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gao_GAO-13-542 | gao_GAO-13-542_0 | REO Program Structures and Use of Contractors
Since 1999, FHA has been outsourcing to private sector contractors the maintenance and disposition of its REO properties. RHS uses both contractors and its own staff to dispose of REO properties, according to agency officials. We also found that, in making these sales, FHA did not follow several practices that other entities used in disposing of REO properties that could potentially increase the agency’s returns, including repairing properties to increase their market value, using multiple inputs to set list prices, and using market-based information to make subsequent list price reductions. FHA and Other Federally Related Entities Have Similar Goals and Strategies for Disposing of REO Properties
FHA’s goals for disposing of its REO properties were similar to those of the other entities we reviewed. FHA’s Returns on REO Sales Slightly Lagged Those of the Enterprises and Dispositions Took Substantially Longer to Complete
FHA’s returns from selling its REO properties generally have trailed the returns of the two enterprises but its performance has improved recently. FHA also took longer to dispose of properties than the enterprises but showed recent improvement in this area. To account for the possibility that the performance differences were attributable to differences in the property characteristics of each of these entities’ REO inventories, we developed a regression model to control for the effects on the net execution rates of certain property characteristics— such as location, value, and local real estate market conditions—that were beyond the entities’ control. FHA took significantly longer to sell its properties than the enterprises and VA, but the differences decreased in the first half of 2012. We found that if FHA’s average number of days from foreclosure sale to REO disposition had equaled those of the enterprises, it could have avoided around $600 million in extra holding costs for 2011 alone. For example, FHA’s independently assessed value and initial list price execution rates (net sales proceeds as a share of property values or list prices) were both 30 percent higher for its retail sales than for its mission program dispositions for sales from January 2007 through June 2012. The Santa Ana and Atlanta centers lagged the enterprises by 2 to 6 percentage points for dispositions in their respective states, while the Philadelphia center lagged the enterprises by 8 and 11 percentage points (fig. FHA Has Yet to Implement a Uniform System for Evaluating Contractor Performance
Under the new contract structure—known as M&M III—created in 2010, FHA expected that its staff and an oversight contractor would conduct a number of specific activities to monitor its REO maintenance and marketing contractors’ performance, including (1) assessing whether its contractors are meeting minimum contractual requirements, and (2) using standard metrics in a scorecard to evaluate the level of contractors’ performance. In addition, staff from one of the private mortgage servicers we interviewed told us that its own field agents inspected about 40 percent of its properties, while two other private mortgage servicers said that they inspected about 7 and 10 to 12 percent of their properties on a monthly basis throughout the year. In addition, FHA does not have the procedures that the enterprises have to ensure that properties are assigned to listing brokers located close enough to the properties to have sufficient knowledge of the local market. We found that FHA’s disposition performance and the time required to complete sales of REO properties lagged the performance of the government-sponsored enterprises. Recommendations for Executive Action
To increase the potential for higher financial returns from FHA’s disposition of REO properties, the Secretary, HUD, should direct the Commissioner, FHA, to identify and implement changes in current practices or requirements that could improve REO disposition outcomes, including requiring the use of multiple estimates of market value when determining initial list prices, considering whether conducting repairs could increase the amount of net proceeds from specific property sales, and ensuring that the timing and amount of price reductions for its listed properties are made on the basis of an evaluation of market conditions rather than on standardized schedules. To improve its oversight of the REO disposition program, the Secretary, HUD, should direct the Commissioner, FHA, to update its REO program disposition handbook, or equivalent document, to include a current and consolidated set of policies and procedures for managing and disposing of FHA’s REO properties; establish a process for analyzing differences in disposition performance and practices across homeownership centers that can be used to periodically update this handbook or equivalent documentation to reflect current policy and procedures; implement a mechanism for systematically reviewing contractors’ compliance with minimum performance requirements through the use of standard metrics; ensure the completion and implementation of the scorecard currently being developed, including ensuring that performance metrics included in the scorecard are consistent with those used to review contractors’ compliance with minimum performance requirements; determine more effective ways, including increased use of in-person inspections, to better ensure that contractors comply with expected requirements; implement controls to ensure that listing brokers are located within close enough proximity to their listed properties to effectively market REO properties; and take steps to develop a legally acceptable means of assigning work to REO contractors that uses more frequent assessments of past performance. To examine the disposition practices, we reviewed REO program regulations, requirements, and policies to determine the goals and strategies for these activities of FHA and other federally related housing entities, including the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), the Department of Agriculture’s Rural Housing Service (RHS), and two housing government-sponsored enterprises (the enterprises)—Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. To assess the effectiveness of FHA’s REO dispositions, we obtained and analyzed REO disposition data from FHA and the other federally related housing entities, including all REO properties disposed of from January 1, 2007, through June 30, 2012, as well as properties in inventory at the end of the period. | Why GAO Did This Study
With mortgage foreclosures at historic levels in recent years, FHA is faced with disposing of a high volume of REO properties. The enterprises, other federal agencies, and private sector mortgage servicers also dispose of REO properties from their foreclosures. To assess the relative effectiveness of FHAs REO dispositions, GAO examined (1) FHAs disposition goals, strategies, practices, and effectiveness in disposing of properties compared with those of the enterprises and private servicers; and (2) FHAs oversight of the contractors that maintained and marketed its REO properties. GAO analyzed REO disposition data from FHA and the enterprises, including modeling to control for property differences across the entities. GAO also collected requirements, policies, and interviews on each entitys oversight of its REO dispositions.
What GAO Found
The Federal Housing Administration's (FHA) performance in selling its foreclosed properties--known as real estate-owned (REO) properties--lagged the performance of both of the government-sponsored enterprises (enterprises), Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. FHA disposed of more than 400,000 properties from January 2007 through June 2012. Its combined 2007-2012 returns, measured by the net execution rate (net sales proceeds divided by independently assessed property values) were about 4 to 6 percentage points below the enterprises' returns. After controlling for certain differences in their properties' characteristics (e.g., value, location, and local market conditions), differences in combined returns between FHA and the enterprises persisted at an estimated 2 to 5 percentage points.
Further, while the enterprises took an average of around 200 days after foreclosure to dispose of REO properties, FHA took about 340 days--more than 60 percent longer . A similar pattern persisted even after controlling for certain property differences. FHA also took longer than the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). For FHA, unlike the others, a significant part of the time between the foreclosure sale and REO sale is taken by loan servicers who must complete certain activities before conveying title to FHA. In the first half of 2012, FHA's disposition returns and timelines generally improved relative to the enterprises'. All three entities use similar strategies to dispose of their REO properties, but FHA does not use some practices that the enterprises and private mortgage servicers use that may have the potential to improve its sales performance. For example, FHA does not repair its properties to increase their marketability, something both enterprises do. And unlike the enterprises, FHA does not incorporate information from multiple sources in setting list prices or consistently take into account market conditions when reducing prices. Instead, it relies on one appraisal in setting initial prices and often reduces them by set amounts. GAO found that if FHA's execution rate and disposition time frame had equaled those of the enterprises in 2011, it could have increased its proceeds by as much as $400 million and decreased its holding costs--which can include items such as taxes, homeowners' association fees, and maintenance costs--by up to $600 million for the year.
In addition, FHAs oversight of the contractors that it uses to maintain and dispose of REO properties has weaknesses, and it does not use some of the oversight tools other entities use that might prove effective. First, government internal control standards require complete, updated policies and procedures to guide program oversight. But FHA has not updated its REO disposition handbook since 1994, even though the agency implemented a different program and contractor structure in 2010. In the absence of a central source of updated guidance, GAO and FHA internal auditors found inconsistencies in both contractor activities and staff oversight across FHAs four regional homeownership centers. Second, FHA has not implemented a uniform system for evaluating contractor performance. For instance, FHA has yet to implement a proposed version of the type of scorecard that the enterprises use to assess differences in contractor performance. Also, its planned incentive structure for contractors has been found not to comply with federal contracting rules. These two shortcomings have prevented FHA from assigning work according to contractors performancea key quality control in its new REO program structure. Further, FHA aims to inspect 2 to 6 percent of its REO properties annually, although other entities with REO properties report inspecting between 25 and 35 percent monthly, or between 7 and 40 percent annually. Finally, FHA has not taken steps to ensure that the listing brokers marketing its REO properties are located close enough to the properties to have adequate knowledge of local markets. Without implementing more effective activities to evaluate contractor performance and ensure compliance with program requirements, FHAs REO properties may continue to remain on the market longer and sell for lower prices than properties held by the enterprises.
What GAO Recommends
GAO makes 10 recommendations intended to increase FHAs returns on the disposition of REO properties, including considering repairs that increase net proceeds, requiring the use of additional information for setting initial and subsequent listing prices; and improving its oversight of its contractors, including updating and maintaining comprehensive guidance, implementing a performance inspections, and ensuring that listing brokers are appropriately located. FHA reviewed a draft of this report and agreed with GAOs recommendations. |
gao_GAO-01-1070 | gao_GAO-01-1070_0 | High-performing organizations in the private and public sectors have long understood the relationship between effective “people management” and organizational success. All five of the agencies we reviewed have experienced challenges in managing their human capital. To address its strategic human capital management challenges, FEMA has started an initiative to reduce middle management layers and streamline its organization. Agency leaders must commit their organizations to valuing and investing in their employees and focusing their employees’ efforts on achieving stated agency missions and goals. For example, FEMA’s U.S. Fire Administration teams had members from units throughout the organization. Some of the barriers included a lack of trust, resistance to change and a lack of buy-in, and implementation issues. Implementation Issues
Implementation issues, such as workload demands and performance incentive issues, also presented barriers to change. Agencies Cited Examples Of Performance Improvements
Agencies identified a range of examples to demonstrate the different ways performance can be improved in implementing the practices to empower and involve employees. These practices are providing sustained leadership commitment to open communications and support culture change, engaging unions to include all perspectives in achieving consensus using a variety of formal and on-the-job training approaches to facilitate the development of new skills, encouraging employees to combine their resources and talents by working together in teams, involving employees in planning and sharing performance information so that employees help shape agencies’ goals and better understand how their day-to-day activities contribute to results, and empowering staff by giving them the authority they need to make decisions and effectively conduct agency operations. | What GAO Found
People are the federal government's most valuable asset. Studies of private and public sector organizations have shown that high-performing organizations value and invest in their employees--human capital--and align their "people policies" to support organizational performance goals. In the federal government, however, strategic human capital management is a pervasive challenge. GAO has included human capital on its high-risk list. The Administration's emphasis on workforce planning and restructuring will require federal agencies to flatten their organizational hierarchy and improve their work processes. To optimize the services provided to citizens, federal employees must understand the link between their daily work and the results their organization seeks to achieve. For the initiatives GAO reviewed, agencies had to overcome organizational and cultural barriers, including a lack of trust, resistance to change and lack of buy-in from front-line employees and managers, and various implementation issues, such as workload demands. The agencies developed strategies to address these barriers, such as maintaining open communication and reassigning and hiring personnel. In implementing the practices to empower and involve employees, agencies identified a range of examples to demonstrate the performance improvements these efforts have accomplished. |
gao_GAO-12-248 | gao_GAO-12-248_0 | Data Sources on Early Child Care and Education Workers
Both federal and state governments collect data on some, but not all, ECCE workers. According to these data, there were nearly 1.8 million ECCE workers nationwide in 2009 in a range of ECCE positions. Average income ranged from $11,500 to $18,000 per year for the various ECCE worker positions and was around $33,000 per year for program directors. Preschool teachers working in elementary schools: ACS data do not distinguish preschool teachers in elementary schools from kindergarten teachers. HHS has provided guidance and funding for state registry systems. Increased Education and Training Can Improve Worker Quality
Experts and government officials that we spoke with said that in general, better educated and trained ECCE workers are more effective than those with less education and training because they are able to acquire the skills and knowledge necessary to more effectively work with children. Worker Quality Improvement Activities Include Training and Scholarships, but Program and Funding Data Are Scarce
HHS and Education Use Existing Programs and Newer Initiatives to Improve Worker Quality
HHS and Education administer six key ECCE programs that provide states and other grantees the flexibility to spend federal dollars for ECCE purposes—sometimes from program funds set aside to improve general program quality—on a variety of workforce quality improvement activities. Both HHS and Education have appointed a senior-level staff member as a “point person” to coordinate with other federal agencies and raise awareness of the importance of early care and education. Jointly administering the Race to the Top-Early Learning Challenge grant, which is intended to improve the quality of ECCE for children. States Used Over $1 Billion in CCDF and State Funds for Worker Training and Other Activities
In our survey of state child care directors, the 37 states that responded reported spending at least $1.4 billion on activities to improve ECCE worker quality over fiscal years 2007 through 2010. All 37 states reported pursuing in-service training, coaching, and mentoring, and 34 states said they offered scholarships or other financial aid to students in postsecondary education. HHS and Education have taken a number of steps to improve data collection, such as funding a survey of caregivers and teachers, and beginning to work with BLS and Census to determine how best to improve federal statistical surveys, which include data on ECCE workers across program settings; however, it is too early in the process to assess the impact of these changes on federal data collection efforts in general, let alone their ultimate success in improving federal data on the ECCE workforce iin particular. In their written comments, both Education and HHS generally agreed with the report’s conclusions, namely that data on the ECCE workforce need to be improved. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
The objectives of our report on the quality of Early Child Care and Education (ECCE) workers were to determine (1) What is known about the composition, education, and income of ECCE workers and how these characteristics relate to quality? and (2) What activities are the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the Department of Education (Education), and the states financing to improve worker quality? What We Know about the ECCE Workforce and How These Characteristics Relate to Quality
To address the first objective, we analyzed data on the composition, education level, and income of the ECCE workforce from the U.S. Census Bureau’s (Census) American Community Survey (ACS) and HHS’s Head Start Program Information Report (PIR); interviewed ECCE experts, researchers and government officials; reviewed relevant federal laws and regulations; and identified and reviewed studies on the characteristics and quality of the ECCE workforce. Our search used such search terms as child care workers, preschool teachers, and early childhood care providers. Most Early Head Start Teachers Have The Required Credentials, But Challenges Exist. | Why GAO Did This Study
Research shows that well trained and educated ECCE workers are key to helping children in care reach their full developmental potential. Federal and state governments spend billions of dollars each year to improve ECCE programs, including the quality of its caregivers and teachers. Because of the importance of this workforce and the federal investment in it, GAO examined (1) what is known about the composition, education, and income of the ECCE workforce and how these characteristics relate to quality, and (2) what activities are the Departments of Health and Human Services (HHS) and Education, and the states financing to improve worker quality? GAO surveyed state child care administrators, interviewed HHS, Department of Education (Education), and other federal and state officials; interviewed ECCE experts and researchers; analyzed Census Bureau and Head Start data; conducted a literature search; and reviewed relevant federal laws and regulations.
What GAO Found
The paid early child care and education (ECCE) workforce was made up of approximately 1.8 million workers in a range of positions, most of whom had relatively low levels of education and income, according to Censuss 2009 American Community Survey (ACS) data. For example, nearly half of all child care workers had a high school degree or less as did 20 percent of preschool teachers. Average yearly income ranged from $11,500 for a child care worker working in a childs home to $18,000 for a preschool teacher. Experts and government officials that we spoke with said, in general, better educated and trained ECCE workers are more effective than those with less education and training. They also noted the need for more comprehensive workforce datasuch as on workers with specialized ECCE training. While existing ECCE workforce data provide valuable insight into worker characteristics, critical data gaps exist. For example, these data omit key segments of ECCE workers, such as some caregivers who provide child care in their own homes, and also do not separately identify preschool teachers working in elementary schools. HHS and Education have taken steps to improve ECCE workforce data, such as providing guidance and funding to states to encourage the collection of state-level data and working with federal agencies to improve workforce data collected nationally.
HHS, Education, and the states use training, scholarships, and other activities to improve ECCE worker quality, but program and funding data are scarce. For example, HHS funded online training to help Head Start teachers meet new teacher credentialing requirements. Both HHS and Education have collaborated on initiatives to improve ECCE worker quality, such as the Race to the Top-Early Learning Challenge Grants. For the most part, however, neither HHS nor Education track expenditures on worker quality improvement. In our survey, states reported that the most common workforce improvement activities were in-service training, coaching, and mentoring for current workers (all 37 state survey respondents) and scholarships to workers enrolled in higher education programs (34 states). Of those who knew funding sources for these activities, states reported relying primarily on state and federal child care funds.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making recommendations in this report. HHS and Education generally agreed with the reports findings and conclusions and also provided additional information on several specific points in the report. |
gao_GAO-10-449 | gao_GAO-10-449_0 | Background
ATSDR investigates community exposures related to chemical sites and releases; works with federal, tribal, state, and local agencies to identify potential exposures; assesses associated health effects; and recommends actions to stop, prevent, or minimize these harmful effects, among other things. Internal control includes activities such as establishing policies and procedures, assessing risks associated with achieving agen objectives, ensuring effective information sharing throughout the organization, conducting ongoing monitoring of agency activities, and establishing key areas of authority and responsibility for agency management and staff. Therefore, once in place, internal control provides reasonable assurance, not absolute assurance, that an agency’s objectives are being achieved. ATSDR’s Policies and Procedures for P Health Product Preparation Lack Some Critical Controls to P Reasonable Assurance of Quality
The policies and procedures that ATSDR has established for public health product preparation lack some of the critical controls to provide ot been reasonable assurance of product quality. Moreover, although policies and procedures include some routine oversight of product development, they do not consistently require that management monitor the development of key components of these products. Although ATSDR has not established policies or procedures that establish and describe information flow within the agency, it is implementing a new agencywide system called Sequoia, which may improve the flow of information about newly initiated work between management and staff. ATSDR also lacks comprehensive policies and procedures for assessing and categorizing the risk of work being initiated at the agency. If a site was classified as a focus site, which typically occurred as work was being initiated, any public health products resulting from that site were required to undergo a higher level of review during review and clearance. Because ATSDR does not currently have policies and procedures that describe how the agency is to comprehensively assess and categorize the risk of work it initiates to prepare public health products, management cannot ensure that it has consistently managed the risk related to all new work, or established product preparation procedures commensurate with the risk. However, these meetings rely on division management to bring problems or concerns regarding product development to the attention of the OD, and according to ATSDR officials, Issues Management meetings focus only on “sites of interest.” Thus, while products related to “sites of interest” may be discussed at these meetings, current ATSDR procedures do not ensure the discussion of key components of products for ATSDR sites not identified as “sites of interest.” Additionally, items on the agenda of the Issues Management meeting are not prioritized to ensure that the most significant problems associated with the development of a public health assessment or health consultation are promptly addressed. Due to scientific concerns identified in the document once review and clearance began, the document underwent several years of reviews and revisions, and a final report was not issued until December 2008. ATSDR’s Review and Clearance Policies and Procedures Do Not Always Reflect Current Practices and Do Not Establish a Process for Ensuring Consistent Review of All Products
While ATSDR has implemented policies and procedures governing the review and clearance of its public health products, some sections of ATSDR’s review and clearance policies and procedures do not reflect current practices. The agency’s clearance policy and procedures generally direct management and staff to use discretion to identify products that warrant a higher level of review, rather than determining review and clearance levels through a risk assessment process. However, even though ATSDR and DHAC have established criteria, there is no required point during a product’s preparation where management and staff collectively determine whether a product meets the criteria, and if additional review is warranted. Because ATSDR does not conduct a comprehensive risk assessment of its products or sites, and its policies and procedures instead rely on management and staff discretion to make these determinations, the agency cannot ensure its products consistently receive the appropriate level of review and clearance. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) has faced concerns related to the quality of some of the public health products it publishes. ATSDR investigates community exposures related to certain hazardous chemical sites and releases; assesses associated health effects; and recommends actions to stop, prevent, or minimize harmful effects. ATSDR publishes many types of products, including public health assessments, health consultations, exposure investigations, and health study reports. GAO was asked to examine the extent to which ATSDR's policies and procedures for product preparation, including work initiation, product development, and review and clearance, provide reasonable assurance of product quality. GAO reviewed ATSDR policies and procedures and interviewed agency officials and employees.
What GAO Found
The policies and procedures that ATSDR has established for public health product preparation lack some of the critical controls to provide reasonable assurance of product quality. To provide reasonable assurance that agency objectives are being met, federal internal control standards call for agencies to establish policies and procedures, assess risks associated with achieving agency objectives, ensure effective information sharing throughout the organization, monitor agency activities, and establish key areas of authority and responsibility for management and staff. While ATSDR has established some policies and procedures to guide the preparation of its public health products, the policies and procedures do not establish how information is to flow between management and staff during initiation. Absent such policies and procedures, ATSDR generally relies on various meetings to inform management and staff about new work. The agency is also implementing a new database, which may improve information flow. Furthermore, ATSDR does not comprehensively evaluate and categorize the risk of work being initiated. While the agency used to officially classify some hazardous chemical sites as "high-priority" or "focus sites," and require any products resulting from those sites to undergo a higher level of review and clearance, it no longer does so. Because ATSDR does not comprehensively assess and categorize the risk of work being initiated at the agency, management cannot ensure that they have consistently managed the risk related to new work. Additionally, many of ATSDR's policies and procedures that guide product development do not clearly define management roles and responsibilities and do not consistently require that management monitor the development of key components of these products. These deficiencies may lead management to be unclear about their responsibilities, and may result in problems that occur during product development not being identified or addressed until review and clearance, if at all. For example, ATSDR and Institute of Medicine reports show that because scientific concerns were not identified during development of an ATSDR report regarding chemical releases in the Great Lakes region, the document underwent several years of review, and a final report was not issued until more than 4 years after the first draft was written. Moreover, because some review and clearance policies do not reflect current practices, ATSDR staff cannot rely on these policies to accurately or consistently determine review and clearance procedures. Furthermore, review and clearance policies and procedures direct management and staff to use discretion to identify products that require higher levels of review, rather than making this determination through a comprehensive risk assessment process. While ATSDR policy sets out criteria for when additional review may occur, such as when a document could have a high degree of visibility, there is no required point during a product's preparation when management and staff collectively determine whether a product meets the criteria, and whether additional review is warranted. Thus, the agency cannot ensure that all products consistently receive the appropriate level of review. |
gao_GAO-10-603T | gao_GAO-10-603T_0 | Background
Since it started development in 2003, FCS has been at the center of the Army’s efforts to modernize into a lighter, more agile, and more capable combat force. As we reported in 2009, the FCS program was immature and unable to meet the Department of Defense’s (DOD) own standards for technology and design from the start. 1). DOD directed the Army to transition to an Army-wide modernization plan consisting of a number of integrated acquisition programs, including one to develop ground combat vehicles (GCV). Subsequently, the Army has been defining its ground force modernization efforts per the Secretary’s decisions and the June 2009 acquisition decision memorandum. The Army Has Started a Series of Development and Fielding Efforts
The Army is implementing DOD direction and redefining its overall modernization strategy as a result of the Secretary of Defense’s decisions to significantly restructure the FCS program. It is transitioning from the FCS long-term acquisition orientation to a shorter-term approach that biennially develops and fields new increments of capability within capability packages. It now has an approved acquisition program that will produce and field the initial increment of the FCS spinout equipment, which includes unmanned aerial and ground vehicles as well as unattended sensors and munitions, and preliminary plans for two other major defense acquisition programs to define and develop follow-on increments and develop a new GCV. 2). Recent Army Contract Actions Related to Its Post- FCS Efforts
For the time being, the Army is continuing selected development work— primarily that related to Increment 1, Increment 2, and network development—under the existing FCS development contract. The Army has also recently released a request for proposals for the technology development phase of the proposed GCV development effort. Acquisition Direction and FCS Lessons Learned Offer Opportunities to Promote Successful Outcomes, but Decision to Proceed with Initial Production Is Premature
The challenge facing both DOD and the Army is to set these ground force modernization efforts on the best footing possible by buying the right capabilities at the best value. In many ways, DOD and the Army have set modernization efforts on a positive course, and they have an opportunity to reduce risks by adhering to the body of acquisition legislation and policy reforms—which incorporate knowledge-based best practices we identified in our previous work—that have been introduced since FCS started in 2003. Army’s Decision to Proceed with Low-Rate Initial Production for Increment 1 Increases Risk
In the first major acquisition decision for the Army’s post-FCS initiatives, DOD and the Army—because they want to support the warfighter quickly—are proceeding with low-rate initial production of Increment 1 systems despite having acknowledged that systems are immature, are unreliable, and cannot perform as required. Moreover, the acquisition community needs to be held accountable for expected results, and DOD and the Army must not be willing to accept whatever results are delivered regardless of military utility. In that regard, we recommended that the Secretary of Defense mandate that the Army correct the identified maturity and reliability issues with the Increment 1 network and systems prior to approving any additional lots of the Increment 1 network and systems for production. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 2003, the Future Combat System (FCS) program has been the centerpiece of the Army's efforts to transition to a lighter, more agile, and more capable combat force. In 2009, however, concerns over the program's performance led to the Secretary of Defense's decision to significantly restructure and ultimately cancel the acquisition program. As a result, the Army is outlining a new approach to ground force modernization. This statement outlines the Army's preliminary post-FCS actions and identifies the challenges the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Army must address as they proceed. This testimony is based on GAO's report on the Army's Ground Force Modernization effort released on March 15, 2010. It emphasizes the December 2009 decision to begin low-rate initial production for Increment 1 of the Brigade Combat Team Modernization.
What GAO Found
The Army is implementing DOD direction and redefining its overall modernization strategy as a result of the Secretary of Defense's decision to significantly restructure the FCS program. It is transitioning from the FCS long-term acquisition orientation to a shorter-term approach that biennially develops and fields new increments of capability within capability packages. It now has an approved acquisition program that will produce and field the initial increment of the FCS spinout equipment, which includes unmanned aerial and ground vehicles as well as unattended sensors and munitions. It has preliminary plans for two other major defense acquisition programs to (1) define and develop follow-on increments and (2) develop a new ground combat vehicle (GCV). The individual systems within Increments 1 and 2 are to be integrated with a preliminary version of an information network. Currently, the Army is continuing selected development work--primarily that related to Increments 1 and 2 and the information network--under the existing FCS development contract. The Army has recently released a request for proposals for the technology development phase of the proposed GCV development effort. The Army's projected investment in Increments 1 and 2 and GCV is estimated to be over $24 billion through fiscal year 2015. With these modernization efforts at an early stage, DOD and the Army face the immediate challenge of setting them on the best possible footing by buying the right capabilities at the best value. DOD and the Army have an opportunity to better position these efforts by utilizing an enhanced body of acquisition legislation and DOD policy reforms--which now incorporate many of the knowledge-based practices that GAO has previously identified--as well as lessons learned from the FCS program. Preliminary plans suggest that the Army and DOD are strongly considering lessons learned. However, DOD recently approved the first of several planned low-rate initial production lots of Increment 1 despite having acknowledged that the systems and network were immature, unreliable, and not performing as required. That decision reflects DOD's emphasis on quickly providing new capabilities to combat units. This decision did not follow knowledge-based acquisition practices and runs the risk of delivering unacceptable equipment to the warfighter and trading off acquisition principles whose validity has been so recently underscored. The Army needs to seize the opportunity of integrating acquisition reforms, knowledge-based acquisition practices, and lessons learned from FCS into future modernization efforts to increase the likelihood of successful outcomes. |
gao_GAO-15-149 | gao_GAO-15-149_0 | DOD Has Not Conducted a Risk Assessment on Foreign Encroachment at Its Test and Training Ranges
DOD has not conducted a risk assessment that includes prioritizing ranges based on mission criticality, determining their vulnerabilities to foreign encroachment, and assessing the degree to which foreign encroachment could pose a threat to the mission of the ranges. In addition, the services do not have guidance on how to conduct such an assessment because the issue of foreign encroachment is new. However, DOD has resolved similar challenges in the past. Specifically, Navy and Air Force headquarters officials as well as officials from all four of the ranges in our review told us that they had concerns about the number of investment- related projects by foreign entities occurring near their respective ranges—projects that they stated could pose potential security threats. DOD officials stated that given the uncertainty surrounding this issue, a risk assessment would be beneficial. Without guidance from DOD for the services to follow in conducting a risk assessment that establishes a time frame for completion, identifies critical ranges, and then assesses vulnerabilities and threats to these ranges, DOD may not be able to determine what, if any, negative impact foreign encroachment may be having on its test or training ranges. DOD Does Not Have Sufficient Information to Fully Identify Instances of Foreign Encroachment near Its Domestic Test and Training Ranges
DOD does not have information that officials say they need, such as the ownership of companies conducting business on federally managed land near DOD’s ranges, to determine if specific transactions on federally owned or managed land pose a threat to ranges. Further, DOD officials have identified some possible sources or methods for obtaining this information but have not formally collaborated with other federal agencies on how to gather this information. Leading practices state that agencies can enhance and sustain collaborative efforts by engaging in several practices that are necessary for a collaborative working relationship. Such information could include, for example, identification of any parent companies or whether a U.S.- based entity is owned or controlled by a foreign entity. Further, Federal Aviation Administration officials told us that while they have a process for collecting information about proposed structures that are more than 200 feet in height or are within certain distances of airports or runways, this process is designed to support the agency’s mission of maintaining a safe and efficient aerospace system, not to collect the information that DOD would need to help identify instances of foreign encroachment on its ranges. DOD has had some success in obtaining information that could be used to identify activities that could provide opportunities for foreign encroachment, but has not discussed options for obtaining additional information with other federal agencies. Without engaging potential sources of information on commercial activities near its ranges, DOD is hindered in its efforts to determine if a project could present a threat to test or training range activities. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve the ability of the Department of Defense and the military departments to manage the potential for foreign encroachment near their test and training ranges, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the military departments, develop and implement guidance for assessing risks to test and training ranges from foreign encroachment in particular, to include: determining the criticality and vulnerability of DOD’s ranges and the level of the threat; and a time frame for completion of risk assessments. Agency Comments
In a written response on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with both recommendations. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine the extent to which DOD has conducted a risk assessment to identify the existence and extent of any threats posed by foreign encroachment to its domestic air, land, and sea test and training ranges, we reviewed statutes, regulations, and guidance pertaining to federal agencies’ oversight of transactions by private entities on air, land, and sea. To determine the extent to which DOD has obtained information on specific transactions near test and training ranges that it needs to determine if these transactions pose a threat to the range, we interviewed officials from OSD and the military service headquarters, as well as military department intelligence agencies, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. | Why GAO Did This Study
For many years, DOD has reported that it faces challenges in carrying out realistic training because of the cumulative result of outside influences—such as urban growth and endangered species habitat—that DOD refers to as encroachment. In January 2014, DOD reported concerns with security encroachment by foreign entities conducting business near its test and training ranges.
GAO was mandated by the House Armed Services Committee report accompanying a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 to review encroachment on DOD's test and training ranges. This report examines the extent to which DOD has (1) conducted a risk assessment to identify the existence and extent of any threats of foreign encroachment and (2) obtained information needed on specific transactions to determine if they pose a threat. GAO reviewed statutes, regulations, and guidance on federal agency oversight of transactions on federal land. GAO interviewed DOD and service officials, as well as officials from other federal agencies identified by DOD as having a role in such transactions.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense (DOD) has not conducted a risk assessment that includes prioritizing test and training ranges based on mission criticality, determining their vulnerabilities to foreign encroachment (i.e., foreign entities acquiring assets, such as mines or energy projects, or otherwise conducting business transactions near test and training ranges), and assessing the degree to which foreign encroachment could pose a threat to the mission of the range. Some DOD officials stated that they are concerned about foreign encroachment, which may provide an opportunity for persistent surveillance of DOD test and training activities. However, DOD has not prioritized its ranges or assessed such threats because, among other things, there is no clear guidance on how to conduct assessments of the risks and threats posed by foreign encroachment. Some DOD officials told GAO they have considered conducting such assessments, but DOD has not issued guidance directing the services to conduct these assessments. Officials from the Navy and the Air Force stated that given the unique nature of each range, it would be difficult to assess their criticality. However, Navy officials stated that they had expected to issue guidance for conducting risk assessments sometime in 2015. Without clear guidance from DOD for the services to follow in conducting a risk assessment, DOD may not be able to determine what, if any, negative impact foreign encroachment may be having on its test or training ranges.
DOD has not obtained sufficient information on commercial activity being conducted near test and training ranges in the level of detail officials say they need—such as if a U.S.-based entity is owned or controlled by a foreign entity—to determine if specific transactions on federally owned or managed land in proximity to ranges pose a threat to the range. Such information is generally not collected by other agencies with responsibilities for these transactions because, in some cases, legal, regulatory, or resource challenges may prevent them from collecting information that is unrelated to their agencies' missions. For example, the Federal Aviation Administration collects information about proposed structures that are more than 200 feet in height to support the agency's mission of maintaining a safe and efficient aerospace system, but does not collect information on the ownership of the companies building the structures because it is beyond the scope of its mission. DOD has identified some potential sources of information, but it has not formally collaborated with other federal agencies on how to gather this information. Leading practices state that agencies can enhance and sustain collaboration by engaging in several practices, including addressing needs and leveraging resources and agreeing on roles and responsibilities. Without engaging potential sources of information on commercial activities near its ranges, DOD is hindered in its efforts to determine if a project could present a threat to test or training range activities.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD (1) develop and implement guidance for conducting a risk assessment on foreign encroachment and (2) collaborate with other federal agencies to obtain additional information on transactions near ranges. In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with both recommendations. |
gao_GAO-05-786T | gao_GAO-05-786T_0 | About One-Fourth of Public Employees Are Not Covered by Social Security
About one-fourth of public employees do not pay Social Security taxes on the earnings from their government jobs. Even though noncovered employees may have many years of earnings on which they do not pay Social Security taxes, they can still be eligible for Social Security benefits based on their spouses’ or their own earnings in covered employment. Current Provisions Seek Fairness but Pose Administrative Challenges
To address the fairness issues that arise with noncovered public employees, Social Security has two provisions—the Government Pension Offset, to address spouse and survivor benefits, and the Windfall Elimination Provision, to address retired worker benefits. Both provisions depend on having complete and accurate information that has proven difficult to get. Under the GPO provision, enacted in 1977, SSA must reduce Social Security benefits for those receiving noncovered government pensions when their entitlement to Social Security is based on another person’s (usually a spouse’s) Social Security coverage. Some Reform Proposals Would Affect Public Employees
In recent years, various Social Security reform proposals that would affect public employees have been offered. Some proposals specifically address the GPO and the WEP and would either revise or eliminate them. Still other proposals would make coverage mandatory for all state and local government employees. Critics of the measures contend that they are basically inaccurate and often unfair. If the GPO were eliminated or reduced for spouses who had paid little or no Social Security taxes on their lifetime earnings, it might be reasonable to ask whether the same should be done for dually entitled spouses who have paid Social Security on all their earnings. According to Social Security actuaries, doing so for all newly hired state and local government employees would reduce the 75-year actuarial deficit by about 11 percent. There is an element of unfairness in a situation where practically all contribute to Social Security, while a few benefit both directly and indirectly but are excused from contributing to the program.”
Moreover, mandatory coverage could improve benefits for the affected beneficiaries, but it could also increase pension costs for the state and local governments that would sponsor the plans. For example, Social Security offers automatic inflation protection, full benefit portability, and dependent benefits, which are not available in many public pension plans. Alternatively, states and localities that wanted to maintain level spending for retirement would likely need to reduce some pension benefits. Still, in the long run, mandatory coverage would make these provisions obsolete. Mandating universal coverage would promise eventual elimination of the GPO and the WEP but at potentially significant cost to affected state and local governments, and even so the GPO and the WEP would continue to apply for some years to come, unless they were repealed. Federal Workforce: Effects of Public Pension Offset on Social Security Benefits of Federal Retirees. | Why GAO Did This Study
Social Security covers about 96 percent of all U.S. workers; the vast majority of the rest are state, local, and federal government employees. While these noncovered workers do not pay Social Security taxes on their government earnings, they may still be eligible for Social Security benefits. This poses difficult issues of fairness, and Social Security has provisions that attempt to address those issues, but critics contend these provisions are themselves often unfair. The Subcommittee asked GAO to discuss Social Security's effects on public employees as well as the implications of reform proposals.
What GAO Found
Social Security's provisions regarding public employees are rooted in the fact that about one-fourth of them do not pay Social Security taxes on the earnings from their government jobs, for various historical reasons. Even though noncovered employees may have many years of earnings on which they do not pay Social Security taxes, they can still be eligible for Social Security benefits based on their spouses' or their own earnings in covered employment. To address the issues that arise with noncovered public employees, Social Security has two provisions--the Government Pension Offset (GPO), which affects spouse and survivor benefits, and the Windfall Elimination Provision (WEP), which affects retired worker benefits. Both provisions reduce Social Security benefits for those who receive noncovered pension benefits. Both provisions also depend on having complete and accurate information on receipt of such noncovered pension benefits. However, such information is not available for many state and local pension plans, even though it is for federal pension benefits. As a result, the GPO and the WEP are not applied consistently for all noncovered pension recipients. In addition to the administrative challenges, these provisions are viewed by some as confusing and unfair. In recent years, various Social Security reform proposals that would affect public employees have been offered. Some proposals specifically address the GPO and the WEP and would either revise or eliminate them. Such actions, while they may reduce confusion among affected workers, would increase the long-range Social Security trust fund deficit and could create fairness issues for workers who have contributed to Social Security throughout their working lifetimes. Other proposals would make coverage mandatory for all state and local government employees. According to Social Security actuaries, mandatory coverage would reduce the 75-year actuarial deficit by 11 percent. It could also enhance inflation protection, pension portability, and dependent benefits for the affected beneficiaries, in many cases. However, to maintain the same level of spending for retirement, mandating coverage would increase costs for the state and local governments that sponsor the plans, and would likely reduce some pension benefits. Moreover, the GPO and the WEP would still be needed for many years to come even though they would become obsolete in the long run. |
gao_GAO-12-300 | gao_GAO-12-300_0 | Under the voucher program, an assisted household pays 30 percent of its monthly adjusted income in rent; the remainder of the rent is paid through a HUD-subsidized “voucher,” which generally is equal to the difference between (1) the lesser of the unit’s gross rent (generally, rent plus utilities) or a local “payment standard” and (2) the household’s payment. Later in this report we discuss the extent to which housing agencies have accumulated subsidy reserves and steps Congress and HUD could take to reduce future budget requests or reallocate the reserve funds. Once adjusted for inflation, housing agencies’ expenditures increased by a smaller rate, approximately 8.8 percent. The formula HUD uses to pay administrative fees to housing agencies is not directly tied to the cost of performing the administrative tasks the program requires. Congress and HUD Have Taken Steps to Limit Cost Increases in the Voucher Program
In light of increasing program costs, Congress and HUD have taken several steps to limit the extent of increases from fiscal years 2003 through 2011, while maintaining assistance for existing program participants. First, improved information on the level of subsidy reserve funding housing agencies should maintain could aid budget decisions and reduce the need for new appropriations. Over time, large sums of money can accumulate. For example, in its fiscal year 2012 voucher program budget proposal, HUD requested the authority to offset excess reserves. According to the proposal, if given this authority, the department first would reallocate the funds to housing agencies to make up any difference between the appropriated amount and the total funding for which housing agencies were eligible based on the renewal formula and then redistribute any remaining funds to housing agencies based on “need and performance.” However, the proposal did not specify how HUD would calculate excess subsidy reserves or a detailed methodology for redistributing the funds, and HUD officials acknowledged that redistributing excess funds among housing agencies will increase the size and the cost of the program over time because if housing agencies are able to lease more vouchers with these funds, Congress will have to appropriate more funding for renewal vouchers in subsequent years. While a reserve for contingencies is prudent, without clear and consistent criteria for determining what constitutes an appropriate level for housing agency reserves, it is difficult to judge how well HUD managed the funding Congress has provided for the voucher program. Administrative Reforms Could Streamline Burdensome Requirements and Reduce Costs
HUD officials have noted that certain requirements for administering the voucher program have grown burdensome and costly and could be streamlined. This formula is not tied to the program’s current administrative costs or requirements. Rent Reform and Consolidation Could Result in Reduced Costs or More Households Served, but Both Involve Trade- offs
If implemented, rent reform (that is, changes to the calculation of households’ payment toward rent) and the consolidation of voucher administration under fewer housing agencies could yield substantial cost savings, allow housing agencies to serve additional households if Congress were to reinvest annual cost savings in the voucher program, or both.cost savings or additional households served could be greater if both options were implemented. Further, implementation of these options may involve some trade-offs, including increased rent burdens for assisted households. Specifically, rather than providing funding based on the number of vouchers housing agencies are permitted to lease, Congress currently provides funding based on housing agencies’ prior-year subsidy expenses. In addition to previous reforms HUD has proposed, examples from the MTW program and HUD’s study on administrative fees can offer options to Congress for streamlining and simplifying administrative activities and aligning the administrative fee structure with actual administrative expenses. Implementing rent reform and administrative consolidation would require policymakers to consider some potential trade-offs—in the balance are issues such as the rent burden of assisted households, concentration of poverty, and the extent of local control over voucher programs. Nevertheless, these options have certain advantages over the current program structure. While the response noted that the draft report provided an accurate assessment of the program and its current outcomes, HUD identified several points for clarification and emphasis, including:
HUD commented that the stated purpose of our report of identifying options for increasing efficiencies and simplifying program administration was inconsistent with our recommendations for agency action because some of the options do not result in both efficiencies and simplification. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to (1) determine the factors that have affected costs in the Housing Choice Voucher (voucher) program from 2003 through 2011 and the actions Congress and the Housing and Urban Department (HUD) took to manage these costs and (2) identify additional steps HUD, housing agencies, or policy makers can take to limit cost growth in the voucher program and more effectively provide decent, safe, and affordable housing. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Housing and Urban Developments (HUD) Housing Choice Voucher (voucher) program subsidizes private-market rents for approximately 2 million low-income households. HUD pays a subsidy that generally is equal to the difference between the units rent and 30 percent of the households income. HUD also pays an administrative fee, based on a formula, to more than 2,400 local housing agencies to manage the program. Over time, program expenditures steadily have risen, causing some to questionhow well HUD managed costs and used program resources. This report (1) discusses the key drivers of cost growth in the voucher program and the actions taken to control this growth and (2) analyzes various options to cut costs or create efficiencies. For this report, GAO analyzed HUD data; reviewed budget documents, program laws and regulations, guidance, academic and industry studies, and GAO reports; and interviewed officials from HUD, industry groups, and 93 housing agencies.
What GAO Found
Several factorsincluding rising rents, declining household incomes, and decisions to expand the number of assisted householdswere key drivers of the approximately 29 percent increase (before inflation) in housing agencies expenditures for the voucher program between 2003 and 2010. Congress and HUD have taken steps to limit cost increases while maintaining assistance for existing program participants. For example, Congress moved away from providing funding to housing agencies based on the number of voucher-assisted households they were authorized to subsidize and instead provided funding based on the generally lower number of voucher-assisted households housing agencies actually subsidized in the prior year. Further, HUD has proposed administrative relief and program flexibility for housing agencies, including streamlining program requirements and reducing subsidies paid.
GAO identified several additional options that, if implemented effectively, could substantially reduce the need for new appropriations, cut costs (expenditures), or increase the number of households assisted.
Reduce housing agencies subsidy reserves. Housing agencies have accumulated approximately $1.8 billion in subsidy reserves (unspent funds). They can hold the funds in reserve or spend them on authorized program expenses in future years. Over time, large sums can accumulate. Although HUD has sought the authority to offset (reduce) its future budget requests by the amount of excess subsidy reserves, it has not provided Congress with complete or consistent information on how much of these reserve funds housing agencies should retain for contingencies. GAO has highlighted the importance of providing clear and consistent information on housing agencies reserves to Congress so it can make informed funding decisions.
Implement administrative reform. HUD officials have noted that certain requirements for administering the voucher program are burdensome and costly and could be streamlined. In addition, the formula HUD uses to pay administrative fees to housing agencies is not tied to current administrative costs or requirements. HUD has an administrative fee study underway, which intends to identify specific reforms to ease administrative burden, increase efficiencies, and suggest ways to align the administrative fee formula with the functions housing agencies perform. Without this information, Congress may not have the information necessary to make fully informed policy and funding decisions related to the voucher program.
Implement rent reform and consolidate voucher administration. Rent reform (for example, reducing subsidies by requiring households to pay more toward rent) and consolidation of program administration under fewer housing agencies could yield substantial cost savingsapproaching $2 billionor allow housing agencies to serve additional households, provided annual savings were reinvested in the program. However, while these options may have some advantages over the current program structure, they would require policymakers to consider some potential trade-offs, including increased rent burdens for low-income households, increased concentration of assisted households in high poverty areas, and more limited local control over voucher programs.
What GAO Recommends
GAO identifies options for increasing efficiencies and recommends that HUD (1) determine what level of reserve funding housing agencies should maintain and reduce future budget requests by the amount of excess reserves and (2) consider proposing options for simplifying program administration and changes to the administrative fee formula. HUD did not agree or disagree with the recommendations. While it noted that the draft provided an accurate assessment, it offered some clarifications and responses. |
gao_GAO-14-69 | gao_GAO-14-69_0 | Since 1991, the number of FLSA lawsuits filed has increased by 514 percent, with a total of 8,148 FLSA lawsuits filed in fiscal year 2012. In fact, while federal district courts in most states saw increases in both the number of FLSA lawsuits filed and the percentage of all civil lawsuits filed that were FLSA lawsuits, increases in a small number of states were substantial and contributed significantly to the overall trends. FLSA Lawsuits Filed in 2012 Were Concentrated in a Few Industries and Most Alleged Overtime Violations
Our review of a representative sample of FLSA lawsuits filed in federal district court in fiscal year 2012 showed that approximately half were filed against private sector employers in four industries. This concentration of lawsuits is consistent with what several stakeholders, including DOL officials, told us about the large number of FLSA violations in the restaurant industry. WHD Plans Its FLSA Enforcement and Compliance Assistance Efforts Annually but Does Not Analyze Relevant Data to Improve Its Guidance
WHD Plans Its FLSA Enforcement Efforts Using an Annual, Data-Based Approach
Consistent with its stated mission of promoting and achieving compliance with labor standards, WHD has an annual process for planning how it targets its FLSA enforcement resources. To plan the deployment of its resources for targeted investigations, WHD identifies broad initiatives that focus on industries it determines have a high likelihood of FLSA violations and where workers may be particularly vulnerable. In Its Compliance Assistance Efforts, WHD Does Not Analyze Data on Requests for Information on the FLSA in Planning How to Improve Its Guidance
Our prior reports and DOL’s planning and performance documents have emphasized the need for WHD to help employers comply with the FLSA. To develop and assess its interpretive guidance about the FLSA, WHD’s national office considers input from its regional offices, but it does not have a data-based approach that is informed by objective input, such as data on areas which employers and workers have indicated the need for additional guidance. Recommendation for Executive Action
To help inform its compliance assistance efforts, the Secretary of Labor should direct the WHD Administrator to develop a systematic approach for identifying areas of confusion about the requirements of the FLSA that contribute to possible violations and improving the guidance it provides to employers and workers in those areas. WHD agreed with our recommendation that the agency develop a systematic approach for identifying and considering areas of confusion that contribute to possible FLSA violations to help inform the development and assessment of its guidance. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Analysis of the Number and Characteristics of FLSA Lawsuits
To describe what is known about trends in the number of lawsuits filed under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended (FLSA), we analyzed federal district court data provided by the Federal Judicial Center. To provide context about identified trends such as the increase in FLSA lawsuits, we interviewed a range of FLSA stakeholders, including Department of Labor (DOL) officials, attorneys who specialize in wage and hour cases, federal district court and magistrate judges, officials from organizations representing workers and employers, and academics. Analysis of WHD’s Planning Efforts
To describe how DOL’s Wage and Hour Division (WHD) plans its FLSA enforcement and compliance assistance efforts, we reviewed the agency’s planning and performance documents, as well as its published guidance on the FLSA. We did not assess WHD’s implementation of its enforcement and compliance assistance plans. | Why GAO Did This Study
The FLSA sets federal minimum wage and overtime pay requirements applicable to millions of U.S. workers and allows workers to sue employers for violating these requirements. Questions have been raised about the effect of FLSA lawsuits on employers and workers and about WHD's enforcement and compliance assistance efforts as the number of lawsuits has increased. This report (1) describes what is known about the number of FLSA lawsuits filed, and (2) examines how WHD plans its FLSA enforcement and compliance assistance efforts. To address these objectives, GAO analyzed federal district court data from fiscal years 1991 to 2012 and reviewed selected documents from a representative sample of lawsuits filed in federal district court in fiscal year 2012. GAO also reviewed DOL's planning and performance documents and interviewed DOL officials, as well as stakeholders, including federal judges, plaintiff and defense attorneys who specialize in FLSA cases, officials from organizations representing workers and employers, and academics about FLSA litigation trends and WHD's enforcement and compliance assistance efforts.
What GAO Found
Substantial increases occurred over the last decade in the number of civil lawsuits filed in federal district court alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended (FLSA). Federal courts in most states experienced increases in the number of FLSA lawsuits filed and the percentage of total civil lawsuits filed that were FLSA cases, but large increases were concentrated in a few states, including Florida and New York. The number of workers involved in FLSA lawsuits is unknown because the courts do not collect data on the number of workers represented. Many factors may contribute to this general trend; however, the factor cited most often by stakeholders, including attorneys and judges, was attorneys' increased willingness to take on such cases. In fiscal year 2012, an estimated 97 percent of FLSA lawsuits were filed against private sector employers, often from the accommodations and food services industry, and 95 percent of the lawsuits filed included allegations of overtime violations.
The Department of Labor's (DOL) Wage and Hour Division (WHD) has an annual process for planning how it will target its enforcement and compliance assistance resources to help prevent and identify potential FLSA violations, but it does not compile and analyze relevant data to help determine what guidance is needed, as recommended by best practices previously identified by GAO. In planning its enforcement efforts, WHD targets industries it determines have a high likelihood of FLSA violations. Although WHD does not analyze data on FLSA lawsuits when planning its enforcement efforts, it does use information on its receipt and investigation of complaints about possible FLSA violations. In developing its guidance on FLSA, WHD considers input from its regional offices, but it does not have a systematic approach that includes analyzing relevant data, nor does it have a routine, data-based process for assessing the adequacy of its guidance. For example, WHD does not analyze trends in the types of FLSA-related questions it receives. Since 2009, WHD has reduced the number of FLSA-related guidance documents it has published. According to plaintiff and defense attorneys GAO interviewed, more FLSA guidance from WHD would be helpful, such as guidance on how to determine whether certain types of workers are exempt from overtime pay and other requirements.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Secretary of Labor direct the WHD Administrator to develop a systematic approach for identifying and considering areas of confusion that contribute to possible FLSA violations to help inform the development and assessment of its guidance. WHD agreed with the recommendation, and described its plans to address it. |
gao_GAO-01-11 | gao_GAO-01-11_0 | Background
The State Department has security standards for U.S. diplomatic facilities to protect employees and property. To provide adequate security, State has determined that it needs to replace most existing facilities that do not meet these standards. Seven Projects Moving Ahead
Seven of the 10 priority projects are progressing and are in the construction phase. Figure 1 illustrates the status of construction. State Has Ranked Future Projects, but Has Not Developed a Long-Term Construction Plan
State envisions a long-term program, but it has not prepared a long-term capital construction plan for facility replacement that identifies the estimated cost and construction schedules for planned projects, as well as projected annual funding requirements for the overall program. Recommendation for Executive Action
To enhance management and decision-making regarding the replacement of embassies and consulates that are vulnerable to terrorist attack, we recommend that the Secretary of State prepare and present to the Congress a long-term capital construction plan that identifies proposed construction projects and their estimated costs and when the Department plans to start and complete site acquisition, design, and construction. Table 2 provides appropriation, obligation, and expenditure data for State’s embassy and consulate replacement program. Jones Construction Co. in September 1999. GAO Comments
1. Our report acknowledges that State has ranked more than 180 projects for potential replacement. 2. | Why GAO Did This Study
The State Department has determined that about 80 percent of overseas U.S. diplomatic facilities lack adequate security and may be vulnerable to terrorist attack. In September 1998, State expanded its capital construction program to accelerate replacing its most vulnerable embassies and consulates by acquiring sites and preparing plans at 10 priority locations. This report summarizes (1) the status of the 10 priority embassy and consulate construction projects and (2) State's plans for the overall construction program.
What GAO Found
As of November 2000, seven projects are in the construction phase. The remaining three projects are on hold pending agreement between State and Congress about the Department's construction proposals. Although State envisions a long-term, multi-billion dollar program and has ranked more than 180 facilities it may need to replace, it has not prepared a long-term capital construction plan that identifies (1) proposed construction project's cost estimates and schedules and (2) estimated annual funding requirements for the overall program. |
gao_GAO-07-43 | gao_GAO-07-43_0 | Florida, for instance, had its JARC funds increased by more than 1,200 percent, from $594,708 in fiscal year 2005 to $8.3 million in fiscal year 2006. In addition, the formula program will result in some states and areas receiving JARC funds that had not received them in the past. FTA Has Developed Proposed Final Guidance for JARC, but Delays in Issuing the Final Guidance May Reduce the Time Available to Obligate JARC Funding
FTA has been developing guidance to help JARC recipients implement changes to the program resulting from the enactment of SAFETEA-LU, but delays in releasing final guidance will reduce the window of availability of fiscal year 2006 funding. FTA received more than 200 comments on its March interim guidance and proposed strategies from state and local departments of transportation, metropolitan planning organizations, private transportation service providers, interest groups, and other JARC stakeholders. A number of states and large urbanized areas have proceeded to implement JARC’s requirements using the interim guidance and proposed strategies. Under this view, the availability of fiscal year 2006 funding would expire at the end of fiscal year 2008, and those agencies that chose to wait for the final guidance to be released before applying for fiscal year 2006 JARC funds would have only 2 years in which to obligate those funds. Few States and Large Urbanized Areas Have Received Fiscal Year 2006 JARC Funds, Although Most We Interviewed Are in the Process of Fulfilling Funding Requirements
As we previously noted, states and large urbanized areas must fulfill three SAFETEA-LU requirements prior to applying to FTA to receive JARC funds to award for projects: identify a designated recipient for JARC funds, conduct a competitive selection process, and certify that JARC projects were derived from a coordinated public transit-human services transportation plan. Nationwide, 3 states and 9 of the 152 large urbanized areas that were apportioned JARC funding had received fiscal year 2006 funds as of the end of fiscal year 2006. States and Large Urbanized Areas Have Encountered Several Implementation Challenges, Most of Which FTA Has Responded to in Its Proposed Final Guidance
In comments submitted on FTA’s March interim guidance and proposed strategies and in interviews with selected state and local officials, program stakeholders expressed several implementation challenges they had encountered or concerns they had as the program moves forward. FTA officials also said they are encouraging areas to build on existing planning efforts to fulfill SAFETEA-LU requirements. FTA plans to use existing oversight processes for monitoring JARC recipients; however, FTA officials also noted that SAFETEA-LU did not specifically provide project management oversight funds for the JARC program. As a result, FTA officials are looking for alternate sources of funding—such as the agency’s administrative funding—to provide program oversight for JARC. Gaps in Monitoring May Limit FTA’s Ability to Evaluate and Oversee the JARC Program
Even if FTA resolves its performance measurement and reporting issues, gaps in its plan for monitoring JARC recipients may continue to limit FTA’s ability to evaluate and oversee the program. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report addresses the following four objectives: (1) changes that were made to the Job Access and Reverse Commute (JARC) program as a result of the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act – A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU); (2) progress that the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) has made in implementing these changes; (3) the extent to which states and large urbanized areas have implemented changes to the JARC program, and challenges they have encountered; and (4) whether FTA’s proposed strategy for evaluating and overseeing the JARC program will allow the agency to assess the extent to which the program is meeting its stated goals. We selected the 12 states to obtain diversity in a range of criteria, as follows: Change in JARC funding: Analyzed the percentage change and selected 4 states that received an increase in their federal JARC funds from fiscal years 2005 to 2006, 5 states whose JARC funds decreased from 2005 to 2006, 1 state that received approximately the same amount of funding in fiscal years 2005 and 2006, and 2 states that did not receive JARC funds in 2005. | Why GAO Did This Study
Begun in 1998, the Job Access and Reverse Commute (JARC) program provides grants to states and localities for improving the mobility of low-income persons seeking work. The Federal Transit Administration (FTA) administers this program. In 2005, the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act--A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU) authorized $727 million for JARC for fiscal years 2005 through 2009, changed how these funds were to be awarded after fiscal year 2005, and required FTA to evaluate the program by August 2008. GAO examined (1) SAFETEA-LU's changes to JARC, (2) FTA's progress in implementing these changes, (3) states' and localities' efforts to respond and challenges they have encountered, and (4) FTA's proposed strategy for evaluation and oversight. GAO's work included analyzing program guidance as well as interviewing officials from FTA, industry groups, and more than 30 state and local agencies.
What GAO Found
SAFETEA-LU created a formula for distributing JARC funds starting in fiscal year 2006, substantially altering funding allocations provided under earlier grants. Funding in some states increased, with 2 states receiving increases of more than 1,200 percent between fiscal years 2005 and 2006. Funding in other states decreased as much as 80 percent, while 18 other states received funds that had not received them in fiscal year 2005. To receive funds, SAFETEA-LU required that states and localities designate a recipient agency to administer JARC funds, award grants on a competitive basis, and certify that projects were derived from a coordinated public transit-human services transportation plan. In March 2006, FTA issued interim guidance and proposed strategies for implementing these new requirements, but delays in issuing final guidance have reduced the window of opportunity for states and localities to obligate fiscal year 2006 funding. As required by SAFETEA-LU, FTA requested public comment on its interim guidance and proposed strategies, and responding to the more than 200 comments took more time than FTA had initially planned. FTA has specified in its guidance that states and localities have until the end of fiscal year 2008 to obligate fiscal year 2006 funds, so their ability to use the funds is not imminently jeopardized. FTA also encouraged states and localities to implement their programs on the basis of the interim guidance. However, given that officials in a number of areas we interviewed planned to wait for final guidance before moving forward, these areas will have less time available to obligate fiscal year 2006 funds. Most states and localities are in the process of trying to meet these new requirements, and although they have encountered challenges in doing so, FTA is taking steps to alleviate most of these challenges. As of the end of fiscal year 2006, about 4 percent of fiscal year 2006 funding apportioned to states and localities had been obligated. States and localities have raised a number of questions or concerns about the new requirements, such as whether an agency serving as the designated recipient would also be eligible to receive funds. In response, FTA proposed several actions that localities could take to reduce the potential conflict of interest in such situations. FTA is continuing to develop and refine its strategies for evaluation and oversight of JARC. FTA, which has had difficulty assessing this program in the past, proposed a new approach, but states and localities found problems with it. FTA is revising its approach and gathering baseline data for its required evaluation of the JARC program. Even if FTA resolves the concerns that have been raised, gaps in monitoring may still limit its ability to evaluate and oversee the program. FTA plans to use existing oversight processes for monitoring JARC recipients; however, FTA officials noted that SAFETEA-LU did not provide specific program management oversight funds for the JARC program and said that they are looking for alternate sources of funding. |
gao_GAO-07-264 | gao_GAO-07-264_0 | INL supports a wide variety of rotary and fixed-wing aircraft. A comprehensive aviation fleet management planning process detailed in guidance that OMB and GSA have issued can help federal aircraft programs ensure that they acquire, manage, and modernize their aircraft in a cost-effective manner. Sound fleet management decisions should be based on a comprehensive process that relies on three key principles: (1) assessing a program’s long-term fleet requirements, (2) acquiring the most cost-effective fleet of aircraft to meet those requirements, and (3) assessing fleet performance to determine if the needs are being effectively met. State Did Not Employ a Systematic Process for Managing Its Aviation Fleet in Accordance with OMB and GSA Guidance, but Plans to Do So Are Under Way
Although INL has made limited progress since we first assessed the Air Wing’s aviation fleet management in 2004 in adhering to OMB and GSA guidance, the bureau plans to undertake a more systematic management approach beginning in 2007. The bureau has not (1) conducted a strategic assessment of all long-term fleet requirements, (2) justified new aircraft investments in a systematic way that considers the range of alternatives and life cycle costs, or (3) routinely reviewed the performance of the fleet to ensure that its composition is the most appropriate and cost-effective to achieve the bureau’s missions. Since 2004, INL has prepared a strategic plan and a Critical Flight Safety Program for Air Wing operations. INL has recently taken steps to justify its aircraft investment decisions better. We found that INL has neither assessed the composition of its aviation fleet, nor fully tracked cost and usage of its aircraft. Without such a review, INL cannot demonstrate that the composition of its fleet and planned additions to it are appropriate and cost-effective. If INL follows through, these analyses should result in a long-term plan for aircraft investments and an assessment of the current composition of the fleet to help ensure that it is the most cost-effective to meet mission requirements. Since INL has undertaken a number of initiatives to address the management weaknesses we observed, we are not making any recommendations in this report. However, we will follow up with INL to ensure that these initiatives have been completed in 2007, as planned. State highlighted the management reforms INL has undertaken to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of aviation fleet management, as well as to improve INL’s adherence to OMB and GSA guidance. State disagreed with our observation that INL did not provide fleet investment justifications using cost-benefit and life-cycle analyses of alternatives. However, the documentation INL provided did not include the analyses called for by OMB guidance. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To assess the extent to which the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) has managed its aviation fleet in accordance with Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and General Services Administration (GSA) guidance, we reviewed the applicable guidance and discussed progress in adhering to this guidance with State and contractor officials at INL offices in Washington, D.C.; Melbourne, Florida; and Colombia, reviewing relevant documents, where appropriate. GAO Comments
1. 2. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of State's (State) Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) owns 357 helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft (valued at over $340 million) primarily to help carry out its counternarcotics efforts, such as aerial eradication of drug crops in Colombia. INL relies on contractor support to help maintain and operate its aircraft. In 2004, GAO analysis showed that INL lagged behind other agencies in implementing Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and General Services Administration (GSA) aviation fleet management principles. GAO was mandated to review INL's management and oversight of this fleet. GAO specifically examined (1) the extent INL has complied with OMB and GSA aviation fleet management guidance and (2) how INL has overseen its aviation support contracts. Since INL has undertaken initiatives to address the weaknesses GAO observed, GAO makes no recommendations. GAO will follow up to ensure that these initiatives are completed, as planned. In comments on this report, State highlighted reforms under way. State also indicated that INL conducted analyses to justify most aviation investments. GAO notes, however, that the documentation provided did not reflect the key analyses called for by OMB guidance.
