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gao_GAO-12-991 | gao_GAO-12-991_0 | Individual Customers Tended to Be Net Winners, While Transaction Patterns for Individuals and Institutions Were Generally Similar
In our analysis of information obtained from the Trustee, we identified 7,994 accounts with at least one transaction. We found that individuals held more than three-fourths (77 percent) of accounts, while almost one-quarter (23 percent) of accounts were held by institutions, such as charities, pension funds, and feeder funds. Using these groupings, we further examined the account holders’ claims outcomes—whether they were net winners or net losers—and the pattern of their transactions leading up to the Madoff firm’s collapse. Accounts Held by Individuals Tended to Be Net Winners
As shown in table 2, our analysis indicates that a higher proportion of accounts held by individuals (60 percent) were net winners that had withdrawn more than they had deposited over the lifetime of their accounts, compared to accounts held by institutions (50 percent). We also found that more institutional accounts (40 percent) were net losers than were individual accounts (29 percent). Individual and Institutional Accounts Had Similar Patterns of Deposits and Withdrawals
Our analysis found that individual and institutional accounts had similar deposit and withdrawal activity throughout the 27-year period we examined, including during the period immediately before the failure in 2008. Instead, they had invested in feeder funds or other vehicles that owned the accounts at the firm. Of the allowed claims, the majority were filed by net losers, meaning they had withdrawn less from their account than they had invested. For example, 10 (less than 1 percent of all claims) net winner claims were allowed. Trustee Has Been Pursuing Hundreds of Lawsuits to Recover Assets
The Madoff Trustee is pursuing various litigation to recover assets from customers and others that can be used to reimburse those customers that have allowable claims under SIPA. For those customers that withdrew fictitious profits in excess of their investments—net winners—the Trustee is pursuing more than a thousand lawsuits to recover these funds as allowed under federal bankruptcy law and state law. The Trustee Has Filed Hundreds of Actions to Recover Excess Withdrawals from Customers Not Claimed to Have Known of the Fraud
According to our review, the Trustee has filed 1,002 actions seeking to recover $3.5 billion from Madoff customers that were net winners but that are not alleged to have had knowledge of the fraud or been in a position to know about it—referred to by the Trustee as “good faith” defendants. As of April 2012, the Trustee had entered into 441 settlement agreements in which the opposing parties agreed to return about $8.4 billion—an amount equal to about 49 percent of the approximately $17.3 billion in principal investments lost by customers who filed claims. This compares to a typical claim taking 3 months or more. Effects of the Fraud on Income Tax Revenues Cannot Be Determined, and New Guidance on Clawbacks Could Reduce Taxpayer Errors
Because the Madoff fraud affects customers’ taxable income, it also affects federal tax collections by the U.S. Treasury. Tax experts expressed concerns about the lack of clarity over how payments stemming from fraud-related avoidance actions, or clawbacks, filed by the Trustee will be treated for tax purposes. After we identified concerns to IRS that lack of guidance could lead to taxpayer errors resulting in over- or underpayment of taxes, the agency issued such guidance. Other deductions. However, he said he did provide information to IRS and the U.S. Department of Labor. Subsequently, IRS on September 5, 2012, issued such guidance, in the form of “frequently asked questions” on how to treat clawbacks, which were posted to the agency’s website. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report discusses (1) the extent to which account activity varied by type of customer of the failed Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities, LLC firm; (2) the nature of claims filed, and rejected or approved, with the Trustee for reimbursement of losses following the firm’s failure due to fraud; (3) litigation and settlement activity the Trustee has pursued during the subsequent liquidation of the firm, in seeking to recover assets for distribution to customers; and (4) the effect of the Madoff fraud on customers’ federal income tax liabilities, including the effect on amounts that would have been due if investor losses had been based on customers’ reported final statement holdings. These included: lawsuits against net winners that are not alleged to have had knowledge of the fraud or been in a position to know about it—referred to by the Trustee as “good faith” defendants; lawsuits against individuals and entities the Trustee argues knew or should have known about the fraud—referred to by the Trustee as “bad faith” defendants; lawsuits against investment vehicles that collected funds from investors and invested them with the Madoff firm; and agreements the Trustee has reached to settle a number of the actions he has filed as part of his asset recovery efforts. We also interviewed Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) officials and executives of the Securities Investor Protection Corp. (SIPC) for their views on conduct of Madoff-related litigation. | Why GAO Did This Study
After the collapse of Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities, LLC--a brokerdealer and investment advisory firm with thousands of individual and institutional clients--the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC), which oversees a fund providing up to $500,000 of protection to qualifying individual customers of failed securities firms, selected a trustee to liquidate the Madoff firm and recover assets for its customers. In March 2012, GAO issued GAO-12-414 , which examined selection of the Trustee, his method for determining customer claims, and expenses of the liquidation, among other things. This report discusses (1) the extent to which account activity varied by type of Madoff customer, (2) the nature of claims filed, and rejected or approved, with the Trustee for reimbursement of losses, (3) litigation and settlement activity the Trustee has pursued in seeking to recover assets for distribution to customers, and (4) the effect of the fraud on customers' federal income tax liabilities. GAO reviewed transaction and claims data from the Trustee, lawsuits filed by the Trustee, IRS rules and guidance, and interviewed the Trustee, private sector tax experts, and officials from IRS, SIPC, and the Securities and Exchange Commission.
What GAO Found
GAO's analysis of Madoff account data shows that more than three-fourths of the firm's customers were individuals and families (individuals). The remaining accounts were held by institutions, such as pension funds and charities. A higher proportion of accounts held by an individual (60 percent) were "net winners" based on their net equity position--meaning they had withdrawn more from their accounts than they had deposited--compared to accounts held by institutions (50 percent). Correspondingly, 40 percent of institutional accounts were "net losers" that had deposited more into their accounts than they had withdrawn, compared to 29 percent of individuals' accounts that were net losers. However, individual and institutional accounts had similar deposit and withdrawal activity from 1981 through 2008, including increased withdrawals immediately before the firm's failure in December 2008.
GAO's analysis shows that the Trustee's decisions to accept or reject claims were similar for individual and institutional account holders. Of the more than 16,000 claims, about 66 percent were denied because the customers were not direct account holders of the Madoff firm, but instead had invested in funds or other vehicles that held accounts directly with the firm. For the remaining claimants who were directly invested, the Trustee generally used the customers' net investment positions--that is, whether they were net winners or net losers-- to determine claims. In examining claims decisions by customer type, GAO found the Trustee denied claims filed by individuals and institutions determined to be net winners in similar proportions. Similarly, most claims filed by individuals or institutions determined to be net losers were allowed.
The Trustee has been pursuing litigation to recover, or "claw back," assets from net winner customers and others that can be used to reimburse customers that did not withdraw all of their principal investments. For those customers that withdrew fictitious profits--net winners--the Trustee has been pursuing more than 1,000 lawsuits to recover funds, as allowed under federal bankruptcy law and state law. In about 60 suits, the Trustee has sought more than fictitious profits, to include principal or other funds received, arguing the parties knew or should have known of the fraud. Thus far, the Trustee said he has recovered about $9.1 billion of the $17.3 billion in principal investments lost by customers who filed claims, including $8.4 billion from settlement agreements.
Because the Madoff fraud affects customers' taxable income, it also affects tax collections by the Department of the Treasury. Under Internal Revenue Service (IRS) rules, Madoff customers can deduct lost principal and fictitious profits on which they paid taxes while holding their accounts. However, IRS does not maintain statistics on specific frauds or their impacts on tax collections, and the tax impact may be reduced because some taxpayers may not be able to fully use this tax relief, such as those that lack other income that can be offset by these deductions. Tax experts expressed concerns about the lack of clarity over how payments stemming from fraud-related avoidance actions filed by the Trustee will be treated for tax purposes. In response to a recommendation in a draft report that IRS provide guidance to help limit taxpayer errors resulting in over- or underpayment of taxes, the agency issued such guidance on September 5, 2012, in the form of "frequently asked questions" posted to its website. |
gao_GAO-16-359 | gao_GAO-16-359_0 | Figure 3 depicts program components. Accordingly, we designated information security as a government-wide high risk area in 1997 and it has remained on our high-risk list since then. As of December 2015, the agency had implemented 2 recommendations and was working to address the remaining 9. NOAA Continues to Develop JPSS, but Selected Components Have Experienced Milestone Delays, Cost Growth, and Risks
Over the last year, the JPSS program has continued to make progress in developing the JPSS-1 satellite. However, the program has continued to experience delays in meeting interim milestones. The JPSS ground system also has experienced recent delays. These have not yet been resolved. However, the program has yet to fully implement the best practices and policies established by the organization, and shortfalls exist in each of the remaining areas. For example, while the program has established plans of action to address control weaknesses, it has not addressed systemic critical issues in a timely manner. Selection and Implementation of Security Controls: The JPSS Program Established a System Security Plan, but Has Not Fully Implemented a Significant Number of Key Controls
In accordance with NOAA policy and NIST guidance, the JPSS program established a System Security Plan for its ground system that identifies the key security controls it plans to implement based on its system security categorization and impact analyses. Specifically, the assessment team reported that it did not have all of the information it needed to plan or test the entire system and its artifacts. NOAA Made Progress in Assessing the Potential for a Satellite Data Gap and Has Improved Efforts to Plan and Implement Gap Mitigation Activities
Over the last year, NOAA made progress in assessing the potential for a satellite gap, improved its satellite gap mitigation plan, and completed multiple mitigation activities; however, key shortfalls remain on these efforts. NOAA Data Show That a Near-Term Gap Is Unlikely, but Weaknesses Remain in Underlying Analysis; the Program Plans to Perform an Additional Assessment
We previously reported that NOAA was facing a potential near-term gap in polar data between the expected end of useful life of the S-NPP satellite and the beginning of operation of the JPSS-1 satellite. The program did this to get regular updates on the health of individual satellites and to help plan future satellite programs and launch dates. These four instruments are environmental sensors that provide critical data used in numerical weather prediction and imagery. Until NOAA ensures that its plans for future polar satellite development are based on the full range of estimated lives of potential satellites, the agency may not be making the most efficient use of the nation’s sizable investment in the polar satellite program. Although the JPSS program has assessed key risks, established and evaluated security controls, and remediated selected control weaknesses, key deficiencies remain. We will continue to monitor NOAA’s ongoing efforts to address our prior recommendations. While NOAA is planning a follow-on polar satellite program to better ensure polar satellite coverage in the future, the agency has not evaluated the costs and benefits of different launch scenarios based on its updated understanding of how long its satellites might last, and uncertainties remain in determining appropriate dates for the development and launch of the satellites. NOAA concurred with all four of our recommendations and identified steps it is taking to implement them. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) evaluate the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA) progress on the Joint Polar Satellite System (JPSS) program with respect to schedule, cost, and key risks; (2) assess NOAA’s efforts to plan and implement appropriate information security protections for polar satellite data; (3) evaluate NOAA’s efforts to assess the probability of a near-term gap in polar satellite data, as well as its progress in implementing key activities for mitigating a gap; and (4) assess NOAA’s efforts to plan and implement a follow-on polar satellite program. | Why GAO Did This Study
NOAA established the JPSS program in 2010 to replace aging polar satellites and provide critical environmental data used in forecasting the weather. However, the potential exists for a gap in satellite data if the current satellite fails before the next one is operational. Because of this risk and the potential impact of a gap on the health and safety of the U.S. population and economy, GAO added this issue to its High Risk list in 2013, and it remained on the list in 2015.
GAO was asked to review the JPSS program. GAO's objectives were to (1) evaluate progress on the program, (2) assess efforts to implement appropriate information security protections for polar satellite data, (3) evaluate efforts to assess and mitigate a potential near-term gap in polar satellite data, and (4) assess agency plans for a follow-on polar satellite program. To do so, GAO analyzed program status reports, milestone reviews, and risk data; assessed security policies and procedures against agency policy and best practices; examined contingency plans and actions, as well as planning documents for future satellites; and interviewed experts as well as agency and contractor officials.
What GAO Found
The $11.3 billion Joint Polar Satellite System (JPSS) program has continued to make progress in developing the JPSS-1 satellite for a March 2017 launch. However, the program has experienced recent delays in meeting interim milestones, including a key instrument on the spacecraft that was delivered almost 2 years later than planned. In addition, the program has experienced cost growth ranging from 1 to 16 percent on selected components, and it is working to address selected risks that have the potential to delay the launch date.
Although the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) established information security policies in key areas recommended by the National Institute of Standards and Technology, the JPSS program has not yet fully implemented them. Specifically, the program categorized the JPSS ground system as a high-impact system, and selected and implemented multiple relevant security controls. However, the program has not yet fully implemented almost half of the recommended security controls, did not have all of the information it needed when assessing security controls, and has not addressed key vulnerabilities in a timely manner (see figure). Until NOAA addresses these weaknesses, the JPSS ground system remains at high risk of compromise.
NOAA has made progress in assessing and mitigating a near-term satellite data gap. GAO previously reported on weaknesses in NOAA's analysis of the health of its existing satellites and its gap mitigation plan. The agency improved both its assessment and its plan; however, key weaknesses remain. For example, the agency anticipates that it will be able to have selected instruments on the next satellite ready for use in operations 3 months after launch, which may be optimistic given past experience. GAO is continuing to monitor NOAA's progress in addressing prior recommendations.
Looking ahead, NOAA has begun planning for new satellites to ensure data continuity. This program would include two new JPSS satellites and a smaller interim satellite. However, uncertainties remain on the expected useful lives of the current satellites, and NOAA has not evaluated the costs and benefits of different launch scenarios based on up-to-date estimates. Until it does so, NOAA may not be making the most efficient use of the nation's sizable investment in the polar satellite program.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that NOAA take steps to address deficiencies in its information security program and complete key program planning actions needed to justify and move forward on a follow-on polar satellite program. NOAA concurred with GAO's recommendations and identified steps it is taking to address them. |
gao_GAO-06-263 | gao_GAO-06-263_0 | Background
Primarily out of concern that noise from air tours over national park units could impair visitors’ experiences and park unit resources, the Congress passed the National Parks Air Tour Management Act of 2000 to regulate air tours conducted over national park units. To implement the act, FAA and the Park Service must, among other things: establish an advisory group to provide continuing advice and counsel on air tours over and near national park units; establish an ATMP at any national park unit whenever an air tour operator applies for authority to conduct an air tour over the park unit; grant interim operating authority to existing air tour operators to provide annual authorizations to operators until 180 days after an ATMP is developed at the relevant park unit; develop an open, competitive process for air tour operators interested in providing air tours over a park unit whenever an ATMP limits the number of air tours during a specified time frame; include incentives in an ATMP for air tour operators to adopt technology that makes aircraft quieter for tours over park units; and submit a report to Congress by April 5, 2002, on the effectiveness of the act in providing incentives for the development and use of quiet aircraft technology. FAA and the Park Service Have Begun to Implement the Act, but No ATMPs Have Been Completed
FAA and the Park Service have taken steps to implement the act, but implementation has been slow and some of the act’s key requirements have not been addressed. While agency officials expect to develop ATMPs more quickly in the future now that they have drafted an implementation plan, they acknowledge that issues must still be addressed before the first ATMP is completed. Act’s Implementation Has Limited Air Tour Operators’ Ability to Make Major Business Decisions but Had Little Effect on National Park Units
FAA and the Park Service’s implementation of the act has limited the ability of air tour operators to make major decisions, such as expanding or selling their businesses. Furthermore, air tour operators face uncertainty about whether they can legally transfer their authority to conduct air tours. In contrast to these effects on operators, the implementation of the act has so far had little effect on the 112 national park units we surveyed in July 2005. Another 33 (29 percent) and 34 (30 percent) park units responded that they were uncertain or did not know the effect, positive or negative, respectively. Regarding the act’s requirement that FAA and the Park service establish ATMPs at all park units where applications for operating authority are made, 53 (47 percent) park units responded in the survey that they need an ATMP to mitigate or prevent potential adverse impacts on park unit resources, visitor experiences, and air safety. Issues Remain to Improve Implementation and Enforcement of the Act
We identified four key issues to be addressed by the Congress and the agencies to improve implementation of the act: (1) a lack of flexibility for determining which park units should develop ATMPs, (2) an absence of Park Service funding for its share of ATMP development costs, (3) limited ability to verify and enforce the number of air tours, and (4) FAA’s inadequate guidance concerning the act’s safety requirements. If some park units find that they do not need ATMPs, then the agencies will save federal dollars if they have the option of not developing such plans. Absence of Park Service Funding for Its Share of ATMP Development Costs
The Park Service has not funded its share of the cost of developing ATMPs, despite its agreement with FAA to fund 40 percent of this effort. As a result, the agencies are limited in their ability to enforce the act. FAA’s Inadequate Guidance Concerning the Act’s Safety Requirements
FAA has not instructed its flight standards district offices or air tour operators on how to interpret and enforce the act’s requirements for Part 91 operators, which are now required to meet the safety standards of Part 135 regulations. 11. Since the National Parks Air Tour Management Act was passed in 2000, to what extent has the implementation of the Act had a negative effect on your Park Unit? 6. | Why GAO Did This Study
Primarily because of concerns that noise from air tours over national parks could impair visitors' experiences and park resources, Congress passed the National Parks Air Tour Management Act of 2000 to regulate air tours. The act requires the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the National Park Service to develop air tour management plans for all parks where air tour operators apply to conduct tours. A plan may establish controls over tours, such as routes, altitudes, time of day restrictions, and/or a maximum number of flights for a given period; or ban all air tours. GAO was asked to (1) determine the status of FAA and the Park Service's implementation of the act; (2) assess how the air tour operators and national parks have been affected by implementation; and (3) identify what issues, if any, need to be addressed to improve implementation.
What GAO Found
FAA and the Park Service have taken some steps to implement the National Parks Air Tour Management Act, but almost 6 years after its passage, the required air tour management plans have not been completed. FAA issued regulations implementing the act and the agencies began developing plans at nine parks. But implementation has been slow, in part, because FAA needed to address airline security after the September 11, 2001, attacks and because the two agencies disagreed over how to comply with environmental laws. Agency officials expect that future plans will be developed more quickly since they have drafted an implementation plan to guide their development. Nevertheless, because no plans have been completed, it is unclear how some of the act's key requirements will be addressed, such as creating incentives for air tour operators to adopt quiet aircraft technology. FAA and the Park Service's slow implementation of the act has limited the ability of air tour operators to make major decisions, such as expanding or selling their businesses, while it has had little effect on the parks. For example, operators have been unable to increase their number of air tours beyond their pre-2000 levels or expand to additional parks. Also, air tour operators face uncertainty about whether they can legally transfer their authority to conduct air tours. In contrast, the implementation of the act has so far had little effect on the 112 national parks we surveyed. Most of the parks responded that they had not experienced any positive or negative effect of the implementation of the act, or that they were uncertain or did not know the extent of the effect. Nonetheless, 47 percent responded that their park could benefit by having a plan to mitigate or prevent potential adverse impacts on park resources, visitor experiences, and air safety. GAO identified four key issues that need to be addressed to improve implementation of the act. Lack of flexibility for determining which parks should develop plans: Not all parks required to develop a plan may need one because they have few air tours or are more affected by other types of flights. Yet, the act does not provide the agencies with any flexibility to exclude some parks. Absence of Park Service funding for its share of plan development costs: The Park Service has not requested nor received funding for its share of the costs of developing plans. Limited ability to verify and enforce the number of air tours: Air tour operators are not required to report the number of tours they conduct. As a result, the agencies are limited in their ability to enforce the act. Based on information provided by operators, GAO found some operators had inappropriately exceeded their number of authorized tours. FAA's inadequate guidance concerning the act's safety requirements: FAA has not instructed its district offices or air tour operators on how to interpret the act's requirement that operators meet a specified level of safety certification. |
gao_GAO-07-79 | gao_GAO-07-79_0 | The Joint Commission Has a Close Relationship with JCR through Their Governance Structure and Operations
The mission statements of the Joint Commission and JCR both share the same phrase of seeking “to continuously improve the safety and quality of care.” While each organization differs in the activities it engages in to achieve that mission, they maintain a close relationship through both their governance structure and operations. This committee is charged with monitoring compliance with the firewall and related policies. The Joint Commission and JCR Provide Operational Assistance to One Another
The structure of the Joint Commission and JCR allows the two organizations to provide certain operational assistance to one another. The Joint Commission provides support and management services to JCR. The Joint Commission and JCR Have Taken Steps to Prevent the Improper Exchange of Facility-Specific Information
The Joint Commission and JCR have taken steps, primarily since 2003, designed to strengthen the firewall guidance initially developed in 1987, shortly after the creation of JCR. The stated purpose of both organizations’ firewall policies is “to eliminate any real or perceived conflict of interest” between the Joint Commission’s accreditation activities and JCR’s consulting services. The Joint Commission’s role in accrediting the majority of hospitals participating in Medicare makes the issue of ensuring the independence of the Joint Commission’s accreditation process vitally important. V.) CMS did not comment on our findings or concluding observations. Both the Joint Commission and CMS provided us with technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
We examined the relationship between the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (Joint Commission) and Joint Commission Resources, Inc. (JCR) as it relates to the independence of the Joint Commissions’ hospital accreditation process from JCR’s hospital consulting services. To describe the policies the Joint Commission and JCR have developed to prevent the improper sharing of facility-specific information, we reviewed Joint Commission and JCR documents, including current and past policies and guidance related, either directly or indirectly, to the firewall. As part of our work, we also interviewed staff at the Department of Health and Human Services’ Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services to obtain information on their oversight of the Joint Commission and other accreditation organizations. | Why GAO Did This Study
Hospitals must meet certain conditions of participation established by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) in order to receive Medicare payments. In 2003, most hospitals--over 80 percent--demonstrated compliance with most of these conditions through accreditation from the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (Joint Commission). Established in 1986, Joint Commission Resources, Inc. (JCR), a nonprofit affiliate of the Joint Commission, provides consultative technical assistance services to hospitals. Both organizations acknowledge the need to ensure that JCR's services do not--and are not perceived to--affect the independence of the Joint Commission's accreditation process. GAO was asked to provide information on the relationship between the Joint Commission and JCR. This report describes (1) their organizational relationship, and (2) the significant steps they have taken to prevent the improper sharing of information, obtained through their accreditation and consulting activities, respectively, since JCR was established. GAO reviewed pertinent documents, including conflict-of-interest policies and information about the organizations' financial relationship, and interviewed staff and board members from both organizations, JCR clients, and CMS officials.
What GAO Found
The Joint Commission and JCR have a close relationship as demonstrated through their governance structure and operations. The Joint Commission has substantial control over JCR and the two organizations provide operational services to one another. For example, JCR manages all Joint Commission publications, while the Joint Commission provides support services to JCR. Despite the Joint Commission's control over JCR, the two organizations have taken steps designed to protect facility-specific information. In 1987, the organizations created a firewall--policies designed to establish a barrier between the organizations to prevent improper sharing of this information. For example, the firewall is intended to prevent JCR from sharing the names of hospital clients with the Joint Commission. Beginning in 2003, both organizations began taking steps intended to strengthen this firewall, such as enhancing monitoring of compliance. Ensuring the independence of the Joint Commission's accreditation process is vitally important. To prevent the improper sharing of facility-specific information, it would be prudent for the Joint Commission and JCR to continue to assess the firewall and other related mechanisms. The Joint Commission agreed with GAO's concluding observations. CMS did not comment on GAO's findings or concluding observations. Both provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-07-1163T | gao_GAO-07-1163T_0 | The excise taxes are associated with purchases of airline tickets and aviation fuel, as well as the shipment of cargo, and most are scheduled to expire September 30, 2007. It provides all of the funding for three of FAA’s four accounts, including (1) the Facilities and Equipment (F&E) account, which funds technological improvements to the air traffic control system; (2) the Research, Engineering, and Development (RE&D) account, which funds research on issues related to aviation safety, mobility, and the environment as well as most of FAA’s contribution to JPDO; and (3) the Airport Improvement Program (AIP), which provides grants for construction and safety projects at airports. Estimates Indicate That Current Funding Structure Can Support FAA Activities, Including NextGen, but Structure Raises Concerns about Equity and Efficiency
The current funding structure—excise taxes plus a General Fund contribution—has funded FAA for many years, and estimates indicate that this structure can potentially provide sufficient funds for the next several years to support the transition to NextGen. Policy choices, structural changes in the aviation industry, and external events have affected revenues flowing into and out of the fund. According to projections prepared by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), the existing funding structure, if maintained, will generate substantially increasing revenues over the next decade. Assuming that the General Fund provides about 19 percent of FAA’s budget, CBO estimates that through 2017 the Trust Fund can support about $22 billion in additional spending over the baseline FAA spending levels CBO has calculated for FAA (the 2006 funding level, growing with inflation) provided that most of that spending occurs after 2010. For example, Congress could raise more revenue from airspace system users for modernization or for other purposes by raising the rates on one or more of the current excise taxes. Congress could also provide more General Fund revenues for FAA, although the nation’s fiscal imbalance may make a larger contribution from this source difficult. Some stakeholders have also raised concerns that the current funding system does not provide aircraft operators with incentives to use FAA services in the most efficient manner. Other issues include the cost savings that might result from more efficient FAA operations and acquisition processes, which could reduce the need for new NextGen funding, and the extent to which FAA uses public-private partnerships or leasing arrangements to acquire NextGen infrastructure as flexibly and cost-effectively as possible. JPDO is also developing an Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Exhibit 300 for NextGen that will be used as input to funding decisions for NextGen research and development and acquisitions across JPDO’s partner agencies. Selected Proposals for Funding Aviation Activities Could Generate More Revenue but Could Also Lead to Unintended Consequences
Several proposals, including a recommendation from a House committee and selected provisions of the House and Senate reauthorization bills, specify different types of revenue sources to fund FAA and NextGen. If these rate increases are enacted, the fuel taxes would provide additional revenue to the Trust Fund. These calculations assume that the increased PFC would not affect passenger demand for air travel. H.R. H.R. 2881 includes new and increased user fees to pay for the costs of certain certification and registration activities of FAA. The proposal would raise the fee to $130 and allow FAA to periodically adjust this and other fees based on the cost of providing the service. However, in general, when fees are imposed for aviation activities, care must be taken to ensure that efforts to avoid the fees do not compromise safety. S. 1300 includes a provision requiring the FAA Administrator to impose a surcharge of $25 per flight to be available to pay the costs of NextGen capital projects. Advocates of this approach say that funding FAA in part through such a charge would do more than the current structure to ensure that revenues are adequate to cover costs over time and to create incentives for efficient use of the national airspace system by directly connecting charges with the costs imposed by users. Another S. 1300 provision would grant FAA the authority to seek debt financing by issuing bonds directly to the private capital market. However, from a governmentwide perspective, some approaches, such as bonding, raise serious concerns because they ultimately will result in higher overall costs. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) operates one of the safest air transportation systems in the world, but this system is under growing strain as the demand for air travel increases. Recognizing the need to transform this system, Congress created the Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO), housed within FAA, to plan and develop the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen). The current authorization for FAA, the Airport and Airway Trust Fund (Trust Fund), and most of the excise taxes that support the Trust Fund will expire September 30, 2007. Several proposals, including two reauthorization bills--H.R. 2881 and S. 1300--identify various funding sources for FAA activities, including NextGen. Among these are current excise taxes, fees, and flight surcharges. Concerned about the need for stable, sustainable financing for the nation's multibillion-dollar transportation infrastructure investments, including NextGen, GAO has designated transportation financing as high risk. GAO's statement addresses (1) the extent to which the current funding structure can support FAA's activities, including NextGen, (2) issues that could affect the overall cost of NextGen, and (3) the implications of selected proposals to fund aviation activities. The statement is based on recent GAO reports and testimonies.
What GAO Found
Recent estimates indicate that FAA's current funding structure--consisting primarily of Trust Fund revenues plus a contribution from the General Fund of the U.S. Treasury--can potentially support FAA's activities, including NextGen. The current structure has provided sufficient funding for FAA's activities to date, and both FAA and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) have estimated that revenues will continue to increase. According to CBO projections through 2017, the current structure, if maintained, could support about $22 billion in additional spending over current spending levels (adjusted for inflation). Congress could also raise more revenue for FAA by raising excise tax rates or by increasing the General Fund contribution. However, contributions from the General Fund may be limited by the federal government's long-term fiscal imbalance, and policy choices, structural changes in the aviation industry, and external events could affect Trust Fund revenues. Furthermore, the current funding structure raises concerns about equity and efficiency because users may pay more or less than the costs of the air traffic control services they receive, and therefore they may lack incentives to use the national airspace system as efficiently as possible. Issues that could affect the overall cost of NextGen are primarily related to the content and cost of its infrastructure and research and development. JPDO is developing and has issued some key planning documents that will provide more insights into some of these issues, but questions remain over which entities will perform activities such as research and development. Other issues include the cost savings that could result from more efficient FAA operations and acquisition processes, which could reduce the need for new NextGen funding, and the extent to which public-private partnerships and leasing can be used to acquire NextGen infrastructure as flexibly and cost-effectively as possible. Selected proposals for funding aviation activities could generate more revenue, but could also lead to unintended consequences. For example, a House committee recommendation to raise general aviation fuel tax rates could increase Trust fund revenue, but might reduce fuel purchases, which would limit the amount of the revenue increase. H.R. 2881 would raise airport passenger facility charges, mainly benefiting larger airports, and would establish or increase fees for certain FAA certification and registration activities. However, when fees are imposed for aviation activities, care must be taken to ensure that efforts to avoid the fees do not compromise safety. S. 1300 would authorize a surcharge of $25 per flight on many flights to help pay for NextGen capital projects. While a surcharge would create an incentive for efficient use of air traffic services, some stakeholders raise the possibility that such a fee could lead to reduced air service for small communities. S. 1300 would also allow FAA to seek debt financing for capital projects in the private capital market--a proposal designed to create a stable revenue source but resulting in higher interest costs than borrowing from the U.S. Treasury. |
gao_GAO-09-386 | gao_GAO-09-386_0 | Donations Have Provided Significant Support to Park Programs and Projects, and Partnerships Amplify These Donations with Intangible Benefits
Donations from nonprofit partners and corporations have provided significant support to park programs and projects, including interpretation and education, repair and rehabilitation of facilities, and cultural resource management and protection, among others. In addition, related partnerships have amplified the value of those donations with countless other benefits that go beyond dollar values or a simple tally of projects. For example, some partners said their donations supported construction of new facilities. From 2005 through 2008, friends groups contributed over $100 million for at least six construction projects. In addition, the Park Service has improved its partnership construction process in response to past accountability concerns, but some gaps remain. Donations and Fund- raising Policy Requirements Address Key Areas, but Weaknesses Remain in Implementation
The Park Service’s donations and fund-raising policy requirements address key areas to protect the agency against risk, but their effect is diminished because parks and partners do not always follow them; ambiguities in the policy create challenges for parks and partners attempting to follow it; and the agency lacks a systematic, comprehensive approach for monitoring conformance. The agency has made progress on some but not all of these recommendations (see table 5). Still, gaps remain, leaving the agency vulnerable to risks in some situations. And by further refining its information on donations, it could support such an approach while also enhancing its accountability. Also, by increasing employees’ knowledge and skills in working with nonprofit and philanthropic partners, the agency could improve partner relations and better protect itself against the risks that may accompany donations. A More Strategic Approach to Management of Donations Could Enhance Effectiveness and Efficiency
Even as the potential for a dramatic expansion of donations increases with the Centennial Challenge program, the Park Service has no long-range vision for philanthropy and related partnerships and no plans for how to achieve such a vision. Meanwhile, indications have been growing that such strategic thinking is needed now. Further Refinements to Information on Donations Could Strengthen Accountability and Transparency
The Park Service is further constrained in its ability to pursue a strategic approach for donations and related partnerships because it has limited information on donations. The information is incomplete for several reasons. The information from IRS forms is also based on inconsistent determinations of support. The Park Service acknowledges that its estimates of support provided by partner organizations are not precise measures of the value received, but agency officials believe that the costs of developing precise, reliable data would outweigh the benefits to the agency, especially because they believe the total value of such donations to be relatively small. Additional Skills and Knowledge about Working with Nonprofit and Philanthropic Organizations Could Promote More-Effective Partnerships
Park Service employees and partner organizations identified challenges with understanding each other’s cultures, policies, and constraints and said they lack sufficient skills in these areas, which they believe are critical for successful partnerships. In addition, to better position Congress and the agency to make informed decisions and plan for the future, we recommend that the Secretary direct the Park Service Director to take the following two actions: In collaboration with representatives of friends groups, cooperating associations, and the National Park Foundation, develop a strategic plan that defines the agency’s vision for donations and related partnerships; sets short- and long-term management goals; delineates desired roles and responsibilities for agency offices and employees involved in managing donations and partnerships, so as to maximize efficient allocation of resources; and identifies steps to take in the short and long terms to achieve agency goals. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
We were asked to determine (1) how donated funds, goods, and services and related partnerships have supported the National Park Service (Park Service); (2) the policies and processes the agency uses to manage donations and related partnerships and how well they are working; and (3) what, if anything, could enhance the agency’s management of donations and related partnerships. We also interviewed Department of the Interior (Interior) and Park Service officials, as well as representatives of partner organizations and others, at the national, regional, and park levels. | Why GAO Did This Study
The National Park Service (Park Service) in the Department of the Interior (Interior) annually receives hundreds of millions of dollars in donated funds, goods, and services to support its 391 parks and other sites. But concerns have been raised about potential accompanying risks, such as undue donor influence, new long-term maintenance costs, or commercialization of parks. To address these concerns, the Park Service has developed and refined policies for managing donations, but questions remain about the agency's ability to do so effectively. GAO was asked to examine (1) how donations and related partnerships have supported the Park Service, (2) the policies and processes the agency uses to manage donations and how well they are working, and (3) what the agency could do to enhance its management of donations and related partnerships. GAO reviewed applicable legal and policy documents, interviewed Interior and Park Service officials and partner organizations, and visited selected national parks.
What GAO Found
Donations from individuals, nonprofit organizations, corporations, and others have provided significant support to park projects and programs, and related partnerships have amplified the value of those donations with countless other benefits. The collective value of these donations is substantial--including over $500 million since 1986 at a single park and over $100 million for six recent construction projects, for example--but their total worth is difficult to quantify, in part because of the numerous and often indirect ways in which parks receive donations. Donations support park programs and projects, such as interpretation and education, new construction, repair of facilities, and cultural resource management and protection. Park partners also provide other benefits that go beyond dollar values or a simple tally of projects. These benefits include enabling projects and programs that would not otherwise have been possible, accomplishing projects more quickly, and expanding parks' connections with their communities. The Park Service's donations and fund-raising policy includes directives in key areas to protect the agency against risks, but their effectiveness is diminished because parks do not always follow these program requirements, and the agency has no systematic process to monitor conformance. Agency officials acknowledged some cases of nonconformance but believed they were justified because they involved parks and partners with long track records of success and therefore did not pose significant risks to the agency. While reasonable, this justification indicates that the policy's requirements (and the resource investment needed to meet them) are not always commensurate with the level of risk to the agency. The Park Service has made improvements to its partnership construction process to address past accountability concerns, but remaining gaps leave the agency exposed to risks in some situations, such as when operations and maintenance costs increase for new construction. To enhance management of donations and related partnerships, GAO believes the Park Service could take a more strategic approach, further refine its information on donations, and increase employees' knowledge and skills for working with nonprofit and philanthropic partners. The agency could benefit from a long-range vision of the desired role of donations and related partnerships, but despite growing indications of the need for one, the Park Service has neither a strategic vision nor a plan for how to achieve it. Also, by enhancing its information on donations, which is currently limited, the agency could better support such a strategic approach. For various reasons, agencywide information on donations from some of its partners is incomplete, out of date, and based on inconsistent determinations of support. Finally, by improving its employees' skills in understanding the culture, policies, and constraints of nonprofit and philanthropic partners, the agency could better manage the risks that accompany donations. Park Service employees and partners say they face challenges and are not sufficiently skilled in this area, although they believe the skills are critical. |
gao_GAO-02-245 | gao_GAO-02-245_0 | Although TANF contractors provide a wide array of services, the most commonly contracted services reported by our survey respondents include employment and training services, job placement services, and support services to promote job entry or retention. In 2001, state and local governments expended at least $1.5 billion in TANF funds for contracted services. Finally, some states and localities are using TANF funds to contract for services related to the TANF objectives of preventing and reducing the incidence of nonmarital pregnancies and encouraging the formation and maintenance of two-parent families. Single Audits Assess TANF Procurement and Subrecipient Monitoring
HHS relies primarily on state single audits to oversee TANF contracting by states and localities. HHS officials said that HHS regional offices review state single audits and perform follow-up actions in cases where deficiencies were identified. Different Approaches Have Been Used To Help Ensure Compliance with, and Identify Problems in, Implementing Bid Solicitation and Contract Award Processes
State and local governments rely on third parties to help ensure compliance with procurement requirements, including bid protests, judicial processes, and external audits. However, HHS officials told us that they do not know the extent and nature of problems pertaining to the oversight of TANF contractors that state single audit reports have cited because HHS does not analyze these reports in such a comprehensive manner. This is due, in part, to HHS’s focus on those problems identified by single audit reports that involve unallowable or questionable costs. | What GAO Found
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 1996 changed the nation's cash assistance program for needy families with children by replacing the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program, with the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant. As specified in PRWORA, TANF's goals include ending the dependence of families receiving government benefits by promoting job preparation, work, and marriage; preventing and reducing the incidence of non-marital pregnancies; and encouraging two-parent families. Contracting with nongovernmental entities to provide TANF-funded services occurs in most states and exceeded $1.5 billion in federal and state funds in 2001. A GAO survey indicated that the most commonly contracted services included education and training, job placement, and support services to promote job entry or retention. The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) relies primarily on state single audit reports to oversee TANF contracting by states and localities. HHS officials told GAO that their regional offices follow up on the TANF deficiencies identified and that HHS focuses on reported deficiencies that involve unallowable or questionable costs. However, HHS officials said that they do not know the extent and nature of problems pertaining to the oversight of nongovernmental TANF contractors that have been cited in state single audits. State and local governments rely on third parties to help ensure compliance with bid solicitation and contract award procedures, including bid protests, judicial processes, and external audits. They use various approaches to oversee TANF contractors, but problems persist in contract oversight and contractor performance. |
gao_GAO-08-710T | gao_GAO-08-710T_0 | As a result, the safety net of programs, many which were put in place decades ago, not only has to protect critical technologies but it also has to do so in a manner that allows legitimate trade with allies and other friendly nations. Inefficiencies in the Processing of License Applications Hinder the Export Control System
Reviews of export license applications require time to deliberate and ensure that license decisions are appropriate. However, State and Commerce have not managed their respective export licensing processes to ensure their efficient operation. These findings prompted us to recommend that State conduct analyses of its licensing data to assess root causes of inefficiencies and then identify and implement actions that would allow it to better manage its workload, reexamine its processes, and determine the most effective workforce structure. Concerns about efficiency have largely focused on State’s processing of applications for arms exports, in part, because few dual-use exports subject to Commerce’s controls require licenses. However, the overall efficiency of Commerce’s licensing process is unknown in part because Commerce lacks efficiency-related measures and analyses that would allow it to identify opportunities for improvement. Poor Interagency Coordination Creates Vulnerabilities
Since multiple departments have a role to play in the export control system, its effective operation depends on those departments working together. However, we have identified instances related to export control jurisdiction, the use of license exemptions, and the dissemination of enforcement information when poor coordination among the departments has created vulnerabilities in the system’s ability to protect U.S. interests. The departments have taken action to address some—but not all—of these vulnerabilities. Given the different restrictions State and Commerce have on the items subject to their controls, the determination of which items fall under State’s export jurisdiction and which fall under Commerce’s is fundamental to the U.S. export control system. However, we have previously reported that State and Commerce have disagreed on which department has jurisdiction over certain items. In another case, for example, Commerce improperly determined that explosive detection devices were subject to Commerce’s less restrictive export control requirements when they were, in fact, State-controlled. Not only does this create an unlevel playing field and competitive disadvantage—because some companies may gain access to markets that others will not—but it also increases the risk that critical items will be exported without the appropriate review and resulting protections. For example, State officials maintained that one exemption was only for use by U.S. government personnel, while Defense officials stated it was available for use by contractors working in direct support of Defense activities. For approximately 4 years, the lack of a common understanding of the exemption created a vulnerability as regulations and licensing requirements could have been inconsistently applied. Prompted by our recommendation, Justice began providing State and Commerce with quarterly reports on criminal enforcement actions so that such information can be considered upfront during the license application review process. Although dramatic changes have occurred in the security and economic environment since the start of the 21st century, State and Commerce have not conducted systematic assessments to determine whether their controls and processes are sufficient and appropriate or whether changes are needed to better protect U.S. interests. Earlier this year, the President signed a package of directives that, according to the White House, will ensure that U.S. export control policies and practices support national security while facilitating economic and technological leadership. Legislation has also been introduced to make changes to the export control system. Other initiatives have not been widely used by exporters. Conclusions
The government’s safety net of programs is intended to protect critical technologies while still allowing legitimate trade. It is only then that meaningful and sustainable improvements to the export control system can be developed and implemented to ensure the efficiency and effectiveness of the system in protecting U.S. interests. High Risk Series: An Update. Defense Trade: Arms Export Control System in the Post-9/11 Environment. Export Controls: State and Commerce Department License Review Times are Similar. Export Controls: Change in Export Licensing Jurisdiction for Two Sensitive Dual-Use Items. | Why GAO Did This Study
In controlling the transfer of weapons and related technologies overseas, the U.S. government must limit the possibility of sensitive items falling into the wrong hands while allowing legitimate trade to occur. Achieving this balance has become more challenging due to redefined security threats and a globalized economy. The export control system is a key component of the safety net of programs intended to balance multiple U.S. interests. The export control system is managed primarily by the State Department, which regulates arms exports, and the Commerce Department, which regulates dual-use exports that have military and civilian applications. Unless an exemption applies, arms exports require licenses, while many dual-use exports do not require licenses. Based on GAO's extensive body of work on the export control system, this testimony focuses on export licensing inefficiencies, poor interagency coordination, and limits in State's and Commerce's ability to provide a sound basis for changes to the system. In prior work, GAO made recommendations to address vulnerabilities in the export control system, but many have not been implemented. Because of these vulnerabilities and others identified in the larger safety net of programs, GAO has designated the effective protection of technologies critical to U.S. national security interests as a high risk area warranting strategic reexamination.
What GAO Found
State and Commerce have not managed their respective export licensing processes to ensure their effective operations. In November 2007, GAO reported that procedural and automation weaknesses, along with workforce challenges, created inefficiencies in State's arms export licensing process. In less than 4 years, median processing times for license applications nearly doubled, with State's backlog of open cases peaking at 10,000. According to State officials, the department has begun analyzing its licensing data and implementing actions that will allow it to better manage its workload and determine the most effective workforce structure. While Commerce's license application processing times for dual-use exports have remained relatively stable, the overall efficiency of its process is unknown. This is due in part to Commerce's lack of performance measures for all steps in its process and analyses that would allow it to identify opportunities for improvement. Poor coordination among State, Commerce, and the other departments involved in the export control system has created vulnerabilities. State and Commerce have disagreed on which department has jurisdiction over the export of certain items. In one case, Commerce determined that an item was subject to its less restrictive export requirements when, in fact, it was State-controlled. Such improper determinations and unclear jurisdiction not only create an unlevel playing field--because some companies may gain access to markets that others will not--it also increases the risk that sensitive items, such as missile-related technologies, will be exported without the appropriate review and resulting protections. Further, State and Defense took almost 4 years to reach agreement regarding when certain arms export licensing exemptions could be used by exporters in support of Defense-certified programs. This lack of agreement could have resulted in export requirements being applied inconsistently. Also, in response to a GAO recommendation, State and Commerce only recently began regularly receiving information on criminal enforcement actions--information that is important to consider upfront when reviewing license applications for approval. Despite dramatic changes in the security and economic environment, State and Commerce have not undertaken basic management steps to ensure their controls and processes are sufficient and appropriate for protecting U.S. interests. Notably, neither department has assessed its controls in recent years. Nevertheless, State and Commerce maintained that no fundamental changes to their export control system were needed. Earlier this year, the White House announced that the President signed directives intended to ensure that the export control system focuses on meeting security and economic challenges. Similarly, legislation to make changes to the export control system has been introduced. However, few details about the basis for these initiatives are known. In the past, GAO has found that export control initiatives not grounded in analyses have generally not resulted in the desired improvements to the system. |
gao_GAO-05-19 | gao_GAO-05-19_0 | SSA’s DI demonstration authority has always been granted on a temporary basis and therefore has been subject to periodic review and renewal by the Congress. SSA Has Not Used Its Demonstration Authority to Evaluate a Wide Range of DI Return-to-Work Policy Issues
SSA has not used its demonstration authority to extensively evaluate a wide range of DI policy areas dealing with return to work. Until very recently, SSA has focused its demonstration efforts primarily on a relatively narrow set of policy issues dealing with the provision of vocational rehabilitation and employment services, despite being given the authority to assess a much broader range of policy alternatives. SSA’s recently initiated or proposed demonstrations have begun to address a broader range of policy issues. However, the agency has no systematic processes or mechanisms for ensuring that it is adequately identifying and prioritizing those issues that could best be addressed through use of its demonstration authority. SSA Lacks a Formal Process for Establishing a Demonstration Research Agenda
Despite SSA’s recent broadening of the scope of its projects, the agency does not have in place any systematic processes for identifying and assessing potential issues that could be well suited for study under SSA’s demonstration project authority. SSA’s Demonstration Projects Have Had Little Influence on Consideration of DI Policy Changes
SSA’s demonstration projects have had little influence on the agency’s and the Congress’ consideration of DI policy issues. This is due, in part, to methodological limitations that have prevented SSA from producing project results that are useful for reliably assessing DI policy alternatives. In addition, SSA lacks a formal process for fully considering the potential policy implications of its demonstration results. Furthermore, SSA’s reports on demonstration projects have not fully apprised the Congress of project results and their policy implications. According to these officials, such a record would constitute a body of knowledge that the agency should be building to improve DI return-to work policies. Because SSA’s use of its DI demonstration authority has yet to achieve the Congress’ intended results—and because SSA is permitted to draw on increasingly limited Trust Funds to conduct these demonstrations—we believe it is important for the Congress to maintain close oversight of SSA’s use of this authority. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 1980, the Congress has required the Social Security Administration (SSA) to conduct demonstration projects to test the effectiveness of possible program changes that could encourage individuals to return to work and decrease their dependence on Disability Insurance (DI) benefits. To conduct these demonstrations, the Congress authorized SSA, on a temporary basis, to waive certain DI and Medicare program rules and to use Social Security Trust Funds. The Congress required GAO to review SSA's use of its DI demonstration authority and to make a recommendation as to whether this authority should be made permanent.
What GAO Found
SSA has not used its demonstration authority to extensively evaluate a wide range of DI policy areas dealing with return to work. Despite being given the authority to assess a broad range of policy alternatives, SSA has, until very recently, focused its demonstration efforts mostly on a relatively narrow set of policy issues--those dealing with the provision of vocational rehabilitation and employment services. SSA's recently proposed or initiated demonstrations have begun to address a broader range of policy issues, such as provisions to reduce, rather than terminate, benefits based on earnings above a certain level. However, the agency has no systematic processes or mechanisms for ensuring that it is adequately identifying and prioritizing those issues that could best be addressed through use of its demonstration authority. For example, the agency has not developed a formal demonstration research agenda explicitly identifying its broad vision for using its DI demonstration authority and explaining how ongoing or proposed demonstration projects support achievement of the agency's goals and objectives. SSA's demonstration projects have had little impact on the agency's and the Congress' consideration of DI policy issues. This is due, in part, to methodological limitations that have prevented SSA from producing project results that are useful for reliably assessing DI policy alternatives. In addition, SSA has not established a formal process for ensuring that its demonstration results are fully considered for potential policy implications. For example, SSA does not maintain a comprehensive record of its demonstration results that could be used to build a body of knowledge for informing policy decisions and planning future research. Furthermore, SSA's reporting of demonstration project results has been insufficient in ensuring that the Congress is fully apprised of these results and their policy implications. |
gao_GAO-07-385T | gao_GAO-07-385T_0 | GAO’s Work in Iraq Is Broad and Coordinated with Other Audit Authorities
While the IGs are designed to focus primarily on exposing fraud, waste, and abuse in individual federal agency programs, GAO’s broad audit authority allows us to support Congress through strategic analyses of issues that cut across multiple federal agencies and sources of funding. Our work in Iraq spans the three prongs of the U.S. national strategy in Iraq—security, political, and economic. The broad, cross-cutting nature of our work helps minimize the possibility of overlap and duplication by individual IGs. Key Findings and Recommendations from GAO’s Work in Iraq
Let me highlight some of the key findings and recommendations we have made as a result of our continuing work in Iraq. Assessment of the November 2005 National Strategy for Victory in Iraq and the U.S. Military Campaign Plan
In November 2005, the National Security Council issued the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq (NSVI) to clarify the President’s strategy for achieving U.S. political, security, and economic goals in Iraq. We recommended that the NSC improve the current strategy by articulating clear roles and responsibilities, specifying future contributions, and identifying current costs and future resources. We have supplemented this work with a series of classified briefings to the Congress on changes to the campaign plan and U.S. efforts to train and equip Iraqi security forces and protect weapons caches throughout Iraq. Limited Transparency on the Costs of the Global War on Terror
Since 2001, Congress has appropriated about $495 billion to U.S. agencies for military and diplomatic efforts in support of the global war on terrorism; the majority of this amount has gone to stabilize and rebuild Iraq. Over the years, we have made a series of recommendations to the Secretary of Defense intended to improve the transparency and reliability of DOD’s GWOT obligation data, including recommendations that DOD (1) revise the cost-reporting guidance so that large amounts of reported obligations are not shown in “miscellaneous” categories, and (2) take steps to ensure that reported GWOT obligations are reliable. We also have recommended that DOD build more funding into the baseline budget once an operation reaches a known level of effort and costs are more predictable. In response, the department has implemented many of our previous recommendations. Transferring security responsibilities to the Iraqi security forces and provincial governments is a critical part of the U.S. government’s strategy in Iraq and key to allowing a drawdown of U.S. forces. A key measure of the capabilities of Iraqi forces is the Transition Readiness Assessment (TRA) reports prepared by coalition advisors embedded in Iraqi units. Our work focuses on the accountability requirements for the transportation and distribution of U.S.-funded equipment and did not review any requirements relevant to the procurement of this equipment. DOD faces significant challenges in maintaining readiness for overseas and homeland missions and sustaining rotational deployments of duty, especially if the duration and intensity of current operations continue at the present pace. Ongoing military operations in Iraq are inflicting heavy wear and tear on military equipment. The Army and the Marine Corps have initiated programs to reset (repair or replace) equipment and are likely to incur large expenditures in the future. In December 2006, we recommended that the Chairman of the Joint Staff conduct a theaterwide survey and risk assessment regarding unsecured conventional munitions in Iraq and incorporate conventional munitions storage site security as a strategic planning factor into all levels of planning policy and guidance. When such requirements were not clear, DOD often entered into contract arrangements that posed additional risks. Managing risks when requirements are in flux requires effective oversight, but DOD lacked the capacity to provide sufficient numbers of contracting, logistics, and other personnel, thereby hindering oversight efforts. To achieve this outcome, we set high standards for ourselves in the conduct of our work. In April 2005, an international peer review team gave our quality assurance system a clean opinion—only the second time a national audit institution has received such a rating from a multinational team. Thus, the Congress and the American people can have confidence that GAO’s work is independent, objective, and reliable. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO provided a strategic overview of GAO's work related to securing, stabilizing, and rebuilding Iraq. In our statement today, as requested, GAO highlighted (1) GAO's scope, authority, and coordination; (2) some of the insights stemming from our work in Iraq; and (3) the rigorous quality assurance framework that GAO uses to ensure relevant, reliable, and consistent results in all of our work. This testimony is based upon extensive work spanning several years. Since 2003, we have issued 67 Iraq-related reports and testimonies. For example, GAO sent a report to the Congress last week on a range of key issues for congressional oversight of efforts to secure, stabilize, and rebuild Iraq. Although many of our sources are classified, we strive to report information to the Congress in a public format to promote greater transparency and accountability of U.S. government policies, programs, and activities. As provided for in our congressional protocols, most of our work in Iraq has been performed under my authority to conduct evaluations on my own initiative since it is a matter of broad interest to the entire Congress and numerous committees in both chambers. Our work also helped inform the deliberations of the Iraq Study Group; the Comptroller General personally briefed this group on the results of our Iraq work in June 2006. GAO also provided significant additional information to the Iraq Study Group for its use.
What GAO Found
GAO and the Inspectors General (IG) of individual departments and agencies have different roles and responsibilities. GAO's broad audit authority allows us to support Congress through strategic analyses of issues that cut across multiple federal agencies and sources of funding. Our work spans the security, political, and economic prongs of the U.S. national strategy in Iraq. The broad, cross-cutting nature of this work helps minimize the possibility of overlap and duplication by any individual Inspector General. Based on our work, we have made some unique contributions to Congress. Our past and ongoing work has focused on the U.S. strategy and costs of operating in Iraq, training and equipping the Iraqi security forces, governance issues, the readiness of U.S. military forces, and acquisition outcomes. Some highlights from our work follow. Our analysis of the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq recommended that the National Security Council improve the strategy by articulating clearer roles and responsibilities, specifying future contributions, and identifying current costs and future resources. In our examination of the cost of U.S. military operations abroad, we recommended that the Secretary of Defense improve the transparency and reliability of Department of Defense's (DOD) Global War on Terror (GWOT) obligation data. We also recommended that DOD build more funding into the baseline budget once an operation reaches a known level of effort and costs are more predictable. In assessing the capabilities of Iraqi security forces, we found that overall security conditions in Iraq have deteriorated despite increases in the numbers of trained and equipped security forces. A complete assessment of Iraqi security forces' capabilities is dependent on DOD providing GAO with the readiness levels of each Iraqi unit. We found that DOD faces significant challenges in maintaining U.S. military readiness for overseas and homeland missions and in sustaining rotational deployments of duty, especially if the duration and intensity of current operations continue at the present pace. In assessing the impact of ongoing military operations in Iraq on military equipment, we found that the Army and the Marine Corps have initiated programs to reset (repair or replace) equipment and are likely to incur large expenditures in the future. In reviewing efforts to secure munitions sites and provide force protection, we recommended that DOD conduct a theaterwide survey and risk assessment of unsecured conventional munitions in Iraq and incorporate storage site security into strategic planning efforts. In assessing acquisition outcomes, we found that DOD often entered into contract arrangements with unclear requirements, which posed additional risks to the government. DOD also lacked the capacity to provide sufficient numbers of contracting, logistics, and other personnel, thereby hindering oversight efforts. In April 2005, an international peer review team gave our quality assurance system a clean opinion--only the second time a national audit institution has received such a rating from a multinational team. Thus, the Congress and the American people can have confidence that GAO's work is independent, objective, and reliable. |
gao_GAO-05-782 | gao_GAO-05-782_0 | Background
IRS provides tax law assistance to taxpayers through IRS’s toll-free telephone lines and tax law and return preparation assistance in person at IRS taxpayer assistance centers (formerly known as “walk-in sites”) nationwide, in addition to other means. IRS did not have data on the number of staff that prepared tax returns at taxpayer assistance centers. However, all staff providing tax law assistance receive some training each year. Taxpayer assistance staff receive training on technical tax law topics, how to use IRS systems and guidance to answer questions, and communication. Responsibility for training and developing IRS’s tax law assistance staff is decentralized. IRS’s Human Capital Office provides guidance and sets policy and standards on training and development for the agency. W&I and SB/SE each have a human resources office with Learning and Education (L&E) staff who are assigned to the taxpayer assistance programs. Generally speaking, the taxpayer assistance program offices identify training needs, L&E staff work with program staff to develop and fund annual training plans, and the program offices administer training. However, the cost data IRS provided did not include the costs of assistors’ time associated with training. Although these components can be discussed separately, they are not mutually exclusive and encompass subcomponents that may blend with one another. Specifically, IRS has not done an analysis to determine the relative importance of the various factors, including training, that affect accuracy. Without an understanding of the relative importance each factor has on accuracy, it is difficult for IRS to make informed decisions about a strategy for improving accuracy, including training’s role in that strategy. None of the taxpayer assistance programs collected another type of information—best practices of other organizations learned through benchmarking. Still another type of information useful for planning can be obtained from evaluations of training efforts. This matters because the resources devoted to training are significant. Evaluating the Impact of Training on Accuracy Could Provide a Basis for Future Improvements
Given the importance of accurate answers to taxpayers’ questions and the resources spent on training, the four assistance programs would benefit from more sophisticated evaluations of the effectiveness of training. The four programs all conduct some evaluations of their training efforts. Data Analysis Phase
All four assistance programs conducted some analyses of their training efforts and analyzed stakeholders’ assessments of training to identify potential improvements to individual courses. In addition, IRS devotes significant resources to training its tax law assistance staff. A more strategic approach to planning and evaluation would have several benefits. In addition, one taxpayer assistance program is pilot testing such an analysis. The evaluations should include the following: an analysis of the feasibility and cost effectiveness of alternative level 4 methodologies and a data collection and analysis plan, a comparison of the accuracy benefits to the costs of the training, benchmarking of the analytical methods and the results of the data analysis against high-performing organizations, and an analysis of stakeholder assessments of the impact of training on accuracy. Appendix I: What GAO Looked For: Examples of Planning Practices That Would Conform to Strategic Guidance for Training
Establish quantitative long-term accuracy goals that link to IRS’s strategic goals
As part of its process for deciding which training and development programs to implement, steps to ensure efforts will target needed improvements and enhance needed skills, which would yield such items as A logical or explicit link between the training and development programs offered and (1) the knowledge and skills identified in the skill needs assessment or (2) the strategic and operational factors identified as affecting accuracy (to the extent that the needs and the identified factors could be addressed through training)
Appendix II: What GAO Looked For: Examples of Evaluation Practices That Would Conform to Strategic Guidance
Establish an overall approach for evaluating the impact of training on accuracy (a level 4 evaluation)
Steps to ensure that analyses will help determine the impact of training and development on accuracy performance, such as Analyses have considered and/or used an array of approaches (both qualitative and quantitative)
Analyses that separate training from other strategic and operational factors that might affect accuracy (to the extent that it is cost-effective and/or feasible)
Appendix III: Assessments of Planning: Less Complex Tax Law Telephone Service by W&I CAS
Establish quantitative long-term accuracy goals that link to IRS’s strategic goals
CAS reported an annual accuracy goal linked to IRS’s strategic goal of improving taxpayer service. | Why GAO Did This Study
Millions of taxpayers ask IRS questions about tax law each year. While the accuracy of IRS's answers has improved in some cases, it is still not always what taxpayers or Congress expect. Concerns about accuracy have raised questions about the adequacy of the training IRS provides to its taxpayer assistance staff. Because of these questions, GAO was asked to assess the extent to which IRS's planning and evaluation of its taxpayer assistor training conformed to guidance published by GAO and others. Planning and evaluation are part of a feedback loop whereby lessons from one year can be applied to making improvements in future years.
What GAO Found
IRS devotes significant resources to training its tax law assistors to answer questions, by telephone and at walk-in sites, and prepare tax returns. Although IRS cannot separate the costs of training tax law assistors from other assistance staff, the thousands of staff devoted to providing tax law assistance receive training each year. The training includes classroom and computer-based training on such subjects as tax law and communication. While IRS has some data on travel and course development costs associated with training, it does not have data on what is likely the largest cost component, the value of staff time devoted to tax law training. Responsibility for training IRS taxpayer assistance staff is decentralized. IRS's Human Capital Office provides guidance and sets policy. The two divisions responsible for tax law assistance each have a human resources office with technical staff that are assigned to the various taxpayer assistance programs. Generally speaking, the taxpayer assistance programs share responsibility for planning training with human resource staff. The human resource staff are responsible for training evaluations. IRS's planning for taxpayer assistor training could be enhanced by a more strategic approach. To their credit, some taxpayer assistance programs clearly communicated the importance of training to staff and had knowledge and skills inventories. All the units had analyses of some of the individual factors that affect accuracy, such as the quality and use of their taxpayer assistance guidance. However, none of the programs had long-term goals for either accuracy or training or had benchmarked their training efforts against those of other organizations. Nor had they done a combined analysis of the major factors that affect accuracy in order to determine their relative importance. Setting long-term goals and analyzing training needs and relative impacts are important steps in strategic planning. Goals can provide a yardstick for measuring progress and benchmarking can help identify best practices. Analyses of relative impacts can help IRS make informed decisions about a strategy for improving accuracy, including the importance of training compared to other factors in that strategy. The taxpayer assistance programs routinely conducted evaluations of their training efforts. However, with one exception, the evaluations did not include analyses of the impact of training on the accuracy of assistance. Instead, the units conducted less sophisticated analyses of more immediate impacts, such as trainees' satisfaction. Given the importance of accurate answers to taxpayers' questions and the resources spent on training, the four assistance programs would benefit from more sophisticated evaluations of the effectiveness of training. One program had recognized the potential value of a more sophisticated evaluation of training and pilot tested an analysis in 2004. The value of evaluation is that it provides feedback about the effectiveness of one year's training that can be used to plan improvements to future training. |
gao_GAO-02-658 | gao_GAO-02-658_0 | Background
Under the Defense Environmental Restoration Program, DOD is authorized to identify, investigate, and clean up environmental contamination and other hazards at FUDS. About 38 Percent of the Corps’ Determinations That No DOD Action Is Indicated Are Questionable
Based on our review of NDAI files, we estimate that the Corps does not have a sound basis for about 38 percent or 1,468, of the estimated 3,840 NDAI determinations in our study population because the property files did not contain evidence showing that the Corps consistently reviewed or obtained information that would have allowed it to identify all of the potential hazards at the properties or that it took sufficient steps to assess their presence. We also found instances where it appears that the Corps’ assessment focused on only one of the four potential hazards included in the Corps’ program—unsafe buildings, structures, or debris; hazardous, toxic, and radioactive wastes; containerized hazardous wastes; and ordnance and explosive wastes. DOD also disagreed that the Corps did not take sufficient steps to assess the presence of potential hazards at FUDS properties. Additional Details on Our Scope and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to determine the extent to which the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) (1) has a sound basis for determining that more than 4,000 formerly used defense sites (FUDS) need no further study or cleanup and for designating those properties as “No Department of Defense (DOD) Action Indicated, Category I” (NDAI) and (2) communicated its NDAI determinations to owners and to the regulatory agencies that may have responsibility and notified the owners that it will reconsider an NDAI determination if evidence of DOD-caused hazards is found later. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) estimates that cleaning up contamination and hazards at thousands of properties that it formerly owned or controlled will take more than 70 years and cost as much as $20 billion. These formerly used defense sites (FUDS), which can range in size from less than an acre to many thousands of acres, are now used for parks, farms, schools, and homes. Hazards at these properties include unsafe buildings, toxic and radioactive wastes, containerized hazardous wastes, and ordnance and explosive wastes. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is responsible for identifying, investigating, and cleaning up hazards resulting from military use.
