSNs. Private Sector Entities Obtain SSNs from Public and Private Sources and Use SSNs for Various Purposes
Private sector entities such as information resellers, CRAs, and health care organizations generally obtain SSNs from various public and private sources and use SSNs to help identify individuals. We also found that Internet-based resellers rely extensively on public sources and records displayed to the public. Large information resellers said that they generally use the SSN as an identity verification tool. Certain Laws Limit the Private Sectors’ Disclosure of Personal Information That Includes SSNs
Certain federal and state laws have placed restrictions on certain private sector entities use and disclosure of consumers’ personal information that includes SSNs. Given the potential for misuse, some government agencies are taking steps to limit their use and display of SSNs and prevent the proliferation of false identities. However, given the open nature of certain government records, SSNs appear in some records displayed to the public. Our ongoing work is looking at the storage, display, and protection of SSNs in records displayed to the public. Moreover, not all agencies use the SSN as their primary identification number for record-keeping purposes. We proposed that Congress convene a representative group of officials from all levels of government to develop a unified approach to safeguard SSNs used in all levels of government and particularly those displayed in public records. Our preliminary survey data show that the types of records most likely to contain SSNs and be made available to the general public by state government entities are court records, death records, UCC filings, and professional licensing records. Data matching and complying with state laws or regulations are also frequently cited as reasons for the collection or use of the SSN. However, responding state offices reported over 35 instances where they had no specific use for collecting SSNs. Although individuals may choose to provide their SSNs to public and private sector entities to obtain their services, individuals are often required to have their SSNs in records that may ultimately be displayed to the public. Such public display of personal information can create opportunities for identity crimes. These permissible uses include: for use by any government agency in carrying out its functions; for use in connection with matters of motor vehicle or driver safety and theft; motor vehicle emissions; motor vehicle product alterations, recalls, or advisories; motor vehicle market research activities, including survey research; for use in the normal course of business by a legitimate business, but only to verify the accuracy of personal information submitted by the individual to the business and, if such information is not correct, to obtain the correct information but only for purposes of preventing fraud by pursuing legal remedies against, or recovering on a debt or security interest against, the individual; for use in connection with any civil, criminal, administrative, or arbitral proceeding in any federal, state, or local court or agency; for use in research activities; for use by any insurer or insurance support organization in connection with claims investigation activities; for use in providing notice to the owners of towed or impounded vehicles; for use by a private investigative agency for any purpose permitted under the DPPA; for use by an employer or its agent or insurer to obtain information relating to the holder of a commercial driver’s license; for use in connection with the operation of private toll transportation facilities; for any other use, if the state has obtained the express consent of the person to whom a request for personal information pertains; for bulk distribution of surveys, marketing, or solicitations, if the state has obtained the express consent of the person to whom such personal information pertains; for use by any requester, if the requester demonstrates that it has obtained the written consent of the individual to whom the information pertains; for any other use specifically authorized under a state law, if such use is related to the operation of a motor vehicle or public safety. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 1936, the Social Security Administration (SSA) established the Social Security number (SSN) to track workers' earnings for social security benefit purposes. Today, private and public sector entities frequently ask individuals for SSNs in order to conduct their businesses and sometimes to comply with federal laws. Although uses of SSNs can be beneficial to the public, SSNs are also a key piece of information in creating false identities either for financial misuse or for assuming an individual's identity. The retention of SSNs in the public and private sectors can create opportunities for identity theft. In addition, the aggregation of personal information, such as SSNs, in large corporate databases, as well as the public display of SSNs in various records accessed by the public, may provide criminals the opportunity to easily obtain this personal information. Given the heightened awareness of identity crimes, this testimony focuses on describing (1) how private sector entities obtain, use, and protect SSNs, and (2) public sector uses and protections of SSNs.
What GAO Found
Private sector entities rely extensively on SSNs. We reported early this year that entities such as information resellers, consumer reporting agencies , and health care organizations routinely obtain SSNs from their business clients and public sources, such as government records that can be displayed to the public. These entities then use SSNs for various purposes, such as to verify individual's identity or match existing records, and have come to rely on the SSN as an identifier, which helps then determine a person's identity for the purpose of providing the services they offer. There is no single federal law that regulates the overall use or restricts the disclosure of SSNs by private sector entities. However, certain federal laws have helped to place restrictions on the disclosures of personal information private sector entities are allowed to make to their customers, and certain states have enacted laws to restrict the private sector's use of SSNs. Public sector entities also extensively use SSNs. All three levels of government use the SSN to comply with certain federal laws and regulations, as well as for their own purposes. These agencies rely on the SSN to manage records, verify benefit eligibility, collect outstanding debt, and conduct research and program evaluations. Despite their widespread reliance on and use of SSNs, government agencies are taking steps to safeguard the SSN. For example, some agencies are not using the SSN as the primary identification number. However, given the open nature of certain government records, SSNs appear in records displayed to the public such as documents that record financial transactions or court documents. Current GAO work under way for this subcommittee is focusing on the storage, display, and protection of SSNs in public records. Our preliminary survey data show that the types of records most likely to contain SSNs and be made available to the general public by state government entities are court records, death records, Uniform Commercial Code filings, and professional licensing records. In addition, our preliminary data suggest that responding state offices reported over 35 instances where they had no specific use for collecting SSNs. In a previous report, we proposed that Congress consider developing a unified approach to safeguarding SSNs used in all levels of government and particularly those displayed in public records, and we continue to believe that this approach has merit. |
gao_GAO-01-448 | gao_GAO-01-448_0 | The Army’s Suite of Integrated Radio Frequency Countermeasures system will include an advanced-threat radar-warning receiver and an advanced- threat radar jammer. Laboratory tests indicate that the software continues to have difficulty in properly detecting, identifying, tracking, and defeating threat-radar systems in complex environments where many radars are operating simultaneously. Conclusion
The Army has identified software and hardware modifications needed for its new radar countermeasures system. The Army expects that future tests will enable it to determine whether the modified software performs as required before the planned low-rate initial production decision in early 2002. However, the testing of the modified hardware is not scheduled for completion until September 2002. By deferring the low-rate initial production decision, the Army would reduce the risk of incurring unanticipated costs to retrofit articles if the system does not perform as required. | What GAO Found
The Army is acquiring a new, state-of-the-art radar countermeasures system--called the Suite of Integrated Radio Frequency Countermeasures to help helicopters and other aircraft identify, track, and defeat radar-guided missiles in complex electronic environments where many radar systems could be operating simultaneously. The Army has identified software and hardware modification needed for its new radar countermeasures system. The Army expects that future tests will enable it to determine whether the modified software performs as required before the planned low-rate initial production decision in early 2002. However, the testing of the modified hardware is not scheduled for completion until September 2002. By deferring low-rate initial production decision, the Army would reduce the risk of incurring anticipated costs to retrofit articles if the system does not work as expected. |
gao_GAO-08-38 | gao_GAO-08-38_0 | Scope and Methodology
To assess IRS’s 2007 filing season performance in the key filing season activities compared to goals and past performance, and identify and assess potential improvements or efficiencies in filing season operations, we reviewed and analyzed IRS reports, testimonies, budget submissions, and other documents and data, including workload data, data related to IRS’s performance measures and goals, and data on taxpayer usage and other statistics such as the number of paid preparers; observed operations at IRS’s Atlanta, Ga. and Andover, Ma. It consumes more than $3 billion annually. Growth in electronic filing generates savings for IRS by reducing staff needed for labor-intensive paper processing. For eight of its nine measures, IRS met or exceeded its previous year’s performance. IRS May Be Missing Opportunities to Further Reduce Costs and Increase Compliance by Not Doing More to Reduce the Number of Paper Returns Processed and Transcribe all Tax Return Data
Paper returns cost IRS tens of millions of dollars to process. To control costs, IRS does not transcribe all the lines on paper tax returns into its computer databases, such as taxpayers’ telephone numbers, limiting the amount of information available electronically for enforcement purposes. Further, to avoid disadvantaging taxpayers who file electronically, IRS has a policy of posting the same information from electronic and paper returns to its databases. Consequently, if a line is not transcribed from paper returns, it is not posted from electronic returns either. Only information posted to computer databases is readily available for use in IRS’s automated compliance checking programs. At least two options exist to increase electronic filing—mandates and bar coding. Additionally, taxpayer compliance burden might be reduced. IRS estimates that the accuracy of telephone assistors’ responses to tax law and account questions was comparable to the same time period last year and met IRS’s goals. IRS has initiatives to expand and improve on its Web site services. With the exception of a microphone that sits atop the desk of the walk-in site assistor, contact recording is similar to the system IRS uses to monitor and assess the quality of telephone interaction between taxpayers and telephone assistors. Including submission processing services. Conclusions
Over the last decade, IRS has improved its performance processing tax returns and providing taxpayer assistance. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Acting Commissioner of Internal Revenue direct the appropriate officials to determine actions needed to require software vendors to include bar codes on printed individual income tax returns and the cost of those actions; determine the benefits, in terms of processing costs and improved enforcement, of having all return information available electronically; determine how much electronic filing would have to increase, either through electronic filing mandates or bar coding, for the benefits of transcribing all remaining paper returns to exceed the costs; develop estimates of the effectiveness of IRS’s volunteer program at targeting underserved populations; and determine the feasibility of using contact recording as a method of monitoring and improving the quality of return preparation assistance at IRS’s walk-in sites. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2007, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) will spend over $3 billion to process returns and provide taxpayer service. Effective service can reduce taxpayers' burden of complying with tax laws and, many tax experts believe, may improve compliance. GAO was asked to assess IRS's performance relative to 2007 goals and prior years' performance including identifying actions that might generate efficiencies and increase compliance. GAO analyzed IRS performance data, reviewed IRS operations at various locations, and interviewed IRS and paid preparer representatives.
What GAO Found
IRS improved most filing season services during 2007, continuing a longer-term trend. Tax return processing exceeded last year's performance by most measures. Electronic filing grew at a faster rate than IRS anticipated and continued to generate savings. Access to IRS telephone assistors was comparable to last year, and the accuracy of responses to questions remained at about 90 percent. The performance of IRS's Web site improved in several measures, such as customer satisfaction. Continuing past trends, more taxpayers used volunteer sites, which are less costly than IRS's walk-in sites. Despite these improvements, IRS could reduce the number of paper tax returns processed and also transcribe all lines from the residual paper returns, making that data more available for enforcement. Two options for reducing paper processing are electronic filing mandates, previously suggested by GAO, and bar coding, which could be required for paper returns prepared on computers and reduces processing costs. Currently, because of the cost, IRS does not transcribe all lines from paper returns. Further, IRS policy is to post the same lines from electronic and paper returns to its enforcement databases. As a result, IRS does not use all tax return information in its automated compliance checking programs. However, IRS does not know the actions needed to require software vendors to include bar codes on printed tax returns; the benefits, in terms of processing savings and improved enforcement, of having all return data available electronically; or how much electronic filing would have to increase, either through mandates or bar coding, for the benefits of transcribing all residual paper returns to exceed the costs. Despite more reliance on its volunteer program, IRS has not evaluated its effectiveness at reaching underserved taxpayers. Further, IRS may be missing an opportunity to assess the quality of return preparation assistance at its walk-in sites through contact recording, a system IRS uses to record and assess the quality of other interactions between its employees and taxpayers. |
gao_T-NSIAD-98-126 | gao_T-NSIAD-98-126_0 | Personnel Shortages Are Significant in Later-Deploying Divisions
In the aggregate, the Army’s later-deploying divisions were assigned 66,053, or 93 percent, of their 70,665 authorized personnel at the beginning of fiscal year 1998. However, aggregate numbers do not adequately reflect the condition that exists within individual battalions, companies, and platoons of these divisions. There is also a significant shortage of NCOs in the later-deploying divisions. Current Readiness Reports Do Not Fully Disclose Personnel Shortfalls
In recent years, in reports and testimony before the Congress, we discussed the Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS), which is used to measure readiness, and reported on the need for improvements. SORTS data for units in the later-deploying divisions have often reflected a high readiness level for personnel because the system uses aggregate statistics to assess personnel readiness. This does not seem realistic, given the shortages we noted. Many Factors Have Contributed to Personnel Shortfalls in Later Deploying Divisions
Many factors have contributed to shortfalls of personnel in the Army’s later-deploying divisions, including (1) the Army’s priority for assigning personnel to units, commands, and agencies; (2) Army-wide shortages of some types of personnel; (3) peacekeeping operations; and (4) the assignment of soldiers to joint and other Army command, recruiting, and base management functions. For example, they assign soldiers that exist in the largest numbers—infantry, armor, and artillery—to work in maintenance, supply, and personnel administration due to personnel shortages in these technical specialties; assign soldiers to fill personnel shortages at a higher headquarters or to accomplish a mission for higher headquarters; and assign soldiers to temporary work such as driving buses, serving as lifeguards, and managing training ranges—vacancies, in some cases, which have resulted from civilian reductions on base. Readiness in the divisions responsible for peacekeeping operations in Bosnia has been especially affected because the challenges imposed by personnel shortages are compounded by frequent deployments. According to Army officials, the rotation of units to Bosnia has also degraded the training and readiness of the divisions providing the personnel. These actions were detrimental to the readiness of the nondeploying units. Retirees, Individual Ready Reservists, and New Recruits Would Be Used to Fill Shortfalls
If the later-deploying divisions are required to deploy to a second major theater contingency, the Army plans to fill personnel shortfalls with retired servicemembers, members of the Individual Ready Reserve, and newly trained recruits. The number of personnel to fill the later deploying divisions could be extensive, since (1) personnel from later deploying divisions would be transferred to fill any shortages in the contingency units that are first to deploy and (2) these divisions are already short of required personnel. Army officials told us that based on past deployments, not all the assumptions in their plans will be realized, and there may not be sufficient trained personnel to fully man later-deploying divisions within their scheduled deployment times. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed its preliminary findings from its ongoing evaluation of personnel readiness in the Army's five later-deploying divisions, focusing on the: (1) extent of personnel shortages in the divisions and the extent to which these shortages are reflected in readiness reports; (2) key factors contributing to personnel shortages and the impact such shortages have on readiness; (3) Army's plans for correcting such shortages should these divisions be called upon to deploy; and (4) issues to be considered in dealing with personnel shortages.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) in the aggregate, the Army's five later-deploying divisions had an average of 93 percent of their personnel on board at the time of GAO's visits; (2) however, aggregate data does not fully reflect the extent of shortages of combat troops, technical specialists, experienced officers, and noncommissioned officers (NCO) that exist in those divisions; (3) the readiness reporting system that contains the aggregate data on these divisions does not fully disclose the impact of personnel shortages on the ability of the divisions' units to accomplish critical wartime tasks; (4) as a result, there is a disconnect between the reported readiness of these forces in formal readiness reports and the actual readiness that GAO observed on its visits; (5) these disconnects exist because the unit readiness reporting system does not consider some information that has a significant impact on a unit's readiness, such as operating tempo, personnel shortfalls in key positions, and crew and squad staffing; (6) the Army's priority in assigning personnel to these divisions, Army-wide shortages of personnel, frequent deployments to peacekeeping missions, and the assignment of soldiers to other tasks outside of their specialty are the primary reasons for personnel shortfalls; (7) the impact of personnel shortages on training and readiness is exacerbated by the extent to which personnel are being used for work outside their specialties or units; (8) according to commanders in all the divisions, the collective impact of understaffing squads and crews, transferring to other jobs the NCOs from their crews and squads they are responsible for training, and assigning personnel to other units as fillers for exercises and operations have degraded their capability and readiness; (9) if the Army had to deploy these divisions for a high-intensity conflict, these divisions would fill their units with Individual Ready Reserve Soldiers, retired servicemembers, and newly recruited soldiers; (10) however, the Army's plan for providing these personnel includes assumptions that have not been validated, and there may not be enough trained personnel to fully staff or fill later-deploying divisions within their scheduled deployment times; and (11) solutions, if any, will depend upon how the Army plans to use these divisions in the future. |
gao_GAO-03-1024T | gao_GAO-03-1024T_0 | GAO: A Unique Agency with a Hybrid System
As an arm of the legislative branch, GAO exists to support the Congress in meeting its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and ensure the accountability of the federal government for the benefit of the American people. Unlike many executive branch agencies, which have either recently received or are just requesting new broad-based human capital tools and flexibilities, GAO has had certain human capital tools and flexibilities for over two decades. Key Elements of GAO’s Proposal
GAO’s proposal combines diverse initiatives that, collectively, should further GAO’s ability to enhance our performance, assure our accountability, and help ensure that we can attract, retain, motivate, and reward a top quality and high-performing workforce currently and in future years. Specifically, we are requesting that the Congress provide us the following additional human capital tools and flexibilities: make permanent GAO’s 3-year authority to offer voluntary early retirement and voluntary separation payments; allow the Comptroller General to adjust the rates of basic pay of GAO on a separate basis than the annual adjustments authorized for employees of the executive branch; permit GAO to set the pay of an employee demoted as a result of workforce restructuring or reclassification at his or her current rate with no automatic annual increase to basic pay until his or her salary is less than the maximum rate of their new position; provide authority in appropriate circumstances to reimburse employees for some relocation expenses when that transfer does not meet current legal requirements for entitlement to reimbursement but still benefits GAO; provide authority to put upper-level hires with less than 3 years of federal experience in the 6-hour leave category; authorize an executive exchange program with private sector organizations working in areas of mutual concern and involving areas in which GAO has a supply-demand imbalance; and change GAO’s legal name from the “General Accounting Office” to the “Government Accountability Office.”
I will go into more detail later in my testimony on the details and rationale for each of these proposals. Nature of GAO Employee Concerns
Based on feedback from GAO employees, there is little or no concern relating to most of the provisions in our proposal. As addressed below, we do believe, however, that these employee concerns, have been reduced considerably due to the clarifications, changes, and commitments resulting from our extensive outreach and consultation effort. We have used the narrowly tailored flexibilities the Congress provided us previously in Public Law 106-303 responsibly, prudently, and strategically to help posture GAO to ensure the accountability of the federal government for the benefit of the Congress and the American people. Although some elements of our initial straw proposal were controversial, we have made a number of changes, clarifications, and commitments to address various comments and concerns raised by GAO employees. However, we believe that it is vitally important to GAO’s future that we continue modernizing and updating our human capital policies and system in light of the changing environment and anticipated challenges ahead. Given our human capital infrastructure and our unique role in leading by example in major management areas, including human capital management, the federal government could benefit from GAO’s experience with pay for performance systems. Overall, we believe that this proposal represents a logical incremental advancement in modernizing GAO’s human capital policies, and with your support, we believe that it will make a big difference for the GAO of the future. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Subcommittee on Civil Service and Agency Organization, House Committee on Government Reform seeks GAO's views on its latest human capital proposal that is slated to be introduced as a bill entitled the GAO Human Capital Reform Act of 2003.
What GAO Found
As an arm of the legislative branch, GAO exists to support the Congress in meeting its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and ensure the accountability of the federal government for the American people. Unlike many executive branch agencies, which have either recently received or are just requesting new broad-based human capital tools and flexibilities, GAO has had certain human capital tools and flexibilities for over two decades. GAO's latest proposal combines diverse initiatives that, collectively, should further GAO's ability to enhance its performance, assure its accountability, and help ensure that it can attract, retain, motivate, and reward a top-quality and high-performing workforce currently and in future years. Specifically, GAO is requesting that the Congress (1) make permanent GAO's 3-year authority to offer early outs and buyouts, (2) allow GAO to set its own annual pay adjustment system separate from the executive branch, (3) permit GAO to set the pay of an employee demoted as a result of workforce restructuring or reclassification to keep his/her basic pay but to set future increases consistent with the new position's pay parameters, (4) provide authority to reimburse employees for some relocation expenses when that transfer has some benefit to GAO but does not meet the legal requirements for reimbursement, (5) provide authority to place upper-level hires with fewer than 3 years of federal experience in the 6-hour leave category, (6) authorize an executive exchange program with the private sector, and (7) change GAO's legal name from the "General Accounting Office" to the "Government Accountability Office." GAO has used the narrowly tailored flexibilities granted by the Congress previously in Public Law 106-303, the GAO Personnel Flexibilities Act, responsibly, prudently, and strategically. GAO believes that it is vitally important to its future to continue modernizing and updating its human capital policies and system in light of the changing environment and anticipated challenges ahead. GAO's proposal represents a logical incremental advancement in modernizing GAO's human capital policies. Based on employee feedback, there is little or no concern relating to most of the proposal's provisions. Although some elements of GAO's initial straw proposal were controversial (e.g., GAO's pay adjustment provision), the Comptroller General has made a number of changes, clarifications, and commitments to address employee concerns. While GAO believes that some employees remain concerned about the pay adjustment provision, GAO also believes that employee concerns have been reduced considerably due to the clarifications, changes, and commitments the Comptroller General has made. Given GAO's human capital infrastructure and unique role in leading by example in major management areas, the rest of the federal government can benefit from GAO's pay system experience. |
gao_GAO-14-597 | gao_GAO-14-597_0 | Background
The SSI program pays benefits to the aged, blind or disabled adults, and children who have limited income and resources. Our analysis of income reported in the NDNH initially showed that SSA made $19 million in potential SSI overpayments to 10,187 SSI recipients in fiscal year 2010, but approximately 70 percent of the total overpayment amount showed indications of possible SSN misuse, such as individuals with wages reported from employers in multiple states during the same quarter, so we were unable to determine whether the recipients actually received SSI overpayments. Using a different methodology that includes additional causes of overpayments not considered in GAO’s analysis, SSA estimated to have made $3.3 billion in SSI overpayments in fiscal year 2010. We determined that for our potential overpayment population of 10,187 recipients, wages for 2,399 SSI recipients were reported solely by employers located outside the recipient’s state of residence. For example, as shown in figure 2 below, one individual living in California had wages reported in the NDNH from 11 different employers in seven other states that were many miles away during the same quarter of calendar year 2010. This suggests that multiple individuals may have been using the SSI recipient’s SSN and name for work purposes. DHS is responsible for granting aliens permission to work in the United States, and for enforcing compliance of employers with immigration laws. Although SSA is able to identify possible SSN misuse for SSI recipients when alert notices are generated and wages are ultimately disclaimed by the recipient, SSA has previously reported that privacy and disclosure issues have limited its ability to combat SSN misuse. Our analysis shows that reviewing these discrepancies between income reported by SSI recipients and income reported by employers at a summary level can provide important information on certain employers that have a high incidence of reporting inaccurate wages for SSI recipients, indicating possible SSN misuse. Obtaining legislative authority to enable the sharing of information regarding potential unauthorized employment, including about employers who file high numbers of wage statements with potentially misused SSNs, could enhance SSA’s ability to address SSN misuse and help DHS better target its work-site enforcement efforts. Recommendation for Executive Action
To help strengthen SSA’s efforts to monitor the SSI program, and pay accurate SSI benefits, as well as to enhance DHS’s investigative efforts on behalf of its work-site enforcement strategy, we recommend that the Acting Commissioner of Social Security work with the Secretary of Homeland Security to identify the specific data useful to DHS’s work-site enforcement strategy, including the new summary information that we identified on employers who file high numbers of wage reports with potentially misused SSNs, along with the corresponding privacy and disclosure restrictions, and seek legislative authority to allow the Secretary to obtain such information, as appropriate. This report examines potential Supplemental Security Income (SSI) overpayments by comparing Social Security Administration (SSA) data with income reported in the National Directory of New Hires (NDNH) database and identifies indicators of possible Social Security number (SSN) misuse. For our prior work on SSA’s programs, SSA had provided us with a file containing SSI recipients as of December 2010 and the matching income information from both the quarterly wage and unemployment insurance component of the NDNH database that included fiscal year 2010. Of our population of SSI recipients that we identified who were reported as receiving wages from a different state than the state of residence that was reported on their SSA record during the same quarter, we analyzed the Employer Identification Number (EIN) for their employers and found nine employers who had 15 or more SSI recipients who lived out of state working for that employer in the 2nd quarter of 2010. 1. 3. 4. As mentioned in the report, we state that the exact number of individuals who received SSI overpayments and the exact amount of overpayments made to those individuals cannot be determined without detailed case investigations by SSA. | Why GAO Did This Study
In fiscal year 2012, SSA estimated it paid over $53.4 billion to SSI recipients, of which 8.1 percent, or $4.3 billion, SSA estimated to have been improper payments. The SSI program pays benefits to the aged, blind or disabled adults and children with limited income and resources.
GAO was asked to analyze potentially improper SSA disability payments. This report identifies potential SSI overpayments and indicators of possible SSN misuse. SSA provided GAO with a onetime file extract of SSI recipients as of December 2010 and the matching income from both the quarterly wage and unemployment insurance components of the NDNH database that included fiscal year 2010. GAO compared the SSI benefit and NDNH income data to identify potential overpayments. GAO randomly selected five individuals for case-file review. These cases cannot be projected to the overpayment population but provide illustrative examples of possible SSN misuse.
What GAO Found
GAO's analysis of wages reported in the National Directory of New Hires (NDNH) initially showed that the Social Security Administration (SSA) made $19 million in potential overpayments to 10,187 recipients through its Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program in fiscal year 2010. Using a different methodology that includes additional causes of overpayments not considered in GAO's analysis, SSA estimated it made $3.3 billion in SSI overpayments in fiscal year 2010. The majority (70 percent) of the estimated overpayment amount GAO identified showed indications of possible Social Security number (SSN) misuse, such as employers reporting wages for recipients in multiple locations during the same quarter. For example, GAO determined that wages for 2,399 SSI recipients were reported solely by employers outside the recipient's state of residence. As the figure below shows, one individual in California had wages reported from 11 different employers in seven other states during the same quarter of calendar year 2010. This suggests that multiple individuals may be using the SSI recipient's SSN and name for work. The exact number of individuals who received overpayments and the exact amount of overpayments made to those individuals cannot be determined without detailed case investigations by SSA. GAO analyzed five recipient cases and provided the results to SSA.
GAO analyzed employers with wages for SSI recipients from outside the recipient's state and found nine employers who reported wages for 15 or more SSI recipients during the same quarter who lived in different states from the employer's location. For example, a plant located in one state reported wages for 22 SSI recipients who lived in six other states, indicating possible SSN misuse. SSA has previously reported that privacy and disclosure issues have limited its ability to routinely share information with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which is responsible for enforcing employer compliance with immigration laws through its work-site enforcement strategy. Reviewing SSI wages at a summary level can provide information on certain employers that have high incidences of inaccurate wage reports. The ability to share information regarding potential unauthorized employment could enhance SSA's ability to address SSN misuse and help DHS better target its work-site enforcement efforts.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Acting Commissioner of Social Security work with the Secretary of Homeland Security to identify the data useful to DHS's work-site enforcement strategy and seek legislative authority to obtain such information, as appropriate. DHS agreed with GAO's recommendation and SSA agreed to the intent of the recommendation, but did not agree to seek legislative authority. GAO still believes this recommendation is valid as discussed in the report to help the federal government better utilize the complementary sources of data available at SSA. |
gao_GAO-16-37 | gao_GAO-16-37_0 | As discussed in our February 2015 High-Risk update, a key role for the federal government is to provide technical assistance to decision makers to help them translate available climate- related data into the information they need for such planning processes. The President’s June 2013 Climate Action Plan and November 2013 Executive Order 13653 drew attention to the need for improved technical assistance. For example, the executive order directs numerous federal agencies, supported by USGCRP, to work together to develop and provide authoritative, easily accessible, usable, and timely data, information, and decision-support tools on climate preparedness and resilience. Risk management is based on the best available information. Information on the economic and health impacts of climate change. Current Federal Efforts Are Fragmented and Do Not Fully Meet the Climate Information Needs of Federal, State, Local, and Private Sector Decision Makers
Current federal efforts are fragmented and do not fully meet the climate information needs of federal, state, local, and private sector decision makers, according to our recent reports; studies from the National Academies and other organizations; and interviews with knowledgeable stakeholders. The federal government’s climate information—composed of observational records from satellites and weather monitoring stations, projections from complex climate models, and other tools—is fragmented across many individual agencies that use the information in different ways to meet their respective missions. However, as we found in our February 2015 High-Risk update, federal, state, local, and private sector decision makers may be unaware that climate information exists or unable to use what is available, making it harder to justify the current costs of incorporating climate change into planning efforts for less certain future benefits. Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom Have Organized Climate Information Systems
Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom have organized systems to meet the climate information needs of decision makers, according to documents we reviewed and officials we interviewed from these countries. In each climate information system we selected, the government provides direction and funding, and entities within and outside the government help translate climate information to meet decision makers’ needs, although each system is organized differently. 3). U.S. Federal Climate Information Efforts Could Be Improved by Incorporating Key Organizational and Data Elements
U.S. federal climate information efforts could be improved by incorporating key organizational and data elements, according to our reports on adaptation and interagency collaboration, National Academies and other studies, observations from site visits to other countries with climate information systems, and interviews with U.S. and international stakeholders. Specifically, the key organizational and data elements that could improve federal climate information efforts are (1) a focused and accountable organization, (2) authoritative data, and (3) technical assistance. According to domestic and international stakeholders we interviewed, authoritative data are crucial because they define a common starting point for decision makers. Various reports we reviewed and stakeholders we interviewed also emphasized that improved federal efforts should provide authoritative locally-focused information because most decisions are made at the local level. Options to Provide Climate Information to U.S. Decision Makers Have Strengths and Limitations
Various options exist for providing climate information to U.S. decision makers, and these options have strengths and limitations, according to our reports, other studies, interviews with officials from countries with climate information systems, and interviews with knowledgeable stakeholders. None of the climate information systems we reviewed in other countries relies on a single new or existing government agency to provide the entire spectrum of climate information and technical assistance. A National Climate Information System Could Incorporate the Best Features and Address the Limitations of Different Options
A national climate information system with defined roles for federal agencies and nonfederal entities could incorporate the best features and address the limitations of different options to provide climate information to decision makers, according to various studies we reviewed and interviews we conducted with knowledgeable stakeholders. A nonfederal entity would be better positioned to interact with existing networks of decision makers and to facilitate connections between decision makers and intermediaries with specialized expertise, according to various stakeholders. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help federal, state, local, and private sector decision makers access and use the best available climate information, we recommend that the Executive Office of the President designate a federal entity to take the following two actions: develop and periodically update a set of authoritative climate change observations and projections for use in federal decision making, which state, local, and private sector decision makers could also access to obtain the best available climate information; and create a national climate information system with defined roles for federal agencies and nonfederal entities with existing statutory authority. They did not provide official written comments, but did provide technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. | Why GAO Did This Study
Over the last decade, the federal government incurred over $300 billion in costs due to extreme weather and fire, according to the President's 2016 budget request. Costs are expected to grow as rare events become more common and intense due to climate change, according to the National Academies. State, local, and private sector decision makers also drive fiscal exposures, as they are responsible for infrastructure paid for with federal funds or eligible for disaster aid. GAO's 2015 High-Risk update prioritized improving federal efforts to provide the best available climate information and technical assistance to help decision makers use the information to build resilience in up front.
This report examines (1) the extent to which federal efforts meet the climate information needs of decision makers; (2) examples of how other countries organized climate information systems; (3) whether and how federal efforts could be improved; and (4) the strengths and limitations of different options to provide climate information. GAO analyzed reports; reviewed systems in three other countries; and interviewed stakeholders with knowledge of climate information.
What GAO Found
Many federal efforts are under way, but the climate information needs of federal, state, local, and private sector decision makers are not being fully met, according to recent GAO reports, National Academies and other studies, and interviews with stakeholders. The November 2013 Executive Order 13653 on Preparing the United States for the Impacts of Climate Change calls on certain federal agencies to work together to provide authoritative information on climate preparedness and resilience. However, the federal government's own climate data—composed of observational records from satellites and weather stations and projections from climate models—are fragmented across individual agencies that use the information in different ways to meet their missions. GAO's February 2015 High-Risk update found that federal, state, local, and private sector decision makers may be unaware that climate information exists or be unable to use what is available.
Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom have well-established climate information systems, although each country's system is organized somewhat differently. In each, the government provides direction and funding, and entities within and outside the government provide technical assistance to help decision makers understand how to use climate information in planning.
Federal climate information efforts could be improved by incorporating key organizational and data elements, according to GAO reports, studies by the National Academies and other organizations, site visits to three countries with climate information systems, and interviews with stakeholders. Specifically, the key elements are (1) a focused and accountable organization, (2) authoritative data that define the best available information for decision makers, and (3) technical assistance to help decision makers access, translate, and use climate information in planning. Authoritative locally-focused information is crucial because it defines a common starting point for decision makers, and most decisions are made at the local level.
Options to provide climate information and technical assistance to decision makers have strengths and limitations, according to studies, international site visits, and interviews with stakeholders. For example, a new federal agency would have a focused mission but could face turf conflicts with existing programs at other agencies. On the other hand, a national climate information system could be developed that would incorporate the best features and address the limitations of these options. Similar to the programs in Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, a national system to provide climate information to U.S. decision makers could have roles for federal and nonfederal entities. Based on GAO's review of systems in other countries, studies, and interviews with stakeholders, a key federal role in a national climate information system would be to provide authoritative data and quality assurance guidelines for how to use the data. A nonfederal entity would be better positioned to provide on-the-ground technical assistance and facilitate connections between decision makers and intermediaries with expertise.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Executive Office of the President (EOP) direct a federal entity to develop a set of authoritative climate change projections and observations and create a national climate information system with defined roles for federal agencies and nonfederal entities. Relevant EOP entities provided only technical comments, which GAO incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GGD-95-44 | gao_GGD-95-44_0 | IRS’ processing of undeliverable mail involves labor-intensive and manual procedures at the 10 IRS service centers. Extent and Causes of Undeliverable Mail
American society is very mobile. Estimates made by these groups indicated that undeliverable mail rose from 6.5 million pieces in 1986 to as much as 15 million pieces in 1992. The Postal Service may not deliver or forward mail, and mail is returned to IRS. IRS incorrectly records taxpayers’ addresses in its databases. In addition, it said these undeliverable notices cost IRS millions of dollars in lost revenue and increased collection costs. A 1992 National Office quality improvement project reported that IRS had at least 1.2 million invalid business addresses in IRS computer files, resulting in about 2.25 million pieces of undeliverable mail annually. Efforts by IRS to Reduce Undeliverable Mail
IRS has recognized the need to reduce the amount of its undeliverable mail and has several studies and projects focusing on ways to deal with it. To implement this program, IRS’ Collection function in the 10 service centers is to start processing undeliverable mail after the first occurrence of this mail as the other service center functions do. The recommendations included (1) developing standardized procedures for processing undeliverable mail throughout IRS and making the Collection function’s automated systems available to other service center functions; (2) testing alternative methods for taxpayers to provide address changes to IRS, such as the use of a tear-off return stub on notices; and (3) adopting procedures to help ensure that taxpayers’ addresses would be accurately updated in its databases. We believe that increasing taxpayers’ awareness of the importance of providing address changes to IRS is fundamental to developing a strategy to minimize the volume of undeliverable mail. However, this unit did not process all of the service center’s undeliverable mail. Conclusions
Although it is unlikely that the problem of undeliverable mail can be totally eliminated, IRS needs to give undeliverable mail more attention because it adversely affects operations and can cause undue burden on taxpayers. | Why GAO Did This Study
In response to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) processes for handling undeliverable mail, focusing on the: (1) amount of and reasons for undeliverable mail; and (2) impact of undeliverable mail on taxpayers and IRS.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) IRS estimates that it had about 6.5 million pieces of undeliverable mail in 1986 and about 15 million pieces in 1992; (2) undeliverable mail is principally caused by taxpayers failing to leave forwarding addresses, the U.S. Postal Service not delivering or forwarding mail, and IRS incorrectly recording taxpayers' addresses in its files; (3) taxpayer interest and penalties can substantially increase because of undeliverable mail, which eventually can lead to IRS attachment of taxpayers' liquid assets; (4) IRS loses millions of dollars in revenue annually and incurs increased operating costs because of undeliverable mail; (5) the IRS Collection Division plans to start processing undeliverable mail after the first occurrence and send only two instead of four service center notices to decrease collection costs; (6) IRS has implemented only a few recommendations to decrease its undeliverable mail because it expects its Tax Systems Modernization initiative to resolve its undeliverable mail problem; (7) senior IRS management recently requested responsible IRS offices to develop action plans to decrease the amount of undeliverable mail in a recent internal IRS report; (8) IRS needs to increase taxpayers' awareness of the need to provide address changes to minimize the volume of undeliverable mail; and (9) more efficient processing of undeliverable mail could result if IRS consolidates mail processing functions into one centralized unit. |
gao_GAO-12-325 | gao_GAO-12-325_0 | related Labor regulations and guidance, responsibilities of plan sponsors and other fiduciaries may include, but are not limited to, In accordance with ERISA and selecting and monitoring any service providers to the plan; reporting plan information to the federal government and to participants; adhering to the plan documents, including any investment policy identifying parties-in-interest to the plan and taking steps to monitor transactions with them; selecting and monitoring investment options the plan will offer and diversifying plan investments; and ensuring that the services provided to their plans are necessary and that the cost of those services is reasonable. Sponsors and Participants Paid a Range of Fees, though Smaller Plans Paid Higher Fees than Larger Plans
Industry Studies on 401(k) Plan Fees Pension industry studies and surveys of 401(k) plans focusing on fees have found that plans pay a range in fees. However, as shown in figure 3, the average amount paid for by sponsors of small plans (fewer than 50 participants) was 1.33 percent of assets. Larger plans are more likely to pass recordkeeping and administrative fees along to participants than smaller plans. However, a couple of respondents of small and medium-sized plans paid more than 1 percent. Further, our survey also shows that the sponsors who had not asked about these fees were more likely to not know if these fees were paid. Plan Sponsors Were Challenged by Complex Fee Arrangements and Likely Paid More than They Realized
Some Sponsors Were Not Aware of Revenue Sharing Arrangements, Resulting in Higher Fees
Our review of select plans indicates that some plan sponsors did not understand the impact of third-party fee arrangements, also known as revenue sharing, on total plan fees. The sponsor of a medium-size plan with over $4 million in plan assets reported that participants did not pay for recordkeeping and administrative services—when in fact the provider estimated that about 43 percent of the fees collected by fund providers from participants’ accounts, roughly $13,000, would be used to pay for recordkeeping and administrative services. Labor Has Taken Actions to Help Sponsors, but Additional Efforts Are Needed to Effectively Oversee Fees Charged by Service Providers
Labor Has Educational Resources, but Sponsors Reported Not Using Them
Labor has made information, guidance, and tools regarding plan fees available to plan sponsors on its website, but our survey shows that many sponsors are not using these resources. As part of this initiative, Labor also distributes a number of publications and tools for sponsors, including a model fee disclosure form, to help them review and compare the fees charged by service providers. Specifically, on the basis of our survey of plan sponsors, we estimate that sponsors of less than 6 percent of 401(k) plans used Labor’s publication A Look At 401(k) Plan Fees, which includes a 401(k) fees checklist, when comparing and assessing the fees charged by their various providers. Labor Is Reexamining the Definition of a Fiduciary, but Additional Efforts Could Help Sponsors and Others
Labor has also taken steps to broaden its oversight of service providers, particularly investment advisers, which may help sponsors in their role as plan fiduciaries, but the impact of its actions remains to be seen. These changes would likely allow Labor to oversee a broader range of plan providers. Therefore, in addition to Labor’s ongoing effort to amend the definition of an ERISA fiduciary, Labor may need to conduct a separate evaluation of relationships between sponsors and providers, whose fiduciary status is unclear. However, in several instances, sponsors of large and small plans did not know or fully understand the fees charged to their plans, because fee arrangements have become so complex and may be disclosed differently, adding to sponsor confusion about plan fees. Recommendations for Executive Action
In order to help plan sponsors better understand how fees are charged to their plans and to help them make well-informed decisions, we recommend that the Secretary of Labor develop and implement alternative approaches to Labor’s plan sponsor outreach and education initiatives that actively engage sponsors and allow the agency to track sponsor engagement. To help sponsors better understand and monitor plan fees, including those paid by participants, Labor should enhance web access to publicly available fee information it collects on the annual Form 5500 to provide sponsors with information to compare and assess fees charged by service providers, such as building in the ability to search for and create customized reports of plans with similar features or providers for the purpose of benchmarking. In its written response, Labor generally agreed with our findings and recommendations. Specifically, our survey results show that sponsors of more than 90 percent of 401(k) plans either did not use or did not know about Labor’s resources. Thus, we reaffirm our recommendation to enhance web access to publicly available Form 5500 data. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
On the basis of our research objectives, we obtained information on fee amounts paid by sponsors and participants for services, examined challenges sponsors faced in understanding how fees are charged, and identified actions the Department of Labor (Labor) has taken to help sponsors understand and monitor fees. A copy of the questionnaire and survey responses for most questions is available in the e-supplement to this report, GAO-12-550SP. Similarly, when generating our estimates of the amounts paid by participants for a particular service, we excluded a sponsor’s response if the value for the amount that participants paid was missing; the sponsor indicated that it did not know the amount paid by participants by reporting a value of “1” per survey instructions; or the value for plan assets or number of plan participants was missing, since these were needed to estimate fees as a percentage of assets and on a per participant basis, respectively. | Why GAO Did This Study
Studies have been conducted to better understand the fees 401(k) plan sponsors and their participants pay. However, these studies focus on larger plans. Thus, uncertainty remains about the amounts paid by small and medium-sized plans and the level of knowledge and expertise these sponsors have to assess the fees charged by service providers.
GAO addressed the following related to small, medium-sized, and large plans: (1) amounts plan sponsors and participants pay for services, (2) challenges sponsors face in understanding how fees are charged, and (3) actions Labor has taken to help sponsors better understand and monitor the fees charged by service providers. GAO reviewed relevant federal laws, regulations, and retirement research, and interviewed federal officials and industry experts. GAO also conducted a survey of 1,000 401(k) plans to collect information about fees paid for plan services. The response rate allowed GAO to generalize to the population of 401(k) plans for most of the survey questions. The survey instrument and most results can be viewed at GAO-12-550SP .
What GAO Found
Plan sponsors and participants paid a range of fees for services, though smaller plans typically paid higher fees as a percentage of plan assets. For example, the average amount sponsors of small plans reported paying for recordkeeping and administrative services was 1.33 percent of assets annually, compared with 0.15 percent paid by sponsors of large plans. Larger plans were more likely to pass recordkeeping fees along to participants, but when fees were passed along to participants in small plans, those in large plans paid lower fees than those in small plans. Participants also paid for investment and plan consulting feesthrough fees deducted from their plan assetsin more instances than sponsors.
GAOs survey and review of plan documents showed that some sponsors faced challenges in understanding the fees they and their participants were charged. Some sponsors did not know if their providers used complex fee arrangements, such as revenue sharing, or if their plans paid certain fees under an insurance contract, such as a group annuity contract. In addition, some sponsors reported knowing about arrangements, but did not fully understand how these fees were charged. For example, one relatively large plan underestimated recordkeeping fees by more than $58,000, because the sponsor did not include the fees charged to participants accounts under its revenue sharing arrangement.
The Department of Labor (Labor) has taken several actions to help sponsors understand and monitor fees charged by service providers. For example, Labor disseminates a number of publications and resources, including a 401(k) fees checklist that is available to sponsors on its website to help them better understand plan fees. However, according to GAOs survey results, more than an estimated 90 percent of sponsors either did not know about or have not used Labors resources to compare and assess plan fees. Additionally, sponsors have access to the plan information of others, including some fees paid, through the Form 5500, but GAOs survey also shows that the information is not being used by sponsors. Finally, although Labor has recently taken on regulatory initiatives to enhance fee disclosures to sponsors, their effect remains to be seen. For example, Labor is in the process of revising a proposed change to the definition of the term fiduciary, which may allow Labor to oversee a broader range of plan investment advisers. However, Labors authority over other types of providers, who have considerable influence over sponsors and may charge sponsors and their plan participants excessive fees, is limited.
The Department of Labor (Labor) has taken several actions to help sponsors understand and monitor fees charged by service providers. For example, Labor disseminates a number of publications and resources, including a 401(k) fees checklist that is available to sponsors on its website to help them better understand plan fees. However, according to GAOs survey results, more than an estimated 90 percent of sponsors either did not know about or have not used Labors resources to compare and assess plan fees. Additionally, sponsors have access to the plan information of others, including some fees paid, through the Form 5500, but GAOs survey also shows that the information is not being used by sponsors. Finally, although Labor has recently taken on regulatory initiatives to enhance fee disclosures to sponsors, their effect remains to be seen. For example, Labor is in the process of revising a proposed change to the definition of the term fiduciary, which may allow Labor to oversee a broader range of plan investment advisers. However, Labors authority over other types of providers, who have considerable influence over sponsors and may charge sponsors and their plan participants excessive fees, is limited.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that Labor develop and implement more proactive approaches to sponsor educational outreach, improve public access to annual Form 5500 data, and examine the definition of a fiduciary to determine if it captures the current relationship between sponsors and providers. In response, Labor generally agreed with the findings and will explore ways to implement these recommendations. |
gao_GAO-07-1062 | gao_GAO-07-1062_0 | However, other civil penalties have fixed dollar amounts, such as minimums or maximums, which are not linked to a percentage of liability. Adjusting Civil Tax Penalties for Inflation May Increase IRS Assessments and Collections
Adjusting civil tax penalties for inflation on a regular basis to maintain their real values over time may increase IRS assessments and collections. Based on our analysis, if the fixed dollar amounts of civil tax penalties had been adjusted for inflation, the increase in IRS assessments potentially would have ranged from an estimated $100 million to $320 million and the increase in collections would have ranged from an estimated $38 million to $61 million per year from 2000 to 2005, as shown in table 1. If the deterrent effect of penalties depends on the real value of the penalty, the deterrent effect of these penalties has eroded because of inflation. IRS officials from all but one unit said that regularly updating the fixed dollar amounts of civil tax penalties would not be a significant burden. Officials from one relatively small office—the Office of Penalties—said that such adjustments might be considerable depending on the number of penalties being adjusted and would require a reprioritization of their work since their office would have lead responsibility for monitoring the administrative steps necessary to implement the adjustments and coordinating tasks among a wide range of functions within IRS. In addition, the limited number of tax practitioners we interviewed told us that the administrative burden associated with adjusting these penalties for inflation on a regular basis would be low. IRS has a variety of experiences that may provide guidance that would be relevant to adjusting civil tax penalties with fixed dollar amounts for inflation. Changes to the civil tax penalty fixed dollar amounts could be handled in a similar manner. Concluding Observations
The real value and potential deterrent effect of civil tax penalties with fixed dollar amounts has decreased because of inflation. Regularly adjusting the fixed dollar amounts of civil tax penalties for inflation likely would not put a significant burden on IRS or tax practitioners. | Why GAO Did This Study
Civil tax penalties are an important tool to encourage taxpayer compliance with the tax laws. A number of civil tax penalties have fixed dollar amounts--a specific dollar amount, a minimum or maximum amount--that are not indexed for inflation. Because of Congress's concerns that civil penalties are not effectively achieving their purposes, we agreed to (1) determine the potential effect of adjusting civil tax penalties for inflation on the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) assessment and collection amounts and (2) describe the likely administrative impact of regularly adjusting civil tax penalties on IRS and tax practitioners. GAO examined IRS data on civil tax penalties and conducted interviews with IRS employees and tax practitioners.