What GAO Found
Despite some improvements since 2004, INL has not yet employed a systematic process for managing its aviation fleet that adheres to OMB and GSA guidance intended to help federal programs ensure that they acquire, manage, and modernize their aircraft in a cost-effective manner. However, in October 2006, INL began a number of initiatives to improve compliance with this guidance. The guidance entails three key principles: (1) assessing a program's long-term fleet requirements, (2) acquiring the most cost-effective fleet of aircraft to meet those requirements, and (3) assessing fleet performance. INL's initiatives are intended to address weaknesses in the following three areas: (1) Long-term planning. Since 2004, INL has prepared a strategic plan and a Critical Flight Safety Program to refurbish certain aircraft and replace others to meet projected mission needs. However, this effort did not address the long-term aircraft needs of all INL aviation programs. (2) Fleet investment justifications. INL has funded multimillion dollar aircraft investments, including the acquisition of new aircraft and major overhauls of older assets, without documenting cost-benefit and life cycle cost analyses of alternatives. (3) Fleet composition assessment. INL has not reviewed the composition of its entire fleet to demonstrate that its aircraft are the most appropriate and cost-effective to meet mission requirements. INL is hampered in assessing the performance of its fleet because it does not have complete and reliable aircraft cost and usage data. INL has undertaken a study to assess the aviation fleet's overall composition, identify investment needs, and assess alternative approaches for meeting those needs. INL expects completion of this and other initiatives in 2007. Regarding contract oversight, INL has met applicable federal, agency, and contract-specific requirements for managing its aviation support contracts. In addition to direct contractor oversight, State has used quantitative measures, primarily aircraft readiness rates, to monitor and assess contractor performance. |
gao_GAO-07-1156 | gao_GAO-07-1156_0 | Two types of health-related costs are of particular concern at the state and local level: (1) Medicaid expenditures, and (2) the cost of health insurance for state and local government employees, retirees, and their beneficiaries. Retirement benefits consist primarily of two components: pensions and retiree health benefits. In contrast, state and local law provides much less protection for retiree health benefits. To the extent retiree health benefits are legally protected, it is generally because they have been collectively bargained and are subject to current labor contracts. State and local governments typically do not set aside funds while employees are working to pay their future retiree health benefits. Strategies Exist to Manage Future Pension Costs, but Not to Meet Escalating Costs for Retiree Health Care
While state and local governments generally have strategies to manage future pension costs, they have not yet developed strategies to fund future health care costs for public sector retirees. First, in our simulation of the fiscal outlook for the state and local sector, we developed projections of the likely cost of pensions and retiree health benefits that already have been and will continue to be earned by employees. Assuming certain historical trends continue and that there is a steady level of pension contributions in the future, contribution rates would need to rise to 9.3 percent of salaries—less than a half percent more than the 9.0 percent contribution rate in 2006. Retiree Health Care Costs Could More than Double as a Percentage of Salaries over the Next Several Decades
Our simulation indicates that projected costs for retiree health benefits, while not as large a component of state and local government budgets as pensions, will more than double as a percentage of salaries over the next several decades, if these costs continue to be funded on a pay-as-you-go basis. In addition, many of the governments are still in the process of responding to the new GASB statement calling for valuations of the liability for the future cost of other postemployment benefits (OPEB), including health care benefits for retirees, as the standard is being implemented in phases. Concluding Observations
Across the state and local government sector, the ability to maintain current levels of public sector retiree benefits will depend, in large part, on the nature and extent of the fiscal challenges these governments face in the years ahead. Policy makers, voters, and beneficiaries can use this new information to begin a debate on ways to control escalating health care costs, the appropriate level of future benefits to be provided to public sector retirees, and who should pay for them. These officials provided us with informal technical comments that we have incorporated in the report, where appropriate. This appendix provides information on (1) the development of several key demographic and economic factors such as future employment, retirement, and wages for the state and local workforce that are necessary for the simulations of future pension and retiree health care costs; (2) how we project the necessary contribution rate to pension funds of state and local governments; and (3) how we project the future yearly pay-as-you-go costs of retiree health benefits. We found that the model results are highly sensitive to our assumptions regarding the expected real yield. Standards relevant to state and local government retiree benefits are listed below. This report summarizes the current coverage levels for retiree health insurance for public and private sector retirees. | Why GAO Did This Study
State and local retiree benefits are not subject, for the most part, to federal laws governing private sector retiree benefits. Nevertheless, there is a federal interest in ensuring that all Americans have a secure retirement, as reflected in the special tax treatment provided for both private and public pension funds. In 2004, new government accounting standards were issued, calling for the reporting of liabilities for future retiree health costs. As these standards are implemented and the extent of the related liabilities become known, questions have been raised about whether the public sector can continue to provide the current level of benefits to its retirees. GAO was asked to provide an overview of state and local government retiree benefits, including the following: (1) the types of benefits provided and how they are structured, (2) how retiree benefits are protected and managed, and (3) the fiscal outlook for retiree benefits and what governments are doing to ensure they can meet their future commitments. For this overview, GAO obtained data from various organizations, used our model that simulates the fiscal outlook for the state and local sector, and conducted site visits to three states that illustrate a range of benefit structures, protections, and fiscal outlooks. Cognizant agency officials provided technical comments which were incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
The systems for providing retiree benefits to state and local workers--who account for about 12 percent of the nation's workforce--are composed of two main components: pensions and retiree health care. These two components are often structured quite differently. Importantly, state and local governments generally have established protections and routinely set aside monies to fund their retirees' future pension costs, but this typically has not been the practice for retiree health benefits. A model GAO developed to simulate the fiscal outlook for state and local governments indicates that, for the sector as a whole, (1) estimated future pension costs (currently about 9 percent of employee pay) would require an increase in annual government contribution rates of less than a half percent, and (2) estimated future retiree health care costs (currently about 2 percent of employee pay) would more than double by the year 2050 if they continue to be funded on a pay-as-you-go basis. Because the estimates are very sensitive to the assumed rates of return and projected rates of health care inflation, the model also indicates that if rates were to fall below historical averages, the funding requirements necessary to meet future pension and health care costs could become much higher. Nevertheless, state and local governments generally have strategies to manage future pension costs. In contrast, many are just beginning to respond to the newly issued standards calling for the reporting of retiree health liabilities, and they generally have not yet developed strategies to manage escalating retiree health care costs. Across the state and local government sector, the ability to maintain current levels of retiree benefits will depend, in large part, on the nature and extent of the fiscal challenges that lie ahead--challenges driven primarily by the growth in health-related costs for Medicaid, and for active employees as well as retirees. In future debates on retiree benefits, policy makers, voters, and beneficiaries will need to decide how to control costs, the appropriate level of benefits, and who should pay the cost--especially for health care. |
gao_GAO-10-73 | gao_GAO-10-73_0 | The HSC Monitors Agencies’ Progress on Most Action Items
The HSC monitors the status of action items in the Plan tasked to federal agencies by convening regular interagency meetings and requesting summaries of progress from agencies. For action items that involve multiple federal agencies, the six agencies monitor the action items assigned to them by designating one or two agencies to report one consolidated summary of progress for each action item to the HSC, according to agency officials. We found that the Plan does not describe the specific circumstances, such as the type or severity of an outbreak or pandemic, under which the response-related action items would be undertaken. Federal agencies may have operational plans or other existing guidance that would specify the information needed to determine whether to undertake the response-related action items during a pandemic. Status of Some Selected Action Items Considered Complete Was Difficult to Determine
The HSC reported in October 2008 that about 75 percent of the 324 action items in the Plan were designated as complete based on its criteria of whether the measures of performance were achieved. Our review found, however, that for more than half of the action items considered complete, the measures of performance did not fully address all the activities contained in their descriptions. All of the 49 action items designated as complete that we reviewed have both a description of activities to be carried out, and a measure of performance, which generally is used as an indicator to measure progress of completion by responsible parties in carrying out what is specified in its respective description. While the HSC’s progress summaries sometimes corrected for this by referring to activities in the action item’s description omitted from the measures of performance, future progress reports would benefit from using measures of performance that are more consistent with the action items’ descriptions. Finally, although the administration has prepared an additional planning document tailored specifically to the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, the Strategy and Plan will still be needed for future events. Because most of the action items were to be completed by May 2009, the Plan should be updated, as we earlier recommended, to include all the elements identified in our 2007 report and to take into account the lessons learned from the 2009 H1N1 pandemic. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve how progress is monitored and completion is assessed under the Plan and in future updates of the Plan, the HSC should instruct the NSS to work with responsible federal agencies to develop a monitoring and reporting process for action items that are intended for nonfederal entities, such as state and local governments; identify the types of information needed to decide whether to carry out the response-related action items; and develop measures of performance that are more consistent with the descriptions of the action items. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this study were to (1) determine how the Homeland Security Council (HSC) and the responsible federal agencies are monitoring the progress and completion of the Implementation Plan for the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza (Plan) action items, and (2) assess the extent to which selected action items have been completed, whether activity has continued on the selected action items reported as complete, and the nature of that work. We did not assess the response efforts for the 2009 H1N1 pandemic in this report, but we continue to monitor the outbreak and the federal government’s response. In addition, we interv a senior HSC official from the previous administration and the Director of aff Medical Preparedness Policy for the White House National Security St (NSS) in the current administration responsible for overseeing the implementation of the Plan. Data are from the Implementation Plan for the Nation al Strategy for Pandemic Influenza. | Why GAO Did This Study
The current H1N1 pandemic highlights the threat posed to our nation by an influenza pandemic. The previous administration's Homeland Security Council (HSC) issued the Implementation Plan for the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza (Plan) in May 2006 to help address a pandemic. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) was asked to (1) determine how the HSC and responsible federal agencies monitor the progress and completion of the Plan's action items; and (2) assess the extent to which selected action items have been completed. To do this, GAO interviewed officials from the HSC and the six federal agencies responsible for implementing most of the Plan, and analyzed a random sample of 60 action items. While this report does not assess the response efforts for the H1N1 pandemic, GAO continues to monitor the outbreak and the federal response.
What GAO Found
To oversee agencies' progress in implementing the Plan's action items, the HSC, which is supported by the White House National Security Staff in this administration, convenes regular interagency meetings, asks agencies for summaries of progress; and leads the interagency process that monitors the progress of the Plan. Officials from the six agencies stated that they monitor action items tasked to more than one agency by selecting one or two agencies to report a consolidated summary of progress, approved by each responsible agency, to the HSC. However, neither the HSC nor the agencies monitor or report on the 17 action items intended for nonfederal entities, including, for example, action items asking state, local, and tribal entities to ensure their preparedness plans address mass immunization, even though the information may have been available from other sources, such as the interagency review of state pandemic plans led by the Department of Health and Human Services. In addition, the Plan does not describe the types of information needed to carry out the Plan's response-related action items, although agencies may have operational plans or other existing guidance that would provide this information. The HSC reported in October 2008 that the majority of the 324 action items were designated as complete. However, GAO's review of 60 action items found that it was difficult to determine the actual status of some of the 49 designated as complete. All of the action items reviewed have both a description of activities to be carried out and a measure of performance, which the HSC stated that it used to assess completion. However, for more than half of the action items considered complete, the measures of performance do not fully address all of the activities contained in their descriptions. While the HSC's progress summaries sometimes corrected for this by either referring to activities in the action item's description or some other information not reflected in either the measure of performance or description, future progress reports would benefit from using measures of performance that are more consistent with the action items' descriptions. The Plan is predicated on a type of pandemic different in severity and origin than the current H1N1 pandemic, but it is serving as the foundation for the response to the outbreak, supplemented by an additional plan tailored specifically to the characteristics of the H1N1 pandemic. Nevertheless, the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza and Plan will still be needed for future events as most of the action items in the Plan were to be completed by May 2009. As recommended in earlier GAO work, but not yet implemented, the Plan should be updated to take into account certain missing elements and lessons learned from the H1N1 pandemic; the update should also address the monitoring and assessment improvements GAO identified in this report. |
gao_GAO-16-47 | gao_GAO-16-47_0 | Further, the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2014 mandates an audit of DOD’s fiscal year 2018 department-wide financial statements and submission of those results to Congress by March 31, 2019. To manage their improvement efforts, components may develop multiple FIPs, including plans related to specific assessable units, which can be information systems supporting financial statement line items or other discrete portions of the program. In December 2014, a contract was signed with an IPA to audit the Navy’s fiscal year 2015 General Fund Schedule of Budgetary Activity. Further, in February 2016, the IPA issued a disclaimer of opinion on the Navy’s Schedule of Budgetary Activity and identified material weaknesses in internal control. FBWT audit readiness is a step in achieving full financial statement audit readiness. Navy Did Not Fully Implement Certain FBWT FIP Tasks in Accordance with the FIAR Guidance
Although the Navy included all the required audit tasks for the Discovery phase in developing its FBWT FIP, it did not fully implement certain required activities within these tasks in accordance with the applicable FIAR Guidance. These included activities in all four key tasks of the Discovery phase, which requires the Navy to (1) perform statement-to- process (process) analysis, (2) prioritize audit readiness efforts, (3) assess and test internal controls, and (4) evaluate supporting documentation. In the Navy’s case, the process analysis is particularly important for understanding the FBWT financial reporting process because the Navy’s transactions do not follow the typical flow of data used to produce financial statements. Without a complete FBWT process analysis and system narratives, internal controls and risks for each of the systems in the process may not be readily identified and appropriately tested. However, the Navy did not prioritize its FBWT audit readiness efforts, quantitatively or qualitatively, or fully implement its audit readiness prioritization and strategy for key information systems prior to assertion. The Navy’s lack of prioritization of key information technology systems used in the FBWT process limits management’s ability to focus audit readiness efforts on the most important systems. Specifically, the Navy did not document information technology general computer controls for significant systems or the hardware and software interfaces as required by the FIAR Guidance. Also, the system narratives and flowcharts the Navy provided did not sufficiently disclose the flow of data. Identifying controls by assessable unit is important for determining whether assessable units, sub-assessable units, and associated systems are producing reliable information and helps link systems and controls to the transaction flows. An evaluation of key supporting documentation is important for determining whether the Navy would be able to support amounts presented in the financial statements and provide an external auditor with sufficient and appropriate evidence to perform the audit. Conclusions
The Navy has made progress in performing its key audit readiness activities, including the development of its FBWT FIP to help guide implementation of its General Fund SBR improvement efforts. In addition, although the Navy performed substantive tests for supporting documentation, such testing may not provide sufficient evidence of the Navy’s ability to produce needed documentation in a sustained manner for future audits. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve the Navy’s implementation of the FIAR Guidance for its General Fund FBWT FIP and facilitate efforts to achieve SBR auditability, we recommend that the Secretary of the Navy direct the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Financial Management and Comptroller, to take the following seven actions in the Discovery phase. In response to our recommendations, the Navy stated that it has actions planned, taken, or under way to (1) develop procedures and documentation that describe the processes associated with the flow of data; (2) prepare a quantitative drilldown; (3) prioritize audit readiness efforts for key FBWT systems; (4) document control activities, information technology general computer controls for significant systems, systems documentation locations, and hardware, software, and interfaces; (5) prepare an internal control assessment document; (6) test effectiveness of FBWT controls, which includes assessing the availability of supporting documentation; and (7) obtain monthly data from DFAS on invalid FBWT transactions. Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and Methodology
The objective of our review was to determine the extent to which the Navy developed and implemented the Discovery phase for its General Funds’ Fund Balance with Treasury (FBWT) financial improvement plan (FIP) in accordance with the Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness (FIAR) Guidance. To address our objective, we analyzed the Navy’s FBWT FIP to determine whether it contained the applicable elements and tasks to be performed for the Discovery phase of audit readiness as required by the FIAR Guidance. We identified and reviewed the Navy’s FBWT FIP key deliverables required by the FIAR Guidance, such as system narratives and flowcharts, internal control assessments, and the Navy’s test results. | Why GAO Did This Study
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 mandates an audit of DOD's fiscal year 2018 department-wide financial statements. To help achieve this, the DOD Comptroller issued the FIAR Guidance to provide a standard methodology for DOD components to follow to improve financial management and achieve audit readiness, and designated the SBR as an audit priority. Full implementation of the Navy's General Fund FIP for FBWT is essential to achieving audit readiness for its General Fund SBR. The Navy asserted Statement of Budgetary Activity (SBA) audit readiness as of September 30, 2014, and in February 2016 received a disclaimer of opinion on the audit of its SBA for fiscal year 2015.
GAO is mandated to audit the U.S. government's consolidated financial statements, which cover activities and balances of executive branch agencies, including DOD. GAO's objective in this report was to determine the extent to which the Navy developed and implemented the Discovery phase of its General Fund FBWT FIP in accordance with the FIAR Guidance. GAO analyzed the Navy's FBWT FIP to determine whether it contained the tasks and activities required by the FIAR Guidance for the Discovery phase. GAO also reviewed the Navy's FBWT FIP key deliverables, such as process narratives and flowcharts, internal control assessments, and test results.
What GAO Found
The Navy has made progress in performing audit readiness activities, including developing a financial improvement plan (FIP) for its Fund Balance with Treasury (FBWT). These activities are critical to the Navy's General Fund Statement of Budgetary Resources (SBR) improvement efforts. The Navy's FBWT FIP is particularly important as it addresses improvement efforts across multiple business processes, including contract and vendor payments and military and civilian payroll that provide significant input to the SBR. However, the Navy did not fully implement certain tasks in its FBWT FIP in accordance with the Department of Defense's (DOD) Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness (FIAR) Guidance. These included activities in all four key tasks of the Discovery phase, the first of the five FIAR guidance phases. In the Discovery phase, the reporting entity documents processes, prioritizes audit readiness efforts, assesses and tests controls, and evaluates supporting documentation.
Document processes. The Navy did not fully document its FBWT process in system narratives and flowcharts. For example, the Navy's analysis did not explain the complex process that occurs within the Defense Departmental Reporting System - B, including merging data and deleting duplicative transactions. In the Navy's case, the process analysis is particularly important because the Navy's transactions do not follow the typical flow of data used to produce financial statements. Without a complete FBWT process analysis and system narratives, internal controls and risks for each of the systems in the process may not be readily identified and appropriately tested.
Prioritize audit readiness efforts. The Navy did not prioritize FBWT audit readiness efforts or fully implement its audit readiness prioritization and strategy for key information systems prior to its assertion of audit readiness. The Navy's lack of prioritization of key information technology limits management's ability to focus audit readiness efforts on the systems with the highest risk.
Assess and test internal controls. Within the FBWT assertion package, the Navy did not document information technology general computer controls for significant systems or the hardware and software interfaces, as required. Also, the Navy did not identify internal controls by assessable units (e.g., information systems supporting financial statement line items or other discrete portions of the program). Identifying controls by assessable unit is important for determining whether assessable units, sub-assessable units, and associated systems are producing reliable information and helps link systems and controls to the transaction flows.
Evaluate supporting documentation. Although the Navy performed substantive tests for supporting documents, such testing may not provide sufficient evidence of the Navy's ability to produce documentation in a substantive manner for future audits. An evaluation of key supporting documentation is important for determining whether the Navy would be able to support amounts presented in the financial statements or provide an external auditor with sufficient and appropriate evidence to perform the audit.
Addressing these shortfalls is critical to achieving audit readiness.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommended that the Navy fully implement the FIAR Guidance for FBWT in the areas of process analysis, prioritization, internal control assessment and testing, and evaluation of supporting documentation to support audit readiness. The Navy concurred with all seven recommendations. |
gao_GAO-11-391 | gao_GAO-11-391_0 | VA has established roles and responsibilities within its system for purchasing, tracking, and reprocessing of these items and policies that VAMCs are required to follow when purchasing and tracking these items at their facilities. These inadequacies create potential risks to the safety of veterans who receive care at VAMCs. However, we did not identify any inadequacies in the purchasing requirements we selected for review that may create potential risks to veterans’ safety. VAMCs Are Not Required to Track Certain Expendable Medical Supplies and RME
VA does not require VAMCs to enter information about certain expendable medical supplies and RME into their inventory management systems, and therefore, VAMC inventories have incomplete information on these items. Incomplete inventories of these items at VAMCs can pose potential risks to veterans’ safety. In the event of a manufacturer recall or patient safety alert related to an expendable medical supply item or RME, VAMCs may be unable to use their inventory management systems to systematically determine whether the affected item is in their facilities and should therefore be removed so that it is not used when providing care to veterans. Selected VA Reprocessing Requirements Are Inadequate
The VA reprocessing requirements we selected for review are inadequate to help ensure veterans’ safety in two respects: (1) they do not specify the types of RME for which VAMCs must develop device-specific training, and (2) VA has provided VAMCs with conflicting guidance on how to develop this training. While VA requires VAMCs to develop device-specific training on reprocessing RME, VA headquarters officials provided VAMCs with conflicting guidance on how they should develop this training. VA’s lack of specificity and conflicting guidance regarding its requirement to develop device-specific training for reprocessing RME may have contributed to delays in developing this training at several of the VAMCs we visited. VA’s Oversight of VAMCs’ Compliance with Selected Purchasing and Reprocessing Requirements Has Weaknesses
VA’s oversight of VAMCs’ compliance with selected purchasing and reprocessing requirements has weaknesses, which result in VA not being able to systematically identify and address noncompliance. We did not identify any weaknesses in VA’s oversight of the tracking requirements we selected for review. VA headquarters officials told us that VA intends to improve oversight over the selected purchasing requirements, but has not yet developed a plan for doing so. VA Has Limited Oversight of VAMCs’ Compliance with Selected Purchasing Requirements
We found that, in general, VA does not oversee VAMCs’ compliance with the purchasing requirements we selected for review. Despite Changes Intended to Improve Its Oversight of VAMCs’ Compliance with Selected Reprocessing Requirements, VA’s Oversight Has Weaknesses
Beginning in fiscal year 2011, VA headquarters directed VISNs to make three changes intended to improve its oversight of VAMCs’ compliance with the selected reprocessing requirements at VAMCs. Similarly, because VA headquarters does not analyze information from VAMCs’ corrective action plans to address noncompliance with VA reprocessing requirements, it is unable to confirm, for example, whether VAMCs have addressed noncompliance with its operational reprocessing requirement to separate clean and dirty RME. VA headquarters officials told us that VA plans to address the weaknesses we identified in its oversight of VAMCs’ compliance with reprocessing requirements. Specifically, VA headquarters officials told us that they intend to develop a systematic approach to analyze the information on VAMCs’ noncompliance and corrective action plans to identify areas of noncompliance across all VAMCs, including those that occur frequently, pose high risks to veterans’ safety, or have not been addressed in a timely manner. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To examine Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) purchasing, tracking, and reprocessing requirements, we reviewed relevant VA policies and from these policies we judgmentally selected two purchasing requirements, two tracking requirements, and two reprocessing requirements that we determined were relevant to veterans’ safety issues that were identified at certain VA medical centers (VAMC) in 2008 and 2009. At these six VAMCs, we examined the adequacy of the selected purchasing, tracking, and reprocessing requirements to help ensure the safety of veterans who received care. | Why GAO Did This Study
Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) clinicians use expendable medical supplies--disposable items that are generally used one time--and reusable medical equipment (RME), which is designed to be reused for multiple patients. VA has policies that VA medical centers (VAMC) must follow when purchasing such supplies and equipment, tracking these items at VAMCs, and reprocessing--that is, cleaning, disinfecting, and sterilizing--RME. GAO was asked to evaluate (1) purchasing, tracking, and reprocessing requirements in VA policies and (2) VA's oversight of VAMCs' compliance with these requirements. GAO reviewed VA policies and selected two purchasing requirements, two tracking requirements, and two reprocessing requirements. At the six VAMCs GAO visited, GAO interviewed officials and reviewed documents to examine the adequacy of the selected requirements to help ensure veterans' safety. GAO also interviewed officials from VA headquarters and from six Veterans Integrated Service Networks (VISN), which oversee VAMCs, and obtained and reviewed documents regarding VA's oversight.
What GAO Found
GAO found that the VA tracking and reprocessing requirements selected for review are inadequate to help ensure the safety of veterans who receive care at VAMCs. GAO did not identify inadequacies in selected VA purchasing requirements that may create potential risks to veterans' safety. GAO found the following: (1) Tracking requirements. Because VA does not require VAMCs to enter information about certain expendable medical supplies and RME in their facilities into VA's inventory management systems, VAMCs may have incomplete inventories of these items. This, in turn, creates potential risks to veterans' safety. For example, in the event of a manufacturer recall involving these items, VAMCs may be unable to readily determine whether the items are in their facilities and should be removed and not used when providing care to veterans. (2) Reprocessing requirements. Although VA requires VAMCs to develop device-specific training for staff on how to correctly reprocess RME, VA has not specified the types of RME for which this training is required. VA has also provided conflicting guidance to VAMCs on how to develop this training. This lack of clarity may have contributed to delays in developing the required training. Without appropriate training on reprocessing, VAMC staff may not be reprocessing RME correctly, which poses potential risks to the safety of veterans. VA headquarters officials told GAO that VA has plans to develop training for certain RME, but VA lacks a timeline for developing this training. GAO also found weaknesses in VA's oversight of VAMCs' compliance with the selected purchasing and reprocessing requirements. These weaknesses render VA unable to systematically identify and address noncompliance with the requirements, which poses potential risks to the safety of veterans. GAO did not identify weaknesses in VA's oversight of VAMCs' compliance with the selected tracking requirements. GAO found the following: (1) Oversight over purchasing requirements. In general, VA does not oversee VAMCs' compliance with the selected purchasing requirements. While VA intends to improve oversight over these requirements, it has not yet developed a plan for doing so. (2) Oversight over reprocessing requirements. Although VA headquarters receives information from the VISNs on any noncompliance they identify as well as VAMCs' corrective action plans to address this noncompliance, VA headquarters does not analyze this information to inform its oversight. According to VA headquarters officials, VA intends to develop a plan for analyzing this information to systematically identify areas of noncompliance that occur frequently, pose high risks to veterans' safety, or have not been addressed across all VAMCs.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making several recommendations for VA to address the inadequacies identified in selected tracking and reprocessing requirements and the weaknesses in its oversight over selected purchasing and reprocessing requirements. VA concurred with these recommendations. |
gao_GAO-02-244T | gao_GAO-02-244T_0 | This requirement is known as a budget neutrality provision. Rural Ambulance Providers Face Multiple Challenges
In our July 2000 report, we noted that several factors characterizing rural ambulance providers may need consideration in implementing an appropriate payment policy. Compared to their urban and suburban counterparts, rural ambulance providers have fewer transports over which to spread their fixed costs because of the low population density in rural areas. New Fee Schedule Will Alter the Way Medicare Pays for Ambulance Services
Medicare’s proposed fee schedule, published in September 2000, reduces the variation in maximum payment amounts to similar providers for the same type of services. As a result, a national fee schedule is likely to provide increased per-trip payments to those providers that under the current system receive payments considerably below the national average and decreased payments to providers with payments that have been substantially above the national average. Some carriers were found to have applied criteria inappropriately, particularly for nonemergency transports. (The carrier’s policy has since changed.) Conclusions
Overall, the proposed fee schedule will improve the equity of Medicare’s payment for ambulance providers. In our July 2000 report, we recommended that HCFA modify the payment adjuster for rural transports to ensure that it is structured to address the high fixed costs of low-volume providers in isolated areas, as these providers’ services are essential to ensuring Medicare beneficiaries’ access to ambulance services. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 required Medicare to change its payment system for ambulance services. In response, the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA), now called the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), proposed a fee schedule to standardize payments across provider types on the basis of national rates for particular services. Under the act, the fee schedule was to have applied to ambulance services furnished on or after January 1, 2000. HCFA published a proposed rule in September 2000 and has received public comment, but it has not yet issued a final rule. This testimony discusses the unique concerns of rural ambulance providers and the likely effects of the proposed fee schedule on these providers.
What GAO Found
Many rural ambulance providers face a set of unique challenges in implementing an appropriate payment policy. Rural providers--particularly those serving large geographic areas with low population density--tend to have high per-trip costs compared with urban and suburban providers. The proposed Medicare fee schedule does not sufficiently distinguish the providers serving beneficiaries in the most isolated rural areas and may not appropriately account for the higher costs of low-volume providers. |
gao_GAO-11-713T | gao_GAO-11-713T_0 | U.S. National Strategies Emphasize the Importance of Denying Safe Havens to Terrorists
The United States highlights the denial of safe haven to terrorists as a key national security concern in several U.S. government strategic documents. For example, National Security Strategies released in 2002, 2006, and 2010 emphasize the importance of denying safe haven to terrorists. The current National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, which was last updated September 2006, also stresses the importance of eliminating terrorist safe havens. The document identifies eliminating terrorist safe havens as a priority action against which all elements of national power—including military, diplomatic, financial, intelligence, and law enforcement—should be applied. According to National Security Staff officials, an updated National Strategy for Combating Terrorism is currently being drafted and its release is expected in the coming months. However, these officials stated that denying safe haven to terrorists will remain an important element of U.S. counterterrorism strategy. In addition to national strategies, plans issued by various U.S. agencies, such as the Departments of Defense (DOD), Justice (DOJ), and State/U.S. Figure 1 shows excerpts from these documents, which discuss terrorist safe havens. Since 2006, State Has Annually Identified Terrorist Safe Havens Posing Risks to U.S. National Security
The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) requires State to include a detailed assessment in its annual Country Reports on Terrorism with respect to each foreign country whose territory is being used as a terrorist sanctuary, also known as a terrorist safe haven. According to U.S. agencies, a variety of groups that pose threats to the United States operate in countries identified by State as terrorist safe havens. For example: Pakistan: Various terrorist organizations operate in Pakistan. First, al Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden was located in a compound in Pakistan from which U.S. officials have stated he was actively involved in planning attacks against the United States. The Pakistani Taliban have claimed responsibility for several attacks against U.S. interests, including an attack on the U.S. Consulate in Peshawar in April 2010. Yemen: The foreign terrorist organization al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is based in Yemen. For example, the group attempted to bomb a plane headed to the United States on December 25, 2009. More recently, in response to the killing of Osama Bin Laden, AQAP issued a press release vowing revenge against the United States. Somalia: Al-Shabaab is a foreign terrorist organization active in Somalia. Al-Shabaab has claimed responsibility for several bombings and shootings throughout Somalia, as well as the July 2010 suicide bomb attacks in Kampala, Uganda, which killed more than 70 people. The U.S. Government Has Not Fully Addressed Reporting Requirements to Identify Efforts to Deny Terrorists Safe Haven
The U.S. government has not fully addressed reporting requirements to identify U.S. efforts to deny safe haven to terrorists. Congress required the President to submit reports outlining U.S. government efforts to deny or disrupt terrorist safe havens in two laws—the IRTPA and the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2010. The IRTPA required the President to submit a report to Congress that includes an outline of the strategies, tactics, and tools the U.S. government uses to disrupt or eliminate the security provided to terrorists by terrorist safe havens, and recommended that State update the report annually, to the extent feasible, in its Country Reports on Terrorism. In response to these provisions, State submitted a report to Congress in April 2006, which it has updated annually as part of its Country Reports on Terrorism. These reports include a section on U.S. strategies, tactics, and tools that identifies several U.S. efforts to address terrorist safe havens. In the Country Reports on Terrorism released in August 2010, State identified several U.S. efforts for addressing terrorist safe havens, including programs such as State’s Regional Strategic Initiative and Antiterrorism Assistance programs. However, State’s August 2010 Country Reports on Terrorism does not fully identify U.S. efforts to deny terrorists safe haven. We maintain that the provisions in the IRTPA recommend annual updates related to U.S. efforts to address terrorist safe havens be included in the Country Reports on Terrorism. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses GAO's report on U.S. efforts to address terrorist safe havens. Terrorist safe havens provide security for terrorists, allowing them to train recruits and plan operations. U.S. officials have concluded that various terrorist incidents demonstrate the dangers emanating from terrorist safe havens, such as the November 2008 attacks in Mumbai, India, planned, in part, from safe havens in Pakistan, and the attempted airliner bombing on December 25, 2009, planned from safe havens in Yemen. The discovery of Osama Bin Laden in a compound in Pakistan, from which, according to U.S. officials, he played an active role in al Qaeda focused on attacking the United States, makes this hearing particularly timely. The testimony today focuses on (1) U.S. national strategies related to addressing terrorist safe havens, (2) terrorist safe havens identified by the Department of State (State) and the threats emanating from these havens, and (3) the extent to which the U.S. government has identified efforts to deny terrorists safe havens.
What GAO Found
We found that U.S. national strategies emphasize the importance of denying safe haven to terrorists and that, since 2006, State has annually identified terrorist safe havens in its "Country Reports on Terrorism." The United States highlights the denial of safe haven to terrorists as a key national security concern in several U.S. government strategic documents. For example, National Security Strategies released in 2002, 2006, and 2010 emphasize the importance of denying safe haven to terrorists. The current "National Strategy for Combating Terrorism," which was last updated September 2006, also stresses the importance of eliminating terrorist safe havens. The document identifies eliminating terrorist safe havens as a priority action against which all elements of national power--including military, diplomatic, financial, intelligence, and law enforcement--should be applied. According to National Security Staff officials, an updated "National Strategy for Combating Terrorism" is currently being drafted and its release is expected in the coming months. However, these officials stated that denying safe haven to terrorists will remain an important element of U.S. counterterrorism strategy. Since 2006, State has identified existing terrorist safe havens in a dedicated chapter of its "Country Reports on Terrorism." According to U.S. agencies, a variety of groups that pose threats to the United States operate in countries identified by State as terrorist safe havens. For example: (1) Pakistan: Various terrorist organizations operate in Pakistan. First, al Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden was located in a compound in Pakistan from which U.S. officials have stated he was actively involved in planning attacks against the United States. The Pakistani Taliban have claimed responsibility for several attacks against U.S. interests, including an attack on the U.S. Consulate in Peshawar in April 2010. (2) Yemen: The foreign terrorist organization al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is based in Yemen. In response to the killing of Osama Bin Laden, AQAP issued a press release vowing revenge against the United States. (3) Somalia: Al-Shabaab is a foreign terrorist organization active in Somalia. Al-Shabaab has claimed responsibility for several bombings and shootings throughout Somalia, as well as the July 2010 suicide bomb attacks in Kampala, Uganda, which killed more than 70 people. The U.S. government has not fully addressed reporting requirements to identify U.S. efforts to deny safe haven to terrorists. Congress required the President to submit reports outlining U.S. government efforts to deny or disrupt terrorist safe havens in two laws--the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) and the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2010. The IRTPA required the President to submit a report to Congress that includes an outline of the strategies, tactics, and tools the U.S. government uses to disrupt or eliminate the security provided to terrorists by terrorist safe havens, and recommended that State update the report annually, to the extent feasible, in its "Country Reports on Terrorism." In response to these provisions, State submitted a report to Congress in April 2006, which it has updated annually as part of its "Country Reports on Terrorism." These reports include a section on U.S. strategies, tactics, and tools that identifies several U.S. efforts to address terrorist safe havens. In the "Country Reports on Terrorism" released in August 2010, State identified several U.S. efforts for addressing terrorist safe havens, including programs such as State's Regional Strategic Initiative and Antiterrorism Assistance programs. However, State's August 2010 "Country Reports on Terrorism" does not fully identify U.S. efforts to deny terrorists safe haven. |
gao_RCED-95-212 | gao_RCED-95-212_0 | The remaining five centers continued to receive TAPP funds through fiscal year 1995. TAPP Center Officials Are Pleased With Their Progress
Officials at the five centers still participating in TAPP told us they were satisfied with the programs they had developed and believed that they were providing valuable services to their client businesses. Lessons Learned Under TAPP Could Be Useful in Designing Future Programs
While federal funding for TAPP will be discontinued after fiscal year 1995, the interest in programs providing technical assistance to small businesses continues. Projects during fiscal year 1994 were evenly divided between technical and nontechnical information, according to Nexus Associates. Moreover, 59 percent of the users were manufacturing companies. These include (1) adding more specificity to the objectives and goals of the program; (2) determining whether a separate and distinct federal program is needed and, if so, what type of organization is best suited to manage it; and (3) deciding how the program should be funded, including charging user fees for the services provided. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Public Law 102-140, enacted October 28, 1991, required GAO to issue two reports on the Pilot Technology Access Program (TAPP). The second report was to determine the program’s effectiveness and impact on improving small business productivity and innovation. We agreed to report on the experiences of and lessons learned by the TAPP centers during the pilot program. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the Pilot Technology Access Program (TAPP), focusing on the: (1) program's effectiveness and impact on improving small business productivity and innovation; and (2) experiences and the lessons learned by the TAPP centers during the pilot program.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) Congress has decided not to fund TAPP beyond fiscal year (FY) 1995; (2) one TAPP center has operated independently on a reduced scale since FY 1993 and the remaining five centers plan to continue operations beyond FY 1995, but they are not sure of their organization, services, and funding; (3) the five centers serviced 1,840 businesses in FY 1994, of which 59 percent were manufacturers and 66 percent were businesses just getting started; (4) TAPP services included technical and nontechnical information, and technical, patent, and marketing assistance; (5) although the program's impact could not be determined, TAPP clients were generally satisfied with the centers' operations and services; (6) center officials were generally pleased with their programs' development and believed that certain individual projects produced favorable results; and (7) lessons learned from TAPP that should be considered in designing future programs include adding more specificity to program goals and objectives, determining whether a separate and distinct federal program is necessary, determining the organizational type best suited to manage such a program, and deciding program funding options. |
gao_GAO-08-967 | gao_GAO-08-967_0 | In August 2007, Congress enacted the 9/11 Act, which provides DHS with the authority to consider admitting into the Visa Waiver Program countries that otherwise meet the program requirements, but have refusal rates between 3 percent and 10 percent, provided the countries meet certain conditions (see app. In addition, DHS must complete two actions aimed at enhancing the security of the program (see app. Executive Branch Is Moving Quickly to Expand the Visa Waiver Program without a Transparent Process
The executive branch is moving aggressively to expand the Visa Waiver Program by the end of 2008, but, in doing so, DHS has not followed a transparent process for admitting new countries to the program—an approach that has created confusion among other U.S. agencies in Washington, D.C.; U.S. embassy officials overseas; and those countries that are seeking to join the Visa Waiver Program. During the expansion negotiations, DHS has achieved some security enhancements, such as new agreements that, among other things, require the reporting of lost and stolen blank and issued passports. DHS Has Not Followed a Transparent Process for Visa Waiver Program Expansion
We found that the Visa Waiver Program Office has not followed its own standard operating procedures, completed in November 2007, which set forth the key milestones that DHS and aspiring countries must meet before additional countries are admitted into the program. DHS is negotiating with 4 Road Map countries with fiscal year 2007 refusal rates over 10 percent (Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovakia), with the expectation that fiscal year 2008 refusal rates for these countries will fall below 10 percent. DHS Has Not Fully Developed Tools Aimed at Assessing and Mitigating Risks in the Visa Waiver Program
As of early September 2008, DHS had not yet met two key certification requirements in the 9/11 Act that are necessary to allow the department to consider expanding the Visa Waiver Program to countries with refusal rates between 3 percent and 10 percent. Finally, in reviewing recommendations from our 2006 report aimed at improving efforts to assess and mitigate program risks, we found that DHS has implemented many of our prior recommendations, but some are only partially implemented. DHS has not announced when it plans to make this certification. Although DHS program officials stated that DHS is on track to implement the biometric exit system by July 2009, it is unlikely that DHS will meet this timeline. While DHS has taken action on many of our recommendations, it has not fully implemented others. Finally, DHS still needs to take actions to fully implement our prior recommendations in light of plans to expand the program. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve management of the Visa Waiver Program and better assess and mitigate risks associated with it, we are recommending that the Secretary of Homeland Security take the following four actions: establish a clear process, in coordination with the Departments of State and Justice, for program expansion that would include the criteria used to determine which countries will be considered for expansion and timelines for nominating countries, security assessments of aspiring countries, and negotiation of any bilateral agreements to implement the program’s legislative requirements; designate an office with responsibility for developing overstay rate information for the purposes of monitoring countries’ compliance with the statutory requirements of the Visa Waiver Program; direct that established office and other appropriate DHS components to explore cost-effective actions necessary to further improve, validate, and test the reliability of overstay data; and direct the Visa Waiver Program Office to request an updated, validated study of estimated overstay rates for current and aspiring Visa Waiver Program countries, and determine the extent to which additional research and validation of these data are required to help evaluate whether particular countries pose a potential illegal immigration risk to the United States. In addition, Justice discussed its efforts, in collaboration with DHS, to include screening against Interpol’s lost and stolen passport database as part of ESTA. The country must certify that it issues machine-readable passports to its citizens. GAO Comments
1. Moreover, absent clear direction from DHS, U.S. embassy officials in several aspiring countries told us that it had been difficult to explain the expansion process to their foreign counterparts and manage their expectations about when those countries might be admitted into the Visa Waiver Program. 3. However, DHS does not anticipate that ESTA authorizations will be mandatory for visa waiver travelers until after January 12, 2009. As we state in our report, and as DHS noted, the department has not yet certified that it can verify the departure of not less than 97 percent of foreign nationals exiting U.S. airports, or that an Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA) for screening visa waiver travelers in advance of their travel is “fully operational.” Moreover, DHS has not yet implemented a biometric air exit system at U.S. airports. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Visa Waiver Program, which enables citizens of participating countries to travel to the United States without first obtaining a visa, has many benefits, but it also has risks. In 2006, GAO found that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) needed to improve efforts to assess and mitigate these risks. In August 2007, Congress passed the 9/11 Act, which provides DHS with the authority to consider expanding the program to countries whose short-term business and tourism visa refusal rates were between 3 and 10 percent in the prior fiscal year. Countries must also meet certain conditions, and DHS must complete actions to enhance the program's security. GAO has examined DHS's process for expanding the Visa Waiver Program and evaluated the extent to which DHS is assessing and mitigating program risks. GAO reviewed relevant laws and procedures and interviewed agency officials in Washington, D.C., and in U.S. embassies in eight aspiring and three Visa Waiver Program countries.
What GAO Found
The executive branch is moving aggressively to expand the Visa Waiver Program by the end of 2008, but, in doing so, DHS has not followed a transparent process. DHS did not follow its own November 2007 standard operating procedures, which set forth key milestones to be met before countries are admitted into the program. As a result, Departments of State (State) and Justice and U.S. embassy officials stated that DHS created confusion among interagency partners and aspiring program countries. U.S. embassy officials in several aspiring countries told us it had been difficult to explain the expansion process to foreign counterparts and manage their expectations. State officials said it was also difficult to explain to countries with fiscal year 2007 refusal rates below 10 percent that have signaled interest in joining the program (Croatia, Israel, and Taiwan) why DHS is not negotiating with them, given that DHS is negotiating with several countries that had refusal rates above 10 percent (Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovakia). Despite this confusion, DHS achieved some security enhancements during the expansion negotiations, including agreements with several aspiring countries on lost and stolen passport reporting. DHS, State, and Justice agreed that a more transparent process is needed to guide future program expansion. DHS has not fully developed tools to assess and mitigate risks in the Visa Waiver Program. To designate new program countries with refusal rates between 3 and 10 percent, DHS must first make two certifications. First, DHS must certify that it can verify the departure of not less than 97 percent of foreign nationals who exit from U.S. airports. In February 2008, we testified that DHS's plan to meet this provision will not help mitigate program risks because it does not account for data on those who remain in the country beyond their authorized period of stay (overstays). DHS has not yet finalized its methodology for meeting this provision. Second, DHS must certify that the Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA) for screening visa waiver travelers in advance of their travel is "fully operational." While DHS has not announced when it plans to make this certification, it anticipates ESTA authorizations will be required for all visa waiver travelers after January 12, 2009. DHS determined that the law permits it to expand the program to countries with refusal rates between 3 and 10 percent after it makes these two certifications, and after the countries have met the required conditions, but before ESTA is mandatory for all Visa Waiver Program travelers. For DHS to maintain its authority to admit certain countries into the program, it must incorporate biometric indicators (such as fingerprints) into the air exit system by July 1, 2009. However, DHS is unlikely to meet this timeline due to several unresolved issues.In addition, DHS does not fully consider countries' overstay rates when assessing illegal immigration risks in the Visa Waiver Program. Finally, DHS has implemented many recommendations from GAO's 2006 report, including screening U.S.-bound travelers against Interpol's lost and stolen passport database, but has not fully implemented others. Implementing the remaining recommendations is important as DHS moves to expand both the program and the department's oversight responsibilities. |
gao_GAO-03-1 | gao_GAO-03-1_0 | The cost to control invasive species and the cost of damages they inflict, or could inflict, on property or natural resources are estimated to total billions of dollars annually. Not all nonnative species, however, cause harm. More Comprehensive Analysis of the Economic Impacts of Invasive Species Would Better Inform Decision Makers
The scope of existing analyses of the economic impact of invasive species in the United States range from narrow to comprehensive. In addition, some of the actions that agencies have reported to the council are not clearly linked to coordinated implementation of the management plan. However, while the national management plan calls for many actions that would likely contribute to preventing and controlling invasive species, even if the actions in the plan were more fully implemented their effect would be uncertain because they typically do not call for quantifiable improvements in invasive species management or control. However, the council did not articulate in the plan a long-term outcome or condition toward which the federal government should strive. The Current Regulations Concerning Ballast Water Management Are Not Keeping Invasive Species Out of the Great Lakes
According to experts and agency officials we consulted, current efforts by the United States and Canada are not adequate to prevent the introduction of nonnative aquatic organisms into the Great Lakes via ballast water of ships, and they need to be improved. Compliance with U.S. Recommendations for Executive Action
To better manage the threats posed by invasive species in the United States, we recommend that the cochairs of the National Invasive Species Council—the Secretaries of Agriculture, Commerce, and the Interior— direct council members to: Include within the revision to the National Invasive Species Management Plan a goal of incorporating information on the economic impacts and relative risks of different invasive species or pathways when formulating a crosscuting invasive species management budget for the federal government. To determine the experts’ views on the adequacy of U.S. and Canadian efforts to control the introduction of invasive aquatic species into the Great Lakes via the ballast water of ships, we selected and interviewed experts from various stakeholder interests. | Why GAO Did This Study
Harmful invasive species--nonnative plants and animals that are spreading throughout the United States--have caused billions of dollars in damage to natural areas, businesses, and consumers. In 2001, the federal government issued a National Invasive Species Management Plan to focus attention on invasive species and coordinate a national control effort involving the 20 or so federal agencies that are responsible for managing them. This report discusses the economic impacts of invasive species, implementation of the management plan, and coordination of U.S. and Canadian efforts to control invasive species, including those introduced to the Great Lakes via the ballast water of ships.
What GAO Found
Existing literature on the economic impacts of invasive species is of limited usefulness to decision makers, although it indicates that the effects of invasive species are significant. Most economic estimates do not consider all of the relevant effects of nonnative species or the future risks that they pose. New initiatives may prompt more comprehensive analysis that could help decision makers make better resource allocations. While the National Invasive Species Management Plan calls for many actions that are likely to contribute to preventing and controlling invasive species in the United States, it does not clearly articulate specific long-term goals toward which the government should strive. In addition, the federal government has made little progress in implementing the actions called for by the plan. Even with high levels of compliance, U.S. regulations have not eliminated the introduction of invasive species into the Great Lakes via the ballast water of ships. The United States and Canada are working on strengthening the existing control system, but developing stronger regulations and the technology needed to meet them will take many years. The continued introduction of invasive species could have high economic and ecological costs for the Great Lakes. |
gao_GAO-06-72 | gao_GAO-06-72_0 | In General, DOD Implemented Health Benefit Cost Provision Based on Standard A-76 Cost Factor
Most DOD components implemented the health benefit cost provision by ensuring that private sector proposals included an amount for health insurance benefits at least equal to the amount that Circular A-76 requires to be added to agency cost estimates to account for health benefit costs. Under Circular A-76, this amount is 5.5 percent of direct labor costs. The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), however, used a process based on the monthly premium contributions DOD is required to make towards civilian employees’ health insurance plans under the FEHBP. Use of two different processes, however, results in health benefit costs being treated inconsistently within DOD and could even result in different competitive sourcing outcomes. Health Benefit Cost Provision Had Minimal Impact
The health benefit cost comparability provision has had minimal impact on DOD’s fiscal year 2005 competitive sourcing program and the offerors that participated. Of the 54 public-private competitions we reviewed, the health benefit provision was applicable in only 12 sourcing decisions. In 7 of these 12 competitions, DOD collected health benefit cost information from private sector offerors and found that most of their health benefit costs exceeded 5.5 percent of direct labor costs. This is mostly due to the requirements of the Service Contract Act—which mandates minimum wages and fringe benefits (which could include health insurance) for employees on government service contracts. DOD contracting officials and the private sector offerors told us that complying with the health care cost provision was not unduly burdensome. The private offeror involved in DLA’s process we contacted raised no concern with us about any burden. We reviewed this material to document actions taken by DOD to implement the health benefit comparability provision in fiscal year 2005 public-private competitions and the impact the provision had in terms of administrative difficulty, competitive sourcing decision outcomes between agency or contractor performance, and any disincentives for private sector participation in DOD’s competitive sourcing program. (a) LIMITATION ON CONVERSION TO CONTRACTOR PERFORMANCE.—None of the funds appropriated by this Act shall be available to convert to contractor performance an activity or function of the Department of Defense that, on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, is performed by more than 10 Department of Defense civilian employees unless— (1) the conversion is based on the result of a public-private competition that includes a most efficient and cost effective organization plan developed by such activity or function; (2) the Competitive Sourcing Official determines that, over all performance periods stated in the solicitation of offers for performance of the activity or function, the cost of performance of the activity or function by a contractor would be less costly to the Department of Defense by an amount that equals or exceeds the lesser of— (A) 10 percent of the most efficient organization’s personnel- related costs for performance of that activity or function by Federal employees; or (B) $10,000,000; and (3) the contractor does not receive an advantage for a proposal that would reduce costs for the Department of Defense by— (A) not making an employer-sponsored health insurance plan available to the workers who are to be employed in the performance of that activity or function under the contract; or (B) offering to such workers an employer-sponsored health benefits plan that requires the employer to contribute less towards the premium or subscription share than the amount that is paid by the Department of Defense for health benefits for civilian employees under chapter 89 of title 5, United States Code. | Why GAO Did This Study
Competitive sourcing is a management tool where federal agencies conduct competitions between federal employees and private companies to determine the best source to provide commercially available services. Concerns have been raised in the Congress that differences in the costs of federal and private health insurance benefits could disadvantage the federal workforce in public-private competitions. A health benefit cost comparability provision in the 2005 Defense Appropriations Act prohibited any advantage for private offerors that provide no health benefits or contribute less for them than the Department of Defense (DOD) contributes for its civilian employees. Legislation is pending to extend the provision for another year. GAO, in response to a mandate, determined (1) how DOD implemented the provision, and (2) what impact the provision had on DOD's fiscal year 2005 competitive sourcing program.
What GAO Found
Most DOD components implemented the health benefit cost provision using a process designed to ensure that private sector proposals include an amount for employee health benefits at least equal to the amount that Office of Management and Budget Circular A-76 requires to be added to agency cost estimates to account for employee health benefits. Under Circular A-76, this amount is 5.5 percent of direct labor costs. The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), however, used a different process designed to determine whether a private sector offeror's monthly health benefit premium contributions are at least equal to DOD's. While DOD's and DLA's processes are both reasonable approaches, the use of different processes could result in different competitive sourcing outcomes in some cases. The health benefit cost provision had minimal impact on DOD's fiscal year 2005 competitive sourcing program. Of the 54 public-private competitions we reviewed, the health benefit provision was applicable in only 12 sourcing decisions. In 7 of these 12 competitions, DOD collected health benefit cost data from private sector offerors and found that most of their health benefit costs exceeded 5.5 percent of direct labor costs. This is largely due to the requirements of the Service Contract Act--which mandates minimum wages and fringe benefits (which could include health insurance) for employees on government service contracts. Although the processes used by DOD and DLA resulted in increasing two private offerors' cost proposals, the adjustments did not alter the outcome of the competitions. Contracting officials and the private sector offerors told us that complying with the health benefit cost provision was not unduly burdensome. |
gao_NSIAD-95-56 | gao_NSIAD-95-56_0 | Objective, Scope, and Methodology
We examined DOD’s bottom-up review assumptions about key aspects of the two-conflict strategy to determine whether they reasonably supported DOD’s conclusion that the projected force, with enhancements, can execute the strategy. However, in doing the review, DOD did not fully analyze its assumptions regarding key aspects of the strategy, such as the ability of forces to redeploy from other operations to regional conflicts or between conflicts, availability of strategic lift and support forces, and deployability of Army National Guard combat brigades. Since the bottom-up review, DOD has begun additional analyses. War-fighting command officials stated that prepositioning this equipment is critical to executing the two-conflict strategy. Conclusions
The strategy of fighting and winning two nearly simultaneous conflicts will require a significant change in military planning for the deployment and use of U.S. forces. DOD did not begin to analyze these changes until after the bottom-up review. Their estimates of key characteristics of a situation involving two nearly simultaneous conflicts and the deployment of forces differ significantly from DOD’s estimates, including the amount of warning time for both conflicts and time between the onset of each conflict, mix of combat forces needed to respond to each conflict, and timing of force deployments. As a result, the commands are examining options they believe may maximize the use of U.S. capabilities. 2). Key war-fighting commands believe that the scenario may not reflect the most effective deployment and use of U.S. capabilities and are analyzing alternatives. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the key assumptions the Department of Defense (DOD) has made during its bottom-up review to determine whether they reasonably support the execution of a two-conflict strategy.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the strategy of fighting and winning two nearly simultaneous conflicts will require a significant change in military planning; (2) DOD has not fully analyzed key bottom-up review assumptions about the ability of forces to redeploy from other operations to regional conflicts or between conflicts, availability of strategic lift and support forces, or the deployability of Army National Guard combat brigades; (3) war-fighting command officials believe that the DOD plan for responding to two simultaneous major regional conflicts is questionable; (4) official estimates of the amount of warning time between the onset of each conflict, mix of combat forces needed to respond to each conflict, and timing of force deployments differ significantly from DOD estimates; (5) the military commands believe that the DOD scenario may not reflect the most effective deployment of U.S. forces and they are examining options they believe may maximize the use of U.S. capabilities; and (6) until DOD fully analyzes its bottom-up review assumptions and considers the war fighting commands' options, it will not be able to determine force size and mix, the supporting capabilities and funding needed for the two-conflict strategy, or if the strategy should be changed. |
gao_GAO-02-816T | gao_GAO-02-816T_0 | While significant and important progress is being made in addressing the impediments to an opinion on the U.S. government’s consolidated financial statements, fundamental problems continue to (1) hamper the government’s ability to accurately report a significant portion of its assets, liabilities, and costs, (2) affect the government’s ability to accurately measure the full costs and financial performance of certain programs and effectively manage related operations, and (3) significantly impair the government’s ability to adequately safeguard certain significant assets and properly record various transactions. For example, the Federal Managers’ Financial Integrity Act of 1982 (FMFIA) requires GAO to issue standards for internal control in government. These guides on human capital are assisting managers in adopting a more strategic approach to the use of their organization’s most important asset—its people. Special Investigations
GAO has an investigations unit that focuses on investigating and exposing potential criminal misconduct and serious wrongdoing in programs that receive federal funds. The primary mission of this unit is to conduct investigations of alleged violations of federal criminal law and serious wrongdoing and to review law enforcement programs and operations, as requested by the Congress and the Comptroller General. Most of the matters reported to GAO were referred to inspectors general of the executive branch for further action or information. | What GAO Found
The United States General Accounting Office (GAO) is an independent, professional, nonpartisan agency in the legislative branch that is commonly referred to as the investigative arm of Congress. Congress created GAO in the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 to assist in the discharge of its core constitutional powers--the power to investigate and oversee the activities of the executive branch, the power to control the use of federal funds, and the power to make laws. All of GAO's efforts on behalf of Congress are guided by three core values: (1) Accountability--GAO helps Congress oversee federal programs and operations to ensure accountability to the American people; (2) Integrity--GAO sets high standards in the conduct of its work. GAO takes a professional, objective, fact-based, non-partisan, nonideological, fair, and balanced approach on all activities; and (3) Reliability--GAO produces high-quality reports, testimonies, briefings, legal opinions, and other products and services that are timely, accurate, useful, clear, and candid. |
gao_GAO-08-222T | gao_GAO-08-222T_0 | These responsibilities include selecting and monitoring service providers to the plan, reporting plan information to the government and to participants, adhering to the plan’s investment policy statement and other plan documents (unless inconsistent with ERISA), identifying parties-in-interest to the plan and taking steps to monitor transactions with them, selecting investment options the plan will offer and diversifying plan investments, and ensuring that the services provided to their plan are necessary and that the cost of those services is reasonable. In our prior report on 401(k) fees, we found that the fee information that ERISA requires 401(k) plan sponsors to disclose is limited and does not provide participants with an easy way to compare investment options. Sponsors Must Consider a Broad Range of Information to Fulfill Their Fiduciary Responsibilities
Plan sponsors, as fiduciaries, must consider plan fee information related to a broad range of functions. According to Labor, ERISA requires that sponsors evaluate fee information associated with the investment options offered to participants and the providers they hire to perform plan services and consider the reasonableness of the expenses charged by the various providers of services to the plan. Some pension plan associations and practitioners have made various suggestions to help plan sponsors collect meaningful information on expenses. Labor has also undertaken a number of activities related to the information on plan expenses that sponsors should consider. Sponsors Need Information to Evaluate Fees and Expenses Associated with Investment Options and Plan Services
In order to carry out their duties, plan sponsors have an obligation under ERISA to prudently select and monitor plan investment options made available to the plan’s participants and beneficiaries and the persons providing services to the plan. Plan sponsors should obtain all information on fees and expenses as well as revenue sharing arrangements with each investment option. Basic Fee Information Is Important for Participants to Make Informed Decisions
Before making informed decisions about their 401(k) plan investments, participants must first be made aware of the types of plan fees that they pay. Most industry professionals agree that information about investment fees—such as the expense ratio, a fund’s operating fees as a percentage of its assets—is fundamental for plan participants. According to industry professionals, participants are often unaware that they pay any fees associated with their 401(k) plan. Participants Also Need Information on Other Fees That Affect Their Account Balances
Industry professionals also believe that participants need information on other fees that are not included in the expense ratio but still affect their account balances. In addition, industry professionals also recommended that certain investment-specific fees be disclosed, including redemption fees or sales charges—fees that may be imposed by the provider as a result of changing investments in a given period, surrender charges—fees that may be imposed as a result of selling or withdrawing money from the investment within a given number of years after investing, and wrap fees—fees that are assessed on the total assets in a participant’s account. Some industry professionals recommended that plan participants be provided information on their returns net of all fees so that they can clearly see what their investments have earned after fees. Labor also has ongoing efforts designed to help participants and plan sponsors understand the importance of plan fees and the effect of those fees on retirement savings. Conclusions
Both 401(k) plan sponsors and participants need fee information in order to make the most informed decisions. For plan sponsors, requiring that certain information on fees be disclosed can help them understand what services they are paying for, who is benefiting, and whether their current arrangements are in the best interest of plan participants. | Why GAO Did This Study
Employers are increasingly moving away from traditional pension plans to what has become the most dominant and fastest growing type of plan, the 401(k). For 401(k) plan sponsors, understanding the fees being charged helps fulfill their fiduciary responsibility to act in the best interest of plan participants. Participants should consider fees as well as the historical performance and investment risk for each plan option when investing in a 401(k) plan because fees can significantly decrease retirement savings over the course of a career. GAO's prior work found that information on 401(k) fees is limited. GAO previously made recommendations to both Congress and the Department of Labor (Labor) on ways to improve the disclosure of fee information to plan participants and sponsors and reporting of fee information by sponsors to Labor. Both Labor and Congress now have efforts under way to ensure that both participants and sponsors receive the necessary fee information to make informed decisions. These efforts on the subject have generated significant debate. This testimony provides information on 401(k) plan fees that (1) sponsors need to carry out their responsibilities to the plan and (2) plan participants need to make informed investment decisions. To complete this statement, GAO relied on previous work and additional information from Labor and industry professionals regarding information about plan fees.
What GAO Found
Information on 401(k) plan fee disclosure serves different functions for plan sponsors and participants. Plan sponsors need to understand a broad range of information on expenses associated with their plans to fulfill their fiduciary responsibilities. Sponsors need information on expenses associated with the investment options that they offer to participants and the providers they hire to perform plan services. Such information would help them meet their fiduciary duty to determine if expenses are reasonable for the services provided. In addition, sponsors also need to understand the implication of certain business arrangements between service providers, such as revenue sharing. Despite some disagreements about how much information is needed, industry professionals have made various suggestions to help plan sponsors collect meaningful information on expenses. Labor has also undertaken a number of activities related to the information on plan fees that sponsors should consider. Participants need fee information to make informed decisions about their investments--primarily, whether to contribute to the plan and how to allocate their contributions among the investment options the plan sponsor has selected. However, many participants are not aware that they pay any fees, and those who are may not know how much they are paying. Most industry professionals agree that information about an investment option's relative risk, its historic performance, and the associated fees is fundamental for plan participants. Some industry professionals also believe that other fees that are also charged to participants should be understood, so that participants can clearly see the effect these fees can have on their account balances. |
gao_GAO-07-1250T | gao_GAO-07-1250T_0 | Background
The South Florida ecosystem covers about 18,000 square miles in 16 counties. Today, the Everglades has been reduced to half its original size and the ecosystem continues to deteriorate because of the alteration of the water flow, impacts of agricultural and industrial activities, and increasing urbanization. In addition to the CERP projects, another 162 projects are also part of the overall restoration effort. Twenty-eight of these projects, when completed, will serve as the foundation for many of the CERP projects and are intended to restore a more natural water flow to Everglades National Park and improve water quality in the ecosystem. Success in completing the restoration effort and achieving the expected benefits for the ecosystem as quickly as possible and in the most cost- effective manner depends on the order, or sequencing, in which many of the 222 projects will be designed and completed. In 2006, WHC adopted a set of benchmarks that, when met, would lead to the Park’s removal from the list. Although Many Restoration Projects Have Been Completed or Are Ongoing, Key Restoration Benefits Are Expected to Come From Projects Not Yet Implemented
Forty-three of the 222 projects that constitute the South Florida ecosystem restoration effort have been completed, while the remaining projects are currently being implemented or are either in design, being planned, or have not yet started. The primary purposes of these projects range from the construction of stormwater treatment areas, to the acquisition or improvement of land for habitat, to the drafting of water supply plans. Nonetheless, some of the CERP projects currently in implementation are significantly behind schedule. Restoration Projects That Would Help Achieve the World Heritage Committee’s Benchmarks Will Not Be Completed for Many Years
Most of the restoration projects that would help Everglades National Park achieve the WHC’s benchmarks for removing the Park from its list of world heritage sites in danger have not been completed. According to Park and WHC documents, nine restoration projects were key to meeting these benchmarks. As table 2 shows, only one of the nine projects has been completed; four projects are ongoing and will not be completed until at least 2012; and four projects are still in planning and design and are not expected to be completed until some time between 2015 and 2035. Based on its review of this progress report, at a benchmarks meeting on April 2-3, 2007, the WHC’s draft decision was to retain Everglades National Park on the list of world heritage sites in danger; to recommend that the United States continue its commitment to the restoration and conservation of the Park and provide the required financial resources for the full implementation of the activities associated with CERP. However, the Corps has not fully applied these criteria when making CERP project sequencing decisions, because it lacked key data such as updated environmental benefits data and interim goals. Because of the correct sequencing of CERP projects is essential to the overall success of the restoration effort, we recommended that the Corps obtain the data that it needs to ensure that all required sequencing criteria are considered and then comprehensively reassess its sequencing decisions to ensure that CERP projects have been appropriately sequenced to maximize the achievement of restoration goals. Federal Agencies and Florida Have Provided More Than $7 Billion for Restoration Activities Since 1999, But Estimated Costs Have Increased and Are Likely to Rise
From fiscal year 1999 through fiscal year 2006, federal and state agencies participating in the restoration of the South Florida ecosystem provided $7.1 billion for the effort. While federal agencies and Florida provided about $2.3 billion during fiscal years 1999 through 2006 for CERP projects, this amount was about $1.2 billion less than they had estimated needing for these projects over this period. This was because the federal contribution was $1.4 billion less than expected. Additionally, between July 31, 2000, and June 30, 2006, the total estimated cost for the South Florida ecosystem restoration grew from $15.4 billion to $19.7 billion, or by 28 percent. Furthermore, the costs of restoring the South Florida ecosystem are likely to continue to increase for the following reasons: Estimated costs for some of the projects are not known or fully known because they are still in the design and planning stage. Consequently, future project costs are likely to rise with higher land costs. | Why GAO Did This Study
The South Florida ecosystem covers about 18,000 square miles, and is home to the Everglades, one of the world's unique environmental resources. Historic efforts to redirect the flow of water through the ecosystem have jeopardized its health and reduced the Everglades to about half of its original size. In 1993, the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization's World Heritage Committee (WHC) added Everglades National Park (Park) to its List of World Heritage in Danger sites. In 2000, a strategy to restore the ecosystem was set; the effort was expected to take at least 40 years and cost $15.4 billion. It comprises 222 projects, including 60 key projects known as the Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan (CERP), to be undertaken by a multiagency partnership. This testimony is based on GAO's May 2007 report, South Florida Ecosystem: Restoration Is Moving Forward, but Is Facing Significant Delays, Implementation Challenges, and Rising Costs, and a review of WHC decision documents relating to the Park's listing. This statement addresses the (1) status of projects implemented (2) status of projects key to improving the health of the Park, (3) project sequencing factors, and (4) funding provided for the effort and extent to which costs have increased.