What GAO Found
GAO found that the Corps lacks a sound basis for its conclusion that 38 percent of 3,840 FUDS need no further study or cleanup action. The Corps' determinations are questionable because there is no evidence that it reviewed or obtained information that would allow it to identify all the potential hazards at the properties, or that it took sufficient steps to assess the presence of potential hazards. GAO also found that the Corps often did not notify owners of its determinations that the properties did not need further action, as called for in its guidance, or tell the owners to contact the Corps if evidence of DOD-caused hazards was found later. |
gao_GAO-02-1105T | gao_GAO-02-1105T_0 | CDC currently recommends routine immunizations against 11 childhood diseases: diphtheria, tetanus, pertussis (whooping cough), Haemophilus influenzae type b (most commonly meningitis), hepatitis B, measles, mumps, rubella (German measles), invasive pneumococcal disease, polio, and varicella (chicken pox). The federal government is also responsible for ensuring the safety of the nation’s vaccine supply. Shortages Prompt Actions to Reduce Immunization Requirements
Recent vaccine shortages have necessitated temporary modifications to the recommended immunization schedule and have caused states to scale back immunization requirements. In general, these states have reduced the immunization requirements for day care and/or school entry or have temporarily suspended enforcement of those requirements until vaccine supplies are replenished. While it is too early to measure the effect of deferred vaccinations on immunization rates, a number of states reported that vaccine shortages and missed make-up vaccinations may take a toll on coverage and, therefore, increase the potential for infectious disease outbreaks. Production Problems - Manufacturing production problems contributed to the shortage of certain vaccines. This was the case with a newly licensed vaccine, pneumococcal conjugate vaccine (PCV), which protects against invasive pneumococcal diseases in young children. While the recent shortages have been largely resolved, the vaccine supply remains vulnerable to any number of disruptions that could occur in the future—including those that contributed to recent shortages and other potential problems, such as a catastrophic plant fire. While FDA has mechanisms available to shorten the review process, they are not used for most vaccines under development. As part of its mandate to study and recommend ways to encourage the availability of safe and effective vaccines, the National Vaccine Advisory Committee formed a work group to explore the issues surrounding vaccine shortages and identify strategies for further consideration by HHS. In 1993, with the establishment of the VFC program, CDC was required to purchase sufficient quantities of pediatric vaccines not only to meet normal usage, but also to provide an additional 6-month supply to meet unanticipated needs. Even if CDC decides to stockpile additional vaccines, the limited supply and manufacturing capacity will restrict CDC’s ability to build certain stockpiles in the near term. | What GAO Found
Vaccine shortages began to appear in November 2000, when supplies of the tetanus and diptheria booster fell short. By October 2001, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) reported shortages of five vaccines that protect against eight childhood diseases. In addition to diptheria and tetanus vaccines, vaccines to protect against pertussis, invasive pneumococcal disease, measles, mumps, rubella, and varicella were in short supply. In July 2002, updated CDC data indicated supplies were returning to normal for most vaccines. However, the shortage of vaccine to protect against invasive pneumococcal disease was expected to continue through at least late 2002. Shortages have prompted federal authorities to recommend deferring some vaccinations and have caused most states to reduce or suspend immunization requirements for school and day care programs so that children who have not received all mandatory immunizations can enroll. States are concerned that failure to be vaccinated at a later date may reduce the share of the population protected and increase the potential for disease to spread; however, data are not currently available to measure these effects. Many factors, including production problems and unanticipated demand for new vaccines, contributed to recent shortages. Although problems leading to the shortages have largely been resolved, the potential exists for shortages to recur. Federal agencies and advisory committees are exploring ways to help stabilize the nation's vaccine supply, but few long-term solutions have emerged. Although CDC is considering expanding vaccine stockpiles to provide a cushion in the event of a supply disruption, limited supply and manufacturing capacity will restrict CDC's ability to build them. |
gao_GAO-02-63 | gao_GAO-02-63_0 | State has long exempted the export of many unclassified defense items to Canada without prior department approval. Exporters Are Implementing the Exemption Inconsistently
We found instances where exporters have been implementing the Canadian exemption inconsistently. Some exporters have been interpreting the May 2001 reporting requirements differently. While the U.S. government has some mechanisms in place to ensure that exporters are ultimately complying with export law and regulations, the government faces limitations in using these mechanisms. Without more effective enforcement, the U.S. government is at greater risk of defense items being exported inappropriately. These limitations are attributed to a lack of information and resources and competing demands within U.S. Customs, which include interdiction of illicit drugs, illegal currency, and stolen vehicles, and since September 11, 2001, terrorism prevention. Based on the experience with the Canadian exemption, the United States will likely need to address three areas when negotiating and executing similar exemptions with other countries. First, upfront agreement is needed on such issues as what items are to be controlled and who can have access to these controlled items. Second, the U.S. government needs to monitor agreements to assess their effectiveness and ensure that unanticipated problems have not arisen. Third, enforcement mechanisms need to be in place to monitor exporters’ compliance with the exemption and enable prosecution of violators. Agreement on what defense items to control. Items excluded from the exemption would require licenses. Second, the Canadian exemption experience shows that once agreements have been reached, the U.S. government needs to periodically evaluate the exemption to assess the effectiveness of agreed upon measures and ensure that unanticipated problems do not arise. The radar was then to be exported to Taiwan under a Canadian license. Defense Trade: Status of the Department of Defense’s Initiatives on Defense Cooperation. | What GAO Found
To control the export of defense items, the U.S. government requires exporters to obtain a license from the State Department. A license is not required to export many defense items to Canada, currently the only country-specific exemption to the licensing requirement. In May 2000, the U.S. government announced the Defense Trade Security Initiative, which included a proposal to grant Canadian-like export licensing exemptions to other qualified countries. Since the initiative was announced, the State Department has been negotiating such exemptions with the United Kingdom and Australia. Exporters have been implementing the Canadian exemption inconsistently. Moreover, some exporters are interpreting reporting requirements about the use of the exemption differently. The U.S. government has mechanisms in place to reduce the risk of defense items being inappropriately exported, but there are associated limitations. U.S. Customs officials attributed these enforcement weaknesses to a lack of information and resources, including inspectors to staff ports. In addition, there are competing demands on the agency, which include the prevention of terrorism, and the interdiction of illicit drugs, illegal currency, and stolen vehicles. Experience with the Canadian exemption shows that three areas need to be addressed when negotiating and executing license exemptions with other countries. First, there needs to be upfront agreement on such issues as what items are to be controlled, who can have access to controlled items, and how to control these items through each country's respective export laws and regulations. Second, the U.S. government needs to monitor agreements to assess their effectiveness and ensure that unanticipated problems have not arisen. Third, enforcement mechanisms need to be in place to monitor exporters' compliance with the exemption and enable prosecution of violators. |
gao_GAO-02-373SP | gao_GAO-02-373SP_0 | Preface
People are an agency’s most important organizational asset. A Model Of Strategic Human Capital Management: A New Tool For Agency Leaders
The human capital model highlights the kinds of thinking that agencies should apply, as well as some of the steps they can take, to make progress in managing human capital strategically. As with any investment, the goal is to maximize value while managing risk. The agency’s human capital approaches are consistently developed, implemented, and evaluated by the standard of how well they support the agency’s efforts to achieve program results. Previous GAO reports and testimonies have underscored the importance of having agency leaders and managers with the skills and commitment to drive cultural change that focuses on results. | What GAO Found
GAO released an exposure draft on its Model of Strategic Human Capital Management, which is intended to help federal agency leaders better manage their organizations' most important asset--their people. The model is designed to help agency leaders effectively use their people, or human capital, and determine how well they integrate human capital considerations into daily decision-making and planning for the program results they seek to achieve. In so doing, the model highlights the importance of a sustained commitment by agency leaders to maximize the value of their agencies' human capital and manage related risks. |
gao_GAO-03-641T | gao_GAO-03-641T_0 | IRS’s Fiscal Year 2004 Budget Request Includes Compliance, Taxpayer Service, and Information Systems as Priorities
For fiscal year 2004, IRS is requesting $10.4 billion, an increase of 5.3 percent over fiscal year 2003 requested levels, and 100,043 FTEs. As shown in figure 1, $166 million of the enhancements would be funded from internal savings with the remainder funded from the budget increase. Current Projections and Recent History Raise Questions about Whether IRS Will Realize Some Priority Resource Reallocations
Revised projections developed since the 2004 budget request was prepared raise questions about IRS’s ability to achieve all the savings projected and shift resources to compliance as planned. For example: IRS still is reviewing its procedures to identify ways to make tax return processing more efficient. This includes (1) $429 million for the agency’s multiyear capital account that funds contractor costs for the BSM program and (2) about $1.67 billion and 7,735 staff years for information systems, of which $1.62 billion is for operations and maintenance. In preparing its fiscal year 2004 budget request for the operations and maintenance of information systems, IRS began to implement an information technology portfolio management process patterned after the one used for the BSM program. However, until IRS fully implements planned process improvements, its ability to develop supportable information systems budget requests will remain limited. In response to our recommendations, IRS developed an enterprise architecture. Interim Results of IRS’s 2003 Filing Season Show Improvement over Previous Years
IRS’s filing season performance through mid-March has improved compared to recent years, based on data we reviewed in five key filing season activities—paper and electronic processing, telephone assistance, IRS’s Web site, and walk-in assistance. For example, telephone access has improved, and IRS’s Web site has seen increased use. While we cannot quantify the connection between these results and IRS’s ongoing systems modernization efforts, the improvement in filing season performance, in part, represents a payoff from systems modernization. Concluding Observations
As the examples of improved telephone access and the Brookhaven Processing Center closing show, IRS is beginning to realize payoffs from the ongoing systems modernization investments and wider management improvements. Although IRS has not succeeded in reallocating staff to one of its priority needs, compliance, there will likely be increased potential for such reallocation as modernization proceeds. This will present Congress, in its oversight and appropriations roles, with significant opportunities to weigh in on IRS’s overall strategy for better accomplishing its mission. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) is responsible for collecting virtually all of the funds that pay for the federal government. For 2003, IRS expects to process 130 million individual income tax returns, issue 99 million refunds, receive 100 million telephone calls, and assist 4 million taxpayers face-to-face at IRS and volunteer offices. Most of these interactions with taxpayers occur during the January through April tax filing season. GAO was asked by the Subcommittee on Oversight, House Committee on Ways and Means, to assess the likelihood of IRS allocating more resources to a key priority, compliance; whether proposed spending on computer systems is justified; and filing season performance.
What GAO Found
IRS is requesting $10.4 billion and 101,043 FTEs, a dollar increase of about 5 percent over the fiscal year 2003 request. The 2004 budget request, like other recent requests, identifies compliance as one of IRS's top priorities for additional resources. IRS intends to fund some program enhancements from the requested budget increase and internal savings. Several factors, including lowered savings projections since the budget request was prepared, raise questions about IRS's ability to achieve all the savings and shift resources to compliance as planned. IRS's recent history raises the same questions, in part, because unbudgeted expenses, such as pay raises, have absorbed budget increases. IRS is requesting $2.1 billion in information technology. This includes $429 million for the agency's multiyear capital account that funds contractor costs for the Business Systems Modernization program, and $1.67 billion for information systems, primarily for operations and maintenance. In response to GAO's recommendation last year, IRS has begun to implement an information technology management process patterned after its systems modernization program. Until the process is fully implemented, IRS will have limited ability to develop supportable information systems budget requests. IRS's 2003 filing season performance has improved over last year. For example, IRS's telephone access has improved and the Web site has seen increased use. Such improvements represent a payoff from IRS's ongoing systems modernization investments and wider management improvements. Although IRS has not succeeded in reallocating staff to one of its priority needs, compliance, there will likely be increased potential for such reallocation as modernization proceeds. This will present Congress, in its oversight and appropriations roles, with significant opportunities to weigh in on IRS's overall strategy for better accomplishing its mission. |
gao_GAO-16-334 | gao_GAO-16-334_0 | According to DOJ officials, there are three key VAWA authorized grant programs administered by DOJ’s Office on Violence Against Women (OVW) that can be used by grant recipients to fund or train sexual assault forensic examiners. Department of Health and Human Services, Indian Health Service, “Chap. We refer to STOP subgrantees as grantees throughout this report. DOJ officials told us that funding from additional DOJ grant programs may be used to fund, train, or support the training of examiners, though officials stated that the use of such grant funding for these purposes is limited. Most States Had at Least One Grantee That Used Federal Grant Funds to Train or Fund Examiners
In 49 states, at least one STOP, Arrest, or Rural Program grantee— including STOP subgrantees—reported using federal grant funds to provide training for sexual assault forensic examiners in 2013, the most recent year for which complete data were available. Grantees in 49 States Used Federal Grant Funds to Provide a Variety of Training to Examiners in 2013
In nearly all states in 2013, at least one STOP, Arrest, or Rural Program grantee reported using federal grant funds to provide training for sexual assault forensic examiners in 2013. Specifically, in 2013, approximately 227 grantees in 49 states reported using grant funds to provide training for over 6,000 examiners. Based on interviews with grantees in some of our six selected states and a review of grantee progress reports submitted to DOJ in 2013, the type of training that grantees provided for examiners ranged from comprehensive examiner training and certification to training on specific topics that enable examiners to improve their response to victims. The extent of examiner training efforts supported with STOP, Arrest, and Rural Grant Program funds varied by state. In half of the states (26), fewer than 100 examiners received training and in 12 of these states fewer than 25 examiners received training. Grantees in 26 States Funded Examiner Positions in 2013, and Grantees in These States Funded Less Than One Position on Average
In half of the states, at least one STOP, Arrest, or Rural grantee funded examiner staff positions in 2013. Nationwide Data on the Availability of Sexual Assault Forensic Examiners Are Limited; Officials in Selected States Reported a Need for Additional Examiners
According to our literature review and the experts we interviewed, only limited nationwide data exist on the availability of sexual assault forensic examiners—that is, both the number of practicing examiners and health care facilities that have examiner programs. However, such data may also present an incomplete picture of the availability of examiners. For example, coalition officials in Wisconsin told us that nearly half of all counties in the state do not have any examiner programs available, and coalition officials in Nebraska told us that most counties in the state do not have examiner programs available. In health care facilities where examiners are available, they are typically available through hospitals on an on-call basis, according to literature we reviewed as well as all STOP administrators and coalition officials we interviewed. In addition, among facilities that have examiners available, the number of examiners available varies and may not provide enough capacity for facilities to offer examiner coverage 24 hours, 7 days a week, according to state STOP administrators and coalition officials we interviewed. Selected States Faced Challenges Training Examiners, Maintaining Stakeholder Support, and Retaining Examiners
According to state STOP administrators and state sexual assault coalition officials we interviewed in six selected states, maintaining a supply of trained examiners that meets communities’ needs for exams is challenging for multiple reasons, including the limited availability of training, a lack of technical assistance and other resources, weak stakeholder support for examiners, and low examiner retention. In order to address these challenges, state officials told us that they have employed a variety of strategies, such as offering web-based training courses or clinical guidance or support for examiners, clinical practice labs, mentorship programs, and developing multidisciplinary teams within communities that respond to cases of sexual assault. Officials in five of six selected states told us that the limited availability of classroom, clinical, or continuing education training is a barrier to maintaining a supply of trained examiners. Officials in five of six selected states told us that limited stakeholder support for examiners and examiner programs, such as from hospitals and law enforcement, is a challenge to maintaining a supply of trained examiners. Additionally, some hospitals do not pay examiners to be on-call. In addition to the challenges of limited training opportunities, technical assistance and other supportive resources, and stakeholder support for examiners, the physically and emotionally demanding nature of examiner work contributes to low examiner retention rates. Wisconsin officials estimated that although 540 SANEs were trained over a 2-year period, only 42 (less than 8 percent) were still practicing in the state at the end of those 2 years. DOJ provided technical comments that we incorporated as appropriate. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2013, about 285,000 individuals age 12 or older were reported victims of sexual assault, according to the Bureau of Justice Statistics. Studies have shown that exams performed by sexual assault forensic examiners—medical providers trained in collecting and preserving forensic evidence—may result in better physical and mental health care for victims, better evidence collection, and higher prosecution rates. Yet, concerns have been raised about the availability of examiners. The Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013 authorized funding for DOJ grant programs that can be used by states and other eligible entities, such as nonprofit organizations, to train and fund examiners.
GAO was asked to review the availability of examiners nationwide. In this report, GAO describes (1) the prevalence and use of federal grants to train or fund sexual assault forensic examiners, (2) what is known about the availability of such examiners nationwide and in selected states, and (3) the challenges selected states face in maintaining a supply of examiners. GAO analyzed 2013 DOJ data on grantees' use of funding to train or fund examiners—the most recent full year of data available—and reviewed literature, relevant laws and DOJ documentation. GAO also interviewed grantees in six states selected based on several factors including population and geographic location, as well as DOJ officials, Department of Health and Human Services officials, and experts, such as health care association officials.
What GAO Found
Federal funding from three key Department of Justice (DOJ) grant programs can be used to train or fund sexual assault forensic examiners and for a range of other activities related to sexual assault, domestic violence, dating violence, and stalking. In 2013, at least one grantee in 49 states used such funds to provide training to examiners and at least one grantee in 26 states funded examiner positions. In 49 states, approximately 227 grantees or subgrantees—referred to collectively as grantees—reported providing training for over 6,000 examiners in 2013. The type of training examiners received ranged from comprehensive examiner training to training on specific topics, such as courtroom testimony. The extent of examiner training efforts supported with funds from the three DOJ grant programs varied by state. For example, in about half of the states, fewer than 100 examiners received training. In addition, in the states where at least one grantee funded examiner staff positions in 2013, grantees funded less than one position, on average. Approximately 75 grantees in 26 states funded roughly 50 full-time equivalent examiner positions in 2013.
On the basis of literature GAO reviewed as well as interviews with experts and state officials, data on the number of examiners nationwide and in selected states are limited or unavailable. However, officials in all six selected states told GAO that the number of examiners available in their state did not meet the need for exams, especially in rural areas. For example, officials in Wisconsin explained that nearly half of all counties in the state do not have any examiners available. In health care facilities where examiners are available, they are typically available in hospitals on an on-call basis, though the number available varies by facility and may not provide enough capacity to offer examiner coverage 24 hours, 7 days a week.
There are multiple challenges to maintaining a supply of examiners, according to interviews with officials in six selected states. These include:
Limited availability of training . Officials in five of six selected states reported that the availability of classroom, clinical, and continuing education training opportunities is a challenge to maintaining a supply of trained examiners.
Weak stakeholder support for examiners. Officials in five of six selected states reported that obtaining support from stakeholders, such as hospitals, was a challenge. For example, hospitals may be reluctant to cover the costs of training examiners or paying for examiners to be on-call.
Low examiner retention rates. The above-mentioned and other challenges, including the emotional and physical demands on examiners, contribute to low examiner retention rates. Officials in one state estimated that while the state trained 540 examiners over a two-year period, only 42 of those examiners were still practicing in the state at the end of those 2 years.
Officials described strategies that can help address these challenges, such as implementing web-based training courses, clinical practice labs, mentorship programs, and multidisciplinary teams that respond to cases of sexual assault.
DOJ provided technical comments on a draft of this report, which GAO incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-06-544 | gao_GAO-06-544_0 | In March 2004, we reported on VA’s screening policies and the gaps we found in VA’s requirement for screening applicants that may result in VA health care practitioners’ personal backgrounds and professional credentials not being thoroughly screened. VA Has Taken Steps to Improve Health Care Practitioner Screening Requirements, but Gaps Remain
VA has taken steps to improve health care practitioner screening by partially implementing each of the four recommendations made in our March 2004 report; however, gaps still remain in VA’s health care practitioner screening requirements. To address our recommendation, VA expanded the verification requirement to include licenses and certificates of all applicants VA intends to hire. VA Policy on Fingerprint- Only Background Investigations Addressed Our Recommendation, but Was Not Fully Implemented
In August 2005, VA issued a policy that when implemented across VA will address our recommendation to expand the use of fingerprint-only background investigations for practitioners previously exempt from background investigations who have direct access to patients. VA’s policy requires, at a minimum, that all newly hired health care practitioners’ fingerprints be checked against a criminal history database. In response to our inquiry, VA surveyed its facilities and found that as of October 19, 2005, 37 facilities did not have electronic fingerprint machines operational by September 1, 2005. Since then VA has made progress; as of February 1, 2006, 2 VA medical facilities had not implemented this new requirement. None of the seven facilities had a compliance rate of 90 percent or more for all five screening requirements we reviewed. Recommendations for Executive Action
To better ensure the safety of veterans receiving health care at VA medical facilities, we recommend that the Secretary of Veterans Affairs take the following two actions: expand the HRM oversight program to include a review of VA facilities’ compliance with screening requirements for all types of salaried and nonsalaried health care practitioners and standardize a method for documenting facility officials’ review of fingerprint-only background investigation results and decisions regarding suitability to work in VA medical facilities. Specifically, we determined the extent to which (1) VA has taken steps to improve health care practitioner screening by implementing the four recommendations made in our March 2004 report and (2) VA medical facilities are in compliance with VA’s health care practitioner screening requirements. To determine the extent to which selected VA medical facilities we visited are in compliance with VA’s health care practitioner screening requirements, we chose a judgmental sample of seven VA medical facilities that varied in geographic location to assess the extent to which these selected facilities complied with the screening requirements included in our review. We reviewed each selected health care practitioner’s personnel file to determine whether the facility had documented evidence that it complied with the following VA screening requirements: determine the position risk level by completing VA Form 2280; ensure completion of background investigations; query the Healthcare Integrity and Protection Data Bank (HIPDB) for all applicants after October 1, 2004; complete an employment checklist for those hired after October 1, 2004; verify state licenses and national certificates for applicants and employed health care practitioners. See appendix II for detailed information on the seven VA facilities’ compliance with each VA screening requirement in our review. | Why GAO Did This Study
In March 2004, GAO reported on gaps in VA's requirements for screening the professional credentials and personal backgrounds of health care practitioners (GAO-04-566). GAO found that VA's requirements did not ensure thorough screening of VA practitioners. VA concurred with four recommendations GAO made to improve practitioner screening. GAO was asked to determine the extent to which (1) VA has taken steps to improve practitioner screening by implementing GAO's recommendations and (2) VA facilities are in compliance with VA's practitioner screening requirements. GAO reviewed VA's current practitioner screening policies to determine if gaps remain, interviewed VA officials, and sampled about 60 practitioner files at each of seven VA facilities selected based on size and geographic location.
What GAO Found
VA has taken steps to improve health care practitioner screening by partially implementing each of four recommendations made in GAO's March 2004 report; however, gaps still remain in VA's practitioner screening requirements. In response to two of GAO's recommendations, VA expanded its screening requirements for all VA applicants to include a verification of all state licenses and national certificates and requires facility officials to query the Healthcare Integrity and Protection Data Bank (HIPDB), which contains information on individuals involved in health care-related civil judgments and criminal convictions and licensing and certification actions. VA, however, has not yet expanded these screening requirements to apply to all health care practitioners currently employed at VA facilities, as GAO recommended. In response to the third GAO recommendation, VA issued a policy in August 2005 that requires individuals who previously were exempt from receiving any level of background investigation to have, at a minimum, their fingerprints screened against a criminal history database. As of October 19, 2005, 37 VA medical facilities had not fully implemented this new requirement because they had not obtained or installed the necessary electronic fingerprint equipment. Since then VA has made progress; as of February 1, 2006, 2 medical facilities had not installed the equipment. Finally, VA has partially implemented GAO's fourth recommendation to conduct oversight of its facilities' compliance with VA practitioner screening requirements; however, GAO found the oversight does not address all of the facility compliance issues GAO previously identified. GAO found poor compliance with four of the five selected VA practitioner screening requirements at the seven VA facilities visited in 2005. None of the seven facilities had a compliance rate of 90 percent or more for all five screening requirements GAO reviewed. Two facilities that had implemented VA's fingerprint-only background investigations--a relatively new form of background investigation--did not comply with VA's requirement to document that the results of the fingerprint check against a criminal history database had been reviewed and used to make a decision on the individual's suitability to work at a VA medical facility. |
gao_GAO-14-698 | gao_GAO-14-698_0 | Ally Financial (when it was known as GMAC) formerly served as General Motors Company’s (GM) captive automotive finance company. For example, the company’s Residential Capital LLC (ResCap) subsidiary lost approximately $17 billion from 2007 through 2009. Second, in December 2013, the bankruptcy proceedings of Ally Financial’s mortgage subsidiary, ResCap, were substantially resolved. Following the resolution of these issues, Treasury significantly reduced its ownership stake in Ally Financial—primarily through sales of common stock—from 74 to 16 percent as of June 30, 2014. Federal Reserve did not object to Ally Financial’s resubmitted capital plan: In November 2013 Ally Financial received a “nonobjection” from the Federal Reserve to its resubmitted 2013 CCAR capital plan, which enabled Ally Financial to move forward on its repurchase of $5.9 billion of the remaining Treasury-owned mandatory convertible preferred shares. The final bankruptcy agreement included a settlement, which the bankruptcy court judge had approved in June 2013, releasing Ally Financial from any and all legal claims by ResCap and, subject to certain exceptions, all other third parties, in exchange for $2.1 billion in cash from Ally Financial and its insurers. Since December 2013, Treasury’s Ownership Share in Ally Financial Has Declined at an Accelerated Pace
After the legal and regulatory developments in late 2013, the pace of Treasury’s reduction in its ownership share of Ally Financial accelerated. As of June 30, 2014, Treasury had received $17.8 billion in sales proceeds and interest and dividend payments on its total assistance to Ally Financial of $17.2 billion. Ally Financial’s financial condition continued to stabilize in late 2013 and early 2014 and the company raised significant levels of common equity through private and public share offerings. According to recent rating agency analyses, Ally Financial is competitive in automotive financing, particularly in the floor-plan business segment, but faces potential competitive challenges, such as its reliance on GM and Chrysler auto financing relationships. Ally Financial’s Financial Condition Has Continued to Stabilize
Since our last review in 2013, Ally Financial’s financial performance has continued to stabilize as illustrated by multiple capital, profitability, and liquidity measures. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to FDIC, the Federal Reserve, and Treasury for their review and comment. Ally Financial provided technical comments, which we have incorporated, as appropriate. FDIC and the Federal Reserve did not provide comments. In its written comments, Treasury generally concurred with our findings. This report examines (1) the status of Treasury’s investments in Ally Financial Inc. (Ally Financial) as of June 30, 2014, and its efforts to wind down those investments; and (2) the financial condition of Ally Financial through March 31, 2014. Review 2014: Assessment Framework and Results.interviewed officials from Treasury, the Federal Reserve, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and representatives from Ally Financial. To obtain information on the financial ratios and indicators used in the analyses of Ally Financial’s financial condition, we reviewed relevant documentation and interviewed officials from FDIC, the Federal Reserve, Treasury, and representatives from Ally Financial. | Why GAO Did This Study
As part of its Automotive Industry Financing Program, funded through the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), Treasury provided $17.2 billion of assistance to Ally Financial (formerly known as GMAC). Ally Financial is a large financial holding company, the primary business of which is auto financing.
TARP's authorizing legislation mandates that GAO report every 60 days on TARP activities. This report examines (1) the status of Treasury's investments in Ally Financial and its efforts to wind down those investments and (2) the financial condition of Ally Financial.
To address these issues, GAO reviewed and analyzed available industry, financial, and regulatory data from 2009 through June 2014. GAO also reviewed rating agency analyses, Treasury reports and documentation detailing Treasury's investments in Ally Financial and its divestments from the company, as well as Ally Financial's financial filings and reports. GAO also interviewed officials from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), Federal Reserve, and Treasury, and representatives from Ally Financial.
GAO provided a draft of this report to FDIC, the Federal Reserve, Treasury, and Ally Financial. Treasury generally concurred with GAO's findings. Ally Financial provided technical comments, which GAO has incorporated, as appropriate. FDIC and the Federal Reserve did not provide comments.
GAO makes no recommendations in this report.
What GAO Found
The Department of the Treasury (Treasury) reduced its ownership stake in Ally Financial Inc. (Ally Financial) from 74 percent in October 2013, to 16 percent as of June 30, 2014. As shown in the figure below, the pace of Treasury's reduction in its ownership share of Ally Financial accelerated in 2013 and corresponds with two key events. First, in November 2013, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve) did not object to Ally Financial's resubmitted 2013 capital plan, which allowed Ally Financial to repurchase preferred shares from Treasury and complete a private placement of common shares. Second, in December 2013 the bankruptcy proceedings of Ally Financial's mortgage subsidiary, Residential Capital LLC (ResCap), were substantially resolved. The confirmed Chapter 11 plan broadly released Ally Financial from any and all legal claims by ResCap and, subject to certain exceptions, all other third parties, in exchange for $2.1 billion in cash from Ally Financial and its insurers. As of June 30, 2014, Treasury had received $17.8 billion in sales proceeds and interest and dividend payments on its total assistance to Ally Financial of $17.2 billion.
Ally Financial's financial condition has continued to stabilize in late 2013 and early 2014 as illustrated by multiple capital, profitability, and liquidity measures. For example, Ally Financial's capital ratios have remained above regulatory minimum levels since 2009, which indicates that it is in a better position to absorb financial losses. In addition, the company raised significant levels of common equity through private and public share offerings. According to recent credit rating agency analyses, Ally Financial is competitive in automotive financing, particularly in the floor-plan business segment, which focuses on dealer financing. However, analysts reported that the company faces potential competitive challenges, such as the loss of certain exclusive relationships with General Motors Company and Chrysler Group LLC. |
gao_GAO-04-501T | gao_GAO-04-501T_0 | Alternative financing mechanisms enable terrorists to earn, move, and store their assets and may include the use of commodities, bulk cash, charities, and informal banking systems, sometimes referred to as hawala. U.S. Government Faces Significant Challenges in Deterring Terrorists’ Use of Key Alternative Financing Mechanisms
The U.S. government faces myriad challenges in determining and monitoring the nature and extent of terrorists’ use of alternative financing mechanisms. As a result of our earlier findings: We recommended that the Director of the FBI, in consultation with relevant U.S. government agencies, systematically collect and analyze information involving terrorists’ use of alternative financing mechanisms. Justice agreed with our finding that the FBI does not systematically collect and analyze such information, but Justice did not specifically agree or disagree with our recommendation. It remains unclear as to how this will serve as a basis for an informed strategy. The IRS agreed with our recommendation, and we are pleased to report that the IRS expedited efforts and issued IRS procedures and state guidance on December 31, 2003, as stated in its agency comments in response to our report. Federal Agencies Have Taken Steps to Coordinate Investigations of Terrorist Financing, but Operational and Organizational Challenges Still Exist
In May 2003, to resolve jurisdictional issues and enhance interagency coordination, the Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security signed a Memorandum of Agreement concerning terrorist financing investigations. In February 2004, we reported to the Senate Appropriations’ Subcommittee on Homeland Security that the FBI and ICE had implemented or taken concrete steps to implement most of the key Memorandum of Agreement provisions. For example, the agencies had developed collaborative procedures to determine whether applicable ICE investigations or financial crimes leads may be related to terrorism or terrorist financing—and, if so, determine whether these investigations or leads should thereafter be pursued under the auspices of the FBI. In September 2003, we reported to this Caucus that, as a mechanism for guiding the coordination of federal law enforcement agencies’ efforts to combat money laundering and related financial crimes, the annual NMLS has had mixed results but generally has not been as useful as envisioned by the Strategy Act. For example, we noted that although Treasury and Justice had made progress on some NMLS initiatives designed to enhance interagency coordination of investigations, most had not achieved the expectations called for in the annual strategies, including plans to (1) use a centralized system to coordinate investigations and (2) develop uniform guidelines for undercover investigations. In summary, our September 2003 report recommended that—if the Congress reauthorizes the requirement for an annual NMLS—the Secretary of the Treasury, working with the Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security, should take appropriate steps to strengthen the leadership structure responsible for strategy development and implementation by establishing a mechanism that would have the ability to marshal resources to ensure that the strategy’s vision is achieved, resolve disputes between agencies, and ensure accountability for strategy implementation; link the strategy to periodic assessments of threats and risks, which would provide a basis for ensuring that clear priorities are established and focused on the areas of greatest need; and establish accountability mechanisms, such as (1) requiring the principal agencies to develop outcome-oriented performance measures that must be linked to the NMLS’s goals and objectives and that also must be reflected in the agencies’ annual performance plans and (2) providing the Congress with periodic reports on the strategy’s results. In commenting on a draft of the September 2003 report, Treasury said that our recommendations are important, should Congress reauthorize the legislation requiring future strategies; Justice said that our observations and conclusions will be helpful in assessing the role that the strategy process has played in the federal government’s efforts to combat money laundering; and Homeland Security said that it agreed with our recommendations. While we have not reviewed the 2003 NMLS, we note that it emphasized that “the broad fight against money laundering is integral to the war against terrorism” and that money laundering and terrorist financing “share many of the same methods to hide and move proceeds.” In this regard, one of the major goals of the 2003 strategy is to “cut off access to the international financial system by money launderers and terrorist financiers more effectively.” Under this goal, the strategy stated that the United States will continue to focus on specific financing mechanisms—including charities, bulk cash smuggling, trade-based schemes, and alternative remittance systems—that are particularly vulnerable or attractive to money launderers and terrorist financiers. Continued progress will depend largely on the ability of the agencies to establish and maintain effective interagency relationships and meet various other operational and organizational challenges. | Why GAO Did This Study
The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks highlighted the importance of data collection, information sharing, and coordination within the U.S. government. Such efforts are important whether focused on terrorism or as an integral part of a broader strategy for combating money laundering. In this testimony, GAO addresses (1) the challenges the U.S. government faces in deterring terrorists' use of alternative financing mechanisms, (2) the steps that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) have taken to implement a May 2003 Memorandum of Agreement concerning terrorist financing investigations, and (3) whether the annual National Money Laundering Strategy (NMLS) has served as a useful mechanism for guiding the coordination of federal efforts to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. GAO's testimony is based on two reports written in September 2003 (GAO-03-813) and November 2003 (GAO-04-163) for the Caucus and congressional requesters within the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, as well as a February 2004 report (GAO-04-464R) on related issues for the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Homeland Security.
What GAO Found
The U.S. government faces various challenges in determining and monitoring the nature and extent of terrorists' use of alternative financing mechanisms, according to GAO's November 2003 report. Alternative financing mechanisms are outside the mainstream financial system and include the use of commodities (cigarettes, counterfeit goods, illicit drugs, etc.), bulk cash, charities, and informal banking systems to earn, move, and store assets. GAO recommended more systematic collection, analysis, and sharing of information to make alternative financing mechanisms less attractive to terrorist groups. In response to our recommendation that the FBI, in consultation with other agencies, systematically collect and analyze information on terrorists' use of these mechanisms, Justice did not specifically agree or disagree with our recommendation, but other agencies agreed with the need for improved analysis. The Treasury agreed with our recommendation to issue an overdue report on precious stones and commodities, but it remains unclear how the resulting product may be used as the basis for an informed strategy as expected under the 2002 NMLS. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) agreed with our recommendation to develop and implement procedures for sharing information on charities with states and issued IRS procedures and state guidance on December 31, 2003. To resolve jurisdictional issues and enhance interagency coordination of terrorist financing investigations, the FBI and ICE have taken steps to implement most of the key provisions of the May 2003 Memorandum of Agreement. According to GAO's February 2004 report, the agencies have developed collaborative procedures to determine whether applicable ICE investigations or financial crimes leads may be related to terrorism or terrorist financing--and, if so, determine whether the FBI should thereafter take the lead in pursuing them. GAO's report noted that continued progress will depend largely on the ability of the agencies to establish and maintain effective interagency relationships. From a broader or strategic perspective, the annual NMLS generally has not served as a useful mechanism for guiding coordination of federal efforts to combat money laundering and terrorist financing, according to GAO's September 2003 report. While Treasury and Justice had made progress on some strategy initiatives designed to enhance interagency coordination of investigations, most initiatives had not achieved the expectations called for in the annual strategies. The report recommended (1) strengthening the leadership structure for strategy development and implementation, (2) identifying key priorities, and (3) establishing accountability mechanisms. In commenting on a draft of the September 2003 report, Treasury said that our recommendations are important, should the Congress reauthorize the legislation requiring future strategies; Justice said that our observations and conclusions will be helpful in assessing the role that the strategy process has played in the federal government's efforts to combat money laundering; and Homeland Security said that it agreed with our recommendations. |
gao_GAO-17-709 | gao_GAO-17-709_0 | Resolving pending applications. VHA’s Implementation of Enrollment Processes Has Hindered the Timely and Accurate Enrollment of Veterans, and VHA Is Assessing Efforts to Improve These Processes
VHA enrollment staff, both from HEC and VAMCs, frequently did not process enrollment applications in accordance with VHA’s timeliness standards and made incorrect enrollment determinations. VHA Frequently Did Not Meet Timeliness Standards for Processing Enrollment Applications
Prior studies show that VHA enrollment staff, whether from HEC or VAMCs, frequently did not process enrollment applications within 5 business days in accordance with VHA timeliness standards. In response to an audit recommendation, HEC officials said they have begun prioritizing workload to help meet the timeliness standard. Additionally, the overall time needed to process enrollment applications may increase when staff need to place applications in a pending status. Based on our discussions with enrollment staff, we found that none of the VAMCs in our review had a specific policy or procedure for how to resolve pending applications. For the six VAMCs in our review, we found that, as of March and April 2017, VAMC enrollment staff had not resolved 31 (55 percent) of the 56 pending applications included in our random, nongeneralizable sample of pending applications. These 9 applications had been in a pending status between 2 and 5 months at the time of our review. HEC developed procedures for HEC enrollment staff to use when resolving pending applications. Furthermore, VAMC officials told us that they had not received any guidance regarding the new procedures and were confused about whether they would continue to have a role in this process. HEC has recently implemented an effort to review the accuracy of some enrollment determinations, specifically those for which veterans were found to be ineligible or rejected for health care benefits. VHA Lacks a Standardized Process for System-Wide Oversight of Enrollment Processes
VHA has not sufficiently defined through policies or procedures a standardized oversight process that describes and delineates the roles and responsibilities of HEC and VISNs—the networks that manage and oversee VAMCs in their geographic area—in monitoring and evaluating the efficiency and effectiveness of enrollment processes. Although HEC officials said they are responsible for oversight of enrollment processes system-wide and VHA policy generally states that HEC is responsible for performing a second-level review of all enrollment determinations, policies and procedures do not document the key oversight activities that should be conducted, how often they should be done, or the data that should be assessed for ensuring timely and accurate enrollment processes system-wide. HEC officials said they recognized the need to improve the oversight of enrollment processes, and a goal under the National Enrollment Improvement is for HEC to have 100 percent accountability and oversight of applications— those processed both at HEC and at the VAMCs. VHA Lacks Complete and Reliable Data to Oversee the Timeliness of Processing Enrollment Applications System-Wide
VHA—through HEC—does not have complete and reliable data for overseeing the timeliness of processing enrollment applications system- wide. Officials from four of the six VAMCs in our review, in contrast, said they considered the timeliness standard met when an application was entered into the system, irrespective of whether an enrollment determination was made or whether the application was pending. Without a central repository of reliable data about enrollment processes and a clearly defined measurement of the processing standard, VHA cannot reliably and consistently oversee processing timeliness of enrollment applications, assess the extent to which VAMCs face challenges in meeting the standard, and make appropriate decisions to improve processes system- wide. First, VHA—through HEC—has recently implemented an effort to review the accuracy of enrollment determinations for which veterans were found to be ineligible or rejected for health care benefits. Conclusions
Timely and accurate processing of veterans’ enrollment applications is critical to ensuring that eligible veterans obtain needed health care. Additionally, limitations in VHA’s oversight further impede its ability to ensure the timeliness of application processing and the accuracy of enrollment determinations system-wide. Clarify its 5-day timeliness standard for processing enrollment applications, including whether it covers the total time needed to make an enrollment determination and the time applications are pending, and ensure the clarification is communicated system-wide. In its written comments, VA concurred with all four of the report’s recommendations, and identified actions it is taking to implement them. | Why GAO Did This Study
Enrollment is generally the first step veterans take to access VA health care, thus timely and accurate processing of enrollment applications is critical to help ensure eligible veterans obtain needed care.
The Explanatory Statement accompanying the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 included a provision for GAO to examine VA's oversight of patient access to care. This report examines (1) VHA's processes for enrolling veterans for health care benefits and (2) its related oversight. GAO reviewed federal laws, regulations, and VHA policies and procedures. GAO also interviewed officials from HEC and 6 of VHA's 170 VAMCs selected to provide variation in factors such as number of enrollment applications processed and geographic location; reviewed actions to resolve a randomly selected, nongeneralizable sample of pending enrollment applications from these 6 VAMCs; and interviewed HEC and VAMC officials on oversight of enrollment processes.
What GAO Found
The Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) Veterans Health Administration's (VHA) implementation and oversight of enrollment processes need improvement to help ensure the timely enrollment of veterans for health care benefits.
VHA frequently did not meet timeliness standards: VHA studies conducted in 2016 revealed that enrollment staff frequently did not process veterans' enrollment applications within the timeliness standard of 5 business days. These issues were found both at VHA's Health Eligibility Center (HEC)—the central enrollment processing center—and at local VA medical centers (VAMC) that also process enrollment applications. In response to an audit recommendation, HEC officials said they have begun prioritizing workload to help meet the timeliness standard. Additionally, the overall time needed to process enrollment applications may increase when staff need to place applications in a pending status, as pending applications require additional information, such as military service information, for staff to make enrollment determinations. However, none of the six VAMCs GAO reviewed had a specific policy for how to resolve pending applications. GAO found that VAMC enrollment staff had not resolved more than half of the pending applications GAO reviewed at these six VAMCs, some of which had been pending for more than 3 months at the time of the review. Although HEC developed new procedures for its enrollment staff to use when resolving pending applications, these procedures were not communicated to VAMCs. Officials from the VAMCs GAO reviewed said that they had not received guidance on these procedures and were confused about whether they would continue to have a role in this process. In the absence of HEC communication with VAMCs, there may be inefficiencies in resolving pending applications. VHA, through HEC, is assessing efforts to improve the timeliness of enrollment application processing and the accuracy of enrollment determinations.
VHA lacks a standardized oversight process and reliable data to monitor enrollment processes system-wide: Although HEC officials said they are responsible for oversight of enrollment processes system-wide, VHA has neither sufficient policies that delineate this role nor procedures that document key oversight activities that should be conducted. For example, policies do not describe the oversight activities HEC should conduct to help ensure the accuracy of enrollment determinations system-wide. Further, VHA does not have reliable data for overseeing the timeliness of processing enrollment applications at VAMCs, which process 90 percent of the applications system-wide. Officials from the six VAMCs in GAO's review and HEC also had varying interpretations of how to measure the timeliness standard. For example, officials from four of the six VAMCs said the standard was met when enrollment staff entered an application into their local system, irrespective of whether an enrollment determination was made. In contrast, HEC officials said the measurement encompasses the time needed to make an enrollment determination, including any time the application was pending. Without reliable data that are consistently measured, VHA cannot accurately oversee the timeliness of application processing system-wide, or assess the extent to which VAMCs face challenges in implementing enrollment processes. To improve oversight, VHA, through HEC, recently implemented an effort to review the accuracy of some enrollment determinations.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that VHA (1) define the responsibilities of VAMCs in resolving pending enrollment applications; (2) define oversight responsibilities to help ensure timely application processing and accurate enrollment determinations; (3) develop procedures for collecting reliable data system-wide to evaluate the timeliness of application processing; and (4) clarify its 5-day timeliness standard. VA concurred with all of GAO's recommendations and identified actions it is taking to implement them. |
gao_GAO-06-870 | gao_GAO-06-870_0 | 1). 3). Labor Has Shortened Award Times, but Does Not Track the Entire Award Process
Labor’s new electronic application system and the streamlined information requirements for national emergency grant applications have, on average, shortened the time it takes to award grants to 25 working days and helped Labor award 70 percent of the grants in program year 2004 within 30 working days from the submission of the application to the issuance of the award letter. 4). Overall, Labor awarded 70 percent of all grants within 30 working days compared with 38 percent in program years 2000-2002. In contrast, awards for regular grants took longer. In addition, some grantees reported that delays in obtaining funds adversely impacted their ability to provide services, because individuals who needed employment left the affected area to search for work in other places or found other jobs instead of waiting for grant funds to become available. Award Processing Time Was More Consistent during Program Year 2004
Labor’s award processing times were more consistent across quarters in program year 2004 than in program years 2000-2002. Labor Has Taken Steps to Improve Quarterly Report Data
Labor’s new electronic quarterly progress report system has enhanced its ability to collect, review, and manage quarterly report information. By contrast, when we examined reports submitted for program years 2000-2002, we found that the quarterly report data were generally incomplete. Regional officials conduct a variety of monitoring activities, including approving program operating plans, reviewing quarterly progress reports, and conducting site visits. However, Labor has not issued complete, program-specific guidance that would standardize monitoring practices across regions, states, and local areas and help ensure consistent practices. In addition, officials in most of the states and local areas we visited said that Labor does not regularly help disseminate information about how states and local areas are managing and monitoring their national emergency grant projects. Moreover, while the system has improved the timeliness of grant awards, some state and local officials have encountered problems using the system. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) determine whether Labor has shortened grant award times since our 2004 report and has been able to meet its own goal of 30 working days for awarding grants, (2) examine the uniformity of the program data that Labor is currently collecting, and (3) assess Labor’s monitoring and oversight of national emergency grant projects. Timeliness Assessment
To examine how long it takes Labor to award national emergency grants and determine whether Labor is meeting its 30-working-day timeliness goal, we obtained a listing from Labor of all grants awarded during program year 2004 and the first 2 quarters of program year 2005. To assess the extent that grantees complied with requirements to summit data to the WIASRD database, we identified states that received national emergency grants in programs years 2002, 2003, and 2004, and, therefore, were likely to have participants that left projects in program year 2004. | Why GAO Did This Study
Between January 2004 and December 2005, more than 30,000 mass layoffs involving 50 or more workers occurred in the United States, causing more than 3.4 million workers to lose their jobs. National emergency grants expand services to laid-off workers when other state and federal programs are insufficient to meet their needs. GAO assessed (1) whether Labor has shortened grant award times since GAO's 2004 report and was meeting own timeliness goal, (2) the uniformity of the program data that Labor now collects, and (3) Labor's oversight of national emergency grant projects. To address these objectives, GAO analyzed information for program year 2004 and the first 2 quarters of 2005 and compared it with data collected for program years 2000- 2002.
What GAO Found
We found that Labor's new electronic application system has, on average, shortened award processing time and most national emergency grants were awarded within Labor's goal of 30 working days as measured by GAO--from the time the application is submitted to the issuance of the award letter. In program year 2004, Labor averaged 25 working days to award grants, in contrast to program years 2000-2002, when it averaged 50 working days. Moreover, in program year 2004, Labor awarded 70 percent of all grants within 30 working days, in contrast to 38 percent for program years 2000- 2002. Although Labor has improved the overall timeliness for awards, award times ranged from 1 to 90 working days and varied by type of grant. For example, disaster grants were awarded, on average, in 16 days, but regular grants were awarded, on average, in 45 days. Delays in obtaining funds adversely impacted some grantees' ability to provide services. Also, we found that Labor's electronic application system and its timeliness goal did not capture every phase of the award process. In addition, users of this system reported some technical problems. Labor has taken steps to improve its two main sources of data for assessing how grant funds are used--the quarterly progress reports and the Workforce Investment Act Standardized Record Data (WIASRD) database. Labor introduced a new electronic quarterly report system in program year 2004. Since then, grantees have generally been submitting uniform and consistent information. Also, our review of available WIASRD data for program year 2004 shows that at least 92 percent of states that received national emergency grants included information on these grants in their WIASRD submissions. Labor's regional offices oversee each project to track performance and compliance with program requirements by conducting various monitoring activities, including approving program operating plans, reviewing quarterly progress reports, and conducting site visits. However, Labor has not issued complete, program-specific guidance that would standardize monitoring practices across regions, states, and local areas and help ensure consistent practices. In addition, officials in most of the states and local areas we visited said that Labor does not regularly help disseminate information about how states and local areas are managing their national emergency grant projects. |
gao_GAO-02-615T | gao_GAO-02-615T_0 | States are allowed to transfer up to 30 percent of their TANF funds to the Child Care and Development Fund (CCDF) and the Social Services Block Grant (SSBG). Although most adults in former welfare families were employed at some time after leaving welfare, many worked at low-wage jobs. The Focus of Welfare Spending Has Shifted from Monthly Cash Payments to Services
Prior to welfare reform, states focused their welfare spending on providing monthly cash payments. States Are Providing More Work Support Services for Welfare Families
Unlike AFDC, which focused on income maintenance for welfare families, federal and state welfare policies under TANF have focused on helping welfare families secure and maintain employment. As a result, states are providing more services to low-income families who are not on welfare, including those who have recently left welfare. Many Low-Income Families Receiving TANF/MOE-Funded Services Are Not Reflected in TANF Caseload Data
While states are using TANF/MOE dollars to provide services to many families who do not receive monthly cash assistance payments, these families are not included in the reported TANF caseload, and the actual number of these families is unknown. Concluding Observations
Since the Congress passed welfare reform legislation in 1996, states have taken steps to implement a work-based, temporary assistance program for needy families. Although this measure provides important information for administrators and policymakers, it does not provide a complete picture of the number of people receiving benefits or services funded at least in part with TANF/MOE funds. Appendix I: Basis for Estimate Shown in Figure 2
Basis for Estimate of Minimum Number of Low-Income Families Receiving TANF/MOE-Funded Services Who Are Not in the TANF Caseload
To be included in our estimate of the number of low-income families receiving TANF/MOE-funded services who were not in the TANF caseload, a service or the data on the service had to meet each of the following criteria: Service had to be funded with at least 30 percent TANF/MOE dollars—If a service was funded with at least 30 percent TANF/MOE dollars (and the other criteria were met for our estimate), we included all service recipients not receiving monthly cash payments. States were able to provide these data for families receiving subsidized child care. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant makes $16.5 billion available to states each year, regardless of changes in the number of people receiving benefits. To qualify for their full TANF allotments, states must spend a certain amount of state money, referred to as maintenance-of-effort funds. As states implemented work-focused reforms during the strong economy of the 1990s, welfare caseloads dropped by more than 50 percent.
What GAO Found
GAO found that most former welfare recipients were employed at some point after leaving welfare, typically with earnings that did not raise them above the poverty level. Under welfare reform, spending shifted from monthly cash payments to services, such as child care and transportation. This shift reflects two key features of reform. First, many states have increased spending to engage more welfare families in work-related activities and to provide more intensive services. Second, many states have increased their efforts to provide services to low-income families not receiving welfare. Services for these families include child care, case management, and job retention and advancement services for families who have recently left welfare for employment as well as other low-income working families. Although states have the flexibility under TANF to use their federal and state welfare-related funds to provide services to families not receiving monthly cash assistance, these families are not reflected in caseload data reported to the Department of Health and Human Services. As a result, caseload data do not provide a complete picture of the number of families receiving benefits and services through TANF. |
gao_GAO-15-243 | gao_GAO-15-243_0 | The combatant commands and the military services are to use the JLLP to develop lessons learned related to joint capabilities by collecting issues from operations and exercises in order to make improvements to areas such as doctrine, policy, training, and education. As the JLLP’s system of record, JLLIS is to facilitate the collection, management, and sharing of issues and lessons learned to improve the development and readiness of the joint force. DOD’s Geographic Combatant Commands Are Improving Efforts to Collect OCS Issues Needed to Develop Lessons Learned, but the Military Services Are Not Generally Collecting OCS Issues
The Geographic Combatant Commands Collect Some OCS Issues from Operations and Are Improving Efforts to Collect OCS Issues from Exercises
DOD’s geographic combatant commands have used large-scale operations as sources for collecting OCS issues. In Afghanistan, senior U.S. Central Command and U.S. Africa Command, U.S. Central Command, U.S. Northern Command, and U.S. Southern Command—have identified OCS as a critical capability in their joint training plans and have integrated it into the planning, execution, and assessment of training events. Additionally, the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force do not have service- specific OCS guidance that establishes and outlines their roles and responsibilities for the collection of OCS issues, which according to officials from these services contributes to the general lack of OCS awareness. As a result, commanders may be unable to build on efficiencies that their services have identified by collecting OCS issues and may be unable to adequately plan for the use of contractor support. As noted by DOD’s OCS Joint Concept, there are multiple organizations across the department that are working on separate, and sometimes disjointed, OCS lessons-learned efforts. While the department, as of December 2014, has not developed a systematic strategy for capturing, retaining, and applying OCS lessons learned, it has assigned JCASO responsibility for collecting joint operations–focused OCS lessons learned and best practices from contingency operations and exercises in order to inform OCS policy and recommend solutions in doctrine and training, among other areas, in cooperation with the services and other DOD components.senior DOD officials, JCASO does not serve as a focal point for integrating OCS issues from the JLLP, but rather informs policy and recommends solutions on joint OCS issues. DOD has undertaken initial efforts to identify and assign an OCS joint proponent that will include lessons-learned responsibilities. Including such roles and responsibilities in the concept for the OCS joint proponent will help better position DOD to integrate all OCS issues identified from the JLLP, thereby addressing any key OCS gaps and shortfalls in its efforts. DOD Organizations Inconsistently Use JLLIS to Share OCS Issues and Lessons Learned Due to Challenges with the System’s Limited Functionality
DOD Organizations That Collect and Resolve OCS Issues and Lessons Learned Use JLLIS to Varying Degrees
The geographic combatant commands and Army use JLLIS to varying degrees to share OCS lessons learned department-wide. However, by using forums and methods outside of JLLIS to share OCS issues and lessons learned, such as meeting minutes and telephone calls, DOD runs the risk of not being able to systematically track, resolve, and share OCS issues department-wide, which could negatively affect joint force development and readiness. JLLIS’s Functionality as an Information-Sharing Mechanism Is Limited
DOD is generally not sharing OCS lessons learned in JLLIS because the system is not functional for users searching OCS issues. JLLIS’s limited functionality for OCS issues is due to (1) its inadequate search features, (2) not having an OCS label in JLLIS, and (3) the lack of a central location for sharing information about OCS issues and lessons learned within JLLIS. Officials at three of the six commands—U.S. Until DOD improves the functionality of JLLIS, it will be difficult for users to search for OCS issues, and DOD runs the risk of working on duplicative efforts and repeating past mistakes. To help improve awareness of OCS roles and responsibilities and to collect OCS issues at the military services and the service component commands, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretaries of the military departments, in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to establish an OCS training requirement for commanders and senior leaders. This report examines the extent to which (1) the geographic combatant commands and the services collect OCS issues to develop lessons learned; (2) DOD has a focal point for integrating OCS issues from the Joint Lessons Learned Program (JLLP); and (3) DOD organizations use the Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS) to share OCS issues and lessons learned. Warfighter Support: DOD Needs to Improve Its Planning for Using Contractors to Support Future Military Operations. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD has spent billions of dollars on contract support during operations in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2002 and anticipates continuing its heavy reliance on contractors in future operations. Generally, OCS is the process of planning for and obtaining needed supplies and services from commercial sources in support of joint operations. GAO has previously identified long-standing concerns with DOD's efforts to institutionalize OCS.
This report examines the extent to which (1) the geographic combatant commands and the services collect OCS issues to develop lessons learned, (2) DOD has a focal point for integrating OCS issues from the JLLP, and (3) DOD organizations use JLLIS to share OCS issues and lessons learned. GAO evaluated OCS and lessons-learned guidance and plans and met with DOD commands and offices responsible for OCS planning, integration, policy, and contractor-management functions.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense's (DOD) geographic combatant commands are improving efforts to collect operational contract support (OCS) issues from operations and exercises needed to develop lessons learned, but the military services are generally not collecting them. Currently, four of the six geographic combatant commands—U.S. Africa Command, U.S. Central Command, U.S. Northern Command, and U.S. Southern Command—have identified OCS as a critical capability in their joint training plans and have incorporated it into planning, execution, and assessment of exercises, while U.S. European Command and U.S. Pacific Command continue to make progress doing so. However, with the exception of the Army, the military services and their component commands are not generally collecting OCS issues to develop lessons learned. Officials from the Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy stated that the lack of OCS awareness caused by not having (1) service-wide guidance on collecting OCS issues and (2) an OCS training requirement for senior leaders hinders their ability to develop lessons learned. Without guidance and a training requirement for senior leaders to improve OCS awareness, it will be difficult for DOD to ensure consistent collection of OCS issues and build on efficiencies that the services have identified to adequately plan for the use of contractor support.
DOD has made progress resolving some OCS issues, but does not have a focal point for integrating OCS issues identified through the Joint Lessons Learned Program (JLLP). The combatant commands and services are to use the JLLP to develop lessons learned related to joint capabilities from operations and exercises to improve areas such as doctrine and training. Currently, there are multiple organizations across DOD that are working on separate and sometimes disjointed OCS lessons-learned efforts. DOD has undertaken initial efforts to assign an OCS joint proponent with lessons-learned responsibilities. A joint proponent is an entity intended to lead collaborative development and integration of joint capability. However, DOD has not determined whether the joint proponent will be responsible for providing formal oversight and integration of OCS issues from the JLLP. As it develops the joint proponent, including such roles and responsibilities will help better position DOD to integrate all OCS issues from the JLLP, thereby addressing any gaps in its efforts.
DOD organizations do not consistently use the Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS) to share OCS issues and lessons learned due to the system's limited functionality. JLLIS is the JLLP's system of record and is to facilitate the DOD-wide collection and sharing of lessons learned. However, GAO found that geographic combatant commands and the Army use JLLIS to varying degrees. Further, DOD is generally not sharing OCS lessons learned in JLLIS because the system is not functional for users searching OCS issues due to, among other reasons, not having an OCS label and not having a designated location for sharing OCS lessons learned. JLLIS's limited functionality impedes information sharing department-wide. Until DOD improves the functionality of JLLIS, it will be difficult for users to search for OCS issues, and DOD runs the risk of not being able to systematically track and share OCS lessons learned department-wide, which could negatively affect joint force development and readiness.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends, among other things, that DOD and the services (1) issue service-wide OCS lessons-learned guidance; (2) establish an OCS training requirement for senior leaders; (3) ensure the planned OCS joint proponent's roles and responsibilities include integrating OCS issues from the JLLP; and (4) improve JLLIS's functionality. DOD concurred with three of these recommendations, but partially concurred with the third recommendation, stating the need to first evaluate its courses of action before establishing such a proponent. GAO believes this recommendation is still valid, as discussed in the report. |
gao_GAO-07-884T | gao_GAO-07-884T_0 | We identified state roads close to the border that appeared to be unmanned and unmonitored, allowing us to simulate the cross- border movement of radioactive materials or other contraband from Canada into the United States. We also located several ports of entry that had posted daytime hours and which, although monitored, were unmanned overnight. State Roads Close to the Northern Border
We found state roads close to the U.S.–Canada border in several states. Many of the roads we found appeared to be unmanned and unmonitored, allowing us to simulate the cross-border movement of radioactive materials or other contraband from Canada into the United States. However, the U.S. Border Patrol was not able to locate the investigators with the duffel bag, even though they had parked nearby to observe traffic passing through the port of entry. During the night, CBP told us that it relies on surveillance systems to monitor, respond to, and attempt to interdict illegal border crossing activity. When the U.S. Border Patrol did not arrive at the port of entry, our investigators returned south, only to have a U.S. Border Patrol agent pull them over 3 miles south of the port of entry. Southern Border
Safety considerations prevented our investigators from performing the same assessment work on the U.S.–Mexico border as performed on the northern border. In contrast to our observations on the northern border, our investigators observed a large law enforcement and Army National Guard presence near a state road on the southern border, including unmanned aerial vehicles. These areas did not appear to be monitored or have a noticeable law enforcement presence during the time our investigators visited the sites. Federal Lands Adjacent to the Southern Border
Investigators identified potential security vulnerabilities on federally managed land adjacent to the U.S.–Mexico border. Although CBP is ultimately responsible for protecting these areas, officials told us that certain legal, environmental, and cultural considerations limit options for enforcement—for example, environmental restrictions and tribal sovereignty rights. CBP officials clarified their approach to law enforcement in unmanned and unmonitored areas at the northern and southern U.S. borders, including an explanation of jurisdictional issues on federally managed lands. Our work shows that a determined cross- border violator would likely be able to bring radioactive materials or other contraband undetected into the United States by crossing the U.S.–Canada border at any of the locations we investigated. Borders
This appendix details four cases where Customs and Border Protection (CBP) apprehended individuals who were engaged in suspicious activities on the northern and southern borders. | Why GAO Did This Study
The possibility that terrorists and criminals might exploit border vulnerabilities and enter the United States poses a serious security risk, especially if they were to bring radioactive material or other contraband with them. Although Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has taken steps to secure the 170 ports of entry on the northern and southern U.S. borders, Congress is concerned that unmanned and unmonitored areas between these ports of entry may be vulnerable. In unmanned locations, CBP relies on surveillance cameras, unmanned aerial drones, and other technology to monitor for illegal border activity. In unmonitored locations, CBP does not have this equipment in place and must rely on alert citizens or other information sources to meet its obligation to protect the border. Today's testimony will address what GAO investigators found during a limited security assessment of seven border areas that were unmanned, unmonitored, or both--four at the U.S.-Canada border and three at the U.S.-Mexico border. In three of the four locations on the U.S.-Canada border, investigators carried a duffel bag across the border to simulate the cross-border movement of radioactive materials or other contraband. Safety considerations prevented GAO investigators from attempting to cross north into the United States from a starting point in Mexico.
What GAO Found
On the U.S.-Canada border, GAO found state roads close to the border that CBP did not appear to man or monitor. In some of these locations, the proximity of the road to the border allowed investigators to cross without being challenged by law enforcement, successfully simulating the cross-border movement of radioactive materials or other contraband into the United States from Canada. In one location on the northern border, the U.S. Border Patrol was alerted to GAO activities through the tip of an alert citizen. However, the responding U.S. Border Patrol agents were not able to locate GAO investigators. Also on the northern border, GAO investigators located several ports of entry that had posted daytime hours and were unmanned overnight. On the southern border, investigators observed a large law enforcement and Army National Guard presence on a state road, including unmanned aerial vehicles. Also, GAO identified federally managed lands that were adjacent to the U.S.-Mexico border. These areas did not appear to be monitored or did not have an observable law enforcement presence, which contrasted sharply with GAO observations on the state road. Although CBP is ultimately responsible for protecting federal lands adjacent to the border, CBP officials told GAO that certain legal, environmental, and cultural considerations limit options for enforcement--for example, environmental restrictions and tribal sovereignty rights. |
gao_GAO-14-629T | gao_GAO-14-629T_0 | FLSA Lawsuits Have Increased Substantially over the Last Decade and Most FLSA Lawsuits Filed in Fiscal Year 2012 Alleged Overtime Pay Violations
FLSA Lawsuits Increased Substantially Over the Last Decade, and Most Were Filed in a Few States
Over the past two decades—from 1991 through 2012—there was a substantial increase in the number of FLSA lawsuits filed, with most of the increase occurring in the period from fiscal year 2001 through 2012. Federal courts in most states experienced increases in the number of FLSA lawsuits filed between 1991 and 2012, but large increases were concentrated in a few states, including Florida, New York, and Alabama. FLSA Lawsuits Filed in 2012 Were Concentrated in a Few Industries and Most Alleged Overtime Violations
In fiscal year 2012, an estimated 97 percent of FLSA lawsuits were filed against private sector employers, and an estimated 57 percent of FLSA lawsuits were filed against employers in four industry areas: accommodations and food services; manufacturing; construction; and “other services”, which includes services such as laundry services, domestic work, and nail salons. WHD Uses a Data- based Approach to Target Its FLSA Enforcement Efforts but Does Not Analyze Data on Requests for Assistance to Improve Its Guidance
We also reviewed DOL’s annual process for determining how to target its enforcement and compliance assistance resources. The agency targets industries for enforcement that, according to its recent enforcement data, have a higher likelihood of FLSA violations, along with other factors. However, DOL does not compile and analyze relevant data, such as information on the subjects or the number of requests for assistance it receives from employers and workers, to help determine what additional or revised guidance employers may need to help them comply with the In developing its guidance on the FLSA, WHD does not use a FLSA.systematic approach that includes analyzing this type of data. In addition, WHD does not have a routine, data-based process for assessing the adequacy of its guidance. For example, WHD does not analyze trends in the types of FLSA-related questions it receives. Because of these issues, we recommended that WHD develop a systematic approach for identifying areas of confusion about the requirements of the FLSA that contribute to possible violations and improving the guidance it provides to employers and workers in those areas. A clearer picture of the needs of employers and workers would allow WHD to more efficiently design and target its compliance assistance efforts, which may, in turn, result in fewer FLSA violations. WHD agreed with our recommendation that the agency develop a systematic approach for identifying and considering areas of confusion that contribute to possible FLSA violations to help inform the development and assessment of its guidance. WHD stated that it is in the process of developing systems to further analyze trends in communications received from stakeholders such as workers and employers and will include findings from this analysis as part of its process for developing new or revised guidance. It is also difficult to determine the effect that the increase in FLSA lawsuits has had on employers and their ability to hire workers. | Why GAO Did This Study
The FLSA sets federal minimum wage and overtime pay requirements applicable to millions of U.S. workers and allows workers to sue employers for violating these requirements. Questions have been raised about the effect of FLSA lawsuits on employers and workers and about WHD's enforcement and compliance assistance efforts as the number of lawsuits has increased.
This statement examines what is known about the number of FLSA lawsuits filed and how WHD plans its FLSA enforcement and compliance assistance efforts. It is based on the results of a previous GAO report issued in December 2013. In conducting the earlier work, GAO analyzed federal district court data from fiscal years 1991 to 2012 and reviewed selected documents from a representative sample of lawsuits filed in federal district court in fiscal year 2012. GAO also reviewed DOL's planning and performance documents, interviewed DOL officials, as well as stakeholders, including federal judges, plaintiff and defense attorneys who specialize in FLSA cases, officials from organizations representing workers and employers, and academics.
What GAO Found
Substantial increases occurred over the last decade in the number of civil lawsuits filed in federal district court alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended (FLSA). Federal courts in most states experienced increases in the number of FLSA lawsuits filed, but large increases were concentrated in a few states, including Florida and New York. Many factors may contribute to this general trend; however, the factor cited most often by stakeholders GAO interviewed—including attorneys and judges—was attorneys' increased willingness to take on such cases. In fiscal year 2012, an estimated 97 percent of FLSA lawsuits were filed against private sector employers, often from the accommodations and food services industry, and 95 percent of the lawsuits filed included allegations of overtime violations.
The Department of Labor's Wage and Hour Division (WHD) has an annual process for planning how it will target its enforcement and compliance assistance resources to help prevent and identify potential FLSA violations. In planning its enforcement efforts, WHD targets industries that, according to its recent enforcement data, have a higher likelihood of FLSA violations. WHD, however, does not have a systematic approach that includes analyzing relevant data, such as the number of requests for assistance it receives from employers and workers, to develop its guidance, as recommended by best practices previously identified by GAO. In addition, WHD does not have a routine, data-based process for assessing the adequacy of its guidance. For example, WHD does not analyze trends in the types of FLSA-related questions it receives from employers or workers. According to plaintiff and defense attorneys GAO interviewed, more FLSA guidance from WHD would be helpful, such as guidance on how to determine whether certain types of workers are exempt from the overtime pay and other requirements of the FLSA.