What GAO Found
Adjusting civil tax penalties for inflation on a regular basis to maintain their real values over time may increase IRS collections by tens of millions of dollars per year. Further, the decline in real value of the fixed dollar amounts of civil tax penalties may weaken the deterrent effect of these penalties and may result in the inconsistent treatment of taxpayers over time. If civil tax penalty fixed dollar amounts were adjusted for inflation, the estimated increase in IRS collections would have ranged from $38 million to $61 million per year from 2000 to 2005. Almost all of the estimated increase in collections was generated by four penalties. These increases result because some of the penalties were set decades ago and have decreased significantly in real value--by over one-half for some penalties. According to those we interviewed, the likely administrative burden associated with adjusting the fixed dollar amounts of civil tax penalties for inflation on a regular basis would not be significant for IRS and would be low for tax practitioners. However, officials from the Office of Penalties, a relatively small office that would be responsible for coordinating the required changes among multiple IRS divisions, said that such adjustments might be considerable depending on the number of penalties being adjusted and would require a reprioritization of work. IRS officials said that the work required would be easier to implement with each subsequent update. |
gao_GAO-17-593T | gao_GAO-17-593T_0 | U.S.–CNMI Relations
Error! Changes in the Application of Federal Immigration Laws
The Consolidated Natural Resources Act of 2008 amended the U.S.– CNMI Covenant to apply federal immigration law to the CNMI, following a transition period. 2). Eliminating CW-1 Permits Would Negatively Affect the Economy; Current and Planned Demand for Labor Exceeds Supply of U.S. Workers
Preliminary Results of Our Economic Analysis and Recent Data Show That Ending the CW Program Could Have a Large Negative Effect on the Economy
If all CW-1 workers, or 45 percent of the total workers in 2015, were removed from the CNMI’s labor market, our preliminary economic analysis projects a 26 to 62 percent reduction in the CNMI’s 2015 GDP, depending on the assumptions made. To estimate the possible effect of a reduction in the number of workers with CW-1 permits in the CNMI to zero—through the scheduled end of the CW program in 2019—we employed an economic method that enabled us to simulate the effect of a reduction under a number of different assumptions. Our Preliminary Analysis Shows That Recent and Planned Demand for Labor Exceeds Existing CW-1 Permits and the Supply of Local Workers
Recent Labor Demand
The CNMI economy currently is experiencing growing demand for workers, particularly among occupations in construction and hospitality. Legend: – = Not applicable; CNMI = Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands; CW-1 = CNMI- Only transitional worker; DHS = U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Construction workers. New businesses. See figure 4 for photos showing the initial gaming facility’s development site in Saipan both before and during construction. Twenty-two new development projects, including six new hotels or casinos in Saipan and two new hotels or casinos in Tinian, are planned for construction or renovation by 2019. show that the unemployed domestic workforce, estimated at 2,386 in 2016, will be well below the number of workers needed to replace currently employed CW-1 workers in nonconstruction-related occupations. of Palau). For example, in 2003, 1,909 freely associated state workers were employed in the CNMI as compared with 677 of these workers in 2015, according to CNMI tax data. Federal and CNMI Efforts to Address Labor Force Challenges Include Job Training Programs and a Consultative Process
The federal and CNMI governments support programs seeking to address the CNMI’s labor force challenges. Fees Collected by CW Program Support Job Training
DHS collects the $150 vocational education fee assessed for each foreign worker on a CW-1 petition and typically transfers the fees to the CNMI government each month. Results of our ongoing work indicate that to support vocational education curricula and program development in fiscal years 2012 through 2016, DHS transferred to the CNMI Treasury about $9.1 million in CW-1 fees. In fiscal years 2012 through 2016, the CNMI government allocated about $5.8 million of the $9.1 million in CW-1 vocational education fees to three educational institutions (see fig. At present, the CW-1 fees support job training programs at Northern Marianas College and Northern Marianas Trades Institute and in recent years also funded job training provided by CNMI’s Public School System. CNMI’s Public School System. Recently Completed 902 Consultative Process Resulted in Recommendations to Congress and DHS
In December 2016, after 8 months of official 902 Consultations, informal discussions, and site visits to locations in the CNMI, the Special Representatives of the United States and the CNMI transmitted a report to the President that included six recommendations agreed to by the Special Representatives on immigration and labor matters: 1. 2. Extending eligibility to the CNMI for additional federal workforce development programs. Establishing a cooperative working relationship between DHS and the CNMI. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2008, Public Law 110-229 established federal control of CNMI immigration. It required DHS to create a transitional work permit program for foreign workers in the CNMI and to decrease the number of permits issued annually; it presently requires that DHS reduce them to zero by December 31, 2019. To implement this aspect of the law, in 2011, DHS created a CW-1 permit program for foreign workers. In 2015, foreign workers totaled 12,784, making up more than half of the CNMI workforce.
GAO was asked to review the implementation of federal immigration laws in the CNMI. This testimony discusses GAO's preliminary observations from its ongoing work on (1) the potential economic impact of reducing the number of CNMI foreign workers to zero and (2) federal and CNMI efforts to address labor force challenges.
GAO reviewed U.S. laws and regulations; analyzed government data, including CNMI tax records since 2001; and conducted fieldwork in Saipan, Tinian, and Rota, CNMI. During fieldwork, GAO conducted semistructured interviews and discussion groups with businesses, CW-1 workers, U.S. workers, and current and former job training participants. GAO also interviewed officials from the CNMI government, DHS, and the U.S. Departments of Commerce, the Interior, and Labor.
What GAO Found
If all foreign workers in the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) with CNMI-Only transitional worker (CW-1) permits, or 45 percent of total workers in 2015, were removed from the CNMI's labor market, GAO's preliminary economic analysis projects a 26 to 62 percent reduction in CNMI's 2015 gross domestic product (GDP)—the most recent GDP available. In addition, demand for foreign workers in the CNMI exceeded the available number of CW-1 permits in 2016—many approved for workers from China and workers in construction occupations. The construction of a new casino in Saipan is a key factor in this demand (see photos taken both before and during construction in 2016). Meanwhile, by 2019, plans for additional hotels, casinos, and other projects estimate needing thousands of new employees. When the CW-1 permit program ends in 2019, GAO's preliminary analysis of available data shows that the unemployed domestic workforce, estimated at 2,386 in 2016, will be well below the CNMI's expected demand for labor. To meet this demand, CNMI employers may need to recruit U.S.-eligible workers from the U.S. states, U.S. territories, and the freely associated states (the Federated States of Micronesia, Republic of the Marshall Islands, and Republic of Palau).
Federal and CNMI efforts to address labor force challenges include (1) job training programs and (2) employment assistance funded by the U.S. Department of Labor and implemented by the CNMI's Department of Labor. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) collects the $150 vocational education fee assessed for each foreign worker on a CW-1 petition and transfers the fees to the CNMI government. Results of GAO's ongoing work indicate that to support vocational education curricula and program development in fiscal years 2012 through 2016, DHS transferred to the CNMI Treasury about $9.1 million in CW-1 fees. During this period, GAO's preliminary analysis shows that the CNMI government allocated about $5.8 million of the $9.1 million to three educational institutions: Northern Marianas College, Northern Marianas Trades Institute, and the CNMI's Public School System. In 2016, a U.S.–CNMI consultative process resulted in a report to Congress with six recommendations related to the CNMI economy, including one to raise the cap on CW-1 foreign worker permits and extend the permit program beyond 2019.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making any recommendations at this time. GAO plans to issue a final report in May 2017. |
gao_GAO-15-52 | gao_GAO-15-52_0 | Eight Agencies Have Direct Oversight Responsibility for Consumer Product Safety
Eight agencies reported that they have direct oversight responsibilities for consumer product safety: the Coast Guard; CPSC; Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD); EPA; FDA; NHTSA; Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC); and Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA). These eight agencies conduct a range of regulatory activities related to consumer product safety, including rulemaking, standard setting, enforcement, risk assessment, and product recalls. Regulatory jurisdiction for some products changes depending on where or how the product is used, which can result in overlapping oversight, as in the following examples. Current Structure Helps Provide More Comprehensive Oversight but Also Creates Some Inefficiencies
Agency officials, as well as a consumer group and industry expert, told us that the involvement of multiple agencies with various areas of expertise can help ensure more comprehensive oversight of a product. For example, NHTSA noted that they share complaint and injury data associated with the use of hand-held infant carriers in motor vehicles with CPSC during joint investigations to inform CPSC’s oversight of these products when used outside of motor vehicles. NIST’s Role as Regulator for the Markings of Toy and Imitation Firearms May Be an Inefficient Use of Resources
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) currently regulates the markings of toy and imitation firearms to distinguish them from real firearms. Jurisdiction for the Regulation of Some Recreational Boating Equipment May Be Unclear
Oversight of products that can be used on recreational boats is fragmented between the Coast Guard and CPSC, and the jurisdiction for some products can be unclear. As a result, we found that the potential exists for confusion regarding which agency has responsibility for addressing product safety hazards. According to Coast Guard officials, the agencies ultimately determined that CPSC had jurisdiction in this case. However, no coordinating mechanism exists to address federal consumer product safety efforts comprehensively. As a result, there is no single entity or mechanism to help the agencies that collectively oversee consumer product safety address the challenges raised in this report, such as staying informed of the regulatory activities of other agencies, jurisdictional issues related to multiple agencies overseeing the same product, or data sharing issues. In addition, agencies may be missing opportunities to better leverage resources and address challenges, including those related to fragmentation and overlap identified in this report. § 5001) is inefficient because such a role may not leverage the agency’s primary mission and expertise in the area of scientific measurement. Transferring this authority to another agency would require a statutory change. In addition, while agencies reported collaborating using a variety of mechanisms to address specific topics, we did not identify a mechanism to facilitate more comprehensive collaboration. Additionally, independent agencies such as CPSC are not subject to the executive branch planning and review process under OMB. To improve existing coordination of oversight for consumer product safety, Congress should consider establishing a formal comprehensive oversight mechanism for consumer product safety agencies to address crosscutting issues as well as inefficiencies related to fragmentation and overlap such as communication and coordination challenges and jurisdictional questions between agencies. CPSC, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and NIST agreed with GAO’s matters and recommendation; other agencies neither agreed nor disagreed. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this review were to examine (1) which federal agencies oversee consumer product safety and their roles and responsibilities; (2) the extent and effects of fragmentation, overlap, or duplication, if any, in the oversight of consumer products; and (3) how consumer product safety oversight agencies coordinate their activities and to what extent does that address any identified negative effects of fragmentation, overlap, or duplication. Inventory of Agencies That Conduct Consumer Product Safety Oversight Activities
To initially identify agencies that conduct consumer product safety oversight and to delineate their roles and responsibilities, we reviewed the following sources: (1) laws and regulations related to consumer product safety, as well as Federal Register notices for proposed and final rulemaking from August 2008 to October 2013; (2) the Consumer Product Safety Commission’s (CPSC) web link to other federal agencies with jurisdiction over consumer products; (3) our past reports; and (4) agency members of CPSC-identified interagency working groups. These agencies support product safety in areas such as public health expertise, law enforcement, and workplace safety. GAO-12-1022. | Why GAO Did This Study
The oversight of consumer product safety is a complex system involving many federal agencies. As part of a mandate that requires GAO to identify federal programs, agencies, offices, and initiatives with duplicative goals or activities, GAO reviewed federal oversight of consumer product safety.
This review examines (1) which federal agencies oversee consumer product safety and their roles and responsibilities; (2) the extent and effects of any fragmentation or overlap in the oversight of consumer products; and (3) collaboration among agencies to address any negative effects of fragmentation or overlap.
To assess the involvement of multiple agencies in the oversight of consumer product safety, GAO conducted a multiagency survey and reviewed laws and regulations, and past GAO work. GAO also interviewed federal agency officials and consumer and industry groups.
What GAO Found
GAO identified eight agencies that have direct oversight responsibilities for consumer product safety: the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC), Department of Housing and Urban Development, Environmental Protection Agency, Food and Drug Administration, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, and the U.S. Coast Guard (within the Department of Homeland Security). All eight agencies conduct regulatory activities to promote consumer product safety, such as rulemaking, standard setting, risk assessment, enforcement, and product recalls. In addition, at least 12 other agencies play a support role in consumer product safety in various areas, such as public health and law enforcement.
Oversight of consumer product safety is fragmented across agencies, and jurisdiction overlaps or is unclear for certain products. In some cases, agencies regulate different components of or carry out different regulatory activities for the same product, or jurisdiction for a product can change depending on where or how it is used. For example, NHTSA regulates hand-held infant carriers when used as car seats, but CPSC regulates the carriers when used outside of motor vehicles. Agencies reported that the involvement of multiple agencies with various expertise can help ensure more comprehensive oversight by addressing a range of safety concerns. However, agencies also noted some inefficiencies, including the challenges of sharing information across agencies and challenges related to jurisdiction. For example, GAO found that the jurisdiction for some recreational boating products can be unclear and the potential exists for confusion regarding agency responsibility for addressing product safety hazards. Coast Guard officials said they work informally with CPSC when the need arises but that these interactions are infrequent. Without a more formal coordination mechanism to address jurisdictional uncertainties some potential safety hazards may go unregulated. In addition, the Department of Commerce's National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) oversees the markings of toy and imitation firearms to distinguish them from real firearms, which may be an inefficient use of resources because it does not leverage NIST's primary expertise related to scientific measurement. According to NIST, this function may be better administered by CPSC, which oversees the safety and performance of toys. However, this would require a statutory change.
Agencies reported that they collaborate to address specific consumer product safety topics, but GAO did not identify a formal mechanism for addressing such issues more comprehensively. Independent agencies, such as CPSC, are not subject to the Office of Management and Budget's planning and review process for executive agencies. Additionally, no single entity or mechanism exists to help the agencies that collectively oversee consumer product safety. GAO has identified issues for agencies to consider in collaborating, such as clarifying roles and including all relevant participants. Because no mechanism exists to help agencies collectively address crosscutting issues, agencies may miss opportunities to leverage resources and address challenges, including those related to fragmentation and overlap identified in this report.
What GAO Recommends
Congress should consider (1) transferring oversight of the markings of toy, look-alike, and imitation firearms from NIST to CPSC, and (2) establishing a formal collaboration mechanism to address comprehensive oversight and inefficiencies related to fragmentation and overlap. Also, GAO recommends that the Coast Guard and CPSC establish a formal coordination mechanism. CPSC, the Department of Homeland Security, and NIST agreed with GAO's matters and recommendation; other agencies neither agreed nor disagreed. |
gao_GAO-02-831 | gao_GAO-02-831_0 | SSA is required to administer its disability programs in a fair and unbiased manner. SSA’s Study of Racial Disparities Was Extensive, but Methodological Weaknesses in Available Documentation Preclude Conclusions
Following our report, SSA undertook an extensive effort to study racial disparities in ALJ decisions at the hearings level, but weaknesses in available documentation preclude conclusions from being drawn. SSA used descriptive statistics to show that overall application and allowance rates of African Americans differed from whites. In addition, SSA used multivariate analyses to examine the effect of race on ALJ decisions while controlling for other factors that influence decisions. Specifically, SSA officials told us that, by 1998, they found no evidence that race significantly affected ALJ decisions for any of the regions. SSA Has Taken Limited Steps to Address Possible Racial Bias in Its Hearings Level Decision-Making Process
Concurrent with SSA’s study of racial disparities, SSA’s Office of Hearings and Appeals took several steps to address possible racial bias in disability decision making at the hearings level. These steps included providing diversity training, increasing recruitment efforts for minority ALJs, and administering a new complaint process for the hearings level to help ensure fair and impartial hearings. OHA also increased its efforts to recruit minorities for ALJ and other legal positions, although the impact of these efforts on the racial/ethnic mix of SSA’s ALJ workforce has been limited. In addition to having information booths and distributing information on legal careers at OHA, OHA presented a workshop called “How to Become an Administrative Law Judge at OHA,” at each conference. In addition to these efforts, in 1993 SSA instituted a complaint process under the direction of OHA that provides claimants and their representatives with a new mechanism for voicing complaints specifically about bias or misconduct by ALJs. Recommendations
To address shortcomings in SSA’s ongoing quality assurance process for ALJs—which would improve SSA’s assessment of ALJ decision-making accuracy—we recommend the agency take the following steps: conduct ongoing analyses to assess the representativeness of the sample used in its quality assurance review of ALJ decisions, including testing the statistical significance of differences in key characteristics of the cases included in the final sample with those that were not obtained; include the results of this analysis in SSA’s annual and biennial reports on ALJ decision making; and use the results to make appropriate changes, if needed, to its data collection or sampling design to ensure a representative sample. Appendix I: Comments from the Social Security Administration
GAO Comments
1. | What GAO Found
The Social Security Administration (SSA) is responsible for administering the Social Security Disability Insurance and the Supplemental Security Insurance programs--the nation's two largest disability programs. SSA is required to administer its disability programs in a fair and unbiased manner. Nevertheless, the proportion of African American applicants allowed benefits has been historically lower than the proportion of white applicants. These allowances rate differences have occurred with respect to disability determinations made by state Disability Determination Service offices and in decisions made at the hearings level by Administrative Law Judges (ALJ). In response to GAO's 1992 report, SSA initiated an extensive study of racial disparities in ALJ decisions, but methodological weaknesses preclude conclusions being drawn from it. The study--the results of which were not published--set out to analyze a representative sample of cases to determine whether race significantly influenced disability decisions, while simultaneously controlling for other factors. SSA officials told GAO that, by 1998, they found no evidence that race significantly influenced ALJ decisions. However, GAO was unable to draw these same conclusions due to weaknesses in sampling and statistical methods evident in the limited documentation still available for GAO's review. Concurrent with SSA's study of racial disparities, SSA's Office of Hearings and Appeals (OHA) took some limited steps at the hearings level to address possible racial bias in ALJ decision-making. OHA instituted a mandatory diversity sensitivity training course for ALJs. Additionally, OHA increased its efforts to recruit minorities for ALJ and other legal positions by attending conferences for minority bar associations, where SSA distributed information and gave seminars on how to become an ALJ. Finally, in keeping with its commitment to provide fair and impartial hearings, SSA established a new process under the direction of OHA for the review, investigation, and resolution of claimant complaints about alleged bias or misconduct by ALJs. |
gao_HEHS-97-6 | gao_HEHS-97-6_0 | For example, in fiscal year 1995, nearly one-half of veterans in substance abuse treatment inpatient units were homeless at the time of admission, and 35 percent had both substance abuse and one or more psychiatric disorders. In addition, veterans treated in substance abuse treatment units were chronically unemployed, had problems maintaining relationships, reported low incomes, or were criminal offenders. VA Offers a Variety of Substance Abuse Treatment Services
VA strives to offer a continuum of services to treat veterans nationwide with substance abuse disorders. Like other providers, VA uses a variety of approaches in treating veterans with substance abuse disorders. As shown in figure 2, obligations for VA substance abuse treatment programs increased about 45 percent, from $407 million to $589 million from fiscal years 1991 to 1996. VA Is Changing Its Quality Management Philosophy
VA currently lacks the necessary data to adequately measure and fully evaluate the efficacy of its many treatment programs. VA is therefore developing a new performance monitoring system, using new outcome measures, to compare treatment and program effectiveness both internally and with non-VA substance abuse treatment providers. Central office officials do, however, monitor the many substance abuse treatment programs by reviewing (1) annual reports on the substance abuse treatment programs at each medical center; (2) reports on program services, staffing, and utilization from VA’s Program Evaluation and Research Center; (3) the Quality Improvement Checklist, a systemwide quality improvement tool that includes one indicator about the rate of readmission for alcohol- and drug-related disorders for patients discharged from inpatient substance abuse treatment units; and (4) the results of patient satisfaction surveys. The revised performance measures will be used to evaluate individual substance abuse treatment programs and compare them with each other as well as with non-VA programs. Community Services Are Available to and Used by Veterans
Non-VA substance abuse providers and programs are also available to and used by veterans. If VA were to stop treating veterans for substance abuse, societal costs would likely increase. VA lacks information on the health care needs of eligible veterans, the number of veterans who might seek care if it were more accessible, the actual cost of treating such veterans, and the outcomes of specific treatments. The lack of this information limits our ability to evaluate the cost-effectiveness of contracting out program services and the implications of this action on the relative quality of services veterans might receive. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) substance abuse program and the effect of VA reorganization on this program, focusing on: (1) characteristics of veterans who receive substance abuse treatment; (2) services VA offers to veterans with substance abuse disorders; (3) methods VA uses to monitor the effectiveness of its substance abuse treatment programs; (4) community services available to veterans who suffer from substance abuse disorders; and (5) implications of changing VA methods for delivering substance abuse treatment services.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) in fiscal year 1995, VA substance abuse treatment units served about 180,000 veterans; (2) about one half of the inpatients were homeless at the time of admission and about one third had psychiatric disorders; (3) many of these veterans were chronically unemployed, had problems maintaining relationships, reported low incomes, or were criminal offenders; (4) VA provides a variety of treatment settings and approaches; (5) between fiscal years 1991 and 1996, VA funding for treatment increased from $407 million to $589 million to accommodate growth in the substance abuse treatment program; (6) VA lacks the necessary data to adequately measure and fully evaluate the efficacy of its many treatment programs and has primarily relied on utilization information and recidivism rates to monitor the quality of its substance abuse treatment programs; (7) VA is developing a performance monitoring system based on treatment outcome measures; (8) numerous non-VA substance abuse treatment programs are also available to and used by veterans; (9) many veterans treated in community-based public programs are like those treated in VA programs; (10) if VA stopped treating veterans for substance abuse, resulting societal costs may shift to welfare or other social services, other federal or state substance abuse treatment programs, and the criminal justice system; (11) VA cannot ascertain the implications of contracting for these services, since it lacks critical information on the health care needs of eligible veterans, the number of veterans who might seek care, and actual cost of treating veterans with substance abuse disorders; and (12) VA officials have not decided how substance abuse treatment services will be delivered and what outcome measures will be used to evaluate treatment and program effectiveness. |
gao_GAO-11-134 | gao_GAO-11-134_0 | The Corps has the responsibility for construction, operation, and maintenance of the nation’s waterway system. Highway infrastructure. More specifically, economic efficiency requires that the price of a good or service equals the marginal social cost (the cost to society of consuming one additional unit of the good or service). Competitive market forces should lead service providers to pass the cost of these payments on to their customers in the same manner that private costs are passed on. When Prices Do Not Reflect All Marginal Costs, Competition Can Be Distorted and Economic Efficiency Reduced
The hypothetical scenarios in figure 2 illustrate how discrepancies between marginal social costs (plus a competitive return on investment) and prices, whether caused by government subsidies or by external costs, can distort competition and cause inefficient allocations of resources in the freight transportation sector. There Can Be a Tradeoff between Recovering Fixed Public Infrastructure Costs and Promoting the Efficient Use of Existing Infrastructure
Certain freight transportation costs, such as the construction of new infrastructure, are considered to be “fixed” (rather than marginal) in the sense that they do not increase as use of the infrastructure increases. Specifically, we estimate that freight trucking costs that were not passed on to customers were at least 6 times greater than rail costs and at least 9 times greater than waterways costs per million ton miles of freight transport. Most of these costs were external costs imposed on society. Consumers of Freight Services Pay Less of the Marginal Costs Associated with Trucking than with Railroads or Waterways
Although certain data limitations and difficulties in valuing important categories of costs prevent us from making definitive quantitative estimates of the nonprivate (i.e., public and external) marginal costs generated by an additional million ton-miles of freight service provided by each of the three transportation modes, we are able to present at least lower bound estimates of those costs and to compare the magnitudes of these costs across the three modes. In a competitive economy, private costs such as payments for labor and fuel are generally passed on in prices to the final consumers of freight services; therefore, those costs did not need to be included in our estimation of costs that are not passed on. In addition to mode-shifting, price changes can prompt other economic responses in the short run, such as the use of lighter-weight materials; over the longer term there is greater potential for responses that will shape the overall distribution and use of freight services. Costs can vary widely based on the specific characteristics of an individual shipment, such as the geography and population density of the shipment’s route, and the fuel-efficiency of the specific vehicle carrying it. Ideally, policy that is able to align marginal prices with marginal costs on a shipment-by-shipment basis would provide the greatest economic benefit. However, achieving this in practice would typically result in high administrative costs. Less targeted interventions (e.g., charging fees or taxes based on average costs, subsidizing more efficient alternatives, or broadly applying safety or emission regulations) can have impacts on users and potentially change the overall distribution of freight across modes or demand for freight overall, but provide fewer benefits. Other complexities arise when attempting to align fixed costs and revenues. Agency Comments
We provided copies of a draft of this report to DOT and the Corps for review and comment. DOT also provided technical corrections, which we incorporated in the report. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report are to (1) describe how public policies can affect competition and efficiency within the surface freight transportation sector; (2) determine what is known about the extent to which costs are borne by surface freight users; and (3) discuss how our findings could be used when making future surface freight transportation policy. Freight trucks. | Why GAO Did This Study
Road, rail, and waterway freight transportation is vital to the nation's economy. Government tax, regulatory, and infrastructure investment policies can affect the costs that shippers pass on to their customers. If government policy gives one mode a cost advantage over another, by, for example, not recouping all the costs of that mode's use of infrastructure, then shipping prices and customers' use of freight modes can be distorted, reducing the overall efficiency of the nation's economy. As requested, this report (1) describes how government policies can affect competition and efficiency within the surface freight transportation sector, (2) determines what is known about the extent to which all costs are borne by surface freight customers, and (3) discusses the use of the findings when making future surface freight transportation policy. GAO reviewed the transportation literature and analyzed financial and technical data from the Department of Transportation (DOT), the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps), and the Environmental Protection Agency to make cross-modal comparisons at a national level. Data limitations and assumptions inherent in an aggregate national comparison are noted in the report.
What GAO Found
Public spending, tax, and regulatory policies can promote economic efficiency in the freight transportation sector when they result in prices that reflect all marginal costs (the cost to society of one additional unit of service). These costs include private costs; public costs, such as infrastructure maintenance; and external costs, such as congestion, pollution, and accidents. When prices do not reflect all these costs, one mode may have a cost advantage over the others that distorts competition. As a consequence, the nation could devote more resources than needed to higher cost freight modes, an inefficient outcome that lowers economic well-being. Inefficient public investment decisions can result when all construction and other fixed costs are not passed on to the beneficiaries of that investment. GAO's analysis shows that on average, additional freight service provided by trucks generated significantly more costs that are not passed on to consumers of that service than the same amount of freight service provided by either rail or water. GAO estimates that freight trucking costs that were not passed on to consumers were at least 6 times greater than rail costs and at least 9 times greater than waterways costs per million ton miles of freight transport. Most of these costs were external costs imposed on society. Marginal public infrastructure costs were significant only for trucking. Given limitations in the highway, rail, and waterway economic, financial, technical, and environmental data available for the analysis, GAO presents conservative estimates. While freight costs are not fully passed on to consumers across all modes, a number of issues are important for decision makers to consider when proposing policy changes to align prices with marginal costs or reduce the difference between government fixed costs and revenues. Costs can vary widely based on the specific characteristics of an individual shipment, such as the geography and population density of the shipment's route, and the fuel-efficiency of the specific vehicle carrying it. Policy changes that align prices with marginal costs on a shipment-by-shipment basis would provide the greatest economic benefit, but precisely targeted policy changes can result in high administrative costs. By contrast, less targeted changes--such as charging user fees based on average costs, subsidizing more efficient alternatives, or broadly applying safety or emissions regulations--can change the overall distribution of freight across modes, but may provide fewer benefits. Although the current configuration of transportation infrastructure can limit the shifting of freight among modes, price changes can prompt other economic responses. Over the longer term, there is greater potential for responses that will shape the overall distribution and use of freight services.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making recommendations in this report. GAO provided a draft of this report to DOT and the Corps. DOT provided technical suggestions and corrections, which were incorporated as appropriate. The Corps had no comments. |
gao_GAO-02-902 | gao_GAO-02-902_0 | Illnesses stemming from contaminated meat and poultry are responsible for an unknown portion of these illnesses and deaths. In January 1998, FSIS began phasing in HACCP regulatory requirements for meat and poultry slaughter and processing plants. FSIS Is Not Ensuring that Plants’ HACCP Plans Meet Regulatory Requirements
According to FSIS’s food safety systems correlation reviews, inspectors are not consistently identifying and documenting failures of plants’ HACCP plans to meet regulatory requirements. Furthermore, FSIS does not expect its inspectors to determine whether HACCP plans are based on sound science—the cornerstone of an effective plan. The in-depth verification reviews also showed that some plants may have a fundamental misunderstanding of what constitutes a hazard that is reasonably likely to occur. FSIS’s Lack of Consistent Identification and Documentation of Repetitive HACCP Violations Weakens Enforcement
According to our review of 1,180 noncompliance records from 16 plants for fiscal year 2001, plant inspectors have not consistently identified and documented repetitive violations of HACCP requirements. The lack of consistency occurs, in part, because FSIS has not established specific, uniform criteria for identifying repetitive violations. Moreover, even at the district level, officials’ understanding of the factors that should be considered in determining repetitive violations varied. The longer that FSIS allows plants to remain out of compliance with regulatory requirements, the greater the risk that unsafe food will be produced and enter the marketplace. Recommendations for Executive Action
To ensure that all HACCP plans fully meet regulatory requirements, we recommend that the Secretary of Agriculture direct FSIS to provide inspectors with additional training on their roles and responsibilities under the HACCP system and use data, such as the results from the food safety system correlation reviews, to help target training to address specific weaknesses; develop procedures for its field supervisors and district managers to use to monitor inspector activities, including, among other things, ensuring that FSIS inspectors are consistently applying HACCP requirements; develop a risk-based strategy and time frames for consumer safety officers to complete their reviews of HACCP plans at all plants; and develop a strategy for its supervisors, managers, and officials to systematically use data, including annual data on noncompliance records by districts, to help oversee plants’ compliance with HACCP requirements. To ensure that plants take prompt actions to correct violations, we recommend that the Secretary of Agriculture direct FSIS to establish clear, consistent criteria for inspectors to use when considering whether to recommend suspension because of repetitive violations; require its inspectors to document the basis for their decision on whether or not to recommend further enforcement action based upon documented repetitive violations; develop guidance with specific time frames for actions to be taken at plants that fail a second set of Salmonella tests, including time frames for FSIS to initiate an in-depth verification review, report the results of the review, and initiate a third set of tests; establish, and document in enforcement case files, time frames for plants with suspensions in abeyance to implement and verify the necessary corrective actions; and document in the enforcement case file how and when the district office determined that the plant had completed its corrective actions and, if the suspension is allowed to remain in abeyance for more than 90 days, the reason for the extension. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Our review of the Food Safety and Inspection Service’s (FSIS) enforcement of the Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) requirements focused exclusively on domestic meat and poultry slaughter and processing plants subject to federal oversight. GAO’s Comments
1. We are recommending that FSIS do so. | Why GAO Did This Study
Every year, some meat and poultry products are contaminated with microbial pathogens--such as Salmonella and E. coli--that cause foodborne illnesses and deaths. To improve the safety of meat and poultry products, the U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) introduced additional regulatory requirements for meat and poultry plants. These requirements are intended to ensure that plants operate food safety systems that are prevention-oriented and science-based. These systems, called Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) systems, were phased in from January 1998 through January 2000 at all meat and poultry slaughter and processing plants. As the foundation of the HACCP system, plants are responsible for developing HACCP plans that, among other things, identify all of the contamination hazards that are reasonably likely to occur in a plant's particular production environment, establish all of the necessary steps to control these hazards, and have valid scientific evidence to support their decisions.
What GAO Found
GAO found that FSIS is not ensuring that all plants' HACCP plans meet regulatory requirements. As a result, consumers may be unnecessarily exposed to unsafe foods that can cause foodborne illnesses. In particular, FSIS's inspectors have not consistently identified and documented failures of plants' HACCP plans to comply with requirements. In addition, although sound science is the cornerstone of an effective HACCP plan, FSIS does not expect its inspectors to determine whether HACCP plans are based on sound science because inspectors lack the expertise to do so. FSIS is not consistently identifying repetitive violations, according to GAO's review of 1,180 noncompliance records for fiscal year 2001. This has occurred, in part, because FSIS has not established specific, uniform, and clearly defined criteria for its inspectors to use in determining when a violation is repetitive. Furthermore, at the district level, FSIS officials' understanding of the criteria to consider in determining if a violation is repetitive varied. Also, in several instances, inspectors have not fully documented the basis for their decisions about repetitive violations on noncompliance records. FSIS is not ensuring that plants take prompt and effective action to return to compliance after a HACCP violation has been identified. The longer that FSIS allows plants to remain out of compliance with regulatory requirements, the greater the risk that unsafe food will be produced and marketed. |
gao_GAO-09-904SP | gao_GAO-09-904SP_0 | Congress and the administration will need to examine the ability of the executive branch to develop and implement overarching strategies to enhance collaboration for national security efforts. Key Findings
Although Some Agencies Have Developed Overarching Strategies, the Lack of Information on Roles and Responsibilities and Lack of Coordination Mechanisms Can Hinder Interagency Collaboration
Although some U.S. government agencies have developed or updated overarching strategies since September 11, 2001, the lack of information on roles and responsibilities and lack of coordination mechanisms in these strategies can hinder interagency collaboration. We have testified and reported that in some cases U.S. efforts have been hindered by multiple agencies pursuing individual efforts without overarching strategies detailing roles and responsibilities of organizations involved or coordination mechanisms to integrate their efforts. For example, we have found the following: Since 2005, multiple U.S. agencies—including the State Department, U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID), and Department of Defense (DOD)—had led separate efforts to improve the capacity of Iraq’s ministries to govern without overarching direction from a lead entity to integrate their efforts. Key Findings
Organizational Differences Can Hinder Collaboration on National Security Activities
Based on our prior work, organizational differences—including differences in organizational structures, planning processes, and funding sources—can hinder interagency collaboration, resulting in a patchwork of activities that can waste scarce funds and limit the overall effectiveness of federal efforts. Agencies involved in national security activities define and organize their regions differently. According to a DOD official, disagreement about equitable funding from each budget led to the initial operating capability date being pushed back 1 year for a new space radar system. Enclosure III of this report further discusses the human capital issues related to interagency collaboration for national security. We have found that some mechanisms are not formalized, may not be fully utilized, or have difficulty gaining stakeholder support, thus limiting their effectiveness in enhancing interagency collaboration. Key Findings
Some Agencies Lack Personnel Capacity to Fully Participate in Interagency Activities
Collaborative approaches to national security require a well-trained workforce with the skills and experience to integrate the government’s diverse capabilities and resources, but some federal government agencies may lack the personnel capacity to fully participate in interagency activities. Some federal government agencies have taken steps to improve their capacity to participate in interagency activities. Training Opportunities and Strategic Workforce Planning Could Facilitate Collaboration
Increased training opportunities and focusing on strategic workforce planning efforts are two tools that could facilitate federal agencies’ ability to fully participate in interagency collaboration activities. As such, sharing and integrating national security information among federal, state, local, and private- sector partners is critical to assessing and responding to current threats to our national security. Congress and the administration will need to ensure that agencies remain committed to sharing relevant national security information, increasing access to necessary information, and effectively managing and integrating information across multiple agencies. Key Findings
Agencies Do Not Always Share Relevant Information
Our prior work has shown that agencies do not always share relevant information with their national security partners, including other federal government agencies, state and local governments, and the private sector. Information is a crucial tool in addressing national security issues and its timely dissemination is absolutely critical for maintaining national security. Security clearance issues. Specifically, we reported in May 2007 that non-DOD personnel could not access some DOD planning documents or participate in planning sessions because they may not have had the proper security clearances, hindering interagency participation in the development of military plans. Based on our previous work, we identified three challenges posed by managing and integrating information drawn from multiple sources. for sharing information? Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Enhance Implementation of Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership. | Why GAO Did This Study
While national security activities, which range from planning for an influenza pandemic to Iraq reconstruction, require collaboration among multiple agencies, the mechanisms used for such activities may not provide the means for interagency collaboration needed to meet modern national security challenges. To assist the 111th Congress and the new administration in developing their oversight and management agendas, this report, which was performed under the Comptroller General's authority, addresses actions needed to enhance interagency collaboration for national security activities: (1) the development and implementation of overarching, integrated strategies; (2) the creation of collaborative organizations; (3) the development of a well-trained workforce; and (4) the sharing and integration of national security information across agencies. This report is based largely on a body of GAO work issued since 2005.
What GAO Found
Based on prior work, GAO has found that agencies need to take the following actions to enhance interagency collaboration for national security: Develop and implement overarching strategies. Although some U.S. government agencies have developed or updated overarching strategies on national security issues, GAO has reported that in some cases, such as U.S. government efforts to improve the capacity of Iraq's ministries to govern, U.S. efforts have been hindered by multiple agencies pursuing individual efforts without an overarching strategy. In particular, a strategy defining organizational roles and responsibilities and coordination mechanisms can help agencies clarify who will lead or participate in activities, organize their joint and individual efforts, and facilitate decision making. Create collaborative organizations. Organizational differences--including differences in agencies' structures, planning processes, and funding sources--can hinder interagency collaboration, potentially wasting scarce funds and limiting the effectiveness of federal efforts. For example, defense and national intelligence activities are funded through separate budgets. Disagreement about funding from each budget led to the initial operating capability date being pushed back 1 year for a new space radar system. Coordination mechanisms are not always formalized or not fully utilized, potentially limiting their effectiveness in enhancing interagency collaboration. Develop a well-trained workforce. Collaborative approaches to national security require a well-trained workforce with the skills and experience to integrate the government's diverse capabilities and resources, but some federal government agencies lack the personnel capacity to fully participate in interagency activities. Some federal agencies have taken steps to improve their capacity to participate in interagency activities, but personnel shortages have impeded agencies' ability to participate in these activities, such as efforts to integrate personnel from other federal government agencies into the Department of Defense's (DOD) new U.S. Africa Command. Increased training opportunities and strategic workforce planning efforts could facilitate federal agencies' ability to fully participate in interagency collaboration activities. Share and integrate national security information across agencies. Information is a crucial tool in national security and its timely dissemination is critical for maintaining national security. However, despite progress made in sharing terrorism-related information, agencies and private-sector partners do not always share relevant information with their national security partners due to a lack of clear guidelines for sharing information and security clearance issues. For example, GAO found that non-DOD personnel could not access some DOD planning documents or participate in planning sessions because they may not have had the proper security clearances. Additionally, incorporating information drawn from multiple sources poses challenges to managing and integrating that information. |
gao_GAO-01-580 | gao_GAO-01-580_0 | VETS’ Proposed Measures Hold Promise, But Some Concerns Remain
VETS’ proposed performance measures are a significant improvement over current measures, but certain aspects of these measures raise concerns that VETS may need to address. The strategic plan suggests that states focus their efforts on providing staff-assisted services to veterans, including case management. Yet, none of the proposed measures specifically gauges whether more staff-intensive services are helping veterans get jobs. Now, under the proposed system, VETS will track the increase in the number of federal contractor jobs listed with the state’s ES office—a process-oriented measure. Proposed Data Source for New Measures Is An Improvement But Will Bring Some Challenges
The proposed data for the new measures will greatly improve the comparability and reliability of these measures, but this change will bring some challenges that VETS will need to address. Using a single, standardized source for collecting data will improve VETS’ ability to compare performance across states. Currently, states are using various data sources for performance-reporting purposes. First, states should find ways to identify interstate job placements. Because the UI wage record system resides within each state, states generally do not have access to wage records from other states, making it difficult to track individuals who receive services in one state but get a job in another. Therefore, the UI system will not be able to track and count veterans who get these types of jobs. Other Measurement Issues Affect Comparability of States’ Performance Data
There are other issues not related to the use of UI wage records that VETS should consider as it finalizes its performance-reporting requirements. In an environment in which self-service is becoming more common, we found that states vary in whether they register veteran job seekers who access self-service tools, such as internet-based job listings or resume writing software. In addition, VETS maintains a measure related to federal contractors—one that is beyond the control of DVOPS and LVERs. Appendix I: Comparison of VETS, ES, and WIA Performance Measures
Similar to Workforce Investment Act (WIA) programs, the Employment Service (ES) and the Veterans’ Employment and Training Service (VETS) are proposing that their programs use Unemployment Insurance wage records to report on performance measures. | Why GAO Did This Study
This report discusses the proposed performance measurement system at the Department of Labor's Veterans' Employment and Training Service (VETS). Specifically, GAO reviews (1) VETS' proposed performance measures, including possible concerns about the measures; (2) the proposed data source for the new system; and (3) other measurement issues that would effect the comparability of states' performance data.
What GAO Found
GAO found that VETS' proposed performance measures would improve performance accountability over the current system, but some aspects of the new measures raise concerns. VETS' strategic plan suggests that states focus their efforts on providing staff-assisted services to veterans, including case management. Yet none of the proposed measures specifically gauge the success of these services. In addition, VETS' proposal includes one measure--the number of federal contractor jobs listed with local employment offices--that is not only process-oriented but also focuses on outcomes that are beyond the control of staff serving veterans. VETS proposes that all states use a single data source--Unemployment Insurance wage records--to identify veterans who get jobs. Using these data will greatly improve the comparability and reliability of the new measures. Although using these data will improve some aspects of data collection, the data present some challenges. States generally do not have access to wage records from other states and, therefore, should find ways to track individuals who receive services in one state but get a job in another. Other issues that affect the comparability of states' performance-related data should be considered. For example, states vary in whether they register and count, for performance reporting purposes, job seekers who use only self-service tools, such as internet-based job listings. |
gao_GAO-14-545 | gao_GAO-14-545_0 | NE’s Approach to Advanced Reactor R&D Supports Several Advanced Reactor Technologies
NE’s approach to its advanced reactor R&D is to support research on technologies associated with three main types of advanced reactors: high-temperature gas-cooled reactors; liquid-metal-cooled fast reactors, including the sodium-cooled fast reactor; and fluoride-salt-cooled high- temperature reactors. This approach provides several advantages, including flexibility in responding to changes in future U.S. energy policy or other circumstances. NE’s Approach Addresses Broad Programmatic Goals and Policy Objectives, and Provides Flexibility in Responding to Changes in U.S. Energy Policy
While the broad goals of NE’s advanced reactor R&D efforts are to improve the economics, safety, and proliferation resistance of nuclear power plants, the R&D efforts also aim to develop advanced reactor technologies that can prepare the United States to address policy objectives such as reducing nuclear waste and greenhouse gas emissions. NE’s approach to advanced reactor R&D is to conduct research in support of multiple advanced reactor technologies. A key objective of NE’s advanced reactor R&D efforts is to conduct research to remove technology barriers or reduce technology risks, while collaborating with industry and academia, with the ultimate goal for industry to take the results of NE’s research to the next step of development and commercialization. To remain aware of industry’s R&D needs and international nuclear energy developments, NE regularly collaborates with industry and international organizations, according to NE officials and NE documents. For example, NE is currently collaborating with industry on advanced fuels and materials, among other things. However, in its June 2013 report, the Nuclear Energy Advisory Committee was critical of NE’s approach, saying that NE needs to better prioritize its R&D efforts on a smaller number of advanced reactor technologies to focus research funding on the ultimate goal of deploying an advanced reactor prototype. Although NE selected the technology to develop under the NGNP Project, many members of the National Academy of Sciences’ National Research Council, members of the Nuclear Energy Advisory Committee, and industry representatives we interviewed agree with NE’s approach to advanced reactor R&D because the time is not right for NE to move to the deployment phase. For instance, representatives from industry and the Nuclear Energy Advisory Committee told us that uncertainties around current policies for handing nuclear waste and controlling greenhouse gases do not make a compelling case for choosing an advanced reactor technology to deploy as a prototype. NE Uses Internal and External Reviews to Set Program and Funding Priorities but Does Not Have a Strategy for Deploying an Advanced Reactor Prototype
NE’s uses internal and external reviews to set program and funding priorities for advanced reactor R&D and to evaluate progress toward program goals. Among the different advanced reactor technologies currently supported by NE R&D, the high-temperature gas-cooled reactor technology is the most likely to be deployed and commercialized in the near term, according to an NE planning document. NE officials said that the likelihood is based on the wide range of potential market applications to industry of electricity and process heat and is supported by substantial government investments in the technology’s development, including testing of materials, fuels, and other components. However, according to NE officials and representatives from the NGNP Industry Alliance, they have been unable to come to an agreement on implementing the cost-share requirement for funding the remainder of the NGNP Project because of disagreement on the applicable cost- share levels and how and when the cost-share would be applied to specific activities or project phases. By conducting nuclear reactor R&D, NE has a critical role to play as it supports existing light water reactors, as well as a new generation of advanced nuclear reactors. Furthermore, without selecting initial reactor design parameters and reporting the parameters to Congress, as required by EPAct 2005 for completing Phase 1 of the project, or establishing a date to make a selection, it is not clear if or when NE is going to take this next step and proceed with Phase 2 of the NGNP Project. Recommendations for Executive Action
To better prepare the Department of Energy to meet the requirement of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 to deploy the NGNP prototype reactor, we recommend that DOE take the following two actions:
Develop, in consultation with the Nuclear Energy Advisory Committee and independent nuclear experts, as appropriate, a strategy to proceed with Phase 2 of the NGNP Project, outlining conditions that will warrant a change in program direction, remaining research and development activities, projected project budget and schedule, and steps necessary to overcome barriers to successful completion of the NGNP Project. In written comments, DOE’s Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Energy, responding on behalf of DOE, wrote that DOE agreed in principle with our first recommendation and respectfully disagreed with our second recommendation. | Why GAO Did This Study
NE conducts R&D on advanced nuclear reactor technologies with multiple aims, including (1) improving the economic competitiveness of nuclear technology to ensure that nuclear power continues to play a role in meeting our nation's energy needs; (2) increasing safety; (3) minimizing the risk of nuclear proliferation and terrorism; and (4) addressing environmental challenges, such as reducing greenhouse gas emissions. External groups have been critical of NE for, among other things, how it prioritizes advanced reactor R&D.
GAO was asked to review NE's advanced reactor R&D efforts. This report (1) describes NE's approach to advanced nuclear reactor R&D and (2) examines how NE plans and prioritizes its advanced reactor R&D activities, including deploying an advanced reactor. GAO reviewed laws and reports concerning NE's efforts to develop advanced reactor technologies and interviewed NE officials and a nonprobability sample of companies developing such technology, selected because of their involvement with DOE's R&D efforts.
What GAO Found
The Department of Energy's (DOE) Office of Nuclear Energy's (NE) approach to advanced reactor research and development (R&D) focuses on three reactor technologies—high-temperature gas-cooled reactors, sodium-cooled fast reactors, and fluoride-salt-cooled high-temperature reactors—but NE is also funding research into other advanced reactor technologies. NE's approach is to conduct research in support of multiple advanced reactor technologies, while collaborating with industry and academia, with the ultimate goal for industry to take the results of NE's research to the next step of development and commercialization. This approach provides several advantages, including flexibility in responding to changes in future U.S. energy policy. Many representatives that GAO talked to from the nuclear power industry and the National Academy of Sciences agree with NE's approach, saying that current policies on controlling greenhouse gas emissions and disposing of nuclear waste do not make a compelling case for choosing a reactor technology to develop. However, others GAO talked to are critical of some of the reactor technologies NE chooses to research, citing economic and technological challenges. The Nuclear Energy Advisory Committee has criticized NE's approach, recommending that NE focus its efforts on a smaller number of technologies to help ensure that a reactor prototype is deployed. To remain aware of industry's R&D needs and international nuclear energy developments, NE regularly collaborates with industry and international organizations.