What GAO Found
Of the restoration effort's 222 projects, 43 have been completed, 107 are being implemented, and 72 are in design, in planning, or are not yet started. The completed and ongoing projects will provide improved water quality and water flow within the ecosystem and additional habitat for wildlife. According to restoration officials, significant progress has been made in acquiring land, constructing water quality projects, and restoring a natural water flow to the Kissimmee River--the headwater of the ecosystem. Many of the policies, strategies, and agreements required to guide the restoration in the future are also now in place. However, the 60 CERP projects, which are the most critical to the restoration's overall success, are among those that are currently being designed, planned, or have not yet started. Some of these projects are behind schedule by up to 6 years. Florida recently began expediting the design and construction of eight key projects, with the hope that they would immediately benefit the environment, enhance flood control, and increase water supply, thus providing further momentum to the restoration. In 2006, the WHC adopted several key benchmarks that if met would facilitate removal of the Everglades National Park from its List of World Heritage in Danger sites. As noted by WHC, achievement of these benchmarks was linked to the implementation of nine key restoration projects. However, only one of these projects has been completed, four are currently being implemented and four are currently being designed. Moreover, the benefits of these projects will not be available for many years because most of the projects are scheduled for completion between 2011 and 2035. There are no overarching sequencing criteria that restoration officials use when making implementation decisions for all 222 projects that make up the restoration effort. Instead, decisions for 162 projects are driven largely by the availability of funds. There are regulatory criteria to ensure that the goals and purposes of the 60 CERP projects are achieved in a cost effective manner. However, the 2005 sequencing plan developed for these projects is not consistent with the criteria because some of the data needed to fully apply these criteria were not available. Therefore, there is little assurance that the plan will be effective. GAO recommended that the agencies obtain the needed data and then comprehensively reassess the sequencing ofthe CERP projects. From fiscal years 1999 through 2006, the federal government contributed $2.3 billion and Florida contributed $4.8 billion, for a total of about $7.1 billion for the restoration. However, federal funding was about $1.4 billion short of the funds originally projected for this period. In addition, the total estimated costs for the restoration have increased by 28 percent--from $15.4 billion in 2000 to $19.7 billion in 2006 because of project scope changes, increased construction costs, and higher land costs. More importantly, these cost estimates do not represent the true costs for the overall restoration effort because they do not include all cost components for a number of projects. |
gao_T-RCED-98-190 | gao_T-RCED-98-190_0 | FAA Has Made Progress, but Full Implementation Will Take Years
As we reported in April 1998, FAA has made progress in a number of critical areas to improve aviation security as recommended by the Commission and mandated by the Reauthorization Act. However, the agency has experienced delays of up to 12 months in completing the five efforts we reviewed: passenger profiling, explosives detection technologies, passenger-bag matching, vulnerability assessments, and the certification of screening companies and the performance of security screeners. We found that delays were caused by the new and relatively untested technologies, limited funds, and problems with equipment installation and contractors’ performance. I will briefly discuss the status of these five initiatives and the actions that FAA and others need to take before they can be fully implemented. In 1996, we stressed that it is important for the Congress to oversee the implementation of FAA’s security measures. Regrettably, after the commission investigating Pan Am Flight 103 issued its report, activity began to wane and not much progress was made. Additional copies are $2 each. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed its recent review of the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) implementation of five key initiatives: automated passenger profiling, explosives detection technologies, passenger-bag match, vulnerability assessments, and certification of screening companies and improvement of screeners' performance.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) FAA has made some progress in five critical areas as recommended by the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security and mandated by Congress; (2) given the current implementation schedule, it will take years for FAA and the aviation industry to fully implement the initiatives; (3) to date, FAA has encountered delays of up to 12 months in implementing these initiatives, in part because they are more complex than originally envisioned and involve new and relatively untested technologies; (4) delays have also been caused by limited funding and problems with equipment installation and contractors' performance; (5) while progress is being made in strengthening aviation security, the completion of the current initiatives will require additional financial resources and a sustained commitment by the federal government and the aviation industry; (6) because momentum and public attention began to subside after the downing of Pan Am Flight 103, sufficient progress did not occur; and (7) to avoid a similar situation, congressional oversight and commitment are important. |
gao_GAO-08-46 | gao_GAO-08-46_0 | Compliance with Legislative Conditions
The ACE expenditure plan—including related program documentation and program officials’ statements—satisfies or partially satisfies the six legislative conditions specified in the appropriations act. Specifically, the plan satisfies the conditions that it (1) comply with the acquisition rules, requirements, guidelines, and systems acquisition management practices of the federal government; (2) include a certification by the DHS Chief Information Officer that an independent verification and validation agent is currently under contract for the program; (3) be reviewed by the DHS Investment Review Board, the Secretary of DHS, and Office of Management and Budget (OMB); and (4) be reviewed by us. The plan and its supporting information partially satisfies the conditions that it (5) meet the capital planning and investment control review requirements established by OMB (including Circular A-11, part 7) and that it (6) comply with the DHS enterprise architecture. Status of GAO Recommendations
DHS has implemented some, but not all, of the recommendations pertaining to ACE that we have made since 2003. The remaining seven recommendations are in the process of being implemented, as described here. Observations on the Expenditure Plan and Management of ACE
We have three observations about ACE requirements, commercial product selection, and risk management. Requirements: Redefinition of requirements for several ACE releases is now under way to address limitations in completeness of originally defined requirements, and this redefinition is likely to introduce program schedule delays and cost increases. As a result of these years of effort, the ACE program is better positioned today for delivering promised capabilities and benefits than it has been in the past. Nevertheless, key program management practices relating to, for example, human capital management, requirements management, and risk management continue to remain a challenge, and other management areas, such as information security and architecture alignment, continue to require attention. To further improve ACE management and minimize its exposure to risk, it is important for CBP and DHS to remain vigilant in their efforts to satisfy ACE legislative requirements and to fully implement our prior recommendations. Moreover, it is important that they keep Congress fully informed on where the program stands and what changes are planned to address emerging cost overruns and schedule delays. OMB approved the expenditure plan on January 22, 2007. Objective 2: Open Recommendations The fiscal year 2007 expenditure plan still does not adequately describe the program’s progress against the commitments that were made in the fiscal year 2006 plan. According to program officials, the new measures will be combined with existing performance measures. Since then, the program office has reduced this overlap and concurrence. To further strengthen ACE management and promote accountability for ACE performance and results, we are making the following recommendation to the Secretary of Homeland Security to direct the CBP Commissioner to ensure that future quarterly reports to the House and Senate Appropriations Committees disclose
(1)the risks and associated mitigation strategies of not having fully satisfied the expenditure plan legislative conditions and not having completed implementation of all our prior recommendations; (2)the status and impacts on the program’s estimated cost and schedule and lessons learned from ongoing efforts to redefine requirements and to implement a different COTS product than originally selected; and (3)the program’s plans and actions for improving ACE risk management and its current inventory of program risks, including their associated mitigation strategies and the status of the strategies’ implementation. Information Technology: Customs Automated Commercial Environment Program Progressing, but Need for Management Improvements Continues. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) established the Automated Commercial Environment (ACE) program to replace and supplement existing cargo processing technology. According to the fiscal year 2007 DHS appropriations act, DHS is to develop and submit an expenditure plan for ACE that satisfies certain conditions, including being reviewed by GAO. GAO reviewed the plan to (1) determine whether the expenditure plan satisfies the legislative conditions, (2) determine the status of 15 open GAO recommendations, and (3) provide observations about the expenditure plan and DHS's management of the program. To address the mandate, GAO assessed plans and related documentation against federal guidelines and industry standards and interviewed the appropriate DHS officials.
What GAO Found
The ACE expenditure plan satisfies many--but not all--of the legislative conditions specified in the fiscal year 2007 DHS appropriations act. Specifically, the plan (with related program documentation and officials' statements) complies with acquisition rules, requirements, guidelines, and management practices of the federal government; includes a DHS certification that an independent verification and validation agent is under contract; was reviewed and approved by DHS and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB); and was reviewed by GAO. In addition, it partially satisfies conditions for meeting the capital planning and investment control review requirements established by OMB in Circular A-11 (part 7), including information security, and for complying with the DHS enterprise architecture. DHS has implemented eight open GAO recommendations made during the past 4 years, including those related to performance measures and targets, independent verification and validation, cost estimation, and program reporting. Seven other recommendations made during this time are in the process of being implemented. With respect to these seven, DHS has taken steps to satisfy each, such as establishing an accountability framework, reducing overlap and concurrence among ACE releases, and completing a privacy impact assessment, and actions are under way or planned to more fully address them. GAO is making three new observations about the expenditure plan and the management of ACE. First, the program is taking needed steps to redefine requirements for several ACE releases because of limitations in the completeness of original requirements, but this redefinition is likely to introduce significant program schedule delays and cost increases. Second, the changes to ACE requirements have led to replacement of a key commercial product, but the new product carries the risk of negatively impacting user productivity. Third, the automated database used for managing ACE risks is incomplete and does not contain information needed to adequately inform program decisions. All told, DHS has continued to make progress on ACE, and the program is better positioned today for delivering promised capabilities and benefits than it has been in the past. Nevertheless, key program management practices relating to, for example, human capital management, requirements management, and risk management remain a challenge, and other management areas, such as information security and architecture alignment, continue to require attention. As a result, GAO sees major program schedule delays and cost overruns on the horizon. To improve ACE management and minimize exposure to risk, it is important for DHS to remain vigilant in its efforts to satisfy ACE legislative requirements, fully implement prior GAO recommendations, and keep Congress fully informed about the program's status, plans, and risk. |
gao_T-HEHS-98-185 | gao_T-HEHS-98-185_0 | Research Consistently Demonstrates Benefits of Drug Abuse Treatment
In numerous large-scale studies examining the outcomes of drug abuse treatment provided in a variety of settings, researchers have concluded that treatment is beneficial. Major Studies Report Reductions in Drug Use and Crime Following Treatment
Comprehensive analyses of the effectiveness of drug abuse treatment have been conducted by several major, federally funded studies over a period of nearly 30 years: the Drug Abuse Treatment Outcome Study (DATOS), the National Treatment Improvement Evaluation Study (NTIES), the Treatment Outcome Prospective Study (TOPS), and the Drug Abuse Reporting Program (DARP). These studies are generally considered by the research community to be the major evaluations of drug abuse treatment effectiveness, and much of what is known about “typical” drug abuse treatment outcomes comes from these studies. Longer Treatment Episodes Have Better Outcomes, but Treatment Duration Is Limited by Client Drop-Out
Another finding across these studies is that clients who stay in treatment longer report better outcomes. However, researchers emphasize that client reporting on use of illicit drugs during the previous year (the outcome measure used in most effectiveness evaluations) has been shown to be more accurate than client reporting on current drug use (the measure used to assess the validity of self-reported data). Although strong evidence supports methadone maintenance as the most effective treatment for heroin addiction, less is known about the best ways to provide treatment services to cocaine users or adolescents. Methadone maintenance reduces heroin use and criminal activity and improves social functioning. Cognitive-Behavioral Treatments Show Promise for Cocaine Addiction
researchers have relied on cognitive-behavioral therapies to treat cocaine addiction. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed its recent report on drug abuse treatment research findings, focusing on: (1) the overall effectiveness of drug abuse treatment; (2) the methodological issues affecting drug abuse treatment evaluations; and (3) what is known about the effectiveness of specific treatments for heroin, cocaine, and adolescent drug addiction.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) it found that large, multisite, longitudinal studies have produced considerable evidence that drug abuse treatment is beneficial to the individual undergoing treatment and to society; (2) the studies have consistently found that a substantial proportion of clients being studied report reductions in drug use and criminal activity following treatment; (3) the studies also show that clients who stay in treatment for longer periods report better outcomes; (4) however, drug abuse treatment research is complicated by a number of methodological challenges that make it difficult to accurately measure the extent to which treatment reduces drug use; (5) in particular, growing concerns about the validity of self-reported data, which are used routinely in the major evaluations of drug abuse treatment, suggest that the treatment benefit reported by these studies may be somewhat overstated; (6) in addition, the research evidence to support the relative effectiveness of specific treatment approaches or settings for particular groups of drug abusers is limited; and (7) while one specific treatment approach--methadone maintenance--has been shown to be the most effective treatment for heroin addiction, research on the best treatment approach or setting for cocaine addiction or adolescent drug users is less definitive. |
gao_GAO-09-932 | gao_GAO-09-932_0 | In January 1997, Treasury introduced its own inflation-indexed securities, TIPS, as part of its debt program. At the time, Treasury’s stated objectives for introducing TIPS were both to raise the national savings rate and to reduce the federal government’s cost of borrowing. TIPS offer inflation protection to investors who are willing to pay a premium for this protection in the form of a lower interest rate. In a functioning TIPS market, the difference between the interest rate on nominal Treasury securities and the interest rate on TIPS should approximately equal the expected inflation rate. To examine what role TIPS should play in Treasury’s debt portfolio and the potential for the TIPS program to help address Treasury’s debt management challenges, we conducted literature reviews on the costs and benefits of inflation-indexed securities and examined research by Federal Reserve economists, market experts, academic sources, and the Department of the Treasury, including an internal review of the TIPS program done by the Office of Debt Management (ODM). Treasury’s total outstanding debt increased by $2.3 trillion (25 percent increase in federal debt) since the onset of the economic recession in December 2007. The largest increase in outstanding marketable Treasury securities was in short-term debt. Fiscal Outlook Will Present Continued Debt Management Challenges
As noted, the federal government’s policy response to the financial market crisis and the economic recession created a significant increase in both debt and debt management challenges. These will not recede when stability returns to financial markets and economic growth resumes. CBO projects that, absent changes in current policy, the debt held by the public will double in 5 years (from 2008 to 2013) and almost triple in 11 years (from 2008 to 2019). Treasury’s TIPS Program Has Had Varying Degrees of Liquidity Since Inception and Major Institutional Investors Have Expressed Concern about Treasury’s Commitment to the Program
Treasury’s TIPS program has had varying degrees of liquidity since its inception in 1997. Liquidity is a measure of the ease with which investors can trade a security. TIPS Program Offers Benefits to Treasury, and Measuring Its Cost Requires both Forward-Looking and After-the-Fact Analysis
TIPS offer a variety of benefits to both Treasury and investors. TIPS Program Could Benefit Treasury by Diversifying Its Funding Sources and Investor Base
TIPS could benefit Treasury by diversifying its funding sources and investor base. Economists have noted that governments are better able to bear inflation risk because periods of inflation are often associated with increased revenues. The results of TIPS auctions also provide useful information to policymakers on inflation expectations. On July 1, 2009, we briefed Treasury’s ODM on the findings from our analysis and interviews with major institutional investors. Treasury later posed questions about ways to improve the TIPS program to the Primary Dealers and TBAC. At the August 2009 TBAC meeting, members discussed TIPS. Following the meeting, Treasury’s Deputy Assistant Secretary for Federal Finance reaffirmed Treasury’s commitment to TIPS and announced plans to gradually increase issuance of TIPS. The Secretary should continually review the appropriate composition of the TIPS program, and consider: the impact of Treasury’s public statements and TIPS issuances on TIPS liquidity, how both ex-ante (before the fact) and ex-post (after the fact) analyses are valuable for evaluating the cost of TIPS, recognizing the anomalous nature of market data from periods such as the 2008 financial market crisis, the ways in which the TIPS program can diversify Treasury’s investor base and funding sources, and the degree to which TIPS impact the cost of nominal securities. | Why GAO Did This Study
The 2008 financial market crisis and the economic recession led to a rapid and substantial increase in federal debt. This report, part of a line of work on debt management, was conducted under the Comptroller General's authority. It describes current debt management challenges and examines the role of a program that could benefit Treasury--Treasury Inflation Protected Securities (TIPS). GAO analyzed market data and interviewed experts as well as the two largest holders of Treasury securities in each of six sectors.
What GAO Found
In January 1997, Treasury introduced an inflation-indexed security--TIPS. Treasury's stated objectives were to both raise the national savings rate and to reduce the federal government's cost of borrowing. TIPS offer inflation protection to investors who are willing to pay a premium for this protection in the form of a lower interest rate. In a functioning TIPS market, the difference between the interest rate on nominal Treasury securities and the interest rate on TIPS is expected to be approximately equal to the expected inflation rate. Federal government actions in response to both the financial market crisis and the economic recession have added significantly to Treasury's borrowing needs. Since the onset of the recession in December 2007, Treasury has borrowed more than $2.3 trillion, largely by issuing short-term nominal debt, which significantly changed the composition of Treasury's debt portfolio. The challenges presented by increasing debt and the change in its composition take place in the context of the medium and longer term fiscal outlook and will not recede with the return of financial market stability and economic growth. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projects that, absent changes in current policy, debt held by the public will double in 5 years (from 2008 to 2013) and almost triple in 11 years (from 2008 to 2019)--reaching 82 percent of GDP. In order to meet these challenges Treasury needs to diversify its funding sources and lengthen the term-to-maturity of its debt portfolio. TIPS can contribute to this effort. Treasury's TIPS program has had varying degrees of liquidity (the ease with which investors can trade the security) since its inception. The major institutional investors that GAO interviewed perceived Treasury's commitment to the TIPS program as having wavered in recent years, decreasing the liquidity of TIPS in the market. Investors demand a premium for holding less-liquid TIPS, which increases Treasury's borrowing costs. TIPS offer benefits to Treasury and measuring the cost against which to weigh these benefits requires both forward-looking and after-the-fact analysis. A more robust TIPS program could benefit Treasury by diversifying and expanding its funding sources and reducing the cost of nominal securities. Governments are well suited to bear inflation risk because periods of inflation are often associated with increased revenues. TIPS auctions also help provide a measure of market inflation expectations. On July 1, 2009, GAO briefed Treasury's Office of Debt Management on the findings from our analysis and interviews with major institutional investors. Treasury later posed questions about ways to improve the TIPS program to the Primary Dealers and the Treasury Borrowing Advisory Committee (TBAC). At the August 2009 TBAC meeting, members discussed TIPS. Following the meeting, Treasury's Deputy Assistant Secretary for Federal Finance reaffirmed Treasury's commitment to TIPS and announced plans to gradually increase issuance of TIPS. |
gao_GAO-09-17 | gao_GAO-09-17_0 | The standard work schedule for full-time VA employees is ten 8-hour work days within a 2-week period. VAMC Nursing Officials Cannot Rely on Information from VA’s PCS to Determine RN Staffing Levels for VA Inpatient Units
VAMC nursing officials reported that although VA RNs are required to input patient data into VA’s PCS, many said they cannot rely on the information generated by PCS because the PCS is outdated and inaccurate. Because of the shortcomings of VA’s PCS, nurse managers use various other data to help set RN staffing levels for their inpatient units, such as historical staffing levels and benchmarking RN staffing levels to inpatient units in hospitals with similar characteristics. VA headquarters officials in the Office of Nursing Services (ONS) and VA’s OIG also reported that PCS has significant limitations. At four VAMCs we visited, nurse managers told us that they set RN staffing levels for their inpatient units by adhering to the historical staffing levels that had been established for the units. First, according to these groups, some inpatient RNs are dissatisfied about spending too much time performing non-nursing duties, such as cleaning beds after a patient is discharged or answering unit telephones. Second, even though VAMCs were authorized in 2004 to offer RNs two alternate work schedules, few nurse executives reported offering these schedules; as a consequence, few RNs work these schedules. In addition to these two main factors, inpatient RNs cited other factors affecting retention, such as reliance on supplemental staffing strategies, for example RN overtime, and insufficient professional development opportunities. Other flexible work schedules were used less frequently: for example, according to nurse executives we surveyed the use of the 10-hour schedule was reported by 13 percent of medical units and only 1 percent of spinal cord injury units. VAMC Nursing Officials Identified Limitations in VA’s Hiring Process and VA-Imposed Hiring Freezes as Contributing Factors to RN Hiring Delays
VAMC nursing officials we surveyed and interviewed reported that delays resulting from limitations in VA’s hiring process and hiring freezes and lags at VAMCs can often discourage prospective RN candidates from seeking or following through on applications for employment at VAMCs. Although VA has recently taken steps to address some of the factors that contribute to RN hiring delays, it is too early to determine the extent to which these steps have been effective in reducing hiring delays. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve the ability of VAMCs to determine RN staffing levels needed for inpatient units and to recruit and retain inpatient RNs, we recommend that the Secretary of Veterans Affairs direct the Under Secretary for Health to implement the following three recommendations develop a detailed action plan that includes a timetable for building, testing, and implementing the new nurse staffing system; ensure that the new nurse staffing system provides RN staffing estimates that accurately account for both the actual inpatient acuity levels and current nursing tasks performed on inpatient units and adequately take into account the level of ancillary and nursing support that is available on VAMC inpatient units; and assess the barriers to wider availability of alternate and flexible work schedules for RNs at VAMCs and explore ways to overcome these barriers. Specifically, we identified (1) how useful the information generated by VA’s patient classification system (PCS) is for determining RN staffing levels on VA inpatient units, (2) key factors that nursing officials and RNs identify that adversely affect RN retention on inpatient units, and (3) factors that nursing officials identify as contributing to delays in hiring RNs to fill vacant positions. A nurse executive is a member of the executive leadership team at a VAMC and is responsible for all nursing care delivered at the VAMC. The findings from these eight VAMCs we visited cannot be generalized to all VAMCs. In addition, we interviewed nurse managers responsible for supervising RNs on inpatient units at the eight VAMCs we visited and conducted focus groups with inpatient RNs to get their perspectives on retention issues. Appendix II: Analysis of GAO Survey of VA Medical Center Nurse Executives
To obtain the views of VA nurse executives on various staffing, recruitment, and retention issues, we conducted a Web-based survey of VA nurse executives employed at VAMCs. | Why GAO Did This Study
Registered nurses (RNs) are the largest group of health care providers employed by VA's health care system. RNs are relied on to deliver inpatient care, but VA medical centers (VAMC) face RN recruitment and retention challenges. VAMCs use a patient classification system (PCS) to determine RN staffing on inpatient units by classifying inpatients according to severity of illness to determine the amount of RN care needed. GAO reviewed VAMC inpatient units for (1) the usefulness of information generated by VA's PCS; (2) key factors that affect RN retention; and (3) factors that contribute to delays in hiring RNs. GAO performed a Web-based survey of all VAMC nurse executives; interviewed VA headquarters officials and VAMC nursing officials, and conducted RN focus groups at eight VAMCs visited by GAO. The findings of GAO's survey are generalizable to all nurse executives; however, findings from the focus groups at the eight VAMCs are not generalizable.
What GAO Found
VAMC nursing officials--nurse executives who are responsible for all nursing care at VAMCs and nurse managers who are responsible for supervising RNs on VAMC inpatient units--GAO interviewed reported that although VA inpatient RNs are required to input patient data into VA's PCS, they do not rely on the information generated by PCS because it is outdated and inaccurate. These nursing officials noted that VA's PCS does not accurately capture the severity of patients' illnesses or account for all the nursing tasks currently performed on inpatient units. Because of the shortcomings of VA's PCS, nurse managers use data from a variety of sources to help set RN staffing levels for their inpatient units. At four of the eight VAMCs GAO visited, nurse managers told GAO that they set RN staffing levels for their inpatient units by adhering to the historical staffing levels that had been established for the units. Three VAMCs GAO visited set their RN staffing levels using data on the RN staffing levels found in inpatient units in other hospitals with similar characteristics. VA reported it is proposing to develop a new RN staffing system. However, VA has not developed a detailed action plan that includes a timetable for building, testing, and implementing the new nurse staffing system. VA nursing officials reported that VA's ability to retain its RNs is adversely affected by two main factors. First, inpatient RNs reported that they spend too much time performing non-nursing duties such as housekeeping and clerical tasks. Second, even though VAMCs were authorized in 2004 to offer RNs two alternate work schedules that are generally desired by nurses--such as working three12-hour shifts within a week that would be considered full-time for pay and benefits purposes--few nurse executives reported offering these schedules; therefore, few RNs work these schedules. Specifically, according to nurse executives GAO surveyed only about 1 percent of many inpatient units offered alternate schedules and less than 1 percent of RNs actually worked these schedules. The availability of flexible work schedules, for example, working eight 10-hour shifts over a 2-week period, are more widely available among VAMCs but are still limited, according to GAO's survey of nurse executives. Nursing officials and RNs noted other factors affecting retention such as reliance on supplemental staffing strategies--for example, RN overtime--and insufficient professional development opportunities. Both VA nurse executives and nursing officials identified limitations in VA's process for hiring RNs and VA-imposed hiring freezes and lags as major contributing factors causing delays in hiring RNs to fill inpatient vacancies at VAMCs. VA nursing officials reported that hiring freezes and lags at VAMCs and delays resulting from limitations in VA's hiring process can discourage prospective candidates from seeking or following through on applications for employment at these facilities. Although VA has recently taken steps to address some of the factors that are reported to contribute to RN hiring delays, it is too early to determine the extent to which these steps have been effective in reducing hiring delays |
gao_GAO-02-307 | gao_GAO-02-307_0 | We examined two types of Medicare debts:
Medicare secondary payer (MSP) debts. Of the approximately $6.4 billion of Medicare debts that CMS had reported as eligible for referral by the end of fiscal year 2000, the agency reported that about $4.3 billion of the debts had not been referred to Treasury or a Treasury-designated debt collection center. Problems with the debt-referral system contributed to the late referral of non-MSP debts. Although CMS reached its $2 billion referral goal for fiscal year 2001, both the prospects for collection during the year and the collectibility of the debts were likely diminished by the referral delays. Limited contractor efforts, coupled with inadequate CMS monitoring of contractor performance, were primarily responsible for the slow progress in referring MSP debts. One of the contractors held $255 million of Part A MSP debt more than 180 days delinquent as of September 30, 2000. Debts resulting from claims adjustments are generally offset from subsequent Medicare payments and require no further collection action. CMS also did not properly report its exclusions from referral requirements. Treasury uses the information to monitor agencies’ implementation of DCIA. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help ensure that CMS promptly refers all eligible delinquent Medicare debts to PSC, as we recommended in September 2000, and that all benefits from closed-out debts are realized, we recommend that the administrator of CMS establish and implement policies and procedures to monitor contractors’ implementation of CMS’s May 2001 instructions to ensure the prompt referral of eligible MSP debts; implement changes to CMS’s non-MSP debt tracking systems so that CMS personnel will be better able to monitor contractors’ referral of eligible non-MSP debts as required by CMS’s April 2001 instructions to contractors; develop and implement a comprehensive referral plan for all eligible delinquent Medicare debts that includes time frames for promptly referring all types of debts, including MSP liability and Part A claims adjustments debts; perform an assessment of MSP debts being closed out because they are more than 6 years and 3 months delinquent to determine whether to pursue collection action on the debts, and document the results of the assessment; establish and implement policies and procedures for reporting closed- out Medicare debts, when appropriate, to IRS; and validate the accuracy of debt-eligible amounts reported in the Medicare Trust Fund TROR by establishing a process that ensures, among other things, (1) accurate reporting of the aging of certain delinquent debts, (2) accurate and complete reporting of debts excluded from referral requirements, and (3) verification of data entry for referral amounts. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Debt Collection Improvement Act (DCIA) of 1996 requires that agencies refer eligible debts delinquent more than 180 days that they have been unable to collect to the Department of the Treasury for payment and offset and to Treasury or a Treasury-designated debt collection center for cross-servicing. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) made progress in referring eligible delinquent debts for collection during fiscal year 2001. Much of the referral volume was late in the year, however, and substantial unreferred balances remained at the end of the fiscal year. Inadequate procedures and controls hampered prompt identification and referral of both eligible non-Medicare Secondary Payer (MSP) and MSP debts. The delayed referral of non-MSP debts resulted from problems with the CMS debt-referral system and insufficient CMS monitoring of contractor referrals. The low level of MSP debt referrals resulted primarily from limited contractor efforts and insufficient CMS monitoring of contractor performance.
What GAO Found
Although GAO did not test whether selected CMS debts had been reasonably excluded from referral and reached no overall conclusion about the appropriateness of CMS exclusions, GAO found that CMS did not report reliable Medicare debt information to the Treasury Department as of September 30, 2000. |
gao_GAO-04-738T | gao_GAO-04-738T_0 | This mission work is carried out under the direction of NNSA and DOE’s program offices. As figure 1 shows, facility management contracts account for more than 80 percent of this amount. Further, meeting a long-term goal of 23 percent small business prime contracting would represent an achievement far beyond what DOE has ever reached—about 6 times the $847 million that it directed to small businesses in fiscal year 2003. Meeting Near-term Goals Requires More Small Business Prime Contracting Dollars Than Previously Achieved
Now that DOE’s facility management subcontracts can no longer be counted toward achieving its small business prime contracting goals, achieving its near-term goals for fiscal years 2004 and 2005, will require DOE to expand the amount of prime contracting dollars it provides directly to small businesses. To meet its fiscal year 2004 goal, DOE will need to direct an additional $226 million, or 26.7 percent, over the 2003 amount. SBA expects DOE to achieve a small business prime contracting goal at least on par with the federal goal of 23 percent. Put in terms of DOE’s current contracting base, the additional amount of contracting dollars necessary to achieve the 23 percent goal approximately equals the combined annual budgets of the facility management contracts for the two largest laboratories—Los Alamos and Sandia National Laboratories. To achieve the near-term goals of 5.06 of prime contracting dollars to small businesses in fiscal year 2004, and 5.50 percent in fiscal year 2005, DOE has focused primarily on improving outreach to the small business community, directing more of the dollars not associated with facility management contracts toward small businesses, and beginning to redirect selected facility management contract activities to small business prime contracts. Officials in these offices have differing views as to how much of the work done by their facility management contractors can be redirected to small businesses without jeopardizing critical agency missions. In addition to its outreach efforts, DOE has taken steps in two other major areas. Although in the near term DOE is concentrating primarily on contracts not associated with facility management, it has also begun to look at certain facility management contracts as they come up for renewal to identify potential work that could be made available to small businesses. DOE’s Small Business Office and Program Offices Have Different Views on the Extent to Which Facility Management Contract Dollars Can Be Redirected to Small Business
While DOE’s Small Business Office and the three largest offices have a consistent approach to their near-term goals—primarily focusing on increasing small business prime contracting by using dollars not associated with facility management contracts—a consistent view does not prevail in the department on whether or how to achieve the eventual goal of directing 23 percent of prime contracting dollars to small businesses. Potential Benefits and Risks of Increased Small Business Prime Contracting Depend on the Goal that DOE Tries to Achieve
Since DOE is in the early stages of implementing a long-term strategy to redirect facility management contracting dollars to small businesses, the implications of increased small business prime contracting are still relatively uncertain. According to EM officials, increased competition from a larger pool of potential contractors could result in better prices for the government. In addition to increased competition, DOE procurement and program office officials believe that small businesses may bring new ideas and innovative approaches to the work. For example, as part of its accelerated cleanup strategy, EM has been looking for better and faster ways to accomplish cleanup at its sites and facilities. In addition, DOE’s efforts to increase small business prime contracting could inadvertently reduce the amount of small business subcontracting directed to local and regional small businesses. Both DOE and facility management contractor officials have expressed concerns about successfully integrating and coordinating the efforts of an increased number of prime contractors at a site. It is not clear to what extent these potential risks will affect DOE’s ability to carry out its missions in a safe, secure, and effective manner. Appendix I: Department of Energy (DOE) Contract Dollars Directed to Small Businesses, Fiscal Years 1990–2003
Small business subcontracts awarded by prime contractors
Small business subcontracts awarded by all other prime contractors Small and large business subcontracts awarded by prime contractors Small business prime and subcontracts (as a percent of contracting base)
Small business subcontracts awarded by prime contractors Small business subcontracts awarded by all other prime contractors Small and large business subcontracts awarded by prime contractors Small business prime and subcontracts (as a percent of contracting base)
DOE’s contracting base includes dollars that can potentially be directed to U.S. small businesses, excluding, under Small Business Administration (SBA) guidelines, dollars that cannot go to small business prime contracts, such as grants and purchases from mandatory or foreign sources. | Why GAO Did This Study
Under the Small Business Reauthorization Act of 1997, the federal government has a goal of awarding at least 23 percent of prime, or direct, contracting dollars to small businesses each fiscal year. The Department of Energy (DOE), like other federal agencies, shares in the responsibility for meeting this goal. In fiscal year 2003, DOE spent $21.6 billion on prime contracts. More than 80 percent of this amount was spent on facility management contracts to manage and operate DOE's sites. Before 1999, DOE included subcontracts awarded by its facility management contractors when calculating its small business prime contracting achievements. In 1999, however, the Office of Federal Procurement Policy determined that DOE could no longer do so. This testimony discusses (1) the effect of the 1999 policy change on the amount of prime contract dollars that DOE will be required to direct to small businesses, (2) the steps that DOE has taken or plans to take to achieve its small business contracting goals, and (3) the likely implications for DOE's programs resulting from these changes.
What GAO Found
To meet its share of federal goals, DOE would need to direct significantly more prime contracting dollars to small businesses. If it is to reach its near-term goals of 5.06 percent in fiscal year 2004, and 5.50 percent in fiscal year 2005, DOE must direct to small businesses an additional $226 million and $319 million, respectively, over the $847 million it directed to small businesses in fiscal year 2003. Achieving a long-term goal of directing 23 percent of prime contracting dollars to small businesses would require DOE to contract with small businesses at about 6 times its current rate. Such an increase is about equal to the combined annual budgets for Los Alamos and Sandia--the two largest national laboratories. To address its near-term small business prime contracting goals, DOE has improved its outreach efforts and has redirected to small businesses some contract dollars not associated with facility management contracts. DOE has also begun to review facility management contracts up for renewal to identify work that could be redirected to small business prime contracts. Achieving a long-term goal of 23 percent is much more problematic. Notably, DOE's three largest offices--the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Environmental Management (EM), and Science--have differing views as to what extent facility management contract work can be redirected to small businesses without having a negative impact on accomplishing their missions. EM is in favor of doing so if redirecting the work is consistent with its accelerated cleanup strategy. NNSA and Science officials express concern that redirecting work now done by facility management contractors could jeopardize critical research missions at the laboratories. DOE's efforts to increase small business prime contracting involve both potential benefits and risks, which depend on the eventual goal DOE attempts to achieve. The potential benefits to DOE of increased small business prime contracting include increasing the pool of potential contractors, which could result in better competition and better prices for the government; finding new and innovative approaches to the work developed by small businesses; and providing experiences to small businesses to allow them to better compete for other federal contracts. The potential risks include integrating and coordinating the work of a greater number of contractors at a site in a safe, secure, and effective manner, and having adequate federal resources for effective contract management and oversight--areas that already pose significant challenges for DOE. In addition, DOE's efforts to increase small business prime contracting may cause its facility management contractors to reduce the amount of subcontracting that they direct to local and regional small businesses. DOE largely agreed with the information in this testimony. However, it disagreed with GAO's characterization of DOE's long-term small business prime contracting goal and its strategy to achieve it. GAO believes that both the longterm goal and DOE's strategy have been accurately described. |
gao_GAO-13-154 | gao_GAO-13-154_0 | Some Overlap and Duplication Exist in Inspections of Select Agent Laboratories
About 15 percent of the 374 entities that were registered to work with select agents between fiscal years 2009 and 2011 were subject to inspection overlap. Inspections conducted by DOT, however, were generally not duplicative of CDC and APHIS inspections because specific inspection activities tended to differ. DHS and DOD’s DAIG inspections tended to be more duplicative with those of CDC and APHIS, in that numerous activities were the same across these inspections, according to survey results. While Difficult to Quantify, Overlap Adds to the Cost of Inspections and Can Negatively Impact Laboratory Operations
The costs of overlapping federal inspections and effects on lab operations are difficult to quantify because (1) agencies and entities generally do not track the costs or effects of inspections and (2) some costs are not quantifiable. Although we could not quantify the portion of federal and entity costs directly attributable to overlap, we could quantify the costs of inspections in general. The approximate overall federal cost for fiscal year 2010 and 2011 inspections was over $2.1 million dollars. On average, the entity costs per inspection were nearly $15,000 and 380 hours in staff time, according to our survey. Entities also reported moderate to significant nonquantifiable costs of inspections when it comes to loss of productivity and delays in research. According to surveyed entities, overlapping inspections negatively affected lab productivity, staff morale, available time to complete research, and the research schedule. Because many of these entities are federal laboratories or are funded through federal grants, these quantifiable and nonquantifiable costs are passed on to the federal government. A Coordinated Approach with Consistently Applied Standards is Recommended by Earlier Reports and Surveyed Entities
Actions to reduce the costs and negative effects of overlapping and duplicative inspections include better coordination and greater consistency in the application of standards, according to various experts and surveyed entities. Well-trained inspectors, who are able to apply consistent standards, would reduce the negative effects of overlapping inspections. For example, according to DAIG officials, they have taken steps to address these issues in joint inspections with CDC and APHIS. Conclusions
Inspections are important for safety and compliance and can help improve laboratory procedures, infrastructure, and security. While one could argue that more-frequent inspections might be necessary to better ensure safety—in particular for larger entities—there is no apparent value-added when specific inspection activities are duplicative and occur, in some cases, before entities have had time to respond to findings from a previous inspection. Recommendations for Executive Action
In order to eliminate overlapping and potentially duplicative inspections, as well as reduce the burden of such overlap and duplication on select agent entities, we recommend that CDC and APHIS, as the primary agencies with regulatory authority, work with DHS and DOD to (1) coordinate inspections of select agent entities and (2) where possible, use mechanisms such as (a) joint inspections with a single report of findings, (b) acceptance of each other’s inspection results rather than independent inspections, and (c) cross-agency training opportunities to ensure consistent application of biosafety, biosecurity, and biocontainment inspection standards. DOT did not provide any comments. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To assess (1) the extent of overlap and potential duplication in federal agencies’ inspections of entities that work with select agents, (2) the costs of overlapping federal inspections and effects on laboratory operations, and (3) actions to reduce the costs and negative effects of overlapping inspections, we interviewed agency officials, reviewed pertinent legislation, regulations, and agency documents. Specifically, we spoke with officials from the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) Division of Select Agents and Toxins, the Department of Agriculture’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), the Department of Transportation’s (DOT) Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), the Department of Defense (DOD) military service Inspector General’s offices, including the Department of the Army Inspector General (DAIG), Navy Inspector General, and Air Force Inspector General offices. Is this correct? Actions to correct deficiencies 9k. Justification for additional resources to 9l. | Why GAO Did This Study
Between 2009 and 2011, there were roughly 374 entities across the United States conducting research with select agents such as anthrax, which have the potential to threaten health and safety. Inspections are one means of ensuring safety and compliance with regulations. However, several federal agencies--CDC, APHIS, DOT, DHS, and DOD--conduct such inspections, creating significant potential for overlap and duplication of effort. In this context, GAO was asked to assess (1) the extent of overlap and potential duplication in federal inspections of select agent entities, (2) the costs of such overlap and effects on laboratory operations, and (3) actions to reduce the costs and negative effects of any overlap. To answer these objectives, GAO analyzed agency data, surveyed entities, held focus groups with lab staff, and interviewed agency officials.
What GAO Found
About 15 percent of entities registered to work with select agents were subject to inspection overlap (multiple federal agencies inspecting within a 2-year period). Entities experiencing overlap tended to be larger ones, with more laboratories, principal investigators, and staff. Although there was overlap between Department of Transportation (DOT) inspections and those of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), they were generally not duplicative because specific inspection activities tended to differ, according to GAO's survey of entities experiencing overlap. For example, DOT inspections tended to focus on transportation issues, such as checking hazardous materials and transportation security plans, rather than general biosafety issues. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Department of Defense (DOD) inspections, however, tended to be more duplicative with those of CDC and APHIS. For example, both review the same documents, require safety and security demonstrations, conduct inventory inspections and personnel interviews, and provide corrective action plans. While inspections are important for safety and compliance, there is no value added when federal agencies are expending resources to conduct the same work and, in some cases, reinspecting before entities have had time to respond to findings from a previous inspection.
The costs of overlapping federal inspections and effects on lab operations are difficult to quantify because agencies and entities generally do not track them and some costs are not quantifiable. Although GAO could not quantify the portion of federal and entity costs directly attributable to overlap, it could quantify the costs of inspections in general. According to agency data, the approximate overall federal cost for fiscal years 2010 and 2011 inspections was $2.1 million dollars. On average, the entity costs per inspection were nearly $15,000, and staff time per inspection was 380 hours, according to the GAO survey. While surveyed entities reported that inspections can help correct deficiencies and improve accountability, most reported moderate to significant nonquantifiable costs of inspections due to loss of productivity and delays in research. In addition, according to surveyed entities, overlapping inspections negatively affected lab productivity, staff morale, available time to complete research, and the research schedule. Because many of these entities are federal laboratories or are funded through federal grants, these costs are passed on to the federal government.
Actions to reduce the costs of overlapping and duplicative inspections include better coordination among federal agencies and greater consistency in the application of standards, according to various experts and surveyed entities. CDC has taken actions to better coordinate inspections with other agencies, for example, by increasing the use of joint inspections. But such actions, including joint inspections, do not fully address the negative effects of multiple inspections if agencies apply inconsistent standards and develop separate reports of findings. Well-trained inspectors, who apply consistent standards, are also needed. Collectively, these actions would reduce the negative effects of overlap and duplication and could increase agencies' acceptance of each other's inspection results.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that CDC and APHIS work with DHS and DOD to coordinate inspections and ensure consistent application of inspection standards.
HHS, USDA, DHS, and DOD generally agreed with our recommendations and noted various actions they have already taken, or plan to take, to coordinate inspection efforts. |
gao_HEHS-98-2 | gao_HEHS-98-2_0 | In each county, beneficiaries are required to enroll in either the “local initiative”—a publicly sponsored health plan cooperatively developed by local government, clinics, hospitals, and other providers—or the commercial plan, under contract in a beneficiary’s county of residence.The local initiative concept was developed to support health care safety-nets—those providers, such as community health centers and federally qualified health centers, that provide health care services to the indigent. Beneficiaries are informed about the mandatory expansion program and their available choices primarily through an enrollment packet that they receive through the mail. Implementation of Expansion Program Is More Than 2 Years Behind Initial Schedule
Full implementation of Medi-Cal’s mandatory expansion program is more than 2 years behind its initial implementation schedule. However, repeated delays in the awarding of contracts and the development of plans made it clear that some counties would be ready for implementation before others. As of July 1997, plans in 7 of the 12 affected counties had been fully implemented, and full implementation in all counties was scheduled for the end of 1997 at the earliest. As of July 1997, over 1.1 million beneficiaries were enrolled in the 12-county expansion program. Education and Enrollment Problems Contributed to Low Beneficiary Choice Rate and Confusion
Despite California’s efforts to encourage beneficiaries to choose a health plan, many beneficiaries have been assigned to a plan by the state. There also have been problems with the HCO presentations. HCFA, advocates, and managed care plans have long called for increased outreach efforts—not only to beneficiaries, who can be difficult to reach, but to providers and others in the community as well. DHS has recently begun to explore additional ways to improve outreach and involve community-based organizations in HCO activities, such as participating in DHS-sponsored work groups. Weaknesses in State Management of the HCO Program Contributed to Implementation Difficulties
Over the past several years, California has been criticized for a number of weaknesses in the management of its Medi-Cal managed care program. HCFA is in the process of developing guidelines to assist states with designing and implementing an effective education and enrollment program, including contracting with enrollment brokers—an increasing trend. Safety-net providers—such as federally qualified health centers, and community and rural health centers—provide health care services to the medically indigent. Some providers have reported that they are having difficulty operating under the two-plan model, especially in maintaining their former patient base. According to DHS, it did not require plans to assign a specific number of beneficiaries to safety-net providers because federal law requires states to ensure that beneficiaries have a choice of providers. The state is now taking certain actions to improve the program, but many are too late to benefit those beneficiaries already enrolled in the seven counties where implementation has been completed. To identify the state’s efforts to educate Medi-Cal beneficiaries about managed care and enroll them into one of the state-contracted plans, and to evaluate its management of the education and enrollment process, we interviewed DHS and HCFA region IX officials and obtained and reviewed relevant state law, regulations, policies, and procedures; the state’s strategic plan for expanding its Medi-Cal managed care program; the state’s two-plan model waiver application submitted to HCFA; Health Care Options (HCO) program documents, including enrollment materials; minutes from DHS’ Policy and Transition Workgroup meetings; HCO’s problem log; enrollment broker contracts and the 1995 Request for Proposal; HCO management reports, including monthly enrollment summaries; and HCFA’s preimplementation reviews. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed California's Medicaid Program, Medi-Cal, focusing on: (1) the implementation status of California's managed care expansion, including identifying the primary causes of delays; (2) the degree to which state efforts to educate beneficiaries about their managed care options and enroll them in managed care have encouraged beneficiaries to choose a plan; (3) the management of the state's education and enrollment process for the new program, including state and federal oversight of enrollment brokers that the state contracted with to carry out these functions; and (4) the impact of the managed care expansion on current safety-net providers, such as community health centers, that serve low-income beneficiaries.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) despite California's extensive planning and managed care experience, implementation of its 12-county expansion program is more than 2 years behind its initial schedule and is still incomplete; (2) California originally had planned to implement the program simultaneously in all affected counties by March 1995; (3) however, as a number of unforeseen difficulties arose, the state began to stagger implementation as it became clear that some counties would be ready before others; (4) still, as of July 1997, the program had been fully implemented in only seven counties; (5) the most recent schedule estimated complete implementation in all 12 counties by December 1997, at the earliest; (6) the state's efforts to encourage beneficiaries to choose a health plan have been undermined by problems in the process for educating and enrolling beneficiaries; (7) according to the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA), beneficiary and provider advocates, and managed care plans, a number of problems contributed to confusion for many beneficiaries, including incorrect or unclear information about the mandatory Medi-Cal program and participating plans as well as erroneous assignments of beneficiaries to plans; (8) available data show that, on average, almost half of affected beneficiaries have not actively chosen their own plan but instead have been automatically assigned to one by the state; (9) other problems were evident in California's Department of Health Services' (DHS) management of the program, including insufficient performance standards for enrollment brokers and poor internal communication and weak ties with advocacy and community-based organizations; (10) California has taken a number of actions to improve the implementation and administration of its mandatory expansion program; (11) DHS also has taken steps to work more closely with community-based organizations to improve outreach efforts; (12) however, these actions were taken too late to benefit the many beneficiaries who have already enrolled in the seven counties where full program implementation has been completed; (13) HCFA is in the process of developing federal guidelines on designing and implementing an education and enrollment program; and (14) despite the fact that the state's 12-county expansion program was designed to help ensure that federally qualified health centers, community and rural health centers, and other safety-net providers participate in the provider networks, some safety-net providers have reported difficulty maintaining their patient base. |
gao_GAO-13-715 | gao_GAO-13-715_0 | In June 2012 we reported that in its fiscal year 2013 budget justification VA was not transparent about the agency’s fiscal year 2013 estimates for initiatives and ongoing health care services as well as VA’s estimate for initiatives in support of the fiscal year 2014 advance appropriations request. VA Expanded the Use of the EHCPM to Develop Its Health Care Budget Estimate and Changed How It Reported Information on Certain Administrative Costs
VA Expanded the Use of the EHCPM by Using a Blend of EHCPM Estimates of Care Provided and Current Spending Data for Most Long-Term Care Services
VA expanded the use of the EHCPM by using estimates of the amount of care provided—which is known as workload—from the EHCPM to estimate resources needed for 14 long-term care services for fiscal years 2014 and 2015. As a result of this blended approach, VA used the EHCPM, in part or in whole, to develop estimates for 74 health care services that accounted for more than 85 percent of VA’s budget estimate supporting the President’s fiscal year 2014 budget request for VA health care. 1.) However, VA did not consistently use the new “Administrative Personnel” label in its fiscal year 2014 budget justification. VA provided information on the types of personnel positions included in the total estimate for administrative personnel costs under the budget category label “Administrative Personnel,” but did not provide similar information for the estimates for each appropriations account labeled under “Administration.” By not providing information on the types of positions included in these estimates, VA was not transparent about how the information that was provided applied to the estimates of administrative personnel costs in each of the appropriations accounts. Further, VA did not provide complete information on the costs included in its estimates for “Administrative Personnel” and “Administrative Contract Services.” Regarding its estimate for “Administrative Personnel” VA did not disclose that this estimate reflected other costs in addition to those costs associated with administrative personnel. Increase in the Request Compared to the Earlier, Advance Appropriations Request Reflected Changes VA Made to Supporting Estimates
The President’s fiscal year 2014 budget request for VA health care services was $54.6 billion, about $158 million more than the earlier, advance appropriations request for the same year. Specifically, the President’s fiscal year 2014 request reflected an estimate of funding needed for initiatives that increased by $1.021 billion and an estimate for ongoing health care services that decreased by $519 million. This increase in the initiatives estimate was further offset by an estimate of $482 million in proposed savings from operational improvements and management initiatives, which resulted in a net increase in expected total obligations of $20 million. A decrease of $138 million in anticipated resources from collections and reimbursements with the increase in expected total obligations resulted in the net increase in the President’s request of $158 million. Increase in estimates of proposed savings from new acquisition savings and other initiatives. Steps Taken to Improve the Transparency, Consistency, and Reliability of Information and Estimates in VA’s Budget Justification
VA took steps to address, in varying degrees, five of the six problems we previously identified related to the reliability, transparency, and consistency of information in VA’s congressional budget justification. In its fiscal year 2014 budget justification, VA used the same label for mental health, inpatient, and other services across all three appropriations accounts, which it had not previously done. VA concurred with this recommendation. In response to our prior work, VA has taken steps to improve the consistency, reliability, and transparency of its estimates and information supporting the President’s budget request for VA health care. In particular, VA has taken steps to improve (1) the transparency of its estimates for initiatives in support of the advance appropriations request, (2) the consistency of its language used to label health care services, (3) the reliability of the estimates for other facility-related activities funded through the Medical Facilities account, (4) the reliability of its estimates for NRM, and (5) the reliability of proposed savings from operational improvements and management initiatives. While VA has addressed to varying degrees the problems we previously identified, it is important that VA ensure that the recommendations from our prior work regarding the information and estimates in VA’s budget justification are fully implemented. Until these recommendations are fully implemented, the problems we previously identified will continue to limit the usefulness of related information to Congress and other users of VA’s budget justification. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve the clarity and transparency of information in VA’s congressional budget justifications that support the President’s budget request for VA health care, we recommend the Secretary of Veterans Affairs take the following two actions: use consistent terminology to label estimates of administrative personnel costs and provide consistent and comprehensive information explaining the costs included in each budget category for administrative costs. Veterans’ Health Care Budget Estimate: Changes Were Made in Developing the President’s Budget Request for Fiscal Years 2012 and 2013. Veterans’ Health Care: VA Uses a Projection Model to Develop Most of Its Health Care Budget Estimate to Inform the President’s Budget Request. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Veterans Health Care Budget Reform and Transparency Act of 2009 requires GAO to report on the Presidents annual budget request to Congress for VA health care services. GAOs previous work has focused on issues related to the consistency, transparency, and reliability of information in VAs congressional budget justifications.
Building on GAOs past work and in light of the Presidents most recent request for VA health care, this report examines (1) changes in how VA used the EHCPM to develop VAs budget estimate supporting the Presidents budget request for fiscal year 2014 and changes in how VA reported information related to this estimate in its budget justification; (2) key changes to the Presidents fiscal year 2014 budget request compared to the advance appropriations request for the same year; and (3) the extent to which VA has addressed problems previously identified by GAO related to information in VAs congressional budget justifications. GAO reviewed the Presidents fiscal year 2014 budget request, VAs fiscal year 2014 budget justification, and VA data. GAO interviewed VA officials and staff from the Office of Management and Budget.
What GAO Found
The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) expanded the use of the Enrollee Health Care Projection Model (EHCPM) in developing the agencys health care budget estimate that supported the Presidents fiscal year 2014 budget request. VA expanded the use of the EHCPM by using, for the first time, the models estimate for the amount of care providedworkloadto develop estimates of the resources needed for 14 long-term care services. However, VA continued to use the most current expenditure data rather than EHCPM estimates for projecting needed resources for these services due to concerns about the reliability of the EHCPM expenditure data. Using this new blended approach, VA used the EHCPM in whole or in part, to develop estimates for 74 health care services that accounted for more than 85 percent of VAs health care budget estimate. Additionally, VA used a new budget category label for its estimate of certain administrative personnel costs, Administrative Personnel, and identified the types of positions this estimate included. However, VA did not consistently use the new label across its three health care appropriations accounts. Instead, VA used Administration and provided no information clarifying the costs included in the estimates. Further, VA did not disclose all the costs included under Administrative Personnel, nor did VA identify the costs included in one other category containing administrative costs, Administrative Contract Services. The lack of transparency regarding administrative costs and inconsistent labeling resulted in Congress and other users of VAs budget justification not having clear and complete information regarding the agencys estimates for such costs.
The Presidents fiscal year 2014 budget request for VA health care services was about $158 million more than the earlier, advance appropriations request for the same year. The estimate for initiatives increased by $1.021 billion and the estimate for ongoing health care services decreased by $519 million. The increase in the initiatives estimate was further offset by $482 million in estimated savings from new acquisition savings and other initiatives, which resulted in a net increase of $20 million. This increase, along with a decrease of $138 million in anticipated resources from collections and reimbursements, resulted in the net increase of $158 million in the Presidents fiscal year 2014 request.
VA has taken steps to address, in varying degrees, five of the six problems GAO previously identified related to information in VAs budget justification. Specifically, VA has taken steps to improve (1) the transparency of its estimates for initiatives in support of the advance appropriations request, (2) the consistency of the language used to label health care services across its three health care appropriations accounts, (3) the reliability of its estimates for certain facility-related activities, (4) the reliability of its estimate for facility maintenance and improvement, and (5) the reliability of its estimates for proposed savings. However, VA did not address (6) the transparency of its estimates for initiatives and ongoing health care services. While VA improved aspects of the information in its fiscal year 2014 budget justification, it is important that VA ensure that the six recommendations from GAOs prior work regarding such information are fully implemented. Until these recommendations are fully implemented, the problems GAO previously identified will continue to limit for Congress and others the usefulness of information related to the estimates that support the Presidents budget request for VA health care.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that VA (1) use consistent terminology to label estimates for administrative personnel costs and (2) provide consistent and comprehensive information explaining the costs in each budget category for administrative costs. VA generally agreed with GAOs conclusions and concurred with GAOs recommendations. |
gao_GAO-15-95 | gao_GAO-15-95_0 | DHS Components Averaged $434 Million Annually in AUO Payments from Fiscal Years 2008 through 2013, Mostly for Border Patrol Agents
DHS components paid an average of $434 million in AUO per year from fiscal years 2008 through 2013—the last full year of available data.Across DHS, annual AUO expenditures increased from $307 million in fiscal year 2008 to $512 million in fiscal year 2013, or an increase of approximately $205 million. Overall, from fiscal year 2008 through fiscal year 2013, the average annual AUO payment per employee increased by about 31 percent, or from about $13,000 in fiscal year 2008 to about $17,000 in fiscal year 2013, as shown in figure 4. Specifically, some DHS component-level policies are not consistent with certain provisions of federal regulations or guidance. In addition, components have not regularly followed their AUO policies and procedures, contributing to significant and widespread AUO administration and oversight deficiencies across the department. DHS components’ AUO policies and procedures reflect inconsistent approaches to implementing and applying federal AUO regulations and guidance. DHS issued two memorandums, one calling for components to suspend AUO for certain employees and one requiring components using AUO to develop and submit corrective action plans to improve AUO administration. Developing and executing a department-wide oversight mechanism to ensure components implement AUO appropriately on a sustained basis, and in accordance with law and regulation, could better position DHS to monitor components’ progress remediating AUO deficiencies. The flexibility of AUO, however, requires the department and components to provide rigorous oversight of the use of AUO—including careful and consistent review of hours claimed and employee eligibility, among other things, so that AUO is appropriately used. In addition, by DHS reporting annually to Congress on the extent to which DHS components have made progress in remediating AUO implementation deficiencies, including information from annual third- party AUO audits or other department AUO oversight efforts, Congress could have reasonable assurance that DHS components have sustained effective and appropriate use of AUO in accordance with law and regulation. Matter for Congressional Consideration
To ensure that DHS components have sustained effective and appropriate use of AUO in accordance with law and regulation, Congress should consider requiring DHS to report annually to Congress on the use of AUO within the department, including the extent to which DHS components have made progress remediating AUO implementation deficiencies and information from annual third-party AUO audits or other department AUO oversight efforts. Recommendation for Executive Action
To better position DHS to monitor components’ progress remediating AUO deficiencies, we recommend that the Secretary of DHS develop and execute a department-wide oversight mechanism to ensure components implement AUO appropriately on a sustained basis, and in accordance with law and regulation. How much has the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) spent on administratively uncontrollable overtime (AUO) pay from fiscal year 2008 through March 2014? To what extent have DHS components implemented AUO appropriately? Specifically, these components included U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), National Protection and Program Directorate (NPPD), U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), U.S. Secret Service (USSS), and the Office of the Chief Security Officer (OCSO). | Why GAO Did This Study
DHS had approximately 29,000 employees earning AUO, a type of premium pay intended to compensate eligible employees for substantial amounts of irregular, unscheduled overtime. DHS components' use of AUO has been a long-standing issue since at least 2007, when reviews identified the inappropriate use of AUO in DHS. GAO was asked to review DHS components' use and implementation of AUO.
This report addresses, among other things, how much DHS spent on AUO from fiscal year 2008 through March 2014 (the most current data available) and the extent to which DHS components implemented AUO appropriately. GAO analyzed AUO payments data from components that have regularly used AUO, which included U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Secret Service, National Protection and Programs Directorate, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, and Office of the Chief Security Officer. When calculating annual averages, GAO used the last full fiscal year of available data (2013). GAO also analyzed component AUO policies and procedures to assess compliance with federal regulations and guidance.
What GAO Found
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) components spent $512 million on administratively uncontrollable overtime (AUO) payments in fiscal year 2013 and $255 million through March 2014, mostly on Border Patrol agents. DHS's AUO expenditures increased from fiscal years 2008 through 2013, in part because of higher payments per earner. The average annual AUO payment per employee increased by about 31 percent, or from about $13,000 to about $17,000 from fiscal years 2008 through 2013, as shown in the figure below.
Some DHS component policies are not consistent with certain provisions of federal regulations or guidance, and components have not regularly followed their respective AUO policies and procedures, contributing to widespread AUO administration and oversight deficiencies. For example, components have not consistently reviewed hours claimed and employee eligibility for AUO. In response, in 2014, DHS issued two memorandums. One required the suspension of AUO for certain employees. The other required components to submit plans to address deficiencies, which most DHS components have done. DHS also plans to issue a department-wide AUO directive and to monitor component implementation of corrective actions through its ongoing human resource office assessments every 3 to 4 years, among other things. However, this monitoring is too general and infrequent to effectively monitor or evaluate DHS components' progress. Given the department's long-standing and widespread AUO administration and oversight deficiencies, developing and executing a department-wide oversight mechanism to ensure components implement AUO appropriately on a sustained basis, and in accordance with law and regulation, could better position DHS to monitor components' progress remediating AUO deficiencies. Further, DHS's reporting annually to Congress on the extent to which DHS components have made progress in remediating AUO implementation deficiencies could provide Congress with reasonable assurance that DHS components have sustained effective and appropriate use of AUO in accordance with law and regulation.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DHS develop and execute a department-wide mechanism to ensure components implement AUO appropriately. Congress should consider requiring DHS to report annually on components' progress remediating AUO implementation deficiencies. DHS concurred with the recommendation. |
gao_GAO-01-197 | gao_GAO-01-197_0 | Conclusions
Developing reasonable estimates of subsidy costs for loan programs is a complex task. Numerous assumptions must be taken into account and projections must be made for the estimated life of the loans, which could be up to 30 years. Because FDLP’s subsidy costs are determined largely by interest rates—specifically the difference, or spread, between the borrower and discount rates—and since interest rate fluctuations cannot be predicted with any certainty, it is uncertain that the current trend in negative subsidy costs for FDLP will continue. That being said, there are also other factors that affect the subsidy cost of FDLP, such as origination fees paid by borrowers, defaults, subsequent collections on defaulted loans, and the timing of loan repayments. While Education is able to estimate origination fees close to the actual amounts in the financial systems, the other key cash flows varied significantly. Additionally, Education’s current model for estimating FDLP subsidy costs does not directly take into account certain key factors, such as prepayments and consolidations. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report responds to your request and that of the former Chairman of the House Committee on the Budget that we prepare a report on the financing of Education's William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program (FDLP). | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Education runs two major federal student loan programs, the William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program (FDLP) and the Federal Family Education Loan Program (FFELP). Under FDLP, students or their parents borrow money directly from the federal government through the schools the students attend. Under FFELP, money is borrowed from private lenders, and the federal government guarantees repayment if the borrowers default. GAO investigated concerns about Education's reliance on estimates to project FDLP costs and a lack of historical information on which to base those estimates.