What GAO Recommends
In its December 2013 report, GAO recommended that the Secretary of Labor direct the WHD Administrator to develop a systematic approach for identifying and considering areas of confusion that contribute to possible FLSA violations to help inform the development and assessment of its guidance. WHD agreed with the recommendation and described its plans to address it. |
gao_GAO-06-1128T | gao_GAO-06-1128T_0 | IAEA Has Strengthened Its Safeguards Program, but Weaknesses Need to Be Addressed
IAEA has taken steps to strengthen safeguards by more aggressively seeking assurances that a country is not pursuing a clandestine nuclear program. In a radical departure from past practices of only verifying the peaceful use of a country’s declared nuclear material at declared facilities, IAEA has begun to develop the capability to independently evaluate all aspects of a country’s nuclear activities. Under the Additional Protocol, IAEA has the right, among other things, to (1) receive more comprehensive information about a country’s nuclear activities, such as research and development activities, and (2) conduct “complementary access,” which enables IAEA to expand its inspection rights for the purpose of ensuring the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. Despite these successes, a group of safeguards experts recently cautioned that a determined country can still conceal a nuclear weapons program. A Number of Weaknesses Impede IAEA’s Ability to Effectively Implement Strengthened Safeguards
There are a number of weaknesses that hamper IAEA’s ability to effectively implement strengthened safeguards. IAEA has only limited information about the nuclear activities of 4 key countries that are not members of the NPT—India, Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan. In addition, these countries are only required to declare exports of nuclear material previously declared to IAEA. Another major weakness is that more than half, or 111 out of 189, of the NPT signatories have not yet brought the Additional Protocol into force, as of August 2006. In addition, safeguards are significantly limited or not applied in about 60 percent, or 112 out of 189, of the NPT signatory countries—either because they have an agreement (known as a small quantities protocol) with IAEA, and are not subject to most safeguards measures, or because they have not concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement with IAEA. According to IAEA and Department of State officials, this is a weakness in the agency’s ability to detect clandestine nuclear activities or transshipments of nuclear material and equipment through the country. Last, IAEA is facing a looming human capital crisis that may hamper the agency’s ability to meet its safeguards mission. For example, as we reported in 2002, the Suppliers Group helped convince Argentina and Brazil to accept IAEA safeguards on their nuclear programs in exchange for expanded access to international cooperation for peaceful nuclear purposes. The Nuclear Suppliers Group has also helped IAEA verify compliance with the NPT. Despite these benefits, there are a number of weaknesses that could limit the Nuclear Suppliers Group’s ability to curb nuclear proliferation. Specifically, members do not always share information about licenses they have approved or denied for the sale of controversial items to nonmember states. Without this shared information, a member country could inadvertently license a controversial item to a country that has already been denied a license from another Suppliers Group member state. In addition, there are a number of obstacles to efforts aimed at strengthening the Nuclear Suppliers Group and other multilateral export control regimes. U.S. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States, through a variety of programs, managed by the Departments of Energy, Defense (DOD), and State, has helped Russia and other former Soviet countries to secure nuclear material and warheads, detect illicitly trafficked nuclear material, eliminate excess stockpiles of weapons-usable nuclear material, and halt the continued production of weapons-grade plutonium. However, U.S. assistance programs have faced a number of challenges, such as a lack of access to key sites and corruption of foreign officials, which could compromise the effectiveness of U.S. assistance. GAO last reported on the MPC&A program in 2003. At that time, a lack of access to many sites in Russia’s nuclear weapons complex had significantly impeded DOE’s progress in helping Russia to secure its nuclear material. However, we also noted that U.S. radiation detection assistance efforts faced challenges, including corruption of some foreign border security officials, technical limitations of some radiation detection equipment, and inadequate maintenance of some equipment. Surplus U.S. Nuclear Nonproliferation: IAEA Has Strengthened Its Safeguards and Nuclear Security Programs, but Weaknesses Need to Be Addressed. GAO- 06-93. Washington, D.C.: October 7, 2005. Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. Efforts to Help Other Countries Combat Nuclear Smuggling Need Strengthened Coordination and Planning. | Why GAO Did This Study
The International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) safeguards system has been a cornerstone of U.S. efforts to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation since the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was adopted in 1970. Safeguards allow IAEA to verify countries' compliance with the NPT. Since the discovery in 1991 of a clandestine nuclear weapons program in Iraq, IAEA has strengthened its safeguards system. In addition to IAEA's strengthened safeguards program, there are other U.S. and international efforts that have helped stem the spread of nuclear materials and technology that could be used for nuclear weapons programs. This testimony is based on GAO's report on IAEA safeguards issued in October 2005 (Nuclear Nonproliferation: IAEA Has Strengthened Its Safeguards and Nuclear Security Programs, but Weaknesses Need to Be Addressed, GAO-06-93 [Washington, D.C.: Oct. 7, 2005]). This testimony is also based on previous GAO work related to the Nuclear Suppliers Group--a group of more than 40 countries that have pledged to limit trade in nuclear materials, equipment, and technology to only countries that are engaged in peaceful nuclear activities--and U.S. assistance to Russia and other countries of the former Soviet Union for the destruction, protection, and detection of nuclear material and weapons.
What GAO Found
IAEA has taken steps to strengthen safeguards, including conducting more intrusive inspections, to seek assurances that countries are not developing clandestine weapons programs. IAEA has begun to develop the capability to independently evaluate all aspects of a country's nuclear activities. This is a radical departure from the past practice of only verifying the peaceful use of a country's declared nuclear material. However, despite successes in uncovering some countries' undeclared nuclear activities, safeguards experts cautioned that a determined country can still conceal a nuclear weapons program. In addition, there are a number of weaknesses that limit IAEA's ability to implement strengthened safeguards. First, IAEA has a limited ability to assess the nuclear activities of 4 key countries that are not NPT members--India, Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan. Second, more than half of the NPT signatories have not yet brought the Additional Protocol, which is designed to give IAEA new authority to search for clandestine nuclear activities, into force. Third, safeguards are significantly limited or not applied to about 60 percent of NPT signatories because they possess small quantities of nuclear material, and are exempt from inspections, or they have not concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement. Finally, IAEA faces a looming human capital crisis caused by the large number of inspectors and safeguards management personnel expected to retire in the next 5 years. In addition to IAEA's strengthened safeguards program, there are other U.S. and international efforts that have helped stem the spread of nuclear materials and technology. The Nuclear Suppliers Group has helped to constrain trade in nuclear material and technology that could be used to develop nuclear weapons. However, there are a number of weaknesses that could limit the Nuclear Suppliers Group's ability to curb proliferation. For example, members of the Suppliers Group do not always share information about licenses they have approved or denied for the sale of controversial items to nonmember states. Without this shared information, a member country could inadvertently license a controversial item to a country that has already been denied a license from another member state. Since the early 1990s, U.S. nonproliferation programs have helped Russia and other former Soviet countries to, among other things, secure nuclear material and warheads, detect illicitly trafficked nuclear material, and eliminate excess stockpiles of weapons-usable nuclear material. However, these programs face a number of challenges which could compromise their ongoing effectiveness. For example, a lack of access to many sites in Russia's nuclear weapons complex has significantly impeded the Department of Energy's progress in helping Russia secure its nuclear material. U.S. radiation detection assistance efforts also face challenges, including corruption of some foreign border security officials, technical limitations of some radiation detection equipment, and inadequate maintenance of some equipment. |
gao_GAO-09-316 | gao_GAO-09-316_0 | Background
Congress established the Highway Trust Fund in 1956 to hold and distribute highway user excise taxes to fund various surface transportation programs. 1.) Distribution of funds begins with a multiyear authorization act, such as SAFETEA-LU. Despite these mechanisms, Highway Account revenues were insufficient to cover outlays, and the balance of the Highway Account has declined from fiscal year 2000 to 2008. Although DOT has reported since February 2006 that the Highway Account balance would be depleted in fiscal year 2009 and recommended several actions to offset the decline, DOT officials acknowledge that communication with stakeholders on the status of the Highway Account could be improved and are developing a plan to improve communication. Based on the estimated outlays and receipts included in SAFETEA- LU, the Highway Account balance would be drawn down from $10.8 billion to about $0.4 billion over the authorization period, providing more federal funding for highway projects. In fact, actual Highway Account receipts were lower than had been estimated in SAFETEA-LU, particularly for fiscal year 2008. 5). In a letter to state DOT agencies dated July 8, 2008, FHWA stated that, in the event of a shortfall in the Highway Account—still anticipated in fiscal year 2009— reimbursements to states would be delayed. Improved Mechanisms Could Help Maintain Highway Account Solvency
Improving the mechanisms that DOT uses to monitor the Highway Account balance—including improving existing mechanisms to make annual adjustments to the account and developing additional indicators to help DOT monitor and manage the account balance throughout the year— could help maintain the solvency of the account. According to a DOT analysis— prepared at GAO’s request—of the impact on the Highway Account had the test remained at 2 years rather than 4, the account would have failed the Byrd Test annually for fiscal years 2005 through 2008. However, DOT officials said that, although they currently project a balance of about $2.7 billion in the account at the end of fiscal year 2009 (using Treasury receipt estimates released in July), the account could reach a zero balance prior to the end of the fiscal year if receipts continue to be lower than anticipated and that the RABA adjustment could help delay or reduce the magnitude of such a shortfall. Monitoring Additional Indicators throughout the Year Could Help DOT Anticipate Sudden Declines in the Highway Account Balance
In addition to modifying existing mechanisms that are applied annually, monitoring indicators throughout the year that could signal sudden changes in the Highway Account revenues could help DOT better manage the account balance and anticipate changes. In the past, we have reported that the following strategies could be used to better align expenditures and revenue: Ensure current revenue sources (i.e., fuel taxes) are aligned with outlays. It is also important to note that without either reduced expenditures or increased revenues, or a combination of the two, Highway Account deficits will likely continue. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve DOT’s communication with stakeholders on the status of the Highway Account and the mechanisms the agency uses to help maintain account solvency, we are recommending that the Secretary of Transportation take the following three actions: Identify changes to existing solvency mechanisms designed to make annual adjustments to the Highway Account and communicate to Congress the potential benefits and limitations of these changes. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Highway Account within the Highway Trust Fund is the primary mechanism for funding federal highway programs. The account-- administered by the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) within the Department of Transportation (DOT)--channels about $33 billion in highway user excise taxes annually to states for highway projects. Although DOT and others projected that the account could run out of funds in fiscal year 2009, the balance fell more rapidly than expected and a shortfall became imminent in August 2008. In September, Congress passed legislation to provide $8 billion to replenish the account, but DOT officials anticipate the account could reach a critical stage again in fiscal year 2009. This report (1) describes the events that led to the decline in the account balance, including how DOT responded, and (2) identifies potential improvements in mechanisms to manage account solvency. This report also includes information on strategies GAO has reported on in the past that could be used to better align account outlays and revenues. To conduct this work, GAO analyzed information in legal and budget documents, reviewed account estimates, and interviewed agency officials and stakeholders.
What GAO Found
The Highway Account balance declined for several reasons. In 2005, estimated outlays from the account specified in legislation exceeded estimated revenues and, if these estimates were realized over the fiscal year 2005 to 2009 authorization period, would draw the account balance down to about $0.4 billion by the end of fiscal year 2009. However, actual revenues for fiscal year 2008 were about $4 billion lower than the estimates due to fewer purchases of trucks and motor fuel--two primary sources of account revenue. In the summer of 2008, DOT received indicators that the Highway Account balance was declining faster than expected and developed cash management practices to slow outlays to states but estimated that the account would remain solvent through the end of fiscal year 2008. Following a large downturn in revenues allocated to the account in August, DOT officials announced on Friday, September 5--three weeks later--that the practices to slow outlays would begin the following Monday, leaving states little time to adjust. DOT officials recognize that communication with stakeholders could be improved and are developing a plan to improve communication. Improving mechanisms intended to help maintain Highway Account solvency could reduce the likelihood of a funding shortfall. First, statutory mechanisms designed to make annual adjustments to the Highway Account could be modified and implemented to perform better. In fact, DOT analyses prepared at GAO's request show that these modifications could have prevented or at least signaled the fiscal year 2008 decline. Second, DOT could monitor additional indicators throughout the year--such as changes in vehicle miles traveled--to help anticipate sudden changes in account revenues. Despite improvements in mechanisms, without either reduced expenditures or increased revenues, or a combination of the two, account shortfalls will likely continue. DOT officials noted that improved solvency mechanisms would be effective only if the authorization act better aligns expenditures from the account with revenues. In the past, GAO has reported on strategies that could be used to align expenditures and revenues. |
gao_GAO-01-586 | gao_GAO-01-586_0 | The Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982 contained the first statutory DBE provision for federal highway and transit programs, requiring that a minimum of 10 percent of the funds provided by the act be expended with small businesses owned and controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals, unless the Secretary of Transportation determined otherwise. A 1995 Supreme Court decision had a significant impact on the federal DBE program, as well as other federal programs that use race or ethnicity as factors in decision-making. For example, under the prior regulations, states and transit authorities were required to justify goals lower than 10 percent—the amount identified in the statutory DBE provision. In contrast, the new regulations require states and transit authorities to base their DBE participation goals on demonstrable evidence of the number of “ready, willing, and able” DBEs available in local markets relative to the number of all businesses “ready, willing, and able” to participate in USDOT-assisted contracts in such markets—representing the level of DBE participation expected in the absence of discrimination. USDOT does not systematically track information on the discrimination complaints filed by DBEs—information that could shed light on the existence of discrimination against DBEs. In addition, USDOT could not provide the total number of investigations launched as a result of the written discrimination complaints filed by DBEs or information on the outcomes of these investigations. Without this information it is impossible to define the universe of DBEs, compare them with the transportation contracting community as a whole or gain a clear understanding of the overall impact of the DBE program. DOT? DOT? 2. 3. What do selected sources indicate about discrimination or other factors that may limit DBEs’ ability to compete for USDOT-assisted contracts? What is the impact of the DBE program on costs, competition, and job creation as well as the impact of discontinuing federal and nonfederal DBE programs? To determine how the DBE program has changed since 1999 and to identify the characteristics of DBEs and non-DBEs that receive USDOT-assisted contracts, we reviewed USDOT’s regulations and guidance pertaining to the DBE program. 1. 4. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Transportation's (DOT) Disadvantaged Business Enterprise (DBE) program seeks to remedy the effects of current and past discrimination against small businesses owned and controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged persons and to foster equal opportunity in transportation contracting. This report provides information on (1) important changes made to the program since 1999; (2) characteristics of DBEs and non-DBEs that receive DOT-assisted highway and transit contracts; (3) evidence of discrimination and other factors that may limit DBEs' ability to compete for DOT-assisted contracts; and (4) the programs impact on costs, competition, and job creation and the impact of discontinuing the federal and nonfederal DBE programs.
What GAO Found
GAO found that the program has changed significantly since DOT issued new regulations in 1999 in response to a 1995 Supreme Court decision that heightened standards for federal programs that use race or ethnicity as a criterion in decision-making. The new regulations overhauled the DBE goal-setting process. For example, states and transit authorities are no longer required to justify goals lower than 10 percent--the amount identified in the statutory DBE provision. Rather, goals are to be based on the number of "ready, willing, and able" DBEs in local markets. GAO was unable to determine the characteristics of DBE participants because of a lack of information. Without this information, it is impossible to define the universe of DBEs, compare them with the transportation contracting community as a whole, or gain a clear understanding of the programs impact. DOT does not systematically track information on discrimination complaints filed by DBEs. Although DOT receives written discrimination complaints filed by DBEs, it could not provide the total number of such complaints, the total number of investigations launched, or the outcomes of the investigations. |
gao_GAO-06-1055 | gao_GAO-06-1055_0 | The underground economy includes any employment in a country for which employers do not pay taxes or social insurance contributions and is thus composed of both unauthorized foreign workers and native workers for whom appropriate contributions are not paid. Countries’ Programs for Admitting Foreign Workers
The countries in our review have programs designed to recruit foreign workers to fill jobs that cannot be filled by native workers, and these programs generally focus on recruiting high-skilled or seasonal foreign workers. Countries Can Use Bilateral Agreements or Third Party Entities to Recruit Foreign Workers
Some countries we studied use bilateral agreements to manage the flow of workers between two countries or to manage foreign worker admissions in specific labor sectors. Countries Control the Admissions of Foreign Workers by Limiting Their Numbers and Setting Eligibility Requirements
Countries Manage Foreign Worker Admissions Using Various Methods But May Find It Difficult to Effectively Respond to Changing Labor Market Needs
Most of the countries we studied assess the need for foreign workers by studying the labor market and using the results to determine the number of foreign workers to admit to work in specific sectors, but the countries varied in the extent to which they have formalized processes to assess labor market needs for foreign workers. However, government officials and experts stated that the fee requirement may create an incentive for workers to seek illegal employment and for employers to hire unauthorized workers in order to avoid having to pay the fee. Countries Use Various Means to Limit Employment of Unauthorized Foreign Workers
The countries we studied generally require employers to report information on workers’ employment, such as workers’ names and social insurance numbers, to government agencies, and in some countries, employers are required to review employees’ work authorization documents. Some Countries Focus Enforcement Efforts on All Illegal Labor Practices, while Others Focus More Specifically on the Employment of Unauthorized Foreign Workers
In some of the countries we studied, labor agencies are primarily responsible for enforcing workplace laws and focus their enforcement efforts broadly on identifying all types of illegal labor practices, of which the employment of unauthorized foreign workers is part, including employers’ provision of substandard working conditions or failure to appropriately pay minimum wages, taxes, or social insurance contributions (see table 3). Immigration experts and governmental officials also suggested that to help deter employers’ hiring of unauthorized foreign workers, government agencies should conduct frequent inspections so as to increase employers’ perception that they are likely to be investigated, contributing to the deterrent effect of employer investigations and monetary fines on employers’ hiring of unauthorized foreign workers. However, countries have faced challenges in conducting employer investigations. Countries’ Experiences with Regularization Programs
Some countries we studied have implemented regularization programs that provide eligible unauthorized immigrants with the opportunity to obtain legal status on a temporary or permanent basis for various reasons, and countries have established different eligibility requirements for program participation. Governments in countries that have implemented regularization programs reported benefits from these programs, such as collecting increased tax and social insurance contributions, yet governments face a variety of challenges in managing such programs. Countries Require Unauthorized Immigrants to Meet Criteria for Participation in Regularization Programs
Some countries we studied, including Italy, Greece, and Spain, have implemented programs through which unauthorized immigrants could regularize or change their status to gain temporary or permanent legal residency, and in some countries, such as Greece and Argentina, unauthorized immigrants could eventually apply for citizenship. For example, requiring unauthorized foreign workers to earn the opportunity to apply for permanent residence status may complicate these workers’ ability to economically and socially integrate into a country. Therefore, government officials and experts have stated that it is important to implement new or enhanced worksite enforcement efforts in conjunction with a regularization program to maximize participation in the program by employers and eligible immigrants and to help deter employers from hiring unauthorized foreign workers in the future. Impact of Regularization Programs on Illegal Immigration and Employment Is Unknown
Experts have noted that regularization programs may be viewed as a pull factor in encouraging further illegal immigration. We selected these countries based on the following criteria: net immigration rate; size of population; membership in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD); classification by the World Bank as high income; range of immigration policies; and geographic location. We also interviewed officials from 6 employer associations, 10 labor groups, and 1 advocacy group, as well as 19 immigration experts, in Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Spain, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States (see app. Employers can apply to renew a work permit B for foreign workers 1 month before expiration of the work permit. In 2000, Belgium implemented a large-scale regularization program. Points-Based System
Canada uses a points-based system to evaluate foreign workers’ applications for permanent skilled immigration to Canada. These permits are not subjected to quota. GAO. GAO. GAO. | Why GAO Did This Study
The opportunity for employment is an important magnet attracting immigrants, including unauthorized immigrants, to countries. The policies and practices used by other countries to manage foreign workers, including actions to limit illegal immigration and to reduce the employment of unauthorized foreign workers, have been shaped by country-specific economic, demographic, and political factors. Immigration reform is a matter of continuing debate in the United States. This report examines selected countries' (1) programs for admitting foreign workers; (2) efforts to limit the employment of unauthorized foreign workers; and (3) programs for providing unauthorized immigrants with an opportunity to obtain legal status, referred to as regularization. To address these objectives, we examined reports from foreign countries, intergovernmental organizations, and research organizations. We also interviewed government officials and experts from 8 countries--Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Spain, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom--and surveyed 6 other countries. We selected these countries based on their net immigration rate, population size, membership in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development or World Bank classification as high income, range of immigration policies, and geographic location.
What GAO Found
The countries GAO studied have programs for admitting foreign workers, most of which are focused on recruiting high-skilled or seasonal foreign workers. To recruit foreign workers, some countries use bilateral agreements with other countries. For example, Canada uses bilateral agreements with Mexico and several Caribbean nations to recruit seasonal agricultural workers. Some countries manage foreign worker admissions by various means, such as quotas or points-based systems. However, officials stated that it is difficult to implement a system that responds to changing labor market needs and does not create incentives for employers to hire unauthorized foreign workers. Some countries regulate foreign worker admissions by specifying requirements for participation in a foreign worker program, such as work permit fees. Moreover, foreign worker programs differ in their requirements for workers to return home. Some temporary programs require workers to return upon expiration of work permits, while others allow foreign workers to renew their permits and apply for permanent resident status. The countries GAO studied use a variety of efforts in enforcing laws designed to limit the employment of unauthorized foreign workers. In some of these countries, employers are required to report workers' information to government agencies or to verify workers' authorization status. Among these countries, the employment of unauthorized foreign workers is largely considered one of several illegal labor practices, including failure to pay taxes or social insurance contributions, and government agencies generally focus their enforcement efforts and investigate employers to detect all such practices. Government officials and experts have noted that conducting frequent employer investigations and publicizing those investigations helps deter employers' hiring of unauthorized foreign workers. Countries can penalize unscrupulous employers for employing unauthorized foreign workers, including imposing monetary fines on employers. However, countries have faced difficulties, such as the prevalence of document fraud, in penalizing employers. Some countries have implemented large-scale regularization programs that allow unauthorized immigrants to apply for legal status on either a temporary or a permanent basis. Countries have implemented regularization programs for different reasons, such as to help reduce the size of the underground economy or to facilitate immigrant integration, and governments believe they derive some benefits from implementing these programs, such as increased collection of tax and social insurance contributions. Under these programs, countries require illegal immigrants to meet specified eligibility requirements, such as residency and work requirements, before applying for or receiving legal status. Employers and unauthorized foreign workers have incentives to participate in regularization programs but may not want to because, for example, some employers can save money by employing unauthorized foreign workers from whom they do not pay taxes or social insurance contributions. However, countries have faced difficulties in implementing these programs, such as in ensuring timely review of applications. Moreover, some experts have reported that regularization programs may attract further illegal immigration,while others have concluded that programs' effect on illegal immigration is unclear. |
gao_RCED-98-117 | gao_RCED-98-117_0 | More specifically, the report looks at how well the programs are meeting their goals, identifies their benefits for participating financial institutions and the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and considers opportunities for improving the programs and HUD’s administration of them. The key statutory objectives of the risk-sharing partnerships with qualified financial institutions are to ensure that the qualified participating entities bear a share of the risk that is sufficient to create strong, market-oriented incentives to maintain sound underwriting and loan management practices; use the resources of FHA to assist in increasing multifamily lending as provide a more adequate supply of mortgage credit for sound multifamily rental housing projects in underserved urban and rural markets; encourage major financial institutions to expand their participation in mortgage lending; increase the efficiency, and lower the costs to the federal government, of processing and servicing multifamily housing mortgage loans insured by FHA; and improve the quality and expertise of FHA staff and other resources, as required for the sound management of reinsurance and other market-oriented forms of credit enhancement. Although HUD delegates most of its traditional loan management responsibilities to its risk-sharing reinsurance partners, it retains monitoring and oversight functions. According to HUD, permanency would allow the demonstration programs to operate under the same rules as HUD’s other insurance programs. The Risk-Sharing Credit Enhancement Program Is Supporting the Financing of Affordable Multifamily Housing
In the 32 states and localities with participating housing finance agencies, the credit enhancement program is increasing access to capital markets and thereby supporting the production of affordable multifamily housing. Most of the properties are serving more low-income households than required because the credit enhancement is being combined with other subsidies, especially low-income housing tax credits. While it is still too early to evaluate the financial performance of the properties insured through the program, the available financial indicators appear to reflect sound underwriting criteria. As noted in chapter 1, HUD has identified smaller properties as an unmet capital need. 4). Conclusions
The credit enhancement demonstration program is meeting several key objectives, including facilitating the financing of affordable multifamily housing and making affordable multifamily housing available in a timely manner. The Risk-Sharing Reinsurance Program Is Largely Untested Because Participation Has Been Limited
Today, more than 5 years after the reinsurance program was authorized, the program remains largely untested. Although HUD’s risk-sharing partners have the potential to expand the participation of major financial institutions in mortgage lending, as envisioned in the risk-sharing statute, only one of the four institutions that was allocated units authorized in 1992—Fannie Mae—has participated extensively in the program, and one lender—Banc One Capital Funding Corporation—has originated over half of the loans that Fannie Mae has reinsured. Banc One Capital’s experience has demonstrated that the reinsurance program can expand participation in mortgage lending, including lending for smaller properties in rural areas. Freddie Mac has asked HUD to resolve this uncertainty. HUD has successfully met this legislative objective. A comparable system does not exist for the reinsurance program because activity in this program has been so limited. HUD is aware of these problems and plans to address them. These five field offices oversee housing finance agencies that account for about 60 percent of the units reserved through September 1997 under the credit enhancement program. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative mandate, GAO reviewed the risk-sharing demonstration programs established under section 542 of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1992, focusing on: (1) how well the programs' goals are being met; (2) the benefits for participating financial institutions and the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD); and (3) opportunities for improving the programs and HUD's administration of them.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the credit enhancement program, together with the reinsurance program, was established under the Housing and Community Development Act of 1992 to facilitate the financing of affordable multifamily housing and to make that financing available in a timely manner; (2) the credit enhancement program is meeting these goals; (3) as of September 1997, 32 participating state and local housing finance agencies had reserved about 84 percent of the risk-sharing units allocated to these agencies through March 1996; (4) most of the insured loans are financing properties that serve more low-income households than required, apparently because the credit enhancement is being used with other subsidies, particularly low-income housing tax credits; (5) while it is still too soon to evaluate the financial performance of the insured loans, the available financial indicators reflect sound underwriting standards; (6) activity in the reinsurance program has been so limited that the program remains largely untested; (7) only one institution--Fannie Mae--has participated extensively in the program, and one lender--Banc One Capital Funding Corporation--has originated over half of the loans that Fannie Mae has reinsured; (8) Banc One's activity has demonstrated that the risk-sharing reinsurance program can expand participation in mortgage lending, including lending for smaller properties in rural areas--an unmet capital need, according to HUD's studies; (9) participation in the demonstration programs has enabled HUD to facilitate the financing of affordable multifamily housing while limiting its loss exposure through risk sharing; (10) participation has also allowed HUD to increase the efficiency and reduce the costs of its operations through delegation, compared with the Federal Housing Administration's (FHA) traditional multifamily program; (11) HUD has retained responsibility for monitoring its risk-sharing partners' performance, but its data system for monitoring the progress of credit enhancement projects is unreliable; (12) HUD is aware of the system's problems and plans to resolve them in the course of overhauling all of its information management systems; (13) HUD has also retained responsibility for overseeing its risk-sharing partners' compliance with the demonstration programs' requirements; however, GAO's review identified one default that was not reported to HUD headquarters for over a year; and (14) HUD recognizes that effective oversight is critical, particularly if one or both of the demonstration programs are made permanent and lenders' activity increases. |
gao_GAO-16-61 | gao_GAO-16-61_0 | DOD Used CDC Guidance to Develop Its Sexual-Assault Prevention Strategy but It Did Not Specify How Related Activities Are Linked to Desired Outcomes or Fully Identify Factors Needed to Focus Its Prevention Efforts
DOD developed its sexual-assault prevention strategy in 2014 using CDC’s framework for effective sexual-violence prevention strategies, but DOD did not link prevention activities to desired outcomes or fully identify risk and protective factors. DOD’s Strategy Does Not Fully Identify Risk and Protective Factors That May Put a Person at Risk for Committing Sexual Assault or, Alternatively, That May Prevent Harm
DOD’s strategy is based on CDC’s framework for effective sexual- violence prevention strategies, and it addresses some but not all of the elements that CDC identified as necessary to maximize the effectiveness of prevention efforts. Specifically referred to as risk factors and protective factors, CDC’s work has demonstrated that by identifying such influences—relative to the domain or environment in which they exist—organizations can focus their efforts on eliminating factors that promote sexual violence while also supporting the factors that prevent it. We reviewed DOD’s strategy and found that it includes risk factors identified by CDC for three of these domains—individuals, relationships, and society. DOD also included six protective factors identified by CDC in its prevention strategy, but it does not specify how they relate to the five domains. Without a more comprehensive list of such factors that correspond to each of the domains in its strategy, DOD may be limited in its ability to take an evidence-based approach to the prevention of sexual assault. DOD and the Services Are Implementing Prevention Activities but They Have Not Taken Steps to Help Ensure That Installation- Developed Activities Are Consistent with the Objectives of DOD’s Prevention Strategy
DOD and the military services developed and are in the process of implementing prevention-focused activities, but they have not taken steps to help ensure that activities developed at the local level are consistent with the overarching objectives of DOD’s strategy. As noted previously, DOD’s 2014–16 prevention strategy identifies 18 prevention-focused activities and, according to SAPRO officials, 2 have been implemented and efforts to address the remaining 16 are ongoing. However, these installation-developed activities may not be consistent with DOD’s prevention strategy because DOD and the services have not communicated the purpose of the strategy and disseminated it to the installation-based personnel responsible for developing and implementing activities at the local level. While the services’ SAPR policies generally address the prevention of sexual assault, they have not been updated to align with and operationalize the principles outlined in DOD’s most recent prevention strategy. DOD Has Identified Prevention-Focused Measures, but They Are Missing Some Key Attributes Needed to Successfully Assess Program Performance
DOD has identified performance measures to assess the extent to which its prevention efforts are achieving its goal to eliminate sexual assault in the military, but these measures are missing many of the 10 key attributes that our prior work has shown can contribute to assessing program performance effectively. While all 5 of DOD’s prevention-focused measures demonstrate some of the key attributes, collectively they are missing more than half of these attributes. However, until DOD has fully developed its prevention-focused performance measures, DOD and other decision makers may be unable to effectively gauge the progress of the department’s prevention efforts. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve the effectiveness of DOD’s strategy for preventing sexual assault in the military, we recommend that, as part of the department’s next biennial update to the 2014–16 sexual-assault prevention strategy, the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, in conjunction with the Secretaries of the military departments, take the following five actions: link sexual-assault prevention activities with desired outcomes, and identify risk and protective factors for all of its domains, including the military community and its leaders. To determine the extent to which DOD has developed performance measures to assess the effectiveness of its efforts to prevent sexual assault in the military, we reviewed DOD’s 2013 Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Strategic Plan, its 2014 Report to the President of the United States on Sexual Assault Prevention and Response, its annual report on sexual assault in the military for fiscal year 2014, its 2014-16 Sexual Assault Prevention Strategy, and other related documents to identify performance measures that the department uses or plans to use to assess its progress in preventing sexual assault in the military. | Why GAO Did This Study
Sexual assault is a crime that devastates victims and has a far-reaching negative impact for DOD because it undermines DOD's core values, degrades mission readiness, and raises financial costs. DOD data show that reported sexual assaults involving servicemembers more than doubled from about 2,800 reports in fiscal year 2007 to about 6,100 reports in fiscal year 2014. Based on results of a 2014 survey, RAND estimated that 20,300 active-duty servicemembers were sexually assaulted in the prior year.
Senate Report 113-176 includes a provision for GAO to review DOD's efforts to prevent sexual assault. This report addresses the extent to which DOD (1) developed an effective prevention strategy, (2) implemented activities department-wide and at military installations related to the department's effort to prevent sexual assault, and (3) developed performance measures to determine the effectiveness of its efforts to prevent sexual assault in the military. GAO evaluated DOD's strategy against CDC's framework for effective sexual-violence prevention strategies, reviewed DOD policies, and interviewed cognizant officials.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense (DOD) developed its strategy to prevent sexual assault using the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) framework for effective sexual-violence prevention strategies, but DOD does not link activities to desired outcomes or fully identify risk and protective factors. Specifically, DOD's strategy identifies 18 prevention-related activities, but they are not linked to desired outcomes—a step that CDC says is necessary to determine whether efforts are producing the intended effect. CDC has also demonstrated that by identifying risk and protective factors—relative to the domain or environment in which they exist—organizations can focus efforts on eliminating risk factors that promote sexual violence while also supporting the protective factors that prevent it. DOD identifies five domains in its strategy and includes risk factors for three—individuals, relationships, and society—but it does not specify risk factors for the other two domains—leaders at all levels of DOD and the military community. Further, DOD does not specify how the protective factors, such as emotional health, identified in its strategy relate to the five domains. Thus, DOD may be limited in its ability to take an evidence-based approach to the prevention of sexual assault.
DOD and the military services are in the process of implementing prevention-focused activities, but they have not taken steps to ensure that installation-level activities are consistent with the overarching objectives of DOD's strategy. DOD's strategy identifies 18 activities, 2 of which DOD considers implemented while efforts to address the remaining 16 are ongoing. For example, DOD officials report that they have implemented the activity directing the development of a military community of practice. Additionally, GAO identified activities that had been developed and implemented at the four installations GAO visited, but found that they may not be consistent with DOD's strategy because it has not been communicated or disseminated to the personnel responsible for implementing the activities. Further, service policies—key conduits of such communication—do not provide the guidance necessary to unify the department's prevention efforts because they have not been updated to align with and operationalize the principles outlined in DOD's most recent strategy. Thus, DOD cannot be sure that all prevention-related activities are achieving the goals and objectives of the department's strategy.
DOD has identified five performance measures to assess the effectiveness of its prevention efforts, but these measures are not fully developed as they are missing many of the 10 key attributes that GAO has found can contribute to assessing program performance effectively, such as baseline and trend data, measurable target, and clarity. Specifically, all five performance measures demonstrate some of these attributes but collectively they are missing more than half of these attributes. All of the prevention efforts' measures demonstrate baseline and trend data but none of the measures have measurable target, clarity, and some of the other attributes. Without fully developed measures, DOD and other decision makers may not be able to effectively gauge the progress of the department's prevention efforts.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD link prevention activities with desired outcomes; identify risk and protective factors for all domains; communicate and disseminate its strategy to all program personnel; align service policies with the strategy; and fully develop performance measures. DOD concurred with all recommendations and noted actions it was taking. |
gao_NSIAD-97-206 | gao_NSIAD-97-206_0 | Equipment predominantly used for units’ 2-week annual training is located at Mobilization and Training Equipment Sites (MATES). However, it would be feasible for these units, as well as other units that use the same training site, to pool and share equipment. More than enough equipment is already located at these MATES to create a pool of equipment to meet unit training needs. The equipment not needed for the pool could be put in preserved storage. Because units train at different times during the summer, this equipment could be made available to other units for use during their 2-week training period or put in preserved storage. In fact, more equipment than the Guard’s 25-percent goal can be preserved. Maintenance Costs Can Be Avoided by Pooling and Sharing Training Equipment
The Guard’s training equipment is costly to maintain. Our analysis of the nine equipment items showed that the Guard could avoid up to $10.3 million annually in maintenance costs if it preserved 25 percent of this equipment in a controlled humidity environment. Our analysis also showed that the Guard could avoid an additional $4.4 million to $9.7 million each year in maintenance costs if it required the three units that train at the Fort Stewart MATES and the two units that train at the Camp Shelby MATES to pool and share equipment. The cost avoidance we identified is the minimum that the Guard can achieve because many equipment items other than the ones used in our analysis could be pooled and shared. Also, our analysis included only eight Guard units, and additional maintenance costs could be avoided if other state and territorial Guard military commands pooled and shared training equipment. According to our analysis of nine equipment items and eight Guard units, we determined that the Guard could reduce scheduled annual maintenance cost by an additional $23.1 million to $39.2 million annually if as few as three units changed their annual training location and share equipment. These figures are $5.3 million to $18 million more than the Guard’s current program could achieve. Recommendations
To optimize the avoidance of annual equipment maintenance costs and achieve the resulting benefits of having a more effective maintenance workforce and increased equipment availability for mobilization, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Director of the Army National Guard Bureau to develop and implement a strategy, along with the modernization of Guard units, to provide controlled humidity facilities at the training sites that will achieve the greatest cost avoidance benefit; incorporate the concept of equipment sharing as the way of doing business in the Guard; and change the annual training locations of Guard units where feasible to achieve maximum cost avoidance benefits through greater equipment sharing while achieving training objectives. Scenarios for Equipment Sharing at Annual Training Sites
According to our analysis, Army National Guard units can preserve more than 25 percent of their equipment in controlled humidity environments if units at the same annual training site pool and share equipment. These items have high annual costs for scheduled maintenance. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO determined the: (1) feasibility of Army National Guard units that annually train at the same site to pool and share equipment; (2) maintenance costs that the Guard would avoid by pooling and sharing equipment; and (3) ways the Guard can maximize equipment sharing at annual training sites.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) according to GAO's analysis of nine equipment items with high annual scheduled maintenance costs and eight Guard units, it is feasible for units that annually train at the same site to pool and share equipment; (2) for the eight units GAO reviewed, more than enough equipment is already located at Mobilization and Training Equipment Sites to create a pool of equipment for unit training needs; (3) the equipment not needed for the pool could be preserved in a controlled humidity environment; (4) more equipment than the Guard's 25-percent goal can be preserved; (5) other than during the 2-week annual training period, the unit equipment located at some training sites is used little; (6) because units train at different times during the summer, this equipment could be made available to other units for use during their 2-week training period or put in preserved storage; (7) GAO's analysis showed that the Guard could avoid up to $10.3 million annually in maintenance costs if it preserved 25 percent of these items in a controlled humidity environment; (8) the Guard could avoid up to $20 million annually in maintenance costs if three units at one training site and two units at another training site pooled and shared their equipment and preserved their unused equipment; (9) the cost avoidance GAO identified is the minimum that the Guard can achieve because many equipment items other than the ones used in the GAO analysis could be pooled and shared; (10) additional maintenance costs could be avoided if other state and territorial Guard military commands pooled and shared training equipment; (11) changing the annual training site of as few as three units will maximize equipment sharing, cause more equipment to be available for preservation, and allow the Guard to more efficiently use scarce maintenance resources; (12) under this scenario, Guard units could place as much as 49 percent of their equipment in preserved storage and reduce maintenance costs by $38.1 million in the first year and $39.2 million each year thereafter, which is $18 million more than the $21.2 million cost avoidance using the Guard's 25-percent goal; and (13) although the Guard would incur additional facility costs to preserve more than 25 percent of its equipment, the benefits of avoiding annual maintenance costs for this equipment would more than offset the facility costs. |
gao_GAO-15-273 | gao_GAO-15-273_0 | Federal Funding for Tribal Child Welfare Programs
Tribes have direct access to some of the federal resources used by states to finance child welfare programs under programs administered by HHS. Some of these program requirements with respect to children in foster care require that states and tribes: make reasonable efforts, consistent with the health and safety of the child, to preserve and reunify families (1) prior to a child’s placement in foster care, to prevent the need for removing the child; and (2) to make it possible for the child to safely return home; prepare a written case plan for each child receiving foster care maintenance payments and ensure periodic court or administrative review of each such case; ensure that each child is placed in a safe setting that is the least restrictive (most family like) and most appropriate setting available, consistent with the child’s best interest and special needs; make reasonable efforts to place siblings together and ensure frequent visits between siblings not jointly placed, unless contrary to their safety or well-being; within a specified time period, hold a permanency hearing and make reasonable efforts to finalize the permanency plan for each child (reunification, adoption, legal guardianship, placement with a fit and willing relative, or another planned permanent living arrangement); and maintain a child’s education and health records in the case plan and include a plan to ensure the educational stability of the child while in foster care. We interviewed officials with 11 tribes that were in various stages of developing a title IV-E plan and representatives from 7 of these tribes said they have a small number of staff working on the title IV-E program, and that the staff are often managing child welfare cases and implementing other tribal programs such as child support or TANF. Child welfare experts and officials from tribes that initially expressed an interest in title IV-E also said resource constraints hindered tribes’ ability to implement title IV-E. All five experts we interviewed also said it is difficult for tribes to establish title IV-E programs because they often have fewer resources than states, their staffs are balancing multiple responsibilities, or there is limited funding to address these needs. Selected Tribes Reported Challenges Adopting Some Title IV-E Requirements
Tribal officials reported challenges adopting some title IV-E program requirements, including requirements related to termination of parental rights, collecting case-level data for children in foster care, and developing a CAM. While the Fostering Connections Act allowed tribes to directly operate a title IV-E program, it generally did not modify the program’s requirements or provide flexibilities for tribes. In addition, one study found that more tribes might qualify for title IV-E if the program’s policies were modified to make them more applicable to the realities of tribal nation characteristics and differences in tribal nation structure and culture.Connections Act provided tribes with equitable access to title IV-E funds, but also required title IV-E program requirements to be applied to tribes in the same manner as states. HHS has acknowledged that termination of parental rights may not align with Indian tribes’ traditional beliefs, but stated that the agency lacks statutory authority to provide a general However, HHS exemption for tribal children from the requirement.officials also noted that title IV-E provides exceptions to the requirement, which tribes may use as appropriate on a case by case basis. 3). However, officials from 5 of the 11 tribes we interviewed that were developing a title IV-E plan said creating a CAM was challenging. HHS Provided Technical Assistance and Guidance to Tribes Interested in Title IV-E but Did Not Always Meet Tribes’ Needs
HHS Assisted Tribes, but Selected Tribes Reported Difficulty in Accessing Assistance or with HHS’s Cultural Understanding
HHS provided title IV-E technical assistance to tribes through a variety of methods (see fig. Although several tribes used the National Resource Centers’ technical assistance services, officials from 6 of 11 tribes we spoke with reported difficulties accessing these services. HHS Does Not Have Procedures in Place to Ensure Consistent Guidance or Timely Reviews of Draft Title IV-E Plans
Although HHS regional staff are the primary technical assistance providers for tribes, we found that some guidance and relevant HHS regulations were not in place at the time they began assisting tribes with their title IV-E plans. Regional staff may use their discretion to determine what is allowable in a tribe’s plan. Despite these efforts by ACF, officials from 6 of the 11 tribes developing title IV-E plans we spoke with told us that they received inconsistent guidance from HHS regional officials while developing their plans. These officials also said that participating in title IV-E peer-to-peer consultations with other tribes—an activity encouraged and sponsored by HHS—can be frustrating because regional offices have provided tribes with different information. According to ACF officials, they have not provided tribes or regional office staff with examples because the language in the examples for one tribe may not be appropriate for all tribes. Given HHS’s goal of approving more tribal title IV-E plans, a lack of draft IV-E plan review timeframes for its staff could continue to result in long tribal IV-E plan development and review periods. While some tribes received timely title IV-E draft plan reviews, others did not, in part because HHS has not provided its regional office staff with expected timeframes for reviewing draft title IV-E plans. Establishing procedures to ensure timely reviews could improve relationships with tribes and promote a smoother process for tribes developing their plans. To improve the consistency of assistance provided to tribes, the Secretary of Health and Human Services should take steps to provide consistent title IV-E guidance to tribes across its regional offices. HHS concurred with our recommendation that the agency, in consultation with tribes, consider whether additional flexibilities in title IV-E program requirements would enable more tribes to participate in the program. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report examines: (1) the obstacles facing tribes interested in directly operating a title IV-E program and (2) how HHS assisted interested tribes. We also interviewed Social Services program staff at the Department of the Interior Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA). In addition, according to an HHS official, tribes were instructed to report on all progress made in developing title IV-E programs. | Why GAO Did This Study
Title IV-E of the Social Security Act provides federal support for foster care and adoption assistance programs. Since 2008, 5 tribes have been approved to operate their own title IV-E foster care programs, although more than 80 tribes initially expressed an interest in doing so. HHS provides development grants and technical assistance to tribes interested in establishing a title IV-E program. GAO was asked to review tribes' experiences with title IV-E.
This report examines (1) obstacles facing tribes interested in directly operating a title IV-E program and (2) the assistance HHS has provided. GAO interviewed officials from 17 tribes, 11 of which were currently developing title IV-E programs. These tribes were selected to achieve variation in progress toward developing a title IV-E program, size of the tribe, and HHS region. While this information is non-generalizable, it provides examples of tribes' experiences with the program. GAO also interviewed HHS and Bureau of Indian Affairs officials, and child welfare experts.
What GAO Found
Indian tribes developing title IV-E foster care programs faced resource constraints and reported challenges adopting some program requirements. According to GAO's interviews with tribal and Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) officials, the resource constraints faced by tribes include limited numbers of staff and staff turnover. While the Fostering Connections to Success and Increasing Adoptions Act of 2008 (Fostering Connections Act) allows tribes to administer a title IV-E foster care program, it generally did not modify title IV-E's requirements for tribes. By contrast, some other programs administered by HHS offer tribes additional flexibilities, provided they are consistent with the objectives of the program. Given tribes' resource constraints and cultural values, adopting some title IV-E requirements has been difficult. For example, officials from 6 of 11 tribes developing title IV-E programs that GAO interviewed said that the requirement to electronically submit case-level data on all children in foster care was challenging. In addition, 7 of these 11 tribal officials reported that incorporating termination of parental rights—which severs the legal parent-child relationship in certain circumstances—into their tribal codes was challenging because it conflicts with their cultural values. HHS recognizes that termination of parental rights may not be part of an Indian tribe's traditional beliefs; however according to the agency it lacks the statutory authority to provide a general exemption for tribal children from the requirement.
HHS provided assistance to tribes interested in directly operating a title IV-E program through its regional offices, headquarters office, and technical assistance providers. Eight of the 11 tribes GAO spoke with reported using HHS-funded technical assistance providers, including a tribally-focused center that was established after the enactment of the Fostering Connections Act. However, GAO found that there are no procedures in place to ensure that the guidance provided by HHS regional staff is consistent across offices or that the review of tribes' draft IV-E plans is timely. To operate a title IV-E program, HHS must approve a tribe's title IV-E plan, ensuring that it complies with program requirements. HHS does not provide its staff or tribes with examples of tribal codes or regulations that would satisfy title IV-E requirements. Regional staff may use their discretion to determine what is allowable in a tribe's plan. HHS officials said they do not provide examples because each tribe is unique and examples for one tribe may not be appropriate for all tribes. However, officials from 6 of 11 tribes GAO interviewed said that they received conflicting guidance from HHS officials, some of them from the same HHS office. Officials from one tribe said that participating in title IV-E peer-to-peer consultations with other tribes—an activity encouraged and sponsored by HHS—can be frustrating because regional offices have provided tribes with different information. HHS officials said that inconsistencies often resulted from differing tribal circumstances rather than interpretations of federal policy. In addition, officials from six tribes GAO spoke with said HHS's suggested revisions on their draft title IV-E plans were not provided in a timely manner. HHS headquarters officials have not provided regional staff with expected timeframes for draft title IV-E plan reviews and there is no limit on the amount of time staff may spend on the reviews. As a result, tribes may continue to have long title IV-E plan development and review periods and limited direct access to federal child welfare program funding.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that HHS (1) consider submitting a legislative proposal if it determines that flexibilities in program requirements would enable more tribes to participate in title IV-E, (2) take steps to provide consistent guidance to tribes on their IV-E plans, and (3) establish procedures to ensure timely reviews of draft plans. HHS agreed with our first two, but did not agree with the third recommendation. GAO maintains the need for procedures, such as clear timeframes, to ensure timely IV-E plan reviews. |
gao_GAO-15-293 | gao_GAO-15-293_0 | For example, NHTSA’s 2007 National Roadside Survey of Alcohol and Drug Use by Drivers (NRS) provides information on drivers testing positive for illegal, prescription, and OTC drugs in a nationally representative sample of weekend-nighttime and Friday daytime drivers. Based on the 2007 survey, NHTSA estimated that 16.3 percent of nighttime drivers nationwide would have tested positive for at least one drug, with marijuana being the most common drug found in test results (see table 1). While NRS survey data provides useful information on the estimated prevalence of drugged driving, these results do not measure the extent to which drivers are impaired by the drugs in their systems as the presence of drugs or drug metabolites does not necessarily indicate impairment. Data on Impaired-Driving Arrests and Toxicology Results
Data on drug-impaired driving arrests and toxicology results in our seven selected states provide some information on drug-impaired driving, but are limited by a lack of separation of data from driving under the influence (DUI) arrests, underreported instances of drug-impaired driving, decentralized reporting, and a lack of standardization in drug testing. Difficulty of Defining Drug Impairment Exacerbates Challenges Related to Enforcement and Public Awareness
In addition to limited data on the extent of drugged and drug-impaired driving, federal and state officials we spoke with cited difficulty in defining drug impairment as a significant challenge to addressing drug-impaired driving. Compared to alcohol, which is chemically simple and has relatively predictable effects, defining and identifying impairment due to drugs is much more complicated due to the large number of available drugs and their unpredictable side effects. According to toxicologists from two states and representatives from SOFT, it is more expensive to test for drugs than alcohol. For example, officers may be trained to administer the Standardized Field Sobriety Test, which focuses on detecting alcohol- impairment in drivers; however, officers may not be trained to recognize drug impairment. The time between arrest and collection of a sample for drug testing can affect the quality of biological evidence, such as blood samples, because the concentration of drugs in the body is constantly changing. Currently, there is no validated roadside drug- testing device, such as the evidential breath-testing device for alcohol, which would facilitate faster sample collection. Public Awareness about Dangers of Drugged Driving Is Limited
State prosecutors, toxicologists, law enforcement and highway-safety office officials from all of the selected states, as well as NIDA, told us that they believe that there is a lack of public awareness about the dangers of driving after using prescription medications and marijuana. As a result of this perceived lack of awareness, members of the public may risk unknowingly driving while impaired, potentially leading to vehicle collisions, injuries, and fatalities. These actions include improvements in the areas of research and data, education of law enforcement and court personnel, evidence quality, legal remedies, and public awareness. Furthermore, NHTSA, ONDCP, and states have coordinated their efforts to address drug-impaired driving challenges. For example, NHTSA is currently researching the crash risk of drug and alcohol use (including illegal, prescription, and OTC drugs) by collecting samples from more than 10,000 crash- and non crash-involved drivers in one city for 20 months. The NTSB has recommended that NHTSA develop and disseminate similar standards to state officials. NHTSA’s mission is to support state traffic safety efforts. These efforts to improve public awareness are in the initial planning stages and could take several years to implement. While NHTSA’s plans to improve public awareness of drug- impaired driving through a survey on public behaviors and attitudes and training for medical professionals are promising, these initiatives will take time to implement. Additional efforts, such as general messaging reminding the public about the impairing effects of some drugs and the dangers of driving after using drugs, could help improve public awareness in the near term. Specifically, we analyzed (1) what is known about the extent of drug-impaired driving in the United States; (2) what challenges, if any, exist for federal, state, and local agencies in addressing drug-impaired driving; and (3) what actions federal and state agencies have taken to address drug-impaired driving and what gaps exist, if any, in the federal response to drug-impaired driving. To describe what is known about the extent of drug-impaired driving in the United States, to identify challenges to addressing drug-impaired driving, and to identify actions federal and state agencies have taken to mitigate those challenges, we conducted a literature search to identify sources of data on the extent of drugged and drug-impaired driving in the United States and studies on the issue of drug-impaired driving, including challenges and strategies for addressing the problem. We interviewed officials at relevant federal agencies including the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA); the White House’s Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP); National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB); and Department of Health and Human Services’ (HHS) components including the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA), Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and National Institutes of Additionally, we reviewed documentation obtained from Health (NIH).and interviewed officials in seven states: Arizona, California, Colorado, Kansas, Ohio, Vermont, and Washington. | Why GAO Did This Study
The issue of alcohol-impaired driving has received broad attention over the years, but drug-impaired driving also contributes to fatalities and injuries from traffic crashes. However, knowledge about the drug-impaired- driving problem is less advanced than for alcohol-impaired driving.
Through Senate Report No. 113-45 (2013), Congress required GAO to report on the strategies NHTSA, ONDCP, and states have taken to address drug-impaired driving and challenges they face in detecting and reducing such driving. This report discusses (1) what is known about the extent of drug-impaired driving in the United States; (2) challenges that exist for federal, state, and local agencies in addressing drug-impaired driving; and (3) actions federal and state agencies have taken to address drug-impaired driving and what gaps exist in the federal response. GAO reviewed literature to identify sources of data on drug-impaired driving; reviewed documentation and interviewed officials from NHTSA, ONDCP, and HHS; and interviewed officials from relevant advocacy and professional organizations and seven selected states. States were selected based on: legal status of marijuana, proximity to states with legalized marijuana, and drugged-driving laws.
What GAO Found
Various state and national-level data sources—including surveys, arrest data, drug-testing results, and crash data—provide limited information on the extent of drugged and drug-impaired driving in the United States. For example, based on preliminary results from a representative sample of weekend-nighttime and Friday daytime drivers, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's (NHTSA) 2013-2014 National Roadside Survey of Alcohol and Drug Use by Drivers ( NRS ) estimated that 20 percent of drivers would have tested positive for at least one drug, with marijuana being the most common drug. However, the survey does not capture the extent to which drivers were impaired by drugs. Arrest data and drug-testing results provide some information on drug-impaired driving, but these data are limited. For example, data for drug impairment may not be separated from that for alcohol impairment and drug testing is not standardized. According to NHTSA officials, currently available data on drug involvement in crashes are generally unreliable due to variances in reporting and testing.
The lack of a clear link between impairment and drug concentrations in the body makes it difficult to define drug impairment, which, in turn, exacerbates challenges related to enforcement and public awareness. Compared to alcohol, defining and identifying impairment due to drugs is more complicated due to the large number of available drugs and their unpredictable effects. For example, the NRS includes tests for 75 illegal prescriptions, and over-the-counter (OTC) drugs identified as potentially impairing. Additionally, law enforcement processes for obtaining samples for drug testing can be time consuming and result in a loss of evidence. For example, there is no validated device for roadside drug testing, and obtaining a search warrant to collect a blood sample to confirm the presence of drugs in a driver's system could take several hours, during which time the concentration of the drug in the driver's system could dissipate. Further, state officials identified limited public awareness about the dangers of drugged driving as a challenge. As a result, members of the public may drive while impaired without knowing the risks, potentially leading to collisions, injuries, and fatalities.
Federal and state agencies—including NHTSA, the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)—are taking actions to address drug-impaired driving, including improvements in the areas of research and data, education for police officers, evidence gathering, and legal changes. For example, NHTSA is currently conducting research to assess the crash risk associated with drug use (including illegal, prescription, and OTC drugs) by collecting samples from more than 10,000 drivers. However, public awareness of the dangers of drug-impaired driving is an area in which state officials told us that NHTSA could do more to support their efforts. As part of its mission to support state safety efforts, NHTSA has provided media and other materials to states for impaired-driving awareness programs, but these materials are focused on alcohol-impaired driving. While NHTSA plans to improve public awareness through initiatives to conduct surveys on drug-impaired-driving behaviors and attitudes as well as training for medical professionals, these plans could take several years to implement. Additional efforts, such as general messaging reminding the public about the impairing effects of drugs, could help improve public awareness in the near term.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that NHTSA take additional actions to support states in emphasizing to the public the dangers of drug-impaired driving. DOT agreed with GAO's recommendation. |
gao_GAO-16-860T | gao_GAO-16-860T_0 | DOD Has Taken Actions to Track the Timeliness of Military Whistleblower Reprisal Investigations but Continues to Not Regularly Report on Timeliness to Congress
DODIG has taken a number of actions to improve its tracking of the timeliness of military whistleblower reprisal investigations, including developing an automated tool to address statutory notification requirements. Further, in 2015 we found that DOD’s average investigation time for cases closed in fiscal years 2013 and 2014 was 526 days, almost three times DOD’s internal completion requirement of 180 days. To improve the timeliness of military whistleblower reprisal investigations, we recommended in February 2012 that DOD (1) implement procedures to track and report data on its case processing timeliness and (2) track and analyze timeliness data to identify reforms that could aid in processing cases within 180-day time frame. Further, DODIG took steps to track and analyze timeliness data that could aid in processing cases within the 180-day timeframe by compiling quarterly timeliness metrics starting in fiscal year 2014, and by updating its case management system in April 2016 to include additional investigation milestones. Because some of these actions were not taken until 2016, it is too early to determine whether timeliness has improved since we last reported on the status. During our 2015 review, DODIG officials stated that they had taken additional steps to help ensure they met the statutory notification requirement. Timeliness Information Is Still Not Regularly Reported to Congress
In 2012, we found that although DODIG is required to keep Congress fully and currently informed through, among other things, its semiannual reports to Congress, DODIG was not including in these reports information on military whistleblower case processing time, including (1) statutorily required notifications of delays in the investigations or (2) those exceeding DODIG’s internal 180-day completion requirement. DOD Strengthened Its Oversight of Military Whistleblower Reprisal Investigations, but Additional Actions Are Needed
DOD Established Processes and Developed Guidance to Strengthen Its Oversight of Military Whistleblower Reprisal Investigations
In 2012 and 2015, we found that DODIG’s oversight of military whistleblower reprisal investigations conducted by the military services was hampered by insufficient processes, including performance metrics; guidance; and plans. As a result, in our 2015 report we recommended that DOD develop and implement a process for military service investigators to document whether the investigation was independent and outside the chain of command and direct the service IGs to provide such documentation for review during the oversight process. Separately, in 2015 we found that DODIG had provided limited guidance to users of its case management system on how to populate case information into the system. However, based on our file review of a sample of 124 cases closed in fiscal year 2013, we found that DODIG investigators were not using the case management system for real-time case management. DOD concurred with this recommendation and in March 2016 issued a case management system user guide and in July 2016, a data entry guide. However, our analysis indicated that DODIG’s case management system did not have records of at least 22 percent of service investigations both open as of September 30, 2014, and closed in fiscal years 2013 and 2014. Standardized Investigation Stages
In 2015, we found that the DODIG and the military service IGs use different terms in their guidance to refer to their investigations, thus hindering DODIG’s ability to consistently classify and assess the completeness of cases during its oversight reviews. DODIG took an important step to improve its guidance by issuing an updated reprisal investigation guide for military reprisal investigations for both DODIG and service IG investigators in October 2014. To improve the military whistleblower reprisal investigation process and oversight of such investigations, in our 2015 report we recommended that the Secretary of Defense in coordination with the DODIG, direct the military services to follow standardized investigation stages and issue guidance clarifying how the stages are defined. DODIG officials noted in August 2016 that they are currently working with the military services through an established working group to standardize the investigation stages as an interim measure. In addition to the recommendations we made regarding establishing corrective action reporting requirements and regularly tracking these data, we also recommended in our 2012 report that DOD regularly report to Congress on the frequency and type of corrective actions taken in response to substantiated reprisal claims. Without including information on (1) all corrective actions taken during a reporting period, (2) outstanding corrective action recommendations, and (3) actions taken by the services that are different than those recommended by DODIG, we believe that DODIG’s current method of reporting does not fully address our recommendation to report to Congress on the frequency and type of corrective action taken in response to substantiated claims. In summary, DOD has taken actions to implement 15 of the 18 recommendations that we made to address the military whistleblower reprisal timeliness and oversight challenges we identified in our 2012 and 2015 reports. | Why GAO Did This Study
Whistleblowers play an important role in safeguarding the federal government against waste, fraud, and abuse, and their willingness to come forward can contribute to improvements in government operations. However, whistleblowers also risk reprisal, such as demotion, reassignment, and firing.
This testimony discusses DODIG's progress in (1) taking actions to track and report on the timeliness of military whistleblower reprisal investigations, and (2) strengthening its oversight of the military services' whistleblower reprisal investigations.
GAO's statement is based primarily on information from May 2015 and February 2012 GAO reports on military whistleblower reprisal investigations. For those reports, GAO examined laws, regulations, and DOD guidance; conducted detailed file reviews using representative samples of cases closed in fiscal year 2013 and between January 2009 and March 2011; analyzed DODIG and military service data for cases closed in fiscal years 2013 and 2014; and interviewed DOD officials. GAO also determined what actions DOD had taken through August 2016 in response to recommendations made in the 2015 and 2012 reports.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense Office of Inspector General (DODIG) has taken actions to improve its tracking of the timeliness of military whistleblower reprisal investigations in response to recommendations that GAO made in 2012 and 2015. For example, in 2012 and 2015, GAO found that DOD was not meeting its internal requirement to complete whistleblower reprisal investigations within 180 days, with cases closed in fiscal years 2013 and 2014 averaging 526 days. In response, DODIG—which is responsible for both conducting investigations and overseeing investigations conducted by the military services—took steps to better track and analyze timeliness data by developing a guide to help ensure the accurate tracking of case processing time and by updating its case management system in April 2016 to include new investigation milestones. Because these actions were not taken until 2016, it is too early to determine if timeliness has improved since GAO last reported on the status. Similarly, in 2015, GAO found that DOD had not met the statutory requirement to notify servicemembers within 180-days about delays in their investigations for about half of the reprisal investigations closed in fiscal year 2013. In response, DODIG developed an automated tool in its case management system to flag cases approaching 180 days. However, DODIG continues to not regularly report to Congress on the timeliness of military whistleblower reprisal investigations as GAO recommended in 2012. On August 31, 2016, a senior DODIG official stated that DODIG will implement this recommendation by reporting timeliness information to Congress biannually.
DODIG has strengthened its oversight of military service reprisal investigations in response to recommendations GAO made in 2012 and 2015 by establishing processes and developing guidance for overseeing investigations, among other things. For example, in 2015, GAO found that DODIG did not have a process for documenting whether investigations were independent and were conducted by someone outside the military service chain of command. In response, DODIG directed the service IGs to certify investigators' independence for oversight reviews. GAO also found in 2015 that DODIG had provided limited guidance to investigators using its case management system, limiting its utility as a real-time management system, as intended. In response, DODIG issued a system guide and a data entry guide, which provide key information on how to work with and maintain system data. However, in 2015 GAO also found that DODIG and the military service IGs used different terms in their guidance to investigators, hindering DODIG oversight of case completeness. GAO recommended that DOD direct the military service IGs to follow standardized investigation stages and issue related guidance. DODIG officials stated in August 2016 that they are working with the services to standardize investigation stages and that DODIG is willing to work with the Secretary of Defense to issue such direction. Separately, GAO found in 2012 that unreliable data on corrective actions taken in response to substantiated reprisal cases was hampering oversight and recommended that DOD regularly report to Congress on the frequency and type of corrective actions taken in response to substantiated reprisal claims. DODIG reports some corrective actions in its semiannual report to Congress, but does not include all relevant corrective actions or outstanding corrective action recommendations.