NE uses internal and external reviews to set program and funding priorities for advanced reactor R&D activities and to evaluate progress toward program goals. For example, NE conducts internal monthly and quarterly reviews to discuss project status, budgets, and technical highlights. Furthermore, NE's R&D efforts are periodically reviewed by external entities, including the Nuclear Energy Advisory Committee. Among the advanced reactor technologies that NE's R&D currently supports, the high-temperature gas-cooled reactor is the technology that is most likely to be deployed and commercialized in the near term, according to an NE planning document. NE officials said this likelihood is based on the wide range of potential industry market applications and because of substantial government investments in the technology's development. NE has been pursuing this technology under the Next Generation Nuclear Plant (NGNP) Project, as established by the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct 2005). Under EPAct 2005, DOE is to deploy a prototype reactor for NGNP by the end of fiscal year 2021. However, in 2011, DOE decided not to proceed with the deployment phase of this project, citing several barriers. For example, NE and industry have been unable to reach an agreement on a cost-share arrangement to fund the deployment phase because of a disagreement on the applicable cost-share levels and how and when the cost-share would be applied to specific activities or project phases. Although NE continues to conduct R&D for the NGNP Project, it has not developed a strategy to overcome the cost-share issue and other barriers to resuming the deployment phase of the project. Furthermore, DOE has not selected initial reactor design parameters or reported to Congress on an alternative date for making this selection. Without doing so, it is not clear when NE is going to take this next step in deploying the NGNP prototype reactor and it risks the project not being completed by the targeted date in 2021.
What GAO Recommends
To better prepare DOE to meet the requirement of EPAct 2005 to deploy the NGNP prototype reactor, GAO recommends that DOE develop a strategy for resuming the NGNP Project and provide a report to Congress updating the status of the project. DOE agreed in principle with GAO's first recommendation and respectfully disagreed with the second. GAO believes these recommendations remain valid as discussed in the report. |
gao_GAO-08-276 | gao_GAO-08-276_0 | Blasts due to IEDs and other explosive devices have been one of the leading causes of injury for those serving in OEF and OIF—and in particular have been a leading cause of TBI. Mild TBI can also be present in servicemembers whose injuries do not result in medical evacuation out of the combat theater. (See table 1 for examples of symptoms associated with mild TBI as categorized by CDC.) According to literature on mild TBI in the civilian population, the duration of mild TBI symptoms can vary. VA Has Implemented a TBI Screening Tool at Its Medical Facilities but Has Not Determined the Clinical Validity and Reliability of the Tool
In April 2007, VA implemented in its medical facilities a computer-based screening tool to identify OEF/OIF veterans who may have a mild TBI. VA’s screening tool consists of a series of questions that VA providers must ask OEF/OIF veterans when the veterans come to a VA medical facility for care. While VA’s screening efforts depend on its TBI screening tool, VA has not determined the clinical validity and reliability of the screening tool—that is, respectively, how effective the tool is in identifying those who are and are not at risk for mild TBI and whether the screening tool would yield consistent results if administered to the same veteran more than once. VA requires its medical facilities to use the TBI screening tool to screen every OEF/OIF veteran who presents for care at any clinic in the medical facility, including primary care, dental, and urgent care clinics, CBOCs, or specialty clinics, such as cardiology or orthopedic clinics. Although VA’s TBI Screening Efforts Depend on the Screening Tool, VA Has Not Determined the Tool’s Clinical Validity and Reliability
The key component of VA’s efforts to screen OEF/OIF veterans for mild TBI is VA’s requirement that VA medical facilities administer the TBI screening tool to these veterans when they seek care at VA facilities. VA based its screening tool largely on a TBI screening tool developed and used by the DVBIC—the Brief Traumatic Brain Injury Screen (BTBIS). The BTBIS has been used at select military bases to screen returning OEF/OIF servicemembers for TBI and has been shown to be clinically valid, according to the DVBIC. First, because VA’s TBI screening tool is a modified version of the BTBIS and is being used to screen a slightly different population, the results from DVBIC’s validity study of the BTBIS would not be directly applicable to VA’s screening tool. Also, because veterans who screen positive are to receive a follow-up evaluation by a specialty provider to determine whether they actually have a mild TBI, false positives affect specialty providers’ workload and may affect their capacity to see other veterans. VA Has Implemented a Protocol to Help Ensure Evaluation and Treatment of OEF/OIF Veterans Who Screen Positive for Possible TBI; However, Some Medical Facilities Had Difficulties Fully Following the Protocol
VA has implemented a national protocol to help ensure that OEF/OIF veterans who screen positive on its TBI screening tool are evaluated by a specialty provider and receive treatment, if necessary, for mild TBI. VA has established training for its providers to enhance providers’ use of the protocol and thereby help ensure veterans are evaluated and treated for mild TBI. VA medical facilities have taken steps to resolve these difficulties, and VA has put in place measures to help ensure that all VA providers follow the protocol. According to the protocol, providers conducting the follow-up evaluations should obtain a complete history of the veteran’s injury and current symptoms, conduct a physical examination targeted to the veteran’s symptoms, and use a symptom checklist to assess the presence and severity of various symptoms associated with mild TBI. 2.) VA Faces Clinical and Cultural Challenges in Screening and Evaluating OEF/OIF Veterans for Mild TBI
VA faces a number of clinical and cultural challenges in its efforts to screen and evaluate OEF/OIF veterans for mild TBI. The lack of objective diagnostic tests that can identify mild TBI, and the fact that many symptoms of mild TBI are similar to those of other conditions, such as PTSD, represent clinical challenges to VA’s screening and evaluation efforts. Characteristics of Military Culture and of OEF/OIF Veterans Create Cultural Challenges to VA’s Mild TBI Screening and Evaluation Efforts
Several characteristics of the OEF/OIF veteran population create cultural challenges to VA’s effort to screen OEF/OIF veterans for mild TBI and evaluate those who screen positive. VA recognizes the importance of evaluating the screening tool’s validity and reliability—and is planning to do so. However, VA has not yet begun its evaluation. | Why GAO Did This Study
Traumatic brain injury (TBI) has emerged as a leading injury among servicemembers serving in the Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) combat theaters. The widespread use of improvised explosive devices, such as roadside bombs, in these combat theaters increases the likelihood that servicemembers will be exposed to incidents that can cause a TBI. TBIs can vary from mild to severe, and in general, mild TBI can be difficult to identify. Because mild TBI can have lasting effects if not identified and treated, concerns have been raised about how the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) identifies and treats OEF/OIF veterans with a mild TBI. In this report GAO describes VA's (1) efforts to screen OEF/OIF veterans for mild TBI, (2) steps taken so that those OEF/OIF veterans at risk for mild TBI are evaluated and treated, and (3) challenges in screening and evaluating OEF/OIF veterans for mild TBI. GAO reviewed VA's policies, interviewed VA officials and TBI experts, and reviewed nine VA medical facilities' efforts to implement TBI screening and evaluation processes.
What GAO Found
To screen OEF/OIF veterans for mild TBI, VA implemented in its medical facilities in April 2007 a computer-based screening tool to identify OEF/OIF veterans who may have a mild TBI. VA's tool consists of questions that VA must ask all OEF/OIF veterans when they come to a VA medical facility for care. VA issued a policy requiring its medical facilities to use the tool to screen all OEF/OIF veterans who present for care in any clinic in the facility, including primary care and specialty care clinics. The policy has guidance on what types of providers may administer the tool and directs providers that a positive screening result requires a further evaluation by a specialist to determine if the veteran has mild TBI. VA's screening efforts depend on its TBI screening tool and VA recognizes the importance of determining the tool's clinical validity and reliability--that is, how effectively the tool identifies those who are and are not at risk for mild TBI and if the tool would yield consistent results if administered to the same veteran more than once. However, VA is planning to but has not yet begun to determine the tool's validity and reliability. VA's screening tool was based largely on a tool developed and validated by the Defense and Veterans Brain Injury Center (DVBIC)--a medical and educational collaboration among DOD, VA, and two civilian partners--used at selected military bases to screen returning OEF/OIF servicemembers for TBI. However, because VA's tool is a modified version of DVBIC's tool and is used to screen a slightly different population, the results of the validity study of DVBIC's tool are not directly applicable to VA's tool. To help ensure that OEF/OIF veterans identified as at risk for a mild TBI by VA's screening tool are evaluated and treated, VA developed a national protocol for their evaluation and treatment. According to VA's protocol, veterans with a positive screening result should be offered a follow-up evaluation by a specialist to determine if they have a mild TBI. The follow-up evaluation should include a history of the veteran's injury, a physical examination targeted to the veteran's symptoms, and the use of a checklist to assess the presence and severity of symptoms associated with mild TBI. VA has established training for its providers to enhance use of the protocol and help ensure veterans are evaluated and treated for mild TBI. Providers at some VA medical facilities we visited had difficulties fully following the protocol. However, the facilities had taken steps to resolve the difficulties, and VA has put in place measures to help providers follow the protocol. VA faces clinical and cultural challenges in its efforts to screen and evaluate mild TBI in OEF/OIF veterans. Clinical challenges include the lack of existing objective diagnostic tests that can definitively identify mild TBI. Also, many symptoms of mild TBI are similar to those associated with other conditions, such as post-traumatic stress disorder, making a diagnosis of mild TBI harder to reach. Some characteristics of the OEF/OIF veteran population present cultural challenges in that they may affect veterans' willingness to seek care for TBI symptoms. For example, some may believe that being labeled with a TBI could affect their ability to stay in the National Guard or Reserves. |
gao_GAO-06-800T | gao_GAO-06-800T_0 | In fiscal year 2005, DOD obligated nearly $270 billion on contracts for products, research and development efforts, and services, such as for information technology and management support. All indications are that this upward trend will continue. Aside from growth in dollar value, there have also been changes in what DOD is buying. DOD’s new weapon system programs are expected to be the most expensive and complex ever, and will consume an increasingly large share of DOD’s budget. To illustrate, in the last 5 years DOD has doubled its commitment to major weapon systems from $700 billion to $1.4 trillion. DOD is counting on these efforts to fundamentally transform military operations. As overall obligations have increased, so has DOD’s reliance on the private sector to provide services to fulfill DOD’s missions and support its operations. Additionally, in recent years, federal agencies including DOD have moved away from using in-house contracting capabilities and are making greater use of existing contracts awarded by other agencies. Moreover, our work and that of some agency inspectors general have uncovered instances of improper use of interagency contracts, including issuing orders that were outside the scope of the underlying contract, failing to follow procedures intended to ensure best pricing, and failing to establish clear lines of accountability and responsibility. At the same time that the amount, nature, and complexity of contract activity has increased, DOD’s acquisition workforce has remained relatively unchanged in size and faces certain skill gaps and serious succession planning challenges. Sound Business Arrangements
I would like to turn now to briefly discuss some of DOD’s practices in three areas—(1) competition and sound pricing; (2) incentivizing contractors; and (3) contract oversight—that increase risks and undermine DOD’s ability to establish sound business arrangements. In this case, we found that the Army devoted twice as many contract dollars—nearly $495 million—to sole-sourced contracts for security guards at 46 of 57 Army installations, despite the Army’s recognition that it was paying about 25 percent more for its sole-source contracts than for those it previously awarded competitively. Incentivizing Contractors
Another element of a sound business arrangement is the fee mechanism used to incentivize excellent contractor performance. In December 2005, we reported that DOD gives its contractors the opportunity to collectively earn billions of dollars through monetary incentives. Unfortunately, we found DOD programs routinely engaged in practices that failed to hold contractors accountable for achieving desired outcomes and undermined efforts to motivate results-based contractor performance, such as evaluating contractor performance on award-fee criteria that are not directly related to key acquisition outcomes (e.g., meeting cost and schedule goals and delivering desired capabilities to the warfighter); paying contractors a significant portion of the available fee for what award-fee plans describe as “acceptable, average, expected, good, or satisfactory” performance, which sometimes did not require meeting the basic requirements of the contract; and giving contractors at least a second opportunity to earn initially unearned or deferred fees. As a result, DOD has paid out an estimated $8 billion in award fees on contracts in our study population, regardless of whether acquisition outcomes fell short of, met, or exceeded DOD’s expectations. Contract Oversight
I would like to briefly discuss the third element of sound business arrangements, DOD’s oversight of its service contracts. In 2005, we reported that DOD’s monitoring of nearly a third of the 90 service contracts we reviewed was insufficient. Such examples illustrate the outcomes of poor acquisition executions. DOD’s spending on goods and services has grown significantly since fiscal year 2000, and all indications are the trend will continue. DOD’s weapon systems acquisition and contract management processes have been on GAO’s high-risk list for more than a decade. DOD obligated nearly $6.5 billion under letter contracts in fiscal year 2004. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense's (DOD) spending on goods and services has grown significantly since fiscal year 2000 to well over $250 billion annually. Prudence with taxpayer funds, widening deficits, and growing long-range fiscal challenges demand that DOD maximize its return on investment, while providing warfighters with the needed capabilities at the best value for the taxpayer. DOD needs to ensure that its funds are spent wisely, and that it is buying the right things, the right way. In this testimony, GAO discusses (1) recent trends in DOD contracting activity and the environment in which this activity takes place, and (2) practices which undermine its ability to establish sound business arrangements, particularly those involving the selection and oversight of DOD's contractors and incentivizing their performance. This statement is based on work GAO has completed over the past 6 years covering a range of DOD acquisition and contracting issues. Some of these issues are long-standing. GAO has identified DOD contract management as a high-risk area for more than decade. With awards to contractors large and growing, DOD will continue to be vulnerable to contracting fraud, waste or misuse of taxpayer dollars, and abuse.
What GAO Found
DOD obligated nearly $270 billion on contracts for goods and services in fiscal year 2005, an 88 percent increase over the amount obligated in fiscal year 2000. All indications are that this upward trend will continue. Aside from growth in dollar value there have also been changes in what DOD is buying. DOD's new weapons system programs are expected to be the most expensive and complex ever and will consume an increasingly large share of its budget. In the last 5 years DOD has doubled its commitment to major weapon systems from $700 billion to $1.4 trillion, and DOD is counting on these efforts to fundamentally transform military operations. As overall obligations have increased so has its reliance on the private sector to provide services to fulfill DOD's missions and support its operations. Additionally, in recent years DOD has increased its use of existing contracts awarded by other agencies (i.e. interagency contracts). While this approach provides a number of benefits, our work, and that of some agency inspector generals, revealed instances of improper use, including issuing orders that were outside the scope of the underlying contract as well as failing to establish clear lines of accountability and responsibility. While the amount, nature, and complexity of DOD contract activity have increased, its acquisition workforce has remained relatively unchanged in size. At the same time, the acquisition workforce faces certain skills gaps and serious succession planning challenges. There are a number of DOD practices which undermine its ability to establish sound business arrangements. For example, with regard to competition and pricing, we recently found that the Army acquired guard services under authorized sole-source contracts at 46 of 57 Army installations, despite the Army's recognition that it was paying about 25 percent more for its sole-source contracts than for those it previously awarded competitively. Another element of a sound business arrangement is the fee mechanism used to incentivize excellent contractor performance. In December 2005, we reported that DOD gives its contractors the opportunity to collectively earn billions of dollars through monetary incentives. Unfortunately, we found DOD programs routinely engaged in practices that failed to hold contractors accountable for achieving desired outcomes and undermined efforts to motivate results-based contractor performance. As a result, DOD paid out an estimated $8 billion in award fees on contracts in our study population, regardless of whether acquisition outcomes fell short of, met, or exceeded DOD's expectations. DOD also increased its risk of poor acquisition outcomes by not assuring that another element of a sound business arrangement, contractor oversight, was sufficient. For example, in 2005 we reported that DOD's oversight on nearly a third of 90 service contracts reviewed was insufficient, in part because DOD failed to assign performance monitors. |
gao_GAO-15-481 | gao_GAO-15-481_0 | Nationally, more than half of Medicaid beneficiaries are enrolled in a managed care plan. States contract with MCOs to provide a specific set of Medicaid-covered services to beneficiaries, and MCOs are expected to report encounter data to state Medicaid programs that allow the Medicaid administrators to track the services received by enrolled beneficiaries. These studies first reported that encounter data were suitable for research purposes in 2012. Beneficiaries’ Service Utilization Varied by State, Population, Service Categories, and Length of Enrollment for Selected States
Based on our analysis of encounter data, the number of professional services utilized by adult and child beneficiaries per year in the 19 selected states ranged widely, with adult beneficiaries typically receiving more services. Services used by adult beneficiaries included E/M services, such as office visits and emergency room and critical care services; procedural services, such as surgery and ophthalmology; ancillary services, such as pathology and lab services and anesthesiology; and other professional services, such as oxygen therapy and hospital-mandated on-call service. However, states varied considerably in how service utilization was distributed within service categories, as was shown in figure 1. Ancillary: Of total services, adult per beneficiary utilization of ancillary services ranged from 37 percent in Rhode Island to 65 percent in Washington and Illinois—a difference of about 28 percentage points. For slightly more than half of the selected states, total service utilization among adults was higher for partial-year beneficiaries—those in comprehensive managed care plans for less than the full-year of 2010. Specifically, in 11 of the 19 states, the number of services utilized per year ranged from 2 to 78 percent higher for partial-year beneficiaries than for full-year beneficiaries. 2.) 3.) E/M: Of total services, child per beneficiary utilization of E/M services ranged from 29 percent in Minnesota to 45 percent in Georgia and Rhode Island—a difference of 16 percentage points. For example, for all but one state, the number of services utilized per year was 4 to 44 percent higher for partial-year child beneficiaries than for full-year child beneficiaries. 4.) Agency Comments
We provided the Secretary of Health and Human Services with a draft of this report. The Department of Health and Human Services provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. We presented service utilization patterns for adults and children by state, by service category, and by the length of beneficiary enrollment—in particular, whether beneficiaries were enrolled in a comprehensive managed care plan for a full or partial year. Based on our analysis of encounter data, the number of professional services utilized per beneficiary per year reported by the 19 selected states for adults enrolled in comprehensive managed care plans in 2010 ranged from about 13 to 55; the range for children was generally lower, from about 6 to 16. | Why GAO Did This Study
Medicaid, a federal-state health financing program for low-income and medically needy individuals, covered 65 million beneficiaries at an estimated cost of $508 billion in fiscal year 2014. More than half of Medicaid beneficiaries are enrolled in managed care plans, a health care delivery model where states contract with managed care organizations to provide covered services for a set cost. Historically, states have submitted relatively unreliable managed care service utilization data, also known as encounter data, to the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, the federal agency that oversees Medicaid. However, recent evidence suggests that encounter data may be improving. Information on beneficiaries' service utilization could serve as a baseline for future analyses of utilization trends over time. GAO was asked to examine the level of services provided to these beneficiaries. In this report, GAO describes what encounter data indicate about the service utilization of Medicaid beneficiaries in managed care plans.
To do this work, GAO analyzed state-reported data included in CMS's 2010 Medicaid Analytic eXtract data and determined that 19 states had data that were reliable for its purposes, but excluded the remaining 31 states and the District of Columbia. For these 19 states, GAO calculated service utilization rates for adult and child beneficiaries enrolled in comprehensive managed care plans by state, service category, and length of enrollment. GAO received technical comments on a draft of this report from HHS and incorporated them as appropriate.
What GAO Found
Based on GAO's analysis of 2010 encounter data reported by 19 states, the number of professional services utilized by adult beneficiaries ranged from about 13 to 55. For children, the number of professional services utilized per beneficiary was lower, ranging from about 6 to 16 among the 19 states. Professional services included four categories of services: (1) evaluation and management (E/M) services, such as office visits and emergency room and critical care services; (2) procedural services, such as surgery and ophthalmology; (3) ancillary services, such as pathology and lab services; and (4) other professional services, such as oxygen therapy.
States varied considerably in how service utilization was distributed within service categories. For example, of total services,
adult per beneficiary utilization of ancillary services ranged from 37 percent in Rhode Island to 65 percent in Washington and Illinois; and
child per beneficiary utilization of E/M services ranged from 29 percent in Minnesota to 45 percent in Georgia and Rhode Island.
Service utilization for both adult and child beneficiaries also varied by the length of enrollment. When compared with beneficiaries enrolled for a full year, total service utilization for adults was 2 to 78 percent higher for partial-year beneficiaries—those enrolled in a comprehensive managed care plan for less than the full year—in slightly more than half of selected states. For children in all but one selected state, service utilization was 4 to 44 percent higher for partial-year beneficiaries compared with full-year beneficiaries. |
gao_GAO-06-331 | gao_GAO-06-331_0 | The UN Security Council has authorized five peacekeeping missions in Haiti since 1993, of which the United States has led two between 1994 and 2004. Estimated Cost of a Hypothetical U.S. Operation Is Twice as High as Ongoing UN Mission
We estimate that it would cost the United States twice as much as the UN to conduct an operation similar to MINUSTAH. The higher U.S. cost of civilian police, military pay and support, and facilities account for virtually the entire difference between our estimate and the MINUSTAH budget, and reflects the additional cost of ensuring high U.S. standards for training, troop welfare, and personnel security. Using the same basic parameters of troop and staff deployment in Haiti for 14 months, we estimated that the United States would likely budget about $876 million, nearly twice the UN estimate, for a comparable U.S. peacekeeping operation. Medical support for the military and civilian personnel on a U.S. operation would cost an estimated $22 million, over four times the UN budgeted cost of $5 million. Alternative Scenarios with Differing Assumptions Could Generate Higher Cost Estimates
Various military and nonmilitary factors can influence the composition of a peacekeeping operation and thus impact the estimated cost. Further, the addition of nation-building and development assistance activities to the scope of an operation in Haiti would increase the estimated cost substantially. We analyzed the potential impact of three principal cost factors by altering the assumptions of our cost estimate to reflect (1) military forces comprised entirely of reserve soldiers, (2) deployment of military forces within the first 60 days of the operation rather than 180 days, and (3) higher operational tempo (more intensive use of vehicles and equipment). This difference has such a significant impact because DOD does not include regular pay for active duty troops in the cost estimates; the department would incur these costs regardless of whether the troops were deployed in Haiti, the United States, or elsewhere. U.S. and UN Peacekeeping Forces in Haiti Each Have Key Strengths
In addition to cost, other factors would be considered when determining the most appropriate role of the United States and the UN in conducting peacekeeping operations. Past U.S. operations in Haiti have benefited from a strong central communications, command and control structure and a vast military infrastructure supporting its operations, particularly in terms of troop deployment, military intelligence, and public information. UN Has Multinational Participation, Extensive Experience, and Structure for Coordinating Nation Building
The UN’s strengths in peacekeeping in Haiti are rooted in the multinational character of its operation as well as extensive experience with peacekeeping and related nation building. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of Defense and State and the United Nations for their comment. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To compare the cost of a specific United Nations (UN) mission with the cost that the United States would have incurred had an operation been deemed in the U.S. national interest and undertaken without UN involvement, we obtained and analyzed cost data from the UN and the U.S. Government. The cost estimate DOD provided included only the incremental costs of the operation—those directly attributable to the operation that would not be incurred if the operation did not take place. To identify and assess the strengths of the United States and the UN in leading peacekeeping operations in Haiti, we obtained and analyzed UN reports and evaluations relating to MINUSTAH and information on past U.S.-led operations in Haiti. | Why GAO Did This Study
The UN employs about 85,000 military and civilian personnel in peacekeeping operations in 16 countries. The United States has provided about $1 billion annually to support UN peacekeeping operations. In addition, the United States has led and participated in many such operations. UN reports and congressional hearings have raised concerns about accountability for UN peacekeeping operations and the need for reforms. We were asked to provide information relating to the cost and relative strengths of UN and U.S. peacekeeping. In particular, we have (1) compared the cost of the ongoing UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti with the cost that the United States would have incurred had an operation been deemed in the U.S. national interest and undertaken without UN involvement; (2) analyzed factors that could materially affect the estimated costs of a U.S. operation; and (3) identified the strengths of the United States and the UN for leading the operation. We developed our cost estimate of a U.S.-led operation using cost models from the Departments of Defense and State. The estimate is based on various military assumptions, such as the use of primarily active duty troops. It includes only those costs directly attributable to the operation that would not otherwise be incurred.
What GAO Found
We estimate that it would cost the United States about twice as much as the United Nations (UN) to conduct a peacekeeping operation similar to the current UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (designated "MINUSTAH"). The UN budgeted $428 million for the first 14 months of this mission. A U.S. operation in Haiti of the same size and duration would cost an estimated $876 million, far exceeding the U.S. contribution for MINUSTAH of $116 million. Virtually all of the cost difference is attributable to (1) civilian police, (2) military pay and support, and (3) facilities, and reflects high U.S. standards for police training, troop welfare, and security. Various military and nonmilitary factors can substantially affect the estimated costs of a U.S. operation. We analyzed three military factors: the mix of reserve and active duty troops, the rate of deployment, and the operational tempo. Deploying all reserve troops would increase the cost estimate by $477 million, since it would require paying more reservists a full salary. Deploying troops at a faster rate than the UN--within the first 60 days instead of 180--would cost an additional $60 million. Conducting the operation at a higher tempo--with more intensive use of vehicles and equipment--would increase estimated costs by $23 million. In addition to military considerations, including nation-building and development assistance activities in the scope of the operation would increase the cost significantly. Official donors, including the United States, distributed $382 million for these activities during the first year of MINUSTAH. Cost is not the sole factor in determining whether the United States or the UN should lead an operation, and each offers strengths for this responsibility. U.S.-led operations in Haiti between 1994 and 2004 benefited from a vast military infrastructure, which provided strong communications, command and control, readiness to deploy, tactical intelligence, and public information. The UN's strengths include multinational participation, extensive peacekeeping experience, and an existing structure for coordinating nation-building activities. Complex political considerations are likely to influence decisions about the role of the United States and the UN in peacekeeping. |
gao_GAO-12-109 | gao_GAO-12-109_0 | EPA established the Superfund program to carry out these responsibilities. EPA’s Enforcement Process for Superfund Site Cleanup
EPA may enter into agreements with PRPs for those parties to conduct cleanups, compel site cleanups by PRPs, or conduct cleanups itself and seek reimbursement for its costs from those parties. The IG stated that this action plan should include, among other things, (1) a process for ensuring completed CERCLIS reports with accurate special accounts data to manage the program and improve performance; (2) an annual planning process— including a determination that regional special account funds will be used consistent with the General Hierarchy—to aid in monitoring special accounts; (3) development of headquarters and regional controls that include follow-up to make sure planned or requested uses (e.g., reclassifications and transfers to the Trust Fund of special account funds) were conducted; and (4) establishment of guidance and policy that addresses the proper application and amount of special account funds that should be reserved for future use. About Half of the $3.7 Billion that EPA Has Collected in Special Accounts Is Available for Future Superfund Cleanup
From fiscal year 1990 through October 2010, EPA collected from PRPs over $3.7 billion that it placed in 1,023 special accounts. Nearly half of these funds—$1.8 billion—are still available to be obligated for future Superfund cleanup; and the remaining funds—$1.9 billion—have already been obligated, but not all of these obligated funds have been disbursed.regions reclassified about $131 million from 96 special accounts to pay for previous EPA site expenditures, transferred about $14 million from 39 accounts to the general portion of the Trust Fund, and closed 76 accounts. As of October 2010, EPA had plans to obligate 99.8 percent of the $1.8 billion available in special accounts, according to our analysis of EPA CERCLIS data. However, EPA regional officials told us that the special account planned obligations are estimates rather than commitments. EPA Has Implemented Processes and Policies in Recent Years to Better Monitor and Manage Superfund Special Accounts
In response to the IG’s findings and recommendations,officials’ own recognition that the agency needed to provide better oversight of the special accounts process, EPA has implemented the following processes and policies in the last few years to better monitor and manage special accounts: (1) processes to better plan the use of special account funds, (2) increased oversight of special accounts by designating a national special accounts coordinator, and a Special Accounts Senior Management Committee, and (3) strategies and guidance on how to plan for using and monitoring special accounts. That is, it established a section in CERCLIS—referred to as the Special Account Management Screen (or planning screen)—that enables EPA regions to see and enter special account planning data into specific data fields and create reports so that both EPA headquarters and regional officials can monitor the special account balances against planned obligations for ongoing and future site- specific response activities. This headquarters staff person—the national special accounts coordinator—conducts annual and midyear reviews and holds discussions with regional staff to evaluate regions’ plans to allocate special account funds, among other things. It meets semiannually to provide overall management oversight and monitor the status of special accounts. At the same time, it also issued a model memorandum for transferring funds from a special account to the Trust Fund and closing out a special account. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We provided a draft of this report to EPA for review and comment. EPA provided technical comments that we incorporated into the report, as appropriate. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This appendix provides information on the scope of the work and the methodology used to (1) describe the status of special accounts— including balances, locations, and recent and planned uses—of Superfund special accounts and (2) examine the extent to which the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) headquarters and regions are implementing processes and policies to improve the monitoring and management of Superfund special accounts. We also analyzed documents and interviewed officials from EPA’s Office of Inspector General (IG) regarding their 2006 and 2009 reports on EPA’s management of special accounts. | Why GAO Did This Study
Under the Superfund program, EPA has the authority to enter into agreements with potentially responsible parties for them to conduct a cleanup at hazardous waste sites or compel potentially responsible parties to do so. EPA can also conduct cleanups itself and then seek reimbursement. EPA is authorized to retain and use funds received from settlements with these parties in interest-earning, site-specific special accounts within the Trust Fund. These accounts provide resources in addition to annual appropriations to clean up sites. The number of accounts grew slowly until 1995 when EPA encouraged their greater use. After 1995, their number and dollar value increased. EPA headquarters is responsible for overseeing its regions management of special accounts. In two reports issued in 2006 and 2009, the EPA IG made recommendations to EPA to better manage these accounts.
As requested, this report examines the (1) statusthat is, balances, locations, and recent and planned usesof Superfund special accounts, and (2) extent to which EPAs headquarters and regions have implemented processes and policies to improve the monitoring and management of these accounts. GAO analyzed EPA Superfund program data, guidance, and strategies, and interviewed EPA officials.
GAO is not making recommendations in this report. GAO provided a draft of this report to EPA for review and comment. EPA provided technical comments that were incorporated into the report, as appropriate.
What GAO Found
From fiscal year 1990 through October 2010, the Environmental Protection Agencys (EPA) 10 regions collected from potentially responsible parties almost $4 billion in funds that were placed in special accounts. Nearly half of these funds are still available to be obligated for future Superfund cleanup; the remaining funds have already been obligated, but not all of these obligated funds have been disbursed. According to GAOs analysis of EPA data, EPA has plans to obligate almost all of the available funds in special accounts over the next 10 years. However, EPA regional officials told GAO that special account funds that are planned to be obligated are estimates rather than commitments, and the planned use of funds often changes as site circumstances warrant. As of October 2010, of the $1.9 billion funds that EPA had obligated for Superfund cleanup expenses, $1.6 billion had been disbursed.
According to GAOs review of EPA documents and interviews with agency officials, EPA has taken steps, including implementing strategies and guidance, in the last few years to better monitor and manage special accounts. EPA took these steps in response to the EPA Inspector Generals (IG) findings and recommendations, as well as EPA officials own recognition that the agency needed to provide better oversight of the special accounts process. These steps include the following:
processes to better plan for the use of special account funds by adding a screen in the agencys Superfund database that enables EPA regions to enter special account planning data into specific data fields and create reports, so that officials can monitor the special account balances against planned obligations for ongoing and future site-specific response activities;
increased oversight of special accounts, including designating a national special accounts coordinator who, among other things, conducts annual and midyear reviews and holds discussions with regional staff to evaluate their plans to allocate special account funds, and establishing a Special Accounts Senior Management Committee that meets semiannually to provide overall management oversight and monitor the status of special accounts; and
strategies and guidance on how to plan for using special accounts, including an agencywide strategic plan, overall guidance for the regions on the proper use and planning of special accounts funds throughout the cleanup process, detailed guidance on the reclassification process, and a model memorandum for transferring funds from a special account to the Hazardous Substance Superfund Trust Fund (Trust Fund) and closing out a special account. |
gao_GAO-14-357 | gao_GAO-14-357_0 | Additionally, TSA used those requirements to evaluate the next generation of AIT systems, referred to as AIT-2. TSA Does Not Collect or Analyze Data That Could Enhance System Performance
TSA does not collect or analyze three types of available information that could be used to enhance the effectiveness of the entire AIT-ATR system. Third, TSA assesses the overall AIT-ATR system performance using laboratory test results that do not reflect the combined performance of the technology, the personnel that operate it, and the process that governs AIT-related security operations. TSA is not enforcing compliance with its directive, and as a result, data on SO performance are not being consistently collected or reported by approximately half of airports with AIT-ATR systems. For example, according to TSA data, we found that TSA personnel at almost half of the airports with AIT-IO or AIT-ATR systems did not report any IED checkpoint drill results on those systems from March 2011 through February 2013. According to TSA officials, the agency does not ensure compliance with the directive at every airport because it is unclear which office within the Office of Security Operations should oversee enforcing the operational directive. Data on IED checkpoint drills could provide insight into how well SOs resolve anomalies detected by the AIT systems, information that could be used to help strengthen the existing screening process. TSA officials agreed that it is important to analyze performance by including an evaluation of the technology, operators, and processes, and stated that TSA is planning to assess the performance of all layers of security. TSA Has Enhanced Privacy by Upgrading All Deployed Systems with ATR Software, but Has Not Met Its Goals Pertaining to Enhancing AIT Capabilities
TSA has met milestones as documented in its roadmap pertaining to the installation of ATR software upgrades that were intended to address privacy concerns and improve operational efficiency for all deployed AIT systems in accordance with the statutory deadline included as part of the Federal Aviation Administration Modernization and Reform Act of 2012.However, it did not meet proposed milestones documented in its AIT roadmap to provide enhanced capabilities to meet the agency’s mission needs. As shown in figure 2, TSA began operational test and evaluation for Tier II upgrades 17 months after the expected start date articulated in its October 2012 roadmap. TSA did not incorporate available information from the national laboratories and vendors into its updated roadmap. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help ensure that TSA improves SO performance on AIT-ATR systems and uses resources effectively, the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration should take the following two actions: clarify which office is responsible for overseeing TSA’s IED screening checkpoint drills operational directive, direct the office to ensure enforcement of the directive in conducting these drills, and analyze the data to identify any potential weaknesses in the screening process, and establish protocols that facilitate the capturing of operational data on secondary screening of passengers at the checkpoint to determine the extent to which AIT-ATR system false alarm rates affect operational costs once AIT-ATR systems are networked together. To help ensure that TSA invests in screening technology that meets mission needs, the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration should ensure that the following two actions are taken before procuring AIT-2 systems: measure system effectiveness based on the performance of the AIT-2 technology and screening officers who operate the technology, while taking into account current processes and deployment strategies, and use scientific evidence and information from DHS’s Science and Technology Directorate, and the national laboratories, as well as information and data provided by vendors to develop a realistic schedule with achievable milestones that outlines the technological advancements, estimated time, and resources needed to achieve TSA’s Tier IV end state. To what extent does TSA collect and analyze available information that could be used to enhance the performance of AIT systems equipped with ATR (AIT-ATR)? To what extent has TSA made progress toward enhancing AIT capabilities to detect concealed explosives and other threat items, and what challenges, if any, remain? To determine the extent to which TSA collects and analyzes available information to improve the performance of screening officers (SO) responsible for resolving anomalies identified by ATR software, we analyzed improvised explosive device (IED) checkpoint drills conducted by TSA personnel at airports that submitted data to TSA from March 1, 2011, through February 28, 2013, under TSA’s IED checkpoint drill operational directive. TSA’s IED checkpoint drill operational directive requires personnel at airports to conduct drills to assess Transportation Security Officer (TSO) compliance with TSA’s screening standard operating procedures (SOP) and to train TSOs to better resolve anomalies identified by AIT-ATR systems. | Why GAO Did This Study
TSA accelerated the deployment of AIT systems, or full-body scanners, in response to the December 25, 2009, attempted terrorist attack on Northwest Airlines Flight 253. Pursuant to the Federal Aviation Administration Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, TSA was mandated to ensure that AIT systems were equipped with ATR software, which displays generic outlines of passengers rather than actual images, by June 1, 2013. All deployed AIT systems were equipped with ATR software by the deadline. GAO was asked to evaluate TSA's AIT-ATR systems' effectiveness. This report addresses the extent to which (1) TSA collects and analyzes available information that could be used to enhance the effectiveness of the AIT-ATR system and (2) TSA has made progress toward enhancing AIT capabilities to detect concealed explosives and other threat items, and any challenges that remain. GAO analyzed testing results conducted by the Transportation Security Laboratory and TSA personnel at airports and interviewed DHS and TSA officials. This is a public version of a classified report that GAO issued in December 2013. Information DHS and TSA deemed classified or sensitive has been omitted, including information and recommendations related to improving AIT capabilities.
What GAO Found
The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Transportation Security Administration (TSA) does not collect or analyze available information that could be used to enhance the effectiveness of the advanced imaging technology (AIT) with automated target recognition (ATR) system. Specifically, TSA does not collect or analyze available data on drills using improvised explosive devices (IED) at the checkpoint that could provide insight into how well screening officers (SO) resolve anomalies, including objects that could pose a threat to an aircraft, identified by AIT systems, because it does not enforce compliance with its operational directive. TSA's operational directive requires personnel at airports to conduct drills to assess SO compliance with TSA's screening standard operating procedures and to train SOs to better resolve anomalies identified by AIT-ATR systems. GAO found that TSA personnel at about half of airports with AIT systems did not report any IED checkpoint drill results on those systems from March 2011 through February 2013. According to TSA, it does not ensure compliance with the directive at every airport because it is unclear which office should oversee enforcing the directive. Without data on IED checkpoint drills, TSA lacks insight into how well SOs resolve anomalies detected by AIT systems, information that could be used to help strengthen existing screening processes. Potential weaknesses in the screening process could be caused by TSA not clarifying which office is responsible for overseeing TSA's operational directive, directing that office to ensure enforcement of the directive in conducting these drills, and analyzing the data. Further, when determining AIT-ATR system effectiveness, TSA uses laboratory test results that do not reflect the combined performance of the technology, the personnel who operate it, and the process that governs AIT-related security operations. TSA officials agreed that it is important to analyze performance by including an evaluation of the technology, operators, and processes and stated that TSA is planning to assess the performance of all layers of security. By not measuring system effectiveness based on the performance of the technology and SOs who operate the technology or taking into account current processes and deployment strategies, DHS and TSA are not ensuring that future procurements meet mission needs.
TSA completed the installation of ATR software upgrades intended to address privacy concerns for all deployed AIT systems; however, it has not met proposed milestones for enhancing capabilities as documented in its AIT roadmap—a document that contains milestones for achieving enhanced capabilities to meet the agency's mission needs. For example, TSA began operational test and evaluation for Tier II upgrades 17 months after the expected start date. Moreover, TSA did not use available scientific research or information from experts from the national laboratories or vendors on the technological challenges that it faces in developing requirements and milestones, because, according to TSA, it relied on time frames proposed by vendors. Thus, TSA cannot ensure that its roadmap reflects the true capabilities of the next generation of AIT systems by using scientific evidence and information from DHS's Science and Technology Directorate, the national laboratories, and vendors to develop a realistic schedule with achievable milestones that outlines the technological advancements, estimated time, and resources needed to achieve enhanced capabilities as outlined in TSA's roadmap.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that TSA, among other things, clarify which office should oversee its operational directive, better measure system effectiveness, and develop a realistic schedule before procuring future generations. TSA concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-07-293 | gao_GAO-07-293_0 | ADVISE Is Intended to Help Identify Patterns of Interest to Homeland Security Analysts
ADVISE is a data mining tool under development that is intended to facilitate the analysis of large amounts of data. It is designed to accommodate both structured data (such as information in a database) and unstructured data (such as e-mail texts, reports, and news articles) and to allow an analyst to search for patterns in data, including relationships among entities (such as people, organizations, and events) and to produce visual representations of these patterns, referred to as semantic graphs. The intended benefit of the ADVISE tool is to help detect activities that threaten the United States by facilitating the analysis of large amounts of data that otherwise would be prohibitively difficult to review. DHS is currently in the process of testing the tool’s effectiveness. 2). DHS Has Not Yet Addressed Key Privacy Risks Associated with Expected Uses of the ADVISE Tool
Use of the ADVISE tool raises a number of privacy concerns. However, it has not assessed privacy risks. Privacy risks that could apply to ADVISE include the potential for erroneous association of individuals with crime or terrorism through data that are not accurate for that purpose, the misidentification of individuals with similar names, and the use of data that were collected for other purposes. A PIA would determine the privacy risks associated with ADVISE and help officials determine what specific controls are needed to mitigate those risks. Further, if a PIA were conducted and privacy risks identified, a number of controls exist that could be built into the tool to mitigate those risks. For example, controls could be implemented to ensure that personal information is used only for a specified purpose or compatible purposes, or they could provide the capability to distinguish among individuals that have similar names (a process known as disambiguation) to address the risk of misidentification. Because privacy risks such as these have not been assessed and decisions about mitigating controls have not been made, DHS faces the likelihood that system implementations based on the tool may require costly and potentially duplicative retrofitting at a later date to add the needed controls. However, DHS has not yet conducted a PIA, despite the fact that the E-Government Act and related OMB and DHS guidance emphasize the need to assess privacy risks early in systems development. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine the following: the planned capabilities, uses, and associated benefits of the Analysis Dissemination, Visualization, Insight, and Semantic Enhancement (ADVISE) tool and whether potential privacy issues could arise from using the ADVISE tool to process personal information and how the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has addressed any such issues. We did not conduct work or review implementations of ADVISE at the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis. | Why GAO Did This Study
The government's interest in using technology to detect terrorism and other threats has led to increased use of data mining. A technique for extracting useful information from large volumes of data, data mining offers potential benefits but also raises privacy concerns when the data include personal information. GAO was asked to review the development by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) of a data mining tool known as ADVISE (Analysis, Dissemination, Visualization, Insight, and Semantic Enhancement). Specifically, GAO was asked to determine (1) the tool's planned capabilities, uses, and associated benefits and (2) whether potential privacy issues could arise from using it to process personal information and how DHS has addressed any such issues. GAO reviewed program documentation and discussed these issues with DHS officials.
What GAO Found
ADVISE is a data mining tool under development intended to help DHS analyze large amounts of information. It is designed to allow an analyst to search for patterns in data--such as relationships among people, organizations, and events--and to produce visual representations of these patterns, referred to as semantic graphs. None of the three planned DHS implementations of ADVISE that GAO reviewed are fully operational. (GAO did not review uses of the tool by the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis.) The intended benefit of the ADVISE tool is to help detect threatening activities by facilitating the analysis of large amounts of data. DHS is currently in the process of testing the tool's effectiveness. Use of the ADVISE tool raises a number of privacy concerns. DHS has added security controls to the tool; however, it has not assessed privacy risks. Privacy risks that could apply to ADVISE include the potential for erroneous association of individuals with crime or terrorism and the misidentification of individuals with similar names. A privacy impact assessment would identify specific privacy risks and help officials determine what controls are needed to mitigate those risks. ADVISE has not undergone such an assessment because DHS officials believe it is not needed given that the tool itself does not contain personal data. However, the tool's intended uses include applications involving personal data, and the E-Government Act and related guidance emphasize the need to assess privacy risks early in systems development. Further, if an assessment were conducted and privacy risks identified, a number of controls could be built into the tool to mitigate those risks. For example, controls could be implemented to ensure that personal information is used only for a specified purpose or compatible purposes, and they could provide the capability to distinguish among individuals that have similar names to address the risk of misidentification. Because privacy has not been assessed and mitigating controls have not been implemented, DHS faces the risk that ADVISE-based system implementations containing personal information may require costly and potentially duplicative retrofitting at a later date to add the needed controls. |
gao_GAO-07-90 | gao_GAO-07-90_0 | To qualify for these pay flexibilities, OPM must certify and OMB must concur that an agency’s senior executive performance appraisal system meets certification criteria jointly developed by OPM and OMB. Key Lessons Learned from the Senior Executive Performance-based Pay System and Other Human Capital Initiatives
The congressionally authorized senior executive performance-based pay system, implemented in 2004, as well as OPM’s implementation of other governmentwide human capital initiatives, provides an opportunity to learn from experiences gained and apply those lessons to the implementation of future human capital reforms. As OPM is likely to play a similar leadership and oversight role in future reforms, the following lessons learned may also assist OPM as it moves forward in the design and implementation of other human capital reforms and initiatives. OPM also gathers agency feedback through the CHCO Council and executive resource forums. Conclusions
Significant reforms are already underway to modernize the federal government’s human capital management systems to better position agencies to meet the challenges of the 21st century. OPM’s workforce and succession planning efforts are also vital to ensuring it has the internal capacity to lead and implement reforms. We reviewed and analyzed key documents including the legislation that authorized the new senior executive performance-based pay system and the regulations for the appraisal system certification process that were jointly issued by OPM and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). | Why GAO Did This Study
As the agency responsible for the federal government's human capital initiatives, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) must have the capacity to successfully guide human capital transformations necessary to meet the governance challenges of the 21st century. Given this key role, GAO was asked to assess OPM's capacity to lead further reforms. In June 2006, GAO testified on several management challenges that OPM faces. This report--the second in a series--supplements that testimony and, using the new senior executive performance-based pay system as a model for understanding OPM's capacity to lead and implement reform, identifies lessons learned that can inform future reforms. GAO analyzed relevant laws and documents, and obtained views from the Chief Human Capital Officers (CHCO) Council and human resource directors, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) staff, and OPM officials.