What GAO Found
GAO found that developing a reasonable estimate of subsidy cost for loan programs is complex. Many assumptions must be taken into account and projections must be made for the life of the loans. Because FDLP's subsidy costs are determined largely by interest rates and interest rate fluctuations cannot be predicted with any certainty, it is unclear whether the current trend in negative subsidy costs for FDLP will continue. In addition, other factors, such as origination fees paid by borrowers, defaults, subsequent collections on defaulted loans and timing of loan repayments, affect the subsidy cost of FDLP. Although Education is able to estimate origination fees close to the actual amounts in the financial system, other key cash flows varied significantly. Also, Education's current model for estimating FDLP subsidy costs does not directly take into account key factors, such as prepayments and consolidations. |
gao_T-NSIAD-96-117 | gao_T-NSIAD-96-117_0 | Specifically, it recommended (1) moving allowable costs out of fee and reducing fee accordingly, and (2) establishing consistent policies on ordinary and necessary costs to be funded through fee. Even though DOD states that it is important to ensure that tasks assigned to the FFRDC meet the core work criteria, we believe it will continue to be difficult to determine whether a task meets these criteria. FFRDC mission statements remain broad, and core competencies appear to differ little from the previous scope of work descriptions. Currently, six of the eight parent organizations that operate FFRDCs also operate one or more non-FFRDC affiliates. DOD’s action plan also recommended the establishment of an independent advisory committee to review and advise on FFRDC management. In late 1995, an independent advisory committee was established. The committee is responsible for reviewing and advising DOD on the management of its FFRDCs by providing guidelines on the appropriate scope of work, customers, organizational structure, and size of the FFRDCs; overseeing compliance with DOD’s FFRDC Management Plan; reviewing sponsor’s management of FFRDCs; reviewing the level and appropriateness of non-DOD and nonsponsor work performed by the FFRDCs; overseeing the comprehensive review process; and performing selected FFRDC program reviews. Comprehensive Review of the Department of Defense’s Fee-Granting Process for Federally Funded Research and Development Centers, Director for Defense Research and Engineering, May 1, 1995. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the Department of Defense's (DOD) efforts to improve the management of its federally funded research and development centers (FFRDC), focusing on the: (1) guidelines to ensure that management fees paid to FFRDC are justified; (2) core work appropriate for FFRDC; (3) criteria for the acceptance of work outside of the core by FFRDC parent corporations; and (4) establishment of an independent advisory committee to review DOD management, use, and oversight of FFRDC.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the DOD action plan recommended that management fees be revised to move allowable costs out of fee, reduce fees, and establish policies on ordinary and necessary costs; (2) it is difficult to determine whether tasks assigned to FFRDC meet core work criteria because the mission statements are broad and the core competencies offer little deviation from previous work descriptions; (3) six of the eight parent organizations that operate FFRDC also operate one or more non-FFRDC affiliates; and (4) DOD established an independent advisory committee to review FFRDC work, customers, and organizational structure and size, oversee FFRDC compliance with the DOD FFRDC management plan, review sponsor's management of FFRDC, determine the level and appropriateness of non-DOD and non-sponsor work performed by FFRDC, monitor the comprehensive review process, and perform selected FFRDC program reviews. |
gao_GAO-11-581 | gao_GAO-11-581_0 | According to recognized industry standards, IV&V can provide management with an objective assessment of a program’s processes, products, and risks throughout its life cycle and help ensure conformance to program performance, schedule, and budget targets. Specifically, the department does not establish risk-based decision making criteria in its Acquisition Guidebook for determining whether, or the extent to which, IT programs should use it and does not require that programs conduct assessments against such criteria. DHS acquisition policy does not address the independence of agents. DHS policy does not address IV&V management or the need to effectively oversee the department’s investment in this practice. Thus, department officials were unaware whether or the extent to which IV&V was being used by the largest IT acquisition programs. Furthermore, in the absence of a clearly articulated risk-based decision framework for undertaking IV&V, applying its results, and evaluating its effectiveness, DHS’s investments in IV&V efforts are unlikely to provide optimal value for the department and, in some cases, may even fail to deliver any significant benefits. DHS Reports Widespread Use of IV&V, but Implementation of Key Elements Is Limited
Many large IT acquisitions from across DHS report using IV&V as part of their acquisition and/or development process. For example, none of the eight used a structured, risk-based decision making process when deciding if, when, and how to use IV&V. In part, these weaknesses can be attributed to the lack of clear departmentwide policy requiring the application of such elements. However, only one fully defined them. Three programs did not specify the resources required for their efforts. To realize IV&V’s promise as a tool for reducing the risks inherent in developing IT systems, DHS needs to promote a common understanding of effective IV&V across the department, and through its oversight activities, ensure that component agencies and their large IT programs conduct efforts that consistently contribute toward meeting IT acquisition cost, schedule, and mission goals. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help guide consistent and effective execution of IV&V at DHS, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the department CIO and CPO to take the following three actions: Revise DHS acquisition policy such that it establishes risk-based criteria for (1) determining which major and other high- risk IT acquisition programs should conduct IV&V and (2) selecting appropriate activities for independent review of these programs; requirements for technical, financial, and managerial independence of agents; standards and guidance for defining and documenting plans and products; controls for planning, managing, and overseeing efforts; mechanisms to ensure that plans and significant findings inform DHS acquisition program reviews and decisions, including those of the ARB; and mechanisms to monitor and ensure implementation of this policy on applicable new IT acquisition programs. Collect and analyze data on IV&V efforts for major IT acquisition programs to facilitate the development of lessons learned and evaluation of the effectiveness of DHS’s investments, and establish a process that uses the results to inform the department’s IT investment decisions. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine (1) how the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) independent verification and validation (IV&V) policies and procedures for information technology (IT) acquisitions compare with leading practices and (2) the extent to which DHS has implemented IV&V on its large IT system acquisitions. Not met. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since its creation in 2003, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has been developing new information technology (IT) systems to perform both mission-critical and support functions; however, it has faced challenges in developing these systems. One way to manage the inherent risks of developing and acquiring systems is through independent verification and validation (IV&V)--a process conducted by a party independent of the development effort that provides an objective assessment of a project's processes, products, and risks throughout its life cycle and helps ensure that program performance, schedule, and budget targets are met. GAO was asked to determine (1) how DHS's IV&V policies and procedures for IT acquisitions compare with leading practices and (2) the extent to which DHS has implemented IV&V on its large IT system acquisitions. To do so, GAO assessed DHS's policy against industry standards and leading practice guides, as well as analyzed how eight selected IT programs had implemented IV&V.
What GAO Found
DHS recognizes the importance of IV&V and recommends its use on major IT programs. Nevertheless, its acquisition policy does not address the elements of leading practices for IV&V. Specifically, the department has not established risk-based decision making criteria for determining whether, or the extent to which, programs should utilize IV&V. In addition, department policy does not define the degree of independence required of agents and does not require that programs determine and document the planned scope of their efforts, including the program activities subject to review; the resources required; roles and responsibilities; and how the results will be reported and acted upon. Moreover, the policy does not address overseeing DHS's investment in IV&V. Thus, officials were unaware of the extent to which it was being used on major IT acquisition programs, associated expenditures, or if those expenditures are producing satisfactory results. Absent such policy elements and more effective oversight, the department's investments in IV&V efforts are unlikely to provide optimal value for the department and, in some cases, may even fail to deliver any significant benefits. Many large IT acquisition programs across DHS reported using IV&V as part of their acquisition and/or development processes. Nevertheless, the eight major IT acquisition programs that GAO analyzed did not consistently implement the elements of leading practice. For example, the eight did not fully apply a structured, risk-based decision making process when deciding if, when, and how to utilize IV&V. In part, these weaknesses are due to the lack of clear departmentwide guidance regarding the use of such practices. As a result, the department's IV&V efforts may not consistently contribute toward meeting IT acquisition cost, schedule, and mission goals.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DHS (1) update its acquisition policy to reflect elements of effective IV&V, (2) monitor and ensure implementation of this policy on applicable new and ongoing IT programs, and (3) collect data on IV&V usage and use it to evaluate the effectiveness of these investments. DHS concurred with GAO's recommendations and described actions planned or under way to address them. |
gao_GAO-02-493 | gao_GAO-02-493_0 | Background
FOIA established a legal right of access to government records and information, on the basis of the principles of openness and accountability in government. The e-FOIA amendments also made changes to agency reporting requirements. Governmentwide, however, agency backlogs of pending requests are substantial, and growing, indicating that agencies are falling behind in processing requests. We were unable to identify any clear trends in request-processing times because of year-to-year changes in agency reporting. VA received the largest number of requests for fiscal years 1998, 1999, 2000, and 2001. Progress in On-Line Availability Is Continuing, but Additional Agency Attention Is Needed
Agencies have made progress in on-line availability of the materials required by e-FOIA as well as in using the Web to make materials publicly available and in incorporating Web site features that facilitate public access to government information. Justice Has Taken Action on Our Recommendations
To improve the public’s access to government records and information, our March 2001 report included recommendations that the Attorney General direct Justice’s Office of Information and Privacy (OIP) to improve the reliability of agencies’ data in their FOIA annual reports by providing guidance that addresses data quality issues and by reviewing agencies’ annual report data for completeness and consistency and encourage agencies to make all required materials available electronically. Justice Continues to Encourage Agencies to Improve Data Quality
In August 2001, OIP issued supplemental guidance, via FOIA Post, on how to prepare annual agency FOIA reports. OIP officials told us that Justice is continuing, through training and on-line publications, to reinforce the need for full e-FOIA compliance by agencies and facilitate sharing of best practices among agencies. Justice’s efforts to implement our previous recommendations have resulted in improvements to both the quality of agencies’ annual reports and on-line availability of information. However, data anomalies remain and not all required information is easily and continuously available. On August 2, 2002, a codirector of the Department of Justice’s OIP provided us with oral comments on the draft, stating that the department generally agreed with the report’s findings and conclusions. | Why GAO Did This Study
The 1966 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) established the public's right of access to government information, on the basis of openness and accountability. The 1996 Electronic Freedom of Information Act (e-FOIA) Amendments extended these principles to include electronic access to information. Under the act, the Department of Justice provides implementing guidance to agencies. In addition, agencies report annually to Justice on their FOIA operations. GAO was asked to determine, among other things, (1) agencies' progress in improving their timeliness in responding to requests for information and (2) the actions Justice has taken on previous GAO recommendations ( GAO-01-378 , Mar. 16, 2001) to improve data quality in annual reports and on-line availability of government information.
What GAO Found
Changes in agency reporting conventions--made to improve accuracy and consistency--make it difficult to identify clear trends in timeliness for fiscal years 1999 through 2001. However, while the number of requests received appears to be leveling off, backlogs of pending requests governmentwide are substantial and growing, indicating that agencies are falling behind in processing requests. In response to our previous recommendation on data quality--including consistency and accuracy of reporting--Justice issued supplemental guidance, augmented its training programs, and continued reviewing agency annual reports. Data quality improved, but numerous anomalies remained in agencies' fiscal year 2001 reports. Justice's efforts to implement this recommendation are continuing. Justice also issued guidance encouraging better on-line availability of information, as GAO recommended. Although agencies have progressed in making information available electronically, not all materials required by e-FOIA were available on line as of May/June 2002. Further, certain information was difficult to find and was not always continuously available on Web sites. Justice officials stated that they are continuing to reinforce the need for full e-FOIA compliance and periodic agency review of Web site content, and to facilitate the sharing of best practices. Justice generally agreed with the report's findings and conclusions. |
gao_NSIAD-98-181 | gao_NSIAD-98-181_0 | The performance plan should describe (1) annual performance goals and measures, (2) the strategies and resources to achieve those goals, and (3) procedures to verify and validate reported performance. While the plan reflects the mission statement and strategic goals in NASA’s strategic plan and provides clear links between strategic goals and the annual performance goals and measures, it does not clearly associate the plan’s performance goals and measures with program activities in the budget. In order to provide a more comprehensive understanding of the importance of the goals and performance measures chosen for its crosscutting processes, it would have been helpful for the plan to acknowledge the agency’s major management challenges and associated corrective actions. NASA’s performance plan contains a table that allocates NASA’s $13.5 billion fiscal year 1999 budget request among its four enterprises and several other consolidated budget accounts. NASA’s Performance Plan Does Not Fully Discuss How the Agency’s Strategies and Resources Will Help Achieve Its Goals
The performance plan does not fully discuss how the agency’s strategies and resources will help achieve its goals. Connecting Resources to Strategies
NASA’s performance plan partially discusses the resources it will use to achieve the performance goals. Internal assessments will be conducted by agency management councils throughout the year and semi-annually by the Senior Management Council. Even though the areas we identified in our report as lacking specificity may be addressed in NASA’s strategic plan, budget justification and other documents, we maintain that the performance plan could be more useful by better linking performance goals and measures to program activities in the budget; more fully explaining procedures for verifying and validating performance data and recognizing the limitations that affect the credibility of data that will be used to measure performance; and by acknowledging major management challenges and associated corrective actions. Including these areas in the plan would provide a more comprehensive understanding of the importance of NASA’s goals and performance measures, making it more useful for purposes of the Results Act. Comments From the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
The following are GAO’s comments on NASA’s letter dated April 24, 1998. In discussing the strengths of NASA’s performance plan, our report recognizes that the plan provided good linkage between strategic goals and the goals in the performance plan and that performance measures were generally objective, quantifiable, and useful for assessing progress. However, our report also clearly states that NASA’s plan could provide a clearer picture of intended performance across the agency and does not fully portray how NASA’s strategies and resources will help it achieve the plan’s performance goals. 2. 3. 6. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) performance plan for fiscal year (FY) 1999, focusing on: (1) NASA's goals and objectives, including how the agency plans to measure its progress toward achieving these goals and objectives; (2) the agency's strategies and resources needed to achieve its goals; and (3) the availability and reliability of data necessary to achieve progress.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) NASA's FY 1999 performance plan could provide a clearer picture of intended performance across the agency, does not fully portray how NASA's strategies and resources will help it achieve the plan's performance goals, and partially provides confidence that the information NASA will use to assess performance will be accurate, complete, and credible; (2) among its strengths, NASA's performance plan reflects the mission statement and goals in its strategic plan and provides good linkage between these strategic goals and the plan's performance goals and targets; (3) it incorporates performance measures that are generally objective, quantifiable, and useful for assessing progress toward the plan's performance objectives; and provides for annual external assessments by its Advisory Council and semi-annual internal assessments by its Senior Management Council to validate progress toward meeting the agency's goals and objectives; (4) to make the plan more useful for purposes of the Government Performance and Results Act, NASA's performance plan should: (a) better link performance goals and measures to the program activities in NASA's budget; (b) more fully explain NASA's procedures for verifying and validating performance data by recognizing the limitations that affect the credibility of data that will be used to measure performance; and (c) acknowledge NASA's major management challenges and associated corrective actions in order to provide a more comprehensive understanding of the importance of the goals and performance measures chosen for its internal crosscutting processes; (5) some of the concerns GAO has regarding NASA's performance plan are similar to its observations on NASA's strategic plan issued on September 30, 1997; and (6) for example, NASA's strategic plan did not contain evidence that NASA had coordinated the plan with those agencies whose programs and activities complement NASA's and did not discuss the human, capital, and information resources needed to achieve the goals and objectives in the plan. |
gao_RCED-00-98 | gao_RCED-00-98_0 | In 1990, the Airport Noise and Capacity Act required civil subsonic turbojet aircraft weighing more than 75,000 pounds to comply with stage 3 noise standards by December 31, 1999, or be retired from service. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The Subcommittee on Aviation, House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, and several Members of the House of Representatives asked us to address four sets of questions about federal programs for airport development and the alleviation of airport-related noise:
What kinds of projects that reduce airport-related noise or mitigate its effects are eligible for federally authorized funding, how do FAA’s selection criteria affect which projects are funded, and to what types of projects have the funds been historically distributed? What aircraft noise standards apply to civil subsonic turbojets, and why are some civil subsonic jets not required to comply with these and earlier noise standards? To address the first set of questions—on the eligibility of noise-related projects for federally authorized funding—we (1) reviewed the statutory provisions and FAA’s regulations, policies, and procedures for funding projects under the AIP and the PFC program to identify project eligibility; (2) reviewed the statutory requirements for airport-related noise compatibility programs, as well as FAA’s regulations and processes for implementing those requirements; (3) obtained FAA’s data on federal grants awarded for noise-related projects and passenger facility charges approved for noise-related projects to identify the types of projects and the total project funding by fiscal year for each type of noise-related project. Unlike most projects funded with AIP grants set aside for noise-related projects, however, PFC projects do not have to be part of an FAA-approved noise compatibility program. Land Acquisition and Soundproofing Projects Receive the Majority of AIP and PFC Noise-Related Funding
More than 75 percent of all AIP funds and over 50 percent of all PFC funds spent on noise reduction or mitigation have been used to acquire land and to soundproof buildings. Required by law to select a single method for measuring the impact of airport-related noise on communities, FAA chose a method that measures community exposure levels and that gives greater weight to the impact of flights occurring during the nighttime. Principal methods for measuring cumulative average noise levels identify geographic areas exposed to the same noise levels but apply different weights to flights occurring during different times of the day. This effectively adds 10 decibels to the noise produced by each takeoff or landing that occurs during those nighttime hours. The second and third methods are considered to have only small differences. Those standards are generally based on an aircraft’s weight and the number of engines and generally allow heavier aircraft to generate more noise than lighter aircraft. Looking to the future, FAA has announced five short-term actions under its Land Use Planning Initiative, which it launched to help prevent incompatible land uses. Reviewing the comments provided by the aviation sector and the general public, we identified four principal areas of concern associated with the initiative. They believe the draft report (1) did not fully recognize, in its discussion of the potential impact of growth in air traffic, the significant progress that the Congress, FAA, airports, and the airlines have made in reducing the number of people exposed to noise from aircraft, nor did it recognize that aircraft used to achieve additional growth may be quieter; (2) did not fully reflect the role of international agreements and obligations related to noise control; (3) was overly broad in its discussion of flight procedures for abating noise when explaining why FAA did not require aircraft weighing 75,000 pounds or less to be retired if they did not meet stage 2 standards; (4) included only two aircraft in the airport model, one of which is no longer being produced, and did not address current production aircraft; and (5) did not fully reflect the relationship and potential trade-offs between noise stringency standards and aircraft emissions. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on airport-related noise, focusing on the: (1) types of projects that are eligible for federally authorized funding to reduce airport-related noise or mitigate its effects; (2) differences in the major methods for measuring the impact of airport-related noise; (3) Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) noise standards for civil subsonic turbojets and the reasons some of those aircraft are not required to comply with these or earlier standards; and (4) status of FAA's Land Use Planning Initiative and the major issues the initiative has raised about how best to address airport-related noise.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) most projects that reduce airport-related noise or mitigate its impact are eligible for federally authorized funding; (2) to be considered for funding under the Airport Improvement Program (AIP), a project must be part of a FAA-approved noise compatibility program; (3) in selecting which noise-related projects to fund, FAA gives priority to projects affecting communities exposed to noise levels of 65 decibels or higher, as determined by FAA's chosen measurement method; (4) in contrast to projects funded by AIP, projects funded by the Passenger Facility Charge program do not have to be part of a noise compatibility program; (5) since the programs began, 75 percent of the grants and over 50 percent of the passenger fees approved for noise-related projects have been used to acquire land and soundproof homes and other buildings; (6) the three principal methods for measuring community exposure are mathematical calculations that differ in the impact each places on noise from flights that occur during different times of the day: (a) one method treats the impact of all flights equally whenever they occur; (b) the second method differs from the first by assigning greater impact to the noise from each flight that occurs during the nighttime than to flights that occur during other times; and (c) the third method assigns additional impact to evening flights as well as nighttime flights; (7) noise standards for regulating aircraft noise from civil subsonic turbojets are generally based on an aircraft's weight and number of engines; (8) the heavier the aircraft and the greater the number of engines, the more noise the aircraft is allowed to generate and still comply with the required noise limits; (9) the newest set of standards--stage 3 standards--apply to all aircraft weighing more than 75,000 pounds and to newly manufactured aircraft weighing 75,000 pounds or less; (10) these lighter aircraft did not have to be retired under earlier noise standards because FAA concluded that it was questionable whether the technology existed to modify those aircraft in a cost-effective manner; (11) under its Initiative, FAA announced five short-term actions in May 1999 designed primarily to provide information that state and local governments can use to improve the compatibility of land uses near airports; and (12) based on comments provided by the aviation sector and the general public, there are four principal areas of concern associated with the Initiative. |
gao_GAO-02-739T | gao_GAO-02-739T_0 | The Workforce Investment Act was passed in 1998 and fundamentally changed the nature of federally funded employment and training services. Increases in coordination between the TANF programs and one-stop centers were also seen in the use of the one-stop system to provide services to TANF clients. WIA funds may not be readily used to serve TANF clients in the one-stops because WIA’s performance measurement system discourages serving those clients who may not be successful. In addition, when TANF clients need training to achieve self-sufficiency, the amount of training available under WIA is generally less than what was historically provided under JTPA. Some Local Areas Have Found Innovative Ways to Coordinate Services Through the One-Stop Centers
Despite these challenges, states and localities are designing and developing coordinated service delivery approaches at the one-stop centers, finding strategies to serve TANF clients and other job seekers by focusing their efforts on resolving some of the longstanding issues inherent in a fragmented system. | Why GAO Did This Study
A central focus of welfare reform has been to help needy adults with children find and keep jobs. The Workforce Investment Act of 1998 (WIA) unifies a fragmented employment and training system. Despite its similar fundamental focus, the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program was not required to participate in the one-stop system, although many states are coordinating their TANF services through one-stop centers.
What GAO Found
GAO found that coordination between TANF programs and WIA's one-stop centers has risen since WIA was first implemented in the spring of 2000. WIA funds may not be readily used to serve TANF clients in the one-stops because WIA's performance measures may be discourage serving clients who may not be successful. Moreover, when TANF clients need training to achieve self sufficiency, WIA funds may be unavailable because the amount of training provided under WIA has been reduced. Some local areas have found innovative ways to provide TANF services in the one-stops, often focusing on resolving the issues that had plagued the fragmented employee training system. |
gao_GAO-12-849 | gao_GAO-12-849_0 | They may retain these loans in their portfolios or sell them to the enterprises or other secondary market investors. Serious delinquency rates for the enterprises’ multifamily loans were generally less than 1 percent from 1994 through 2011, but the unpaid principal balance on seriously delinquent loans rose considerably starting in 2008. Fannie Mae Retained a Lower Percentage of Multifamily Loans Than Freddie Mac
From 1994 through 2011, Fannie Mae retained a lower percentage of its annual multifamily loan purchases in portfolio at acquisition than Freddie Mac (see fig. The enterprises met their affordable housing goals in most years, with multifamily activities greatly contributing to their fulfillment. Their share of the multifamily market increased to 86 percent in 2009, but decreased to about 57 percent in 2011 as other participants reentered the market. The Safety and Soundness Act required the enterprises to meet annual numeric goals for the purchase of mortgages serving targeted groups. On July 30, 2008, HERA transferred the housing goal oversight function to FHFA.HERA, requires FHFA to consider the following when setting multifamily goals: national multifamily mortgage credit needs and the ability of the enterprises in making mortgage credit available to provide additional liquidity and stability for the multifamily mortgage market; the performance and effort of the enterprises in making mortgage credit available for multifamily housing in previous years; the size of the multifamily mortgage market for housing affordable to low-income and very low-income The Safety and Soundness Act, as amended by families; the ability of the enterprises to lead the market in making multifamily mortgage credit available; the availability of public subsidies; and the need to maintain the sound financial conditions of the enterprises. performance that include loan-level data, as well as an annual report at the end of each year. For example, in 2008 the enterprises’ multifamily business, which represented 4.5 percent of the enterprises’ total unpaid principal balance financed, accounted for 32 percent of the units that met the low- and moderate-income goal, 27 percent of the units that met the underserved areas goal, and 39 percent of the units that met the special affordable goal (see table 5). For example, they found deficiencies in Fannie Mae’s delegated underwriting and servicing program, its risk-management reorganization, and information systems; and Freddie Mac’s management of its lower-performing assets. Both enterprises are taking steps to address these deficiencies. The enterprises also performed better than commercial banks and thrifts insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). Regulators Have Identified a Number of Deficiencies in Multifamily Credit Risk Management
From 2006 through 2011, FHFA and its predecessor, OFHEO, identified deficiencies in management of credit risk at the enterprises. FHFA, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac provided technical comments, which we incorporated into the report where appropriate. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine (1) how Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s (the enterprises) multifamily loan activities, products, and loan performance have changed over time; (2) the enterprises’ role in the multifamily housing financing marketplace and the extent to which they have met their affordable housing goals; and (3) how the enterprises’ credit standards and delinquency rates compare with those of other mortgage capital sources and how they have managed credit risk associated with their multifamily housing activities. To describe how the enterprises’ multifamily loan activities, products, and performance have changed, we analyzed loan-level data from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac for 1994 (the earliest year for which data were available) through 2011. | Why GAO Did This Study
Congress established the enterprises to provide stability in the secondary market for residential mortgages and serve the mortgage credit needs of targeted groups. But in September 2008, FHFA placed the enterprises in conservatorship out of concern that their deteriorating financial condition would destabilize the financial system. As Congress and the Executive Branch have explored options for restructuring\ the enterprises, most of the discussion has focused on the single-family market. But the enterprises also play a large role in providing financing for\ multifamily properties (those with five\ or more units).
GAO was asked to describe (1) how the enterprises multifamily loan\ activities have changed, (2) the financing marketplace and how they met affordable housing goals, and (3) how the enterprises multifamily delinquency rates compare with those of other mortgage capital sources and how they have managed their credit risk.
To address these objectives, GAO analyzed (1) loan-level data from 1994 (the earliest period for which loan-level data were available) through 2011 from the enterprises and (2) data from the Mortgage Bankers Association; interviewed key multifamily housing stakeholders; and reviewed FHFA examination reports. FHFA, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac provided technical comments, which GAO incorporated where appropriate.
What GAO Found
From 1994 through 2011, the multifamily loan activities of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (the enterprises) generally increased. In this period, Fannie Mae held a lower percentage of multifamily loans in its portfolio than Freddie Mac. While the enterprises multifamily business operations generally were profitable, both enterprises reported losses in 2008 and 2009.
In recent years, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac played a larger role in the multifamily marketplace, and their multifamily activities contributed considerably to meeting their affordable housing goals (set by their regulator for the purchase of mortgages that serve targeted groups or areas). Before 2008, the enterprises financed about 30 percent of multifamily loans. Their share increased to 86 percent in 2009, but decreased to 57 percent in 2011 as other participants reentered the market. GAO's analysis showed that multifamily activities greatly contributed to the enterprises' ability to meet affordable housing goals. For example, the enterprises' multifamily activities constituted 4.5 percent of their total business in 2008, but about a third of the units used to meet the goal of serving low- and moderate-income persons were multifamily units.
The enterprises have purchased multifamily loans that generally performed as well as or better than those of other market participants, but the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) has identified deficiencies in their credit risk management. In 2005-2008, the enterprises' serious delinquency rates (less than 1 percent) were somewhat lower than the rates on multifamily loans made by commercial banks and much lower than rates for multifamily loans funded by commercial mortgage-backed securities. FHFA, through its examination and oversight of the enterprises, identified a number of credit risk deficiencies over the past few years. For example, FHFA found deficiencies in Fannie Mae's delegated underwriting and servicing program, risk-management practices, and information systems; and Freddie Mac's management of its lower-performing assets. Both enterprises have been taking steps to address these deficiencies. |
gao_GAO-10-770 | gao_GAO-10-770_0 | Section 241 Provisions Were Used in 24 Percent of Eligible Relicensing Projects, Resulting in Modified Conditions or Prescriptions for Most Projects and Three Hearings
Nonfederal stakeholders—licensees, states, environmental groups, and an Indian tribe—used the section 241 provisions for 25 of the 103 (24 percent) eligible hydropower projects being relicensed, although the use of these provisions has decreased since its first year. In all, resource agencies did not formally accept any alternatives as originally proposed and instead modified a total of 140 preliminary conditions and prescriptions for 22 of rejected a total of 42 alternative conditions and prescriptions in 5 projects, and removed a total of 9 preliminary conditions and prescriptions in 4 projects. Similarly, the agencies’ interim rules provide, “The written statement must explain the basis for the modified conditions or prescriptions and, if the Department did not accept an alternative condition or prescription, its reasons for not doing so.” While the agencies provided an explanation for rejecting all 42 alternative conditions and prescriptions, they did not explain the reasons for not accepting a proposed alternative for 127 of the 140 modified conditions and prescriptions. Without an explanation, it is difficult to determine the extent, type, or basis of changes that were made and difficult to determine if and how the proposed alternatives affected the final conditions and prescriptions issued by the agencies. Three Trial-Type Hearings Were Completed, and Resource Agencies Have Prevailed on Most of the Issues Decided in These Hearings
As of May 17, 2010, nonfederal stakeholders requested trial-type hearings for 18 of the 25 projects in which the section 241 provisions were used, and 3 trial-type hearings were completed. The requests for hearings in 14 of the 18 projects were withdrawn when nonfederal stakeholders and resource agencies reached a settlement agreement before the ALJ made a ruling, and 1 request is pending as of May 17, 2010, because the licensee is in negotiations to decommission the project. Prior to a trial-type hearing, an ALJ holds a prehearing conference to identify, narrow, and clarify the disputed issues of material fact. Stakeholders Cited a Variety of Effects from Section 241 Provisions on the Relicensing Process and on the License Conditions and Prescriptions and Suggested Improvements
According to the relicensing stakeholders we spoke with, section 241 provisions have had a variety of effects on relicensing in three areas: (1) settlement agreements between licensees and resource agencies, (2) conditions and prescriptions that the resource agencies set, and (3) agencies’ workload and cost. Regarding conditions and prescriptions, some stakeholders commented that under section 241, resource agencies generally researched their conditions and prescriptions more thoroughly, while all seven of the environmental groups’ representatives and some resource agency officials we spoke with said that resource agencies issued fewer or less environmentally protective conditions and prescriptions. Resource agency officials also raised concerns about increases in workload and costs as a result of section 241. Finally, many of the stakeholders offered suggestions for improving the use of section 241. Most Licensees Reported That Section 241 Made Settlements Easier, but Some Resource Agency Officials Said It Made Settlements More Difficult
Most of the licensees and a few resource agency officials we spoke with said that section 241 encourages settlement agreements between the licensee and resource agency. Conclusions
Section 241 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 changed the hydropower relicensing process, including permitting licensees and other nonfederal stakeholders to propose alternative conditions and prescriptions. Recommendations for Executive Action
To encourage transparency in the process for relicensing hydropower projects, we are recommending that the Secretaries of Agriculture, Commerce, and the Interior take the following two actions: Direct cognizant officials, where the agency has not adopted a proposed alternative condition or prescription, to include in the written statement filed with FERC (1) its reasons for not doing so, in accordance with the interim rules and (2) whether a proposed alternative was withdrawn as a result of negotiations and an explanation of what occurred subsequent to the withdrawal; and Issue final rules governing the use of the section 241 provisions after providing an additional period for notice and an opportunity for public comment and after considering their own lessons learned from their experience with the interim rules. | Why GAO Did This Study
Under the Federal Power Act, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) issues licenses for up to 50 years to construct and operate nonfederal hydropower projects. These projects must be relicensed when their licenses expire to continue operating. Relevant federal resource agencies issue license conditions to protect federal lands and prescriptions to assist fish passage on these projects. Under section 241 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005, parties to the licensing process may (1) request a "trial-type hearing" on any disputed issue of material fact related to a condition or prescription and (2) propose alternative conditions or prescriptions. In this context, GAO was asked to (1) determine the extent to which stakeholders have used section 241 provisions in relicensing and their outcomes and (2) describe stakeholders' views on section 241's impact on relicensing and conditions and prescriptions. GAO analyzed relicensing documents filed with FERC and conducted a total of 61 interviews with representatives from relevant federal resource agencies, FERC, licensees, tribal groups, industry groups, and environmental groups.
What GAO Found
Since the passage of the Energy Policy Act in 2005, nonfederal stakeholders--licensees, states, environmental groups, and an Indian tribe--used section 241 provisions for 25 of the 103 eligible hydropower projects being relicensed, most of which occurred within the first year. Of these 25 projects, stakeholders proposed a total of 211 alternative conditions and prescriptions. In response, the federal resource agencies (U.S. Department of Agriculture's Forest Service, Department of Commerce's National Marine Fisheries Service, and several bureaus in the Department of the Interior) accepted no alternatives as originally proposed but instead modified a total of 140 and removed a total of 9 of the agencies' preliminary conditions and prescriptions and rejected 42 of the 211 alternatives; the remaining alternatives are pending as of May 17, 2010. Under section 241, resource agencies must submit a statement to FERC explaining the basis for accepting or rejecting a proposed alternative. While agencies generally provided explanations for rejecting alternative conditions and prescriptions, with few exceptions, they did not explain the reasons for not accepting alternatives when they modified conditions and prescriptions. As a result, it is difficult to determine the extent, type, or basis of changes that were made and difficult to determine if and how the proposed alternatives affected the final conditions and prescriptions issued by the agencies. As of May 17, 2010, nonfederal stakeholders requested trial-type hearings for 18 of the 25 projects in which section 241 provisions were used, and three trial-type hearings were completed. Of the remaining 15 projects, requests for hearings were withdrawn for 14 of them when licensees and agencies negotiated a settlement agreement before the administrative law judge made a ruling, and one is pending because the licensee is in negotiations to decommission the project. In the three hearings held to date, the administrative law judge ruled in favor of the agencies on most issues. According to the federal and nonfederal relicensing stakeholders GAO spoke with, the section 241 provisions have had a variety of effects on the relicensing process and on the license conditions and prescriptions. While most licensees and a few agency officials said that section 241 encourages settlement agreements between the licensee and resource agency, some agency officials said that section 241 made agreements more difficult because efforts to negotiate have moved to preparing for potential hearings. Regarding conditions and prescriptions, some stakeholders commented that under section 241, agencies put more effort into reviewing and providing support for their conditions and prescriptions, but environmental groups and some agency officials said that in their opinion, agencies issued fewer or less environmentally protective conditions and prescriptions. Many agency officials also raised concerns about increases in workload and costs as a result of section 241. For example, their estimated costs for the three hearings to date totaled approximately $3.1 million. Furthermore, many of the stakeholders offered suggestions for improving the use of section 241, including adjusting the time frame for a trial-type hearing.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that cognizant officials who do not adopt a proposed alternative include reasons why in their statement to FERC. The resource agencies generally agreed, but commented that no explanation is required when an alternative is withdrawn as a result of negotiations. |
gao_T-RCED-96-114 | gao_T-RCED-96-114_0 | In 1994, this exposure resulted in motor vehicle accidents at crossings that killed 501 people and injured 1,764 others. The Congress has funded research to develop innovative technologies for improving railroad crossing safety. Many states, particularly those with many railroad crossings, face a dilemma. DOT’s educational initiatives are part of a larger plan to improve railroad crossing safety. The five proposals would (1) change the method used to apportion section 130 funds to the states, (2) use Surface Transportation Program funds to pay local governments a bonus to close crossings, (3) eliminate the requirement for localities to match a portion of the costs associated with closing crossings, (4) establish a $15 million program to encourage the states to improve rail corridors, and (5) use Surface Transportation Program funds to increase federal funding for Operation Lifesaver. Improving Track Safety
Under the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970, as amended, FRA is responsible for regulating all aspects of railroad safety. In conclusion, safety at highway-railroad crossings, the adequacy of track safety inspections and enforcement, and the safety of passenger cars operated by commuter railroads and Amtrak will remain important issues for Congress, FRA, the states, and the industry to address as the nation continues its efforts to prevent rail-related accidents and fatalities. A recorded menu will provide information on how to obtain these lists. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO provided information on the safety of highway railroad crossings, commuter passenger rails and adequacy of track safety inspections.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the leading cause of death associated with the railroad industry involved railroad crossing accidents; (2) about half of rail-related deaths occur because of collisions between trains and vehicles at public railroad crossings; (3) in 1994, 501 people were killed and 1,764 injured in railroad crossing accidents; (4) to improve the safety of railroad crossings, the Department of Transportation (DOT) must better target funds to high-risk areas, close more railroad crossings, install new technologies, and develop educational programs to increase the public's awareness of railroad crossings; (5) DOT plans are costly and will require congressional approval; (6) the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) is unable to adequately inspect and enforce truck safety standards or direct transportation officials to the routes with the highest accident potential because its database contains inaccurate information; and (7) Congress has directed FRA to establish sufficient passenger car safety standards by 1999. |
gao_GAO-07-430 | gao_GAO-07-430_0 | MDA’s March 2006 Report Includes Some Useful Information but Has Several Limitations
MDA’s March 2006 report to Congress included some useful technical and operational information on boost and ascent phase capabilities. However, the information in the report has several limitations—such as not including stakeholders in the analysis or explaining how assumptions affect results. Further, the report discussed geographic areas where boost and ascent phase elements could intercept missiles shortly after launch based on desired technical capabilities. MDA’s Analyses Have Limitations but DOD Can Improve Information to Support Future Decisions
The information in the March 2006 report has several limitations because the analyses did not involve stakeholders and did not clearly explain modeling assumptions and their effects on results as identified by relevant research standards. Developing such information with the services, Joint Staff, and combatant commands could provide a much more complete explanation of operational issues and challenges. However, stakeholders such as the services, Joint Staff, or combatant commands could have assisted MDA in assessing potential quantities required for various deployment periods. We compared the report’s cost estimates with various DOD and GAO sources that describe key principles for developing accurate and reliable life-cycle cost estimates. Based on our analysis, we found that MDA did not include all cost categories, calculate costs based on warfighter quantities, and did not conduct a sensitivity analysis to assess the effects of cost drivers. Additionally, MDA’s cost estimates did not include costs to establish and sustain operations at forward overseas locations, even though the report states that the elements will have to be located in close proximity to their targets, and the operational concepts for Kinetic Energy Interceptor and Airborne Laser, although in early development, state that these elements will be operated from forward locations. However, MDA did not take these steps to assess the confidence of the estimates reported in March 2006. MDA officials stated that, in developing the cost estimates for the March 2006 report, they decided not to follow some of the key principles for developing life-cycle cost estimates such as time phasing and independent verification of the cost estimates in order to complete the report in a timely manner. Recommendations for Executive Action
To provide decision makers with information that enables them to clearly understand the technical progress and operational implications of each boost and ascent phase element and make fully informed, fact-based, program decisions at future key decision points, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics to take the following actions to support key decision points for the BMDS boost and ascent phase elements: Include all DOD stakeholders (including services, combatant commands, Joint Staff) in developing and analyzing operational issues regarding what is needed to support operations at U.S. bases and potential forward locations, including basing assessments, force structure and quantity requirements, infrastructure, security/force protection, maintenance, and personnel. To provide decision makers with complete and reliable data on the costs of each boost/ascent phase BMDS element to enhance investment and budget decisions, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following actions: Direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics to require MDA to prepare and—to support key decision points—periodically update a full life-cycle cost estimate for each boost/ascent phase element, in accordance with key principles for developing accurate and reliable life-cycle cost estimates, that includes all operational costs, including costs to establish and sustain operations at U.S. bases and forward locations, and that is based on warfighter quantities, includes sensitivity analyses, and reflects time phasing. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) has spent about $107 billion since the mid-1980s to develop a capability to destroy incoming ballistic missiles. DOD has set key decision points for deciding whether to further invest in capabilities to destroy missiles during the initial phases after launch. In March 2006, DOD issued a report on these capabilities in response to two mandates. To satisfy a direction from the House Appropriations Committee, GAO agreed to review the report. To assist Congress in evaluating DOD's report and preparing for future decisions, GAO studied the extent to which DOD (1) analyzed technical and operational issues and (2) presented complete cost information. To do so, GAO assessed the report's methodology, explanation of assumptions and their effects on results, and whether DOD followed key principles for developing life-cycle costs.
What GAO Found
The report DOD's Missile Defense Agency (MDA) submitted to Congress in March 2006 included some useful technical and operational information on boost and ascent phase capabilities by describing these elements, listing upcoming decision points, and discussing geographic areas where boost and ascent elements could intercept missiles shortly after launch. However, the information in the report has several limitations because the analysis did not involve key DOD stakeholders such as the services and combatant commands in preparing the report and did not clearly explain modeling assumptions and their effects on results as required by relevant research standards. MDA's report states that, at this time, some data is limited, and operational concepts that discuss operations from forward locations have not been fully vetted with the services and combatant commands. However, the report did not explain how each element's performance may change if developing technologies do not perform as expected. Also, it did not address the challenges in establishing bases at the locations cited or provide information on the quantity of each element required for various deployment periods. Moving forward, DOD has an opportunity to involve stakeholders in analyzing operational and technical issues so that senior DOD and congressional leaders will have more complete information on which to base upcoming program decisions following key tests in 2008 and 2009 for the Kinetic Energy Interceptor and Airborne Laser boost and ascent phase programs. MDA's report provided some cost estimates for developing and fielding boost and ascent phase capabilities, but these estimates have several limitations and will require refinement before they can serve as a basis for DOD and congressional decision makers to compare life-cycle costs for the elements. MDA's report states that there is uncertainty in estimating life-cycle costs because the elements are early in development. However, based on a comparison of the estimates in the report with key principles for developing life-cycle cost estimates, GAO found that MDA's estimates did not include all cost categories, including costs to establish and sustain operations at U.S. bases and at forward overseas operating locations. Also, MDA's estimates did not calculate costs based on realistic quantities of each element the combatant commanders or services would need to conduct the mission. Finally, MDA did not conduct a sensitivity analysis to assess the effect of key cost drivers on total costs. MDA officials stated that further analysis of the costs for each element along with measures to assess their confidence would help to better inform DOD and congressional decision makers in making investment decisions following key tests in 2008 and 2009. |
gao_GAO-10-353 | gao_GAO-10-353_0 | SBA’s 8(a) program is delivered collaboratively by two departments of SBA. While SBA Has Made Improvements to Its 8(a) Annual Reviews, Internal Control Weaknesses and Other Challenges Limit Program Oversight
SBA relies primarily on its annual reviews of 8(a) firms to ensure the continued eligibility of firms enrolled in the program, but we observed inconsistencies and weaknesses in annual review procedures related to determining continued eligibility for the program. The lack of specific criteria in the current regulations and procedures may have contributed to the inconsistencies that we observed, and SBA has taken steps to clarify some, but not all, of these requirements in a recent proposed rule change. Finally, we found that SBA did not maintain an accurate inventory of Mentor-Protégé Program participants and did not document some annual oversight activities of these firms. SBA’s Staff Did Not Follow Required Annual Review Procedures Related to Continuing Program Eligibility in about Half of the Files We Reviewed
In a substantial number of cases we reviewed, SBA staff failed to complete required annual review procedures intended to assess fundamental eligibility conditions, such as the firm’s net worth, used to determine if participants continue to meet the criteria for being economically disadvantaged. More specifically, we estimate that 17 percent of the firms had exceeded one or more eligibility criteria for 2 consecutive years, indicating that the firms may have been outgrowing the program, but were recommended by SBA for retention. The agency has been planning to address some data integrity and compatibility issues with BDMIS and E-8(a), a database that provides business status and business contract activity for each participant in the 8(a) program. As a result, unauthorized partnerships could receive 8(a) set-aside contracts. However, because district staff do not collect and maintain comprehensive complaint information involving 8(a) firms, staff are not aware of the types and frequency of complaints across the agency, including potential eligibility concerns. Without a standard process for collecting and analyzing complaints, SBA staff—and the agency as a whole—lack information that could be used to help identify issues relating to program integrity and help improve the effectiveness of SBA oversight. Although complaint data are not a primary mechanism to ensure program eligibility, continual monitoring is a key component in detecting and deterring fraud. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve the monitoring of and procedures used in assessing the continuing eligibility of firms to participate in and benefit from the 8(a) program, we recommend that the Administrator of SBA take the following six actions: To help ensure greater consistency in carrying out annual review procedures and improve the overall quality of these reviews, we recommend that the SBA Administrator monitor, and provide additional guidance and training to, district offices on the procedures used to determine continuing eligibility, including taking appropriate action when firms exceed four of seven industry size averages, including notifying firms the first year and enforcing procedures relating to early graduation of firms that exceed industry averages for 2 consecutive years; obtaining appropriate supervisory signatures to finalize annual review submitting remedial action or a waiver for firms in the transition phase that did not meet business activity targets; graduating firms that exceed the net worth threshold of $750,000; performing timely eligibility reviews in required cases; and completing required annual reviews. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) evaluate the procedures and processes that the Small Business Administration (SBA) has implemented to ensure that only eligible firms remain in the 8(a) program, and (2) assess the extent to which SBA used external mechanisms, such as complaints by other 8(a) firms, to help ensure that only eligible firms participate in the program. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Small Business Administration's (SBA) 8(a) program helps eligible socially and economically disadvantaged small businesses compete in the economy by providing business development activities, such as counseling and technical assistance, and providing opportunities to obtain federal contracts on a set-aside basis. GAO was asked to review SBA's internal control procedures for determining 8(a) eligibility. Specifically, we (1) evaluated the procedures and processes that SBA has implemented to ensure that only eligible firms participate in the 8(a) program, and (2) assessed the extent to which SBA uses external mechanisms such as complaint information in helping to ensure that only eligible firms participate. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed SBA guidance and prior reports, interviewed SBA officials, and conducted site visits and file reviews of 123 randomly sampled 8(a) firms covering the most recent 2 years of annual reviews at five SBA locations.
What GAO Found
SBA relies primarily on its annual review of 8(a) firms to ensure their continued eligibility in the program, but inconsistencies and weaknesses in annual review procedures limit program oversight. GAO's review of a random sample of 8(a) firms identified an estimated 55 percent in which SBA staff failed to complete required annual review procedures intended to assess fundamental eligibility criteria, such as being economically disadvantaged. Multiple factors appear to have contributed to the inconsistencies identified, including the lack of specific criteria in SBA's current regulations and procedures that relate to some eligibility requirements such as determining whether firms exceed program thresholds for industry size averages, personal compensation, and personal asset limits. As a result, firms that may have outgrown the program continued to receive 8(a) program benefits. For example, GAO estimated that 17 percent of the firms we reviewed had exceeded one or more eligibility criteria for 2 consecutive years, but were recommended by SBA for retention. SBA has taken steps to clarify some, but not all, of these rules in recent proposed rule changes. SBA is required by statute to perform annual reviews on 100 percent of 8(a) firms but staff spent significant amounts of time trying to obtain annual review documents from firms--especially firms that did not have 8(a) contracts--which affected the timeliness of reviews. GAO identified a significant number of instances in which firms failed to submit annual review documents as required but still were recommended for retention. The Business Development Specialists' (BDS) dual role of advocacy for and monitoring of the firms may have contributed in part to the retention of ineligible firms. SBA has been addressing some data integrity and compatibility issues by enhancing its primary electronic system for annual review information. Finally, SBA did not maintain an accurate inventory of 8(a) Mentor-Prot?g? Program participant data, which limited the agency's ability to monitor these firms. SBA's program offices did not maintain comprehensive data on or have a system in place to track complaints on the eligibility of firms participating in the 8(a) program. District staff were not aware of the types and frequency of complaints across the agency. As a result, SBA staff lacked information that could be used with other information to help identify issues relating to program integrity and help improve the effectiveness of SBA oversight. Although complaint data are not a primary mechanism to ensure program eligibility, continuous monitoring is a key component in detecting and deterring fraud. |
gao_GAO-06-178 | gao_GAO-06-178_0 | Furthermore, many can be easily forged or stolen and altered to permit access by unauthorized individuals. HSPD-12 Requires Standardized Agency ID and Credentialing Systems
In August 2004, the President issued HSPD-12, which required the Department of Commerce to develop a new standard for secure and reliable forms of ID for federal employees and contractors by February 27, 2005. Agencies are required to begin issuing credentials that meet these provisions by October 27, 2006. Their primary focus has been on actions to address the first part of the standard, including establishing appropriate identity proofing and card issuance policies and procedures. For example, five of the six agencies had instituted policies to require that at least a successful fingerprint check be completed prior to issuing a credential; and the sixth agency, Defense, was in the process of having such a policy instituted. Regarding other requirements, efforts were still under way. For example, Defense and NASA reported that they were still making modifications to their background check policies. Agencies have begun to take actions to address the second part of the standard, which focuses on interoperable smart card systems. Defense and Interior, for example, have conducted assessments of technological gaps between their existing systems and the infrastructure required by FIPS 201, but they have not yet developed specific designs for card systems that meet FIPS 201 interoperability requirements. The Federal Government Faces Challenges in Implementing FIPS 201
The federal government faces a number of significant challenges to implementing FIPS 201, including testing and acquiring compliant products within OMB’s mandated time frames; reconciling divergent implementation specifications; assessing risks associated with implementing the recently- chosen biometric standard; incomplete guidance regarding the applicability of FIPS 201 to facilities, people, and information systems; and planning and budgeting with uncertain knowledge and the potential for substantial cost increases. Without more complete time frames and guidance, agencies may not be able to meet implementation deadlines; and more importantly, true interoperability among federal government agencies’ smart card programs—one of the major goals of FIPS 201—could be jeopardized. Further, we also recommend that the Director, OMB, amend or supplement governmentwide policy guidance regarding compliance with the FIPS 201 standard to take the following three actions: provide specific deadlines by which agencies implementing transitional smart card systems are to meet the “end-point” specification, thus allowing for interoperability of smart card systems across the federal government; provide guidance to agencies on assessing risks associated with the variation in the reliability and accuracy among biometric products, so that they can select vendors that best meet the needs of their agencies while maintaining interoperability with other agencies, and clarify the extent to which agencies should make risk-based assessments regarding the applicability of FIPS 201 to specific types of facilities, individuals, and information systems, such as small offices, foreign nationals, and volunteers. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine (1) actions that selected federal agencies have taken to implement the new standard and (2) challenges that federal agencies are facing in implementing the standard. The agencies we selected were the Departments of Defense, Interior, Homeland Security (DHS), Housing and Urban Development (HUD), Labor, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). | Why GAO Did This Study
Many forms of identification (ID) that federal employees and contractors use to access government-controlled buildings and information systems can be easily forged, stolen, or altered to allow unauthorized access. In an effort to increase the quality and security of federal ID and credentialing practices, the President directed the establishment of a governmentwide standard--Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 201--for secure and reliable forms of ID based on "smart cards" that use integrated circuit chips to store and process data with a variety of external systems across government. GAO was asked to determine (1) actions that selected federal agencies have taken to implement the new standard and (2) challenges that federal agencies are facing in implementing the standard.
What GAO Found
The six agencies we reviewed--Defense, Interior, Homeland Security, Housing and Urban Development (HUD), Labor, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)--had each taken actions to begin implementing the FIPS 201 standard. Their primary focus has been on actions to address the first part of the standard, which calls for establishing appropriate identity proofing and card issuance policies and procedures and which the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) required agencies to implement by October 27, 2005. Agencies had completed a variety of actions, such as instituting policies to require that at least a successful fingerprint check be completed prior to issuing a credential. Regarding other requirements, however, efforts were still under way. For example, Defense and NASA reported that they were still modifying their background check policies. Based on OMB guidance, agencies have until October 27, 2006, to implement the second part of the standard, which requires them to implement interoperable smart-card based ID systems. Agencies have begun to take actions to address this part of the standard. For example, Defense and Interior conducted assessments of technological gaps between their existing systems and the infrastructure required by FIPS 201 but had not yet developed specific designs for card systems that meet FIPS 201 interoperability requirements. The federal government faces significant challenges in implementing FIPS 201, including (1) testing and acquiring compliant commercial products--such as smart cards and card readers--within required time frames; (2) reconciling divergent implementation specifications; (3) assessing the risks associated with specific vendor implementations of the recently chosen biometric standard; (4) incomplete guidance regarding the applicability of FIPS 201 to facilities, people, and information systems; and (5) planning and budgeting with uncertain knowledge and the potential for substantial cost increases. Until these implementation challenges are addressed, the benefits of FIPS 201 may not be fully realized. Specifically, agencies may not be able to meet implementation deadlines established by OMB, and more importantly, true interoperability among federal government agencies' smart card programs--one of the major goals of FIPS 201--may not be achieved. |
gao_GAO-16-101 | gao_GAO-16-101_0 | Facility security assessments are conducted by the Pentagon Force Protection Agency and the Federal Protective Service, using standards set by the Interagency Security Committee. DOD Is Addressing Data Issues but Its Inventory Database Has Some Inaccurate and Incomplete Data on Leased Assets
While DOD is taking some steps to address data issues, it cannot fully determine the number, size, and costs of its leases because RPAD contains some inaccurate and incomplete data. Most of these errors were in the Army’s lease records; however, the Army reported to us that it is aware of these issues and is taking steps to correct future data. We also found that about 5 percent of the Army’s lease records were not included in RPAD for fiscal year 2011 and fiscal year 2013. DOD’s Guidance Results in the Square Footage for Some WHS Leased Space Being Overstated in RPAD
In our review of the various data elements used to record information related to DOD leased assets, we found that DOD’s Real Property Information Model does not include a data element that captures the square footage associated with a given lease record. DOD Has Not Taken Full Advantage of Available Opportunities to Reduce Its Reliance on Leased Facilities
DOD is currently implementing a presidential memorandum and a series of OMB memorandums instructing federal agencies to maintain or reduce both owned and leased space; however, DOD is not projecting any significant reductions in its leased space. Furthermore, our works shows that potential future force structure reductions exist that may offer DOD and the military services an opportunity to further reduce reliance on leased space. DOD Does Not Have Oversight of the Status of Facility Security Assessments for All of Its Leased Facilities
DOD does not have oversight of information about the facility security assessments for all of its leased facilities acquired through GSA. We found that the Pentagon Force Protection Agency had completed the facility security assessments for the leased facilities for which it is responsible between August 8, 2013 and January 31, 2014. Some Late Assessments and Incomplete and Inaccurate Data Exist in the Federal Protective Service’s Facility Security Assessments Data
Our analysis of fiscal years 2011 and 2013 data from the database the Federal Protective Service used to track scheduled and completed facility security assessments for facilities leased by DOD through GSA identified three issues: (1) some assessments were not scheduled within the required time frames; (2) data on assessments completed, as required, is unknown; and (3) dates for completed and next scheduled assessments were not always recorded. Without periodically obtaining information on whether facility security assessments for its leased facilities are being completed in accordance with required standards and without access to the results of the assessments, DOD is not in a position to ensure that its tenants in leased space are secure. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve DOD’s ability to oversee its inventory of leased real property, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following two actions aimed at improving the accuracy and completeness of data in RPAD:
Direct the Secretary of the Army to enforce DOD’s Real Property Inventory (RPI) Reporting Guidance, which states that for multiple assets associated with a single lease, the military departments and WHS must provide a breakout of the annual rent plus other costs for each asset on the same lease, to avoid overstating costs associated with such leases. DOD did not concur with our remaining two recommendations, which are discussed in detail below. Our report also states that DOD reoccupied about 1.1 million square feet of leased space previously vacated through BRAC 2005, which DOD’s letter confirmed. DOD also did not concur with our third recommendation that the military departments look for opportunities to relocate DOD organizations in leased space onto installations that may have underutilized space. Therefore, we believe this recommendation remains valid. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) has accurate and complete data on the number, size, and costs of its leases, we obtained and analyzed selected data elements from the Real Property Assets Database (RPAD) for fiscal years 2011 and 2013, as well as data from the military departments’ and Washington Headquarters Services’ (WHS) real property inventory systems. Second, since the Army had the largest number of lease records in RPAD—4,695 (approximately 79 percent) of 5,965 records in fiscal year 2011 and 4,210 (approximately 76 percent) of the 5,538 records in fiscal year 2013—we compared the records representing the Army’s lease assets to the lease records maintained in the Army Rental Facilities Management Information system to determine whether the data for each of the data elements submitted by the Army matched the data in RPAD for those same 2 years. We then analyzed some of the lease data from RPAD for fiscal year 2013 to determine whether any opportunities exist for DOD to reduce its leased space in geographic locations that are in close proximity to the DOD installations that may have unutilized or underutilized facilities based on these planned force structure reductions. We also reviewed prior GAO reports on this issue. We found that the Pentagon Force Protection Agency’s data were sufficiently reliable for our purposes. GAO-15-346. High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-11-879T. GAO-10-873. | Why GAO Did This Study
Overreliance on costly leasing is one of the major reasons that federal real property management remains on GAO's high-risk list. GAO's prior work has shown that owning buildings often costs less than operating leases, especially where there are long-term needs for space.
House Report 113-102 included a provision that GAO review DOD's management of leased space. For fiscal years 2011 and 2013, this report evaluates the extent to which DOD (1) has accurate and complete data on the number, size, and costs of its leases; (2) has taken actions to reduce its reliance on leased space; and (3) has oversight of the status of security assessments conducted for leased facilities contracted through GSA. GAO analyzed lease data from the real property systems kept by DOD, the military departments, WHS, and GSA, and facility security assessment data from FPS and the Pentagon Force Protection Agency; reviewed guidance; and interviewed cognizant officials.
What GAO Found
While the Department of Defense (DOD) is taking some steps to address data issues, it cannot fully determine the number, size, and costs of its leases for real property because its Real Property Assets Database (RPAD), the real property inventory system that DOD uses to report on its leased assets, contains some inaccurate and incomplete data. GAO found that about 15 percent of the RPAD lease records for fiscal year 2011 and 10 percent of the records for fiscal year 2013 were inaccurate. Most of these errors were in the lease records for the Army (the manager of about 80 percent of the leased assets records in RPAD); however, the Army is aware of these issues and is taking steps to correct future data. GAO also found that RPAD did not include about 5 percent of the Army's lease records for fiscal years 2011 and 2013. GAO conducted a random sample of the fiscal year 2013 RPAD data and found that the data element required to calculate costs was unreliable for 11 of the 84 Army sample records. GAO found that the Army was not following DOD's guidance for reporting costs on leases that have multiple assets associated with them. Furthermore, GAO found that RPAD does not contain a data element for the square footage for leases in which there are multiple tenants occupying space in the same building, as is the case for some Washington Headquarters Services (WHS) leases.
DOD is implementing a presidential memorandum and a series of Office of Management and Budget memorandums to maintain or reduce owned and leased space, but has projected minimal change to its leasing activities. There have been opportunities in the past to reduce its leased space; however, DOD reoccupied over 1.1 million square feet in leased space previously vacated when it implemented the 2005 Base Closure and Realignment recommendations. In some cases, DOD tenants occupy leased space close to large installations that may have had unused facilities. Potential force structure reductions may offer an opportunity to further reduce DOD's reliance on leased space in the future, if DOD actively identifies suitable underutilized facilities on its installations.
DOD does not have complete oversight of the security assessments conducted for its leased facilities acquired through the General Services Administration (GSA). Facility security assessments, which are required to be conducted every 3 to 5 years, are conducted by the Pentagon Force Protection Agency and the Federal Protective Service (FPS) using established standards. The Pentagon Force Protection Agency had completed the required assessments for the facilities for which it is responsible between August 8, 2013, and January 31, 2014. However, DOD has not requested information on whether FPS, the primary agency for protecting federal facilities, has completed its facility security assessments as required for all DOD-leased locations. GAO analyzed the FPS assessment data for fiscal years 2011 and 2013 and identified several issues: (1) some assessments were not scheduled within required time frames, (2) data on previously recorded assessment dates were overwritten when updated, and (3) dates for completed and next-scheduled assessments were not always recorded. While FPS is not required to inform DOD about assessment schedules, without periodically requesting information on whether facility security assessments have been conducted, DOD does not have the information it needs to ensure that its leased facilities are secure.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends four actions to improve DOD's management of its leased facilities. DOD concurred with GAO recommendations to (1) enforce its guidance to provide annual rent plus other costs for each asset on the same lease, and (2) request information from FPS on facility security assessments. DOD did not concur with GAO recommendations to capture total square footage, by lease, or to look for opportunities to move DOD organizations in leased space onto installations. As discussed in the report, GAO believes that these recommendations remain valid. |
gao_GAO-04-70 | gao_GAO-04-70_0 | Taxpayers Believe They Benefit by Using Paid Preparers but Some Are Poorly Served
Based on projections from our national survey, most taxpayers who used a paid preparer believe they benefited from doing so and would use a paid preparer in the future. As already noted, many of the taxpayers we interviewed in-depth told us they used a paid preparer because they did not understand the tax laws. In addition to over- or underpaying their taxes, IRS officials and others told us that sometimes taxpayers are poorly served by paying for services that accelerate the receipt of refunds, including RALs. While this evidence does not allow a precise estimate due to methodological limitations, none of it suggests that the percentage of poorly served taxpayers is large. However, even a small percentage of the more than 72 million taxpayers who used paid preparers in 2001 can translate into millions of affected taxpayers. For example, we have already mentioned that last year we estimated that as many as 2 million taxpayers overpaid their 1998 taxes by $945 million because they claimed the standard deduction when it would have been more beneficial to itemize, and half of these taxpayers used a paid preparer. IRS and Others Act Against Problem Paid Preparers, but Balancing Taxpayer Protection Against Other Priorities Is a Challenge
Several IRS offices have responsibility for problem paid preparers, but balancing resources devoted to taxpayer protection with resources devoted to other priorities is a challenge. Proposals have been made for expanding IRS’s oversight of the paid preparer industry. Consideration of such proposals is complicated by a lack of data on the extent of the problem and the effectiveness of IRS’s actions and by the involvement of other agencies, state, and local governments as well as professional organizations. Many taxpayers do not understand their filing requirements and would have great difficulty filling out their tax forms without the assistance of paid preparers. Examples of problematic preparer behavior are easy to find but reliable estimates of the number of taxpayers affected by the problems do not exist and would be difficult, perhaps impossible, to develop. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to (1) obtain the views of taxpayers who used paid preparers and provide examples of paid preparer performance, including what is known about the extent of problems caused by paid preparers and (2) describe IRS’s efforts to prevent, detect, and take action against problem paid preparers; challenges facing IRS offices that interact with paid preparers, especially the Office of Professional Responsibility; and efforts to address those challenges. | Why GAO Did This Study
Over 55 percent of the nearly 130 million taxpayers in tax year 2001 used a paid tax preparer. However, using a preparer may not assure that taxpayers pay the least amount due. Last year, GAO estimated that as many as 2 million taxpayers overpaid their 1998 taxes by $945 million because they failed to itemize deductions and half of these used preparers. GAO was asked to (1) obtain the views of taxpayers about paid preparers and examples of preparer performance including any problems and (2) describe the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS's) oversight of problem preparers; the challenges facing IRS in dealing with problem preparers, especially the Office of Professional Responsibility; and the efforts to address those challenges. To obtain the views of taxpayers who used preparers, GAO surveyed a national representative sample of taxpayers.