What GAO Recommends
DOD implemented 15 of the 18 recommendations GAO made to improve and track investigation timeliness and strengthen oversight of the military services' investigations, and is considering steps to implement the remaining three regarding standardized investigations and reporting to Congress. |
gao_GAO-02-512 | gao_GAO-02-512_0 | In addition to having flexibility in program design and benefits offered, states participating in SCHIP have a larger proportion of their program expenditures paid by the federal government than for Medicaid. OIG’s Assessment of Appropriate Enrollment Would Benefit From an Expanded Selection of States
In determining whether Medicaid-eligible children were improperly enrolled in SCHIP, the OIG reported that, based on a sample of 5 states, SCHIP enrollees in the 13 states with separate child health programs were generally appropriately enrolled. While States’ Evaluations Offered Limited Results, Future OIG Reviews May Benefit from Improved Data Sources
The OIG identified important limitations to states’ evaluations that made it unable to conclude whether states were making progress in reducing the number of uninsured children and in meeting the objectives and goals that they established under SCHIP. The OIG also found that states set goals without considering how to evaluate progress, and that little emphasis was placed on evaluation by the states. This would provide a broader base for understanding how well states are screening for Medicaid eligibility and identifying issues related to reducing the number of uninsured children. Recommendations to the HHS Inspector General
In order to better inform the Congress on states’ efforts to implement SCHIP, we recommend that the HHS inspector general expand the scope of the statutorily required periodic reviews to include all states with separate child health programs, including those with combination programs, and consider using its general audit authority to explore whether issues of appropriate SCHIP enrollment also exist among states that have opted for Medicaid expansions under SCHIP, and should therefore be included in future OIG reviews. Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Health and Human Services’ Office of Inspector General
Related GAO Products
Medicaid and SCHIP: States’ Enrollment and Payment Policies Can Affect Children’s Access to Care. Children’s Health Insurance Program: State Implementation Approaches are Evolving. | What GAO Found
Congress created the State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) in 1997 to reduce the number of uninsured children in families with incomes that are too high to qualify for Medicaid. Financed jointly by the states and the federal government, SCHIP encourages state participation by offering a higher federal matching rate than the Medicaid program. Concerns have been raised that states might inappropriately enroll Medicaid-eligible children in SCHIP and thus obtain higher federal matching funds than allowed under Medicaid. The Department of Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General (OIG) concluded that Medicaid-eligible children were not being enrolled in SCHIP by the 13 states that administer separate child health care programs. Furthermore, the issue of appropriate enrollment is not limited to states with completely separate child health programs but also applies to those states with combination programs and Medicaid expansions, which also receive the higher SCHIP matching rate. The OIG could not conclude whether states were reducing the number of uninsured children and meeting the objectives and goals they established in their SCHIP programs. The OIG found that some states had set program goals without considering how they might be measured and that states' staffs often lacked adequate evaluation skills. |
gao_GAO-03-980T | gao_GAO-03-980T_0 | Nature and Extent of Post-Conflict Assistance
GAO’s work over the past 10 years on Bosnia and Kosovo, and our recent work on Afghanistan, indicate that post-conflict assistance is a broad, long-term effort that requires humanitarian, security, economic, governance, and democracy-building measures. A number of international organizations involved in the Bosnia peace operation, including the Office of the High Representative, the United Nations, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, helped develop government institutions and supported democracy-building measures and police training. Post-conflict assistance efforts differ in the extent of multilateral involvement. While the post-conflict situation in each location has varied, certain similarities are apparent, chief among them that assistance efforts continue to be provided in volatile and highly politicized environments where local parties have competing interests and differing degrees of support for the peace process. Essential Components for Effective Post- Conflict Assistance
Our work has consistently shown that effective reconstruction assistance cannot be provided without three essential elements: a secure environment, a strategic vision for the overall effort, and strong leadership. Secure Environment
In Bosnia and Kosovo, humanitarian and other civilian workers were generally able to perform their tasks because they were supported by large NATO-led forces. Challenges to Implementing Assistance Operations
Among the challenges to implementing post-conflict assistance operations that we have identified are ensuring sustained political and financial commitment, adequate human resources and funds to carry out operations, coordinated assistance efforts, and local support. In Afghanistan, coordination of international assistance in general, and agricultural assistance in particular, was weak in 2002. Mechanisms Used for Accountability and Oversight
Over the course of our work, we found that the international community and the United States provide a number of mechanisms for accountability in and oversight of assistance operations. Over the past 10 years, GAO has evaluated assistance efforts in 16 post- conflict emergencies, including those in Haiti, Cambodia, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. | Why GAO Did This Study
The circumstances of armed conflicts in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan differed in many respects, but in all three cases the United States and the international community became involved in the wars and post-conflict assistance because of important national and international interests. Over the past 10 years, GAO has done extensive work assessing post-conflict assistance in Bosnia and Kosovo and, more recently, has evaluated such assistance to Afghanistan. GAO was asked to provide observations on assistance efforts in these countries that may be applicable to ongoing assistance in Iraq. Specifically, GAO assessed (1) the nature and extent of post-conflict assistance in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan; (2) essential components for carrying out assistance effectively; (3) challenges to implementation; and (4) mechanisms used for accountability and oversight.
What GAO Found
Humanitarian assistance following armed conflict in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan--as well as in Iraq--is part of a broader, long-term assistance effort comprising humanitarian, military, economic, governance, and democracy-building measures. While the post-conflict situations in these countries have varied, they have certain conditions in common--most notably the volatile and highly politicized environment in which assistance operations take place. During years of work on post-conflict situations, GAO found that three key components are needed for effective implementation of assistance efforts: a secure environment where humanitarian and other civilian workers are able to perform their tasks; a strategic vision that looks beyond the immediate situation and plans for ongoing efforts; and strong leadership with the authority to direct assistance operations. GAO also observed a number of challenges to implementing assistance operations, including the need for sustained political and financial commitment, adequate resources, coordinated assistance efforts, and support of the host government and civil society. Finally, GAO found that the international community and the United States provide a number of mechanisms for accountability in and oversight of assistance operations. |
gao_GAO-16-505T | gao_GAO-16-505T_0 | Aspects of the OIRA Regulatory Review Process Could Be More Transparent
Our reports on cost-benefit analysis in the rulemaking process, rule development and regulatory reviews, and OMB’s role in reviews of agencies’ rules under Executive Order 12866 illustrate specific actions that, if taken, would increase the transparency of the rulemaking process. For example, in 72 percent of these rules, there was no explanation for why the rule was designated as significant, thus triggering additional oversight required by Executive Order 12866. Rules Development and Regulatory Reviews
In our 2009 report on the regulatory review process, we found that OIRA’s reviews of agencies’ draft rules often resulted in changes. However, we found that the transparency of this documentation could be improved. In particular, there was uneven attribution of changes made during the OIRA review period and differing interpretations regarding which changes were “substantive” and thus required documentation. OMB’s Role in Reviews of Agencies’ Draft Rules
In 2003, we examined 85 rules from nine health, safety, or environmental agencies and found that the OIRA review process had significantly affected 25 of those 85 rules. The agencies’ docket files did not always provide clear and complete documentation of the changes made during OIRA’s review or at OIRA’s suggestion, as required by the executive order, even though a few agencies exhibited exemplary transparency practices. We made eight recommendations in 2003 targeting aspects of the OIRA review process that remained unclear and where improvements could allow the public to better understand the effects of OIRA’s review, including that the Director of OMB: 1. instruct agencies to document the changes made to rules submitted for OIRA review in public rulemaking dockets and within a reasonable time after the rules have been published; 2. define the types of substantive changes made during the review process that agencies should disclose; 3. disclose the reasons for withdrawal of a rule from OIRA review; 4. reexamine OIRA policy that only documents exchanged by agencies with OIRA branch chiefs and above during the review process need to be disclosed; 5. differentiate in OIRA’s database which rules were substantively changed at OIRA’s suggestion or recommendation and which were changed in other ways and for other reasons; 6. define transparency requirements to also include the informal review period when OIRA says it can have its most important impact on agencies’ rules; 7. encourage agencies to use best practice methods of documentation that clearly describe changes; and 8. disclose in OIRA’s logs of meetings with outside parties which regulatory action was being discussed and the affiliation of the meeting participants. Additional Opportunities Exist to Enhance Transparency and Congressional Oversight of Federal Regulations and the Rulemaking Process
Improvements made to the transparency of the regulatory process benefit the public and aid congressional oversight. Four relevant reports covering the topics of regulatory guidance, retrospective regulatory review processes, and exceptions for expediting the rulemaking process illustrate additional opportunities to enhance transparency of federal regulations. All four departments identified standard practices to follow when developing guidance and addressed OMB’s requirements for significant guidance to varying degrees. In a 2014 report on reexamining regulations, we found that agencies often changed regulations in response to completed retrospective analyses, but could improve the reporting of progress and strengthen links between those analyses and the agencies’ performance goals. We also concluded that OMB could do more to enhance the transparency and usefulness of the information provided to the public. We also found that agencies, though not required, often requested comments on major final rules issued without an NPRM. However, they did not always respond to the comments received. To better balance the benefits of expedited rulemaking procedures with the benefits of public comments, and to improve the quality and transparency of rulemaking records, we recommended that OMB issue guidance to encourage agencies to respond to comments on final major rules issued without a prior notice of proposed rulemaking. In summary, OIRA to date has implemented 9 of the 25 recommendations we made to improve transparency and effectiveness of the Executive Order review process and other aspects of federal rulemaking. We believe that the other 16 related recommendations cited in this statement that have not been implemented still have merit and, if acted upon, would improve the transparency of federal rulemaking. In a step in that direction, the OIRA Administrator in 2015 noted that OIRA has worked with agencies to help them with their Executive Order disclosure requirements. Regulatory Reform: Procedural and Analytical Requirements in Federal Rulemaking. | Why GAO Did This Study
Federal regulation is a basic tool of government. Agencies issue regulations to achieve public policy goals such as ensuring that workplaces, air travel, foods, and drugs are safe; that the nation's air, water, and land are not polluted; and that the appropriate amount of taxes is collected. Congresses and Presidents have acted to refine and reform the regulatory process during the last several decades. Among the goals of such initiatives are enhancing oversight of rulemaking by Congress and the President, promoting greater transparency and public participation in the process, and reducing regulatory burdens on affected parties.
Congress has often asked GAO to evaluate the implementation of procedural and analytical requirements that apply to the rulemaking process. The importance of improving the transparency of the rulemaking process emerged as a common theme throughout GAO's body of work. Based on that body of work, this testimony addresses (1) GAO's prior findings and OIRA's progress to date on recent GAO recommendations to improve the transparency of the regulatory review process, and (2) other challenges and opportunities GAO has identified for increasing the transparency and oversight of the rulemaking process.
GAO has made 25 prior related recommendations of which OMB has implemented 9 to date.
What GAO Found
GAO has consistently found opportunities to improve the transparency of regulatory processes coordinated through the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA). Three GAO reports on OIRA's reviews of agencies' rules under Executive Order 12866 illustrate current and specific actions that would increase the transparency of that review process.
In a 2014 report on cost-benefit analysis, GAO found that OIRA's reviews resulted in changes. However, in 72 percent of the 109 rules GAO reviewed, there was no explanation for why the rule was designated as significant.
In a 2009 report on the development of rules, GAO found that documentation of OIRA's reviews could be improved. In reviews of 12 case studies, GAO found uneven attribution of changes made during the OIRA review period and differing interpretations regarding which changes required documentation.
In a 2003 report, GAO examined 85 rules from nine health, safety, or environmental agencies. GAO found that, while the OIRA review process had significantly affected 25 of those rules, some agencies' files did not provide clear and complete documentation of changes made during OIRA's review. However, a few agencies exhibited exemplary transparency practices.
Four GAO reports covering the topics of regulatory guidance, retrospective regulatory review processes, and exceptions for expediting the rulemaking process further illustrate opportunities for OMB to enhance transparency.
In a 2015 report on guidance development processes at four agencies GAO found that all four identified standard practices to follow when developing guidance. However, the four agencies addressed OMB's requirements on significant guidance to varying degrees.
In 2007 and 2014 reports on retrospective regulatory reviews, GAO found that, while such reviews often resulted in changes, OMB and agencies could improve the reporting of progress to enhance the transparency and usefulness of information provided to the public.
In a 2012 report on exceptions to proposed rules, GAO reviewed a generalizable sample of final rules published over an 8 year period. GAO found that, although agencies often requested comments on final major rules (rules with an annual impact of $100 million or more) issued without a prior notice of proposed rulemaking, the agencies did not always respond to comments received.
GAO made 25 recommendations to OMB to address the transparency issues identified in these seven reports. OMB has implemented 9 of the recommendations. GAO believes that the other 16 recommendations that have not been implemented still have merit and, if acted upon, would improve the transparency of federal rulemaking. In a step in that direction, the OIRA Administrator in 2015 noted that OIRA has worked with agencies to help them with their Executive Order disclosure requirements. |
gao_GAO-09-879 | gao_GAO-09-879_0 | CRs are temporary appropriations acts. Figure 1 shows that the duration of individual CRs enacted from 1999 to 2009 ranged from 1 to 157 days and the number of CRs enacted in each year ranged from 2 to 21. CRs Provide Interim Funding for Agencies and Programs
During the period studied, fiscal years 1999-2009, every agency operated under a CR for some period of time. For most, this meant temporarily operating under a conservative rate of spending and limitations on certain activities, as required by the standard provisions. These specific provisions—called legislative anomalies—may alleviate some challenges during the CR period. These provisions provide direction regarding the availability of funding and demonstrate the temporary nature of the legislation. The amount often is based on the prior fiscal year’s funding level or the “current rate” but may also be based on a bill that has passed either the House or Senate. Legislative Anomalies May Alleviate Some Challenges of Operating during the CR Period
In addition to the standard provisions, CRs contained legislative anomalies that provided funding and authorities that were different from the standard provisions. 3). Under these circumstances, agencies have funding certainty during the CR period. If the authorization had not been extended, VA would have had to operate with less funding. Selected Agencies’ Experiences Varied but All Reported That CRs Limited Management Options and Resulted in Inefficiencies
All six case study agencies reported that the most common inefficiencies were delays to certain activities, such as hiring, and repetitive work, including having to enter into several short-term contracts or issuing multiple grants to the same recipient. The effects of the delays and the amount of additional work varied by agency and by activity and depended in large part on the number and duration of CRs. Other case study agencies reported similar experiences. Operating under CRs for a Prolonged Period Limited Some Agencies’ Decision- making Options
While some agency officials said that a single, long-term CR allowed for better planning in the near term, reducing delays and the amount of repetitive work, others said that operating under the specified rate for operations for a prolonged period limited their decision-making options, making trade-offs more difficult. Officials from three agencies that we reviewed said that having multiyear budget authority— funds that are available for more than one fiscal year—was helpful for managing funds in the compressed time period after regular appropriations were enacted. CRs enable federal agencies to continue carrying out their missions and delivering services until agreement is reached on their regular appropriations. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report are to describe: 1. the history and characteristics of continuing resolutions (CR), and 2. for selected case study agencies, how CRs have affected agency operations and what actions have been taken to mitigate the effects of CRs. | Why GAO Did This Study
In all but 3 of the last 30 years, Congress enacted a continuing resolution (CR) allowing federal agencies to continue operating when their regular appropriations had not been passed. CRs appropriate funds generally through rates for operations--funding formulas frequently referenced to the previous years' appropriations acts or a bill that has passed either the House or Senate--instead of a specific amount. GAO was asked to examine how CRs have changed over time, the effect CRs have had on selected agency operations, and actions that have been taken to mitigate the effects. Accordingly, GAO analyzed CR provisions enacted over the past 10 years and did a case study review of selected agencies that have considerable experience with CRs, represent different ways of providing services, and have different operational capabilities. Case study agencies were the Administration for Children and Families, Bureau of Prisons, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Food and Drug Administration, Veterans Benefits Administration, and Veterans Health Administration.
What GAO Found
Since 1999, all agencies operated under a CR for some period of time. The CRs included 11 standard provisions that provided direction on the availability of funding and demonstrated the temporary nature of CRs. During CR periods, these standard provisions required most agencies to operate under a conservative rate of spending and imposed limitations on certain activities. However, CRs provided some agencies or programs funding or direction different from what was provided by the standard provisions, especially under longer-term CRs. These specific provisions--called legislative anomalies--may alleviate some challenges of operating during the CR period. Over the last decade, the duration of individual CRs ranged from 1 to 157 days and the CR period lasted 3 months on average. All six case study agencies reported that operating within the limitations of the CR resulted in inefficiencies. The most common inefficiencies reported were delays to certain activities, such as hiring, and repetitive work, including issuing multiple grants or contracts. Case study agencies also reported that CRs limited management options, making trade-offs more difficult. Both the limitations in planning and amount of additional work varied by agency and activity and depended in large part on the number and duration of CRs. After operating under CRs for a prolonged period, agencies faced additional challenges executing their budget in a compressed time frame. Officials from three agencies said that multiyear budget authority was helpful for managing funds in these circumstances. CRs enabled agencies to continue to carry out their missions until the irregular appropriations were enacted. |
gao_GAO-09-328 | gao_GAO-09-328_0 | Recognizing the need for a more holistic approach to address the seriousness of these problems, OMB launched the FMLOB initiative in March 2004, in connection with the 2001 President’s Management Agenda (PMA). In part, the FMLOB initiative is intended to reduce the cost and upgrade the quality and performance of federal financial management systems by leveraging shared service solutions and implementing other governmentwide reforms that foster efficiencies in federal financial operations. Progress Continues but Achieving FMLOB Goals Requires Much More Work and Time
OMB and FSIO efforts to implement the FMLOB initiative continue to show progress and have effectively addressed 5 of the 18 recommendations and made progress toward addressing the remaining 13 recommendations we made related to four areas considered key building blocks for governmentwide financial management systems—a concept of operations, standard business processes, migration strategy, and disciplined processes. OMB has not completed development of a concept of operations representing the first and foremost building block on which all system planning processes as well as the remaining building blocks are built. For example, according to FSIO officials, it may take as many as 15 years or more before software that incorporates the standard business processes currently under development is in use governmentwide. In addition, development of a migration timeline reflecting agencies’ commitment to migrating to shared service providers has not yet been completed. We also recognize that incorporating standard business processes into operational systems will be a much longer-term effort since OMB is not requiring agencies to consider migrating to a shared service provider until upgrading to the next major release of their core financial systems, and adoption of these standards is not required until migration occurs. OMB has yet to take sufficient actions to fully address these recommendations, despite the critical role of OMB oversight, established in various statutes, in helping to ensure the success of agency modernization efforts. Achieving FMLOB goals requires effective OMB oversight of agency modernization projects. Actions Still Needed to Address Prior Recommendations Related to Oversight of Financial Management System Modernization and Other IT Projects
Although OMB has taken steps to address some of the oversight-related recommendations we have made since 2005, it has yet to fully address them. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine the Office of Mana toward addressing our prior recommend management line of business (FMLOB) initiative, we reviewed relevant OMB and Financial Systems Integration Office (FSIO) policies, guidance, reports, and memorandums related to actions taken and actions remaining and interviewed key OMB and FSIO officials, including senior officials in OMB’s Office of Federal Financial Management (OFFM) and Office of Electronic Government and Information Technology (E-Gov and IT). In addition, OMB Circular No. Enhance existing oversight efforts to improve financial management syste implementations by developing a structured process to identify and evaluate specific and systemic implementation weaknesses and risks specifically related to financial management system modernizations, including those associated with projects on the Management Watch List and High Risk List and others identified through reviews of agency provided information, as well as their costs, and discussions with agency officials; implementing processes to ensure that agencies more effectively and consistently comply with guidance related to implementing financial management system modernization projects, including the use of disciplined processes to reduce the risk of implementation failures; and clarifying guidance so that agencies consistently report planned and spending related to financial management system modernization projects including the financial portion of mixed systems. | Why GAO Did This Study
In March 2004, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) launched the financial management line of business (FMLOB) initiative, in part, to reduce the cost and improve the quality and performance of federal financial management systems by leveraging shared service solutions and implementing other reforms. In March 2006, GAO reported that OMB's approach did not fully integrate certain fundamental system implementation-related concepts and recommended OMB take specific actions. This report discusses (1) OMB's progress in addressing GAO's prior FMLOB recommendations and implementation challenges and (2) the effectiveness of OMB's monitoring of financial management system modernization projects and their costs. GAO's methodology included reviewing OMB's FMLOB-related guidance and reports and interviewing OMB and Financial Systems Integration Office (FSIO) staff.
What GAO Found
OMB has made progress toward implementing the FMLOB initiative. In March 2006, GAO recommended that OMB place a high priority on fully integrating four key concepts into its approach. As shown in the table, OMB has completed actions to fully address 5 of GAO's 18 recommendations. Although OMB has made progress toward completing the remaining 13 recommendations, extensive work remains before the goals of the FMLOB initiative are achieved. For example, OMB has yet to finalize a financial management system concept of operations, the first and foremost critical building block on which the remaining three concepts will be built. In addition, development of a migration timeline reflecting agencies' commitment for migrating to shared service providers has not yet been completed. Further, agencies are not required to consider migrating until the next major release of their core financial system and much work remains before the software used by shared service providers will incorporate the standard business processes currently under development. Accordingly, FSIO officials stated it could take 15 years or more before software that incorporates these standard business processes is in use governmentwide. We recognize that the FMLOB initiative represents a long-term effort; however, expediting efforts to address our prior recommendations could help achieve more effective and timely benefits. Until OMB fully integrates the four key concepts into its approach, the extent to which FMLOB goals will be achieved is uncertain. The Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990 and other information technology (IT) reform legislation contain requirements related to OMB's oversight of agency financial management systems modernization and other IT projects. Achieving FMLOB goals requires effective OMB oversight of agency modernization projects, but OMB has yet to fully address GAO's previously reported oversight-related recommendations such as taking actions to define and ensure that agencies effectively implement disciplined processes and develop a more structured review of agency efforts. In addition, OMB does not obtain and report complete and accurate data concerning agencies' spending on financial management system modernization projects. The lack of sufficient information and processes to effectively monitor agency modernization efforts and their costs limits OMB's ability to evaluate and help reduce the risks associated with financial management system implementations as well as achieve FMLOB goals. |
gao_GAO-02-268 | gao_GAO-02-268_0 | Joint EPA/State Agreement to Pursue Regulatory Innovation
In 1998, EPA and ECOS agreed to encourage experimentation by states with new approaches to environmental protection through their Joint EPA/State Agreement to Pursue Regulatory Innovation. Other Avenues
In addition to Project XL and the ECOS/EPA agreement, state and EPA officials identified several other avenues for negotiation that states have used to obtain EPA’s approval for innovative environmental strategies. Resource Constraints Are Among the Key Obstacles at the State Level
Officials in all of the states we contacted indicated that they faced significant obstacles—including lack of resources, cultural resistance in the state agency, and opposition from environmental groups--even in advance of proposing a project to EPA. Opposition to innovative approaches from environmental groups and other stakeholders has also impeded proposals. Diversifying environmental tools and approaches. It is also consistent with EPA’s recent adoption of the recommendations of its own Task Force on Improving EPA Regulations which advocates, among other things, that innovative alternatives should be considered as new regulations are developed. The Environmental Cooperation Pilot Program (ECPP) was developed by the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources to allow facilities to test innovative approaches to environmental protection in exchange for superior environmental performance. | What GAO Found
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issues regulations that states, localities, and private companies must comply with under the existing federal approach to environmental protection. This approach has been widely criticized for being costly, inflexible, and ineffective in addressing some of the nation's most pressing environmental problems. The states have used several methods to obtain EPA approval for innovative approaches to environmental protection. Among the primary approaches cited by the state environmental officials GAO interviewed are EPA's Project XL and the Joint EPA/State Agreement to Pursue Regulatory Innovation. Officials in most states told GAO that they faced significant challenges in submitting proposals to EPA, including resistance from within the state environmental agency and a lack of adequate resources to pursue innovative approaches. EPA recognizes that it needs to do more to encourage innovative environmental approaches by states and other entities. As a result, EPA has (1) issued a broad-based draft strategy entitled "Innovating for Better Environmental Results" and (2) adopted the recommendations of an internal task force, which advocated the consideration of innovative alternatives as new regulations are developed. |
gao_NSIAD-97-20 | gao_NSIAD-97-20_0 | Eximbank, SBA, and States Use Various Delivery Approaches
Eximbank and SBA emphasize different delivery approaches for facilitating their programs. Eximbank relies on its U.S. Division and network of delegated authority lenders, whereas SBA relies primarily on staff with lending authority it has assigned to the USEACs and on its network of district offices. Eight states also have export finance programs that provide working capital guarantees. The remaining seven states surveyed did not have export finance programs. The agencies’ efforts to harmonize and, in other ways, improve their programs appear to have increased the level of loans guaranteed and the extent of exporter and lender participation. These program changes, including those related to the agencies’ harmonization efforts, appear to have helped expand the use of the program, improve SME access to working capital, and increase the number of lenders participating in export financing. Issues Associated With Expanding the Use of Cooperative Agreements
To facilitate small business export finance, Eximbank and SBA have established more cooperative agreements with both the private and public sectors. Eximbank established partnerships with state and local government offices and private organizations to help market its small business financial products. In September 1996, it implemented a pilot program delegating authority for approving working capital guarantees to six of the agency’s state partners. Potential Implications of Transferring SBA’s Export Working Capital Program to Eximbank
In 1993, TPCC recommended that SBA’s Export Working Capital Program should be merged into Eximbank’s program if the agency’s harmonization efforts were unsatisfactory. Although Eximbank and SBA have made progress in harmonizing their programs, a number of factors would need to be considered before any such transfer occurred. Eximbank’s Program May Not Be Accessible to Some Exporters
If SBA’s Export Working Capital Program were transferred to Eximbank, SMEs in some states might not have convenient access to the current lenders who participate in Eximbank’s Delegated Authority Program. Some SMEs currently served by SBA may not have access to Eximbank’s Working Capital Guarantee Program because of statutory restrictions on the types of loans Eximbank can guarantee and a difference in Eximbank’s and SBA’s credit qualification requirements. We also reviewed Eximbank and SBA documents on various arrangements aimed at facilitating export working capital guarantees, such as the Eximbank Delegated Authority Program, the Eximbank City/State Program, SBA coguarantee arrangements with states, and SBA agreements with intermediaries to package export working capital loans. To identify the issues associated with expanding the number of cooperative agreements in the federal working capital guarantee programs, we focused on delegating authority to lenders and devolving greater responsibility for export working capital programs to the states. Main Components for Delivering Export Working Capital Programs to Small- and Medium-Sized Enterprises
The U.S. Export-Import Bank (Eximbank) relies heavily on its U.S. Division and delegated authority lenders for delivering its Working Capital Guarantee Program. The Small Business Administration (SBA) relies on the U.S. Export Assistance Centers (USEAC) and district offices to deliver its Export Working Capital Program. GAO Comments
1. 2. 2. 3. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the current government programs that provide export working capital for small- and medium-sized enterprises (SME), focusing on: (1) federal and state approaches for providing export working capital; (2) federal efforts to harmonize the export working capital programs of the U.S. Export-Import Bank (Eximbank) and the Small Business Administration (SBA); (3) issues associated with increasing the number of cooperative agreements with lenders and devolving greater responsibility for export working capital programs to the states; and (4) the potential implications of transferring SBA's export working capital program to Eximbank.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) Eximbank and SBA have programs that provide guarantees to facilitate export working capital loans for SMEs, however, the agencies emphasize different delivery approaches; (2) Eximbank implements its program primarily through a specific division within the agency and a network of lending institutions that have been delegated with authority for approving the agency's working capital guarantees; (3) SBA relies primarily on specialists with lending authority that it has assigned to the U.S. Export Assistance Centers network and on the agency's 69 district offices to implement its working capital program; (4) both Eximbank and SBA have established other arrangements with state and local offices to help administer their working capital programs; (5) eight states have export guarantee programs specifically geared to assisting small businesses which provide a wide range of funds, staff, and activity levels involving export financing for SMEs; (6) Eximbank and SBA have harmonized certain aspects of their export working capital guarantee programs; (7) while harmonization was underway, Eximbank and SBA made other changes aimed at improving their own export finance assistance programs for small businesses; (8) these efforts to harmonize and improve their programs appear to have helped simplify the lending process, increase the number and value of loans guaranteed, and expand the number of exporters and lenders who participate in the programs, however, some program differences remain; (9) to leverage federal funds and provide SMEs with more export financing, Eximbank and SBA have set up cooperative arrangements with both the private and public sectors; (10) Eximbank also has a pilot program underway that delegates lending authority to six state export finance organizations; (11) the potential to further expand cooperative agreements would be affected by various factors; (12) the Trade Promotion Coordinating Committee proposed transferring SBA's Export Working Capital Program to Eximbank if harmonization efforts were unsatisfactory; (13) GAO identified a number of factors that would need to be considered before any transfer of program responsibility from SBA to Eximbank were to take place; and (14) these factors are: (a) some exporters currently served by SBA may not be served by Eximbank; (b) the Eximbank and its network of delegated authority lenders may not be accessible to some SMEs currently assisted by SBA; and (c) the consolidation of the programs may lead to only minimal cost savings. |
gao_GAO-05-888 | gao_GAO-05-888_0 | DHS Has Made Progress in Addressing Departmentwide Training Issues, but Challenges May Impede Its Efforts
DHS has made progress in addressing departmentwide training issues and these efforts reflect some of the elements of a strategic approach toward training as described in our previous work. The department’s current efforts, although promising, are still in the early stages and they face significant challenges. In July 2005, DHS issued its first departmental training plan, Department of Homeland Security Learning and Development Strategic Plan, which provides a strategic vision for departmentwide training. This plan is a significant and positive step toward addressing departmentwide training challenges. These challenges include lack of common management information systems, the absence of commonly understood training terminology across components, the lack of specificity in authority and accountability relationships between the CHCO office and components, insufficient planning for effective implementation, and insufficient resources for ensuring effective implementation of training strategies. Sharing of Training Information across Components Made More Difficult by Lack of Compatible Infrastructure and Commonly Understood Terminology
The formation of DHS from 22 legacy agencies and programs has created challenges to achieving departmentwide training goals. Strategic training practices in several DHS components or programs may provide models or insights to others in the department regarding ways to improve training practices. Some components in DHS applied the strategic practice of aligning training with organizational priorities, while others did not. Several components and programs we examined at DHS used these practices, while others did not. FLETC’s Level III evaluations obtain feedback from both trainees and their supervisors to inform future improvements to training curricula. DHS Has Used Training in an Effort to Help Its Workforce as the Department Undergoes Transformation and Cultural Change
The creation of DHS resulted in significant cultural and transformational challenges for the department. Another training intervention sponsored by the department directly targets managers and supervisors who will be responsible for carrying out many of the key behaviors associated with the new system and whose active support is viewed by DHS as critical for achieving the transformation to a performance-based culture. Conclusions
DHS must continue to make progress on three important aspects of training as it moves forward: (1) forging an effective role for training at the departmental level and implementing its departmentwide training strategy; (2) taking a strategic approach to training practices, in part by building upon examples of good practice to be found among its former organizations, as well as considering other examples of strategic practices; and (3) finding ways that training can help to foster organizational transformation and cultural change within the department. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help DHS establish and implement an effective and strategic approach to departmentwide training, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security take the following actions: adopt additional good strategic planning and management practices to enhance the department’s training strategic plan by (1) creating a clearer crosswalk between specific training goals and objectives and DHS’s organizational and human capital strategic goals and (2) developing appropriate training performance measures and targets; clearly specify authority and accountability relationships between the CHCO office and organizational components regarding training as a first step to addressing issues DHS has identified for fiscal year 2006; ensure that the department and component organizations develop detailed implementation plans and related processes for training initiatives; and when setting funding priorities, give appropriate attention to providing resources to support training councils and groups to further DHS’s capacity to achieve its departmentwide training goals. We supplemented our review of departmental training at DHS by examining the department’s effort to use training related to MAXHR to foster transformation and cultural change in the department. We also included the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center because of the special role it plays in training employees from other DHS components. | Why GAO Did This Study
Training can play a key role in helping the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) successfully address the challenge of transformation and cultural change and help ensure that its workforce possesses the knowledge and skills needed to effectively respond to current and future threats. This report discusses (1) how DHS is addressing or planning to address departmentwide training and the related challenges it is encountering; (2) examples of how DHS training practices, specifically those related to planning and evaluation, reflect strategic practices; and (3) examples of how DHS uses training to foster transformation and cultural change.
What GAO Found
DHS has taken several positive steps toward establishing an effective departmentwide approach to training, yet significant challenges remain. Progress made in addressing departmentwide training issues, but efforts are still in the early stages and face several challenges. Actions taken by DHS include issuing its first training strategic plan in July 2005, establishing training councils and groups to increase communication across components, and directly providing training for specific departmentwide needs. However, several challenges may impede DHS from achieving its departmental training goals. First, the sharing of training information across components is made more difficult by the lack of common or compatible information management systems and a commonly understood training terminology. Second, authority and accountability relationships between the Office of the Chief Human Capital Officer and organizational components are not sufficiently clear. Third, DHS's planning may be insufficiently detailed to ensure effective and coordinated implementation of departmentwide training efforts. Finally, according to training officials, DHS lacks resources needed to implement its departmental training strategy. Examples of planning and evaluation of training demonstrate some elements of strategic practice. Specific training practices at both the component and departmental levels may provide useful models or insights to help others in DHS adopt a more strategic approach to training. We found that some components of DHS apply these practices, while others do not. For example, Customs and Border Protection (CBP) aligns training priorities with strategic goals through planning and budgeting processes. In the area of evaluation, the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center obtains feedback from both the trainee and the trainee's job supervisor to inform training program designers in order to make improvements to the program curriculum. Training has been used to help DHS's workforce as it undergoes transformation and cultural change. The creation of DHS from different legacy organizations, each with its own distinct culture, has resulted in significant cultural and transformation challenges for the department. At the departmental level, one of the ways DHS is addressing these challenges is by encouraging the transformation to a shared performance-based culture through the implementation of its new human capital management system, MAXHR. DHS considers training to be critical to effectively implementing this initiative and defining its culture. Toward that end, the department is providing a wide range of training, including programs targeted to executives, managers, and supervisors. For example, at the component level, CBP has developed cross-training to equip employees with the knowledge needed to integrate inspection functions once carried out by three different types of inspectors at three separate agencies. |
gao_GAO-08-67 | gao_GAO-08-67_0 | Aliens who are in violation of immigration laws are subject to removal from the United States. ICE Officers Exercise Discretion, Particularly for Aliens with Humanitarian Issues or Who Are Not Investigation Targets
Our review of ICE policies and procedures, along with interviews at ICE field offices, showed that officers exercise discretion throughout various phases of the alien apprehension and removal process, but the initial phases of the process—initiating removals, apprehending aliens, issuing removal documents and detaining aliens—involve the most discretion. Specifically, officers told us that they exercise discretion when they encounter aliens who (1) present humanitarian concerns such as medical issues or being the sole caregiver for minor children or (2) are not the primary target of their investigations. Officers and Attorneys Have Less Discretion Once Removal Proceedings Have Been Initiated
Our review of ICE policy and DRO’s field operational manual showed that ICE attorneys—who generally enter the process once proceedings have begun—and officers have less discretion in the later phases of the apprehension and removal process. For example, ICE has not completed efforts to provide officers with complete and up to date guidance to reflect expanded worksite and fugitive operations enforcement efforts. ICE headquarters officials told us that they do not have a time frame for completing efforts to update available guidance in field operational manuals. The lack of comprehensive guidance and a mechanism by which to help ensure that officers receive consistent information regarding legal developments puts ICE officers at risk of taking actions that are not appropriate exercises of discretion and do not support the agency’s operational objectives. However, ICE guidance to instruct officer decision making in cases involving humanitarian issues and aliens who are not primary targets of ICE investigations during the alien apprehension and removal process is not comprehensive and has not been updated by headquarters officials to reflect ICE’s expanded worksite and fugitive operations. In addition to supervisory reviews, ICE has recently taken steps to institute an inspection program designed to oversee field offices’ compliance with established policies and procedures. Given that 75 field offices are involved in the alien apprehension and removal process and that oversight of these offices lies with three ICE units, a comprehensive mechanism for reviewing officers’ decision making could provide ICE with meaningful information to promote the appropriate use of discretion, identify best practices, and analyze any significant differences across field offices in order to take appropriate action. Recommendations for Executive Action
To enhance ICE’s ability to inform and monitor its officers’ use of discretion in alien apprehensions and removals, we recommend the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Assistant Secretary of ICE to take the following three actions: develop time frames for updating existing policies, guidelines, and procedures for alien apprehension and removals and include in the updates factors that should be considered when officers make apprehension, charging, and detention determinations for aliens with humanitarian issues; develop a mechanism to help ensure that officers are consistently provided with updates regarding legal developments necessary for making alien apprehension and removal decisions; evaluate the costs and alternatives of developing a reporting mechanism by which ICE senior managers can analyze trends in the use of discretion to help identify areas that may require management actions—such as changes to guidance, procedures, and training. We will also make copies available to others on request. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This review examined how Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) ensures that discretion is used in the most fair, reasoned, and efficient manner. Along these lines, we examined whether ICE has designed internal controls to guide and monitor officers’ exercise of discretion when making alien apprehension and removal decisions, consistent with internal control standards for the federal government. When and how do ICE officers and attorneys exercise discretion during the alien apprehension and removal process? What internal controls has ICE designed to guide officer decision making to enhance its assurance that the exercise of discretion supports its operational objectives? 3. | Why GAO Did This Study
Officers with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) investigate violations of immigration laws and identify aliens who are removable from the United States. ICE officers exercise discretion to achieve its operational goals of removing any aliens subject to removal while prioritizing those who pose a threat to national security or public safety and safeguarding aliens' rights in the removal process. The General Accountability Office (GAO) was asked to examine how ICE ensures that discretion is used in the most fair, reasoned, and efficient manner possible. GAO reviewed (1) when and how ICE officers and attorneys exercise discretion and what internal controls ICE has designed to (2) guide decision making and (3) oversee and monitor officers' decisions. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed ICE manuals, memorandums, and removal data, interviewed ICE officials, and visited 21 of 75 ICE field offices.
What GAO Found
ICE officers exercise discretion throughout the alien apprehension and removal process, but primarily during the initial phases of the process when deciding to initiate removals, apprehend aliens, issue removal documents, and detain aliens. Officers GAO interviewed at ICE field offices said that ICE policies and procedures limit their discretion when encountering the targets of their investigations--typically criminal or fugitive aliens, but that they can exercise more discretion for other aliens they encounter. Officers also said that they consider humanitarian circumstances, such as sole caregiver responsibilities or medical reasons, when making these decisions. Attorneys, who generally enter later in the process, and officers told GAO that once removal proceedings have begun, discretion is limited to specific circumstances, such as if the alien is awaiting approval of lawful permanent resident status. Consistent with internal control standards, ICE has begun to update and enhance training curricula to better support officer decision making. However, ICE has not taken steps to ensure that written guidance designed to promote the appropriate exercise of discretion during alien apprehension and removal is comprehensive and up to date and has not established time frames for updating guidance. For example, field operational manuals have not been updated to provide information about the appropriate exercise of discretion in light of a recent expansion of ICE worksite enforcement and fugitive operations, in which officers are more likely to encounter aliens with humanitarian issues or who are not targets of investigations. Also, ICE does not have a mechanism to ensure the timely dissemination of legal developments to help ensure that officers make decisions in line with the most recent interpretations of immigration law. As a result, ICE officers are at risk of taking actions that do not support operational objectives and making removal decisions that do not reflect the most recent legal developments. Consistent with internal control standards, ICE relies on supervisory reviews to ensure that officers exercise appropriate discretion and has instituted an inspection program designed to ensure that field offices comply with established policies and procedures. However, ICE lacks other controls to help monitor performance across the 75 field offices responsible for making apprehension and removal decisions. A comprehensive mechanism for reviewing officers' decision making could provide ICE with meaningful information to analyze trends to identify areas that may need corrective action and to identify best practices. ICE officials acknowledged they do not collect the data necessary for such a mechanism and said doing so may be costly. Without assessing costs and alternatives, ICE is not in a position to select an approach that will help identify best practices and areas needing corrective action. |
gao_GAO-10-659T | gao_GAO-10-659T_0 | Background
Postsecondary institutions that serve large proportions of low-income and minority students are eligible to receive grants from Education through programs authorized under Title III and Title V of the Higher Education Act, as amended. Long-Standing Deficiencies in Grant Monitoring and Technical Assistance Limit Education’s Ability to Ensure That Funds Are Used Properly and Grantees Are Supported
Education Has Made Limited Progress toward Implementing a Systematic Approach to Monitoring and Technical Assistance
GAO and Education’s Inspector General have recommended multiple times that Education implement a systematic monitoring approach to better assess the fiscal and programmatic performance of Title III and V grantees. In our 2009 report, however, we found that while Education had taken some steps to better target its monitoring in response to our previous recommendation, many of its initiatives had yet to be fully realized. Accordingly, we recommended that the Secretary of Education develop a comprehensive, risk-based approach to target grant monitoring and technical assistance based on the needs of grantees. At this time, however, Education is still in the process of modifying its monitoring approach and it is too early to determine the effectiveness of its efforts. Annual Monitoring Plans
Our 2009 report found that Education still lacked a coordinated approach to guide its monitoring efforts. The plan for Title III and V programs outlines Education’s monitoring approach and describes various monitoring tools and activities—such as the monitoring index and site visits; how they are to be used to target limited monitoring resources to grantees that need it most; and an increased focus on staff training. Site Visits
With the implementation of an electronic monitoring system and risk-based monitoring index, Education now has tools to enhance its ability to select grantees for site visits, a critical component of an effective grants management program. In our 2009 report, however, we found that overall site visits to Title III and V grantees had declined substantially in recent years (see table 3), and Education was not making full use of its risk-based criteria to select grantees for visits. In response to our 2009 report, Education officials said that they would use the revised monitoring index to select half of the schools chosen for site visits. However, none of the five site visits completed so far in fiscal year 2010 was selected based on the monitoring index. For example, Education had developed courses on internal control and grants monitoring, but these courses were attended by less than half of the program staff. Education agreed with the recommendation and has developed additional training in key areas. Technical Assistance
While Education provides technical assistance for prospective and current Title III and V grantees through preapplication workshops and routine interaction between program officers and grant administrators at the institutions, our 2009 report found that it had not made progress in developing a systemic approach that targeted the needs of grantees. To improve the provision of technical assistance, our 2009 report recommended that Education disseminate information to grantees about common implementation challenges and successful projects and develop appropriate mechanisms to collect and use grantee feedback. Education Lacks Assurance That Grant Funds Are Used Appropriately
Without a comprehensive approach to target its monitoring, Education lacks assurance that grantees appropriately manage federal funds, increasing the potential for fraud, waste, or abuse. At one institution—Grantee D—we identified significant internal control weaknesses and $105,117 in questionable expenditures. Targeting monitoring and assistance to grantees with the greatest risk and needs is critical to ensuring that grant funds are appropriately spent and are used to improve institutional capacity and student outcomes. | Why GAO Did This Study
Higher education has become more accessible than ever before, although students from some demographic groups still face challenges in attending college. To help improve access to higher education for minority and low-income students, Titles III and V of the Higher Education Act, as amended, provide grants to strengthen and support institutions that enroll large proportions of these students. GAO was asked to testify on the Department of Education's (Education) oversight of institutions receiving Title III or V grants and progress Education has made in monitoring the financial and programmatic performance of Title III and V grantees. GAO's testimony is based primarily on its recent report, Low-Income and Minority Serving Institutions: Management Attention to Long-standing Concerns Needed to Improve Education's Oversight of Grant Programs ( GAO-09-309 , August 2009) and updated information provided by Education. In that report, GAO recommended that Education, among other things, (1) develop a comprehensive, risk-based approach to target monitoring and technical assistance; (2) ensure staff training needs are fully met; (3) disseminate information about implementation challenges and successful projects; and (4) develop appropriate feedback mechanisms. No new recommendations are being made in this testimony.
What GAO Found
GAO's 2009 report found that Education had taken steps in response to previous GAO recommendations to improve its monitoring of Title III and V grants, but many of its initiatives had yet to be fully realized. A coordinated, risk-based approach, targeting monitoring and assistance to grantees with the greatest risk and needs is critical, especially as Education's oversight responsibilities are expanding. Education agreed with GAO's 2009 recommendations and has begun taking steps to implement them, but it is too early to determine the effectiveness of these efforts, described below. (1) Risk-based monitoring criteria: At the time of the 2009 report, Education had developed a monitoring index to identify high-risk institutions, but was not using it to target schools for site visits. Education committed to use the index to select half of its fiscal year 2010 site visits, but none of the visits completed to date were based on the monitoring index. (2) Annual monitoring plan: Because it stopped developing annual monitoring plans for Title III and V programs in 2006, GAO determined that Education lacked a coordinated approach to guide its monitoring efforts. Since then, Education has developed a 2010 monitoring plan, but some of the monitoring activities lack realistic and measurable performance goals. (3) Site visits and staff training: The 2009 report found that site visits to Title III and V grantees, a key component of an effective grants management program, had declined substantially in recent years and that staff lacked the skills to conduct financial site visits. Since then, site visits have remained limited, but Education has developed training courses to address the skill deficits identified that about half the program staff have attended. (4) Technical assistance: The 2009 report found Education had not made progress in developing a systemic approach to target the needs of grantees. In response to GAO's recommendations, Education has taken some steps to encourage grantee feedback and information sharing among grantees. Without a comprehensive approach to target its monitoring, GAO previously found that Education lacked assurance that grantees appropriately manage federal funds, increasing the potential for fraud, waste, or abuse. For example, GAO identified $105,117 in questionable expenditures at one school, including student trips to amusement parks and an airplane global positioning system. |
gao_GAO-10-485T | gao_GAO-10-485T_0 | Protective Forces Are Not Uniformly Managed, Organized, Staffed, Trained, or Compensated
Contractor protective forces—including 2,339 unionized officers and their 376 nonunionized supervisors—are not uniformly managed, organized, staffed, trained, or compensated across the six DOE sites we reviewed. First, protective forces at all six of the sites we reviewed operate under separate contracts and collective bargaining agreements. Tactical Response Force Implementation Has Raised Concerns about the Longevity of Protective Forces Careers
Since its inception in 2005, TRF has raised concerns in DOE security organizations, among protective force contractors, and in protective force unions about the ability of protective forces—especially older individuals serving in protective forces—to continue meeting DOE’s weapons, physical fitness, and medical qualifications. Adding to these concerns are DOE’s broader efforts to manage its long-term postretirement and pension liabilities for its contractors, which could have a negative impact on retirement eligibility and benefits for protective forces. Concerns over TRF implementation and DOE’s efforts to limit long-term pension and postretirement liabilities contributed to a 44-day protective force strike at the Pantex Plant in 2007. However, according to protective force union officials, failure to resolve issues surrounding TRF implementation and retirement benefits could lead to strikes at three sites with large numbers of protective forces—Pantex, the Savannah River Site, and Y-12—when their collective bargaining agreements expire in 2012. Either Improving the Existing Contractor Forces System or Creating a Federal Force Could Result in More Uniform Management of Protective Forces
To manage its protective forces more effectively and uniformly, over the past decades DOE has considered two principal options—improving elements of the existing contractor system or creating a federal protective force. Either option could result in effective and more uniform security if well-managed. Greater standardization of protective forces across sites to more consistently support high performance and ready transfer of personnel between sites. Better DOE management and oversight to ensure effective security. Federalizing Protective Forces Could Create Difficulties Either under Current Laws or with Special Provisions for Enhanced Retirement Benefits
If protective forces were to be federalized under existing law, the current forces probably would not be eligible for early and enhanced retirement benefits and might face a loss of pay or even their jobs. DOE Seeks to Address Protective Force Issues by Reforming Contractor Forces, but Progress Has Been Limited to Date
In a joint January 2009 memorandum, senior officials from NNSA and DOE rejected the federalization of protective forces as an option and supported the continued use of contracted protective forces—but with improvements. However, these officials recognized that the current contractor system could be improved by addressing some of the issues that federalization might have resolved. For the personnel system initiative to enhance career longevity and retirement options, in June 2009, the DOE-chartered study group made 29 recommendations that were generally designed to enable members to reach a normal retirement age within the protective force, take another job within DOE, or transition to a non-DOE career. Other recommendations focus on providing training and planning assistance for retirement and job transitions. These concerns have elevated the importance of finding the most effective approach to maintaining protective force readiness, including an approach that better aligns personnel systems and protective force requirements. NNSA’s standardization initiatives and recommendations made by a DOE study group offer a step forward. | Why GAO Did This Study
The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks raised concerns about the security of Department of Energy (DOE) sites with weapons-grade nuclear material, known as Category I special nuclear material (SNM). To better protect these sites against attacks, DOE has sought to transform its protective forces protecting SNM into a Tactical Response Force (TRF) with training and capabilities similar to the U.S. military. This testimony is based on prior work and has been updated with additional information provided by protective forces' union officials. In a prior GAO report, Nuclear Security: DOE Needs to Address Protective Forces' Personnel System Issues (GAO-10-275), GAO (1) analyzed information on the management, organization, staffing, training, and compensation of protective forces at DOE sites with Category I SNM; (2) examined the implementation of TRF; and (3) assessed DOE's two options to more uniformly manage protective forces; and (4) reported on DOE's progress in addressing protective force issues. DOE generally agreed with the recommendations in GAO's prior report that called for the agency to fully assess and implement, where feasible, measures identified by DOE's 2009 protective forces study group to enhance protective forces' career longevity and retirement options.
What GAO Found
Over 2,300 contractor protective forces provide armed security for DOE and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) at six sites that have long-term missions to store and process Category I SNM. DOE protective forces at each of these sites are covered under separate contracts and collective bargaining agreements between contractors and protective force unions. As a result, the management, organization, staffing, training and compensation--in terms of pay and benefits--of protective forces vary. Protective force contractors, unions, and DOE security officials are concerned that the implementation of TRF's more rigorous requirements and the current protective forces' personnel systems threaten the ability of protective forces--especially older members--to continue their careers until retirement age. These concerns, heightened by broader DOE efforts to manage postretirement and pension liabilities for its contractors that might have a negative impact on retirement eligibility and benefits for protective forces, contributed to a 44-day protective force strike at an important NNSA site in 2007. According to protective force union officials, the issues surrounding TRF implementation and retirement benefits are still unresolved and could lead to strikes at three sites with large numbers of protective forces when their collective bargaining agreements expire in 2012. Efforts to more uniformly manage protective forces have focused on either reforming the current contracting approach or creating a federal protective force (federalization). Either approach might provide for managing protective forces more uniformly and could result in effective security if well-managed. However, if protective forces were to be federalized under existing law, the current forces probably would not be eligible for enhanced retirement benefits and might face a loss of pay or even their jobs. Although DOE rejected federalization as an option in 2009, it recognized that the current contracting approach could be improved by greater standardization and by addressing personnel system issues. As a result, NNSA began a standardization initiative to centralize procurement of equipment, uniforms, and weapons to achieve cost savings. Under a separate initiative, a DOE study group developed a number of recommendations to enhance protective forces' career longevity and retirement options, but DOE has made limited progress to date in implementing these recommendations. |
gao_GAO-01-498 | gao_GAO-01-498_0 | Demand for Organs for Pediatric Patients Continues to Outpace Supply
Pediatric patients in need of an organ transplant continue to face a shortage of donated organs. The number of adult donors has increased significantly during the same period, in large part because donor eligibility criteria have been expanded to include older donors and donors with certain diseases that were not accepted in the past. However, compared to adults, children account for a small number of transplant candidates. Number of Pediatric Organ Donors Has Remained Relatively Constant
The number of pediatric donors has held relatively steady despite a drop in the number of potential donors. However, the degree to which pediatric organs are transplanted into adults varies by organ. Pediatric Patients Generally Fare As Well As or Better Than Adult Patients on Critical Measures
Although the patterns vary by organ and present a complex picture, pediatric patients appear to be faring as well as or better than adult patients, both while on the waiting list and after transplantation. The priority a child receives takes into account differences between children and adults in the progression and treatment of end stage organ disease. The policies differ for each organ. | What GAO Found
Pediatric patients in need of an organ transplant face a shortage of donated organs. The number of pediatric organ donors has remained relatively constant from 1991 to 2000, despite a drop in potential donors. The number of adult donors rose 45 percent during the same period, in large part because donor eligibility criteria have been expanded to include older donors and donors with diseases that have been prohibited in the past. Organ waiting lists for pediatric patients have more than doubled. Compared to adults, however, children account for a small number of transplant candidates. The degree to which pediatric organs are transplanted into adults varies by organ. Pediatric patients appear to be faring as well as or better than adult patients, both while on the waiting list and after transplantation. Allocation policies for kidneys, livers, and hearts provide several protections for children awaiting transplants. The priority a child receives takes into account differences between children and adults in the progression and treatment of end stage organ disease, with the policies differing for each organ. |
gao_HEHS-96-120 | gao_HEHS-96-120_0 | . . would require the level of care provided” in an institutional setting such as an ICF/MR; (2) total Medicaid per capita costs for waiver program recipients are not greater than total Medicaid per capita costs for persons receiving institutional care; and (3) states properly assure quality. States Use Waivers to Expand and Change Programs for Developmentally Disabled
Through the use of waivers, states have changed long-term care nationally for persons with developmental disabilities in two ways. More people are now served through the waiver program than the ICF/MR program. States believed that they could use the waiver program to expand services while simultaneously reducing or limiting access to ICF/MR program care as a means to control growth in expenditures. Flexibility of the Waiver Program Has Allowed States to Pursue Distinct Strategies
States have used the flexibility of the waiver program to pursue distinct strategies and achieve different program results as shown in the three states we visited (see table 2). States Are Changing Their Waiver Programs to Serve More Individuals at Home
In the continuing evolution of services for persons with developmental disabilities, some states, such as Florida, Michigan, and Rhode Island, are changing the focus of waiver program services from group home care to more tailored services to meet individuals’ unique needs and preferences at home. Medicaid Costs Rose During Planned Expansion in Persons Served
Nationwide, Medicaid costs for long-term care services for persons with developmental disability rose at an average annual rate of 9 percent between 1990 and 1995 as states implemented their planned increases in the number of persons served. Most of the increase reflected increased costs for waiver program services, but increased ICF/MR program costs also were a factor. First is a cap on the number of program recipients. States have also used several management practices to help contain costs. These changes are intended to provide recipients and families with a greater choice of services within appropriate budget and safety limits. However, state officials and HCFA agree that more development of quality assurance approaches is needed. Long-Term Care: Status of Quality Assurance and Measurement in Home and Community Based Services (GAO/PEMD-94-19, Mar. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed states' experiences in utilizing the Medicaid waiver program to provide care for developmentally disabled adults in alternative settings, focusing on: (1) expanding state use of the waiver program; (2) controlling long-term care costs for developmentally disabled individuals; and (3) the strengths and limitations in states' quality assurance approaches in community settings.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) based on national data and three case studies, states' use of the waiver program has changed long-term care for developmental disabled persons by providing such persons with a broader range of services that they and their families prefer; (2) the waiver program has increased the number of persons served and the use of group home settings while allowing states to close many institutional care facilities and to expand services to persons in state-financed programs; (3) states now serve more developmentally disabled persons through the waiver program than the institutional program; (4) the waiver program has allowed states to pursue distinct strategies and achieve different program results; (5) from 1990 to 1995, Medicaid costs for long-term care for developmentally disabled persons increased an average of 9 percent annually due to increased costs for waiver and institutional program services, but per capita costs and cost increases varied by state; (6) the cap on the number of program recipients and state management practices helped contain these costs; (7) changes in the Health Care Financing Administration's (HCFA) process for setting waiver program caps could increase program costs, but HCFA believes that state budget constraints could limit program growth; and (8) although states are changing their quality assurance procedures for waiver program services, such as customizing quality assurance to individual circumstances, more needs to be done to improve quality oversight mechanisms and reduce participants' risk as these mechanisms evolve. |
gao_GAO-05-926 | gao_GAO-05-926_0 | The Army believes a brigade-based force will make it more agile and deployable and better able to meet combatant commander requirements. Modular Transformation Cost Estimate Has Increased, and Uncertainties Surrounding Pending Decisions May Increase Costs Further
Since the summer of 2004, the Army’s cost estimate for transforming its force through fiscal year 2011 increased from $28 billion to $48 billion in its spring 2005 estimate. Pending decisions about the number and design of modular units, and uncertainties surrounding equipment, personnel, and facilities costs, may require the Army to request additional funding beyond $75.5 billion or accept reduced capabilities among some or all of its units. Without a clearer picture of the Army’s resource requirements, DOD will have difficulty weighing competing funding priorities, and the Secretary of Defense and Congress will not have information they need to evaluate funding requests. This estimate, however, did not include personnel costs and some construction costs. Adding these known costs for construction and personnel to the Army’s official estimate brings the total potential known costs to $75.5 billion. We identified the following factors that could affect equipment, personnel, and facilities costs. However, until the strategy is finalized, costs for converting this equipment remain unclear. End Strength Requirements Are Uncertain and Could Increase Personnel Related Costs
Although the Army has estimated that it will require about $3 billion per year for the 30,000 soldiers it has attributed to meeting the requirements of transforming to a modular force while conducting operations related to the Global War on Terrorism, uncertainty about the need for additional end strength could produce cost growth in personnel-related expenses. The Army’s Funding Plan Poses Funding Risks That May Cause Affordability Challenges in the Future
The Army’s funding plan for its modular force anticipates a combination of supplemental and annual appropriations, but risks borne of the fast pace of transformation, cost growth for the modular transformation, not achieving efficiencies as planned, and likely cost growth from FCS could pose affordability challenges in the future. The Army intends to use this funding plan in developing funding requests for funds provided through both regular and supplemental appropriations. First, when compared to the Army’s unit creation schedule, the plan indicates that the Army will be creating units before it has the funding available to resource them, as shown in figure 1. Lack of an Approach to Track Funds Obligated for the Modular Force Limits the Transparency of Funds Used
While the Army can generally track funds associated with individual programs, it has not established an approach for tracking funds obligated for its modular force transformation. It should include a clear definition of what costs the Army does and does not consider to be related to the modular transformation; estimates for equipment, facilities and personnel; identification of uncertainties in the plan due to pending force structure design decisions or other decisions that may affect costs, and updates to the plan as these decisions are made; a report on obligations related to the modular force made the previous divergences from the plan as stated in the prior year’s report, and contributing factors. As we noted in the report, in preparing its budget estimate and request for funding, the Army has already grouped projects together under the modularity umbrella and has identified specific funding needs for modularity. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2004, the Army began transforming its force into modular brigade-based units, thus expanding the number of units available for deployment and creating new command and support units. The Army is transforming while engaged in the Global War on Terrorism and developing other high-cost capabilities. This prompted congressional concern about the affordability of Army plans. Thus, under the Comptroller General's statutory authority, GAO examined the Army's restructuring. This report addresses (1) the extent of change in costs and areas of uncertainty that could affect those costs, (2) the Army's plan for funding modularity and factors that may affect affordability, and (3) whether the Army has an adequate approach to track modularity obligations.
What GAO Found
The Army's cost estimates for its modular force are evolving and have increased substantially, and uncertainty exists that will likely increase costs further. In March 2005, the Army estimated it will need $48 billion to fund modularity through 2011, a 71 percent increase from its 2004 estimate of $28 billion. However, this latest estimate does not include $27.5 billion in personnel and construction costs the Army and GAO identified, bringing potential known costs to $75.5 billion. Uncertainties remain in this estimate related to force design, equipment, facilities, and personnel, which could increase costs or require the Army to reduce capabilities. Until the Army provides a more reliable estimate of its modularity costs, DOD and Congress will not be well positioned to weigh competing requests for funding. The Army's funding plan, which it uses as the basis for developing funding requests, relies on annual and supplemental appropriations and may present future affordability challenges. Uncertainty in cost estimates noted above, reliance on business engineering efficiencies that historically have been difficult for DOD to achieve, and likely cost growth from another high-cost program--Future Combat Systems--collectively pose the risk of making this plan unaffordable. Also, the Army will be creating most of the modular units before it has the funding to support them While the Army can generally identify overall equipment purchases, it lacks an approach for tracking most modularity obligations and thus cannot provide a reliable picture of past spending or future funding needs. Army officials said they had not established a framework to track personnel and equipment obligations in part due to the difficulty of defining whether such expenses were incurred specifically for modularity or to support the force in general. However, we note the Army has made such distinctions in its past funding requests, including identifying specific amounts needed for equipment, and will require such data to develop and justify future requests. |
gao_GAO-07-534T | gao_GAO-07-534T_0 | States’ Annual Tobacco Settlement Payments Have Varied
The 46 states reported receiving a total of nearly $52.6 billion in payments in varying annual amounts from fiscal year 2000 through fiscal year 2005. Of the nearly $52.6 billion, about $36.5 billion were payments from the tobacco companies and about $16 billion were securitized proceeds that 15 states arranged to receive, as shown in table 1. In addition to the annual payments states receive, the Master Settlement Agreement requires that a Strategic Contribution Fund payment begin in 2008 and continue through 2017. States Are Exercising Their Flexibility to Use Tobacco Settlement Payments for a Wide Variety of Activities
The Master Settlement Agreement imposed no restrictions on how states could spend their settlement payments and, as such, the states have allocated their payments to a wide variety of activities, with health-related activities the largest among them. States allocated the largest portion of their payments—about $16.8 billion, or 30 percent of the total payments—to health-related activities. States allocated the second largest portion of their payments—about $12.8 billion or 22.9 percent—to cover budget shortfalls. Some states told us that they viewed the settlement payments as an opportunity to fund needs that they were not able to fund previously due to the high cost of health care. On the other hand, for health care, the states allocated from 20 to 38 percent of the total payments. From fiscal years 2000 through 2005, states allocated about $16.8 billion of their Master Settlement Agreement payments to a variety of health care programs, including Medicaid; health insurance; cancer prevention, screening, and treatment; heart and lung disease; and drug addiction. In fiscal year 2005, the most recent year for which we collected actual data, 36 of the 46 states allocated some of their Master Settlement Agreement payments to health care. Infrastructure. Education. Debt Service on Securitized Funds. Tobacco Control. Budget shortfalls: This category is comprised of amounts allocated to balance state budgets and close gaps or reduce deficits resulting from lower than anticipated revenues or increased mandatory or essential expenditures. This category includes retirement of debt owed on capital projects. | Why GAO Did This Study
In the 1990s, states sued major tobacco companies to obtain reimbursement for health impairments caused by the public's use of tobacco. In 1998, four of the nation's largest tobacco companies signed a Master Settlement Agreement, agreeing to make annual payments to 46 states in perpetuity as reimbursement for past tobacco-related health care costs. Some states have arranged to receive advance proceeds based on the amounts that tobacco companies owe by issuing bonds backed by future payments. This testimony discusses (1) the amounts of tobacco settlement payments that the states received from fiscal years 2000 through 2005, the most recent year for which GAO has actual data, and (2) the states' allocations of these payments. We also include states' projected fiscal year 2006 allocations. The Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 required GAO to report annually, through fiscal year 2006, on how states used the payments made by tobacco companies. GAO based this testimony on five annual surveys of these 46 states' Master Settlement Agreement payments and how they allocated these payments.
What GAO Found
From fiscal year 2000 through 2005, the 46 states party to the Master Settlement Agreement received $52.6 billion in tobacco settlement payments. Of the $52.6 billion total, about $36.5 billion were payments from the tobacco companies and about $16 billion were advance payments which several states had arranged to receive by issuing bonds backed by their future payments from the tobacco companies. The Master Settlement Agreement imposed no restrictions on how states could spend their payments, and as such, the states have chosen to allocate them to a wide variety of activities. Some states told us that they viewed the settlement payments as an opportunity to fund needs that they were not able to fund previously due to the high costs of health care. States allocated the largest portion of their payments to health care--$16.8 billion or 30 percent--which includes Medicaid, health insurance, hospitals, medical technology, and research. States allocated the second largest portion to cover budget shortfalls--about $12.8 billion or about 22.9 percent. This category includes allocations to balance state budgets or reduce deficits that resulted from lower than anticipated revenues, increased mandatory spending, or essential expenditures. Included among the next largest categories are allocations for infrastructure projects, education, debt service on securitized proceeds, and tobacco control. |
gao_GAO-07-583T | gao_GAO-07-583T_0 | DHS Has Taken Steps to Assess Risk to Passenger Rail Systems, but Has Not Issued a Strategy for Securing the Transportation Sector
DHS has made progress in assessing the risks facing the U.S. passenger rail system, but has not issued a plan based on those risk assessments for securing the entire transportation sector and supporting plans for each mode of transportation, including passenger rail. Further, we reported in September 2005 that TSA had not completed a comprehensive risk assessment of the entire passenger rail system. More recently, in January 2007, TSA reported taking additional actions to assess the risks facing the U.S. passenger rail system. We also reported in September 2005 that DHS was developing, but had not yet completed, a framework intended to help TSA, OGT, and other federal agencies work with their stakeholders to assess risk. Until TSA issues the TSSP and modal plans, the agency lacks a clearly communicated strategy with goals and objectives for securing the overall transportation sector, including passenger rail. Federal Agencies Have Taken Actions to Enhance Passenger Rail Security
In addition to ongoing initiatives to enhance passenger rail security conducted by FTA and FRA before and after September 11, 2001, TSA issued security directives to passenger rail operators after the March 2004 terrorist attacks on the rail system in Madrid. However, federal and rail industry stakeholders have questioned the extent to which these directives were based on industry best practices and expressed confusion about how TSA would monitor compliance with the directives. For example, TSA tested rail security technologies, developed training tools for rail workers, and issued a proposed rule in December 2006 regarding passenger and freight rail security, among other efforts. OGT has also acted to help improve passenger rail security by, for example, providing funding for security enhancements to rail transit agencies and Amtrak through various grant programs. DHS and DOT have taken steps to better coordinate their rail security roles and responsibilities. These annexes describe each agency’s roles and responsibilities for passenger rail security. Conclusions
In conclusion, the rail attacks in Europe and Asia highlight the inherent vulnerability of passenger rail and other surface transportation systems to terrorist attack. Moreover, securing rail and other surface transportation systems is a daunting task, requiring the federal government to develop clear strategies that are based on an assessment of the risks to the security of the systems, including goals and objectives, for strengthening the security of these systems. We will continue to assess DHS and DOT’s efforts to secure the U.S. passenger rail system during follow-on work to be initiated later this year. | Why GAO Did This Study
The four rail attacks in Europe and Asia since 2004, including the most recent in India, highlight the vulnerability of passenger rail and other surface transportation systems to terrorist attack and demonstrate the need for greater focus on securing these systems. This testimony is based primarily on GAO's September 2005 passenger rail security report and selected recent program updates. Specifically, it addressees (1) the extent to which the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has assessed the risks facing the U.S. passenger rail system and developed a strategy based on risk assessments for securing all modes of transportation, including passenger rail, and (2) the actions that federal agencies have taken to enhance the security of the U.S. passenger rail system.