What GAO Found
The congressionally authorized senior executive performance-based pay system, implemented in 2004, provides an opportunity to learn from experiences gained and apply those lessons to the design and implementation of future human capital reforms. Under the performance-based system, before an agency can receive the new pay flexibilities, OPM, with concurrence from OMB, must certify that the agency's appraisal system meets certain criteria. OPM is likely to play a similar leadership and oversight role for future reforms. |
gao_GAO-08-3 | gao_GAO-08-3_0 | These designated national agencies charge fees for the services provided to local nonprofit agencies. The JWOD program provided employment for about 48,000 people who are blind or have severe disabilities. In August 2006, DOD, Education, and the Committee for Purchase issued a policy statement that established certain guidelines, including the following: The Randolph-Sheppard program will not seek contracts for dining support services that are on the JWOD procurement list, and Randolph- Sheppard will not seek contracts for operation of a dining facility if the work is currently being performed under the JWOD program; JWOD will not pursue prime contracts for operation of dining facilities at locations where an existing contract was awarded under the Randolph- Sheppard program (commonly known as the “no-poaching” provision). Randolph-Sheppard Places Blind Individuals in Managerial Roles, while JWOD Employs Persons with Disabilities in Less Skilled Jobs
The Randolph Sheppard and JWOD programs utilize different operating procedures to provide dining services to DOD. For the Randolph-Sheppard program, state licensing agencies act as prime contractors, and train and license blind vendors to operate dining facilities. According to our survey, 33 of the 39 Randolph-Sheppard contracts relied on a food service company—known as a teaming partner—to provide assistance in operating dining facilities. The Committee for Purchase Works with NISH and Local Nonprofit Agencies to Employ Individuals with Disabilities in DOD Dining Facilities
The Committee for Purchase works with NISH to match DOD’s need for services with nonprofit agencies able to provide food services. Programs Differ Regarding How Contracts Are Awarded and Priced, and How Program Beneficiaries Are Compensated
The Randolph-Sheppard and JWOD programs have significant differences in terms of how contracts are awarded and priced, and in the compensation provided to beneficiaries who are blind or have other disabilities. This priority may come into play when contracts are awarded either by direct noncompetitive negotiations or through competition with other food service companies. Under the JWOD program, competition is not a factor because DOD is required to purchase food services from a list maintained by the Committee for Purchase. The two programs also differ in terms of how program beneficiaries are compensated. Randolph-Sheppard blind vendors received, on the average, pretax compensation of about $276,500 annually, while JWOD workers at the three sites visited earned on average $13.15 per hour, including fringe benefits. Of the eight Randolph-Sheppard contracts we reviewed in detail, six had been awarded through direct negotiations with the state licensing agency. Negotiations in either case typically begin with a pricing proposal submitted by the state licensing agency, and will then involve a comparison of the proposed price with the prices in previous contracts, an independent government estimate, or the prices offered by other competitors, if any. Randolph-Sheppard Vendors Generally Receive a Percentage of Profits, and JWOD Beneficiaries Are Paid Hourly Wages According to Federal Law
Compensation for Randolph-Sheppard blind vendors is computed differently from compensation paid to JWOD disabled workers. These figures are based on pretax earnings. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To accomplish our research objectives, we interviewed officials from the Department of Defense (DOD), the Department of Education, the Committee for Purchase, and organizations representing both the Randolph-Sheppard and Javits-Wagner-O’Day (JWOD) programs. | Why GAO Did This Study
Randolph-Sheppard and Javits-Wagner-O'Day (JWOD) are two federal programs that provide employment for persons with disabilities through federal contracts. In 2006, participants in the two programs had contracts with the Department of Defense (DOD) worth $465 million annually to provide dining services at military dining facilities. The 2007 National Defense Authorization Act directed GAO to study the two programs. This report examines (1) differences in how the Randolph-Sheppard and JWOD programs provide food services for DOD and (2) differences in how contracts are awarded, prices are set, and program beneficiaries (i.e. persons with disabilities) are compensated. GAO interviewed program officials, conducted a survey of states with Randolph-Sheppard programs, and reviewed eight Randolph-Sheppard and six JWOD contracts.
What GAO Found
The Randolph-Sheppard and JWOD programs use different procedures to provide food services to DOD. In Randolph-Sheppard, states act as prime contractors, and train and license blind individuals to act as managers of dining facilities. In most cases, the blind vendor relies on a food service company--known as a teaming partner--to assist in operations, provide expertise, and help with start-up costs. About half of the blind vendors are required to employ other persons with disabilities. JWOD is administered by an independent federal agency called the Committee for Purchase from People Who are Blind or Severely Disabled (Committee for Purchase). The Committee for Purchase engages a central nonprofit agency to match DOD's needs with services provided by local nonprofit agencies. Most of the individuals working for these local nonprofit agencies are employed in less skilled jobs such as serving food or washing dishes. The Randolph-Sheppard and JWOD programs differ significantly in the way DOD dining contracts are awarded, how prices are set, and how participants are compensated. For Randolph-Sheppard, DOD awards contracts to the states either through direct negotiations or competition with other food service companies. In either case, DOD and the states negotiate the prices based on factors such as historical prices and independent government estimates. Under JWOD, competition is not a factor because DOD is required to purchase services it needs from a list maintained by the Committee for Purchase, which establishes fair market prices for these contracts. In terms of compensation, Randolph-Sheppard blind vendors generally received a percentage of contract profits, averaging about $276,500 per vendor annually. JWOD beneficiaries are generally paid hourly wages according to rules set by the federal government. For the three sites we visited, we estimate that beneficiaries received an average wage of $13.15 per hour, including fringe benefits. Given the differences in the roles of the beneficiaries of these two programs, comparisons of their compensation have limited value. |
gao_GAO-10-163T | gao_GAO-10-163T_0 | Widespread DCAA Management Environment and Audit Quality Problems
Our investigation of DCAA hotline allegations and our DCAA-wide follow- up audit document systemic weaknesses in DCAA’s management environment and structure for assuring audit quality. Last year, our investigation of hotline allegations substantiated auditor concerns made on all 14 audits we reviewed at two locations and 62 forward pricing reports we investigated at a third location. In addition, we found that contractor officials and the DOD contracting community improperly influenced the audit scope, conclusions, and opinions of some audits—a serious independence issue. This year, our follow-on audit found DCAA-wide audit quality problems similar to those identified in our investigation, including compromise of auditor independence, insufficient audit testing to support conclusions and opinions, and inadequate planning and supervision. For example, of the 69 audits and cost-related assignments we reviewed, 65 exhibited serious GAGAS and other deficiencies that rendered them unreliable for decisions on contract awards and contract management and oversight. DCAA has rescinded 81 audit reports in response to our work and the DOD Inspector General’s (IG) follow-up audit because the audit evidence was outdated, insufficient, or inconsistent with reported conclusions and opinions and reliance on these reports for contracting decisions could pose a problem. Because the conclusions and opinions in the rescinded reports were used to assess risk in planning subsequent audits, they impact the reliability of hundreds of other audits and contracting decisions covering billions of dollars in DOD expenditures. The DOD IG recommended that the Air Force buying command withhold the balance of $271 million for unabsorbed PM&HS costs (of which $101 million had already been paid) and that the Air Force cease negotiations with the launch services contractor on a $114 million proposal for unabsorbed costs. For a billing system audit of a contractor with $168 million in annual billings to the government, the field office manager allowed the original auditor to work on the audit after being assured that the auditors would help the contractor correct billing system deficiencies during the performance of the audit. DCAA-wide Audit Identified Widespread Audit Quality Problems Requiring Significant Reform
Our follow-up audit found that a management environment and agency culture that focused on facilitating the award of contracts and an ineffective audit quality assurance structure are at the root of the DCAA- wide audit failures that we identified for the 69 audits and cost related assignments that we reviewed. DCAA’s mission statement, strategic plan, and metrics all focused on producing a large number of audit reports and provided little focus on assuring quality audits that protect taxpayer interest. Contract Management Issues That Require Greater Oversight
For fiscal year 2008, DOD reported that it obligated over $380 billion for payments to federal contractors, more than double the amount it obligated for fiscal year 2002. With hundreds of billions in taxpayer dollars at stake, the government needs strong controls to provide reasonable assurance that these contract funds are not being lost to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement. Moreover, effective contract audit capacity is particularly important as DOD continues its use of high-risk contracting strategies. For example, we have found numerous issues with DOD’s use of time-and-materials contracts, which are used to purchase billions of dollars of services across the government. Examples of recent DCAA and DOD actions include the following. Further, in March 2009, the new DOD Comptroller/CFO established a DCAA Oversight Committee to monitor and advise on DCAA corrective actions. While these are positive steps, much more needs to be done to address fundamental weaknesses in DCAA’s mission, strategic plan, metrics, audit approach, and human capital practices that have resulted in widespread audit quality problems. DCAA’s production-oriented culture is deeply imbedded and will likely take several years to change. To address these issues, our September 2009 report contained 15 recommendations to improve the quality of DCAA’s audits and strengthen auditor effectiveness and independence. DCAA Audits: Allegations That Certain Audits at Three Locations Did Not Meet Professional Standards Were Substantiated, GAO-08-857, Washington, D.C.: July 22, 2008. | Why GAO Did This Study
In fiscal year 2008, the Department of Defense (DOD) obligated over $380 billion to federal contractors, more than doubling the amount it obligated in fiscal year 2002. With hundreds of billions of taxpayer dollars at stake, the government needs strong controls to provide reasonable assurance that contract funds are not being lost to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement. The Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) is charged with a critical role in contractor oversight by providing auditing, accounting, and financial advisory services in connection with DOD and other federal agency contracts and subcontracts. However, last year GAO found numerous problems with DCAA audit quality at three locations in California, including the failure to meet professional auditing standards. In a follow-up audit issued this September, GAO found that these problems existed agencywide. Today's testimony describes widespread audit quality problems at DCAA and provides information about continuing contract management challenges at DOD, which underscore the importance of DCAA audits that meet professional standards. It also discusses some of the corrective actions taken by DCAA and DOD and key GAO recommendations to improve DCAA audit quality. In preparing this testimony, GAO drew from issued reports and testimonies. These products contained statements regarding the scope and methodology GAO used.
What GAO Found
GAO found substantial evidence of widespread audit quality problems at DCAA. In the face of this evidence, DOD, Congress, and American taxpayers lack reasonable assurance that billions of dollars in federal contract payments are being appropriately scrutinized for fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement. An initial investigation of hotline allegations at three DCAA field office locations in California revealed that all 14 audits and 62 forward pricing reports GAO examined were not performed in accordance with professional auditing standards. For example, while auditing the satellite launch proposal for a major U.S. defense contractor, a DCAA manager experienced pressure from the contractor and the DOD buying command to drop adverse findings. The manager directed his auditors to drop the findings, and DCAA issued a more favorable opinion, allowing the contractor to win a contract that improperly compensated the contractor for hundreds of millions of dollars in commercial business losses. Specifically, of $271 million in unallowable costs related to commercial losses, the contractor has already been paid $101 million. This incident is under criminal investigation by the DOD Inspector General (IG). In September of this year, GAO followed up on its initial investigation and identified audit quality problems agencywide at DCAA. Audit quality problems included insufficient audit testing, inadequate planning and supervision, and the compromise of auditor independence. For example, of the 69 audits and cost-related assignments GAO reviewed, 65 exhibited serious deficiencies that rendered them unreliable for decisions on contract awards, management, and oversight. DCAA has rescinded 81 audit reports to date as a result of GAO's and DOD IG's work. Because the rescinded reports were used to assess risk in planning subsequent audits, they affect the reliability of hundreds of other audits and contracting decisions covering billions of dollars in DOD contract expenditures. GAO determined that quality problems are widespread because DCAA's management environment and quality assurance structure were based on a production-oriented mission that prevented DCAA from protecting the public interest while also facilitating DOD contracting. GAO has designated both contract management and weapon systems acquisition as high-risk areas since the early 1990s. DOD acquisition and contract management weaknesses create vulnerabilities to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement that leave hundreds of billions of taxpayer dollars at risk, and underscore the importance of a strong contract audit function. In response to GAO's findings and recommendations, DCAA has taken several steps to improve metrics, policies, and processes, and the DOD Comptroller has established a DCAA oversight committee. To ensure quality audits for contractor oversight and accountability, DOD and DCAA will also need to address the fundamental weaknesses in DCAA's mission, strategic plan, metrics, audit approach, and human capital practices that have had a detrimental effect on audit quality. |
gao_NSIAD-97-23 | gao_NSIAD-97-23_0 | 2400, DOD is to buy minimum quantities of a new weapon. DOD Often Decreases Production Rates of Proven Weapons
It is not uncommon for DOD to reduce the annual production quantities of proven weapons, stretching out full-rate production schedules for years. For 17 of the 22 proven weapons we reviewed, the actual production rates were 57 percent lower than originally planned. As a result of reduced rates, production of the 17 weapons will take an average of over 8 years, or 170 percent, longer to complete than originally planned. Extended Schedules Result in Higher Acquisition Costs
Because of their reduced annual production rates and stretched out schedules, the acquisition of the 17 weapons we reviewed in full-rate production has cost nearly $10 billion more, through fiscal year 1996, than the program offices estimated based on their original planned production rates. Making Large Investments in Untested Weapons Increases Cost and Performance Risks
The practice of allocating funds during low-rate production to increase annual production quantities before successful completion of initial operational test and evaluation has frequently been wasteful. As we reported in November 1994, the consequences of buying large quantities of untested weapons are increased acquisition costs, the accumulation of unsatisfactory weapons that require costly modifications to meet performance requirements and, in some cases, the deployment of substandard weapons to combat forces. By minimizing the quantities of weapons procured during LRIP, DOD can reduce the risk associated with producing untested weapons and increase the funding available to produce other proven systems in full-rate production at planned rates, lowering their unit cost. However, because DOD often budgets available funding for unnecessary increases in low-rate production quantities of unproven weapons, it rarely is able to buy proven weapons at originally planned full-rates. Recommendations
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense revise DOD’s weapon acquisition policies to require that (1) annual quantities of weapons bought during LRIP be limited to the minimum necessary to complete initial operational test and evaluation and prove the production line and (2) rates and quantities not be increased during low-rate production to ease the transition into full-rate production unless DOD clearly establishes that the increase is critical to achieving efficient, realistic, and affordable full production rates and can be accomplished without affecting the efficient production of proven systems. DOD’s comments have not addressed (1) the negative effect of the current approach on the industrial base, (2) the cost implications, and (3) the delayed deployment of proven weapons. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) weapons acquisition procedures, focusing on: (1) DOD's practice of reducing the annual production of weapons below planned optimum rates during full-rate production; (2) the reasons for this practice; and (3) the effect of this practice on the costs and availability of weapons.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) DOD has inappropriately placed a high priority on buying large numbers of untested weapons during low-rate initial production to ensure commitment to new programs and thus has had to cut by more than half its planned full production rates for many weapons that have already been tested; (2) this practice is wasteful because DOD must often modify, at high cost, the large numbers of untested weapons it has bought before they are usable and must lower annual buys of tested, proven weapons, stretching out full-rate production for years due to a lack of funds; (3) GAO has repeatedly reported on DOD's practice of procuring substantial inventories of unsatisfactory weapons requiring costly modifications to achieve satisfactory performance and, in some cases, deployment of substandard weapons to combat forces; (4) GAO found the practice of reducing planned full production rates to be widespread; (5) primarily because of funding limitations, DOD has reduced the annual full-rate production for 17 of the 22 proven weapons reviewed, stretching out the completion of the weapons' production an average of 8 years longer than planned; (6) according to DOD's records, if these weapons were produced at their originally planned rates and respective cost estimates, the quantities produced as of the end of fiscal year 1996 would have cost nearly $10 billion less; (7) at the same time, DOD is funding increased annual quantities of weapons in low-rate production that often are in excess of what is needed to perform operational tests and establish the production base; (8) if DOD bought untested weapons during low-rate initial production at minimum rates, more funds would be available to buy other proven weapons in full-rate production at more efficient rates and at lower costs; and (9) this would reduce costly modifications to fix substandard weapons bought in low-rate production and allow full-rate production of weapons with demonstrated performance to be completed and deployed to combat forces earlier. |
gao_GAO-15-23 | gao_GAO-15-23_0 | Bureau of Indian Affairs
Within the Department of the Interior (Interior), the Bureau of Indian Affairs is responsible for supporting tribes in their efforts to ensure public safety and administer justice within their reservations, as well as to provide related services directly or to enter into contracts or compacts with federally recognized tribes to administer the law enforcement program.major federal crimes, including sexual offenses, committed on, or involving, Indian country. Most Eligible Tribes Have Retained Their SORNA Implementation Authority and Have Either Substantially Implemented the Act or Are in the Process of Doing So
Most Eligible Tribes Retained Their Implementation Authority, and Tribes That Lacked the Resources or Did Not Take the Necessary Steps toward Implementation Had Their Authority Delegated
As of August 2014, 164 of the 214 (nearly 77 percent) eligible tribes had retained their authority to implement SORNA, while the remainder did not retain their authority because they either elected to delegate their authority to a state (24 tribes) or the SMART Office delegated their authority to a state (26 tribes), as shown in figure 1. SMART Office Determined That 43 Percent of Tribes That Retained Their Authority Have Substantially Implemented SORNA, and Nearly 43 Percent More Are in Process
According to the SMART Office, 43 percent (71 of 164) of tribes that retained their authority to implement SORNA have substantially implemented the act; nearly 43 percent (70 of 164) have submitted an implementation package, but the SMART Office has not yet made a determination; and 13 percent (22 of 164) have not submitted a complete package. DOJ and BIA, as well as state and local law enforcement agencies, have taken actions to help address these challenges. Tribes Most Frequently Reported Lack of Access to NCIC, Lack of Notification when Convicted Sex Offenders Are Released, and Insufficient Staff
Tribal officials from 98 of the 129 tribes (76 percent) that retained their authority to implement SORNA and responded to our survey questions on challenges to implementing SORNA reported that their tribes experienced As shown at least one major or minor challenge to implementing the act.in figure 4, the major challenges tribes most frequently reported included inability to submit convicted sex offender information to NCIC or NSOR; lack of notification from state prisons about sex offenders who indicate that they plan to live, work, or attend school on tribal lands; insufficient staff; and inability to cover costs to implement SORNA or maintain the tribe’s registry. DOJ and BIA Have Formed a Working Group to Better Coordinate Federal Efforts to Address Tribes’ Difficulties Submitting Convicted Sex Offender Information to NCIC or NSOR
Under SORNA, as well as DOJ’s National Guidelines for SORNA Implementation, jurisdictions are to provide convicted sex offender information for inclusion in NSOR, which is part of NCIC. SMART Office representatives reported conducting some outreach to states as part of the substantial review process, but acknowledged that more could be done to encourage states to provide notification to tribes. Taking steps to ascertain what, if any, resource or other needs all tribes that have not implemented SORNA may have could better support the tribes’ efforts to substantially implement the act, and thereby better ensure monitoring of convicted sex offenders on tribal lands. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help ensure that tribes that retained their SORNA implementation authority, as well as ineligible and delegated tribes, are notified when convicted sex offenders who intend to live, work, or attend school on tribal land initially register or update a registration, we recommend that the Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Justice Programs direct the SMART Office to take the following two actions:
Amend its substantial implementation assurance guidance to require its evaluators to determine whether substantially implemented states are notifying tribes that retained their authority to implement SORNA, as well as ineligible and delegated tribes, as required, and use this information in the office’s ongoing outreach to the states. For tribes that would like assistance from BIA, where possible, BIA should provide this assistance or refer the tribe to other resources. What implementation challenges, if any, have tribes that retained their authority to implement SORNA reported, and what steps have federal agencies and others taken or could take to address these challenges? Appendix III: Extent to Which Eligible Tribes Have Implemented the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA)
Appendix III: Extent to Which Eligible Tribes Have Implemented the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA)
According to the Office of Sex Offender Sentencing, Monitoring, Apprehending, Registering, and Tracking (SMART Office), the 214 tribes that are eligible to implement SORNA are located in 33 states; of these states, 11 have substantially implemented SORNA. | Why GAO Did This Study
According to DOJ, tribal nations are disproportionately affected by violent crimes and sex offenses in particular. In 2006, Congress passed SORNA, which introduced new sex offender registration and notification standards for states, territories, and eligible tribes. The act made special provisions for eligible tribes to elect either to act as registration jurisdictions or to delegate SORNA functions to the states in which they are located. GAO was asked to assess the status of tribes' efforts to implement SORNA and the challenges they face doing so.
This report addresses, among other things, (1) the extent to which eligible tribes have retained their authority to implement, and for those that did, describe their implementation status and (2) implementation challenges tribes that retained their authority reported, and steps federal agencies have taken or could take to address these challenges. GAO reviewed data on eligible tribes' implementation status; conducted a survey of tribes that retained their authority; and interviewed federal, state, and local officials.
What GAO Found
Most eligible tribes have retained their Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) implementation authority and have either substantially implemented the act or are in the process of doing so. As of August 2014, 77 percent (164 of the 214) of eligible tribes had retained their implementation authority. Tribes that lacked the resources, among other factors, to implement SORNA either delegated their own authority, or the SMART Office delegated the tribe's authority, to a state. According to the Office of Sex Offender Sentencing, Monitoring, Apprehending, Registering, and Tracking (SMART Office)—the office SORNA established within the Department of Justice (DOJ) to administer and assist jurisdictions with implementing the law—43 percent (71 of 164) of tribes that retained their authority to implement SORNA have substantially implemented the act; the SMART Office has not yet made a final determination on 43 percent (70 of 164); and 13 percent (22 of 164) have not submitted complete packages. The SMART Office determined that 1 tribe has not yet substantially implemented SORNA.
In GAO's survey of tribes that retained their authority, the four most frequently reported implementation challenges included inability to submit convicted sex offender information to federal databases, lack of notification from state prisons upon the release of sex offenders, lack of staff, and inability to cover the costs of SORNA implementation. Federal agencies have taken steps to address these challenges, but more could be done. For example, DOJ and the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) within the Department of the Interior (Interior) have formed a working group to better coordinate federal efforts to address tribes' difficulties submitting convicted sex offender information to federal databases. However, some states have not notified tribes—those that retained their SORNA authority, as well as ineligible and delegated tribes—when sex offenders who will be or have been released from state prison register with the state and indicate that they intend to live, work or attend school on tribal land, as SORNA requires; and while the SMART Office has taken some actions, more could be done to encourage states to provide notification to tribes. Such notification would help tribes identify and monitor sex offenders who live on their lands and enforce tribal laws pertaining to sex offenders. The SMART Office, U.S. Marshals Service, and BIA provided financial assistance, equipment, and staff to help tribes address their resource needs. However, BIA offered assistance only to tribes for which BIA provides direct law enforcement services, which account for only 20 percent of the tribes that retained their SORNA implementation authority, even though BIA is responsible for assisting and advising all federally recognized tribes regarding their law enforcement and public safety needs. Taking steps to ascertain what, if any, resource or other needs all tribes that retained their authority may have could better position BIA to support the tribes' efforts to implement the act.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that, among other things, the SMART Office encourage states to notify tribes about offenders who plan to live, work, or attend school on tribal land upon release from prison. GAO also recommends that BIA reach out to all tribes that retained their authority to determine what, if any, assistance they would like from BIA. DOJ and Interior concurred. |
gao_GAO-05-474 | gao_GAO-05-474_0 | These principles are (1) from a legal standpoint, Commerce does not have explicit authority to apply CVDs against NME countries; and (2) as a practical matter, Commerce cannot arrive at economically meaningful conclusions regarding subsidies in such countries. Alternatively, Commerce could reverse its 1984 position and decide that CVD law could be applied to China while it remains classified as an NME country. However, absent a clear grant of authority from Congress, such a reversal could be challenged in court. WTO rules, including relevant provisions of China’s WTO accession agreement, do not explicitly preclude the United States from pursuing either alternative. Commerce could employ third-country information or “facts available” to complete China CVD actions. Chinese Subsidies Remain Difficult to Identify and Assess
“It is difficult to identify and quantify possible export subsidies in China because of the lack of transparency in China’s subsidy regime. This lack of clarity raises a question about whether Commerce could currently apply this commitment, even if it were to decide to reclassify China as a market economy or specific Chinese industries as market oriented in character. CVDs alone generally tend to be lower than antidumping duties. For two reasons, simultaneous application of both types of duties could well result in reduced antidumping duties, and it is unclear whether application of CVDs would compensate for such reductions. Second, regardless of whether China is designated as a market economy, some companion antidumping duties might need to be reduced to avoid double counting subsidy benefits. This may, in part, explain why U.S. producers seek CVDs less often than antidumping duties. Matters for Congressional Consideration
In the event that (1) Commerce changes China’s NME status or (2) Congress decides to adopt proposed legislation that would authorize Commerce to apply U.S. CVD laws to NME countries, including China, Congress may wish to consider adopting legislation to provide Commerce clear authority to fully implement China’s WTO commitment regarding use of third- country information in CVD cases, and make corrections to avoid double counting domestic subsidy benefits when applying both CVDs and antidumping duties to the same products from NME countries, in situations where Commerce finds that double counting has in fact occurred, taking into account Commerce’s analyses of this issue prepared in response to our recommendation above. In this report, we (1) explain why the United States does not currently apply CVDs to imports from China, (2) describe available alternatives for applying CVDs to Chinese- origin imports, (3) explore the challenges that the Department of Commerce would face in applying these alternatives, and (4) examine the potential impact that applying these alternatives would have on the rates of duty applied to Chinese products. | Why GAO Did This Study
Some U.S. companies allege that unfair subsidies are a factor in Chinese success in U.S. markets. U.S. producers injured by subsidized imports may normally seek countervailing duties (CVD) to offset subsidies, but the United States does not apply CVDs against countries, including China, that the Department of Commerce classifies as "nonmarket economies" (NME). In this report, GAO (1) explains why the United States does not apply CVDs to China, (2) describes alternatives for changing this policy, (3) explores challenges that would arise in applying CVDs, and (4) examines the implications for duty rates on Chinese products.
What GAO Found
The current Commerce policy of not applying CVDs to NME countries (including China) rests on two principles advanced in 1984 and confirmed by a federal appeals court. These are that Commerce (1) lacks explicit authority to do so, and (2) cannot arrive at meaningful conclusions regarding subsidies in such countries due to government intervention in the economy. Commerce could reclassify China as a market economy or individual Chinese industries as "market oriented" and apply CVDs against China as a market economy. Commerce has criteria for such determinations, but said that China is unlikely to satisfy them in the near term. It could also reverse its 1984 position and apply CVDs without any change in China's NME status. However, absent a congressional grant of authority, such a decision could be challenged in court, with uncertain results. World Trade Organization (WTO) rules do not explicitly preclude either alternative. Commerce would face challenges, regardless of the alternative adopted. Chinese subsidies remain difficult to identify and measure. Employing third-country information or "facts available" may help, but would not eliminate these difficulties. Commerce lacks clear authority to fully implement China's WTO commitment on use of third-country information in CVD cases. It is unclear whether, on a net basis, applying CVDs would provide greater protection than U.S. producers already obtain from antidumping duties. CVDs alone tend to be lower than antidumping duties. If Commerce grants China market economy status, both CVDs and antidumping duties could be applied simultaneously, but required methodological changes could well reduce antidumping duties. It is not clear whether CVDs would compensate for these reductions. Regardless of China's status, some duties might need to be reduced to avoid double counting of subsidies. Commerce lacks clear authority to make such corrections when domestic subsidies are involved. |
gao_GAO-09-516T | gao_GAO-09-516T_0 | CDC Had 13 Infection Control and Prevention Guidelines Containing Almost 1,200 Recommended Practices, and HHS’s Action Plan Includes Some Prioritized Practices to Promote Implementation
In March 2008, we reported that CDC had 13 guidelines for hospitals on infection control and prevention, and in these guidelines CDC recommended almost 1,200 practices for implementation to prevent HAIs and related adverse events. Most of the practices were sorted into five categories—from strongly recommended for implementation to not recommended— primarily on the basis of the strength of the scientific evidence for each practice. However, these steps were not guided by a prioritization of recommended practices. The department subsequently established the Steering Committee for the Prevention of Healthcare-Associated Infections, with senior-level representation of HHS offices and operating divisions, to develop the HHS Action Plan. CMS’s and Accrediting Organizations’ Required Hospital Standards Described Components of Infection Control Programs, and Compliance with These Standards Was Assessed through On- Site Surveys
In March 2008, we reported that while CDC’s infection control guidelines described specific clinical practices recommended to reduce HAIs, the infection control standards that CMS and accrediting organizations require as part of the hospital certification and accreditation processes described the fundamental components of a hospital’s infection control program. The standards were far fewer in number than the recommended practices in CDC’s guidelines—for example, CMS’s infection control COP contained two standards. Although CMS and the accrediting organizations generally did not require that hospitals implement all recommended practices in CDC’s infection control and prevention guidelines, we reported that the Joint Commission and AOA had standards that required the implementation of certain practices recommended in CDC’s infection control guidelines. Multiple HHS Programs Collected Data on HAIs, but Lack of Integration of Available Data and Other Problems Limited Utility of the Data
In March 2008, we reported that multiple HHS programs collected data on HAIs but that limitations in the scope of information they collected and the lack of integration across the databases maintained by these separate programs constrained the utility of the data. First, although CDC’s guidelines are an important source for its recommended practices on how to reduce HAIs, the large number of recommended practices and lack of department- level prioritization hinder efforts to promote their implementation. A few of these are required by CMS’s or accrediting organizations’ standards or their standards interpretations, but it is not reasonable to expect CMS or accrediting organizations to require additional practices without prioritization. For example, work by AHRQ suggests factors such as costs or organizational obstacles that could be considered. Second, we reported that HHS had not effectively used the HAI-related data it had collected through multiple databases across the department to provide a complete picture of the extent of the problem. The recently released HHS Action Plan identifies strategies that are intended to address some of the reasons for the lack of effective actions to control HAIs, including some identification of priorities from among the 1,200 recommended practices, and plans to coordinate HAI-related data collection activities across HHS. HHS released the Action Plan for comment in early January 2009, with the intent of revising it based on the public input it received. Following the transition to the new presidential administration, HHS has continued to solicit public comments on the plan with no designated deadline for submissions. Consequently, it remains uncertain when or if the new administration will choose to implement this plan, and if so, with what modifications, to address our recommendations and reduce the serious problem of HAIs. | Why GAO Did This Study
According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), health-care-associated infections (HAI)--infections that patients acquire while receiving treatment for other conditions-- are estimated to be 1 of the top 10 causes of death in the nation. The statement GAO is issuing today summarizes a March 2008 report, Health-Care-Associated Infections in Hospitals: Leadership Needed from HHS to Prioritize Prevention Practices and Improve Data on These Infections (GAO-08-283). In this report, GAO examined (1) CDC's guidelines for hospitals to reduce or prevent HAIs and what HHS does to promote their implementation, (2) Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services' (CMS) and hospital accrediting organizations' required standards for hospitals to reduce or prevent HAIs, and (3) HHS programs that collect data related to HAIs and integration of the data across HHS. To conduct the work, GAO reviewed documents and interviewed HHS and accrediting organization officials. To update certain information for this statement, GAO reviewed relevant HHS documents released after GAO's March 2008 report.
What GAO Found
In its March 2008 report, which is summarized in this statement, GAO found that CDC has 13 guidelines for hospitals on infection control and prevention, which contain almost 1,200 recommended practices, but activities across HHS to promote implementation of these practices are not guided by a prioritization of the practices. Although most of the practices have been sorted into categories primarily on the basis of the strength of the scientific evidence for the practice, other factors to consider in prioritizing, such as costs or organizational obstacles, have not been taken into account. While CDC's guidelines describe specific clinical practices recommended to reduce HAIs, the infection control standards that CMS and the accrediting organizations require describe the fundamental components of a hospital's infection control program. The standards are far fewer in number than CDC's recommended practices and generally do not require that hospitals implement all recommended practices in CDC's guidelines. Multiple HHS programs have databases that collect data on HAIs, but limitations in the scope of information collected and a lack of integration across the databases constrain the utility of the data. GAO concluded that the lack of department-level prioritization of CDC's large number of recommended practices had hindered efforts to promote their implementation. GAO noted that a few of CDC's strongly recommended practices were required by CMS or the accrediting organizations but that it was not reasonable to expect CMS or the accrediting organizations to require additional practices without prioritization. GAO also concluded that HHS had not effectively used the HAI-related data it had collected through multiple databases across the department to provide a complete picture of the extent of the problem. Subsequent to GAO's report, HHS established a steering committee, with senior-level representation of HHS offices and operating divisions, to develop the HHS Action Plan to Prevent Healthcare-Associated Infections. This plan includes strategies that are intended to address some of the reasons for the lack of effective actions to control HAIs, including some identification of priorities from among the 1,200 recommended practices, and plans to coordinate HAI-related data collection activities across HHS. HHS released the Action Plan for comment in early January 2009, with the intent of revising it based on the public input it received. Following the transition to the new presidential administration, HHS has continued to solicit public comments. Consequently, it remains uncertain when or if the new administration will choose to implement this plan, and if so, with what modifications, to address GAO's recommendations and reduce the serious problem of HAIs. |
gao_GAO-03-52 | gao_GAO-03-52_0 | Twenty-one of 24 Projects Transitioned at Least Some Technologies to Users
Of the 24 projects we reviewed, 21 transitioned at least some technologies to users, meaning that users found that these had some level of military utility and that a military service or a defense agency chose to accept and fund their transition in the form of residual assets or as an acquisition. The technologies were used in military operations in Kosovo. Some Factors Can Hamper the ACTD Process
Though the majority of the projects we examined transitioned technologies to users, we identified a range of factors that hampered this process. Specifically: The technology has been too immature to be tested in a realistic setting, leading to possible cancellation of the demonstration. The military services and defense agencies have been reluctant to fund acquisition of ACTD-proven technologies, especially those focusing on joint requirements, because of competing priorities. For example: The Joint Countermine project tested 15 technologies, including detection systems and clearance/breaching systems. For some of the ACTDs we reviewed, no documentation on military utility could be found. Initiatives Are Underway to Improve ACTD Outcomes
DOD has undertaken several initiatives to improve the ACTD process, including adopting criteria to ensure technology is sufficiently mature; evaluating how the ACTD process can be improved; and placing more attention on transition planning and management (rather than on simply the selection and demonstration phases) through additional guidance, training, and staffing. However, DOD’s initiatives will be challenging to implement since they require decision makers to balance the need to preserve creativity and flexibility within the ACTD process against the need for structure and management control. DOD’s comments are reprinted in appendix II. Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense | Why GAO Did This Study
The Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) program was started by the Department of Defense (DOD) as a way to get new technologies that meet critical military needs into the hands of users faster and less cost. GAO was asked to examine DOD's process for structuring and executing ACTDs.
What GAO Found
Since the ACTD program was started in 1994, a wide range of products have been tested by technology experts and military operators in realistic settings--from unmanned aerial vehicles, to friend-or-foe detection systems, to biological agent detection systems, to advanced simulation technology designed to enhance joint training. Many of these have successfully delivered new technologies to users. In fact, 21 of 24 projects we examined that were found to have military utility delivered at least some technologies to users that meet military needs. Though the majority of the projects we examined transitioned technologies to users, there are factors that hamper the ACTD process. For example, (1)Technology has been too immature to be tested in a realistic setting, leading to cancellation of the demonstration; (2) Military services and defense agencies have been reluctant to fund acquisition of ACTD-proven technologies, especially those focusing on joint requirements, because of competing priorities; and (3) ACTDs' military utility may not have been assessed consistently. Some of the barriers we identified can be addressed through efforts DOD now has underway, including an evaluation of how the ACTD process can be improved; adoption of criteria to be used to ensure technology is sufficiently mature; and placing of more attention on the end phases of the ACTD process. Other barriers, however, will be much more difficult to address in view of cultural resistance to joint initiatives and the requirements of DOD's planning and funding process. |
gao_GAO-01-721 | gao_GAO-01-721_0 | Assessment of USAID’s Progress and Strategies in Achieving Selected Key Outcomes
This section discusses our analysis of USAID’s performance in achieving its selected key outcomes and the strategies the agency has in place.Although USAID reported it made progress toward achieving the selected outcomes, the extent of the progress is unclear because the agency based its support on disaggregated and, in some cases, out-of-date and selective data. Actual progress toward achieving outcomes, detailed in the FY 2000 Performance Overview, is not clear because USAID did not base its assessment of progress on fiscal year 2000 performance data. In addition, USAID did not assess agency progress against the performance goals contained in the Annual Performance Plan for Fiscal Year 2000. Moreover, the Performance Overview relies on 1999 performance data of selected missions, and fiscal year 2000 data reported in the Budget Justification were not aggregated to summarize regional or agency level performance. The Budget Justification provides more detailed fiscal year 2000 performance information and fiscal year 2002 plans for individual countries and regional offices and bureaus. This year’s approach sought to tie the agency’s efforts more closely to the agency’s desired outcomes by reporting performance data at the operating unit level. | Why GAO Did This Study
This report reviews the U.S. Agency for International Development's (USAID) fiscal year 2000 performance report and fiscal year 2002 performance plan to assess the agency's progress in achieving selected key outcomes that are important to the agency's mission.
What GAO Found
GAO found that although USAID reported progress toward achieving the selected outcomes, the extent of the progress is unclear because the agency based its support on disaggregated and, in some cases, out-of-date and selective data. Unlike past years when USAID issued separate performance reports and performance plans, the agency issued a performance overview supplemented by more detailed data in the fiscal year 2000 budget justification to Congress, both of which incorporated elements of performance reporting and planning. In the fiscal year 2000 Performance Overview, USAID based its statements of progress on self-reported fiscal year 1999 performance data provided by individual USAID missions. In addition, USAID reported progress toward achieving agency goals and objectives by relying on selected information about an individual country's missions' performance. Although USAID reported detailed fiscal year 2000 performance data at the operating unit level in its budget justification, those data were not aggregated to summarize progress toward agency objectives. |
gao_GAO-06-591T | gao_GAO-06-591T_0 | CBP Currently Does Not Have Reasonable Assurance That ATS Is Effective
CBP does not yet have key controls in place to provide reasonable assurance that ATS is effective at targeting oceangoing cargo containers with the highest risk of containing smuggled weapons of mass destruction. To address this shortcoming, CBP is (1) developing and implementing performance metrics to measure the effectives of ATS, (2) planning to compare the results of randomly conducted inspections with the results of its ATS inspections, (3) developing and implementing a simulation and testing environment, and (4) addressing recommendations contained in a 2005 peer review. To date, none of these control activities have been fully completed or implemented. Thus, CBP does not yet have key internal controls in place to be reasonably certain that ATS is providing the best available information to allocate resources for targeting and inspecting containers that are the highest risk and thus not overlook inspecting containers that pose a high threat to the nation. CBP Has Not Yet Tested the Effectiveness of ATS in Targeting Cargo Containers for Inspection but Has Plans to Do So
Currently, CBP does not conduct simulated events (e.g., covert tests and computer-generated simulations)—a key control activity—to test and validate the effectiveness of ATS in targeting oceangoing cargo containers with the highest risk of containing smuggled weapons of mass destruction and has not yet implemented a dedicated simulation and testing environment. CBP does not have a comprehensive, integrated system in place to report details on security inspections nationwide that will allow management to analyze those inspections and refine ATS. However, without analyzing and using security inspection results to adjust ATS, CBP is limited in refining ATS, a fact that could hinder the effectiveness of CBP’s overall targeting strategy. These officials stated that overall the feedback they have received from CBP targeting officers at the seaports related to the operation and usefulness of ATS has been positive. CBP Has Taken Steps to Better Implement the Targeting Strategy at the Seaports
CBP has implemented a testing and certification process for its officers who complete the Sea Cargo Targeting Course that should provide better assurance of effective targeting practices. CBP has also made a good faith effort to address longshoremen’s safety concerns regarding radiation emitted by nonintrusive inspection equipment. Nevertheless, it has not been able to persuade one longshoremen’s union to permit changes in the procedure for staging containers to increase inspection efficiency. CBP has implemented such a testing and certification process. In response to our recommendation that CBP work with longshoremen to address their safety concerns, CBP engaged in two efforts: (1) establishing CBP’s radiation threshold in accordance with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC) federal guidelines for public radiation exposure and advertising this threshold to longshoremen through the unions, and (2) working with longshoremen’s unions and other maritime organizations to develop public radiation tests on nonintrusive inspection equipment. - - - - - In closing, ATS is an integral part of CBP’s layered security strategy. These seaports were selected based on the number of cargo containers arriving at the seaport and their geographic dispersion as reported by the U.S. Department of Transportation. To evaluate how CBP provides assurance that the Automated Targeting System (ATS) targets the highest-risk oceangoing cargo containers for inspection, we reviewed CBP documentation and prior GAO work on performance measures. To assess how CBP adjusts ATS to respond to findings that occur during the course of its operational activities, we met with CBP officials responsible for gathering and disseminating intelligence and for incorporating intelligence into CBP’s targeting operations. | Why GAO Did This Study
U.S. Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) Automated Targeting System (ATS)--a computerized model that CBP officers use as a decision support tool to help them target oceangoing cargo containers for inspection--is part of CBP's layered approach to securing oceangoing cargo. GAO reported in February 2004 on challenges CBP faced in targeting oceangoing cargo containers for inspection and testified before Congress in March 2004 about the findings in that report. The report and testimony outlined recommendations aimed at (1) better incorporating recognized modeling practices into CBP's targeting strategy, (2) periodically adjusting the targeting strategy to respond to findings that occur during the course of its operation, and (3) improving implementation of the targeting strategy. This statement for the record discusses preliminary observations from GAO's ongoing work related to ATS and GAO's 2004 recommendations addressing the following questions: (1) What controls does CBP have in place to provide reasonable assurance that ATS is effective at targeting oceangoing cargo containers with the highest risk of smuggled weapons of mass destruction? (2) How does CBP systematically analyze security inspection results and incorporate them into ATS? and (3) What steps has CBP taken to better implement the rest of its targeting strategy at the seaports?
What GAO Found
CBP has not yet put key controls in place to provide reasonable assurance that ATS is effective at targeting oceangoing cargo containers with the highest risk of containing smuggled weapons of mass destruction. To provide assurance that ATS targets the highest-risk cargo containers as intended, CBP is (1) working to develop and implement performance measures related to the targeting of cargo containers, (2) planning to compare the results of its random inspections with its ATS inspection results, (3) working to develop and implement a testing and simulation environment, and (4) addressing recommendations contained in a 2005 peer review of ATS. CBP expects to begin using performance measures in June 2006 and enter the final phase of software development for its testing and simulation environment at the same time. However, to date, none of these four initiatives has been fully implemented. Thus, CBP does not yet have key internal controls in place to be reasonably confident that ATS is providing the best information to allocate resources for targeting and inspecting containers that are the highest risk and not overlook inspecting containers that pose a threat to the nation. CBP does not yet have a comprehensive, integrated system in place to analyze security inspection results and incorporate them into ATS. CBP currently adjusts ATS based on intelligence information it receives and has initiated a process to track suggestions submitted by CBP targeting officers at the seaports for modifying ATS. However, CBP has not yet implemented plans to refine ATS based on findings from routine security inspections. Without a more comprehensive feedback system, CBP is limited in refining ATS, a fact that could hinder the overall effectiveness of the targeting strategy. CBP has taken steps to improve implementation of the targeting strategy at the seaports. It has implemented a testing and certification process for its officers who complete the Sea Cargo Targeting Course that should provide better assurance of effective targeting practices. CBP has also made a good faith effort to address longshoremen's safety concerns regarding radiation emitted by nonintrusive inspection equipment by taking actions such as working with longshoremen's unions and other maritime organization to develop public radiation tests on the nonintrusive inspection equipment. Nevertheless, CBP has not been able to persuade one longshoremen's union to permit changes in the procedure for staging containers to increase inspection efficiency at some West Coast seaports where the union's members work. |
gao_GAO-16-77 | gao_GAO-16-77_0 | Background
As of December 2014, 39 states were using comprehensive, risk-based managed care in their Medicaid programs. 1.) For example, some states carve out certain types of services from their managed care contracts, such as behavioral health care services or dental services, and provide those services separately, while other states include those services. States have the flexibility within federal parameters to determine whether enrollment in managed care will be mandatory (required for beneficiaries) or voluntary (beneficiaries have a choice between managed care and FFS). PPACA mandated a specific MLR formula for private insurers, and CMS rules implementing MLRs in Medicare established a specific formula for MA organizations and Part D sponsors. 2.) Auto Assignment in Medicaid Managed Care
When automatically assigning a beneficiary to a Medicaid managed care plan offered by an MCO, states may offer beneficiaries a certain amount of time (the length of which is at the discretion of the state) to choose a plan at the time of enrollment. Total payments to MCOs and average per beneficiary payments showed considerable variation across selected states in state fiscal year 2014. Federal Spending for Medicaid Managed Care Represented 38 Percent of Total Federal Medicaid Spending in 2014
Federal spending for Medicaid managed care increased significantly over the past decade—from $27 billion in fiscal year 2004 to $107 billion in fiscal year 2014—and represented a significantly larger portion of total federal Medicaid spending in 2014 than it did 10 years earlier. Consistent with the national trend, in seven of our eight selected states, the proportion of total federal Medicaid spending represented by managed care was significantly higher in fiscal year 2014 than in fiscal year 2004, with increases ranging from 17 to 59 percent. Total and Average per Beneficiary Payments Varied Considerably across Selected States, with Differences in Covered Populations and Services Contributing to the Variation
Reflecting variation common in the Medicaid program, generally, state payments to MCOs varied considerably across and within states. In state fiscal year 2014, total capitated payments to MCOs in the eight selected states ranged from $1.3 billion in Louisiana to $18.2 billion in California. Over Half of Selected States Set Medical Loss Ratio Minimums Similar to Federal Standards for Other Coverage Types, with Some Variation in Calculation Methods
Five of our eight selected states—Arizona, Florida, Louisiana, Michigan, and Washington— required MCOs to annually meet a minimum MLR percentage. The MLR minimums required in the five states generally ranged from 83 to 85 percent for most populations. Two of the five states with MLR minimum requirements for Medicaid managed care—Louisiana and Washington—require MCOs to reimburse the state if the MLR minimum requirements are not met. Officials from seven of the eight states indicated that they also use the rate setting process, during which states review data on medical and administrative costs for prior years. Selected States’ Auto Assignment Methods Primarily Focused on Beneficiary Factors, and Then Considered Plan Performance and Program Goals
The eight selected states varied in their methodologies for automatically assigning beneficiaries to plans offered by MCOs, but all of them first considered beneficiary factors, such as prior participation in a plan offered by a Medicaid MCO. For example, states made auto assignment decisions based on such goals as ensuring plan capacity to serve additional beneficiaries or managing enrollment distributions across plans in certain geographic markets. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Health and Human Services for comment. The Department had no comments. Appendix II: Federal Expenditures on Managed Care as Percent of Total Medicaid Expenditures, Fiscal Years 2004 and 2014
Total Medicaid expenditures (millions) 3,237.5
Total Medicaid expenditures (millions) 2,103.0
Appendix III: Selected States’ Methods for Overseeing Quality in Medicaid Managed Care
Our eight selected states (Arizona, California, Florida, Louisiana, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Washington) varied in the methods used to oversee the quality of care provided by contracted managed care organizations (MCOs). | Why GAO Did This Study
The importance of managed care in Medicaid—under which states contract with MCOs to provide a specific set of services—has increased as states expand eligibility for Medicaid under PPACA and increasingly move populations with complex health needs into managed care. States have flexibility within broad federal parameters to design and implement their Medicaid programs, and therefore play a critical role in overseeing managed care. GAO was asked to examine managed care expenditures and provide information on certain components of state oversight of Medicaid managed care.
In this report, GAO analyzes (1) federal expenditures for Medicaid managed care and the range in selected states' payments made to MCOs; (2) selected states' MLR standards and how they compare with federal standards for other sources of health coverage; and (3) selected states' methods for automatically assigning Medicaid beneficiaries to MCO plans. GAO analyzed federal data on Medicaid expenditures for comprehensive risk-based managed care. GAO selected eight states because they used managed care for some portion of their Medicaid population and were geographically diverse. For these states, GAO reviewed state payment data and documentation, including contracts with MCOs, and interviewed state officials. GAO also reviewed federal laws to describe MLR minimums in Medicare and the private insurance market.
The Department of Health and Human Services had no comments on this report.
What GAO Found
Federal spending for Medicaid managed care increased significantly from fiscal year 2004 through fiscal year 2014 (from $27 billion to $107 billion), and represented 38 percent of total federal Medicaid spending in fiscal year 2014. Consistent with this national trend, managed care as a proportion of total federal Medicaid spending was higher in seven of eight selected states in fiscal year 2014 compared with fiscal year 2004.
Total and average per beneficiary payments by states to managed care organizations (MCOs) varied considerably across the eight selected states in state fiscal year 2014. For example, total payments ranged from $1.3 billion in one state to $18.2 billion in another, and average payments per beneficiary ranged from about $2,800 to about $5,200.