What GAO Found
GAO estimates that most of the taxpayers who used a paid preparer believe they benefited from doing so. Many taxpayers told us they believed they would have great difficulty filling out their own tax forms because they do not understand their filing requirements. At the same time, some taxpayers are poorly served when paid preparers make mistakes, causing taxpayers to over-or underpay their taxes or pay for services, such as short-term loans called Refund Anticipation Loans (RALs), without understanding their costs and benefits. The evidence available does not allow a precise estimate of the extent of problems caused by paid preparers, but nothing suggests that the percentage of taxpayers affected is large. Nevertheless, even a small percentage of the over 72 million taxpayers who used paid preparers in 2001 translates into millions of taxpayers who are potentially adversely affected. IRS has several offices responsible for taking action against problem paid preparers, including the newly formed Office of Professional Responsibility. These offices sanction preparers for violating standards of conduct; assess monetary penalties for violating tax laws when preparing returns; monitor and, if justified, sanction problem preparers offering electronic filing and RALs; and investigate fraudulent preparer behavior. However, balancing resources devoted to such efforts against those devoted to other IRS priorities is a challenge. In addition to IRS, other federal agencies, state and local governments, and professional organizations have a role in regulating paid preparers. At least two proposals exist to expand IRS's oversight of paid preparers. Consideration of such proposals is complicated by the difficulty of developing reliable estimates of the number of taxpayers affected by problem preparers or the effectiveness of the actions taken against them. |
gao_GAO-09-481T | gao_GAO-09-481T_0 | JPDO and ATO Have Issued Key NextGen Plans, but ATO Restructuring and Recent Executive Order Have Not Fully Resolved NextGen Management Issues
JPDO and ATO have issued key NextGen plans and have reorganized the management structure for NextGen. Planning Effort Has Shifted to Focus on Implementation, but Continues to Lack Specific Timelines and Commitments
Since 2003, JPDO and ATO have made progress in planning for and implementing NextGen. The current version of the NextGen Implementation Plan, released in January 2009, focuses on the midterm (2012 though 2018) implementation of NextGen capabilities. Recent versions of NextGen planning documents have partially addressed some of these concerns, but industry stakeholders continue to express frustration that the planning documents lack any specific timelines or commitments. 1). 2.). The reorganization also led to JPDO’s placement lower in FAA’s organizational structure—it is now a fourth-level organization. According to ATO’s COO, a purpose of the reorganization was to respond to industry stakeholders’ concerns about the fragmentation of authority and lack of accountability for NextGen, which might delay its implementation. FAA has said that it and JPDO are working with DOT to clarify roles and responsibilities in executing the executive order. Industry Stakeholders Seek More Rapid Midterm Implementation of Existing Capabilities, but Progress Depends Both on Airlines’ Investments and on FAA’s Validation, Certification, and Rulemaking
To help address current congestion and delays, many stakeholders have suggested that FAA focus on maximizing what can be done with existing, proven capabilities and existing infrastructure. A member of the task force indicated that it will be identifying a handful of capabilities that can be implemented in the midterm and prioritizing them according to their relative net benefits. Current plans call for the task force to provide final conclusions and recommendations to FAA in August 2009. A range of potential requirements and incentives could encourage aircraft operators to purchase equipment. These could include mandated deadlines or operational preferences—such as preferred airspace, routings, or runway access. Any activities needed to implement new policies and procedures, such as the expanded use of performance-based navigation procedures; to demonstrate new capabilities, such as the use of closely spaced parallel runways; to set parameters for the certification of new systems, such as ADS-B; and to develop new technologies will take time and be a priority in the mid- and long-term planning for NextGen. Addressing Ongoing Human Capital, Research and Development, and Facility and Capacity Challenges Will Be Critical for NextGen’s Implementation Going Forward
A number of other challenges affect FAA’s ability to move forward with NextGen’s implementation. These challenges include resolving ongoing human capital challenges, addressing research and development needs, reconfiguring and maintaining existing facilities, and enhancing the physical capacity of airports. Resolving Key Human Capital Challenges, Including Involving Internal Stakeholders and Acquiring Expertise, Will Be Critical to NextGen’s Success
Involving internal stakeholders, such as current air traffic controllers and technicians, in planning for and deploying new technologies will be important to NextGen’s success. In our view, input from current air traffic controllers with recent experience controlling aircraft, who will be responsible for managing traffic in the NextGen environment, and from current technicians, who will maintain NextGen equipment, is important when considering human factors and safety issues. According to the technicians’ union, it does not generally participate in NextGen efforts, although it has a liaison working on ADS-B and is seeking to participate in the NextGen Midterm Implementation Task Force. According to an FAA official, FAA plans to fill a total of 378 NextGen positions in fiscal years 2009 and 2010. Going forward, further research and development is needed in a number of areas to implement NextGen, according to FAA, stakeholders, and our analysis. Compared with the current ATC system, NextGen will rely to a greater extent on automation, and the roles and responsibilities of pilots and air traffic controllers will change. Planning infrastructure projects to increase capacity, such as building additional runways, can be a lengthy process, and will require substantial advance planning and safety and cost analyses. Joint Planning and Development Office: Progress and Key Issues in Planning the Transition to the Next Generation Air Transportation System. Federal Aviation Administration: Key Issues in Ensuring the Efficient Development and Safe Operation of the Next Generation Air Transportation System. | Why GAO Did This Study
To prepare for forecasted air traffic growth, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), including its Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO) and Air Traffic Organization (ATO), is planning for and implementing the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) in partnership with other federal agencies and the aviation industry. NextGen will transform the current radar-based air traffic control system into a more automated aircraft-centered, satellite-based system. GAO's previous work has identified issues related to the usefulness of NextGen planning documents, FAA's organizational structure to manage the transition to NextGen, and FAA's workforce to oversee and implement NextGen. Recently, the focus of NextGen planning and implementation has shifted to capabilities that can be achieved in the midterm, defined as 2012 through 2018. GAO's testimony focuses on (1) JPDO's and ATO's progress in planning NextGen and changes in the NextGen management structure; (2) ongoing efforts to implement midterm capabilities to address capacity constraints, and issues related to these efforts; and (3) key human capital issues, research and development needs, and facilities maintenance and reconfiguration challenges going forward. GAO's testimony updates prior GAO work with FAA data and interviews with agency and union officials and industry stakeholders, including airline, aircraft, and avionics manufacturer representatives.
What GAO Found
JPDO and ATO have made progress in planning for and developing NextGen. JPDO has continued to update its basic planning documents, and in January 2009, ATO released the current version of its NextGen Implementation Plan, which focuses on the midterm implementation of capabilities. Recent versions of NextGen planning documents have partially addressed some of GAO's previously reported concerns about their usefulness, but industry participants continue to express frustration that the documents lack any specific timelines or commitments. Recent changes in the management structure for NextGen, though designed to address industry stakeholders' and others' concerns about fragmentation of authority and lack of accountability, have not fully addressed these issues and have raised further questions about parties' roles and responsibilities. To help address current congestion and delays, industry stakeholders have frequently suggested that FAA shift its focus from planning for NextGen to maximizing what can be done with existing, proven capabilities and existing infrastructure. In January of this year, FAA created a NextGen Midterm Implementation Task Force, which responds to this suggestion and is to report its recommendations to FAA in August 2009. The task force plans to identify and prioritize capabilities that can be implemented in the midterm and potentially be deployed regionally to address key bottlenecks. Essential to the mid- and long-term success of these efforts is persuading the airlines to make costly investments in NextGen equipment--a step they are reluctant to take without clearly demonstrated benefits. Incentives that could encourage such investments include operational preferences--such as preferred airspace, routings, or runway access--and equipment investment tax credits. FAA will also have to validate, certify, and issue rules for these capabilities. Going forward, FAA faces challenges in resolving human capital issues, addressing needed research and development, reconfiguring and maintaining existing facilities, and enhancing capacity. Human capital issues include involving stakeholders, such as controllers and technicians, in NextGen efforts and acquiring the systems engineering, contract management, leadership, and other skills needed for NextGen. FAA plans to fill 378 NextGen positions in fiscal years 2009 and 2010. Additionally, for NextGen, research and development efforts to address the environmental impact of aviation, human factors, and weather will be critical. Air traffic facilities will also have to be reconfigured to support NextGen, and existing facilities require maintenance to ensure safety and reliability. FAA is currently reviewing its facility needs.Finally, even with the efficiencies anticipated from implementing NextGen, FAA has determined that it will need additional airport and runway capacity. Efforts to enhance capacity will require substantial advance planning and cost and safety analyses. |
gao_GAO-17-393 | gao_GAO-17-393_0 | We calculated the disenrollment rate for each of these contracts and designated the 126 contracts above the median rate of 10.6 percent as having relatively high disenrollment rates and the 126 contracts below the median rate as having relatively low disenrollment rates. To examine how, if at all, CMS identifies contracts with health-biased disenrollment as part of its routine oversight of MA contracts, we reviewed the agency guidance and data provided to its regional offices and interviewed CMS officials. We examined CMS’s oversight in the context of relevant standards for internal control in the federal government. 1.) Health-biased Disenrollment Found in One-Quarter of MA Contracts with Higher Disenrollment Rates
Among the 126 contracts with higher disenrollment rates, we found that 35 contracts had health-biased disenrollment—meaning that beneficiaries in poor health were substantially more likely to leave their contracts than those in better health. For these 35 contracts, on average, beneficiaries in poor health were 47 percent more likely to disenroll relative to beneficiaries in better health. 2.) Beneficiaries Reported Different Reasons for Disenrolling from Contracts with and without Health-Biased Disenrollment
Our review of CMS’s Disenrollment Reasons Survey reports showed that beneficiaries who disenrolled from the 35 contracts with health-biased disenrollment tended to report that they did so for reasons related to provider coverage. In contrast, beneficiaries who disenrolled from the 91 contracts without health-biased disenrollment tended to report that they left their contracts for reasons related to the cost of care. 3.) By not analyzing disenrollment rates for signs of potential health-biased disenrollment, CMS account managers may fail to identify problems in MA contract performance. This poses a risk to beneficiaries, given that MA contracts are prohibited from limiting or conditioning their coverage or provision of benefits based on health status and must ensure adequate access to covered services for all beneficiaries. CMS’s oversight is also inconsistent with federal internal control standards, which call for agencies to identify, analyze, and respond to risks. This type of information on disenrollment and beneficiary health status is available to CMS; however, by not leveraging it as part of its routine oversight of MA contracts, CMS is missing an opportunity to better target its oversight activities toward MA contracts that may not be adequately meeting the health care needs of all beneficiaries, particularly those in poor health. Recommendation
To strengthen CMS’s oversight of MA contracts, the Administrator of CMS should review data on disenrollment by health status and the reasons beneficiaries disenroll as part of the agency’s routine monitoring efforts. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2016, over 30 percent of Medicare beneficiaries were enrolled in the MA program. Each year beneficiaries have an opportunity to join or leave their MA plan.
GAO was asked to review MA disenrollment by health status and CMS oversight. This report examines, among other issues, (1) the extent of any health-biased disenrollment, (2) beneficiaries' reasons for leaving contracts with and without health biased disenrollment, and (3) how, if at all, CMS identifies contracts with health-biased disenrollment, for routine oversight purposes.
GAO analyzed 2014 disenrollment rates for the 252 MA contracts that had a sufficient number of disenrollees and met other criteria. For the 126 contracts with disenrollment rates above the median rate, GAO used beneficiaries' projected health care costs to identify those in poor health and better health. GAO examined data from CMS's Disenrollment Reasons Survey to learn why beneficiaries reported leaving the 126 contracts with relatively high disenrollment rates. GAO also interviewed CMS officials and compared their oversight to federal standards for internal control.
What GAO Found
Under the Medicare Advantage (MA) program, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) contracts with private entities to offer coverage for Medicare beneficiaries. GAO examined 126 contracts with higher disenrollment rates—above the median rate of 10.6 percent in 2014—and found 35 contracts with health-biased disenrollment. In these contracts, beneficiaries in poor health were substantially more likely (on average, 47 percent more likely) to disenroll relative to beneficiaries in better health. Such disparities in contract disenrollment by health status may indicate that the needs of beneficiaries, particularly those in poor health, may not be adequately met.
GAO found that beneficiaries who left the 35 contracts with health-biased disenrollment tended to report leaving for reasons related to preferred providers and access to care. In contrast, beneficiaries who left the 91 contracts without health-biased disenrollment tended to report that they left their contracts for reasons related to the cost of care.
CMS does not use available data to examine data on disenrollment by health status as part of its ongoing oversight; thus, CMS may fail to identify problems in MA contract performance, which poses a risk as contracts are prohibited from limiting coverage based on health status. CMS's oversight is inconsistent with internal control standards.
What GAO Recommends
To strengthen its oversight of MA contracts, CMS should examine data on disenrollment by health status and the reasons beneficiaries disenroll. HHS concurred with GAO's recommendation. |
gao_GAO-03-948 | gao_GAO-03-948_0 | The CAH program allows eligible rural hospitals to receive Medicare payments based on their reasonable costs rather than under a PPS. In 2002, a PPS was implemented for inpatient rehabilitation. If, however, the other financial benefits associated with the DPU exceeded their combined losses on inpatient and outpatient services, these potential CAHs would have had a countervailing incentive to stay under the PPS, rather than close their DPU and convert. CAH Eligibility Requirements Led to DPU Closures in Rural Communities
The closure of 25 DPUs by hospitals that needed to relinquish their DPU as part of becoming a CAH may have contributed to the lower availability of inpatient psychiatric and rehabilitation services in rural areas. Inpatient psychiatric and rehabilitation providers are concentrated in urban areas, and DPUs are least common among smaller rural hospitals. In fiscal year 1999, 14 percent (93) of potential CAHs operated a DPU. Some rural hospital administrators told us that, even when it was financially advantageous to seek CAH status, they were reluctant to close their DPU because they believed it was needed to maintain access to psychiatric or rehabilitation services in their community. We found 129 potential CAHs that likely would have been able to meet the patient census limit of 15 in 1999 if not for the seasonal increase in their patient census. Most Hospitals Experience Higher Patient Census during Winter
Among hospitals we studied, seasonal fluctuations in patient volume were common. This pattern was consistent with reports from hospital officials that their patient census often increased during the winter due to a higher incidence of flu and pneumonia. Because CAH Patient Census Limit Is Absolute, Potential CAHs Near the Limit May Have Difficulty Staying under It
There were 129 potential CAHs that had at least a slight seasonal increase in 1999 that pushed them over the CAH limit of 15 acute care patients per day for some portion of the year. Relaxing the CAH census limit to an annual average of 15 acute care patients rather than an absolute limit of 15 would accommodate the 129 potential CAHs that exceeded the current limit due to a seasonal increase as they all had an annual average census below 15. Among the 129 potential CAHs, about 60 percent had net losses on Medicare services in fiscal year 1999, indicating they might benefit from CAH conversion, while the 40 percent with net gains would less likely have the financial incentive to convert. From the resulting list of 683 potential CAHs, we identified hospitals operating rehabilitation or psychiatric distinct part units (DPUs), as well as those with seasonal variation in patient census or length of stay that caused them to exceed CAH limits. | Why GAO Did This Study
Critical Access Hospitals (CAHs) are small rural hospitals that receive payment for their reasonable costs of providing inpatient and outpatient services to Medicare beneficiaries, rather than being paid fixed amounts under Medicare's prospective payment systems. Between fiscal years 1997 and 2002, 681 hospitals have become CAHs. In the Medicare, Medicaid and SCHIP Benefits Improvement and Protection Act of 2000, GAO was directed to examine requirements for CAH eligibility, including the ban on inpatient psychiatric or rehabilitation distinct part units (DPUs) and limit on patient census, and to make recommendations on related program changes.
What GAO Found
Using fiscal year 1999 hospital cost report data, GAO identified 683 rural hospitals as "potential CAHs" based on their having an annual average of no more than 15 acute care patients per day. About 14 percent (93) of these potential CAHs operated an inpatient psychiatric or rehabilitation DPU, which they would have to close to convert to CAH status. Among existing CAHs, 25 previously operated a DPU but had to close it as part of becoming a CAH. Among the potential CAHs that operated a DPU, about half had a net loss on Medicare services, indicating they might benefit from CAH conversion. Officials in some hospitals expressed a reluctance to close their DPU, even if conversion would benefit the hospital financially, as they believe the DPU maintains the availability of services in their community. Because inpatient rehabilitation and psychiatric services are disproportionately located in urban areas, even a small number of rural DPU closures may exacerbate any disparities in the availability of these services. Using 1999 Medicare claims data, GAO found 129 potential CAHs that likely would have been able to meet the CAH census limit of no more than 15 acute care patients at any given time if not for a seasonal increase in their patient census. Seasonal increases in patient census were common among the hospitals GAO studied, generally occurring during the winter flu and pneumonia season. For most potential CAHs, their patient census was typically low enough that a small seasonal increase did not cause them to exceed CAH limits. For the 129 potential CAHs that would have had difficulty staying under the CAH limit due to seasonal variation, they could have accommodated their patient volume and had greater flexibility in the management of their patient census if the CAH census limit were changed from an absolute limit of 15 patients per day to an annual average of 15 patients. |
gao_HEHS-95-22 | gao_HEHS-95-22_0 | These issues include the government costs of providing benefits and services to illegal aliens and the impact illegal aliens’ presence has on the employment of U.S. workers. Scope and Methodology
To examine the costs of elementary and secondary education, Medicaid, and adult incarceration associated with illegal aliens residing in California, we evaluated the reasonableness of the assumptions and methodologies underlying the cost estimates published by the state of California in its January and September 1994 studies and the Urban Institute in its Fiscal Impacts study. We also reviewed the revenue estimates for illegal aliens contained in California’s September study and the Fiscal Impacts study. Cost Estimates Are Questionable Due to Limited Data and Varied Assumptions
As of September 1994, California estimated that it will spend $2.35 billion on elementary and secondary education, Medicaid, and adult incarceration for illegal aliens in fiscal year 1994-95. However, differences between legalized and illegal aliens’ use of Medicaid may also explain why California’s estimate was higher. The study provided an estimate ranging from a low of $528 million to a high of $1.4 billion, with a median estimate of $878 million. Federal Efforts Aimed at Improving Cost and Revenue Estimates
Recognizing the problems associated with estimating the fiscal impact of illegal aliens, OMB and the Department of Justice requested the Fiscal Impacts study to help the federal government assess states’ requests for reimbursement of illegal alien costs. The study represents an initial effort to standardize and improve states’ methodologies for estimating selected costs and revenues. To estimate per capita tax payments for legal residents in California, we used Census Bureau data on revenue collected from California residents for each of the five types of revenues and divided these amounts by the size of California’s population. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the fiscal impact of illegal aliens residing in California, focusing on: (1) the Governor of California's 1994 and 1995 budget estimates for elementary and secondary education, Medicaid benefits, and adult incarceration; (2) the estimates of revenues attributable to illegal aliens; and (3) federal efforts to improve estimates of the fiscal impact of illegal aliens residing in California.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) there are limited data on California's illegal alien population's size, use of public services, and tax payments and a lack of consensus on the appropriate methodologies, assumptions, and data sources to use in estimating the costs and revenues for illegal aliens in California; (2) using the most reasonable assumptions, it adjusted California's revised estimates on the costs of elementary and secondary education and adult incarceration for illegal aliens; (3) while its overall adjusted cost estimate of $2.35 billion agreed with the state's revised estimate, the component estimates differed; (4) the estimates of revenues attributable to illegal aliens ranged from $500 million to $1.4 billion, but data limitations prevented it from judging the reasonableness of the revenue estimates; and (5) although the Urban Institute has attempted to standardize and improve states' methodologies for estimating illegal aliens' costs to the public, many differences still remain that will require further consensus. |
gao_NSIAD-97-164 | gao_NSIAD-97-164_0 | Although NATO has no formal program to prepare such nations for NATO membership, it has taken steps to strengthen certain non-NATO members’ relationships with NATO. 1). PFP objectives include fostering democratization in partners’ defense establishments; encouraging joint planning, training, and military exercises with NATO forces; promoting the ability of partner nations to operate with NATO forces in humanitarian relief, search and rescue, peacekeeping, and other agreed-upon missions; and developing forces that are better able to operate with NATO forces. To implement the program, NATO and each PFP partner develop a plan that depicts NATO-proposed exercises and other PFP-related activities of interest to the partner and lists the partner’s military and other assets that might be used for PFP activities. NATO’s PFP Program Helps Partners Prepare for Membership
The Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia are extensively involved in NATO’s PFP program. NATO, U.S., and partner officials agree that PFP is improving the ability of potential new members and other PFP partners to work with NATO in key areas but they cannot quantifiably measure the extent to which it will improve such abilities across the full range of NATO activities. Needs of PFP Partner States
PFP partners need to improve their ability to work closely with NATO in numerous areas, according to U.S., NATO, and partner officials. The remaining 36 percent of the activities involve 13 other PFP cooperation areas. Civil Emergency Planning 6.5%Civil Emergency Plan NATO has also offered partners the opportunity to take part in a planning and review process aimed at helping them meet NATO’s PFP interoperability standards. U.S. Programs Support NATO PFP Efforts
The United States has focused its Warsaw Initiative and other U.S. assistance programs heavily on the six countries that we reviewed. The executive branch programmed about $308.6 million for fiscal years 1995-97 for Warsaw Initiative efforts and other related bilateral assistance programs. It has directed about 46 percent ($142.7 million) of these funds to the six countries that we reviewed. Efforts to Coordinate Allied Support
Several NATO members are providing bilateral assistance to PFP partners. NATO and some of its members are seeking to exchange data about PFP-related efforts in several different forums. Prospective New Members Preparing for NATO Membership
The six countries that we reviewed have taken several steps to demonstrate their interest in joining NATO and to prepare for possible membership. All six of these countries have also demonstrated their interest in NATO by volunteering units to support the NATO-led peace operation effort in Bosnia. NATO officials informed us that the Bosnia mission has greatly promoted the interoperability of these nations’ units with those of NATO members. Scope and Methodology
To address our objectives, we interviewed officials and gathered and analyzed information from officials in the Department of State; the Office of the Secretary of Defense; the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Defense Intelligence Agency; the Defense Security Assistance Agency; the U.S. Mission and Military Delegation to NATO, Brussels, Belgium; the U.S. European Command in Germany; the U.S. Atlantic Command, Norfolk, Virginia; NATO headquarters in Brussels, Belgium; SHAPE in Mons, Belgium; U.S. country delegations in Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Germany; and recipient governments in the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary, and Germany, and Denmark. Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.
Partnership for Peace Areas of Cooperation as of May 1996
North Atlantic Treaty Organization PFP Interoperability Objective Topics
Department of Defense Warsaw Initiative Interoperability Programs
During fiscal years 1995-97 the Department of Defense (DOD) programmed almost $7.3 million to support U.S. interoperability programs in the six countries included in our review, including about $7.2 million for the following programs. DOD programmed almost $2.7 million in fiscal year 1995-97 funds for such studies and a navigational aids study for the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. Additional copies are $2 each. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed how: (1) the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) Partnership for Peace (PFP) program is helping aspiring members prepare for possible NATO membership; (2) U.S. assistance efforts are helping aspiring partner countries to prepare for possible NATO membership; (3) other NATO members' efforts are being coordinated with NATO and U.S. efforts; and (4) aspiring countries are preparing themselves for possible NATO membership. In addressing these objectives, GAO focused on efforts aimed at improving partners' ability to work militarily with NATO, but did not evaluate prospective members' political and economic efforts to prepare for membership.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) NATO, the United States, and other NATO members are assisting prospective new members in areas relevant to NATO's principles for expansion; (2) GAO's analysis indicates the assistance provided under these programs is generally consistent with prospective members' needs, as those needs were identified to GAO by NATO, U.S., and prospective member officials; (3) through exercises, symposia, training, and other activities, NATO's $26.2 million PFP program is helping partner countries begin to improve their ability to work more closely with NATO in PFP-related activities; (4) the six countries that GAO reviewed are using PFP primarily to take part in hundreds of NATO-sponsored exercises, training sessions, communications efforts, and other activities; (5) these events are limited to peacekeeping, search and rescue, and similar missions; (6) while U.S. and NATO officials cannot quantitatively measure the extent to which such events would enhance a future member's ability to work closely with other NATO members on the full range of NATO activities, they believe that the events are improving the ability of partner forces to interoperate with NATO; (7) U.S. bilateral assistance efforts generally complement NATO's PFP program, fall within areas of cooperation designated by NATO and its PFP partners, and reflect an emphasis on helping PFP forces work with NATO forces; (8) while it has programmed $308.6 million in fiscal year 1995 to 1997 funds for such assistance to 23 PFP partners, the United States has focused 46 percent of this amount on efforts involving Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia; (9) about 60 percent of these funds for the six countries is for the purchase of nonlethal military hardware; (10) other NATO members are also assisting PFP partners, although GAO could not determine the overall value of such aid; (11) while NATO seeks to improve its mechanism for coordinating members' assistance efforts, the United States and other major donors are attempting to coordinate directly with one another by exchanging detailed information among themselves; (12) also, NATO's military command has set up a database of PFP and bilateral events; (13) each of the six countries that GAO reviewed has formally informed NATO of its interest in joining NATO and has identified various steps it believes are needed to address NATO's expectations for new members; (14) each is actively involved in PFP and all are participating in the NATO-led peacekeeping operation in Bosnia; and (15) some are seeking to meet NATO interoperability standards, develop new arrangements with neighbors, and streamline their militaries. |
gao_GAO-08-117 | gao_GAO-08-117_0 | To address this problem, multiple U.S. agencies have conducted capacity development efforts at individual Iraqi ministries since 2003. U.S. Efforts to Build Capacity of the Iraqi Government Lack Unified Direction
The implementation of U.S. efforts to help build the capacity of the Iraqi national government over the past 4 years has been characterized by (1) multiple U.S. agencies leading individual efforts without overarching direction from a lead entity or strategic approach that integrates their efforts with Iraqi government priorities and (2) shifting timeframes and priorities in response to deteriorating security and U.S. embassy reorganization. State, USAID, and DOD Lead Individual Efforts without Overall Direction
No single agency is in charge of leading and providing overall direction for U.S. ministry capacity development efforts. However, this effort was abandoned, according to State and USAID officials, and State and DOD developed their own metrics. Low Capacity of Iraq Ministries and Other Challenges Pose Risks to the U.S. Ministry Capacity Development Program
U.S. efforts to develop Iraqi ministerial capacity face four key challenges that pose a risk to their success and long-term sustainability. Iraq Ministries’ Lack of Trained Personnel Hinders Capacity Development
Iraqi government institutions suffer from significant shortages of competent personnel with the skills to perform the vital tasks necessary to provide security and deliver essential services to the Iraqi people. The exodus of employees from the ministries limits U.S. efforts to develop ministry capacity. Nonetheless, the need for an overarching capacity development strategy is clear given that the President has identified ministry capacity development as a key to the success in Iraq, has called for greater integration of U.S. civilian and military efforts to develop Iraqi government capacity, and has requested at least $255 million in additional funding in fiscal year 2008 for these efforts. Moreover, a January 2007 report by the Iraqi National Security Council took steps to identify the critical efforts and coordination needed at key civilian ministries to support the Ministries of Defense and Interior. Finally, it called for U.S. agencies to plan these efforts in consultation with the Iraqi ministries and work with the ministries to determine their needs and priorities. U.S. agencies have provided $169 million to improve the capacity of Iraq’s ministries as of the end of 2006. Key components of an overall capacity development strategy should include a clear purpose, scope, and methodology; a clear delineation of U.S. roles, responsibilities, and coordination, including the designation of a lead agency for capacity development; desired goals, objectives, and activities, based on Iraqi- identified priorities; performance measures based on outcome metrics; and a description of how resources will be targeted to achieve the desired end-state balancing benefits, costs, and both internal risks (such as potential changes in cost, schedule, or objectives) and external risks (such as an increase in violence or militia influence). 10. Appendix II: Scope and Methodology
In this report, we (1) assess the nature and extent of U.S. efforts to develop the capacity of the Iraqi ministries, (2) assess the key challenges to these efforts, and (3) assess the extent to which the U.S. government has an overall strategy for these efforts that incorporates key elements. To describe these programs, we reviewed U.S. government documents including the Department of State’s (State) quarterly section 2207 reports to Congress from October 2004 to April 2007 on the use of Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Funds; State’s quarterly section 1227 reports to Congress from April 2006 to April 2007 on current military, diplomatic, political, and economic measures undertaken to complete the mission in Iraq; the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) contract awarded in July 2006 to Management Systems International, Inc., Building Recovery and Reform through Democratic Governance National Capacity Development Program; reports on USAID’s implementation of the Iraqi Financial Management Information System under the Economic Governance Project II; the U.S. Embassy-Baghdad Joint Task Force for Capacity Development’s catalogue of U.S. capacity development efforts fromApril 2007; the Department of Defense’s (DOD) quarterly reports to Congress, Measuring Security and Stability and Iraq, from July 2005 to June 2007; and Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq’s 2007 Campaign Action Plan. For example, a number of subquestions were not answered for all ministries. Help Iraqi ministries execute budgets and provide metrics for leadership. | Why GAO Did This Study
Iraq's ministries were decimated following years of neglect and centralized control under the former regime. Developing competent and loyal Iraqi ministries is critical to stabilizing and rebuilding Iraq. The President received $140 million in fiscal year 2007 funds and requested an additional $255 million in fiscal year 2008 to develop the capacity of the Iraq's ministries. This report assesses (1) the nature and extent of U.S. efforts to develop the capacity of the Iraqi ministries, (2) the key challenges to these efforts, and (3) the extent to which the U.S. government has an overall integrated strategy for these efforts. For this effort, GAO reviewed U.S. project contracts and reports and interviewed officials from the Departments of State (State), Defense (DOD), and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in Baghdad and Washington, D.C.
What GAO Found
Over the past 4 years, U.S. efforts to help build the capacity of the Iraqi national government have been characterized by (1) multiple U.S. agencies leading individual efforts, without overarching direction from a lead entity that integrates their efforts; and (2) shifting timeframes and priorities in response to deteriorating security and the reorganization of the U.S. mission in Iraq. First, no single agency is in charge of leading the U.S. ministry capacity development efforts, although State took steps to improve coordination in early 2007. State, DOD and USAID have led separate efforts at Iraqi ministries. About $169 million in funds were allocated in 2005 and 2006 for these efforts. As of mid-2007, State and USAID were providing 169 capacity development advisors to 10 key civilian ministries and DOD was providing 215 to the Ministries of Defense and Interior. Second, the focus of U.S. capacity development efforts has shifted from long-term institution-building projects, such as helping the Iraqi government develop its own capacity development strategy, to an immediate effort to help Iraqi ministries overcome their inability to spend their capital budgets and deliver essential services to the Iraqi people. U.S. ministry capacity efforts face four key challenges that pose a risk to their success and long-term sustainability. First, Iraqi ministries lack personnel with key skills, such as budgeting and procurement. Second, sectarian influence over ministry leadership and staff complicates efforts to build a professional and non-aligned civil service. Third, pervasive corruption in the Iraqi ministries impedes the effectiveness of U.S. efforts. Fourth, poor security limits U.S. advisors' access to their Iraqi counterparts, preventing ministry staff from attending planned training sessions and contributing to the exodus of skilled professionals to other countries. The U.S. government is beginning to develop an integrated strategy for U.S. capacity development efforts in Iraq, although agencies have been implementing separate programs since 2003. GAO's previous analyses of U.S. multiagency national strategies demonstrate that such a strategy should integrate the efforts of the involved agencies with the priorities of the Iraqi government, and include a clear purpose and scope; a delineation of U.S. roles, responsibilities, and coordination with other donors, including the United Nations; desired goals and objectives; performance measures; and a description of benefits and costs. Moreover, it should attempt to address and mitigate the risks associated with the four challenges identified above. U.S. ministry capacity efforts to date have included some but not all of these components. For example, agencies are working to clarify roles and responsibilities. However, U.S. efforts lack clear ties to Iraqi-identified priorities at all ministries, clear performance measures to determine results at civilian ministries, and information on how resources will be targeted to achieve the desired end-state. |
gao_GAO-15-732 | gao_GAO-15-732_0 | Such activities are intended to achieve a variety of objectives. Food-for-assets activities provide food in exchange for participation in activities focused on constructing community assets, such as roads or irrigation systems. USAID Does Not Track Use of Conditional Food Aid, although Most Title II Projects Included It in Fiscal Years 2013-2014
USAID does not track the use of conditional food aid in Title II projects, although our comprehensive review of USAID data found that most Title II projects included conditional food aid in fiscal years 2013 and 2014. Despite the prevalence of conditional food aid activities, USAID does not systematically collect or use data on conditional food aid provided through Title II projects and, as a result, could not readily provide data on the use of these activities in USAID’s projects. Our review of available USAID data for fiscal years 2013 and 2014 found that 111 of 119 Title II development and emergency projects included conditional, as well as unconditional, food aid activities and that funding for these projects totaled $2.1 billion—87 percent of all USAID funding for Title II projects during this period. USAID and its implementing partners implemented various conditional food aid activities through these projects, including food for assets, food for training, and maternal and child health care and nutrition. However, without the ability to identify all conditional food aid activities, USAID cannot reliably oversee the projects that use it. According to chapter 203 of USAID’s Automated Directives System (ADS), USAID operating units must strive to continuously learn and improve their approach to achieving results in order to meet development goals. 1). 2). USAID Cannot Systematically Assess Food-for- Assets Activities, but Implementing Partners Highlighted Both Benefits and Challenges
USAID cannot systematically measure the performance of food-for-assets activities across all Title II development projects and therefore cannot determine the effectiveness of food-for-assets activities in achieving short-term or longer-term development goals. While USAID uses indicators to assess the overall effectiveness of these development projects, the agency cannot use these indicators to systematically assess the specific effectiveness of food-for-assets activities across all Title II development projects. During our interviews with 10 implementing partners that implemented 14 projects, partners identified several benefits specific to food-for-assets activities, such as developing needed infrastructure, teaching skills to beneficiaries, and achieving short-term increases in food security. They also cited challenges in implementing these activities, such as difficulty in ensuring the sustainability of the assets created as well as weak technical capacity and inadequate resources in host governments and communities. Additionally, chapter 203 of the ADS states that to ensure accountability, metrics should be matched to meaningful outputs and outcomes that are under the control of the agency. Recommendations for Executive Action
To strengthen USAID’s ability to monitor Title II conditional food aid and evaluate food-for-assets activities’ impact on reducing food insecurity, we recommend that the USAID Administrator take the following two actions: establish a mechanism to readily identify all Title II projects that include conditional food aid activities and systematically collect information about the type of conditional activity included in each project and systematically assess the effectiveness of food-for-assets activities in development projects in achieving project goals and objectives. In its written comments, USAID concurred with our recommendations. Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to examine (1) the U.S. Agency for International Development’s (USAID) use of conditional food aid through Title II development and emergency projects in fiscal years 2013 and 2014, (2) the factors that implementing partners considered and the challenges they faced when designing food-for-assets activities in development projects, and (3) the extent to which USAID assessed the effectiveness of food-for-assets activities in development projects. Washington, D.C.: May 24, 2007. | Why GAO Did This Study
In fiscal year 2014, USAID awarded about $1.3 billion for emergency and development food aid under Title II of the Food for Peace Act. USAID's implementing partners may provide what is known as conditional food aid—that is, food in exchange for beneficiaries' participation in activities intended to support development. For example, food-for-assets activities are intended to address beneficiaries' immediate food needs while building assets to improve longer-term food security. Questions have arisen about whether the dual goals of addressing both immediate and long-term needs may compromise the ability to achieve either goal, underscoring the need to understand conditional food aid.
This report examines, among other things, (1) USAID's use of conditional food aid through Title II development and emergency awards in fiscal years 2013 and 2014 and (2) the extent to which USAID has assessed the effectiveness of food-for-assets activities in development projects. GAO analyzed agency and partner documents and interviewed agency and partner officials in Washington, D.C., and in three countries selected on the basis of project type and representing a variety of partners.
What GAO Found
The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) does not track the use of conditional food aid in projects funded under Title II of the Food for Peace Act. However, GAO's comprehensive review of USAID data found that most Title II projects included conditional food aid in fiscal years 2013 and 2014. Despite the prevalence of conditional food aid activities, USAID does not regularly collect data on conditional food aid provided through Title II projects and, as a result, could not readily provide data on the use of these activities in USAID's projects. Without the ability to identify all conditional food aid activities, USAID cannot systematically oversee the projects that include them. According to USAID's operational policy, USAID operating units must strive to continuously learn and improve their approach to achieving results in order to meet development goals. GAO's review of available USAID data for fiscal years 2013 and 2014 found that 111 of 119 Title II development and emergency projects included conditional food aid activities and that funding for these projects totaled $2.1 billion—87 percent of all USAID funding for Title II projects during this period. USAID and its implementing partners implemented various conditional food aid activities, most commonly a type known as food for assets, through these projects (see fig.). Beneficiaries of food-for-assets activities typically must work at constructing community assets, such as roads or irrigation systems, in exchange for food.
USAID cannot systematically measure the performance of food-for-assets activities across all Title II development projects and therefore cannot determine the effectiveness of food-for-assets activities in achieving short-term or longer-term development goals. According to USAID's operational policy, measures of program effectiveness should be matched to meaningful outputs under the agency's control. While USAID uses indicators to assess the effectiveness of Title II projects, USAID cannot use these indicators to systematically assess the specific effectiveness of food for assets across its Title II projects. However, during GAO's interviews with 10 implementing partners that implemented 14 projects, partners identified several benefits specific to food-for-assets activities, such as developing needed infrastructure, teaching skills to beneficiaries, and achieving short-term increases in food security. Partners also cited challenges in implementing these activities, such as difficulty in ensuring the sustainability of created assets as well as interruptions resulting from weather and civil conflict.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that USAID (1) establish a mechanism to readily identify all Title II programs that include conditional food aid activities and (2) systematically assess the effectiveness of food-for-assets activities in development projects. USAID concurred with the recommendations but disagreed with some aspects of GAO's findings. GAO continues to believe its findings are valid, as discussed in the report. |
gao_GAO-08-504 | gao_GAO-08-504_0 | Implementing a Combined Federal Flood and Wind Insurance Program Would Require FEMA to Address Several Management Challenges
To implement a combined federal flood and wind insurance program, FEMA would need to complete a number of steps, similar to those undertaken to establish the NFIP, which would require the agency to address several challenges. First, FEMA would need to undertake studies in order to determine appropriate building codes that communities would be required to adopt in order to participate in the combined program. Fourth, promoting the combined federal flood and wind insurance program in communities would require that FEMA staff raise awareness of the combined program’s availability and coordinate enforcement of the new building codes. FEMA Would Need to Adapt Existing NFIP Processes for Wind Coverage
While some of the NFIP’s current processes could be leveraged to implement a combined federal flood and wind program, they would need to be revised, an action that could pose further challenges for FEMA. H.R. FEMA Would Need to Set Premium Rates for the Flood and Wind Program Adequate to Cover All Future and Catastrophic Losses without Borrowing
Setting premium rates that would adequately reflect all expected costs without borrowing from the Treasury would require FEMA to make a number of sophisticated determinations. This determination could be particularly difficult because it is unclear whether the program might be able to purchase reinsurance, and because attempting to build up a sufficient surplus to pay for catastrophic losses would require high premium rates compared to the size of expected claims and an unknown number of years without larger than average losses, over which FEMA has no control. As a result, in setting rates FEMA would need to determine how much the program would be required to pay, including in years with catastrophic losses, and use this amount in setting rates, as is done by private sector insurers. H.R. FEMA Would Need to Account for Likely Adverse Selection and Limited Participation
In determining a premium rate for a federal flood and wind program that was adequate to pay all future costs, FEMA would also need to take into account the adverse selection—the tendency to insure primarily the highest risks—and limited participation the program would likely experience. 3121 would require the new program to charge rates adequate to cover all future costs, potentially precluding any subsidies. Second, a federal flood and wind policy would have lower coverage limits than the flood and wind coverage currently available in high-risk coastal areas, further limiting participation. A Federal Flood and Wind Insurance Program Could Benefit Some but Would Involve Trade- offs
While a combined federal flood and wind program would entail costs, it could benefit some property owners and market participants. While H.R. For example, losses from Hurricane Katrina and other hurricanes were beyond what NFIP could pay with the premiums it had collected. As of December 2007, FEMA still owed approximately $17.3 billion to the Treasury, an amount it is unlikely able to repay. 3121 to stop renewing or selling new polices until such losses are repaid could actually increase the cost to the federal government. FEMA also generally agreed with our findings and emphasized the challenges it would face in addressing several key issues. Finally, FEMA provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. In addition, we stated that termination of the program due to the borrowing restriction could potentially leave some property owners uninsured following a catastrophic event and limit FEMA’s ability to repay any borrowed funds. 3121, the Flood Insurance Reform and Modernization Act of 2007, in terms of (1) the program’s potential effects on policyholders, insurance market participants, and the federal government; (2) what would be required for Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to determine and charge actuarially sound premium rates; and (3) the steps FEMA would have to take to implement the program. To evaluate the program’s potential effects on policyholders, insurance market participants, and the federal government, we interviewed officials from the FEMA, the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), state insurance regulators, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), state wind insurance program operators, primary insurers, reinsurers, insurance and reinsurance associations, insurance agent associations, risk- modeling organizations, actuarial consultants, the American Academy of Actuaries (AAA), the Association of State Flood Plain Managers (ASFPM), the National Flood Determination Association (NFDA), and others. | Why GAO Did This Study
Disputes between policyholders and insurers after the 2005 hurricanes highlight the challenges of determining the cause and extent of damages when properties are subject to both high winds and flooding. Additionally, insurers want to reduce their exposure in high-risk areas, and state wind insurance programs have grown significantly. H.R. 3121, the Flood Insurance Reform and Modernization Act of 2007, would create a combined federal insurance program with coverage for both wind and flood damage. GAO was asked to evaluate this potential program in terms of (1) what would be required to implement it; (2) the steps the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) would need to take to determine premium rates that reflect all future costs; and (3) how it could affect policyholders, insurance market participants, and the federal government. To address these questions, GAO analyzed state and federal programs, examined studies of coastal wind insurance issues, and interviewed federal and state regulatory officials as well as industry participants and analysts. FEMA and the National Association of Insurance Commissioners generally agreed with GAO's report findings. FEMA emphasized the challenges it would face in addressing several key issues. FEMA also provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
To implement a combined federal flood and wind insurance program, FEMA would need to complete certain challenging steps. First, FEMA would need to determine wind hazard prevention standards that communities would have to adopt in order to receive coverage. Second, FEMA would need to adapt existing programs to accommodate wind coverage--for example, the Write Your Own program. Third, FEMA would need to create a new rate-setting process, as the process for setting flood insurance rates is different from what is needed for wind coverage. Fourth, promoting the new program in communities would require that FEMA staff raise awareness of the combined program's availability and coordinate enforcement of the new building codes. Finally, FEMA would need to put staff and procedures in place to administer and oversee the new program while it faces current management and oversight challenges with the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP). Setting premium rates adequate to cover all the expected costs of flood and wind damage would require FEMA to make sophisticated determinations. For example, FEMA would need to determine how the program would pay claims in years with catastrophic losses without borrowing from the Department of the Treasury. H.R. 3121 would require the program to stop renewing or selling new policies if it needed to borrow funds, effectively terminating the program. It is also unclear whether the program could obtain reinsurance to cover such losses, and attempting to fund losses by building up a surplus would potentially require high premium rates and an unknown number of years without large losses, something over which FEMA has no control. Further, FEMA would need to account for the likelihood that participation would be limited and only the highest-risk properties would be insured. These factors would further increase premium rates and make it difficult to set rates adequate to cover future costs. A federal flood and wind insurance program could benefit some policyholders and market participants but would also involve trade-offs. For example, not requiring adjusters to distinguish between flood and wind damage could reduce both delays in reimbursing participants and the potential for litigation. However, borrowing restrictions could also leave property owners without coverage after a catastrophic event. In addition, the proposed coverage limits are relatively low compared with the coverage that is currently available, potentially leaving some properties underinsured. The program could also reduce the exposure of some insurers by insuring high-risk properties that currently have private sector coverage. However, an unknown portion of the exposure currently held by state wind programs--nearly $600 billion in 2007--could be transferred to the federal government. While H.R. 3121 would require premium rates to be adequate to cover any exposure and restrict borrowing by the program, the potential exists for losses to greatly exceed expectations, as happened with Hurricane Katrina in 2005. This could increase FEMA's total debt, which as of December 2007 was about $17.3 billion. |
gao_GAO-04-104T | gao_GAO-04-104T_0 | In his letter to the then Ranking Member of the Committee on Finance, then Secretary of the Treasury O’Neill addressed the actions being taken to combat abusive shelters, referring to Treasury’s March 20, 2002, enforcement proposals on the topic. Nature of Abusive Shelters Is Varied and Complex
Abusive shelters are complex transactions that manipulate many parts of the tax code or regulations and are typically buried among “legitimate” transactions reported on tax returns. Several Sources Indicate That the Scope of Abusive Shelters Is in the Tens of Billions of Dollars, Though All Are Based on Limited Data
IRS has information that suggests the scope of abusive shelters totaled tens of billions of dollars over about a decade, but those estimates are based on limited data. It was also aware of about 6,400 investors, including individuals and corporations that bought abusive shelters and other aggressive tax planning products. Nevertheless, as table 2 shows, the contractor produced estimates of the size of the problem for each year from 1993 through 1999. Although IRS documents outline an overall strategy for combating abusive shelters, IRS has generally not yet defined long-term performance goals for the effort and the measures it would use to track progress in achieving those goals.However, IRS is planning to establish such goals and measures when it has more information on the abusive shelter activities it is currently tracking. IRS Efforts Are to Deter, Detect, and Resolve
IRS focuses its efforts on deterring future marketing and sales of abusive tax shelters and on detecting and resolving existing shelters. Resource Shifts Are Significant but IRS Faces Challenges in Addressing Abusive Shelter Workload
Using admittedly limited information, IRS used a systematic decision- making process in deciding to shift a large portion of LMSB examination staff resources toward addressing abusive shelters. Even so, IRS faces challenges, especially in the near term, in addressing expected increases in its shelter workload because of the growing number of shelter cases and limited information it has on how long it takes to conduct shelter examinations. IRS Used Systematic Planning and Budgeting Process to Determine Staffing Priorities
At an agencywide level, IRS decided staffing resource levels to be devoted to addressing abusive shelters through a systematic planning and budgeting process based on experience and professional judgment because IRS did not and does not have a reliable measure of the abusive shelter problem. According to IRS’s fiscal year 2004 congressional budget justification, LMSB planned to allocate 691 and 949 FTEs in fiscal years 2003 and 2004, respectively. Because (1) the known abusive shelter workload has increased, (2) IRS has limited experience to judge how many resources will be needed to work the cases for how long a period, and (3) the workload may continue to increase, it remains uncertain whether the substantial shift of resources to shelter work will enable IRS to examine in a timely manner the growing workload associated with shelters. We encourage IRS to continue its efforts to obtain a better analytic basis for determining the resources needed to address schemes and shelters–while providing sufficient attention to other tax compliance areas–and to develop goals and measures that it and Congress can use to gauge IRS’s progress. | Why GAO Did This Study
Recent scandals involving corporations, company executives, and accounting, law, and investment banking firms heightened awareness of abusive tax shelters and highlighted the importance of the Department of the Treasury and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) addressing them. During 1999, Treasury issued a report indicating that abusive shelters were a large and growing problem, involving billions of dollars of tax reductions. Treasury was concerned that abusive shelters could ultimately undermine the integrity of the voluntary compliance tax system. GAO's statement today is based on work done at the request of the Chairman and the Ranking Minority Member of the Senate Committee on Finance to examine IRS's strategy for dealing with abusive tax shelters. In reporting on abusive shelters, GAO is describing (1) their nature and scope; (2) IRS's strategy and enforcement mechanisms to combat them and the performance goals and measures IRS uses to track its major effort in that area; and (3) the decision-making process IRS used and the plans it has to devote more resources to addressing abusive shelters.
What GAO Found
By their nature, abusive tax shelters are varied, complex, and difficult to detect and measure. Abusive shelters manipulate many parts of the tax code or regulations and may involve steps to hide the transaction within a tax return. In recent years, IRS has been accumulating information about them and, although it does not have a reliable measure of the size of the abusive shelter problem, has come to believe that abusive shelters deserve substantially increased attention. IRS continues to gather more information to better define the scope of the problem and has data sources, all with their own limitations, that suggest abusive tax shelters total tens of billions of dollars of potential tax losses over about a decade. IRS's broad-based strategy for addressing abusive shelters included: (1) targeting promoters to head off the proliferation of shelters; (2) making efforts to deter, detect, and resolve abuse; (3) offering inducements to individuals and businesses to disclose their use of questionable tax practices; and (4) using performance indicators to measure outputs and some outcomes and intending to go down the path it has started and develop long-term performance goals and measures linked to those goals. Without these latter elements, Congress would find gauging IRS's progress difficult. In allocating resources to shelters, IRS used a systematic decision-making process that relied on admittedly limited information. It planned to shift significant resources in fiscal years 2003 and 2004 to address abusive shelters but faces challenges, especially in the near term, in addressing abusive shelters due to a growing workload and limited information on how long it takes to examine shelter cases. IRS's understanding of how many staff will be needed to address the problem over what period will continue to evolve as it gains a better understanding of the problem's scope. |
gao_NSIAD-97-26 | gao_NSIAD-97-26_0 | Although the information needed to measure progress toward FASA’s criteria is not available, federal agencies have reported executing relatively few procurement actions through FACNET. Agencies and vendors reported that FACNET has resulted in lower prices and expanded markets in some cases but, more generally stated that FACNET was not providing the benefits expected. Similarly, at least 14 of the 18 agencies we contacted cited the lack of a sound FACNET infrastructure and the lack of effective engineering and operational management as great or very great obstacles to efficient and effective implementation of FACNET. Buyers and vendors have been reluctant to do business through FACNET, in part, because of operational problems. Vendor registration in, and agency use of, the CCR database is mandated in the governmentwide Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) implementing FASA’s requirements for FACNET. More generally, however, government buyers have found that using FACNET to award contracts of $25,000 or less takes longer and requires more resources than traditional methods. As mandated by FASA, FACNET focuses primarily on competitive solicitations and new contract awards,requiring a federal agency to provide widespread public notice and exchange information with multiple vendors—not just one. Several OFPP, ECA-PMO, GSA, and other agency officials said that focusing FACNET’s implementation on competitive procurements has contributed significantly to FACNET’s problems and the skepticism that surrounds the existing infrastructure. The Administrator for Federal Procurement Policy and other agency officials also told us that FASA’s requirement to focus FACNET principally on awarding relatively low dollar value contracts competitively may not have been a good idea. Agencies and vendors have consistently cited the lack of clear leadership, direction, and adequate program management governmentwide as major reasons for delays in problem resolution and implementation of FACNET. A governmentwide strategy for FACNET implementation has not been clearly and convincingly communicated. The DCI specifically asked for agency data and information related to (1) current FACNET operations, (2) current and potential FACNET procurement transactions, (3) benefits from using FACNET, (4) obstacles to governmentwide implementation of FACNET, (5) potential use of FACNET for simplified acquisitions, and (6) changes needed in the FACNET development and implementation strategies. We asked electronic commerce program managers and comparable agency officials at Department of Defense, its 4 major buying components, and 18 federal civilian agencies to give us information and observations on their agencies’ efforts to implement the Federal Acquisition Computer Network (FACNET). GAO Comments
1. 2. 3. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the federal government's progress in developing and implementing the Federal Acquisition Computer Network (FACNET), focusing on: (1) federal agencies' use of FACNET; (2) problems and benefits of using FACNET; (3) concerns relating to the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act's (FASA) requirements for FACNET; and (4) management obstacles to effective governmentwide implementation of FACNET.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) overall, the federal government has executed relatively few procurement actions through FACNET; (2) the Department of Defense executed the vast majority of all FACNET procurement actions that federal agencies have reported; (3) difficulties doing business through FACNET have overshadowed the benefits of using it; (4) officials from at least 14 of the 18 agencies GAO contacted rated the lack of a sound FACNET infrastructure, effective engineering and operational management, and a well-populated and fully functional centralized contractor registration database as great or very great obstacles to effective FACNET implementation; (5) officials of many federal agencies said the current FACNET approach is out of step with new, cost-effective technologies and buying practices; (6) although FACNET has, in some instances, resulted in lower prices and expanded access to vendors, agency officials and vendors often said that FACNET is not producing the benefits expected; (7) agencies' analyses have concluded that using FACNET to award contracts of $25,000 or less often takes longer and requires more resources than traditional simplified purchasing methods for such awards; (8) as mandated by FASA, FACNET implementation has focused primarily on competitive contract awards, requiring agencies to exchange information with multiple, often unknown vendors; (9) organizations with the most success in using electronic data interchange technology for purchasing, however, typically use it to transmit high-volume, routine, and repetitive transactions with a small group of known suppliers; (10) federal officials have stated that FASA's requirement to focus FACNET's implementation principally on competitive contract awards may not have been a good approach and has contributed significantly to FACNET's problems; (11) agencies and vendors have consistently cited leadership and management shortcomings as major reasons for delays and unresolved problems in FACNET implementation; and (12) agency officials also expressed considerable uncertainty about what the governmentwide strategy for FACNET implementation is. |
gao_GAO-02-265 | gao_GAO-02-265_0 | Some Applicants May Have Experienced Barriers to College Access
Of the nearly 2,500 applicants who were eligible for the tuition assistance grant, 21 percent—or 516 applicants—did not use the grant in academic year 2000-01 and some of these applicants may have faced barriers due to college entrance requirements and the absence of minority outreach programs. Whether caps on the number of out-of-state residents who can enroll at an institution served as a barrier to college access for these eligible TAG applicants is unclear. Although Most Initial Concerns Have Been Resolved, Some Administrative Issues May Hinder Program Operations
Although most concerns about administration of the TAG Program that were initially raised by four large institutions were largely resolved by the revision of the regulations in December 2000, some administrative issues exist that may hinder program operations. In fact, all four institutions have now signed a Program Participation Agreement with the mayor of the District of Columbia, formally agreeing to participate in the grant program. We wanted to explore several issues, such as the extent to which TAG-eligible applicants who did not use the tuition assistance grant faced barriers to college access, how student enrollment at the University of the District of Columbia (UDC) has changed since the TAG Program began, whether UDC and TAG serve similar freshmen populations, and whether there are program administration issues that could potentially hinder the TAG Program operations. | What GAO Found
Twenty-one percent of grant-eligible applicants who did not use the District of Columbia's tuition assistance grant (TAG) funding to attend a participating college or university may have encountered such barriers as college entrance requirements and the absence of minority outreach programs. Whether enrollment caps at colleges posed a barrier for applicants is unclear. In the program's first year, 516 of the nearly 2,500 eligible applicants did not use the grants. About 21 percent of the institutions in which applicants expressed interest restrict the number of out-of-state students that they will accept, although the extent to which this played a role in limiting access to these institutions is unclear. Enrollment at the University of the District of Columbia (UDC) changed little during the TAG program's first year. The TAG program and UDC appeared to serve different freshmen populations, which may account for the TAG program's minimal impact on UDC enrollment. Although concerns about TAG program administration were largely resolved with the revision of program regulations in December 2000, other administrative issues may hinder program operations, including the determination of applicant eligibility and the distribution of information on institutions participating in the program. |
gao_GAO-10-477 | gao_GAO-10-477_0 | Recognizing that nonprofit organizations have diverse characteristics and accounting practices, the guidance states that it is not possible to specify the types of cost that may be classified as indirect costs in all situations. According to OMB officials, the terms “direct” and “indirect” can be thought of as ways to classify costs; that is, they are “cost buckets.” In contrast, the term “administrative” refers to a cost function or activity—such as accounting, procurement, personnel, or budgeting. Classifying similar costs differently can make it difficult to determine how much money grantees receive for cost activities typically thought of as indirect, and at what rate. When grants and grantees classify similar costs differently it can also result in the same cost activity being covered for some nonprofits but not others, and can increase the complexity of administering the grants. Inconsistencies in guidance in grant award packages and across federal programs add to the challenge of administering federal grants. Nonprofits’ Reimbursement for Indirect Costs Largely Depends on Federal, State, and Local Government Practices
For the majority of grants in our review, we found that state and local government grantees are allowed to decide whether or not and how much they reimburse nonprofit subgrantees for their administrative or indirect costs. In all three states we reviewed, we found differences in the rates at which state and local governments reimburse nonprofits for indirect costs. These differences, including whether nonprofits are reimbursed at all, largely depend on the policies and practices of the state and local governments that award federal funds to nonprofits. Although states often enjoy wide latitude in determining the administrative and indirect reimbursement rates of their subgrantees, applying a more specific interpretation of federal statute potentially limits the amount of funds available to nonprofits. Variations in cost coverage exist not only among different grants across different states, but also within the same grant across different states. When Nonprofits Report Differences between Indirect Costs Incurred and Reimbursed, They Take a Variety of Steps to Bridge Gaps
Nonprofits Fund Indirect Costs from a Variety of Sources
To help cover their indirect costs, nonprofits reported using funding from a variety of sources in addition to federal funds, such as capacity-building grants, private donations, fundraising, endowment funds, and business income generated from services provided. Nonprofits Take Steps to Bridge Reported Funding Gaps
Fifteen of the 17 nonprofits in our sample reported that funding received for indirect costs does not cover their actual indirect costs. Limited Ability to Build a Financial Safety Net
Nonprofits’ strained resources also limit their ability to build financial reserves for unanticipated expenses. Officials at a Louisiana nonprofit said that their ability to build a financial safety net is limited because they struggle to cover their costs and do not have money left over to save. Factors such as untimely reimbursements and high grant administration costs can place stress on the nonprofit sector, diminishing its ability to continue to provide services to vulnerable populations. A 2002 study that reviewed prior research on this topic noted that when government agencies are delayed in approving contracts or grant payments, recipient organizations often experience cash flow problems. Conclusions
Federal, state, and local governments rely on nonprofit organizations as key partners in implementing programs and providing services to the public, such as health care, human services, and housing-related services. Recommendation for Executive Action
GAO recommends that the Director of OMB bring together federal, state, and local governments, and nonprofit representatives to propose ways to clarify and improve understanding of how indirect costs should be treated, particularly for grants passed through state and local governments to nonprofits by clarifying the definitions of indirect costs and administrative costs and their relationship to each other and considering ways to help nonprofits improve their understanding and ability to better capture, categorize, report, and recover indirect and administrative costs. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to provide information for selected federal grant programs and nonprofits on (1) how indirect cost terminology and classification vary, (2) how indirect costs are reimbursed, and (3) if gaps occur between indirect costs incurred and reimbursed, steps nonprofits take to bridge the gaps. | Why GAO Did This Study
Nonprofits are key partners in delivering federal services yet reportedly often struggle to cover their indirect costs (costs not readily identifiable with particular programs or projects). This raises concerns about fiscal strain on the sector. To provide information on nonprofits' indirect cost reimbursement, especially when funding flows through entities such as state and local governments, GAO was asked to review, for selected grants and nonprofits, (1) how indirect cost terminology and classification vary, (2) how indirect costs are reimbursed, and (3) if gaps occur between indirect costs incurred and reimbursed, steps taken to bridge gaps. GAO selected six Departments of Health and Human Services and Housing and Urban Development grants and 17 nonprofits in Louisiana, Maryland, and Wisconsin. GAO selected these agencies for their historical relationship with nonprofits. GAO reviewed policies and documents governing indirect costs and interviewed relevant officials. GAO also reviewed research on nonprofits' indirect costs.
What GAO Found
Depending on the grant program, nonprofits may be reimbursed for indirect costs (generally costs such as rent or utilities), administrative costs (generally cost activities such as accounting or personnel), both, or neither. OMB officials said costs can be classified as either indirect or direct, and administrative cost activities are usually, but not always, classified as indirect costs. However, inconsistencies in the use and meaning of the terms indirect and administrative, and their relationship to each other, has made it difficult for state and local governments and nonprofits to classify costs consistently. This has resulted in varying interpretations of what activity costs are indirect versus administrative. As OMB guidance on cost principles for nonprofits recognizes (2 CFR Part 230), because nonprofit organizations have diverse characteristics and accounting practices, it is not possible to specify the types of costs that may be classified as indirect in all situations. This increases the challenges of administering federal grants and, in some cases, makes it difficult for recipients to determine those activities eligible for indirect cost reimbursement under a particular federal grant and those that are not. GAO found differences in the rate in which state and local governments reimburse nonprofits for indirect costs. These differences, including whether nonprofits are reimbursed at all, largely depend on the policies and practices of the state and local governments that award federal funds to nonprofits. Federal grants often provide wide latitude in setting cost reimbursement policies and practices, and some state and local governments do not reimburse these costs at all. Those that do can often choose the reimbursement rate. As a result, GAO found that variations in indirect cost reimbursement exist not only among different grants, but also within the same grant across different states. GAO found that nonprofits fund indirect costs with a variety of federal and nonfederal funding sources, and that when indirect cost reimbursement is less than the amount of indirect costs nonprofits determine they have incurred, most nonprofits GAO interviewed take steps to bridge the gap. They may reduce the population served or the scope of services offered, and may forgo or delay physical infrastructure and technology improvements and staffing needs. Because many nonprofits view cuts in clients served or services offered as unpalatable, they reported that they often compromise vital "back-office" functions, which over time can affect their ability to meet their missions. Further, nonprofits' strained resources limit their ability to build a financial safety net, which can create a precarious financial situation for them. Absent a sufficient safety net, nonprofits that experience delays in receiving their federal funding may be inhibited in their ability to bridge funding gaps. When funding is delayed, some nonprofits said they either borrow funds on a line of credit or use cash reserves to provide services and pay bills until their grant awards are received. Collectively, these issues place stress on the nonprofit sector, diminishing its ability to continue to effectively partner with the federal government to provide services to vulnerable populations. |
gao_GAO-12-163 | gao_GAO-12-163_0 | TSA revised and updated its Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) for the program. TSA developed a 2011 strategic implementation plan. Challenges Affecting TSA Assessment Efforts
Even with TSA’s efforts to enhance the program, challenges remain in several areas: gaining access to some foreign airports, developing an automated database to manage program information, prioritizing and providing training and technical assistance, and expanding the scope of TSA’s airport assessments to include all-cargo operations, as discussed below. For example, following the October 2010 discovery of explosive devices in air cargo packages bound for the United States from Yemen, TSA loaned six hand- held explosives trace detection devices to Yemen in an expedited fashion as a response to an emergent threat to help enhance the government’s passenger and cargo screening processes. Some Number of Foreign Airports Complied with ICAO Standards, but TSA Could Better Use Its Assessment Results
Some Foreign Airports Complied with ICAO Standards, but TSA Identified Serious Noncompliance Issues at Other Airports
Based on our analysis of the results of TSA’s foreign airport assessments conducted during fiscal year 2006 through May 9, 2011, some number of the foreign airports TSA assessed complied with all of TSA’s aviation security assessment standards. Common areas of noncompliance included weaknesses in airport access controls and passenger and baggage screening. For example, our analysis showed that some number of regions of the world had no airports with egregious noncompliance while some regions had several such airports. TSA Has Not Yet Analyzed Its Assessment Results to Identify Trends and Better Inform Future Activities
TSA has not taken steps to analyze or evaluate its foreign airport assessment results in the aggregate to identify regional and other trends over time, which could assist the agency in informing and prioritizing its future activities. TSA has one internally funded program in place that is specifically intended to provide aviation security training and technical assistance to foreign aviation security officials. Moreover, with analysis of airport assessment results, TSA could better inform its risk management decision making by identifying trends and security gaps, and target capacity building efforts accordingly. Opportunities Exist to Clarify Airport Assessment Criteria, Further Target Airport Assessments, and Systematically Identify Security Best Practices
While TSA has taken a number of steps to improve and streamline its foreign airport assessment program since our 2007 report, opportunities exist for TSA to make additional improvements in several key areas. This is particularly important given that these scores represent an overall assessment of an airport’s level of compliance or noncompliance with ICAO standards that TSA has deemed critical to airport security, and also are a key component of TSA foreign airport risk- ranking determinations. Although we recognize the inherently subjective nature of the standards, providing TSA decision makers with more specific criteria and definitions for determining a foreign airport’s level of compliance with ICAO standards would provide greater assurance that such determinations are consistent across airports over time. In addition, TSA officials we spoke with identified opportunities for TSA to increase program efficiency by conducting more targeted airport assessments. For example, while accompanying TSA inspectors during an airport assessment, we observed TSA inspectors being briefed on various passenger screening processes, technologies, and equipment that were comparable to, and in some cases may have exceeded, those used in the U.S. We believe establishing a mechanism to systematically compile and analyze this type of information could help ensure TSA is more effectively able to assist foreign airports in meeting ICAO standards and improve security practices, as well as identify security practices and technologies that may be applicable to enhancing the security of U.S. airports. For example, developing a mechanism to evaluate assessment results to determine security trends and patterns could enable TSA to target and prioritize future assessment activities, including training and other capacity building resources. Moreover, establishing criteria and guidance for determining the vulnerability of individual foreign airports would provide for greater consistency of these vulnerability ratings across airports over time. DHS concurred with the third recommendation that TSA consider the feasibility of conducting more targeted assessments and systematically compiling information on aviation security best practices. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To examine the efforts made by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to determine whether foreign airports that provide service to the United States are maintaining and carrying out effective security measures, we addressed the following questions: (1) to what extent has TSA taken steps to enhance its foreign airport assessment program since 2007, and what challenges remain; (2) what are the results of TSA’s foreign airport assessments, and to what extent does TSA use the results of these assessments to guide its future assessment activities; and (3) what opportunities, if any, exist to enhance the value of TSA’s foreign airport assessment program? | Why GAO Did This Study
International flights bound for the United States continue to be targets of terrorist activity, as demonstrated by the October 2010 discovery of explosive devices in air cargo packages bound for the United States from Yemen. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is responsible for securing the nation's civil aviation system, which includes ensuring the security of U.S.-bound flights. As requested, GAO evaluated (1) the steps TSA has taken to enhance its foreign airport assessment program since 2007, and any remaining program challenges; (2) TSA's assessment results, including how TSA uses the results to guide future efforts; and (3) what opportunities, if any, exist to enhance the program. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed foreign airport assessment procedures and results, interviewed TSA and foreign aviation security officials, and observed TSA conduct a foreign airport assessment. While these interviews and observations are not generalizable, they provided insights on TSA's program. This is the public version of a sensitive report GAO issued in September, 2011. Information that TSA deemed sensitive has been omitted.