What GAO Found
The DHS Office of Grants and Training (OGT) and TSA have begun to assess the risks facing the U.S. passenger rail system. However, GAO reported in September 2005 that TSA had not completed a comprehensive risk assessment of passenger rail. GAO found that, until TSA does so, it may be limited in its ability to prioritize passenger rail assets and help guide security investments. GAO also reported that DHS had begun, but not yet completed, a framework to help agencies and the private sector develop a consistent approach for analyzing and comparing risks among and across critical sectors. Since that time, TSA has reported taking additional steps to assess the risks to the passenger rail system. However, as of March 2, 2007, TSA has not issued the required Transportation Sector Specific Plan and supporting plans for passenger rail and other surface transportation modes, based on risk assessments. Until TSA does so, it lacks a clearly communicated strategy with goals and objectives for securing the transportation sector, including passenger rail. After September 11, DOT initiated efforts to strengthen passenger rail security. TSA has also taken actions to strengthen rail security, including issuing security directives, testing security technologies, and issuing a proposed rule for passenger and freight rail security, among other efforts. However, federal and rail industry stakeholders have questioned the extent to which TSA's directives were based on industry best practices. OGT has also acted to help improve passenger rail security by, for example, providing funding for security enhancements to rail transit agencies and Amtrak through various grant programs. DHS and DOT have taken steps to better coordinate their respective rail security roles and responsibilities. In particular, DHS and DOT updated their memorandum of understanding to clarify their respective security roles and responsibilities for passenger rail. |
gao_GAO-17-510 | gao_GAO-17-510_0 | NOAA also procures and oversees hydrographic surveying and related services from the private sector. Under this process, NOAA (1) identifies the areas in greatest need of surveying, (2) evaluates resources, including funding and vessel availability, and (3) develops an annual hydrographic surveying plan, which identifies the resulting hydrographic survey priorities. However, NOAA officials said they found this approach increasingly outdated because it did not reflect changing ocean and shipping conditions or take advantage of available technology. NOAA is Developing a Model to Better Assess Hydrographic Risks to Help Inform Prioritization Decisions
NOAA is developing a model intended to better assess hydrographic risks as part of its effort to identify areas most in need of hydrographic surveys—the first step in NOAA’s process for creating the hydrographic surveying plan. NOAA’s Annual Report Compares the Cost of Collecting Its Own Survey Data to the Cost of Procuring Data from the Private Sector but Does Not Include All Costs
NOAA prepares an annual report that compares the cost of collecting its own hydrographic survey data to the cost of procuring such data from the private sector. Based on our review of NOAA’s cost comparison reports for fiscal years 2006 through 2016, NOAA did not in all instances report complete or accurate cost data for its hydrographic survey program. NOAA did not include the cost of major maintenance performed in 2010 on the hydrographic survey vessel Rainier in its cost comparison reports from fiscal years 2010 through 2016. Contract administration for private sector hydrographers. In addition to incomplete costs for some activities, we also noted that NOAA did not accurately report certain costs of the hydrographic survey program in the year to which those costs should be assigned. In some instances, officials identified specific steps and associated time frames to carry out these actions. However, NOAA officials could not yet identify the steps or associated time frames for carrying out other actions to improve the completeness and accuracy of cost data. For example, to help improve NOAA’s process for tracking depreciation costs of capital assets—such as vessel acquisition or equipment, repair, and maintenance—NOAA officials said they planned to implement an improved process in fiscal year 2019 but did not identify the specific steps to implement this process. Without ensuring that its efforts to improve its cost comparison reports include actions to fully track capital asset depreciation costs and account for ships in port undergoing major maintenance, NOAA may be unable to prepare cost comparison reports that reflect the full cost of its hydrographic survey program, as called for in the agency’s standard operating procedure. NOAA Has Taken Steps to Increase Private Sector Involvement in Data Collection, but Has Not Developed a Strategy for Expanding Such Involvement as Required by Law
NOAA has taken steps aimed at increasing private sector involvement in its hydrographic data collection program, such as streamlining its contracting process and increasing communication with contractors. For example, NOAA developed a centralized process for competing and awarding contracts in 2003, which NOAA officials said reduced administrative costs and contract award time. As a result of implementing a centralized process for competing and awarding contracts, NOAA officials said they increased the number of private sector firms under contract, from five during the 2003-2008 contract period to eight during the current 2014-2019 contract period. NOAA officials said the agency intends to develop a strategy describing how it plans to expand private sector involvement in the hydrographic data collection program—which the Ocean and Coastal Mapping Integration Act required the agency to submit in a report to relevant congressional committees in 2009—and it will use the 2010 Ocean and Coastal Mapping and Contracting Policy to guide this effort. However, NOAA officials did not provide specific information about how they intend to develop the strategy, what elements it will contain, or when it will be completed. Without developing such a strategy, NOAA may have difficulty minimizing duplication and taking maximum advantage of private sector capabilities in fulfilling NOAA’s mapping and charting responsibilities. Without such a strategy, NOAA may have difficulty minimizing duplication and taking maximum advantage of private sector capabilities in fulfilling NOAA’s mapping and charting responsibilities. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of Commerce direct the NOAA Administrator to take the following two actions: ensure that NOAA’s efforts to improve its cost comparison reports include actions to fully track capital asset depreciation costs and account for ships in port undergoing major maintenance in accordance with its standard operating procedure, and develop a strategy for expanding NOAA’s use of the private sector in its hydrographic survey program, as required by law. Regarding our recommendation that NOAA develop a strategy for expanding its use of the private sector in hydrographic surveying, NOAA stated that the agency will develop such a strategy once it improves its approach for comparing its hydrographic survey costs to those of the private sector. | Why GAO Did This Study
NOAA is responsible for collecting hydrographic data—that is, data on the depth and bottom configuration of water bodies—to help create nautical charts. NOAA collects data using its fleet and also procures data from the private sector. The Hydrographic Services Improvement Act of 1998 requires NOAA to acquire such data from the private sector “to the greatest extent practicable and cost-effective.”
GAO was asked to review NOAA efforts to collect hydrographic data. This report examines (1) how NOAA determines its hydrographic survey priorities, (2) NOAA's efforts to compare the costs of collecting its own survey data to the costs of procuring such data from the private sector, and (3) the extent to which NOAA has developed a strategy for private sector involvement in hydrographic data collection.
GAO analyzed relevant laws and agency procedures, NOAA cost comparison reports from fiscal years 2006 through 2016, and other NOAA information, such as hydrographic survey program priorities. GAO also interviewed NOAA officials and the eight survey companies that currently have contracts with NOAA.
What GAO Found
The Department of Commerce's National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) uses a three-step process to determine its hydrographic survey priorities, according to agency documents and officials. NOAA first identifies areas in greatest need of surveying by analyzing data such as seafloor depth, shipping tonnage, and the time elapsed since the most recent survey. Second, the agency evaluates the availability of funding resources as well as the availability and capability of NOAA and private sector hydrographic survey vessels. Third, NOAA develops an annual hydrographic surveying plan that identifies survey priorities. To help inform the first step in this process, NOAA is developing a model to take advantage of new mapping technologies.
NOAA prepares an annual report comparing the cost of collecting its own hydrographic survey data to the cost of procuring data from the private sector but does not include all costs in its cost comparisons. Under its standard operating procedure, NOAA is to report the full cost of the hydrographic survey program, including equipment, maintenance, and administrative costs. GAO's review of NOAA's cost comparison reports from fiscal years 2006 through 2016, however, found that NOAA did not in all instances report complete or accurate cost data. For example, NOAA did not include the acquisition of a $24 million vessel in 2012, and in some cases it did not report certain costs in the year to which those costs should be assigned. NOAA officials said they recognized the need to improve the agency's tracking of costs, and they identified actions they intend to take but did not always provide information about specific steps to carry out these actions or associated time frames. For example, NOAA officials said they planned to implement an improved process in fiscal year 2019 for tracking the costs of capital assets such as vessels but did not identify specific steps to do so. They also said they plan to develop a system to better track maintenance costs but did not provide specific details or a time frame to do this. Without ensuring that its efforts to improve its cost comparison reports include actions to fully track asset and maintenance costs, NOAA may be unable to prepare cost comparison reports that reflect the full cost of its survey program, as specified in the agency's standard operating procedure.
NOAA has taken steps to increase private sector involvement in its hydrographic data collection program but has not developed a strategy for expanding such involvement as required by law. For example, NOAA moved to a centralized process for competing and awarding contracts, which NOAA officials said reduced administrative costs and contract award time and allowed NOAA to increase the number of private sector firms under contract from five to eight. However, NOAA did not develop a strategy for expanding its use of the private sector to minimize duplication and take maximum advantage of private sector capabilities, as required by law. NOAA officials said the agency intends to develop such a strategy but must first make improvements in its approach to comparing its own hydrographic survey costs to those of the private sector. However, NOAA officials did not provide specific information about how they intend to develop the strategy, what elements it will contain, or when it will be completed. Without developing such a strategy, NOAA may have difficulty minimizing duplication and taking advantage of private sector capabilities.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that NOAA (1) ensure that its efforts to improve its cost comparison reports include actions to fully track asset and maintenance costs and (2) develop a strategy for expanding private sector involvement in the hydrographic survey program. NOAA agreed with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-01-983 | gao_GAO-01-983_0 | For fiscal years 1977 through 2000, the total cost was about $370 million. Historical Space Data Provide Guidance for Amount of Office Space; Office Sizes Vary
Under the Former Presidents Act, GSA is authorized to furnish each former president suitable office space appropriately furnished and equipped, as determined by the GSA Administrator, at a location of the former presidents choosing in the U.S. As of June 1, 2001, the size of former presidents’ offices ranged from 3,306 to 5,912 square feet. GSA Generally Pays All Costs for Office Space
According to GSA officials, except for the office of former President Carter, all the space occupied by each of the offices of former presidents is paid for by GSA. As shown in Table 8, for fiscal year 2000, GSA’s rental charge to former President Bush was $144,000, former President Carter $89,283, former President Ford $105,099, and former President Reagan $256,671. As of August 7, 2001, former President Clinton’s office was not finished. His estimated annual rent payment to GSA for fiscal year 2002, is expected to be about $354,000. Former President Carter, who maintains his office at the Carter Presidential Center, utilizes some additional office space that is provided by the center at no cost to the government. The Secret Service pays rental costs for its space to GSA. Former presidents’ office staff ranged from 6 to 19 persons, including full- and part-time paid members and volunteers and interns. Staffs Receive Compensation From Nonfederal Sources
In addition to receiving federal compensation, most of the former presidents’ staffs reportedly receive compensation from nonfederal sources according to representatives of the former presidents. GSA has not issued any overall instructions about the propriety of political fund-raising by the staff of former presidents. Presidential Foundations Involved With the Offices of Former Presidents
To varying degrees, foundations associated with the former presidents or their spouses are involved with the use of former president’s office space and staff. The foundation provided some furniture. | What GAO Found
For fiscal years 1977 through 2000, the federal government paid about $370 million to support former presidents and their families. As of June 2001, the offices of the five living former presidents ranged in size from 3,300 to 5,900 square feet. The General Services Administration (GSA) is authorized to provide each former president with suitable office space appropriately furnished and equipped at a location specified by the former president. The law does not, however, provide any guidance on the appropriate amount of space that is to be provided. For fiscal year 2000, GSA's rent charged to former President Bush was $144,000, former President Carter $89,283, former President Ford $105,099, and former President Reagan $256,671. Former President Clinton's office was not finished until late August 2001. His annual rent payment to GSA for fiscal year 2002 is estimated to be about $354,000. The federal government is paying the entire lease cost for all of the former presidents' offices, according to GSA officials. The rental rates GSA has paid for former presidents' offices are generally comparable to rents paid for similar properties in the same areas. The Carter Presidential Center has provided additional space for President Carter's use at no cost to the government. The Secret Service maintains space close to each of the former presidents' offices and pays rent to GSA for that space. The office staffs of former presidents ranged from six to 19 persons, including paid staff, volunteers, and interns. In addition to receiving federal compensation, most paid staff members also receive compensation from other sources. According to representatives of each former president, the staff is not involved with political fund-raising activities. To varying degrees, foundations associated with each former president are involved with the office operations. Although the foundations themselves do not pay any portion of the office rent, they do supply some furniture and equipment. |
gao_GAO-06-419T | gao_GAO-06-419T_0 | Background
Under the U. S. Housing Act of 1937, as amended, Congress created the federal public housing program to provide decent and safe rental housing for eligible low-income families, the elderly, and persons with disabilities. HUD administers the program with PHAs, typically local agencies created under state law that manage housing for low-income residents at rents they can afford. HUD Provides Funding, Guidance, and Oversight for Local PHAs
Traditionally, HUD has provided funding to local PHAs to manage the public housing system, as well as for the revitalization of severely distressed public housing. In addition, HUD has provided selected agencies with grants under the HOPE VI program to help housing agencies replace and revitalize severely distressed public housing with physical and community and supportive service improvements. HUD provides guidance to PHAs to supplement its regulations, and explicitly convey required program policies and procedures. Some of our past work has shown a need for HUD to improve the clarity and/or timeliness of its guidance to housing authorities. 1). Our past work has identified opportunities for HUD to improve its oversight of housing agencies and it provision of technical assistance. PHAs Are Responsible for Managing Public Housing in Accordance with HUD Regulations and Requirements
Generally, PHAs are responsible for administering the public housing program in accordance with HUD regulations and requirements. QHWRA also established new requirements for housing agencies, including, for example, mandatory reporting requirements in the form of a 5-year plan and annual reporting plans. Five-year plans include long-range goals, while annual plans detail the agency’s objectives and strategies for achieving these goals, as well as the agency’s policies and procedures. Private Capital Has Been Involved in Some HOPE VI Projects
While we have not reviewed the extent to which capital markets can be used with the public housing system, our reviews of the HOPE VI program have shown that some PHAs use HOPE VI revitalization grants to leverage additional funds from a variety of other public and private sources. HUD encourages PHAs to use their HOPE VI grants to leverage funding from other sources to increase the number of affordable housing units developed at HOPE VI sites. Community Services Organizations May Provide Supportive Services to Public Housing Residents
PHAs may utilize community service organizations to provide supportive services to public housing residents. Also, HUD’s Service Coordinator Program provides funding for PHA managers of public housing designated for the elderly or persons with disabilities to hire coordinators to assist residents in obtaining supportive services from community agencies; and its Congregate Housing Services Program provides grants for the delivery of meals and nonmedical supportive services to residents of public and multifamily housing who are elderly or have disabilities. This work identified examples of partnerships between PHAs and local organizations such as community-based nonprofits and churches to provide supportive services for the elderly and non-elderly persons with disabilities. Public Housing: Information on Receiverships at Public Housing Authorities. Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Housing and Urban Development. | Why GAO Did This Study
Under the Public Housing Program, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and local public housing agencies (PHA) provide housing for low-income residents at rents they can afford. Today, over 3,000 PHAs administer approximately 1.2 million public housing units throughout the nation. First authorized in 1937, the program has undergone changes over the decades. The Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998 increased managerial flexibility but also established new requirements for housing agencies. Some observers have questioned the program's ability to provide quality, affordable housing to the nation's neediest families. This testimony, which is based upon a number of reports that GAO has issued related to public housing since 2002, discusses the roles of (1) HUD (2) public housing agencies, (3) capital markets, and (4) community services organizations in the public housing system.
What GAO Found
Traditionally, HUD's role has been to provide PHAs with funding, guidance, and oversight. HUD provides both capital and operating funding. In addition, HUD has provided selected agencies with grants under the HOPE VI program to demolish and revitalize severely distressed public housing and provide community and supportive services. HUD provides guidance to PHAs to supplement its regulations and explicitly convey required program policies and procedures. Based on past work, GAO has made recommendations to HUD to improve the clarity and timeliness of its guidance to PHAs and to improve its oversight of the program. PHAs are responsible for managing public housing in accordance with HUD regulations and requirements. They are also required to develop and submit plans detailing the agency's goals and strategies for reaching these goals. Further, PHAs that receive HOPE VI grants are required to provide residents with supportive services. GAO's work has identified challenges that the agencies face in carrying out their responsibilities, including difficulty with HUD's data systems and lack of resources for hiring and training staff. GAO has not reviewed the extent to which capital markets can play a role in the public housing system, but its examination of the HOPE VI program and other work has identified examples of leveraging federal funds with funds from a variety of other public and private sources. HUD encourages public housing agencies to use their HOPE VI grants to leverage funding from other sources to increase the number of affordable housing units developed at project sites. The examples GAO has found include private funding for both capital projects and the provision of supportive services. PHAs may utilize community service organizations to assist public housing residents. Work GAO has done on federal housing programs that benefit the elderly, as well as recent work focused on public housing for the elderly and residents with disabilities, identified examples of supportive services being offered or provided to public housing residents. Such services may be provided through HUD grants as well as through partnerships between public housing agencies and community-based nonprofit organizations. |
gao_GAO-12-32 | gao_GAO-12-32_0 | Sources of Information on Jobs and Other Impacts of Recovery Act Grants
NIH and NIH Recovery Act grantees collect information about the FTEs supported by NIH Recovery Act funding as well as information on the other impacts of this funding from a variety of sources. NIH is also participating in the development of a multiagency collaboration (called Star Metrics) to track the employment, scientific, and economic impacts of its funded research projects—including Recovery Act grants. NIH and Its Grantees Reported That Recovery Act Funding Generally Increased FTEs at Grantee Institutions and Primarily Supported Scientists and Other Faculty
Data reported by all NIH Recovery Act grantee institutions to the nationwide data collection system and available to NIH indicate that the number of FTEs supported by NIH Recovery Act funds generally increased from December 2009 through September 2010, then generally remained steady from December 2010 through June 2011—the most recent quarters for which data are available. As shown in figure 1, the number of FTEs supported by NIH Recovery Act funding ranged from about 12,000 in the reporting quarter ending December 2009 to about 21,000 in the quarter ending in June 2011. 2). Nearly 30 percent of the 50 selected principal investigators reported that the NIH funding they received supported new positions, and about half of the principal investigators reported that the funding they received allowed them to avoid reductions in the number of employees at their institution or avoid a reduction in the number of hours worked by current employees. In response to our data collection instrument, two-thirds of our 50 selected principal investigators—who direct research at the grantee institutions—reported that the Recovery Act funding received in fiscal years 2009 and 2010 was used to purchase research supplies and equipment and lab testing services. NIH Is Participating in a Program to Track Other Impacts, and Selected NIH Grantees Reported Other Impacts such as Purchases of Supplies and Equipment
NIH officials we interviewed said that principal investigators—who direct research at the grantee institutions—including those which received Recovery Act funding—currently report some information to NIH about the other impacts of NIH-funded research. NIH officials expect that the Star Metrics program could provide more information about these other impacts. However, at this time there is no expected completion date for reporting this information. Some of the principal investigators also reported that in the course of conducting some of their Recovery Act-funded research, they were able to provide scientific training to health care professionals. The selected principal investigators provided anecdotal information about the other impacts of the selected grants. According to the majority of our selected principal investigators these preliminary results could contribute to future scientific developments in preventive medicine, the early detection of diseases, and medical therapies. Grantee institutions and principal investigators in our review and NIH officials we interviewed reported that they track the scientific impact of NIH research—including preliminary results from research funded through the Recovery Act—primarily through peer-reviewed publications. According to NIH, when a sufficiently large body of research results have accumulated the agency plans to prepare reports (similar to its Investment Reports) that highlight the impact of its Recovery Act- funded research. Improvements in Medical Therapies. Improved Research Capabilities. HHS provided technical comments that were incorporated as appropriate. At that time, we will send copies of this report to other interested congressional committees, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, and the Director of the National Institutes of Health. Appendix I: Scope and Methods
To obtain the information National Institutes of Health (NIH) and selected NIH Recovery Act grantees have on the jobs supported with NIH Recovery Act funding, we interviewed NIH officials about the information they have on the full-time-equivalents (FTE) supported by the Recovery Act, and reviewed (1) NIH data containing information reported by grantee institutions to a nationwide data collection system at www.federalreporting.gov on the FTEs supported by NIH Recovery Act funding, (2) annual progress reports for fiscal year 2010 that NIH Recovery Act grantees are required to submit to NIH, and (3) other jobs information that NIH gathers from other sources. Appendix III: Analysis of Information Reported by Selected Principal Investigators on Other Impacts of Recovery Act Funding
We disseminated a Web-based data collection instrument to a total of 50 selected principal investigators (10 principal investigators at each of five selected grantee institutions). | Why GAO Did This Study
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act) included $8.2 billion in funding for the National Institutes of Health (NIH) to be used to support additional scientific research-including extramural grants at universities and other research institutions. In 2009, the Acting Director of NIH testified that each extramural grant awarded with Recovery Act funding had the potential of supporting employment--full- or part-time scientific jobs--in addition to other impacts, such as contributing to advances in improving public health. GAO was asked to examine the use of Recovery Act funds by NIH grantees. Specifically, GAO addresses the information available from NIH and its grantees about the extent to which NIH Recovery Act funding (1) supported jobs, and (2) had other impacts. To obtain information on job impacts, GAO reviewed a database containing information NIH Recovery Act grantees reported to the national data collection system and interviewed NIH officials. To obtain more specific jobs information about individual grants, GAO administered a Web-based data collection instrument to 50 selected principal investigators who direct research at grantee institutions--10 principal investigators at each of five selected grantee institutions. The selected principal investigators had generally received awards of $500,000 or more. To obtain information on other Recovery Act impacts, GAO used information from the data collection instrument and interviewed NIH officials.
What GAO Found
Data reported by all of NIH's Recovery Act grantee institutions to the national data collection system at www.federalreporting.gov and available to NIH indicate that the number of full-time equivalent (FTEs) jobs supported by NIH Recovery Act funds increased from December 2009 through September 2010, and then remained steady from December 2010 through June 2011--the most recent quarter for which data are available. The number of FTEs supported by NIH Recovery Act funds increased from about 12,000 in the reporting quarter ending December 2009 to about 21,000 in the quarter ending in June 2011. The 50 selected principal investigators who direct research at the grantee institutions in GAO's review provided additional information explaining how the Recovery Act funding supported FTEs. Nearly one-third of the selected principal investigators reported that the NIH Recovery Act funding they received supported new positions, and about half of the principal investigators reported that the funding they received allowed them to avoid reductions in jobs or avoid a reduction in the number of hours worked by current employees. The selected principal investigators also reported that the Recovery Act funding they received primarily supported scientists and other faculty. NIH officials we interviewed reported that they receive some information from principal investigators about the other impacts of NIH-funded research, such as preliminary research results included in annual progress reports. NIH is also participating in the Star Metrics program--a multiagency venture to monitor the scientific, social, and economic impacts of federally funded science--which NIH officials expect could provide more information about these impacts. While Star Metrics is currently developing an approach to capture information about the other impacts of NIH grant funding, there is no expected completion date for reporting this information. In response to GAO's data collection instrument, selected principal investigators who direct research at the grantee institutions in GAO's review reported that the use of Recovery Act funds resulted in purchases of research supplies, equipment, laboratory testing services, and scientific training of health care professionals. The majority of the 50 selected principal investigators in GAO's review also reported preliminary results from their Recovery Act-funded research that could contribute to future scientific developments in prevention and early detection of disease, improvements in medical therapies, and improved research capabilities. The principal investigators in GAO's review and NIH officials GAO interviewed reported that they track the scientific impact of NIH research--including the impact of research funded through the Recovery Act--primarily through peer-reviewed publications, but also through other metrics such as the filing and approval of patent applications. According to NIH officials, when a sufficiently large body of research results has accumulated, NIH plans to prepare reports--similar to its existing publicly available Investment Reports--that will highlight the impact of its Recovery Act-funded research. The Department of Health and Human Services provided technical comments on a draft of this report, which GAO incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-06-163 | gao_GAO-06-163_0 | Based on survey responses from public housing directors— covering 66 housing developments with indications of potential distress and occupied primarily by the elderly or persons with disabilities—we found that 11 developments exhibited signs of severe physical distress; 12 had signs of severe social distress; and an additional 5 developments had signs of both severe physical and social distress. The factors they most frequently cited were (1) aging buildings and systems, including inadequate air-conditioning; (2) lack of accessibility for residents with disabilities; (3) small studio apartments; (4) tension between elderly residents and non-elderly residents with disabilities; (5) lack of supportive services; and (6) security and crime issues. Even If Not Severely Distressed, Public Housing Developments May Pose Problematic Living Conditions for the Elderly and Non-Elderly Persons with Disabilities
Responses to our survey of public housing directors indicated that some of the 76 public housing developments occupied primarily by elderly persons and non-elderly persons with disabilities were severely distressed and that, among those that were not, certain characteristics nevertheless adversely affected the quality of life for their residents. 2). Indicators of severe social distress that the directors reported include inadequate supportive services, such as transportation, assistance with meals, and problems with crime. 3). Various Strategies Could Improve Physical and Social Conditions at Public Housing for the Elderly and Non-Elderly Persons with Disabilities
According to officials whom we surveyed and interviewed, various strategies have been used to improve both physical and social conditions to better address the special needs of the elderly and non-elderly persons with disabilities. Methods to deal with physical distress included capital improvements such as renovating or modernizing buildings, systems, and units or, in extreme cases, demolishing or selling a development. Methods to reduce the level of social distress include a range of actions to address the needs of the elderly and non-elderly persons with disabilities, such as designating developments as “elderly only” for reasons of safety, converting developments into assisted living facilities, and working with other agencies, such as nonprofit and religious organizations, to provide in-home supportive services to residents. We received oral comments from officials in HUD’s Office of Public and Indian Housing indicating general agreement with the report. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to examine (1) the extent to which public housing developments occupied primarily by the elderly and non-elderly persons with disabilities were severely distressed and (2) the ways in which the stock of severely distressed public housing for the elderly and non-elderly persons with disabilities could be improved. We determined that 3,537 of these developments met our criteria as “primarily occupied by elderly persons or non-elderly persons with disabilities.” Of these 3,537 developments, we identified 76 developments (administered by 46 public housing agencies) that were potentially severely distressed. We had 43 housing agencies return the survey, providing a response rate of 93 percent, and representing 66 of the 76 developments. For example, one of the survey questions asked about the extent to which the physical structures at the development were deteriorated. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2003, Congress reauthorized HOPE VI, a program administered by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and designed to improve the nation's worst public housing. In doing so, Congress required GAO to report on the extent of severely distressed public housing for the elderly and non-elderly persons with disabilities. "Severely distressed" is described in the statute as developments that, among other things, are a significant contributing factor to the physical decline of, and disinvestment in, the surrounding neighborhood; occupied predominantly by very low-income families, the unemployed, and those dependent on public assistance; have high rates of vandalism and criminal activity; and/or lack critical services, resulting in severe social distress. In response to this mandate, GAO examined (1) the extent to which public housing developments occupied primarily by elderly persons and non-elderly persons with disabilities are severely distressed and (2) the ways in which such housing can be improved. HUD officials provided oral comments indicating general agreement with the report.
What GAO Found
Available data on the physical and social conditions of public housing are insufficient to determine the extent to which developments occupied primarily by elderly persons and non-elderly persons with disabilities are severely distressed. Using HUD's data on public housing developments--buildings or groups of buildings--and their tenants, GAO identified 3,537 developments primarily occupied by elderly residents and persons with disabilities. Data from HUD and other sources indicated that 76 (2 percent) of these 3,537 developments were potentially severely distressed. To gather more information on the 76 developments that were potentially distressed, GAO surveyed public housing agency directors responsible for these developments. GAO received responses covering 66 of the 76 developments (the survey and aggregated results are available in GAO-06-205SP). These responses indicated the following: (1) eleven developments had signs of severe physical distress, such as deterioration of aging buildings and a lack of accessible features for persons with disabilities; (2) another twelve developments had signs of severe social distress, which included a lack of appropriate supportive services such as transportation or assistance with meals; and (3) an additional five developments had characteristics of both severe physical and social distress. Nevertheless, many of the directors GAO surveyed reported that numerous factors adversely affected the quality of life of elderly persons and non-elderly persons with disabilities residing in their developments. The factors cited most frequently were (1) aging buildings and systems, including inadequate air conditioning; (2) lack of accessibility for persons with disabilities; (3) small size of apartments; (4) the mixing of elderly and non-elderly residents; (5) inadequate supportive services; and (6) crime. To better address the special needs of the elderly and non-elderly persons with disabilities, public housing agency officials GAO surveyed or contacted have used various strategies to improve both physical and social conditions at their developments. Strategies to reduce physical distress include capital improvements such as renovating buildings, systems, and units or, in extreme cases, relocating residents and demolishing or selling a development. Methods to reduce the level of social distress include a range of actions, such as designating developments as "elderly only," converting developments into assisted living facilities, and working with other governmental agencies and nonprofit organizations to provide supportive services to residents. |
gao_GAO-13-386 | gao_GAO-13-386_0 | 1.) Examples of Improper Payments, Overlapping Benefits, and Potential Fraud Highlight the Importance of Data Sharing to Verify Benefit Eligibility
We found examples of improper payments, overlapping benefits, and potential fraud in the FECA program, which could be attributed, in part, to factors such as oversight and data-access issues. OWCP has taken some steps to enhance oversight of the FECA program; however, Labor lacks authority to directly access wage data, which limits its ability to verify self-reported wage information. These individuals continued to receive FECA compensation benefits without evidence that their medical condition has not improved, which potentially could result in an improper payment. Our review identified 2 out of our sample of 32 FECA claimants who did not have evidence in their FECA file that OWCP reviewed their employment activity annually, as required. In 2012, we reported that periodic reviews of FECA case files are a promising practice and can be used to help increase program officials’ awareness of potential fraudulent activities. Our review of a nongeneralizable sample of 32 individual cases identified eight FECA claimants who had significantly underreported employment wages in comparison to the wages reported in the state’s QW reports for the same period. As part of this reform, OWCP sought authority to match SSA wage data directly with FECA files. However, at this time, Labor does not have direct access to the NDNH or SSA wage data. Some FECA Program Regulations and Policies Introduce Challenges to Identifying and Mitigating Potential Fraud and Waste
FECA Program Requirements Allow Claimants to Receive Earnings and Earnings Increases without Necessarily Resulting in Adjustment of FECA Compensation
Because of case law and regulatory requirements, once OWCP calculates an individual’s WEC, it remains in place unless the evidence establishes that there is a material change in the nature and extent of the injury-related condition; the claimant has been retrained, or otherwise vocationally rehabilitated; or it is established that OWCP’s original determination was erroneous. As a result, claimants could be earning more money than they were originally determined capable of earning but never have the WEC adjusted to account for the increase in wage earning capacity. Of the 32 cases we reviewed, we found five instances where an individual’s WEC was not adjusted even though the individual earned substantially more (at least 25 percent) than what was originally calculated as their WEC. In addition, two FECA total-disability claimants continued to receive private-employment salaries that were not subject to the WEC. Labor Lacks a Process to Identify Overlapping FECA and UI Benefits and Does Not Report FECA Claimant Information to States
Overlapping Benefits
While FECA claimants can be eligible to receive state UI benefits in addition to FECA benefits, Labor lacks a process to share the necessary data with states to determine whether FECA claimants may be improperly receiving overlapping benefits. In addition, certain states, for example four of the five selected states in our review, require the offset of UI benefits against certain workers’ compensation payments, including FECA. Our review of a nongeneralizable sample of 19 individual cases identified claimants who received overlapping UI and FECA benefits totaling over $1.3 million from January 2008 to June 2012. Four claimants who resided in states that require UI payments to be offset received more income from the combined UI and FECA benefits than they would have received from their federal salary alone. While in certain circumstances receiving concurrent UI and FECA benefits may be allowable, the cases we identified where claimants received concurrent UI and FECA benefits without Labor’s knowledge could be an indicator of improper payments. Matter for Congressional Consideration
Congress should consider granting Labor the additional authority it is seeking to access wage data to help verify claimants’ reported income and help ensure the proper payment of benefits. Recommendation for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of Labor assess the feasibility of developing a cost-effective mechanism to share FECA compensation information with states, such as reporting information to NDNH, to help identify whether claimants are inappropriately receiving overlapping UI and FECA payments. Labor agreed with the recommendation to assess the feasibility of developing a cost-effective mechanism to share FECA compensation information with the states, such as reporting information to NDNH, to help identify whether claimants are inappropriately receiving overlapping UI and FECA payments. In addition, Labor stated that one of our examples cited in our report—example 5—should not be classified as an improper payment because FECA program procedures allow a claimant to receive wages from two different employers and not have those wages affect the claimant’s WEC or ability to receive FECA benefits. Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Labor | Why GAO Did This Study
In fiscal year 2012, the FECA program made more than $2.1 billion in wageloss compensation payments to claimants. FECA provides benefits to federal employees who sustained injuries or illnesses at work.
GAO was asked to examine whether examples of improper payments, potential fraud, or overlapping benefits could be found in the FECA program. This report identifies examples of these issues, what factors may contribute to these issues, and how, if at all, Labor could address them. GAO matched QW and unemployment files from five selected states with FECA payment files for the period of July 2009 to June 2010. GAO identified 530 individuals who received concurrent FECA compensation payments and wages of at least $5,000 between July 2009 and June 2010. GAO also identified 50 individuals who received concurrent FECA compensation and UI benefits of at least $5,000 each during the same period. GAO randomly selected up to seven recipients from each state for an in-depth review, for a total of 32 QW and 19 UI cases, respectively. These examples cannot be generalized beyond those presented. GAO also reviewed Labor's policies, guidelines, and procedures for managing claims.
What GAO Found
GAO found examples of improper payments and indicators of potential fraud in the Federal Employees' Compensation Act (FECA) program, which could be attributed, in part, to oversight and data-access issues. GAO found examples of claimants' receiving overlapping FECA and unemployment insurance (UI) benefits, which may be allowable under certain circumstances, but could also be erroneous. GAO also found that FECA program requirements allow claimants to receive earnings, and earnings increases, without necessarily resulting in adjustment of FECA compensation. For example, of the 32 FECA case files reviewed, GAO found five instances where an individual's wage-earning capacity (WEC), which is used to determine FECA benefits, was not adjusted even though the individual earned substantially more than the wage that was originally used to calculate the WEC. In addition, two FECA claimants continued to receive privateemployment salaries that were not subject to their WEC calculation. This is because, as currently written, program procedures allow claimants to receive increases in earnings, in certain circumstances, without adjustments to FECA compensation, and current law allows for claimants' earnings from dissimilar concurrent private employment at the time of injury to be exempt when determining FECA compensation. As discussed below, GAO identified challenges related to oversight and data access, which could result in improper payments or overlapping benefits.
GAO found that the Department of Labor (Labor) did not conduct a timely review of the medical activity reports of 4 of the 32 FECA claimants and did not complete a timely review of the employment activity reports of 2 claimants, which could potentially result in an improper payment or be an indicator of potential fraud in one case where a claimant did not respond to repeated Labor requests for the employment activity reports. Labor has taken some steps to enhance oversight of the program, such as developing measures to improve the periodic review of claimants' documentation.
GAO found that 8 out of 32 claimants underreported employment wages in comparison to the state's quarterly wage (QW) reports. Labor does not have authority to directly access Social Security Administration (SSA) wage data to verify claimants' reported income; consequently, it relies on periodic selfreporting of income. GAO has previously identified this as a potential vulnerability that could increase the risk of claimants receiving benefits they are not entitled to. To address this, Labor proposed legislation allowing the agency to match SSA wage data with FECA files, but the proposal is still pending.
GAO identified 19 cases where claimants were receiving overlapping UI and FECA benefits totaling over $1.3 million. Four of these 19 claimants received more income from combined UI and FECA benefits than they would have received from their federal salary alone. Four of the five selected states in our review require the offset of UI benefits against FECA compensation payments. Because Labor does not have a process to share necessary data with states to identify overlapping FECA and UI payments, a mechanism to share FECA information with the states would help provide reasonable assurance that payments are being made properly.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Secretary of Labor develop an effective mechanism to share FECA compensation information with states to help identify whether claimants are inappropriately receiving overlapping UI and FECA payments. In addition, Congress should consider granting Labor the additional authority it is seeking to access wage data to help verify claimants reported income and help ensure the proper payment of benefits. Labor agreed to study the feasibility of sharing compensation information with the states. |
gao_GAO-16-250 | gao_GAO-16-250_0 | SSA may also conduct CDRs that are not required by law as it deems appropriate. CDR Process
SSA contracts with state Disability Determination Services (DDS) agencies to initially determine whether applicants are disabled and to conduct periodic CDRs to determine whether beneficiaries continue to be disabled. SSA Prioritizes CDRs Using Several Inputs but Does Not Fully Incorporate Potential Cost-Savings
SSA Uses a Variety of Inputs, Including Legal Requirements and Statistical Models, to Prioritize CDRs
Because SSA does not complete all CDRs as scheduled due to competing priorities and existing resources, the agency must decide which cases will receive a full medical review. The extent to which the statistical models have been used to select cases for full medical reviews has varied by year, but the models have been consistently used for determining who receives mailers. SSA Considers Cost Savings Information to a Limited Extent When Prioritizing CDRs
Although SSA considers cost savings when prioritizing CDR cases, it does not do so in a manner that will maximize potential savings. According to federal internal control standards, federal agencies should ensure effective stewardship of public resources. As a program integrity effort, CDRs are intended to assess the continued eligibility of beneficiaries to ensure that payments are made only to those individuals who should be receiving them, and SSA’s statistical models use an appropriate proxy of eligibility—potential for medical improvement—to prioritize cases for review. Although SSA has reported high nationwide CDR accuracy rates in recent years, we identified shortcomings in how SSA prevents errors, defines and reports accuracy, and samples CDRs for quality review:
Preventing errors: Although SSA tracks the number and types of CDR decision errors and disseminates this information to state DDSs, it does not analyze the characteristics of CDR errors to help identify error trends associated with particular types of cases and address root causes. As a result, decision makers do not have a complete picture of the CDR errors that affect disability payments. In conducting and reporting on these reviews, however, SSA does not specifically focus on CDRs. To calculate the federal program savings generated by CDRs in a particular year, SSA estimates the present value of expected future benefits over 40 years that are saved as a result of the reviews. Conclusions
In light of SSA’s current backlog of CDRs and the long-term financial challenges of the Disability Insurance Trust Fund, conducting timely, high- quality, and cost-effective CDRs is particularly important. Direct the Deputy Commissioner of Budget, Finance, Quality, and Management to adjust its approach to sampling CDRs to efficiently produce reliable accuracy rate estimates for continuances and cessations separately in each state. However, in fiscal year 2014 as an example, SSA identified over 600 CDRs with errors. Regarding our recommendation to track the number and rate of date errors and consider including them in its reported CDR accuracy rates, SSA disagreed and stated that, per SSA regulation, the agency does not consider date errors when calculating accuracy rates because date errors do not affect the decision to cease or continue benefits. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to examine (1) how the Social Security Administration (SSA) selects which Continuing Disability Reviews (CDR) to conduct, (2) the extent to which SSA reviews the quality of CDR decisions, and (3) how SSA calculates cost savings from CDRs. CDR Prioritization
To evaluate how SSA selects which CDRs to conduct, we reviewed relevant federal laws and interviewed SSA officials from the agency’s offices of Public Service and Operations Support, Budget, and Quality Improvement. From the total number of full medical reviews completed during a fiscal year, we subtracted completed full medical reviews that were prioritized because they were statutorily required (e.g., reviews of SSI children at age 18 and reviews of children under 1 year old who are receiving SSI benefits due in part to low birth weight) and because of SSA policy (e.g., mailers with certain responses and first-time reviews for beneficiaries in the “medical improvement expected” diary category). We also interviewed state Disability Determination Services officials about factors that challenge CDR quality. | Why GAO Did This Study
To help ensure that only eligible individuals receive disability benefits, SSA conducts periodic CDRs to assess beneficiaries' medical condition. CDRs have historically saved the government money. However, in recent years, SSA has had difficulty conducting timely CDRs resulting in a backlog of over 900,000 CDRs in fiscal year 2014. With this backdrop, GAO was asked to study SSA's ability to conduct and manage timely, high-quality CDRs.
This report evaluates, among other things, how SSA selects which CDRs to conduct and the extent to which SSA reviews the quality of CDR decisions.
GAO analyzed CDR data for fiscal years 2003 through 2013 (the most recent year for which complete data were available); assessed SSA's models used to prioritize CDRs; reviewed relevant federal laws, regulations, and SSA documentation about CDR prioritization and accuracy review procedures; and interviewed SSA and state Disability Determination Services officials.
What GAO Found
The Social Security Administration (SSA) selects cases for continuing disability reviews (CDR) using several inputs, but it does not do so in a manner that maximizes potential savings. SSA first prioritizes CDRs required by law or agency policy such as those for children under 1 year old who are receiving benefits due in part to low birth weight. Then SSA uses statistical models to identify the remaining CDRs to be conducted each year. The models also determine which cases will receive an in-depth review of medical records by the Disability Determination Services—the state agencies that conduct CDRs—versus a lower-cost questionnaire sent directly to the beneficiary. As shown in the figure below, a growing number of cases have been set aside for future review (backlogged) over the last 10 years. Although SSA somewhat considers potential cost savings when selecting cases for in-depth reviews, its approach does not maximize potential savings for the government. For example, estimated average savings from conducting CDRs are higher for some groups of Disability Insurance (DI) beneficiaries than others, but SSA's selection process does not differentiate among these groups. As a result, it may be missing opportunities to efficiently and effectively use federal resources.
SSA reviews a sample of CDRs for quality, but its analysis and reporting of errors is not comprehensive. Specifically, SSA randomly selects CDR decisions to check for a variety of potential errors. For example, SSA regularly monitors and reports on the frequency of errors that affect whether benefits are continued or ceased. However, contrary to federal internal control standards, SSA does not systematically analyze errors to detect and address root causes. Consequently, SSA lacks information that could help improve the quality of the reviews conducted by the Disability Determination Services. Further, in determining CDR accuracy rates, SSA does not count date errors, including incorrect cessation dates, which can affect disability benefit payments. As a result, decision makers do not have a complete picture of the CDR errors that affect disability payments.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends SSA, among other things, further consider cost savings as part of its prioritization of CDRs, analyze the root causes of CDRs with errors, and track date errors. SSA agreed with most of GAO's recommendations, but disagreed that there is a need to track date errors and to adjust its approach to sampling CDRs for quality review. GAO maintains actions are warranted and feasible as discussed in the report. |
gao_GGD-00-17 | gao_GGD-00-17_0 | To determine whether the project had met the state of Maryland requirements for building the facility on a floodplain, we reviewed actions taken by GSA and the project’s design consultants to obtain the needed construction authorizations from MDE. To determine whether steps have been taken to mitigate the risks involved in placing computers in the basement and who was involved in making the decision to place the computers in the basement of the building, we reviewed project documents and interviewed GSA and FDA project management officials, FDA managers responsible for information management resources, and representatives of the firms responsible for designing the new facility. The FDA Revitalization Act and subsequent appropriations acts, particularly the act containing GSA’s appropriations for fiscal year 1992, authorized GSA to construct the FDA facility in College Park, MD. FEMA has not designated a floodplain on this site. If a variance is granted and a basement is authorized, it must be waterproofed. FDA officials informed us that after an exhaustive review of the related constraints, alternatives, and opportunities, the decision to locate the main computer room in the basement of the new facility was reached by consensus of the project team. The FDA representatives were selected from FDA’s Division of Facilities Planning, Engineering and Safety and from CFSAN, which is to occupy the new facility. CFSAN officials told us that backup and off-site storage for the new facility will be developed that are appropriate for the nature of the systems installed, the data stored, and the risk factors at the time the new facility is occupied. They believe that with the steps that have been taken by the design team to protect the building from an external flood, the likelihood of internal water damage (e.g., broken pipe, leak in the roof, or accidental fire sprinkler activation) will be greater than the likelihood of damage from a flood condition. Steps Have Been Taken to Protect the Building From an External Flood
The new facility will have several different, but complementary, systems to mitigate damage from water entering the building. Initially, the design team intended to construct a building of five stories above grade with no basement. However, as the design process evolved with involvement from the local communities, a height restriction of 84 feet was placed upon the site by the College Park-Riverdale Transit District Development Plan for the area surrounding the College Park Airport. We also reviewed the final construction drawings and the specifications for the construction of the superstructure of the building to confirm that the plans included the systems and equipment we were told had been designed into the facility to mitigate the risk of water entering the building. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the construction of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) facility for its Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition (CFSAN) in College Park, Maryland, focusing on: (1) the General Services Administration's (GSA) authority to construct a new facility for FDA in College Park; (2) whether the requirements for building on a floodplain had been met; and (3) the planned placement of computers in the basement of the new building, specifically whether; (a) steps had been taken or will be taken to mitigate the risk of damage from water entering the basement of the building, and (b) CFSAN staff were involved in the decision to place the computer operations in the basement.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) GSA's authority to construct the FDA facility in College Park, MD, is derived from the FDA Revitalization Act and subsequent appropriations acts; (2) the design team for the project has satisfactorily met the minimum requirements, set by the state of Maryland, to construct a building with a basement on a floodplain; (3) the basement was necessary because of a local building height restriction due to the proximity of the site to the College Park Airport; (4) although basements are not normally allowed in buildings on a floodplain in Maryland, the state granted a variance, in part because a taller or wider building was prohibited; (5) the new CFSAN facility has been designed with several systems to mitigate the risk of damage from water entering the building; (6) with the steps taken by the design team to protect the building from an external flood, FDA officials believe that the potential for internal water damage is a greater probability than is damage from a flood condition; (7) to protect the data stored on the computers, CFSAN officials plan to develop a mitigation plan for the new facility that they say will be appropriate to the nature of the systems installed, the data stored, and risk factors at the time the building is occupied; (8) the decision to locate the main computer room in the basement of the building was reached by consensus of the project team - the design team consultants and representatives from GSA and FDA; and (9) the FDA representatives included CFSAN telecommunications personnel and staff from FDA's Office of Information Resources Management. |
gao_GAO-12-375 | gao_GAO-12-375_0 | Suspect Counterfeit Electronic Parts Can Be Found on Internet Purchasing Platforms
As shown in figure 1, each of the 16 parts we purchased was either suspect counterfeit or bogus. Specifically, all 12 of the parts we received after requesting authentic part numbers (either with valid or invalid date codes) were suspect counterfeit, according to SMT Corp. In addition, vendors provided us with 4 bogus parts after we requested invalid part numbers, which demonstrates their willingness to sell parts that do not technically exist. The following sections detail our findings for each of the three categories of parts we purchased. Under our selection methodology, the 16 parts we purchased were provided by 13 vendors in China. After submitting requests for quotes on both platforms, we received responses from 396 vendors, of which 334 were located in China; 25 in the United States; and 37 in other countries, including the United Kingdom and Japan. We selected the first of any vendor among those offering the lowest prices that provided enough information to purchase a As such, 3 vendors each supplied 2 given part, generally within 2 weeks.parts and 10 vendors each supplied 1 part. All seven of the obsolete or rare parts that SMT Corp. tested were suspected counterfeits. Each part failed multiple component authentication analyses, including visual, chemical, X-ray, and microscopic testing. The parts received from both vendors failed the same authentication analyses. Category 2: Authentic Part Numbers with Postproduction Date Codes
Similarly, all five of the parts we received and tested after requesting legitimate part numbers but specifying postproduction date codes were also suspected counterfeit, according to SMT Corp. By fulfilling our requests, the four vendors that provided these parts represented them as several years newer than the date the parts were last manufactured, as verified by the part manufacturers. Delidding revealed die that were consistent with the authentic part, but the date code showed evidence of re-marking to make them appear as if they had come from a homogenous lot. Category 3: Bogus Part Numbers
We received offers from 40 vendors in China to supply parts using invalid part numbers, and we purchased four parts from four vendors to determine whether they would in fact supply bogus parts. None of the invalid part numbers were listed in DLA’s Federal Logistics Information System and, according to selected manufacturers, none are associated with parts that have ever been manufactured. As such, we did not send the parts to SMT Corp. for authentication analysis. In furtherance of our investigation to determine the willingness of firms to provide us bogus parts, we created a totally fictitious part number that was not based on an actual part number and requested quotations over one Internet platform. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Appendix I: Details of Authentication Analysis Tests
This appendix provides details on each of the tests that constitute the authentication analysis SMT Corp. conducted for the parts we purchased. This test is not performed on all parts. This is usually performed on a two-piece sample from the evidence lot. | Why GAO Did This Study
Counterfeit partsgenerally the misrepresentation of parts identity or pedigreecan seriously disrupt the Department of Defense (DOD) supply chain, harm weapon systems integrity, and endanger troops lives. In a November testimony (GAO-12-213T), GAO summarized preliminary observations from its investigation into the purchase and authenticity testing of selected, military-grade electronic parts that may enter the DOD supply chain. As requested, this report presents GAOs final findings on this issue. The results are based on a nongeneralizable sample and cannot be used to make inferences about the extent to which parts are being counterfeited. GAO created a fictitious company and gained membership to two Internet platforms providing access to vendors selling military-grade electronic parts. GAO requested quotes from numerous vendors to purchase a total of 16 parts from three categories: (1) authentic part numbers for obsolete and rare parts; (2) authentic part numbers with postproduction date codes (date code after the last date the part was manufactured); and (3) bogus, or fictitious, part numbers that are not associated with any authentic parts. To determine whether the parts received were counterfeit, GAO contracted with a qualified, independent testing lab for full component authentication analysis of the first two categories of parts, but not the third (bogus) category. Part numbers have been altered for reporting purposes. GAO is not making recommendations in this report.
What GAO Found
Suspect counterfeit and boguspart numbers that are not associated with any authentic partsmilitary-grade electronic parts can be found on Internet purchasing platforms, as none of the 16 parts vendors provided to GAO were legitimate. Suspect counterfeit, which applies to the first two categories of parts that were tested, is the strongest term used by an independent testing lab, signifying a potential violation of intellectual property rights, copyrights, or trademark laws, or misrepresentation to defraud or deceive. After submitting requests for quotes on both platforms, GAO received responses from 396 vendors, of which 334 were located in China; 25 in the United States; and 37 in other countries, including the United Kingdom and Japan. Of the 16 parts purchased, vendors usually responded within a day. GAO selected the first of any vendor among those offering the lowest prices that provided enough information to purchase a given part, generally within 2 weeks. Under GAOs selection methodology, all 16 parts were provided by vendors in China.
Specifically, all 12 of the parts received after GAO requested rare part numbers or postproduction date codes were suspect counterfeit, according to the testing lab. Multiple authentication tests, ranging from inspection with electron microscopes to X-ray analysis, revealed that the parts had been re-marked to display the part numbers and manufacturer logos of authentic parts. Other features were found to be deficient from military standards, such as the metallic composition of certain pieces. For the parts requested using postproduction date codes, the vendors also altered date markings to represent the parts as newer than when they were last manufactured, as verified by the parts makers. Finally, after submitting requests for bogus parts using invalid part numbers, GAO purchased four parts from four vendors, which shows their willingness to supply parts that do not technically exist. |
gao_NSIAD-96-4 | gao_NSIAD-96-4_0 | The Initial Operational Test and Evaluation was designed to determine whether and to what degree the FMTV could accomplish its mission when operated and maintained by soldiers in the expected operational environment. FMTV Passed Production and Operational Tests
The FMTV’s performance during the recently completed limited production and operational tests significantly improved. The Army test data in tables 1 through 3 reflect the test results that supported the Army’s decision to proceed to full-rate production. Based on the DOT&E data, however, the dump and tractor models did not meet their reliability requirement, and the dump, tractor, and wrecker models did not meet their availability requirement. The vehicles were tested both ways. Test Vehicles Modified Before the Tests
The trucks the contractor provided the Army for its most recent testing may not have been production representative vehicles because (1) either the Army or the contractor modified some test trucks off the production line and/or (2) the contractor tested the trucks and corrected any problems identified prior to delivering the trucks to the Army for testing. The FMTV contract allows the Army to verify that the contractor has corrected the problems identified during testing through tests comparing the quality and performance of full-production trucks with that of the approved final configuration. If the Army’s comparison tests include full-production and retrofitted trucks, it should have adequate assurance that the FMTV trucks continue to meet the Army’s RAM and performance requirements. The Department also noted that the Army plans to perform the comparison tests on both retrofit and new production vehicles to verify that the quality and performance of the vehicles will continue to meet the requirements. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Army's testing of its Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles (FMTV) to determine whether the FMTV demonstrated that it could meet contractual and operational requirements.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the FMTV trucks passed technical and operational tests, paving the way for the Army's August 29, 1995, decision to approve full-rate production; (2) following the contractor's modifications of the vehicle to correct deficiencies identified in previous testing, the Army conducted: (a) a limited follow-on technical test to determine whether the trucks could meet contractual reliability and performance requirements; and (b) a full operational test to determine whether it could meet its operational reliability and other mission requirements when operated and maintained by soldiers; (3) the trucks exceeded reliability requirements in both tests and met most performance requirements; (4) in those cases where the performance did not meet requirements, the Army determined that the performance levels were satisfactory; (5) while the FMTV trucks overall performed satisfactorily, many of the technical test vehicles were not produced on the production line and/or were retrofitted to correct past deficiencies; (6) also, the contractor pretested both the technical and operational test vehicles and corrected deficiencies prior to delivering them to the Army for testing; (7) however, the FMTV contract allows the Army to verify that the contractor has corrected the problems identified during testing through tests comparing the quality and performance of full-production trucks with that of the approved final configuration; and (8) if the Army's comparison tests include full-production and retrofitted trucks, it should have adequate assurance that the trucks continue to meet the Army's performance and reliability, availability, and maintainability requirements. |
gao_GAO-14-395 | gao_GAO-14-395_0 | Among the DOD components in our study, the Army had the highest competition rate in fiscal year 2013, while MDA had the lowest. Competition Rate Has Stopped Declining and Varies by Component
Between fiscal years 2009 and 2013, DOD’s competition rate—based on all contract obligations—declined by 5 percent, from 62 percent to 57 percent, with an average competition rate of 59 percent for the 5 year period (see figure 3). Competed obligations decreased by over $31 billion, from $205.6 billion in fiscal year 2012 to $174.2 billion in fiscal year 2013. The percent obligated on new noncompetitive contracts and task orders on single award contracts as reported in FPDS-NG under the “only one responsible source” exception has increased—from 66 percent in fiscal year 2009 to 72 percent in fiscal year 2013. In some cases the justifications provided insight as to how a lack of the right level of data rights resulted in complete reliance on a single vendor over time. Justifications Generally Contained the Required Elements
As required by the FAR, DOD contracting officials prepared written justifications for all 14 noncompetitive contract awards in our sample. Lack of Necessary Data Rights Is Frequently a Barrier to Competition and Results in Reliance on a Single Vendor
All 14 noncompetitive contracts and task orders within our sample were justified under the exceptions for competition of “only one responsible source or “only one source capable.” For half of these awards, the basis for this exception was the agency’s lack of data rights. Focus on the Use of Open Systems Architectures and Emphasis on Data Rights Help to Guide Program Behavior
The focus on open systems architecture and acquiring effective types of data rights is changing the way DOD acquires goods and services. Programs are moving away from dependency upon single suppliers for parts, maintenance or upgrades and are moving toward open systems; these are designed to allow components to be added, removed, modified, replaced or maintained by multiple suppliers. The programs we sampled illustrate that leveraging open systems architecture and data rights to help promote competition involves early consideration and extensive analysis of how each system can best use these approaches to maintain a competitive environment throughout a program’s life cycle. For example, according to program officials the BBP’s emphasis on open systems architecture and effective management of data rights resulted in increased competition for the Air Force’s Military Global Positioning System User Equipment and KC-46 Tanker Modernization programs. DOD’s One-Offer Requirements Are Focused Late in the Acquisition Process
In 2010, DOD introduced new requirements for when full and open competition results in only one offer; however, these rules, as implemented in the DFARS, are focused late in the acquisition process and DOD officials have limited insight into the reasons only one offer was received. The one-offer awards we reviewed complied with DOD’s rules which require contracting officers to ensure solicitation periods allow at least 30 days for receipt of proposals and to conduct cost or price analysis. DOD contracting officials and vendors told us that engagement well before the 30-day solicitation period is key to ensuring vendors have adequate time to review draft requests for proposals, plan resources, provide feedback on potentially restrictive requirements, and determine through internal management processes whether it is worthwhile to prepare proposals. For the awards we reviewed, however, contracting officers seldom collected information about reasons only one offer was received, which could limit their ability to revise acquisition strategies appropriately or plan for future competitive acquisitions. There is no requirement to engage with the vendor community to learn why they chose not to submit offers. DOD also has established a goal of increasing effective competition— where competitive procedures are used and more than one offer is received. Enhancing the department’s acquisition planning guidance to ensure enough time and attention are provided for early vendor engagement could help encourage multiple offers. Establish guidance for when contracting officers should assess and document the reasons only one offer was received on competitive awards, including reviewing requirements to determine if they are overly restrictive and collecting feedback from potential vendors about the reasons they did not submit offers, taking into account dollar value and the likelihood the requirement is a recurring need. In written comments, DOD concurred with our recommendations. Staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives for this review were to examine (1) the trends in DOD’s use of competitive awards, (2) the extent to which justifications for exceptions to competitive procedures were adequate and the reasons for the exceptions, (3) how DOD’s strategies aimed at promoting long-term competition are changing behavior, and (4) the extent to which DOD’s recent requirements address the reasons why only one offer was received for competitive solicitations. | Why GAO Did This Study
Competition is the cornerstone of a sound acquisition process. In fiscal year 2013, DOD obligated over $300 billion through contracts and orders, of which 57 percent was competed. DOD also obligates billions of dollars annually on contracts that are awarded using competitive procedures, but for which the government received only one offer. DOD implemented the Better Buying Power initiative in 2010, in part to increase competition. The conference report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 mandated GAO to report on DOD's noncompetitive and one-offer awards.
GAO examined (1) the trends in DOD's use of competitive awards, (2) the extent to which justifications for exceptions to competitive procedures were adequate and reasons for exceptions, (3) how DOD's strategies aimed at promoting long-term competition are changing behavior, and (4) whether DOD's requirements address reasons only one offer was received for competitive solicitations. GAO analyzed federal procurement data for fiscal years 2009 through 2013; reviewed DOD policy and competition reports; examined two nongeneralizable samples of 14 and 15 awards, in part, based on dollar value; and interviewed DOD officials.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense's (DOD) competition rate for all contract obligations declined over the past 5 fiscal years from 62 percent in fiscal year 2009 to 57 percent in fiscal year 2013, but remained flat for the past 2 years. In fiscal year 2013, the Army had the highest competition rate, 66 percent, while the Missile Defense Agency had the lowest competition rate, 29 percent. The 14 justifications for noncompetitive awards that GAO reviewed generally included the elements required by the Federal Acquisition Regulation such as the authority permitting other than full and open competition. The majority of DOD's noncompetitive contracts and task orders (including all in GAO's sample) were coded under the “only one responsible source” exception to competition requirements. Seven of the 14 justifications explained that the awards could not be competed due to a lack of technical data. In these cases, DOD did not purchase the necessary data rights with the initial award. In some cases the justifications provided insight into how a lack of data rights resulted in reliance on a single vendor over time.
DOD's focus on using open systems architecture and acquiring sufficient data rights—which DOD's Better Buying Power memo encourages—is influencing the way DOD acquires goods and services. Programs are trying to move away from dependency upon single suppliers for parts, maintenance or upgrades and are moving toward open systems architecture, which allows components to be modified, replaced or maintained by multiple suppliers. Some DOD programs have shown that using open systems architecture and obtaining data rights involves early consideration and extensive analysis of how each system can best use these approaches to maintain a competitive environment throughout a program's lifecycle. For example, an emphasis on open systems architecture and effective management of data rights resulted in increased competition for the Air Force's user equipment for the Global Positioning System and KC-46 Tanker Modernization programs.
In 2010, DOD introduced requirements for competitive solicitations that result in only one offer; however, these rules are focused late in the acquisition process and DOD has limited insight into the reasons only one offer is received. The 15 one-offer awards GAO reviewed generally satisfied DOD's rules, which require contracting officers to ensure adequate solicitation periods and conduct cost or price analysis. These rules were intended to help ensure more effective competition but may apply too late in the acquisition process. DOD contracting officials and vendors told GAO that engagement with vendors well before the 30 day solicitation period is key to ensuring vendors have adequate time to review draft requests for proposals, plan resources, provide feedback on potentially restrictive requirements, and determine whether to prepare proposals. Moreover, contracting officers for the contracts GAO reviewed seldom collected information about reasons only one offer was received, which could limit their ability to revise acquisition strategies appropriately or plan for future competitive acquisitions. DOD's one-offer rules do not require contracting officials to engage with the vendor community to learn why vendors chose not to submit offers. However, contracting officials chose to do so in two sample cases, and in one case, based on this information, changed the acquisition strategy to allow for recompetition sooner than planned.
What GAO Recommends
DOD should ensure that existing acquisition planning guidance promotes early vendor engagement, and establish guidance for when contracting officers should assess the reasons only one offer was received on competitive awards. DOD concurred with these recommendations. |
gao_GAO-08-157 | gao_GAO-08-157_0 | Exclusion orders direct CBP to stop certain goods from entering the United States while the order is in effect. Multiple Agencies Carry Out IP Enforcement, but Their IP Priorities Vary, and Few Resources Are Dedicated Exclusively to IP Enforcement
For the five key federal agencies with IP enforcement roles, such enforcement is not a top priority for most of them, and determining their resource allocations to IP enforcement is challenging. These agencies’ IP enforcement functions include: (1) seizing IP infringing goods; (2) conducting investigations; and (3) prosecuting alleged violations. Staff in agency headquarters play a role in setting IP enforcement policies and, at some agencies, carry out certain IP enforcement actions, but most enforcement activity takes place at the field office level. IP Enforcement Generally Increased, but Agencies Have Not Taken Key Steps to Assess Enforcement Efforts
Federal IP enforcement activity generally increased from fiscal year 2001 through 2006; however, most agencies have not taken key steps to assess their achievements. Specifically, most agencies have not: (1) conducted systematic analyses of their IP enforcement data to inform management and resource allocation decisions, (2) clearly identified which of their efforts relate to a key IP enforcement area—IP crimes that affect public health and safety—nor collected data to track these efforts, and (3) established performance measures or targets to assess their achievements and report to Congress and others. The other agencies lack data for identifying IP enforcement actions related to public health and safety. The National Intellectual Property Rights Coordination Center Has Not Achieved Its Mission, and Staff Levels Have Decreased
The National Intellectual Property Rights Coordination Center, an interagency mechanism created by the executive branch to improve federal IP enforcement and coordinate investigative efforts between ICE and FBI, has not achieved its mission or maintained the staffing levels set for it upon its creation. FBI filled or nearly filled all eight positions during fiscal years 2001 through 2005. ICE Views Center’s Relocation as an Opportunity to Revisit Center’s Purpose and Agency Roles
In early 2008, ICE plans to move the center to a new location that is being configured specifically for the center and some additional functions. According to ICE officials, the new center will continue to focus on private sector outreach. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
The Ranking Minority Member of the Senate Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce and the District of Columbia, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, asked us to (1) examine federal agencies’ roles, priorities, and resources devoted to intellectual property (IP) enforcement, (2) evaluate agencies’ IP-related enforcement statistics and achievements, and (3) examine the status of the National Intellectual Property Rights Coordination Center. | Why GAO Did This Study
Federal law enforcement actions against criminals who manufacture and distribute counterfeit and pirated goods are important to enforcing intellectual property (IP) rights and protecting Americans from unsafe or substandard products. GAO was asked to: (1) examine key federal agencies' roles, priorities, and resources devoted to IP-related enforcement; (2) evaluate agencies' IP-related enforcement statistics and achievements; and (3) examine the status of the National Intellectual Property Rights Coordination Center. GAO reviewed relevant documents, interviewed officials in five key agencies, and analyzed agency IP enforcement data from fiscal years 2001 through 2006.