While not required by federal policy to do so, five of the eight selected states required MCOs to annually meet minimum medical loss ratio (MLR) percentages—standards that ensure a certain proportion of payments are for medical care and, in effect, limit the amount that can be used for administrative cost and profit. These state minimums generally ranged from 83 to 85 percent, similar to the 85 percent minimums established in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) for other sources of health coverage. All MCOs in the five states had MLRs in state fiscal year 2014 that were above the state-required minimums.
GAO also found that all eight selected states focused on beneficiary factors, such as assigning a beneficiary to the same managed care plan in which a family member is enrolled, when the state selects a plan for the beneficiary in the absence of the beneficiary choosing a plan—referred to as auto assignment. States also considered plan performance, for example, on quality measures and program goals, such as achieving a certain distribution of enrollment across plans. Auto assignments of beneficiaries ranged from 23 to 61 percent of managed care enrollees across the seven selected states that tracked such data. |
gao_GAO-02-17 | gao_GAO-02-17_0 | We also analyzed laws mandating aspects of SBA’s current organization. SBA Staff Identified Organizational Problems
Senior SBA officials in headquarters and the field identified aspects of the current organizational alignment that contribute to the challenges faced by SBA management, including cumbersome communication links between headquarters and field units; confusion over the mission of district offices; complex, overlapping organizational relationships; and a field structure not consistently matched with mission requirements. SBA managers would need to obtain extensive input from internal and external stakeholders first to identify (1) how well the current structure is aligned with the agency’s mission and strategic plan and establishes clear lines of authority and accountability, (2) how well the current structure facilitates communication with both internal and external customers, (3) how well the number and location of offices facilitates the agency meeting its mission as efficiently and effectively as possible, and (4) the extent of buy-in for the current structure from internal and external customers. Without this acceptance, restructuring is impeded. For example, we reported in 2000 that employee resistance to organizational changes was hampering restructuring efforts at the Department of Agriculture. Observations
SBA’s current organizational alignment has some weaknesses that contribute to challenges in delivering services to the small business community. 1780 (1978) Small Business Administration Authorizations, P.L. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO's recent performance and accountability series report on the Small Business Administration (SBA) described major management challenges and program risks to efficient delivery of services. However, that report did not discuss how well SBA's organization was aligned to achieve its mission.
What GAO Found
GAO found that SBA's current structure contributes to the challenges SBA faces in delivering services to the small business community. In particular, ineffective lines of communication; confusion over the mission of district offices; complicated, overlapping organizational relationships; and a field structure not consistently matched with mission requirements combine to impede the effective deliver of services. Restructuring efforts by other federal agencies may prove instructive in addressing the problems with SBA's current structure. Efforts at other agencies also demonstrate the need for buy-in from both internal and external stakeholders and the importance of agency efforts to consider the human impact of restructuring activities, including the closure of field offices. |
gao_GAO-14-709 | gao_GAO-14-709_0 | BOP Is behind Schedule Fully Activating New Institutions, and Does Not Have an Activation Policy or Schedules That Meet Best Practices
BOP is behind schedule in fully activating, or reaching rated capacity for, all six institutions in the activation process. According to BOP officials, delays in receiving congressionally directed activation funding are outside BOP’s control and can exacerbate existing challenges with staffing or populating an institution with inmates. On our site visits to these institutions, we found that the locations of these institutions posed challenges related to staffing institutions and populating them with inmates within schedule estimates. In contrast, BOP’s annual According to BOP officials, when BOP is congressionally directed to investigate a particular location, BOP generally considers this as a direction to focus its efforts on constructing an institution in that specific location. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that management should ensure that there are adequate means of communicating with, and obtaining information from, external stakeholders, such as Congress, that may have a significant impact on the agency achieving its goals.activations limit BOP’s ability to reduce crowding as BOP intended, DOJ and BOP would be better positioned for future activations and could more effectively manage activation costs and timelines by using BOP’s annual congressional budget justification to communicate to Congress the factors that might delay future activations, such as challenges hiring staff and placing inmates, associated with the locations of new institutions. BOP Does Not Have a Policy to Guide Activation or a Schedule That Meets Best Practices
BOP institutions in the activation process rely on the expertise of staff and two templates that the Central Office developed to guide the activation process: (1) the activation handbook, which identifies roles and responsibilities for BOP officials during the activation process, and (2) the staffing timeline, which provides a general sequence of hiring events that BOP staff are to follow prior to the institution receiving inmates. Crowding by security level. DOJ Purchased Thomson to Provide High-Security Bed Space and Used Several Accounts to Finance the Purchase
DOJ stated in its budget requests that acquiring the Thomson Correctional Center in Illinois would address high-security crowding and support BOP’s mission, as well as DOJ’s strategic goal to ensure the fair and efficient administration of justice. Purchasing Thomson Will Address Crowding at the High-Security Level, but Will Result in Increased Operational Costs
Once it reaches rated capacity, according to our analysis of inmate population data, Administrative USP Thomson will help address crowding at the high-security level by about 16 percent for male inmates, which is similar to the decrease in crowding rates that DOJ asserted in the business cases submitted to Congress as part of the annual budget process. Accordingly, they estimate that Administrative USP Thomson will ultimately house between 2,600 and 3,000 inmates. In particular, by using the BOP annual budget justifications to clearly communicate to Congress the factors that might delay activation, like institution locations, DOJ could more effectively mitigate activation challenges and better meet the bureau’s needs. To better address obstacles that occur during the activation process and to help ensure that institutions are activated within estimated timeframes, including those institutions that do not currently have inmates, such as Administrative USP Thomson and USP Yazoo City, we recommend that the Director of the Bureau of Prisons take the following three actions: direct the Central Office to analyze staffing data at individual institutions in the activation process to assess their progress toward reaching authorized staffing levels and use that assessment to develop effective, tailored strategies to mitigate those challenges; develop and implement a comprehensive activation policy that incorporates the knowledge of staff with experience activating institutions; and develop and implement an activation schedule that incorporates the four characteristics of scheduling best practices. If BOP had a schedule that reflected best practices, it could revise its estimates, when warranted, for when activation would be completed. None of the six institutions is at rated capacity— the number of inmates that a given institution can safely and securely house. BOP estimated in fiscal year 2008 that FCI Berlin would be fully activated by fiscal year 2010. After reviewing documentation BOP submitted for its activation schedule estimates and conducting interviews with BOP officials involved in activations, we determined that the documents used as schedules by the six activating institutions are not reliable. Comprehensive. Such an analysis typically focuses on key risks and how they affect the schedule’s activities. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal inmate population has increased over the last two decades, and as of July 2014, BOP was responsible for the custody and care of more than 216,000 inmates. To handle the projected growth of between 2,500 and 3,000 or more inmates per year from 2015 through 2020, BOP has spent about $1.3 billion constructing five new institutions and acquiring one in Thomson, Illinois. BOP is activating these institutions by staffing and equipping them and populating them with inmates.
GAO was requested to review BOP's activation process of newly constructed and acquired institutions. GAO reviewed, among other things, (1) the extent to which BOP is activating institutions within estimated timeframes and has an activation policy or schedules that meet best practices, and (2) why DOJ purchased Thomson and how the purchase affected system wide costs. GAO reviewed BOP budget documents from fiscal years 2008 to 2015 and assessed schedules against GAO's Schedule Assessment Guide. GAO conducted site visits to the six institutions, interviewed BOP officials, and reviewed staffing data from fiscal years 2010 through 2013.
What GAO Found
The Department of Justice's (DOJ) Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) is behind schedule activating all six new institutions—the process by which it prepares them for inmates—and does not have a policy to guide activation or an activation schedule that reflects best practices. BOP is behind schedule, in part, because of challenges, such as staffing, posed by the locations of the activating institutions. According to BOP officials, delays in receiving congressionally directed activation funding can exacerbate these challenges (see fig.). None of the six institutions is fully activated, or at rated capacity, as they do not house the number of inmates they are designed to safely and securely house.
BOP does not effectively communicate to Congress how the locations of new institutions may affect activation schedules. BOP officials said that when directed by Congress to investigate a location, they consider this as direction to focus on construction at that site. DOJ and BOP could more effectively manage activation timelines and costs by using the BOP annual budget justification to communicate to Congress the factors associated with certain locations that can delay activations, such as challenges hiring staff and placing inmates in institutions. Also, BOP officials said they review staffing data system-wide, but they have not prioritized an analysis of such data at the institution level. Analyzing staffing data on institutions in the activation process could help BOP assess its progress in staffing and tailoring effective mitigating strategies. Finally, BOP lacks a comprehensive activation policy to guide activations, as well as an activation schedule that reflects best practices, and it has largely relied on staff's past experience to complete ongoing activations. Developing and implementing a comprehensive policy and a schedule that reflects best practices, could better position BOP to meet its estimated timeframes and activation costs.
DOJ purchased Thomson to help reduce crowding among inmates requiring high levels of security. Once it is fully populated, it will reduce BOP-wide crowding by 16 percent at the high-security level. Thomson will cost about $160 million annually to operate once fully activated, adding to BOP's system-wide costs. BOP officials said Thomson will provide benefits, such as high-security bed space, which outweigh the costs associated with the institution.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOJ use its annual budget justification to communicate to Congress factors that might delay prison activation, and that BOP analyze institution-level staffing data and develop and implement a comprehensive activation policy and a schedule that reflects best practices. DOJ concurred with all of GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-06-872 | gao_GAO-06-872_0 | Experts Suggested Several Points to Consider When Making Decisions about SPR Use
Despite the lack of clear consensus regarding previous decisions to use the SPR, experts in our group suggested several points that policymakers should consider when deciding whether to use the SPR: (1) that recent increases in the size of the SPR should result in a greater willingness to use it during a disruption, (2) that more extensive experience with the SPR during oil supply disruptions may enable better understanding of the features of each disruption that determine whether SPR use is warranted, and (3) that using the SPR without delay when it is needed will minimize economic damage. Additionally, several factors beyond the SPR’s ability to replace oil could decrease or increase the economic benefit of the reserve, such as the compatibility of SPR oil with some U.S. refineries. The difference between the estimates with and without reserve use is the avoided damage to GDP resulting from use of the reserve. Other Factors, in Addition to the SPR’s Ability to Replace Oil, May Affect the Extent to Which the SPR Can Protect the U.S. Economy from Damage
The purpose of the SPR is to protect the economy from harm during oil supply disruptions by replacing the disrupted oil. Releasing Oil from the SPR Is Less Helpful If U.S. Crude oil must be processed in refineries to be useful. A Larger SPR Is Warranted If Demand for Oil Grows as Expected
If demand for oil in the United States increases as expected, a larger SPR will be necessary to maintain the economy’s present level of protection from oil supply disruptions. In addition, a recent study prepared for DOE shows that the benefits of expanding the SPR to as much as 1.5 billion barrels would exceed the costs over a range of future conditions, although expanding the reserve to this size would take approximately 18 years. However, factors influencing the SPR’s ideal size are likely to change over time, including factors such as oil demand and the likelihood of oil supply disruptions. The SPR contained enough crude oil in 2005 to offset about 58 days of imports. Predicting future demand is difficult because it depends on many factors, including the rates of economic growth, the price of oil, policy choices, and technology changes. Therefore, as time passes and oil markets change, periodic reassessments by DOE of the appropriate size of the SPR could be helpful as part of the nation’s long-term energy security planning. Our work shows that the SPR, particularly in conjunction with reserves held by the other countries of the International Energy Agency, can replace the oil lost during all but the most catastrophic disruption scenarios and, thus, can reduce the negative consequences of oil supply disruptions on the U.S. economy. Specifically, the Secretary should: Study how to best implement experts’ suggestions to fill the SPR more acquiring a steady dollar value of oil for the SPR over the long term, rather than a steady volume, to ensure a greater volume of fill when prices are low and a lesser volume of fill when prices are high and providing industry with more flexibility in the royalty-in-kind program to delay oil delivery to the SPR during times when supply and demand are in tight balance and current prices are higher than expected future prices. Scope and Methodology
We addressed the following questions during our review: (1) Based on past experience, what factors do experts recommend be considered when filling and using the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR)? (2) To what extent can the SPR protect the U.S. economy from damage during oil supply disruptions? (3) Under what circumstances would an SPR larger than its current size be warranted? Modeling of Economic Impacts
We used two DOE models to estimate the economic effects of our six disruption scenarios. Their cost-benefit approach uses a simple model of the oil market and the U.S. economy to (1) assess the potential causes and likelihood that oil supply disruptions will occur, (2) account for the size of existing strategic oil stocks and expected degree of international cooperation on their use, (3) estimate the cost to the U.S. economy of oil supply disruptions and the incremental ability of additional SPR stocks and drawdown capability to reduce these costs, (4) estimate the costs of buying and storing oil in the SPR, and (5) determine the net benefit and efficient size of the SPR. | Why GAO Did This Study
Congress authorized the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR), operated by the Department of Energy (DOE), to release oil to the market during supply disruptions and protect the U.S. economy from damage. The reserve can store up to 727 million barrels of crude oil, and currently contains enough oil to offset 59 days of U.S. oil imports. GAO answered the following questions: (1) What factors do experts recommend be considered when filling and using the SPR? (2) To what extent can the SPR protect the U.S. economy from damage during oil supply disruptions? (3) Under what circumstances would an SPR larger than its current size be warranted? As part of this study, GAO developed oil supply disruption scenarios, used models to estimate potential economic harm, and convened 13 experts in conjunction with the National Academy of Sciences.
What GAO Found
The group of experts recommended a number of factors to be considered when filling and using the SPR. They generally agreed that filling the reserve by acquiring a steady dollar value of oil over time, rather than a steady volume of oil over time as has occurred in recent years, would ensure that more oil will be acquired when prices are low and less when prices are high. Experts also suggested allowing oil producers to defer delivery of oil to the reserve at times when supply and demand are in tight balance, with oil producers providing additional oil to the SPR to pay for the delay. Regarding use of the SPR, experts described several factors to consider when making future use decisions, including using the reserve without delay when it is needed to minimize economic damage. During oil supply disruptions, releasing oil from the SPR could greatly reduce damage to the U.S. economy, based on our analyses and expert opinions. Particularly when used in conjunction with reserves in other countries, the SPR can replace the oil lost in all but the most catastrophic oil disruption scenarios we considered, lasting from 3 months to 2 years. DOE uses one model to estimate the optimal size of the SPR and another to estimate the economic effects of oil supply disruptions. Both models predict positive effects from using the SPR, but the magnitude of such benefits differ. The substantial differences between the results of these two models could lead DOE to provide inconsistent advice about expanding and using the reserve. Furthermore, factors beyond the SPR's ability to replace oil affect the extent to which the SPR can protect the U.S. economy from damage. For example, SPR crude is not compatible with all U.S. refineries. During a disruption of heavy sour crude oil, refineries configured to use this type of oil would have to reduce production of some petroleum products when refining the lighter oil in the SPR, decreasing the reserve's effectiveness at preventing economic damage. If demand for oil increases as expected, a larger SPR would be necessary to maintain the existing level of protection for the U.S. economy. The Energy Information Administration recently projected increases in U.S. demand for petroleum of approximately 12 percent by 2015 and 24 percent by 2025, compared with the 2005 level. In this regard, a 2005 study prepared for DOE found that the benefits of expanding the reserve to 1.5 billion barrels exceed the costs over a range of future conditions. However, many factors that influence the SPR's ideal size are likely to change over time. For example, although projections show increasing oil demand, the level of demand depends on many factors, including rates of economic growth, the price of oil, policy choices related to alternatives to oil, and technology changes. Consequently, periodic reassessments of the SPR's size in light of new information could be helpful as part of the nation's energy security planning. |
gao_GAO-14-504T | gao_GAO-14-504T_0 | Climate-Related and Extreme Weather Impacts on Infrastructure and Federal Lands Increase Federal Fiscal Exposures
As our past work has found, climate-related and extreme weather impacts on physical infrastructure such as buildings, roads, and bridges, as well as on federal lands, increase federal fiscal exposures. Climate- Thus, infrastructure designs related impacts can increase the operating and maintenance costs of infrastructure and federal lands or decrease the infrastructure’s life span, leading to increased fiscal exposures for the federal government that are not fully reflected in the budget. Key examples from our recent work include (1) Department of Defense (DOD) facilities, (2) other large federal facilities such as National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) centers, and (3) federal lands such as National Parks. DOD Facilities
DOD manages a global real-estate portfolio that includes over 555,000 facilities and 28 million acres of land with a replacement value that DOD estimates at close to $850 billion. As we reported in May 2014, this infrastructure is vulnerable to the potential impacts of climate change, including increased drought and more frequent and severe extreme weather events in certain locations. In its 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, DOD stated that the impacts of climate change may increase the frequency, scale, and complexity of future missions, while undermining the capacity of domestic installations to support training activities. 1). Other Large Federal Facilities
The federal government owns and operates hundreds of thousands of non-defense buildings and facilities that a changing climate could affect. In total, these NASA assets—many of which are located in vulnerable coastal areas—represent more than $32 billion in current replacement value. The federal government manages nearly 30 percent of the land in the United States for a variety of purposes, such as recreation, grazing, timber, and habitat for fish and wildlife. Specifically, federal agencies manage natural resources on about 650 million acres of land, including 401 national park units and 155 national forests. As we reported in May 2013, these resources are vulnerable to changes in the climate, including increases in air and water temperatures, wildfires, and drought; forests stressed by drought becoming more vulnerable to insect infestations; rising sea levels; and reduced snow cover and retreating glaciers. Appropriations for the federal government’s wildland fire management activities have tripled, averaging over $3 billion annually in recent years, up from about $1 billion in fiscal year 1999. Improved Climate- Related Technical Assistance to All Levels of Government Can Help Limit Federal Fiscal Exposures
As we have previously reported, improved climate-related technical assistance to all levels of government can help limit federal fiscal exposures. Federal Decision Makers
The Executive Office of the President and federal agencies have many efforts underway to increase the resilience of federal infrastructure and programs. State and Local Decision Makers
The federal government invests tens of billions of dollars annually in infrastructure projects prioritized and supervised by state and local governments. According to a 2010 Congressional Budget Office report, total public spending on transportation and water infrastructure exceeds $300 billion annually, with roughly 25 percent of this amount coming from the federal government However, the and the rest coming from state and local governments. In our April 2013 report, we concluded that the federal government could help state and local efforts to increase their resilience by (1) improving access to and use of available climate-related information, (2) providing officials with improved access to technical assistance, and (3) helping officials consider climate change in their planning processes. This work may help identify other steps the federal government could take to limit its fiscal exposure and make our communities more resilient to extreme weather events. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
Certain types of extreme weather events have become more frequent or intense according to the United States Global Change Research Program, including prolonged periods of heat, heavy downpours, and, in some regions, floods and droughts. While it is not possible to link any individual weather event to climate change, the impacts of these events affect many sectors of our economy, including the budgets of federal, state, and local governments.
GAO focuses particular attention on government operations it identifies as posing a “high risk” to the American taxpayer and, in February 2013, added to its High Risk List the area Limiting the Federal Government's Fiscal Exposure by Better Managing Climate Change Risks . GAO's past work has identified a variety of fiscal exposures—responsibilities, programs, and activities that may explicitly or implicitly expose the federal government to future spending.
This testimony is based on reports GAO issued from August 2007 to May 2014, and discusses (1) federal fiscal exposures resulting from climate-related and extreme weather impacts on critical infrastructure and federal lands, and (2) how improved federal technical assistance to all levels of government can help reduce climate-related fiscal exposures.
GAO is not making new recommendations but has made numerous recommendations in prior reports on this topic, which are in varying states of implementation by the Executive Office of the President and federal agencies.
What GAO Found
Climate change and related extreme weather impacts on infrastructure and federal lands increase fiscal exposures that the federal budget does not fully reflect. Investing in resilience—actions to reduce potential future losses rather than waiting for an event to occur and paying for recovery afterward—can reduce the potential impacts of climate-related events. Implementing resilience measures creates additional up-front costs but could also confer benefits, such as a reduction in future damages from climate-related events. Key examples of vulnerable infrastructure and federal lands GAO has identified include:
Department of Defense (DOD) facilities. DOD manages a global real-estate portfolio that includes over 555,000 facilities and 28 million acres of land with a replacement value DOD estimates at close to $850 billion. This infrastructure is vulnerable to the potential impacts of climate change and related extreme weather events. For example, in May 2014, GAO reported that a military base in the desert Southwest experienced a rain event in August 2013 in which about 1 year's worth of rain fell in 80 minutes. The flooding caused by the storm damaged more than 160 facilities, 8 roads, 1 bridge, and 11,000 linear feet of fencing, resulting in an estimated $64 million in damages.
Other large federal facilities. The federal government owns and operates hundreds of thousands of other facilities that a changing climate could affect. For example, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) manages more than 5,000 buildings and other structures. GAO reported in April 2013 that, in total, these NASA assets—many of which are in coastal areas vulnerable to storm surge and sea level rise—represent more than $32 billion in current replacement value.
Federal lands. The federal government manages nearly 30 percent of the land in the United States—about 650 million acres of land—including 401 national park units and 155 national forests. GAO reported in May 2013 that these resources are vulnerable to changes in the climate, including the possibility of more frequent and severe droughts and wildfires. Appropriations for federal wildland fire management activities have tripled since 1999, averaging over $3 billion annually in recent years.
GAO has reported that improved climate-related technical assistance to all levels of government can help limit federal fiscal exposures. The federal government invests tens of billions of dollars annually in infrastructure projects that state and local governments prioritize, such as roads and bridges. Total public spending on transportation and water infrastructure exceeds $300 billion annually, with about 25 percent coming from the federal government and the rest from state and local governments. GAO's April 2013 report on infrastructure adaptation concluded that the federal government could help state and local efforts to increase their resilience by (1) improving access to and use of available climate-related information, (2) providing officials with improved access to technical assistance, and (3) helping officials consider climate change in their planning processes. |
gao_GAO-13-381 | gao_GAO-13-381_0 | Advisor Teams Varied in the Extent to Which Their Approaches Identified Activities Based on Specific Objectives Linked to ANSF Development Goals
While ISAF and the regional commands have defined the mission and broad goals for the advisor teams, it is largely left to the teams, in coordination with the regional command and brigade commander for their area of operations, to develop their approach for working with their ANSF counterpart units. Similarly, the Army’s Field Manual for Security Force Assistance states that, in order to be successful, advisors have an end or goal in mind and should establish objectives and milestones that support higher- command plans and can be achieved during their deployment.addition, advisor teams must balance the priorities of their commands with those of their counterpart units. For example, advisor teams in multiple regional commands stated their approach was to rely on interactions with their ANSF counterparts to identify priorities, using this input to develop activities on an ad hoc basis. Similarly, according to a brigade commander serving as an advisor team leader, his team and other advisor teams from his brigade generally identified development activities in reaction to situations as they arose rather than as part of a longer-term, more structured approach to achieve broad goals. Without a more structured approach with clear linkages between objectives or end states linked to development goals for ANSF units, regional commanders cannot be assured that the activities of individual advisor teams are in fact making progress toward established goals. The Army’s use of brigades to form advisor teams has enabled them to meet requirements but has resulted in leaving large numbers of brigade personnel at their home station locations. To manage these large rear detachments, brigade leadership undertook significant planning to ensure enough stay- behind leadership existed to maintain a sufficient command structure and provide certain training and exercises. According to Army and Marine Corps officials, meeting the rank and skills required for SFA advisor teams, including those as part of SFABs, continues to present a challenge given the limited availability of such personnel across the services. For instance, specific rank requirements can generally be substituted with an individual one rank above or below the requirement. The Army and Marine Corps Have Developed Programs to Train Advisor Teams, but Teams Differed in the Extent to Which They Had Mission-Specific Information Prior to Deployment
The Army and Marine Corps have developed standardized predeployment training programs for SFA advisor teams in Afghanistan, but teams varied in the extent to which they had access to mission- specific information prior to deploying that they believed would help them prepare for their specific advising missions. Advisor teams varied in the extent to which they had access to information to help prepare for their specific advising missions prior to deployment. Advisor teams may gain access to this information through a variety of ways. For example, officials from one brigade that provided SFA advisor teams said that they recognized the value of CENTRIXS-I in gathering specific information from units on the ground in order for teams to conduct their mission analysis and early planning, and proactively took steps to gain access to the network at home station early on in predeployment training, and were able to obtain access for its SFA advisor teams 5 months prior to deploying. Nonetheless, without a more complete understanding of the capabilities of the ANSF counterpart units to be advised and the operating environment in which they will be advising prior to deploying, it may take advisor teams more time after deploying to maximize their impact as advisors. By ensuring that SFA advisor teams have structured approaches with clear linkages between end states, objectives, and milestones that are in support of broad goals for ANSF units, theater commanders can enhance the ability of advisor teams to develop their ANSF counterparts. Recommendations for Executive Action
To ensure that the activities of individual advisor teams are more clearly linked to ISAF and regional command goals for overall ANSF development, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the commander of U.S. Central Command, direct theater commanders in Afghanistan to work with brigade commanders and advisor teams to identify specific end states, objectives and milestones for developing their ANSF counterparts that are in support of the broad theater goals to guide their advising efforts during their deployment. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD), in conjunction with the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), has defined Security Force Assistance (SFA) advisor team missions, goals, and objectives, we reviewed doctrine and guidance from the Army, Marine Corps, and theater commanders, including the Army Field Manual 3-07.1 Security Force Assistance and the ISAF SFA Concept and Implementation Guidance. We visited or contacted officials from the following organizations in the United States and Afghanistan during our review: DOD Organizations in the United States
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Arlington, Virginia
U.S. Central Command, Tampa, Florida
U.S. Army
Department of the Army Headquarters, Arlington, Virginia
U.S. Army Forces Command, Fort Bragg, North Carolina
162nd Infantry Training Brigade, Fort Polk, Louisiana
Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, Louisiana
101st Airborne Division, Fort Campbell, Kentucky
Headquarters, Marine Corps, Arlington, Virginia
Marine Corps Central Command, Tampa, Florida
1st Marine Expeditionary Force, including its Advisor Training Cell,
Advisor Training Group, Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center, DOD and International Entities in Afghanistan
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) entities, including the ISAF, ISAF Commander’s Advisory and Assistance Team, and ISAF Joint Command, Kabul, Afghanistan
NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan, Kabul, Afghanistan
Regional Command headquarters and staff:
Regional Command–East (Commanded by 1st Infantry Division, U.S. Army), Bagram Air Field, Afghanistan
Regional Command–South (Commanded by 3rd Infantry Division, U.S. Army), Kandahar Air Field, Afghanistan
Regional Command–Southwest (Commanded by 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (Fwd), U.S. Marine Corps), Camp Leatherneck, Afghanistan
U.S. Forces–Afghanistan, Kabul, Afghanistan
U.S. Army and Marine Corps Units, Personnel, and Advisor Teams deployed in Afghanistan:
4th Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, U.S. Army
2nd Stryker Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division, U.S. Army
162nd Infantry Training Brigade training liaison officers
23 SFA advisor teams in Afghanistan, including the following:
7 Army advisor teams in Regional Command–East
10 Army advisor teams in Regional Command–South
5 Marine Corps advisor teams in Regional Command–
1 Army advisor team in Regional Command–West As part of this review, we selected an illustrative, non-generalizable sample of deployed U.S. Army and Marine Corps SFA advisor teams in Afghanistan. Observations on U.S. Military Capabilities to Support Transition of Lead Security Responsibility to Afghan National Security Forces. | Why GAO Did This Study
ISAF's mission in Afghanistan has shifted from a combat role to focus more on preparing ANSF units to assume lead security responsibility by the end of 2014. A key element in advising and assisting the ANSF is SFA advisor teams, provided by the U.S. Army and Marine Corps. A House Armed Services Committee report accompanying its version of the Fiscal Year 2013 National Defense Authorization Act directed GAO to review DOD's establishment and use of SFA advisor teams. Specifically, GAO evaluated the extent to which (1) DOD, in conjunction with ISAF, has defined SFA advisor team missions, goals, and objectives; (2) the Army and Marine Corps have been able to provide teams; and (3) the Army and Marine Corps have developed programs to train teams for their specific missions. GAO reviewed doctrine and guidance, analyzed advisor requirements, reviewed training curricula, and interviewed Army, Marine Corps, theater command, and SFA advisor team officials in the U.S. and Afghanistan.
What GAO Found
DOD and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) have defined the mission and broad goals for Security Force Assistance (SFA) advisor teams; however, teams varied in the extent to which their approaches for developing their Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) units identified activities based on specific objectives or end states that were clearly linked with established goals. SFA guidance states that to be successful, advisors must have an end or goal in mind, and establish objectives that support higher-command plans. Theater commanders have outlined goals aimed at strengthening specific capabilities such as logistics, and it is largely left to the teams to then develop their approach for working with their counterparts. GAO found some advisor teams had developed structured advising approaches drawing from these goals, such as identifying monthly objectives and milestones for their team. Other teams GAO met with used less structured approaches, such as relying on interactions with ANSF counterparts to identify priorities and using this input to develop activities on an ad hoc basis, rather than as part of a longer-term, more structured approach to achieve broad goals. Officials from several teams stated that the guidance they received lacked specificity regarding desired end states for the development of their ANSF counterpart units. Without a more structured approach with clear linkages between end states, objectives, and milestones that are in support of broad goals for ANSF units, theater commanders cannot be assured that the advisor team activities are making progress toward these goals.
The Army and Marine Corps have been able to fill requests for SFA advisor teams, using various approaches such as tasking non-deployed brigades to form advisor teams or creating teams using personnel already deployed in Afghanistan. According to Army and Marine Corps officials, the ability to substitute an individual at one rank above or below the request has helped the services meet rank and skill requirements. The Army's reliance on brigades to provide a portion of their personnel to form advisor teams has enabled them to meet requirements but resulted in leaving large numbers of personnel at the brigades' home stations. To manage these large rear detachments, brigades undertook significant planning to ensure that enough stay-behind leadership existed to maintain a sufficient command structure and provide certain training.
The Army and Marine Corps have developed training programs for SFA advisor teams, but teams varied in the extent to which they had specific information to help prepare them for their mission prior to deployment. SFA guidance states that an in-depth understanding of the operational environment and of foreign security force capabilities is critical to planning and conducting effective SFA. Advisor teams may access such information from a variety of sources such as conducting video teleconferences with the teams they will replace, using secure networks to gather information, or sending personnel on predeployment site surveys, although teams varied in the extent to which they were actually able to gain access to these sources. For example, GAO found that while teams had access to a certain secure network at training sites, only some had access at home station, enabling them to shape their training and mission analysis earlier in predeployment training or after training but prior to deploying. Having limited access to this information prior to arriving in Afghanistan may result in advisor teams needing more time after deploying to maximize their impact as advisors.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that theater commanders take steps to work with brigade commanders and advisor teams to identify end states, objectives, and milestones for the development of their ANSF counterpart units in support of the regional commands broad goals, and that the Army and Marine Corps improve availability of mission-specific information prior to advisor teams deployment. DOD partially concurred with GAOs recommendations and identified actions to further prepare SFA advisor teams for their missions. |
gao_GAO-08-821T | gao_GAO-08-821T_0 | Background
FMD Is a Highly Contagious Animal Disease
FMD is a highly contagious animal disease. Plum Island Animal Disease Center
Plum Island is a federally owned 840-acre island off the northeastern tip of Long Island, New York. The North American Foot-and-Mouth Disease Vaccine Bank is also located on Plum Island. Evidence That FMD Work Can Be Conducted Safely on the U.S. Mainland Is Lacking
We found that DHS has neither conducted nor commissioned any study to determine whether FMD work can be done safely on the U.S. mainland. In particular, the study 1. did not assess the history of releases of FMD virus or other dangerous 2. did not address in detail the issues related to large animal work in BSL- 3 Ag facilities, and 3. was inaccurate in comparing other countries’ FMD work experience with that of the United States. Consequently, we believe DHS does not have evidence to conclude that FMD work can be done safely on the U.S. mainland. The proposed U.S. sites are potentially more likely to pose a risk, given their closer proximity to susceptible animal populations. The 2002 study used the U.K. Pirbright facility as an example of a precedent for allowing FMD work on the mainland. This fact highlights the risks of release from a laboratory that is in close proximity to susceptible animals and provides the best evidence in favor of an island location. Given That Releases Can Occur from Any Biocontainment Facility, an Island Location Can Provide Additional Protection
While location confers no advantage in preventing a release, location can help prevent the spread of FMD virus and a resulting disease outbreak, if there is a release. This was because of the facility’s island location. The Economic Consequences of an FMD Outbreak in the United States Could Be Significant
While humans cannot become infected with FMD through contact with infected animals or through eating products of diseased animals, still, FMD can have economic consequences, as recent outbreaks in the United Kingdom have demonstrated. Although estimates vary, experts agree that the economic consequences of an FMD outbreak on the U.S. mainland could be significant, especially for red meat producers whose animals would be at risk for diseases, depending on how and where such an outbreak occurred. The economic effects of an FMD outbreak would depend on the characteristics of the outbreak and how producers, consumers, and the government responded to it. Given the non-zero risk of a release from any biocontainment facility, most of the experts we spoke with told us that an island location can provide additional protection. Instead, in proposing to move FMD virus to the mainland, DHS relied on a 2002 USDA study that addressed a different question. That study does not clearly support the conclusion that FMD work can be done safely on the mainland. An island location can help prevent the spread of FMD virus along terrestrial routes, such as by vehicles splashed with contaminated mud, and may also reduce airborne transmission. Historically, the United States and other countries as well have seen the benefit of an island location, with its combination of remoteness from susceptible species and a permanent water barrier. Although FMD has no human-health implications, recent outbreaks in the United Kingdom have demonstrated its economic consequences. Estimates for the United States vary but would depend on the characteristics of the outbreak and how producers, consumers, and the government responded to it. | Why GAO Did This Study
DHS is proposing to move foot-and mouth disease (FMD) research from its current location at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center--located on a federally owned island off the northern tip of Long Island, New York--and potentially onto the United States mainland. FMD is the most highly infectious animal disease that is known. Nearly 100 percent of exposed animals become infected. A single outbreak of FMD on the U.S. mainland could have significant economic consequences. Concerns have been raised about moving FMD research off its island location and onto the U.S. mainland--where it would be in closer proximity to susceptible animal populations--as opposed to building a new facility on the island. GAO was asked to evaluate the evidence DHS used to support its decision that FMD work can be done safely on the U.S. mainland, whether an island location provides any additional protection over and above that provided by modern high containment laboratories on the mainland, and the economic consequences of an FMD outbreak on the U.S. mainland. In preparing this testimony, GAO interviewed officials from DHS and USDA, talked with experts in FMD and high-containment laboratories worldwide, and reviewed studies on FMD, high-containment laboratories, and the economic consequences of FMD outbreaks. GAO also visited the Plum Island Animal Disease Center and other animal biocontainment laboratories in other countries.
What GAO Found
GAO found that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)has neither conducted nor commissioned any study to determine whether work on foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) can be done safely on the U.S. mainland. Instead, in deciding that work with FMD can be done safely on the mainland, DHS relied on a 2002 U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) study that addressed a different question. The study did not assess the past history of releases of FMD virus or other dangerous pathogens in the United States or elsewhere. It did not address in detail the issues of containment related to large animal work in BSL-3 Ag facilities. It was inaccurate in comparing other countries' FMD work experience with that of the United States. Therefore, GAO believes DHS does not have evidence to conclude that FMD work can be done safely on the U.S. mainland. While location, in general, confers no advantage in preventing a release, location can help prevent the spread of pathogens and, thus, a resulting disease outbreak if there is a release. Given that there is always some risk of a release from any biocontainment facility, most experts GAO spoke with said that an island location can provide additional protection. An island location can help prevent the spread of FMD virus along terrestrial routes, such as from vehicles splashed with contaminated mud, and may also reduce airborne transmission. Some other countries besides the United States have historically seen the benefit of an island location, with its remoteness from susceptible species and permanent water barriers. A recent release from the Pirbright facility--located in a farming community on the mainland of the United Kingdom--highlights the risks of a release from a laboratory that is in close proximity to the susceptible animals and provides the best evidence in favor of an island location. FMD has no health implications for humans, but it can have significant economic consequences, as recent outbreaks in the United Kingdom have demonstrated. The economic effects of an FMD outbreak in the United States, however, would depend on the characteristics of the outbreak and how producers, consumers, and the government responded to it. Although estimates vary, experts agree that the economic consequences of an FMD outbreak on the U.S. mainland could be significant, especially for red meat producers whose animals would be at risk for diseases, depending on how and where such an outbreak occurred. |
gao_GAO-09-49 | gao_GAO-09-49_0 | While limited occasional direct sharing of DOD and DHS biometrics has occurred, it is not regularized. However, even within departments, there may not be policies to ensure that officials in different parts of the organization are aware of or have access to biometrics data that are collected by others. DOD Collection, Matching, and Sharing of Biometrics Data
During DOD field activities, such as those in Afghanistan and Iraq, U.S. forces collect biometrics data for a variety of purposes, such as to control access to U.S. bases in order to protect personnel and to identify and verify non-U.S. persons that they encounter. DOD Has Issued Limited Guidance for Collecting Biometrics Data
The Biometrics Task Force has not issued guidance specifying a standard set of biometrics data that would allow for comparison of newly collected biometrics data with existing biometrics data in the field. Having a standard set of biometrics data would help ensure consistent identification and confirmation of an individual’s identity thus allowing forces to compare data across multiple databases in different commands and to determine whether individuals should be detained. As a result, some units may collect fingerprints and facial photos, while others may collect only iris images, even though they are all using devices that can collect the same types of biometrics. The lack of comparable data also has implications for broader national security issues. Thus, military personnel collecting only iris images may be unable to identify someone who has harmed or attempted to harm U.S. or coalition forces. Persons through Interagency Agreements, but Some Gaps in Data May Remain
DOD shares biometrics data that it collects on non-U.S. persons with other federal agencies through a variety of interagency agreements, but some gaps in data sharing may remain. Despite the sharing agreements, a DHS memorandum indicates that DHS does not regularly receive certain types of data from DOD. DHS officials stated that this information could potentially be used to carry out DHS’s national security mission. Since the events of September 11, 2001, the President and Congress have issued broad policies that require federal agencies to share counterterrorism information, and federal agencies have in turn issued their own policies. A January 2007 Deputy Secretary of Defense memorandum called for DOD to immediately adopt the practice of sharing unclassified DOD biometrics data records with other U.S. departments and agencies that have counterterrorism missions, including data related to terrorism information defined in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act regarding terrorists, detainees, and those individuals or groups posing a threat to the United States, U.S. persons, or U.S. interests, but excluding data pertaining to U.S. persons, defined as U.S. citizens and aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence. According to DHS, these data could be used to (1) prohibit individuals from entering the United States who are determined to be inadmissible based on these data and other relevant information, (2) detain individuals for law enforcement reasons if needed, or (3) provide additional information about refugees and their potential eligibility to enter the United States. Opportunities to reduce gaps in our security through comprehensive data sharing may be lost unless remaining needs for biometrics data are appropriately filled. Additionally, we recommend that until a formalized, governmentwide biometrics data-sharing architecture is implemented, the Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security, in consultation with other federal agencies, such as the FBI and DOS, determine if biometrics information sharing needs are being met and address, as appropriate, any biometrics data-sharing gaps that may exist, in accordance with U.S. laws and regulations and international agreements, as well as information sharing environment efforts. As such, this public version of the For Official Use Only report was sent to DOD for comment. Moreover, DOD acknowledges this risk in its comments, stating that DOD officials want to continue to rely on the commanders’ judgment on the biometrics to be collected during military operations in the field, including hostile environments. | Why GAO Did This Study
The events of September 11, 2001, and operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have made it critical for military units to identify individuals they encounter and share this information with other units and federal agencies. Biometrics are unique personal aspects such as fingerprints and iris images used to identify an unfamiliar person. Federal agencies with national security missions, such as the Departments of Homeland Security (DHS) and State (DOS), need access to certain biometrics data gathered by the Department of Defense (DOD). GAO was asked to determine to what extent (1) DOD has guidance on the biometrics data to be collected to support military activities, and (2) there may be gaps in biometrics information shared between DOD and DHS. This is a public version of a For Official Use Only report, GAO-08-430NI , issued in May 2008. GAO examined DOD's guidance for field collection of biometrics data, biometrics sharing agreements, and information on national level efforts to enhance data sharing.
What GAO Found
DOD has issued guidance on the biometrics data collected from individuals who are detained or allowed access to U.S. bases in Iraq, but has not issued guidance on data to be collected during field activities where U.S. forces encounter hostile or questionable individuals such as in Afghanistan and Iraq. DOD has allowed commanders to determine the type of data to collect, such as fingerprints or iris images, during their operations. GAO's analysis showed that allowing for this flexibility results in the collection of different data that are not necessarily comparable to each other. Some units may collect iris images while others collect fingerprints, which are not comparable data. Broader national security implications can arise, such as military personnel's inability to identify someone who has harmed or attempted to harm U.S. or coalition forces. These newly collected data are not necessarily comparable with data collected by other units or with federal databases that store biometrics data, such as the FBI's fingerprint database, DOD's biometric database, or the DHS biometric database. Having a standard set of data would help ensure consistent identification and confirmation of an individual's identity thus allowing forces to compare data across multiple databases in different commands. A standard set of data also would allow for comparison of new biometrics data collected in the field with existing biometrics data. DOD shares biometrics data that it collects on non-U.S. persons with other federal agencies through a variety of inter-agency agreements, but some gaps in data sharing may remain. Since the events of September 11, 2001, the President and Congress have issued policies that require agencies to share counterterrorism information, and agencies have in turn issued their own policies. National efforts to develop policies about such information sharing are still in development. In January 2007, the Deputy Secretary of Defense issued a memo that stated that DOD would immediately adopt the practice of sharing, when asked, unclassified DOD biometrics data records with other U.S. agencies that have counterterrorism missions--this includes data related to terrorism information but excludes data pertaining to U.S. persons. According to a DHS memorandum, DHS is not regularly receiving updates on certain types of DOD biometrics data that it could use. DHS officials told GAO they could use such data in various ways, such as to prohibit individuals from entering the United States who are determined to be inadmissible based on these data and other relevant information. GAO found that DHS officials are consulting with DOD on how to obtain additional biometrics data from DOD. Until national level policies are developed, opportunities to reduce gaps in national security through comprehensive data sharing may be lost unless remaining needs for biometrics data are identified and filled as appropriate and in accordance with U.S. laws and regulations and international agreements. |
gao_GAO-13-683 | gao_GAO-13-683_0 | Federal law establishes consequences for foreign nationals who overstay their authorized periods of admission. DHS has implemented or taken actions to implement some of these recommendations; however, DHS has not addressed others. DHS Continually Reviews Records of Potential Overstays, but a Significant Number of Unmatched Arrival Records Remain
DHS Reviewed a Backlog of 1.6 Million Records of Potential Overstays in 2011
DHS reviewed a backlog of records of potential overstays that we DHS uses ADIS to match departure previously identified in April 2011.records to arrival records and subsequently close records for individuals with matching arrival and departure records because either (1) the individual departed prior to the end of his or her authorized period of admission and is therefore not an overstay, or (2) the individual departed after the end of his or her authorized period of admission and is therefore an out-of-country overstay. In April 2011, we reported that, as of January 2011, ADIS contained a backlog of 1.6 million unmatched arrival records that DHS had not reviewed through automated or manual processes. Second, DHS reviewed the remaining 757,000 records against national security and law enforcement databases to identify potential national security or public safety threats. DHS Has More than 1 Million Unmatched Arrival Records That Do Not Meet Enforcement Priorities
Since DHS conducted its review of the previous backlog in 2011, additional unmatched arrival records have accrued, and as of June 2013, DHS has more than 1 million unmatched arrival records in ADIS (that is, arrival records for which ADIS does not have a record of departure or status change), which do not meet ICE’s enforcement priorities. DHS Has Actions Completed and Under Way to Improve Data to Identify Potential Overstays, but the Effect of These Improvements Is Not Yet Known
DHS Has Begun Collecting Additional Data and Improved Sharing of Data among Its Databases to Help Identify Potential Overstays
Since April 2011, DHS has taken various actions to improve its data on potential overstays. Since that time, DHS has taken action to strengthen its processes for reviewing records to identify potential overstays, including (1) streamlining connections among DHS databases used to identify potential overstays and (2) collecting information from the Canadian government about those exiting the United States and entering Canada through northern land ports of entry. DHS Continues to Face Limitations in Reporting Reliable Overstay Rates and Has Not Assessed and Documented Improvements in Reliability
Since 1994, neither DHS nor its predecessor has regularly reported annual overstay rates to Congress because of concerns about the reliability of the department’s overstay data. In April 2011, we reported that DHS officials stated that the department had not reported overstay estimates because it had not had sufficient confidence in the quality of its overstay data. These limitations in overstay data may affect DHS’s ability to report reliable overstay estimates unless resolved. However, development and implementation of a biometric exit capability has been a long-standing challenge for DHS. As a result, as of April 2013, according to DHS officials, the department’s planning efforts focus on developing a biometric exit capability for airports, with the potential for a similar solution to be implemented at seaports, and DHS’s planning documents, as of June 2013, do not address plans for a biometric exit capability at land ports of entry. May 2012 DHS reported internally on the results of S&T’s analysis and made recommendations to support the planning and development of a biometric air exit capability. February 2005 GAO issued a report entitled Homeland Security: Some Progress Made, but Many Challenges Remain on U.S. Although DHS’s May 2012 report stated that DHS would take steps to address the report’s recommendations by May 2014, DHS officials told us that the department’s current goal is to develop information about options for biometric air exit and to report to Congress in time for the fiscal year 2016 budget cycle regarding (1) the additional benefits that a biometric air exit system provides beyond an enhanced biographic exit system and (2) costs associated with biometric air exit. According to A Guide to the Project Management Body of Knowledge, which provides standards for project managers, specific goals and objectives should be conceptualized, defined, and documented in the planning process, along with the appropriate steps, time frames, and milestones needed to achieve those results. In fall 2012, DHS developed a high-level plan for its biometric air exit efforts, which it updated in May 2013, but this plan does not clearly identify the tasks needed to develop and implement an evaluation framework. DHS plans to provide Congress with an assessment of the benefits and costs of various options for pursuing a biometric exit system at airports, but without robust planning that includes time frames and milestones to develop and implement an evaluation framework for this assessment, DHS lacks reasonable assurance that it will be able to provide this assessment to Congress for the fiscal year 2016 budget cycle as planned. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help improve confidence in the quality of overstay data that DHS plans to report in December 2013 in accordance with statutory reporting requirements, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct relevant DHS components to assess and document the extent to which the reliability of the data used to develop any overstay estimates has improved and any remaining limitations in how the data can be used. | Why GAO Did This Study
Each year, millions of visitors come to the United States legally on a temporary basis either with or without a visa. Overstays are individuals who were admitted legally on a temporary basis but then overstayed their authorized periods of admission. DHS has primary responsibility for identifying and taking enforcement action to address overstays. In April 2011, GAO reported on DHS's actions to identify and address overstays and made recommendations to strengthen these processes. DHS concurred and has taken or is taking steps to address them. DHS has also reported taking further actions to address overstays.
GAO was asked to review DHS's progress since April 2011. This report addresses (1) DHS's efforts to review its records to identify potential overstays, (2) the extent to which DHS's changes in its systems or processes have improved data on potential overstays and DHS's ability to report overstay rates, and (3) the extent to which DHS has made progress toward establishing a biometric exit system. GAO analyzed DHS overstay data and documents-- such as those related to the overstay identification processes and biometric exit plans--and interviewed relevant DHS officials.