What GAO Found
Since 2007, TSA has taken a number of steps to enhance its foreign airport assessment program, some of which were taken in response to GAO's prior recommendations. For example, TSA updated its policies and methodologies used to guide and prioritize its assessment efforts, and implemented tools to track its annual assessment schedule, airport assessment results, and foreign government progress in resolving security deficiencies previously identified during the assessments. However, challenges remain in gaining access to some foreign airports, developing an automated database to better manage program information, prioritizing and providing training and technical assistance to foreign countries, and expanding the scope of TSA's airport assessments to include all-cargo operations. TSA has various efforts under way to address these challenges. Based on GAO's analysis of TSA's foreign airport assessments conducted from fiscal year 2006 through May 2011, some foreign airports complied with all of TSA's aviation security assessment standards; however, TSA has identified serious noncompliance issues at a number of foreign airports. Common areas of noncompliance included weaknesses in airport access controls and passenger and baggage screening. Moreover, GAO's analysis showed variation in airport compliance across geographic regions and individual security standards, among other things. For example, GAO's analysis showed that some number of regions of the world had no airports with egregious noncompliance while other regions had several such airports. However, TSA has not yet taken steps to evaluate its assessment results to identify regional and other trends over time. Developing a mechanism to evaluate its assessment results could help support TSA's priorities for aviation security training and technical assistance, inform its risk management decision making by identifying any trends and security gaps, and target capacity building efforts. Opportunities also exist for TSA to make additional program improvements in several key areas. For example, the agency has not developed criteria and guidance for determining foreign airport vulnerability ratings. This is particularly important given that these ratings are a key component for how TSA determines each foreign airport's risk level. Providing TSA decision makers with more specific criteria and definitions could provide greater assurance that such determinations are consistent across airports over time. In addition, there are opportunities for TSA to increase program efficiency and effectiveness by, for example, conducting more targeted foreign airport assessments and systematically compiling and analyzing security best practices. Taking such actions could help TSA better focus its assessments to address areas of highest risk, and identify security best practices and technologies that may be applicable to enhancing the security of both foreign and domestic airports.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that TSA develop a mechanism to evaluate its assessment results to identify any trends, and target resources and future activities; establish criteria for determining foreign airport vulnerability ratings; and consider the feasibility of conducting more targeted assessments and compiling information on aviation security best practices. DHS agreed with the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-12-803T | gao_GAO-12-803T_0 | CMS and States Have Undertaken Efforts to Improve Medicaid Program Integrity, but More Needs to Be Done
CMS and the states are continuing to strengthen provider enrollment standards and procedures, as well as developing adequate controls to detect improper claims before they are paid. Finally, the agency has not established a robust process for incorporating RAC-identified vulnerabilities in state corrective action plans. While these problems were identified in nearly every state, CMS also reported that it had noticed a positive trend in states’ awareness of regulatory requirements and knowledge of how to implement the requirements. According to CMS officials, they have had discussions with and provided guidance and technical assistance to states regarding the use of predictive analytics to identify and prevent improper payments both informally and during three recent Medicaid Integrity Institute symposiums. Federal Postpayment Claims Reviews Are Becoming More Collaborative; Introduction of Recovery Audit Contractors Will Need to Avoid Duplication with Other Audit Efforts
Our prior work found that postpayment reviews are critical to identifying and recouping overpayments, but the importance of collaboration and coordination to avoid duplication has grown because of the increase in the number of entities other than states now conducting such reviews. In 2011, we reported that collaborative audits were a promising approach to avoiding duplication of federal and state audit efforts. In response to a comment on the proposed rule noting this weakness, CMS acknowledged the importance of having RAC-identified vulnerabilities incorporated in state program integrity activities, observing, “if Medicaid CMS requires state RACs identify program vulnerabilities as a result of their findings, we encourage RACs to share this information with States so that they can implement corrective action, such as pre-payment edits or other similar system fixes.” However, CMS did not incorporate a process for states to evaluate and address RAC-identified vulnerabilities into its final rule. CMS Has Made Progress in Strengthening Its Medicare Program Integrity Efforts, but Further Actions Are Needed
CMS has made progress strengthening several of the strategies to better ensure the integrity of the Medicare program, such as implementing changes to provider enrollment. However, CMS has not completed other actions that could be helpful in addressing improper payments and reducing fraud, waste and abuse in the Medicare program, including implementation of some relevant PPACA provisions and some of our prior recommendations. Screening Provider Enrollment Applications by Risk Level: CMS and the HHS-OIG issued a final rule with comment period in February 2011 to implement many of the new screening procedures required by PPACA.CMS designated three levels of risk—high, moderate, and limited—with different screening procedures for categories of Medicare providers at each level. These actions could help further reduce the enrollment of providers and suppliers intent on defrauding the Medicare program. CMS has not developed a proposed rule to require surety bonds as conditions of enrollment to implement this requirement. Our prior work found certain gaps in Medicare’s prepayment edits based on coverage and payment policies and made recommendations for improvement, which have not all been implemented. Robust Process to Address Identified Vulnerabilities Could Help Reduce Improper Payments
Having mechanisms in place to resolve vulnerabilities that lead to improper payments is critical to effective program management, but our work has shown weaknesses in CMS’s processes to address such Our March 2010 report on the RAC demonstration vulnerabilities.program found that CMS had not established an adequate process during the demonstration or in planning for the national program to ensure prompt resolution of identified vulnerabilities in Medicare. Concluding Observations
CMS and the states must continue and improve their efforts to reduce improper payments. Although Medicaid presents different challenges, we believe that many of the lessons learned from our Medicare work could be applied to strengthen Medicaid program integrity. These lessons can be applied as CMS and the states begin to use the additional tools to identify and recoup Medicaid improper payments provided through recent legislation. The level of importance placed on effectively implementing our recommendations and the provisions of recent laws will be critical to reducing improper payments in the Medicaid and Medicare programs, and ensuring that federal funds are used efficiently and for their intended purposes. Fraud Detection Systems: Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services Needs to Ensure More Widespread Use. Medicaid Program Integrity: State and Federal Efforts to Prevent and Detect Improper Payments. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2011, CMS estimated that Medicaid and Medicare had improper payments of $21.9 billion and almost $43 billion, respectivelyamong the largest for all federal programs. Both health care programs are on GAOs list of high-risk programs. Over the years, Congress has passed legislation designed to help address program integrity issues in the two programs but they remain vulnerable to fraud, waste, and abuse. The program integrity challenges are different for Medicaid and Medicare. With 51 distinct state-based programs, Medicaid has complex challenges for finding the appropriate balance between state and federal efforts. Medicare uses contractors to help administer the program and CMS must oversee their efforts.
This statement examines the progress made and important steps still to be taken in these programs. GAO focused on four key strategies and recommendations that were designed to facilitate them that were identified in prior work and that could help reduce improper payments: (1) strengthening provider enrollment standards and procedures to ensure that only legitimate providers participate in the program; (2) improving prepayment controls; (3) improving postpayment claims review and recovery of improper payments; and (4) developing a robust process for addressing identified vulnerabilities. This statement is based on GAO products issued from April 2004 through May 2012 and interviews with agency officials and other stakeholders. In May 2012, GAO also received additional information from CMS on agency actions. GAO received technical comments from CMS officials and incorporated them into this statement.
What GAO Found
For the Medicaid program, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) and the states have taken some actions related to GAOs four key strategies but more needs to be done.
CMSs comprehensive state program integrity reviews identified provider enrollment as the most frequently cited area of concern but the agency has noted a positive trend in states awareness of regulatory requirements.
CMS noted vulnerabilities in the prepayment reviews of claims in five states and effective practices in seven others. In anticipation of new analytic tools to predict vulnerabilities before claims are paid, the agency has initiated discussions with and provided guidance to states.
CMS has begun collaborating with states to identify targets for federal postpayment audits, which should help to avoid duplication of federal and state audit efforts.
CMS has not established a robust process for states to evaluate and address vulnerabilities identified by the states new recovery audit contractors brought in to identify improper payments and recoup overpayments.
For the Medicare program, CMS has acted to strengthen several of its strategies to better ensure program integrity, but other actions remain undone.
Congress authorized CMS to implement several new or improved enrollment safeguards, including screening enrollment applications for categories of Medicare providers by risk level. CMS has issued a final rule to implement this and other changes, but has not completed other final rules and additional actions that could further strengthen enrollment procedures, such as rules to implement new surety bond provisions and provider and supplier disclosures.
GAOs prior work found certain gaps in Medicares prepayment edits based on coverage and payment policies and made recommendations for improvement, such as adding edits to identify abnormally rapid increases in medical equipment billing. GAO is currently evaluating new CMS efforts in this area.
CMS has begun using recovery auditing in its prescription drug program but not for its Medicare managed care plans.
GAO recommended that CMS establish an adequate process to ensure prompt resolution of identified vulnerabilities in Medicare and is currently evaluating steps that CMS has taken recently.
It is critical that CMS and the states continue working on reducing improper payments. While both have made efforts to reduce improper payments, further action is needed. Although Medicaid presents different challenges, GAO believes that many of the lessons learned from its work on Medicare could be applied to strengthen Medicaid program integrity. These lessons can be applied as CMS and the states begin to use the additional tools provided through recent legislation. As the implementation process proceeds, GAO is continuing to monitor these issues. Effectively implementing provisions of recent laws and GAOs recommendations will be critical to reducing improper payments and ensuring that federal funds are used efficiently and for their intended purpose. |
gao_GAO-02-1035 | gao_GAO-02-1035_0 | The costs for this federal disaster assistance have grown significantly since the late 1980s. However, during the following 12-year period ending in 2001, as the number of large, costly disasters has grown and the activities eligible for federal assistance have increased, expenditures from the disaster relief fund increased nearly fivefold to over $39 billion (in fiscal year 2001 dollars). According to FEMA’s projections, disaster assistance expenditures from the disaster relief fund in fiscal year 2002 will total more than $4 billion. In fact, FEMA has made disaster mitigation a primary goal in its efforts to reduce the long-term cost of disasters. The administration has proposed a substantial change to FEMA’s multihazard mitigation programs. The HMGP, FEMA’s oldest and largest multihazard mitigation program, is a postdisaster program that has provided the bulk of mitigation assistance provided to states and communities. FEMA has used its more recent and smaller predisaster Project Impact program to provide mitigation assistance directly to communities in every state, regardless of whether the state had recently experienced a disaster. State and local officials also said that Project Impact has been successful in increasing awareness of and community support for mitigation efforts due to its funding of these types of activities. State Officials Believe that HMGP Successfully Takes Advantage of Mitigation Opportunities in a Postdisaster Environment
Hazard mitigation officials from the 24 states we contacted said that the HMGP has been effective in stimulating action to mitigate the impacts of natural hazards, primarily because it takes advantage of a “window of opportunity” that exists in the postdisaster environment. Under the proposed new program, mitigation grants would be awarded on a nationally competitive basis—instead of the current formula-based awards—to better ensure that funding goes to the most cost-beneficial projects. The first responder grant program would provide funding to states and local governments to prepare for terrorist events, and a portion of this preparedness may involve activities that could be viewed as mitigation. The proposed inclusion of FEMA in DHS and, in the broader context, the heightened concern over terrorism raises more fundamental issues about hazard mitigation efforts, such as (1) how natural hazard mitigation activities would fare in the new department that focuses on terrorism, (2) whether planning and program efforts in the mitigation and preparedness area should remain separate and distinct, and (3) how the HMGP—and the legislation authorizing it—address the role and rationale for mitigation after a terrorism-caused disaster. What are the issues resulting from the increased federal focus on homeland security on conducting hazard mitigation efforts? | What GAO Found
Over the past 12 years, federal disaster assistance costs have totaled more than $39 billion (in fiscal year 2001 dollars)--a nearly fivefold increase over the previous 12-year period--as a result of a series of unusually large and frequent disasters and an increasing federal role in assisting communities and individuals affected by disasters. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the lead agency for providing federal disaster relief, has provided the bulk of the assistance to help those in need respond to and recover from disasters. As the costs for disaster assistance have risen, FEMA has made disaster mitigation a primary goal in its efforts to reduce the long-term cost of disasters and has developed mitigation programs designed to minimize risk to property or individuals from natural or man-made hazards. FEMA's multihazard mitigation programs differ substantially in how they have sought to reduce the risks from hazards but each has features that the state emergency management community believes has been successful for mitigation. The Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP), FEMA's oldest multihazard mitigation programs, is a post disaster program that has provided the bulk of mitigation assistance to states and communities. State mitigation officials view the HMGP as a highly successful means for achieving mitigation because commitment to undertake mitigation efforts is greatest in the aftermath of a disaster, and the HMGP takes advantage of this "window of opportunity." FEMA has used its more recent and smaller predisaster Project Impact program to provide funding directly to communities in every state, regardless of whether the state had recently experienced a disaster. State and local officials said that Project Impact has been successful in increasing awareness of and community support for mitigation efforts due to its funding of these types of activities. The proposed new mitigation program would fundamentally change FEMA's approach by eliminating the postdisaster HMGP and by funding mitigation activities on a nationally competitive basis. The administration believes that the new program will ensure that mitigation funding remains stable from year to year and that the most cost-beneficial projects receive funding. The heightened focus on homeland security has raised several issues related to the conduct of hazard mitigation activities. Foremost among these issues is whether the increased emphasis on preventing and preparing for terrorist events will result in less focus on natural hazard mitigation concerns. |
gao_GAO-08-197 | gao_GAO-08-197_0 | Federal Agencies Rely Extensively on Leasing, Especially for Office Space Needs; GSA Predicts It Will Lease More Space Than It Owns in 2008
Federal agencies rely extensively on leasing, occupying about 398 million square feet of leased building space domestically in fiscal year 2006, according to data from FRPP. Decisions to Lease Selected Federal Properties Are Not Always Driven by Cost-effectiveness Considerations
In the 10 leases we examined, decisions to lease space that would be more cost-effective to own were driven by the limited availability of capital for ownership and other considerations, such as operational efficiency and security. We found that leasing was more costly over the long-term than construction for four of the seven GSA leases, and these four GSA leases were estimated to be $83.3 million more costly over 30 years than construction. Funds for Ownership Are Limited
For GSA, limited funding for construction is exacerbated by federal budget scorekeeping rules which require, for ownership and capital leases, that the full cost of the government’s commitment be recorded up front in the budget. In contrast, for operating leases, only the amount needed to cover yearly lease payments plus cancellation costs is required to be recorded in the budget, thereby making operating leases “look cheaper” in any given year. This is a long-standing problem, and overreliance on leasing is one of the major reasons we designated federal real property management as a high-risk area. As a result, the current real property reform initiative has lacked a comprehensive analysis of alternatives and potential solutions to the leasing challenge. Over the last decade, our work has shown that GSA relies heavily on operating leases to meet new long-term space needs and that building ownership often costs less than operating leases, especially for long-term space needs. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to identify (1) the profile of domestically held, federally leased space, including the overall amount and type of space agencies lease, and discuss any related trends; (2) the factors that drive agencies to lease space that may be more cost-effective to own; and (3) the actions, if any, the administration has taken, and what alternative approaches have been proposed, to address agencies’ reliance on costly leased space. Postal Service (USPS), and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (Agriculture), which collectively hold 71 percent of domestic, federally leased space. We assessed the reliability of the leasing data provided by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and GSA and interviewed OMB officials because OMB oversees the implementation of Executive Order 13327, which addresses real property management and FRPP. U.S. General Services Administration Opportunities for Cost Savings in the Public Buildings Area. | Why GAO Did This Study
In January 2003, GAO designated federal real property as a high-risk area, citing the government's overreliance on costly, long-term leasing as one of the major reasons. GAO's work over the years has shown that building ownership often costs less than operating leases, especially for long-term space needs. GAO was asked to identify (1) the profile of domestically held, federally leased space including the overall amount and type of space agencies lease, and any related trends; (2) the factors that drive agencies to lease space that may be more cost-effective to own; and (3) any actions taken by the administration and alternative approaches proposed to address this issue. GAO reviewed fiscal year 2006 Federal Real Property Profile (FRPP) leasing data and relevant documents and interviewed officials from the General Services Administration (GSA), the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and the U.S. Postal Service (USPS). GAO also reviewed 10 building leases that were among those with the largest dollar value in 3 locations GAO visited.
What GAO Found
Federal agencies rely extensively on leasing, occupying about 398 million square feet of leased building space domestically in fiscal year 2006, according to FRPP data. GSA, USPS, and the U.S. Department of Agriculture lease about 71 percent of this space, mostly for offices, with the military services leasing another 17 percent. GSA is increasing its use of leased space and predicts that in 2008 it will, for the first time, lease more space than it owns. In the 10 GSA and USPS leases GAO examined, decisions to lease space that would be more cost-effective to own were driven by the limited availability of capital for building ownership and other considerations, such as operational efficiency and security. For example, for four of the seven GSA leases GAO analyzed, leasing was more costly over time than construction--by an estimated $83.3 million over 30 years. Although ownership through construction is often the least expensive option, federal budget scorekeeping rules require the full cost of this option to be recorded up-front in the budget, whereas only the annual lease payment plus cancellation costs need to be recorded for operating leases, making them "look cheaper" in any year even though they generally are more costly over time. USPS is not subject to the scorekeeping rules and cited operational efficiency and limited capital as its main reasons for leasing. While the administration has made progress in addressing long-standing real property problems, efforts to address the leasing challenge have been limited. GAO has raised this issue for almost 20 years. Several alternative approaches have been discussed by various stakeholders, including scoring operating leases the same as ownership, but none have been implemented. The current real property reform initiative, however, presents an opportunity to address the leasing challenge. |
gao_RCED-96-214 | gao_RCED-96-214_0 | Managing for Results: Key Steps and Challenges in Implementing GPRA in Science Agencies
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: We are pleased to have this opportunity to discuss the key steps and challenges in using the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) to improve federal civilian science agencies’ management and congressional decisionmaking. Equally important, if successfully implemented, GPRA should help Congress make the difficult funding, policy, and program decisions that the current budget environment demands. Under GPRA, agencies are to set strategic and annual goals, measure performance, and report on the degree to which goals are met. Congress intended for GPRA to fundamentally shift the focus of federal management and accountability from a preoccupation with staffing and activity levels to a focus on “outcomes” of federal programs. These three steps are (1) define mission and desired outcomes, (2) measure performance, and (3) use performance information. In particular, assessing the outcomes of science-related projects can be extremely difficult because a wide range of factors determine if and how a particular R&D project will result in commercial or other benefits. Step 3: Use Performance Information
As to be expected during the initial efforts of such a challenging management reform effort as GPRA, most agencies, including science agencies, are still struggling to integrate the mission-based goal-setting and performance measurement requirements of GPRA into their daily program operations. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the challenges in implementing the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) in federal civilian science agencies, focusing on ways to improve the management of federal civilian science agencies and aid congressional decisionmaking.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) GPRA enables Congress to make difficult funding, policy, and programming decisions relative to science agencies' demands; (2) the science agencies are required to set strategic and annual goals, measure performance rates, and report their goals attainment; (3) GPRA has shifted the focus of federal management and accountability from staffing and activity levels to federal program outcomes; (4) GPRA is being phased in through 70 pilot projects, to provide agencies with guidance in meeting GPRA requirements; (5) the successful implementation of this results-oriented management approach depends on defining missions and desired outcomes, measuring program performance, and using performance data to improve program operations; (6) measuring program performance can be extremely difficult because of the wide range of factors to consider in determining a project's commercial viability; and (7) most agencies are struggling to integrate GPRA goal-setting and performance measurement requirements into their daily program operations. |
gao_GAO-16-163T | gao_GAO-16-163T_0 | These studies indicate that many Central American children who in the past may have made it to the U.S. border and been counted in U.S. apprehension statistics, have this year been apprehended in Mexico. A number of U.S. agencies provide assistance to the three countries. Agencies Seek to Address UAC Migration with Recently Developed and Long-standing Efforts
Agency-Identified Causes of Increase in UAC Migration
As we reported in July 2015, according to agency officials a variety of factors likely caused the rapid increase in UAC migration of recent years, including the increased presence of coyotes, perceptions concerning U.S. immigration law, recent improvements in the U.S. economy, the increased use of social media, and the worsening of pervasive problems. Perceptions of U.S. immigration policy. Agency Efforts Seeking to Address UAC Migration
In our July 2015 report, we found that among the various agency actions taken in response to UAC migration, several sought to directly combat coyotes, which agency officials identified as a key emergent factor causing migration. For example, according to DHS officials, in response to the rapid increase in UAC migration in 2014, DHS shifted the investigative priorities of its Transnational Criminal Investigative Units (TCIU)—which include host government police, customs officers, and prosecutors, among others—to target child-smuggling operations in all three countries. Public information campaigns to deter migration. We also found that DHS and State had carried out several public information campaigns between 2013 and 2015 intended to dissuade citizens of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras from migrating to the United States. According to DHS, the campaign, which was developed with the Department of State and was approved by the White House, is intended to deter individuals from Mexico, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras from entering the United States illegally by increasing awareness of U.S. immigration policies and enhanced border security efforts, as well as the dangers posed by smugglers. We also reported that USAID, State, IAF, and MCC programs have long sought to address what officials have identified as underlying causes of migration, including persistent development challenges such as violence, poverty, and lack of educational opportunities. Agencies Aligned Program Locations with Long-Term Strategic Objectives and Made Some Adjustments to Reach More Communities Affected by UAC Migration
Our July 2015 report found that agencies had generally located programs in alignment with long-term objectives for El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, such as addressing areas of high poverty and violence. USAID’s Country Development Cooperation Strategy documents, for example, outline development objectives for each country that focus on specific locations. Most Agencies Had Some Evaluation Processes in Place, but Weaknesses Existed in Performance Measurement of Some Antismuggling Programs
As we reported in July 2015, most agencies we reviewed had established processes to measure and evaluate programs agencies identified as addressing underlying causes of migration. First, DHS had established performance indicators for its TCIUs, but had not established performance targets, making it difficult to track progress of these units’ efforts to combat UAC smuggling and other priorities. However, DHS had not set targets for these performance measures. Second, we found that DHS and State had not consistently evaluated their information campaigns intended to combat the misinformation promoted by smuggling organizations and reduce migration, making it difficult to know the effectiveness of these efforts. DHS evaluated its 2013 campaign but did not evaluate its 2014 campaign. Moreover, DHS launched this campaign at the end of June 2014, by which point migration levels had already peaked, reaching record levels, as shown in figure 3. In our July 2015 report, we recommended that State and DHS integrate evaluation into their planning for, and implementation of, future public information campaigns intended to dissuade migration. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 2012 there has been a rapid increase in the number of apprehensions at the U.S.-Mexican border of UAC from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. Current data indicate the rate of UAC migration from Central America in 2015 is lower than the record levels of 2014, though apprehensions increased in August 2015. Children from these three countries face a host of challenges, such as extreme violence and persistent poverty.
This testimony summarizes the findings from GAO's July 2015 report, which reviewed (1) U.S. assistance in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras addressing agency-identified causes of UAC migration; (2) how agencies have determined where to locate these assistance efforts; and (3) the extent to which agencies have developed processes to assess the effectiveness of programs seeking to address UAC migration. This testimony also provides updated information on several topics covered in the report. GAO reviewed agency documents and interviewed officials in Washington, D.C., and in Central America for the report.
What GAO Found
GAO reported in July 2015 that U.S. agencies had sought to address causes of unaccompanied alien child (UAC) migration through recent programs, such as information campaigns to deter migration, developed in response to the migration increase and other long-standing efforts. The increase in migration since 2012 was likely triggered, according to U.S. officials, by several factors such as the increased presence and sophistication of child smugglers (known as coyotes) and confusion over U.S. immigration policy. Officials also noted that certain persistent conditions such as violence and poverty have worsened in certain countries. In addition to long-standing efforts, such as U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) antipoverty programs, agencies had taken new actions. For example, Department of Homeland Security (DHS)-led investigative units had increasingly sought to disrupt human smuggling operations.
GAO found that U.S. agencies located programs based on various factors, including long-term priorities such as targeting high-poverty and -crime areas, but adjusted to locate more programs in high-migration communities. For example, Department of State (State) officials in Guatemala said they moved programs enhancing police anticrime capabilities into such communities, and USAID officials in El Salvador said they expanded to UAC migration-affected locations.
GAO found that most agencies had developed processes to assess the effectiveness of programs seeking to address UAC migration, but weaknesses existed in these processes for some antismuggling programs. For example, DHS had established performance measures, such as arrests, for units combating UAC smuggling, but had not established numeric or other types of targets for these measures, which would enable DHS to measure the units' progress. In addition, DHS and State had not always evaluated information campaigns intended to combat coyote misinformation. DHS launched its 2013 campaign in April, but launched its 2014 campaign in late June after migration levels peaked. Neither agency evaluated its 2014 campaign. DHS has reported that it plans to evaluate its ongoing campaign before the end of this year.
What GAO Recommends
GAO's July 2015 report included recommendations that DHS and State integrate evaluations into their information campaigns intended to deter migration, and that DHS establish performance targets for its investigative units. DHS concurred with both recommendations, and said that it plans to evaluate its most recent campaign. State also concurred with the recommendation directed to it. |
gao_GAO-03-259 | gao_GAO-03-259_0 | Charities Have Played an Unprecedented Role in the Amount of Money Collected and Types of Assistance Provided to September 11 Survivors
While it may be difficult to tally precisely the total amount of funds collected, 35 of the larger charities have raised almost $2.7 billion and distributed about 70 percent of the money. Charities used the money they collected to provide cash and a broad range of services to people directly and indirectly affected, although questions about how best to use the funds as well as service delivery difficulties complicated charities’ responses. Charities Provided Cash and a Broad Range of Services to People Directly and Indirectly Affected
Charities provided a wide range of assistance to the different categories of individuals affected, including the families of those killed, those indirectly affected through the loss of a job or displacement from their home, and services provided to the rescue workers and volunteers, as shown in table 2. While most of the September 11 funds have been distributed in the first year, some charities are planning to provide services over the longer term. Charities and Oversight Agencies Have Several Accountability Measures in Place; Relatively Few Cases of Fraud Identified So Far
Charities and government oversight agencies have taken a number of steps to prevent fraud, and relatively few cases have been uncovered so far. While information is available on identified fraud cases, the total extent of fraud is not known and will be difficult for oversight agencies and charities to assess. Third, it may also be difficult to track fund-raising by groups using September 11 to solicit for other purposes. Some efforts are under way to address these issues. However, the independence of charitable organizations, while one of their key strengths, will make implementation of these lessons learned dependent on close collaboration and agreement among these independent organizations. While some charitable organizations are taking steps to incorporate lessons learned, they face significant challenges. Conclusions
Overall, charitable aid made a major contribution in the nation’s response to the September 11 attacks. Through the work of these charities, millions of people have been able to contribute to the recovery effort and provide assistance to those directly and indirectly affected by the attacks. While much has been accomplished by charities in this disaster, lessons or strategies have also been identified related to improving access to aid, enhancing coordination among charities and between charities and FEMA, increasing attention to public education, and planning for future events that could improve future responses in disasters. | Why GAO Did This Study
Surveys suggest that as many as two-thirds of American households have donated money to charitable organizations to aid in the response to the September 11 disasters. To provide the public with information on the role of charitable aid in assisting those affected by the attacks, GAO was asked to report on the amount of donations charities raised and distributed, the accountability measures in place to prevent fraud by organizations and individuals, and lessons learned about how to best distribute charitable aid in similar situations.
What GAO Found
Although it may be difficult to precisely tally the total amount of funds raised in response to the September 11 attacks, 35 of the larger charities have reported raising an estimated $2.7 billion since September 11, 2001. About 70 percent of the money that has been collected by these 35 charities has been reported distributed to survivors or spent on disaster relief since September 11, 2001. Charities used the money they collected to provide direct cash assistance and a wide range of services to families of those killed, those more indirectly affected through loss of their job or residence, and to disaster relief workers. Some of the charities plan to use funds to provide services over the longer term, such as for scholarships, mental health counseling, and employment assistance. Charities and government oversight agencies have taken a number of steps to prevent fraud by individuals or organizations, and relatively few cases have been uncovered so far. However, the total extent of fraud is not known and will be difficult to assess particularly in situations when organizations solicit funds on behalf of September 11 but use the funds for other purposes. Overall, charitable aid made a major contribution in the nation's response to the September 11 attacks, despite very difficult circumstances. Through the work of charities, millions of people contributed to the recovery effort. At the same time, lessons have been learned that could improve future charitable responses in disasters, including easing access to aid, enhancing coordination among charities and between charities and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), increasing attention to public education, and planning for future events. FEMA and some charitable organizations have taken some steps to address these issues. However, the independence of charitable organizations, while one of their key strengths, will make the implementation of these lessons dependent on close collaboration and agreement among charities involved in aiding in disasters. |
gao_GAO-13-691 | gao_GAO-13-691_0 | Connectivity between Major Airports and Intercity Passenger Rail Remains Limited, as Does Passenger Usage
Most Major Airports Are near Intercity Passenger Rail Stations, but Air-Rail Connectivity is Rare
Most major U.S. airports have some degree of physical proximity to intercity passenger rail stations; however, few are collocated with rail stations. Specifically, our analysis found that 42 of the 60 large and medium hub airports in the contiguous United States are located within 10 miles of an Amtrak station; 21 of the 42 airports are within 5 miles of a station. Newark Liberty International Airport and Bob Hope (Burbank) Airport are the only airports where passengers can access the Amtrak stations via an automated people mover (Newark) or by walking (Burbank). Amtrak and state transportation agencies are considering projects to expand connectivity with airports. Some states, such as California, Illinois, and Texas, are looking at options to enhance air-rail connectivity by developing high-speed rail connections at nearby large and medium hub airports. Few Passengers Use Air- Rail Connections
Studies and data, while limited, suggest that relatively few passengers and airport employees use the limited air-rail connections available to travel to and from U.S. airports. Collocated Airport Terminals and Rail Stations Allow for Code Sharing
The only current code-sharing agreement for air and rail travel in the United States is at Newark Liberty International Airport, though code- sharing has been implemented or explored at other airports. Air-Rail Connectivity May Provide a Range of Benefits for Passengers and Others, but Costs Can Be Significant
Benefits
We found that air-rail connectivity has the potential to provide a range of mobility, economic, and environmental benefits. In our discussions with stakeholders, including state departments of transportation, local transportation-planning organizations, and airlines; our review of academic literature; and the expert opinions obtained from our survey, we found that a general consensus exists that air-rail connectivity can provide a range of mobility benefits for travelers; however, we found less agreement exists on the importance and extent of other types of benefits, including economic and environmental benefits. 2.) Costs
Expanding the current intercity passenger rail network and connecting it to airports would be expensive. Air-Rail Connectivity Is Influenced by a Variety of Factors
Based on input from our expert survey; discussions with stakeholders, including state departments of transportation, local transportation planning organizations, airports, and airlines; and our review of academic literature, we identified five categories of factors that can greatly affect air- rail connectivity, including the degree of leadership and collaboration among stakeholders, resource availability, the extent of passenger demand for air-rail connectivity, the ease of the air-rail connection, and the passenger rail service operating characteristics. In addition, our prior work also identified challenges of funding intercity passenger rail projects. While this funding will allow many projects to begin construction, it is not sufficient to complete them. The frequency of Amtrak service is highly variable across the nation. For example, some of the strategies that experts suggested to improve connectivity, such as increasing connections with other transportation modes, could be related to the implementation of other strategies, such as providing additional funding for air-rail connections. However, in many locations, particularly in the Northeast Corridor, the rail network was developed decades before the airport. Furthermore, as previously noted, the commitment of financial resources for air-rail projects may also impose opportunity costs as a result of canceling or delaying other projects or initiatives that could be funded by these federal programs. DOT and Amtrak provided technical comments on the draft, which we incorporated as appropriate. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report addressed the following objectives: (1) the nature and scope of existing air-rail connectivity in the United States; (2) the benefits and costs of developing air-rail connectivity; (3) the factors that facilitate and hinder the development and use of air-rail connectivity; and (4) potential strategies, including lessons learned from other countries, that may help inform deliberations regarding air-rail connectivity policy. We interviewed officials from DOT and Amtrak, transportation experts, and representatives from U.S. airlines and industry associations to obtain their perspectives on air-rail connectivity issues. We also analyzed Amtrak’s distance and connectivity to the 28 large and 32 medium hub airports located in the contiguous United States based on the 2011 Federal Aviation Administration’s Air Carrier Activity Information System database. To obtain additional insight on issues related to air-rail connectivity, we collaborated with the National Academy of Sciences to identify 25 experts from the aviation and rail industries, Amtrak, state and local governments, academia, and the private sector. We conducted a web-based survey in which we asked these 42 experts for their views on the benefits of air-rail connectivity, factors that facilitate and hinder the development and use of air-rail connectivity, differences between air-rail connectivity in the United States and Europe, and strategies that could improve air-rail connectivity. The full survey and responses are available at GAO-13-692SP. | Why GAO Did This Study
Increasing passenger travel has led to growing congestion in the nation's air transportation system, and projections suggest that this trend is likely to continue. The integration of air and intercity passenger rail service, which is provided in the United States by Amtrak, has been suggested by some transportation experts as a strategy to increase mobility and reduce congestion in the United States. The FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 mandated that GAO review issues related to air-rail connectivity. This report discusses (1) the nature and scope of air-rail connectivity, (2) the benefits and costs of air-rail connectivity, (3) factors affecting the development and use of air-rail connectivity, and (4) potential strategies to improve air-rail connectivity.
GAO reviewed laws, strategic plans, and academic studies. GAO analyzed data to determine distances between Amtrak stations and large and medium hub airports and interviewed officials from DOT, and representatives from Amtrak, the airlines, and aviation and rail industry associations. GAO interviewed stakeholders at eight large and medium hub airports, which were selected based on geographic location and extent of connectivity with Amtrak. In addition, GAO surveyed experts from the aviation industry, rail industry, state and local governments, academia and the private sector about air-rail connectivity issues. The survey and results can be found at GAO-13-692SP .
GAO is not making recommendations in this report. DOT and Amtrak provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
Most major U.S. airports have some degree of physical proximity to intercity passenger rail stations, though only 2 airports are currently collocated with intercity rail stations. Specifically, 42 of the nation's 60 large and medium hub airports are located within 10 miles of Amtrak stations; 21 of the 42 airports are within 5 miles of Amtrak stations. At the 2 collocated airports, passengers can access Amtrak either via an automated people mover (Newark Liberty International Airport) or by walking (Bob Hope Burbank Airport). At some airports, such as Baltimore/Washington International Thurgood Marshall Airport, passengers can take a direct shuttle between the airport and the nearby Amtrak station, while at other airports, connections to Amtrak can be made through other modes of transportation. Studies and data, while limited, suggest that relatively few passengers in the United States use intercity rail to travel to and from the airport or through more integrated travel such as code-sharing agreements, whereby airlines sell tickets for Amtrak's service. The only existing air-rail code-sharing agreement in the United States is at Newark Airport. Amtrak and states are considering projects to expand intercity rail connectivity with airports, including as part of the construction of high-speed rail in California.
Air-rail connectivity may provide a range of mobility, economic, and environmental benefits, though the financial costs of building these connections could be substantial. Specifically, based on discussions with industry stakeholders, input from surveyed experts, and a review of academic literature, GAO found a general consensus that air-rail connectivity can provide a range of mobility benefits for travelers, though less agreement existed on the importance and extent of economic and environmental benefits. However, achieving these benefits could require significant trade-offs, because the costs of expanding the existing intercity passenger rail network and constructing viable connections can be significant. Given these costs, based on GAO's work, there are currently limited locations where benefits are high enough to justify funding to improve air-rail connectivity.
Air-rail connectivity remains limited in the United States, according to experts, as a result of institutional and financial factors, among other things. In particular, the limited nature of the existing intercity passenger rail network, including the frequency of service and connectivity to other transportation modes, remains an obstacle to developing and using air-rail connections. Securing funding for air-rail projects also remains a barrier. While funds from some federal grant programs can be used to help facilitate air-rail connections, there is no single funding source for air-rail projects.
There are strategies to improve air-rail connectivity, but adopting them involves trade-offs. Experts generally focused on, among other things, leadership, funding, and infrastructure improvements, though the effectiveness of these strategies may depend on a project's local characteristics. There has been little emphasis on air-rail connectivity by either the Department of Transportation (DOT) or Amtrak. Furthermore, experts noted that some of the strategies could be particularly challenging or costly to implement, such as in locations where the rail network was developed decades before airports. For example, increasing intercity passenger rail's frequency could improve air-rail connectivity but could also be expensive. |
gao_GAO-08-233T | gao_GAO-08-233T_0 | In Brief
Our analysis of FDIC data showed that while the profitability of most minority banks with assets greater than $100 million nearly equaled the profitability of all similarly sized banks (peers), the profitability of smaller minority banks and African-American banks of all sizes did not. Our analysis of FDIC data identified some possible explanations for the relatively low profitability of some small minority banks and African-American banks, such as relatively higher reserves for potential loan losses and administrative expenses and competition from larger banks. The bank regulators have adopted differing approaches to supporting minority banks, and, at the time of our review, no agency had assessed the effectiveness of its efforts through regular and comprehensive surveys of minority banks or outcome-oriented performance measures. FDIC— which supervises more than half of all minority banks—had the most comprehensive program to support minority banks and led an interagency group that coordinates such efforts. OCC and the Federal Reserve, while not required to do so by Section 308 of FIRREA, undertook some efforts to support minority banks, such as holding occasional conferences for Native American banks, and were planning additional efforts. Furthermore, none of the other regulators comprehensively surveyed minority banks on the effectiveness of their support efforts or established outcome-oriented performance measures. Consequently, the regulators were not well positioned to assess the results of their support efforts or identify areas for improvement. About one-third of survey respondents rated their regulators’ efforts for minority banks as very good or good, while 26 percent rated the efforts as fair, 13 percent as poor or very poor, and 25 percent responded “do not know.” FDIC-regulated banks were more positive about their agency’s efforts than banks that other agencies regulated. However, only about half of the FDIC-regulated banks and about a quarter of the banks regulated by other agencies rated their agency’s efforts as very good or good. Although regulators may emphasize the provision of technical assistance to minority banks, less than 30 percent of such institutions said they had used such agency services within the last 3 years. Therefore, the banks may have been missing opportunities to address problems that limited their operations or financial performance. OCC and the Federal Reserve had also hosted events for some minority banks. Survey of Minority Banks Identified Potential Limitations in Regulators’ Support Efforts and Other Regulatory Issues
Minority bank officials we surveyed identified potential limitations in the regulators’ efforts to support them and related regulatory issues, such as examiners’ understanding of issues affecting minority banks, which would likely be of significance to agency managers and warrant follow-up analysis. Minority banks regulated by OCC and the Federal Reserve reported similarly low usage of technical assistance services. Regulators Recently Have Taken Steps to Assess and Enhance Their Minority Bank Support Efforts, but It Is Too Soon to Assess Their Effectiveness
Our 2006 report recommended that the bank regulators regularly review the effectiveness of their minority bank support efforts and related regulatory activities and, as appropriate, make changes necessary to better serve such institutions. | Why GAO Did This Study
Minority banks can play an important role in serving the financial needs of historically underserved communities and growing populations of minorities. For this reason, the Financial Institutions, Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA) established goals that the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) must work toward to preserve and promote such institutions (support efforts). While not required to do so by FIRREA, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve) and Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) have established some minority bank support efforts. This testimony, based on a 2006 General Accountability Office (GAO) report, discusses the profitability of minority banks, regulators' support and assessment efforts, and the views of minority banks on the regulators' efforts as identified through responses from a survey of 149 such institutions.
What GAO Found
GAO reported in 2006 that the profitability of most large minority banks (assets greater than $100 million) was nearly equal to that of their peers (similarly sized banks) in 2005 and earlier years, according to FDIC data. However, many small minority banks and African-American banks of all sizes were less profitable than their peers. GAO's analysis and other studies identified some possible explanations for these differences, including relatively higher loan loss reserves and operating expenses and competition from larger banks. Bank regulators had adopted differing approaches to supporting minority banks, but no agency had regularly and comprehensively assessed the effectiveness of its efforts. FDIC--which supervises over half of all minority banks--had the most comprehensive support efforts and leads interagency efforts. OTS focused on providing technical assistance to minority banks. While not required to do so by FIRREA, OCC and the Federal Reserve had taken some steps to support minority banks. Although FDIC had recently sought to assess the effectiveness of its support efforts through various methods, none of the regulators comprehensively surveyed minority banks or had developed performance measures. Consequently, the regulators were not well positioned to assess their support efforts. GAO's survey of minority banks identified potential limitations in the regulators' support efforts that would likely be of significance to agency managers and warrant follow-up analysis. Only about one-third of survey respondents rated their regulators' efforts for minority banks as very good or good, while 26 percent rated the efforts as fair, 13 percent as poor or very poor, and 25 percent responded "don't know". Banks regulated by FDIC were more positive about their agency's efforts than banks regulated by other agencies. However, only about half of the FDIC-regulated banks and about a quarter of the banks regulated by other agencies rated their agency's efforts as very good or good. Although regulators may have emphasized the provision of technical assistance to minority banks, less than 30 percent of such institutions have used such agency services within the last 3 years and therefore may be missing opportunities to address problems that limit their operations or financial performance. |
gao_AIMD-98-62 | gao_AIMD-98-62_0 | The IG audited FAA’s fiscal year 1996 Statement of Financial Position, which reports the agency’s assets and liabilities, but disclaimed (did not express) an opinion primarily because of internal control weaknesses that precluded the IG from determining if FAA’s operating materials and supplies and property and equipment were fairly presented. In addition, because many of the problems identified by the IG were the result of the lack of a reliable system to accumulate costs, we reviewed several reports concerning FAA’s financial and cost accounting systems. The lack of accurate inventory information may also impair operational effectiveness, as shown in the following examples. Finally, the lack of accurate inventory information affects the reliability of financial management information. Agency Actions Related to Operating Materials and Supplies
FAA advised us that it has performed a wall-to-wall inventory of operating materials and supplies at the central warehouse, identified excess items, and adjusted records accordingly; revised policies and procedures to include an inventory count of operating materials and supplies every 3 years; counted 48 percent (dollar value) of field spares and plans to complete the field spares inventory by the end of fiscal year 1998; initiated a new project to provide physical and fiscal management of FAA assets both centralized at the Logistics Center and in field facilities; begun recording field spares as assets rather than expensing them as was revised methods to ensure timely review of excess operating materials and supplies stored at the Logistics Center; and made plans to implement bar coding for the asset tracking process in July 1998. These types of errors and omissions affect FAA’s ability to manage its real estate assets and make decisions about future needs. The inadequacy of FAA’s cost accounting system has been identified by GAO and others as a weakness that prevents FAA from reliably determining project and other costs. Our report concluded that without a system to capture and report the full cost of ATC projects, FAA cannot reliably measure the ATC projects’ actual cost performance against established baselines, and cannot reliably use information relating to actual cost experiences to improve future cost estimating efforts. Further, we reported that the Congress does not have reliable cost information to use in making funding decisions about FAA. The questions that could be answered in a cost-based environment cannot be answered today.”
The lack of reliable information about the costs of program activities limits the ability of FAA management and other decisionmakers to estimate future costs in preparing and reviewing budgets, to control and reduce costs, and to identify and avoid waste. Finally, the lack of reliable cost information limits the ability of FAA management and other decisionmakers to meaningfully evaluate performance measures. Measuring costs is an integral part of measuring performance in terms of efficiency and cost-effectiveness. Conclusion
Accountability over physical assets is a key step in avoiding waste, fraud, and abuse, and is essential to efficient and effective budgeting and management of resources. It is particularly critical in situations such as FAA’s, in which billions of dollars of assets are being acquired in connection with the ATC modernization program. We have added throughout our report a discussion of actions FAA stated it has taken since the date the IG audit report was issued. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Transportation (DOT) Inspector General's (IG) audit report on the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) fiscal year 1996 Statement of Financial Position, which reports FAA's assets and liabilities.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the deficiencies concerning operating materials and supplies and property and equipment cited by the IG impair FAA's ability to efficiently and effectively manage programs that use these assets and expose the agency to waste, fraud, and abuse; (2) in addition, while not a specific focus of the IG report, GAO and others have identified the lack of a reliable cost accounting system as a weakness that prevents FAA from reliably determining costs; (3) the lack of cost accounting information impairs FAA's ability to make effective decisions about resource needs, to adequately control major projects such as the air traffic control (ATC) modernization program, and to identify and avoid waste; (4) for example, without good cost information FAA cannot reliably measure the ATC modernization program's actual cost performance against established baselines, and cannot reliably use information relating to actual cost experiences to improve future cost estimating efforts; (5) the lack of cost accounting information also limits the ability to meaningfully evaluate performance measures in terms of efficiency and cost-effectiveness; (6) the lack of reliable cost information also limits FAA's ability to meaningfully evaluate performance measures in terms of efficiency and cost-effectiveness; (7) overall, the lack of accountability over physical assets means that FAA and Congress may not have accurate financial management information to help make informed decisions about future funding; (8) the lack of accountability is of particular concern in situations such as FAA's where billions of dollars of assets are being acquired in connection with the ATC modernization program; (9) FAA advised GAO that since the IG report was issued on March 27, 1997, it has made significant progress and expended significant resources toward correcting the problems reported by the IG; (10) according to FAA, it has taken or plans corrective actions in three principal areas: (a) operating materials and supplies; (b) property and equipment; and (c) cost systems; (11) FAA informed GAO that it has counted a major portion of operating materials and supplies and property, identified excess items, adjusted its records, and created a Cost Accounting Division; and (12) GAO has not assessed the current status or sufficiency of these actions. |
gao_GAO-02-136 | gao_GAO-02-136_0 | BLM and the Forest Service manage about 93 percent of the 44 million acres of federally owned land in Oregon and Washington. In addition, the Northwest Forest Plan's road management guidelines state that the agencies shall "provide and maintain fish passage at all road crossings of existing and potential fish-bearing streams." Extent to Which Barrier Culverts Block Fish Passage Is Unknown
As of August 1, 2001, the agencies' fish passage assessments identified almost 2,600 barrier culverts—over 400 on BLM lands and nearly 2,200 on Forest Service lands—-and agency officials estimate that, in total, up to 5,500 fish barrier culverts may exist. Other factors affecting the agencies' efforts to restore fish passage include the complex and lengthy federal and state project approval process to obtain environmental clearances and the limited number of agency engineers experienced in designing culverts that meet current fish passage requirements. Furthermore, to minimize disturbance to fish and wildlife habitat, states impose a short seasonal "window of opportunity" within which restoration work on barrier culverts can occur. Ultimate Effectiveness of Agency Efforts to Restore Fish Passage Is Largely Unknown Because Completed Projects Are Not Systematically Monitored
BLM and the Forest Service completed 141 projects to restore fish passage for anadromous fish at barrier culverts from fiscal year 1998 through July 2001 and opened access to an estimated 171 miles of fish habitat. However, the Oregon and Washington state fish passage restoration programs, as well as other local efforts, require systematic post-project monitoring to determine the most effective methods for improving fish passage under various conditions. We are sending copies of this report to the Director of the Bureau of Land Management and the Chief of the Forest Service. | What GAO Found
The Bureau of Land Management and the Forest Service manage more than 41 million acres of federal lands in Oregon and Washington, including 122,000 miles of roads that use culverts--pipes or arches that allow water to flow from one side of the road to the other. Many of the streams that pass through these culverts are essential habitat for fish and other aquatic species. More than 10,000 culverts exist on fish-bearing streams in Oregon and Washington, but the number that impede fish passage is unknown. Ongoing agency inventory and assessment efforts have identified nearly 2,600 barrier culverts, but agency officials estimate that more than twice that number may exist. Although the agencies recognize the importance of restoring fish passage, several factors inhibit their efforts. Most significantly, the agencies have not made enough money available to do all the necessary culvert work. In addition, the often lengthy process of obtaining federal and state environmental clearances and permits, as well as the short seasonal "window of opportunity" to do the work, affects the agencies' ability to restore fish passages quickly. Furthermore, the shortage of experienced engineering staff limits the number of projects that can be designed and completed. BLM and the Forest Service have completed 141 culvert projects to remove barriers and to open an estimated 171 miles of fish habitat from fiscal year 1998 through 2000. Neither agency, however, knows the extent to which culvert projects ultimately improve fish passage because they don't require systematic post-project monitoring to measure the outcomes of their efforts. |
gao_GAO-16-84T | gao_GAO-16-84T_0 | Weaknesses in CVN 78’s Business Case Manifested by Less Capability at Higher Cost
In July 2007, we reported on weaknesses in the Navy’s business case for the Ford-class aircraft carrier and focused mainly on the lead ship, CVN 78. We noted that costs and labor hours were underestimated and critical technologies were immature. Today, all of this has come to pass in the form of cost growth, testing delays, and reduced capability—in other words, less for more. In August 2007, we also observed that in consequence of its optimistic business case, the Navy would likely face the choice of (1) keeping the ship’s construction schedule intact while deferring key knowledge-building events—such as land-based tests of technologies—until later, or (2) slipping the ship’s construction schedule to accommodate technology and other delays. The result is a final acquisition phase in which construction and key test events are occurring concurrently, with no margin for error without giving something else up. Absent a strong business case, the CVN 78 program deviated from its initial promises of cost and capability, which we discuss below. In August 2007, before the Navy awarded a contract to construct the lead ship, we reported on key risks in the program that would impair the Navy’s ability to deliver CVN 78 at cost, on time, and with its planned capabilities (as seen in table 1 below). Business Case for Follow-On Ship Assumes Ambitious Efficiency Gains
Although increases have already been made to the CVN 79’s cost cap and tradeoffs made to the ship’s scope, it still has an unrealistic business case. The Navy recently awarded a construction contract for CVN 79 which it believes will allow the program to achieve the current $11.5 billion legislative cost cap. Similar to the lead ship, the business case for CVN 79 is not commensurate with the costs needed to produce an operational ship. By any measure, CVN 79 should cost less than CVN 78, as it will incorporate important lessons learned on construction sequencing and other efficiencies. While it may cost less than its predecessor, CVN 79 is likely to cost more than estimated. As we reported in November 2014, the Navy’s strategy to achieve the cost cap: 1) relies on optimistic assumptions of construction efficiencies and cost savings; (2) shifts work—including installation of mission systems—needed to make the ship fully operational until after ship delivery; and (3) delivers the ship with the same baseline capability as CVN 78, with the costs of a number of planned mission system upgrades and modernizations postponed until future maintenance periods. While the shipbuilder has initiated significant revisions in its processes for building the ship that are expected to reduce labor hours, the Navy’s cost estimate for CVN 79 is predicated on an over 9 million labor hour reduction compared to CVN 78. Such outcomes persist even though DOD and Congress have taken steps to address long-standing problems with DOD acquisitions. The budget process results in funding major program commitments before knowledge is available to support such decisions. These incentives, coupled with a marketplace that is characterized by a single buyer (DOD), low volume and limited number of major sources, create a culture in weapon system acquisition that encourages undue optimism about program risks and costs. To be sure, this is not to suggest that the acquisition process is foiled by bad actors. The Ford-class program illustrates the pitfalls of operating in this environment. While these specifics relate to the Ford-class carrier, the principles apply to all major weapon system acquisitions. Concluding Remarks
The experiences of the Ford-class program are not unique—rather, they represent a typical acquisition outcome. It is too simplistic to look at the program as a product of a broken acquisition process; rather it is indicative of a process that is in equilibrium. Under consideration this year are a number of acquisition reforms. Going forward, there are two acquisition reform challenges I would like to put on the table. What it does with funding sets the tone for what acquisition practices are acceptable. Appendix I: Prior GAO Recommendations for Ford Class Carriers and Department of Defense (DOD) Responses and Subsequent Actions
Improve the realism of CVN 78’s budget estimate. DOD Response and actions
While the department agreed with our recommendations in concept, it has not fully taken action to implement them. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Navy set ambitious goals for the Ford-class program, including an array of new technologies and design features that were intended to improve combat capability and create operational efficiencies, all while reducing acquisition and life-cycle costs. The lead ship, CVN 78, has experienced significant cost growth with a reduced capability expected at delivery. More cost growth is likely. While CVN 78 is close to delivery, examining its acquisition history may provide an opportunity to improve outcomes for the other ships in the class and illustrate the dynamics of defense acquisition.
GAO has reported on the acquisition struggles facing the Ford-class, particularly in GAO-07-866 , GAO-13-396 , and GAO-15-22 . This statement discusses: (1) the Navy's initial vision for CVN 78 and where the ship stands today; (2) plans for follow-on ship cost and construction; and (3) Ford-class experiences as illustrative of acquisition decision making. This statement is largely based on the three reports as well as GAO's larger work on shipbuilding and acquisition best practices, and also incorporates updated audit work where appropriate.
What GAO Found
The Ford-class aircraft carrier's lead ship began construction with an unrealistic business case. A sound business case balances the necessary resources and knowledge needed to transform a chosen concept into a product. Yet in 2007, GAO found that CVN 78 costs were underestimated and critical technologies were immature—key risks that would impair delivering CVN 78 at cost, on-time, and with its planned capabilities. The ship and its business case were nonetheless approved. Over the past 8 years, the business case has predictably decayed in the form of cost growth, testing delays, and reduced capability—in essence, getting less for more. Today, CVN 78 is more than $2 billion over its initial budget. Land-based tests of key technologies have been deferred by years while the ship's construction schedule has largely held fast. The CVN 78 is unlikely to achieve promised aircraft launch and recovery rates as key systems are unreliable. The ship must complete its final, more complex, construction phase concurrent with key test events. While problems are likely to be encountered, there is no margin for the unexpected. Additional costs are likely.
Similarly, the business case for CVN 79 is not realistic. The Navy recently awarded a construction contract for CVN 79 which it believes will allow the program to achieve the current $11.5 billion legislative cost cap. Clearly, CVN 79 should cost less than CVN 78, as it will incorporate lessons learned on construction sequencing and other efficiencies. While it may cost less than its predecessor, CVN 79 is likely to cost more than estimated. As GAO found in November 2014, the Navy's strategy to achieve the cost cap relies on optimistic assumptions of construction efficiencies and cost savings—including unprecedented reductions in labor hours, shifting work until after ship delivery, and delivering the ship with the same baseline capability as CVN 78 by postponing planned mission system upgrades and modernizations until future maintenance periods.
Today, with CVN 78 over 92 percent complete as it reaches delivery in May 2016, and the CVN 79 on contract, the ability to exercise oversight and make course corrections is limited. Yet, it is not too late to examine the carrier's acquisition history to illustrate the dynamics of shipbuilding—and weapon system—acquisition and the challenges they pose to acquisition reform. The carrier's problems are by no means unique; rather, they are quite typical of weapon systems. Such outcomes persist despite acquisition reforms the Department of Defense and Congress have put forward—such as realistic estimating and “fly before buy.” Competition with other programs for funding creates pressures to overpromise performance at unrealistic costs and schedules. These incentives are more powerful than policies to follow best acquisition practices and oversight tools. Moreover, the budget process provides incentives for programs to be funded before sufficient knowledge is available to make key decisions. Complementing these incentives is a marketplace characterized by a single buyer, low volume, and limited number of major sources. The decades-old culture of undue optimism when starting programs is not the consequence of a broken process, but rather of a process in equilibrium that rewards unrealistic business cases and, thus, devalues sound practices.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making any new recommendations in this statement but has made numerous recommendations to the Department of Defense in the past on Ford-class acquisition, including strengthening the program's business case before proceeding with acquisition decisions. While the Department has, at times, agreed with GAO's recommendations it has taken little to no action to implement them. |
gao_GAO-06-573T | gao_GAO-06-573T_0 | Background
Since the 1960s, the United States has operated two separate operational polar-orbiting meteorological satellite systems: the Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite (POES) series, managed by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP), managed by the Department of Defense (DOD). These models are a primary tool for forecasting weather 3 or more days in advance, including forecasting the path and intensity of hurricanes. The converged program, NPOESS, is considered critical to the United States’ ability to maintain the continuity of data required for weather forecasting and global climate monitoring through the year 2020. To manage this program, DOD, NOAA, and NASA formed a tri-agency Integrated Program Office, located within NOAA. Sound management is critical to program success. NPOESS Status and Plans: Decision on Program’s Future Direction on Hold, Interim Efforts Under Way
The future direction of the NPOESS program—what will be delivered, at what cost, and by when—is currently on hold pending a decision on how to proceed. Over the last few years, NPOESS has experienced continued cost increases and schedule delays, requiring difficult decisions about the program’s direction and capabilities. In mid-November 2005, we reported that the NPOESS executive committee expected to make a decision in December 2005 on the direction of the program. We urged the committee to make a decision quickly so that the program could proceed. However, in late November 2005, NPOESS cost growth exceeded a legislatively mandated threshold that requires the Department of Defense to certify the program to Congress. This placed any decision about the future direction of the program on hold until the certification takes place in June 2006. Following certification, a decision on future direction should be clear. That will require developing a new program baseline and renegotiating contracts—efforts that could take up to a year. As for continuing sensor development, because any major changes to the program will not be known until the certification process is completed, the program office has implemented an interim plan to continue work on key sensors and other program elements within the fiscal year 2006 funding profile. Considerations in Moving the NPOESS Program Forward
As NPOESS undergoes the Nunn-McCurdy certification process and important decisions are made on how the program is to proceed, there are several important considerations. ● NOAA and NASA representation in the DOD Nunn-McCurdy certification process is imperative. It will be important for NOAA and NASA to remain active players in the deliberation of options and the final decision on how to move the program forward. ● Indecision increases the risk of a gap in satellite data. Specifically, if th satellite in the predecessor satellite series (the Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites or POES) were to fail, there would be a gap in satellite coverage until the first NPOESS sat was launched and put into operation (see fig. Once this decision is made, it will be important t move quickly to implement the decision in agency budgets and contracts. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System’s (NPOESS) current status and plans, and to discuss considerations in moving the program forward. | Why GAO Did This Study
Polar-orbiting environmental satellites provide data and imagery that are used by weather forecasters, climatologists, and the military to map and monitor changes in weather, climate, the oceans, and the environment. They are critical to long-term weather prediction, including advance forecasts of a hurricane's path and intensity. Our nation's current operational polar-orbiting environmental satellite program is a complex infrastructure that includes two satellite systems, supporting ground stations, and four central data processing centers. In the future, the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) is to combine the two current systems into a single, state-of-the-art environment-monitoring satellite system. NPOESS is considered critical to the United States' ability to maintain the continuity of data required for weather forecasting and global climate monitoring though the year 2020. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the Department of Defense (DOD), and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) have formed a tri-agency integrated program office to manage NPOESS. GAO was asked to determine the NPOESS program's current status and plans and to discuss considerations in moving the program forward.