What GAO Found
Five key agencies play a role in IP enforcement, and their enforcement functions include seizures, investigations, and prosecutions. While IP enforcement is generally not their highest priority, IP crimes with a public health and safety risk, such as production of counterfeit pharmaceuticals, is an IP enforcement priority at each agency. Determining agencies' IP enforcement resources is challenging because few staff are dedicated to this area, and not all agencies track staff time spent on IP enforcement. Agencies carry out some enforcement actions through their headquarters, but significant enforcement takes place in the field. Federal enforcement actions generally increased during fiscal years 2001-2006, but the key agencies have not taken key steps to assess their achievements. For example, most have not systematically analyzed their IP enforcement statistics to inform management and resource allocation decisions, collected data on their efforts to address IP crimes that affect public health and safety, or established IP-related performance measures or targets to assess their achievements. Also, Customs and Border Protection's enforcement of exclusion orders, which stop certain IP-infringing goods from entering the country, has been limited due to certain procedural weaknesses. The National Intellectual Property Rights Coordination Center, an interagency mechanism created to coordinate federal investigative efforts, has not achieved its mission and staff levels have decreased. Currently, only one agency participates in the center's activities, which focus on private sector outreach. Agencies have lacked a common understanding of the center's purpose and agencies' roles. The center's upcoming move to a new location presents an opportunity to reconsider its mission. |
gao_GAO-03-639 | gao_GAO-03-639_0 | Background
DOD’s operations at military installations and other defense sites in the United States are subject to the same environmental laws and regulations, such as the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act, as is private industry. 1.) The installations are responsible for identifying all regulations and other environmental requirements that apply to them, and identifying and tracking pending requirements. DOD’s and the Services’ Policies and Processes Do Not Always Ensure That the Most Important and Appropriate Environmental Quality Activities Are Funded
Based on broad DOD policy, each military service has established its own policy and processes to implement the environmental quality program. The Services’ Varying Interpretations of DOD’s Broad Policy Have Resulted in Inconsistent Eligibility Criteria and Funding of Activities More Closely Related to Military Operations or Maintenance
DOD’s policy provides the services with a broad charge to comply with applicable environmental requirements, such as statutes and regulations, but leaves to the services most decisions about which activities are appropriate for funding through their environmental quality programs. The Services’ Policies Differ in Which Activities Are Eligible for Their Environmental Quality Programs
Although the services have developed policies intended, in part, to clarify which activities can be funded through the environmental quality program, implementation of these policies has sometimes led to inconsistencies across the services in the types of activities they determine eligible for funding. In fiscal year 2002, for example, the Navy’s environmental quality program spent $17.8 million to comply with NEPA requirements. Oil and hazardous material spills. It is unclear why this activity is treated differently from the case of hazardous spills discussed previously, in which the Navy requires the organization that caused the spill to pay for the cleanup. The Services Do Not Always Ensure That Funding Is Targeted to the Highest Priority Environmental Activities, and in Some Cases, Have Funded Activities That Are Ineligible Under Their Policies
Certain low-priority activities were funded through the environmental quality program at two Army installations we visited, even though some high priorities, considered “must fund” activities by DOD and Army policy, were not funded. Specifically, we found the following: Pest management. Landscaping for a hazardous waste storage facility. Restoration and maintenance of a historic structure. The Services’ Environmental Quality Programs Cannot Ensure That DOD’s Requirement to Fund All High-Priority Needs Is Met
Although DOD’s and the services’ policies call for funding of all high-priority environmental quality program activities, the services have not always been able to fund all such activities through their environmental quality program. According to some environmental managers at the installations where high-priority activities were deferred, the activities they were most likely to defer were those that do not have a firm timeline for completion, such as surveys of cultural resources. Environmental program managers at most of the installations we visited indicated that they have generally been able to fund emergency, high-priority environmental activities that occurred outside the normal budgeting cycle, but they have done so by using funds allocated for other planned high-priority activities, emergency or year-end funding from the environmental quality program, or other funding sources at the installation or command. This variation among the services’ programs can result in different eligibility requirements for environmental activities across services and funding of activities that would be more appropriately funded from other sources, such as military operations or base maintenance. Although the services have, over the past decade, made significant improvements in their environmental compliance performance, these improvements have leveled off in recent years, and DOD has not reached its goal of full environmental compliance. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) and its military services are responsible for complying with a broad range of environmental laws and other requirements that apply to the lands they manage, including more than 425 major military installations covering about 25 million acres across the United States. Through its environmental quality program, DOD spends about $2 billion per year to comply with these requirements. Although the services have made significant improvements in environmental management in recent years, DOD has not reached full environmental compliance. In response to the Senate Armed Services Committee's report on the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, we assessed how DOD and the services identify, prioritize, and fund their environmental quality activities to determine whether the most important and appropriate activities are funded.
What GAO Found
DOD's and the services' policies and processes for the environmental quality program do not always ensure that program funds are targeted to the most important and appropriate environmental activities. Instead, GAO found that some installations have funded low-priority or other activities that were ineligible under their environmental quality funding policies, at the same time that higher-priority activities were not funded. For example, at certain large installations that GAO visited, low-priority activities, such as noise monitoring, or ineligible activities, such as pest management, landscaping, and roof replacement, were funded while high-priority activities to prevent soil erosion were not. At the root of the problem is DOD's broad program policy that does not provide specific guidance on what activities are eligible for the program and the resulting inconsistent interpretation and implementation of this policy by the military services. DOD's policy requires that all high-priority activities be funded, but gives the services broad discretion in how this policy is put into place. As a result, GAO found (1) inconsistencies across and within the services about which activities are eligible for environmental quality program funding and (2) the funding of some activities through the program that more closely relate to military operations or base maintenance. For example, some services use program funds for oil and hazardous material spill response plans, equipment, and cleanup costs, while other services require the organization responsible for the spill to pay for the cleanup portion of those costs. Similarly, service policies can differ regarding responsibility for funding maintenance of structures such as water and sewer treatment facilities and historic buildings. Without a consistently implemented approach, there is no assurance that DOD's requirement to fund all high-priority activities is being met. Instead, some high-priority projects are being deferred. Generally, these deferrals involve projects that, although required by law, do not have to be completed by specific dates (e.g., surveys of properties required by historic preservation law). Deferring such activities, however, can lead to larger and more costly problems later. Moreover, to fund unbudgeted emergency environmental activities, the installations may have to defer other high-priority environmental program activities, obtain funds from other sources at the installation such as maintenance activities, or obtain funds from higher command levels. Some services have recently indicated that the availability of funds for environmental activities is likely to get worse in future years, because of expected reductions in their budgets for this program. Such constraints make a well-implemented prioritization process even more important. |
gao_NSIAD-96-8 | gao_NSIAD-96-8_0 | Contractors Report Significant Payment Discrepancies
In response to our data request, 374 business units of large and small contractors reported overpayments and underpayments using their accounting records. The business units responding to our request reported payment discrepancies of $857.4 million—overpayments of $231.5 million and underpayments of $625.9 million. Many contractors notified the government of payment errors but did not always return overpayments until instructed to do so. Center personnel, in accordance with payment procedures, pay contractor invoices as if the payment information in the system were correct, even though the information in the system is known to have a high error rate. Overpayments Reported by Contractors Not Recovered Promptly
The Columbus Center did not promptly recover identified overpayments because it did not (1) follow the Center’s policy of requesting contractors to immediately return identified overpayments pending a reconciliation and (2) record and track actions on reported overpayments. We estimate that delays in recovering the $84.2 million in overpayments cost the government about $10.6 million in interest. We recommended that DOD develop a comprehensive plan to mobilize resources to identify and correct payment discrepancies. For example, Center officials advised us of corrective actions being taken to improve the detection and collection process, including changes to ensure that the Center’s policy of asking contractors to immediately return overpayments is implemented, including an August 1995 pilot installation of telephone and computer equipment to establish a historical record, by contract, of payment problems identified by customers; changes to prevent overpayments that occur because of incorrect progress payment liquidations, including both procedural and systems changes that are expected to improve payment research and progress payment records; changes in monitoring and reporting practices to ensure that all reconciliations that identify amounts owed the government are resolved promptly; and increases in the resources directed toward reducing the backlog of contracts requiring reconciliation by December 1995. Also, after discussing the results in this report with DOD and DFAS officials, DFAS, on July 31, 1995, directed the Columbus Center to begin surveying contractors to identify and resolve payment discrepancies. We also discussed payment errors with the Defense Logistics Agency, the Defense Contract Management Command, and the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) officials. 3. 5. 6. Examples of Selected Overpayments
We reviewed over $84 million in overpayments on eight contracts to determine why the overpayments were made and to evaluate the efforts of the DFAS Center in Columbus, Ohio, to recover the overpayments. 1. 8. However, as of May 1995, the Center’s automated payment records showed the contract to be underpaid by about $2.7 million. 14, 1994). 9, 1994). | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed outstanding overpayments and underpayments identified in Department of Defense (DOD) contractors' records, focusing on: (1) whether DOD was detecting and recovering contract overpayments promptly; and (2) the actions taken to recover overpayments at the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) Center in Columbus, Ohio.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the 374 business units (representing 82 large defense contractors and 57 small contractors) that responded to GAO's request for data as of July 1994 reported about $231.5 million in outstanding overpayments and about $625.9 million in underpayments; (2) the evidence suggests and contractors reported that they followed up to collect underpayments and usually notified DOD of overpayments; however, contractors did not always return overpayments unless instructed to do so; (3) the DFAS Columbus Center cannot readily detect payment discrepancies because of significant errors in its automated payment records; (4) despite these errors, Center personnel, in accordance with payment procedures, pay contractor invoices as if the payment data were correct; (5) with significant errors in the automated payment records, incorrect payments are likely to continue; (6) the Center did not properly pursue recovery after overpayments were reported by contractors or identified through reconciliation; (7) on the basis of GAO's research of $84.2 million in overpayments, the Center's delay in collecting overpayments was long and costly; (8) for those overpayments, GAO estimates that recovery delays cost the government about $10.6 million in interest; (9) even after a public accounting firm completed contract reconciliations to identify the amounts owed the government, the Center did not recover overpayments promptly; (10) in response to GAO's August 1994 recommendation that DOD mobilize resources to identify, verify, and correct payment discrepancies, DOD advised GAO in May 1995 that various actions were under way or planned to to reduce payment discrepancies and to use contractor records to facilitate reconciliations; and (11) on July 31, 1995, DFAS requested the Columbus Center to undertake a new effort to identify and resolve payment discrepancies. |
gao_GAO-10-634 | gao_GAO-10-634_0 | Treasury has entered into agreements with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to act as its financial agents for HAMP. Treasury has not established how many borrowers are likely to be helped with this feature. Servicers’ Solicitation and Evaluation of Borrowers for HAMP Have Been Inconsistent, and More Treasury Action Is Immediately Needed To Ensure Equitable Treatment of Borrowers with Similar Circumstances
Although one of Treasury’s stated goals for HAMP is to standardize the loan modification process across the servicing industry, we identified several areas of inconsistencies in how servicers treat borrowers under HAMP. These areas of inconsistency could lead to inequitable treatment of similarly situated borrowers, and borrowers in similar circumstances could have different outcomes. First, we found that servicers differed in when and how they solicited borrowers for HAMP, and numerous borrowers had complained that they did not receive timely responses to their HAMP applications or had difficulty getting information from their servicers about the program. In March 2010, more than a year after the program was first announced, Treasury issued additional guidelines governing solicitation efforts. According to HAMP guidelines, borrowers who are current or less than 60 days delinquent on their mortgage payments but in imminent danger of defaulting may be eligible for HAMP modifications, and Treasury has emphasized the importance of reaching borrowers before they are delinquent. As a result of the lack of specific guidance, we found seven different sets of criteria for determining imminent default among the 10 servicers we contacted. While the HOPE Hotline escalation process is the primary means for borrowers to raise concerns about their servicer’s handling of their HAMP applications and potentially incorrect denials, Treasury has not explicitly informed borrowers that the hotline can be used for these purposes. The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act called for Treasury to, among other things, preserve homeownership and protect home values, and HAMP continues to be Treasury’s cornerstone effort for doing this. However, because Treasury has not specified requirements on the types of complaints that servicers should track, some servicers are tracking only certain types of complaints such as those addressed to a company executive. Recommendations for Executive Action
As part of its efforts to continue improving the transparency and accountability of HAMP, we recommend that the Secretary of the Treasury take actions to expeditiously: establish clear and specific criteria for determining whether a borrower is in imminent default to ensure greater consistency across servicers; develop additional guidance for servicers on their quality assurance programs for HAMP, including greater specificity on how to categorize loans for sampling and what servicers should be evaluating in their reviews; specify which complaints servicers should track to ensure consistency and to facilitate program oversight and compliance; more clearly inform borrowers that the HOPE Hotline may also be used if they are having difficulty with their HAMP application or servicer or feel that they have been incorrectly denied HAMP, monitor the effectiveness of the HOPE Hotline as an escalation process for handling borrower concerns about potentially incorrect HAMP denials, and develop an improved escalation mechanism if the HOPE Hotline is not sufficiently effective; finalize and issue consequences for servicer noncompliance with HAMP requirements as soon as possible; report activity under the principal reduction program, including the extent to which servicers determined that principal reduction was beneficial to investors but did not offer it, to ensure transparency in the implementation of this program feature across servicers; finalize and implement benchmarks for performance measures under the first-lien modification program, as well as develop measures and benchmarks for the recently announced HAMP-funded homeowner assistance programs; and implement a prudent design for remaining HAMP-funded programs. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To examine servicers’ treatment of borrowers under the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP), between November 2009 and March 2010, we spoke with and obtained information from 10 HAMP servicers of various sizes that collectively represented 71 percent of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) funds allocated to participating servicers, visiting 6 of them. | Why GAO Did This Study
Congress created the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) to, among other things, preserve homeownership and protect home values. In March 2009, the U.S. Department of the Treasury (Treasury) announced the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) as its cornerstone effort to achieve these goals. This report examines (1) the extent to which HAMP servicers have treated borrowers consistently and (2) the actions that Treasury has taken to address the challenges of trial modification conversions, negative equity, redefaults, and program stability. GAO obtained information from 10 servicers that account for 71 percent of HAMP funds and spoke with Treasury, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac officials.
What GAO Found
While one of Treasury's stated goals for HAMP was to standardize the loan modification process across the servicing industry, GAO found inconsistencies in how servicers were treating borrowers under HAMP that could lead to inequitable treatment of similarly situated borrowers. First, because Treasury did not issue guidelines for soliciting borrowers for HAMP until a year after announcing the program, servicers notified borrowers about HAMP anywhere from 31 days to more than 60 days after a delinquency. Many borrowers also complained that they did not receive timely responses to their HAMP applications and had difficulty obtaining information about the program. Treasury has recently issued guidelines on borrower communications, and plans to monitor compliance with the guidelines. Second, Treasury has emphasized the importance of reaching borrowers before they are delinquent but has not issued guidelines for determining when borrowers are in imminent danger of default. As a result, the 10 servicers that GAO contacted reported 7 different sets of criteria for determining imminent default. Third, while Treasury required servicers to have internal quality assurance procedures to ensure compliance with HAMP requirements, Treasury did not specify how loan files should be sampled for review or what the reviews should contain. As a result, some servicers did not review trial modifications or HAMP denials as part of their quality assurance procedures. Fourth, Treasury has not specified which HAMP complaints should be tracked, and several servicers track only certain types of complaints. Fifth, Treasury has not clearly informed borrowers that the HOPE Hotline can be used to raise concerns about servicers' handling of HAMP loan modifications and to challenge potentially incorrect denials, likely limiting the number of borrowers who have used the hotline for these purposes. Finally, Treasury does not have clear consequences for servicers that do not comply with program requirements, potentially leading to inconsistencies in how instances of noncompliance are handled. |
gao_GGD-95-30 | gao_GGD-95-30_0 | Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
In addressing our objectives to (1) determine the extent of the threat from drug smuggling and illegal immigration and (2) identify ways to enhance security between the ports of entry, we interviewed intelligence officials responsible for determining the threat from drug smuggling and illegal immigration and reviewed related documentation; reviewed the Sandia study and discussed the study’s findings with its authors and various INS officials responsible for border control; reviewed EPIC, Department of State, and Operation Alliance reports to determine the threat from drug smuggling; visited the San Diego and El Paso Border Patrol sectors and discussed with sector officials their recent border control initiatives; analyzed INS data from its management information systems related to apprehensions and narcotics seizures to obtain additional information on the threat from drug smuggling and illegal immigration along the southwest border; and interviewed INS headquarters officials to determine plans for improving border security. Drug Smuggling and Illegal Immigration Are Serious Threats Along the Southwest Border
Drug Smuggling
Although the full extent is unknown, drug smuggling is a serious threat along the southwest border. The report stated that in spite of law enforcement agencies’ efforts to counter drug smuggling, the flow of drugs between the ports of entry along the southwest border continued due to vast open areas and a relatively low law enforcement presence. 3). 4). Unless border control efforts become more effective, illegal immigration is expected to increase. Both sectors have begun initiatives that focus on preventing illegal entry rather than on apprehending aliens. Sandia recommended multiple physical barriers to prevent entry; the sector employs agents as a human barrier. These aliens apparently adapted to the prevention strategy by finding new routes into the United States. However, since it will take several years to implement the strategy, it is too early to tell what impact it will eventually have on drug smuggling and illegal immigration along the southwest border. U.S. General Accounting Office P.O. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed U.S. efforts to secure the southwest border, focusing on: (1) the extent to which border security is threatened by drug smuggling and illegal immigration; and (2) ways the United States can enhance security between ports of entry.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) although the full extent of drug smuggling and illegal immigration is unknown, both pose serious security threats along the U.S. southwest border; (2) despite U.S. law enforcement efforts, the flow of cocaine and illegal immigrants continues and is expected to increase; (3) a 1993 study on ways to enhance security along the southwest border between ports of entry recommended that the Border Patrol emphasize entry prevention instead of apprehension, construct physical barriers, and set up additional highway checkpoints to prevent entry; (4) although there is increased interest in a national entry prevention strategy, many officials believe that drug smuggling and illegal immigration activities have merely been rerouted to other southwest border areas where enforcement is less effective; (5) the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) plans to implement a national strategy that focuses on preventing illegal entry; and (6) it is too early to assess what impact the new INS strategy will have on drug smuggling and illegal immigration along the southwest border. |
gao_GAO-08-487T | gao_GAO-08-487T_0 | TSA has operational responsibility for conducting passenger and checked baggage screening at most airports, and has regulatory, or oversight, responsibility, for air carriers who conduct air cargo screening. Figure 1 identifies reported aviation security funding for fiscal years 2004 through 2008. According to TSA congressional budget justifications, TSA received appropriations for surface transportation security that totaled about $175 million since fiscal year 2005. In accordance with the act, we reviewed (1) TSA’s efforts to develop reliable cost and schedule estimates for Secure Flight; (2) progress made by TSA in developing and implementing the Secure Flight system, including the implementation of security controls; (3) TSA’s efforts to coordinate with CBP to integrate Secure Flight with CBP’s watch-list matching function for international flights; (4) TSA’s plans to protect private passenger information under Secure Flight; and (5) DHS’s efforts to assess the effectiveness of the current redress process for passengers misidentified as being on or wrongly assigned to the No Fly or Selectee list. TSA’s security mission includes establishing security standards and conducting assessments and inspections of surface transportation modes, including passenger and freight rail; mass transit; highways and commercial vehicles; and pipelines. Finally, TSA is exploring new technologies to enhance the detection of explosives and other threats, but continues to face management and funding challenges in developing and fielding technologies at airport checkpoints. TSA Has Taken Steps to Strengthen Passenger Screening Procedures, but Could Improve Its Evaluation and Documentation of Proposed Procedures
In addition to TSA’s efforts to strengthen the allocation of its TSO workforce, TSA has taken steps to strengthen passenger checkpoint screening procedures to enhance the detection of prohibited items. For example, TSA has issued an Air Cargo Strategic Plan that focused on securing the domestic air cargo supply chain. TSA Has Made Progress in Developing and Implementing the Secure Flight Program, but Can Further Strengthen Its Efforts
In February 2008, we reported that TSA has made substantial progress in instilling more discipline and rigor into Secure Flight’s development and implementation, but challenges remain that may hinder the program’s progress moving forward. While the Secure Flight program office has completed important steps to incorporate security into the system’s development, it has not fully completed other steps to ensure security is effectively addressed. Previous GAO work identified that agencies successful in evaluating performance had measures that used attributes from GAO’s best practices. We have ongoing work assessing the security of surface modes of transportation, and will report on our results later this year. Our work assessing DHS’s efforts in implementing its strategy for securing surface transportation modes is being conducted as part of our ongoing reviews of mass transit, passenger and freight rail, commercial vehicle, and highway infrastructure security. Threat, Vulnerability, and Criticality Assessments
TSA has taken actions to assess risk by conducting threat, criticality, and vulnerability assessments of surface transportation assets, particularly for mass transit, passenger rail, and freight rail, but its efforts related to commercial vehicles and highway infrastructure are in the early stages. However, TSA has not yet developed or issued security standards for all surface transportation modes, such as commercial vehicle and highway infrastructure, or determined whether standards are necessary for these modes of transportation. Conclusions
DHS and TSA have undertaken numerous initiatives to strengthen the security of the nation’s transportation system, and should be commended for these efforts. Regarding commercial aviation, TSA has developed processes to more efficiently allocate and deploy the TSO workforce, strengthened screening procedures, is working to develop and deploy more effective screening technologies, strengthened the security of air cargo, and improved the development of a program to prescreen passengers against terrorist watch-lists. Further, TSA has more recently taken actions in a number of areas to help secure surface modes of transportation. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since its inception, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has focused much of its efforts on aviation security, and has developed and implemented a variety of programs and procedures to secure commercial aviation. More recently, TSA has taken actions to secure the nation's surface transportation modes. TSA funding for aviation security has totaled about $26 billion since fiscal year 2004, and for surface transportation security activities, about $175 million since fiscal year 2005. This testimony focuses on TSA's efforts to secure the commercial aviation system-- through passenger screening, air cargo, and watch-list matching programs--and the nation's surface transportation modes. It also addresses challenges remaining in these areas. GAO's comments are based on GAO products issued from February 2004 through April 2008 including selected updates obtained in February through April 2008.
What GAO Found
DHS and TSA have undertaken numerous initiatives to strengthen the security of the nation's transportation system, including actions to address many recommendations made by GAO. With respect to aviation security, TSA has focused its efforts on, among other things, more efficiently allocating, deploying, and managing the Transportation Security Officer (TSO) workforce--formerly known as screeners; strengthening screening procedures; developing and deploying more effective and efficient screening technologies; strengthening domestic air cargo security; and developing a government operated watch-list matching program, known as Secure Flight. For example, in response to GAO's recommendation, TSA developed a plan to periodically review assumptions in its Staffing Allocation Model, and took steps to strengthen its evaluation of proposed procedural changes. TSA has also explored new passenger checkpoint screening technologies to better detect explosives and other threats, and has taken steps to strengthen air cargo security, including conducting compliance inspections of air carriers. Finally, TSA has instilled more discipline and rigor into Secure Flight's systems development, including preparing key documentation and strengthening privacy protections. With regard to surface transportation security, TSA has, among other things, taken steps to develop a strategic approach for securing mass transit, passenger and freight rail, commercial vehicles, and highways; established security standards for certain transportation modes; and conducted threat, criticality, and vulnerability assessments of surface transportation assets, particularly related to passenger and freight rail. While these efforts should be commended, GAO has identified several areas that should be addressed to further strengthen transportation security. For example, TSA has made limited progress in developing and deploying checkpoint technologies due to planning and management challenges. In addition, TSA has not revised screening exemptions for air cargo transported into the United States that may leave the air cargo system unacceptably vulnerable. GAO further identified that TSA experienced some program management challenges in the development of Secure Flight, including developing cost and schedule estimates consistent with best practices; fully implementing the program's risk management plan; developing a comprehensive testing strategy; and ensuring that information security requirements are fully implemented. In addition, DHS and TSA lack performance measures to fully evaluate the effectiveness of current processes for passengers who apply for redress due to inconveniences experienced during the check-in and screening process. GAO recently made recommendations to address these issues. Additionally, although TSA has recently taken actions in a number of areas to help secure surface modes of transportation, particularly passenger and freight rail, the agency has not fully defined its role with respect to securing other transportation modes, such as commercial vehicles and highway infrastructure. We are continuing to assess TSA's efforts to secure surface modes of transportation as part of our ongoing work and will report on our results later this year. |
gao_GAO-17-501 | gao_GAO-17-501_0 | A&O Subsidies
RMA partners with private insurance companies, which sell and service federal crop insurance policies. The 2011 SRA’s Cap on A&O Expense Subsidies Has Stabilized Overall Costs, but Subsidies Have Fluctuated Widely by Crop, State, and County
The 2011 SRA’s cap on A&O expense subsidies—payments to insurance companies to cover the cost of selling and servicing crop insurance policies—stabilized the program’s overall costs, but subsidies have fluctuated widely by crop, state, and county. For example, the average A&O subsidy per policy in California decreased by 32 percent from 2010 to 2011, when the subsidy declined for two of the state’s leading insured crops, almonds and grapes. As a result of the revised calculation method, overall A&O subsidies have become more stable since 2010, staying at about $1.4 billion per year from 2011 through 2015. By considering an adjustment to the A&O expense subsidy calculation method that reduces the effects of changes in premiums caused by changes in crop prices or other factors, when it renegotiates the SRA, RMA could reduce year-to- year fluctuations in the A&O expense subsidies that companies receive at the crop, state, and county levels. The Federal Crop Insurance Program’s Target Rate of Return Does Not Reflect Market Conditions
The federal crop insurance program’s target rate of return—the average annual rate of return that insurance companies are expected to earn— does not reflect market conditions. A 2009 USDA-commissioned study, which RMA used in SRA renegotiations, estimated a reasonable rate of return for crop insurance providers for 1989 through 2008 based on economic factors, such as interest rates, which are subject to changes in market conditions. The average of the two methods was 9.6 percent. Two Opportunities Exist for the Federal Government to Reduce the Delivery Costs of the Program
We identified two opportunities for the federal government to reduce its delivery costs for the crop insurance program: (1) by reducing the target rate of return or (2) by reducing the portion of premiums that participating insurance companies retain. If the target rate of return was reduced by 4.9 percentage points, from the current target rate of 14.5 percent to 9.6 percent—the average reasonable rate that we calculated for 2009 through 2015—on the companies’ 2015 retained premiums of $7.42 billion, the companies’ expected underwriting gains would decrease by $364 million. Even if the target rate of return remained unchanged, reducing companies’ portion of retained premiums would reduce their expected underwriting gains because they would earn their rate of return on a smaller premium base. According to this report, part of the justification for the companies to share in the program’s underwriting losses was that it would encourage the companies to more carefully adjust farmers’ loss claims. The Agricultural Risk Protection Act of 2000, however, improved RMA’s ability to monitor farmers’ loss claims and companies’ adjustment of these loss claims by enhancing the agency’s data mining capabilities. In addition, the portion of program premiums that participating insurance companies retain—which provides the companies with financial incentive to accurately adjust farmers’ loss claims—has changed little since 2000. Such an adjustment could generate significant cost savings for the program. However, because a provision in the 2014 farm bill requires that any revised SRA is to be budget neutral with respect to estimates of future underwriting gains for the companies, any savings that could be achieved through the SRA by reducing companies’ expected future underwriting gains as a result of reducing the portion of premiums retained by participating insurance companies are not allowed under current law and would also require congressional action to repeal this provision in the 2014 farm bill. Matter for Congressional Consideration
To reduce the cost of delivering the crop insurance program, Congress should consider repealing the 2014 farm bill requirement that any revision to the standard reinsurance agreement not reduce insurance companies’ expected underwriting gains, and directing the Risk Management Agency to, during the next renegotiation of the agreement, (1) adjust the participating insurance companies’ target rate of return to reflect market conditions and (2) assess the portion of premiums that participating insurance companies retain and, if warranted, adjust it. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to examine (1) the changes, if any, in the distribution of administrative and operating (A&O) expense subsidies due to the implementation of the 2011 standard reinsurance agreement’s (SRA) national cap on subsidies, (2) the extent to which the federal crop insurance program’s target rate of return reflects market conditions and (3) opportunities, if any, for the federal government to reduce its delivery costs for the program. This study derived, for the 20 years from 1989 through 2008, the annual rate of return on equity that companies participating in the federal crop insurance program should be expected to earn. | Why GAO Did This Study
To implement the federal crop insurance program, USDA's RMA partners with private insurance companies, which sell and service policies. In 2010, USDA negotiated an agreement with insurance companies to set a national cap on the annual payments it makes to them for expenses and a target rate of return.
GAO was asked to examine (1) the changes in expense payments to companies due to the cap, (2) the extent to which the program's target rate of return reflects market conditions, and (3) opportunities for the federal government to reduce its delivery costs for the program. GAO analyzed RMA data on payments to companies for their expenses, conducted an updated analysis based on a USDA-commissioned study of the annual rate of return that companies should be expected to earn, and interviewed RMA officials.
What GAO Found
The U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) Risk Management Agency (RMA) makes payments to insurance companies to cover the cost of selling and servicing federal crop insurance policies. A cap on these payments stabilized them at about $1.4 billion per year from 2011 to 2015. In capping the annual payment to companies, RMA sought to make these payments more stable and dependable for companies and agents, but payments have fluctuated widely by crop, state, and county because, as GAO's analysis shows, the method RMA uses for calculating payments has allowed large fluctuations at the policy level. Specifically, RMA calculates payments based on such factors as crop price, and a price change can cause a change in the payments. For example, the average payment for almonds decreased by 42 percent from 2010 to 2011 but increased by 75 percent from 2013 to 2014. RMA could reduce such fluctuations and achieve greater stability by considering adjustments to how the payments are calculated when it negotiates a new agreement with companies.
The crop insurance program's target rate of return—the average annual rate of return that insurance companies are expected to earn—does not reflect market conditions. A 2009 USDA-commissioned study found that a 12.8 percent rate of return was reasonable for participating companies for 1989 through 2008 based on economic factors, such as interest rates. RMA used this study in 2010 negotiations with insurance companies to set a 14.5 percent target rate. According to GAO's analysis, which updated information in the study for 2009 through 2015, the reasonable rate of return declined, averaging 9.6 percent.
GAO identified two opportunities to reduce federal delivery costs for the program.
First, given that GAO's analysis shows that the target rate of return does not reflect market conditions, that rate could be reduced. As a result, companies would earn a lower rate of return on their existing base of retained premiums. At the 2015 premium level, if the target rate were reduced by 4.9 percentage points, from the current rate of 14.5 percent to 9.6 percent, the companies' expected annual underwriting gains would decrease by $364 million.
Second, the portion of premiums retained by companies could be reduced so that they would earn a rate of return on a smaller premium base. The portion of premiums retained by companies has changed little, averaging 77 percent since 2000, while USDA has retained the rest. Part of the justification for companies' retaining a significant portion of premiums was that they needed financial incentive to more carefully adjust farmers' loss claims. The need for this incentive decreased after a statutory change in 2000 improved RMA's ability to monitor those claims and companies' adjustment of them. Reducing the premiums that companies retain by 5 percentage points could reduce companies' annual underwriting gains by up to $100 million.
However, a provision in the Agricultural Act of 2014 requires any changes negotiated for a new SRA be budget neutral. To realize savings, such changes would require congressional action to repeal this provision. If Congress were to direct RMA to adjust the target rate in future negotiations or assess the portion of premiums companies retain, the agency could generate significant cost savings for the program.
What GAO Recommends
Congress should consider repealing the Agricultural Act of 2014 provision that any revision to the agreement with insurance companies not reduce their expected underwriting gains and direct RMA to (1) adjust companies' target rate of return to reflect market conditions and (2) assess the portion of premiums that companies retain and adjust it, if warranted. GAO also recommends that RMA consider adjusting the method it uses to determine payments to insurance companies for expenses. RMA stated it will take steps to implement GAO's recommendation. |
gao_AIMD-99-38 | gao_AIMD-99-38_0 | In April 1997, we reported on serious weaknesses at five IRS facilities that we visited. We reported that until these weaknesses are corrected, IRS runs the risk of its tax processing operations being disrupted and taxpayer data being improperly used, modified, or destroyed. IRS has acted to address recommendations made in our April 1997 report by preparing and transmitting to the Congress a high-level action plan for identifying and correcting the security weaknesses at all of its facilities including the five facilities discussed in our prior report; reevaluating and establishing a new approach to managing computer security that involves the resolution of security weaknesses and issues by facility type, including computing centers, service centers, district offices, and others; and submitting to the Congress its plan for improving the service’s management approach to computer security. IRS Has Not Yet Fully Institutionalized Its Servicewide Computer Security Management Program
Although IRS has made significant strides in improving computer security at certain facilities, an effective servicewide computer security management program has not yet been fully implemented. Our current review identified weaknesses that remain uncorrected at the five facilities visited during our prior audit and additional weaknesses we identified at those locations and at a sixth facility included in this review. If properly implemented, this system would improve IRS’ capability to detect unauthorized accesses to taxpayer data. Examples of these weaknesses follow. Conclusions
IRS has made significant progress in correcting its serious weaknesses in computer security controls intended to safeguard IRS computer systems, data, and facilities. Until IRS identifies and corrects all of its critical computer security weaknesses and fully institutionalizes an effective servicewide computer security management program, the service will continue to expose its tax processing operations to the risk of disruption; taxpayer data to the risk of unauthorized use, modification, and destruction; and taxpayers to loss and damages resulting from identity fraud and other financial crimes. IRS specified the actions it has taken or plans to take to adequately mitigate the remaining weaknesses and stated that an additional 12 percent of the weaknesses have been corrected since the completion of our review. We will review the actions taken by IRS to mitigate the remaining weaknesses as part of our audit of IRS’ fiscal year 1998 financial statements. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) progress in correcting serious computer security weaknesses at five IRS facilities, focusing on: (1) additional security weaknesses identified at the five facilities and at an IRS facility not included in GAO's previous report; and (2) steps IRS has taken or plans to take to implement a service-wide computer security management program.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that:(1) IRS is making significant progress to improve computer security over its facilities; (2) since GAO's April 1997 report, IRS has acknowledged the seriousness of its computer security weaknesses, consolidated overall responsibility for computer security management within one executive-level office under its Chief Information Officer, reevaluated its approach to computer security management, and developed a high-level plan for mitigating the weaknesses GAO identified; (3) GAO found that IRS has corrected or mitigated the risks associated with 63 percent of the weaknesses discussed in its prior report; (4) while progress has been made, serious weaknesses continue to exist at the five facilities visited during GAO's prior audit, and it identified several additional weaknesses at those locations and at a sixth facility included in this review; (5) these weaknesses exist primarily because IRS has not yet fully institutionalized its computer security management program; (6) these weaknesses affect IRS' ability to control physical access to its data processing facilities and sensitive taxpayer data and computer programs, prevent or detect unauthorized changes to taxpayer data or computer software, and restore essential IRS operations following an emergency or natural disaster; (7) until these weaknesses are mitigated, IRS continues to run the risk of its tax processing operations being disrupted; (8) furthermore, sensitive taxpayer data entrusted to IRS could be disclosed to unauthorized individuals, improperly used or modified, or destroyed, thereby exposing taxpayers to loss or damages resulting from identity fraud and other financial crimes; (9) in comments agreeing with GAO's recommendations, IRS stated that since the end of GAO's review, it had also specified actions planned and under way to address the remaining weaknesses; and (10) GAO will review those actions as part of its audit of IRS' fiscal year 1998 financial statements. |
gao_GAO-17-682 | gao_GAO-17-682_0 | There are several different contract types and selection is the principal means that DOD has for allocating cost risk between the government and the contractor. At times, DOD may combine FMS purchases with its own procurements. However, in recent years, there has been an increase in the use of fixed-price-incentive contracts for FMS procurements, which is consistent with DOD guidance that has emphasized the use of these contracts. DOD is in the early stages of implementing the Fiscal Year 2017 NDAA requirement to use firm-fixed-price contracts and is weighing various factors such as how waivers will be reviewed and approved. Firm-Fixed-Price Contracts Accounted for Nearly All FMS Procurements but Use of Fixed-Price-Incentive Contracts Has Increased
Over the past 10 years DOD used a mix of contract types to procure defense articles and services on behalf of foreign customers through the FMS program; however, firm-fixed-price contracts were most frequently used, both in terms of number of contracts awarded and dollars obligated. Once Army officials discovered the high profit rates, they switched to a fixed-price- incentive contract for subsequent awards to position the U.S. government and FMS customers to share in any subsequent cost savings. DOD Is Weighing Various Factors as It Takes Steps to Implement Legislative Contracting Requirements for FMS
The Fiscal Year 2017 NDAA called for DOD to revise its acquisition regulations to require the use of firm-fixed-price contracts for items procured under the FMS program, unless a waiver is granted or the foreign customer states a preference for an alternate contract type. Variety of Factors Can Extend FMS Timeframes and Increase Costs, but Some DOD Programs Use a Checklist to Expedite Requirements Definition Challenges in Defining Requirements Can Slow the FMS Process, but Some Programs Use a Checklist to Minimize Delays
A variety of factors can prolong various phases of the FMS acquisition process, but program officials we spoke to most commonly cited the challenge in defining FMS customer’s requirements as a major contributing factor. Defining the requirement—that is, the materiel and services needed—occurs in the first phases of the FMS process and is the linchpin to enable DOD to deliver the goods and services to FMS customers by the time they need them and at a price they can afford. In addition, specifying these details enables the contracting officer to obtain more accurate pricing data from the contractor and better estimate delivery timeframes. We reviewed 32 FMS cases from across the seven programs in our sample and found that program offices missed the 20-day goal in 14 cases. Accordingly, the military departments have developed a range of checklists, with some from the Air Force and Army available to the public on the Internet. The Air Force has developed checklists for specific weapon systems such as missiles, global positioning systems, and various types of aircraft. Delays during FMS Case Reviews May Prevent Synchronization of DOD and FMS Requirements
According to DOD program officials, the reviews conducted by the U.S. and foreign governments after a program office develops a letter of offer and acceptance can be lengthy and may affect a program’s ability to synchronize FMS and U.S. procurements. Recommendation for Executive Action
To help increase efficiency when defining FMS requirements to be placed on contract, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense issue department-wide guidance for the military departments and DOD components to expand the use of requirements checklists to develop more comprehensive letters of request for FMS cases. In its comments, reproduced in appendix II, DOD concurred with our recommendation. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The House Report 114-537 that accompanied the National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2017 included a provision for GAO to review certain aspects of Department of Defense’s (DOD) acquisition process, including contract type selection, to determine their effect, if any, on foreign military sales (FMS). We assessed 1) how the use of firm- fixed-price contracts compares to other contract types awarded for FMS procurements and the reasons they were used and 2) the factors that may contribute to delays and potentially increase costs for FMS procurements. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. government procures billions of dollars in goods and services each year on behalf of foreign governments through the FMS program. Multiple federal agencies are involved in the FMS program; however, DOD manages the procurement process. The FMS program is a key component of national security and foreign policy.
House Report 114-537 included a provision for GAO to review certain aspects of DOD's acquisition process such as what effect, if any, certain types of contracts may have on the FMS process. This report addresses (1) how the use of firm-fixed-price contracts compares to other contract types awarded for FMS and the reasons they are used; and (2) the factors that may contribute to delays or potentially increase costs. GAO has other work addressing the FMS process and will issue separate reports.
GAO analyzed FMS procurement data for fiscal years 2007 through 2016, the most current data available to determine trends. GAO also selected a non-generalizable sample of 32 FMS cases from seven program offices, based on use of different contract types to procure the same item; reviewed relevant DOD and federal acquisition regulations and policies; and interviewed DOD officials.
What GAO Found
Over the past 10 years, firm-fixed-price contracts—where the contractor is paid a set amount regardless of incurred costs—accounted for 99 percent of contract awards and had the highest obligations for foreign military sales (FMS). But in recent years, there has been an increased use of fixed-price-incentive contracts—where the government and contractor share in cost savings and risks and the contractor's ability to earn a profit is tied to its performance. This trend is consistent with recent Department of Defense (DOD) contracting practices and aligns with department guidance that emphasizes the use of fixed-price-incentive contracts in certain instances where better pricing outcomes might be achieved. Contracting officers generally follow the same acquisition guidance for FMS procurements as they do for DOD and use various contract types based on assessed risks. For example, for decades, the Air Force had awarded firm-fixed-price contracts for FMS customers to procure an air-to-air missile, but in 2015 transitioned to a fixed-price-incentive contract when it realized the contractor could achieve cost savings through production efficiencies. Legislative changes in fiscal year 2017 call for DOD to use firm-fixed-price contracts for FMS unless a waiver is granted. DOD is in the early stages of implementing these revisions and is weighing various factors, such as how waivers will be reviewed.
GAO found several factors may contribute to delays or increased prices in FMS. For example, program officials noted that general acquisition issues, such as delayed contract awards and unforeseen events during production, can similarly affect FMS. Moreover, military department officials stated that the process for defining requirements is a significant challenge that affects expediency of FMS procurements. DOD guidance states that programs may combine FMS and domestic requirements onto a single contract as a way to lower prices and facilitate timely delivery. However, program offices GAO spoke with noted that adequately defining foreign customers' requirements may prevent them from doing so. To expedite requirements definition, the Air Force and Army implemented checklists to aid foreign partners and program offices when specifying requirements. The Navy developed but has not yet disseminated its checklists for use. GAO's analysis of 32 FMS cases showed that checklists were not always available to support procurements but that program offices that used them noted increases in timeliness. Expanding the use of checklists by DOD may better position DOD to obtain information needed to deliver equipment and services to FMS customers when needed.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD issue department-wide guidance for program offices to expand the use of tools, such as checklists, to aid FMS customers in specifying their requirements in a way that DOD can act upon in a timely manner. DOD concurred with GAO's recommendation. |
gao_GAO-11-325 | gao_GAO-11-325_0 | Background
The F-35 program is a joint, multinational acquisition to develop and field an affordable, highly common family of stealthy, next-generation strike fighter aircraft for the United States Air Force, Marine Corps, Navy, and eight international partners. The JSF is DOD’s largest cooperative program. These actions, effectively implemented, should result in more predictable and achievable program outcomes, but restructuring comes with consequences—higher upfront development costs, fewer aircraft received in the near term, training delays, and extended times for testing and delivering the capabilities required by the warfighter. Affordability for the U.S. and our allies is challenged because unit prices are about double what they were at program start and with new forecasts that the aircraft may cost substantially more to operate and maintain over the life cycle than the legacy aircraft they replace. Going forward, the program requires unprecedented levels of funding in a period of more austere defense funding. Key program changes (1) added $4.6 billion to the development program through completion for a total development program estimate of $56.4 billion (an increase of 26 percent against the current baseline and 64 percent from the original baseline at program start); (2) extended the development test period to 2016 (a 4-year slip from the current baseline); and (3) reduced near-term procurement quantities by 124 aircraft in addition to the 122 aircraft cut announced in February 2010; and (4) lowered the annual rate of increase for boosting future production. We expect total procurement costs will be somewhat higher than the estimate submitted in the Nunn-McCurdy certification (refer to table 1). The JSF is the linchpin in DOD’s tactical aircraft recapitalization plans, replacing hundreds of legacy aircraft. It had mixed success, achieving 6 goals and making varying degrees of progress on the other 6. The development flight test program significantly ramped up operations in 2010, accomplishing three times as many test flights as the previous 3 years combined. The Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 established this requirement and we understand the Department is working on its implementation. Program Has Still Not Fully Demonstrated a Stable Design and Mature Manufacturing Processes as It Enters Its Fifth Year of Production
After completing 9 years of system development and 4 years of overlapping production activities, the JSF program has been slow to gain adequate knowledge that its design and manufacturing process are fully mature and ready for greater levels of annual production. Specifically, the program has not yet stabilized aircraft designs—engineering changes continue at higher than expected rates long after critical design reviews and well into procurement, and more changes are expected as testing accelerates. Also, the aircraft and engine manufacturing processes are not yet mature enough to support efficient production at higher annual rates and substantial improvements in the global supply network are needed. In addition, changes to drawings have not decreased and leveled off as planned. The most significant incomplete recommendation is improving global supply chain management. Testing Has Been Slow and Has Not Demonstrated That the Aircraft Will Work in Its Intended Environment
The JSF program is still very early in demonstrating aircraft design and testing to verify it works as intended. As of December 2010, about four percent of JSF capabilities have been completely verified by flight tests, lab results, or both. Only 3 of 32 ground test labs and simulation models critical to complement and, in some cases, substitute for flight tests, are accredited to verify and ensure the fidelity of results. Software development—essential for achieving about 80 percent of the JSF functionality—is significantly behind schedule as it enters its most challenging phase. Focused individual attention on STOVL apart from the other two variants could allow each variant to proceed through development and testing at its own pace. 2. Establish criteria for the STOVL probation period and take additional steps to sustain individual attention on STOVL-specific issues, including independent F-35B/STOVL Progress Reviews with Senior Leadership to ensure cost and schedule milestones are achieved to deliver required warfighter capabilities. 3. DOD concurred with the recommendations as amended. We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the Secretaries of the Air Force and Navy; the Commandant of the Marine Corps; and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget. To assess plans, progress, and risks in test activities, we examined program documents and interviewed DOD, program office, and contractor officials about current test plans and progress. In February 2010, the Department announced a major restructuring of the JSF program, including reduced procurement and a planned move to fixed-price contracts. GAO-10-382. | Why GAO Did This Study
The F-35 Lightning II, also known as the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), is the Department of Defense's (DOD) most costly and ambitious aircraft acquisition, seeking to simultaneously develop and field three aircraft variants for the Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and eight international partners. The JSF is critical for recapitalizing tactical air forces and will require a long-term commitment to very large annual funding outlays. The current estimated investment is $382 billion to develop and procure 2,457 aircraft. This report, prepared in response to a congressional mandate in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, discusses (1) program cost and schedule changes and their implications on affordability; (2) progress made during 2010; (3) design and manufacturing maturity; and (4) test plans and progress. GAO's work included analyses of a wide range of program documents and interviews with defense and contractor officials.
What GAO Found
DOD continues to substantially restructure the JSF program, taking positive actions that should lead to more achievable and predictable outcomes. Restructuring has consequences--higher up-front development costs, fewer aircraft in the near term, training delays, and extended times for testing and delivering capabilities to warfighters. Total development funding is now $56.4 billion to complete in 2018, a 26 percent increase in cost and a 5-year slip in schedule compared to the current baseline. DOD also reduced procurement quantities by 246 aircraft through 2016, but has not calculated the net effects of restructuring on total procurement costs nor approved a new baseline. Affordability for the U.S. and partners is challenged by a near doubling in average unit prices since program start and higher estimated life-cycle costs. Going forward, the JSF requires unprecedented funding levels in a period of more austere defense budgets. The program had mixed success in 2010, achieving 6 of 12 major goals it established and making varying degrees of progress on the others. Successes included the first flight of the carrier variant, award of a fixed-price aircraft procurement contract, and an accelerated pace in development flight tests that accomplished three times as many flights in 2010 as the previous 3 years combined. However, the program did not deliver as many aircraft to test and training sites as planned and made only a partial release of software capabilities. The short take off and landing variant (STOVL) experienced significant technical problems and did not meet flight test expectations. The Secretary of Defense directed a 2-year period to evaluate and engineer STOVL solutions. After more than 9 years in development and 4 in production, the JSF program has not fully demonstrated that the aircraft design is stable, manufacturing processes are mature, and the system is reliable. Engineering drawings are still being released to the manufacturing floor and design changes continue at higher rates than desired. More changes are expected as testing accelerates. Test and production aircraft cost more and are taking longer to deliver than expected. Manufacturers are improving operations and implemented 8 of 20 recommendations from an expert panel, but have not yet demonstrated a capacity to efficiently produce at higher production rates. Substantial improvements in factory throughput and the global supply chain are needed. Development testing is still early in demonstrating that aircraft will work as intended and meet warfighter requirements. Only about 4 percent of JSF capabilities have been completely verified by flight tests, lab results, or both. Only 3 of the extensive network of 32 ground test labs and simulation models are fully accredited to ensure the fidelity of results. Software development--essential for achieving about 80 percent of the JSF functionality--is significantly behind schedule as it enters its most challenging phase.
What GAO Recommends
To sustain a focus on accountability and facilitate tradeoffs within the JSF program, GAO recommends that DOD (1) maintain annual funding levels at current budgeted amounts; (2) establish criteria for evaluating the STOVL's progress and make independent reviews, allowing each variant to proceed at its own pace; and (3) conduct an independent review of the software development and lab accreditation processes. DOD concurred. |
gao_HEHS-98-232 | gao_HEHS-98-232_0 | Specifically, the objectives of this study were to describe the major federal requirements that affect school districts; describe the issues that local school districts face in implementing these analyze the impact of the Department of Education’s flexibility initiatives on school districts’ ability to address these implementation issues. Implementation Issues Relating to Federal Requirements Affect How School Districts Plan, Fund, and Operate Educational Programs
School district officials generally expressed support for federal initiatives, recognizing the importance of such goals as ensuring equal educational opportunity and protecting children’s health and safety. At the same time they noted their concerns with implementation issues that make achieving these goals more difficult. Rather than focusing on a single federal program or requirement, these concerns extend to a wide variety of implementation issues that affect all phases of program and service delivery. School districts’ key implementation issues include: (1) the lack of adequate information on federal requirements and federal funding, which can make school districts less efficient and less innovative in implementing federal requirements; (2) program and facilities costs associated with federal requirements, as well as the administrative costs associated with federal programs; and (3) the logistical and management challenges presented by certain federal requirements, which can make it difficult to meet federally prescribed timelines and to find the qualified staff or providers to successfully implement federal requirements. However, they also expressed concern about both the program costs and the administrative costs of implementing federal laws and regulations. Some of these flexibility initiatives have been used infrequently, and their use varies considerably across states. Other financial flexibility provisions are more narrowly designed and less frequently used. Flexibility Initiatives Increase Districts’ Informational Needs
Although information-related issues are of key concern to school district officials, the recent flexibility initiatives increase the amount of information districts need, rather than simplify or streamline information on federal requirements. In addition, because these flexibility efforts do not make fundamental changes in the requirements of federal programs and mandates, school districts continue to be responsible for providing required services. Because federal flexibility efforts are limited to a few programs, these initiatives are not able to address problems that arise outside these programs’ parameters. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the: (1) major federal requirements that affect school districts; (2) issues that school districts face in implementing these requirements; and (3) impact of the Department of Education's flexibility initiatives on school districts' ability to address these implementation issues.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the wide range of federal requirements that affect school districts reflects many different policy goals and program objectives; (2) many of these federal requirements--especially those that most directly affect teaching--come with federal dollars, but others do not; (3) federal laws and regulations affect school districts in all their varied activities; (4) federal requirements are augmented by state and local requirements and court decisions; (5) district officials generally expressed support for federal programs and mandates, recognizing the importance of goals such as ensuring school safety and promoting equal educational opportunity; (6) at the same time they noted their concerns with implementation issues that made achieving these goals more difficult; (7) rather than focusing on a single federal program or requirement, these implementation issues extend across several broad areas, including the: (a) difficulty in obtaining accurate, timely, and sufficiently detailed information about federal requirements and federal funding; (b) limited funds available to meet program and administrative costs; and (c) logistical and management challenges presented by certain requirements; (8) in the past 5 years, several initiatives have been designed and implemented to provide more flexibility to school districts; (9) however, some of these initiatives have not been widely used by the districts; (10) in addition, because they are narrowly structured, these flexibility initiatives generally do not address school districts' major concerns; (11) although information-related issues are very important to school district officials, the recent flexibility initiatives increase the amount of information districts need, rather than simplifying or streamlining information on federal requirements; (12) federal flexibility efforts neither reduce districts' financial obligations nor provide additional federal dollars; (13) because the flexibility initiatives are limited to specific programs, their ability to reduce administrative effort and streamline procedures is also limited; and (14) broadening the scope of federal flexibility efforts, however, raises concerns about whether the underlying goals of federal programs can be achieved without the guidance of specific regulatory provisions. |
gao_NSIAD-99-67 | gao_NSIAD-99-67_0 | The act authorizes special immigrants to be admitted to the United States as religious workers if, for 2 years prior to admission, they have been members of a religious denomination having a bona fide, nonprofit, religious organization in the United States; they intend to enter the United States to work for the organization at the organization's request in a religious vocation or occupation; and they have been carrying on the religious work continuously for at least 2 years immediately preceding their application for admission. The Extent and Nature of Fraud
Both INS and State have expressed concern about fraud in the religious worker visa program, but they do not have data or analysis to firmly establish the extent of the problem. Their knowledge of program fraud is based on information developed primarily from fraud investigations and through the visa screening process. The types of fraud the agencies have encountered often involved petitioners making false statements about the length of time that the applicant was a member of the religious organization and the nature of the qualifying work experience. At least five investigations performed by INS since 1994 have involved individuals or organizations filing petitions for hundreds of religious workers. Changes to the Visa Screening Process
INS and State reviewers stated that they are not confident that the agencies' screening process is identifying all unqualified applicants and sponsoring organizations. They attributed the problem to the lack of sufficient information to determine the eligibility of visa applicants and their sponsors. INS, with State's support, is considering a number of steps to address this problem. They said that sometimes the sponsoring organizations submit copies of their original tax-exemption form, which may no longer be valid. Full-time Work Requirement
INS is in the process of implementing a proposed regulatory change to expressly require that the prior work experience specified for immigrant religious worker visa applicants be full-time work. Scope and Methodology
To determine whether INS and State have data on any fraud in the religious worker visa program and to determine the nature of any abuse, we met with INS and State headquarters officials and visited three of the four INS service centers responsible for processing and approving religious worker visas. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on: (1) the extent and nature of any fraud the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and the Department of State have identified in the religious worker visa program; and (2) any steps INS and State have taken or plan to take to change the visa screening process.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) although INS and State have identified some program fraud through the visa screening process and investigations, they do not have data or analysis to firmly establish the extent of fraud in the religious worker visa program; (2) the nature of the fraud uncovered typically involved: (a) applicants making false statements about their qualifications as religious workers or their exact plans in the United States; or (b) conspiracy between an applicant and a sponsoring organization to misrepresent material facts about the applicant's qualifications or the nature of the position to be filled; (3) INS and State sometimes detect fraud schemes when a sponsoring organization petitions INS for hundreds of religious workers at a time; (4) in order to increase the availability of information necessary to allow reviewers to determine the eligibility of visa applicants and sponsors, INS, with State's support, is considering changes to the visa screening process; (5) these changes include: (a) having an applicant submit additional evidence of his or her qualifications; (b) having the sponsoring organization submit additional evidence regarding its ability to financially support the applicant; and (c) incorporating new software applications that alert reviewers to organizations filing petitions for numerous workers; (6) INS is also proposing a regulatory change to expressly require that the prior work experience specified for immigrant religious worker visa applicants be full-time and that the individuals work for the religious organization in the United States on a full-time basis; (7) the religious organizations GAO met with believe the program meets their needs; and (8) of the seven organizations commenting on the proposed regulatory change, three opposed it because some part-time religious workers that are eligible may no longer qualify. |
gao_GAO-12-244 | gao_GAO-12-244_0 | Industry Has Improved Its Capabilities for Subsea Well Containment in the Gulf of Mexico
Since the Deepwater Horizon incident, the oil and gas industry has improved its capabilities to respond to a subsea well blowout in the Gulf of Mexico. In particular, operators have formed two new organizations that are expected to offer improved well containment capabilities, including more effective equipment and services, and expertise to member operators in the event of a well blowout. The subsea well containment capabilities available for the Gulf of Mexico consist primarily of existing technologies that have been modified to support well containment. Well containment capabilities in the Gulf of Mexico include the following: containment equipment, including capping stacks used to shut in a well, and containment domes and top hats that are used to collect escaping oil and gas and flow them to the surface; subsea support systems, such as riser systems that direct captured oil and gas to surface vessels in the event that the well cannot be shut in completely; utility equipment, such as dispersant injection systems, hydrate inhibitor systems, and hydraulic power systems; manifolds and connection systems; and remotely operated vehicles; and surface vessels, such as multipurpose containment response vessels that can be configured to conduct a variety of drilling or containment activities, production vessels that can process captured oil, storage tankers to transport the captured oil, and other support vessels used to distribute dispersants and control remotely operated underwater vehicles. 3). Interior Has Issued New Guidance and Is Documenting Many of Its Oversight Processes, but Has Not Documented a Time Frame for Testing Operators’ Responses to a Subsea Blowout
Following the Deepwater Horizon incident, Interior issued new guidance that identified information operators are to provide to demonstrate well containment capability, but Interior has not fully documented its internal process for reviewing this information. According to Interior officials, on at least 12 occasions, an operator strengthened its wellbore design based on the results of the screening tool. Interior Is Documenting Its Process to Ensure Equipment Is Inspected and Available, but Has Not Documented a Time Frame for Incorporating Well Containment Scenarios into Unannounced Spill Drills
As previously stated in this report, since the Deepwater Horizon incident, the well containment plans that operators submit to Interior as part of the permitting process identify equipment that the operator plans to use to contain subsea well blowouts. However, Interior has not tested most operators’ ability to respond to a subsea blowout, and has not established a time frame to incorporate these tests into unannounced spill drills. Subsea Well Containment Capabilities Available for the Gulf of Mexico Could Be Used in Other Federal Waters, but Environmental and Logistical Risks Differ
Subsea well containment capabilities similar to what industry offers for the Gulf of Mexico could generally be used in other federal waters, including the outer continental shelf off Alaska. Industry officials said that they are developing a well containment response capability for use in this region. Industry Is Developing Well Containment Capabilities for the Alaska Outer Continental Shelf
For the past two decades, the majority of subsea oil and gas exploration and production in U.S. waters has occurred in the Gulf of Mexico; however, in 2010, Shell Oil submitted plans to Interior to drill in the waters north of Alaska as early as the summer of 2012. For example, while Interior has not fully documented its well containment plan review process, Interior officials told us that they expect to have documentation in place by spring 2012. Finally, Interior has conducted two unannounced spill drills that have included a subsea well containment scenario, and Interior officials told us it will incorporate these scenarios into future spill drills. However, Interior has not established a time frame for incorporating subsea well containment scenarios into spill drills and until it does so, there is limited assurance that operators drilling in the Gulf of Mexico or other areas will be prepared to respond to a subsea well blowout. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We provided a draft of this report to the Department of the Interior for review and comment. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact Madhav Panwar at (202) 512-6228 or [email protected] or Frank Rusco at (202) 512-3841 or [email protected]. | Why GAO Did This Study
On April 20, 2010, an explosion and fire on board the Deepwater Horizon, an offshore drilling rig, resulted in 11 deaths and the largest oil spill in U.S. history in the Gulf of Mexico. After this event, the Department of the Interior (Interior), which oversees oil and gas operations in federal waters, suspended certain offshore drilling operations. After developing new guidance, Interior resumed approving drilling operations in the Gulf of Mexico. GAO was asked to examine (1) the industrys improved capabilities for containing subsea wells (those on the ocean floor) in the Gulf of Mexico; (2) Interiors oversight of subsea well containment in the Gulf of Mexico; and (3) the potential to use similar subsea well containment capabilities in other federal waters, such as those along the Alaskan coast.
GAO reviewed laws, regulations, and guidance; documents from oil and gas operators; and Interiors oversight processes. GAO also interviewed agency officials and industry representatives.
What GAO Found
Since the Deepwater Horizon incident, the oil and gas industry has improved its capabilities to respond to a subsea well blowoutthe uncontrolled release of oil or gas from a well on the ocean floorin the Gulf of Mexico. In particular, operators have formed two new not-for-profit organizations that can quickly make available well containment equipment, services, and expertise. Among the equipment that these organizations can provide are capping stacksdevices used to stop the flow of oil or gas from a well. This improved well containment response equipment consists primarily of existing technologies that have been modified to support well containment, according to industry representatives.
Following the Deepwater Horizon incident, Interior strengthened its review plans and resources to contain a subsea well blowout; however, its internal oversight processes have not yet been fully documented. Interior has issued guidance to operators outlining information that must be provided to Interior to demonstrate that operators can respond to a well blowout. Interior officials said that they expect to have documentation of their process for reviewing this information in place by spring 2012. Also, Interior incorporated tests of an operators well containment response capabilities into two unannounced spill drills, and Interior officials told us they intend to incorporate such tests into future spill drills. However, Interior has not documented a time frame for incorporating these tests, and until it does so there is limited assurance of an operators ability to respond to a subsea well blowout.
Subsea well containment capabilities developed for the Gulf of Mexico could generally be used elsewhere, including Alaskan waters, according to industry representatives and Interior officials. However, because other areas lack the infrastructure and equipment present in the Gulf of Mexico, well blowout response capabilities are more limited. Two operators have submitted plans to Interior to drill in waters north of Alaska as early as the summer of 2012. They are developing, but have not submitted, final well containment plans to Interior, and these plans will need to be approved by Interior before drilling. Oil and gas exploration and production off the coast of Alaska is likely to encounter environmental and logistical risks that differ from those in the Gulf of Mexico because of the regions cold and icy conditionsfactors that would also likely affect the response to a well blowout.
What GAO Recommends
To help ensure that operators can respond effectively to a subsea well blowout, GAO recommends that Interior document a time frame for incorporating well containment response scenarios into unannounced spill drills. In commenting on a draft of this report, Interior concurred with GAOs recommendation.
or Frank Rusco at (202) 512-3841 or [email protected] . |
gao_GAO-12-39 | gao_GAO-12-39_0 | Distance Education Has Become Common in All Sectors and Is Offered through a Range of Programs and Courses
Online Distance Education Has Grown Dramatically and Is Offered in a Variety of Ways
While distance education can use various technologies, it has grown most rapidly online with the use of the Internet to support interaction among users. Moreover, the term “distance education” no longer connotes only instruction separated by physical distance, since many distance education courses—specifically online courses—are offered to students living on campus as well as away from a campus and across state lines. School offerings in online learning range from individual classes to complete degree programs. Individual courses as well as degree programs may also be a mix of face-to-face and online instruction—often referred to as “hybrid” or “blended” instruction. As shown in figure 2, public schools, both 2- and 4-year, were more likely to offer distance education opportunities than private nonprofit or for-profit schools. Distance education students enroll in a variety of fields of study. While Students in Distance Education Tend to Be Older and Female, and Have Family and Work Obligations, They Are Also a Diverse Population
According to our analysis of 2007-2008 NPSAS data, distance education students varied somewhat from students who did not enroll in distance education in that they tended to be somewhat older and female, and have family and work obligations. Moreover, students who are participating in distance education represent a diverse population that includes students of all races, current and former members of the military, and students with disabilities. Accreditors and Schools Assess the Academic Quality of Distance Education in Several Ways, but Accreditors Reported Some Oversight Challenges
Accrediting Agencies Examine the Quality of Distance Education in Various Ways but Reported Some Challenges
Accreditors we interviewed have various procedures to examine schools’ distance education programs, but some accreditors reported they face challenges. However, accrediting agencies are not required to have separate standards for distance education. As such, accreditors we spoke with who accredit both distance education and face-to-face programs use the same standards for both, although they differed in the practices they used to examine schools offering distance education. Schools Use a Range of Course Design Principles and Student Performance Assessments to Hold Distance Education to the Same Quality Standards as Traditional Courses
To assure that their distance education programs are accredited by federally recognized accreditors and that their students qualify for Title IV funding, officials we interviewed at 20 selected schools reported that they generally apply certain course design principles and use student performance assessments to assess the quality of the courses that make up these programs. Some teams include specialized staff who work with faculty to translate traditional face-to-face courses to the online environment. Officials at most schools we spoke with said they also used outcome data to make improvements to their courses. Education Has Increased Its Monitoring of Distance Education but Lacks Sufficient Data to Inform Its Oversight
Education’s Office of Federal Student Aid (FSA) has recently increased its monitoring of distance education by updating its program review procedures and undertaking a risk analysis project. conducting this project in conjunction with others in the department. While the objective of the project was to review high-risk distance education schools, Education lacked data to adequately identify schools’ level of risk based on the extent to which they offered distance education and the amount of federal student aid they received for those programs or courses. While the project is not yet complete, officials reported confidence that their study is currently based on an appropriate selection of schools. For example, they will be able to match the extent to which schools offer distance education with Title IV violations identified during program reviews. Moreover, FSA indicated it was not aware of NCES’s efforts to expand the IPEDS distance education data collection and, therefore, was not involved in the planning and did not provide input during comment periods. Recommendation for Executive Action
To help Education strengthen its oversight of distance education, the Secretary of Education should direct FSA to develop a plan on how best to use the new IPEDS distance education data and provide input to NCES on future IPEDS survey work with regard to distance education. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This appendix discusses in detail our methodology for addressing the following research objectives: (1) the characteristics of distance education today, (2) the characteristics of students participating in distance education, (3) how the quality of distance education is being assessed, and (4) how Education monitors distance education in its stewardship of federal student aid funds. To determine the current characteristics of distance education, we analyzed 2009-2010 data from Education’s IPEDS and also from a 2008 report by Education’s National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) to obtain a national perspective on distance education practices and offerings at postsecondary schools. 5 public 4-year schools. | Why GAO Did This Study
As the largest provider of financial aid in higher education, with about $134 billion in Title IV funds provided to students in fiscal year 2010, the Department of Education (Education) has a considerable interest in distance education. Distance education--that is, offering courses by the Internet, video, or other forms outside the classroom--has been a growing force in postsecondary education and there are questions about quality and adequate oversight. GAO was asked to determine (1) the characteristics of distance education today, (2) the characteristics of students participating in distance education, (3) how the quality of distance education is being assessed, and (4) how Education monitors distance education in its stewardship of federal student aid funds. GAO reviewed federal laws and regulations, analyzed Education data and documents, and interviewed Education officials and industry experts. GAO also interviewed officials from accrediting and state agencies, as well as 20 schools--which were selected based on a variety of factors to represent diverse perspectives.