What GAO Found
Since April 2011, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has taken action to address a backlog of potential overstay records that GAO previously identified. Specifically, DHS reviewed such records to identify national security and public safety threats, but unmatched arrival records--those without corresponding departure records--remain in DHS's system. GAO had previously reported that, as of January 2011, DHS had a backlog of 1.6 million unmatched arrival records that had not been reviewed through automated or manual processes. DHS tracks arrivals and departures and closes records for individuals with matching arrival and departure records. Unmatched arrival records indicate that the individual is a potential overstay. In 2011, DHS reviewed this backlog of 1.6 million records, closed about 863,000 records, and removed them from the backlog. As new unmatched arrival records have accrued, DHS has continued to review all of these new records for national security and public safety concerns. As of June 2013, DHS's unmatched arrival records totaled more than 1 million.
DHS has actions completed and under way to improve data on potential overstays and report overstay rates, but the effect of these improvements is not yet known. Further, DHS continues to face challenges in reporting reliable overstay rates. DHS has streamlined connections among databases used to identify potential overstays. However, these improvements do not address some underlying data quality issues, such as missing land departure data. Federal law requires DHS to report overstay estimates, but DHS or its predecessor has not regularly done so since 1994. In April 2011, GAO reported that DHS officials said that they have not reported overstay rates because DHS has not had sufficient confidence in the quality of its overstay data. In February 2013, the Secretary of Homeland Security testified that DHS plans to report overstay rates by December 2013. However, DHS has not assessed or documented improvements in the reliability of data used to develop overstay estimates, in accordance with federal internal control standards. Without such a documented assessment to ensure the reliability of these data, decision makers would not have the information needed to use these data for policy-making purposes.
Developing and implementing a biometric exit capability to collect biometric data, such as fingerprints, which is required by federal law, has been a long-standing challenge for DHS. In May 2012, DHS internally reported recommendations to support the planning for a biometric exit capability at airports--DHS's priority for biometric exit capabilities--that could also be implemented at seaports in the future; however, as of June 2013, DHS's planning did not address a biometric exit capability at land ports of entry. DHS officials stated that the department's goal is to develop information and report to Congress about the benefits and costs of biometric air exit options before the fiscal year 2016 budget cycle. Standard practices for project management state that time frames should be documented as part of the planning process; however, DHS has a high-level plan for a biometric air exit capability, and it does not clearly define the steps, time frames, and milestones needed to develop and implement an evaluation framework, as recommended in DHS's May 2012 report. Without robust planning that includes time frames and milestones, DHS does not have reasonable assurance that it will meet its time frame for developing and implementing an evaluation framework. |
gao_GAO-01-1023 | gao_GAO-01-1023_0 | Export Assistance Centers (USEAC) in 1993, the Trade Promotion Coordinating Committee (TPCC) designated the U.S. Department of Commerce as the primary provider of export promotion services, such as market information and counseling, to export-ready firms. The other USEAC partners, the U.S. Export-Import Bank (Eximbank) and the Small Business Administration (SBA), were to provide firms with export financing support. The Two Export Training Programs Were Not Coordinated
The Department of Commerce did not coordinate closely with SBA when it developed a separate Commerce export training program in 1999 as part of the Global Diversity Initiative—a Commerce effort to reach an underserved community of minority- and woman-owned firms. Moreover, both agencies’ staff assist each other in identifying potential training participants. Performance Measures Provide a Partial Picture of Training Program Results
Commerce and SBA do not systematically collect information on the number of new exporters or the export sales the training programs generate. Also, Commerce and SBA have not systematically conducted follow-up contacts with training participants in order to understand their export experiences and make training program adjustments to better serve potential small business exporters. In addition, Commerce’s duplication of SBA training illustrates that the TPCC has not fully met its mandate to coordinate trade promotion agencies’ efforts and eliminate duplication. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Export Enhancement Act of 1992 created the Trade Promotion Coordinating Committee to coordinate the delivery of federal export promotion services and to eliminate the areas of overlap and duplication among federal export promotion programs. The Export Enhancement Act of 1999 reiterated that eliminating duplication was a primary objective. In 1993, Congress recommended that three agencies co-locate their staffs at a domestic network of 19 "one-stop shops" called U.S. Export Assistance Centers. These centers were to provide coordinated export training, as well as trade leads, export finance, and counseling to U.S. firms interested in becoming exporters.
What GAO Found
GAO found that the Department of Commerce did not coordinate closely with the Small Business Administration in introducing its export training program. As a result, Commerce and the SBA provide separate and duplicative training programs for potential small business exporters. Neither Commerce nor SBA systematically collect outcome data for their export training programs. Instead, both agencies track the number of clients trained and Commerce identifies export successes for its clients overall, but not for training participants. Staff at Commerce and SBA do not systematically follow up with training participants to learn whether they have exported, the difficulties they encountered, and how training programs might need to be adjusted to be more helpful. |
gao_T-AIMD-98-167 | gao_T-AIMD-98-167_0 | Risk of Year 2000 Disruptions Requires Leadership
The public faces the risk that critical services could be severely disrupted by the Year 2000 computing crisis. The federal government is extremely vulnerable to Year 2000 problems due to its widespread dependence on computer systems to process financial transactions, deliver vital public services, and carry out its operations. USDA’s Approach Relies on Component Agencies
USDA’s Chief Information Officer (CIO) is responsible for leading the department’s preparation for the Year 2000 date change and ensuring that all critical USDA information systems are Year 2000 compliant and operational. Direct accountability for assessing, renovating, validating, and implementing systems conversion, however, rests with USDA’s 31 component agencies, which include staff offices. Component Agencies Have a Tremendous Amount of Remaining Work
USDA’s component agencies have a great deal of work still to be accomplished in the next 19 months in making its mission-critical systems ready for the year 2000. Major Weaknesses in Component Agency Efforts
Although agencies should have completed the assessment phase of Year 2000 readiness last summer, critical assessment tasks for many USDA agencies remain unfinished. The component agencies judged systems to be mission-critical in an inconsistent manner. The Year 2000 Program Office Has Performed Limited Oversight
The oversight provided by the Year 2000 Program Office has been limited to monthly meetings with component agency executive sponsors, regularly scheduled meetings on topics such as telecommunications and reviews of monthly status reports, and written guidance on awareness and assessment. The Farm Credit Administration
FCA regulates, and performs periodic examinations of, the entities that make up the Farm Credit System. However, FCA has not called for the regulated institutions to develop business continuity and contingency plans unless certain deadlines are not met or service providers and software vendors have not provided adequate information about their Year 2000 readiness, or where the provider or vendor solutions do not appear to be viable. Although CFTC has not yet reviewed the Year 2000 readiness of the SRO member institutions, it has worked with the SRO audit organization, the Joint Audit Committee. While CFTC has taken some action to address the effect the year 2000 will have on the futures and options markets, the potential major disruption that the year 2000 could hold for these markets suggests that the commission should take a strong leadership role in providing reasonable assurance that the futures and options markets will be Year 2000 compliant in time. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed its views on what additional actions must be taken to reduce the nation's year 2000 risks, focusing on: (1) an overview of the potential impact of the century change on the Department of Agriculture's (USDA) mission; (2) how the department is structured to address the crisis; (3) how much work remains to be completed; (4) the efforts of ten of USDA's component agencies and the department as a whole; and (5) the year 2000 status at the Farm Credit Administration (FCA) and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC).
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the public faces the risk that critical services could be severely disrupted by the year 2000 computing crisis; (2) the federal government is extremely vulnerable to year 2000 problems due to its widespread dependence on computer systems to process financial transactions, deliver vital public services, and carry out its operations; (3) USDA's Chief Information Officer is responsible for leading USDA's preparation for the year 2000 date change and ensuring that all critical USDA information systems are year 2000 compliant and operational; (4) direct accountability for assessing, renovating, validating, and implementing systems conversion, however, rests with USDA's 31 component agencies, which include staff offices; (5) USDA's component agencies have a great deal of work still to be accomplished in the next 19 months in making its mission-critical systems ready for the year 2000; (6) although agencies should have completed the assessment phase of year 2000 readiness last summer, critical assessment tasks for many USDA agencies remain unfinished; (7) the component agencies judged systems to be mission-critical in an inconsistent manner; (8) the oversight provided by the USDA's Year 2000 Program Office has been limited to monthly meetings with component agency executive sponsors, regularly scheduled meetings on topics such as telecommunications and reviews of monthly status reports, and written guidance on awareness and assessment; (9) FCA regulates, and performs periodic examinations of, the entities that make up the Farm Credit System; (10) FCA has not called for the regulated institutions to develop business continuity and contingency plans unless certain deadlines are not met or service providers and software vendors have not provided adequate information about their year 2000 readiness, or where the provider or vendor solutions do not appear viable; (11) although CFTC has not yet reviewed the year 2000 readiness of the self-regulatory organization (SRO) member institutions, it has worked with the SRO audit organization; and (12) while CFTC has taken some action to address the effect the year 2000 will have on the futures and options markets, the potential major disruption that the year 2000 could hold for these markets suggests that the commission should take a strong leadership role in providing reasonable assurance that the futures and options markets will be year 2000 compliant in time. |
gao_GAO-17-483 | gao_GAO-17-483_0 | A purpose of the program was to improve low-income individuals’ ability to access jobs and job- related needs by providing grants to states and localities for the provision of additional or expanded transportation services. FTA apportioned dedicated program funds to states for projects in small urbanized and rural areas, and to large urbanized areas, based on a statutory formula. Specifically, the statute consolidated eligible JARC activities into the existing Urbanized Area Formula Program (urban transit program) and Formula Grants for Rural Areas Program (rural transit program). FTA Issued Guidance and Conducted Outreach to Communicate That JARC Activities Remain Eligible for Federal Funding
FTA communicated changes that MAP-21 made to public transportation programs, including the JARC program, to designated recipients through program guidance and outreach. Initially, FTA issued a Federal Register notice regarding FTA transit program changes in October 2012. The notice provided interim guidance and emphasized that under MAP-21, activities that were funded through the former JARC program are eligible under the urban transit program and the rural transit program. After the 2012 consolidation, DOT applied all of the JARC eligibility requirements and existing activities in the urban transit program and rural transit program. FTA issued circulars with the final MAP-21 program guidance in 2014. Additionally, FTA officials stated that headquarters and regional FTA officials made themselves available through conferences, or other means such as telephone calls or e-mail, to answer questions or concerns regarding the consolidation and its potential impacts on JARC activities. In Arizona, an official with a selected subrecipient said he learned about the JARC program changes through its metropolitan planning organization’s committee meeting. Of the 34 total selected recipients we interviewed, 22 stated they found the guidance provided to them, either from FTA directly or through their respective designated recipients, to be sufficient and effective in communicating program changes. Selected Recipients Continue to Provide JARC Activities, but the Full Impact of Statutory Changes Is Unclear
Almost all (30 of 34) selected recipients reported that they have continued providing JARC activities, such as transportation services, that were started prior to the 2012 MAP-21 consolidation. Selected Recipients Stated That to Date, They Have Continued Funding and Providing JARC Activities
Of the 34 selected recipients we interviewed, 30 had continued JARC activities, such as ongoing transit service, started prior to the MAP-21 changes. Overall federal transit formula funding amounts were unchanged: None of the 19 selected designated recipients we interviewed reported a significant overall change to their annual FTA formula funding allocations attributable to the statutory changes. JARC activities integrated into existing transit services: Half of selected recipients (17 of 34) reported that their JARC program funded activities fulfilled a variety of citizens’ transportation needs, encouraging the providers to continue those JARC activities using alternate funding sources after the 2012 statutory changes. Selected JARC Recipients Identified Some Ongoing Funding and Service Challenges, as well as Possible Methods for Addressing Challenges
Selected recipients reported facing service and funding challenges in continuing JARC activities after the statutory changes in 2012. For example, many noted that they have had difficulty competing for funds against other public services. It Is Too Soon to Determine the Full Impact of Statutory Changes on JARC Activities
A substantial amount of dedicated JARC funds apportioned in 2012 and earlier under SAFETEA-LU remains unspent. According to FTA data, as of February 2017, there are approximately 265 federally funded JARC program grants accounting for about $147.9 million still open with funds to expend. For those with dedicated funding still available, they may not yet have faced the decision of whether to continue to fund—or at what level to fund— eligible JARC activities under the urban or rural transit program, whether to fund other eligible activities under those programs, or whether to seek additional nonfederal funds to continue their eligible JARC activities. Officials from 7 of the 17 selected recipients that have already expended all of their dedicated funds stated that they are uncertain whether they will be able to obtain long-term funding to continue to support JARC activities into future years. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to DOT for comment. DOT had no comments on this report. | Why GAO Did This Study
Established in 1998, the JARC program, which was administered by FTA, provided grants to states and localities for improving the mobility of low-income individuals to and from jobs and employment-related activities. In 2005, statute changed JARC into a formula program with dedicated funds apportioned by FTA. Then in 2012, MAP-21 repealed and consolidated the JARC program. However, activities previously funded through the JARC program are still eligible for funding through other programs administered by FTA.
The Fixing America's Surface Transportation Act included a provision for GAO to examine the impact of changes that MAP-21 had on public transportation. This report examines: (1) how FTA communicated the 2012 statutory changes to JARC activities to transit providers and (2) whether and how selected states and transit providers have continued to fund and provide JARC activities since the 2012 statutory changes. GAO reviewed FTA program guidance. GAO interviewed FTA officials and 34 selected recipients of JARC funding, including transportation officials and transit providers, from six states (Arizona, Michigan, Mississippi, Oregon, Texas, and Virginia). GAO judgmentally selected these JARC recipients for interviews to represent diverse geographic locations, including large-urban, small-urban, and rural funding areas within each state, among other factors.
GAO provided a draft of this report to DOT for comment. DOT had no comment on this report.
What GAO Found
The Federal Transit Administration (FTA) communicated changes that Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act (MAP-21) made to public transportation programs, including the Job Access and Reverse Commute (JARC) program, to designated recipients through program guidance and outreach. For example, in an October 2012 Federal Register notice, FTA addressed the consolidation of the JARC program and its eligible activities (JARC activities) into the existing Urbanized Area Formula Program (urban transit program) and the Formula Grants for Rural Areas Program (rural transit program). Additionally, in 2014, FTA issued final guidance on JARC activities allowed under the urban and rural transit programs. In addition to written guidance, FTA officials offered webinars and made staff available via in-person meetings, calls, and e-mail messages to answer any questions or concerns about the 2012 program change. Of the 34 selected JARC recipients (selected recipients) GAO interviewed, most (22) stated that they found the guidance provided to them, either by FTA directly or by other means, to be sufficient and effective in communicating program changes.
Most of the selected recipients we interviewed (30 of 34) said that they have continued to provide some level of JARC activities after the 2012 statutory changes. Selected recipients cited several reasons why they continue—or plan to continue—providing JARC activities, including:
recipients still have remaining dedicated JARC funds,
overall federal transit formula amounts were unchanged, and
JARC activities have already been integrated into existing transit services.
The 34 selected recipients GAO interviewed also identified an array of challenges in continuing their JARC activities. All but one of the selected recipients specified funding challenges related to MAP-21 changes. In particular, 21 selected recipients reported JARC activities had difficulty competing against other public services, including transit services, for funds, and 17 reported year-to-year funding allocations for continued JARC activities could change. In addition, 25 selected recipients specified service challenges linked to the location of low-income housing and employment centers. GAO found that it is too soon to determine the full impact of the statutory changes on JARC activities. This finding is in part due to the number of grant recipients and subrecipients still spending dedicated funds apportioned before the 2012 statutory changes. Half of the 34 selected recipients GAO interviewed reported that they were still spending dedicated JARC funds, and recent FTA data indicate that as of February 2017, there were approximately 265 active program grants funding JARC activities. Officials from 7 of the 17 selected recipients that have already expended all of their JARC program funding stated that they are uncertain whether or not they will be able to obtain long-term funding to continue to support JARC activities into future years. |
gao_GAO-05-781 | gao_GAO-05-781_0 | A theme of the national strategy is that homeland security is a shared responsibility among these stakeholders, not solely the responsibility of the federal government. Stakeholders we interviewed and our own analysis of revisions made to the guidance and standards generally found the revised guidance and standards to be better organized and to provide some additional clarity on security training requirements for crew members. Although TSA made these enhancements, stakeholders we interviewed and stakeholders identified by TSA provided concerns about the reasonableness of applying parts of the guidance and standards to both flight and cabin crew members, the difficulty in implementing some of the standards without additional information or training tools from TSA, and the vagueness of some of the guidance and standards. In January 2005, TSA took another step to strengthen its review of air carriers’ flight and cabin crew member security training by developing a standard form for TSA inspectors and training staff to use to conduct and document their reviews of air carriers’ security training curriculums. However, TSA has not established a time frame for completing these efforts. TSA Has Not Established Performance Measures or a Time Frame for Evaluating Training Effectiveness
TSA has not yet developed performance measures for the advanced voluntary crew member self-defense training program or established a time frame for evaluating the program’s overall effectiveness. However, TSA has not yet established performance measures or a timeframe for evaluating the effectiveness of the training program, including the training design and delivery. Recommendations
To help provide TSA management with reasonable assurance that its security training guidance and standards for flight and cabin crew members are preparing crew members for potential threat conditions, and to enable TSA and air carriers to assess the accomplishments of the security training and target program improvements, we recommend that the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security direct the Assistant Secretary, Transportation Security Administration, to take the following three actions: establish strategic goals for the flight and cabin crew member security training program, in collaboration with air carriers, and communicate these goals to air carriers to explain the results that are expected from the training; develop guidance and standards for air carriers to use in establishing performance goals and measures for their individual flight and cabin crew member security training programs to help ensure consistency in the development of goals and measures; and review air carriers’ goals and measures as part of its monitoring efforts to help ensure that they are linked to strategic goals established by TSA and to assess whether the training programs are achieving their intended results. (3) What efforts has TSA taken to develop, implement, and measure the effectiveness of advanced voluntary self-defense training for flight and cabin crew members? To determine the actions TSA has taken to develop guidance and standards for flight and cabin crew security training and to measure the effectiveness of the training as well as how TSA ensures domestic air carriers comply with required training guidance and standards, we obtained and analyzed relevant legislation, guidance, and standards developed by TSA and FAA, and TSA records documenting its reviews of air carriers’ security training programs. | Why GAO Did This Study
Training flight and cabin crew members to handle potential threats against domestic aircraft is an important element in securing our nation's aviation system. The responsibility for ensuring that crew members are prepared to handle these threats is a shared responsibility between the private sector--air carriers--and the federal government, primarily the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). This report addresses (1) actions TSA has taken to develop guidance and standards for flight and cabin crew member security training and to measure the effectiveness of the training, (2) how TSA ensures domestic air carriers comply with the training guidance and standards, and (3) efforts TSA has taken to develop and assess the effectiveness of its voluntary self-defense training program.
What GAO Found
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, TSA enhanced guidance and standards for flight and cabin crew member security training with input from stakeholders. Specifically, TSA revised the guidance and standards to include additional training elements required by law and to improve the organization and clarity of the guidance and standards. Some stakeholders we interviewed and our own review generally found that the revised guidance and standards improved upon previous versions in terms of organization and clarity of the information provided. However, some stakeholders identified concerns about, for example, the reasonableness of applying parts of the guidance and standards to both flight and cabin crew members and the difficulty in implementing some of the standards without additional information or training tools from TSA. Additionally, TSA has not established strategic goals and performance measures for assessing the effectiveness of the training because it considers its role in the training program as regulatory. In this regard, TSA views the individual air carriers as responsible for establishing performance goals and measures for their training programs, but has not required them to do so. Without goals and measures, TSA and air carriers will be limited in their ability to fully assess accomplishments and target associated improvements. TSA recently took steps to strengthen its efforts to oversee air carriers' flight and cabin crew security training to ensure they are complying with the required guidance and standards. For example, in January 2005, TSA added staff with expertise in designing training programs to review air carriers' crew member security training curriculums and developed a standard form for staff to use to conduct their reviews. However, TSA lacks adequate controls for monitoring and reviewing air carriers' crew member security training, including written procedures for conducting and documenting these reviews. TSA plans to develop written procedures, but has not established a timeframe for completing this effort. TSA has developed an advanced voluntary self-defense training program with input from stakeholders and implemented the program in December 2004, as required by law. However, stakeholders and our own analysis identified concerns about the training design and delivery, such as the lack of recurrent training and the lack of a realistic training environment. Also, TSA has not yet established performance measures for the program or established a time frame for evaluating the program's effectiveness. |
gao_GAO-13-765T | gao_GAO-13-765T_0 | In 2002, GAO reported that leading companies of that time committed to a strategic approach to acquiring services—a process that moves a company away from numerous individual procurements to a broader aggregate approach—including developing knowledge of how much they were spending on services and taking an enterprise-wide approach to As a result, companies made structural changes services acquisition.with top leadership support, such as establishing commodity managers— responsible for purchasing services within a category—and were better able to leverage their buying power to achieve substantial savings. We have previously reported that because procurement at federal departments and agencies is generally decentralized, the federal government is not fully leveraging its aggregate buying power to obtain the most advantageous terms and conditions for its procurements. Recognizing the benefits of strategic sourcing, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued a memorandum in 2005 that implemented strategic sourcing practices. More specifically, in fiscal year 2011, the Department of Defense (DOD), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Department of Energy, and Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) accounted for 80 percent of the $537 billion in federal procurement spending, but reported managing about 5 percent of that spending, or $25.8 billion, through strategic sourcing efforts. Similarly, we found that the FSSI program had only managed a small amount of spending through its four government- wide strategic sourcing initiatives in fiscal year 2011, although it reported achieving significant savings on those efforts. Further, we found that most selected agencies’ efforts did not address their highest spending areas, such as services, which provides opportunities for significant savings. We reported on the results of this review in April 2013. Like the federal government, leading companies have experienced growth in spending on services, and over the last 5 to 7 years, have been examining ways to better manage them. Officials from seven leading companies GAO spoke with reported saving 4 to15 percent over prior year spending through strategically sourcing the full range of services they buy, including services very similar to what the federal government buys: facilities management, engineering, and information technology, for example. Companies’ keen analysis of spending, coupled with central management and knowledge sharing about the services they buy, is key to their savings. Their analysis of spending patterns can be described as comprising two essential variables: the complexity of the service and the number of suppliers for that service. Knowing these variables for any given service, companies tailor their tactics to fit the situation; they do not treat all services the same. Leading companies generally agreed that the following foundational principles are all important to achieving successful services acquisition outcomes: maintaining spend visibility, developing category strategies, focusing on total cost of ownership, and regularly reviewing strategies and tactics. Taken together, these principles enable companies to better identify and share information on spending and increase market knowledge about suppliers to gain situational awareness of their procurement environment. This awareness positions companies to make more informed contracting decisions. Recent Actions May Facilitate Agencies’ Greater Use of Strategic Sourcing
OMB and other agencies have recently taken actions to expand the use of strategic sourcing. In commenting on the September 2012 report, DOD, VA, and OMB concurred with the recommendations and stated they would take action to adopt them. We reported in April 2013 that DOD and VA had not fully adopted a strategic sourcing approach but had actions under way. For example, at that time, DOD had developed a more comprehensive list of the department’s strategic sourcing efforts, was creating additional guidance that includes a process for regular review of proposed strategic sourcing initiatives, noted a more focused targeting of top procurement spending categories for supplies, equipment, and services, and was assessing the need for additional resources to support strategic sourcing efforts. VA reported that it had taken steps to better measure spending through strategic sourcing contracts and was in the process of reviewing business cases for new strategic sourcing initiatives, and adding resources to increase strategic sourcing efforts. In 2012, OMB released a Cross-Agency Priority Goal Statement, which called for agencies to strategically source at least two new products or services in both 2013 and 2014 that yielded at least 10 percent savings. In December 2012, OMB further directed certain agencies to reinforce senior leadership commitment by designating an official responsible for coordinating the agency’s strategic sourcing activities. In addition, OMB identified agencies that should take a leadership role on strategic sourcing. OMB directed these agencies to promote strategic sourcing practices inside their agencies by taking actions including collecting data on procurement spending. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO has reported that the government is not fully leveraging its aggregate buying power. Strategic sourcing, a process that moves an organization away from numerous individual procurements to a broader aggregate approach, has allowed leading companies to achieve savings of 10 percent or more. A savings rate of 10 percent of total federal procurement spending would represent more than $50 billion annually. While strategic sourcing makes good sense and holds the potential to achieve significant savings, federal agencies have been slow to embrace it, even in a time of great fiscal pressure.
This statement highlights GAO's recent findings related to the use of strategic sourcing across government, best practices leading companies are adopting to increase savings when acquiring services, and recent actions that could facilitate greater use of strategic sourcing. GAO's testimony is based largely on GAO's September 2012 report on strategic sourcing and GAO's April 2013 report on leading practices for acquiring services, as well as other GAO reports on contracting and acquisition.
What GAO Found
Most of the agencies GAO reviewed for its September 2012 report leveraged a fraction of their buying power. More specifically, in fiscal year 2011, the Departments of Defense (DOD), Homeland Security, Energy, and Veterans Affairs (VA) accounted for 80 percent of the $537 billion in federal procurement spending, but reported managing about 5 percent of that spending, or $25.8 billion, through strategic sourcing efforts. Similarly, GAO found that the Federal Strategic Sourcing Initiative had only managed a small amount of spending through its four government-wide strategic sourcing initiatives in fiscal year 2011, although it reported achieving significant savings on those efforts. Further, we found that most selected agencies' efforts did not address their highest spending areas, such as services, which may provide opportunities for significant savings.
Companies' keen analysis of spending is key to their savings, coupled with central management and knowledge sharing about the services they buy. Their analysis of spending patterns comprises two essential variables: the complexity of the service and the number of suppliers for that service. Knowing these variables for any given service, companies tailor their tactics to fit the situation, and do not treat all services the same. Leading companies generally agreed that foundational principles--maintaining spend visibility, centralizing procurement, developing category strategies, focusing on total cost of ownership, and regularly reviewing strategies and tactics--are all important to achieving successful services acquisition outcomes. Taken together, these principles enable companies to better identify and share information on spending and increase market knowledge about suppliers to gain situational awareness of their procurement environment and make more informed contracting decisions. Like the federal government, leading companies have experienced growth in spending on services, and over the last 5 to 7 years have been examining ways to better manage spending. Officials from seven leading companies GAO spoke with reported saving 4 to 15 percent over prior year spending through strategically sourcing the full range of services they buy, including those very similar to what the federal government buys--for example, facilities management, engineering, and information technology.
Agencies have not fully adopted a strategic sourcing approach but some have actions under way. For example, in April 2013, DOD was assessing the need for additional resources to support strategic sourcing efforts, and noted a more focused targeting of top procurement spending categories for supplies, equipment, and services. VA reported that it had taken steps to better measure spending through strategic sourcing contracts and was in the process of reviewing business cases for new strategic sourcing initiatives. In 2012, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) released a Cross-Agency Priority Goal Statement, which called for agencies to strategically source at least two new products or services in both 2013 and 2014 that yield at least 10 percent savings. In December 2012, OMB further directed agencies to reinforce senior leadership commitment by designating an official responsible for coordinating the agency's strategic sourcing activities. In addition, OMB identified agencies that should take a leadership role on strategic sourcing. OMB directed these agencies to promote strategic sourcing practices inside their agencies by taking actions including collecting data on procurement spending.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making any new recommendations in this testimony. GAO has made recommendations to OMB, DOD, VA, and other agencies on key aspects of strategic sourcing and acquisition of products and services in the past. These recommendations addressed such matters as setting goals and establishing metrics. OMB and the agencies concurred with the recommendations, and are in the process of implementing them. |
gao_GAO-04-984 | gao_GAO-04-984_0 | For example, since our 2003 report, all of the seven critical organizations we reviewed reduced risks by adding physical barriers around their facilities, enhancing protection from hackers, or establishing geographically diverse backup facilities. Critical Organizations Improved Their Ability to Recover from Disruptions, but Some Faced Limitations That Increased Risks
All the critical organizations had also further increased their ability to recover from attacks or other disasters since our 2003 report, but some still had limitations in their business continuity capabilities that increased their risk of disruption. The organizations also took actions to identify and mitigate their respective risks. For example, to address the potential for a region-wide disruption in New York City, one firm was developing a geographically diverse backup center. However, four of these firms were at greater risk of a disruption to their trading operations than other firms because of the concentration of key trading staff in a single location at the same time. New Private Telecommunications Network Created for Financial Market Participants
Responding to the challenges of maintaining diversity, one financial market participant has acted to improve the resiliency of the telecommunications services supporting the financial industry. SEC Has Not Fully Analyzed Capabilities of Trading Firms to Resume Operations
Although the actions securities and banking regulators have taken will likely improve the preparedness of the securities markets to withstand future disruptions, SEC has not conducted the comprehensive assessments that would allow it to better ensure that trading in the securities markets could promptly resume following a wide-scale disaster. Although SEC had taken some steps to assess broker-dealer readiness, it had not done a systematic analysis to determine whether sufficient numbers of firms would be capable of resuming trading within regulators’ current expectations. SEC staff also said that a recent reorganization within its Division of Market Regulation also improved program effectiveness. Conclusions
The securities market organizations we reviewed all had reduced the risk that their operations would be disrupted by terrorist attacks or other disasters. However, as of May 2004, a number of the critical financial market organizations and the broker-dealers and banks that conduct significant trading activities remained at a greater risk of disruption than others from a wide-scale event because they lacked certain business continuity capabilities. Nevertheless, SEC has not fully assessed whether or not sufficient numbers of firms with staff capable of trading securities would to be ready to operate after a wide-scale disaster. Such steps would include assessing whether the placement of the program within SEC’s organizational structure is optimal for ensuring that it has adequate resources and staff expertise. In addition, to improve the effectiveness of SEC’s ARP program, which oversees preparedness of securities trading and clearing organizations for future disasters, we recommend that the Chairman, SEC, take the following three steps to enhance the ARP program’s effectiveness: Establish a definite time frame for the submission of a rule requiring exchanges and clearing organizations to engage in activities consistent with the operational practices and other tenets of the ARP program; Assess the adequacy of ARP staffing in terms of positions and technical skill levels, including information security expertise, given its mission and workload; and Continue to assess the organizational alignment of the ARP program within SEC. Specifically, we assessed (1) actions that critical securities market organizations and key market participants undertook to reduce their vulnerabilities to physical or electronic attacks and to improve their business continuity capabilities; (2) steps that financial market participants, telecommunications industry organizations, and others took to improve the resiliency of telecommunications systems and infrastructure; (3) financial regulators’ efforts to ensure the resiliency of the financial markets; and (4) the progress the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has made in improving its Automation Review Policy program, which oversees security and operations issues at exchanges, clearing organizations, and electronic communications networks (ECN). Potential Terrorist Attacks: Additional Actions Needed to Better Prepare Critical Financial Market Participants. | Why GAO Did This Study
In February 2003 reports, GAO identified actions needed to better prepare critical financial market participants for wide-scale disasters, such as terrorist attacks. To determine progress made since then, GAO assessed (1) actions that critical securities market organizations took to improve their ability to prevent and recover from disruptions, (2) actions that financial market and telecommunications industry participants took to improve telecommunications resiliency, (3) financial regulators' efforts to ensure the resiliency of the financial markets; and (4) SEC's efforts to improve its program for overseeing operations risks at certain market participants.
What GAO Found
The critical securities market organizations and market participants GAO reviewed had taken actions, since GAO's previous reports, to further reduce the risk that their operations would be disrupted by terrorist attacks or other disasters. For example, they had added physical barriers, enhanced protection from hackers, or established geographically diverse backup facilities. Still, some entities had limitations that increased the risk that a wide-scale disaster could disrupt their operations and, in turn, the ability of securities markets to operate. For example, three organizations were at a greater risk of disruption than others because of the proximity of their primary and backup facilities. In addition, four of the eight large trading firms GAO reviewed had all of their critical trading staff in single locations, putting them at greater risk than others of a single event incapacitating their trading operations. Geographic concentration of these firms could leave the markets without adequate liquidity for fair and efficient trading in a potential disaster. Since GAO last reported, actions were taken to improve the resiliency of the telecommunications service critical to the markets, including creating a private network for routing data between broker-dealers and various markets. Maintaining telecommunications redundancy and diversity over time will remain a challenge. Financial market regulators also took steps that should reduce the potential that future disasters would disrupt the financial markets, such as issuing business continuity guidelines for financial market participants designed to reopen trading markets the next business day after a disruption. However, despite the risk posed by the concentration of broker-dealers' trading staffs, and the lack of regulations requiring broker-dealers' to be prepared to operate following a wide-scale disruption, SEC had not fully analyzed the extent to which these organizations would be able to resume trading following such a disruption. Furthermore, while SEC has made some improvements to the voluntary program it uses to oversee the information security and business continuity at certain critical organizations, it has not taken steps to address key long-standing limitations. Despite past difficulties obtaining cooperation with recommendations and a lack of resources to conduct more frequent inspections, SEC had not proposed a rule making this program mandatory or increased the level of the program's resources--as GAO has previously recommended. In addition, SEC appeared to lack sufficient staff with expertise to ensure that the organizations in the program adequately addressed the issues identified in internal or external reviews, or to identify other important opportunities for improvement. Although SEC staff continue to assess the impact of a recent reorganization involving the programs staff, whether the current placement of the program within SEC is adequate for ensuring that the program receives sufficient resources is not yet clear. |
gao_GAO-10-548 | gao_GAO-10-548_0 | RMA provides its annual list to the appropriate FSA state offices for distribution to FSA county offices, as well as to the insurance company selling the policy to the farmer. Provisions under the Supplemental Revenue Assistance Payments Program
The 2008 farm bill authorized and funded a new disaster program for losses in crop years 2008 through 2011. FSA Largely Based Crop Disaster Payments on RMA Data, Resulting in About $395 Million to Farmers RMA Identified as Having Received Suspicious Crop Insurance Payments
FSA largely used RMA crop insurance payment data to calculate nearly $7 billion in crop disaster payments under the three crop disaster programs from 2001 through 2007. Crop Disaster Programs Resulted in Payments to Farmers RMA Identified as Having Received Suspicious Crop Insurance Payments
Of the nearly $7 billion in payments made under the 2001 through 2007 crop disaster assistance programs, we found that FSA made about $395 million in crop disaster payments to farmers or entities that were identified by RMA’s data mining as having received suspicious crop insurance claims payments during that same period of time. However, in a 2005 report, we found that few suspicious claims payments resulted in a conviction for fraud. According to Department of Justice officials, the factors considered when accepting a case include sufficiency of the evidence, complexity of the case, whether the fraudulent activity is part of a pattern or scheme, and workload and resources that would be needed to investigate and prosecute the case. First, under the past programs, FSA county officials could not verify the cause of a crop loss because of the lag—as much as 4 years—between the occurrence of a disaster-related crop loss and the application for a disaster payment for that loss. Under the new program, FSA officials will still face a lag time, and without more timely eligibility determinations, FSA county officials will be unable to verify that applicants experienced losses due to an eligible cause. Second, the lack of documentation in FSA’s data systems for calculating and issuing payments under the ad hoc programs makes it difficult to validate the accuracy of those payments. A similar lack of documentation under the new program could hamper FSA officials’ efforts to track payments and ensure the payments adhere to statutes, regulations, and FSA guidelines. Conclusions
FSA helps the nation’s farmers recover financially from natural disasters. First, USDA disagreed with our statement that FSA officials did not provide systems documentation, such as specifications and business rules on how FSA used data in its systems to calculate crop disaster payments. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine (1) how the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) Farm Service Agency (FSA) administered its crop disaster programs for losses from 2001 through 2007 and the results of payments under these programs and (2) what lessons FSA can learn from its experience with the previous crop disaster programs for managing its new crop disaster program. To assess the reliability of these data, we obtained and reviewed the available documentation about the data elements in the data files; performed electronic testing on the data elements that we used; reconciled the two sources of crop disaster program payment data— Producer Payment Reporting System and crop disaster program payment history records—by matching common data elements including FSA state code, FSA county code, and tax identification number; worked with FSA Application Development Center staff to determine how to merge all of the data files because FSA did not have written business rules or overall system documentation; discussed our results from merging these data files with officials in FSA’s Production, Emergency, and Compliance Division and in FSA’s Application Development Center, which administers and oversees the crop disaster program payments; and compared the results of merging all data files to FSA county office hard copy payment records that contain the calculations for the statutory payment cap. Therefore, the reliability of FSA’s electronic data files for the purpose of assessing whether a crop disaster payment complied with a statutory cap is undetermined. 8. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) Farm Service Agency (FSA) provides programs to help farmers recover financially from natural disasters. Congress has historically supplemented these programs with ad hoc programs that pay farmers who experienced crop losses. The 2008 farm bill established a program through 2011 to pay farmers who lose crops. To receive these payments, farmers must purchase coverage under federal crop insurance or the Noninsured Crop Disaster Assistance Program, and receive claims payments for losses. GAO was asked to evaluate (1) how FSA administered the crop disaster programs for losses from 2001 through 2007 and the results of payments under these programs and (2) what lessons FSA can learn from the previous crop disaster programs to manage its new crop disaster program. GAO reviewed statutes, regulations, and guidance; analyzed USDA data; and interviewed USDA officials.
What GAO Found
FSA largely used crop insurance data from USDA's Risk Management Agency (RMA) to calculate nearly $7 billion in crop disaster payments under the 2001 through 2007 ad hoc crop disaster programs. FSA made about $395 million in payments under these programs to 8,463 farmers who RMA identified as having received suspicious crop insurance claims payments in those same years. Almost half of crop disaster payments for farmers RMA identified as having suspicious crop insurance claims payments were in five states. RMA provides its annual list of suspicious claims payments to FSA state and county offices and to the insurance company selling the policy to the farmer for appropriate follow-up action. However, GAO previously reported that few suspicious claims payments resulted in a conviction for fraud. As reported, the factors considered when accepting a case for investigation and prosecution include sufficiency of the evidence, complexity of the case, whether the fraudulent activity is part of a pattern or scheme, and workload and resources that would be needed to investigate and prosecute the case. For 2001 through 2007, GAO could not use FSA's electronic data files to determine whether crop disaster payments complied with a statutory cap because the reliability of these files is undetermined for the purpose of assessing whether a crop disaster payment was in compliance with the cap. However, in using hard copy files to determine compliance with the cap, GAO found that payments to selected farmers were in compliance. Furthermore, FSA officials did not provide systems documentation, such as specifications and business rules on how FSA used data in its systems to calculate crop disaster payments. FSA's experience with ad hoc crop disaster programs shows that a lag--as much as 4 years--between the occurrence of a disaster-related crop loss and the application for a disaster payment for that loss prevented FSA county officials from verifying the cause of the loss. Under the new program, there will still be a lag before farmers can apply for a payment; in contrast, farmers have to file a crop insurance claim immediately after a loss and be subject to insurance verification. Without more timely eligibility determinations for the new crop disaster program, FSA county officials will be unable to verify that applicants experienced losses due to an eligible cause. In addition, insufficient documentation of the data systems FSA used for calculating and issuing payments under the ad hoc programs makes it difficult to validate the accuracy of those payments. A similar lack of documentation under the new program could hamper FSA officials' efforts to track payments and ensure the payments adhere to statutes, regulations, and FSA guidelines. |
gao_GAO-08-1095 | gao_GAO-08-1095_0 | Consistent with multilateral export controls, the U.S. government classifies semiconductor manufacturing equipment and materials as dual-use items because they have both commercial and military uses. China’s Semiconductor Manufacturing Capability Has Steadily Advanced
Since 2002, China’s ability to produce commercial semiconductors has steadily advanced but remains approximately one generation behind the United States. As of July 2008, China’s most advanced semiconductor manufacturing company can produce integrated circuits with a feature size of 65 nanometers, compared with U.S. companies that are producing semiconductors with 45-nanometer feature sizes. However, China has begun developing an indigenous capacity to build some types of advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment, which may enable it to reduce its dependence on some foreign-sourced equipment. Since 2002, commercial state-of-the-art production has continued to advance. The United States also lacks a domestic source of state-of-the-art lithography equipment. The VEU Program Allows Export of Some Semiconductor Equipment and Materials to China without a License
The VEU program, announced by Commerce in June 2007, marks a shift to a more end-user-based system of export controls for semiconductor equipment and materials by allowing the export of some items to China without a license. Moreover, Commerce has not reached a VEU-specific agreement with the Chinese government for conducting on- site reviews of validated end-users, a key mechanism for ensuring program compliance. Instead, as a stopgap measure, Commerce is attempting to conduct VEU on-site reviews under a 2004 agreement. Challenges with VEU Implementation May Limit Commerce’s Ability to Conduct On-site Reviews
Commerce may not be able to ensure that semiconductor equipment and materials exported to China are used as intended because it has not negotiated a VEU-specific agreement with the Chinese government for conducting on-site reviews under the VEU program and lacks specific procedures for carrying out these reviews. However, to conduct on-site reviews under the 2004 agreement, Commerce relies on the voluntary compliance of validated end-users to obtain End-User Statements from the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, as this requirement was not included in the regulations establishing the VEU program. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report discusses the (1) evolution of China’s semiconductor manufacturing capabilities since 2002, (2) changes to U.S. export control policies over the sale of semiconductor manufacturing equipment and materials to China since 2002, and (3) the advantages and limitations of these changes to U.S. export controls. In addition, we visited three companies—Applied Materials China, Hua Hong NEC, and Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation—that are involved in manufacturing semiconductors in China and have received semiconductor manufacturing equipment and materials from U.S. exporters under export licenses and the Validated End-User authorization. | Why GAO Did This Study
Semiconductors are key components in weapons systems and consumer electronics. Since semiconductors have both civilian and military applications, U.S. export control policy treats the equipment and materials used to manufacture semiconductors as "dual-use" items, and controls the export of these items through licensing requirements to sensitive destinations such as China. You requested that we update our 2002 report on China's semiconductor manufacturing capabilities to address the (1) evolution of China's capabilities since 2002, (2) changes to U.S. export control policies over the sale of semiconductor manufacturing equipment and materials to China since 2002, and (3) the advantages and limitations of these changes.
What GAO Found
The gap between U.S. and Chinese commercial semiconductor manufacturing capabilities, as measured by the feature size of the semiconductors produced, rapidly narrowed between 1994 and 2002. Since 2002, China's semiconductor manufacturing capabilities have continued to advance but remain one generation behind state-of-the-art semiconductors produced in the United States. China's most advanced semiconductor manufacturing companies continue to rely on equipment and materials from the United States, Europe, and Japan to improve their manufacturing capabilities. However, China has developed an indigenous capacity to build some types of advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment, which may soon provide companies in China with a domestic source of equipment capable of producing semiconductors that are close to state of the art. Since 2002, U.S. export control policies over semiconductor equipment and materials to China have become more "end-user" focused, with the introduction of the Validated End-User (VEU) program, a parallel licensing framework that allows select pre-screened Chinese end-users to receive controlled items, including some semiconductor equipment and materials, without a license. The Department of Commerce anticipated that the VEU program would facilitate trade to China and enhance U.S. security; however, challenges with program implementation may limit Commerce's ability to ensure items are being used as intended. Specifically, Commerce has not reached a VEU-specific agreement with the Chinese government for conducting on-site reviews of validated end-users, a mechanism cited by Commerce as critical for ensuring program compliance. Instead, as a stopgap measure, Commerce is attempting to conduct VEU on-site reviews under a 2004 agreement. In addition, Commerce lacks procedures for conducting on-site reviews, though the validated end-user program was introduced in June 2007. |
gao_GAO-04-269T | gao_GAO-04-269T_0 | Farmer Mac securitizes mortgages and issues AMBS and, like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, guarantees the timely payment of interest and principal on these securities. The GSEs’ financial obligations were $4.4 trillion as of September 30, 2003. The GSEs Should Lead by Example in Terms of Corporate Governance and Accountability
Not only should GSEs be sensitive to good governance but it is all the more important they lead by example in connection with accountability, integrity, and public trust. Measures Must Be Established to Help Ensure That the GSEs’ Benefits Outweigh the Financial Risks That Their Activities Pose to Taxpayers
Without clearly defined measures of the GSEs’ benefits, it is not possible for Congress, accountability organizations, and the public to determine whether the federal government should be subject to the financial risks associated with the GSEs’ activities. While there is some positive information to report about the GSEs, there are also weaknesses in the areas of corporate governance, regulatory oversight, and mission compliance reporting. OFHEO, in its special examination of Freddie Mac (OFHEO report), recommended that Freddie Mac should separate the functions of the CEO and the board chairman to improve the effectiveness of the board of directors and Freddie Mac has agreed to do so. In the area of compensation, there are indications that the structure of executive compensation arrangements and the process of determining compensation levels at the GSEs are not in line with best practices for corporate governance. Housing GSE Regulatory Structure Does Not Ensure Effective Oversight
Unfortunately, the current housing GSE regulatory structure is fragmented, which limits the federal government’s ability to oversee the GSE’s activities. Congress should also ensure that the new GSE regulator has the authorities necessary to carry out its critical responsibilities. FHFB serves as the safety and soundness and mission regulator of the FHLBanks. As I stated previously, a single GSE regulator offers many advantages over the fragmented structure that exists today including prominence in government, the sharing of technical expertise, and the ability to assess trade-offs between safety and soundness considerations and certain mission compliance activities. Furthermore, it is generally agreed that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s mortgage purchase activities have lowered the interest rates on qualifying mortgages below what they otherwise would be. The following are some examples that we have identified: There is limited information as to the extent to which the FHLBank System’s more than $500 billion in outstanding advances, as of mid- year 2003, have facilitated mortgage availability. In summary, I believe that the following steps can be taken to strengthen GSE governance and oversight: Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac should ensure that their executives report to independent boards; FHLBank directors should be chosen through transparent and inclusive processes; and GSE compensation packages should include short and long-term performance measures; Congress should create a single housing GSE regulator that is governed by a board or a hybrid board and director and has adequate authorities to fulfill its safety and soundness and mission compliance oversight responsibilities; and Congress should provide clearer direction to the GSEs in fulfilling their missions—such as in the case of the GSEs’ nonmortgage investments— and the GSEs, the new GSE regulator, and FCA should research certain aspects of the GSEs’ financial activities and periodically report to the public as to how these activities are consistent with mission requirements. Government-Sponsored Enterprises: Development of the Federal Housing Enterprise Financial Regulator. Farm Credit System: Repayment of Federal Assistance and Competitive Position. | Why GAO Did This Study
Congress established government sponsored enterprises (GSE)-- such as Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, the FHLBank System, and the Farm Credit System--to facilitate the development of mortgage and agricultural lending in the United States. Although the federal government does not explicitly guarantee the GSEs' approximately $4.4 trillion in financial obligations, the potential exists that the government would provide financial assistance in an emergency as it has done in the past. Recent financial reporting problems at Freddie Mac have raised concerns about the quality of the GSEs' corporate governance and regulatory oversight. To assist Congress in reviewing the adequacy of GSE oversight, this testimony provides information on GSE corporate governance, regulatory oversight, and mission compliance measures.