What GAO Found
The future direction of the NPOESS program--what will be delivered, at what cost, and by when--is currently on hold pending a decision on how to proceed. In recent years, the program has experienced significant cost increases and schedule delays, with cost estimates increasing to about $10 billion and launch delays approaching 3 years. These factors triggered the need for difficult decisions about the program's direction and capabilities. In mid-November 2005, GAO reported that the NPOESS executive committee expected to make a decision by December 2005 on the direction of the program. GAO noted the importance of making a decision quickly so that the program could proceed. However, in late November 2005, NPOESS cost growth exceeded a legislatively mandated threshold that requires DOD to certify the program to Congress. This placed any decision about future direction on hold until certification takes place in June 2006. In the meantime, the program office has implemented an interim plan to continue work on key sensors and other program elements using fiscal year 2006 funding. Following certification, a decision on future direction should be clear. Proceeding will require a new program baseline and renegotiated contracts--efforts that could take up to a year. As NPOESS undergoes the Defense certification process and important decisions are made on how the program is to proceed, there are several important considerations. First, NOAA and NASA representation in the DOD certification process is imperative. It will be important for these agencies to remain active players in the deliberation of options and the final decision on how to move the program forward. Second, continued indecision increases the risk of a gap in satellite coverage if the final satellite in the predecessor satellite series (the Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites or POES) were to fail. Thus, once program direction is decided, it will be important to move quickly to adjust agency budgets and contracts. Third, continuing oversight of program and executive management is essential to avoid repeating past problems. |
gao_GAO-14-442 | gao_GAO-14-442_0 | Figure 3 shows the amount of this funding CBDP received by fiscal year in constant fiscal year 2013 dollars. Our analysis of DOD data showed that most of the funding for medical countermeasures against biological threat agents in fiscal years 2001 through 2013 was targeted to research and development efforts, with research and development funding totaling approximately $3.75 billion, or nearly 90 percent of the $4.3 billion in funding; the remaining amount was for procurement. DOD Has Made Progress in Researching, Developing, and Making Available Medical Countermeasures Against Biological Threat Agents, but Has Not Updated Its List of Threat Priorities as Required
DOD is researching and developing over 40 candidates for medical countermeasures for use against traditional, emerging, and genetically modified biological threat agents, and is researching, developing, or has obtained FDA approval for countermeasures that address 10 of the 19 biological threat agents it has identified as threats to the warfighter. Over the past 15 years, the biological threat list that DOD’s CBDP uses to prioritize its investments in medical countermeasures has been updated, in various ways, to respond to policy changes, but DOD does not follow its established process for annually updating the biological threat list. For example, officials told us the 2012 update assessed CBRN threats; however, it did not include input from key stakeholders and it was not updated as part of an annual process as required by DOD Directive 6205.3. By not following its directives and regularly updating its biological threat list and priorities, DOD cannot be fully assured that its investments and allocation of resources—and those of its partners—are being applied toward developing medical countermeasures to respond to the most- serious and likely biological threat agents. DOD Has Taken Steps to Enhance Internal Coordination on Resource Allocation for Medical Countermeasures Against Biological Threat Agents
CBDP has taken steps to increase transparency and improve coordination practices within DOD as it allocates resources to address biological threat agents. To address these concerns and better incorporate service priorities and perspectives, CBDP issued a business plan in 2012, which updated its coordination methods. Military service officials agreed with CBDP’s actions and stressed the need for continuing dialogue and collaboration. DOD’s Efforts to Coordinate across Agency Boundaries Align with Best Practices
DOD’s efforts to coordinate with HHS and DHS align with best practices we have identified for collaborating across agency boundaries— specifically, to leverage available resources; establish mutually reinforcing joint strategies; and develop compatible policies, procedures, and other tools to operate across agency boundaries. DOD, HHS, and DHS share a joint research campus—the National Interagency Biodefense Campus at Fort Detrick, Maryland—to study biological threat agents. The campus has its own governance structure, which allows the agencies to leverage available resources and facilitate scientific exchange. Senior leaders at DOD and HHS have also developed interagency agreements and other tools that facilitate communication on the various stages of medical countermeasure development. Finally, DOD and DHS have established processes for identifying biological agents that pose domestic threats and risks. Recommendation for Executive Action
To help ensure that DOD’s investments are being applied toward developing medical countermeasures to respond to the most serious and likely biological threat agents, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the appropriate DOD officials to develop and implement a process to update and validate DOD’s list of biological threats, as required by DOD Directives 5160.05E and 6205.3, or implement a process that aligns with the department’s current policies, practices, and priorities as reflected in the 2001 and 2010 Quadrennial Defense Reviews. To evaluate DOD’s progress in researching, developing, and making available medical countermeasures for use against prioritized biological threat agents, including DOD’s process to prioritize biological medical countermeasure development, we compared the requirements of DOD Directive 6205.3, DOD Immunization Program for Biological Warfare Defense and DOD Directive 5160.05E, Roles and Responsibilities Associated with the Chemical and Biological Defense Program, to the practices CBDP uses to prioritize investments in medical countermeasures against biological threat agents. To evaluate the extent to which DOD’s efforts to coordinate with the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to research and develop medical countermeasures against prioritized biological threat agents align with best practices for collaboration, we reviewed DOD, HHS, and DHS policies and procedures, strategies, memorandums of understanding, and other documents on medical countermeasure efforts to understand how the departments coordinate and communicate. GAO-13-466R. | Why GAO Did This Study
The spread of the scientific capabilities to produce effective biological weapons has contributed to concerns about the threat posed to the warfighter from biological attacks.
GAO was mandated to review DOD's efforts to research and develop medical countermeasures against prioritized biological threat agents. This report (1) describes DOD's funding of medical countermeasures against biological threat agents from fiscal years 2001 through 2013; (2) evaluates DOD's progress in researching, developing, and making available medical countermeasures against biological threat agents, including DOD's prioritization process; (3) describes DOD's internal coordination to allocate resources to medical countermeasures against biological threat agents; and (4) evaluates DOD's coordination with HHS and DHS to research and develop medical countermeasures against biological threat agents.
GAO analyzed DOD budget information from fiscal years 2001 through 2013, policies, and strategies relating to biological medical countermeasures and analyzed information and interviewed officials from DOD, HHS, and DHS on collaborative efforts to research and develop biological medical countermeasures.
What GAO Found
From fiscal years 2001 through 2013, the Department of Defense (DOD) received over $4.3 billion in total funding (in constant fiscal year 2013 dollars) to research, develop, and make available medical countermeasures that respond to biological threat agents. Of that $4.3 billion, approximately $3.75 billion was for the research and development of new medical countermeasures.
DOD has made progress in researching, developing, and making available medical countermeasures against biological threat agents, but does not use its established process for annually updating its list of threat priorities. DOD's Chemical and Biological Defense Program (CBDP) is researching, is developing, or has obtained Food and Drug Administration approval for countermeasures that address 10 of the 19 biological threat agents DOD has identified as threats to the warfighter. Of DOD's 43 candidates for medical countermeasures, 13 use technologies that may allow them to respond to various emerging or genetically modified biological threat agents. However, DOD does not use its established process to annually update its list of biological threat priorities. DOD Directive 6205.3, DOD Immunization Program for Biological Warfare Defense , establishes roles and responsibilities and an annual process for updating DOD's biological threat list. GAO found that the list has not been updated annually and, when it was updated in 2001 and 2012, DOD did not receive input from key stakeholders. By not following its established process for annually updating its biological threat list, DOD cannot ensure that its investments—and those of its partners—are applied toward responding to the most-serious and likely biological threats.
CBDP has taken steps to increase transparency and improve coordination practices within DOD to allocate resources to address biological threats. In response to concerns raised by military service officials that CBDP was not completely transparent in how it prioritized requirements and made resourcing decisions, CBDP issued a business plan in 2012 to update its coordination methods. While military service officials were supportive of CBDP's actions, they stressed the need for continuing dialogue and collaboration in the future.
DOD's efforts to coordinate with the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) align with best practices GAO has identified for collaborating across agency boundaries—specifically, to leverage available resources; establish mutually reinforcing joint strategies; and develop compatible policies, procedures, and other tools to operate across agency boundaries. DOD, HHS, and DHS share a joint research campus—the National Interagency Biodefense Campus at Fort Detrick, Maryland—to study biological threat agents. The campus has its own governance structure, which allows the agencies to leverage available resources and facilitate scientific exchange. Senior leaders at DOD and HHS also have developed interagency agreements and other tools that facilitate communication on the various stages of medical countermeasure development. Finally, DOD and DHS have established processes for identifying biological agents that pose domestic threats and risks.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD implement a process to update its list of biological threats according to its current policies. DOD concurred and identified steps to address the recommendation. |
gao_GAO-10-460 | gao_GAO-10-460_0 | DOD’s Urgent Needs Processes Provide Solutions to Emerging Battlefield Threats but DOD Is Unable to Fully Assess the Effectiveness of Those Processes or of Fielded Solutions
Although DOD has taken steps to create urgent needs processes that are more responsive to urgent warfighter requests than its traditional acquisition procedures, DOD is unable to fully assess how well the urgent needs processes are addressing critical deficiencies or to measure the effectiveness of solutions fielded in the theater because it has not established an effective management framework for those processes. As a result, the department does not have the tools it needs to fully assess how well its processes are working to address critical warfighter needs, to manage their performance, to ensure the efficient use of resources, and to make decisions regarding the long-term sustainment of a fielded combatant command capability. DOD’s Guidance for the Urgent Needs Processes Does Not Include Standards for Collecting and Managing Data
The online data management systems of the joint and Army urgent needs processes lack comprehensive, complete, and reliable information on the achievement of key process phases, as well as the ability to generate reports to track key dates and activities because DOD guidance has not established standards for the collection and management of urgent needs data. In one case, DOD fielded a solution to a joint need for an airborne counter-improvised explosive device for more than 18 months, although it did not meet the warfighters’ needs. Challenges Associated with Training and Funding Can Prolong the Fielding of Solutions to Meet Urgent Warfighter Needs
During our field work in Iraq as well as our analysis of 23 urgent needs case studies, we found several challenges that hinder DOD’s ability to respond to urgent warfighter needs as quickly as possible. Not All Personnel Involved in the Urgent Needs Process Receive Adequate Training
Army personnel who utilize the joint and Army urgent needs processes do not receive adequate training on how to select which process to use to request a solution for an urgent need and how to submit and review requests. According to DOD’s strategic plan for transforming training, deploying personnel should receive priority for training and be responsive to the needs of the combatant commander across the full spectrum of operations. This is due in part because OSD has not designated any one organization with primary responsibility for determining when to implement the department’s statutory rapid acquisition authority or to execute other timely funding decisions. In 11 of our 23 case studies—7 joint, 3 Army, and 1 Marine Corps— obtaining funding was a challenge that increased the amount of time needed to field solutions to the theater. Without greater high-level participation in the decision-making process over when to invoke, or not to invoke, its rapid acquisition authority, OSD will continue to play a reactive, rather than proactive, role in the timely use of DOD resources to meet urgent warfighter needs. OSD Has Not Provided Leadership Over Reprogramming Appropriated Funds to Meet Joint Urgent Needs
Apart from the Secretary’s rapid acquisition authority, DOD has a reprogramming authority, but the military services are reluctant to reprogram funds from their respective budgets to fund solutions to joint urgent needs, and OSD has not exercised its authority to do so. This work has also found that midlevel agencies, such as JRAC, can not guide policies at a high enough level to promote effective interagency cooperation. Conclusions
Due to rapidly changing battlefield threats in Iraq and Afghanistan, Congress has recognized DOD’s need to be more nimble in its response to warfighter requests for urgently needed capabilities than the department’s usual acquisitions process allows. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following nine actions: To improve the department’s ability to fully assess how well the urgent needs processes are addressing critical warfighter deficiencies and to measure the effectiveness of solutions fielded in the theater, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense, in conjunction with the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, combatant commands, military services, and other DOD components, as necessary, take the following actions to permanently establish the joint urgent needs process and to improve consistency with federal internal control standards: Clearly define the roles and responsibilities of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the military services, and other DOD components, as necessary, through the issuance of new or updated OSD and Joint Chiefs of Staff guidance, to identify who is accountable for implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of all phases of the process—including applying the technological maturity criteria. Include rapid acquisition authority procedures available to officials responsible for meeting joint urgent need requests. | Why GAO Did This Study
Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan have faced rapidly changing threats to mission failure or loss of life, highlighting the Department of Defense's (DOD) need to develop and field new capabilities more quickly than its usual acquisition procedures allow. Since 2006, Congress has provided nearly $16 billion to counter improvised explosive devices alone. GAO and others have reported funding, organizational, acquisition, and oversight issues involving DOD's processes for meeting warfighters' urgent needs. The Senate Armed Services Committee asked GAO to determine 1) the extent to which DOD has a means to assess the effectiveness of its urgent needs processes, and 2) what challenges, if any, have affected the overall responsiveness of DOD's urgent needs processes. To conduct this review GAO looked at three urgent needs processes--joint, Army, and the Marine Corps processes--visited forces overseas that submit urgent needs requests and receive solutions, and conducted 23 case studies.
What GAO Found
Although DOD has taken steps to create urgent needs processes that are more responsive to urgent warfighter requests than traditional acquisition procedures, DOD is unable to fully assess how well the processes address critical deficiencies or to measure the effectiveness of solutions fielded in the theater because it has not established an effective management framework for those processes. GAO found that DOD's guidance for its urgent needs processes is dispersed and outdated. Further, DOD guidance does not clearly define roles and responsibilities for implementing, monitoring, and evaluating all phases of those processes or incorporate all of the expedited acquisition authorities available to acquire joint urgent need solutions. Data systems for the processes lack comprehensive, reliable data for tracking overall results and do not have standards for collecting and managing data. In addition, the joint process does not include a formal method for feedback to inform joint leadership on the performance of solutions. In one case, a solution for a joint request was fielded for 18 months without meeting warfighter needs. In the absence of a management framework for its urgent needs processes, DOD lacks tools to fully assess how well its processes work, manage their performance, ensure efficient use of resources, and make decisions regarding the long-term sustainment of fielded capabilities. In conducting field work in Iraq as well as 23 case studies, GAO found several challenges that could hinder DOD's ability to rapidly respond to urgent warfighter needs. First, not all personnel involved in the initial development and review of urgent needs documentation receive adequate training. DOD policy states that deploying personnel should receive priority for training and be responsive to the needs of the combatant commander; however, officers responsible for drafting, submitting, and reviewing Army and joint urgent needs requests are not likely to receive such training. Hence, once in theater, they often face difficulties processing the large volume of requests, in a timely manner. Second, in 11 of 23 cases GAO studied, challenges obtaining funding were the primary factor that increased the amount of time needed to field solutions. Funding has not always been available for joint urgent needs in part because the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) has not assigned primary responsibility for implementing the department's rapid acquisition authority. Congress provided OSD with that authority to meet urgent warfighter needs, but OSD has played a reactive rather than proactive role in making decisions about when to invoke it. In addition, DOD can reprogram funds appropriated for other purposes to meet urgent needs requests, but authority for determining when and how to reprogram funds has been delegated to the services and combatant commands. Prior GAO work has shown that strong leadership from OSD over resource control is critical, and midlevel agencies such as the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell, which is responsible for facilitating urgent needs requests, including funding, cannot guide other agencies at a high enough level to promote effective interagency coordination. Finally, GAO found that attempts to meet urgent needs with immature or complex technologies can result in significant delays. |
gao_GAO-08-20 | gao_GAO-08-20_0 | AFIP provides pathology expertise for all branches of the military. In 2006, AFIP provided over 40,000 consultations, almost half of which were for DOD physicians. DOD, VA, and civilian physicians use AFIP’s educational services, but the civilian community uses AFIP’s educational services more extensively than military physicians. Regarding its research services, AFIP pathologists work individually and in partnership with other federal and private researchers using material from the repository to conduct research applicable to military operations as well as to diagnose and treat diseases affecting military and civilian health. That is, when physicians—clinicians or general pathologists— at civilian, DOD, or VA medical centers cannot make a diagnosis or when they are unsure of their initial diagnosis and are in need of another opinion, they can send the case to AFIP’s subspecialty pathologists for diagnostic consultation. DOD, VA, and civilian physicians have access to AskAFIP. Studying these samples allows for advances in diagnosis and treatment of diseases. DOD Has Specific Plans to Terminate Most Services Currently Provided by AFIP and Is Developing Plans to Relocate the Others
The 2005 BRAC provision specifies that AFIP be disestablished. With the exception of two educational courses, DOD does not plan to retain and relocate the educational programs currently offered by AFIP. DOD plans to halt AFIP’s research and realign the repository, which is AFIP’s primary research resource, to the Forest Glen Annex, Maryland, under the management of USUHS. The BRAC provision allows DOD the flexibility to retain capabilities that were not specifically addressed in the provision. In accordance with this statutory authority, the ASD(HA) has retained four additional AFIP services and is considering whether to retain six others. According to DOD’s most recently developed implementation plan, dated February 2007, DOD had planned to begin implementation of the BRAC provision relating to AFIP in July 2007 and to complete action by September 2011. However, a provision from the 2007 supplemental appropriations act prevents DOD from reorganizing or relocating any AFIP functions until after DOD has submitted detailed plans and timetables for the proposed reorganization and relocation to Congress. Once the reorganization plan has been submitted, DOD can resume reorganizing and relocating AFIP. Most of AFIP’s Services Will Be Terminated, but Some Will Be Relocated
DOD plans to terminate AFIP’s provision of diagnostic consultations and outsource certain DOD diagnostic consultations to the private sector through a newly established PMO. However, a smooth transition depends on DOD’s actions to address key challenges involved in developing new approaches to obtaining subspecialty pathology consultations and managing the repository to facilitate its use for research. DOD and VA officials have begun to identify the challenges, but have not decided upon strategies to address them. These challenges include determining how to effectively use existing subspecialty pathology resources, obtain outside expertise, and ensure coordination and funding of services to encourage efficiency while avoiding disincentives to quality care. Research Could Be Affected Depending on How DOD Plans to Populate, Maintain, and Use the Repository in the Future
Because DOD has not developed its strategy regarding how it will populate, maintain, and use the repository, some pathologists we interviewed were concerned about the future of the repository and whether it would continue to be a viable research tool. DOD awarded a contract to study the usefulness of the material in the repository, which it anticipates to be completed by the end of 2008. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To describe key services that the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology (AFIP) provides to the Department of Defense (DOD), the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), and civilian communities, we reviewed recent reports describing AFIP’s services and business practices, including a previous GAO report and an Army Audit Agency report on AFIP’s business plan and a BearingPoint report on AFIP’s capabilities, and other relevant reports, including some from VA. We also interviewed officials from AFIP, DOD, VA, the American Registry of Pathology (ARP), pathology associations such as the College of American Pathologists (CAP), the American Society for Investigative Pathology, and the Association of Pathology Chairs, as well as radiology associations, such as the American College of Radiology and the Canadian Radiology Association, to collect information on AFIP’s core services. To describe DOD’s plans to terminate, relocate, or outsource services currently provided by AFIP, as required by the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) provision, we interviewed officials from DOD’s Offices of the Surgeons General of the Army, Navy, and Air Force; the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs; the Office of the General Counsel; the TRICARE Management Activity; the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment); AFIP; and the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences (USUHS). | Why GAO Did This Study
The 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) provision required the Department of Defense (DOD) to close the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology (AFIP). GAO was asked to address the status and potential impact of implementing this BRAC provision. This report discusses (1) key services AFIP provides to the military and civilian communities; (2) DOD's plans to terminate, relocate, or outsource services currently provided by AFIP; and (3) the potential impacts of disestablishing AFIP on military and civilian communities. New legislation requires DOD to consider this GAO report as it develops its plan for the reorganization of AFIP. GAO reviewed DOD's plans, analysis, and other relevant information, and interviewed officials from the public and private sectors.
What GAO Found
AFIP pathologists perform three key services--diagnostic consultations, education, and research--primarily for physicians from DOD, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), and civilian institutions. AFIP provides consultations when physicians cannot make a diagnosis or are unsure of their initial diagnosis. About half of its 40,000 consultations in 2006 were for DOD physicians, and the rest were nearly equally divided between VA and civilian physicians. AFIP's educational services train physicians in diagnosing the most difficult-to-diagnose diseases. Civilian physicians use these services more extensively than military physicians. In addition, AFIP pathologists collaborate with others on research applicable to military operations and general medicine, often using material from AFIP's repository of tissue specimens to gain a better understanding of disease diagnosis and treatment. To implement the 2005 BRAC provision, DOD plans to terminate most services currently provided by AFIP and is developing plans to relocate or outsource others. DOD plans to outsource some diagnostic consultations to the private sector through a newly established office and use its pathologists for consultations when possible. With the exception of two courses, DOD does not plan to retain AFIP's educational program. DOD also plans to halt AFIP's research and realign the repository, which is AFIP's primary research resource. The BRAC provision allows DOD flexibility to retain services that were not specifically addressed in the provision. As a result, DOD will retain four additional AFIP services and is considering whether to retain six others. DOD had planned to begin implementation of the BRAC provision related to AFIP in July 2007 and complete action by September 2011, but statutory requirements prevent DOD from reorganizing or relocating AFIP functions until after DOD submits a detailed plan and timetable for the proposed implementation of these changes to congressional committees no later than December 31, 2007. Once the plan has been submitted, DOD can resume reorganizing and relocating AFIP. Discontinuing, relocating, or outsourcing AFIP services may have minimal impact on DOD, VA, and civilian communities because pathology services are available from alternate sources, but a smooth transition depends on DOD's actions to address the challenges in developing new approaches to obtaining pathology expertise and managing the repository. For consultations, these challenges are to determine how to use existing pathology resources, obtain outside expertise, and ensure coordination and funding of services to avoid disincentives to quality care. While DOD has begun to identify the challenges, it has not developed strategies to address them. Similarly, whether the repository will continue to be a rich resource for military and civilian research depends on how DOD populates, maintains, and provides access to it in the future, but DOD has not developed strategies to address these issues. DOD contracted for a study, due to be completed in October 2008, of the usefulness of the material in the repository. DOD plans to use this study to help make decisions about managing the repository. |
gao_GAO-01-934 | gao_GAO-01-934_0 | Estimated per-pupil expenditures vary widely among different types of BIA schools, such as boarding schools and day schools, and are higher than per-pupil expenditures at public schools. Academic Performance of Many BIA Students is Below That of Public School Students
In school year 1999–2000, BIA students scored far below public school students on state assessments in North Dakota, South Dakota, and Arizona—three states with large numbers of BIA schools. In addition, BIA students score significantly below national averages on college admission tests. While nearly all teachers at BIA schools were certified, officials at some schools we visited, particularly tribally operated schools, recounted some difficulties recruiting and retaining qualified staff. While computers and the Internet are generally available at BIA schools, a smaller proportion of the schools have paid (versus volunteer) technology support staff than public schools. BIA’s infrastructure also includes dormitory facilities for boarding students and housing for staff and their families. The DOD School System
DOD students’ academic achievement generally exceeds that of elementary and secondary students as measured by national standardized tests. DOD school administrators indicated that nearly all teachers in DOD schools are certified in the subjects or grades they teach, and the majority of teachers hold advanced degrees—this proportion is greater than the national average for public school teachers. A high proportion of DOD students take college admissions tests, scoring at or near national averages. DOD Teachers Are Certified and Most Have Advanced Degrees
Administrators responding to our survey indicated that virtually all teachers in DOD schools are certified in the subjects or grades they teach, both in domestic and overseas schools. Technology Access and Support Reported by DOD Schools is on Average Greater Than Public Schools
Based on the responses of DOD school officials to our survey, DOD students appear to have greater access to computers, including computers connected to the Internet, than do public school students nationwide. Administrators Report Some Problems With DOD School Facilities
Many DOD school administrators responding to our survey reported problems with their school facilities but, for the most part, their responses were not substantially different from those reported nationally by public school administrators in 1999. | What GAO Found
Unlike public schools, the schools run by the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) and the Department of Defense (DOD) depend almost entirely on federal funds. Although the two school systems are similar in that regard, their histories and settings are very different. The performance of many BIA students on standardized tests and other academic measures is far below that of public school students. BIA students also score considerably below the national average on college admission tests. Nearly all BIA teachers are fully certified for the subjects or grade levels they teach, although BIA officials said that some schools have great difficulty recruiting and retaining qualified staff. BIA schools report that they have greater access to computers and the Internet than do public schools, but the technical support available to maintain the computers and help teachers use technology in the classroom is more limited. Many school administrators reported problems with school facilities. Estimated per-pupil expenditures at BIA schools varied widely by school type, such as day or boarding school, but are generally higher than for public schools nationally. The academic performance of DOD students generally exceeds that of elementary and secondary students nationwide. On college admission tests, DOD students perform at or near the national average. Nearly all DOD teachers are fully certified for the subjects or grade levels they teach, and about two-thirds have advanced degrees. Access to computers and the Internet is better than at public schools, and nearly all DOD administrators said that technical support is available in their schools. Many DOD administrators reported problems with their school facilities, but the overall condition of their buildings did not differ greatly from that reported by public schools in 1999. Estimated per-pupil expenditures at DOD schools overseas were higher than those for U.S. schools, mainly because of the costs involved in moving and housing teachers and staff overseas. |
gao_GAO-17-240 | gao_GAO-17-240_0 | In 2014, the Revitalize American Manufacturing and Innovation Act of 2014 (RAMI Act) was enacted as part of the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015. Selected Federal Programs Reported Supporting U.S. Manufacturing by Fostering Innovation, Strengthening Competitiveness in the Global Marketplace, and Assisting Workers
Federal Programs We Identified Reported Supporting U.S. Manufacturing
We identified 58 programs in 11 federal agencies that reported they support U.S. manufacturing. Based on our review of survey responses, these programs support manufacturing by fostering innovation, helping manufacturers compete in the global marketplace, helping workers enhance skills and obtain employment, and providing general financing or general business assistance. Reported obligations for these programs ranged from $750,000 to $203,568,000 in fiscal year 2015. Twenty-six other programs reported using funding to support manufacturing—in additional to other sectors—and provided ranges of estimates for the obligations directly supporting manufacturing. The remaining 11 programs either did not provide an estimate of their support to manufacturing or reported zero program obligations in fiscal year 2015. In fiscal year 2015, this program obligated $3,223,434, according to agency officials, and provided grants to approximately 12 educational institutions, which supported about 140 students and other individuals conducting research. Supporting the enhancement of job seekers’ skills. Our analysis of survey responses shows that more than two thirds of programs are addressing the shift toward advanced manufacturing, approximately half of the programs are taking steps to address increased globalization and competition, and less than half are addressing the need for a higher skilled workforce. Programs reported addressing trends in several ways, including providing funding and resources, sharing information, and promoting coordination. Most Programs Reported Goals or Measures Related to Support of Manufacturing, and an Interagency Group Has Not Identified the Information It Needs to Report on Progress in Supporting Advanced Manufacturing Most Programs Reported Having Performance Goals or Measures Related to Supporting Manufacturing
Most of the 58 programs reported having performance goals or measures related to the support of manufacturing. Apart from agency efforts to assess the performance of individual programs, a federal interagency initiative coordinates activities and assesses progress in the area of advanced manufacturing. Developing the workforce. The study concluded that, among other things, the NSF, through the MME program, has positively “contributed to the emergence of additive manufacturing over the last 25 years.”
An Interagency Subcommittee Coordinates Agencies’ Advanced Manufacturing Efforts but Has Not Identified the Information Needed to Report Progress toward Achieving Strategic Objectives
Apart from these efforts to assess the performance of individual programs, there is an interagency subcommittee—the Subcommittee on Advanced Manufacturing (SAM)—which was tasked by the NSTC’s Committee on Technology with, among other things, coordinating federal agencies’ activities and reporting on the federal government’s progress in a particular area—advanced manufacturing. SAM is co-chaired by OSTP. The strategic plan identifies potential measures that could be used to measure progress toward these objectives but does not specify what information should be submitted by agencies. Without specifying the information it will collect from federal agencies, SAM may lack consistent, comprehensive information that would help it fully report on the progress in achieving the objectives of the National Strategic Plan for Advanced Manufacturing. Recommendation for Executive Action
To enhance the ability of the Executive Office of the President to implement RAMI Act requirements related to reporting on advanced manufacturing, we recommend that the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, working through the National Science and Technology Council and agency leadership, as appropriate, identify the information they will collect from federal agencies to determine the extent to which the objectives outlined in the National Strategic Plan for Advanced Manufacturing are being achieved. While we agree that the SAM charter provides for periodic updates on the implementation of the strategic plan, the focus of the draft recommendation was on the need to identify the specific information to be collected from federal agencies to report on progress made in achieving the objectives of the 2012 strategic plan. OSTP also suggested revising the recommendation to specifically mention the SAM. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to examine (1) how selected federal programs provide support to U.S. manufacturing; (2) how selected federal tax expenditures provide support to U.S. manufacturing; (3) how, if at all, selected federal programs address manufacturing trends and what, if any, challenges they face; and (4) the extent to which federal agencies measure performance and assess effectiveness in supporting manufacturing generally, and advanced manufacturing specifically. We identified 11 agencies that administered programs that support the manufacturing sector. GAO-12-930. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. manufacturing sector—representing about 12 percent of the economy and employing 12 million workers in 2015—has undergone changes over the last several decades. With increased productivity and technological innovation, the sector experienced a decreasing number of jobs and share of the economy. GAO was asked to examine how the federal government supports manufacturing.
This report examines (1) how selected federal programs and tax expenditures provide support to U.S. manufacturing; (2) how programs are addressing manufacturing trends; and (3) the extent to which agencies measure performance and assess effectiveness in support of manufacturing generally, and advanced manufacturing specifically. GAO reviewed selected programs with a focus on manufacturing, among other criteria, and conducted a survey of these selected programs to collect data on their budget, activities, and effects. GAO also reviewed reports and interviewed agency officials and experts.
What GAO Found
GAO identified 58 programs in 11 federal agencies that reported providing support to U.S. manufacturing by fostering innovation through research and development, assisting with trade in the global marketplace, helping job seekers enhance skills and obtain employment, and providing general financing or business assistance. Twenty-one of these programs reported using all of their obligations in fiscal year 2015 to support U.S. manufacturing. For these 21 programs, obligations of each program ranged from $750,000 to $204 million in fiscal year 2015, the most recent full year of data. Twenty-six other programs reported using funding to support manufacturing—in addition to other sectors—and provided ranges of estimates for the obligations directly supporting manufacturing. The remaining 11 programs either did not provide an estimate of their support to manufacturing or reported no program obligations in fiscal year 2015. GAO also identified nine tax expenditures that can provide benefits to manufacturers, amounting to billions of dollars in incentives for both the manufacturing sector and other sectors of the economy.
Most (51) of the 58 programs reported addressing trends toward an increase in advanced manufacturing (e.g. activities using automation, software, or cutting edge materials), the need for a higher-skilled workforce, and more global trade competition for U.S. manufacturers by providing funds and resources, sharing information, and promoting coordination. Survey responses from the 58 programs indicated that more than two-thirds of them are addressing the shift toward advanced manufacturing, approximately half are taking steps to address increased globalization and competition, and fewer than half are addressing the need for a higher skilled workforce.
Forty-four of the 58 programs reported having performance goals or measures related to the support of manufacturing, but agencies that comprise an interagency group have not identified the information they will collect from agencies and use to report progress in supporting advanced manufacturing. Ten of the 11 agencies that administer programs GAO reviewed participate in a federal interagency initiative to coordinate activities and report on progress in the area of advanced manufacturing. The Subcommittee on Advanced Manufacturing—co-chaired by the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) and that coordinates advanced manufacturing efforts—supports the updating and reporting on a National Strategic Plan for Advanced Manufacturing. The plan, which was published in 2012, identifies objectives and potential measures that could be used to assess progress. The subcommittee plans to report in 2018 on progress in achieving the strategic plan's objectives, as required by the Revitalize American Manufacturing and Innovation Act of 2014. However, OSTP has not worked with the subcommittee member agencies to identify the information needed to report progress in achieving the strategic objectives, such as what measures will be used. While subcommittee officials said the subcommittee does not provide top-down direction to federal agencies on how to measure effectiveness, specifying the information it will collect from federal agencies would better position it to report consistent and comprehensive information on the progress in achieving the plan's objectives.
What GAO Recommends
OSTP should identify the information it will collect from agencies to determine their progress in achieving the objectives of the National Strategic Plan for Advanced Manufacturing. In commenting on a draft of this report, OSTP neither agreed nor disagreed with the recommendation and suggested alternative language. In response, GAO revised the recommendation to focus on the identification of information, as discussed in the report. |
gao_GAO-16-672T | gao_GAO-16-672T_0 | Background
The federal government plans to invest more than $89 billion on IT in fiscal year 2017. However, as we have previously reported, investments in federal IT too often result in failed projects that incur cost overruns and schedule slippages while contributing little to the mission-related outcome. Federal data center consolidation initiative (FDCCI). Enhanced transparency and improved risk management. As of May 2016, about 33 percent of these recommendations had been implemented. Also in our high risk report, we stated that OMB and agencies will need to demonstrate measurable government-wide progress in the following key areas: implement at least 80 percent of GAO’s recommendations related to the management of IT acquisitions and operations within 4 years, ensure that a minimum of 80 percent of the government’s major acquisitions deliver functionality every 12 months, and achieve no less than 80 percent of the planned PortfolioStat savings and 80 percent of the planned savings for data center consolidation. In total, we have made 111 recommendations to OMB and agencies to improve the execution and oversight of the initiative. Specifically, as of November 2015, agencies had identified a total of 10,584 data centers, of which they reported closing 3,125 through fiscal year 2015. See figure 1 for a summary of agencies’ total data centers and reported and planned closures. Further, 21 agencies collectively reported planning an additional $5.4 billion in cost savings and avoidances, for a total of approximately $8.2 billion, through fiscal year 2019. Finally, we reported that agencies made limited progress against OMB’s fiscal year 2015 core data center optimization performance metrics. To better ensure that federal data center consolidation and optimization efforts improve governmental efficiency and achieve cost savings, we recommended that 10 agencies take action to complete their planned data center cost savings and avoidance targets for fiscal years 2016 through 2018. Risks Need to Be Fully Considered When Agencies Rate Their Major Investments on OMB’s IT Dashboard
To facilitate transparency across the government in acquiring and managing IT investments, OMB established a public website—the IT Dashboard—to provide detailed information on major investments at 26 agencies, including ratings of their performance against cost and schedule targets. Among other things, agencies are to submit ratings from their CIOs, which, according to OMB’s instructions, should reflect the level of risk facing an investment relative to that investment’s ability to accomplish its goals. In total, we have made 22 recommendations to OMB and federal agencies to help improve the accuracy and reliability of the information on the IT Dashboard and to increase its availability. Most agencies agreed with our recommendations or had no comment. Specifically, our assessment of 95 investments at 15 agencies matched the CIO ratings posted on the Dashboard 22 times, showed more risk 60 times, and showed less risk 13 times. Agencies Need to Increase Their Use of Incremental Development Practices
OMB has emphasized the need to deliver investments in smaller parts, or increments, in order to reduce risk, deliver capabilities more quickly, and facilitate the adoption of emerging technologies. Most agencies agreed with our recommendations or had no comment. Specifically, as of August 31, 2015, on the IT Dashboard, 22 federal agencies reported that 300 of 469 active software development projects (approximately 64 percent) were planning to deliver usable functionality every 6 months for fiscal year 2016, as required by OMB guidance. For example, the percentage of software projects delivering every 6 months that was reported to us by the Department of Commerce decreased by about 42 percentage points from what was reported on the IT Dashboard. We determined that the significant differences in delivery rates were due, in part, to agencies having different interpretations of OMB’s guidance on reporting software development projects and because the information reported to us was generally more current than the information reported on the IT Dashboard. To improve the use of incremental development, we are recommending in our draft report, which is with the applicable agencies for comment, that agencies take action to update their policies for incremental development and IT Dashboard project information. High-Risk Series: An Update. Information Technology: Agencies Need to Establish and Implement Incremental Development Policies. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government plans to invest more than $89 billion on IT in fiscal year 2017. Historically, these investments have frequently failed, incurred cost overruns and schedule slippages, or contributed little to mission-related outcomes. Accordingly, in December 2014, IT reform legislation was enacted into law, aimed at improving agencies' acquisition of IT. Further, in February 2015, GAO added improving the management of IT acquisitions and operations to its high-risk list—a list of agencies and program areas that are high risk due to their vulnerabilities to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement, or are most in need of transformation. Between fiscal years 2010 and 2015, GAO made about 800 recommendations related to this high-risk area to OMB and agencies. As of May 2016, about 33 percent of these had been implemented.
This statement primarily summarizes: (1) GAO's published work on data center consolidation, and (2) GAO's draft reports on the risk of major investments as reported on the IT Dashboard and the implementation of incremental development practices. These draft reports with recommendations are currently with applicable agencies for comment.
What GAO Found
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and agencies have taken steps to improve federal information technology (IT) through a series of initiatives; however, additional actions are needed.
Consolidating data centers. In an effort to reduce the growing number of data centers, OMB launched a consolidation initiative in 2010. GAO recently reported that agencies had closed 3,125 of the 10,584 total data centers and achieved $2.8 billion in cost savings and avoidances through fiscal year 2015. Agencies are planning a total of about $8.2 billion in savings and avoidances through fiscal year 2019. However, these planned savings may be higher because 10 agencies had not fully developed their planned savings goals. In addition, agencies made limited progress against OMB's fiscal year 2015 data center optimization performance targets, such as the utilization of data center facilities. GAO recommended that the agencies take action to complete their cost savings targets and improve optimization progress. Most agencies agreed with the recommendations or had no comment.
Enhancing transparency. OMB's IT Dashboard provides detailed information on major investments at federal agencies, including ratings from Chief Information Officers (CIO) that should reflect the level of risk facing an investment. In a draft report, GAO's assessments of the risk ratings showed more risk than the associated CIO ratings. In particular, of the 95 investments reviewed, GAO's assessments matched the CIO ratings 22 times, showed more risk 60 times, and showed less risk 13 times. Several issues contributed to these differences, such as ratings not being updated frequently. In its draft report, GAO is recommending that agencies improve the quality and frequency of their CIO ratings.
Implementing incremental development. An additional key reform initiated by OMB has emphasized the need to deliver investments in smaller parts, or increments, in order to reduce risk and deliver capabilities more quickly. Since 2012, OMB has required investments to deliver functionality every 6 months. In a draft report, GAO determined that 22 agencies reported that 64 percent of 469 active software development projects had plans to deliver usable functionality every 6 months for fiscal year 2016. Further, for seven selected agencies, GAO identified significant differences in the percentage of software projects delivering every 6 months reported to GAO compared to what was reported on the IT Dashboard. For example, the percentage of software projects reported to GAO by the Department of Commerce decreased by about 42 percentage points from what was reported on the IT Dashboard. These differences were due, in part, to agencies having different interpretations of OMB's guidance on reporting software development projects. In its draft report, GAO is recommending that OMB and agencies improve the use of incremental development.
What GAO Recommends
GAO has previously made numerous recommendations to OMB and federal agencies to improve the oversight and execution of the data center consolidation initiative, the accuracy and reliability of the IT Dashboard, and incremental development policies. Most agencies agreed with GAO's recommendations or had no comment. |
gao_GAO-08-112 | gao_GAO-08-112_0 | In 2006, VA paid over $34 billion in compensation and pension benefits to about 3.5 million veterans and survivors. The VA Pension Population Is Characterized by Low Income, Older Ages, Multiple Impairments, and Decreasing Numbers
In 2006, most VA pensioners had nonpension incomes well below the federal poverty level, were beyond retirement age, and had multiple impairments, and the population had been decreasing in number. The Size of the Pensioner Population Has Decreased
As shown in table 2, the total number of pensioners has been decreasing in recent years, although the number of pensioners from more recent service periods has been increasing. For Initial Pension Claims, VA Policies and Procedures Do Not Always Ensure Well-Supported Decisions
VA policies and procedures are not sufficient to ensure sound decisions on new pension claims. Unlike other federal agencies with similar income- based programs, VA largely does not independently verify the accuracy of financial information provided by claimants to support initial pension program eligibility, a fact that makes the pension program vulnerable to improper payments. In addition, the guidance used by staff to make pension eligibility decisions, which is under revision and dispersed across several sources, is not always current or clear. Further, VA’s quality assurance review process for initial claims does not select a sufficient number of pension cases to examine to ensure the accuracy of pension decisions. Finally, VA does not adequately evaluate pension training. For Ongoing Pension Cases, VA Procedures and Controls Do Not Adequately Ensure That Benefits Are Proper
VA procedures for assessing whether pensioners continue to receive the proper benefits have significant limitations because VA does not require pensioners to submit financial documentation, conducts untimely and inefficient verification of pensioners’ incomes and assets, and lacks a system for identifying and reducing improper pension benefits. Although the agency requires all pensioners to submit documentation for nonfinancial changes, such as for marriages or deaths, it does not require documentation such as bank or asset statements when pensioners report financial changes. Finally, despite millions of dollars in improper payments made each year, VA does not collect sufficient data on causes of improper payments that could be used to help it better manage the pension program. 5. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The Senate Veterans’ Affairs Committee asked GAO to (1) determine the characteristics and trends in size of the pensioner population, (2) assess the policies and procedures the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) has in place to ensure that initial pension eligibility decisions are well managed, and (3) assess the procedures VA has in place to ensure that pensioners continue to receive the proper benefit payments. We visited 4 of VA’s 57 regional offices, located in Boston, Milwaukee, Providence, and St. Paul. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2006, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) paid about $3.5 billion in means-tested pension benefits to over 500,000 veterans and survivors. GAO was asked to review the management of VA pension program. This report assesses (1) the characteristics and trends in size of the current pensioner population, (2) the policies and procedures VA has in place to ensure that initial pension eligibility decisions are well managed, and (3) the procedures VA has in place to ensure that pensioners continue to receive the proper benefit payments on an ongoing basis. Our study included reviews of agency policies, procedures, and internal controls; site visits to 4 of VA's 57 regional offices and all three of its pension maintenance centers; and a selected file review of new claims at three locations.
What GAO Found
In 2006, most of the over 500,000 VA pensioners had nonpension incomes well below the federal poverty level, were beyond retirement age, and had multiple impairments, and the population has been decreasing in number. The average annual reported income of these pensioners, excluding their VA pensions, was less than $5,000. The average age of VA pensioners was 70. More than 80 percent had no spouse or dependent children. Three-fourths of veteran pensioners had multiple impairments. After reaching a peak of almost 2 million in 1978, the overall size of the pensioner population has gradually decreased, although the number of pensioners from more recent service periods has been increasing. VA policies and procedures are not sufficient to ensure sound decisions on new pension claims. Unlike other federal agencies with similar income-based programs, VA largely does not independently verify the accuracy of financial information provided by claimants to support initial pension program eligibility. In addition, the guidance used by staff to make pension eligibility decisions is not always current or clear. Further, VA's quality assurance review process for initial claims does not select a sufficient number of pension cases to ensure the accuracy of pension claims decisions. Finally, VA does not adequately evaluate training for pension staff. VA procedures for assessing whether pensioners continue to receive the proper benefits have significant limitations. Although the agency requires pensioners to report changes that might affect their pensions, VA does not require documentation such as bank or asset statements when pensioners report financial changes. Also, a key data match operation with the Internal Revenue Service is not conducted in a timely or efficient manner. Finally, despite millions of dollars in improper pension payments made each year, VA lacks a system to monitor and analyze their causes. |
gao_GAO-16-624 | gao_GAO-16-624_0 | Program integrity activities may encompass a broad range of activities, such as identifying improper payments or improper access to federal programs or benefits. Commercial Data and Data Services
Throughout this report, we refer to commercial data and data service providers. Figure 1 shows examples of the types of data that agencies may obtain from data service providers. Selected Federal Agencies Report Using Commercial Data Services to Access Data and Improve the Efficiency of Program Integrity Activities
Officials from SSA, the Department of Labor (DOL), the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), GSA, and IRS told us that using commercial data services can help their agencies to access proprietary private sector data that are not available from government sources and improve the efficiency of program integrity activities. Commercial bank account information from private financial institutions may not be available from government sources, and this proprietary private sector information may help a federal agency to identify improper payments. For example, IRS officials told us that using commercial data service providers to provide web and phone-based services to help authenticate certain taxpayers’ identities allowed their staff to focus on other work rather than deal with large volumes of in-person requests for identity authentication. Selected Agencies Consider Factors Such as Completeness and Accuracy When Determining Whether Data from Commercial Data Services Meet Information Requirements for Program Integrity Activities
Factors agencies may consider in determining whether data from nongovernmental data services meet their information requirements for conducting program integrity activities include the accuracy of data; the currency and timeliness of data; the completeness of data; and technical aspects of using the data for these purposes, according to officials we spoke with. As mentioned, our work was based on a nonprobability sample of agencies and nongovernmental entities, and the information and perspectives that we obtained are not generalizable to other federal agencies and data service providers. As part of our review, OMB staff described provisions of the Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act of 1988 (“Computer Matching Act”) designed to mitigate the risk of agencies using inaccurate data in conducting program integrity activities. For example, DOL officials told us that state UI agencies could likely improve their ability to identify and prevent improper UI payments to claimants who return to work by obtaining wage data from Equifax’s Work Number system, which are generally more recent than quarterly wage data that UI agencies receive from employers. In April 2016, DOL officials told us that the agency is currently working with three states and Equifax to conduct a pilot project to examine the use of Equifax’s Work Number data to identify improper payments to UI recipients with disqualifying income from work. The DOL officials expect the pilot project to last for up to 4 months. Agencies May Consider Technical Aspects of Commercial Data Services When Conducting Program Integrity Activities
Officials from IRS, SSA, and GSA told us that federal agencies also consider technical aspects of commercial data services when determining whether commercial data meet their information requirements for conducting program integrity activities, such as restrictions on batch versus manual data processing. Commercial data service providers may also place restrictions on how agencies can use data. Agency Comments
We are not making recommendations in this report. | Why GAO Did This Study
Federal agencies may use commercial data services in conducting program integrity activities designed to identify fraud and improper payments, which pose a significant risk to the integrity of federal programs. For example, federal agencies may obtain commercial data—subject to applicable laws and protections—that identifies individuals' deaths, income and assets, or other information that may help the agency determine whether individuals or entities are eligible for a government program or benefit.
GAO was asked to review issues surrounding the use of commercial data in conducting program integrity activities. This report identifies and describes the views of selected agency officials and commercial data service providers regarding (1) reasons selected agencies have used commercial data services in conducting program integrity activities; and (2) factors agencies may consider in determining whether commercial data services meet their information requirements for conducting program integrity activities.
To do this, GAO reviewed documents and conducted interviews with federal agency officials and representatives of commercial data service providers selected as part of a nonprobability sample of 12 entities selected to represent a range of program integrity activities and commercial data services. The information and perspectives that GAO obtained are not generalizable to other agencies and providers.
GAO is making no recommendations in this report, which incorporates various technical comments from the agencies.
What GAO Found
Officials from selected federal agencies told GAO that using commercial data services can help their agencies improve the efficiency of program integrity activities. For example, Internal Revenue Service (IRS) officials told GAO that using commercial data service providers to provide web and phone-based services to help authenticate certain taxpayer's identities likely allowed their staff to focus on other work rather than deal with large volumes of in-person requests for identity authentication. Commercial data services can also provide federal agencies access to private sector data, such as bank deposit information, that is not available from federal government sources. This financial information may help agencies to determine whether individuals have income from work or assets that indicate they are not eligible for certain programs, such as disability programs. Applicable laws generally require that agencies independently verify instances of matching data identified by computer matching programs before taking action and provide minimum notice to affected individuals. The figure below shows examples of the types of data that agencies may obtain from data service providers.
Federal agencies may consider various factors in determining whether data from commercial data services meet their information requirements for conducting program integrity activities. These factors include the accuracy of data; the currency and timeliness of data; the completeness of data; and technical aspects of using the data for these purposes, according to officials from agencies in GAO's nonprobability sample. For example, Department of Labor (DOL) officials told GAO that state Unemployment Insurance (UI) agencies could likely improve their ability to identify and prevent improper UI payments to claimants who return to work by obtaining commercially available wage data from a data service provider that are generally more recent than quarterly wage data that UI agencies receive directly from employers. DOL officials also told GAO that the agency is currently working with three states and a provider to conduct a pilot project to examine the use of the provider's payroll data to identify improper payments to UI recipients with disqualifying income from work. DOL expects the pilot to last up to 4 months. |
gao_GAO-12-840T | gao_GAO-12-840T_0 | for assessing the completeness, adequacy, and appropriateness of these institutions’ appraisal and evaluation policies and procedures. Appraisal Subcommittee. Among other things, ASC is responsible for (1) monitoring and reviewing the practices, procedures, activities, and organizational structure of the Appraisal Foundation—including making grants to the Foundation in amounts that it deems appropriate to help defray costs associated with its Title XI activities; (2) monitoring the requirements that states and their appraiser regulatory agencies establish for the certification and licensing of appraisers; (3) monitoring the requirements established by the federal banking regulators regarding appraisal standards for federally related transactions and determinations of which federally related transactions will require the services of state-licensed or -certified appraisers; and (4) maintaining a national registry of state-licensed and -certified appraisers who can perform appraisals for federally related transactions. The Widespread Use of Appraisals for Mortgage Originations Reflects Their Advantages Relative to Other Valuation Methods
Available data and interviews with lenders and other mortgage industry participants indicate that appraisals are the most frequently used valuation method for home purchase and refinance mortgage originations. Appraisals provide an opinion of market value at a point in time and reflect prevailing economic and housing market conditions. Some mortgage industry stakeholders have argued that wider use of the cost approach in particular could help mitigate what they viewed as a limitation of the sales comparison approach. The data we obtained did not allow us to analyze the differences between the values appraisers generated using the different approaches. Conflict-of-Interest Policies Have Changed Appraiser Selection Processes, with Implications for Appraisal Oversight
Recently issued policies reinforce long-standing requirements and guidance designed to address conflicts of interest that may arise when direct or indirect personal interests bias appraisers from exercising their independent professional judgment. AMCs are third parties that, among other things, select appraisers for appraisal assignments on behalf of lenders. Greater use of AMCs has raised questions about oversight of these firms and their impact on appraisal quality. AMC officials we spoke with said that they had processes that addressed these areas of concern—for example, using an automated system that identified the most qualified appraiser based on the requirements for the assignment, proximity to the subject property, and performance metrics such as timeliness and appraisal quality. While the impact of the increased use of AMCs on appraisal quality is unclear, Congress recognized the importance of additional AMC oversight in enacting the Dodd-Frank Act by requiring state appraiser regulatory boards to supervise AMCs. The Dodd-Frank Act requires the federal banking regulators, CFPB, and FHFA to establish minimum standards for states to apply in registering AMCs, including requirements that appraisals coordinated by an AMC comply with USPAP and be conducted independently and free from inappropriate influence and coercion. Such reinforcement could help to provide greater assurance to lenders, the enterprises, and federal agencies of the quality of the appraisals provided by AMCs. To help ensure more consistent and effective oversight of the appraisal industry, we recommended in our July 2011 report that the heads of the federal banking regulators, CFPB, and FHFA—as part of their joint rulemaking required under the Dodd-Frank Act—consider including criteria for the selection of appraisers for appraisal orders, review of completed appraisals, and qualifications for appraisal reviewers when developing minimum standards for state registration of AMCs. federal banking regulators and FHFA agreed with or indicated that they would consider our recommendation but as of June 2012 had not issued a rule setting minimum standards for state registration of AMCs. Several Weaknesses Have Potentially Limited ASC’s Effectiveness in Performing Its Title XI Functions
ASC has been performing its monitoring role under Title XI, but several weaknesses have potentially limited its effectiveness. In addition, ASC faces potential challenges in implementing some Dodd-Frank Act provisions. Monitoring States’ Compliance with Title XI
GAO-11-653. In addition to this procedural weakness, ASC has functioned without regulations and enforcement tools that could be useful in promoting state compliance with Title XI. Monitoring the Appraisal Requirements of the Federal Banking Regulators
Although Title XI charges ASC with monitoring the appraisal requirements of the federal banking regulators, ASC has not developed policies and procedures for carrying out this responsibility. The absence of policies and procedures specifying monitoring tasks and responsibilities limits accountability for this function and is inconsistent with federal internal control standards designed to help ensure effectiveness and efficiency in agency operations. Further, one ASC board member told us that ASC’s monitoring of the federal financial regulators was more limited than its monitoring of states because (1) board members from the federal financial regulatory agencies are knowledgeable of the appraisal requirements of their agencies, (2) the federal regulators’ interagency process for developing appraisal guidelines (in place since 1994) has reduced the need for monitoring the consistency of guidelines across agencies, and (3) monitoring the states’ appraiser requirements requires in-depth review of state processes for licensing, certification, and enforcement. However, determinations about what activities are Title XI-related are not always clear-cut. To address this limitation, we recommended that ASC develop specific criteria for assessing whether the grant activities of the Appraisal Foundation were related to Title XI In and include these criteria in ASC’s policy and procedures manual.June 2012, ASC officials told us that they had been developing these criteria and planned to finalize them by August 2012. | Why GAO Did This Study
Real estate valuations, which encompass appraisals and other estimation methods, have come under increased scrutiny in the wake of the recent mortgage crisis. The Dodd-Frank Act codified several independence requirements for appraisers and requires federal regulators to set standards for registering AMCs. Additionally, the act expanded the role of ASC, which oversees the appraisal regulatory structure established by Title XI of FIRREA. The act also directed GAO to conduct two studies on real estate appraisals. This testimony discusses information from those studies, including (1) the use of different real estate valuation methods, (2) policies on appraiser conflict-of-interest and selection and views on their impact, and (3) ASCs performance of its Title XI functions. To address these objectives, GAO analyzed government and industry data; reviewed academic and industry literature; examined policies, regulations, and professional standards; and interviewed industry participants and stakeholders.
What GAO Found
Data GAO obtained from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (the enterprises) and five of the largest mortgage lenders indicate that appraisalswhich provide an estimate of market value at a point in timeare the most commonly used valuation method for first-lien residential mortgage originations. Other methods, such as broker price opinions and automated valuation models, are quicker and less costly but are viewed as less reliable. As a result, they generally are not used for most purchase and refinance mortgage originations. Although the enterprises and lenders GAO spoke with did not capture data on the prevalence of approaches used to perform appraisals, the sales comparison approachin which the value is based on recent sales of similar propertiesis required by the enterprises and the Federal Housing Administration. This approach is reportedly used in nearly all appraisals.
Conflict-of-interest policies have changed appraiser selection processes and the appraisal industry more broadly, raising concerns about the oversight of appraisal management companies (AMC), which often manage appraisals for lenders. Recent policies, including provisions in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), reinforce prior requirements and guidance that restrict who can select appraisers and prohibit coercion. In response to market changes and these requirements, some lenders have turned to AMCs. Greater use of AMCs has raised questions about oversight of these firms and their impact on appraisal quality. Federal regulators and the enterprises said they hold lenders responsible for ensuring that AMCs policies and practices meet their requirements but that they generally do not directly examine AMCs operations. Some industry participants voiced concerns that some AMCs may prioritize low costs and speed over quality and competence. The Dodd-Frank Act requires state appraiser licensing boards to supervise AMCs and requires the federal banking regulators, the Federal Housing Finance Agency, and the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection to establish minimum standards for states to apply in registering them. Setting minimum standards that address key functions AMCs perform on behalf of lenders could provide greater assurance of the quality of the appraisals that AMCs provide. As of June 2012, federal regulators had not completed rulemaking to set state standards.
The Appraisal Subcommittee (ASC) has been performing its monitoring role under Title XI of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), but several weaknesses have potentially limited its effectiveness. For example, ASC has not clearly defined the criteria it uses to assess states overall compliance with Title XI. In addition, Title XI charges ASC with monitoring the appraisal requirements of the federal banking regulators, but ASC has not defined the scope of this functionfor example, by developing policies and proceduresand its monitoring activities have been limited. ASC also lacks specific policies for determining whether activities of the Appraisal Foundation (a private nonprofit organization that sets criteria for appraisals and appraisers) that are funded by ASC grants are Title XI-related. Not having appropriate policies and procedures is inconsistent with federal internal control standards that are designed to promote the effectiveness and efficiency of federal activities.
What GAO Recommends
GAO previously recommended that federal regulators consider key AMC functions in rulemaking to set minimum standards for registering these firms. The regulators agreed with or said they would consider this recommendation. GAO also recommended that ASC clarify the criteria it uses to assess states compliance with Title XI and develop specific policies and procedures for monitoring the federal banking regulators and the Appraisal Foundation. ASC is taking steps to implement these recommendations. See G AO-11-653 and GAO-12-147 . |
gao_GAO-16-253 | gao_GAO-16-253_0 | Overview of DHS’s Human Resources Information Technology Investment
Since DHS was created, the department’s human resources environment has included fragmented systems, duplicative and paper-based processes, and little uniformity of data management practices. To address these issues, in 2003, DHS initiated the HRIT investment, which is intended to consolidate, integrate, and modernize the department’s and its components’ human resources IT infrastructure. While the vast majority of HRIT capabilities (called strategic improvement opportunities) were to be delivered by June 2015, only 1 has been fully implemented, and the completion dates for the other 14 are currently unknown. As a result of DHS’s ineffective management and limited progress in implementing this investment, the department is unaware of when critical weaknesses in the department’s human capital environment will be addressed, which is, among other things, impacting DHS’s ability to reduce duplication and carry out its mission. HRIT officials explained the decision to focus primarily on PALMS was due, in part, to the investment’s declining funding stream. HRIT’s 2011 Blueprint May Not Be Valid and Reflective of DHS’s Current Priorities and Goals
According to the HRIT executive steering committee’s charter, the Under Secretary for Management (as the chair of the committee) is to ensure that the department’s human resources IT business needs are met, as outlined in the blueprint. However, officials did not know when this re- evaluation and a determination for how to move forward with HRIT would occur, or be completed. HRIT’s minimally involved executive steering committee during a time when significant problems were occurring was a key factor in the lack of progress. Ensure that the HRIT executive steering committee is consistently involved in overseeing and advising HRIT, including approving key program management documents, such as HRIT’s operational plan, schedule, and planned cost estimate. In its comments, the department concurred with our 14 recommendations and provided estimated completion dates for implementing each of them. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) evaluate the progress the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has made in implementing the Human Resources Information Technology (HRIT) investment and how effectively DHS has managed the investment since completing the Human Capital Segment Architecture in August 2011, (2) describe whether DHS has justified its investment in the Performance and Learning Management System (PALMS) program, (3) determine whether PALMS is being implemented enterprise-wide, and (4) evaluate the extent to which PALMS is implementing selected information technology (IT) acquisition best practices. To address the first part of our first objective—to evaluate the progress DHS had made in implementing the HRIT investment—we compared HRIT’s goals, scope, and implementation time frames (as defined in the Human Capital Segment Architecture Blueprint, which was completed in August 2011) to the investment’s actual accomplishments. We also compared DHS’s planned schedule for implementing the improvement opportunities and projects against DHS’s current planned schedule for implementing them as of November 2015. | Why GAO Did This Study
DHS's human resources administrative environment includes fragmented systems, duplicative and paper-based processes, and little uniformity of data management practices, which according to DHS, are compromising the department's ability to effectively carry out its mission. DHS initiated HRIT in 2003 to consolidate, integrate, and modernize DHS's human resources information technology infrastructure. In 2011, DHS redefined HRIT's scope and implementation time frames.
GAO was asked to review DHS's efforts to implement the HRIT investment. GAO's objectives included, among others, evaluating the progress DHS has made in implementing the HRIT investment. GAO compared HRIT's goals and scope to the investment's actual accomplishments, and compared DHS's planned schedule for implementing strategic improvement opportunities (key areas identified by DHS as needing improvement) against its current schedule.
What GAO Found
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has made very little progress in implementing its Human Resources Information Technology (HRIT) investment in the last several years. This investment includes 15 improvement opportunities; as of November 2015, DHS had fully implemented only 1, see table below.
Key: ●Fully implemented ◐Partially implemented ○Not yet started
Source: GAO analysis of data provided by DHS officials.
a Dates reflect the last month of the quarter in which the opportunities were planned to be complete.
HRIT's limited progress was due in part to the lack of involvement of its executive steering committee—the investment's core oversight and advisory body—which was minimally involved with HRIT, such as meeting only one time during a nearly 2-year period when major problems, including schedule delays, were occurring. As a result, key governance activities, such as approval of HRIT's operational plan, were not completed. Officials acknowledged that HRIT should be re-evaluated and took early steps to do so (i.e., meeting to discuss the need to re-evaluate); however, specific actions and time frames have not been determined. Until DHS takes key actions to re-evaluate and manage this neglected investment, it is unknown when its human capital weaknesses will be addressed.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making 14 recommendations to DHS to, among other things, address HRIT's poor progress and ineffective management. For example, GAO recommends that the HRIT executive steering committee is consistently involved in overseeing and advising the investment. In addition, GAO recommends DHS evaluate the HRIT investment to determine whether its goals are still valid and reflect the department's priorities. DHS concurred with all 14 recommendations and provided estimated completion dates for implementing each of them. |
gao_GAO-05-273 | gao_GAO-05-273_0 | The aircraft is a Boeing 767-400ER, the largest 767 variant Boeing makes. OSD is still studying whether the E-10A is the most cost-effective alternative for the cruise missile requirement and the extent of battle management command and control needed on board to satisfy the intended need. OSD officials are also uncertain about the degree of battle management command and control capability needed onboard the E-10A versus transmitting the information gathered by the E-10A to other command and control centers. This strategy requires significant concurrency among the technology development, product development, and production phases and places decision makers at a disadvantage by not knowing if the E-10A can demonstrate it meets system performance and reliability requirements before transitioning into production. In fact, the results of operational testing are not scheduled to be available until four of the six planned E-10As are already in production in 2011, greatly increasing the risks of costly design changes and schedule delays later in the program (see fig. 2). The decision to start a major weapon systems acquisition program for the E-10A requires an executable business case that demonstrates the E-10A is the best way to satisfy the gap in warfighter’s capability and that the concept can be developed and produced within existing resources. Are technologies at a high level of maturity? Additionally, to ensure a greater likelihood of success, if the E-10A program is approved to begin, we recommend the Secretary direct the Air Force to revise the acquisition strategy to ensure sufficient time is included in the schedule to (1) integrate and demonstrate the design before moving past the critical design review and (2) test a production representative E-10A prototype before starting production. Nonetheless, DOD stated that it is restructuring the program with the goal of demonstrating the radar and battle management technologies in a prototype before starting systems development and demonstration. We made changes where appropriate but many of these comments were based on a new acquisition strategy that plans to delay the E-10A program Milestone B decision until 2010. To determine the progress the Air Force had made in developing the business case for the E-10A, we obtained available information on the system’s requirements and resources. However, because of other related information, such as the status of the software intensive battle management command and control subsystem, the significant reduction in funding for fiscal years 2006 and 2007, and the ongoing studies to answer OSD concerns, we were able to conclude that at the time of our review key business case elements were still not mature enough to begin product development. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Air Force is on the verge of making a major commitment to the multi-billion dollar E-10A Multi-sensor Command and Control Aircraft program. Due to the substantial investment needed and technological challenges in developing the aircraft, the Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces asked GAO to examine the soundness of the E-10A business case as well as the risks associated with the current acquisition strategy.