What GAO Found
While distance education can use a variety of technologies, it has grown most rapidly online with the use of the Internet. Online distance education is currently being offered in various ways to students living on campus, away from a campus, and across state lines. School offerings in online learning range from individual classes to complete degree programs. Courses and degree programs may be a mix of face-to-face and online instruction--"hybrid" or "blended" instruction. Online asynchronous instruction--whereby students participate on their own schedule--is most common because it provides students with more convenience and flexibility, according to school officials. In the 2009-2010 academic year, almost half of postsecondary schools offered distance education opportunities to their students. Public 2- and 4-year schools were most likely to offer distance education, followed closely by private for-profit 4-year schools. Students in distance education enroll mostly in public schools, and they represent a diverse population. While they tend to be older and female, and have family and work obligations, they also include students of all races, current and former members of the military, and those with disabilities. According to the most current Education data (2007-2008), students enrolled in distance education studied a range of subjects, such as business and health. Accrediting agencies and schools assess the academic quality of distance education in several ways, but accreditors reported some oversight challenges. Federal law and regulations do not require accrediting agencies to have separate standards for reviewing distance education. As such, accreditors GAO spoke with have not adopted separate review standards, although they differed in the practices they used to examine schools offering distance education. Officials at two accreditors GAO spoke with cited some challenges with assessing quality, including keeping pace with the number of new online programs. School officials GAO interviewed reported using a range of design principles and student performance assessments to hold distance education to the same standards as face-to-face education. Some schools reported using specialized staff to translate face-to-face courses to the online environment, as well as standards developed by distance education experts to design their distance education courses. Schools also reported collecting outcome data, including data on student learning, to improve their courses. Education has increased its monitoring of distance education but lacks sufficient data to inform its oversight activities. In 2009, Education began selecting 27 schools for distance education monitoring based on an analysis of risk factors, but it did not have data to identify schools with high enrollments in distance education, which may have impeded its ability to accurately identify high-risk schools. Between 2011 and 2013, Education's National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) will start collecting survey data on the extent to which schools offer distance education, as well as enrollment levels. However, the department's Office of Federal Student Aid (FSA), responsible for monitoring Title IV compliance, was not involved in the process of deciding what distance education information would be collected; therefore, it did not provide input on what types of data could be helpful in oversight. Further, FSA officials said they do not yet have a plan on how they will use the new data in monitoring. To improve its oversight and monitoring of federal student aid funds, Education should develop a plan on how it could best use the new distance education data NCES is collecting and provide input to NCES on future data collections. Education agreed with the recommendation. |
gao_GAO-02-20 | gao_GAO-02-20_0 | Day Trading Firms Have Continued to Evolve
Since 1999, day traders as a group and firms that offer day trading capability have continued to evolve. We also found that many day trading firms now market to institutional customers, such as hedge funds and money market managers, rather than focusing on retail customers. Another change involves the growth in the number of day trading firms being acquired by other brokerages and in market participants that want the direct access technology. Day Trading Firms Have Also Taken Steps to Address Concerns About Day Trading
In addition to the ongoing changes in day trading and in regulatory oversight of the activity, many day trading firms have responded to changing market conditions and regulatory scrutiny. In general, today’s day traders appear to be more experienced and knowledgeable about securities markets than many day traders in the late 1990s. Likewise, many day trading firms have begun to focus on institutional traders as well as retail customers, and more firms are likely to engage in proprietary trading. Implementation of disclosure rules and amendments to margin rules have directly or indirectly addressed many of the concerns raised by the Permanent Subcommittee. Finally, the firms themselves have adjusted their behavior in response to market changes and regulatory scrutiny. The most noticeable changes appear in their advertising and Web site information, which in many cases now generally highlight the risks associated with day trading and the fact that day trading is not for everyone. | What GAO Found
Concerns arose in the late 1990s about day trading, particularly the use of questionable advertising to attract customers without fully disclosing or by downplaying the risks involved. Concerns were also raised that traders were losing large amounts of money. Day traders as a group and day trading firms have continued to evolve and are generally more experienced and sophisticated about securities markets and investing than was the case several years ago. Likewise, day trading firms' operations have evolved, and many have shifted their primary focus away from retail customers and toward attracting institutional customers, such as hedge funds and money market managers. Furthermore, more firms are likely to engage in proprietary trading activities through professional traders that trade the firms' own capital. Finally, although the number of day trading firms appears to have remained constant, several day trading firms have been acquired by other brokerages and market participants whose customers want the direct access to securities markets and market information that technology used by day trading firms provides. Since GAO's 2000 review, the Securities and Exchange Commission and the self-regulatory organizations have addressed many of the concerns raised about day trading. In addition to the ongoing changes in the industry and regulatory action, day trading firms have responded to changing market conditions and regulatory scrutiny by changing their behavior. The most noticeable changes appear in their advertising and website information, which now generally highlight the risks associated with day trading and the fact that day trading is not for everyone. |
gao_T-RCED-98-125 | gao_T-RCED-98-125_0 | In fiscal year 1996, the states returned about $121.6 million, or about 3.3 percent, of that year’s $3.7 billion WIC grant for reallocation to the states in the next fiscal year. Some of the reasons cited by the WIC directors for not spending all available federal funds related to the structure of the WIC program. Some of these states prohibit agency expenditures that exceed their available funding. As a result, they were unable to certify and serve a number of eligible individuals and did not spend the associated grant funds. WIC Access for Working Women
On the basis of our nationwide survey of randomly selected local WIC agencies, we reported in October 1997 that these agencies have implemented a variety of strategies to increase the accessibility of their clinics for working women. The most frequently cited strategies—used by every agency—are scheduling appointments instead of taking participants on a first-come, first-served basis and allowing other persons to pick up participants’ WIC vouchers. We estimated that about 66 percent of local WIC agencies have taken steps to expedite clinic visits for working women. Containing Program Costs
In September 1997, we reported that the states have used a variety of initiatives to control WIC costs. These two practices are (1) contracting with manufacturers to obtain rebates on WIC foods in addition to infant formula and (2) limiting authorized food selections by, for example, requiring participants to select brands of foods that have the lowest cost. Our survey also collected information on the practices that the states are using to ensure that program participants meet the program’s income and residency requirements. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed its three recently completed reviews of the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC), focusing on: (1) the reasons that states had for not spending all of their federal grant funds; (2) efforts of WIC agencies to improve access to WIC benefits for working women; and (3) various practices states use to lower the costs of WIC and ensure that the incomes of WIC applicants' meet the program's eligibility requirements for participation.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) states had unspent WIC funds for a variety of reasons; (2) in fiscal year 1996, these funds totalled about $121.6 million, or about 3.3 percent of that year's $3.7 billion WIC grants; (3) some of these reasons were associated with the way WIC is structured; (4) virtually all the directors of local WIC agencies report that their clinics have taken steps to improve access to WIC benefits for working women; (5) the two most frequently cited strategies are: (a) scheduling appointments instead of taking participants on a first-come, first-served basis; and (b) allowing a person other than the participant to pick up the food vouchers, as well as nutrition information, and to pass these benefits on to the participant; (6) the states are using a variety of cost containment initiatives that have saved millions of dollars annually for WIC and enabled more individuals to participate in the program; and (7) some of these initiatives include obtaining rebates on WIC foods, limiting participants' food choices to lowest-cost items, and limiting the number of stores that participate in WIC. |
gao_GAO-11-902 | gao_GAO-11-902_0 | In this regard, it provides a flexible benchmark against which to plan for and measure architecture program management maturity that permits thoughtful and reasonable discretion to be applied in using it. Version 2.0 of the framework arranges 59 core elements into a matrix of seven hierarchical stages. We reported that DOD, as a whole, was not as well positioned as it should be to realize the significant benefits that a well- managed federation of architectures can afford its business systems modernization efforts. Military Departments Have Begun to Develop Enterprise Architectures, but Management and Use Can Be Improved
The Air Force, Army, and DON each have long-standing efforts in place to develop and use an enterprise architecture, but much remains to be accomplished before these efforts can be considered sufficiently mature to fully support ongoing organizational transformation and corporate optimization efforts. Specifically, the Air Force has fully satisfied 20 percent, partially satisfied 47 percent, and not satisfied 32 percent of GAO’s enterprise architecture framework elements. The Army has fully satisfied 12 percent and partially satisfied 42 percent of elements, with the remaining 46 percent not satisfied. Finally, DON has satisfied 27 percent, partially satisfied 41 percent, and not satisfied 32 percent of framework elements. (Table 1 summarizes each military department’s satisfaction of core enterprise architecture management elements and detailed results are presented in appendices III, IV, and V.)
More specifically, while the military departments have each demonstrated that they are beginning to establish an institutional commitment to their respective enterprise architecture by addressing many of the elements described in Stage 1 of GAO’s enterprise architecture management framework and to develop initial enterprise architecture content (Stage 3), they have generally not established a well-developed enterprise architecture management foundation (Stage 2). Moreover, the departments have yet to complete and use their initial enterprise architecture versions to achieve targeted results (Stage 4) or expand and evolve their respective architectures to support institutional transformation (Stage 5). Finally, the departments have taken limited steps to continuously improve their respective architecture programs and use their architectures to achieve enterprisewide optimization (Stage 6). Officials at the military departments stated that they continue to face long-standing enterprise architecture management challenges, such as receiving adequate funding, overcoming cultural resistance and attaining sufficient senior leadership understanding. Nevertheless, DOD has been provided with considerable resources for its IT systems environment. Specifically, in recent years, DOD has been provided with over $30 billion annually for this environment. Military Departments Lack Well-Developed Management Foundations for Enterprise Architecture Development and Use
Stage 2 of GAO’s EAMMF describes elements that build on the strategic leadership commitment established in Stage 1 by creating the managerial means to accomplish activities in later stages, including developing an initial version of the enterprise architecture (Stages 3 and 4) and evolving and continuously improving an enterprise architecture (Stages 5 and 6) that can be used to help guide and direct investments and achieve the architecture’s stated purpose. Without fully developed and effectively managed enterprise architectures and a plan, the Air Force, Army, and DON do not have the needed road maps for transforming their business processes and modernizing their supporting systems to minimize overlap and maximize interoperability. While DOD has been provided with considerable resources for its IT systems environment, the department is not managing its systems in a consistent, repeatable, and effective manner that, among other things, maximizes mission performance while minimizing or eliminating system overlap and duplication. Because DOD is provided with over $30 billion each year for its IT systems environment, the potential for identifying and avoiding the costs associated with duplicative functionality across its IT investments is significant. Recommendation for Executive Action
To ensure that the military departments establish commitments to fully develop and effectively manage their enterprise architectures, we recommend that the Secretaries of the Air Force, Army, and Navy each expeditiously provide to the congressional defense committees a plan that identifies milestones for their respective department’s full satisfaction of all of our Enterprise Architecture Management Maturity Framework elements. Specifically, the DOD and Army CIOs concurred with the recommendation, while the Air Force and DON CIOs did not concur. The department added, however, that the Air Force and DON do not have a valid business case that would justify the implementation of all 59 elements of our framework. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) spends billions of dollars annually to build and maintain information technology (IT) systems intended to support its mission. For decades, DOD has been challenged in modernizing its systems environment to reduce duplication and increase integration. Such modernizations can be guided by an enterprise architecture--a blueprint that describes an organization's current and target state for its business operations and supporting IT systems and a plan for transitioning between the two states. DOD has long sought to employ enterprise architectures and has defined an approach for doing so that depends in large part on the military departments developing architectures of their own. In light of the critical role that military department enterprise architectures play in DOD's overall architecture approach, GAO was requested to assess the status of the Departments of the Air Force, Army, and Navy (DON) enterprise architecture programs. To do so, GAO obtained and analyzed key information about each department's architecture relative to the 59 core elements contained in stages 1 through 6 of GAO's Enterprise Architecture Management Maturity Framework.
What GAO Found
While Air Force, Army, and DON each have long-standing efforts to develop and use enterprise architectures, they have much to do before their efforts can be considered mature. GAO's enterprise architecture management framework provides a flexible benchmark against which to plan for and measure architecture program maturity and consists of 59 core elements arranged into a matrix of seven hierarchical stages. The Air Force has fully satisfied 20 percent, partially satisfied 47 percent, and not satisfied 32 percent of GAO's framework elements. The Army has fully satisfied 12 percent and partially satisfied 42 percent of the elements, with the remaining 46 percent not satisfied. Finally, DON has satisfied 27 percent, partially satisfied 41 percent, and not satisfied 32 percent of the framework elements. With respect to stages 1 through 6 of GAO's architecture framework, the military departments have generally begun establishing institutional commitments to their respective enterprise architecture efforts (stage 1), not established the management foundations necessary for effective enterprise architecture development and use (stage 2), begun developing initial enterprise architecture content (stage 3), not completed and used their initial enterprise architecture versions to achieve results (stage 4), not expanded and evolved the development and use of their respective architectures to support institutional transformation (stage 5), and taken limited steps to continuously improve their respective architecture programs and use their architectures to achieve corporate optimization (stage 6). Officials at the military departments stated that they have been limited in their ability to overcome long-standing enterprise architecture management challenges, including receiving adequate funding and attaining sufficient senior leadership understanding. Nevertheless, DOD has been provided with considerable resources for its IT systems environment, which consists of 2,324 systems. Specifically, DOD receives over $30 billion each year for this environment. Without fully developed and effectively managed enterprise architectures and a plan, the Air Force, Army, and DON lack the necessary road maps for transforming their business processes and modernizing their hundreds of supporting systems to minimize overlap and maximize interoperability. What this means is that DOD, as a whole, is not as well positioned as it should be to realize the significant benefits that a well-managed federation of architectures can afford its systems modernization efforts, such as eliminating system overlap and duplication. Because DOD is provided with over $30 billion each year for its IT systems environment, the potential for identifying and avoiding the costs associated with duplicative functionality across its IT investments is significant.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the military departments each develop a plan for fully satisfying the elements of GAO's framework. DOD and Army concurred and the Air Force and DON did not. In this regard, DOD stated that Air Force and DON do not have a valid business case that would justify the implementation of all the elements. However, GAO continues to believe its recommendation is warranted. |
gao_GAO-05-845T | gao_GAO-05-845T_0 | The protocol that guides the administration of the routing addresses is the Internet protocol. The most widely deployed version of IP is version 4 (IPv4). IPv4 uses a 32-bit address format, which provides approximately 4.3 billion unique IP addresses. As a result, the region is investing in IPv6 development, testing, and implementation. IPv6 Key Characteristics Increase Address Space, Improve Functionality, Ease Network Administration, and Enhance Security
The key characteristics of IPv6 are designed to increase address space, promote flexibility and functionality, and enhance security. For example, IPv6 dramatically increases the amount of IP address space available from the approximately 4.3 billion in IPv4 to approximately 3.4 × 10This large number of IPv6 addresses means that almost any electronic device can have its own address. Besides recognizing that an IPv6 transition is already under way, other key considerations for federal agencies to address in an IPv6 transition include significant IT planning efforts and immediate actions to ensure the security of agency information and networks. Progress Has Been Made at Defense but Is Lacking at Other Federal Agencies
The Department of Defense’s transition to IPv6 is a key component of its business case to improve interoperability among many information and weapons systems, known as the Global Information Grid (GIG). The department’s efforts to develop policies, timelines, and methods for transitioning to IPv6 are progressing. Although DOD has made substantial progress in developing a planning framework for transitioning to IPv6, the department still faces several challenges, including developing a full inventory of IPv6-capable software and hardware, finalizing its IPv6 systems engineering management plan, monitoring its operational networks for unauthorized IPv6 traffic, and developing a comprehensive enforcement strategy, including using its existing budgetary and acquisition review process. Unlike DOD, the majority of other federal agencies reporting have not yet initiated transition planning efforts for IPv6. The majority of agencies have not addressed key planning considerations. Specifically, we recommended that the Director of OMB instruct agencies to begin developing inventories and assessing risks, creating business cases for the IPv6 transition, establishing policies and enforcement mechanisms, determining the costs, and identifying timelines and methods for transition, as appropriate. Finally, because poorly configured and unmanaged IPv6 capabilities present immediate risks to federal agency networks, we recommended that agency heads take immediate action to address the near-term security risks. But such benefits may be diminished if action is not taken to ensure that agencies are addressing the attendant challenges, including addressing key planning considerations and acting to ensure the security of agency information and networks. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Internet protocol (IP) provides the addressing mechanism that defines how and where information such as text, voice, and video moves across interconnected networks. Internet protocol version 4 (IPv4), which is widely used today, may not be able to accommodate the increasing number of global users and devices that are connecting to the Internet. As a result, IP version 6 (IPv6) was developed to increase the amount of available IP address space. The new protocol is gaining increased attention from regions with limited IP addresses. For its testimony, GAO was asked to discuss the findings and recommendations of its recent study of IPv6 (GAO-05-471). In this study, GAO was asked to (1) describe the key characteristics of IPv6; (2) identify the key planning considerations for federal agencies in transitioning to IPv6; and (3) determine the progress made by the Department of Defense (DOD) and other major agencies in the transition to IPv6.
What GAO Found
The key characteristics of IPv6 are designed to increase address space, promote flexibility and functionality, and enhance security. For example, by using 128-bit addresses rather than 32-bit addresses, IPv6 dramatically increases the available Internet address space from approximately 4.3 billion in IPv4 to approximately 3.4 x 10^38 in IPv6. Key planning considerations for federal agencies include recognizing that the transition is already under way, because agency networks already include IPv6-capable software and equipment. Other important agency planning considerations include developing inventories and assessing risks; creating business cases that identify organizational needs and goals; establishing policies and enforcement mechanisms; determining costs; and identifying timelines and methods for transition. Managing the security aspects of transition is also an important consideration because poorly managed IPv6 capabilities can put agency information and systems at risk. DOD has made progress in developing a business case, policies, timelines, and processes for transitioning to IPv6. Unlike DOD, the majority of other major federal agencies reported that they have not yet initiated key planning efforts for IPv6. In its report, GAO recommended, among other things, that the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) instruct agencies to begin to address key planning considerations for the IPv6 transition and that agencies act to mitigate near-term IPv6 security risks. Officials from OMB, DOD, and Commerce generally agreed with the contents of the report. |
gao_GAO-04-951T | gao_GAO-04-951T_0 | Before the 1970s, major oil companies that were fully vertically integrated controlled the global network for supplying, pricing, and marketing crude oil. To determine the potential effect of a merger on market competition, FTC evaluates how the merger would change the level of market concentration, among other things. Mergers Occurred in All Segments of the U.S. Petroleum Industry in the 1990s for Several Reasons
Over 2,600 merger transactions occurred from 1991 through 2000 involving all three segments of the U.S. petroleum industry. Economic literature indicates that enhancing market power is also sometimes a motive for mergers. Mergers Contributed to Increases in Market Concentration and to Other Changes That Affect Competition
Mergers in the 1990s contributed to increases in market concentration in the downstream segment of the U.S. petroleum industry, while the upstream segment experienced little change overall. Moreover, based on benchmarks established jointly by DOJ and FTC, the upstream segment of the U.S. petroleum industry remained unconcentrated at the end of the 1990s. For example, the HHI of the refining market in the East Coast region increased from a moderately concentrated level of 1136 in 1990 to a highly concentrated level of 1819 in 2000. Thus, while each of these refining markets increased in concentration, the Rocky Mountain remained within the moderately concentrated range but the West Coast changed from unconcentrated in 1990 to moderately concentrated in 2000. In wholesale gasoline markets, market concentration increased broadly throughout the United States between 1994 and 2002. Evidence from various sources indicates that, in addition to increasing market concentration, mergers also contributed to changes in other aspects of market structure in the U.S. petroleum industry that affect competition—specifically, vertical integration and barriers to entry. Based on anecdotal evidence and economic analyses by some industry experts, we determined that a number of mergers that have occurred since the 1990s have led to greater vertical integration in the U.S. petroleum industry, especially in the refining and marketing segment. U.S. Gasoline Marketing Has Changed in Two Major Ways
According to some petroleum industry officials that we interviewed, gasoline marketing in the United States has changed in two major ways since the 1990s. First, the availability of unbranded gasoline has decreased, partly due to mergers. Officials noted that unbranded gasoline is generally priced lower than branded. The second change identified by these officials is that refiners now prefer dealing with large distributors and retailers because they present a lower credit risk and because it is more efficient to sell a larger volume through fewer entities. These requirements have motivated further consolidation in the distributor and retail sectors, including the rise of hypermarkets. Mergers and Increased Market Concentration Generally Led to Higher U.S. Wholesale Gasoline Prices
Our econometric modeling shows that the mergers we examined mostly led to higher wholesale gasoline prices in the second half of the 1990s. For the four mergers that we modeled for reformulated gasoline, two— Exxon-Mobil and Marathon-Ashland—led to increased prices of about 1 cent per gallon, on average. For market concentration, which captures the cumulative effects of mergers as well as other competitive factors, our econometric analysis shows that increased market concentration resulted in higher wholesale gasoline prices. Prices for conventional (non-boutique) gasoline, the dominant type of gasoline sold nationwide from 1994 through 2000, increased by less than one-half cent per gallon, on average, for branded and unbranded gasoline. The wholesale prices increased by an average of about 1 cent per gallon for boutique fuel sold in the East Coast and Gulf Coast regions between 1995 and 2000, and by an average of over 7 cents per gallon in California between 1996 and 2000. Our analysis shows that wholesale gasoline prices were also affected by other factors included in the econometric models—particularly, gasoline inventories relative to demand, refinery capacity utilization rates, and the supply disruptions that occurred in some parts of the Midwest and the West Coast. In particular, wholesale gasoline prices were about 1 cent per gallon higher, on average, when gasoline inventories were low relative to demand, typically in the summer driving months. | Why GAO Did This Study
Gasoline is subject to dramatic price swings. A multitude of factors cause volatility in U.S. gasoline markets, including world crude oil costs, limited refining capacity, and low inventories relative to demand. Since the 1990s, another factor affecting U.S. gasoline markets has been a wave of mergers in the petroleum industry, several of them between large oil companies that had previously competed with each other. For example, in 1999, Exxon, the largest U.S. oil company, merged with Mobil, the second largest. This testimony is based primarily on Energy Markets: Effects of Mergers and Market Concentration in the U.S. Petroleum Industry ( GAO-04-96 , May 17, 2004). This report examined mergers in the U.S. petroleum industry from the 1990s through 2000, the changes in market concentration (the distribution of market shares among competing firms) and other factors affecting competition in the U.S. petroleum industry, how U.S. gasoline marketing has changed since the 1990s, and how mergers and market concentration in the U.S. petroleum industry have affected U.S. gasoline prices at the wholesale level. To address these issues, GAO purchased and analyzed a large body of data and developed state-of-the art econometric models for isolating the effects of eight specific mergers and increased market concentration on wholesale gasoline prices. Experts peer-reviewed GAO's analysis.
What GAO Found
One of the many factors that can impact gasoline prices is mergers within the U.S. petroleum industry. Over 2,600 such mergers have occurred since the 1990s. The majority occurred later in the period, most frequently among firms involved in exploration and production. Industry officials cited various reasons for the mergers, particularly the need for increased efficiency and cost savings. Economic literature also suggests that firms sometimes merge to enhance their ability to control prices. Partly because of the mergers, market concentration has increased in the industry, mostly in the downstream (refining and marketing) segment. For example, market concentration in refining increased from moderately to highly concentrated on the East Coast and from unconcentrated to moderately concentrated on the West Coast. Concentration in the wholesale gasoline market increased substantially from the mid-1990s so that by 2002, most states had either moderately or highly concentrated wholesale gasoline markets. On the other hand, market concentration in the upstream (exploration and production) segment remained unconcentrated by the end of the 1990s. Anecdotal evidence suggests that mergers also have changed other factors affecting competition, such as firms' ability to enter the market. Two major changes have occurred in U.S. gasoline marketing related to mergers, according to industry officials. First, the availability of generic gasoline, which is generally priced lower than branded gasoline, has decreased substantially. Second, refiners now prefer to deal with large distributors and retailers, which has motivated further consolidation in distributor and retail markets. Based on data from the mid-1990s through 2000, GAO's econometric analyses indicate that mergers and increased market concentration generally led to higher wholesale gasoline prices in the United States. Six of the eight mergers GAO modeled led to price increases, averaging about 2 cents per gallon. Increased market concentration, which reflects the cumulative effects of mergers and other competitive factors, also led to increased prices in most cases. For conventional gasoline, the predominant type used in the country, the change in wholesale price due to increased market concentration ranged from a decrease of about 1 cent per gallon to an increase of about 5 cents per gallon. For boutique fuels sold in the East Coast and Gulf Coast regions, wholesale prices increased by about 1 cent per gallon, while prices for boutique fuels sold in California increased by over 7 cents per gallon. GAO also identified price increases of one-tenth of a cent to 7 cents that were caused by other factors included in the models--particularly low gasoline inventories relative to demand, high refinery capacity utilization rates, and supply disruptions in some regions. FTC disagreed with GAO's methodology and findings. However, GAO believes its analyses are sound. |
gao_GAO-09-431T | gao_GAO-09-431T_0 | Fragmented Investment Decision Making, Unexecutable Programs, and Lack of Accountability Underlie Poor Acquisition Outcomes
Over the past several years our work has highlighted a number of underlying systemic causes for cost growth and schedule delays at both the strategic and program levels. At the strategic level, DOD’s processes for identifying warfighter needs, allocating resources, and developing and procuring weapon systems—which together define DOD’s overall weapon system investment strategy—are fragmented. As a result, DOD fails to effectively address joint warfighting needs and commits to more programs than it has resources for, thus creating unhealthy competition for funding. Furthermore, DOD officials are rarely held accountable for poor decisions or poor program outcomes. We recently reviewed the impact of the PPBE process on major defense acquisition programs and found that the process does not produce an accurate picture of the department’s resource needs for weapon system programs, in large part because it allows too many programs to go forward with unreliable cost estimates and without a commitment to fully fund them. Recent DOD Policy Changes Could Improve Future Performance of Weapon System Programs
The department understands many of the problems that affect acquisition programs and has recently taken steps to remedy them. It has revised its acquisition policy and introduced several initiatives based in part on direction from Congress and recommendations from GAO that could provide a foundation for establishing sound, knowledge-based business cases for individual acquisition programs. Some key elements of the department’s new acquisition policy include a new materiel development decision as a starting point for all programs regardless of where they are intended to enter the acquisition process, a more robust Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) to assess potential materiel solutions that address a capability need validated through JCIDS, a cost estimate for the proposed solution identified by the AOA, early program support reviews by systems engineering teams, competitive prototyping of the proposed system or key system elements as part of the technology development phase, certifications for entry into the technology development and system development phases (as required by congressional legislation), preliminary design review that may be conducted before the start of configuration steering boards to review all requirements and technical changes that have potential to affect cost and schedule. Observations on Proposed Acquisition Reform Legislation
Overall, we believe that the legislative initiatives being proposed by the committee have the potential, if implemented, to lead to significant improvements in DOD’s management of weapon system programs. Several of the initiatives—including the increased emphasis on systems engineering and developmental testing, the requirement for earlier preliminary design reviews, and the strengthening of independent cost estimates and technology readiness assessments—could instill more discipline into the front end of the acquisition process when it is critical for programs to gain knowledge. Establishing a termination criterion for Nunn-McCurdy cost breaches could help prevent the acceptance of unrealistic cost estimates as a foundation for starting programs. Having greater involvement by the combatant commands in determining requirements and requiring greater consultation between the requirements, budget, and acquisition processes could help improve the department’s efforts to balance its portfolio of weapon system programs. Concluding Observations on What Remains to Be Done
A broad consensus exists that weapon system problems are serious and that their resolution is overdue. The new policy will not work effectively, however, without changes to the overall acquisition environment. Resisting the urge to achieve the revolutionary but unachievable capability, allowing technologies to mature in the science and technology base before bringing them onto programs, ensuring that requirements are well-defined and doable, and instituting shorter development cycles would all make it easier to estimate costs accurately, and then predict funding needs and allocate resources effectively. But these measures will succeed only if the department uses an incremental approach. Defense Management: Actions Needed to Overcome Long-standing Challenges with Weapon Systems Acquisition and Service Contract Management. Best Practices: Increased Focus on Requirements and Oversight Needed to Improve DOD’s Acquisition Environment and Weapon System Quality. Defense Acquisitions: Major Weapon Systems Continue to Experience Cost and Schedule Problems under DOD’s Revised Policy. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 1990, GAO has consistently designated the Department of Defense's (DOD) management of its major weapon acquisitions as a high-risk area. A broad consensus exists that weapon system problems are serious, but efforts at reform have had limited impact. Last year, GAO reported that DOD's portfolio of weapon programs experienced cost growth of $295 billion from first estimates, were delayed by an average of 21 months, and delivered fewer quantities and capabilities to the warfighter than originally planned. At a time when DOD faces increased fiscal pressures from ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the federal budget is strained by a growing number of priorities, it is critical that the department effectively manage its substantial investment in weapon system programs. Every dollar wasted or used inefficiently on acquiring weapon systems means that less money is available for the government's other important budgetary demands. This testimony describes the systemic problems that contribute to the cost, schedule, and performance problems in weapon system programs, recent actions that DOD has taken to address these problems, proposed reform legislation that the committee recently introduced, and additional steps needed to improve future performance of acquisition programs. The testimony is drawn from GAO's body of work on DOD's acquisition, requirements, and funding processes.
What GAO Found
For several years, GAO's work has highlighted a number of strategic- and program-level causes for cost, schedule, and performance problems in DOD's weapon system programs. At the strategic level, DOD's processes for identifying warfighter needs, allocating resources, and developing and procuring weapon systems, which together define the department's overall weapon system investment strategy, are fragmented. As a result, DOD fails to balance the competing needs of the services with those of the joint warfighter and commits to more programs than resources can support. At the program level, DOD allows programs to begin development without a full understanding of requirements and the resources needed to execute them. The lack of early systems engineering, acceptance of unreliable cost estimates based on overly optimistic assumptions, failure to commit full funding, and the addition of new requirements well into the acquisition cycle all contribute to poor outcomes. Moreover, DOD officials are rarely held accountable for poor decisions or poor program outcomes. Recognizing the need for more discipline in weapon systems acquisition and to implement Congressional direction, DOD recently revised its policy and introduced several initiatives. The revised policy, if implemented properly, could provide a foundation for developing individual acquisition programs with sound, knowledge-based business cases. The policy recommends the completion of key systems engineering activities, establishes early milestone reviews, requires competitive prototyping, and establishes review boards to manage potential requirements changes to ongoing programs. The committee's proposed reform legislation should lead to further improvements in outcomes. Improved systems engineering, early preliminary design reviews, and strengthened independent cost estimates and technology readiness assessments should make the critical front end of the acquisition process more disciplined. Establishing a termination criterion for critical cost breaches could help prevent the acceptance of unrealistic cost estimates at program initiation. Having greater combatant command involvement in determining requirements and greater consultation between the requirements, budget, and acquisition processes could help improve the department's efforts to balance its portfolio of weapon system programs. Legislation and policy revisions may lead to improvements but cannot work effectively without changes to the overall acquisition environment and the incentives that drive it. Resisting the urge to achieve revolutionary but unachievable capabilities, allowing technologies to mature in the technology base before bringing them onto programs, ensuring requirements are well-defined and doable, and instituting shorter development cycles would all make it easier to estimate costs accurately, and then predict funding needs and allocate resources effectively. These measures will only succeed if the department balances its portfolio and adopts an incremental approach to developing and procuring weapon systems. |
gao_HEHS-98-29 | gao_HEHS-98-29_0 | HHAs do not need health care experience to be certified by Medicare. Initial Surveys Provide Little Assurance That HHAs Are Capable of Furnishing Quality Care
Medicare’s initial certification process does not provide a sound basis for judging whether an HHA does or will provide quality care in accordance with Medicare’s conditions of participation. HHAs Are Not Assessed Against All Conditions of Participation
HCFA recertifies most HHAs without requiring them to demonstrate compliance with all the conditions of participation. This legislation increased the allowed intervals between recertification surveys to up to 36 months, from the previous requirement of approximately every 12 months. By not surveying branch operations, significant problems can go undetected. For example, one Texas HHA has branch offices located over 300 miles from the parent office. Once Certified, Few HHAs Lose Their Certification
Once an HHA has been certified as a Medicare provider, it is virtually assured of remaining in the program, with no penalty, even if found to be repeatedly deficient in complying with Medicare’s conditions of participation. Given multiple opportunities to correct their deficiencies, it is not unusual for HHAs to have conditions and standards out of compliance from one survey to another and remain in the program, as the following examples illustrate:
A California HHA’s second recertification survey revealed that the HHA had deficiencies in meeting five standards and that three of the deficiencies had been identified in the previous year’s survey and supposedly corrected. As a result, few HHAs are denied entry to the program. Revise the survey frequency criteria to include consideration of other factors that may indicate problem HHAs, such as rapid growth and high utilization patterns. Additionally, these states are among the 10 states with the highest numbers of certified HHAs. To determine how HCFA ensures that certified HHAs continue to comply with Medicare’s conditions of participation and provide quality care, we reviewed HCFA’s On-line Survey, Certification and Reporting (OSCAR) database to determine the extent to which HHAs (1) do not meet Medicare’s conditions of participation during surveys, (2) have repeated violations of Medicare’s conditions and associated standards over time, and (3) create branch offices. Aides must be supervised. Home Health Care: HCFA Properly Evaluated JCAHO’s Ability to Survey Home Health Agencies (GAO/HRD-93-33, Oct. 26, 1992). 4, 1983). | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed how the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA): (1) controls the entry of home health agencies (HHA) into the Medicare program; (2) ensures that certified HHAs continue to comply with Medicare's conditions of participation and associated standards; and (3) decertifies HHAs that are not complying with Medicare's requirements.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) becoming a Medicare-certified HHA is relatively easy-- probably too easy, given the large number of problem agencies identified in various studies over the past few years; (2) if HHA owners have not been previously barred from Medicare, they can obtain certification without having any health care experience; (3) although such entrepreneurs can hire qualified health care professionals, Medicare's initial certification survey is so limited that it does not provide a sound basis for judging an HHA's ability to provide quality care; (4) although certified HHAs must be periodically recertified, serious deficiencies in the process allow problems to go undetected; (5) HCFA recertifies HHAs by screening them against a subset of the conditions of participation, but when surveyors assessed 44 targeted HHAs against all applicable conditions of participation, almost half had problems serious enough to warrant decertification; (6) many HHAs operate branch offices, but these offices are not subject to the same oversight afforded the parent offices; (7) HHAs are resurveyed every 12 to 36 months, depending on a variety of factors, but rapid growth and high utilization rates, which may indicate potential problem HHAs, are not included among those factors; (8) once certified, HHAs have little reason to fear that they will suffer serious consequences from failing to comply with Medicare's conditions of participation and associated standards; (9) few problem HHAs are terminated from the program; instead they are provided repeated opportunities to correct their deficiencies, even if the same deficiencies recur from one survey to the next; and (10) moreover, HCFA has not implemented a range of penalties to sanction problem HHAs, even though the Congress provided it the authority to do so over 10 years ago. |
gao_GAO-11-478 | gao_GAO-11-478_0 | Managing Partner Agency. HHS is also responsible for managing Grants.gov as an information technology (IT) investment through HHS’s Office of the Chief Information Officer (OCIO). Grants.gov Funding Model Raises Issues about How Costs Are Distributed among Users and the Lack of Effective Strategies to Manage Recurring Collection Delays
Grants.gov’s Funding Model Attempts to Better Align Contributions with Agency Use
In keeping with OMB’s expectation for legacy E-Gov initiatives to move toward a fee-for-service model, starting with the fiscal year 2010 budget, the Grants Executive Board (GEB) approved changes to the Grants.gov contribution calculation to better reflect agencies’ use of Grants.gov’s services. The Grants.gov Contribution Calculation Results in Different Contribution Amounts for Agencies with Similar System Use
The Grants.gov contribution calculation results in different contribution amounts for agencies with similar usage profiles. For example, under the fiscal year 2011 contribution calculation, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (categorized as a large agency for the purposes of Grants.gov) posted 40 grant opportunities, received 4,817 applications through the Grants.gov Web site, and paid $414,422. However, the National Endowment for the Humanities (categorized as a small agency for the purposes of Grants.gov) posted 42 grant opportunities, received 4,577 applications through the Web site, and paid $155,159. NEH’s agency size component is $50,000; HUD’s is $200,000. Grants.gov Does Not Track and Report on Certain Key Costs and Does Not Charge Agencies for All Known Costs
The Grants.gov PMO tracks costs for internal management purposes to ensure contract compliance and that program activities stay within GEB approved funding levels; however, it does not report costs by key program activities to its partner agencies, and it does not track or report on costs attributable to each partner agency. The type of cost tracking in our case study initiatives varied. They are: (1) depositing partner fees/contributions into multiyear appropriation accounts and (2) receiving some form of funds from their managing partners until partner agency contributions become available. Accountability and Responsibility for Grants.gov Performance among the Grants.gov Governance Entities Remains Unclear
Grants.gov continues to experience persistent governance challenges, including unclear roles and responsibilities among the governance entities, a lack of key performance metrics, and communication with stakeholders. Since we first reported on these issues in July 2009, some progress has been made in these areas. Unclear Roles and Responsibilities. As we previously reported, the GEB and HHS’s OCIO share responsibility for reviewing and approving major changes to, and funding for, the Grants.gov system. Key System Performance Measures. Communication with Partner Agencies. HHS provides partner agencies with feedback opportunities but does not communicate some key performance and cost information. The new body would report directly to OMB and would serve as the federal grants advisory body responsible for establishing the direction for and coordinating all governmentwide grants initiatives, including Grants.gov. As a preliminary, high-level concept document, it is understandable that the proposal does not flesh out details as to how the framework would be implemented, but it lacks even a high-level overview of several critical elements. HHS’s written comments are reprinted in appendix V. Key comments include that HHS “is proud of the significant progress made since the government-wide “Boost” to enhance system capacity, performance, and ensure the public has reliable access to a central portal to find and apply for federal assistance opportunities.” HHS also stated that “long term strategic planning as well as short term operations including acquisition activities … are hampered by the uncertainties associated with the level of funding and schedule of funding availability” and “if a “Fee for Service” model is not adopted and Grants.gov remains tied to the E-Gov Benefit Report, HHS recommends federal grant policy be changed to require OMB transmit the E-Gov Benefits report to Congress by December 1st.” In regards to governance issues, HHS “appreciates the work of the Grants Governance Taskforce in supporting the Grants.gov PMO and recommending governance changes, and hopes that OMB will soon make its final determination on the federal grants governance framework.” We agree that delayed funding poses a serious risk to Grants.gov's operations. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To examine the Grants.gov system and make recommendations to improve system management, we evaluated (1) key factors the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) should consider when proposing a funding model for Grants.gov and (2) how the Grants.gov governance bodies could address Grants.gov’s previously identified governance challenges. To address both objectives, we gathered and reviewed reports and documentary evidence from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the Grants.gov Program Management Office (PMO), and the Grants Executive Board (GEB). Specifically, we analyzed the relationship between the agency size designation and other measures of system use. Each agency’s contribution is calculated using four measures of system usage. | Why GAO Did This Study
In response to the Federal Financial Assistance Management Improvement Act of 1999, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), among other things, deployed Grants.gov as the central grant identification and application portal for federal grant programs in 2003 and named the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) its managing partner. As a result of funding and governance challenges-- such as untimely contributions, a lack of performance metrics, unclear lines of authority, and confusion over roles and responsibilities among Grants.gov's governance bodies-- that have adversely affected operations, GAO is required to examine (1) key factors HHS should consider when proposing a funding model for Grants.gov, and (2) how the Grants.gov governance bodies could address Grants.gov's previously identified governance challenges. To do this, GAO analyzed agency documents and interviewed officials at HHS, OMB, the Grants Executive Board (GEB), three case study agencies that manage similar E-Gov initiatives and three Grants.gov partner agencies.
What GAO Found
In keeping with OMB's expectation to move toward a fee-for-service model, starting with the fiscal year 2010 budget, the Grants.gov contribution calculation changed to better reflect agencies' use of Grants.gov's services. However, GAO found that the calculation results in different contribution amounts for agencies with similar usage profiles because the calculation includes a measure of agency size that does not correlate well with an agency's use of Grants.gov. For example, usage data for the fiscal year 2011 contributions indicates that the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD, a large agency) posted 40 grant opportunities and received 4,817 applications through the Grants.gov Web site while the National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH, a small agency) posted 42 opportunities and received 4,577 applications. However, HUD's contribution is $414,422 while NEH's is $155,159. In addition, GAO found that the Grants.gov Program Management Office (PMO) does not track and report on certain key costs, limiting partner agencies' ability to understand the relationship between services received and amounts paid for that service. Grants.gov also does not charge partner agencies for all known costs, which can result in some agencies subsidizing other agencies' use of the system. Finally, Grants.gov continues to suffer from untimely agency contributions. While the other EGov initiatives GAO spoke with report similar challenges, some take mitigating steps that aid them in managing delays. They are: (1) depositing partner fees/contributions into multiyear appropriation accounts and (2) receiving some form of funds from their managing partners until partner agency contributions become available. Accountability and responsibility for Grants.gov performance among its governance bodies--the PMO, GEB and HHS's Office of the Chief Information Officer (OCIO)--remains unclear. Since GAO first reported on these issues in July 2009, some progress has been made clarifying roles and responsibilities, developing performance measures to track important aspects of system performance, and providing partner agencies with key performance and cost information. However, although the GEB and the OCIO continue to share responsibility for approving major changes to, and funding for, the Grants.gov system, there remains little evidence that the GEB-approved funding for Grants.gov is considered in HHS's review of Grants.gov as an IT investment as required by OMB guidance. In addition, Grants.gov's performance measures have not changed since GAO reported on them and still do not provide a clear picture of system performance. Finally, Grants.gov does not communicate some key performance and activity cost information with its partner agencies. A new federal grants governance model under OMB review would merge various Grants.gov governance entities and serve as the federal grants advisory body responsible for establishing the direction for and coordinating all governmentwide grants initiatives, including Grants.gov. As a preliminary, concept document, it is understandable that it contains few implementation details; however, the proposal lacks even an overview of several critical elements, such as how grants initiatives would be managed as IT investments.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making four recommendations to HHS aimed at improving Grants.gov's funding calculation, cost tracking, and annual and strategic plan; and knowledgesharing with other E-Gov initiatives. HHS generally agreed with our findings and recommendations. |
gao_GAO-08-131T | gao_GAO-08-131T_0 | The SBInet PMO workforce includes a mix of government and contractor support staff. The SBInet PMO reports to the CBP SBI Program Executive Director. These include task orders for (1) Project 28, Boeing’s pilot project and initial implementation of SBInet technology to achieve control of 28 miles of the border in the Tucson sector; (2) Project 37, for construction approximately 32 miles of vehicle barriers and pedestrian fencing in the Yuma sector along the Barry M. Goldwater Range (BMGR); (3) Program Management, for engineering, facilities and infrastructure, test and evaluation, and general program management services; (4) Fence Lab, a project to evaluate the performance and cost of deploying different types of fences and vehicle barriers; and (5) a design task order for developing the plans for several technology projects to be located in the Tucson, Yuma, and El Paso sectors. In addition to deploying technology across the southwest border, the SBInet PMO plans to deploy 370 miles of single-layer pedestrian fencing and 200 miles of vehicle barriers by December 31, 2008. DHS has estimated that the total cost for completing the deployment for the southwest border—the initial focus of SBInet deployment—will be $7.6 billion from fiscal years 2007 through 2011. SBInet Technology Deployment Delays May Increase Schedule Risks
DHS has made some progress to implement Project 28—the first segment of technology on the southwest border, but it has fallen behind its planned schedule. Boeing’s inability thus far to resolve system integration issues has left Project 28 incomplete more than 4 months after its planned June 13 milestone to become operational—at which point, Border Patrol agents were to begin using SBInet technology to support their activities, and CBP was to begin its operational test and evaluation phase. In September 2007, CBP officials told us that Boeing was making progress in correcting the system integration problems; however, CBP was unable to provide us with a specific date when Boeing would complete the corrections necessary to make Project 28 operational. CBP reports that it is taking steps to strengthen its contract management for Project 28. SBInet Tactical Infrastructure Deployment on Track but May Be Challenging and More Costly than Planned
Deploying SBInet’s tactical infrastructure along the southwest border is on schedule, but meeting the SBInet program’s goal to have 370 miles of pedestrian fence and 200 miles of vehicle barriers in place by December 31, 2008, may be challenging and more costly than planned. To minimize one of the many factors that add to cost, in the past DHS has used Border Patrol agents and DOD military personnel. However, CBP officials reported that they plan to use commercial labor for future infrastructure projects to meet their deadlines. Although deployment of tactical infrastructure is on schedule, CBP officials reported that meeting deadlines has been challenging because factors they will continue to face include conducting outreach necessary to address border community resistance, devoting time to identify and complete steps necessary to comply with environmental regulations, and addressing difficulties in acquiring rights to border lands. According to agency officials, CBP is on track to meet its hiring goal of 6,000 new Border Patrol agents by December 2008, but after SBInet is deployed, CBP officials expect the number of Border Patrol agents required to meet mission needs to change from current projections, although the direction and magnitude of the change is unknown. The Tucson sector, where Project 28 is being deployed, is developing a plan on how to integrate SBInet into its operating procedures. SBI PMO Did Not Meet All of Its Staffing Goals and Has Not Yet Completed Long-Term Human Capital Planning
The SBI PMO tripled in size in fiscal year 2007 but fell short of its staffing goal of 270 employees. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine the progress that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has made in implementing the Secure Border Initiative (SBI) SBInet’s technology deployment projects, we analyzed DHS documentation, including program schedules, project task orders, status reports, and expenditures. We also interviewed DHS and the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) headquarters and field officials, including representatives of the SBInet Program Management Office (PMO), Border Patrol, CBP Air and Marine, and the DHS Science and Technology Directorate, as well as SBInet contractors. To determine the extent to which CBP has determined the impact of SBInet technology and infrastructure on its workforce needs and operating procedures, we reviewed documentation of the agency’s decision to hire an additional 6,000 agents and the progress hiring these agents. We performed our work from April 2007 through October 2007 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. | Why GAO Did This Study
In November 2005, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) established the Secure Border Initiative (SBI), a multiyear, multibillion dollar program to secure U.S. borders. One element of SBI is SBInet--the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) program responsible for developing a comprehensive border protection system through a mix of security infrastructure (e.g., fencing), and surveillance and communication technologies (e.g., radars, sensors, cameras, and satellite phones). The House Committee on Homeland Security asked GAO to monitor DHS progress in implementing the SBInet program. This testimony provides GAO's observations on (1) SBInet technology implementation; (2) SBInet infrastructure implementation; (3) the extent to which CBP has determined the impact of SBInet technology and infrastructure on its workforce needs and operating procedures; and (4) how the CBP SBI Program Management Office (PMO) has defined its human capital goals and the progress it has made to achieve these goals. GAO's observations are based on analysis of DHS documentation, such as program schedules, contracts, status, and reports. GAO also conducted interviews with DHS officials and contractors, and visits to sites in the southwest border where SBInet deployment is underway. GAO performed the work from April 2007 through October 2007. DHS generally agreed with GAO's findings.
What GAO Found
DHS has made some progress to implement Project 28--the first segment of SBInet technology across the southwest border, but it has fallen behind its planned schedule. The SBInet contractor delivered the components (i.e., radars, sensors and cameras) to the Project 28 site in Tucson, Arizona on schedule. However, Project 28 is incomplete more than 4 months after it was to become operational--at which point Border Patrol agents were to begin using SBInet technology to support their activities. According to DHS, the delays are primarily due to software integration problems. In September 2007, DHS officials said that the Project 28 contractor was making progress in correcting the problems, but DHS was unable to specify a date when the system would be operational. Due to the slippage in completing Project 28, DHS is revising the SBInet implementation schedule for follow-on technology projects, but still plans to deploy technology along 387 miles of the southwest border by December 31, 2008. DHS is also taking steps to strengthen its contract management for Project 28. SBInet infrastructure deployment along the southwest border is on schedule, but meeting CBP's goal to have 370 miles of pedestrian fence and 200 miles of vehicle barriers in place by December 31, 2008, may be challenging and more costly than planned. CBP met its intermediate goal to deploy 70 miles of new fencing in fiscal year 2007 and the average cost per mile was $2.9 million. The SBInet PMO estimates that deployment costs for remaining fencing will be similar to those thus far. In the past, DHS has minimized infrastructure construction labor costs by using Border Patrol agents and Department of Defense military personnel. However, CBP officials report that they plan to use commercial labor for future fencing projects. The additional cost of commercial labor and potential unforeseen increases in contract costs suggest future deployment could be more costly than planned. DHS officials also reported other challenging factors they will continue to face for infrastructure deployment, including community resistance, environmental considerations, and difficulties in acquiring rights to land along the border. The impact of SBInet on CBP's workforce needs and operating procedures remains unclear because the SBInet technology is not fully identified or deployed. CBP officials expect the number of Border Patrol agents required to meet mission needs to change from current projections, but until the system is fully deployed, the direction and magnitude of the change is unknown. For the Tucson sector, where Project 28 is being deployed, Border Patrol officials are developing a plan on how to integrate SBInet into their operating procedures. The SBI PMO tripled in size during fiscal year 2007, but fell short of its staffing goal of 270 employees. Agency officials expressed concerns that staffing shortfalls could affect the agency's capacity to provide adequate contractor oversight. In addition, the SBInet PMO has not yet completed long-term human capital planning. |
gao_GAO-02-398 | gao_GAO-02-398_0 | Status of the Growth Strategy
Amtrak has been unsuccessful in implementing its Network Growth Strategy. About 2 years after announcing the Network Growth Strategy, Amtrak has cancelled 9 of the 15 planned route actions without implementing them. Amtrak implemented three route actions, although it cancelled one of these in September 2001. Amtrak Overestimated Expected Mail and Express Revenue
Amtrak told us that it cancelled six of the Network Growth Strategy routes before they were implemented, in part, because it overestimated expected increases to mail and express revenue under the Network Growth Strategy. Amtrak said that there were several reasons why this overestimation occurred. Finally, Amtrak officials told us that express shippers were reluctant to enter into contracts for service that did not yet exist. Quick agreement was necessary because Amtrak wanted to implement the new routes and services to help it reach operational self- sufficiency by December 2002. However, Amtrak was largely unable to gain freight railroads’ agreement. Other freight railroads we contacted were similarly wary of Amtrak’s plans to use its route and service expansion to increase express business that could potentially compete with their own. Conclusions
Amtrak’s Network Growth Strategy has been unsuccessful because it overestimated (1) revenues expected from new mail and express service and (2) its ability to reach agreement with freight railroads over capital funding and other implementation issues. Amtrak said that it has improved it revenue estimation process. Amtrak also stated that (1) it needed to act quickly to reach operational self-sufficiency within 3 years, (2) the purpose of the Network Growth Strategy was to implement route and service changes that would more than cover their operating costs and therefore contribute to achieving operational self-sufficiency, and (3) not every route and service change requires lengthy negotiations. | What GAO Found
In light of its continuing financial deterioration and its stated goal of eliminating federal operating assistance by December 2002, Amtrak undertook several steps to improve its financial condition, including changing in its routes and services. Amtrak has been unsuccessful in implementing its Network Growth Strategy to shift its route and service plans for new routes and expanded services on the freight tracks over which it operates. Two years after announcing the new strategy, Amtrak has only implemented three routes, one of which was later canceled. Amtrak still plans to implement the remaining three routes, although later than planned. Increased mail and express revenues were the cornerstone of the new strategy. However, Amtrak overestimated the mail and express revenue expected. According to Amtrak, this overestimation occurred because (1) it had no empirical basis for its revenue estimates and (2) express shippers were reluctant to enter into contracts for service that did not yet exist. Six of the planned route actions were canceled because Amtrak overestimated the revenues associated with them. Amtrak was unable to reach agreement with freight railroads because they were concerned about (1) Amtrak's plans to operate additional trains in already congested areas, (2) Amtrak's plans to carry express merchandise that might compete with their own business, and (3) compensation that Amtrak would pay for use of their tracks. |
gao_GAO-08-481T | gao_GAO-08-481T_0 | Number and Rate of Incursions Show Upward Trend
Runway safety is a longstanding major aviation safety concern; prevention of runway incursions, which are precursors to aviation accidents, has been on NTSB’s list of most wanted transportation improvements since 1990 because runway collisions can be catastrophic. Recent data indicate that runway incursions are growing and may become even more numerous as the volume of air traffic increases. The number and rate of incursions declined from a peak in fiscal year 2001 and remained relatively constant for the next 5 years. However, from fiscal years 2006 through 2007, the number and rate of incursions increased by 12 percent and nearly regained the 2001 peak (see fig. Moreover, the number and rate of serious incursions—where collisions were narrowly or barely avoided—increased substantially during the first quarter of fiscal year 2008, compared to the same quarter in fiscal year 2007. Challenges Remain Despite Numerous Efforts to Address Runway Safety
FAA, airports, and airlines have taken steps to address runway safety, but the lack of leadership and coordination, technology challenges, lack of data, and human factors-related issues impede further progress. To improve runway safety, FAA has deployed and tested technology designed to prevent runway collisions; promoted changes in airport layout, markings, signage, and lighting; and provided training for pilots and air traffic controllers. Until recently, the office did not have a permanent director for the previous 2 years and staffing levels declined. In our November 2007 report, we also found that FAA had not updated its national runway safety plan since 2002, despite agency policy that such a plan be prepared every 2 to 3 years. The lack of an updated plan resulted in uncoordinated runway safety efforts by individual FAA offices. The deployment of surface surveillance technology to airports is a major part of FAA’s strategy to improve runway safety, but it has presented challenges. Both systems are designed to provide controllers with alerts when they detect a possible collision on the ground. FAA lacks reliable runway safety data and the mechanisms to ensure that the data are complete. FAA plans to start a nonpunitive, confidential, voluntary program for air traffic controllers similar to a program that FAA has already established for pilots and others in the aviation community. The new program will enable air traffic controllers to report anything that they perceive could contribute to safety risks in the national airspace system. However, FAA has not indicated when such a program would be implemented. However, air traffic controller fatigue, which may result from regularly working overtime, continues to be a human factors issue affecting runway safety. Experts we surveyed indicated that the actions that FAA could take with the greatest potential to prevent runway incursions, considering costs, technological feasibility, and operational changes, were measures to provide information or alerts directly to pilots. Recommendations
In our November 2007 report, we recommended that FAA (1) prepare a new national runway safety plan, (2) develop an implementation schedule for establishing a nonpunitive voluntary safety reporting program for air traffic controllers, and (3) develop a mitigation plan for addressing controller overtime. | Why GAO Did This Study
While aviation accidents in the United States are relatively infrequent, recent incidents have heightened concerns about safety on airport runways. As the nation's aviation system becomes more crowded every day, increased congestion at airports may exacerbate ground safety concerns. This statement discusses (1) the trends in runway incursions, (2) what FAA has done to improve runway safety, and (3) what more could be done. This statement is based on GAO's November 2007 report issued to this committee on runway safety. GAO's work on that report included surveying experts on the causes of runway incidents and accidents and the effectiveness of measures to address them, reviewing safety data, and interviewing agency and industry officials. This statement also contains information from FAA on recent incursions and actions taken since November 2007.
What GAO Found
Recent data indicate that runway incursions, which are precursors to aviation accidents, are growing. Although the number and rate of incursions declined after reaching a peak in fiscal year 2001 and remained relatively constant for the next 5 years, they show a recent upward trend. From fiscal year 2006 through fiscal year 2007, the number and rate of incursions increased by 12 percent and both were nearly as high as their 2001 peak. Furthermore, the number of serious incursions--where collisions are narrowly or barely avoided--increased from 2 during the first quarter of fiscal year 2007 to 10 during the same quarter in fiscal year 2008. FAA has taken steps to address runway safety, but further progress has been impeded by the lack of leadership and coordination, technology challenges, lack of data, and human factors-related issues. FAA's actions have included deploying and testing technology designed to prevent runway collisions and promoting changes in airport layout, markings, signage, and lighting. However, until recently, FAA's Office of Runway Safety did not have a permanent director. Also, FAA has not updated its national runway safety plan since 2002, despite agency policy that such a plan be prepared every 2 to 3 years, resulting in uncoordinated efforts within the agency. Moreover, runway safety technology currently being installed, which is designed to provide air traffic controllers with the position and identification of aircraft on the ground and alerts of potential collisions, is behind schedule and experiencing cost increases and operational difficulties with its alerting function. FAA also lacks reliable runway safety data and the mechanisms to ensure that the data are complete. Furthermore, air traffic controller fatigue, which may result from regularly working overtime, continues to be a matter of concern for the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) and others. FAA could take additional measures to improve runway safety. These measures include implementing GAO's recommendations to prepare a new national runway safety plan, address controller overtime and fatigue, and start a nonpunitive, confidential, voluntary program for air traffic controllers to report safety risks in the national airspace system, which would be similar to a program that FAA has already established for pilots and others in the aviation community. Such a program could help the agency to understand the causes and circumstances regarding runway safety incidents. Additional improvements, suggested by experts and NTSB, include developing and deploying technology to provide alerts directly to pilots. |
gao_GAO-12-602T | gao_GAO-12-602T_0 | In addition to the requirements of the APA, federal agencies typically must comply with requirements imposed by certain other statutes and executive orders. The process OSHA uses to develop and issue standards is spelled out in the OSH Act. Section 6(a) of the act directed the Secretary of Labor (through OSHA) to adopt any national consensus standards or established federal standards as safety and health standards within 2 years of the date the OSH Act went into effect, without following the procedures set forth in section 6(b) or the APA.publication, the vast majority of these standards have not changed since originally adopted, despite significant advances in technology, equipment, and machinery over the past several decades. Once OSHA initiates such an effort, an interdisciplinary team typically composed of at least five staff focus on that issue. OSHA’s Standard- Setting Time Frames Vary Widely and Are Influenced by the Many Procedural Requirements and Other Factors
We analyzed the 58 significant health and safety standards OSHA issued between 1981 and 2010 and found that the time frames for developing and issuing them averaged about 93 months (7 years, 9 months), and ranged from 15 months to about 19 years (see table 1). During this period, OSHA staff also worked to develop standards that have not yet been finalized. The standard of judicial review that applies to OSHA standards if they are challenged in court also affects OSHA’s time frames because it requires more robust research and analysis than the standard that applies to many other agencies’ regulations, according to some experts and agency officials. OSHA uses enforcement and education as alternatives to issuing emergency temporary standards to respond relatively quickly to urgent workplace hazards. It its enforcement efforts to address urgent hazards, OSHA uses the general duty clause of the OSH Act, which requires employers to provide a workplace free from recognized hazards that are causing, or are likely to cause, death or serious physical Under the general duty clause, OSHA has the harm to their employees. Along with its enforcement and standard-setting activities, OSHA also educates employers and workers to promote voluntary protective measures against urgent hazards. OSHA’s education efforts include on-site consultations and publishing health and safety information on urgent hazards. Other Regulatory Agencies’ Experiences Offer Limited Insight into OSHA’s Challenges
Although the rulemaking experiences of EPA and MSHA shed some light on OSHA’s challenges, their statutory framework and resources differ too markedly for them to be models for OSHA’s standard–setting process. For example, EPA is directed to regulate certain sources of specified air pollutants and review its existing regulations within specific time frames under section 112 of the Clean Air Act, which EPA officials told us gave the agency clear requirements and statutory deadlines for regulating hazardous air pollutants. Experts Suggested Many Ideas to Improve OSHA’s Standard-Setting Process, Including More Interagency Coordination and Statutory Deadlines
Agency officials and occupational safety and health experts shared their understanding of the challenges facing OSHA and offered ideas for improving the agency’s standard-setting process.involve substantial procedural changes that may be beyond the scope of OSHA’s authority and require amending existing laws, including the OSH Act. Improve coordination with other agencies: Experts and agency officials noted that OSHA has not fully leveraged available expertise at other federal agencies, especially NIOSH, in developing and issuing its standards. They stated that collaborating with NIOSH on risk assessments, and generally in a more systematic way, could reduce the time it takes to develop a standard by several months, thus facilitating OSHA’s standard-setting process. Concluding Remarks
The process for developing new and updated safety and health standards for occupational hazards is a lengthy one and can result in periods when there are insufficient protections for workers. In our report being released today, we recommend that OSHA and NIOSH more consistently collaborate on researching occupational hazards so that OSHA can more effectively leverage NIOSH expertise in its standard-setting process. Both agencies agreed with this recommendation. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses the challenges the Department of Labors (Labor) Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) faces in developing and issuing safety and health standards. Workplace safety and health standards are designed to help protect over 130 million public and private sector workers from hazards at more than 8 million worksites in the United States, and have been credited with helping prevent thousands of work-related deaths, injuries, and illnesses. However, questions have been raised concerning whether the agencys approach to developing standards is overly cautious, resulting in too few standards being issued. Others counter that the process is intentionally deliberative to balance protections provided for workers with the compliance burden imposed on employers. Over the past 30 years, various presidential executive orders and federal laws have added new procedural requirements for regulatory agencies, resulting in multiple and sometimes lengthy steps OSHA and other agencies must follow.
The remarks today are based on findings from our report, which is being released today, entitled "Workplace Safety and Health: Multiple Challenges Lengthen OSHAs Standard Setting." For this report, we were asked to review: (1) the time taken by OSHA to develop and issue occupational safety and health standards and the key factors that affect these time frames, (2) alternatives to the typical standard-setting process that are available for OSHA to address urgent hazards, (3) whether rulemaking at other regulatory agencies offers insight into OSHAs challenges with setting standards, and (4) ideas that have been suggested by occupational safety and health experts for improving the process.
What GAO Found
In summary, we found that, between 1981 and 2010, the time it took OSHA to develop and issue safety and health standards ranged from 15 months to 19 years and averaged more than 7 years. Experts and agency officials cited several factors that contribute to the lengthy time frames for developing and issuing standards, including increased procedural requirements, shifting priorities, and a rigorous standard of judicial review. We also found that, in addition to using the typical standard-setting process, OSHA can address urgent hazards by issuing emergency temporary standards, although the agency has not used this authority since 1983 because of the difficulty it has faced in compiling the evidence necessary to meet the statutory requirements. Instead, OSHA focuses on enforcement activitiessuch as enforcing the general requirement of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSH Act) that employers provide a workplace free from recognized hazardsand educating employers and workers about urgent hazards. Experiences of other federal agencies that regulate public or worker health hazards offered limited insight into the challenges OSHA faces in setting standards. For example, EPA officials pointed to certain requirements of the Clean Air Act to set and regularly review standards for specified air pollutants that have facilitated the agencys standard-setting efforts. In contrast, the OSH Act does not require OSHA to periodically review its standards. Also, MSHA officials noted that their standard-setting process benefits from both the in-house knowledge of its inspectors, who inspect every mine at least twice yearly, and a dedicated mine safety research group within the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), a federal research agency that makes recommendations on occupational safety and health. OSHA must instead rely on time-consuming site visits to obtain information on hazards and has not consistently coordinated with NIOSH to assess occupational hazards. Finally, experts and agency officials identified several ideas that could improve OSHAs standard-setting process. In our report being released today, we draw upon one of these ideas and recommend that OSHA and NIOSH more consistently collaborate on researching occupational hazards so that OSHA can more effectively leverage NIOSH expertise in its standard-setting process. |
gao_GAO-03-1012T | gao_GAO-03-1012T_0 | Background
The JSF program is DOD’s largest cooperative program. As currently planned, the program will cost about $200 billion to develop and procure about 2,600 aircraft and related support equipment. United States and Partners Expect Significant Benefits
The United States and its partners expect to realize a variety of benefits from cooperation on the JSF program. Partners also expect to benefit from increased access to JSF program data, defined influence over aircraft requirements, and technology transfers to their industries from U.S. aerospace companies. United States Benefits from Financial Contributions and Access to Partner Industry
According to DOD and the program office, through its cooperative agreements, the JSF program contributes to armaments cooperation policy in the following four areas: Political/military–expanded foreign relations. Operational–improved mission capabilities through interoperability with allied systems. Partners Benefit Financially and from Shared Technology and Information
Partner governments expect to benefit financially by leveraging significant U.S. resources and inventory requirements to obtain an advanced tactical aircraft they could not afford to develop on their own. Program Challenges Force JSF Program to Balance Competing Pressures
International program participants have significant expectations regarding government and industry return based on their contributions. Recent actions by Lockheed Martin to address partner concerns could represent a departure from the JSF competitive contracting approach and result in increased program costs. International participation in the program also presents a challenge because the transfer of technologies necessary to achieve DOD’s goals for aircraft commonality is expected to far exceed past transfers of advanced military technology. Alternate Contracting Approach May be Used to Meet Partner Expectations
DOD and the JSF Program Office have said that the use of competitive contracting is central to meeting partner expectations for industrial return and will assist in controlling program costs. To that end, Lockheed Martin performed assessments for many of the partners to determine the ability of their industries to compete for JSF contracts. Decisions in this area will be critical because the extent of technology transfers necessary to achieve program goals will push the boundaries of U.S. disclosure policy for some of the most sensitive U.S. military technology. Due to the degree of international participation at both a government and an industry level, a large number of export authorizations are necessary to share project information with governments, solicit bids from partner suppliers, and execute contracts. Therefore, future cost increases in the JSF program may fall almost entirely on the United States because there are no provisions in the negotiated agreements requiring partners to share these increases. DOD has not required any of the partners to share cost program increases to date. International participation in the program, while providing benefits, makes managing these challenges more difficult and places additional risk on DOD and the prime contractor. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) is a cooperative program between the Department of Defense (DOD) and U.S. allies for developing and producing next generation fighter aircraft to replace aging inventories. As currently planned, the JSF program is DOD's most expensive aircraft program to date, costing an estimated $200 billion to procure about 2,600 aircraft and related support equipment. Many in DOD consider JSF to be a model for future cooperative programs. To determine the implications of the JSF international program structure, GAO identified JSF program relationships and expected benefits, and assessed how DOD is managing challenges associated with partner expectations, technology transfer, and recent technical concerns.