What GAO Found
GSEs should lead by example in connection with governance, accountability, integrity, and public trust issues. GSEs should strive to achieve model corporate governance structure, provide reasonable transparency of financial and performance activities, and adopt compensation arrangements that focus on both long-term and short-term results. However, GSE corporate governance has not always reflected best practices. For example, currently, the Chief Executive Officers (CEO) of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae also serve as the chairmen of their respective GSE boards, which is not consistent with model governance standards that call for officers to work for an independent board. GAO notes that as part of its regulatory agreement, Freddie Mac has agreed to separate the position of CEO and the position of chairman within a reasonable period of time. However, Fannie Mae has yet to take this step. With respect to compensation arrangements, Freddie Mac's focus on short-term financial results as performance targets appears to have contributed to the GSE's recent financial reporting problems. GSE regulators must be capable, credible, strong, and independent. However, the regulatory structure for the housing GSEs--Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the FHLBank System--is fragmented with safety and soundness and mission oversight responsibilities divided among three regulators. A single housing GSE regulator offers many advantages over this fragmented structure including prominence in government, the sharing of technical expertise, and the ability to assess trade-offs between safety and soundness considerations and certain mission compliance activities, such as affordable housing initiatives. Although there are advantages of a single director model for the new housing GSE regulator, GAO believes on balance that a board or a hybrid board and director might make the most sense to oversee the GSEs' safety and soundness and mission oversight. To be effective, the single GSE regulator must also have all the regulatory oversight and enforcement powers necessary to carry out its critical responsibilities. Because of a lack of clear measures, it is difficult for Congress, accountability organizations, and the public to determine whether the benefits provided by the GSEs' activities are in the public interest and outweigh their financial risks. Available evidence and data indicate that the housing GSEs have made, in some cases, progress in benefiting homebuyers. For example, it is generally agreed that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac's activities have lowered mortgage interest rates, although there is debate over the degree of these benefits. However, it is not clear that the housing GSEs' large holdings of mortgage-backed securities benefit borrowers. There is also limited information as to the extent to which the FHLBank System's more than $500 billion in outstanding loans to financial institutions have facilitated mortgage lending. |
gao_GAO-05-719 | gao_GAO-05-719_0 | Alaska Native Villages and Regional Native Nonprofits Received Over $3 Billion in Funding from Multiple Federal Agencies, with HHS the Largest Single Provider of Funding
Based on our analysis of information from FAADS, 17 federal agencies provided about $3.5 billion in federal funding to Alaska Native villages and regional Native nonprofits—ANCSA regional nonprofits, regional health nonprofits, and regional housing authorities—from 1998 through 2003. For example, only 13 out of 216 Native villages received 38 percent of total federal funding to Native villages. Specifically, funds from these programs were used to provide Alaska Natives with assistance in health care, housing, infrastructure, and other areas such as education and community development. The extent of readily available information on how funds from these programs were used varied, partly because of different reporting requirements and partly due to different efforts to summarize individual grantee data. HHS’s Indian Health Service (IHS) awards self-governance funding to 13 regional Native health care nonprofits, three Native villages, one statewide Native health care provider, and four groups of between two and seven Alaska Native villages, to provide health care services to Alaska Natives. For example, in 2003, the Alaska Native Tribal Health Consortium used a total of $2.7 million from the commission’s health facilities program to build a health clinic in Toksook Bay (the location of the Nunakauyarmiut Tribe). Alaska Native Villages and Regional Housing Authorities Constructed More Than 800 and Rehabilitated Almost 3,000 Homes, and the Number and Costs of Completed Units Varied across Regions
Results from our survey of Alaska Native villages and regional housing authorities indicated that, from calendar years 1998 through 2003, these entities constructed 874 single-family units and rehabilitated 2,990 single- family units. Regional housing authorities’ average cost for all units constructed was $236,229 per unit or $189 per square foot, compared with villages, which had an average cost per unit of $180,338 or $160 per square foot. Several Factors May Account for Differences in the Number and Cost of Units Constructed and Rehabilitated by Villages and Housing Authorities and by Region
As previously discussed, the number of units constructed and rehabilitated over the period varied by whether they were completed by villages or housing authorities, and by region. According to federal and tribal officials and documentation, the following factors could account for these differences: Differences in housing goals and objectives. Scope and Methodology
This study’s objectives were to (1) provide information on the amount of federal assistance to Alaska Native villages during federal fiscal years 1998 through 2003; (2) describe how selected federal funds have been used to assist Alaska Native villages; and (3) provide data on the number and average cost of houses built by villages and Alaska Native regional housing authorities. Also, GAO’s FAADS analyses uses constant 2003 dollars. The State of Alaska Passed Through Federal Funding to Native Villages, Regional Native Nonprofits, Cities, and Boroughs
Based on our analysis of data from the state of Alaska, the state passed through more than $105 million in federal funds to Alaska Native villages and regional Native nonprofits for state fiscal years 1998 through 2003. Program Summary for the Department of Health and Human Services
Subagency: Indian Health Service. Program name: Indian Housing Block Grant. assistance! 1. 6. | Why GAO Did This Study
This report responds to section 112, Division B, of the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2004, which directs GAO to review federal programs benefiting rural communities in Alaska. After discussions with congressional staff, GAO agreed to examine federal programs benefiting Alaska Native villages. Specifically, this report (1) provides information on the amount of federal assistance provided to Alaska Native villages during fiscal years 1998 through 2003, (2) describes how selected federal funds have been used to assist Alaska Native villages, and (3) provides data on the number and average cost of houses built by villages and Alaska Native regional housing authorities.
What GAO Found
GAO's analysis of available data indicates that Alaska Native villages and regional Native nonprofits--including Native associations, and regional health and housing nonprofits--received over $3 billion in federal assistance from fiscal years 1998 through 2003. Specifically, total federal funding included approximately $483 million to 216 Alaska Native villages and about $3 billion to 33 regional Native nonprofits. The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) accounted for 63 percent of all funding over the period. According to federal and state officials, Alaska Native villages also likely benefited from federal funding to the state of Alaska and to cities and boroughs that contain villages, such as when federal funding is used by municipalities to provide water services. Based on data GAO obtained from the state of Alaska, during fiscal years 1998 through 2003, the state passed through more than $105 million in federal funding to Native villages and regional Native nonprofits. Based on available information for 13 programs GAO reviewed, federal funding was used to provide Alaska Natives with assistance in health care, housing, infrastructure, and other areas. For example, according to information from HHS, its Tribal Self-Governance Program was used by 13 regional Native nonprofits, three Native villages, four groups of Alaska Native villages, and one statewide Native health care provider to provide clinical services at tribally run hospitals and health clinics that had over 1 million total visits throughout Alaska in 2002. Another program, HUD's Indian Housing Block Grant, provided funds used by villages and regional housing authorities to build, rehabilitate, modernize, and operate single-family homes and multifamily housing properties. However, the extent of readily available information on how funds were used from the 13 programs GAO reviewed varied, in part due to different agency reporting requirements. Results from GAO's survey of Alaska Native villages and regional housing authorities indicated that, during calendar years 1998 through 2003, responding entities constructed a total of 874 single-family units. GAO's survey indicated that the average cost of units constructed by responding entities varied by region and by whether they were developed by villages or housing authorities. For example, the 6-year average regional cost (in 2003 dollars) of all units constructed ranged from a low of $138,944 per unit, or $122 per square foot, to a high of $305,634 per unit, or $267 per square foot. GAO also found that the cost of new housing units developed by housing authorities was slightly higher than units developed by Native villages, and that regional housing authorities constructed more than three times the number of units compared with villages. However, various factors could account for differences in the cost and number of units completed among regions or between villages and regional housing authorities. |
gao_GAO-08-97T | gao_GAO-08-97T_0 | Sarasota County Used ES&S Voting Systems in 2006 General Elections
In the 2006 general election, Sarasota County used voting systems manufactured by ES&S. Sarasota County used iVotronic DREs for early and election day voting. 2). 3). 4). Analysis of Election Data Shows that Undervote Was Distributed across All Machines and Precincts
Our analysis of the 2006 general election data from Sarasota County does not identify any particular voting machines or machine characteristics that could have caused the large undervote in Florida’s 13th Congressional District race. The undervotes in Sarasota County for the congressional race were generally distributed across all machines and precincts. Prior Tests and Reviews Provide Some Assurance, but Do Not Provide Reasonable Assurance That the iVotronic DREs Did Not Contribute to the Undervote
Prior to the elections, Sarasota County’s voting systems were subjected to several different tests that included testing by the manufacturer, certification testing by the Florida Division of Elections, testing by independent testing authorities, and logic and accuracy testing by Sarasota County’s Supervisor of Elections. Reasonable Assurance of Some Voting System Objectives Has Been Achieved
The Unity election management system and the iVotronic DREs are the major voting system components that may require testing to determine whether they contributed to the large undervote in Sarasota County. Further Tests Could Provide Increased but Not Absolute Assurance That the iVotronic DREs Used in the Election Did Not Cause the Undervote
On the basis of our analysis of all prior test and audit activities, we propose that a firmware verification test, a ballot test, and a calibration test be conducted to try to obtain increased assurance that the iVotronic DREs used in Sarasota County during the 2006 general election did not cause the undervote. We propose that the firmware verification testing be started first, once the necessary arrangements have been made, such as access to the needed machines and the development of test protocols and detailed test procedures. We propose drawing a representative sample from all the iVotronic DREs that recorded votes in the general election. We would test 112 ways to select a candidate on the early voting machine. Assuming that (1) reasonable assurance is obtained that all iVotronic DREs used during the election were using the same certified firmware, and (2) we found no failures during the ballot testing, this testing would provide increased assurance that the iVotronic DREs used during the election, both in early voting and in election day voting, were able to accurately record and count ballots when using any of the 112 ways to select a candidate in the Florida-13 race. Deliberately Miscalibrate an iVotronic DRE to Understand the Effect on the Undervote
Because little is known about the effect of a miscalibrated machine on the behavior of an iVotronic DRE, we propose to deliberately miscalibrate an iVotronic DREs and verify the functioning of the machine. Several Matters Remain to Be Addressed to Conduct Further Testing
Should the task force ask us to conduct the proposed testing, we want to make the task force aware of several other matters that would need to be addressed before we could begin testing. First, we would need to gain access to iVotronic DREs that have been subject to a sequestration order in the state court system of Florida. Sarasota County Supervisor of Elections has indicated that we can use its warehouse space, but because of upcoming elections in November and January, the only time the election officials would be able to provide us this space and the necessary support is between November 26 and December 7, 2007. We found that the prior reviews of Sarasota County’s 2006 general election have provided valuable information about the voting systems. By successfully conducting the proposed tests, we could reduce the possibility that the iVotronic DREs were the cause of the undervote and shift attention to the possibilities that the undervote was the result of intentional actions by the voter or voters that did not properly cast their votes on the voting system. We disagree that the collective results of testing already conducted on the Sarasota County voting systems adequately demonstrate that the voting systems could not have contributed to the undervote in the Florida-13 race. However, the focus of our review, as agreed with the task force, was to review whether the voting systems could have contributed to the large undervote. | Why GAO Did This Study
In November 2006, about 18,000 undervotes were reported in Sarasota County in the race for Florida's 13th Congressional District (FL-13). After the contesting of the election results in the House of Representatives, the task force unanimously voted to seek GAO's assistance in determining whether the voting systems contributed to the large undervote in Sarasota County. GAO agreed with the task force on an engagement plan, including the following review objectives: (1) What voting systems were used in Sarasota County and what processes governed their use? (2) What was the scope of the undervote in Sarasota County in the general election? (3) What tests were conducted on the voting systems in Sarasota County prior to the general election and what were the results of those tests? (4) Considering the voting systems tests conducted after the general election, are additional tests needed to determine whether the voting systems contributed to the undervote? To conduct its work, GAO met with officials from the State of Florida, Sarasota County, and Election Systems and Software (ES&S)--the voting systems manufacturer--and reviewed voting systems test documentation. GAO analyzed election data to characterize the undervote. On the basis of its assessments of prior testing and other activities, GAO identified potential additional tests for the Sarasota County voting systems.
What GAO Found
In the 2006 general election, Sarasota County used voting systems manufactured by ES&S, specifically iVotronic direct recording electronic (DRE) voting systems during early and election day voting and the Unity election management system, which handles the election administration functions, such as ballot design and election reporting. GAO's analysis of the 2006 general election data from Sarasota County did not identify any particular voting machines or machine characteristics that could have caused the large undervote in the FL-13 race. The undervotes in Sarasota County were generally distributed across all machines and precincts. GAO's analysis found that some of the prior tests and reviews conducted by the State of Florida and Sarasota County provide assurance that certain components of the voting systems in Sarasota County functioned correctly, but they are not enough to provide reasonable assurance that the iVotronic DREs did not contribute to the undervote. Specifically, GAO found that assurance is lacking in three areas, and proposes that tests be conducted to address those areas. First, because there is insufficient assurance that the firmware in all the iVotronic DREs used in the election matched the certified version held by the Florida Division of Elections, GAO proposes that a firmware verification test be conducted on a representative sample of 115 (of the 1,499) machines that were used in the general election. Second, because an insufficient number of ways to select a candidate in the FL-13 race were tested, GAO proposes that a test be conducted to verify all 112 ways that GAO identified to select a candidate. Third, because no prior tests were identified that address the effect of a miscalibrated iVotronic DRE on the undervote, GAO proposes that an iVotronic DRE be deliberately miscalibrated to verify the accurate recording of ballots under these conditions. GAO expects these three tests would take 2 weeks, once the necessary arrangements are made. Should the task force ask GAO to conduct the proposed tests, several matters would need to be addressed before testing could begin, including obtaining access to the iVotronic DREs that have been subject to a sequestration order, arranging for a test site, obtaining some commercially available test tools, developing test protocols and detailed test procedures, and arranging for the video recording of the tests. Sarasota County election officials have indicated that they can help GAO access the machines and provide a test site between November 26 and December 7, 2007. Although the proposed tests could help provide increased assurance, they would not provide absolute assurance that the iVotronic DREs did not cause the large undervote in Sarasota County. The successful conduct of the proposed tests could reduce the possibility that the voting systems caused the undervote and shift attention to the possibilities that the undervote was the result of intentional actions by voters or voters that did not properly cast their votes on the voting system. |
gao_GAO-16-762T | gao_GAO-16-762T_0 | However, a number of VA’s systems are old. VA concurred with our recommendation and stated that it is planning to retire PAID and BDN in 2017 and 2018, respectively. IT Challenges Contributed to Designation of VA Health Care as High Risk
In February 2015, we designated VA health care as a high-risk area. Among the five broad areas contributing to our determination was the department’s IT challenges. Of particular concern was the failed modernization of a system, suspended development of another system, and the extent of system interoperability—the ability to exchange information—with DOD, which present risks to the timeliness, quality, and safety of VA health care. We have reported on the department’s failed attempts to modernize its outpatient appointment scheduling system, which is about 30 years old. Additionally, we reported in February 2014 that VA and DOD lacked electronic health record systems that permit the efficient electronic exchange of patient health information as military service members transition from DOD to VA health care systems. VA and DOD agreed with our prior recommendations and stated that initial comparison indicated that the current approach would be more cost effective. Recent Evaluations Have Identified Additional IT Challenges
To further highlight the department’s IT challenges, our most recent report in August 2015 on VA’s efforts to achieve electronic health record interoperability with DOD noted that the departments have engaged in several near-term efforts focused on expanding interoperability between their existing electronic health record systems. In addition, VA and DOD have moved forward with plans to modernize their respective electronic health record systems. Nevertheless, a significant concern that we identified is that VA (and DOD) had not identified outcome-oriented goals and metrics that would more clearly define what they aim to achieve from their interoperability efforts and the value and benefits these efforts are intended to yield. Accordingly, we recommended that the departments, working with the IPO, establish a time frame for identifying outcome- oriented metrics, define related goals as a basis for determining the extent to which the departments’ modernized electronic health record systems are achieving interoperability, and update IPO guidance accordingly. VA concurred with our recommendations and has told us that it has initiated actions in response to them. Efforts to Develop and Use the Veterans Benefits Management System Can Be Improved
In September 2015, we reported that VBA had made progress in developing and implementing VBMS, its system that is to be used for processing disability benefit claims. Specifically, it had deployed the initial version of the system to all of its regional offices as of June 2013. As VA continues its efforts to complete the development and implementation of VBMS, we reported in September 2015 that three areas could benefit from increased management attention. We also found in our September 2015 report that VA had not conducted a customer satisfaction survey that would allow the department to compile data on how users view the system’s performance, and ultimately, to develop goals for improving the system. In our September 2015 report, we recommended that VA develop a plan with a time frame and a reliable cost estimate for completing VBMS, establish goals for system response time, minimize the incidence of high and medium severity system defects for future VBMS releases, assess user satisfaction, and establish satisfaction goals to promote improvement. Modernization of Health Care Claims Processing System Requires Additional Planning to Ensure Weaknesses Are Addressed
As we reported in May 2016, VA’s expenditures for its care in the community programs, the number of veterans for whom VA has purchased care, and the number of claims processed by VHA have all grown considerably in recent years. The substantial increase in utilization of VA care in the community programs poses staffing and workload challenges for VHA, which has had ongoing difficulty processing claims from community providers in a timely manner. Thus, to help provide reasonable assurance that VHA achieves its long-term goal of modernizing its claims processing system, we recommended in May 2016 that the Secretary of Veterans Affairs direct the Under Secretary for Health to ensure that the agency develops a sound written plan that includes: a detailed schedule for when VHA intends to complete development and implementation of each major aspect of its new claims processing system; the estimated costs for implementing each major aspect of the system; and the performance goals, measures, and interim milestones that VHA will use to evaluate progress, hold staff accountable for achieving desired results, and report to stakeholders the agency’s progress in modernizing its claims processing system. The department concurred with our recommendation and said that VHA plans to address the recommendation when the agency develops an implementation strategy for the future consolidation of its VA care in the community programs. In conclusion, effective IT management is critical to the performance of VA’s mission. The department faces challenges in key areas, including the development of new systems, modernization of existing systems, and increasing interoperability with DOD. | Why GAO Did This Study
VA relies on IT to meet its mission and effectively serve the nation's veterans. Over the past several years, the department has expended billions of dollars to manage and modernize its information systems. However, VA has experienced challenges in managing its IT, raising questions about the effectiveness of its IT operations. GAO has previously reported on a number of the department's IT initiatives.
This statement summarizes results from key GAO reports issued between 2010 and 2014 highlighting IT challenges that have contributed to GAO's designation of VA health care as a high risk area. It also describes additional challenges that GAO more recently identified in 2015 and 2016 that are related to increasing the electronic exchange of VA's health records with those of DOD, development and use of VBMS, and the department's modernization of its health care claims processing system.
What GAO Found
In February 2015, GAO designated Veterans Affairs (VA) health care as a high-risk area based on its concerns about the department's ability to ensure the quality and safety of veterans' health care in five broad areas, one of which was information technology (IT) challenges. Of particular concern at that time was the failed modernization of an outpatient appointment scheduling system, suspended development of a system that was to electronically store and retrieve information about surgical implants, and the extent of system interoperability—the ability to exchange information—with the Department of Defense (DOD), which present risks to the timeliness, quality, and safety of VA health care.
Subsequent to the designation of VA health care as high risk, GAO completed evaluations that identified additional IT management challenges at VA.
In August 2015, GAO reported on VA's efforts to achieve electronic health record interoperability with DOD and noted that (1) the two departments had engaged in several near-term efforts to expand interoperability and (2) VA and DOD had moved forward with plans to separately modernize their electronic health record systems. However, of significant concern was that VA (and DOD) had not identified outcome-oriented goals and metrics that would clearly define what it aims to achieve from its efforts. GAO recommended that VA develop goals and metrics, among other things. VA concurred with the recommendations and stated that it has initiated actions in response.
VA had made progress in developing and implementing its Veterans Benefits Management System (VBMS), with deployment of the initial version of the system. However, in September 2015, GAO reported that the development and implementation of the system was ongoing and noted three areas that could benefit from increased management attention: cost estimating, system availability, and system defects. The report also noted that VA had neither conducted a customer satisfaction survey nor developed goals for improving the system. GAO recommended that VA develop a plan with a time frame and a reliable cost estimate for completing VBMS, establish goals for system response time, minimize the incidences of high and medium severity system defects for future VBMS releases, assess user satisfaction, and establish satisfaction goals to promote improvement. VA agreed with the recommendations and noted steps it was taking to address them.
Due to recent increases in utilization of VA care in the community, the department has had difficulty processing claims in a timely manner. In May 2016, GAO reported that VA officials and claims processing staff indicated that IT limitations, manual processes, and staffing challenges had delayed claims processing. The department had implemented interim measures to address some of the system's challenges, but did not expect to deploy solutions to address all challenges, including those related to IT, until fiscal year 2018 or later. Further, VA did not have a sound plan for modernizing its claims processing system, which GAO recommended it develop. The department concurred with this recommendation and stated that it intended to address the recommendation through the planned consolidation of its care in the community programs.
What GAO Recommends
GAO has made numerous recommendations to VA to improve the modernization of its IT systems. Among other things, GAO has recommended that VA address challenges associated with its efforts to modernize its electronic health record system to increase interoperability with DOD, develop goals and metrics as a basis for determining the extent to which VA's and DOD's modernized electronic health records systems are achieving interoperability, address shortcomings with VBMS planning and implementation, and develop a sound written plan for deploying its modernized claims processing system. VA has concurred with these recommendations and has some actions ongoing. |
gao_GAO-08-634 | gao_GAO-08-634_0 | As such, FCI construction projects typically include a UNICOR facility that employs and provides job skills training to inmates. However, detailed project information is not provided in this status report. Project Delays Contributed to Increased Cost Estimates, and the Imprecise Nature of Estimates Was Not Communicated to Congress and Other Stakeholders
Delays in starting project construction or disruptions in available funding, which interrupted construction, contributed to increases in cost estimates due to inflation and to unexpected increases in construction material costs. Problems with Site Selection and the Availability of Funding Contributed to Project Construction Delays
According to BOP officials, all three projects experienced delays in beginning construction because of problems associated with selecting and approving the sites for the prisons as well as with the availability of funding. When BOP initially estimated the cost for this project, it expected the contract to be awarded in fiscal year 2001 and the construction to begin in fiscal year 2002. In September 2007 after it received additional funding, BOP awarded the contract to complete FCI Mendota. BOP officials told us that they do not plan to request any more funding for these projects, and that BOP will shift funds within its Buildings and Facilities Account as necessary to complete them. BOP officials stated that during the time that these projects were delayed, construction industry costs increased at a rate greater than inflation. For example, steel prices rose by about 60 percent and oil prices rose by almost 150 percent between 2003 and 2007—a time between when the initial cost estimates were prepared and when the projects were ready to proceed with construction. Cost Estimates Are Imprecise, and Congress and Other Stakeholders Were Not Informed of the Extent to Which They Might Vary
Because BOP estimates its initial project costs and requests funding early in the planning process, generally before the specific location for the prison has been selected, actual project costs can be expected to vary from the initial estimates to some extent. Although BOP, like other agencies, is not required to communicate the extent to which actual costs may be expected to vary from its estimates in budget documents or reports on project status, we have recently identified providing such information as a best practice. BOP Has Eliminated or Reduced Portions of Two Projects, and Plans to Use Its Construction Management Policies and Procedures to Control Cost and Schedule Changes
BOP eliminated or reduced portions of two projects, but did not clearly communicate these changes to Congress and other stakeholders. At FCI Mendota, BOP eliminated both the UNICOR facility and the minimum security Federal Prison Camp. Furthermore, BOP did not mention that the Federal Prison Camp had been eliminated from FCI Mendota. These officials believe that using their construction management policies and procedures will allow them to control cost increases and schedule delays. BOP officials stated that they have more ability to control costs while the project is under construction, and that for the FCI Mendota, FCI Berlin, and FCI McDowell prison projects, they plan to continue to carefully consider and approve changes after construction has begun to stay within its budget. The Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons provided written comments on this draft. We interviewed BOP construction, budget, and financial officials in Washington, D.C.
To assess the actions BOP has taken—or plans to take—to control cost increases and schedule delays on the three current construction projects, we obtained and analyzed BOP’s construction guidance and BOP’s project files for FCI Mendota, FCI Berlin, and FCI McDowell. We interviewed BOP construction, budget, and financial officials in Washington, D.C. We did not evaluate the effectiveness of BOP’s construction policies and procedures in controlling cost increases and schedule delays on these projects because although design and construction contracts were awarded, little construction had been done. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) is responsible for the custody and care of more than 201,000 federal offenders. To provide housing for the federal prison population, BOP manages the construction and maintenance of its prison facilities and oversees contract facilities. GAO was asked to look into recent increases in estimated costs for Federal Correctional Institution (FCI) construction projects located in Mendota, CA; Berlin, NH; and McDowell, WV, which have led to almost $278 million or 62 percent more being provided in funding than initially estimated. This report addresses (1) the reasons for the changes to the estimated costs and (2) the actions BOP has taken--or plans to take--to control future cost increases and delays. GAO reviewed and analyzed BOP's fiscal years 2001 to 2009 budget documents, files for these three projects, and project management guidance. GAO also reviewed government and industry guidance on project management and met with BOP officials.
What GAO Found
For these three projects, delays in starting construction or disruptions in available funding that interrupted construction contributed to increases in cost estimates due to inflation and unexpected increases in construction material costs. According to BOP officials, delays resulted from problems with selecting and approving the sites for the prisons and with the availability of funding. BOP officials stated that they expected costs to increase by the inflation rate during the delay period, but did not anticipate that market forces would cause the construction costs to increase above the inflation rate, as they did. For example, steel prices rose about 60 percent and oil prices rose by almost 170 percent between the time that BOP prepared the initial cost estimates for these projects and when construction was ready to begin. In addition, because BOP estimates initial project costs early in the planning process, generally before an actual prison location is selected, variance from the initial estimates would be expected to some extent, even if the projects are not delayed. BOP, like other agencies, is not required to communicate how much it expects costs may vary from its estimates in its budget documents. Without such information, Congress and other stakeholders do not know the extent to which additional funding may be required to complete the project, even absent any project delays. BOP eliminated or reduced portions of two projects to remain within the amount that was funded and plans to use its construction management policies and procedures to control further cost increases and schedule delays. When awarding the contract for FCI Mendota in 2007, BOP eliminated a UNICOR facility, which would have provided additional employment and job skills training opportunities for inmates, and the minimum-security prison camp. At FCI Berlin, BOP eliminated the UNICOR facility when it awarded the contract in 2007, but subsequently added a smaller UNICOR facility to the project, which will be paid for by UNICOR. Intended to reduce costs, these changes also reduced the functionality of the two prisons, deviating from what BOP planned and requested funding for. In the subsequent budget submission to Congress and other stakeholders, BOP did not clearly communicate these changes, since BOP does not provide such detailed project information. Now that BOP has awarded the construction contracts for the three projects, BOP officials believe that their construction management policies and procedures will allow them to control cost increases and schedule delays. These policies and procedures reflect current government and industry project management practices to monitor and track projects, and to report on their status. Furthermore, BOP officials said that they plan to continue to avoid making changes that would increase construction costs after construction begins. GAO did not evaluate the effectiveness of BOP's construction policies and procedures in controlling cost increases and schedule delays on these projects because while construction contracts were awarded, little construction had been done. |
gao_GAO-13-65 | gao_GAO-13-65_0 | DHS’s Recent Efforts to Manage Strategic Workforce Planning Reflect Leading Principles, but Increased Oversight of Component Planning Would Enhance Efforts
While DHS has recently taken steps that are generally consistent with leading principles in managing departmental strategic workforce planning, OCHCO has made limited progress in developing an oversight approach for monitoring and evaluating component-level efforts. Specifically, since January 2011, DHS has taken steps to develop and implement strategic workforce planning efforts that are generally consistent with the leading principles including involving management and stakeholders, identifying skills and competencies, developing strategies to fill gaps, and building capability through training. DHS also included component input in the development of the DHS Workforce Strategy Fiscal Years 2011-2016. While DHS has taken relatively recent steps, since January 2011, to implement strategic workforce planning, recent internal audits, as well as our previous work, identified challenges related to workforce planning at the component level. For example, internal audits and our previous work found challenges related to the following. In July 2009 we reported that, among other things, the Federal Protective Service’s (FPS) workforce planning was limited because FPS headquarters did not collect data on its workforce’s knowledge, skills, and abilities. We reported that without such information, FPS was unable to determine what its optimal staffing levels should be or identify gaps in its workforce needs, or determine how to modify its workforce planning strategies to fill these gaps, and we made recommendations that FPS take steps to address these issues. FPS officials agreed with our recommendations and in June 2010 drafted a staffing plan consistent with our recommendations, but as of November 2012, FPS has not gained approval of its staffing plan. DHS Efforts to Monitor and Evaluate Components Progress
Although the department recently began taking positive steps for managing strategic workforce planning in 2011, DHS officials have not yet taken steps to implement an effective oversight approach for monitoring and evaluating components’ progress in implementing strategic workforce planning, consistent with strategic workforce planning principles. According to leading principles, agencies should measure the effectiveness of the workforce plan and help ensure that the strategies work as intended by evaluating the contributions workforce plans make to strategic results. To do this, agencies should determine how well the agency implemented its workforce plan and determine the contribution that the implementation made toward achieving programmatic goals. Further, OPM’s Human Capital Assessment and Accountability OCHCO has developed limited performance measures to provide a basis for monitoring and evaluating departmentwide strategic workforce planning efforts. Thus, on the basis of our evaluations, OCHCO has established performance measures that monitor only 2 of the 15 elements in the department’s workforce planning model. Conclusion
DHS’s ability to successfully meet its multiple, diverse, and essential missions involves the efforts of more than 240,000 employees, the vast majority of which work within the seven operational components. Similarly, without policies and procedures for integrating the results of audits into component workforce plans and annual reports, DHS lacks reasonable assurance that evaluation of such efforts will be institutionalized, nor can it provide evidence of component alignment with departmental strategic workforce planning guidance. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help ensure that DHS strategic workforce planning is effectively implemented departmentwide, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Office of the Chief Human Capital Officer to take the following three actions to provide a basis to monitor and assess the effectiveness of departmentwide strategic workforce planning: identify and document additional performance measures, such as measures to monitor component efforts to develop and implement action plans to address workforce supply and demand discrepancies, and use them to assess and report on components’ progress in implementing DHS’s strategic workforce planning process; document policies and procedures for the Balanced Workforce Program Management Office and the Human Capital Policy and Programs Office to use the results of audits related to component- level workforce planning; and integrate the results of these audits with components’ annual operational plans and review the plans and provide timely feedback to enhance components’ implementation of strategic workforce planning efforts. Specifically, DHS stated that—-
The department has taken steps to implement an effective oversight approach for monitoring and evaluating components’ progress in implementing strategic workforce planning. | Why GAO Did This Study
With more than 240,000 employees doing diverse jobs, DHS's workforce supports the department's multiple missions to prevent terrorism and enhance security, secure and manage the nation's borders, and ensure resilience from disasters, amongst others. Strategic workforce planning focuses on developing long-term strategies for acquiring, developing, and retaining an organization's total workforce, including federal staff and contractors, to meet the needs of the future. GAO has previously identified workforce-related challenges faced by DHS components. In light of these ongoing challenges, GAO was asked to review DHS's strategic workforce planning efforts. This report assesses whether DHS has incorporated strategic workforce planning leading principles into the department's management of strategic workforce planning efforts. GAO reviewed DHS strategies and guidance related to strategic workforce planning, compared them with leading principles identified in previous GAO work, and discussed ongoing strategic workforce planning efforts with officials from the seven components selected because they constitute the majority of DHS personnel.
What GAO Found
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has taken some relatively recent steps to enhance strategic workforce planning across the department. These steps are generally consistent with leading principles, but the department has not yet implemented an effective oversight approach for monitoring and evaluating components' progress. Specifically, recent steps DHS has taken to develop and implement strategic workforce planning efforts are consistent with the leading principles GAO has reported that include involving management and stakeholders, identifying skills and competencies, developing strategies to fill gaps, and building capability through training. For example, the department demonstrated stakeholder involvement by including component-level stakeholders in the development of the DHS Workforce Strategy. Though DHS has taken steps to implement strategic workforce planning, recent internal audits, as well as GAO's previous work, identified challenges related to workforce planning at the component level that could impair the continued implementation of recently initiated strategic workforce planning efforts. For example, GAO reported in July 2009 that the Federal Protective Service's (FPS) workforce planning was limited because FPS headquarters did not collect data on its workforce's knowledge, skills, and abilities and subsequently could not determine optimal staffing levels or determine how to modify its workforce planning strategies accordingly, amongst others. GAO recommended that FPS take steps to address these issues. FPS officials agreed with our recommendations, and in June 2010 drafted a staffing plan consistent with our recommendation, but as of November 2012, FPS has not gained approval of its staffing plan.
Although DHS began taking positive steps for managing strategic workforce planning in 2011, DHS officials have not yet taken steps to implement an effective oversight approach for monitoring and evaluating components' progress in implementing strategic workforce planning. According to this principle, agencies should measure the effectiveness of the workforce plan and help ensure that the strategies work as intended by monitoring and evaluating the contributions workforce plans make to strategic results. To do this, agencies should determine how well the agency implemented its workforce plan and the contribution that its implementation made toward achieving programmatic goals. However, the Office of the Chief Human Capital Officer (OCHCO) has developed limited performance measures to provide a basis for monitoring and evaluating departmentwide strategic workforce planning efforts. GAO's analysis identified performance measures that reported on only 2 of the 15 elements in DHS's strategic workforce planning model. OCHCO relies on an informal process to evaluate component workforce planning, though processes exist that it could leverage to provide oversight. For example, OCHCO performs internal audits and requires components to develop annual operations plans to implement the department's workforce strategy. However, the results of the audits are not used to evaluate components' workforce planning. Without (1) performance measures that more comprehensively address DHS's strategic workforce planning process, and (2) policies and procedures for ensuring monitoring and evaluation of departmentwide workforce planning, DHS's OCHCO does not have reasonable assurance that such efforts will be institutionalized. Further, the department will not be able to produce departmentwide evidence of component alignment with DHS strategic workforce planning guidance.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that, among other actions, the Secretary of Homeland Security (1) identify and document additional performance measures to assess workforce planning efforts and (2) document policies and procedures regarding the use of internal audit results. DHS concurred with our recommendations. |
gao_GAO-05-485T | gao_GAO-05-485T_0 | The ATO Has Made Progress in Addressing Key Challenges and Needs to Continue
The ATO inherited a decades-long legacy of cost, schedule, and performance problems in the ATC modernization program. Despite successes to date, these acquisition programs will require sustained management attention to help ensure that they remain within their cost, schedule, and performance targets. ATO Is Taking Some Positive Steps to Address Legacy Acquisition Problems
The ATO has already taken some steps to control the legacy problems identified with the ATC modernization program. Additionally, the ATO has established collaborative teams of technical experts and ATC system users, reorganized air traffic services and the research and acquisition organization along functional lines of business to bring stakeholders together and integrate goals, rewarded cooperation by linking investments to operations, started preparing agency planning documents in a format consistent with that prescribed by the Office of Management and Budget, begun implementing portions of a cost accounting system, and reduced layers of management from 11 to 7 to help address the hierarchical nature of the organization. Additionally, we view the decision to cut major systems as an indication that the ATO is willing to make difficult decisions to suspend major ATC system acquisitions that are not achieving their intended goals—even after a substantial investment of agency resources. However, as we reported last fall, the Acquisition Management System still does not ensure that FAA uses a knowledge-based approach to acquisition that is characteristic of the best procurement practices used in commercial entities or by DOD. Finally, FAA has made progress in improving its process for acquiring software-intensive systems. Unless FAA demonstrates a strong commitment to process improvement and establishes a consistent, institutional approach to implementing and evaluating this process improvement, the agency risks taking a major step backwards in its capabilities for ATC systems and software. To Address the Challenges of Modernizing and Expanding the NAS While Living within Its Means, the ATO Has a Number of Options
The ATO faces multiple challenges: (1) expanding and modernizing the NAS to accommodate an expected 25-percent increase in the volume of air traffic over the next 10 years; (2) hiring thousands of air traffic controllers to replace those expected to retire over the next decade; (3) working with the new JPDO to coordinate the research efforts of diverse federal agencies to transform the NAS to meet potential air travel needs of 2025; and (4) addressing aging infrastructure. The ATO plans to continue modernizing and expanding the capacity of the NAS to accommodate an expected 25-percent increase in air traffic volume over the next 10 years. 1.) The ATO will be challenged to harness the efforts of the diverse agencies that participate in the JDPO, including DOD, the Department of Homeland Security and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and to align these efforts with the goals of the national plan. This will have to change under the JPDO paradigm. To provide the $4.4 billion needed for its major system acquisitions while remaining within its budget targets through fiscal year 2009, the ATO has made significant cuts elsewhere in its capital funding plans. 2.) However, when forwarding its budget submission for administration and congressional review, the ATO does not highlight the programs slated for increased or reduced funding and does not identify the impact of these decisions on ATC and NAS modernization. Such information would make clear how constrained budgets will affect NAS modernization and how the ATO is working to live within its means. The ATO Has Options to Increase Its Prospects for Success
Contracting out more services and proposing legislation to provide borrowing authority are two options proposed by aviation experts to improve the ATO’s chances of success. Federal Aviation Administration: Challenges for Transforming into a High-Performing Organization. Air Traffic Control: FAA’s Modernization Efforts—Past, Present, and Future. | Why GAO Did This Study
Congress's formation of the Air Traffic Organization (ATO) and the Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO), both within the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), represent the latest efforts to address the monumental challenges of modernizing the national airspace system (NAS) during the first quarter of the twenty-first century. For more than two decades, FAA has been working to modernize the air traffic control (ATC) system, but projects have repeatedly missed cost, schedule, and performance targets. Consequently, ATC modernization has been on GAO's list of high-risk federal programs since 1995. The ATO's focus is on a rolling 10- year outlook to operate and modernize the NAS. By contrast, the JPDO's vision is longer term, focused on coordinating the research efforts of diverse federal agencies to achieve a common goal of meeting potential air traffic demands in 2025. This statement discusses (1) GAO's assessment of the ATO's efforts to date in addressing some of the key challenges for the ATC modernization program and (2) challenges that lie ahead for the ATO and options that it could consider in addressing the needs of the NAS over the next decade, as well as longer-term needs defined by the JPDO.
What GAO Found
The ATO is taking a number of positive steps to address the legacy cost, schedule, and performance problems that have affected the ATC modernization program for the past two decades. For example, the ATO is beginning to involve stakeholders early and throughout a system's development; has demonstrated a willingness to cut major acquisitions that are not meeting their goals, even after investing significant resources; and has improved its management of information technology. However, the ATO does not use a knowledge-based approach to acquisitions, characteristic of best commercial and federal practices, which would help avoid cost, schedule, and performance problems. Additionally, the ATO has used a process improvement model in several software-intensive acquisitions. However, because the ATO has not mandated use of the model in all such acquisitions, it risks taking a major step backwards in its capabilities for ATC systems and software. Finally, the ATO is taking steps to change the culture of its component organizations by, for example, replacing a personality-driven culture with one that is more sustainable and stable. Continued management attention in this area will be important to the organization's success. The ATO faces the challenges of (1) modernizing and expanding NAS capacity to accommodate an expected 25-percent increase in the volume of air traffic over the next 10 years, (2) hiring thousands of air traffic controllers to replace those expected to retire over the next decade, (3) working with the new JPDO to coordinate the research efforts of diverse federal agencies to transform the NAS to meet potential air travel needs of 2025, and (4) addressing aging infrastructure. To fund its major system acquisitions through fiscal year 2009 while remaining within projected budget targets, the ATO has substantially reduced funding for other areas. However, the ATO does not provide administration and congressional decisionmakers with information about the impact of the reduced funding on NAS modernization. To deal with these challenges, some aviation experts suggested options that the ATO could consider, including contracting out more services and incurring debt to obtain multiyear funding for capital investments (an option requiring legislative change). Our work and some experts also suggest clarifying budget submissions to show decisionmakers how constrained budgets affect NAS modernization and how the ATO is working to live within its means. |
gao_GAO-11-286 | gao_GAO-11-286_0 | FDA’s Program to Ensure the Safety of Imported Seafood from Residues of Unapproved Drugs Is Limited, Especially as Compared with the EU
FDA’s program to ensure the safety of imported seafood from residues of unapproved drugs is limited, because the agency’s primary oversight program generally involves reviews of documents at individual foreign processing facilities and importers for HACCP compliance. In contrast, the EU reviews foreign government structures, food safety legislation, and the foreign country’s fish farm inspection program to ensure imported seafood products come from countries with seafood safety systems equivalent to that of the EU. These inspections involve reviewing the processors’ HACCP plans and other records to ensure the processors have considered drug residues as a hazard that is reasonably likely to occur if the seafood products it receives are from fish farms. In general, as part of foreign HACCP inspections, FDA inspectors do not visit fish farms to evaluate drug use or controls. In addition to FDA’s HACCP inspections, the agency conducts foreign country assessments to gather information about other countries’ aquaculture programs including the country’s competent authority and regulatory infrastructure. However, according to FDA officials, the agency does not have any written operating procedures or any criteria or standards that it uses for these assessments to evaluate a country’s regulatory infrastructure; farms; or the capabilities, competence, and quality controls of foreign laboratories. FDA has conducted such foreign country assessments in five countries: Chile, China, India, Indonesia, and Vietnam. Thus, FDA does not generally test for drugs that some countries and the EU have approved for use in aquaculture. In addition, FDA does not effectively implement its limited sampling program. Thus, in fiscal year 2009, the seafood samples FDA reported it collected for drug residue testing amounted to 0.1 percent of all the seafood products imported into the United States. For example, while some other countries have increased their laboratory capabilities through programs to accredit commercial laboratories, FDA relies on 7 of its 13 laboratories to conduct all of its aquaculture drug residue testing. FDA and NMFS Have Made Limited Progress to Implement the 2009 MOU, and FDA Has Not Leveraged NMFS Inspection Resources
FDA and NMFS have made limited progress in implementing the 2009 MOU, resulting in a lack of systematic collaboration between the agencies. FDA has inspected 41 of 2,744 (or 1.5 percent) Chinese seafood processing facilities in the last 6 years. Recommendations for Executive Action
To better ensure the safety of seafood imports, we recommend that the Secretary of Health and Human Services direct the Commissioner of FDA to take the following three actions: study the feasibility of adopting other practices used by other entities, such as requiring foreign countries that want to export seafood to the United States to develop a national residues monitoring plan to control the use of aquaculture drugs, to more efficiently ensure the safety of imported seafood and report its findings to the Secretary; develop a more comprehensive import sampling program for seafood by more effectively using its laboratory resources and taking into account the imported seafood sampling programs of other entities and countries; and develop a strategic approach with specific time frames for enhancing collaborative efforts with NMFS and better leveraging NMFS inspection resources. On March 23, 2011, we received written comments from HHS, which are reproduced in appendix IV; HHS neither agreed nor disagreed with the findings and recommendations in the report. The Department of Commerce’s National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) provides voluntary fee-for-service inspections to ensure compliance with FDA’s Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) regulations, among other things. To assess the extent to which FDA ensures the safety of seafood imports against residues from unapproved drugs, we analyzed information on FDA’s oversight mechanism for seafood imports—importer and foreign country processing facilities inspections—and its seafood import sampling program. We analyzed fiscal years 2006 through 2009 data on FDA’s import sampling program’s test results to determine the magnitude and scope of the program. 1. | Why GAO Did This Study
About half of the seafood imported into the U.S. comes from farmed fish (aquaculture). Fish grown in confined aquacultured areas can have bacterial infections, which may require farmers to use drugs like antibiotics. The residues of some drugs can cause cancer and antibiotic resistance. The Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is charged with ensuring the safety of seafood against residues from unapproved drugs, and the Department of Commerce's National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) provides inspection services on request. In 2009, these agencies signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) to enhance seafood oversight and leverage inspection resources. GAO was asked to assess the extent to which (1) FDA's program is able to ensure the safety of seafood imports against residues from unapproved drugs and (2) FDA and NMFS have implemented the 2009 MOU. GAO reviewed data and documents from each agency and interviewed agency officials and other key stakeholders.
What GAO Found
FDA's oversight program to ensure the safety of imported seafood from residues of unapproved drugs is limited, especially as compared with the European Union (EU). FDA's program is generally limited to enforcing the Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point--the internationally recognized food safety management system--by conducting inspections of foreign seafood processors and importers each year. These inspections involve FDA inspectors reviewing records to ensure the processors and importers considered significant hazards, including those resulting from drug residues if the seafood they receive are from fish farms. The inspectors generally do not visit the farms to evaluate drug use or the capabilities, competence, and quality control of laboratories that analyze the seafood. In addition, FDA has conducted foreign country assessments in five countries to gather information about those countries' aquaculture programs. However, these assessments have been limited by FDA's lack of procedures, criteria, and standards. In contrast, the EU reviews foreign government structures, food safety legislation, the foreign country's fish farm inspection program, and visits farms to ensure that imported seafood products come from countries with seafood safety systems equivalent to that of the EU. In addition, the scope of FDA's sampling program, which supplements its oversight program, is limited. Specifically, the sampling program does not generally test for drugs that some countries and the EU have approved for use in aquaculture. Consequently, seafood containing residues of drugs not approved for use in the United States may be entering U.S. commerce. Further, FDA's sampling program is ineffectively implemented. For example, for fiscal years 2006 through 2009, FDA missed its assignment plan goal for collecting import samples by about 30 percent. In addition, in fiscal year 2009, FDA tested about 0.1 percent of all imported seafood products for drug residues. Moreover, FDA's reliance on 7 of its 13 laboratories to conduct all its aquaculture drug residue testing raises questions about the agency's use of resources. FDA and NMFS have made limited progress in implementing their 2009 MOU. The agencies have developed procedures for certain MOU activities, such as notifying NMFS of pending FDA regulatory actions. However, because FDA believes NMFS inspectors need training to conduct inspections according to FDA standards, it has not utilized NMFS' inspection resources or results in a systematic manner. Better leveraging available resources is critical, especially in places like China, where FDA has inspected 1.5 percent of Chinese seafood processing facilities in the last 6 years.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that FDA study the feasibility of adopting practices used by other entities to better ensure the safety of imported seafood, enhance its import sampling program, and develop a strategic approach for enhancing collaboration with NMFS and better leveraging resources. HHS neither agreed nor disagreed with GAO's recommendations but cited actions in process or planned that are generally responsive to them. |
gao_GAO-03-908T | gao_GAO-03-908T_0 | Weaknesses in Notification and Watch List Procedures
In our review of the 240 visa revocations, we found examples where information on visa revocations did not flow between the State Department and appropriate units overseas and within INS and the FBI. We found that that these units did not consistently receive information on visa revocations. Individuals with Revoked Visas May Be in the United States
Our analysis shows that thirty individuals with revoked visas have entered the United States and may still remain in the country. Twenty-nine of these individuals entered before State revoked their visas. INS and the FBI Did Not Routinely Take Action on Individuals with Revoked Visas Who Had Entered the United States
The INS and the FBI did not routinely attempt to investigate or locate any of the individuals whose visas were revoked and who may be in the country. Systemic Weaknesses Were the Result of Limited Guidance on Visa Revocation Process
The weaknesses I have outlined above resulted from the U.S. government’s limited policy guidance on the visa revocation process. While State and INS officials told us they use the visa revocation process to prevent suspected terrorists from entering the United States, neither they nor FBI officials had policies or procedures that covered investigating, locating, and taking appropriate action in cases where the visa holder had already entered the country. To remedy the systemic weaknesses in the visa revocation process, we are recommending that the Secretary of Homeland Security, who is now responsible for issuing regulations and administering and enforcing provisions of U.S. immigration law relating to visa issuance, work in conjunction with the Secretary of State and the Attorney General to: develop specific policies and procedures for the interagency visa revocation process to ensure that notification of visa revocations for suspected terrorists and relevant supporting information are transmitted from State to immigration and law enforcement agencies, and their respective inspection and investigation units, in a timely manner; develop a specific policy on actions that immigration and law enforcement agencies should take to investigate and locate individuals whose visas have been revoked for terrorism concerns and who remain in the United States after revocation; and determine if any persons with visas revoked on terrorism grounds are in the United States and, if so, whether they pose a security threat. In commenting on our report, Homeland Security agreed that the visa revocation process should be strengthened as an antiterrorism tool. | Why GAO Did This Study
The National Strategy for Homeland Security calls for preventing the entry of foreign terrorists into our country and using all legal means to identify; halt; and where appropriate, prosecute or bring immigration or other civil charges against terrorists in the United States. GAO reported in October 2002 that the Department of State had revoked visas of certain persons after it learned they might be suspected terrorists, raising concerns that some of these individuals may have entered the United States before or after State's action. Congressional requesters asked GAO to (1) assess the effectiveness of the visa revocation process and (2) identify the policies and procedures of State, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) that govern their respective actions in the process.