What GAO Found
As the E-10A Multi-sensor Command and Control Aircraft program nears its official starting point, questions remain regarding critical elements of its business case, including the need for the aircraft, the maturity level of its technology, and its funding. Plans call for the E-10A to couple a new radar system with a sophisticated and software intensive battle management command and control system aboard a Boeing 767. E-10A is planned to fill a current gap in U.S. capabilities and provide a defense against weapons such as cruise missiles. The Office of the Secretary of Defense is still working on a study to determine whether the E-10A program is the most cost-effective way to fill that gap. E-10A program funding plans changed dramatically in December 2004 when the DOD proposed reducing the total program budget by about 45 percent for the next 2 fiscal years. The business case for starting a development program requires demonstrated evidence that (1) the warfighter need exists and that it can best be met with the chosen concept and (2) the concept can be developed and produced within existing resources--including design knowledge, demonstrated technologies, adequate funding, and adequate time to deliver the product. E-10A requirements and resources are still in flux. GAO found risks associated with the current E-10A acquisition strategy that could lead to costly changes later in the program. The program is set to move into production before critical knowledge is acquired. For example, the first fully assembled E-10A, outfitted with its radar and battle management command and control systems, would not be delivered in time to complete testing before the decision is made to begin production. Testing and production are scheduled to start at the same time in 2010. Furthermore, four of six E-10As are scheduled to begin production before the results of testing are available. By not demonstrating that the system can perform as expected before entering production, the program increases the risk of changes and delays later in the program. This strategy requires significant concurrency among the technology development, product development, and production phases. |
gao_GAO-15-702T | gao_GAO-15-702T_0 | The Federal Marketplace Approved Subsidized Coverage for 11 of 12 Fictitious Applicants in 2014, with Coverage Continuing into 2015
We Obtained Coverage for 11 of 12 Fictitious Applicants by Using the Telephone Application Process and Bypassing Online Identity Verification
As we described in our July 2014 testimony, the federal Marketplace approved subsidized coverage for 11 of 12 fictitious applicants who initially applied online or by telephone. The APTC and CSR subsidies are not paid directly to enrolled consumers; instead, the federal government pays them to issuers of health-care policies on consumers’ behalf. However, they represent a benefit to consumers—and a cost to the government—by reducing out-of-pocket costs for medical coverage. Although intended to counter such identity theft involving others, identity proofing thus also serves as an enrollment control for those applying online. The Marketplace is required to seek postapproval documentation in the case of certain application “inconsistencies.” Inconsistencies occur in instances in which information an applicant has provided does not match information contained in data sources that the Marketplace uses for eligibility verification at time of application, or such information is not available. Thus, the Marketplace was required to approve eligibility to enroll in health-care coverage and to receive subsidies for each of our 11 fictitious applicants while the inconsistencies were being addressed. Federal Marketplace Communications with Our 11 Successful Fictitious Enrollees about Their Applications Were Unclear or Incomplete
According to CMS officials, the federal Marketplace makes eligibility determinations. We also noted instances where the Marketplace either did not accurately capture all inconsistencies, or resolved inconsistencies based on suspect documentation, including the following:
Did not capture all inconsistencies. For 3 of the 11 applicants, while the Marketplace at the outset directed our applicants to provide documentation of citizenship/immigration status, the CMS applicant data we later received for these applicants do not reflect inconsistencies for the items initially identified. For example, if consumers elect to receive the premium tax credit in advance, that lowers the cost of monthly coverage. Under the CMS directive, the applicant’s policy and subsidies continued through 2014 because our applicant submitted at least one document to the Marketplace, but not all documents required. Thus, in the case of our four applicants that submitted partial documentation to the Marketplace, we likely were relieved of the obligation for submitting all documents for the 2014 plan year. The Marketplace Automatically Reenrolled Coverage for All 11 Fictitious Applicants for 2015
The coverage we obtained for our 11 fictitious applicants contained an automatic reenrollment feature—both insurers and the Marketplace notified us that if we took no action, we would automatically be enrolled in the new coverage year (2015). CMS Provided Inaccurate Tax Information for 3 of 11 Fictitious Applicants
Under PPACA, an applicant’s filing of a federal income-tax return is a key element of back-end controls. If an applicant chooses to have all or some of his or her credit paid in advance, the applicant is required to “reconcile” on his or her federal tax return the amount of advance payments the government sent to the applicant’s insurer on the applicant’s behalf with the tax credit for which the applicant qualifies based on actual reported income and family size. However, we had not filed any such applications, nor, as described earlier, had we sought any redetermination of subsidies. For five of the six applicants, the Marketplace approved reinstatement of subsidized coverage, while in the process also increasing total premium tax credit subsidies for all these applicants combined by a total of more than $1,000 annually. We Were Unable to Obtain In-Person Assistance in Five of Six Undercover Attempts to Test Income-Verification Controls, and Application Assisters Subsequently Acknowledged Errors
As described earlier, CMS has awarded grants for “Navigators,” which are to provide free, impartial health-insurance information to consumers. As described in our July 2014 statement, in addition to the 12 online and telephone applications, we also attempted an additional 6 in-person applications, seeking to test income-verification controls only. During our testing, we visited one in-person assister and obtained information on whether our stated income would qualify for subsidy. Representatives of these organizations generally acknowledged the issues we raised in handling of our application inquiries. CMS officials stressed to us Navigator training and experience from the first open-enrollment period helped improve training for the second enrollment period ending in February 2015. A full examination of in-person assistance was beyond the scope of our work. Appendix I: Undercover Application Results
Figure 3 summarizes outcomes for all 12 of the undercover phone and online applications we made for coverage to the Health Insurance Marketplace (Marketplace) under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, as part of our testing of eligibility and enrollment controls. | Why GAO Did This Study
PPACA provides for the establishment of health-insurance exchanges, or marketplaces, where consumers can compare and select private health-insurance plans. The act also expands the availability of subsidized health-care coverage. The Congressional Budget Office estimates the cost of subsidies and related spending under the act at $28 billion for fiscal year 2015. PPACA requires verification of applicant information to determine eligibility for enrollment or subsidies.
GAO was asked to examine controls for application and enrollment for coverage through the federal Marketplace. This testimony describes (1) the results of GAO's undercover testing of the Marketplace's eligibility and enrollment controls, including opportunities for potential enrollment fraud, for the act's first open-enrollment period; and (2) additional undercover testing in which GAO sought in-person application assistance.
This statement is based on GAO undercover testing of the Marketplace application, enrollment, and eligibility-verification controls using 18 fictitious identities. GAO submitted or attempted to submit applications through the Marketplace in several states by telephone, online, and in-person. Details of the target areas are not disclosed, to protect GAO's undercover identities. GAO's tests were intended to identify potential control issues and inform possible further work. The results, while illustrative, cannot be generalized to the full population of applicants or enrollees. GAO provided details to CMS for comment, and made technical changes as appropriate.
What GAO Found
To assess the enrollment controls of the federal Health Insurance Marketplace (Marketplace), GAO performed 18 undercover tests, 12 of which focused on phone or online applications. During these tests, the Marketplace approved subsidized coverage under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) for 11 of the 12 fictitious GAO applicants for 2014. The GAO applicants obtained a total of about $30,000 in annual advance premium tax credits, plus eligibility for lower costs due at time of service. For 7 of the 11 successful fictitious applicants, GAO intentionally did not submit all required verification documentation to the Marketplace, but the Marketplace did not cancel subsidized coverage for these applicants. While these subsidies, including those granted to GAO's fictitious applicants, are paid to health-care insurers, and not directly to enrolled consumers, they nevertheless represent a benefit to consumers and a cost to the government. GAO's undercover testing, while illustrative, cannot be generalized to the population of all applicants or enrollees. GAO shared details of its observations with the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) during the course of its testing, to seek agency responses to the issues raised. Other observations included the following:
The Marketplace did not accurately record all inconsistencies. Inconsistencies occur when applicant information does not match information available from Marketplace verification sources. Also, the Marketplace resolved inconsistencies from GAO's fictitious applications based on fictitious documentation that GAO submitted. Overall, according to CMS officials, the Marketplace did not terminate any coverage for several types of inconsistencies, including Social Security data or incarceration status.
Under PPACA, filing a federal income-tax return is a key control element, designed to ensure that premium subsidies granted at time of application are appropriate based on reported applicant earnings during the coverage year. GAO, however, found errors in information reported by the Marketplace for tax filing purposes for 3 of its 11 fictitious enrollees, such as incorrect coverage periods and subsidy amounts.
The Marketplace automatically reenrolled coverage for all 11 fictitious enrollees for 2015. Later, based on what it said were new applications GAO's fictional enrollees had filed—but which GAO did not itself make—the Marketplace terminated coverage for 6 of the 11 enrollees, saying the fictitious enrollees had not provided necessary documentation. However, for five of the six terminations, GAO subsequently obtained reinstatements, including increases in premium tax-credit subsidies.
For an additional six applicants, GAO sought to test the extent to which, if any, in-person assisters would encourage applicants to misstate income in order to qualify for income-based subsidies during coverage year 2014. However, GAO was unable to obtain in-person assistance in 5 of the 6 undercover attempts. For example, an assister told GAO that it only provided help for those applying for Medicaid and not health-care insurance applications. Representatives of these organizations acknowledged the issues GAO raised in handling of the inquiries. CMS officials said that their experience from the first open-enrollment period helped improve training for the 2015 enrollment period. |
gao_GAO-06-389 | gao_GAO-06-389_0 | DHS’s strategy includes: (1) countering proliferation at the source by assisting foreign governments in their efforts to detect and interdict nuclear and radiological smuggling; (2) controlling the illegal export of technology and equipment from the United States that terrorists could use to develop a nuclear or radiological weapon; (3) detecting and interdicting potential smuggling attempts before they reach the United States; and (4) securing U.S. ports-of-entry through multiple technologies that include radiation detection and nonintrusive inspections to view images of cargo in sea containers. DHS Has Made Progress in Deploying Radiation Detection Equipment, but the Agency’s Program Goals Are Unrealistic and the Cost Estimate Is Uncertain
As of December 2005, DHS had completed deployment of portal monitors at two categories of entry—a total of 61 ports-of-entry—and has begun work on two other categories; overall, however, progress has been slower than planned. The Program to Install Portal Monitors Has Fallen Behind Schedule
Between October 2000 and October 2005, DHS, mainly through its prime contractor PNNL, has spent about $286 million to deploy radiation detection equipment at U.S. ports-of-entry. As of December 2005, DHS had deployed 670 of 3,034 radiation portal monitors—about 22 percent of the portal monitors DHS plans to deploy. Delays in Gaining Agreements Have Slowed Seaport Deployments
Negotiations with seaport operators have been slow and have also delayed the portal monitor deployment program. In addition, deploying portal monitors in major seaports presents several unique challenges. Second, our analysis of CBP’s earned value data also suggests that the program will likely cost much more than planned. Recent tests of the new portal monitors indicate that DNDO’s criteria have not yet been met. However, we do not agree. CBP Officers Have Made Progress in Using Radiation Detection Equipment Correctly and Adhering to Inspection Guidelines, but There Are Potential Issues with Agency Procedures
CBP officers we observed conducting primary and secondary inspections appeared to use radiation detection equipment correctly and to follow the agency’s inspection procedures. However, the agency’s inspection procedures could be strengthened. However, NRC regulations do not require that the license accompany the shipment, although in some cases importers choose to voluntarily include the license. DHS Is Working to Improve the Capabilities of Currently-fielded and New Radiation Detection Equipment, but Much Work Remains to Achieve Better Equipment Performance
DHS has managed research, development, and testing activities that attempt to address the inherent limitations of currently-fielded radiation detection equipment and to produce new, advanced technologies with even greater detection capabilities. However, because DNDO was created so recently, these efforts are in their early stages of development and implementation. A subset of this issue concerns screening rail traffic leaving seaports, which is a particularly difficult problem. On the other hand, because CBP officers do not have access to NRC licensing data, it is difficult for them to verify that shippers have obtained necessary NRC licenses and to verify the authenticity of any NRC licenses that may accompany shipments of radioactive materials. Recommendations for Executive Action
Since DHS provides the Congress with information concerning the acquisition and deployment of portal monitors, and since DHS’s procedures to obtain internal agreement on this information are lengthy and cumbersome—often resulting in delays—we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security, working with the Director of DNDO and the Commissioner of CBP, review these approval procedures and take actions necessary to ensure that DHS submits information to the Congress early in the fiscal year. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix IV. Homeland Security: Key Cargo Security Programs Can Be Improved. | Why GAO Did This Study
Preventing radioactive material from being smuggled into the United States is a key national security objective. To help address this threat, in October 2002, DHS began deploying radiation detection equipment at U.S. ports-of-entry. This report reviews recent progress DHS has made (1) deploying radiation detection equipment, (2) using radiation detection equipment, (3) improving the capabilities and testing of this equipment, and (4) increasing cooperation between DHS and other federal agencies in conducting radiation detection programs.
What GAO Found
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has made progress in deploying radiation detection equipment at U.S. ports-of-entry, but the agency's program goals are unrealistic and the program cost estimate is uncertain. As of December 2005, DHS had deployed 670 portal monitors and over 19,000 pieces of handheld radiation detection equipment. However, the deployment of portal monitors has fallen behind schedule, making DHS's goal of deploying 3,034 by September 2009 unlikely. In particular, two factors have contributed to the schedule delay. First, DHS provides the Congress with information on portal monitor acquisitions and deployments before releasing any funds. However, DHS's lengthy review process has caused delays in providing such information to the Congress. Second, difficult negotiations with seaport operators about placement of portal monitors and how to most efficiently screen rail cars have delayed deployments at seaports. Regarding the uncertainty of the program's cost estimate, DHS would like to deploy advanced technology portals that will likely cost significantly more than the currently deployed portals, but tests have not yet shown that these portals are demonstrably more effective than the current portals. Consequently, it is not clear that the benefits of the new portals would be worth any increased cost to the program. Also, our analysis of the program's costs indicates that DHS may incur a $342 million cost overrun. DHS has improved in using detection equipment and in following the agency's inspection procedures since 2003, but we identified two potential issues in Customs and Border Protection (CBP) inspection procedures. First, although radiological materials being transported into the United States are generally required to have a Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) license, regulations do not require that the license accompany the shipment. Further, CBP officers do not have access to data that could be used to verify that shippers have acquired the necessary documentation. Second, CBP inspection procedures do not require officers to open containers and inspect them, although under some circumstances, doing so could improve security. In addition, DHS has sponsored research, development, and testing activities to address the inherent limitations of currently fielded equipment. However, much work remains to achieve consistently better detection capabilities. DHS seems to have made progress in coordinating with other agencies to conduct radiation detection programs; however, because the DHS office created to achieve the coordination is less than 1 year old, its working relationships with other agencies are in their early stages of development and implementation. In the future, this office plans to develop a "global architecture" to integrate several agencies' radiation detection efforts, including several international programs. |
gao_GAO-11-456 | gao_GAO-11-456_0 | Army and Marine Corps Developed Language and Culture Strategies, but Did Not Include Some Key Elements and Departmentwide Efforts to Establish a Planning Process Are Incomplete
Our prior work shows that establishing priorities and results-oriented performance metrics can help federal agencies target training investments and assess the contributions that training programs make toward achieving strategic program goals and objectives. We found that the Army and Marine Corps had not conducted comprehensive analyses to prioritize language and culture training investments and assign responsibilities for program performance and departmentwide efforts to establish a planning process for language and culture capabilities were not yet complete. The Army and Marine Corps Developed Broad Goals and Objectives within Language and Culture Strategies and Identified Some Training Programs and Activities
The Army and Marine Corps developed broad service-specific goals and objectives for language and culture training within their respective language and culture strategies and identified some key training programs and activities. In February 2011, DOD published the Department of Defense Strategic Plan for Language Skills, Regional Expertise, and Cultural Capabilities (2011- 2016). Without a clearly defined planning process that includes internal mechanisms, such as procedures and milestones, and a validated set of language and culture capability requirements, the department does not have the tools it needs to set strategic direction for language and culture training efforts, fully align departmentwide efforts to develop plans and budget requests that reflect its priorities, and measure progress in implementing various initiatives. U.S. Central Command Did Not Synchronize Varying Language and Culture Training Requirements for Army and Marine Corps General Purpose Forces
DOD components identified language and culture training requirements for Army and Marine Corps general purpose forces that will deploy to the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility, but these requirements varied among and within DOD components. We surveyed 15 documents issued since June 2008 that address language and culture predeployment training requirements. For example, in October 2010, U.S. Additionally, just as the focus of training has varied, the type and duration of training has varied as well. For example, in July 2010, the Army required that all forces deploying to either Afghanistan or Iraq complete a 4- to 6-hour online training program for language and culture. In September 2010, the Marine Corps directed that all ground units assigned to the I Marine Expeditionary Force preparing for Afghanistan deployment complete a 2-day culture course and receive an introduction to software used for self-paced study. During the course of our review, Army and Marine Corps officials noted that language and culture predeployment training requirements changed constantly, which led to some confusion over the training that was needed to meet operational needs and that considerable time and resources were spent adjusting training programs. Without a comprehensive process, U.S. Central Command will not have a mechanism to identify and synchronize training for current and future operations, which may result in deploying forces that receive training that is inconsistent and may not meet operational needs. U.S. Central Command has taken some steps to consolidate training requirements, but the command has not yet established a comprehensive, analytically based process for identifying and synchronizing predeployment training requirements. DOD concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense direct the Commander of U.S. Central Command to establish a comprehensive, analytically based process to (1) identify and approve predeployment training requirements that includes a description of the analysis to be conducted prior to approving the requirements and (2) coordinate with key stakeholders, such as the military services and subordinate commands to ensure that requirements are synchronized among and within DOD components and with departmentwide guidance, and solicit feedback on service training approaches in meeting operational needs. To evaluate the extent to which the Army and Marine Corps had developed language and culture strategies with key elements, such as goals, funding priorities, and metrics to guide training approaches and investments that were aligned with departmentwide planning efforts, we focused on the Army’s and Marine Corps’ general purpose forces. We reviewed these documents in the context of our prior work, Department of Defense (DOD) budget documents, and service guidance to determine the extent to which the Army and Marine Corps were developing strategies that identified goals and objectives, training programs and priorities, resource requirements, and approaches for measuring progress, including results-oriented performance metrics.We also reviewed funding data for fiscal years 2009 through 2012 provided by the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command and the Marine Corps’ Center for the Advanced Operational Culture Learning that are associated with the implementation of the Army’s and Marine Corps’ respective language and culture strategies. DoD Response: Concur. DoD Response: Concur. | Why GAO Did This Study
Today, and in the foreseeable future, military operations require U.S. personnel, in particular Army and Marine Corps ground forces, to communicate and interact with multinational partners and local populations. The committee report accompanying a proposed bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 directed GAO to review several issues related to language and culture training for Army and Marine Corps general purpose forces. For this report, GAO evaluated (1) the extent to which the Army and Marine Corps had developed strategies with elements such as goals, funding priorities, and metrics to guide training approaches and investments that were aligned with Department of Defense (DOD) planning efforts and (2) DOD's approach for identifying training requirements for Army and Marine Corps forces that will deploy to the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility. To do so, GAO analyzed Army and Marine Corps strategies and training requirements and interviewed cognizant officials.
What GAO Found
The Army and Marine Corps developed service-specific language and culture strategies, but did not include some key elements to guide their training approaches and investments, and DOD-wide efforts to establish a planning process that could better align service training approaches are incomplete. The Army and Marine Corps developed broad goals and objectives within their strategies and identified some training programs and activities tied to these goals. However, the services did not always identify priorities and the investments needed to implement the training or a set of results-oriented performance metrics to assess the contributions that training programs have made collectively, which GAO and DOD have recognized can help ensure training investments are making progress toward achieving program goals and objectives. GAO found that the Army and Marine Corps did not complete underlying analyses and assign responsibilities for program performance prior to designing and implementing their strategies and associated training programs. DOD has taken steps to develop a strategic planning process to align service training approaches. For example, in February 2011, DOD published a strategic plan for language skills and cultural capabilities that outlines a broad departmentwide planning process. However, DOD has not yet set up internal mechanisms, such as procedures and milestones, by which it can reach consensus with the military services on priorities and investments. Without a clearly defined planning process, DOD does not have the tools it needs to set strategic direction for language and culture training efforts, fully align departmentwide efforts to develop plans and budget requests that reflect its priorities, and measure progress in implementing various initiatives. DOD components identified varying language and culture training requirements for Army and Marine Corps general purpose forces that will deploy to the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility, but the Command did not use a comprehensive process to synchronize these requirements. GAO surveyed 15 documents issued since June 2008 and found several variances with respect to the language to be trained and the type and duration of training. For example, in July 2010 the Army required that all forces deploying to either Afghanistan or Iraq complete a 4- to 6-hour online training program for language and culture. In September 2010, a senior Marine Corps commander directed that ground units preparing for Afghanistan deployments complete a 2-day culture course. Army and Marine Corps officials noted that training requirements changed constantly and this led to some confusion in developing training programs as well as considerable time and resources that were spent adjusting training. GAO found that contrary to DOD guidance, U.S. Central Command had not yet established a comprehensive process to approve training requirements and coordinate them with key stakeholders to ensure alignment with DOD guidance and obtain feedback on service training approaches. Without a comprehensive process, U.S. Central Command will not have a mechanism to identify and synchronize training for current and future operations, which may result in deploying forces that receive training that is inconsistent and may not meet operational needs.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Army and Marine Corps assign responsibilities for program performance, and identify training investments and metrics; DOD establish a defined planning process with internal mechanisms, such as procedures and milestones, to align training efforts; and U.S. Central Command establish a process to identify and synchronize training requirements. DOD generally agreed with the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-14-204 | gao_GAO-14-204_0 | Core contract personnel perform the types of functions that may affect an IC element’s decision- making authority or control of its mission and operations. However, we identified several issues that limit the comparability, accuracy, and consistency of the information reported by the civilian IC elements as a whole. Changes to Core Contract Personnel Definition and Data Shortcomings Limit Comparability of Obligation and FTE Data Across Years
Trends in the civilian IC elements’ use of core contract personnel from fiscal year 2007 to 2011 in terms of the number of personnel and associated costs cannot be identified due to changes in the definition of core contract personnel and known data shortcomings. IC CHCO did not explain that the rebaselining would limit the comparability of the number and costs of core contract personnel for both this civilian IC element and the IC as a whole because the element did not adjust the number and costs previously reported. For 37 percent of the 287 records we reviewed, we could not determine the reliability of the information reported. Inventory Provides Limited Insight into Functions Performed by Contractors and Reasons for Their Use
The civilian IC elements have used core contract personnel to perform a range of functions, such as human capital, information technology, and program management, and have reported in the core contract personnel inventory the reasons for using contractors for such functions. Further, in the inventory, the civilian IC elements provided information on their reasons for using core contract personnel, such as the need for unique expertise, but our analysis found that 40 percent of the contracts in our sample did not contain evidence of the reasons reported. As a result, we could not corroborate the information reported in the inventory on the reasons for using core contract personnel. Limited Progress Has Been Made in Developing Policies and Strategies on Contractor Use to Mitigate Risks
CIA, ODNI, and the executive departments, which are responsible for developing policies to address risks related to contractors for the other six civilian IC elements within those departments, have generally made limited progress in developing such policies. Further, the eight civilian IC elements have generally not developed strategic workforce plans that address contractor use. Without guidance, strategies, and tools related to services that closely support inherently governmental functions and critical functions, the civilian IC elements may not be well-positioned to identify and manage the related risks of contracting for those functions. ICD 612 directs IC elements to determine, review, and evaluate the number and uses of core contract personnel when conducting strategic workforce planning but does not reference the requirements related to determining the appropriate workforce mix specified in OMB’s July 2009 memorandum or require elements to document the extent to which contractors should be used. Not fully disclosing these limitations and the effects of these changes limits the transparency and usefulness of the information reported to Congress. To improve the ability of the civilian IC elements to strategically plan for their contractors and mitigate associated risks, we recommend that IC CHCO take the following three actions:
Revise ICD 612’s provisions governing strategic workforce planning to require the IC elements to identify their assessment of the appropriate workforce mix on a function-by-function basis;
Assess options for how the core contract personnel inventory could be modified to provide better insights into the functions performed by contractors when there are multiple services provided under a contract; and
Require the IC elements to identify contracts within the core contract personnel inventory that include services that are critical or closely support inherently governmental functions. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this review were to determine (1) the extent to which the civilian intelligence community (IC) elements rely on core contract personnel; (2) the functions performed by core contract personnel and the factors that contribute to their use; and (3) whether the civilian IC elements have developed policies and guidance and strategically planned for their use of these contract personnel to mitigate related risks. The eight civilian IC elements covered by our review are the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Department of Energy’s Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence (DOE IN), Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis (DHS I&A), Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (State INR), Department of the Treasury’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis (Treasury OIA), Drug Enforcement Administration’s Office of National Security Intelligence (DEA NN), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). Therefore, this report omits sensitive information about (1) the number and associated costs of government and core contract personnel and some details on how the civilian IC elements prepare the core contract personnel inventory, (2) specific contracts from civilian IC elements we reviewed, and (3) details related to the civilian IC elements’ or their respective departments’ progress in developing policies to mitigate risks related to contractors and the civilian IC elements’ strategic workforce planning efforts. We subsequently worked with ODNI from September 2013 to December 2013 to prepare an unclassified version of this report for public release. | Why GAO Did This Study
The IC uses core contract personnel to augment its workforce. These contractors typically work alongside government personnel and perform staff-like work. Some core contract personnel require enhanced oversight because they perform services that could inappropriately influence the government's decision making.
This report is an unclassified version of a classified report issued in September 2013. GAO was asked to examine the eight civilian IC elements' use of contractors. This report examines (1) the extent to which the eight civilian IC elements use core contract personnel, (2) the functions performed by these personnel and the reasons for their use, and (3) whether the elements developed policies and strategically planned for their use. GAO reviewed and assessed the reliability of the eight civilian IC elements' core contract personnel inventory data for fiscal years 2010 and 2011, including reviewing a sample of 287 contract records. This sample is nongeneralizable as certain contract records were removed due to sensitivity concerns. GAO also reviewed agency acquisition policies and workforce plans and interviewed agency officials.
What GAO Found
Limitations in the intelligence community's (IC) inventory of contract personnel hinder the ability to determine the extent to which the eight civilian IC elements--the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), and six components within the Departments of Energy, Homeland Security, Justice, State, and the Treasury--use these personnel. The IC Chief Human Capital Officer (CHCO) conducts an annual inventory of core contract personnel that includes information on the number and costs of these personnel. However, GAO identified a number of limitations in the inventory that collectively limit the comparability, accuracy, and consistency of the information reported by the civilian IC elements as a whole. For example, changes to the definition of core contract personnel and data shortcomings limit the comparability of the information over time. In addition, the civilian IC elements used various methods to calculate the number of contract personnel and did not maintain documentation to validate the number of personnel reported for 37 percent of the 287 records GAO reviewed. Further, IC CHCO did not fully disclose the effects of such limitations when reporting contract personnel and cost information to Congress, which limits its transparency and usefulness.
The civilian IC elements used core contract personnel to perform a broad range of functions, such as information technology and program management, and reported in the core contract personnel inventory on the reasons for using these personnel. However, limitations in the information on the number and cost of core contract personnel preclude the information on contractor functions from being used to determine the number of personnel and their costs associated with each function. Further, civilian IC elements reported in the inventory a number of reasons for using core contract personnel, such as the need for unique expertise, but GAO found that 40 percent of the contract records reviewed did not contain evidence to support the reasons reported.
Collectively, CIA, ODNI, and the departments responsible for developing policies to address risks related to contractors for the other six civilian IC elements have made limited progress in developing those policies, and the civilian IC elements have generally not developed strategic workforce plans that address contractor use. Only the Departments of Homeland Security and State have issued policies that generally address all of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy's requirements related to contracting for services that could affect the government's decision-making authority. In addition, IC CHCO requires the elements to conduct strategic workforce planning but does not require the elements to determine the appropriate mix of government and contract personnel. Further, the elements' ability to use the core contract personnel inventory as a strategic planning tool is hindered because the inventory does not provide insight into the functions performed by contractors, in particular those that could inappropriately influence the government's control over its decisions. Without guidance, strategies, and tools related to these types of functions, the eight civilian IC elements may not be well-positioned to identify and manage related risks.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is recommending that IC CHCO take several actions to improve the inventory data's reliability and transparency and revise strategic workforce planning guidance, and develop ways to identify contracts for services that could affect the government's decision-making authority. IC CHCO generally agreed with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-08-982 | gao_GAO-08-982_0 | Specifically, the estimate should be well documented, comprehensive, accurate, and credible. Cost factors and management factors are key types of data that the tool uses to develop estimates. The Army Relies More on COST to Develop Personnel and Operations Estimates, but the Other Services Rely on Their Own Estimates
The Army uses COST as intended by relying on the tool to generate an estimate for many personnel and operations costs for GWOT budget requests. DOD officials and IDA representatives stated that COST is better suited for Army ground forces; therefore, the Army relies on the final estimate developed by COST and submits this information to the DOD Comptroller as part of its GWOT budget request. The Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy all fulfill the requirement to develop an estimate for their respective service’s personnel and operations funding requirements for GWOT using COST; however, these services significantly alter the COST results to match estimates they have developed outside COST, using historical obligation data and other information. As a result, most of the changes they make to COST results, based on historical obligation data, are decreases in the amount estimated by COST. Several service officials stated that, because of the limitations to COST, the required process of using COST to develop a cost estimate was duplicative of their preferred method of using historical obligation data and other information better suited to their specific service to develop a GWOT budget request. However, officials stated the tool does not perform as well for estimating costs for the lengthy deployment and sustainment phases associated with a large campaign such as GWOT. Military Services Use Other Methods to Determine Cost Estimates for Procurement, Most Equipment Maintenance, and Some Contract Costs
Because COST does not have the capability to estimate costs such as procurement, reset-related equipment maintenance, and contracted needs and services, service budget officials report using historical obligation data, other models and formulas, and other information, such as deployment information, to estimate these costs. COST Is Frequently Updated and Refined, but Could Benefit from a Review of Adherence to Best Practices
DOD has taken steps to improve the performance and reliability of COST; however, COST could benefit from a review of the tool’s adherence to best practices for high-quality cost estimation as outlined in our Cost Assessment Guide. While we did not undertake a full assessment of COST against best practices, during the course of our review we identified features of COST’s estimation process that meet best practices and other features that would benefit from further review. For example, COST adheres to several best practices for a comprehensive and accurate cost estimate, such as frequent updates to the structure of COST and the data that COST uses to generate estimates. COST Could be Assessed for Adherence to Cost Estimation Best Practices
While DOD has taken steps to revise and update COST to improve effectiveness, COST has not been assessed according to best practices for cost estimation that define reliable, high-quality cost estimates. DOD Comptroller officials stated they are confident in the tool’s ability to provide reasonable estimates because COST is frequently updated. While the tool and underlying data have been refined and updated, COST’s overall effectiveness for estimating GWOT costs has not been assessed. DOD agreed with our recommendation that the DOD Comptroller arrange for an independent review of the Contingency Operations Support Tool (COST) against best practices for cost estimation. Furthermore, the AFSAA review was not a thorough review against best practices for cost estimation, which requires cost estimates to be well documented, comprehensive, accurate, and credible. To better understand how the Department of Defense (DOD) develops a Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) budget request and the use of the Contingency Operations Support Tool (COST) and other methods of developing an estimate, we asked DOD to demonstrate how the services used COST and other methods to develop the $6.3 billion budget estimate for military operations that was included as part of DOD’s October 2007 $42.3 billion amendment to the fiscal year 2008 GWOT supplemental request for emergency funding. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since the September 2001 terrorist attacks, Congress has provided about $800 billion as of July 2008 to the Department of Defense (DOD) for military operations in support of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). GWOT budget requests have grown in scope and the amount requested has increased every year. DOD uses various processes and the Contingency Operations Support Tool (COST) to estimate costs for these operations and to develop budget requests. GAO assessed (1) how DOD uses COST and other processes to develop GWOT budget requests and (2) what actions DOD has taken to ensure COST adheres to best practices for cost estimation. GAO interviewed DOD officials and others to determine how the services develop GWOT budget requests using COST and other processes. GAO also used its Cost Assessment Guide as criteria for best practices for cost estimation.
What GAO Found
The services use COST as part of their process to develop a GWOT budget request. While the Army relies more on the estimate resulting from COST, the other services adjust the results of COST to reflect estimates they generate outside of COST, based on historical obligation data and other information. DOD's financial management regulation and other guidance require components to use COST to develop an estimate for the deployment and sustainment of military personnel and equipment for ongoing operations in support of GWOT. While all services use COST to develop an initial estimate, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy budget officials alter the results of the tool to match information provided by lower level commands and historical obligation data that they believe are more accurate than the COST-generated estimate. These officials stated that the tool routinely overestimates some costs and therefore most changes made are decreases in the amount estimated by COST. These officials believe that the requirement to use COST to develop a GWOT budget request is a duplicative process to their preferred method of using historical obligation data and other information better suited to their specific service. For example, they stated that COST better represents the needs of Army ground forces and the tool has not been refined to be as effective for estimating needs for their service's mission. These officials also mentioned that COST is better suited for developing estimates for smaller-scale contingency operations than for the lengthy deployments and sustainment phases associated with a large campaign such as GWOT. To develop estimates for items that are outside the scope of COST, such as procurement and certain contracts, the military services rely primarily on needs assessments developed by commanders and historical obligation data. DOD has taken steps to improve the performance and reliability of COST; however, COST could benefit from an independent review of the tool's adherence to best practices for high-quality cost estimation as described in GAO's Cost Assessment Guide. COST has been refined many times and cost factors are routinely updated in an effort to use the most current information available to develop an estimate. DOD officials stated they are confident in the tool's ability to provide reasonable estimates because COST is frequently updated. However, COST has not been assessed against best practices for cost estimation to determine whether COST can provide high-quality estimates that are well documented, comprehensive, accurate, and credible. While GAO did not undertake a full assessment of COST against best practices, it determined that some features of the tool meet best practices while other features would benefit from further review. For example, the tool adheres to several best practices for a comprehensive and accurate cost estimate, such as frequent updates to the structure of COST and the data the tool uses to generate estimates. However, COST relies on GWOT obligation data that GAO has identified as being of questionable reliability. A thorough, independent review of COST against best practices could provide decision makers with information about whether the tool creates cost estimates for GWOT expenses that are well documented, comprehensive, accurate, and credible. |
gao_GAO-10-778T | gao_GAO-10-778T_0 | Background
On May 3, 2010, United and Continental announced an agreement to merge the two airlines. In 1988, merger and acquisition review authority was transferred from the Department of Transportation (DOT) to DOJ. A proposed merger of United Airlines and US Airways in 2000 also resulted in opposition from DOJ, which found that, in its view, the merger would violate antitrust laws by reducing competition, increasing air fares, and harming consumers on airline routes throughout the United States. Airline Mergers Are Driven by Financial and Competitive Pressures, but Challenges Exist
Volatile earnings and structural changes in the industry have spurred some airlines to explore mergers as a way to increase their profitability and financial viability. Over the last decade, the U.S. passenger airline industry has incurred more than $15 billion in operating losses. One of the primary financial benefits that airlines consider when merging with another airline is the cost reduction that may result from combining complementary assets, eliminating duplicative activities, and reducing capacity. The other primary financial benefit that airlines consider with mergers and acquisitions is the potential for increased revenues through additional demand, which may be achieved by more seamless travel to more destinations and increased market share and higher fares on some routes. The airline industry is becoming increasingly global; for example, the Open Skies agreement between the United States and the European Union became effective in March 2008. The Department of Justice’s Antitrust Review Is a Critical Step in the Airline Merger and Acquisition Process
DOJ’s review of airline mergers and acquisitions is a key step for airlines hoping to consummate a merger. For airlines, as with other industries, DOJ uses an analytical framework set forth in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines (the Guidelines) to evaluate merger proposals. To analyze whether a proposed merger or acquisition raises antitrust concerns—whether the proposal will create or enhance market power or facilitate its exercise— DOJ follows an integrated five-part analytical process set forth in the Guidelines. Third, DOJ considers whether other competitors are likely to enter the affected markets and whether they would counteract any potential anticompetitive effects that the merger might have posed. Fifth, DOJ considers whether, absent the merger or acquisition, one of the firms is likely to fail, causing its assets to exit the market. In Creating the Largest U.S. Passenger Airline, a United-Continental Merger May Face Integration Challenges and Analysis of Some Overlapping Markets
If not challenged by DOJ, the merged United-Continental would surpass Delta as the largest U.S. passenger airline. The amount of overlap in airport-pair combinations between the two airlines’ networks is considerable if considering all connecting traffic; however, for most of the overlapping airport-pair markets there is at least one other competitor. Based on 2009 ticket sample data, for 13,515 airport pairs with at least 520 passengers per year, there would be a loss of one effective competitor in 1,135 airport-pair markets affecting almost 35 million passengers by merging these airlines (see fig. However, only 10 of these airport-pair markets would not have any other competitors in after a merger. The combination of the two airlines would also create a new effective competitor in 173 airport-pair markets affecting almost 9.5 million passengers. | Why GAO Did This Study
Earlier this month, United Air Lines (United) and Continental Airlines (Continental) announced plans to merge the two airlines and signed a merger agreement. This follows the acquisition of Northwest Airlines by Delta Air Lines (Delta) in 2008, which propelled Delta to become the largest airline in the United States. This latest merger, if not challenged by the Department of Justice (DOJ), would surpass Delta's merger in scope to create the largest passenger airline in terms of capacity in the United States. The passenger airline industry has struggled financially over the last decade, and these two airlines believe a merger will strengthen them. However, as with any proposed merger of this magnitude, this one will be carefully examined by DOJ to determine if its potential benefits for consumers outweigh the potential negative effects. At the Committee's request, GAO is providing a statement for the record that describes (1) an overview of the factors that are driving mergers in the industry, (2) the role of federal authorities in reviewing merger proposals, and (3) key issues associated with the proposed merger of United and Continental. To address these objectives, GAO drew from previous reports on the potential effects of the proposed merger between Delta and Northwest and the financial condition of the airline industry, and analyzed Department of Transportation (DOT) airline operating and financial data.
What GAO Found
As GAO has previously reported, airlines seek to merge with or acquire other airlines to increase their profitability and financial sustainability, but must weigh these potential benefits against operational costs and challenges. The principal benefits airlines consider are cost reductions--by combining complementary assets, eliminating duplicate activities, and reducing capacity--and increased revenues from higher fares in existing markets and increased demand for more seamless travel to more destinations. Balanced against these potential benefits are operational costs of integrating workforces, aircraft fleets, and systems. DOJ's antitrust review is a critical step in the airline merger and acquisition process. DOJ uses an integrated analytical framework set forth in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines to determine whether the merger poses any antitrust concerns. Under that process, DOJ assesses the extent of likely anticompetitive effects of reducing competition in the relevant markets--in this case, between cities or airports. DOJ further considers the likelihood that airlines entering these markets would counteract any anticompetitive effects. It also considers any efficiencies that a merger or acquisition could bring--for example, consumer benefits from an expanded route network. Finally, it examines whether one of the airlines proposing to merge would fail and its assets exit the market in the absence of a merger. One of the most important issues in this merger will be its effect on competition in the airline industry. For example, GAO's analysis of 2009 ticket data showed that combining these airlines would result in a loss of one effective competitor (defined as having at least 5 percent of total traffic between airports) in 1,135 markets (called airport pairs) affecting almost 35 million passengers while creating a new effective competitor in 173 airport pairs affecting almost 9.5 million passengers. However, in all but 10 of these airports pairs there is at least one other competitor. |
gao_GAO-13-201 | gao_GAO-13-201_0 | DOD Is Not Fully Aware of All In- Transit Visibility Efforts across the Department and Lacks a Central Mechanism to Track Their Status
DOD has taken steps to improve in-transit visibility of its assets through efforts developed by several of the defense components, but no one organization is fully aware of all such efforts across the department, because they are not centrally tracked. Currently, DOD conducts some informal coordination and information sharing regarding its in-transit visibility efforts, but information is not consistently shared through a formal mechanism. We have previously reported that it is important for organizations to have complete, accurate, and consistent data to inform policy, document performance, and support decision making. Managers striving to reach organizational goals must have information systems in place to provide them with needed information. Based on information we collected, DOD has obligated about $701 million for fiscal years 2009 through 2011 for these efforts and projected about $455.3 million in costs for fiscal years 2012 through 2015—for a total of approximately $1.2 billion. However, participants have included officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the combatant commands, the four military services, the Defense Logistics Agency, and other government agencies that support distribution process improvements. DOD’s Draft Strategy to Achieve Asset Visibility and In- Transit Visibility Has Not Been Finalized and Does Not Include Some of the Key Elements of a Comprehensive Strategic Plan
In 2012, DOD began developing a strategy for asset visibility and in- transit visibility; however, as of January 2013 the strategy had not been finalized and did not include some of the key elements of a comprehensive strategic plan. According to DOD officials, the draft strategy, developed in collaboration with all pertinent components, is expected to be completed by June 2013. Officials anticipate that it will be used to guide and integrate related department-wide efforts to improve end-to-end supply chain management and support to the services. According to DOD officials, each component will be expected to develop an execution plan that contains information about its in-transit visibility efforts. The draft strategy indicates that such information is to include descriptions of gaps or challenges within the supply chain and the component’s actions or proposed actions to address them. According to our prior work, a comprehensive strategic plan should include a mission statement; a problem definition, scope, and methodology; goals and objectives; activities, milestones, and performance measures; resources and investments; information about organizational roles, responsibilities, and coordination; and a description of key external factors that could affect the achievement of goals. Our analysis shows that the current draft of DOD’s strategy for asset visibility and in-transit visibility fully includes one of the seven elements of a comprehensive strategic plan, partially includes four others, and does not include the remaining two. Three of the elements we identified as ‘partially included’ are nearing completion, but our review of the draft strategy shows that not all components had submitted their execution plans, which provide key information about the components’ in-transit visibility efforts and describe gaps or challenges within the supply chain, as well as the components’ actions or proposed actions to address them. Until DOD has compiled all execution plans in the draft and finalized its in-transit visibility strategy to include all key elements necessary for a comprehensive strategic plan, it will not have the information it needs to make well-informed decisions about asset visibility and in-transit visibility, including setting budget priorities for its in-transit visibility efforts across the supply chain in an increasingly constrained fiscal environment. When finalizing this strategy and the accompanying execution plans, DOD should ensure that complete, accurate, and consistent information about all in-transit visibility efforts is captured, tracked, and shared across the department and the strategy contains all of the key elements of a comprehensive strategic plan, including resources and investments and key external factors. For the purposes of this report, in- transit visibility efforts are systems, devices, or programs that are intended to improve DOD’s ability to track the identity, status, and location of DOD cargo (excluding petroleum, oils, and lubricants) from origin to destination. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD has invested heavily in its logistics operations, estimating that its overall spending on logistics--including supply chain management--was more than $171 billion in fiscal year 2011. GAO has previously reported that one of the most complex and vital tasks facing DOD is managing its supply chain to effectively and efficiently provide spare parts, food, fuel, and other critical supplies in support of U.S. military forces. GAO has identified DOD's supply chain management as a high-risk area and has previously reported that limitations in asset visibility--including the visibility of assets in transit--make it difficult to obtain timely and accurate information on the assets that are present in the theater of operations. As part of GAO's work to update its high-risk areas, this report assesses the extent to which DOD (1) is aware of its components' efforts to improve in-transit visibility and (2) has a strategy to achieve in-transit visibility that includes the key elements of a comprehensive strategic plan. To conduct these assessments, GAO obtained and analyzed information from the defense components, reviewed and analyzed relevant defense policies, guidance, and plans regarding in-transit visibility, and interviewed officials from DOD and the defense components.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense (DOD) has taken steps to improve in-transit visibility of its assets through efforts developed by several of the defense components, but no one DOD organization is fully aware of all such efforts across the department, because they are not centrally tracked. In-transit visibility is the ability to track the identity, status, and location of DOD assets and personnel from origin to consignee or destination across the range of military operations. GAO has previously reported that it is important for organizations to have complete, accurate, and consistent data to inform policy, document performance, and support decision making. Managers striving to reach organizational goals must have information systems in place to provide them with needed information. Based on data from defense components--the Joint Staff, U.S. Transportation Command, U.S. Central Command, the Defense Logistics Agency, and the military services--that GAO reviewed, 34 in-transit visibility efforts are being conducted by the components. The department has obligated about $701 million for fiscal years 2009 through 2011 for these efforts and projected about $455.3 million in costs to be incurred for fiscal years 2012 through 2015--a total of approximately $1.2 billion. Currently, DOD conducts some informal coordination and information sharing regarding its in-transit visibility efforts, but information is not consistently shared through a formal mechanism.
In 2012, DOD began developing a draft strategy for asset visibility and in-transit visibility; however, this strategy includes some but not all key elements of a comprehensive strategic plan. According to DOD officials, the draft strategy, developed in collaboration with all pertinent components, is expected to be completed by June 2013. Officials anticipate that it will be used to guide and integrate related department-wide efforts to improve end-to-end supply chain management and support to the services. According to DOD officials, each component will be expected to develop an execution plan that contains information about its in-transit visibility efforts. The draft strategy indicates that such information is to include descriptions of gaps or challenges within the supply chain, as well as the component's actions or proposed actions to address them. According to GAO's prior work, a comprehensive strategic plan should include a mission statement; a problem definition, scope, and methodology; goals and objectives; activities, milestones, and performance measures; resources and investments; information about organizational roles, responsibilities, and coordination; and a description of key external factors that could affect the achievement of goals. GAO's review of DOD's draft strategy found that it includes one of the seven key elements of a comprehensive strategic plan, partially includes four others, and does not include the remaining two. For example, it includes overarching goals and objectives, but it does not include information on DOD's planned resources and investments to achieve those goals or key external factors that could affect the achievement of the goals. Until DOD has finalized a department-wide strategy with all accompanying execution plans, it will not have the information it needs to make well-informed decisions about asset visibility and in-transit visibility, including setting budget priorities for its in-transit visibility efforts across the supply chain in an increasingly constrained fiscal environment.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that as DOD finalizes its in-transit visibility strategy it should ensure that it receives complete information from the components that addresses all key elements of a strategic plan. DOD concurred with GAO's recommendation. |
gao_GAO-13-694 | gao_GAO-13-694_0 | Several of FPS’s Guard Requirements Are Generally Comparable to Selected Agencies, but FPS Faces Challenges in Other Aspects of Guards’ Training
FPS Has Several Guard Training Requirements That Are Generally Comparable to Other Selected Agencies
Before guards are assigned to a post or an area of responsibility at a federal facility, FPS requires that they all have contractor employee fitness determinations (the employee’s fitness to work on behalf of the government based on character and conduct) and complete approximately 120 hours of training provided by the contractor and FPS, including basic training, firearms training, and screener (X-ray and magnetometer) training. All six agencies and FPS require basic, firearms, and screener (x-ray and magnetometer) training for their armed guards. For example, an official at one contract guard company stated that 133 of its approximately 350 guards (about 38 percent) on three separate FPS contracts (awarded in 2009) have never received their initial x-ray and magnetometer training from FPS. Through this pilot program, contract guard company instructors, in addition to FPS inspectors, will be certified to provide screener training to guards. According to FPS officials, the agency requires its guards to receive training on how to respond to an active-shooter scenario, but we found that some guards have not received it. For example, of the 16 contract guard companies we interviewed about this topic: eight contract guard company officials stated that their guards have received active-shooter scenario training during orientation, five guard company officials stated that FPS has not provided active- shooter scenario training to their guards, and three guard companies stated that FPS had not provided active- shooter scenario training to their guards during the FPS-provided orientation training, but that the topic was covered in one of the following ways: during guard company-provided basic training or refresher training,
FPS provided on-the-job instruction on the topic during post
FPS provided a link to an active-shooter training video, which the company shows its guards. Twenty-three Percent of Contract Guard Files We Reviewed Did Not Have Required Training and Certification Documentation
Some contract guard files we reviewed did not contain all required documentation. We reviewed 276 randomly selected (non-generalizeable) guard files maintained by 11 of the 31 guard companies we interviewed and found that 212 files (77 percent) contained the required training and certification documentation, but 64 files (23 percent) were missing one or more required documents. As shown in table 2, the 64 guard files were missing 117 total documents. Although FPS has taken some steps to address its challenges in this area, our previous recommendations are a guide to furthering its efforts. According to FPS officials, it plans to address this recommendation in the near future. FPS Still Lacks Effective Management Controls to Ensure Guards Have Met Training and Certification Requirements
FPS Continues to Lack a Comprehensive System to Effectively Manage Guard Training, Certification, and Qualification Data
DHS agreed with our 2010 and 2012 recommendations to develop a comprehensive and reliable system for contract guard oversight, but it still does not have such a system. According to FPS officials, it plans to address this recommendation in the near future. FPS Management Controls Do Not Ensure Consistency in Monthly File Review Process
FPS’s monthly reviews of contract guard companies’ guard files are its primary management control for ensuring that the companies are complying with contractual requirements for guards’ training, certification, and qualifications. In the absence of specific guidance regarding how files are to be selected, the four regions we visited varied in how they conducted the monthly file reviews. Allowing contract guard company officials to select files for review by FPS could result in selection bias and affect the results of FPS’s review. However, FPS’s directive regarding monthly file reviews, discussed above, does not include requirements for reviewing and verifying the results of the file reviews. FPS agreed with the recommendations in our 2010 and 2012 reports. Finally, inconsistencies in how FPS regional officials conduct monthly file reviews (which are FPS’s primary management control for ensuring compliance with the guard contract requirements) indicate that the current guidance for monthly file reviews is insufficient to ensure that, for instance, guard companies do not have the opportunity to select files for review and thus affect the results of the file reviews. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve the management and oversight of FPS’s contract guard program, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Under Secretary of NPPD and the Director of FPS to take the following three actions: take immediate steps to determine which guards have not had screener or active-shooter scenario training and provide it to them and, as part of developing a national lesson plan, decide how and how often these trainings will be provided in the future require that contract guard companies’ instructors be certified to teach basic and refresher training courses to guards and evaluate whether a standardized instructor certification process should be implemented; and develop and implement procedures for monthly guard-file reviews to ensure consistency in selecting files and verifying the results. | Why GAO Did This Study
FPS relies on a privately contracted guard force (about 13,500 guards) to provide security to federal facilities under the custody and control of the General Services Administration. In 2010 and 2012, GAO reported that FPS faced challenges overseeing its contract guard program, specifically in ensuring guards' qualifications.
GAO was asked to update the status of FPS's contract guard oversight. This report examines (1) how FPS's requirements for contract guards compare to those of selected federal agencies and challenges, if any, that FPS faces in ensuring its requirements are met; (2) the extent to which guard companies have documented compliance with FPS's guard requirements; and (3) the management controls FPS uses to ensure compliance with its guard requirements. GAO reviewed 31 FPS guard contracts, and analyzed guard files from 11 contracts, selected based on geographic diversity; interviewed officials from guard companies, FPS headquarters, and 4 of 11 FPS regions; and reviewed the contract guard requirements and processes at six federal agencies, selected for their comparability to FPS.
What GAO Found
Several of the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Federal Protective Service's (FPS) guard requirements are generally comparable to those of the six selected agencies GAO reviewed, but FPS faces challenges in some aspects of guards' training. FPS and the six selected agencies GAO reviewed require basic, firearms, and screener (x-ray and magnetometer equipment) training for their armed guards. However, GAO found that providing screener training remains a challenge for FPS. For example, officials from one of FPS's contract guard companies stated that 133 (about 38 percent) of its approximately 350 guards have never received this training. Similarly, according to officials at five guard companies, some of their contract guards have not received training on how to respond during incidents involving an active shooter. Additionally, while contract guard industry guidance states that all training should be done with a certified instructor, GAO found that FPS does not require guard instructors to be certified to provide basic and refresher training, which represents the majority of guards' training. According to six guard companies, the lack of a requirement has led to having to retrain some guards, potentially increasing costs to FPS.
Twenty-three percent of contract guard files GAO reviewed did not have required training and certification documentation. GAO reviewed 276 randomly selected (non-generalizable) guard files maintained by 11 of the 31 guard companies GAO interviewed and found that 212 files (77 percent) contained the required training and certification documentation, but 64 files (23 percent) were missing one or more required documents. For example, the 64 files were missing items such as documentation of initial weapons and screener training and firearms qualifications. Although FPS has taken steps to address its challenges in this area, GAO's previous recommendations concerning monitoring guard companies' performance are a guide to furthering FPS's efforts. According to FPS officials, it plans to address GAO's recommendations in the near future. FPS continues to lack effective management controls to ensure its guards have met its training and certification requirements. For instance, although FPS agreed with GAO's 2010 and 2012 recommendations that it develop a comprehensive and reliable system for managing information on guards' training, certifications, and qualifications, it still does not have such a system. According to FPS officials, it plans to address this recommendation in the near future.
FPS also lacks sufficient management controls to ensure consistency in its monthly guard file review process (its primary management control for ensuring that guards are trained and certified), raising questions about the utility of this process. In the absence of specific guidance regarding how files are to be selected, FPS's 11 regions varied in how they conducted the monthly file reviews. For example, FPS officials from three regions stated that they randomly select their files for review, while officials from one guard company in another region stated that FPS asks the guard company to select the files for review. Allowing contract guard company officials to select files for review by FPS could result in selection bias and affect the results of FPS's review. FPS also lacks guidance on reviewing and verifying the results of its guard-file reviews. Without such guidance, FPS may not be able to determine the accuracy of its monthly file review results or if its contract guard companies are complying with the guard training and certification requirements.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Secretary of DHS direct FPS to take immediate steps to determine which guards have not had screener or active-shooter scenario training and provide it to them; require that guard instructors be certified to teach basic and refresher training; and develop and implement guidance for selecting guard files and verifying the results. DHS concurred with GAOs recommendations. |
gao_GGD-96-72 | gao_GGD-96-72_0 | Those actions included deployment of staff from the Examination function to work on nonfiler cases, an increased emphasis on nonfiler activities by other IRS functions, elimination of aged cases from inventory, cooperative working arrangements with states and the private sector, and implementation of a refund hold program. Was the Nonfiler Strategy a Success? According to IRS, the Nonfiler Strategy was generally a success. Among other things, IRS cited (1) a decrease in the nonfiler inventory, (2) creation of the refund hold program, (3) elimination of unproductive cases that allowed IRS to focus its enforcement resources more effectively, (4) elimination of backlogs in the automated SFR inventory, (5) increases in the number of returns secured from and dollars assessed against individual nonfilers during the 2 years of the Strategy (fiscal years 1993 and 1994) compared with the year before the Strategy (fiscal year 1992), and (6) a closer working relationship between IRS and outside stakeholders and professional associations. Opportunities to Improve Future IRS Nonfiler Efforts
Our review of the Nonfiler Strategy identified several areas where we think opportunities exist for IRS to enhance future efforts directed at nonfilers. However, IRS’ procedures still call for sending several notices to a potential nonfiler before IRS attempts to make telephone contact. IRS staff must then review the results of the match to determine what action to take. IRS has a project directed at reducing the time it takes to match data on information returns with data on income tax returns and thus shortening the time before the first notice is issued by several months. Those data are not projectable. We believe that IRS could move even further in that direction if, as recommended by an internal study group, it reduced the number of notices sent to nonfilers and moved nonfiler cases more quickly to a telephone call site—similar to its Early Intervention Project for delinquent taxes. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the results of the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) Nonfiler Strategy and opportunities to improve any similar future efforts.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) IRS actions to achieve its Nonfiler Strategy's goals included deploying examination staff to work on nonfiler cases, increasing other IRS functions' emphasis on nonfiler activities, eliminating old cases from inventory, establishing cooperative relationships with states and the private sector, and implementing a refund hold program; (2) IRS believes that its Nonfiler Strategy was generally a success, since it reduced its nonfiler inventory, eliminated unproductive cases, increased the number of returns from and dollars assessed against individual nonfilers, and created closer working relationships with outside stakeholders and professional associations; (3) although IRS reduced its nonfiler inventory, there are not enough data to determine voluntary compliance improvement or the program's cost-effectiveness; (4) returns from business nonfilers and collection of delinquent taxes decreased during the two years the strategy was in effect; (5) IRS made measuring the strategy's success more difficult by failing to establish measurable goals; (6) at least 38 percent of nonfilers who eventually filed a return became recidivists in the following year; (7) future IRS nonfiler efforts could be improved by shortening the time before first notices and telephone contacts are made, using lower-grade staff to pursue nonfiler cases, and revising notices sent to recidivists to increase their urgency; and (8) IRS has reduced the time before sending first notices and developed special recidivist procedures, but it continues to send several notices before making telephone contact. |
gao_GAO-07-710T | gao_GAO-07-710T_0 | In 1999, Congress created the interagency National Intellectual Property Law Enforcement Coordination Council (NIPLECC) as a mechanism to coordinate U.S. efforts to protect and enforce IP rights in the United States and overseas. In October 2004, the Bush Administration announced the Strategy Targeting Organized Piracy (STOP) to “smash criminal networks that traffic in fakes, stop trade in pirated and counterfeit goods at America’s borders, block bogus goods around the world, and help small businesses secure and enforce their rights in overseas markets.” Although both NIPLECC and STOP were created to improve the United States’ IP enforcement and protection efforts, they were established under different authorities – NIPLECC as a congressional mandate and STOP as a presidential initiative led by the White House under the auspices of the National Security Council. Lack of Leadership and Permanence Hampers Effectiveness and Long-Term Viability of IP Enforcement Coordinating Structure
The U.S. government has a coordinating structure for IP enforcement, but the structure’s effectiveness is hampered by a lack of clear leadership and permanence, and despite some progress, it has not been developed in a manner that makes it effective and viable for the long term. However, NIPLECC continues to have problems in providing leadership despite enhancements made by Congress, and STOP’s authority and influence, which result from its status as a presidential initiative, could disappear after the current administration leaves office. While NIPLECC adopted STOP as its strategy for protecting IP overseas in February 2006, its commitment to implementing STOP as a successful strategy remains unclear. Improvements Needed to Achieve an Effective National IP Enforcement Strategy
STOP is a first step toward an integrated national strategy for IP protection and enforcement and has energized agency efforts. Figure 2 provides the results of our analysis and indicates the extent to which STOP addresses the desirable characteristics of an effective national strategy. Although STOP identifies five main goals, it does not consistently articulate their objectives and is missing key elements related to assessing performance such as priorities, milestones, and a process for monitoring and reporting on progress. Further it does not discuss other risks such as potential threats to consumer health and safety from counterfeited products or discuss how resources will be allocated given these risks. STOP partially addresses organizational roles, responsibilities, and coordination but lacks a framework for oversight or integration. For instance, there is no mention of STOP meetings, objectives, or agendas. While some of these elements of a national strategy are addressed in individual agency documents, the absence of clear linkages and the need to consult multiple agency documents underscores the strategy’s lack of integration and limits the usefulness of STOP as a management tool for long-term effective oversight and accountability. GAO Recommended Actions to Improve IP Leadership and Accountability Among U.S. We recommended that the IP Coordinator, in consultation with the National Security Council and the six STOP agencies, clarify in the STOP strategy how NIPLECC will carry out its oversight and accountability responsibilities in implementing STOP as its strategy. In addition, we recommended that the IP Coordinator, in consultation with the National Security Council and the six STOP agencies, take steps to ensure that STOP fully addresses the six characteristics of a national strategy. Coordinator for International Property Enforcement has taken some steps to address GAO’s recommendations. This limits its usefulness as a management tool for effective oversight and accountability by Congress as well as the private sector and consumers who STOP aims to protect. | Why GAO Did This Study
U.S. government efforts to protect and enforce intellectual property (IP) rights domestically and overseas are crucial to preventing billions of dollars in losses to U.S. industry and IP rights owners and to avoiding health and safety risks resulting from the trade in counterfeit and pirated goods. IP protection and enforcement cut across a wide range of U.S. agencies and a coordinating structure has evolved to address coordination issues. First, Congress created the interagency National Intellectual Property Rights Law Enforcement Coordination Council (NIPLECC) in 1999. Later, in October 2004, the Bush administration initiated the Strategy Targeting Organized Piracy (STOP). GAO's testimony focuses on (1) the effectiveness of NIPLECC and STOP as a coordinating structure to guide and manage U.S. government efforts; and (2) the extent to which STOP meets the criteria for an effective national strategy. This statement is based on GAO's November 2006 report (GAO-07-74), which included an assessment of STOP using criteria previously developed by GAO. In this report, we recommended that head of NIPLECC, called the IP Coordinator, in consultation with the National Security Council and relevant agencies (1) clarify in the STOP strategy how NIPLECC will carry out its oversight and accountability roles and (2) take steps to ensure that STOP fully addresses the characteristics of a national strategy. The IP Coordinator concurred with our recommendations.
What GAO Found
The current coordinating structure that has evolved for protecting and enforcing U.S. intellectual property rights lacks leadership and permanence, presenting challenges for effective and viable coordination for the long term. NIPLECC has struggled to define its purpose and retains an image of inactivity among the private sector. It continues to have leadership problems despite enhancements made by Congress in December 2004 to strengthen its role. In contrast, the presidential initiative called STOP, which is led by the National Security Council, has a positive image compared to NIPLECC, but lacks permanence since its authority and influence could disappear after the current administration leaves office. While NIPLECC adopted STOP in February 2006 as its strategy for protecting IP overseas, its commitment to implementing STOP as an effective national strategy remains unclear, creating challenges for accountability and long-term viability. While STOP has energized agency efforts for protecting and enforcing intellectual property, its potential as a national strategy is limited since it does not fully address the desirable characteristics of an effective national strategy. For example, its performance measures lack baselines and targets to assess how well the activities are being implemented. In addition, STOP is missing key elements such as a discussion of risk management and designation of oversight responsibility. For instance, the strategy lacks a discussion of current or future costs, the types or sources of investments needed to target organized piracy, and processes to effectively balance the threats from counterfeit products with the resources available. While STOP partially addresses organizational roles and responsibilities, it does not discuss a framework for accountability among the STOP agencies, such as designating responsibility for oversight. Agency documents clarify some of the key elements of an effective national strategy that were not incorporated into STOP directly; however, the need to consult multiple documents underscores the strategy's lack of integration and limited usefulness as a management tool for effective oversight and accountability. |
gao_T-HEHS-96-206 | gao_T-HEHS-96-206_0 | The Association’s contract with PCS for retail prescription drug services began in 1993; its contract with Medco for mail order drug services began in 1987. Under its FEHBP contract, the Association must submit to OPM any proposal to change its federal employee health plan benefits. Between 1988 and 1995, the Association’s payments for the plan’s prescription drugs increased at an average annual rate of about 21 percent, compared with an average annual rate of about 12 percent for total benefit payments. 1). Before the benefit change, the approximately 800,000 people insured under the Association’s Standard Option Plan who also had Medicare part B coverage did not pay anything for prescription drugs purchased at network retail pharmacies or through the mail order program. Both OPM and Association officials contended that the change would promote more cost-effective use of the prescription drug benefit by encouraging enrollees to use the less expensive mail order program. The number of pharmacists was insufficient to handle prescription orders, and many enrollees did not get their prescriptions filled promptly. Concern About the Effect of the Benefit Change on Retail Pharmacies
NACDS and many chain and independent pharmacies foresee the benefit change shifting millions of dollars in prescription drug sales to the mail order program. 3.) PBM Performance Produced Savings in 1995
The Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association estimated that its two PBMs saved the plan about $505 million in 1995. I will be pleased to answer any questions. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association's change in prescription drug benefits covered under its federal employee health plan.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the Association's payments for prescription drugs increased about 21 percent between 1988 and 1995; (2) to manage costs, the Association contracted with two pharmacy benefit managers (PBM) to provide retail prescription and mail order drug services; (3) to offset high prescription costs, the Association began requiring enrollees insured under the Standard Option Plan and covered by Medicare part B to pay 20 percent of their prescription costs at retail pharmacies; (4) the Association also encouraged enrollees to utilize the least expensive mail order option by offering prescriptions free of charge; (5) the demand for mail-order prescriptions surpassed contractor and Association expectations, causing delays in prescription orders and customer calls; (6) critics of the benefit change believe that millions of dollars in prescription drug sales will be shifted away from retail drug stores to the mail order program; and (7) the Association estimated that its two PBM saved $505 million in 1995. |
gao_GAO-02-470T | gao_GAO-02-470T_0 | Background
Dramatic increases in computer interconnectivity, especially in the use of the Internet, continue to revolutionize the way our government, our nation, and much of the world communicate and conduct business. However, this widespread interconnectivity also poses significant risks to our computer systems and, more important, to the critical operations and infrastructures they support, such as telecommunications, power distribution, public health, national defense (including the military’s warfighting capability), law enforcement, government, and emergency services. Since September 1996, we have reported that poor information security is a widespread federal problem with potentially devastating consequences.Although agencies have taken steps to redesign and strengthen their information system security programs, our analyses of information security at major federal agencies have shown that federal systems were not being adequately protected from computer-based threats, even though these systems process, store, and transmit enormous amounts of sensitive data and are indispensable to many federal agency operations. | What GAO Found
Provisions in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 seek to minimize pervasive information security weaknesses that place federal operations at significant risk of disruption, tampering, fraud, and inappropriate disclosure of sensitive information. Increases in computer interconnectivity, especially in the use of the Internet, pose significant risks to computer systems and to the critical operations and infrastructures they support, such as telecommunications, power distribution, public health, national defense, law enforcement, and emergency services. Although federal agencies have taken steps to redesign and strengthen their information security programs, federal systems are not being adequately protected from computer-based threats, even though these systems process, store, and transmit enormous amounts of sensitive data and are indispensable to many federal agency operations. |
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