What GAO Found
The JSF program is based on a complex set of relationships among governments and industries from the United States and eight partner countries. The program is expected to benefit the United States by reducing its share of program costs, giving it access to foreign industrial capabilities, and improving interoperability with allied militaries. Partner governments expect to benefit financially and technologically through relationships with U.S. aerospace companies and access to JSF program data. Yet international participation also presents a number of challenges. Because of their contributions to the program, partners have significant expectations for financial returns, technology transfer, and information sharing. If these expectations are not met, their support for the program could deteriorate. To realize these financial returns, partners expect their industry to win JSF contracts through competition--a departure from cooperative programs, which directly link contract awards to financial contributions. However, recent actions by the prime contractor could indicate a departure from this competitive approach and a return to directed work share. Technology transfer also presents challenges. Transfers of sensitive U.S. military technologies--which are needed to achieve aircraft commonality and interoperability goals--will push the boundaries of U.S. disclosure policy. In addition, a large number of export authorizations are needed to share project information and execute contracts. These authorizations must be submitted and resolved in a timely manner to maintain program schedules and ensure partner industry has the opportunity to compete for subcontracts. Finally, recent technical challenges threaten program costs and possibly partner participation in the program. While partners can choose to share any future program cost increases, they are not required to do so. Therefore, the burden of any future increases may fall almost entirely on the United States. If efforts to meet any of these partner expectations come into conflict with program cost, schedule, and performance goals, the program office will have to make decisions that balance these potentially competing interests within the JSF program. |
gao_GAO-07-299 | gao_GAO-07-299_0 | Background
Our Nation’s Commercial Airports
There are more than 400 airports in the United States at which TSA provides or oversees passenger and checked baggage screening. The result of this effort is the Staffing Allocation Model—an optimization model that seeks, within certain TSA constraints, to estimate the most efficient balance of TSOs needed to ensure security and minimize wait times. These staffing levels, as determined by the model, served as a limit on the number of private screeners that the private screening contractors could employ. TSA Relies on the Assumptions in Its Staffing Allocation Model, along with Mechanisms for Monitoring Them, to Help Ensure Sufficient TSO Staffing Levels, but Some Key Assumptions Do Not Reflect Operating Conditions
TSA aims to ensure that its Staffing Allocation Model provides a sufficient number of TSOs to perform passenger and checked baggage screening by: (1) building assumptions into its allocation model that are designed to calculate the necessary levels of TSOs to ensure security and minimize wait times, and (2) employing multiple monitoring mechanisms for the sufficiency of the model’s outputs. However, TSA does not have a mechanism for selecting and prioritizing which assumptions to review each year and for assuring that all assumptions are periodically reviewed. In addition, the model assumed a ratio of 20 percent part time to 80 percent full time (expressed in full-time equivalents), even in airports that have consistently been unable to achieve a 20 percent part-time TSO workforce; and the model had no mechanism to account for use of TSOs to perform operation support functions. According to TSA officials responsible for the Staffing Allocation Model, the model ensures that the staffing allocations provide for the necessary levels of security because the model is based on TSA’s standard operating procedures for screening passengers and their carry-on items and checked baggage and on the technology available at the passenger checkpoints and baggage screening areas. After receiving the annual FTE allocation from TSA headquarters, the FSD and his or her staff must prepare TSO work schedules, by using the staffing model’s optional scheduling tool or some other method, to ensure that adequate numbers of TSOs are conducting passenger and baggage screening operations, at all times, to ensure adequate security and attempt to meet the 10 minute wait time standard. However, factors outside the model’s determination of overall staffing levels can affect FSDs’ ability to effectively schedule TSOs at passenger lanes and baggage check areas. FSDs Are Responsible for Managing to Their TSO Staffing Allocation in Light of Local Circumstances
FSDs are responsible for deploying and managing to their TSO allocation in light of local circumstances, including those that might affect scheduling and pose challenges to most efficiently deploying their resource allocations. TSA has provided FSDs with an optional tool they can use to facilitate the management of their TSO allocation. TSO training requirements (based on available times identified by t scheduling tool). TSA Reported Several Efforts Underway to Help Address Challenges in Deploying the TSO Workforce
TSA headquarters officials and FSDs we interviewed reported having several efforts underway to help address some of the challenges they face in deploying the TSO workforce. TSA human capital officials told us that they plan to establish performance metrics to use in evaluating their workforce initiatives and use the results of the evaluations to make any needed changes to their approach. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Objectives
The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, enacted in December 2004, required the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to develop and submit to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, and the House of Representatives Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, standards for determining the aviation security staffing for all airports at which TSA provides or overse screening services by March 2005. This provision of the act also mandated that we conduct an analysis of TSA’s staffing standards. To assess TSA’s efforts in developing a staffing allocation model that ensures that it provides the necessary levels of aviation security and that the average aviation security-related delay experienced by passengers is minimized, we addressed the following questions: How does TSA ensure its Staffing Allocation Model provides a sufficient number of Transportation Security Officers (TSO) to pe passenger and checked baggage screening at each airport and what challenges has it faced while implementing the model? Objective One: Use of the Staffing Allocation Model to Provide a Sufficient Number of TSOs to Perform Passenger and Checked Baggage Screening at Each Airport and Challenges Faced While Implementing the Model
To determine how TSA ensures its Staffing Allocation Model provides a sufficient number of Transportation Security Officers (TSO) to perform passenger and checked baggage screening at each airport and what challenges it has faced while implementing the model, we first sought to obtain an understanding of how the Staffing Allocation Model works to provide the appropriate number of TSO staff at the nation’s airports. Objective Two: TSA’s Deployment of Its TSO Allocation at Individual Airports and Factors That Impact the Allocation Model’s Effectiveness in Helping TSA Accomplish This Deployment
To determine how TSA deploys its allocation of TSOs at individual airports and addresses other factors affecting the deployment, we interviewed TSA staff at headquarters and at the airports we visited, regarding TSO scheduling and workforce-related factors that can affect these efforts. Appendix II: Development and Description of TSA’s Staffing Allocation Model
TSA’s Development of Its Staffing Allocation Model
The Aviation and Transportation Security Act, enacted in November 2001, significantly changed how passenger and checked baggage screening is conducted in the United States. ATSA removed screening responsibility from air carriers and the contractors who conducted screening for them, and placed this responsibility with TSA. As a result, TSA hired and deployed approximately 55,000 federal passenger and baggage Transportation Security Officers (TSO) (formerly known as screeners) to more than 400 airports nationwide. | Why GAO Did This Study
Over 600 million people travel by air each year in the United States, and the screening of airline passengers and their carry-on and checked baggage is vital to securing our transportation security system. The Aviation and Transportation Security Act, enacted in November 2001, established the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and significantly changed how passenger and checked baggage screening is conducted in the United States. This act removed screening responsibility from air carriers and the contractors who conducted screening for them, and placed this responsibility with TSA. As a result, TSA hired and deployed about 55,000 federal passenger and baggage Transportation Security Officers (TSO)--formerly known as screeners--to more than 400 airports nationwide based largely on the number of screeners that the air carrier contractors had employed. Since August 2002, however, TSA has been statutorily prohibited from exceeding 45,000 full-time equivalent positions available for screening. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, enacted in December 2004, required TSA to develop and submit to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, and the House of Representatives Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, standards for determining the aviation security staffing for all airports at which TSA provides or oversees screening services by March 2005. These standards are to provide the necessary levels of aviation security and ensure that the average aviation security related delay experienced by passengers is minimized. TSA submitted these standards, which form the basis of TSA's Staffing Allocation Model on June 22, 2005. The purpose of this optimization model, as identified by TSA, is to estimate the most efficient balance of TSOs needed to ensure security and minimize wait times. Models, in general, are expected to approximate the real world. These approximations must be validated to assure model users that their predictions are credible within the bounds of specific situations, environments, and circumstances. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act also mandated that we conduct an analysis of TSA's staffing standards. In particular, the congressional committees to which TSA submitted the staffing standards were interested in how TSA is using the Staffing Allocation Model to identify the number of TSOs needed across the more than 400 commercial airports and how the model ensures that TSA has the right number of TSOs at the right checkpoints at the right times. This report addresses the following questions: (1) How does TSA ensure that its Staffing Allocation Model provides a sufficient number of TSOs to perform passenger and checked baggage screening at each airport and what challenges has it faced while implementing the model? (2) How does TSA deploy its TSO allocation and what factors affect the model's effectiveness in helping TSA accomplish this deployment?
What GAO Found
TSA aims to ensure that its Staffing Allocation Model provides a sufficient number of TSOs to perform passenger and checked baggage screening by: (1) building assumptions into its allocation model that are designed to calculate the necessary levels of TSOs to ensure security and minimize wait times, and (2) employing multiple monitoring mechanisms for the sufficiency of the model's outputs. However, TSA faces some challenges to effective implementation of the model, primarily in ensuring that the model's key assumptions reflect operating conditions across airports. The model determines the annual TSO allocation for each airport by first considering the workload demands unique to each airport based on an estimate of each airport's peak passenger volume. This input is then processed against certain TSA assumptions about screening passengers and checked baggage--including expected processing rates, required staffing for passenger lanes and baggage equipment based on standard operating procedures, and historical equipment alarm rates. To monitor the sufficiency of the model's allocation outputs, TSA has both field and headquarters-driven mechanisms in place. However, TSA does not have a mechanism, such as a documented plan, for selecting and prioritizing which assumptions to review each year and for assuring that all assumptions are periodically reviewed to help ensure that they are current with and reflect actual operating conditions. Without a plan for periodically validating all of the assumptions, TSA is at risk of assumptions becoming outdated, which could result in TSO allocations that do not reflect operating conditions. TSA has vested its FSDs with responsibility for deploying and managing to their TSO allocation in light of local circumstances, including those that might affect scheduling and pose challenges to most efficiently deploying their resource allocations. After receiving the annual staffing allocation from TSA headquarters, FSDs must prepare work schedules, which may include use of the Staffing Allocation Model's optional scheduling tool, to deploy TSO staff to meet screening demand. However, Federal Security Directors (FSD) we interviewed identified several challenges they faced in deploying their TSO workforce. These challenges involve factors outside the model's determination of overall TSO staffing levels and affect FSDs' ability to effectively deploy their TSO staff regardless of their allocation. Specifically, FSDs cited difficulties in achieving a 20 percent part-time TSO workforce, which the model has identified as the optimal ratio for scheduling efficiency; recruiting and retaining sufficient TSOs (both full-time and part-time) to reach their full allocations as determined by the model; staffing checkpoints appropriately given that some TSOs are unavailable due to absenteeism and injuries; and managing competing demands on TSOs' time, particularly with regard to operational support functions sometimes performed by TSOs and TSO training requirements. FSDs also had to manage around physical infrastructure limitations at some airports, such as lack of room for additional lanes or baggage check areas despite demand levels that would justify such added capacity. TSA headquarters officials and FSDs we interviewed reported having several efforts underway to help address challenges they face in deploying the TSO workforce. TSA officials at individual airports we visited are also working to address these challenges. TSA human capital officials told us that they plan to evaluate the effects of their workforce initiatives and use the results of the evaluations to make any needed changes to their approach. |
gao_GAO-01-780 | gao_GAO-01-780_0 | To accomplish their task, the National Security and Counterterrorism Divisions engage in foreign intelligence and foreign counterintelligence investigations. The FISA Court, as noted previously, has jurisdiction to hear applications for and grant orders approving FISA surveillance and searches. The Foreign Intelligence Review Court was established to rule on the government’s appeals of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court denials of government-requested surveillance and search orders. FISA, among other things, contains requirements and a process for seeking electronic surveillance and physical search authority in investigations seeking to obtain foreign intelligence and counterintelligence information within the United States. Concern Over Possible Adverse Consequences of Judicial Rulings Has Been a Key Factor Impeding Coordination
A key factor impeding coordination of foreign counterintelligence investigations involving the use or anticipated use of the FISA surveillance and search tools has been the FBI’s and OIPR’s concern about the possible consequences that could result should a federal court rule that the line between an intelligence and a criminal investigation had been crossed due to contacts and/or information shared between the FBI and the Criminal Division. In January 2000, the Attorney General promulgated coordination procedures, which were in addition to the 1995 procedures. In investigations involving FISA, the notification procedures established criteria that “If in the course of an… investigation utilizing electronic surveillance or physical searches under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act…facts or circumstances are developed that reasonably indicate that a significant federal crime has been, is being, or may be committed, the FBI and OIPR each shall independently notify the Criminal Division.” Following the Criminal Division’s notification, the procedures require the FBI to provide the Criminal Division with the facts and circumstances, developed during its investigation that indicated significant criminal activity. DOJ Promulgated Additional Procedures to Address Some Coordination Problems
In January 2000, based on the Attorney General’s Review Team’s interim recommendations, the coordination working group recommended to the Attorney General additional procedures to address the FBI/Criminal Division coordination issues. However, these mechanisms have not been institutionalized in writing and, thus, their perpetuation is not ensured. Furthermore, these standards require that such documentation appear in management directives, administrative policies, or operating manuals. On the one hand, some risk and uncertainty will likely remain regarding how the FISA Court or another federal court might upon review interpret the primary purpose of a particular surveillance or search in light of notification of the Criminal Division and the subsequent advice it provided. 2. 2. | Why GAO Did This Study
This report reviews the coordination efforts involved in foreign counterintelligence investigations where the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act has been or may be employed. The act established (1) requirements and a process for seeking electronic surveillance and physical search authority in national security investigations seeking foreign intelligence and counterintelligence information within the United States and (2) the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, which has jurisdiction to hear applications for and grant orders approving Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act surveillance and searches.
What GAO Found
GAO found that coordination between the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Department of Justice's (DOJ) Criminal Division has been limited in those foreign counterintelligence cases in which criminal activity is indicated and surveillance and searches have been, or may be, employed. A key factor inhibiting this coordination is the concern over how the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court or another federal court might rule on the primary purpose of the surveillance or search in light of such coordination. In addition, the FBI and the Criminal Division differ on the interpretations of DOJ's 1995 procedures concerning counterintelligence investigations. In January 2000, the Attorney General issued additional procedures to address these coordination concerns. These procedures, among other things, required the FBI to submit case summaries to the Criminal Division and established a protocol for briefing Criminal Division officials about those investigations. In addition, the FBI established two mechanisms to ensure compliance with the Attorney General's 1995 procedures. These mechanisms include (1) requiring the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review to notify the FBI and the Criminal Division of investigations it believes meets the requirements of the 1995 procedures and (2) establishing a core group of high-level officials to oversee coordination issues. However, these efforts have not been institutionalized in management directives or written administrative policies or procedures. |
gao_HEHS-99-17 | gao_HEHS-99-17_0 | Ed-Flex Waiver Authority Is Limited in Scope
Under Ed-Flex, the Department of Education delegates a portion of its authority to grant waivers to the 12 participating states, allowing each of these states to make decisions about whether particular school districts should be granted waivers of covered federal requirements. Although the federal government has established many education programs, Ed-Flex states can waive only certain specific requirements under six major programs: (1) Title I of the ESEA, which provides funding to help local school districts give additional educational assistance to disadvantaged children; (2) Title II of the ESEA, the Eisenhower Professional Development Program, which provides funding to local school districts to provide teacher training and professional development in math and science; (3) Title IV of the ESEA, the Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communities Program, which provides funding for programs to prevent violence and substance abuse; (4) Title VI of the ESEA, Innovative Education Program Strategies, which provides funding to help school districts develop innovative programs in several areas, including adult education and family literacy; (5) part C of Title VII of the ESEA, Emergency Immigrant Education, which provides funding for the educational needs of immigrant children; and (6) the Carl D. Perkins Vocational-Technical Education Act, which provides support for vocational and technical education programs at the secondary and postsecondary levels. Of the 12 Ed-Flex states, 7—Colorado, Maryland, Michigan, New Mexico, Ohio, Texas, and Vermont—have the authority to grant both statewide waivers (which can be used by any qualifying district in the state) and individual waivers (which can be used by only the district that applied and was approved for the waiver). However, the remaining 28 states clearly do not meet Ed-Flex eligibility criteria. Under current law, a state is eligible for the Ed-Flex designation only if it meets two criteria. Second, Ed-Flex states must have the ability to modify their own requirements consistent with the federal waivers they grant. Number of Ed-Flex Waivers Varies by State, but Most Waivers Are Related to Title I
In some Ed-Flex states, the state education agency has granted relatively few waivers of federal requirements in comparison with the number of school districts in the state. Of the nine states that had been participating in Ed-Flex for more than 1 year as of January 1998, four granted 10 or fewer individual waivers. In the seven Ed-Flex states that have the authority to grant statewide waivers, any qualifying school district can take advantage of a statewide waiver without having to demonstrate specific need for that waiver. Most Ed-Flex Waivers Involve Title I
Most of the Ed-Flex waivers granted have centered around Title I, the largest federal program for elementary and secondary education. According to several officials from these and other Ed-Flex states, Ed-Flex is valuable, regardless of the number of waivers granted, because it promotes a climate that encourages state and local educators to explore new approaches, frequently making better use of the flexibility that already exists within state and federal requirements. Second, the federal government is accountable for the overall results of the federal programs affected by Ed-Flex waivers. Ed-Flex States Vary in How They Establish Goals and Objectives for Federal Waivers
Wide variation exists among Ed-Flex states regarding whether they have established clearly defined goals to measure the results of waivers received by districts and schools. Federal Oversight Under Ed-Flex Provides Limited Information on Program Results
Currently, the Department of Education’s oversight of Ed-Flex waivers is limited to requiring Ed-Flex states to submit an annual report to the Department summarizing the waivers granted in the previous calendar year. The Department also expressed concern that the report focused on the few requirements that may not be waived rather than on the broad scope of program-related requirements that are subject to waivers. Number and Types of Waivers Granted for State-Imposed Requirements, 1997
Does state have authority to waive state requirements? State special education requirements. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the Education Flexibility Partnership Demonstration Act (Ed-Flex) in 1994, focusing on: (1) the scope of Ed-Flex and how it works; (2) the criteria states must meet to participate in Ed-Flex and identify the extent to which states not currently participating satisfy these criteria; (3) the number and type of waivers that Ed-Flex states have granted to their local school districts; (4) participating states' views on the usefulness of Ed-Flex; and (5) issues for ensuring accountability if Ed-Flex is continued or expanded.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) under the Ed-Flex project, the state is allowed to make decisions about whether particular school districts should be granted waivers of certain federal requirements; (2) although the federal government has established a large number of education programs, states can waive only certain specific requirements within six programs; (3) in 5 of the 12 Ed-Flex states, the state can grant only individual waivers; (4) in the remaining seven states, the state can grant statewide waivers without the requirement that the district demonstrate its specific need for the waiver; (5) to be eligible for selection as an Ed-Flex state, a state had to meet two criteria related to its ability to implement Ed-Flex in conjunction with overall education reform; (6) states were required to: (a) have a plan for education reform that had been reviewed and approved by the federal Department of Education; and (b) be able to modify any of their own state requirements that were associated with the federal waivers they granted; (7) currently, only 2 of the 38 nonparticipating states clearly satisfy these criteria and would be eligible to participate if the limit of 12 Ed-Flex states was eliminated; (8) states participating in the Ed-Flex project vary in the number of waivers they have granted to local school districts; (9) the waivers granted by Ed-Flex states typically center around Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act; (10) Title I provides funds to many school districts to give special educational assistance to economically and educationally disadvantaged students; (11) school districts seeking waivers have mainly sought to change how Title I funds can be used within a school or to change the distribution of Title I funds across schools; (12) states also vary in the degree to which they view these waivers as helpful; (13) some states told GAO that Ed-Flex is useful for creating a climate that encourages innovation and flexibility, even if few waivers are granted; (14) others reported that because the authority to grant waivers is limited to specific programs and requirements, Ed-Flex is of limited value; (15) the Ed-Flex project creates challenges in holding districts accountable for the results of individual waivers and also in holding states, districts, and the federal Department of Education accountable for the results of federal programs that are affected by these waivers; and (16) while some states have put in place specific goals and established clear and measurable objectives for evaluating the impact of waivers, many Ed-Flex states have not established any goals or have defined only vague objectives. |
gao_GGD-98-50 | gao_GGD-98-50_0 | Furthermore, it (1) remains vulnerable to assertions by its critics that federal customers are dissatisfied and, in turn, should no longer be required to buy FPI products; and (2) possibly misses opportunities to improve its operations by having better data on how federal customers view its performance. FPI Data Systems Not Designed to Track Customer Satisfaction
FPI has a variety of management information systems that, among other things, allow it to track customer orders and react to complaints. FPI’s Manager of Information Systems told us that FPI does not have a management information system that tracks customer satisfaction. FPI’s Efforts to Collect Customer Satisfaction Information Have Been Limited
Over the years, FPI has relied on a variety of initiatives—at both the headquarters and factory levels—to obtain limited feedback from federal customers in general about its products and services. However, the results have been too limited to reliably support broad generalizations regarding whether federal customers who buy and use FPI products and services are satisfied overall with FPI’s performance. Agencies Develop Performance Information on All Vendors but Apply It Differently to FPI
Major customer agencies—DLA, FSS, Army, SSA, and the Postal Service—consider price when awarding contracts and monitor factors like quality and timeliness while administering contracts for all vendors, including FPI. It should be recognized, however, that the contracting officer’s leverage in resolving procurement problems is different for FPI from the leverage the contracting officer has for private sector vendors since the rules that typically govern contracts with commercial vendors do not apply to FPI. In this regard, on September 13, 1993, the Acting Attorney General issued a legal opinion which held that FPI, as a seller of goods to the federal government, is not covered by the FAR, and must be treated under its authorizing legislation and FAR Subpart 8.6. Furthermore, agencies cannot use past performance information to deny awarding a contract to FPI because, under the law, FPI is a mandatory source of supply for products. However, at FPI’s discretion, they can use it to negotiate with FPI on factors such as product quality or delivery time frames, or to seek a waiver from FPI so that they can buy from a commercial vendor that can better meet their quality or delivery requirements. Furthermore, the lack of a systematic approach for collecting and analyzing these data is inconsistent with recent public and private sector initiatives to use customer satisfaction data to measure performance and address real and perceived performance problems. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine (1) if Federal Prison Industries (FPI) has data, either from its management information systems or other sources, to support overall conclusions about how federal customers who buy and use its products and services view their timeliness, price, and quality; and (2) whether agencies who are among the largest buyers of FPI products and services monitor FPI’s performance the same way they do commercial vendors in terms of timeliness, price, and quality. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on whether Federal Prison Industries (FPI) collects and maintains data that would enable it to make reliable, generalizable statements about the satisfaction of its federal agency customers with respect to the quality, cost, and timely delivery of FPI's products, focusing on: (1) if FPI has data, either from its management information system or other sources, to support overall conclusions about how federal customers who buy and use its products and services view their timeliness, price, and quality; and (2) whether agencies who are among the largest buyers of FPI products and services monitor FPI's performance the same way they do commercial vendors in terms of timeliness, price, and quality.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) FPI has been the subject of substantial debate over the years, much of which has centered on the timeliness, price, and quality of its products; (2) missing from this debate have been convincing data that show whether federal customers who buy and use FPI products and services are satisfied with FPI's performance; (3) FPI has a variety of management information systems that allow it to track customer orders and react to complaints; (4) however, FPI does not have a systematic or structured process for collecting and analyzing customer satisfaction data so that conclusions can be drawn about customer satisfaction; (5) FPI's efforts to gauge customer satisfaction have been limited to relying on narrowly scoped surveys as well as other efforts; (6) without convincing data on customer satisfaction, FPI: (a) remains vulnerable to assertions by its critics that federal customers are dissatisfied and, in turn, should no longer be required to buy FPI products; and (b) may miss opportunities to improve its operations by having better data on how federal customers view its performance in the areas of timeliness, price, and quality; (7) furthermore, FPI's lack of a systematic approach for collecting these data appears inconsistent with contemporary management principles used by both public- and private-sector organizations; (8) regarding agencies' efforts to monitor FPI performance, major customer agencies that GAO contacted stated that they consider price when awarding contracts and monitor factors like quality and timeliness while administering contracts for all vendors, including FPI; (9) it should be recognized, however, that the contracting officer's leverage in resolving procurement problems is different for FPI than for private-sector vendors since the rules that typically govern contracts with private-sector vendors do not apply to FPI; (10) in this regard, on September 13, 1993, the Acting Attorney General issued a legal opinion that FPI, as a seller of goods to the federal government, is not covered by the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR), and must be treated under its authorizing legislation FAR Subpart 8.6; (11) furthermore, agencies cannot use past performance information to deny awarding a contract to FPI because, under the law, FPI is a mandatory source of supply; and (12) however, at FPI's discretion, agencies can use it to negotiate with FPI factors such as product quality or delivery time frames, or to seek a waiver from FPI so that they can buy from a commercial vendor that can better meet their quality or delivery requirements. |
gao_GAO-15-561 | gao_GAO-15-561_0 | Dodd-Frank Act Provisions Concerning Conflict Minerals in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Adjoining Countries
Section 1502(a) states that “it is the sense of the Congress that the exploitation and trade of conflict minerals originating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is helping to finance conflict characterized by extreme levels of violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, particularly sexual- and gender-based violence, and contributing to an emergency humanitarian situation therein, warranting the provisions of section 13(p) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as added by subsection (b).”
Section 1502(b) requires the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), in consultation with the Department of State (State), to promulgate disclosure and reporting regulations regarding the use of conflict minerals from the DRC and adjoining countries. Section 1502(c) requires State and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to develop, among other things, a strategy to address the linkages among human rights abuses, armed groups, the mining of conflict minerals, and commercial products. 4. Company Filings in 2014 Indicate Companies Performed Country-of- Origin Inquiry but Provided Limited Insights Regarding Country of Origin of Conflict Minerals Used, Citing Difficulty Obtaining Information From Suppliers
The sample of filings in 2014 that we reviewed indicates that 99 percent of companies conducted a country-of-origin inquiry and most companies reported that they were unable to determine the country of origin of conflict minerals they had used in 2013. Company Filings Indicate Companies Exercised Due Diligence but Most Were Unable to Determine Whether or Not Conflict Minerals Used Came From Covered Countries, or Whether They Financed or Benefited Armed Groups
According to our analysis, the exercise of due diligence on the source and chain of custody of conflict minerals yielded little or no additional information, beyond the RCOI, regarding the country of origin of conflict minerals or whether the conflict minerals used in 2013 in products by companies benefited or financed armed groups in the Covered Countries. 2) in their Conflict Minerals Report (CMR). Figure 5 depicts the SEC conflict minerals disclosure rule timeline. Companies that disclosed that conflict minerals came from covered countries indicated they are or will be taking action. Examples include the following: notify suppliers that the company intends to cease doing business with suppliers who continue to source conflict minerals from smelters that are not certified as conflict-free; include a conflict minerals clause in new or renewed contracts requiring suppliers to provide conflict minerals information on a prospective basis and identify alternative sources of conflict minerals if suppliers are found to be providing the company with minerals that support conflict in the Covered Countries; increase the number of surveyed suppliers; reach out earlier in the year, and direct suppliers to information and training resources; participate in the Conflict-Free Sourcing Initiative, an industry association effort, to define best practices and induce smelters and refiners to adopt socially responsible business practices; and address, as appropriate, complaints or concerns expressed through grievance mechanisms. State and USAID Actions to Implement the U.S. Traceability mechanisms may minimize the risk that minerals that have been exploited by illegal armed groups will enter the supply chain and may also support companies’ efforts to identify the source of the conflict minerals across the supply chain around the world. First, the mining areas in eastern DRC continue to be plagued by insecurity because of the presence and activities of illegal armed groups and some corrupt members of the national military. As we reported in 2010, U.S. government officials and others have indicated that weak governance and lack of state authority in eastern DRC constitute a significant challenge. 11 shows a timeline of population-based surveys for the DRC, Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi since 2007). Rwanda. DRC. DRC. Burundi. We randomly sampled 147 filings from a population of 1,324 to create estimates generalizable to the population of all companies that filed. To examine Department of State (State) and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) actions related to the U.S. conflict minerals strategy in the DRC region, we reviewed the U.S. Strategy to Address the Linkages between Human Rights Abuses, Armed Groups, Mining of Conflict Minerals and Commercial Products, developed by State and USAID in 2011, and State’s and USAID’s websites. We also reviewed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. | Why GAO Did This Study
Armed groups in eastern DRC continue to commit severe human rights abuses and profit from the exploitation of minerals, according to the United Nations. Congress included a provision in the 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act that, among other things, directed SEC to promulgate disclosure and reporting regulations regarding the use of conflict minerals from the DRC and adjoining countries. The act also directed State and USAID to develop a strategy to address the linkages among human rights abuses, armed groups, the mining of conflict minerals, and commercial products.
This report examines (1) company disclosures filed with SEC for the first time in 2014 in response to the SEC conflict minerals disclosure rule; and (2) State and USAID actions related to the U.S. conflict minerals strategy in the DRC region. This report also includes information on sexual violence in the DRC and three adjoining countries. GAO reviewed and analyzed relevant documents and data and interviewed officials from relevant U.S. agencies and nongovernmental, industry, and international organizations; and analyzed a random sample of company disclosures from the SEC database that was sufficiently large to produce estimates for all companies that filed. GAO also traveled to the DRC, Rwanda, and Burundi to conduct field work.
What GAO Found
According to a generalizable sample GAO reviewed, company disclosures filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for the first time in 2014 in response to the SEC conflict minerals disclosure rule indicated that most companies were unable to determine the source of their conflict minerals. Companies that filed disclosures used one or more of the four “conflict minerals”—tantalum, tin, tungsten, and gold—determined by the Secretary of State to be financing conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) or adjoining countries. Most companies were based in the United States (87 percent). Almost all of the companies (99 percent) reported performing country-of-origin inquiries for conflict minerals used. Companies GAO spoke to cited difficulty obtaining necessary information from suppliers because of delays and other challenges in communication. Most of the companies (94 percent) reported exercising due diligence on the source and chain of custody of conflict minerals used. However, most (67 percent) were unable to determine whether those minerals came from the DRC or adjoining countries (Covered Countries), and none could determine whether the minerals financed or benefited armed groups in those countries. Companies that disclosed that conflict minerals in their products came from covered countries (4 percent) indicated that they are or will be taking action to address the risks associated with the use and source of conflict minerals in their supply chains. For example, one company indicated that it would notify suppliers that it intends to cease doing business with suppliers who continue to source conflict minerals from smelters that are not certified as conflict-free.
a Covered Countries: Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia.
Department of State (State) and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) officials reported taking actions to implement the U.S. conflict minerals strategy, but a difficult operating environment complicates this implementation. The agencies reported supporting a range of initiatives including validation of conflict-free mine sites and strengthening traceability mechanisms that minimize the risk that minerals that have been exploited by illegal armed groups will enter the supply chain. As a result, according to the agencies, 140 mine sites have been validated and competition within conflict-free traceability systems has benefited artisanal miners and exporters. Implementation of the U.S conflict minerals strategy faces multiple obstacles outside the control of the U.S. government. For example, eastern DRC is plagued by insecurity because of the presence of illegal armed groups and some corrupt members of the national military, weak governance, and poor infrastructure.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making any recommendations. |
gao_GAO-16-137 | gao_GAO-16-137_0 | This amount is based in part on a plan’s bid, which is its projection of the revenue it requires to provide a beneficiary with services that are covered under Medicare FFS, and a benchmark, which CMS generally calculates from average per capita Medicare FFS spending in the plan’s service area and other factors. Overall Payments to MA Plans Likely Were Lower Due to VA’s Provision of $2.4 Billion in Services to MA-Enrolled Veterans, but Appropriateness of Resulting Payments Still Uncertain
VA provided about $2.4 billion in Medicare-covered inpatient and outpatient services to the 833,684 MA-enrolled veterans in fiscal year 2010. As a result, the benchmark would be lower and, in turn, payments to MA plans would also be lower. Risk scores—VA’s provision of Medicare-covered services may result in lower risk scores because, like benchmarks, they are calibrated based on Medicare FFS spending for beneficiaries with specific diagnoses identified by Medicare. Although VA spending on Medicare-covered services likely results in lower CMS payments to MA plans, the extent to which these payments reflect the expected utilization of services by the MA population remains uncertain. Specifically, payment amounts may still be too high or could even be too low, depending on the utilization of VA services by veterans enrolled in MA plans and veterans enrolled in Medicare FFS. For example, payments to MA plans may be too high if veterans enrolled in MA receive a greater proportion of their services from VA relative to veterans enrolled in Medicare FFS. In contrast, payments to MA plans may be too low if veterans enrolled in MA receive a lesser proportion of their services from VA relative to veterans enrolled in Medicare FFS. Data on veterans’ use of services through Medicare FFS and VA health care are available from CMS and VA, respectively. CMS agreed with the recommendation, but as of August 2015, had not completed all steps needed to validate the encounter data. CMS Does Not Have the VA Diagnosis and Utilization Data That May Improve Its Methodology for Calculating Adjustments to MA Payments
CMS determined that no adjustment to 2010 through 2016 MA payments was needed to account for the provision of Medicare-covered services by VA, but used a methodology that had certain shortcomings that could have affected MA payments. To determine whether an adjustment was needed, CMS obtained data from VA showing veterans who are enrolled in VA health care and Medicare FFS (that is, enrollment data). When CMS updated its 2009 study to determine whether an MA payment adjustment was needed for 2017, it used the same methodology, albeit with more recent data. Specifically, CMS cannot account for services provided by and diagnoses made by VA. Officials said that they did not intend to incorporate VA utilization and diagnoses data into their analysis because they did not currently have such data and that incorporating these data would introduce additional uncertainty into the analysis. Depending on the mix of veterans and nonveterans enrolled by individual MA plans, this could result in some plans being paid too much and others too little. Federal standards for internal control call for management to have the operational data it needs to meet agency goals to effectively and efficiently use resources and to help ensure compliance with laws and regulations. Therefore, if CMS determines that an adjustment to the benchmark to account for VA spending is needed and the adjustment results in payments to MA plans that are too high for veterans, additional adjustments to payments to MA plans could be necessary. While CMS is required to adjust MA payments to account for VA spending on Medicare-covered services, as appropriate, the agency determined that no adjustment to the benchmark, which is based in part on per capita county Medicare FFS spending, was necessary for years 2010 through 2016. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of Health and Human Services direct the Administrator of CMS to take the following two actions:
Assess the feasibility of updating the agency’s study on the effect of VA-provided Medicare-covered services on per capita county Medicare FFS spending rates by obtaining VA utilization and diagnosis data for veterans enrolled in Medicare FFS under its existing data use agreement or by other means as necessary. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
This appendix describes the scope and methodology used to (1) estimate the amount that the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) spends to provide Medicare-covered services to veterans enrolled in Medicare Advantage (MA) plans and how VA spending on these services affects Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) payments to MA plans; and (2) evaluate the extent to which CMS has the data it needs to determine an appropriate adjustment, if any, to MA payments to account for VA’s provision of Medicare-covered services to MA-enrolled veterans. Our evaluation was based on a review of CMS documentation and an interview with CMS officials. | Why GAO Did This Study
Veterans enrolled in Medicare can also enroll in the VA health care system and may receive Medicare-covered services from either their Medicare source of coverage or VA. Payments to MA plans are based in part on Medicare FFS spending and may be lower than they otherwise would be if veterans enrolled in Medicare FFS receive some of their services from VA. Because this could result in payments that are too low for some MA plans, CMS is required to adjust payments to MA plans to account for VA spending, as appropriate. CMS determined an adjustment was needed for 2017, but not for 2010 through 2016.
GAO was asked to examine how VA's provision of Medicare-covered services to Medicare beneficiaries affects payments to MA plans. GAO (1) estimated VA spending on Medicare-covered services and how VA spending affects payments to MA plans and (2) evaluated whether CMS has the data it needs to adjust payments to MA plans, as appropriate. GAO used CMS and VA data to develop an estimate of VA spending on Medicare-covered services. GAO reviewed CMS documentation and interviewed CMS and VA officials.
What GAO Found
In fiscal year 2010, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) health care system provided $2.4 billion in inpatient and outpatient services to the 833,684 veterans enrolled in Medicare Advantage (MA), a private plan alternative to Medicare fee-for-service (FFS). While the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), an agency within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), generally pays Medicare FFS providers separately for each service provided, MA plans receive a monthly payment from CMS to provide all services covered under Medicare FFS. These monthly payments are based in part on a bidding target, known as a benchmark, and risk scores, which are used to adjust the payment amount to account for beneficiary demographic characteristics and health conditions. Both the benchmark and risk scores are calibrated based on Medicare FFS spending. Therefore, VA's provision of Medicare-covered services to veterans enrolled in Medicare FFS likely resulted in lower Medicare FFS spending and, in turn, lower overall payments to MA plans. However, the extent to which these payments reflect the expected utilization of services by the MA population remains uncertain. Specifically, payment amounts may still be too high or could even be too low, depending on the utilization of VA services by veterans enrolled in MA plans and veterans enrolled in Medicare FFS. If, for example, veterans enrolled in MA receive a greater proportion of their services from VA relative to veterans enrolled in Medicare FFS, then the benchmark may be too high. Conversely, payments may be too low if MA-enrolled veterans tended to receive fewer Medicare-covered services from VA relative to veterans enrolled in Medicare FFS. Assessing these possible differences would require data on the services veterans receive from MA. CMS began collecting these data in 2012 but, as of August 2015, had yet to take all the steps necessary to validate the accuracy of the data, as GAO has previously recommended.
CMS also lacks data on VA diagnoses and utilization that may improve its methodology for determining if an adjustment to the benchmark is needed to account for VA's provision of Medicare-covered services to veterans enrolled in Medicare FFS. Federal standards for internal control call for management to have the operational data it needs to meet agency goals to effectively and efficiently use resources and to help ensure compliance with laws and regulations. While CMS determined that no adjustment was necessary for 2010 through 2016 based on a 2009 study it performed, CMS's methodology did not account for services provided by and diagnoses made by VA, which can only be identified using VA's data. CMS officials updated the agency's study in 2016 using the same methodology, but with more recent data. CMS officials told GAO that they did not plan to incorporate VA utilization and diagnoses data into their analysis because (1) they do not currently have such data and (2) incorporating these data would introduce additional uncertainty into the analysis. However, if an adjustment is needed but not made or if an adjustment is too low due to limitations with CMS's methodology, it could result in some plans being paid too much and others too little. If CMS does revise its methodology and determines that an adjustment to the benchmark is necessary, it may need to make additional adjustments to MA plan payments, as discussed in this report.
What GAO Recommends
CMS should (1) assess the feasibility of revising its methodology for determining if an adjustment to the benchmark is needed by obtaining diagnoses and utilization data from VA and (2) make any additional adjustments to MA plan payments as appropriate. HHS disagreed with the first recommendation, but agreed with the second. GAO maintains that VA data may improve CMS's analysis. |
gao_GAO-15-626 | gao_GAO-15-626_0 | In January 2015, the Army Reserve and Army National Guard reported overall non-availability rates of 22 percent and 21 percent, respectively. Overall, we found that the availability data for more than 3,800 soldiers of the 85,000 soldiers assigned to these units were incomplete, inaccurate, or inconsistent, thus making the data used to report these rates not sufficiently reliable. Because we only analyzed a selection of medical-, training-, and administrative-related availability data, a more comprehensive analysis of the universe of availability- related variables could reveal additional examples of incorrect availability statuses— meaning that the overall non-availability rates reported by the Army Reserve and Army National Guard could be different than the percentages stated above. Specifically, soldiers listed with a long-term medically limiting condition in one data system were listed as having only a short-term disability, or no medical limitations, in other systems. While the Army reserve component commands and the units we selected perform some data quality reviews to identify and correct discrepancies within the multiple data systems that they rely on for availability data, these reviews examine a limited scope of availability-related variables and are performed infrequently. The Army Reserve Components Do Not Verify in a Timely Manner Whether Soldiers’ Injuries and Illnesses Are Service Connected, Which Could Lengthen Soldier Non- Availability
The Army Reserve and the Army National Guard do not verify whether not medically ready soldiers’ injuries or illnesses are service-connected in accordance with Line of Duty investigation completion time lines prescribed by Army regulation, which could lengthen the time which some soldiers are reported as non-available. A planned revised program regulation for Line of Duty investigations could address some of the delays, but its issuance has been pending for years and does not appear to address all causes of the delays, such as soldiers not providing information as required. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to take the following four actions: Improve the Army Reserve’s and the Army National Guard’s internal control procedures to ensure that individual soldier availability information in each data system is complete, accurate, and timely by increasing the scope and frequency of data quality reviews at the unit and national levels to address issues resulting from self-reporting and inaccurate inputs;
Develop and implement ways that the Army reserve components can facilitate timely updates of availability data between all data systems through the current system interfaces to improve the relevance and value of the data that management is using to make soldier availability-related decisions;
Develop a plan with timelines and take actions accordingly to address the backlog of Line of Duty investigations; and
Revise the Line of Duty program regulation to include procedures that would address implementation challenges that contribute to delays in the processing of Army Reserve and Army National Guard soldiers’ claims of incurring service-connected injuries and illnesses, such as by including the identification of and procedures to address non- compliance by soldiers, and take steps to expeditiously issue that revised program regulation. In the report we state several reasons why the soldier non-availability information is not complete, accurate or timely. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to (1) examine the extent to which the Army reserve components have complete, accurate, and timely information to report soldiers’ non-availability rates and (2) examine the extent to which the Army reserve components verify in a timely manner whether soldiers’ injuries and illnesses are service-connected, as delays can affect soldier non-availability and (3) provide a description of how the Army reserve components account for new soldiers who are not available because they have not completed initial military training. | Why GAO Did This Study
The sustained readiness and availability of the Army's reserve component forces (the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard) is critical to U.S. national defense. These soldiers comprise over half of the Army's total force and their availability is key, as the Army plans to reduce its number of soldiers over the next several years.
The House Report accompanying the Fiscal Year 2015 National Defense Authorization Act included a provision for GAO to review issues related to the non-availability of soldiers in the Army reserve components. In this report GAO examined, among other things, the extent to which the Army reserve components (1) have complete, accurate, and timely soldier information to report soldiers' non-availability rates and (2) verify in a timely manner whether soldiers' injuries and illnesses are service-connected, as delays can affect soldier non-availability.
GAO reviewed Army regulations and analyzed soldier non-availability data for fiscal years 2012-14; however, due to concerns with data reliability, GAO focused its analysis on January 2015.
What GAO Found
The Army reserve components do not have complete, accurate, and timely information to report soldiers' non-availability rates. In January 2015, the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard reported overall non-availability rates of 22 and 21 percent, respectively. However, GAO analyzed a limited number of medical, training, and administrative availability-related variables for all 85,000 soldiers in six units during this time period and identified more than 3,800 examples of soldiers' records that were inaccurate, incomplete, or inconsistent. For example, GAO identified soldiers who were listed as available but were incarcerated or had a medically limiting condition. A comprehensive analysis could reveal additional inaccuracies. While the Army reserve component commands and some units perform some data quality reviews to identify and correct discrepancies within the multiple data systems that they rely on for availability data, these reviews examine a limited scope of availability-related variables and are performed infrequently. For example, one system generates a report that identifies a small number of problematic variables, but only reports this information quarterly. Further, it does not provide information specific enough to correct individual problems or cover the full range of variables contributing to inaccurate data. Furthermore, the multiple systems do not interface with each other in a way to allow for timely updates of inconsistent availability information. Without an increase in the scope and frequency of data quality reviews, and improvements to systems to update information in a timely manner, the Army reserve components' availability data will continue to be inaccurate.
The Army reserve components do not verify in a timely manner whether soldiers' injuries or illnesses are service-connected (i.e., occurred in the line of duty) which could lengthen the time that some soldiers are classified as non-available. In January 2015, 81 percent of Army Reserve and 74 percent of the Army National Guard investigations of soldiers' injuries and illnesses were overdue per Army regulation. However, the Army does not have a plan to reduce the existing backlog which officials said is caused in part by soldiers not complying with information requests during investigations. The Army is updating its program guidance to address some of the causes cited for these delays, but as of June 2015, officials stated that the revised regulation had not been issued and did not address soldier noncompliance.
Note: Overdue means the investigation has been in process longer than the standard processing time as prescribed by Army Regulation 600-8-4.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Army reserve components increase the scope and frequency of data quality reviews; improve data system updates of availability-related information; reduce the backlog of investigations of service-connected injuries and illnesses; and issue revised guidance that addresses causes for the delays. In written comments, DOD agreed with the recommendations and provided additional comments for context. |
gao_GAO-09-750 | gao_GAO-09-750_0 | These other military initiatives will also be implemented over a longer time frame than BRAC decisions, which are scheduled to be completed in 2011. For example, at Fort Meade, Maryland, DOD has estimated that an additional 10,000 contractor personnel may relocate near to or on the base. Military Growth Will Have a Significant Impact on Transportation in Affected Communities, but the Full Extent and Cost of That Impact Are Uncertain
Affected communities expect BRAC and other military growth initiatives to have a significant impact on local transportation. Of 18 current BRAC-growth communities, 17 identified transportation as one of their top three priorities. These 17 communities ranged in size from very large metropolitan areas to relatively small communities, and the extent of the impact depended in part on the size of the affected community. According to Maryland transportation planners, the additional traffic resulting from the BRAC action will lead to further deterioration of traffic conditions in the area. Near-Term Projects to Address Growth Are Estimated to Cost $2.0 Billion; Longer-Term Project Costs and Impacts Are Uncertain
Using community estimates, OEA projected that the cost of addressing the most immediate effects of military growth on transportation in the affected communities would be about $2.0 billion. First, some potential projects are not included in the $2.0 billion estimate, and, if built, will result in additional costs beyond the $2.0 billion estimate. DOD Funding for Transportation Projects Is Limited, and Projects Must Compete for DOT Funds, but State and Local Governments Have Adopted Strategies to Expedite Projects
The federal response to the expected impact of military growth on transportation includes helping with planning, estimating project costs, and providing some funding for projects. State and local officials are prioritizing highway projects that can be completed with existing funding and identifying alternative transportation approaches, such as transit and biking, to help address the growth expected in their communities. For example, OEA has provided transportation planning grants to Maryland and Virginia. The DAR program has not funded large numbers of defense access road projects. As shown in table 3, Federal Highway Administration data suggest similar time frames for completing major highway construction projects. Some state and local governments have encountered difficulties in responding to transportation needs before the BRAC moves take place. State and Local Governments Are Employing Several Strategies to Complete Some Critical Projects before BRAC Growth Occurs
Given the estimated shortfall in affected communities’ funding for critical near-term projects and the difficulties posed by the Recovery Act’s short obligation time frames, local officials are adopting various strategies to complete some projects before the BRAC 2005 implementation deadline. Fort Belvoir, Virginia
As discussed, Fort Belvoir will gain about 24,100 military and civilian personnel. State and local officials used a combination of state and local funds to complete needed improvements to Interstate and state highways and to a major roadway near the base. Officials in Texas used an innovative financing approach to generate funding sufficient to complete a critical BRAC growth-related project within a short time frame. Agency Comments
We provided copies of this report to the Departments of Defense and Transportation for their review and comment. Both provided technical comments, which we incorporated into the report, as appropriate. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine the expected impact of military growth on transportation in communities affected by the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) decisions, we reviewed the 18 military bases identified by the Office of Economic Adjustment (OEA) that will be substantially and seriously affected by growth resulting from the BRAC 2005 realignments. To determine the federal, state, and local response to the expected impact of BRAC growth on transportation, we reviewed DOD’s Defense Access Roads (DAR) program guidance and interviewed base and DOD Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command officials to determine which BRAC growth-related projects base commanders had submitted for program funding and the amount of program funding committed. We reviewed local and state short- and long-term transportation improvement plans for the selected communities to identify transportation projects planned to address BRAC growth, communities’ prioritization of these projects, and communities’ strategies for funding and completing the projects. Defense Infrastructure: High-Level Leadership Needed to Help Communities Address Challenges Caused by DOD-Related Growth. Washington, D.C.: July 1, 2005. | Why GAO Did This Study
As part of the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) round, the Department of Defense (DOD) plans to relocate over 123,000 military and DOD civilian personnel, thereby increasing the staffing at 18 bases nationwide. In addition, DOD and local officials expect thousands of dependents and DOD contractor employees to relocate to communities near the BRAC 2005 growth bases. These actions will greatly increase traffic in the surrounding communities. BRAC recommendations must be implemented by September 2011. The House and Senate Committees on Appropriations directed GAO to assess and report on the impact of BRAC-related growth on transportation systems and on the responses of federal, state, and local governments. Accordingly, GAO determined the (1) expected impact on transportation in communities affected by BRAC decisions, and (2) federal, state, and local response to the expected impacts. To perform its work, GAO obtained information from the 18 communities with expected substantial BRAC growth; visited 8 of these communities; interviewed federal civilian and military officials and state and local officials; and reviewed DOD data, transportation plans, and environmental studies. GAO provided copies of this report to the Departments of Defense and Transportation for their review. The Departments provided technical comments, which GAO incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
Growth resulting from BRAC decisions will have a significant impact on transportation systems in some communities, but estimates of the total cost to address those impacts are uncertain. In addition to BRAC, other defense initiatives will result in growth in communities and also add to transportation needs. BRAC growth will result in increased traffic in communities ranging from very large metropolitan areas to small communities, creating or worsening congested roads at specific locations. Traffic impacts can also affect larger relocation decisions, and were important in DOD's decision to acquire an additional site for Fort Belvoir, Virginia, an acquisition that DOD estimates will cost $1.2 billion. According to a DOD Office of Economic Adjustment (OEA) survey, 17 of 18 BRAC growth communities identified transportation as one of their top challenges. Near-term transportation projects to address these challenges could cost about $2.0 billion, of which about $1.1 billion is related to projects in the metropolitan Washington, D.C., area. BRAC-related transportation infrastructure costs are subject to a number of uncertainties. For example, not all potential projects are included in the estimate, military staffing levels at some growth installations are in flux and the location decisions of military and civilian personnel have not yet been made, and pre-existing, non-military community growth makes a direct link between transportation projects to military growth difficult. The federal government has provided limited direct assistance to help communities address BRAC transportation impacts, and state and local governments have adopted strategies to expedite projects within the time frame allowed by BRAC. For example, DOD's Defense Access Roads Program has certified transportation projects for funding at three affected communities. Also, OEA has provided planning grants and funded traffic studies and local planning positions. While federal highway and transit programs can be used for many BRAC-related transportation needs, dedicated funds are not available. Instead, BRAC-related transportation projects must compete with other proposed transportation projects. Communities had identified funding for about $500 million of the estimated $2.0 billion needed to address their near term project needs. Some state and local governments have adopted strategies to expedite highway projects, such as prioritizing short-term high-impact projects, because the time frames for completing BRAC personnel moves are much shorter than the time frames for such projects. While legislation mandates that BRAC growth be completed by 2011, major highway and transit projects usually take 9 to 19 years. To complete some critical projects before BRAC growth occurs, state and local officials are reprioritizing planned projects and implementing those that can be completed quickly. For example, Maryland prioritized certain lower-cost intersection projects that will improve traffic flow. In Texas, officials used an innovative financing approach to generate funding quickly for a major highway project at Fort Bliss. |
gao_GAO-06-929 | gao_GAO-06-929_0 | Credit Card Fees and Issuer Practices That Can Increase Cardholder Costs Have Expanded, but a Minority of Cardholders Appear to Be Affected
Prior to about 1990, card issuers offered credit cards that featured an annual fee, a relatively high, fixed interest rate, and low penalty fees, compared with average rates and fees assessed in 2005. However, the rates these cards assessed for obtaining a cash advance were around 20 percent on average. Similar to late fees, over-limit fees also have been rising and increasingly involve a tiered structure. Under this pricing structure, issuers have offered cards with lower rates to more creditworthy borrowers, but also have offered credit to consumers who previously would not have been considered sufficiently creditworthy. According to these issuers, about 80 percent of active accounts were assessed interest rates below 20 percent as of December 31, 2005, with more than 40 percent having rates below 15 percent. No comprehensive sources existed to show the extent to which U.S. cardholders were paying penalty interest rates, but, according to data provided by the six largest issuers, a small proportion of their active accounts were being assessed interest rates above 25 percent— which we determined were likely to represent penalty rates. Weaknesses in Credit Card Disclosures Appear to Hinder Cardholder Understanding of Fees and Other Practices That Can Affect Their Costs
The disclosures that issuers representing the majority of credit card accounts use to provide information about the costs and terms of using credit cards had serious weaknesses that likely reduce their usefulness to consumers. When attempting to use these disclosures, cardholders were often unable to identify key rates or terms and often failed to understand the information in these documents. In addition, the disclosure documents often failed to group relevant information together. Although issuers can penalize cardholders for violating the terms of the card, such as by making late payments or by increasing the interest rates in effect on the cardholder’s account to rates as high as 30 percent or more, only about half of the cardholders that the usability consultant tested were able to use the typical credit card disclosure documents to successfully identify the default rate and the circumstances that would trigger rate increases for these cards. Federal Reserve Effort to Revise Regulations Presents Opportunity to Improve Disclosures
With liability concerns and outdated regulatory requirements seemingly explaining the weaknesses in card disclosures, the Federal Reserve has begun efforts to review its requirements for credit card disclosures. However, the Federal Reserve staff told us they recognize the challenge of designing disclosures that include all key information in a clear manner, given the complexity of credit card products and the different ways in which consumers use credit cards. Although Penalty Interest and Fees Likely Have Grown as a Share of Credit Card Revenues, Large Card Issuers’ Profitability Has Been Stable
Determining the extent to which penalty interest charges and fees contribute to issuers’ revenues and profits was difficult because issuers’ regulatory filings and other public sources do not include such detail. We identified various sources that gave estimates of penalty fee income as a percentage of card issuers’ total revenues that ranged from 9 to 13 percent: Analysis of the data the top six issuers provided to us indicated that each of these issuers assessed an average of about $1.2 billion in penalty fees for cardholders that made late payments or exceeded their credit limit in 2005. Objectives, Scope and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine (1) how the interest, fees, and other practices that affect the pricing structure of cards from the largest U.S. issuers have evolved, and cardholders’ experiences under these pricing structures in recent years; (2) how effectively the issuers disclose the pricing structures of cards to their cardholders; (3) whether credit card debt and penalty interest and fees contribute to cardholder bankruptcies; and (4) the extent to which penalty interest and fees contribute to the revenues and profitability of issuers’ credit card operations. Consumer Bankruptcies Have Risen Along with Debt
Consumer bankruptcies have increased significantly over the past 25 years. | Why GAO Did This Study
With credit card penalty rates and fees now common, the Federal Reserve has begun efforts to revise disclosures to better inform consumers of these costs. Questions have also been raised about the relationship among penalty charges, consumer bankruptcies, and issuer profits. GAO examined (1) how card fees and other practices have evolved and how cardholders have been affected, (2) how effectively these pricing practices are disclosed to cardholders, (3) the extent to which penalty charges contribute to cardholder bankruptcies, and (4) card issuers' revenues and profitability. Among other things, GAO analyzed disclosures from popular cards; obtained data on rates and fees paid on cardholder accounts from 6 large issuers; employed a usability consultant to analyze and test disclosures; interviewed a sample of consumers selected to represent a range of education and income levels; and analyzed academic and regulatory studies on bankruptcy and card issuer revenues.
What GAO Found
Originally having fixed interest rates around 20 percent and few fees, popular credit cards now feature a variety of interest rates and other fees, including penalties for making late payments that have increased to as high as $39 per occurrence and interest rates of over 30 percent for cardholders who pay late or exceed a credit limit. Issuers explained that these practices represent risk-based pricing that allows them to offer cards with lower costs to less risky cardholders while providing cards to riskier consumers who might otherwise be unable to obtain such credit. Although costs can vary significantly, many cardholders now appear to have cards with lower interest rates than those offered in the past; data from the top six issuers reported to GAO indicate that, in 2005, about 80 percent of their accounts were assessed interest rates of less than 20 percent, with over 40 percent having rates below 15 percent. The issuers also reported that 35 percent of their active U.S. accounts were assessed late fees and 13 percent were assessed over-limit fees in 2005. Although issuers must disclose information intended to help consumers compare card costs, disclosures by the largest issuers have various weaknesses that reduced consumers' ability to use and understand them. According to a usability expert's review, disclosures from the largest credit card issuers were often written well above the eighth-grade level at which about half of U.S. adults read. Contrary to usability and readability best practices, the disclosures buried important information in text, failed to group and label related material, and used small typefaces. Perhaps as a result, cardholders that the expert tested often had difficulty using the disclosures to find and understand key rates or terms applicable to the cards. Similarly, GAO's interviews with 112 cardholders indicated that many failed to understand key aspects of their cards, including when they would be charged for late payments or what actions could cause issuers to raise rates. These weaknesses may arise from issuers drafting disclosures to avoid lawsuits, and from federal regulations that highlight less relevant information and are not well suited for presenting the complex rates or terms that cards currently feature. Although the Federal Reserve has started to obtain consumer input, its staff recognizes the challenge of designing disclosures that include all key information in a clear manner. Although penalty charges reduce the funds available to repay cardholders' debts, their role in contributing to bankruptcies was not clear. The six largest issuers reported that unpaid interest and fees represented about 10 percent of the balances owed by bankrupt cardholders, but were unable to provide data on penalty charges these cardholders paid prior to filing for bankruptcy. Although revenues from penalty interest and fees have increased, profits of the largest issuers have been stable in recent years. GAO analysis indicates that while the majority of issuer revenues came from interest charges, the portion attributable to penalty rates has grown. |
gao_GAO-16-515 | gao_GAO-16-515_0 | Unlike NCIC, any member of the public may register to use NamUs and access published case information. NCIC data include criminal justice agency information and access to such data is restricted by law to only authorized users. Because many users of NamUs are not authorized to access NCIC, there are no direct links or data transfers between the systems. As a result, while both NCIC and NamUs contain information on long-term missing and unidentified persons, they remain separate systems. Opportunities Exist to More Efficiently Share Missing and Unidentified Persons Information in NCIC and NamUs
DOJ could facilitate more efficient sharing of information on missing and unidentified persons cases contained in NCIC and NamUs. Further, three key characteristics of NCIC and NamUs—the systems’ records, registered users, and data validation efforts—are fragmented or overlapping, creating the risk of duplication. Database Records: NCIC and NamUs contain fragmented information associated with long-term missing and unidentified persons. NamUs also accepts and maintains records of missing and unidentified persons cases that are not published on its public website, in part because they may not meet criteria for entry into NCIC. Further, the NCIC user base is significantly larger than the NamUs user base, which likely contributes to the discrepancies in the number of long-term missing persons cases reported to each system. Additionally, members of the public who do not have access to NCIC and are not affiliated with any type of agency can report missing persons cases to NamUs. NamUs also has some ad hoc processes in place, beyond routine RSA responsibilities, designed to help ensure that data in selected states on missing and unidentified persons contained in NCIC are captured by NamUs. However, while intended in part to minimize fragmentation, these processes introduce additional inefficiencies caused by overlapping and potentially duplicative activities. Implementing mechanisms to share information without fully integrating the systems could help improve the efficiency of efforts to solve long-term missing and unidentified persons cases using NCIC and NamUs. Conclusions
Every year, more than 600,000 people are reported missing, and hundreds of sets of human remains go unidentified. Although there are statutory differences between the systems, there are potential options for sharing information—such as a notification to inform NCIC users if related case data were present in NamUs —that could reduce inefficiencies between NCIC and NamUs within the existing legal framework. Recommendation for Executive Action
To allow for more efficient use of data on missing and unidentified persons contained in the NCIC’s Missing Persons and Unidentified Persons files and NamUs, the Directors of the FBI and NIJ should evaluate the feasibility of sharing certain information among authorized users, document the results of this evaluation, and incorporate, as appropriate, legally and technically feasible options for sharing the information. However, this statutory restriction does not preclude DOJ from exploring options to more efficiently share information within the confines of the current legal framework. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
In response to Senate Report 113-181 (accompanying the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act of 2015) this report addresses the following objectives: 1. To describe the access to and use of missing and unidentified persons information contained in NCIC and NamUs, we reviewed and compared NCIC and NamUs operating and policy manuals and data entry guides. We reviewed laws, policies, and information associated with reporting and sharing information on missing and unidentified persons, to include information about the types of users that can access or enter information into each system within three categories: (1) LEA, (2) non-LEA criminal justice agency (CJA)—such as a court; and (3) medicolegal investigator— such as a coroner. Appendix II: Comparison of Fragmentation and Overlap in Key Characteristics of the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) and National Missing and Unidentified Persons System (NamUs)
Appendix II: Comparison of Fragmentation and Overlap in Key Characteristics of the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) and National Missing and Unidentified Persons System (NamUs)
Purpose Both systems contain data designed to be used to solve long- term missing and unidentified persons cases. Specifically, in fiscal year 2015, 3,170 missing persons cases were reported to NamUs, while 84,401 long-term cases were reported to NCIC during the same time period. | Why GAO Did This Study
Every year, more than 600,000 people are reported missing, and hundreds of human remains go unidentified. Two primary federal databases supported by DOJ—NCIC and NamUs—contain data related to missing and unidentified persons to help solve these cases. NCIC contains criminal justice information accessed by authorized agencies to assist with daily investigations. NamUs information can be used by law enforcement, medical examiners, coroners, and the general public to help with long-term missing and unidentified persons cases.
Senate Report 113-181 (accompanying the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act of 2015) includes a provision for GAO to review NCIC and NamUs. This report describes the access to and use of missing and unidentified persons information contained in NCIC and NamUs, and the extent to which there are opportunities to improve the use of this information. GAO reviewed NCIC and NamUs data, and relevant state and federal statutes. GAO also conducted nongeneralizeable interviews with stakeholders in three states, selected in part on state laws.
What GAO Found
The Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) National Crime Information Center (NCIC) database includes criminal justice agency information and access to such data is restricted to authorized users. In contrast, the Department of Justice's (DOJ) National Institute of Justice (NIJ) funds and oversees the National Missing and Unidentified Persons System (NamUs), a database for which the public may register to access published case information. Because many users of NamUs are not authorized to access NCIC, there are no direct links between the systems. As a result, while both NCIC and NamUs contain information on long-term missing and unidentified persons, they remain separate systems.
DOJ could facilitate more efficient sharing of information on missing persons and unidentified remains (referred to as missing and unidentified persons cases) contained in these systems. GAO found, in part, that the following three key characteristics of NCIC and NamUs are fragmented or overlapping, creating the risk of duplication.
Database Records: NCIC and NamUs contain fragmented information associated with long-term missing and unidentified persons (cases open for more than 30 days). For example, in fiscal year 2015, 3,170 long-term missing persons cases were reported to NamUs while 84,401 missing persons records reported to NCIC became long-term cases. NamUs also accepts and maintains records of missing and unidentified persons cases that may not be found in NCIC because, for example, they have not yet been filed with law enforcement. As a result, users relying on only one system may miss information that could be instrumental in solving these types of cases.
Registered Users: The NCIC user base is significantly larger than the NamUs user base, and the types of users vary, which may contribute to the discrepancies in each system's data. For instance, almost all law enforcement agencies use NCIC, with only a small fraction registered to use NamUs. Additionally, members of the public do not have access to NCIC, but can report missing persons cases to NamUs.
Data Validation Efforts: In part to minimize fragmentation, NamUs uses a case validation process and other ad hoc efforts to help ensure that data on missing and unidentified persons contained in NCIC is captured by NamUs. However, these processes introduce additional inefficiencies because they require officials to manually review and enter case data into both systems, resulting in duplicative data entry.
Inefficiencies exist in the use of information on missing and unidentified persons primarily because there is no mechanism to share information between the systems, such as a notifier to inform NCIC users if related case data were present in NamUs. According to FBI officials, federal law precludes full integration of NCIC and NamUs; however, opportunities to share information may exist within the legal framework to address fragmentation and overlap without full system integration. By evaluating the technical and legal feasibility of options to share information, documenting the results, and implementing feasible options, DOJ could better inform those who are helping solve missing and unidentified persons cases and increase the efficiency of solving such cases.
What GAO Recommends
To allow for more efficient use of missing and unidentified persons information, GAO recommends that DOJ evaluate options to share information between NCIC and NamUs. DOJ disagreed because it believes it lacks the necessary legal authority. GAO believes DOJ can study options for sharing information within the confines of its legal framework, and therefore believes the recommendation remains valid. |
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