What GAO Found
Our analysis shows that the visa revocation process was not being fully utilized as an antiterrorism tool. The visa revocation process broke down when information on individuals with revoked visas was not shared between State and appropriate immigration and law enforcement offices. It broke down even further when individuals had already entered the United States prior to revocation. INS and the FBI were not routinely taking actions to investigate, locate, or resolve the cases of individuals who remained in the United States after their visas were revoked. In our review of 240 visa revocations, we found that (1) appropriate units within INS and the FBI did not always receive notifications of all the revocations; (2) names were not consistently posted to the agencies' watch lists of suspected terrorists; (3) 30 individuals whose visas were revoked on terrorism grounds had entered the United States and may still remain; and (4) INS and the FBI were not routinely taking actions to investigate, locate, or resolve the cases of individuals who remained in the United States after their visas were revoked. These weaknesses resulted from the U.S. government's limited policy guidance on the process. None of the agencies have specific, written policies on using the visa revocation process as an antiterrorism tool. |
gao_GAO-01-1129 | gao_GAO-01-1129_0 | FDA, FTC, and state agencies all have oversight responsibility for alternative medicine products. Although precise estimates of the physical harm caused to senior citizens by questionable anti-aging and alternative products are not available, there is evidence in the medical literature that seniors are at risk for adverse effects, that dietary supplements are contraindicated for individuals with some underlying health problems, and that a variety of frequently used dietary supplements can have dangerous interactions with drugs that are being taken concurrently. Some scientific studies have found that there may be significantly more active ingredient in some herbal and specialty supplement products than is indicated on the label. FTC does not have an estimate of economic harm attributable to these products, but some of these unproven products can cost hundreds or thousands of dollars apiece. FDA and FTC sponsor programs and provide educational materials for senior citizens to help them avoid health fraud on the Internet and in other media. At the state level, agencies are working to protect consumers of health products by enforcing state consumer protection and public health laws, although anti-aging and alternative products have received limited attention. We also interviewed officials and reviewed documents from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), Federal Trade Commission (FTC), and National Institutes of Health (NIH). | What GAO Found
Evidence from the medical literature shows that a variety of frequently used dietary supplements marketed as anti-aging therapies can have serious health consequences for senior citizens. Some seniors have underlying diseases or health conditions that make the use of the product medically inadvisable, and some supplements can interact with medications that are being taken concurrently. Furthermore, studies have found that products sometimes contain harmful contaminants or much more of an active ingredient than is indicated on the label. Unproven anti-aging and alternative medicine products also pose an economic risk to seniors. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) have identified several products that make advertising or labeling claims with insufficient substantiation, some costing consumers hundreds or thousands of dollars apiece. Federal and state agencies have efforts under way to protect consumers of these products. FDA and FTC sponsor programs and provide educational materials for senior citizens to help them avoid health fraud. At the state level, agencies are working to protect consumers of health products by enforcing state consumer protection and public health laws, although anti-aging and alternative products are receiving limited attention. GAO summarized this report in testimony before Congress (GAO-01-1139T). |
gao_NSIAD-96-163 | gao_NSIAD-96-163_0 | Background
Mexico is the primary transit country for cocaine entering the United States from South America as well as a major source country for heroin, marijuana and, more recently, methamphetamine. In our June 1995 testimony on U.S. efforts to stop the flow of drugs from cocaine producing and transit countries, we highlighted problems in such areas as changes in the U.S. drug interdiction strategy; competing foreign policy objectives at some U.S. embassies; coordination of U.S. activities; management and oversight of U.S. assets; and willingness and ability of foreign governments to combat the drug trade. 1.) Problems in Mexico Impede Efforts to Curb the Flow of Drugs
Mexico eradicated substantial amounts of marijuana and opium poppy crops in 1995 but other counternarcotics activities, including cocaine seizures and arrests of traffickers, have declined since 1992. Economic and Political Problems Limit Mexico’s Counternarcotics Efforts
Since 1992, the Mexican government has confronted several major crises that have competed with drug control activities for government resources. These essential tools, according to DEA, have been used by U.S. law enforcement agencies to successfully combat organized crime within the United States. U.S. Counternarcotics Programs in Mexico Have Declined Since 1992
Relative to the threat posed by narcotics produced in and transported through Mexico and the pivotal role Mexico plays in the success of any U.S. drug control strategy, the size of the U.S. counternarcotics effort in Mexico is extremely small. U.S. Policy Decisions Affect Drug Control Efforts in the Transit Zone and Mexico
With the November 1993 issuance of Presidential Decision Directive Number 14, the United States changed the focus of its international drug control strategy from interdicting cocaine as it moved through the transit zone of Mexico and the Caribbean to stopping cocaine in the source countries of Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru, before the drug could reach the transit zone. The strategy focused on strengthening the political commitment and institutional capability of the Mexican government, targeting major drug-trafficking organizations, and developing operational initiatives, including the interdiction of drugs. Despite the virtual absence of a U.S. counternarcotics assistance program in Mexico during the past 3 years, the United States has provided some limited training and equipment to the Mexican government. In Mexico, U.S. assistance and DEA activities have focused primarily on interdicting trafficking aircraft as they deliver their drug cargoes. However, as discussed previously, traffickers are increasingly using commercial and noncommercial maritime conveyances to move drugs into Mexico. Recent Efforts to Address Bilateral Drug Control Issues
Since our June 1995 testimony, a number of events have occurred that could affect future drug control efforts by the United States and Mexico. First, the importance of drug control issues at the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City has been elevated, and the embassy has developed a drug control plan that focuses the efforts of all U.S. agencies in Mexico on specific goals and objectives. Fourth, the United States and Mexico have created a framework for increased cooperation and the development of a joint counternarcotics strategy. U.S. officials view this as an indication that the Mexican government and its military components are committed to stopping the flow of drugs through Mexico. GAO’s Comments
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed counternarcotics activities in Mexico, focusing on: (1) the nature of the drug-trafficking threat from Mexico; (2) Mexican government efforts to counter drug-trafficking activities; (3) the U.S. strategy and programs intended to stem the flow of illegal drugs through Mexico; and (4) recent initiatives by the United States and Mexico to increase counternarcotics activities.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) Mexico continues to be a major transit point for cocaine, heroin, marijuana, and methamphetamine entering the United States; (2) drug traffickers have changed their preferred mode of transportation for moving cocaine into Mexico, decreasing the use of aircraft and increasing the use of maritime vessels, which are currently used to move an estimated two-thirds of the cocaine entering Mexico; (3) Mexico eradicated substantial amounts of marijuana and opium poppy crops in 1995; (4) however, U.S. and Mexican interdiction efforts have had little, if any, impact on the overall flow of drugs through Mexico to the United States; (5) the current Mexican government appears committed to fighting drug trafficking, but, according to U.S. officials, is hampered by pervasive corruption of key institutions, economic and political problems, and limited counternarcotics and law enforcement capabilities; (6) the current U.S. strategy in Mexico focuses on strengthening the Mexican government's political commitment and institutional capability, targeting major drug-trafficking organizations, and developing operational initiatives; (7) in late 1993, the United States revised its international cocaine strategy from focusing on intercepting drugs as they move through the transit region of Central America, Mexico, and the Caribbean to stopping cocaine at its production source in South America; (8) U.S. counternarcotics activities in Mexico and the transit zone have declined since 1992; (9) multiple-agency drug interdiction funding for the transit zone, including Mexico, declined from about $1 billion in fiscal year (FY) 1992 to about $570 million in FY 1995; (10) the U.S. assistance program in Mexico has been negligible since Mexico initiated its policy of refusing nearly all U.S. counternarcotics assistance in early 1993; (11) staffing cutbacks have limited U.S. capabilities to monitor previously funded U.S. assistance; and (12) since GAO's June 1995 testimony, several events have occurred that could greatly affect future drug control efforts by the United States and Mexico: (a) drug control issues have been elevated in importance at the U.S. embassy and a drug control operating plan with measurable goals has been developed for U.S. agencies in Mexico; (b) the Mexican government has recently signaled a willingness to develop a mutual counternarcotics assistance program; (c) the Mexican government has taken some action on important law enforcement and money laundering legislation; and (d) the United States and Mexico have created a framework for increased cooperation and are currently developing a new binational strategy. |
gao_GAO-01-878T | gao_GAO-01-878T_0 | Concluding Observations
Medicare is a popular program that millions of Americans depend on for covering their essential health needs. However, the management of the program has fallen short of expectations because it has not always appropriately balanced or satisfied beneficiaries’, providers’, and taxpayers’ needs. For example, stakeholders expect that Medicare will price services prudently; that providers will be treated fairly and paid accurately; and that beneficiaries will clearly understand their program options and will receive services that meet quality standards. In addition, there are expectations that the agency will be prepared to implement restructuring or added benefits in the context of Medicare reform. Today’s Medicare agency, while successful in certain areas, may not be able to meet these expectations effectively without further congressional attention to its multiple missions, capacity, and flexibility. The agency will also need to do its part by implementing a performance-based approach that articulates priorities, documents resource needs, and holds managers accountable for accomplishing program goals. | What GAO Found
Medicare is a popular program that millions of Americans depend on for covering their essential health needs. However, the management of the program has fallen short of expectations because it has not always appropriately balanced or satisfied the needs of beneficiaries, providers, and taxpayers. For example, stakeholders expect that Medicare will price services prudently; that providers will be treated fairly and paid accurately; and that beneficiaries will clearly understand their program options and will receive services that meet quality standards. In addition, there are expectations that the agency will be prepared to implement restructuring or added benefits in the context of Medicare reform. Today's Medicare, although successful in some areas, may not be able to meet these expectations effectively without further congressional attention to its multiple missions, capacity, and flexibility. The program will also need to do its part by implementing a performance-based approach that articulates priorities, documents resource needs, and holds managers accountable for accomplishing program goals. |
gao_NSIAD-96-72 | gao_NSIAD-96-72_0 | Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To illustrate the need to compare the services’ plans for improving their interdiction capabilities, we evaluated (1) the services’ current and future aggregate interdiction assets for striking identified enemy targets and (2) the effect of the services’ planned modernization programs on total interdiction capabilities and alternatives to those programs. The services have concluded, and we concur, that they have enough capability to carry out the national military strategy. Our analysis indicated that some proposals may not be sound investments. This allowed us to focus on the interdiction contribution of those weapons if they are modified or added to the services’ capabilities. Some of these modernization programs may be worth the cost if they materially strengthen interdiction capabilities, but until DOD’s decision processes give sufficient attention to interdiction capabilities in the aggregate, there can be little assurance that the appropriate, most cost-effective mix of weapon systems is being identified, developed, and fielded for interdiction missions. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO evaluated the military services' current aggregate interdiction assets for striking enemy targets and the contribution of planned modernization programs to total interdiction capabilities, focusing on the reasonableness of the planned enhancements.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) although the services have determined that they have enough capability to carry out the national military strategy of being able to engage and win in two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts, the services plan to spend over $213 billion to modify and purchase weapons; (2) the services' independently developed modernization plans do not consider the other services' capabilities, sometimes resulting in interdiction redundancies; (3) some weapons modernization proposals may not be sound investments because they may add expensive new capabilities that may be redundant or unnecessary; and (4) until the Department of Defense assesses interdiction capabilities in the aggregate, there can be little assurance that the appropriate, most cost-effective mix of weapons systems is being identified, developed, and fielded for interdiction missions. |
gao_RCED-95-172 | gao_RCED-95-172_0 | The city has worked closely with state and federal environmental protection agencies in assessing and cleaning up five demonstration brownfield sites. Federal Efforts Are Targeted Toward Redeveloping Brownfields
As state and local governments have shown increased interest in redeveloping their industrial sites, several federal agencies have begun to help them. Both EPA and EDA have gained practical experience through redevelopment activities at several sites, while HUD has started a series of projects to carry out its brownfield strategy. According to EPA, many of these sites either were not contaminated, had already been cleaned up under state programs, or were being cleaned up; still, potential developers were reluctant to get involved with them because they remained on EPA’s list. EPA has also loaned staff to local governments to further assist efforts to redevelop brownfields. In 1994, almost 300 communities applied for six federal Urban Empowerment Zone and 65 Enterprise Community designations that provide tax incentives. Scope and Methodology
To determine what is known about the extent and nature of abandoned industrial sites in distressed urban communities and the barriers that brownfields present to redevelopment efforts, we reviewed previous GAO reports on Superfund issues and other reports on the subject, such as the Northeast-Midwest Institute’s report entitled New Life For Old Buildings and Resources for the Future’s report entitled The Impact of Uncertain Environmental Liability on Industrial Real Estate Development. To provide information on federal initiatives aimed at helping communities overcome obstacles to reusing brownfield sites, we discussed brownfield programs and issues at three federal agencies—EPA, HUD, and the Department of Commerce—that were identified by public interest group, state government, or local government officials as having brownfield programs. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on brownfields, focusing on: (1) the extent and nature of abandoned industrial sites in distressed urban communities and the barriers brownfields present to redevelopment efforts; and (2) federal initiatives aimed at helping communities overcome obstacles to reusing brownfield sites.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) while no national inventory of brownfield sites exist, states have identified thousands of former industrial sites that are abandoned and possibly contaminated; (2) although brownfield sites are usually not contaminated enough to qualify for the Superfund Program, many offer great potential for redevelopment; (3) although developers and lenders have been reluctant to get involved with brownfields due to uncertain liability, governments have created initiatives, such as offering loans and liability protection, to speed up redevelopment efforts; (4) brownfield redevelopment has remained state and local in nature, but federal agencies have begun assisting local governments to reclaim sites; (5) the Environmental Protection Agency has provided demonstration grants to help redevelop industrial properties that were not contaminated or had been cleaned up; (6) the Economic Development Administration has provided financial support for brownfield research and has also acquired practical experience from cleaning up properties it acquired through loan defaults; and (7) the Department of Housing and Urban Development is implementing several brownfield projects through its Empowerment Zone and Enterprise Community program. |
gao_GAO-11-482T | gao_GAO-11-482T_0 | Financing of TC projects is generally supported through the annual voluntary contributions of member states to IAEA’s Technical Cooperation Fund (TCF). In the United States, State and DOE are the two principal agencies involved in TC issues. GAO’s 2009 Findings and Recommendations on Potential Proliferation and Management Concerns Surrounding the TC Program
In our 2009 report, we identified potential proliferation concerns with the TC program, including concerns about certain countries receiving TC assistance—such as those designated by the United States as state sponsors of terrorism—and lack of sufficient and timely information from IAEA on TC project proposals to allow the United States or other member states to assess the proliferation risks of the proposed projects. We also identified several limitations in how the TC program is managed, which could undermine its long-term effectiveness, including the use of outdated program metrics and financial resource constraints. GAO’s Findings on Potential Proliferation and Management Concerns in the TC Program
In our 2009 report, we found that neither State nor IAEA sought to systematically limit or prevent TC assistance to countries that (1) have been identified as sponsors of terrorism, (2) are not parties to the NPT, and (3) have not completed comprehensive safeguards or additional protocol agreements with IAEA. Specifically: State officials told us that the United States did not systematically try to limit TC projects in Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and Syria—which the department designated as sponsors of terrorism. IAEA’s former Deputy Director General for the TC program told us that requests for TC assistance are evaluated strictly on technical merits and the contributions of the proposed projects to a nation’s development priorities. GAO’s Recommendations to Address Potential Proliferation and Management Concerns in the TC Program
Based on our findings, we asked Congress to consider directing State to withhold a proportionate share of future U.S. voluntary contributions to the TC program that is equivalent to the amounts of TCF funding that would otherwise be made available to U.S.-designated state sponsors of terrorism and other countries of concern, as it currently does with Cuba and has done in the past with Iran, Libya, and the Territories Under the Jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority. In addition, we recommended that the Secretary of State, working with IAEA and member states through the Board of Governors, explore undertaking the following eight actions to address the range of proliferation and management concerns related to the TC program: Establish a formal mechanism to facilitate greater and more timely information sharing on TC project proposals between IAEA and the United States and other countries—including detailed information on the TC proposals themselves, as well as the results of IAEA’s internal proliferation reviews of the proposals—so that proliferation and other concerns can be identified and addressed early in the project development cycle. State Continues to Oppose Withholding a Proportionate Share of U.S. Funding for the TC Program, but State and IAEA have Made Some Progress in Implementing Our Other Recommendations
State officials told us that they continue to strongly oppose our matter for congressional consideration to require State to withhold a proportionate share of the U.S. voluntary contribution to the TC program that is equivalent to the amounts of TCF funding that would otherwise be made available to U.S.-designated state sponsors of terrorism and other countries of concern. We continue to believe that Congress should give serious consideration to this matter, and that it is not unique or unprecedented. To avoid the appearance of an inconsistent approach and to foster greater cohesion in U.S. policy toward such nations, we believe that it is fair for Congress to consider requiring State to withhold a share of the U.S. contribution to the TCF for program activities in countries that the United States chooses not to engage directly in trade, assistance, and other forms of cooperation. State has developed formal guidance establishing criteria for accepting or denying applications from TC fellows from foreign countries requesting opportunities to study nuclear issues at institutions in the United States. We are making no new recommendations at this time. We also reviewed documentation provided by State and IAEA concerning our recommendations and the steps taken to implement them. | Why GAO Did This Study
A key mission of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy through its Technical Cooperation (TC) program, which provides equipment, training, fellowships, and other services to its member states. The United States provides approximately 25 percent of the TC program's annual budget. While the vast majority of TC projects have not involved the transfer of sensitive nuclear materials and technology, TC assistance has been provided to countries of proliferation concern. In March 2009, GAO reported on potential proliferation and management concerns related to the program (GAO-09-275). This testimony discusses (1) GAO's findings and recommendations to the Department of State and IAEA in that report and (2) agency progress made to implement those recommendations to address these concerns. This testimony is based on GAO's 2009 report and updated in March 2011 by (1) reviewing documentation on actions taken by State and IAEA in response to the report's recommendations and (2) interviewing State and Department of Energy (DOE) officials.
What GAO Found
As GAO reported in 2009, neither State nor IAEA seeks to systematically limit TC assistance to countries that (1) the United States has designated as state sponsors of terrorism--Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and Syria; (2) are not party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons--India, Israel, and Pakistan; and (3) have not completed comprehensive safeguards or additional protocol agreements with IAEA. The former head of the TC program told GAO that requests for TC assistance are evaluated strictly on technical merits. GAO found that the lack of sufficient and timely information provided by IAEA on project proposals limits the ability of DOE and the national laboratories to fully assess potential proliferation concerns associated with the program. In addition, GAO identified limitations in how the program is managed, including the failure of many member states to pay their full share of support to IAEA's Technical Cooperation Fund (TCF) and the use of outdated program metrics. GAO asked Congress to consider directing State to withhold a proportionate share of the U.S. voluntary contribution to the TC program that is equivalent to the amounts of TCF funding that would otherwise be made available to U.S.-designated state sponsors of terrorism, as the United States currently does with Cuba and has done in the past with other countries and territories. GAO recommended that State, working with IAEA, undertake eight actions to address proliferation and management concerns related to the program, such as establishing a mechanism to facilitate greater and more timely information sharing on proposals. GAO made two additional recommendations to State, including enhancing its record-keeping on project proposals identified as having potential proliferation concerns, and developing formal guidance to evaluate requests from TC fellows to study nuclear issues in the United States. State and IAEA have made some progress in implementing several of the recommendations in GAO's report. This progress includes, among other things, (1) IAEA providing proposal information to the United States and other member states earlier in the project approval process; (2) IAEA pursuing efforts to promote results-based management of TC projects; (3) State doing better tracking of TC proposals that may contain proliferation concerns; and (4) State developing new guidance and criteria for accepting or denying requests by foreign TC fellows to study in the United States. State, however, continues to strongly oppose GAO's suggestion that Congress consider requiring State to withhold a proportionate share of U.S. voluntary contributions to the fund for TC program assistance provided to U.S.-designated state sponsors of terrorism. GAO continues to believe that Congress should give serious consideration to this matter because there is a precedent for such a withholding and because such action would foster a more consistent and cohesive U.S. policy toward such nations that the United States chooses not to engage directly in trade, assistance, and other forms of cooperation.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making no new recommendations at this time and continues to believe that implementation of the recommendations in its March 2009 report could substantially reduce potential proliferation and management concerns related to the TC program. |
gao_GAO-03-1005 | gao_GAO-03-1005_0 | Recruiting efforts focus on three initiatives. DOD Has Revised Advertising Programs and Increased Funding
After most of the services experienced recruiting shortfalls in the late 1990s, DOD reviewed its advertising programs and identified opportunities for improvement. DOD has revamped its advertising programs. Today, all of the active services are meeting or exceeding their overall recruiting goals. Internet and Web-site recruiting have also increased significantly from fiscal year 1998 through fiscal year 2003. All of the active military services have increased the amount of advertising on the Internet and have used interactive Web sites to complement their traditional recruiting and advertising methods. Total advertising funding for all of the services increased 98 percent, from $299 million in fiscal year 1998 to $592 million in fiscal year 2003. DOD Does Not Adequately Measure Advertising’s Effectiveness
DOD does not have adequate outcome measures to evaluate the effectiveness of its advertising as part of its overall recruiting effort. This information would include public awareness of military recruiting advertising and the willingness of young adults to join the military. Without adequate information and outcome measures, the Office of the Secretary of Defense cannot satisfactorily review the services’ advertising budget justifications nor can it determine the return on their advertising dollars as part of their overall recruiting investment. Enlisting in a military service is a profound life decision. They scrutinize the quality and quantity of recruits and gather data about the uses of advertising funds. DOD has altered its advertising and recruiting strategies and is spending much more on advertising. This is crucial because DOD is now spending nearly $592 million annually on recruiting advertising, or about $1,900 per enlisted recruit. In addition, the total funding for all of DOD’s recruiting efforts is now almost $4 billion. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve DOD’s ability to adequately measure the impact of its advertising programs on its recruiting mission, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to issue guidance that would (1) set clear, measurable objectives for DOD’s advertising programs; (2) develop outcome measures for each of DOD’s advertising programs that clearly link advertising program performance with these objectives; and (3) use these outcome measures to monitor the advertising programs’ performance and make fact-based choices about advertising funding as part of the overall recruiting investment in the future. To assess the adequacy of the measures used by DOD to evaluate the effectiveness of advertising, we reviewed information on outcome measures used to evaluate the effectiveness of advertising provided by each of the active and reserve components; the advertising agencies that are their contractors; and the DOD Joint Advertising, Market Research, and Studies program. Military Recruiting: More Innovative Approaches Needed. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) must convince more than 200,000 people each year to join the military. To assist in recruiting, the military services advertise on television, on radio, and in print and participate in other promotional activities. In the late 1990s, some of the services missed their overall recruiting goals. In response, DOD added recruiting resources by increasing its advertising, number of recruiters, and financial incentives. By fiscal year 2003, DOD's total recruiting budget was approaching $4 billion annually. At the request of Congress, GAO determined the changes in DOD's advertising programs and funding trends since the late 1990s and assessed the adequacy of measures used by DOD to evaluate the effectiveness of its advertising. GAO recommends that DOD set clear, measurable advertising
What GAO Found
Since the late 1990s, DOD has revamped its recruiting advertising programs and nearly doubled the funding for recruiting advertising. The military services have revised many of their advertising campaigns and focused on complementing traditional advertising, such as by increasing the use of the Internet, and participating in more promotional activities, such as sports car racing events. DOD's total advertising funding increased 98 percent in constant dollars from fiscal year 1998 through fiscal year 2003--from $299 million to $592 million. The advertising cost per enlisted recruit has nearly tripled and is now almost $1,900. The military services agree that the revised strategies and increased investments have energized their advertising campaigns and better positioned them to recruit in an increasingly competitive marketplace. Today, almost all of the active and reserve components are meeting their overall recruiting goals in terms of the quality and quantity of new recruits. DOD does not have clear program objectives and adequate outcome measures to evaluate the effectiveness of its advertising as part of its overall recruiting effort. Thus, DOD cannot show that its increased advertising efforts have been a key reason for its overall recruiting success. Isolating the impact of advertising on recruiting efforts is inherently difficult because joining the military is a profound life decision. Moreover, DOD has not consistently tracked key information, such as public awareness of military recruiting advertising and the willingness of young adults to join the military. Such data could be used to help evaluate the effectiveness of advertising. Without sufficient information on advertising's effectiveness, DOD cannot determine the return on its advertising funding or make fact-based choices on how its overall recruiting investments should be allocated. |
gao_GAO-05-221 | gao_GAO-05-221_0 | Use of Federal Low- Income Assistance Varies Greatly by Program and by Subgroup
The proportion of those eligible who are actually enrolled in 12 selected low-income programs varies substantially both between and within programs, but several factors must be considered to understand the implications of this information for program access. For Entitlement Programs, the Proportion of Those Eligible Who Were Enrolled Ranged from about 50 Percent to More Than 70 Percent, but Participation Rates Are Higher among Some Groups
For four of the five entitlement programs we examined, the proportion of eligible people who were enrolled varied from around 50 percent in the Food Stamp Program to more than 70 percent in the EITC and SSI programs; and within programs, different types of participants, such as children or the elderly, were enrolled in varying proportions. HHS and USDA are the only two agencies to regularly estimate participation rates in low-income programs. Coverage rates also have limitations such as data sources, and estimation methodologies that make it inappropriate to compare the estimates across programs. Recognizing the differences in goals, design, administration, and funding in the 12 programs, it may be neither feasible nor desirable to provide program benefits to all those eligible. Many Factors Influence Participation but Their Impact on Entitlement and Non- Entitlement Programs Differs
Many factors influence access to means-tested programs, including the benefits provided by the program, ease of access, misperceptions about program requirements, and eligibility verification procedures put in place to ensure program integrity, based on our literature review and agency interviews. Program Administrators Have Strategies That Improve Both Access and Integrity, but Federal Agencies Have Generally Focused More on Measuring Program Integrity Outcomes
Program administrators have implemented many strategies to achieve desired program outcomes, including those related to program access and program integrity, but while agencies have generally taken steps to monitor and disseminate information on program integrity, few track and report on the extent to which they are serving their eligible populations. Because the most fundamental purpose of these programs is to serve low- income individuals and families, all track measures that provide some information about program participation and access. Participation or coverage rate information can guide program administrators in setting priorities and targeting scarce resources, even among programs that were not intended to serve everyone eligible for program benefits. Federal agencies responsible for administering only four of the programs we covered in this review—CCDF, food stamps, WIC, and EITC—either currently collect and report information on the extent to which they are reaching their target populations in key performance and program reports or plan to do so. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
We designed our study to provide information on (1) the proportion of those eligible who are participating in 12 selected low-income programs; (2) the factors that influence participation in those programs; and (3) strategies used by federal, state, and local administrators to improve both access and integrity, and whether agencies monitor access by measuring participation rates. Those eligible could also have access to state and local programs that address similar needs. | Why GAO Did This Study
Federal agencies that administer means-tested programs are responsible for both ensuring that people have appropriate access to assistance and ensuring the integrity of the programs they oversee. To balance these two priorities appropriately, it is important for agencies to have information on program integrity and program access. Knowing the proportion of the population that qualifies for these programs relative to the numbers who actually participate can help ensure that agencies can monitor and communicate key information on program access. To better understand participation in low-income programs, this report provides information on: (1) the proportion of those eligible who are participating in 12 selected low-income programs; (2) factors that influence participation in those programs; and (3) strategies used by federal, state, and local administrators to improve both access and integrity, and whether agencies monitor access by measuring participation rates.
What GAO Found
For 12 federal programs supporting low-income people, we found that the proportion of those eligible who are enrolled varies substantially both between and within programs. Among entitlement programs--those programs that provide benefits to all applicants that meet program eligibility criteria--these rates range from about 50 to more than 70 percent. Among non-entitlement programs--those with limited funding--these rates ranged from less than 10 percent to more than 50 percent. While it may be neither feasible nor desirable for programs to serve 100 percent of those eligible for benefits, information on the share of those eligible who are enrolled in means-tested programs and on particular recipient groups such as the elderly or families with children, can help program managers more effectively address issues related to program access. However, participation rate estimates must be interpreted carefully because of limitations in the data sources and estimation methodologies used to calculate the estimates. Many factors influence access to low-income programs--including the type of benefits, ease of access, misperceptions about program requirements, and application and eligibility verification procedures. These factors can impact not only the share of eligible people who participate in low-income programs, but other aspects of program access as well, including the composition of the program caseload and how programs work together to serve low-income individuals and families. Federal, state, and local administrators have implemented many strategies to achieve the goals of access and integrity, but federal agencies generally put more emphasis on tracking information and outcomes related to program integrity than program access. To better ensure that program administrators achieve program integrity goals, agencies have begun to develop measures to track and report on program integrity. Federal agencies have developed participation rate estimates for several low-income programs, but only four--CCDF, food stamps, WIC, and EITC--either currently collect and report information on the extent to which they are reaching their target populations or plan to do so. Such information can guide administrators in setting priorities and targeting scarce resources, even among programs that were not intended to serve everyone eligible for program benefits. |
gao_GAO-14-481T | gao_GAO-14-481T_0 | While some concurrency is understandable, committing to product development before requirements are understood and technologies are mature or committing to production and fielding before development is complete is a high-risk strategy that often results in performance shortfalls, unexpected cost increases, schedule delays, and test problems. MDA has been challenged to meet some of its goals for the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA). MDA reported baselines for several BMDS programs to Congress for the first time in its June 2010 BMDS Accountability Report (BAR). Since 2011, although progress has been made to improve the reporting, we have found issues affecting the usefulness of MDA’s acquisition baselines for oversight due to (1) a lack of clarity, consistency, and completeness; (2) a lack of high-quality supporting cost estimates and schedules; and (3) instability in the content of the baselines. MDA Made Progress on Testing and Further Improved Some Management Practices
This year we found that MDA gained important knowledge about the BMDS system-level performance and individual elements by successfully executing several flight tests. We also found that MDA further improved some of its acquisition practices for managing the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) and improved the clarity of its resource and schedule baselines. In addition, the Aegis BMD SM-3 Block IB and GMD programs successfully conducted developmental flight tests in 2013 that demonstrated key capabilities and modifications made to resolve prior issues. In its 2013 BAR, MDA continued to incorporate useful changes it made last year, and took some additional actions to improve the completeness and clarity of the BAR baselines by: identifying the date of the initial baseline and, if applicable, the date when the initial baseline was most recently revised; explaining most of the significant cost and schedule changes from the current baseline estimates against both the estimates reported in the prior year’s BAR and the latest initial baseline; and making the baselines easier to read by removing cluttered formatting such as strikethroughs and highlights that made some of the events listed in past BARs unreadable. Challenge: Implementing Higher Risk Acquisition Programs
While MDA has gained important insights through testing and taken some steps to improve management and increase transparency, it still faces challenges stemming from higher-risk acquisition strategies that overlap production activities with development activities. Our April 2014 report found that Aegis BMD SM-3 Block IB and GMD, which have already produced some of their assets before completing testing, discovered issues during testing that could affect or have affected production. DOD partially concurred with the recommendation on the Aegis SM-3 Block IB, stating that MDA will verify the efficacy of any modifications by testing and that the full production decision will be vetted through the DOD process. DOD did not agree with the recommendation on GMD, stating that the decision to flight test the interceptor will be made by the Director, MDA, based on the judgment of other stakeholders. The agency also combined, delayed, and deleted some tests, and eliminated test objectives in others. These changes reduced the knowledge expected to be available to understand the capabilities and limitations of the BMDS. Previously GAO has made recommendations to improve MDA’s ability to gather expected knowledge from testing. Challenge: Managing Development and Deployment of U.S. Missile Defense in Europe
In March 2014, we found that while MDA made further improvements to the way it manages EPAA, it has yet to develop or implement a complete Specifically, MDA management strategy for synchronizing these efforts.has not established an integrated schedule and has yet to completely define EPAA requirements. As a result, it remains unclear how different EPAA efforts are aligned together and what constitutes success in delivering EPAA capabilities. Although DOD generally concurred with these recommendations, it has not yet fully implemented them. Additionally, issues with the content and presentation of the schedule baselines continue to limit the usefulness of the information for decision makers. For example,
MDA has not fully implemented its cost estimating handbook. As a result, we did not make any new recommendations regarding cost this year. In April 2014, we also found that assessing MDA’s progress in achieving its schedule goals is difficult because MDA’s 2013 schedule baselines are not presented in a way that allows decision makers to understand or easily monitor progress.identify numerous events, but provide little information on the events and why they are important. | Why GAO Did This Study
In order to meet its mission, MDA is developing a diverse group of BMDS components including (1) land-, sea-, and space-based sensors; (2) interceptors; and (3) a battle management system. These systems can be integrated in different ways to provide protection in various regions of the world. Since its inception in 2002, MDA has been given flexibility in executing the development and fielding of the ballistic missile defense system. This statement addresses recent MDA progress and the challenges it faces with its acquisition management. It is based on GAO's March and April 2014 reports and prior reports on missile defense.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense's (DOD) Missile Defense Agency (MDA) made progress in its goals to improve acquisition management, and accountability and transparency. The agency gained important knowledge for its Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) by successfully conducting several important tests, including the first missile defense system-level operational flight test. Additionally, key programs successfully conducted developmental flight tests that demonstrated key capabilities and modifications made to resolve prior issues. MDA also made some improvements to transparency and accountability. For example, MDA improved the management of its acquisition-related efforts to deploy a missile defense system in Europe and MDA continued to improve the clarity of its resource and schedule baselines, which are reported to Congress for oversight.
Although some progress has been made, MDA acquisitions are still high risk, due to inherent technical and integration challenges, tight timeframes, strategies that overlap development and production activities, and incomplete management tools. More specifically:
MDA faces challenges stemming from higher-risk acquisition strategies that overlap production activities with development activities. While some concurrency is understandable, committing to production and fielding before development is complete often results in performance shortfalls, unexpected cost increases, schedule delays, and test problems. GAO found that the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense SM-3 Block IB and Ground-based Midcourse Defense programs, which have already produced some of their assets before completing testing, discovered issues during testing that have affected or continue to affect production.
Testing continues to fall short of goals. For example, the first ever system-level operational flight test failed to demonstrate true integration. MDA also combined, delayed, and deleted some tests, and eliminated test objectives in other tests. These challenges reduced the knowledge they had planned to obtain in order to understand the capabilities and limitations of the BMDS.
MDA has not yet fully developed or implemented a complete management strategy for synchronizing its efforts to deploy missile defense in Europe. As a result, it remains unclear how different European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) efforts are aligned together and what constitutes success in delivering capabilities in Europe.
Issues with the content and presentation of resource and schedule baselines continue to limit their usefulness as management tools. For the fourth year, GAO has found that MDA's cost estimates are unreliable for some BMDS elements and do not include certain costs for military services which may significantly understate total costs. Recently, Congress took steps to require that improvements be made to MDA's cost estimates, so GAO did not make any new cost recommendations. MDA's schedule baselines continue to be presented in a way that makes it difficult to assess progress. For instance, MDA's schedule baselines identify numerous events, but provide little information on the events and why they are important.
What GAO Recommends
In April 2014, GAO recommended that MDA verify any changes needed for the SM-3 Block IB missile through flight testing before approving full production; retest the fielded GMD interceptor to demonstrate performance and the effectiveness of changes; and take actions to improve the clarity of its schedule baselines. DOD partially concurred with the recommendation on the SM-3, stating that MDA will verify the efficacy of any modifications by testing and that the production decision will be vetted through the DOD process. DOD did not agree with the recommendation on GMD, stating that the decision to flight test the interceptor will be made by the Director, MDA, based on the judgment of other stakeholders. GAO previously made recommendations on EPAA and testing. DOD generally concurred with them. GAO continues to believe all recommendations are valid. |
gao_GAO-02-394 | gao_GAO-02-394_0 | Education allocates funds from School-age, Preschool, and Infant Grants to all states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico, based on federal formulas. School-Age and Preschool Grants Are Similar Except for Age Range Served; Infant Grants Differ
School-age and Preschool Grants share the same goal, performance objectives, and performance measures; fund the same range of services; and have similar eligibility requirements except for the age-range served, while Infant Grants differ from these grants in almost all respects. The key distinction between the two grants is that School-age grants serve children ages 3 through 21, whereas Preschool Grants serve only children ages 3 through 5. Whether a local agency receives funds from any one grant depends on whether it is serving the relevant age group. Since they are not required to track such information, none of the 19 states we contacted were able to tell us the percentage of School- age Grant funds they used to provide services for children aged 3 through 5, although officials in several states said that the amount was small. Education requires only that states report the number of children ages 3 through 5 collectively receiving special education and related services under School-age and Preschool Grants. The Pre-Elementary Education Longitudinal Study will follow children who received preschool special education services through their experience in preschool and early elementary school. At the federal level, there is no administrative overlap between School-age and Preschool Grants because Education already administers these grants as if they were one program. May 14, 2001. | What GAO Found
In fiscal year 2001, the federal government spent $7 billion on the following three special education grant programs: Special Education Grants to States (School-age Grants), Special Education Grants Preschool (Preschool Grants) and Special Education Grants for Infants and Families with Disabilities (Infants Grants). School-age and Preschool Grants are similar, except for the age ranges served, while Infant Grants differ in goals, performance objectives, performance measures, eligibility, and services. The key distinction between School-Age and Preschool Grants is that School-age Grants serve children ages three through 21, whereas Preschool Grants serve only children ages three through five. States receive funds from all three grants, and some states report they use both School-age and Preschool funds to provide the same range of services to children aged three through five. Although states receive funds from all three grants, local agencies may receive funds from only one grant, or from all three. Eighteen of the 19 states GAO reviewed reported that the range of services they provide to children ages three through five is the same as those they provide with Preschool Grants. Evaluations show that half the children who received preschool services (mainly speech and language therapy) no longer needed them on reaching school age. Consolidating the two grants would eliminate coordination problems, but it is unclear whether program efficiency would increase. At the federal level, Education is already administering School-age and Preschool Grants as one program. State and local officials said that consolidation would not significantly reduce administrative burden. |
gao_GAO-04-627T | gao_GAO-04-627T_0 | Background
The Broadcasting Board of Governors oversees the efforts of all nonmilitary international broadcasting, which reaches an estimated audience of more than 100 million people each week in more than 125 markets worldwide. Created by the Bush Administration and the Board, the Middle East Television Network draws its mission from the core purpose of U.S. international broadcasting, which is to promote and sustain freedom by broadcasting accurate and objective news and information about the United States and the world to audiences overseas. Currently, 42 of the Board’s 74 language services (or 57 percent) target the same audiences in the same languages. Among the broadcast entities, funds are roughly equally divided among VOA and the four other U.S. broadcasting entities. As we reported in July 2003, the Board has adopted a new approach to broadcasting that is designed to overcome several of these challenges. To address this problem, the Board has adopted a “single system” approach to broadcasting whereby broadcast entities are viewed as content providers and the Board assumes a central role in tailoring this content to meet the demands of individual markets. Recent Board initiatives such as Radio Sawa and Alhurra have addressed these deficiencies in priority markets and the Board has required that all broadcast services, to the extent feasible, address these issues as well. New Initiatives Address Marketing Challenges
The Board’s strategic plan comments openly on the marketing challenges facing U.S. international broadcasters, including that many language services lack a unique reason for listeners or viewers to tune in; few language services have identified their target audience—a key first step in developing a broadcast strategy; many language services have outmoded formats and programs with an antiquated, even Cold War, sound and style; and three-quarters of transmitted hours have poor or fair signal quality. Language Service Review Used to Reallocate Millions to Higher Priority Broadcast Needs
The Board manages its limited resources through its annual language service review process which is used to address such issues as how resources should be allocated among services based on their priority and impact, how many broadcast services should be carried in total, what degree of overlap and content duplication should exist among services, and whether services should be eliminated because they have fulfilled their broadcast mission. Since 1999, the Board has identified more than $50 million in actual or potential savings through the language service review process by moving resources from lower to higher priority services, by eliminating language services, and by reducing language service overlap and transmission costs. Strategic Planning and Performance Management System Revised to Place a Greater Focus on Results
Mr. Chairman, the Board has revised its strategic planning and performance management system to respond to the recommendations in our July 2003 report aimed at improving the measurement of its results. Our report also recommended that the Board establish key performance indicators relating to the perceived credibility of U.S. broadcasters, whether audiences are aware of U.S. broadcast offerings in their area, and whether VOA is achieving its mission of effectively explaining U.S. policies and practices to overseas audiences. Reaching Large Audiences in Key Markets
In response to our recommendation for a goal that would measure progress in reaching large audiences in markets of strategic interest to the United States, the Board replaced the seven strategic goals in its plan with a single goal focused on this core objective. | Why GAO Did This Study
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, were a dramatic reminder of the importance of cultivating a better understanding of the United States and our policies with overseas audiences. U.S. public diplomacy activities include the efforts of the Broadcasting Board of Governors, which oversees all nonmilitary U.S. international broadcasting by the Voice of America (VOA) and several other broadcast entities. Such broadcasting helps promote a better understanding of the United States and serves U.S. interests by providing overseas audiences with accurate and objective news about the United States and the world. GAO has issued three reports over the past 4 years examining the organizational, marketing, resource, and performance reporting challenges faced by the Board. Our recommendations to the Board have included the need to address the long-standing issue of overlapping language services (that is, where two services broadcast in the same language to the same audience) and to strengthen the Board's strategic planning and performance by placing a greater emphasis on results. The Board has taken significant steps to respond to these and other recommendations.
What GAO Found
The Broadcasting Board of Governors has responded to a disparate organizational structure and marketing challenges by developing a new strategic approach to broadcasting which, among other things, emphasizes reaching large audiences through modern broadcasting techniques. The existence of five separate broadcast entities has led to overlapping language services, duplication of program content, redundant newsgathering and support services, and difficulties coordinating broadcast efforts. The Board's new approach seeks to overcome these problems by treating all broadcast entities as part of a "single system" it oversees to ensure that broadcast content meets the needs of individual markets. Other challenges include a lack of target audiences within broadcast markets, outmoded program formats and styles, poor signal delivery in many areas, and low audience awareness in several major markets. The Board's approach calls for new initiatives (such as Radio Sawa broadcasts to the Middle East) and existing language services to systematically address these deficiencies. To streamline its operations, the Board has used its annual language service review to address such issues as how resources should be allocated among language services on the basis of their priority and impact, what degree of overlap should exist among services, and whether services should be eliminated because they have fulfilled their broadcast mission. Since 1999, the Board has identified more than $50 million in actual or potential savings through this process. In response to our recommendations on the Board's strategic planning and performance management efforts, the Board revised its strategic plan to make reaching large audiences in strategic markets the centerpiece of its performance reporting system. The Board also added broadcaster credibility and audience awareness to its array of performance measures and plans to add a measure of whether VOA is meeting its mandated mission. |
gao_GAO-01-401 | gao_GAO-01-401_0 | Background
Task Force Hawk deployed to Albania in April 1999 as part of Operation Allied Force. However, the government of Macedonia would not allow combat operations to be conducted from its territory. 1.) The task force was a unique Army organization. Typically, attack helicopters are used in conjunction with Army ground forces to engage massed formations of enemy armor. See appendix V.
We determined the status of each of the 107 lessons learned as of January 2001. In progress: We placed 60 lessons in this category. One was the need for the Army and the Air Force to work together better jointly. A third area that the Army and the Air Force had difficulty with was targeting. Improvements Are Needed in Interoperability
The second major theme that emerged from the lessons learned was the interoperability of the command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence equipment. Matter for Congressional Consideration
To ensure that the Army maintains the momentum to take actions to resolve Task Force Hawk lessons learned, the Congress may want to consider requiring the Army to report on remedial actions taken to implement Task Force Hawk lessons. Scope and Methodology
To determine how Task Force Hawk’s concept of operation compared to existing Army and joint doctrine, we reviewed Army and Joint Staff doctrine publications and were briefed on existing deep attack doctrine at the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command and the Army’s Aviation School. | What GAO Found
The Army deployed its team, called Task Force Hawk, to participate in a Kosovo combat operation known as Operation Allied Force. This report (1) examines how Task Force Hawk's concept of operation compared to Army and joint doctrine, (2) reviews the lessons learned identified from the operation and determines the status of actions to address those lessons, and (3) examines the extent to which the Army and the Air Force were able to operate together as a joint force. GAO concludes that Task Force Hawk's deep attacks against Serbian forces in Kosovo was consistent with doctrine, but was not typical in that the task force was supporting an air campaign rather than its more traditional role of being used in conjunction with Army ground forces to engage massed formations of enemy armor. The Army identified 107 items that require remedial action. As of January 2001, 47 of the 107 items had been recommended for closure. Action is in process for the remaining 60 lessons. Finally, the Army and the Air Force experienced significant problems in their ability to work together jointly and the interoperability of the command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence equipment used during the operation. The Army is working on both issues aggressively. However, it will take time for results to be seen. |
gao_OIMC-95-8 | gao_OIMC-95-8_0 | 2. Objectives
To implement reforms in the job management process that result in a reduction in average cycle time to produce a “product” by 100 days. To quantify the expected staff time (and cost) savings resulting from the process improvements. To identify additional opportunities that will dramatically reduce cycle time and reduce staff-days required. Section 3 provides more details on the roles and the responsibilities of the teams. The members of the Job Process Reengineering Team will also participate in the project teams. 3. In addition, the Team will be responsible for identifying the barriers to change and developing a change management plan; developing and executing a communication plan; executing an activity analysis to determine how people currently spend developing the transition plan, including establishing performance measures; and identifying and prioritizing further opportunities for process reengineering. What are the process triggers and outcomes? | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO described its strategy to implement job process reforms and the roles and responsibilities of the project's key personnel.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that the objectives of the project are to: (1) implement reforms in the job management process that result in a reduction in average production time; (2) quantify the expected staff time and cost savings resulting from the process improvements; and (3) identify additional opportunities that will dramatically reduce cycle time and reduce the staff-days required to produce a product. GAO also noted that the Job Process Reengineering Team is responsible for: (1) implementing the process reforms identified by the Job Process Management Owners; (2) identifying the barriers to change and developing a change management plan; (3) developing and executing a communications plan; (4) executing an activity analysis to determine how people currently spend their time; (5) developing the transition plan and establishing performance measures; and (6) identifying and prioritizing further opportunities for process reengineering. |
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